Islam in the West: An inevitable conflict?

A statistical analysis of the effect of the presence of Muslims and consociationalism on civilizational/religious domestic conflict in seventeen Western countries in the period 1970-2014

Arjan Bouman, BSc – s4470974
Department of Political Science
Radboud University
Master's program Political Science
(Conflict, Power and Politics)
Master thesis
1st year, 2nd semester
Supervisor: A.K.I. Hoh, MSc
Date: 29 June 2018
Word count: 22.555
Key Words: Islam, the West, clash of civilizations, religious domestic conflict, terrorism, populist radical right parties, consociationalism, multilevel research, panel data

Abstract

This study investigates to what extent an increase of the relative size of the Muslim population leads to religiously influenced domestic conflict. Religious domestic conflict is operationalized in this study as societal domestic religious conflict, being terrorist attacks, and political religious conflict, being anti-Muslim political parties. Two contrasting theories are used to explain the occurrence of domestic religious conflict: the clash of civilizations, and consociationalism. According to the clash of civilizations, Islam and the West have inherent conflicting values. Interactions between the two therefore inevitably lead to conflict. Consociationalism on the other hand, argues that interactions between Islam and the West do not necessarily lead to conflict, but that conflict between different religious and cultural groups is triggered by political exclusion that cause grievances. Countries that have a consociational democracy are more inclusive and should therefore be better in including Muslims in the political processes and preventing domestic religious conflict. A panel data study is conducted, containing seventeen Western countries as cases, with nine observations for each of the countries. The period of interest is between 1970 and 2014. A mixed effects analysis is used to estimate the effects of the independent and control variables on the dependent variables. The outcomes of this study sustain the theory of the clash of civilizations and find no proof for consociationalist theory. An increase of the relative size of the Muslim population, does lead to more terrorist attacks and anti-Muslim political parties. Thus, consociationalism does not prevent domestic religious conflict, and Islam and the West seem to inevitably clash. This study also claims that the clash of civilization is in fact a clash of religious values.

Index

List of tables

1. Introduction

1.1 Problem statement

The relative share of Muslims in the population of Western countries has risen the last decades from almost zero percent in 1970 in most countries, to almost eight percent in France and approximately five percent in Germany, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Maoz & Henderson, 2013). This increase started mainly via Muslim guest workers in the sixties and the seventies of the previous century. In more recent years, the influx of Muslims into especially European Western countries consists of refugees from for instance Syria (Hansen, 2003; Pew Research Center, 2017b). Simultaneously there has been a rise of anti-Muslim political parties, such as the *Partij Voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) in the Netherlands, *Front National* in France and the FPÖ in Germany (BBC, 2016; Chakelian, 2017, Faiola, 2016; Mudde, 2007, 2016). The PVV claims for instance that there is an incompatibility between Islam and Western culture (BBC, 2016). The years after 9/11 stood in the context of globalized Islamic inspired terrorism. First, the most featured Islamic terrorist attacks carried out in Western countries were perpetrated by Al Qaida (Gerges, 2015). More recent terrorist attacks were carried out or inspired by ISIS (ibid.). The amount of hate crimes in the Netherlands that targeted Muslims occurred almost four times more often in 2016 (352 times) than in 2009 (96 times), which also signals growing anti-Muslim sentiments (OSCE, 2017).

It seems that there is a relation between a growing Muslim population in Western countries and increasing political resistance to this phenomenon by Westerners through the political system in the shape of anti-Muslim political parties. It also seems that there is an increase in terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslims. Both aspects are regarded as different manifestations of a conflict with the same two groups as adversaries, namely Islam and the West.

This research investigates whether the increase of Muslims within Western societies leads to more domestic conflict between the West and Islam inside those Western countries. Therefore, this study looks at anti-Muslim political parties in Western countries as political manifestations of the conflict between the West and Islam, and this study looks at terrorism as the domestic societal manifestation of this conflict. One of the important aspects that need to be examined is to what extent this conflict is actually inevitable. This study therefore uses two theories to formulate possible explanations for the presence of the conflict between the West

and Islam in Western countries. The first theory is the clash of civilizations and the second theory is consociationalism.

The theory of the clash of civilizations states that civilizations are incompatible because of clashing values, which will inevitably lead to conflict when inter-civilizational interactions increase (Huntington, 1993, 1996, 2007; Lewis, 1990). Huntington (1996) argues that due to amongst other things globalization, economic modernization, and increasing economic regionalism, civilizations will undoubtedly clash. The two most conflicting civilizations are the Islamic and the Western civilization, because these are the most incompatible (Huntington, 1993, 1996, 2007; Lewis, 1990).

Central to the clash of civilizations is that increasing interactions between civilizations lead to a strengthening of the civilizational awareness of countries and people. This leads to more awareness about civilizational differences, which causes more conflict (Huntington, 1993, 1996, 2007). Geographical borders of civilizations are historically the places with most interactions and these are thus the places were conflict takes place more often (ibid.). However, globalization and increasing migration from Islamic countries to Western countries have also led to increased interactions between Islam and the Western civilization within Western countries, instead of only at the geographical borders of civilizations. This stresses the importance to look at the effect of the clash of civilizations on the domestic level. The incompatibility of values of two groups is the same on the macro-level as on the micro-level, because Islam is central to a Muslim identity, regardless of the place of his or her residence. Therefore, more interactions between Islam and the West within Western countries will also lead to more conflict within the domestic sphere.

Civilizations are the highest cultural entity to which people can belong and this cultural identity consists of, amongst other things, ethnicity, religion and language (Huntington, 1993, 1996, 2007). However, as Huntington (1996) argued himself, religion is central to the concept of a civilization. Christianity has to be considered the main aspect and central component of the Western civilization (Huntington, 1996, p. 305). This indicates that the concept of civilizations is actually centered around the concept of religion and that the clash of civilizations is actually a clash of religions. Fox (2001a, 2001b) shows in an empirical study that conflicts that are caused by civilizational differences are in fact caused by religious differences and also result in religious conflict. Therefore, the clash of civilizations is considered a clash of religions in this study, which has important implications for this research, because religious characteristics and variables can thus represent civilizational characteristics.

The clash of civilizations is criticized on its supposed deterministic view of cultures and religious values (Sen, 2007). Sen (2007) argues that values and identities of people change and therefore do not necessarily lead to conflict. Furthermore, Roeder (2003) did a quantitative study that focused on the relation between interactions between civilizations and the escalation of conflicts. He concludes that in the period from 1991 until 1999 there has been an increase in violence that is motivated by cultural differences, but this increase was not necessarily only applicable to civilizational violence (Roeder, 2003). Roeder (2003) suggested the importance of governmental discrimination and the lack of inclusive government policies to be motivators for cultural conflict. This connects to the theory of consociationalism, which is the second theory used in this study to formulate possible explanations for the presence of domestic conflict between the West and Islam.

Consociationalism disputes that cultural, ethnic or religious groups clash inevitably, due to civilizational interactions (Lijphart, 1969, 1980, 1999, 2012). Lijphart (ibid.) argues that especially governmental discrimination and the lack of inclusive policies are motivators for conflict. Consociational democracy with power-sharing institutions makes it possible to coexist for people from different seemingly incompatible cultural, religious, linguistic or ethnic backgrounds (Lijphart, 1969, 1980, 1999, 2012). This would mean that in a more consociational Western society, it should be easier for Islamic people to coexist with Western people without religious conflict or tensions, than in a less consociational Western society, as showed in a case study of the Netherlands and Germany by Yukleyen (2010). Political, religious, ethnic or other conflicts are caused by interactions between conflicting cultures when there is no inclusive governance (Lijphart, 1980). Inclusive governance, or consociationalism, is present when the elites of subcultures can work together through power-sharing (Lijphart, 1969, 1980, 1999; Schneckener, 2002). The exact interpretation of this concept, as used in this study, is further operationalized in paragraph 3.3.2.

This study focuses on two current gaps in the literature. The first gap focuses on what effect increased interactions between conflicting civilizations, Islam and the West, within Western countries have on religious conflict, and whether power-sharing institutions of consociationalist democracy can create coexistence and prevent religious conflict from occurring. Secondly, previous research on the topic of domestic civilizational conflict, such as Fox (1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2003) and Roeder (2003), happened in the realm of civil wars, failed states, ethnic conflict and extreme violent conflicts. However, none of those studies focused on the effect of increased inter-civilizational interactions within relative stable Western states that have not been engaged in large-scale domestic conflicts since the Second

World War. This is particularly interesting, because there has been a substantial increase from several thousands to currently millions of Muslims, and thus inter-civilizational interactions, in Western countries since 1945 until now (Maoz & Henderson, 2013).

This study uses a quantitative research design to test the argument that increased interactions between the Islamic and Western civilization within Western countries leads inevitably to more religiously inspired conflict on the domestic level.

1.2 Research question

The general research question that follows from the contrasting theories on the effect of Muslims in Western countries on religious domestic conflict in those countries is:

To what extent does an increase of the relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries lead to more religiously influenced domestic conflict in the period from 1970 to 2014?

In order to answer this question, a multilevel quantitative research is conducted on religious conflict in Western countries between 1970 and 2014. For each country, there is an observation on the percentage of Muslims in the population for every five years. The observed period from 1970 until 2014 is chosen to assess the applicability of especially the clash of civilizations. Huntington (1996) namely states that the new worldwide master cleavage has become based on civilizations after the end of the Cold War, due to several worldwide phenomena such as globalization and the increase of interactions between conflicting civilizations. However, if the clashing values between the civilizations cause this conflict, increased interactions should also lead to more domestic conflict before the end of the Cold War. If there is no direct link between the relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries and domestic conflict in the period before and after the Cold War, this would mean that the West-Islam divide only filled the gap that the West-East divide left after the end of the Cold War. Fox (2003) suggested that this happened at the international political level, namely that secondary threats during the Cold War became of primary importance after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, to make sure that this problem does not bias the current study, the period 1970-1991 is also included in this research, to investigate whether the values of Islam and the West are indeed inherently clashing.

The Western countries that are selected as cases are: the Netherlands, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, the United States (U.S.), Ireland, Canada, Australia, Finland and New Zealand. Thus the

N of this research is seventeen, with nine observations per country. This makes the study a panel data research. The case selection is primarily based on whether countries fall within the categorization of Huntington's (1996) Western countries, and whether there was data available to estimate a statistical analysis on the causes of religious conflict. Another criteria for the case selection is that the cases represent different levels of political inclusivity, or power-sharing politics, as rated by Lijphart (1999), so it will be possible to see whether less inclusive countries develop more religious conflicts than more inclusive countries. The exact definition of how political inclusivity and power-sharing politics are measured is further specified in paragraph 3.3.2.

1.3 Scientific and societal relevance

The scientific relevance of this research is found in the different explanations of how inter-civilizational interactions cause or create domestic religious conflict. On the one side is the clash of civilizations, as developed by Huntington (1993, 1996, 2007) and amended towards a clash of religions based on the empirical and theoretical critique of, amongst others, Fox (2001a, 2001b) and Roeder (2003). Huntington (1993, 1996) describes the incompatibility of Islam and the West as definitively conflictual when they become aware of their interactions. Therefore his conception about identity is mostly fixed and primordial.

On the other side is the consociational theory, which argues that cultural groups are not per definition incompatible in the sense that coexistence is not possible and has to lead to conflict (Lijphart, 1969, 1990, 1999, 2012; Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991; Schneckener, 2002). The extent to which political and social institutions in a country are inclusive towards all societal groups determines whether a group is excluded from society. This exclusion then results in more tension and conflict. Consociational theory argues that countries with a consociational democracy are more open to inclusion of a variation of different and conflicting groups within society (ibid.). Consociational countries would thus have less problems with an increase of the relative size of the Muslim population within their country.

Both theories differ in their explanation of civilizational conflict, and most important is that both theories contrast each other in to which extent civilizational conflict is preventable. Huntington (1993, 1996, 2007) argues that conflict is inherent to the incompatibility between Islam and the West, while consociationalist theory states that these incompatibilities are not inherent (Lijphart, 1969, 1990, 1999, 2012; Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991; Schneckener, 2002).

What adds to the scientific relevance of this study, is that previous research did not focus on the effect of Islam in (relative) stable Western democracies, even though these cases are very interesting objects to study the perceived incompatibility of Islam and the Western civilization. These cases are also particularly interesting, because the relative size of Islamic people within Western countries has become relatively bigger (Maoz & Henderson, 2013), which makes it possible to test whether consociationalism has a stabilizing pacification effect on incompatibilities between the Muslim and Western culture and not only between clashing Western sub-cultures.

The societal relevance of this study is found in the importance of how to address and prevent domestic religious conflict between Islam and the West within Western countries. Pew Research Center (2017b) indicates that the relative size of the Muslim population within European Western countries will possibly double within thirty years. It is important to know whether this will lead to inevitable conflict, or how civilizational conflict can be avoided. When this study supports the argument of the clash of civilizations, it would seem best to decrease inter-civilizational interactions within countries, to prevent religious conflict from erupting and to maintain stability. However, when consociationalist power-sharing via inclusive domestic political institutions can prevent religious conflict and create coexistence between civilizational groups, this gives incentives to governments to strive for a consociational mode of power-sharing, to maintain domestic peace with growing multi-civilizational societies. In that case, it would be even dangerous to base policy on the clash of civilizations, because, as Walt (1997) argues, this would only make the clash of civilizations a reinforced process that is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

1.4 Outline

This introduction will be followed by a chapter in which the theoretic framework of the study is further developed. It will first address the two main conflicting theories that are the basis of this study, namely the clash of civilizations and consociationalism. Hypotheses to the main research question are derived from these two theories. Secondly, the theory chapter provides a theoretic explanation for other possible effects that could result in domestic religious conflict which are not covered by the main theories. These other theoretic explanations will lead to control variables which are operationalized in the methodology chapter that follows the theory chapter.

The methodology chapter justifies the used methodology and accounts for the conceptualization of variables in this study. This chapter contains an analysis of why specific

cases are chosen. Specific attention is paid to the operationalization of the dependent variable domestic religious conflict, because it is important to specify this broad term, to make it fit the theories and the current study. The method section also highlights the operationalization of the different independent and control variables.

Subsequently, the analysis chapter discusses the models used to test the hypotheses. It also discusses several statistical assumptions that are important to be able to interpret the panel data analysis. After that, the hypotheses are tested via several increasingly complex models, using a statistical panel data analysis that estimates fixed and random effects.

The conclusion reviews how the analysis provides an answer to the research question and how this relates back to the theory of the clash of civilizations and consociationalism. Based on the findings in this study and based on some possible limitations of this study, recommendations for further research finalize the conclusion.

2. Theory and general hypotheses

This chapter first discusses the two main theories, the clash of civilizations and consociationalism, and how they both explain how inter-civilizational interactions can lead to domestic religious conflict. First, the clash of civilizations will be discussed, which argues that interactions between civilizations lead to inevitable conflict. This theory will lead to two hypotheses to the research question. Both hypotheses will be visualized in a conceptual model.

Secondly, the consociational theory will be discussed. This theory argues that interactions between different cultural groups do not necessarily lead to a clash of civilizations and domestic religious conflict. This conflict can be prevented when a country has an inclusive power-sharing political system. The consociational theory will also lead to two hypotheses to the research question. Both hypotheses will be visualized into a conceptual model.

Thirdly, the clash of civilizations and consociationalism are discussed in comparison to each other, to delve deeper in the theoretic similarities and differences between both theories. Lastly, a paragraph is included that gives some theoretical explanations for the control variables used in this study.

2.1. The clash of civilizations

Huntington (1993, 1996, 2000) argues that the dominant cleavage in international world politics was between the capitalist and liberal West and the communist East until the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War ended and the communist East was no longer the main adversary of the West, the international world politics aligned around a new cleavage. This new cleavage is based on the incompatibility of diverging religious and cultural values of civilizations (ibid.). Civilizations are described as cultural entities that are the highest level of a cultural identity (Huntington, 1993, p.24). Civilizations are a combination of cultural heritage, language and religion, which does not mean that civilizations are homogeneous or that people have only one identity (Huntington, 1993, 2007). This contrasts the critique given by Sen (2007), that Huntington would assume that people can only have one rigid, unchangeable identity. Huntington (1993, 2007) himself argues that people have multiple identities, but that the civilizational identity is the highest identity that overarches all other identities.

The wars between monarchies and republics in the nineteenth century and the wars of nation-states and ideologies in the twentieth century mainly took place within the Western civilization (Huntington, 1993, p. 23). The end of the Cold War did not mean an end to the history of conflicts of mankind as Fukuyama (1992) states, but Huntington (1993, 1996, 2000) argues that after the end of the wars of ideology, the nature of conflict would just change again. After the Cold War, interactions between Western and non-Western civilizations became leading for conflict in the international political arena and conflicts became increasingly identity-based (ibid.).

The clash of civilizations occurs on two levels. The clash of civilizations occurs in the international arena, on the macro-level, between states of different civilizations that compete for power (Huntington, 1993, 1996). The clash also occurs at the domestic level, which is especially important for this study, because it leads to domestic conflict. At the domestic level, groups fight alongside the civilizational cleavage over the control of territory and over the control over other civilizational groups (Huntington, 1996). This fight happens often violently, but not necessarily. The most violent conflicts occur on the borders of civilizations and in border countries between civilizations, especially on Muslim borders (Huntington, 1993, 1996). The biggest civilizational differences are between the Muslim and Western civilization, and conflict is therefore most likely to occur between these two civilizations. In an interview, Huntington (The New York Times, 2001) stated that Islam in itself is not more violent than other religions, only that interactions between Islam and the West lead to more violent conflict.

