



# Indigenous Voices in Latin America

Examining Ethnic Populist Parties and External Political Efficacy

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# Abstract

During the early twenty-first century, a ‘pink tide’ emerged through Latin American countries, in which left-wing populism gained electoral success. The 2005 electoral victory of Evo Morales in Bolivia and his MAS-IPSP party, representing various indigenous communities as well as obtaining votes from other ethnic groups, gained scholarly attention. In Ecuador, a similar indigenous-based party (MUPP) gained electoral success and represent the interests of the indigenous population on the national level. These indigenous-based parties utilized populist rhetoric where a corrupt elite opposes the pure people. However, they incorporated multiple ethnicities in their conception of the pure people, forging inter-ethnic bonds. This thesis looks at the effect these ethnic populist parties have on the representation of indigenous people, especially how indigenous people evaluate the responsiveness of politicians to their demands. Multilevel models assess the difference in external political efficacy between ethnic groups in 15 Latin American countries. The results show that indigenous people, on average, have a higher sense of external political efficacy compared to other ethnic groups such as white and mestizo. Also, the cross-level interaction shows that in countries where ethnic populist parties are present, the external political efficacy of indigenous people is higher compared to indigenous individuals in countries without an ethnic populist party present. However, the effect is not moderated by voting for the ethnic populist party; nor by the left/right orientation of the individual. Therefore the causal mechanisms remains to be uncovered. This analysis underlines the importance of descriptive representation of indigenous people in Latin America.

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador
EZLN	Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MAS-IPSP	Movimiento al Socialismo – Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos
MUPP	Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares

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# 1 Introduction

Indigenous peoples are present throughout Latin America. Think of the Mayans in Guatemala, the descendants from the Aztecs in Mexico, the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia, and the Kuna Yala in Panama. The World Bank reported on the position and numbers of indigenous people in Latin America in 2015, using censuses based on self-identification. The report shows that Guatemala and Bolivia have the highest proportion of indigenous people within their territories, both 41%. After that comes Peru with 26%. Following up are Mexico and Panama with respectively 15% and 12,2%. In Ecuador and Honduras, the indigenous population makes up about 7% of the total. In all other countries, the indigenous population makes up less than 5%. Overall, around 7.8% of the population of Latin America is indigenous (World Bank Group, 2015). However, defining who is indigenous and who is not, is not as clear-cut as it might seem. Estimates of the proportion of indigenous individuals in countries tend to vary a great deal. Multiple causes that complicate the definition can be identified. First, there is a lower level of ethnic polarization compared to the United States and Europe, and ethnic identification is more ambiguous and fluid (Madrid, 2007). Therefore, it is hard to pinpoint who exactly is indigenous, as one can identify as indigenous in some contexts but not others. Second is the history of marginalization. People do not prefer to identify themselves as indigenous, as a stigma is attached to the term. Other dominant groups in society have constructed the category 'indigenous'. Therefore, the category 'indigenous' is seen as a category of racial marginalization and social exclusion (Espinosa et al., 2023).

The processes of marginalization started from the conquest and colonization of the Americas. In a large part of the South American region, two states were simultaneously founded. The Republic of Spaniards and the Republic of Indians came into being, laying the foundation of racial and class-based exclusion and discrimination. The ethnic and racial categories, therefore, established boundaries between groups in terms of access to power and influence (Cunha Filho, 2023; Espinosa et al., 2023; Wade, 2010). The process of acquiring voting rights is one instance that shows the struggle for power and representation of indigenous people. For example, in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, only literate people were allowed to vote in several countries like Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador and Brazil, disproportionately affecting indigenous people (Albala & Natal, 2023). Nowadays, indigenous people are recognized by almost all countries, and they formally have the right to vote. However, practically, they face barriers due to the higher amount of undocumented people among the indigenous, their remote location, and higher illiteracy rates compared to non-indigenous (Villalba, 2023). Indigenous communities are also disadvantaged by the land grabs to use their land for agricultural purposes. For example, in Paraguay, the Mbyá-Guaraní were chased from the dense forest that they used to live in. These forests were used for cattle ranches and soybean fields, forcing the Mbyá-Guaraní to move to the cities where they often lived in poverty (Reed, 2015). From the 1990s onward, states started

recognizing indigenous peoples' rights, starting with Colombia in 1991 and Bolivia in 1994. These rights consist of recognition of the existence of indigenous peoples, the recognition of collective property rights, the recognition of customary law, the recognition of indigenous languages, and the provision of bilingual education. Most countries recognize at least three of these five components. Colombia, Panama and Nicaragua also recognize territorial autonomy for some regions, and Colombia and Venezuela have reserved seats for indigenous representatives (Van Cott, 2010). Even though there are laws in place that ensure indigenous rights, it is also essential to look at the participation of indigenous in political organizations because when it comes to representation, indigenous peoples are mostly excluded from political life and decision-making (Barragán, 2023).

Besides the history of marginalization, states have actively promoted the mixing of ethnicities and cultures to create a common identity. This process is called *mestizaje* and originates in racist and colonial hierarchies demarcating various ethnic groups (Madrid, 2007; Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2015). In the colonial context, it highlighted the differences between ethnic identities and their unequal access to power, social standing and privilege. The meaning of *mestizaje* changed due to Vasconcelos's literary work in 1925 at the beginning of the Mexican Revolution called *La Raza Cósmica*, the cosmic race. He wrote that races would mix and give rise to a new race. He stated that the decline of racial and ethnic barriers is the future of humankind. The mestizo is then an embodiment of this new racial identity, which would lead civilization to a more inclusive and less exploitative future (Pérez-Torres, 2013). State leaders then used the concept of *mestizaje* as a nation-building ideology that would create a homogenous nation that is posed as the opposite of states hierarchically structured along the lines of race and ethnicity. It became the official discourse of nation formation to claim authenticity, denying racial oppression. *Mestizaje*, therefore, seems to be an inclusive process where everyone could become a mestizo, but in fact, it marginalizes blackness and indigenusness and values whiteness. The term *mestizo*, therefore, carries the ambiguity of sameness and exclusion (Wade, 2005). This has seriously affected people's self-identification as nowadays, most people in Latin America identify as mestizo or indigenous mestizo (Madrid, 2007; Yashar, 2015).

In this context, indigenous people's representation is vital to advocating for their interests. However, in most Latin American countries, there are few indigenous representatives on the national level (Smith, 2007). In some countries like Guatemala, there is an increase in indigenous representation at the local level (Pallister, 2013). However, there is room for improvement, as 29% of the indigenous people feel better represented by someone from the same ethnic background (Madrid, 2007). Therefore, indigenous representation is still a pressing concern nowadays in combination with other contemporary issues. For example, in Panama. The Kuna Yala see their territory disappear into the sea, reopening the discussion of communal land rights (Wickstrom, 2003). Quite some scholars immersed themselves in the question of why no indigenous party has risen in specific countries. Often

identified cases are the lack of an indigenous organization backing up a candidate, as was the case of Rigoberta Menchú in Guatemala (Pallister, 2013), the low level of ethnic politicization (Madrid, 2005), the proportion of indigenous people in the country (Van Cott, 2005) and the democratic party system permeability and fragmentation (Birnie & Van Cott, 2007; Yashar, 1999). They all looked at the structural factors that played a role in the success or failure of indigenous parties. Whereas the Guatemalan and Peruvian cases are often mentioned as failures, Ecuador and Bolivia are considered successes (Madrid, 2007; Pallister, 2013; Van Cott, 2010). In both countries, a specific type of indigenous party managed to enter the national legislative body and consolidate its place. The Movimiento al Socialismo—Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (MAS-IPSP) in Bolivia and the Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP) in Ecuador are ethnic populist parties. Their success is often explained by the inclusionary populist approach that incorporates multiple ethnic groups instead of glorifying one specific group, together with charismatic leadership (Madrid, 2007).

As stated above, the current representation of indigenous people on the national level does not resemble the proportion of indigenous people in most countries in Latin America (World Bank Group, 2015). This is an issue because of the history of marginalization of indigenous people and the current situation in which indigenous people are often still excluded from positions of power. However, Bolivia and Ecuador are two interesting cases in which a political party represents indigenous people's interests on the national level and succeeded in solidifying its position, making them unique cases worth investigating further. This thesis looks into the effect of the ethnic populist parties on the feeling of being represented among indigenous people. This leads to the following central research question:

*To what extent do ethnic populist parties influence how indigenous people perceive their political representation?*

To specify the question, I will examine the reported feeling of external political efficacy to see whether ethnic populist parties change people's perceptions of politicians' responsiveness. Political efficacy concerns the evaluation of the institutional responsiveness to the demands of the individual (external political efficacy) and the extent to which someone feels they can influence the political process (internal political efficacy) (Geurkink et al., 2020). I hypothesize that ethnic populist parties have an effect on the external political efficacy of indigenous people, based on the arguments put forward by Mansbridge (1999) that justify descriptive representation. Firstly, when the ability to rule of a historically marginalized group was seriously questioned, a relationship of mistrust occurred between the historically marginalized group and the governmental elite. This created a belief among the subordinated group that only representatives of their group could be trusted (Dovi, 2002). Secondly, descriptive representation helps to represent the interests of the historically marginalized

group when new issues arise on the political agenda on which party identification has not happened yet. Thirdly, the descriptive representation includes historically marginalized groups, increasing their participation and de facto legitimacy of the polity. The underlying idea is that when people see themselves represented by co-ethnic politicians, the historical relation of distrust between the government and indigenous individuals is countered, which leads to a higher level of external political efficacy (Mansbridge, 1999).

The structure of the thesis is as follows: First, I elaborate on the relevant concepts in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2. Concepts discussed are descriptive representation, ethnic populist parties, external political efficacy, and how these concepts relate to each other. In the third chapter, the data and methods are described. This thesis uses the LAPOP survey data of 2023 and applies multilevel regression models to address the different levels of the data. After that, the results are analyzed and discussed. Subsequently, I discuss the findings and their implications, ending with the thesis's conclusion, which reflects on the central question posed above.

The results can be summarized as follows: Different ethnic groups display different levels of external political efficacy in Latin America. Especially striking is that mestizos display the lowest level of external political efficacy. Indigenous people have a higher level of external political efficacy than white people on average. In countries where an ethnic populist party is present (Bolivia and Ecuador), indigenous people's external political efficacy is higher compared to indigenous individuals living in a country without such a party present. The hypothesized interaction of the left/right orientation and voting for an ethnic populist party on external political efficacy do not give significant results. Therefore, ethnic populist parties lead to higher external political efficacy among indigenous individuals, but the mechanism has yet to be uncovered. The importance of aligning political structures with the diverse identities of the citizenry is underscored by highlighting the role of descriptive representation concerning the external political efficacy of indigenous people.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

This chapter elaborates on descriptive representation and its relevance to the broader discussion of political representation. Subsequently, the different ethnic and racial categories in Latin America that are relevant to this thesis are discussed. After that, the focus shifts to populism in the Latin American context. Subsequently, I explore the rise of indigenous movements and ethnic populist parties.