According to Huntington (2007), Muslim migrants that migrate to the European Union (EU) will lead to problems, since the group is relatively big compared to the total European population and because the language, cultural and religious differences are too large and alien to the European identity, which is Western. Huntington (1996) states:

> Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe. (pp. 304-305)

Huntington (1993, 2000, 2007) shows the importance of especially religion in the context of civilizational conflict. His research is often interpreted as research on the effect of basic ethnic divides on the amount of ethnic conflict, but this is not how Huntington should be interpreted. Huntington (1996) argued himself that religion is central to the concept of civilizations. Christianity is for instance the most important aspect of the Western civilization, since the

secularization of the West weakens its identity (Huntington, 1996, p. 305). This shows the central aspect that religion plays in civilizational differences. Therefore, the current study uses the argument that civilizational conflict is basically another terminology of religious conflict. This argumentation is strengthened by research of Fox (2001a, 2001b), whofound empirical evidence that civilizations in fact seems to be a surrogate of religion. Fox (ibid.) also concluded that ethnic conflict is not primarily caused by religion or by civilizational differences. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind for this study that religions or civilizations are not the driving force of ethnic conflict, but that they can be a source of conflict itself, which would then just be civilizational or religious conflict, instead of ethnic conflict. Thus religious differences cause only religious conflict and therefore only religious conflicts are measured in this study.

Religion and ethnicity are often in interplay with each other. However, ethnic conflict is almost always caused by grievances, exclusionist policies and histories of violence (Fox, 2001a). This means that ethnic conflict is not inevitable and can be solved when grievances are taken away and inclusive policies are adopted, via for instance a consociationalist model. However, religious conflict is based on inherent clashing values, not on grievances, and is therefore inevitable. Inglehart and Norris (2003) also agree that there is a clash between Islam and the West, but they state that this clash is about diverging sex-related values. Examples are the position of females in society and visions with regard to homosexuality. While this argumentation uses other diverging values than Huntington to explain the clash of civilizations, it still adds to the importance of religion in the definition of civilizational differences.

However, there has been more fundamental critique towards the clash of civilization theory. Fox (2003) states that the amount of civilizational conflict did not increase after the end of the Cold War and even decreased. He also found that Islam does not seem to have bloodier borders than other civilizations and that civilizational conflict that leads to state-failure did not increase after the Cold War (ibid.). The West has had most of its conflicts after the Cold War with the Islamic civilization, but this could also be due to the disappearance of Cold War conflict threats that give the opportunity to focus on Islam as new primary threat. Walt (1997) argues that the West's view of Islam as its greatest threat is also a self-fulfilling prophecy, based on amongst others Huntington's theory and the policy that is made based on that theory, which creates violent responses by Islamic countries in return.

Heilbrunn (1998) has methodological criticisms on Huntington, but does agree that there seems to be more tendency towards conflict between the West and Islam. Criticism on

Huntington and the clash of civilization is overwhelming, and often seems to disapprove the theory of the clash of civilizations. However, the clash between Islam and the Western world as representatives of secularized Christian states still seems to be present and has not been tested for domestic effects inside Western countries. All criticisms on the clash of civilizations are with regard to ethnic conflict or conflict at the international level. However, a test on the domestic level in relative stable Western countries is better able to show the de facto relation between increased inter-civilizational interactions and domestic conflict, because those domestic interactions between individuals on the local level deal with value differences more directly.

When considering civilizations not as ethnic or cultural, but as entities that are predominantly based on religion, the following mechanism applies to religious conflict, following the theory of the clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007; Lewis, 1990). This mechanism includes six reasons that explain why civilizations will clash when they experience increased inter-civilizational interactions.

First, the differences between civilizations are based on language, culture, tradition and most important religion, and influence all aspects of life, such as: "views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife … and of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy" (Huntington, 1993, p.25). These differences are rigid, because they developed over centuries and are based on the absolute values of religion.

Second, there is an increasing amount of interactions between the different civilizations due to globalization. The interactions with people from different civilizations, make people conscious of the differences between their civilization and other civilizations and makes them see the similarities with other subgroups within their own civilization (Huntington, 1993). The increasing amount of interactions enforces the idea of unity within one's own civilization and dissimilarity with other civilizations (ibid.).

Third, economic modernization and worldwide social change distance people from their local and national identities, which ties them more to their religious identity (ibid.).

Fourth, the West is on its height of power, which leads non-Western societies to diverge from Western culture and reinvent their 'own culture' (Huntington, 1993). For instance the importance of re-Islamization in Islamic societies, as an attempt to resist the Western cultural influence and dominance (ibid.). Lewis (1990, p. 60) argues something similar, namely that there is a growing global Islamic aversion against the current and historic more successful expansion of Judeo-Christian heritage and its current secular version.

Fifth, cultural identities are most rigid, in contrast to political and economic identities. This cultural identity is not a question of choice but merely who someone is, due to the historic processes that gave someone that identity. Especially religion is a factor that is absolute. Someone can have a shared identity on the terrain of language and ethnicity. Someone can speak for instance two languages, and someone can have a mother and a father with diverging ethnicities, but as Huntington (1993, p. 27) argues, people can only belong to one religion.

Sixth, Huntington (1993) ties increasing civilizational consciousness to economic regionalism. This process works twofold. First, economic regionalism reinforces civilizational consciousness. Secondly, civilizational equalities make it easier for people to overcome other differences and to work economically together in their region through trade (ibid.).

Summarized and applied to this study, these six steps have the following consequences. Due to incompatibilities between the Western and Islamic civilization, which are partly inherent and partly historically developed, increased interactions between these civilizations make conflict more likely. This is especially applicable to for instance Muslims who migrate to Western states, because their Islamic identity is not tied to a certain region, but they carry it always with them. When those Muslims have to interact with the Western world, they become more aware of their mutual differences. This encounter often leads to a countermovement, a revival of old norms. This also applies to the Western people who encounter Islamic people within their own Western country. It leads to an awakening and strengthening of their own Western identity. The unity that people can experience with other people from their own civilization is also important in this process, described by Huntington (1993). When there is no other Muslim to compare someone's self to, it becomes more difficult to see the differences between the own and the other civilization. Experiencing the other and experiencing your own group is therefore very important to create this increased awareness of conflicting identities.

This has two consequences. First, when the relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries increases, there will be more interactions and there will be more civilizational awakening, which will lead to more conflict. This process leads to hypothesis H1a. Secondly, it means that the level of religious homogeneity in Western states is also important to increase the occurrence of conflict. A country is fully religiously homogeneous when all people belong to one religion. A country becomes less religiously homogeneous if more people belong to different other religions. Thus when a country is more religiously fractionalized, Muslims are less able to activate and reinforce their identity. Therefore, with

more religious fractionalization, the relative size of Muslims within Western countries will influence the occurrence of domestic religious conflict to a lesser extent. This leads to hypothesis H2b. The exact operationalization of religious fractionalization is further explained in paragraph 3.3.3.

Two hypotheses can be derived from the clash of civilizations theory. Hypothesis H1a is the main hypothesis of this study. This hypothesis is about the positive effect that the relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries has on the occurrence of domestic religious conflict. Hypothesis H1b predicts that increased religious fractionalization has a negative interaction effect that decreases the main effect of hypothesis H1a.

H1a. *An increase of the relative size of the Muslim population in a Western country, leads to more domestic religious conflict in that country.*

Relative size of Muslim population	+ →	Domestic religious conflict

H1b. *The less religiously fractionalized a Western country is, the smaller the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on domestic religious conflict in that country.*

Relative size of Muslim population	+ →	Domestic religious conflict
	- ↑	
	Religious fractionalization	

2.1 Consociationalism

The theory of the clash of civilizations argues that identities are unchangeable and that the interactions between civilizations lead inevitably to conflict (Huntington, 1993, 1996). Consociational theory contrasts the idea that the presence of two interacting civilizations within one country leads to inevitable conflict. Lijphart (1969, 1980, 2012) formulated the consociational theory that builds upon the idea that cross-cutting cleavages make it possible to create cooperation between conflicting cultural, ethnic, societal and religious groups. Consociationalism is based on consensus democracy and is a proposed solution to states that are deeply divided along, for instance, ethnic or religious lines (Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991). This type of government is based on consensus and is therefore not based on federalism or other forms of self-rule, but primarily on shared and inclusive governance (ibid.).

The consociational theory has been formulated as an explanation to how it is possible that Western countries with different conflicting subcultures still manage to be peaceful and can have political stability (Lijphart, 1969). Based on that explanation, consociational theory provides a framework for how countries with conflicting cultures could shape their political system, so that conflict can be prevented by achieving cooperation and coexistence.

Lijphart (1969, p. 211) first of all separates the Western democracies into two types, based on political culture and role structure. The first category consists of the Anglo-American, old Commonwealth and Scandinavian states. The second category consists of other European democracies, such as France, Italy, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland (ibid.). The first category has high sub-system autonomy as role structure of the political system, in contrast to the second category. The second category includes more interaction between on the one hand the political system and on the other hand interest groups, media and other external groups. The first category is homogeneous with regard to political culture, while the second category is pillarized and has different political subcultures.

Lijphart (1969, pp. 211-212) observes big political stability differences between countries in the second category. The countries with most cross-cutting cleavages appear to be the most instable at first sight, while these are in fact the most stable, because of elite behavior. When they "make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation" there can be political stability that is inconsistent with the amount of societal heterogeneity (ibid.). Elite behavior is thus important for consociationalism.

Four aspects of the behavior of political elites make consociationalism successful (Lijphart, 1969, p. 216; Schneckener, 2002). First, the political elites have to be willing to cooperate and to accommodate the interests and demands of their subcultures. Secondly, the elites must transcend cleavages and pursue the general interest of all subcultures together with other elites. Thirdly, the elites have to be in favor of maintaining the system and to pursue its stability. Lastly, the elites have to understand what dangers political fragmentation entails.

This positive elite behavior will most likely occur when certain conditions are present (Lijphart, 1969). The relations among elites of the subcultures are first of all strengthened during times of external threats, such as the two World Wars. The second aspect is that different coalition options amongst the subcultures create the necessity of cooperation for elites, since not cooperating makes it more likely that other subcultures will cooperate together. The third important aspect is that inter-elite cooperation is more likely to fail in cases of high pressure on the political system (Lijphart, 1969).

The relations at the mass-level should also fulfill certain criteria. The cleavages of the political cultures in society need to be as sharply distinguished as possible, which means that people should be strongly affiliated with a specific subculture, so that they have only limited cross-subcultural contact (Lijphart, 1969, p. 219-221). When they do have cross-subcultural contact, that will lead to more conflict. Thus it is possible to derive from this criteria that when a society is more fractionalized, there is more intergroup contact, which leads to more conflict. This leads to hypothesis H2b, because in case of religious conflict, it means that when a country is more religious fractionalized, that will lead to more religious conflict. In the case of especially conflict between the West and Islam, the positive effect between the relative size of the Muslim population and domestic religious conflict is increased by more religious fractionalization. This is therefore contrary to what can be derived from Huntington (1993), namely that when a country is more religiously fractionalized, civilizational groups are less aware of themselves being different. When groups of people are less aware of their differences, their differentiating identity is not activated and they will not start to see themselves as opposite to the other civilizational group or groups (ibid.).

Another aspect that is important for consociationalism is to have strong internal political cohesion inside the political subcultures. The elites and the masses of the subcultures need to be a cohesive unity (Lijphart, 1969).

Consociationalism has been criticized by van Schendelen (1984). Van Schendelen (1984) has especially criticized the motivations of elites to cooperate. He argues that this cooperation happened solely out of self-interest. He also questions whether consociationalist countries, such as the Netherlands, were really stable and whether this was due to the consociationalist model. Van Schendelen (1984) also mentions that the elite behavior is almost non-democratic, because the elites function and cooperate in the shadows, invisible to the people. Lustick (1997) adds that Lijphart often changed his methodology to make cases fit the consociationalist theory. Therefore, it is important for this study to come up in the method section with a clear definition of how to measure consociationalism, so the analysis will really measure whether consociationalism leads to less religious conflict.

Yukleyen (2010) shows in a case study of the Netherlands and Germany that the consociationalist political culture of the Netherlands is more inclusive towards Muslim elites than the more exclusionist and less consociational German political system. The exclusion in Germany led to more distrust between Islamic organizations and the German government in general (ibid.). This shows that there indeed seems to be a stabilizing pacification effect of consociationalism and that this effect can also be applied to Muslims as religious group in

Western consociationalist states, even though Muslims are a relatively new group in society. This indicates that the consociationalist system in general is more inclusive and allows minorities to take part in the political system. Powell (1981) also shows that consensus democracies, or consociationalist countries, are better able to control violence than non-consensus democracies. Shah (2013) adds that these consensus democracies are in fact more likely to be more successful in controlling violence and in effective governance than for instance majoritarian governments. All these observations lead to an enhancement of the applicability of consociational theory in this study and as explanation to why religious domestic conflict occurs.

From consociationalism it thus follows that countries with sharply distinguished homogeneous subcultures, in which the elites of the subcultures have the ability and willingness to cooperate, will experience less conflict based on deeply dividing cleavages such as religion, ethnicity, language and ideology. From this argumentation, two hypotheses are derived. First, when countries are more consociationalist, they are more inclusive towards all cultural or religious groups, also towards new groups such as Muslims. Muslims thus have the opportunity to voice their interests better towards the government in more consociational countries. Therefore, less grievances will arise between Muslims and Westerners within more consociational countries. This leads to hypothesis H2a, because the political system in countries that are more consociational are able to mediate religious differences and diverging interests better than countries with less consociationalism. This should therefore lead to less religious conflict, caused by the relative size of the Muslim population, in more consociational countries. However, when this consociationalist system is not present, a bigger relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries should lead to more religious based domestic conflict due to exclusionist policy. Therefore, consociationalism expects the same main effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the amount of domestic religious conflict as the theory of the clash of civilizations. Namely, when the relative share of Muslims in a Western population is bigger, this will lead to more domestic religious conflict (hypothesis H1a). However, the cause of this conflict is not a clash of values between civilizations or religions, but this conflict is then based on grievances and exclusionist policy. Religious domestic conflict is thus not inevitable. Therefore, when a Western country is more consociational, this effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the occurrence of domestic religious conflict decreases (hypothesis H2a).

The second hypothesis (hypothesis H2b) is, the more religiously fractionalized a Western country is, the more religious conflict should take place when the Islamic population

increases in relative size. There are two reasons for this effect. First, when there is more religious fractionalization, cross-subcultural contact increases, and this will lead to more conflict. Secondly, with more religious fractionalization, the subcultures become smaller, which makes it more difficult to create cooperation on the elite-level, with enough support in the masses, between big groups in society. Therefore, an increased level of religious fractionalization makes the positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on domestic religious conflict stronger, because it increases cross-subcultural interactions. This interaction effect takes place regardless of the level of consociationalism in a country, because consociationalism functions worse with high levels of religious fractionalization, due to the smaller subcultures. A consociational model only increases the cooperation on the elite level which should trickle down positively to Muslims in the masses. However, it does not take away the incentive of conflict between Muslims and Western people as conflicting cultures. Thus the predicted interaction effect of religious fractionalization on the effect between the relative size of the Muslim population on religious domestic conflict, that is based on consociational theory, is exactly opposite to the effect predicted by the theory of the clash of civilizations. A negative interaction effect can be derived from the clash of civilizations (hypothesis H1b), while a positive interaction effect can be derived from consociational theory (hypothesis H2b).

Two hypotheses are derived from consociational theory. Hypothesis H2a considers Muslims in Western countries as possible, not inevitable, source of conflict, since higher levels of consociationalism take away the grievances and exclusionist policies that lead to religious domestic conflict. Hypothesis H2b predicts that higher levels of political fractionalization have exactly the opposite effect, namely enforce religious conflict.

H2a.   *The higher the level of consociationalism, the lower the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on domestic religious conflict within a Western country.*

H2b.   *The more religiously fractionalized a Western country is, the bigger the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on domestic religious conflict in that country.*

Relative size of Muslim population	+	Domestic religious conflict

Religious fractionalization

2.3 The clash of civilizations vs. consociationalism

To better understand the theoretical differences between the clash of civilizations and consociationalism, this paragraph further examines the assumptions of both theories as portrayed in this study. Central in this discussion are the assumptions of both theories that lead to the four hypotheses that are based on opposing ideas with regard to the inevitability of religious conflict.

The main assumption of the clash of civilizations is that interactions between Islam and the West will inevitably lead to conflict, because the values of those two civilizations are too diverging. Civilizational differences are based on diverging and clashing religious values. Consociationalism is based on the assumption that as long as a country adheres to consociational democracy, conflict can be prevented. In consociational theory, there is no differentiation in the pacification capabilities of consociationalist governance between ethnic, cultural or religious conflict. For the clash of civilizations, it is important to stress the difference between ethnic conflict and religious conflict, because the first type is caused by grievances and exclusionist policies, while the second type is caused by clashing values that are inherent to the conflicting religions. This makes religious conflict inevitable, since the values that lead to conflict are inherently clashing. Ethnic conflict on the other hand, can be solved and prevented, because good policies can create inclusion and can take away grievances. However, consociationalism argues that both, religious and ethnic conflict, can be solved with consociational democracy which takes away grievances and presents inclusive policies that combats exclusionism of specific ethnic, cultural and religious groups. According to consociationalism, the interaction between contrasting religious groups can indeed lead to violence, and therefore, the theory accepts a kind of inherent clash between for instance Islam and the West. However, consociational theory does not accept that this leads inevitably to

21

conflict, because if the masses of clashing groups are separated and cooperation at the elite-level achieves coexistence, mutual beneficiary cooperation and acceptance can be achieved.

The second important difference between the two theories is with regard to what effect religious fractionalization has on the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on domestic religious conflict. The argumentation of the clash of civilizations is partly based on the activation of conflicting identities via two pathways. People first activate their religious identity via self-identification with other people that have the similar belief as oneself. The second pathway focuses on self-identification, which is activated when people interact with people from a clashing civilization. Therefore, when the relative size of the Muslim population within a Western population is bigger, there will be more interactions between Muslims and Westerners, which will lead to more conflict. There will also be more possible interactions with other Muslims which reinforces the self-identification process. This effect is reinforced by lower levels of religious fractionalization, because this means that the total population is more homogeneous and consists more of only the most conflicting group, Muslims and Westerners. Therefore, according to the clash of civilizations, with lower levels of religious fractionalization, there will be more interaction between Muslims and Westerners. Lower levels of religious fractionalization should thus increase the positive effect between the relative size of the Muslim population and domestic religious conflict. Consociationalism however expects that when there is more religious fractionalization, subcultures are smaller, which makes it more difficult to achieve cooperation at the elite-level. Subcultures are also less sharply distinguished and separated on the mass-level when there is more religious fractionalization, which will lead to more conflict. For consociationalism, a higher level of religious fractionalization will increase the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on domestic religious conflict.

2.4 Control variables

To control for other effects that possibly trigger domestic religious conflict, three other variables are used in this study. This paragraph contains a theoretic explanation for why these effects might occur and why they need to be introduced as control variables in this study. The three control variables are: equality, political party system polarization and a dummy variable whether a country is European or not.

The first important control variable is equality. Economic equality is included as control variable, because it is often indicated as trigger for civil conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Muller, 1985). When income is distributed less equally within a country, this will cause

grievances (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Muller, 1985). The Pew Research Center (2017a) shows that in the U.S. in 2017, Muslims are more likely to have no work than U.S.-citizens in general, and that they are more likely than other U.S.-citizens to have a low household income. This indicates that higher rates of domestic religious violence might be caused by economic inequality, which can overlap with a growth of the relative size of the Muslim population, but such an effect is then not necessarily limited to Muslims as a group. Lewis and Kashyap (2013) namely show that the fact that Muslims are more fundamental and have more conservative values than non-Muslims in the United Kingdom, is mainly caused by the worse economic circumstances in which they are located. Thus, more inequality in a country could result in more religious domestic conflict.

The second control variable is political party system polarization. Political party system polarization measures to which extent the political parties in a country are polarized and oppose each other ideologically (Dalton, 2008). Dalton (2008) argues that political party system polarization is more important in explaining political patterns and conflict, than the level of political fragmentation, which is the amount of effective political parties in a political party system. The number of political parties is not necessarily an indication of radical opposing values or ideas, while the level of polarization in fact shows how far the extremes in a political party system are diverged. Layman, Carsey and Horowitz (2006) argue that political party system polarization might have several consequences or causes, of which an increased radical polarization of the public can in fact be cause or consequence. This radical polarization can create an environment that is more susceptible to conflict. It does not really matter for this research whether party system polarization causes public polarization or that it is a consequence of the latter development, because both mechanisms make it worth to control for political party system polarization as source of domestic religious conflict.

The third control variable controls for a possible effect that is inherent to European countries which contributes to domestic religious violence, caused by another factor than the other independent and control variables which are accounted for in this study. Huntington (2007, pp. 58-59) argues that there is for instance a difference between European countries and the U.S. in the extent to which they are able to integrate Muslims, because the U.S. has always been a migrant country. It is worth to control for a variable whether a country is European or not, because it is possible that the non-European Western countries, which are often former colonies and therefore migrant countries, are better in absorbing new migrants from diverging cultures, such as Islam, than the historically quite homogeneous European nation-states.

3. Methodology

This chapter consists of four parts. First, the case selection for this study will be described and justified. Subsequently, the operationalization will follow of the three dependent variables, the three independent variables and the three control variables. A summary of the data sources that were used to gather data for these variables can be found in Appendix A.1, table 1 and table 2.

3.1 Case selection

The case selection is, first of all, based on whether a country is considered Western by Huntington (1993). The second criterion for the case selection is that enough data is available to measure consociationalism as formulated by Lijphart (1969, 1980, 2012), who came up with a definition to classify countries as consociational or not. This selection leads to the following seventeen cases: the Netherlands, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, the United States, Ireland, Canada, Australia, Finland and New Zealand. Spain, Portugal and Croatia also met the two criteria to be selected as cases in this research, but these countries only became democracies after 1970. The mean level of the score on consociational democracy can thus not be measured for the period from 1970 until 2014.

The scores on domestic religious conflict tend to be small, indicating that for instance only few terrorist attacks are committed per million citizens. This makes it very likely that in very small countries with less than one million citizens, no terrorist attacks occur. Therefore, the countries Luxembourg and Iceland are not incorporated in the dataset, because those cases could bias the outcomes of this study and because this study does not control for the effect of the total population size on domestic religious conflict.

Germany is included in this dataset as well, even though unified Germany has only existed since 1991, which means the observations start after at 1995. East Germany did not have any considerable amount of Muslims, nor did it have any registered religious domestic conflicts preceding the unification of Germany. Therefore, West Germany is considered the predecessor of unified Germany before 1990. Germany is an important case to include in the dataset, because it can be specified as a borderline case that is between the consociationalist, such as Switzerland, and non-consociationalist countries, for instance Great Britain (Lijphart, 1999).

Per country, nine observations are included in this study, based on data availability. The period measured falls between 1970 and 2014 with an observation every five years. The exact observations are thus in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The reason for including multiple observations in the study is that it is interesting to test whether a supposed interaction between the relative amount of Muslims in a country and the amount of religious domestic conflict occurs over time and occurs in a period that stretches out before and after the end of the Cold War. If the effect only occurs after the Cold War, it implies that the issue of religion became politicized after the Cold War and that conflict between Islam and the West is thus not inevitable.

3.2 Dependent variables

The dependent variable in this study is domestic religious conflict. As indicated in the introduction, two different manifestations of domestic religious conflict are used. The first is formalized conflict through politics, via anti-Muslim political parties, which indicates a clash of civilizational values. The second possible kind of conflict is societal violence, measured through committed terrorist attacks. Both indicators for conflict will be measured independently and the effect of both indicators will be combined into one variable that combines both, political and societal, domestic religious conflict, by aggregating the two separate variables. To summarize, this study investigates the four hypotheses on three different dependent variables, namely political domestic religious conflict, societal domestic religious conflict and combined domestic religious conflict.

3.2.1 Political domestic religious conflict

The easiest way to measure the amount of political religious conflict is to measure if there are anti-Muslim political parties in Western countries. It would also be possible to take into account anti-Muslim legislation. However, that would be open for much interpretation. An example of the difficulty to operationalize anti-Muslim legislation is the Burqa prohibition in for instance Austria and Denmark (The Guardian, 2018; Wright & Associated Press, 2017). It is difficult to determine whether this Burqa prohibition specifically targets Muslims, or that the intended goal of the legislation is to achieve security by banning garment that covers the face. It would also be difficult to measure under which conditions anti-Muslim legislation should be counted for such a variable. For instance, it would be difficult to decide whether legislation drafts that are accepted or legislation drafts that were only proposed should be included in composing such a variable. In the latter case a proposal that is not adopted would

count as much as legislation that has received unanimously support. Therefore, for reasons of practical and theoretical difficulties, anti-Muslim legislation will not be included in the political indicator of domestic religious conflict.

Since anti-Muslim political parties are used as the indicator of political domestic religious conflict, it is important to have a clear description of which political parties are anti-Islam. The parties that are considered anti-Islam and which obtained parliamentary seats in the period between 1970 and 2010 are displayed per country in table 1. Mudde (2016, p. 12) stated that populist radical right parties emphasize, amongst other things, 'the struggle against Global Islam', because Islam threatens the values of Europe and the nation. Therefore, the parties that can be classified as populist radical right represent the political clash between the Islamic and the Western civilization. Even when decreasing the influence of Islam is not the most important political goal of a specific populist radical right party, the party still ideologically includes this clash of values and therefore represents the belief that the values of the clashing civilizations are incompatible. Mudde (2007) gave a classification of populist radical right parties that existed in Europe between 1980 and 2010. It is not necessarily a problem that this classification does not contain political parties from before 1980. There were no political parties that started and ceased to exist before 1980 that could be identified as populist radical right parties when following the current terminology, which includes the fight over values against Islam. To add new populist radical right parties that arose after Mudde's (2007) study, Mudde (2016) is used to identify new populist radical right political parties.

The Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) has existed during the entire period from 1970 until 2010, however, the party changed ideologically and adopted populist radical right politics and ideology after an internal political struggle around the year 1990 (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.; Skenderovic, 2009). This political struggle turned out to be critical for their ideological direction and their electoral results. Therefore, the SVP is included from 1990 until 2010.

Mudde (2007, 2016) only identified populist radical right parties within European countries, but Norris (2005) also identified populist radical right parties outside Europe. Therefore, Norris (2005) is used to add populist radical right parties to this study that are active in Western countries outside Europe.

Table 1. Populist radical right parties that obtained seats in parliament between 1970 and 2014.

Country	Political party
Australia	-
Austria	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ)
	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)
Belgium	Front National (FNb)
	Vlaams Blok (VB1)
	Vlaams Belang (VB2)
Canada	-
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (DFP)
France	Front National (FNf)
Finland	Perussuomalaiset (FS)
Germany	-
Italy	Lega Nord (LN)
Ireland	-
Netherlands	Centrumpartij (CP)
	Centrumdemocraten (CD)
	Centrumpartij '86/Nationale Volkspartij (CP'86)
	Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF)
	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
New Zealand	New Zealand First (NZF)
Norway	-
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)
Switzerland	Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz (FPS)
	Schweizer Demokraten (SD)
	Schweizer Vigilance (SV)
	Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) *after 1990*
United Kingdom	-
United States	-

Source: Mudde (2007, 2016), Norris (2005).

This dependent variable is measured at ratio-level, measuring the percentage of seats in parliamentary elections that were obtained by anti-Muslim political parties in the year of the observation. The percentage of the total obtainable seats is used, because all countries have different amounts of parliamentary seats, which otherwise would make this variable incomparable across countries. When, for instance, multiple elections were held from 1970 to 1974, in which the anti-Muslim political party obtained at least one seat in at least one of the elections, the mean score of the result of all elections in that period is used. The scores range between percentages of 0 and 33,00.

To determine how many seats anti-Muslim political parties obtained in legislative elections per country, multiple data sources had to be used. These sources are summarized in Appendix A.1, table 2. Since it is impractical to refer to all these sources in the text when this variable is used, the sources will be referred to as 'Appendix A.1 (table 2)'.

3.2.2 Societal domestic religious conflict

The second aspect of domestic religious conflict are violent societal, religiously motivated attacks. This societal violence can be either perpetrated by Muslims directed to Westerners, or by Westerners directed to Muslims as an indication of the clash between the civilizations.

The data that will be used to measure societal violence is collected from the Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland, 2017b). This dataset contains terrorist attacks from 1970 until 2017 and is especially interesting, because it also includes less violent terrorist attacks that do not involve killing or wounding people, as for instance committing arson to a mosque. This database also separates in motivations, and can therefore be used to select only cases in which violence is religiously based and targeted against or perpetrated by Muslims.

The dataset includes also non-terrorist attacks and attacks that are committed by non-religious actors. Therefore, the attacks that are used to create the database for this research are coded by hand, for all seventeen countries in the entire period from 1970 until 2014, out of all terrorist attacks included in the Global Terrorism Database. This resulted in a very accurate representation of the total amount of religious terrorist attacks.

The attacks that are included in this study, to make up the variable societal religious domestic conflict, are attacks that meet certain specific criteria of terrorism. Terrorism in this database is defined as: "…the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (University of Maryland, 2017a, p. 9). This means that an attack can be labeled as a terrorist attack, when three conditions are met. "First, the incident must be intentional. Second, the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence. Third, the perpetrators must be sub-national actors" (University of Maryland, 2017a, pp. 9-10).

On top of these necessary conditions, three other conditions are mentioned, from which at least two should be fulfilled to make an attack an act of terrorism. "First, the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal. Second, There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a large audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. Third, the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities" (University of Maryland, 2017a, p. 10).

The first of these complementary conditions focuses on the fact that an act of terrorism must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal. For the current study, this condition is necessary, because all acts of terrorism are relevant for the variable

societal religious domestic conflict, if they are inspired by religion and are aimed at achieving a religious goal.

A specific note has to be made about terrorist attacks committed by Palestinians or Palestinian groups, because these are terrorist attacks committed by both Arab and Muslim groups. The distinction between ideologies and goals between the different Palestinian terrorist organizations is not always very clear. Therefore, it is important to state that Palestinian acts of terrorism are only counted and added to the score on societal religious domestic conflict, if the acts are undoubtedly inspired by Islam, and if they are directed towards Westerners, or when the groups with whom the perpetrators are affiliated based their ideology on Islam. Examples of such organizations are Hamas and Hezbollah. Organizations such as the PFLP, PLO or Black September are left-Marxists, Arab or Palestinian nationalists and are therefore not included in the variable because they are not an indication of the clash between Islam and the West, but of ethnic, nationalist or ideological conflict.

Attacks that are carried out by Westerners, such as right-extremists or neo-Nazis, against non-Westerners are only added to the score of societal religious domestic violence when Islamic entities were targeted or when targets can be associated with Islamic targets, such as refugees from Islamic countries.

For societal violence, each observation in time includes the conflicts of that year and the four following years, because otherwise only the conflicts in that exact year are measured, which can lead to biases. These biases can arise because the effect of the independent variables on the amount of domestic religious conflict is not necessarily bound to that specific year only, but can have an effect over time. Thus the observation of conflict in for instance the year 1970 means the aggregation of attacks in the years 1970 until 1974. To make the amount of terrorist attacks comparable between countries regardless their size, the amount of terrorist attacks will be divided by the number of the total population of a country at the time of that observation and multiplied by 1.000.000, so the amount of terrorist attacks per one million citizens is measured. The data for the total population per country used in this calculation comes from the United Nations (2017). The variable is thus measured at ratio-level, with as minimum score zero and as maximum in this dataset a score of 1,036 terrorist attacks per one million citizens.

3.2.3 Combined domestic religious conflict

To be able to measure the effect of the Muslim population and the other independent and control variables on domestic religious conflict in general, the societal and political domestic conflict variables are combined into one aggregated variable.

It is possible to combine both scores across countries and across time, because both indicate a score that reflects the relative amount of something, which controls for effects such as a growing or incomparable size of a population and different numbers of parliamentary representatives. Societal domestic violence measures how many terrorist attacks occur per million citizens in a country. The maximum score of this variable is 1,036, which indicates that 1,036 terrorist occur in that country per one million citizens. The highest score of political religious domestic conflict is 33,00, which indicates that 33 percent of the total amount of seats in the legislative parliament is occupied by anti-Muslim political parties.

To make the variables societal and political domestic religious conflict of the same weight in computing the new domestic religious violence variable, the new variable is computed by aggregating both variables for each observation for each country and by multiplying the scores on societal religious conflict by (33,00/1,036 ≈ 31,853). Thus the following calculation is used to create the new variable: *Combined domestic religious conflict = Societal religious conflict*(33,00/1,036) + political religious conflict*. The variable is measured at ratio-level and ranges from 0 to 46,68 as maximum amount of combined domestic religious conflict.

3.3 Independent variables

3.3.1 Muslim population in Western countries

The first independent variable is the relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries. This variable is measured with data of the World Religion Database, version 1.1 (Maoz & Henderson, 2013). This database gives an overview of more than 160 states, including all Western cases that are selected in this research. The study has observations in the period from 1945 until 2015 for every five years and therefore includes the necessary data for this research.

The World Religion Database breaks the total amount of Muslims down to different denominations and groups, namely Sunni, Shi'a, Ibadhi, Nation of Islam, Alawite and Ahmadiyya. However, this study combines these different groups into one group Islam, and takes it as percentage of the entire population. To test the hypotheses based on Huntington, it

is important to consider Islam as unity, because Huntington (1993, 2007) considers this civilizational identity the highest identity to which people can belong.