Additionally, the concept of political efficacy and its connection to descriptive representation is discussed. I argue that the presence of ethnic populist parties results in a higher level of external political efficacy among indigenous citizens. The representation indigenous people by indigenous individuals on the national level counters mistrust between historically marginalized groups and the government elite. This leads to a higher evaluation of the responsiveness of politicians in general by indigenous individuals.

### 2.1 Descriptive Representation

#### 2.1.1 What is Political Representation?

Before it is possible to discuss the political representation of any group, it is important to establish what political representation is. Hanna Pitkin (1972) provides a starting point by distinguishing four types of political representation. The first, formalistic representation, entails the institutional arrangements that deal with accountability and authority. This type of political representation focuses on the institutional arrangements that lead to representation and assesses whether the representative acquired his or her position legitimately by, for example, looking at the quality of elections. To assess the accountability of a representative, the formalistic lens looks at the institutional arrangements in place regarding the sanctioning mechanisms available to constituents, like elections (Dovi, 2018). Secondly, symbolic representation addresses how a representative symbolizes a group. This form of representation looks at the meaning that the representative has for the represented. An example is a king in a constitutional monarchy. The evaluation of formalistic representation can be done by measuring the approval rates of citizens towards the king. Thirdly, with substantive representation, the representative takes action on behalf of the represented as a substitute for them. To evaluate the substantive representation, one looks at the policy preferences of the represented and whether the representative advocates for those policy preferences. Lastly, descriptive representation looks at *who* is representing. This form of political representation questions whether the representatives resemble the characteristics of, or correspond to, the represented, looking at, for example, gender, ethnicity, and class. The representative thus ‘stands for’ a group (Pitkin, 1972). This also comes forward in the definition of descriptive representation from Jane Mansbridge. She defines descriptive representatives as ‘Representatives who in their own person and lives are in some sense typical of the larger class of

persons whom they represent' ((Mansbridge, 1999, p. 629). Descriptive representation is not undisputed. Therefore, the pitfalls and advantages of descriptive representation are discussed below.

### 2.1.2 Pitfalls of Descriptive Representation

There is an ongoing debate on the desirability of descriptive political representation within political science. Some believe in the importance of descriptive representation, while others have put forward arguments on why descriptive representation might not be desirable. Pitkin (1972) states that descriptive representation might contrast with accountability. The focus on the resemblance of characteristics between the constituents and the representatives distracts the focus from evaluating whether the representative serves the constituents' interests by their actions. This might lead to a lesser focus on holding the representatives accountable for their decisions by constituents and political systems, as their presence alone is assumed to address the substantive representation of the constituents. The constituents might provide unquestioning loyalty to the descriptive representative. Pitkin thus warns that descriptive representation must not be the only evaluation criterion of representatives' legitimacy.

When discussing descriptive representation, it is important to avoid the pitfall of essentialism. Essentialism assumes all group members have a shared, identical, exclusive identity. The identity and experiences of the group members are experienced and lived by them uniformly. When adhering to a discourse of essentialism, one overlooks the heterogeneity within a group and the diverse and sometimes conflicting interests existing within the group (Dovi, 2002; Mansbridge, 1999). This boils down to the question, 'Will just any woman, black or Latino do?' Dovi (2002) provides a solution that acknowledges the heterogeneity within historically disadvantaged groups. The descriptive representative(s) should possess strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups that exist within the historically disadvantaged group. Dispossessed subgroups of a historically disadvantaged group are groups that lack the political and economic resources necessary for effective representation. The members of a dispossessed subgroup suffer oppression not only as members of the overarching group but also as members of the subgroup. Class, sexuality, drug use, geographic location, criminal records, and religion are possible makers of dispossessed subgroups within a historically disadvantaged group. This diversity within the dispossessed subgroups needs to be recognized, together with the possibility that subgroups of the historically disadvantaged group are excluded within this historically disadvantaged group. If the divisions within the group are so significant that one representative cannot represent them legitimately, more than one descriptive representative of the historically disadvantaged group is necessary. This counters the assumption that 'any woman or black will do' representing the historically disadvantaged group (Dovi, 2002).

## 2.1.2 The Importance of Descriptive Representation

Even though there are some pitfalls to consider when discussing descriptive representation, some have put forward arguments as to why descriptive representation is justified. Mansbridge (1999) argues that the descriptive representation of groups is sometimes justified to the extent that it reflects the proportion of the population. She states that the descriptive representation of a group furthers its substantive representation. Especially when it concerns groups who have been marginalized in the past and whose ability to rule was seriously questioned. The descriptive representation is necessary for several reasons. Firstly, to counter mistrust. If one group has been historically dominant over the other group, this creates inattention and arrogance on the part of the dominant group towards the subordinate group. Likewise, a history of dominance and subordination creates distrust between members of the subordinate group towards the dominant group members (Mansbridge, 1999). Betrayal in the past and present of the dominant group towards the subordinate group created a belief among the subordinate group that only descriptive representatives can be trusted (Dovi, 2002). This distrust makes communication between the groups difficult. Representatives and voters who share experiences of being in the subordinate group and who share similar outward signs of having lived through these shared experiences can read each others signals more efficiently. Therefore, communication is more accurate, forging bonds of trust based on the shared experience of subordination (Mansbridge, 1999).

Secondly, Mansbridge states that descriptive representation can help articulate uncrystallized interests in deliberation. When issues are new on the political agenda, political parties are often not yet organized around these new issues. Party identification and campaign statements may not provide enough guidelines; therefore, the voter might best vote for the representative with the descriptive characteristics corresponding to one's own. With new issues arising, the voter can more or less expect the representative to do what the voter would have done. The descriptive representative draws on shared experiences with constituents to explore the consequences of these new issues and speak on those issues with the authority of experience (Mansbridge, 1999). Especially in a context of communicative mistrust, the representative is less able to advocate for the interests of the subordinate group when the representative has not lived through these experiences themselves.

Two other arguments forwarded by Mansbridge do not concern the improvement of the substantive representation of a minority group but are nevertheless important when discussing descriptive representation. First, creating a sense of ability to rule and second, an increased legitimacy of the polity. Firstly, creating a sense of ability to rule is especially important when a group has been legally excluded from voting in history. The group has the historically embedded meaning that persons with these characteristics do not rule, which implies that persons with these characteristics cannot (are not able to) rule. Including descriptive representatives from these groups can reshape the social

meaning of the characteristics into implying that they can rule. This also counts when the descriptive characteristics signal status differences. A low descriptive proportion of a minority group in politics creates the social meaning of 'unable to rule.' Proportional descriptive representation can reshape the social meaning into 'able to rule.' Secondly, seeing the proportional descriptive representation of a minority group enhances the de facto legitimacy of the polity as the members of the historically underrepresented groups feel as if they themselves are present in the deliberations. The feeling of inclusion makes the polity democratically more legitimate (Mansbridge, 1999). The inclusion is necessary for increasing political participation among historically disadvantaged groups and strengthening the legitimacy of democratic institutions (Dovi, 2002).

The importance of descriptive political representation is illustrated by Suzanne Dovi (2002). She states that privileged and less privileged groups have conflicting interests. Therefore, a privileged group will not represent the interests of a historically disadvantaged group. To exemplify, we can look at the issue of women's representation, as Sapiro (1981) did. Men were long deemed fit to represent the interests of their wives. From this perspective, there was no issue with women's representation, as their husbands represented their interests. However, men's and women's political interests are different and possibly conflicting. Through this construction, the interests of the women were not represented by their husbands. Griffin (2014) exemplifies the impact that the descriptive representation of a minority group can have in the US. He summarizes that in the US, African American legislators are more likely to reflect the interests of the black constituents during roll call votes than their white party members. Black legislators are also more likely to propose legislation that aligns with African American policy preferences. Minority groups like Blacks and Latinos benefit when there are minority legislators present to prioritize and advance issues that affect minority groups more, like education, health care, and employment. Descriptive representation would also lower political alienation and increase knowledge about the representatives. This improves the evaluations of governmental responsiveness. The presence of minority political candidates also leads to a higher efficacy in the mass public, which leads to higher voter turnout. Wolak (2020) shows that men and women in the US display more political knowledge when represented by a woman in Congress. However, there is no higher level of political participation among women when a female representative represents them. Haider-Markel (2007) contends that, in the US, a higher number of open LGBT representatives and state legislators leads to a better substantive representation of LGBT interests, leading to more legislative bills and policies beneficial to the LGBT community. Wolak & Juenke (2021) show that when co-racial and co-ethnic representatives represent a minority, the knowledge gaps between whites, blacks, Asian-Americans and Latinos are diminished. Descriptive representation, therefore, ensures more informed voter decision-making and helps citizens hold their elected officials accountable.

## 2.2 Ethnic Populist Parties in Latin America

To fully understand the rise, existence, and importance of ethnic populist parties in Latin America, it is important to break the topic down into its underlying elements. First, I discuss the different ethnic and racial categories and how they relate to each other in Latin America. Thereafter, I discuss populism's developments in the Latin American context. Subsequently, an overview is given on the rise of indigenous politics and how it led to the emergence of ethnic populist parties in Latin America.

### 2.2.1 Race and Ethnicity in Latin America

Race and ethnicity are often used interchangeably in the Latin American context. However, what they mean is often not clearly defined (Peloso, 2014; Wade, 2003). The concepts do not refer to a biological state but are a social construct with real social implications. Central is the idea that there are human categories of people who look and act differently from each other, and these differences are seen as physically and culturally inheritable. Especially the concept of race emerged during the trans-Atlantic slave trade of Africans by Europeans and was assumed to have foundations in human nature. Race and ethnicity refer to the idea that there is a physical difference between categories such as 'white,' 'black,' and 'Indigenous.' However, the differences in education level, income and cultural behavior are social differences (Peloso, 2014; Wade, 2003). Here, I elaborate on the different ethnic and racial groups present in Latin America.

#### *White*

From colonial times onwards, the white European identity has been in power through the installment of the dual state: the Republic of the Indians and the Republic of the Spaniards. In colonial times, the Spaniards from the Iberian peninsula started as the continent's rulers but were later replaced by their descendants, called Creoles (Wade, 2003). This new white upper class maintained their grip on power, although in different ways. The governments actively promoted processes of 'whitening' the population through European immigration. In Argentina, for example, 6 million European immigrants entered the country at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Peloso, 2014). This white ideal and myth of Argentina as a white European country linked poverty and low socioeconomic status to pigmentation and phenotype (Teichman, 2022). Whites, especially men, remained at the top of the hierarchy. The process of *mestizaje*, mentioned in the introduction, also implied that social mobility could be achieved by identifying as a social category classified as 'lighter' (Wade, 2015). Nowadays, Uruguay and Argentina have the highest proportion of white inhabitants. Throughout Latin America, whites most often have completed university education, together with mestizos, except in Ecuador (Telles et al., 2023).