The data used in this study is the percentage of the total population that consists of Muslims. These scores were taken from the World Religion Database, version 1.1. The score on the relative size of the Muslim population in a country has a theoretical maximum 1,00, which means that 100% of the entire population is Muslim, and a theoretical minimum of 0,00, which means that there is no considerable amount of Muslims in that specific country. This variable is therefore measured at a ratio-level.

3.3.2 The level of consociationalism

The second independent variable is the level of consociationalism in a country. The data for this variable is based on the classifications of Lijphart (1999), as he describes consensus democracies. Consensus democracy focuses on power-sharing amongst divergent groups in a divided society and according to Lijphart (1969), it is especially important that this power-sharing happens at the elite level. A consensus democracy is not necessarily a functioning consociationalist country, but it has all institutional aspects to be consociational and therefore is the best approximation for a statistical operationalization of the concept of consociationalism.

Ten aspects are important to identify consensus democracies, listed in table 2. These indicators need to be combined into one variable that measures the extent to which a country is a consensus democracy or not. Lijphart (1999, p. 244) already combined the ten variables into two dimensions that together measure the level of consensus democracy in a country, as table 2 shows. The first dimension consists of the first five mentioned indicators and is called the executives-parties dimension. The second dimension consists of the last five mentioned indicators and is called the federal-unitary dimension.

There are two scores in the data of Lijphart (1999) per country for both the executives-parties and federal-unitary dimension. These two scores represent two country means, one for the period 1945-2010 and one for the period 1981-2010. These scores represent the mean level of consensus democracy on both dimensions in that specific time period for each country. The scores from the data of Lijphart (1999) that are used for the dataset in this study are from the period 1981-2010, because it approaches the period 1970 until 2010 best. The period directly after the Second World War was a period full of changes in political party systems, and could therefore distort the political party system reality of the countries in this study.

Table 2. Ten characteristics and two dimensions to identify consensus democracies.

Dimensions	Characteristics
Executive-parties dimension	Executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets
	Executive-legislative balance of power
	The presence of a multi-party system
	Proportional representation in the parliament
	Interest group corportatism
Federal-unitary dimension	Federal and decentralized government
	Strong bicameralism
	Constitutional rigidity
	Judicial review
	Central bank independence

Source: Lijphart (1999, pp. 33-40).

In the data of Lijphart (1999), both dimensions have a theoretical scale from -2,5 to 2,5. These scores represent how many standard deviations a country is away from the mean of all countries on that dimension. To create one score for the level of consensus democracy, this paper uses the sum of both dimensions. Which results in a possible score for consensus democracies between -5 and 5. However, to make this variable easier to interpret, 5 is added to all scores, which results in an index with possible scores between 0 and 10. The following sum is thus made for each country: *level of consociationalism = federal-unitary dimension + executives-parties dimension + 5*. The higher the score on this index, the more a country can be called a consensus democracy, indicating a higher level of consociationalism.

The data is measured at a ratio-level. It is not problematic that this variable is time indifferent, because the level of consensus democracy is a part of the political structure of a country and therefore quite rigid. It takes a long period of time to change a party system, so it is possible to use the mean level of consensus democracy to compare and explain between-country differences in the occurrence of domestic religious conflict.

3.3.3 Religious fractionalization

The third independent variable is religious fractionalization, which measures to which extent a country is religiously more heterogeneous. Based on the argument in the theoretical framework of this paper, only religious fractionalization is measured, and not ethnic or linguistic fractionalization. The reason for this is that the clash of civilizations cannot be considered a clash of civilizations as an overarching identity that consists of religion, ethnicity and language, but that this clash of civilizations has to be considered a clash of religions.

There are multiple useful possible sources to extract the data for religious fractionalization from. One source is the dataset used by Alesina et al. (2003), which

measures the level of heterogeneity of religion in countries worldwide. However, this data is problematic, because it only has data for one observation in time for each country and the exact moments in time of those observations differ more than fifteen years between countries. This makes the data incomparable between countries, since religious fractionalization differs to a large extent within the observed period between 1970 and 2014.

Another very good source with data on religious fractionalization is the religious diversity index of Pew Research Center (2014b), since this index has scores for all relevant countries in this study. This data, however, is only available for the year 2010. It is problematic to have only one point in time to measure the level of religious fractionalization, because this variable did not remain constant over time in the period 1970-2014. The level of religious diversity has grown tremendously in the period 1970-2014 in all countries that are subjects in this study. Therefore, the level of religious fractionalization cannot be treated as if it remained the same for each country between 1970 and 2014. To be able to carry out an analysis of the effect of religious fractionalization on religious conflict, the methodology of the Pew Research Center (2014a) is used on data of another dataset to determine the level of religious fractionalization for each country, for every five years from 1970 until 2014.

To make the calculation used by Pew Research Center (2014b), data is needed with percentages that indicate the relative size of religious groups in all seventeen countries and for all nine observations in time. For this data, the World Religion Database, version 1.1 (Maoz & Henderson, 2013) is used. This dataset contains the relative size of even more religious groups than used by Pew Research Center (2014b) to determine the religious diversity index, which can provide a better view on the real level of religious fractionalization of a country. The sixteen different religions or religious groups are listed in table 3. The percentages that represent the relative size of all these groups are taken into account in the calculation that determines the religious fractionalization for this study.

The calculation method of the Pew Research Center (2014a) that is followed to determine the scores on the religious fractionalization variable in this study consists of four steps. First of all, for each religion present in society, the percentage of the total population of a country is determined. This procedure and the following calculation were done by hand for every country and each observation in the dataset. Secondly, the percentages of all religious groups are squared and added to each other per country and observation. Then, this sum has to be subtracted of 10.000, which represents no religious diversity at all. By doing this, the score for religious diversity is inverted, resulting in a scale where high scores indicate high levels of political fractionalization, and low scores indicate low levels. This step in the calculation

33

makes the interpretation of statistical analysis more straightforward. Finally, the score that is subtracted of 10.000 is divided by 875 to create a score between 0 and 10, where zero translates to full religious homogeneity and ten to full religious heterogeneity or fractionalization.

Table 3. Religious groups used to determine the religious fractionalization per country.

Religions
Christianity
Judaism
Islam
Buddhism
Zoroastrian
Hindu
Sikh
Shinto
Baha'i
Taoism
Confucianism
Jain
Syncretic religions
Animist
Non-religious
Other

Source: Maoz & Henderson (2013).

3.4 Control variables

3.4.1 Equality

The level of equality inside countries is included to check whether economic inequality leads to domestic religious conflict instead of the presence of a Muslim population in Western countries. As indicated by Lewis and Kashyap (2013) higher levels of economic inequality can explain more extremist views amongst Muslims and other societal groups in general. On top of that, Muslims are, for instance in the U.S., in lower socio-economic classes than other U.S. citizens (Pew Research Center, 2017a). The variable that measures equality therefore controls for a possible alternative explanation for domestic religious conflict caused by Muslims, namely that this conflict in fact is caused by inequality.

The most common score to measure the levels of equality inside countries is the Gini-coefficient, which is also used in this study. There is no data available from one database for the Gini-coefficient on all 17 countries in this study and on all different observations in time. Therefore, to create this variable, two different sources with comparable data are used to

complete the data for this variable. The first source is Clio Infra (2014), which is the only source that has included data for all countries in the period between 1970 and 2000. To cover some missing observations in time, interpolation is used.

The data used to complete the scores on equality after 2000, is from the OECD (2017). The Gini-scores from these two data sources are based on the gross household income before taxes and other obliged expenditures are abstracted. A Gini-score of the equivilized disposable household income - the practical income people can spend after taxes and other obliged expenditures are subtracted of their gross income -, would better estimate the practical level of inequality within countries. However, there was no equally operationalized data available amongst different sources that delivered comparable scores on the equivilized disposable household income. Therefore, the Gini-score on the gross household income before extraction of taxes is used to determine the level of economic inequality in the seventeen countries in the dataset.

The variable on equality in this study is measured at the ratio-level and varies theoretically between a minimum of zero and a maximum of 100. A high score indicates a low level of equality, while a low score indicates a high level of equality. This variable can account for between- and within-country differences on the dependent variable.

3.4.2 European-country dummy

Whether a Western country is European or not is measured through a dummy variable. This variable is included to control for a possible other explanation for domestic religious violence, namely the different histories of the geographic entities European and non-European Western countries. Non-European Western countries are historically immigrant countries in contrast to the historically more homogeneous European Western nation-states. By including this variable, it is possible to test the effect of the relative size of Muslims on the occurrence of religious domestic conflict, while controlling for other effects that could be caused by differences between European and non-European countries.

Countries that are part of the geographical entity Europe are included as European countries for this variable. European countries receive a score 1. Countries that are not part of the European geographical entity receive a score 0. This variable is time-invariant and can therefore only measure between-country differences on the dependent variable.

3.4.3 Political party system polarization

The occurrence of religious domestic conflict could also be explained by polarization of the political system. Political party system polarization is considered to be the ideological difference between most divergent political parties present in the party system within a country (Dalton, 2008). It might in fact cause, or be a symptom of, public polarization, which could lead to more conflict. Therefore, political party system polarization is included as variable to control for a possible effect of polarization on the occurrence of domestic religious conflict.

The data that is used to create the variable of political party system polarization in this study comes from the Party System Polarization Index Modules 1-4 of Dalton (2017). The scores of this dataset are theoretically between 0 and 10. However, when combining the different scores for all countries, none of the scores comes above the 5,00 and none of the scores is below the 1,00. Therefore, this study will use 5 as maximum level and 1 as minimum level of party system polarization.

Some countries have only one score available, while other countries have multiple observations available. Therefore, the available scores for each country are combined into one score that represents the mean of the party system polarization for that country. However, because there is only data available for the period 1996-2015, and because there can thus be inconsistencies in representation of reality when calculating a mean score per country for this data, the data is changed from a ratio-level towards an interval-level with eight different categories of political party system polarization. The old and new scores are displayed in table 4. This makes the different categories of political party system polarization more comprising, making the scores represent time-invariant mean scores better for the different countries in the dataset.

Table 4. Old and new scores for the variable political party system polarization.

Old values	New values
1,00 – 1,49	1
1,50 – 1,99	2
2,00 – 2,49	3
2,50 – 2,99	4
3,00 – 3,49	5
3,50 – 3,99	6
4,00 – 4,49	7
4,50 – 4,99	8

Source: Dalton (2017).

The variable political party system polarization only measures differences between countries, for two reasons. Firstly, there is simply no data availability that allows for an analysis that takes into account differences on the amount of religious conflict within countries. The only data that is available to measure political party system polarization is for several random observations within the period between 1996 and 2015 (Dalton, 2017). Secondly, when this study would look into the within-country effects, there would be too much theoretical overlap between the political party system polarization and the dependent variable that takes into consideration political religious domestic conflict, because one of the strongest extremes which accounts for political party system polarization are populist radical right parties. Therefore, this study only looks at the country means for the available data on political party system polarization and compares if that variable can account for differences between countries on the amount of religious domestic conflict.

4. Analysis

To test the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical framework, eight statistical models are examined for each dependent variable. First in this chapter, the descriptive statistics are discussed, together with possible outliers that can have an influence or biasing effect on the outcome of the analysis. Subsequently, the model building is discussed, which describes how the different statistical models are built and structured to be able to test the hypotheses. Thirdly, the models are estimated and the hypotheses are tested for each of the three dependent variables. For each of the dependent variable the hypotheses of the clash of civilizations and consociationalism are separately discussed. Lastly, the most important findings regarding the main variables and the hypotheses are summarized in a reflection that answers which theory explains the occurrence of religious domestic conflict in Western countries best, based on the estimated models in this study.

4.1 Descriptive statistics

The descriptive statistics of the independent, dependent and control variables are discussed before testing the hypotheses in the statistical analysis. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the different variables.

As showed in table 5, the three dependent variables, measuring religious domestic conflict, have mean scores that are close to the minimum scores. This means that the means of all countries and all observations for the three dependent variables, societal religious domestic conflict (0,0643), political religious domestic conflict (3,37) and combined religious domestic conflict (5,295) are relatively low (table 5). Thus countries most often do not experience much religious domestic conflict. However, the much higher maximum scores for the three dependent variables (1,036; 31,00; 46,680) indicate that there are cases in which high levels of religious conflict are present (table 5). These cases are especially important in this study, because these cases determine whether there indeed is an effect between for instance the relative size of the Muslim population and domestic religious conflict.

Of the independent variables, the average Muslim population in the analyzed Western countries is 1,75% of the total population. This low score does not necessarily mean that there will be no domestic religious conflict. This research investigates whether an increase in the relative size of the Muslim population leads to more domestic religious conflict. Also with an increase of a small Muslim population to a bit bigger population, there are more inter-civilizational interactions, which could lead to domestic religious conflict.

The countries in the analysis have an average consociationalist level of 5,66, which indicates that most countries are more consociationalist than non-consociationalist. The level of religious fractionalization of the countries in the data is 2,96, which indicates that the countries are on average religiously homogeneous, because it means that approximately 85% of the population belongs to the biggest religion in a country.

The mean value of the first control variable (5,36), political polarization, indicates that the average political party system is a bit more polarized than not polarized. The income in the countries in the dataset is quite equally distributed with a value of 35,48, which indicates that the gross household income is more equally distributed than unequally distributed in the countries in the data. The mean (0,76) for the last control variable, European country, indicates that there are approximately three times as many European countries in the dataset than non-European Western countries.

Table 5. Descriptive statistics.

	Valid N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Standard Deviation
Societal religious domestic conflict per million	152	0	1,036	0,0643	0,1479
Political religious domestic conflict	152	0	31,00	3,370	6,7103
Aggregated religious domestic conflict	152	0	46,68	5,295	9,1183
Muslim population	152	0	0,0902	0,01749	0,01777
Consociationalism	152	2,40	6,32	5,6567	1,4522
Religious fractionalization	152	0,32	8	2,9579	1,4470
Political polarization	152	3	8	5,36	1,38
Equality	152	26,0	47,5	35,48	4,26
European country	152	0	1	0,76	0,43

Sources: societal religious domestic conflict per million: United Nations (2017), University of Maryland (2017b); political religious domestic conflict: Mudde (2007, 2016), Norris (2005), Appendix A.1 (table 2); Muslim population: Maoz & Henderson (2013); consociationalism: Lijphart (1999); religious fractionalization: Maoz & Henderson (2013); political polarization: Dalton (2017); equality: Clio Infra (2014), OECD (2017).

When checking for outliers, no problematic values were observed for the independent and control variables. In Appendix A.2 is shown how the values for the independent and control variables are distributed and which scores are outliers. There are only outliers for the variable that measures the percentage of Muslims in society and for the variable that measures the level of consociationalism. This is interesting data to keep in the dataset, because a relative large number of Muslims in the population and a low level of consociationalism are scores that are important observations to test the hypotheses derived from the theories of the clash of civilizations and consociationalism.

4.2 Model building

The method of analysis used in this study, is a linear mixed multi-level statistical analysis. There are two different levels of analysis. The first level is the country level, which compares between-country differences on the amount of religious domestic conflict. The second level looks at differences within countries over time. It is necessary to make this distinction between within-country and between-country differences, because the effect of the Muslim population on the amount of religious domestic conflict can vary over the different countries. When only within-country differences would be assumed, intra-class correlation could be confused with inter-class correlation. The necessity to use this multi-level modeling is shown for the dependent variables political and combined domestic religious conflict, and is further elaborated in Appendix A.3.

To make sure that there are no downwardly biased standard errors, and to make sure that the intra-class correlation is not mistaken for inter-class correlation, the estimated models for the three relevant dependent variables are mixed models that combine fixed and random effects (Field, 2013; Seltman, 2008). When this would not be applied, a possible risk would be that the null-hypothesis, that there is no relation between the dependent and the independent variables, becomes rejected too quickly. To make sure that the same method is used for all three dependent variables, the first model includes an estimation of the fixed and random effects of the variable that measures the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variables. The random effects estimation is further included for the more complex models for the two dependent variables political and combined domestic religious conflict, since they are indicated to have multi-level variance (Appendix A.3). Since adding the random effects shows no significant random effect for the relative size of the Muslim population, as seen in table 6, 7 and 8 in respectively paragraph 4.3, 4.4. and 4.5, the random effects of the relative size of the Muslim population for the dependent variable societal religious domestic conflict are not estimated in the more complex models. Appendix A.3 namely shows that there is no reason to estimate random effects for societal domestic religious conflict. The random effects for the intercept are estimated in all models, for each of the three dependent variables, because this allows for an estimation whether there is a difference between the intercept for the different countries.

Since the data did not allow for an unstructured covariational random effects estimate for the more complex models, a variance components analysis is used. In Appendix A.4 is shown that a model that uses a variance components covariance type does not explain the

variance in the dependent variable significantly worse than a model that uses an unstructured covariance type.

There are three different dependent variables in this study, therefore the following statistical models are examined three times. The statistical models will be the same for all three dependent variables, because there are no different theoretical explanations for the effect on the three different types of religious domestic violence. The only difference is that the random effects for the relative size of the Muslim population are not estimated for the dependent variable societal religious domestic violence after model 1.

This research starts with examining the bivariate relation between the relative size of the Muslim population and religious domestic conflict in model 1. To increase the explanatory power and to investigate how different independent variables and control variables interact within one model, the models are made increasingly complex by adding control variables in model 2 until model 6. Model 7 and 8 include an estimation of the interaction effect of first consociationalism, and second religious fractionalization on the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on religious domestic conflict.

In the model formulas, the symbols represent the following aspects. Y_{it} represents all scores on the dependent variable for each country and observation in the study. I represents the cases that are analyzed. In this research, these cases are countries. T represents the moment of observations in time. In this research, these moments are years. γ_{00} and $\gamma_{10}*$"...variable..."$_{it}$ represent the fixed effects of the intercept and different independent and control variables. u_{0t} represents the random effects of the intercept and $u_{1t}*$"percentage Muslims in population"$_{it}$ represents the random effects estimation of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable. e_{it} represents the standard error.

Model 1: $Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}*$"percentage Muslims in population"$_{it} + u_{0t} + u_{1t}*$"percentage Muslims in population"$_{it} + e_{it}$

Model 2: $Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}*$"percentage Muslims in population"$_{it} + \gamma_{20}*$"consociationalism"$_{it} + u_{0t} + u_{1t}*$"percentage Muslims in population"$_{it} + e_{it}$

Model 3: $Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}*$"percentage Muslims in population"$_{it} + \gamma_{20}*$"consociationalism"$_{it} + \gamma_{30}*$"European country"$_{it} + u_{0t} + u_{1t}*$"percentage Muslims in population"$_{it} + e_{it}$

Model 4: $Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}*$"percentage Muslims in population"$_{it} + \gamma_{20}*$"consociationalism"$_{it} + \gamma_{30}*$"European country"$_{it} + \gamma_{40}*$"equality"$_{it} + u_{0t} + u_{1t}*$"percentage Muslims in population"$_{it} + e_{it}$

Model 5: $Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population"}_{it} + \gamma_{20}*\text{"consociationalism"}_{it} + \gamma_{30}*\text{"European country"}_{it} + \gamma_{40}*\text{"equality"}_{it} + \gamma_{50}*\text{"political party system polarization"} + u_{0t} + u_{1t}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population"}_{it} + e_{it}$

Model 6: $Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population"}_{it} + \gamma_{20}*\text{"consociationalism"}_{it} + \gamma_{30}*\text{"European country"}_{it} + \gamma_{40}*\text{"equality"}_{it} + \gamma_{50}*\text{"political party system polarization"}_{it} + \gamma_{60}*\text{"religious fractionalization"}_{it} + u_{0t} + u_{1t}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population"}_{it} + e_{it}$

The previous models all test the strength of the effect between the relative size of the Muslim population on religious domestic conflict. These models test the strength of the main hypothesis, H1a, that an increase in the relative size of the Muslim population leads to more domestic religious conflict. This is the main hypothesis of the clash of civilizations, but the presence of such an effect is also important for the other hypotheses that expect an interaction effect with this particular main effect. These interaction effects are added in model seven and eight. In model seven the interaction effect of consociationalism is tested, which is important for hypothesis H2a. In model eight, a possible interaction effect of religious fractionalization on the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on religious domestic conflict is estimated. This test is important for hypotheses H1b and H2b.

Model 7: $Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population"}_{it} + \gamma_{20}*\text{"consociationalism"}_{it} + \gamma_{30}*\text{"European country"}_{it} + \gamma_{40}*\text{"equality"}_{it} + \gamma_{50}*\text{"political party system polarization"}_{it} + \gamma_{60}*\text{"religious fractionalization"}_{it} + \gamma_{70}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population*level of consociationalism"}_{it} + u_{0t} + u_{1t}*\text{percentage Muslims in population}_{it} + e_{it}$

Model 8: $Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population"}_{it} + \gamma_{20}*\text{"consociationalism"}_{it} + \gamma_{30}*\text{"European country"}_{it} + \gamma_{40}*\text{"equality"}_{it} + \gamma_{50}*\text{"political party system polarization"}_{it} + \gamma_{60}*\text{"religious fractionalization"}_{it} + \gamma_{70}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population*level of consociationalism"}_{it} + \gamma_{80}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population*religious fractionalization"}_{it} + u_{0t} + u_{1t}*\text{"percentage Muslims in population"}_{it} + e_{it}$

Based on these eight models, the hypotheses regarding the clash of civilizations and consociationalist theory are tested. First, the hypotheses of the clash of civilizations theory and consociationalist theory will be tested for the dependent variable societal religious domestic conflict. Secondly, these hypotheses will be tested for the dependent variable political religious domestic conflict. Lastly, these hypotheses will be tested for the dependent variable combined religious domestic conflict.

4.3 Test for multicollinearity

An important condition for estimating the effect of the independent and the control variables on the dependent variables is that the variables do not have too much mutual collinearity (Field, 2013). To test the level of collinearity a tolerance and a VIF test were conducted. These tests both measure the extent to which the independent and control variables have mutual collinearity. The rules of thumb as formulated by Field (2013) are used to determine whether the scores on tolerance and the VIF test are still acceptable (Field, 2013). The lower limit for the tolerance score is 0,1 and the upper limit for the VIF is a score 10. All three models in this study use the same seven variables, thus the collinearity diagnostics results are the same for all three models.

When running the collinearity diagnostics, all scores fall within the acceptable range of scores on both the tolerance and the VIF test. The highest VIF value is 2,753 for Muslim population, which is an acceptable score, with an tolerance value of 0,363 (Appendix A.2, table 6). This indicates that there are no signs of unacceptable multicollinearity within the three models for this study, thus no independent or control variables are assumed to be too close related to each other. However, the collinearity scores do indicate that especially religious fractionalization and the relative size of Muslims in Western countries have noteworthy mutual collinearity, but this collinearity is theoretically explainable. The increase of Muslims in Western society developed almost simultaneously with a decrease of importance of religion, more specific of Christianity, in Western countries. Therefore, there is some overlap between both variables. The other aspect is that for almost every increase of the relative size of the Muslim population within a Western country, the importance of the most dominant religion decreases, which increases the score on religious fractionalization the most.

4.4 Test of the hypotheses: dependent variable societal religious domestic conflict

4.4.1 Clash of Civilizations

Hypothesis H1a predicted that an increase in the relative size of the Muslim population within Western countries leads to an increase in religious domestic conflict, in this case societal religious domestic conflict. When examining the different models in table 6, the variable of the relative size of the Muslim population has a significant positive effect in the first five models on the dependent variable. This means that a larger relative size of the Muslim population within Western countries leads to more acts of terrorism per one million citizens and thus leads to more societal religious domestic conflict. The effect of the relative size of the Muslim population ranges from 2,6962 in model 1 to 2,2361 in the more complex model

5, with being statistically significant (at least $p<0,01$). This means that in the more complex model 5, an increase of one point for the relative size of the Muslim population would mean that there are 2,2361 terrorist attacks per million citizens. However, an increase of one point on the value of the relative size of the Muslim population is only theoretical possible, because it translates to the difference between a society without Muslims and a society that consists only of Muslims. Therefore, to interpret this score more practical, an increase of one percent point of the relative size of Muslims in a Western country, leads to approximately a significant increase of 0,02 terrorist attacks per one million citizens. The first model that includes the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable fits the data better ($p<0,01$) than a model that does not estimate the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population.

When the religious fractionalization control variable is added to model 6, as displayed in table 6, the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable stops to be significant. This is also the case in the two more complex models that include the two interaction effects. The significant effect of religious fractionalization ranges from 0,0259 ($p<0,05$) in model 6 to 0,0389 ($p<0,01$) in model 8 (table 6). When using the most complex model 8, for every point a country is more religiously fractionalized, the country experiences 0,0389 more terrorist attacks per million citizens. The first model that includes the variable religious fractionalization fits the data significantly better ($p<0,05$), than the previous models without that variable (table 6).

Based on the first five models, hypothesis H1a cannot be refuted, since there is a positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on societal religious domestic conflict. Religious fractionalization takes away this effect, however, because that variable becomes significant as well, and because there is certain theoretical overlap and practical mutual collinearity between the two variables, there is enough evidence to maintain hypothesis H1a for this dependent variable. However, there is also not sufficient proof to definitely reject the null-hypothesis that there is no effect between the relative size of the Muslim population and societal religious domestic violence.

Hypothesis H1b predicted that the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on societal religious domestic violence is affected negatively by an increase of the religious fractionalization in a country. This interaction effect is estimated in model 8, as shown in table 6, but no significant effect is found. Therefore, hypothesis H1b. needs to be rejected for this dependent variable.

4.4.2 Consociationalism

Hypothesis H2a predicted that the effect of the Muslim population on domestic religious conflict was negatively influenced by the level of consociationalism in a country. Thus, the higher the level of consociationalism, the weaker the effect of the Muslim population on societal domestic religious conflict should be. As indicated in paragraph 4.4.1, there indeed seems to be evidence to assume that there is a positive relation between the relative size of the Muslim population and societal religious domestic conflict. The interaction effect of the level of consociationalism on that relation is estimated in model 7 and 8, and displayed in table 6. The interaction appears to be not significant. Therefore, hypothesis H2a has to be rejected. The level of consociationalism does not have an effect on the relation between the relative size of the Muslim population and societal religious domestic conflict.

Hypothesis H2b predicted that the effect of the Muslim population on societal domestic religious conflict was also influenced by the level of religious fractionalization within a country. This relationship was predicted to be positive. Thus the higher the amount of religious fractionalization, the bigger the positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the amount of societal religious domestic conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph 4.4.1, there is no significant interaction effect of religious fractionalization on the relationship between the relative size of the Muslim population and societal religious domestic conflict. Hypothesis H2b is therefore rejected.

4.4.3 Summary for societal religious domestic conflict model

Overall, the clash of civilizations and consociationalism cannot give a full explanation of the occurrence of societal religious domestic conflict. No evidence is found to confirm the consociational theory. However, there seems to be an indication that there might indeed be a positive effect between the relative size of the Muslim population on the amount of societal religious domestic conflict per million citizens, as the theory of the clash of civilizations claims. Since religious fractionalization takes away the significance of that effect, it cannot be confirmed that this effect indeed is significantly present.

Table 6. Multilevel regression estimates with random and fixed effects of the independent and control variables on societal domestic religious conflict in Western countries between 1970 and 2014.

Model	1 estimate	2 estimate	3 estimate	4 estimate	5 estimate	6 estimate	7 estimate	8 estimate
Fixed effects								
Intercept	0,0179 (0,0177)	0,0179 (0,0566)	0,0171 (0,0583)	0,1758 (0,1251)	0,1139 (0,1542)	0,0340 (0,1598)	0,0013 (0,1653)	-0,0303 (0,1668)
Muslim population	**2,6962** (0,7371)	**2,5697*** (0,6862)**	**2,5607*** (0,7144)**	**2,3054** (0,7287)**	**2,2361** (0,7323)**	0,5243 (1,1136)	3,6160 (2,8888)	7,7128 (3,9982)
Consociationalism		0,0003 (0,0095)	0,0002 (0,0095)	0,0000 (0,0093)	0,0005 (0,0092)	0,0033 (0,0096)	0,0175 (0,0156)	0,0194 (0,0158)
European country (dummy)								
Non-European country			Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
European country			0,0015 (0,0332)	-0,0047 (0,0328)	-0,0136 (0,0349)	0,0200 (0,0396)	0,0212 (0,0419)	0,0234 (0,0424)
Equality				-0,0042 (0,0029)	0,00035 (0,0031)	-0,0039 (0,0031)	-0,0052 (0,0032)	-0,0053 (0,0032)
Political party system polarization					0,0079 (0,0117)	0,0090 (0,0120)	0,0083 (0,0129)	0,0062 (0,0131)
Religious fractionalization						**0,0259*** (0,0127)**	**0,0295*** (0,0129)**	**0,0389**** (0,0143)`**
Muslim population*Consociationalism							-0,6203 (-0,5179)	-0,8102 (0,5281)
Muslim population*Religious fractionalization								-0,7113 (0,4977)
Random effects								
Variance intercept	0,0008 (0,0013)	0,0186 (0,0023)	0,0011 (0,0011)	0,0010 (0,0011)	0,0009 (0,0010)	0,0012 (0,0012)	0,0018 (0,0014)	0,0020 (0,0015)
Variance country difference Muslim population	0,5337 (1,3897)							
Model summary								
-2 Log likelyhood	**-167,510****	-167,314	-167,316	-167.317	-169,773	**-173,811***	-175,026	-177,034
N country level	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
N individual level	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

*Standard errors in parantheses; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).*

Sources: societal religious domestic conflict per million: United Nations (2017), University of Maryland (2017b); political religious domestic conflict: Mudde (2007, 2016), Norris (2005), Appendix A.1 (table 2); Muslim population: Maoz & Henderson (2013); consociationalism: Lijphart (1999); religious fractionalization: Maoz & Henderson (2013); political polarization: Dalton (2017); equality: Clio Infra (2014), OECD (2017).

4.5 Test of the hypotheses: dependent variable political religious domestic conflict

4.5.1 Clash of Civilizations

Hypothesis H1a predicted that the relative size of the Muslim population should have a positive effect on the amount of religious domestic conflict, in this case political religious domestic conflict. When examining the first five models in table 7, there is a significant positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable. This means that when the relative size of a Muslim population within a Western country is larger, there will be more political conflict in the form of bigger representations of anti-Muslim parties in the legislative parliaments. The effect ranges from 248,3568 in model 2 to 243,8636 in the more complex model 5, with being statistically significant (p<0,05) [table 7]. This means that in the more complex model 5, an increase of one point for the relative size of the Muslim population would mean that the representation of anti-Muslim parties increases with 248,3568 percent points. However, these scores are theoretical. A better representation of these scores is, if the share of Muslims as part of the total population in Western countries increases with one percent point, that leads to an increase of the share of the total seats in the legislative parliament for anti-Muslim parties of approximately 2,48%. The first model that includes the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable fits the data significantly better (p<0,001) than a model that does not estimate the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population (table 7).

When the religious fractionalization control variable is added in model 6, the same happens to the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on political religious domestic conflict, as happened to its effect on societal religious domestic conflict: the effect stops to be significant (table 7). The effect of religious fractionalization itself on political religious domestic conflict is however significant. The effect ranges from 1,0034 (p<0,05) in model 6 to 1,3297 (p<0,01) in model 8 (table 7). Following the most complex model 8, for every point a country is more religiously fractionalized, the percentage of legislative parliamentary seats occupied by anti-Muslim parties increases with 1,3297 percent point. The first model that includes the variable of religious fractionalization fits the data significantly better, than the previous models (p<0,05) [table 7].

Based on the first five models, hypothesis H1a cannot be refuted, since there is a positive effect between the relative size of the Muslim population and societal religious domestic conflict. However, this effect disappears when religious fractionalization is included as control variable. Therefore, the null-hypothesis that there is no effect between the relative

size of the Muslim population and political religious domestic conflict can also not be refuted with certainty

Hypothesis H1b predicted that the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on political religious domestic violence is affected negatively by an increase of the religious fractionalization in a country. This interaction effect is estimated in model 8, but no significant interaction effect is found. Therefore, hypothesis H1b needs to be rejected for this dependent variable. Higher levels of religious fractionalization thus do not decrease the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on political domestic religious conflict.

4.5.2 Consociationalism

Hypothesis H2a predicted that the positive effect of the Muslim population on political domestic religious conflict is influenced negatively by the level of consociationalism. This means that higher levels of consociationalism in Western countries, should decrease the effect of the Muslim population on domestic religious conflict. As shown in paragraph 4.5.1, there is an indication that the relative size of the Muslim population has a positive effect on political religious domestic conflict. However, this effect is not decreased by a higher level of consociationalism, as it is shown not significant in model 7 and 8 (table 7).

Hypothesis H2b predicted that the effect of the Muslim population on political religious domestic conflict would be positively influenced by the level of religious fractionalization within a country. Thus, the higher the amount of religious fractionalization, the bigger the positive effect between the relative size of the Muslim population and political religious domestic conflict should be. However, as indicated in paragraph 4.5.1, this interaction effect is not present for this dependent variable. Hypothesis H2b, which predicted that this interaction effect should be present can thus be rejected.

4.5.3 Summary for political religious domestic conflict model

Overall, the theory of the clash of civilizations and the consociational theory cannot give a full explanation for the occurrence of political religious domestic conflict. The independent and control variables follow the same pattern of (non-)significance for this dependent variable as for the dependent variable societal religious domestic conflict. There appears to be evidence that there is a positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the occurrence of political religious domestic conflict. For consociationalism, no proof is found to confirm that this theory can explain the occurrence of political religious domestic conflict.

Table 7. Multilevel regression estimates with random and fixed effects of the independent and control variables on political domestic religious conflict in Western countries between 1970 and 2014.