### *Mestizo*

The mestizo category is especially characteristic of the Latin American context. For example, Ecuador and El Salvador mainly consist of mestizo inhabitants (Telles et al., 2023). As stated in the introduction, the mestizo category emerged from the mixing of indigenous and European inhabitants. The mestizo category became larger and nowadays many people in Latin America identify themselves as mestizo (Wade, 2015; Yashar, 2015). As ethnic identification is more ambiguous in the Latin American context, it is not completely clear who and how many mestizos there are, as identifying as mestizo also might be an attempt towards upward mobility for indigenous who ‘pass’ as mestizo (Wade, 2010). The mestizo identity was championed by countries in order to form a homogenous society and as part of the nation-building ideology. However, by championing mestizo over the indigenous, black or mulatto identity, a perception of whiteness is associated with social status. As a nation-building ideology, mestizaje also led to mestizos entering the top of the ethnic hierarchy, sometimes just below, and sometimes next to the Creoles in Latin America (Peloso, 2014).

### *Indigenous*

As earlier stated, identifying who is indigenous and who is not, together with other ethnic categories, is not as straightforward in the Latin American context due to the high ambiguity and flexibility of ethnic identification (Madrid, 2005). Countries have struggled with identifying who is indigenous, now primarily relying on self-identification. Only Peru relies on the mother tongue to identify indigenous people in its census. However, Spanish or Portuguese have replaced many indigenous languages (World Bank Group, 2015). Some substantive indigenous groups throughout the region are the Mayans in Guatemala and Mexico, the Aztecs in Mexico, the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia and Peru, the Kiche and Shuar in Ecuador, the Mapuche in Chile, the Guaraní in Paraguay, and the different Amazonian communities (Albala & Natal, 2023). These are overarching terms. For example, in Mexico alone already live 68 different ethnic groups with 364 different languages spoken (Natal, 2023).

Some shared features can be distinguished when looking at the indigenous population of Latin America. Generally speaking, indigenous people live more in the rural areas. One striking exception is Chile, where approximately 75% of the indigenous Mapuche population lives in the capital. This can be explained by the invasion of indigenous territories in the south, leading to a forced migration to Santiago de Chile (Tricot, 2023). These rural areas often lack access to electricity, piped water and sewerage. Also, at the education level, rural indigenous communities often lie behind (World Bank Group, 2015). In Mexico, 43% of indigenous people do not finish elementary education (Natal, 2023). In Guatemala, the literacy rate of indigenous people is 64,7%, whereas that of non-indigenous people is 79,1% (Barragán, 2023). In Paraguay, the literacy rate among indigenous is 37,6%, whereas this is

6,3% on average of the population (Villalba, 2023). Also, indigenous people are more likely to live in poverty in the region. In Ecuador, 42% of the indigenous population lives in poverty, compared to 27% of the non-indigenous population (Resina, 2023). In Guatemala, the numbers are 79,2%, respectively, compared to 42,6% (Barragán, 2023). Even though indigenous people are formally included, they often face a marginalized social and economic position in the region. Indigenous people, together with black people, comprise the largest group that did not obtain any education or only primary education throughout Latin America (Telles et al., 2023).

### *African Descendants*

The Afro-descendant population makes up between 20% and 25% of the population in Latin America (Telles et al., 2023). During colonial times, African people were sold and transported as enslaved people to work on plantations throughout the whole of the American continent, including the Caribbean. Large numbers ended up in Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru and Mexico. The mixing between indigenous people, Africans and Europeans happened from the beginning; however, the acceptance of it differed throughout the region (Wade, 2003). The mixing of different races led to a 'pyramid scheme' where white Europeans and their descendants were at the top of the hierarchy, and indigenous people and enslaved black people were at the bottom. The people of mixed descent ended up somewhere in the middle, depending on ancestry, appearance, occupation and wealth (Wade, 2003). One of the mixed categories that emerged was 'mulatto', which meant someone with mixed African and European descent (Smedley et al., 2024; Yashar, 2015). Together with mestizos, they occupied a middle category in the colonial hierarchy. However, mulattos, together with black people, indigenous people and mestizos, suffered from racial discrimination and exclusion from residential areas and occupations (Wade, 2003).

Hooker (2005) points out that the current status of black people in Latin America is different from the status of indigenous people. She states that even though indigenous people have gained certain collective rights and group rights, such as territorial autonomy, collective land rights and language preservation, African descendants experience difficulties acquiring such rights. Only in specific contexts of communities of descendants of runaway slaves, such as the Quilombos in Brazil, the Garifuna in Central America, and the Cimarrones in Colombia and Ecuador, managed to acquire collective group rights. The success depends on framing their struggles similarly to indigenous people: they claim land rights based on ancestral peoples who lived there for generations in relative isolation. The rights are based on the idea that the group possesses a distinct identity. However, indigenous people are generally granted more and more often group rights as they are more often perceived as a distinct cultural group. Only in three countries did Afro-Latinos gain exactly the same collective rights as indigenous people: Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (Hooker, 2005). However, Brazil has the

most significant proportion of the Afro-descendant population in Latin America (Telles et al., 2023). Also, the general societal position of black people leaves room for improvement. The black population experiences higher poverty rates and maternal and child mortality than white counterparts (Yashar, 2015). Additionally, skin color is an important predictor of lower educational attainment (Flores & Telles, 2012). The disadvantage in education level compared to whites is most apparent in El Salvador, Ecuador and Brazil (Telles et al., 2023).

### *Other Groups*

There are other ethnic groups present in Latin America than white, indigenous, black and mixed. From the mid-nineteenth century, immigrants from Asia (called Chinos, regardless of the country of origin) and the Middle East (often called Turcos as they entered the country as Ottoman citizens) entered Latin American countries, which continued during the First and Second World Wars. Hu-DeHart (2009) states that Latin American scholars have long overlooked these immigrants. However, Chinese, Japanese, and Syrian-Lebanese often entered Latin American countries to work on the land. Even though these groups started with small numbers, nowadays, they have increased in size and influence. For example, 1.2 million Brazilians are of Japanese heritage (Hu-DeHart, 2009). Some of these groups have risen to elite status and delivered presidents of Latin American countries, such as Bucaram and Mahuad in Ecuador and Fujimori in Peru. In Costa Rica, Uruguay and Brazil, the Asian population constitutes a large part of the university graduates (Telles et al., 2023). Even though this group is not the main focus of this thesis, it is important to note that immigration did not stop after the independence of Latin American countries but that the region has remained a destiny of immigrants, which are also part of the composition of the Latin American people.

## 2.2.2 History of Populism in Latin America

Populism is often defined as ‘ a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people ’ (Geurkink et al., 2020; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Defining populism as a thin-centered ideology results in that it can differ who the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’ are. (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) argue that populism is different in Latin America from populism as known in Europe. They state that populism in Latin America is inclusionary, while populism in Europe is exclusionary. The difference between inclusionary and exclusionary lies between who is seen by the people and the elite and the ideological features attached to the populist ideology. Exclusionary populism means that the definition of the good people is a narrow definition entailing, for example, the white working class of a country. Inclusionary populism implies that the

definition of the good people is more broadly applied to everyone not benefitting from the incumbent regime. Multiple groups can be included in opposing the corrupt elite.

Populism can be left-wing as well as right-wing, and this also defines who is seen as the good people and the corrupt elite. In Latin America, populism has been typically described by its socioeconomic dimension of including people with low incomes, while in Europe, populism has a more sociocultural dimension of excluding the ‘aliens’ and politicizing identity issues (Madrid, 2007). Historically, populism in Europe has been classified as more right-wing, whereas populism in Latin America is seen as more left-wing. However, the image is not as clear-cut as it seems. Left-wing populist parties exist in Europe. For example, the SP in The Netherlands (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015), Podemos in Spain, and Syriza in Greece have been labeled left-wing populist parties (Santana & Rama, 2018). Historically, there were right-wing populist regimes in Latin America, for example, by Fujimori in Peru. Currently, there is a rise of right-wing populism in Latin America, as demonstrated by the presidential election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Javier Milei in Argentina (Salgado & Sandrin, 2021). Therefore, dividing populism into European right-wing populism and Latin American left-wing populism might be too short-sighted when looking at the empiric reality. The section below elaborates on the development of populism in Latin America. The historical development of populism in Latin America can be classified into three waves. From the 1940s to the 1960s, classical populism emerged. The second wave is the neoliberal populist wave that emerged during the 1990s. The last wave of populism in Latin America emerged in the 2000s and has a radical leftist character (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).

The first wave of classical populism arose during the crisis with the ruling order that implemented liberally inspired constitutions in mainly rural societies. There was a relationship of domination and subordination, as the majority of the population was excluded from the public sphere. Processes of urbanization and industrialization questioned these power structures and allowed populist leaders to emerge. Examples of classical populist leaders are Juan Perón in Argentina and José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador (De La Torre, 2017). Common people were seen as the pure people, while the foreign-oriented elites were framed as the corrupt elite. However, indigenous people and people of African descent were not part of the imagined ‘virtuous and mestizo community’ (Salgado & Sandrin, 2021). In countries like Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, industrialization led to the cooperation of populist leaders with labor organizations and redistributive social policies. In more agrarian countries, populism was linked to including the previously excluded electors through demonstrations and mass rallies. This gave a symbolic sense of inclusion to the marginalized and poor. However, the participation of common people was not institutionalized; Their participation was envisioned as attending demonstrations and mass rallies (Salgado & Sandrin, 2021). The ties to the government were through labor and peasant organizations (Yashar, 1999). The populist leaders of the classical wave did

not feel much for liberal democracy and the constraints on power, the autonomy of civil society, and the pluralism it entailed. The first wave ended with the rise of the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s (De La Torre, 2017).

The second wave of populism in Latin America is the neoliberal wave. They portrayed the incumbent political parties as the corrupt elite that illegally claimed to act on behalf of the people, appropriating the people's sovereignty. The rise of the neoliberal populist wave led to social polarization and political divisions. Examples of neoliberal populist leaders are Fujimori in Peru, Menem in Argentina, Collor de Mello in Brazil, and Bucaram in Ecuador. The cause of the rise of this populist wave was often the bad state of the economy and the high levels of inflation. The traditional white political elites were held responsible for the economic downfall and were framed as enemies of 'the people.' (De La Torre, 2017) Similar to the previous wave of populism, it aimed to include the previously excluded people. This time, the people working in the informal sector who weren't part of any working or middle-class organization had to be included. The people were seen as a passive mass of individuals whose interests and ideas could be inferred by opinion polls (Salgado & Sandrin, 2021). The neoliberal wave abandoned nationalist policies, reduced the state and opened the country's economy to the international market. They privatized what the first wave of populism had nationalized. The lowering of hyperinflation partly explains the success of the neoliberal wave. However, the privatization of previously state-owned businesses made it possible to install a system of patronage and clientelism. The free market policies also led to higher unemployment rates and increased inequality, which paved the way for the third populist wave (De La Torre, 2017).