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate
Fixed effects								
Intercept	0,1138	1,4313	1,2329	2,5605	4,4741	2,3789	2,8297	2,5233
	(0,5654)	(2,3532)	(2,4140)	(3,8298)	(4,7671)	(4,8468)	(4,9530)	(5,0838)
Muslim population	**246,4272***	**248,3568***	**247,0517***	**243,8636***	**244,1694***	134,1907	-249,6159	-182,5096
	(82,4365)	**(83,5132)**	**(81,2767)**	**(79,4943)**	**(83,0510)**	(84,1608)	(248,0474)	249,6584
Consociationalism		-0,2382	-0,2674	-0,2312	-0,2580	-0,1185	-0,3182	-0,2821
		(0,4134)	(0,4222)	(0,4370)	(0,4347)	(0,4357)	(0,4713)	(0,4889)
European country (dummy)								
Non-European country			Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
European country			0,5048	0,5178	0,8205	1,9651	2,2649	2,2887
			(1,1899)	(1,2138)	(1,3023)	(1,3793)	1,4082	(1,4606)
Equality				-0,0423	-0,0545	-0,0753	-0,0714	-0,0816
				0,0916	(00934)	(0,0934)	(0,0949)	(0,0954)
Political party system polarization					-0,2926	-0,3580	-0,3311	-0,3758
					(0,4308)	(0,4322)	(0,4426)	(0,4646)
Religious fractionalization						**1,0034***	**1,1156***	**1,3297****
						(0,4441)	**0,4432**	**(0,4933)**
Muslim population*Consociationalism							63,5951	62,2823
							(40,3261)	(38,5745)
Muslim population*Religious fractionalization								-16,2884
								(17,2258)
Random effects								
Variance intercept	1,0740	0,9788	1,0597	1,2919	1,1866	1,3143	1,6397	2,1486
	(1,7168)	(1,6761)	(1,6752)	(1,8487)	(1,8748)	(1,8855)	(1,9442)	(2,2848)
Variance country difference Muslim population	86816,4774	89646,9845	83704,3635	79154,2344	87744,6761	61,644,3169	41144,2323	36538,8108
	(69600,0417)	(72212,4971)	(64536,450)	(59628,2150)	(72436,2930)	(36626,7915)	(25002,7121)	(22887,1148)
Model summary								
-2 Log likelihood	**879,499*****	879,170	878,998	878,803	878,362	**873,542***	871,586	870,772
N country level	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
N individual level	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

*Standard errors in parantheses; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).*

Sources: societal religious domestic conflict per million: United Nations (2017), University of Maryland (2017b); political religious domestic conflict: Mudde (2007, 2016), Norris (2005), Appendix A.1(table 2); Muslim population: Maoz & Henderson (2013); consociationalism: Lijphart (1999); religious fractionalization: Maoz & Henderson (2013); political polarization: Dalton (2017); equality: Clio Infra (2014), OECD (2017).

4.6 Test of the hypotheses: dependent variable combined religious domestic conflict

4.6.1 Clash of Civilizations

Hypothesis H1a predicted that the relative size of the Muslim population should have a positive effect on the amount of religious domestic conflict, in this case combined religious domestic conflict. When examining the first five models in table 8, there indeed is a significant positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable. This means that the larger the relative size of a Muslim population within a Western country, the more religious domestic conflict occurs in the form of a combination of terrorist attacks and anti-Muslim political parties. The effect ranges from 293,1184 in model 1 to 276,1763 in model 5, with being statistically significant ($p<0,01$) [table 8]. This means that in the more complex model 5, an increase of one point of the relative size of the Muslim population means an increase of 276,1763 on the scale of religious domestic conflict. This score on the dependent variable does not translate to a single event in reality, because the dependent variable is the aggregation of terrorism per million citizens and the representation of anti-Muslim parties in the legislative parliament. However, the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on this dependent variable gives an indication of the effect on domestic religious conflict in general. The first model that includes the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable fits the data significantly better ($p<0,001$) than a model that does not estimate the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population (table 8).

When the religious fractionalization control variable is added in model 6, the same happens with the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on political religious domestic conflict, as happened with its effect on both societal and political religious domestic conflict: the effect stops to be significant (table 8). The effect of religious fractionalization on political religious domestic conflict is however significant. The effect ranges from 2,1552 ($p<0,01$) in model 6 to 3,0051 ($p<0,001$) in model 8 (table 8). The first model that includes the variable religious fractionalization fits the data significantly better ($p<0,05$), than the previous models without the control variable religious fractionalization.

Based on the first five models, there is evidence for hypothesis H1a, since there is a positive relation between the relative size of the Muslim population and religious domestic conflict in general. However, because the effect disappears when religious fractionalization is included as control variable, the null-hypothesis, that there is no effect between the relative

size of the Muslim population and religious domestic conflict, cannot be refuted with certainty.

Hypothesis H1b predicted that the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on religious domestic violence is affected negatively by an increase of the religious fractionalization in a country. This interaction effect is estimated in model 8 and has a significant score of -77,5927 (p<0,001) [table 8]. This means that for every point increase of the score on religious fractionalization, the effect of one point change of the value of the Muslim population on religious domestic conflict decreases with 77,5927. This finding sustains the prediction of hypothesis H1b, that religious fractionalization has a negative interaction effect on the positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the occurrence of the combination of societal and political domestic religious conflict. The null-hypothesis, that religious fractionalization has no decreasing effect on the relation between the relative size of the Muslim population and combined religious domestic conflict, has to be rejected.

4.6.2 Consociationalism

Hypothesis H2a predicted that the effect of the Muslim population on religious domestic conflict, was negatively influenced by the level of consociationalism in a country. This would mean that the higher the level of consociationalism in Western countries, the weaker the effect of the Muslim population on combined religious domestic conflict should be. As indicated in paragraph 4.6.1, there is a positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on combined political religious domestic conflict. However, this effect is not decreased by a higher level of consociationalism, as this interaction effect is shown not significant in model 7 and 8 (table 8).

Hypothesis H2b predicted that the effect of the Muslim population on political religious domestic conflict should be positively influenced by the level of religious fractionalization within a country. Thus, the higher the amount of religious fractionalization, the bigger the positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on political religious domestic conflict should be. However, as indicated in paragraph 4.6.1, the variable religious fractionalization has a negative interaction effect instead of a positive interaction effect. Thus hypothesis H2b, which predicted that this positive interaction effect would occur, has to be rejected.

4.6.3 Summary for aggregated religious domestic conflict model

For the occurrence of the combination of political and societal domestic religious conflict, consociationalism cannot provide an explanation. However, the clash of civilizations can provide an explanation for the occurrence of combined domestic religious conflict.

There appears to be evidence that the relative size of the Muslim population has a positive effect on the occurrence of combined religious domestic conflict. Since religious fractionalization takes away the significance of that effect, the null-hypothesis that there is no effect between the relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries and combined religious domestic conflict, cannot be refuted with certainty.

A second interesting observation is that for the dependent variable combined domestic religious conflict, there seems to be evidence that sustains hypothesis H1b, which predicted that religious fractionalization has a negative interaction effect on the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable. This means that this model provides some evidence that the clash of civilizations can help to explain the occurrence of religious domestic conflict in Western countries.

The evidence for hypothesis H1b also immediately rejects hypothesis H2b, which predicted the exact opposite interaction effect, namely that religious fractionalization has a positive interaction effect on the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable. Hypothesis H2a predicted that the level of consociationalism has a negative interaction effect on the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variable. This interaction effect is not found. Hypothesis H2a is thus rejected.

The rejection of hypothesis H2a and H2b indicate that consociationalism cannot provide an explanation for the occurrence of the combination of political and societal domestic religious conflict.

Another interesting phenomena that is worth mentioning, is that as soon religious fractionalization is added as control variable to model 6, the relative size of the Muslim population does not have a significant effect anymore. However, a significant effect suddenly appears for the control variable equality. There is no clear indication of why this latter effect suddenly appears.

Table 8. Multilevel regression estimates with random and fixed effects of the independent and control variables on combined domestic religious conflict in Western countries between 1970 and 2014.

Model	1 estimate	2 estimate	3 estimate	4 estimate	5 estimate	6 estimate	7 estimate	8 estimate
Fixed effects								
Intercept	0,7013 (1,0493)	-0,03394 (4,1487)	-0,7878 (4,2492)	276,1834 (6,9788)	7,2654 (8,7089)	3,9107 (8,9747)	4,9312 (9,0551)	3,7176 (10,0716)
Muslim population	**293,1184** (71,9081)**	**291,8912** (71,4777)**	**291,1724** (71,2164)**	**276,1834** (66,5360)**	**276,1763** (66,5663)**	93,8718 (85,6916)	-113,5136 235,7673	221,6506 (199,9631)
Consociationalism		0,1879 (0,7221)	0,1437 (0,7275)	0,3354 (0,7898)	0,3346 (0,7919)	0,8044 (0,8456)	0,4333 (0,9346)	0,2691 (1,0791)
European country (dummy)								
Non-European country			Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
European country			0,9761 (2,0738)	0,8291 (2,2759)	0,8435 (2,4992)	3,3569 (2,7516)	3,4374 (2,7453)	2,9704 (3,1106)
Equality				-0,2458 (0,1528)	-0,2463 (0,1559)	**-0,3512*** (0,1534)**	**-0,3288*** (0,1561)**	**-0,3583*** (0,1551)**
Political party system polarization					-0,0117 (0,8563)	-0,1934 (0,9136)	-0,1627 (0,9094)	3,0051 (0,6958)
Religious fractionalization						**2,1628** (0,6927)**	**2,1552** (0,6869)**	**3,0051*** (0,6958)**
Muslim population*Consociationalism							36,3431 (38,4687)	38,9709 (26,1337)
Muslim population*Religious fractionalization								**-77,5927*** (23,0492)**
Random effects								
Covariance intercept	7,1128 (6,1143)	7,2206 (6,1132)	7,2193 (6,0737)	10,9291 (7,7229)	10,9385 (7,7565)	14,2688 (8,6673)	14,2606 (8,6959)	**25,3547*** (10,3133)**
Covariance Muslim population	42518,0245 (28352,8018)	41520,6938 (28341,5912)	41053,5585 (27794,4184)	32135,5799 (23199,9811)	32155,6838 (23271,3337)	27438,2680 (18560,7843)	21683,5543 (17153,6625)	-
Model summary								
-2 Log likelyhood	**1018,669***	1018,604	1018,382	1016,154	1016,154	**1006,956***	1006,193	**999,640***
N country level	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
N individual level	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

*Standard errors in parantheses; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).*

Sources: societal religious domestic conflict per million: United Nations (2017), University of Maryland (2017b); political religious domestic conflict: Mudde (2007, 2016), Norris (2005), Appendix A.1 (table 2); Muslim population: Maoz & Henderson (2013); consociationalism: Lijphart (1999); religious fractionalization: Maoz & Henderson (2013); political polarization: Dalton (2017); equality: Clio Infra (2014), OECD (2017).

4.7 Reflection

It is important to summarize the most important findings of all estimated models and combine the findings for the three different dependent variables to give a definitive judgement over the hypotheses. First, no evidence is found that sustains the hypotheses that are derived from consociationalist theory. There is respectively no negative and positive interaction effect of the level of consociationalism and religious fractionalization on the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on any of the three dependent variables. Therefore, hypotheses H2a and H2b can be rejected for all three dependent variables. Consociational theory cannot provide an explanation for the occurrence of domestic religious conflict.

Secondly, there is evidence that the theory of the clash of civilizations can help to explain societal, religious and combined religious domestic conflict. Hypothesis H1a predicted that an increase in the relative size of the Muslim population leads to an increase in the occurrence of religious domestic conflict. There is evidence, based on the estimated models, that supports hypothesis H1a for all three dependent variables. However, this evidence is not strong enough to definitively reject the null-hypothesis that this effect is not present, since including religious fractionalization in the statistical model makes the significance of the effect disappear. Still, because of theoretical and empirical overlap between the relative size of the Muslim population and religious fractionalization, the fact that the significant effect disappears does not have to mean that there is no proof at all for the positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on religious domestic conflict.

Thirdly, hypothesis H1b, that religious fractionalization has a negative effect on the effect between the relative size of the Muslim population and domestic religious conflict, is not supported for societal and political domestic religious conflict. However, the interaction effect is significant for the dependent variable that combines both aspects of religious domestic conflict. Therefore, it is only possible to reject the null-hypothesis that this interaction effect is not present for the dependent variable combined domestic religious conflict.

5. Conclusion

The increase of the relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries has been a reality the last decades. Together with this growth, there has been an increase in religiously motivated terrorist attacks and anti-Muslim political parties. A lot of research, such as Fox (1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2003) Huntington (1993, 1996), Inglehart & Norris (2003), Lewis (1990), and Roeder (2003), focused on the possible violent interaction between different identity groups, such as Islam and the West. However, these studies have not focused on the domestic effects of a growing Islamic minority inside Western countries. Therefore, it is important to investigate the extent to which these groups, Islam and the West, clash and result inevitably into domestic religious conflict. This has led to the following main research question:

To what extent does an increase of the relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries lead to more religiously influenced domestic conflict in the period from 1970 to 2014?

The dependent variable domestic religious conflict is separated in three different dependent variables, societal and political religious domestic conflict and an aggregated variable that takes both aspects as a combined phenomenon. This differentiation made it possible to test whether there is a difference between violent societal and political religious conflict and how these different aspects of religious domestic conflict are caused. Societal religious domestic conflict measures the amount of religiously motivated acts of terrorism that are perpetrated by or against Westerners or Muslims. Political domestic religious conflict measures the percentage of seats in the legislative parliament occupied by anti-Muslim political parties.

Four hypotheses were derived from the clash of civilizations and consociationalism, to explain the occurrence of societal and political religious domestic conflict and to be able to answer the main research question. The most important difference between these two theories is with regard to the inevitability of religious conflict. The clash of civilizations argues that interactions between the West and Islam lead inevitably to conflict. Consociationalist theory argues that this conflict is caused by the political exclusion of minority groups which cause grievances and ultimately conflict.

To test the hypotheses, several independent variables were formulated and operationalized. The main independent variable was the relative size of the Muslim population within Western countries. This variable was derived from both the clash of

civilizations and consociationalism. According to the clash of civilizations, a bigger relative size of the Muslim population will inevitably lead to more religious domestic conflict. However, consociationalist theory beliefs that the strength of this effect depends on the level of consociationalism in countries, because conflict is not caused by inherent differences, but by grievances caused by political exclusion. Therefore, the most important independent variable derived from consociationalist theory is the level of consociationalism within a country. The third independent variable, political fractionalization, is also derived from both theories. The theory of the clash of civilizations expects that higher levels of religious fractionalization decrease the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on religious domestic conflict. Consociational theory expects the opposite interaction effect.

Societal religious domestic conflict has been measured by coding all terrorist attacks in the period between 1970 and 2014 from the Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland, 2017b). Political domestic religious conflict has been measured by coding all populist radical right parties in the period between 1970 and 2014, based on Mudde's (2007, 2016) classifications of these parties and by using their electoral results in the legislative parliaments of the seventeen researched Western countries. Nine observations were included for each country. Based on a multilevel quantitative (panel data) research design, the hypotheses were tested that were derived from the clash of civilizations and consociationalism. To control for between-country differences, a random effects approach was estimated when proven necessary. Eight models were estimated for each of the three different dependent variables, with each model increasing in complexity.

5.1 Results

Four hypotheses that were derived from the clash of civilizations and consociationalism have been tested. Hypothesis H2a and H2b were derived from consociationalism and both these hypotheses have been rejected. There is respectively no negative and positive interaction effect of the level of consociationalism and religious fractionalization on the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on any of the three dependent variables. This has two consequences for the effect of an increase of the relative size of the Muslim population on religiously influenced domestic conflict. Firstly, this effect does not decrease when a country has higher levels of consociational democracy. Secondly, this effect is not increased when a country is more religiously fractionalized.

There has been found evidence that supports the hypotheses that have been derived from the theory of the clash of civilizations. Hypothesis H1a predicted that an increase in the

relative size of the Muslim population leads to an increase in the occurrence of religious domestic conflict. This hypothesis can be sustained. The evidence for this hypothesis is however not definitive, because when religious fractionalization is included in the statistical model, the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the dependent variables becomes not significant. However, both variables measure to some extent the same country-characteristics. An increase in the Muslim population generally means in a Western country that that country is religiously more fractionalized, since the two biggest non-Christian religious groups in most Western countries are Islam and non-affiliated or atheism. On top of that, the multicollinearity test shows that both variables have some mutual collinearity, and because the dataset is not very large, adding the variable religious fractionalization can lead to a not significant effect of the Muslim population on religious domestic conflict, while this effect is actually present in reality. Therefore, the presence of a significant effect of the relative size of the Muslim population in all models without the variable religious fractionalization supports the hypothesis of the clash of civilizations that the increase of the relative size of the Muslim population leads to domestic religious conflict.

Other proof for the theory of the clash of civilizations is found in the negative interaction effect of religious fractionalization on the effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on combined domestic religious conflict. This effect was predicted by hypothesis H1b. The interaction effect was estimated not significant for the two separate aspects of domestic religious conflict, societal and political domestic religious conflict.

In general, there is support for both hypotheses that have been derived from the clash of civilizations. However, the findings cannot confirm the predictions of the clash of civilizations with full certainty. When assuming this evidence indicates into the right direction, this means that two general statements can be made. First, an increase of the relative size of the Muslim populations in Western countries leads to more societal and political domestic religious conflict. Secondly, an increase of the religious fractionalization decreases the positive effect of the relative size of the Muslim population on the combination of societal and political domestic religious conflict.

The results lead to the following answer to the research question. An increase of the relative size of the Muslim population in Western countries leads to more religiously influenced domestic conflict in the period 1970-2014. This effect decreases when a country is more religiously fractionalized, and this effect occurs regardless of the presence of consociationalist democracy. Therefore, there is evidence that an increase of the relative size of the Muslim population leads to inevitable conflict.

5.2 Theoretical implications

The findings of this research have several theoretical consequences. Consociationalism cannot explain the occurrence of domestic religious conflict in Western countries. Consociational theory expects that consociational countries are better in including varying ethnic, cultural and religious groups into the political power-system via power-sharing. However, this study did not show a decreased influence of the relative size of Muslims in Western countries on the amount of religious domestic conflict, when the level of consociationalism of those countries is higher. In other words, consociational democracy does not prevent that interactions between Muslims and Westerners lead to domestic religious conflict.

This finding has several theoretical implications. This could first of all mean that Islam is just too alien to Western states to fit within the power-sharing institutions of consociational Western states. Consociationalism talks about making cooperation possible between elites of different deeply conflicted subcultures in society. However, it is possible that alien cultures cannot be treated as subcultures, but should be treated as entirely different entities. This would in fact not necessarily contradict consociational theory, because it is questionable whether there are cross-cutting cleavages, such as class, that overlap the divide between Islam as subculture and other groups within society. These cross-cutting cleavages are important, according to Lijphart (1969), to make the power-sharing between elites function well. This argument is in line with critique on consociationalism, namely that countries which have been proven as successful examples of consociationalism were already stable before the implementation of consociational democracy (Van Schendelen, 1984). Consociational successes were also most of the time between subcultural groups with equal historic ties to a country and between groups that lived relatively peaceful amongst each other (ibid.). It thus seems that subcultural elite cooperation does not function when the diverging groups are of different civilizations.

Another explanation for the absent interaction effect of consociationalism could be that in the researched period, there were not enough elites that could represent the Muslims-masses within Western countries. This would mean that cooperation within the power-sharing institutions of the elites in the Western consociational democracies is not yet possible for Muslims.

Further research is definitely needed to investigate whether the absence of cross-cutting cleavages or representational Muslim elites in the power-sharing institutions resulted in the absence of a decreasing effect of the level of consociationalism on the amount of religious domestic conflict that is caused by the increase of the relative size of the Muslim

population. For now, without this further research, the preliminary conclusion is that consociationalist democracy does not limit the occurrence of domestic religious conflict, caused by inter-civilizational interactions between Muslims and Westerners within Western countries. The societal implication is that it seems not helpful for Western countries to strive for consociational democracy as an attempt to prevent domestic religious conflict, caused by the increased relative size of the Muslim population.

The findings of this study do indicate that the clash of civilizations can partly explain the occurrence of religious domestic conflict between Islam and the West inside Western countries, based on the relative size of the Muslim population in those countries. This seems to indicate that Islam and the West clash and that interactions between the two groups lead inevitably to conflict, as follows from the theory of Huntington (1993, 1996). When Islam and the West clash inevitably due to incompatible values, the effects have to be unbound to place and time, which is the case in this study, because the effect is shown significant over the period from 1970 until 2014. This shows that the increase of the relative size of the Muslim population leads to domestic religious conflict, before and after the Cold War. The clash of civilization is thus not only present after the Cold War, because it would be either activated after the Cold War, or because the most important trigger for conflict disappeared with the end of the Cold War.

Another important finding of this study that provides evidence for inevitable conflict as result of the clash of civilizations, is that the clash between the Islamic and the Western civilization is not only present between countries or at the borders of civilizations, but that this clash has domestic consequences for Western countries as well. This consequence is that an increase in the relative size of the Muslim population within a Western country leads to more domestic religious conflict. This finding also adds to the literature, such as Fox (2001a, 2001b), that claims that the clash of civilizations is actually a clash of religions. The independent variables such as religious fractionalization and the relative size of the Muslim population only measured the effect of religious diverging groups on the dependent variable, domestic religious conflict. For these independent variables the theory of the clash of civilizations is tested and appears to provide a good explanation for the occurrence of domestic religious conflict. Therefore, the clash of civilizations seems to be a clash of religions in practice.

It is also interesting that religious fractionalization has a decreasing effect on the strength of the effect between the relative size of the Muslim population within Western countries on religious domestic conflict. This effect was only found for the dependent variable

that combined political and societal domestic religious conflict. However, when this interaction effect is present, this means that civilizational identities within individuals become more activated when a country is less religiously fractionalized, as the theory of the clash of civilizations claims.

For now, without further research, the preliminary conclusion of these findings is that the clash of civilizations seems to exist at the domestic level of Western countries in the form of inevitable conflict between religions. This conclusion has as societal implication that to prevent societal and political conflict within Western countries, the increase of the relative size of the Islamic population or the interactions between conflicting civilizations should be limited.

The last interesting conclusion is that religious fractionalization shows an unexpected, but interesting, effect in this research, as it seems to cause religious domestic conflict itself. Religious fractionalization seems to lead to an increase in religious domestic conflict and it decreases the overall impact of the relative size of the Muslims population on the occurrence of religious domestic conflict at the same time. A possible explanation for this seemingly contradiction is that the direct positive effect of religious fractionalization on domestic religious conflict is possibly based on the overlap between the relative size of the Muslim population and religious fractionalization. The negative interaction effect would then be caused by the total composition of the variable, which measures the total religious fractionalization of a country.

5.3 Limitations and recommendations for further research

There are also some limitations to this research that have to be considered when generalizing the findings of this study and when designing further research to test the explanatory powers of particularly the clash of civilizations and religious fractionalization with regard to religious domestic conflict.

The first possible limitation has to do with the operationalization of the dependent variables. Societal religious domestic conflict has been operationalized as acts of terrorism, and does not include weaker forms of societal violence, for the simple fact that it was not possible to gather the data. Further research could include less violent forms of societal conflict such as hate crimes. However, including these kinds of violence should not make any theoretical difference, because an increase in more violent actions indicates the same civilizational conflict caused by the relative size of the Muslim population as an increase in less violent actions would indicate. The existence of weaker violence only means that the

conflict is less far developed. Therefore, investigating the more violent religious domestic conflicts, such as terrorism, is more interesting to be able to test whether there really is proof for the presence of a civilizational conflict.

The second possible limitation is the operationalization of the dependent variable political religious domestic conflict. This variable only includes anti-Islam political parties, operationalized as populist radical right parties. These parties generally include anti-Islamic views. However, support for these parties does not necessarily mean that they are supported for their anti-Islamic ideas. People can also support these parties for, for instance, economic reasons. Anti-Islam parties were however the best method to measure the politicization of a clash between civilizations, because it at least means that these political parties think it is necessary to adopt anti-Muslim views and they are supported for their anti-Muslim ideas, or their voters at least accept these ideas by voting on people who believe that it is necessary that Islam is opposed in Western countries due to inherently clashing values.

A third possible limitation is that the level of consociationalism is measured as time-invariant variable due to limited data availability. It is possible that the level of consociationalism changes over time. So it would be interesting to include a time-variant variable that includes the differences between countries on the level of consociationalism, to test whether this results in a significant interaction effect that proves that consociationalism makes countries experience less religious domestic conflict caused by the presence of Muslims in Western societies.

A fourth possible limitation is that the dataset of this study was quite small. This is not necessarily problematic, however, it can cause significant effects to be less significant when the statistical model becomes over-specified. This seems to occur when the effects of both the relative size of the Muslim population and religious fractionalization are estimated. Therefore, further research with bigger datasets is needed to be able to test how religious fractionalization and the relative size of the Muslim population interact, when combined in one statistical model. Such research could provide evidence that both aspects are causes to religious domestic conflict. Further research should also take into account the possibility that both variables in fact measure the same effect, namely the effect of a growing Islamic population within Western countries that inevitably clashes with the dominance of Western society. This further research also has to provide more evidence for the hypotheses of the clash of civilizations, because the evidence in this study was not definite. Future research also has to investigate the influence of religious fractionalization on domestic religious conflict in relative stable Western countries.

61

It would also be interesting to investigate whether secularism, or a growing religious group that is unaffiliated or atheist, influences the occurrence of religious domestic conflict, because the measured effect of religious fractionalization can also indicate that the clash within Western countries between this secular group and Islam is more inevitable than between Islam and Christianity. This argumentation could in fact be redirected to the cause of civilizational conflict, as stated by Inglehart and Norris (2003), namely that the clash between Islam and the West is about sex-related and gender-related values instead of religious values. During the period between 1970 and 2014, with growing secularization and de-Christianization of the West, the values in Western countries have been increasingly liberalized with regard to topics such as gay-rights.

The positive relation between religious fractionalization and domestic religious conflict could also indicate that the clash of civilizations exists, and that Western civilization is weakened because of the decline of Christianity, which is central to the Western civilization according to Huntington (1996, p. 305). In that case, the weakened own Western identity could cause that Islam is seen as a growing danger from the Western perspective.

References

Alesina, A., et al. (2003). Fractionalization. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8, 2, 155-194.

BBC (2016). *Guide to nationalist parties challenging Europe*. Retrieved at 15 January 2018 from, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006.

Bundesamt für Statistiek (2015). *Nationalratswahlen: Stärke der Parteien*. Retrieved at 22 June 2018 from, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/politik/wahlen/nationalratswahlen.assetdetail.217191.html.

Bundesministerium Inneres (2018). *Nationalratswahlen: Historischer Rückblick*. Retrieved at 22 June 2018 from, https://www.bmi.gv.at/412/Nationalratswahlen/Historischer_Rueckblick.aspx.

Chakelian, A. (2017). *Rise of the nationalists: A guide to Europe's far-right parties*. Retrieved at 15 January 2018 from, https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2017/03/rise-nationalists-guide-europe-s-far-right-parties.

Clio Infra (2014). *Income inequality*. Retrieved at 29 May 2018 from, https://www.clio-infra.eu/Indicators/IncomeInequality.html.

Dalton, R. J. (2008). The quantity and the quality of party systems. Party system polarization, its measurement, and its consequences. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41, 7, 899-920.

Dalton, R. J. (2017). *Party system polarization index for CSES Modules 1-4*. Retrieved at 28 May 2018 from, http://www.cses.org/datacenter/usercommunity3/usercommunity3.htm.

Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.). *Swiss people's party: Political party, Switzerland*. Retrieved at 31 May 2018 from, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Swiss-Peoples-Party.

Faiola, A. (2016). *Austria's right-wing populism reflects anti-Muslim platform of Donald Trump*. Retrieved at 11 June from, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/austrias-right-wing-populism-reflects-anti-migrant-anti-muslim-platform-of-donald-trump/2016/05/19/73368bbe-1c26-11e6-82c2-a7dcb313287d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5e861d1b0582.

Fearon, J. D. & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review*, 97, 1, 75-90.

Federale Overheidsdienst Binnenlandse Zaken (2008). *Belgische verkiezingsuitslagen*. Retrieved at 22 June 2018 from, http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html.

Field, A. (2013). *Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics*. London: Sage.

Fox, J. (1998). The effects of religion on domestic conflicts. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10,4, 43-63.

Fox, J. (2001a). Clash of civilizations or clash of religions: Which is a more important determinant of ethnic conflict? *Ethnicities*, 1, 2, 295-329.

Fox, J. (2001b). Two civilizations and ethnic conflict: Islam and the West. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38, 4, 459-472.

Fox, J. (2003). State failure and the clash of civilizations: An examination of the magnitude and extent of domestic civilizational conflict from 1950 to 1996. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 38, 2, 195-213.

France Politique (2018). *Élections législatives*. Retrieved at 22 June 2018 from, http://www.france-politique.fr/elections-legislatives.htm.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press.

Gerges, F. A. (2015). ISIS and the third wave of Jihadism. *Current History*, 113, 767, 339-343.

Hansen, R. (2003). Migration to Europe since 1945: Its history and its lessons. *The Political Quarterly*, 74, 1.

Heilbrunn, J. (1998). The Clash of Samuel Huntington. *American Prospect* 39, 22–28.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 3, 22-49.

Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Huntington, S. P. (2000). Try again: A reply to Russett, Oneal and Cox. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37, 609-610.

Huntington, S. P. (2007). The clash of civilizations revisited. *New Perspectives Quaterly*, 30, 4, 46-54.

Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2003). The true clash of civilizations: Samuel Huntington was only half right. The cultural fault line dividing the Western and Muslim worlds is not about democracy but sex. *Foreign Policy*, 135, 62-70.

Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M. & Horowitz, J. M. (2006). Party polarization in American politics: Characteristics, causes, and consequences. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9, 83-110.

Lewis, B. (1990). The roots of Muslim rage. *The Atlantic*, 266, 3, 47-60.

Lewis, V. A. & Kashyap, R. (2013). Are Muslims a distinctive minority? An empirical analysis of religiosity, social attitudes and Islam. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 52, 3, 617-626.

Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational democracy. *World Politics*, 21, 2, 207-225.

Lijphart, A. (1980). *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1999). *Comparing democracies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (2012). *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries* (2nd ed.). New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. & Crepaz, M. M. L. (1991). Corporatism and consensus democracy in eighteen countries: Conceptual and empirical linkages. *British Journal of Political Science*, 21, 2, 235-246.

Lustick, I. S. (1997). Lijphart, Lakatos and consociationalism. *World Politics*, 50, 1, 88-117.

Maoz, Z. & Henderson, E. A. (2013). The World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010: Logic, Estimates, and Trends. *International Interactions*, 39, 265-291.

Ministero dell'Interno (2018). *Archivio storico delle elezioni*. Retrieved at 22 June 2018 from, http://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=24/02/2013&tpa=I&tpe=A&lev0=0&levsut0=0&es0=S&ms=S.

Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C. (2016). The study of populist radical right parties: Towards a fourth wave. *C-REX Working Paper Series*, 1, 1-26.

Muller, E. N. (1985). Income inequality, regime repressiveness, and political violence. *American Sociological Review*, 50, 47-61.

Norris, P. (2005). *Radical right: Voters and parties in the electoral market*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University.

Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata (2018). *European election database*. Retrieved at 22 June 2018 from, http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database.

OSCE (2017). *Hate-crime reporting: Netherlands*. Retrieved at 20 March 2018 from, http://hatecrime.osce.org/netherlands.

OECD (2017). *Income distribution and poverty: By country*. Retrieved at 4 June 2018 from, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=66670.

Parlement & Politiek (2018). *Zetelverdeling tweede kamer 1946-heden*. Retrieved at 22 June 2018 from, https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvx6/zetelverdeling_tweede_kamer_1946_heden.

Pew Research Center (2014a). *Global religious diversity: Methodology.* Retrieved at 24 May 2018 from, http://www.pewforum.org/2014/04/04/methodology-2/.

Pew Research Center (2014b). *Religious diversity index scores by country*. Retrieved at 24 May 2018 from, http://www.pewforum.org/2014/04/04/religious-diversity-index-scores-by-country/.

Pew Research Center (2017a). *Demographic portrait of Muslim Americans*. Retrieved at 1 June 2018 from, http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/demographic-portrait-of-muslim-americans/.

Pew Research Center (2017b). *Europe's growing Muslim population*. Retrieved at 11 June 2018 from, http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/.

Powell, G. B. (1981). Party systems and political system performance: Voting participation, government stability and mass violence in contemporary democracies. *The American Political Science Review*, 75, 4, 861-879.

Roeder, P. G. (2003). Clash of civilizations and escalation of domestic ethnopolitical conflcits. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36, 5, 509-540.

Sen, A. (2007). *Identity and violence: The illusion of destiny*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Van Schendelen, M. C. P. M. (1984). The views of Arend Lijphart and collected criticisms. *Acta Politica*, 19, 1, 19-55.

Schneckener, U. (2002). Making power-sharing work: Lessons from successes and failures in ethnic conflict regulation. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39, 2, 203-228.

Seltman, H. (2008). *Experimental design and analysis*. Retrieved at 5 June 2018 from, http://www.stat.cmu.edu/~hseltman/309/Book/Book.pdf.

Shah, V. D. (2013). Consensus democracy and state performance: Evaluating the impact of coalition government on Indian states. Retrieved at 1 May 2018 from, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/171.

Skenderovic, D. (2009). *The radical right in Switzerland: Continuity and change, 1945-2000*. New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books.

The New York Times (2001). *Q&A; A head-on collision of alien cultures?* Retrieved at 18 June 2018 from, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/20/arts/q-a-a-head-on-collision-of-alien-cultures.html.

The Guardian (2018). *Denmark passes law banning burqa and niqab*. Retrieved at 11 June 2018 from, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/31/denmark-passes-law-banning-burqa-and-niqab.

University of Maryland (2017a). *Global terrorism database: Codebook: Inclusion criteria and variables.* Retrieved at 1 June 2018 from, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf.

University of Maryland (2017b). *Global Terrorist Index*. Retrieved at 30 March 2018 from, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

United Nations (2017). *World population prospects: The 2017 revision: Total population by sex (thousands).* Retrieved at 1 June 2018 from, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/.

Walt, S. M. (1997). Building up new bogeyman. *Foreign Policy*, 106, 177-189.

Wright, M. & Associated Press (2017). *Austria's 'burka ban' comes into force, prohibiting face veils in public places*. Retrieved at 11 June 2018 from, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/01/austrias-burka-ban-comes-force-prohibiting-face-veils-public/.