The last wave of populism is radical populism, which, like the classical populist wave, politicized social and economic exclusion. Radical populism is characterized by nationalism, anti-imperialism, and redistribution based on the high prices of commodities. The regimes were of a personalistic nature, centering on the leader. Like the neoliberal populist wave, they framed the traditional political parties as the source of the issues. Neoliberal economic policies were linked to liberal politics, leading to the conviction that the neoliberal wave caused the failure of liberal democracy. The policies of radical populism were similar to classical populism in that they implemented nationalist and redistributive policies but kept neoliberal policies that targeted people who worked in the informal sector (De La Torre, 2017). In Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, mineral resources like mines were nationalized again, as they saw the multinationals that exploited them as part of the corrupt elite. The growth of China led to increased prices of raw materials and commodities, which was the basis of the economic growth in Latin America, helping millions of people out of poverty. The people who were excluded and discriminated against, like indigenous groups, were now envisioned as part of the people, while the elite were the neoliberals and all politicians who supported Western models of politics and foreign investments (Salgado & Sandrin,

2021). Examples of leaders from the radical populist wave are Correa in Ecuador and Chávez and Maduro in Venezuela. They had a leadership style commanding from above, combining diverse demands from below as they claimed to embody the demands of different constituencies. Morales in Bolivia had a different leadership style, allowing more autonomy to grassroots organizations that made up his constituencies (Madrid, 2007). They all promised better democratic arrangements to tackle the issues of failing participation and representation in liberal democratic regimes.

Salgado and Sandrin discuss that after the 'pink tide' of the third wave of populism with the abovementioned leaders, there is now a turn to the right from 2017 onward with the election of Pinera in Chile, Duque in Colombia and, more recently, Bolsonaro in Brazil and Milei in Argentina. This was because the economic growth the third populist policies were based on stagnated due to the global financial crisis in 2008. The prices of natural resources collapsed, leading to economic downfall and making way for conservative right-wing politicians. However, the turn to the right is not occurring in all Latin American countries and not in the same manner. Populism thus developed in several waves in Latin America, showing that it could connect to different ideologies. Nevertheless, the waves did not occur similarly everywhere in Latin America. In Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica and Colombia, populist leaders did not get to power. De La Torre (2017) explains that populism results from a political representation crisis. In countries like Uruguay and Colombia, the traditional political parties succeeded in incorporating the previously excluded groups. However, in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia, the opposition to the political establishment was organized through new labor-based populist parties and political movements, politicizing a new cleavage of the elite versus the people. Also, the high personalization of political competition and the unresponsiveness of the party system are factors that explain the rise of the populist waves.

### 2.2.3 From Indigenous Movement to Ethnic Populist Party

To understand the rise and success of ethnic populist parties, we need to understand the political situation in the region from approximately the 1950s and onwards. Throughout the region, both democratic and authoritarian regimes institutionalized corporatist constructions through which organizations intermediate interests between individuals and the state. Corporatist citizenship regimes meant that not individuals but peasant and labor associations could access civil and social rights such as health care, credit, and education. The role of labor unions was expanded, and the representation of the working class was enhanced, extending social benefits and enhancing land reforms (Yashar, 1999, 2015). Mexico was one of the first countries to enact land reforms in the 1930s (Natal, 2023), whereas, in Bolivia, such laws were passed in the 1950s. In Ecuador, the land reforms were passed in 1964 and 1973. (Yashar, 2015). These corporatist citizen regimes aimed to create unity and attempt a nation-building process by framing indigenous peoples as national peasants, downplaying possible ethnic

cleavages (Kaltwasser, 2014). In some sense, it was effective, as indigenous communities started registering themselves as a peasant organization to access resources and get politically included. However, the implementation was not as strictly and evenly as intended. Via these land reform and credit programs, indigenous communities could secure the spaces where they locally institutionalized indigenous practices (Yashar, 1999). The reforms created a lawful form of peasant incorporation in the state in, for example, Guatemala (1944-1954), Ecuador (1964-1966), Peru (1968-1975), Mexico (1943-1940) and Bolivia (1952-1964) (Yashar, 1998). The states thus fostered and maintained an indigenous culture by providing resources like land and agricultural credits and subsidies through peasant organizations. The indigenous people took up a peasant identity for the state, while within the community they maintained their indigenous identity. The union authorities and rules shaped these community organizations, but the indigenous authorities also began to shape union politics over time (Yashar, 1999).

During the following decades, many Latin American countries went from a democratic regime to an authoritarian regime and back. For example, in 1964, military leader Barrientos came to power in Bolivia, and in 1971, Banzer committed a coup, installing a military regime lasting until 1982 (Cunha Filho, 2023). The military seized power in Brazil in 1965 and ruled until 1985 (Peloso, 2014). In Ecuador, the military junta ruled from 1963 to 1979, with a break from 1967 to 1972. In Argentina, the Videla regime ruled from 1976 to 1983, whereas in Guatemala, the authoritarian regime installed in 1954 led to a civil war lasting until 1996 (Barragán, 2023; Pallister, 2013). Peru already faced military coups before Alberto Fujimori came to power and ruled from 1968 until 1980 (Espinosa et al., 2023). Probably most known is the Pinochet regime in Chile, lasting from 1973 to 1990 (Tricot, 2023). During the 1980s and 1990s economic crisis, states adopted a neoliberal course, advocating for individual autonomy and responsibility, and leftist parties declined in size and number (Pallister, 2013; Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 1999). Where before, organizations like labor unions were the way through which individuals got access to the state, now individuals themselves were granted civil rights (and political rights after democratic reform). Peasant and labor organizations, therefore, lost their political and social position. The indigenous groups that used these organizations to access the state lost their formal ties to the state. Credit programs were canceled, the land market became privatized and the government decentralized. This posed a threat to the communal land base of the indigenous peoples. The neoliberal and democratic politics, therefore, did not grant more equal and neoliberal citizenship rights to indigenous people as it promised. On the contrary, their access to the state and the indigenous local autonomy was diminished. The neoliberal focus on individual autonomy failed to address the position of the indigenous and to secure their rights (Yashar, 1999, 2015).

Especially in the countryside, indigenous movements started to protest the violation of their rights under the democratic regimes. These regimes and their focus on individual rights could not

protect the rights of indigenous minorities as a group. These indigenous movements politicized an ethnic cleavage and challenged the state-promoted discourse of national homogeneity and the attack on their communal lands (Yashar, 1998, 1999). A first example of such an indigenous movement is the neozapatista movement in Mexico, declaring war on the Mexican state in 1994 (Natal, 2023). Even though it seemed like a peasant revolt, the negotiations focused on issues that indigenous communities face, like autonomy and the participation of indigenous people in the country's decision-making process. In Bolivia, the Kataristas were the leading group opposing the military regime and became the link between the Aymara population in the cities and the countryside. Also, the Federations of Coca Growers became an indigenous-based movement opposing the neoliberal regime and the war on drugs initiated by the United States (Cunha Filho, 2023; Yashar, 1998). In Ecuador, the CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador) proved vital in organizing the Inti Raymi uprising in June 1990, where indigenous people from the highlands started protesting for their rights, which later proved to be a turning point in putting the issues of indigenous people under neoliberalism on the agenda and unifying indigenous communities (Resina, 2023). In Colombia, indigenous organizations arose in the Cauca region, gaining momentum and mobilizing indigenous and non-indigenous citizens, leading to the new constitution of 1991 in which indigenous were granted assigned seats and land rights. They were no longer labeled as 'savages who need civilizing' (Laurent, 2023). These indigenous organizations started the promotion of indigenous customary law and institutions of self-government to strengthen territorial autonomy and end the domination of local elites over indigenous peoples.

Not in all countries indigenous movements managed to gain momentum and organize themselves. Peru and Guatemala are often mentioned as 'failed' cases where indigenous movements did not manage to rise and/or consolidate themselves into a national political party (Barragán, 2023; Pallister, 2013; Yashar, 1998). Most famously is the Guatemalan Rigoberta Menchú, who won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 for her efforts to achieve social justice in Guatemala (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024). Her efforts to organize a Mayan party on the national level failed, as the indigenous movements of the country were not strong and well organized enough to back her up (Pallister, 2013). Also, in Paraguay, Chile and Brazil, no mentionable indigenous movement or political party emerged (Villalba, 2023). In the literature, several reasons are mentioned as to why indigenous movements emerged and had electoral success as political parties in some countries, and in others, they did not. The previous level of indigenous mobilization, the level of cohesion of the indigenous movements' organization, the electoral rules, and the party system openness are all factors that contribute to the success or failure of an indigenous political party (Van Cott, 2005). Additionally, when indigenous representation is present at the local level, as is the case in Guatemala, the need for representation at the national level declines. Indigenous political parties also are less likely to emerge when there is a national context of political repression and violence (Pallister, 2013). In the Latin American context, one specific type of

indigenous political party proved successful and managed to gain electoral success and consolidate on the national level: the ethnic populist parties, present in Bolivia and Ecuador (Madrid, 2005).

Ethnic populist parties emerged after the decline of the left-oriented parties with the implementation of neoliberal policies. The traditionally left parties appealed to indigenous voters. Leftist organizations that were previously part of left-wing parties helped the rising Indigenous movements combine an anti-neoliberal discourse with cultural demands and authority claims (Yashar, 1999). The combination of populist economic discourse and indigenous identity has been important for the electoral success of the indigenous-based political parties. They appealed to a broad public of lower-class and unattached voters who were dissatisfied with the corrupt and unresponsive traditional political parties. The low levels of ethnic polarization and the fluidity of ethnic identification in the region meant that the indigenous-based parties had to adopt inclusionary rhetoric to win sufficient votes (Madrid, 2007). Inclusionary rhetoric entailed the envisioning of the 'pure people' by multiple ethnic groups, including several indigenous communities, mestizos and whites, to form a coalition against a 'corrupt elite.' This was enacted by including individuals from different ethnic groups in the party in key positions. Through this strategy, the indigenous-based parties also appealed to people of other ethnic groups and people who somewhat identify with indigenous cultures or support other party positions. Together with inclusionary rhetoric, the party strategy combined the denouncing of traditional political parties and existing elites with a highly redistributive, nationalist and state interventionist agenda. With this agenda, ethnic populist parties succeeded in binding urban whites and mestizos together with multiple rural and urban indigenous communities. The inclusion of multiple ethnic groups within the party as leaders and candidates and explicitly including them in the rhetoric of the pure people who need to benefit from the redistributive agenda makes the ethnic populist parties inclusive populist parties (Kaltwasser, 2014; Madrid, 2005, 2007).

Bolivia and Ecuador are the two cases in which an ethnic populist party consolidated their position on the national level. In Bolivia, the constitutional reforms of the 1990s already recognized the country as multicultural and pluri-ethnic. However, the country's rural areas lagged behind in the development of access to resources such as healthcare and education. The war on drugs also put pressure on the Federation of Coca Growers from Chapare, who became combative in their resistance and based themselves on the early Kataristas. To enter the political arena, they used the already registered but inactive party name Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). They chose Evo Morales as their candidate for the presidency in the 2002 elections. MAS came second, and Morales proved vital in mobilizing the mass protests that would become the Gas War. These protests were against foreign investors exploiting the country's natural gas resources, leading to President Lozada's resignation (Cunha Filho, 2023). New elections were held in 2005, where MAS would be the biggest party with 53% of the votes. Morales mobilized and united multiple ethnic groups by framing the foreign

investors and former president as the 'corrupt elite,' uniting Aymara, Quechua and mestizos against this corrupt elite. Not only was the populist rhetoric inclusionary, but the party also recruited white and mestizo candidates. The MAS campaigned to nationalize the country's natural resources and framed the neoliberal government as the corrupt elite, stating that their policies caused inequality in the country (Cunha Filho, 2023; Madrid, 2005, 2007). The MAS emerged from indigenous peasant organizations and evolved also to include middle-class and non-indigenous people, building multiclass and multiethnic alliances.

The Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) is Ecuador's primary indigenous movement and organization. The CONAIE was founded in 1986 to advocate for land rights and agricultural reform of indigenous communities. It was based on two different organizations that advocated for indigenous rights in the highlands and the Amazon region. In Ecuador, the indigenous communities are found in the highlands, the Amazon and the coastal region, which all have different demands. The CONAIE brought these communities closer and represented their interests as one organization (Resina, 2023). The result was the Inti Raymi uprising in 1990, in which indigenous people from the highlands participated in protests and roadblocks to advocate for land rights reform. In 1992, the Great March was organized in which Amazonian indigenous people marched from the Amazon to Quito to protest against the extraction of natural resources by multinational companies in the Amazon and for the recognition of their identity and capacity of self-government (Resina, 2023; Zamosc, 2007). In 1995, the movement founded a political branch: the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement (MUPP). The CONAIE and MUPP have been vital for the support or failure of several Ecuadorian presidents, such as Bucaram, Mahuad and Gutiérrez. The CONAIE played an important role in the constituent assemblies that resulted in the 1998 Constitution, which recognized the identity and rights of the indigenous population. The Pachakutik party and CONAIE had an anti-systemic voice. They managed to unite not only the various indigenous groups in the countries but also included mestizo leaders and had more general policy proposals to serve a broad constituency. The focus on land reform and the redistributive ideology made Pachakutik an alternative to traditional left-wing parties (Resina, 2023; Zamosc, 2007). This led to the best electoral results in 2006, with 20,64% of the votes with the alliance with Gutiérrez, and in 2021, with Yaku Pérez leading to 19,39% of the votes. However, the 2006 alliance and the later rise of Rafael Correa, who managed to include progressive voters, led to meager election results between 2006 and 2021. Including the Amazonian indigenous people and their issues led to identifying the MUPP party as an eco-socialist party, enabling the party to attract more progressive voters again (Zamosc, 2007)

## 2.3 External Political Efficacy

As stated in the introduction, the main question asks to what extent ethnic populist parties affect the perceived representation of indigenous people. The previous parts explained why descriptive representation is important and what these ethnic populist parties entail. To make the effect of ethnic populist parties on the perceived representation of indigenous people more tangible, the concept of external political efficacy is utilized. Summarized, here, the connection is made between the topics and how the effect of the ethnic populist parties on the perceived descriptive representation is operationalized. The underlying assumption is that when people see themselves represented nationally, they feel more included in the decision-making process and feel their interests are advocated for. This would counter the mistrust between the governing elite and the indigenous population and increase the legitimacy of the polity, heightening the external political efficacy of indigenous citizens.

First, a definition of external political efficacy and an evaluation of its applicability is necessary when looking at the perceived representation of indigenous people. Campbell et al. (1971) define political efficacy as the feeling that an individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible and that individual citizens can contribute to this change. This definition highlights the individual as an actor that can bring about change. However, the definition is quite broad and does not go into the mechanisms that bring about the desired change. A distinction is made within the political efficacy concept, which indicates that two different actors are involved in change. The first is internal political efficacy, which entails whether an individual feels competent to understand and participate in politics. Internal political efficacy is important when evaluating politics and feeling that one can adequately form an opinion on political affairs and formulate a demand for change. Distinct but related to it is the concept of external political efficacy. This concerns the beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizen demands (Clarke & Acock, 1989; Craig et al., 1990; Geurkink et al., 2020). Internal and external political efficacy jointly articulate two actors that the individual evaluates when he or she wants to bring about change. An individual him/herself needs to feel competent to form opinions on the political situation and evaluate alternatives. Additionally, politicians and government institutions must also respond to citizens' demands and implement the change.

Both external and internal political efficacy have been associated with the political participation of the individual. When an individual feels able to understand politics and beliefs and have his or her voice heard, he or she is more likely to participate in politics (McDonnell, 2020; Seligson, 1980). Also, a positive correlation was found between political efficacy and voting. However, the connection between external political efficacy and participation has not yet been

confirmed reliably. The findings can be conditional as external efficacy might be boosted when one votes for the winning political party (Clarke & Acock, 1989; Gil De Zúñiga et al., 2017). Especially external political efficacy has been connected to other concepts such as political trust and populist attitudes. External political efficacy is often used to explain populist parties' support as it concerns the feeling that government authorities do not hear citizens' opinions. However, Geurkink et al. (2020) argue that these concepts are theoretically and empirically distinct. Even though external political efficacy has a sense of 'the people' to which government authorities should be responsive, it does not entail the populist dimension of a sovereign people; neither is the elite inherently opposing the people. Geurkink et al. find in their analysis that political trust, external political efficacy and populist attitudes are indeed different concepts and that external political efficacy does not predict populist voting. As external political efficacy is distinct from populist attitudes and does not predict populist voting, it is possible to turn around the causal arrow and see whether the presence of ethnic populist parties affects the external political efficacy of the people they represent.

Mansbridge (1999) argues that the descriptive representation of historically marginalized groups has important effects. Descriptive representation counters mistrust between the governing elite and the marginalized group. Secondly, it creates a sense of ability to rule. Both can be connected to external political efficacy. In countries where an ethnic populist party is present, indigenous individuals are part of the governing elite, which gives them a key position in which they can counter mistrust based on historically unequal relations, exemplifying that people from the same ethnic background are able to rule. Additionally, descriptive representation increases polity legitimacy among the historically disadvantaged group. As the interests of the disadvantaged groups are represented on the national level, the legitimacy of this governmental level increases among the historically disadvantaged group when they vote. In countries without an ethnic populist party present, Indigenous people often are not represented in either a descriptive or substantive way. Therefore, the abovementioned positive effects of descriptive representation for the marginalized group are expected not to be present, as in most Latin American countries, ethnic populist parties are absent. I expect that there is generally a difference in the external political efficacy between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens. Based on the lack of descriptive representation and the positive effects it brings for the marginalized group, the expected level of external political efficacy among indigenous citizens is lower than that of other ethnic groups. This leads to the first hypothesis:

*H1: There is a difference in the external political efficacy between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens.*

Madrid (2005) illustrated the relationship between ethnic populist parties and voter turnout. He showed that voter turnout among indigenous people has increased since the rise of ethnic populist

parties in Bolivia and Ecuador. As stated above, political efficacy is positively related to political participation, of which voting is an element. The external political efficacy concept implies that it is essential for citizens to feel that politicians listen to them and their demands. Therefore, citizens need to believe that they can make an impact on politicians and trust that they listen to the demands. Mansbridge pointed out that being a historically marginalized group results in mistrust between the group and the governing elite. The national presence of ethnic populist parties makes indigenous individuals become part of the governing elite, enabling them to counter the mistrust between indigenous citizens and the governing elite, increasing the feeling among indigenous people that government authorities respond to them. Therefore, the presence of ethnic populist parties is expected to cause an increase in external political efficacy among indigenous individuals, as shown in hypothesis 2:

*H2: In countries where ethnic populist parties represent indigenous people on the national level, people who belong to an indigenous minority show higher levels of external political efficacy compared to people who belong to an indigenous minority in countries without ethnic populist parties present on the national level.*

To further the causal mechanism, I expect that in countries where an ethnic populist party is present, the indigenous constituents have a higher level of external political efficacy, based on Mansbridge's argument that once co-ethnic individuals of a marginalized group are in power, they counter mistrust between marginalized groups and the governing elite. Madrid (2005) illustrated the correlation between ethnic populist party presence and voter turnout, showing the correlation between ethnic populist parties and political participation. Voting itself also might have an effect on the external political efficacy of indigenous individuals. The descriptive representation of indigenous people by ethnic populist parties is expected to make indigenous individuals feel included in the polity, increasing the polity's de facto legitimacy, as they can make their voices heard within the polity, as based on Mansbridge's arguments for descriptive representation. This higher de facto legitimacy of the polity leads to a better evaluation of the responsiveness of government institutions and politicians. This leads to the third hypothesis:

*H3: The effect of ethnic populist party representation on external political efficacy will be stronger among indigenous people who voted for an ethnic populist party.*


The ethnic populist parties promote an anti-neoliberal and redistributive agenda. Therefore, their election program might resonate more with left-wing people. When these parties are present on the national level, the external political efficacy might rise among the left-oriented voters as they see their ideological standpoints represented and advocated for. This leads to the fourth hypothesis:

H4: The effect of ethnic populist party representation on external political efficacy will be stronger for more left-oriented people.

To summarize, Figure 1 visually represents the causal mechanism that underlies the effect of ethnic populist parties on external political efficacy. The interactions indicate that the effect of ethnic populist party presence is dependent on an individual's ethnicity, left/right orientation, and whether one voted for an ethnic populist party.

**Figure 1**

*Hypothesized Causal Mechanism*



This thesis expects that ethnic populist parties positively affect indigenous people's external political efficacy. However, an alternative argument about the opposite effect of the presence of the ethnic populist party can also be made. Populism politicizes and mobilizes feelings of discontent towards an elite, as it entails a Manichean conception of a good, pure people versus a corrupt elite. For ethnic populist parties, the pure people are the indigenous communities. The elite is often imagined as the economic neoliberal leaders of a country, together with the bigger, US-owned corporations. The ethnic populist parties mobilize their constituents by pointing out the economic disadvantages they historically had and still have (Madrid, 2007). It could, therefore, be that the ethnic populist parties create a feeling of not being represented as they politicize the ethnic cleavage. These parties then

create a sense of anti-elitism. This can lead to a lower sense of external political efficacy, as these people feel that the ruling elite is not responsive to their needs, whereas before they did not pay attention to it. Table 1 gives an overview of the hypotheses that will be tested in the following chapters.

**Table 1**

*Hypotheses Overview*

Hypothesis	Phrasing
H1	There is a difference in the external political efficacy between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens.
H2	In countries where ethnic populist parties represent indigenous people on the national level, people who belong to an indigenous minority show higher levels of external political efficacy compared to people who belong to an indigenous minority in countries without ethnic populist parties present on the national level.
H3	The effect of ethnic populist party representation on external political efficacy will be stronger among indigenous people who voted for an ethnic populist party.
H4	The effect of ethnic populist party representation on external political efficacy will be stronger for more left-oriented people.

## 3 Data, Methodology & Operationalization

In this chapter, I explain the data I used to test the hypotheses in Chapter 2 and elaborate on the methodology used to analyze the data and operationalize the variables.