Yukleyen, A. (2010). State policies and Islam in Europe: Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36, 3, 445-463.

Appendices

Appendix A.1. Tables.

Table 1. An overview of the description and source of the dependent, independent and control variables.

	Description	Time-(in)variant	Sources
Societal domestic religious conflict	Religiously motivated terrorist attacks (per one million citizens)	Time-variant	Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland, 2017b); World Population Prospect, 2017 revision: Population by sex (United Nations,2017)
Political domestic religious conflict	Percentage of total legislative parliamentary seats occupied by radical populist right political parties	Time-variant	Multiple sources See table 2 in appendix A.1 for all used sources When this variable is used, in for instance a table, the sources will be referred to as 'Appendix A.1 (table 2)'
Combined domestic religious conflict	A combination of the scores on societal and political domestic religious conflict	Time-variant	Societal and political domestic religious conflict
Relative size of the Muslim population	Percentage of total population that is Muslim	Time-variant	World Religion Database, version 1.1 (Maoz & Henderson, 2013)
Consociationalism	The level of consensus democracy	Time-invariant	List of values of the executives-parties and federal-unitary dimensions and of the ten basic variables of consensus democracy, 1945-2010 and 1981-2010 (Lijphart, 1999)
Religious fractionalization	The extent to which a country is religiously fractionalized	Time-variant	World Religion Database, version 1.1 (Maoz & Henderson, 2013)
Equality	Gini-score on the level of equal distribution of gross household income	Time-invariant	Income Inequality Database (Clio Infra, 2014); Income Distribution and Poverty: By Country (OECD, 2017)
European country dummy	European countries versus non-European countries	Time-invariant	-
Political party system polarization	The degree of ideological differentiation among political parties in a system	Time-invariant	Party System Polarization Index Modules 1-4 (Dalton, 2017)

Table 2. An overview of the sources of the dependent variable political domestic religious conflict.

Sources	Description
European Election Database (Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata, 2018)	Dataset with coverage of legislative parliamentary election results for all European countries in this study, for the period 1990 until 2018. This dataset was used for all European countries with no populist radical right political parties before 1990.
Zetelverdeling Tweede Kamer van 1946 tot heden (Parlement & Politiek, 2018)	The parliamentary election results per political party for the Netherlands in the period 1946-2018.
Belgische verkiezingsuitslagen (Federale Overheidsdienst Binnenlandse Zaken, 2008)	The election results per parliamentary election for Belgium in the period 1848-2007.
Nationalratswahlen: historische rückblick (Bundesministerium Inneres, 2018)	The election results per parliamentary election for Austria in the period 1919-2013.
Élections législatives résultats (France Politique, 2018)	The election results per parliamentary election for France in the period 1958-2012.
Archivio storico delle elezioni (Ministero dell'Interno, 2018)	The election results per parliamentary election for Italy in the period 1948-2013.
Nationalratswahlen: Stärke der Parteien (Bundesamt für Statistiek, 2015)	The parliamentary election results per political party for Switzerland in the period 1919-2015.

Table 3. Frequency table of dependent variable societal domestic religious conflict.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
,0000000	96	63,2	63,2
,0041525	1	,7	63,8
,0075284	1	,7	64,5
,0079199	1	,7	65,1
,0087047	1	,7	65,8
,0169417	1	,7	66,4
,0169635	1	,7	67,1
,0170039	1	,7	67,8
,0177242	1	,7	68,4
,0283768	1	,7	69,1
,0325309	1	,7	69,7
,0349773	1	,7	70,4
,0351124	1	,7	71,1
,0369891	1	,7	71,7
,0489956	1	,7	72,4
,0525118	1	,7	73,0
,0541516	1	,7	73,7
,0585309	1	,7	74,3
,0698202	1	,7	75,0
,0701631	1	,7	75,7
,0734664	1	,7	76,3
,0741748	1	,7	77,0
,0754575	1	,7	77,6
,0874806	1	,7	78,3
,0904159	1	,7	78,9
,0947867	1	,7	79,6
,0981354	1	,7	80,3
,0981716	1	,7	80,9
,1107829	1	,7	81,6
,1212121	1	,7	82,2
,1255493	1	,7	82,9
,1269237	1	,7	83,6
,1349528	1	,7	84,2
,1509814	1	,7	84,9
,1547988	1	,7	85,5
,1587302	1	,7	86,2
,1658650	1	,7	86,8
,1801802	1	,7	87,5
,1845018	1	,7	88,2
,1888736	1	,7	88,8
,2000000	1	,7	89,5
,2016129	1	,7	90,1
,2053388	1	,7	90,8
,2398082	1	,7	91,4
,2628121	2	1,3	92,8
,2672011	1	,7	93,4

,2742230	1	,7	94,1
,2918288	1	,7	94,7
,3039514	1	,7	95,4
,3232062	1	,7	96,1
,3913894	1	,7	96,7
,4259851	1	,7	97,4
,4424779	1	,7	98,0
,6257822	1	,7	98,7
,9067358	1	,7	99,3
1,0362694	1	,7	100,0
Total	152	100,0	

Source: University of Maryland (2017b).

Table 4. Frequency table of dependent variable political domestic religious conflict.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
,00	99	65,1	65,1
,16	2	1,3	66,4
,17	1	,7	67,1
,35	1	,7	67,8
,50	1	,7	68,4
,67	3	2,0	70,4
1,00	1	,7	71,1
1,50	1	,7	71,7
2,00	1	,7	72,4
2,02	1	,7	73,0
2,50	2	1,3	74,3
2,86	1	,7	75,0
2,88	1	,7	75,7
3,12	1	,7	76,3
4,76	1	,7	77,0
5,00	2	1,3	78,3
5,50	1	,7	78,9
5,70	1	,7	79,6
6,00	1	,7	80,3
6,83	1	,7	80,9
7,26	1	,7	81,6
7,85	1	,7	82,2
8,67	1	,7	82,9
8,70	1	,7	83,6
9,17	1	,7	84,2
9,37	1	,7	84,9
9,67	1	,7	85,5
9,89	1	,7	86,2
10,00	1	,7	86,8
10,83	1	,7	87,5
11,33	1	,7	88,2
12,00	1	,7	88,8
12,29	2	1,3	90,1
12,67	1	,7	90,8
13,00	1	,7	91,4
13,69	1	,7	92,1
18,05	1	,7	92,8
19,00	2	1,3	94,1
19,25	1	,7	94,7
19,50	1	,7	95,4
19,55	1	,7	96,1
23,00	1	,7	96,7
24,00	1	,7	97,4
24,45	1	,7	98,0
27,00	1	,7	98,7
27,30	1	,7	99,3

31,00	1	,7	100,0
Total	152	100,0	

Source: Appendix A.1 (table 2).

Table 5. Frequency table of dependent variable combined domestic religious conflict.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
,00	71	46,7	46,7
,12	1	,7	47,4
,23	1	,7	48,0
,24	1	,7	48,7
,26	1	,7	49,3
,50	1	,7	50,0
,51	1	,7	50,7
,51	1	,7	51,3
,67	2	1,3	52,6
,69	1	,7	53,3
,85	1	,7	53,9
,97	1	,7	54,6
1,05	1	,7	55,3
1,05	1	,7	55,9
1,11	1	,7	56,6
1,47	1	,7	57,2
1,50	1	,7	57,9
1,75	1	,7	58,6
2,02	1	,7	59,2
2,20	1	,7	59,9
2,22	1	,7	60,5
2,26	1	,7	61,2
2,26	1	,7	61,8
2,50	2	1,3	63,2
2,62	1	,7	63,8
2,71	1	,7	64,5
2,86	1	,7	65,1
2,88	1	,7	65,8
2,94	1	,7	66,4
3,31	1	,7	67,1
4,15	1	,7	67,8
4,52	1	,7	68,4
4,63	1	,7	69,1
4,74	1	,7	69,7
4,75	1	,7	70,4
4,96	1	,7	71,1
5,50	1	,7	71,7
5,70	1	,7	72,4
5,82	1	,7	73,0
6,00	1	,7	73,7
6,14	1	,7	74,3
6,85	1	,7	75,0
7,03	1	,7	75,7
7,26	1	,7	76,3
7,34	1	,7	77,0
7,85	1	,7	77,6

9,17	1	,7	78,3
9,37	1	,7	78,9
9,67	1	,7	79,6
9,77	1	,7	80,3
10,00	1	,7	80,9
10,00	1	,7	81,6
11,71	1	,7	82,2
12,29	1	,7	82,9
12,61	1	,7	83,6
12,86	1	,7	84,2
13,21	1	,7	84,9
13,24	1	,7	85,5
14,65	1	,7	86,2
14,84	1	,7	86,8
15,09	1	,7	87,5
16,56	1	,7	88,2
17,68	1	,7	88,8
19,00	2	1,3	90,1
19,21	1	,7	90,8
19,25	1	,7	91,4
19,50	1	,7	92,1
20,18	1	,7	92,8
21,40	1	,7	93,4
21,68	1	,7	94,1
22,64	1	,7	94,7
23,00	1	,7	95,4
24,00	1	,7	96,1
27,00	1	,7	96,7
28,87	1	,7	97,4
35,04	1	,7	98,0
41,84	1	,7	98,7
43,18	1	,7	99,3
46,68	1	,7	100,0
Total	152	100,0	

Table 6. Collinearity diagnostics for the three different dependent variables.

	VIF	Tolerance
Muslim population	2,753	0,363
Consociationalism	1,050	0,952
Religious fractionalization	2,446	0,409
Equality	1,303	0,767
Political polarization	1,556	0,642
European country	1,716	0,583

Sources: Muslim population: Maoz & Henderson (2013); consociationalism: Lijphart (1999); religious fractionalization: Maoz & Henderson (2013); political polarization: Dalton (2017); equality: Clio Infra (2014), OECD (2017).

Appendix A.2. Outlier figures.

This appendix contains the box-plots of all the continuous independent and control variables. As seen in figure 1 and figure 2, only the independent variables the relative size of the Muslim population and the level of consociationalism have outliers. The cases 42, 44 and 43, in figure 1 are three observations for France, which has the biggest relative amount of Muslims in its population, of all the seventeen countries in this dataset. The three outliers are the most recent observations, in 2000, 2005 and 2010. The outliers that are observed in figure 2, are all the observations for the score on the level of consociationalism for the United Kingdom, since the score on consociationalism is the same for all observations per country. The United Kingdom has a very low level of consociational democracy, in comparison to the other countries in the database. No outlier scores were observed for the variables religious fractionalization, equality and political party system polarization, as showed in figure 3, 4 and 5.

**Figure 1**. Box-plot of the variable relative size of the Muslim population.

**Figure 2**. Box-plot of the variable consociationalism.

Figure 3. Box-plot of the variable religious fractionalization.

**Figure 4**. Box-plot of the variable equality.

Figure 5. Box-plot of the variable political party system polarization.

Appendix A.3. Test for multi-level necessity.

Table 7 shows the deviance test for the three dependent variables. This test shows to which extent there is between-country variance. Two models are estimated per dependent variable. The first model, -2LL Baseline, only takes into account within-country differences, while the second model, -2LL New, is a more complex model that also takes into account the between-country differences. When the difference between both models is significant, it shows that it is necessary to do the analysis of the hypotheses with a multi-level model, which takes into account the within- and between-country differences.

The two estimated models were formulated as follows, for all three dependent variables:

$$Model\ -2LL\ Baseline: Y_{it} = u_{0t} + e_{it}$$
$$Model\ -2LL\ New: Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0t} + e_{it}$$

As displayed in table 7, the differences between the baseline and the new model are significant for dependent variable 2 and 3, thus for the occurrence of political domestic religious conflict and for the occurrence of combined domestic religious conflict. The difference between the baseline model and the new model is not significant for the dependent variable societal domestic religious conflict. However, the score (0,0593) was very close to the limit of a significant score ($p<0,05$), therefore the model for this dependent variable is also estimated while considering between- and within-country differences, because they could have important implications for the hypotheses.

Table 7. Deviance test for multi-level modeling necessity.

	Dependent variable 1	Dependent variable 2	Dependent variable 3
-2LL Baseline	-150,6060	1009,0610	1102,2800
-2LL New	-154,1620	975,3440	1073,8030
Degrees of freedom	1	1	1
Difference	3,56	**33,72***	**28,48***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (one-tailed).
Sources: societal religious domestic conflict per million: United Nations (2017), University of Maryland (2017b); political religious domestic conflict: Mudde (2007, 2016), Norris (2005), Appendix A.1(table 2); Muslim population: Maoz & Henderson (2013); consociationalism: Lijphart (1999); religious fractionalization: Maoz & Henderson (2013); political polarization: Dalton (2017); equality: Clio Infra (2014), OECD (2017).

Appendix A.4. Test of model-fit for different covariance types of random effects.

The data turned out to be not sufficient to test a random effect with an unstructured covariance type. Therefore, table 8 shows a test to determine whether the variance components covariance type explains the variance for the dependent variable significantly worse than the model that uses a unstructured covariance type for the random effects. The variance components covariance type is less complex and is possible with the available data. Both tested models were formulated as follows, for all three dependent variables:

$$Model: Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}*\text{``percentage Muslims in population''}_{it} + u_{0t} + u_{1t}*\text{``percentage Muslims in population''}_{it} + e_{it}$$

The only difference between both models was how the random effects are estimated, namely with variance components or unstructured covariance.

As showed in table 8, the more simple model that uses the covariance type variance components explains the variance estimated by the random effects not significantly worse than the model that uses the unstructured covariance type. Therefore, the covariance type variance components can be used in all statistical models that estimate random effects.

Table 8. Deviance test for covariance type random effects in mixed model

	Models societal religious domestic conflict	Models political religious domestic conflict	Models aggregated religious domestic conflict
-2LL in model with covariance type variance components	-167,1210	879,4990	1018,6690
-2LL in model with unstructured covariance type	-167,5100	879,4040	1016,4570
Degrees of freedom	1	1	1
-2LL difference	0,39	0,0950	2,21

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (one-tailed).*
Sources: societal religious domestic conflict per million: United Nations (2017), University of Maryland (2017b); political religious domestic conflict: Mudde (2007, 2016), Norris (2005), Appendix A.1(table 2); Muslim population: Maoz & Henderson (2013); consociationalism: Lijphart (1999); religious fractionalization: Maoz & Henderson (2013); political polarization: Dalton (2017); equality: Clio Infra (2014), OECD (2017).

Appendix A.5. Syntax SPSS.

Frequencies of the dependent variables.
Frequencies Terror_permillion Political_Conflict Rel_Conflict3.

Descriptives of dependent, independent and control variables.
Descriptives Terror_permillion Political_Conflict Rel_Conflict3 Muslim_pop Consociationalism
W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization Religious_fractionalization.

Test for multicollinearity.
Regression /DESCRIPTIVES
 /statistics= R COEFF ANOVA OUTS F BCOV ZPP LABEL SES XTX TOL COLLIN
  /Dependent=Terror_permillion
   /enter=Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization
Religious_fractionalization.

Box-plot of the continuous independent and control variables.
examine variables=Muslim_pop
 /plot=boxplot
 /statistics=none.

examine variables=Consociationalism
 /plot=boxplot
 /statistics=none.

examine variables=Religious_fractionalization
 /plot=boxplot
 /statistics=none.

examine variables=Equality
 /plot=boxplot
 /statistics=none.

examine variables=Pol_polarization
 /plot=boxplot
 /statistics=none.

MIXED Terror_permillion

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Terror_permillion

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country)

/METHOD=ML.

*Deviance test for covariance type random effects in mixed model.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) COVTYPE (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) COVTYPE (un)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) COVTYPE (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) COVTYPE (un)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) COVTYPE (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) COVTYPE (un)

/METHOD=ML.

Mixed effects models for dependent variable societal domestic religious conflict.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality
Pol_polarization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality
Pol_polarization Religious_fractionalization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization
Religious_fractionalization

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

Pol_polarization Religious_fractionalization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization

Religious_fractionalization Muslim_pop*Consociationalism

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Terror_permillion WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

Pol_polarization Religious_fractionalization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization

Religious_fractionalization Muslim_pop*Consociationalism Muslim_pop*Religious_fractionalization

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

Mixed effects models for dependent variable political domestic religious conflict.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

Pol_polarization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

Pol_polarization Religious_fractionalization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization

Religious_fractionalization

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

Pol_polarization Religious_fractionalization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization

Religious_fractionalization Muslim_pop*Consociationalism

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Political_Conflict WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

Pol_polarization Religious_fractionalization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization

Religious_fractionalization Muslim_pop*Consociationalism Muslim_pop*Religious_fractionalization

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

Mixed effects models for dependent variable combined domestic religious conflict.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization
Religious_fractionalization

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization
Religious_fractionalization

/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)

/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization
Religious_fractionalization
/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV
/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization
Religious_fractionalization Muslim_pop*Consociationalism
/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)
/METHOD=ML.

MIXED Rel_Conflict3 WITH Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization
Religious_fractionalization
/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV
/fixed = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop Consociationalism W_Europe Equality Pol_polarization
Religious_fractionalization Muslim_pop*Consociationalism Muslim_pop*Religious_fractionalization
/RANDOM = INTERCEPT Muslim_pop | SUBJECT(Country) covtype (vc)
/METHOD=ML.