### 3.1 Data

#### 3.1.1 LAPOP Survey

The data comes from the Latin American Popular Opinion Project, which executes the Americas Barometer project every two years. The project measures the public opinion of participants in 34 countries approximately every two years. LAPOP provides data on each specific country for each year and a merged file that combines all this data. The aim was to include all years in the analysis to get more indigenous respondents. However, through the years, the questionnaire has changed. Only the most recent survey contained all variables of interest. Therefore, only the data from the 2023 survey is used to analyze the hypotheses. The survey's target population is all non-institutionalized voting-age citizens or permanent residents of each country. Therefore, people in hospitals, boarding schools, military barracks, police academies and inmates are excluded. The sampling method is a stratified multi-stage cluster sampling in each country, where only one respondent per household is interviewed. The survey asked about the single respondents and the household. The samples are stratified on three factors: 1. The size of the municipalities, 2. Urban/rural areas, and 3. Regions. (LAPOP, 2023). This is to reduce the sampling error. The data collection usually starts in February of the data collection year and ends in October. The LAPOP datasets reweigh each country so that all country weights are  $N=1500$  to give each country an identical weight in the pooled sample. The table below (Table 2) shows the completed surveys per country, data collection dates and the response rate. The response rate is adjusted by applying an eligibility rate to the unknown cases. Therefore, it accounts for the likelihood that some unknown cases might be ineligible (LAPOP, 2023).

The hypotheses look at a specific population subgroup. The sampling strategy ensures a representative sample on the country level, but not necessarily for the subgroup of interest: indigenous people. In some cases, the percentage of indigenous respondents is higher than that of indigenous inhabitants according to censuses. However, in most countries included in the analysis, indigenous people are underrepresented in the sample. The smaller sample size for indigenous respondents might limit the precision of the subgroup-specific estimates.

**Table 2***Observations, Data Collection and Non-Response per Country*

Country	N	Fieldwork start date	Fieldwork end date	Response rate
Mexico	1622	May 12, 2023	July 19, 2023	33.1
Guatemala	1556	March 6, 2023	June 7, 2023	43.1
El Salvador	1516	July 12, 2023	August 3, 2023	10.6
Honduras	1602	June 16, 2023	August 9, 2023	36.3
Costa Rica	1527	July 19, 2023	August 20, 2023	22.4
Panama	1532	July 20, 2023	August 21, 2023	40.9
Colombia	1503	May 16, 2023	July 12, 2023	39.1
Ecuador	1604	February 15, 2023	March 22, 2023	26.2
Bolivia	1706	April 21, 2023	May 25, 2023	22.7
Peru	1535	March 15, 2023	April 28, 2023	28.6
Paraguay	1524	February 4, 2023	March 22, 2023	39.0
Chile	1635	June 8, 2023	August 13, 2023	42.0
Uruguay	1517	April 15, 2023	June 28, 2023	24.9
Brazil	1526	June 6, 2023	July 4, 2023	32.5
Argentina	1540	May 31, 2023	July 21, 2023	23.8

*Source: LAPOP (2023)*

### 3.1.2 Country selection

The countries I include in the analysis are Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Of these countries, Peru, Guatemala and Mexico have a high percentage of indigenous constituents but do not have ethnic populist parties representing them (Madrid, 2007; Van Cott, 2005). Other countries with a considerable proportion of indigenous constituents are Chile, Honduras, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil. Costa Rica, El Salvador and Uruguay have a very small indigenous population (World Bank Group, 2015). Panama has a substantial number of indigenous inhabitants; however, they obtained self-governing rights in the form of a federal state. In Colombia, indigenous parties have reserved seats in the Senate and House of Representatives (Van Cott, 2005). I will not include Surinam, Guyana and French Guyana, as these are not part of Latin America and were not colonized by the Spanish or Portuguese. These countries had a different historical trajectory and do not fall into the definition of Latin America. For the same reason I also omit Canada, the United States, Dominicana, Trinidad & Tobago, Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominican Republic, Belize, Saint Vincent and the

Grenadines, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Jamaica, and Saint Lucia from the analysis, even though the LAPOP survey is conducted in these countries.

There are only two countries in which an ethnic populist party manifested itself on the national level. This is relevant for testing the other hypotheses. The first country where an ethnic populist party is present is Bolivia. The MAS-IPSP (Movimiento al Socialismo) party is the textbook example of a successful ethnic populist party. In the latest election of Bolivia in 2020, they obtained 75 out of the 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and they have a majority of 21 seats out of 36 in the Senate. In Ecuador, the MUPP party (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik) obtained 5 of the 137 seats at the national assembly of Ecuador in the elections of 2023. Together with MAS-IPSP, the MUPP party exemplifies the success of ethnic populist parties in Latin America (Madrid, 2007; Van Cott, 2005). In Nicaragua, the YATAMA party (Sons of Mother Earth) is also seen as a successful ethnic populist party. However, they only managed to obtain one seat in the national assembly (Madrid, 2005). Adding to that, the Freedom House score of Nicaragua is 16/100 as shown on the map of the Freedom House website. V-dem gives Nicaragua a score of 0.17 out of 1 on electoral democracy. To compare: Ecuador has a Freedom House score of 67/100, a V-dem score on electoral democracy of 0.65/1.00, and Bolivia has a Freedom House score of 66/100 and a V-dem score of 0.59. This means that Ecuador and Bolivia are not perfect democracies, but more so than Nicaragua. Because of this I exclude Nicaragua from the analysis. I also exclude Venezuela, for the same reason as Nicaragua. The V-dem score of Venezuela is 0.21/1.00, and the Freedom House score is 15/100 (*V-Dem*, n.d.).

## 3.2 Methodology

### 3.2.1 OLS Regression

Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 will be tested by OLS regression. OLS stands for Ordinary Least Squares, and it is the method I use to test the abovementioned hypotheses. In essence, this method estimates the average effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable, which is external political efficacy. The mean is the simplest model and the starting point. Simple linear regression involves one explanatory variable. Multiple regression allows one to control for possible confounding factors by including them as additional independent variables (Field, 2017). Confounding variables are variables related to both the independent and the dependent variables. The outcome of multiple OLS regression is a combination of the average score of the dependent variable and the variation in the average score. The variance is explained by the linear regression line. OLS regression is probabilistic as it gives a predicted score on the dependent variable with certain values of an independent variable. The formula for multiple OLS regression looks like the following:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \dots + \beta_k X_{ki} + \epsilon_i$$

$Y_i$  is the predicted score of the dependent variable for observation  $i$ .  $\beta_0$  is the intercept with the Y-axis and represents the mean value of  $Y$  when all  $X$  values are zero.  $\beta_1$  is the slope, showing the change in  $Y$  for a one-unit increase in  $X$ . The coefficients are point estimates of the true effect  $B$  in the population. For multiple regression, the model is extended with more  $\beta$  coefficients. The coefficient represents the effect of  $X$  on  $Y$ , controlling for the effect of all other independent variables in the model on  $Y$ .  $\epsilon_i$  is the error term, representing the unexplained variance of the model. The regression line is estimated using the least squares method. This method minimizes the sum of the squared differences between the observed and predicted values by the regression line. (Field, 2017) In other words, OLS regression means that the best possible/most efficient line is estimated to capture the effect of  $X$  on  $Y$ . The differences between the observations and the regression line are the model's residuals.

### 3.2.2 Assumptions with OLS Regression

With OLS regression come several statistical assumptions that need to be met to draw valid conclusions. The first is the assumption of linearity and additivity. Linearity means that each increment in  $X$  leads to a fixed change in  $Y$ . A linear line can capture the effect of  $X$  on  $Y$ . Additivity means that the model is a result of adding up the components of the model (Field, 2017). The second assumption is homoscedasticity, which entails that the variance of the errors should be constant across all observations. A scatterplot with a Loess curve assesses the linearity and homoscedasticity of the data, and the results are shown in Appendix A. Both assumptions seem to be met. The third assumption is that of independent errors. There should not be a correlation between the error terms of the observations. This can happen when groups look alike because they are spatially near each other or when the observations are close in time (Field, 2017). The analysis concerns nested data: people who are nested in countries. Therefore, this issue has to be dealt with. This thesis uses a multilevel analysis, which considers the nested data structure. The intraclass correlation derived from the multilevel model shows the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that can be ascribed to the group level. Fourth is the assumption of the normally distributed errors. This is assessed by a P-P plot, Q-Q plot and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (found in Appendix A). The errors seem not quite to follow a normal distribution. The discussion will reflect further on this issue. One last issue also needs to be addressed when using OLS regression. This is the issue of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity entails that two or more predictor variables are highly correlated to each other and explain the same part of the variance in the dependent variable. This can lead to issues with the estimation of the coefficients. Multicollinearity can inflate the standard errors of the regression coefficient. I address it using

Pearson's r correlation score (Appendix A). No scores higher than 0.54 are given. Conventionally, a Pearson's r correlation score of 0.8 or higher indicates issues with multicollinearity (Field, 2017). Therefore, I conclude that multicollinearity is not an issue here.

### 3.2.3 Multilevel Analysis

Most of the hypotheses contain a multilevel structure. The unit of analysis is people who are nested in countries. This means that people in the same country tend to have similar scores on variables. The analysis aims to see whether there is a difference across countries and to compare the countries. This means that a fixed effects approach that dummy codes the countries will not be sufficient as it takes out the between-country variance and leaves us with only within-country variance to analyze. A cross-country comparison is not possible with the fixed effects approach (Field, 2017). Therefore, I used a multilevel analysis to account for the nested structure of the data. It allows me to model causal heterogeneity: the effect of the individual level variance can be different across groups (Field, 2017; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). The starting point is still the multiple OLS regression. However, the random part (the error term)  $\epsilon_i$  is split into two variance components. It will display the variance within and between groups, which we can estimate. It starts with the empty model, also called the random intercept-only model. This looks as follows:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + u_{0j} + \epsilon_{ij}$$


$Y_{ij}$  is the external political efficacy for individual  $i$  in country  $j$ .  $\beta_0$  is the intercept, and  $u_{0j}$  is the error at the country level.  $\epsilon_i$  is the unexplained variance at the individual level. The model thus contains the overall mean, the between-group variance, and the within-group variance. The model is called an empty model as it does not contain independent variables. Therefore, it does not predict anything yet. The full multilevel model is the following:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1ij} + \beta_2 X_{2j} + \dots + \beta_k X_{kij} + u_{0j} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

$\beta_0$  is the fixed intercept. Here it shows the average level of external political efficacy across countries and individuals when all independent variables are zero.  $\beta_1 X_{1ij}$  is the effect of an individual-level variable on external political efficacy for individual  $i$  in country  $j$ .  $\beta_2 X_{2j}$  is a macro (country) level variable that explains the between-country variance in political efficacy.  $u_{0j}$  is the random intercept for country  $j$ , showing how the intercept of the country differs from the overall average intercept  $\beta_0$ . This means each country can have a different baseline level of external political efficacy.  $\epsilon_{ij}$  captures the deviation of individual  $i$  in country  $j$  from the predicted level of external political

efficacy (Field, 2017; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). I assume that the ethnicity one has influences the experienced sense of external political efficacy and that the presence of an ethnic populist party influences the political efficacy of an individual. Visually, this can be captured in the following model:

**Figure 2**  
*Multilevel Data Structure*



### 3.2.4 Interaction Effect

Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 contain an interaction effect. The interpretation will be: How much does the effect of X1 on Y change with a one-unit increase in X2? Hypothesis 2 entails an interaction between ethnicity and the ethnic populist party to assess if the presence of such a party makes a difference. For hypothesis 3, this means that the presence of an ethnic populist party leads to a higher level of political efficacy. However, this effect will be stronger for people who voted for the ethnic populist party. Concerning hypothesis 4, it means that the presence of an ethnic populist party has a positive effect on political efficacy and that this effect is stronger for more left-oriented people. An interaction effect is calculated by including an extra variable that multiplies the independent variable with the interaction variable (Field, 2017). In a formula for the usual OLS regression, the interaction effect looks as follows:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \beta_3 (X_{1i} * X_{2i}) + \epsilon_i$$


Thus, it is possible to include macro and micro-level variables in a multilevel model. This is interesting when hypothesizing a multilevel interaction. This means that the effect of X on Y can vary over different contexts (here, countries); in other words, it is possible to account for causal heterogeneity. I hypothesize that the country-level characteristics interact with the individual-level characteristics. The level of political efficacy is different for indigenous people in different contexts.

This is a cross-level interaction. The formula for a cross-level interaction in a multilevel analysis is the following:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1ij} + \beta_2 X_{2j} + \beta_3 (X_{1ij} * X_{2j}) + u_{0j} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

The interaction term concerns a country-level variable with an individual-level variable. To exemplify, the cross-level interaction effect of hypothesis 4 is shown.

**Figure 3**  
*Cross-Level Interaction*



One note needs to be made concerning the operationalization of hypothesis 3. As there needs to be an ethnic populist party present in order to vote for it, the interaction will be only on the micro level as voting and ethnicity are both micro-level variables. Hypothesis 3, therefore, does not contain a cross-level interaction. However, the data is still hierarchical, and a multilevel analysis is utilized.

### 3.2.5 Significance Level

The significance level is essential to conclude whether there is support for the hypotheses. The significance level is a threshold to determine whether to reject the null hypothesis implied with every hypothesis. For example, the null hypothesis of H1 is 'There is no difference in political efficacy between indigenous and non-indigenous people.' To say whether a finding is significant or not, it is important to look at several concepts. The first is the sample. The goal of statistical research is to draw conclusions about the population. To do so, a sample from the population is drawn. The findings in the sample are a point estimate used to say something about the population, with a predefined level of uncertainty. The significance level indicates the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true. The most commonly used is a significance level of 0.05, so there is a 5% risk of

concluding that there is an effect of X on Y based on the sample when, in reality, there is none. This is a Type I error (Field, 2017). The p-value indicates the probability of getting the test result, assuming the null hypothesis is true (stating X has no effect on Y). This is based on the normal distribution. Possible values for the sample mean are normally distributed around the population mean. The normal distribution entails that 95% of the dispersion around the mean falls within approximately two times (1.96 times) the standard error added and subtracted from the mean. The t-distribution is used to see how likely it is to find the coefficient, and thus the effect of X on Y, in the sample when there is no effect in the population. The coefficient should be divided by the standard error to get to the t-value. The t-value should be larger than 1.96 and determines the p-value. The p-value should be lower than the predetermined significance level of  $\alpha = 0.05$ . As the starting point is the null hypothesis, so there is no effect, it is now possible to assess the chance that there is an effect of X on Y. The null hypothesis is rejected when the p-value is lower than 0.05. When the null hypothesis is rejected, the alternative hypothesis is supported. I use a significance level of  $\alpha = 0.05$ , as is conventional in the social sciences (Field, 2017).

### 3.3 Operationalization

#### 3.3.1 Dependent Variable: External Political Efficacy

The LAPOP Americas Barometer survey of 2023 operationalizes external political efficacy by the following question: ‘Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree?’ The interviewer reads the options on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 – strongly disagree to 7- strongly agree. Other possible answering categories not read aloud are ‘Don’t know’ and ‘No answer.’ Ideally, external political efficacy would be measured using multiple items, also assessing one's opinion on the legal ways citizens can influence what the government does and whether the people have the final say about how the country is run (Craig et al., 1990). However, the LAPOP Americas Barometer survey does not include more questions concerning political efficacy. Therefore, the score on this single item will be the dependent variable. Table 3 gives an overview of the mean score on external political efficacy per country. The table shows that the mean score differs from 3.36 in Ecuador to 4.75 in El Salvador, with an average mean of 3.71.

**Table 3***Mean per Country on External Political Efficacy*

Country	N	Mean	Std dev
Mexico	736	4.25	2.00
Guatemala	457	3.69	1.95
El Salvador	747	4.75	1.86
Honduras	724	3.44	2.15
Costa Rica	664	4.12	1.99
Panama	724	3.27	2.10
Colombia	691	3.58	2.05
Ecuador	814	3.36	1.99
Bolivia	736	3.72	1.80
Peru	1030	3.22	1.96
Paraguay	520	3.59	2.01
Chile	446	3.37	1.80
Uruguay	1014	3.49	1.98
Brazil	897	3.85	1.97
Argentina	783	3.44	2.05
<b>Overall</b>	10982	3.71	2.02

*Note:* N = number of observations, Std dev = standard deviation.

*Source:* LAPOP (2023).

### 3.3.2 Independent Variables

#### *Ethnic populist party presence*

The presence of an ethnic populist party is included in the analysis as an explanatory variable. This is also the country-level variable, as it can only vary across countries and not between individuals. The variable is dummy-coded with no ethnic populist party as the reference category (0 = no ethnic populist party present, 1 = ethnic populist party present). The countries coded with 1 are Bolivia, where the MAS-IPSP party is the ethnic populist party, and Ecuador, where the MUPP party is present. The rest of the abovementioned included countries are coded with 0.

#### *Ethnicity*

The operationalization of an indigenous identity is not as straightforward as it might seem because of the historical process of *mestizaje*. The government promoted the mixing of the indigenous population with the white population, which means that most people now identify as *mestizo*, mixed race. The

state promoted the process of *mestizaje* to create national unity and a national identity. This has led to a degrading of the indigenous ethnicity and identity, resulting in *mestizo* being seen as a higher social class than indigenous (Teichman, 2022; Van Cott, 2005). Even though this varies across regions, it means that many Latin Americans who are mostly or entirely of indigenous descent prefer to identify themselves as *mestizo*. Another complicating factor for the operationalization of who is indigenous is that ethnicity and race are not as set in stone in Latin America as in other regions of the world. This means that, for example, someone can identify as *mestizo* at work and as indigenous at home. Ethnicity is a more fluid concept in this context. Some people combine it and identify as *indigenous mestizo* (Madrid, 2007). The LAPOP survey operationalizes ethnicity by self-identification, which I will use for the analysis. The answer categories differ per country and are specified into country-specific indigenous groups. The variable is recoded into seven categories: 1=white, 2=mestizo, 3=indigenous, 4=black, 5=mulatto and 6=other. To do the cross-level interaction, ethnicity is also coded as a dummy variable, with white as the reference category, as the ethnic populist parties are expected to affect the external political efficacy of indigenous, but arguably, they also impact mestizos and other marginalized groups.

#### *Voted for an ethnic populist party*

Whether someone voted for an ethnic populist party is also included as an explanatory variable and will be used in the analysis to explain differences in political efficacy. However, there are only two countries with an ethnic populist party present, which means that it is only possible in the two countries to vote for them: Ecuador and Bolivia. This variable is also dummy-coded, where not voted is the reference category (0 = not voted, 1 = voted). As an interaction effect between the presence of an ethnic populist party and the voting for it is not meaningful, the interaction effect of hypothesis 3 is operationalized at the individual level: ethnicity\*voted ethnic populist. Unfortunately, the voted variable had a high non-response, leading to a decrease in the sample size after the listwise exclusion of the cases with missing values on any of the variables.

#### *Theoretical control variables: left-right scale & political interest*

Hypothesis 4 assumes a stronger effect of left-oriented people on political efficacy. The left/right orientation is included as a control variable for all the other models. If hypothesis 4 is supported, a person's left/right orientation matters for the level of political efficacy. Controlling for this effect is vital to correctly estimate the effect of other variables, such as voting or the ethnic populist party presence, on external political efficacy, holding the left/right orientation constant. Respondents are asked to place themselves on a scale where 1 is left and 10 is right. The left/right scale is mean-centered to make the interpretation easier and prevent issues with multicollinearity. The analysis,

therefore, controls for the mean on the left/right scale, which is 5,32. This means that, on average, people in Latin America identify as slightly right from center.

The second theoretical control variable is political interest. Political interest is often defined as the extent to which politics is attractive to someone. People interested in politics are more likely to know about politics and engage in political behaviors such as voting in elections. Therefore, one's political interest is important in the likelihood of engaging with politics (Dostie-Goulet, 2009; Robison, 2017). External political efficacy is also linked to political engagement and voter turnout (McDonnell, 2020). Therefore, an individual's political interest level might affect an individual's voting behavior and external political efficacy. Therefore, political interest needs to be controlled for to get valid results of the effect of ethnic populist party presence on external political efficacy. Respondents are asked how much interest they have in politics (1 = a lot, 2 = some, 3 = little, 4 = none).

#### *Demographic control variables: Gender, education level & age*

Some commonly used demographic control variables are included. The control variables are gender, age, and education level. Gender is coded as a dummy variable, with 'male' as the reference category (0 = male, 1 = female). Education is included as a categorical variable (0 = none, 1 = primary incomplete, 2 = primary complete, 3 = secondary incomplete, 4 = secondary complete, 5 = tertiary or university or higher incomplete, 6 = tertiary or university or higher complete). Age is measured in years from 16 (in Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador) or 18 (in all other countries) to 99. Income was aimed to be included in the analysis, but due to the high non-response, income as a control variable is omitted from the analysis.

### 3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics

Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics of the independent variables of interest and the control variables after listwise deletions of cases with missing values on any of the variables. Important to note is that the left/right scale variable will be mean-centered for the analysis. When the variable is included, the analysis controls for the mean score on the scale, which is 5.32. Zero on the left/right centered variable thus means controlling for the mean score of 5.32 on the left/right scale.

**Table 4***Descriptive Statistics of Variables*

Variable	Valid N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std dev	%
External political eff	10982	1.00	7.00	3.71	2.02	
Ethnicity	10982	1.00	6.00	2.31	1.40	
White	3165					28.82
Mestizo	5070					46.17
Indigenous	828					7.54
Black	570					5.19
Mulatto	756					6.88
Other	593					5.40
Voted (dummy)	10982	0.00	1.00	0.04	0.20	
Left/Right scale	10982	1.00	10.00	5.32	2.69	
Political interest	10982	1.00	4.00	2.81	1.04	
Education level	10982	0.00	6.00	3.74	1.66	
Age	10982	16.00	92.00	42.49	15.78	
Gender (dummy)	10982	0.00	1.00	0.48	0.50	

*Note:* Valid N = number of observations, Std dev = standard deviation, Voted (dummy) reference = not voted for an ethnic populist party, Gender (dummy) reference = male.

*Source:* LAPOP (2023).

## 4 Analysis

This chapter presents and discusses the results of the statistical analyses. Based on these results, the different hypotheses are evaluated. The first part of the chapter deals with the analysis of hypothesis 1, estimating whether there is a variance in external political efficacy between different ethnic groups. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the models that include country-level and individual-level predictors and their effect on external political efficacy across different ethnic groups across Latin American countries. Through this approach, the hypotheses stated in Chapter two can be supported or rejected.

### 4.1 Variance analysis

Table 3 displays the variance of external political efficacy within different countries in Latin America. However, hypothesis 1 expects a difference in political efficacy between ethnic groups across countries. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to test this hypothesis. A one-way ANOVA tests whether there is a difference in the dependent variable (external political efficacy) across three or more groups. Table 5 shows the results of the one-way ANOVA.

**Table 5**

*One-Way ANOVA of Ethnic Groups on External Political Efficacy*

Ethnic group	N	Mean	Std dev
White	3165	3.81	2.03
Mestizo	5070	3.56	1.99
Indigenous	828	3.83	2.00
Black	570	3.77	2.13
Mulatto	756	3.84	2.01
Other	593	4.02	2.11
Total	10982	3.71	2.02
	df	F-value	P-value
Between group	5	10.779	<0.001
Within group	10976		
Total	10918		

*Note:* N = number of observations, Std dev = standard deviation, df = degrees of freedom  
*Source:* LAPOP (2023)

The upper part of the table displays the number of observations of each ethnic group, the mean score of this group across countries on external political efficacy, and the standard deviation. The table shows that mestizos display the lowest sense of external political efficacy. In the table below, the between-group and within-group variance is shown. What is most important here is to see whether there is a substantive difference between three or more groups. From the F-value, the likelihood of finding this variance between the groups in the sample can be assessed when there is none in the population. The F-value of 10.779 corresponds with a p-value below 0.001, which means that the probability of finding this variance between groups while there is, in fact, none in the population is below 0.1%. Therefore, it is very likely that there is a difference in external political efficacy between ethnic groups in the population.

Although useful for assessing whether there is a difference between the groups, the one-way ANOVA table does not provide an overview of which groups differ from each other in their sense of external political efficacy. For that, a post hoc analysis is necessary. Table 6 displays the result of the Tukey post hoc test.

**Table 6**  
*Tukey Post Hoc Comparisons*

Ethnic group	2	3	4	5	6
1. White	0.245***	-0.019	0.038	-0.026	-0.206
2. Mestizo		-0.264***	-0.207	-0.271***	-0.451***
3, Indigenous			0.057	-0.007	-0.187
4. Black				-0.064	-0.243
5. Mulatto					-0.180
6. Other					

*Note:* \*\*\* p < .001, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .10, two-tailed test.  
*Source:* LAPOP (2023).

The Tukey post hoc test displays the mean difference between the groups. Reading from left to right, it shows, for example, that for white people, the mean value of external political efficacy is 0.245 higher than for mestizos. However, for white people, the mean value of external political efficacy is -0.019 lower than the mean value of indigenous people on external political efficacy. This is interesting, as one would expect that the interests of white people are better represented than the interests of indigenous people. Therefore, white people are expected to display a higher level of political efficacy on average than indigenous people. However, the finding is not significant, as indicated by the asterisks. Therefore we cannot make inferences about the mean differences between the groups in the sample to the population level.

What catches the attention is the statistically significant difference in means between mestizo and almost all other ethnic groups. Mestizos not only display a lower level of external political efficacy than white people (the inverse from the first number shown in Table 6), but they seem to display the lowest level of external political efficacy compared to all ethnic groups. Only the mean difference between mestizo and black people is not statistically significant. One explanation could be that many people who feel an affinity with indigenous culture and traditions have identified themselves as mestizo in the survey. Therefore, the mean difference between mestizo and the rest might be biased by the ambiguity of ethnic identification.

The hypothesis expects a difference in external political efficacy between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens. This difference was found between indigenous and mestizo citizens but not between indigenous and other ethnic groups. However, based on the ANOVA and Tukey post hoc analysis, we can say there is a difference in external political efficacy between different ethnic groups in Latin America. As the ethnic groups differ substantively in size, a Welch test with a Games-Howell post hoc test was also performed to assess the robustness of the findings. Similar results were found here, as displayed in Appendix B. Additionally, a multilevel analysis was done with white as the reference category, displayed in Table 7, model 1. A similar result is shown: indigenous display a higher level of external political efficacy than white people. Also a multilevel analysis was done where indigenous was chosen as the reference category (table displayed in Appendix B). This is because the hypothesis expects a difference between indigenous and other ethnic groups. In the multilevel analysis, the estimate for the white dummy is negative and significant, stating that white people indeed have a lower external political efficacy compared to indigenous individuals. Also, the coefficient of the mestizo dummy is negative and significant, indicating that mestizo display a lower level of external political efficacy than indigenous people. Going back to the first hypothesis, we can conclude that the hypothesis is supported, although not in the direction as implicitly expected. The rest of the chapter analyzes the multilevel models that might explain the mean difference in external political efficacy between the different ethnic groups.

## 4.2 Multilevel Models on External Political Efficacy

In the previous part, a difference in external political efficacy between ethnic groups was established. This part is dedicated to explaining the variance in external political efficacy between ethnic groups and whether the presence of ethnic populist parties has an effect on it. A multilevel analysis is chosen, as the data is nested. This deals with possible issues of dependent errors, as observations within the same country tend to resemble each other. Model 0 in Table 7 displays the random intercept only or

'empty' model, as it only contains the country and individual level variance of external political efficacy but no predictors. From this model, the intraclass correlation can be calculated by dividing the country-level variance by the sum of the country-level variance and individual-level variance  $0.0159/(3.924 + 0.159) = 0.039$ . This means that around 4% of the variance in external political efficacy between individuals can be explained by the country that the individuals live in. The country-level estimate of 0.159 entails that there is variability in the intercepts across the country level. The significance level shows us that the countries differ significantly in the average score of external political efficacy, justifying a multilevel model to account for this country-level variability. The residual variance displays the variance on the individual level. The estimate is 3.924 and is statistically significant, meaning that there is considerable unexplained variability of external political efficacy at the individual level. The three remaining hypotheses are tested by three different models. The models are displayed in Table 7. For ethnicity, the reference category chosen is white, as theoretically, the effect of ethnic populist party presence might do something for the external political efficacy of minorities that do not make up the administrative elite.

Model 2 tests hypothesis two, which assumes that the presence of an ethnic populist party leads to a higher sense of external political efficacy among indigenous people. A negative and significant estimate is shown for the mestizo dummy. This means that mestizos display a lower sense of external political efficacy as compared to white people (the reference category). This is in line with the one-way ANOVA table above. Furthermore, it shows that other ethnic groups display a higher sense of political efficacy than the white ethnic category. This is also in line with the one-way ANOVA analysis. What catches the eye is that almost all individual-level control variables are statistically significant, except for gender. The political interest variable shows that people who are more interested in politics display a lower sense of external political efficacy. Possibly because they are more up to date about the state of democracy and possible scandals, lowering their evaluation of politicians and whether they listen to their demands. The education level variable indicates a similar mechanism. It shows that the reported external political efficacy goes down when the education level goes up. The age and left/right centered variable show a positive effect. For age, this means that the older one gets, the higher the reported external political efficacy is. The interpretation of the left/right-centered variable is different. As the variable is centered on the overall mean of individuals on the left/right scale, this means that when the left/right centered variable is zero, the variable controls for the mean score on the scale from 1 = left and 10 = right. A positive estimate indicates that the more right than the mean score one is, the higher their sense of external political efficacy is. Inversely, the more left from the mean score one is, the lower their sense of external political efficacy is.

**Table 7***Multilevel Models of External Political Efficacy*

Variable	Model 0		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Estimate	s.e.	Estimate	s.e.	Estimate	s.e.	Estimate	s.e.	Estimate	s.e.
Intercept	3.705***	(0.105)	4.334***	(0.146)	4.346***	(0.146)	4.307***	(0.145)	4.335***	(0.146)
<i>Individual level variables</i>										
Ethnicity (reference = white)										
Mestizo			-0.072	(0.050)	-0.091*	(0.052)	-0.079	(0.050)	-0.071	(0.050)
Indigenous			0.159**	(0.081)	0.102	(0.088)	0.109	(0.085)	0.157*	(0.081)
Black			0.037	(0.093)	0.027	(0.096)	0.039	(0.093)	0.038	(0.093)
Mulatto			0.065	(0.088)	0.022	(0.092)	0.055	(0.089)	0.065	(0.088)
Other			0.111	(0.089)	0.112	(0.092)	0.109	(0.090)	0.111	(0.089)
Political interest			-0.117***	(0.019)	-0.117***	(0.019)	-0.113***	(0.019)	-0.118***	(0.019)
Education level			-0.126***	(0.013)	-0.013***	(0.013)	-0.122***	(0.013)	-0.126***	(0.013)
Age			0.004***	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)
Gender (reference = male)			0.059	(0.037)	0.059	(0.037)	0.061*	(0.037)	0.059	(0.037)
Left/Right centered			0.074***	(0.007)	0.074***	(0.007)	0.075***	(0.007)	0.078***	(0.007)
Voted ethnic party (reference = no)							0.326	(0.332)		
<i>Country level variable</i>										
Ethnic populist party (reference = not present)					-0.380	(0.317)	-0.243	(0.267)	-0.054	(0.268)
<i>Interactions</i>										
Mestizo * Ethnic populist party					0.344*	(0.190)				
Indigenous * Ethnic populist party					0.524**	(0.246)				
Black * Ethnic populist party					0.236	(0.370)				
Mulatto * Ethnic populist party					0.661**	(0.329)				
Other * Ethnic populist party					0.110	(0.341)				
Mestizo * Voted ethnic party							0.291	(0.338)		
Indigenous * Voted ethnic party							0.337	(0.337)		
Black * Voted ethnic party							-0.092	(1.175)		
Mulatto * Voted ethnic party							0.594	(0.653)		
Other * Voted ethnic party							0.179	(0.556)		
Ethnic populist party * left/right centered									-0.027	(0.021)
<i>Random effects</i>										
Variance (country)	0.159***	(0.060)	0.120***	(0.046)	0.120***	(0.046)	0.116***	(0.051)	0.119***	(0.046)
Residual (individual)	3.924***	(0.052)	3.821***	(0.051)	3.818***	(0.051)	3.811***	(0.051)	3.820***	(0.051)
N individuals	10982		10982		10982		10982		10982	
N countries	15		15		15		15		15	
-2x log likelihood	47487.09		47183.34		47176.45		47153.30		47181.65	

Note: s.e. = standard error, \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .10, two-tailed test. Source: LAPOP (2023).

Model 2 captures the effect of the presence of an ethnic populist on the external political efficacy of different ethnic groups in Latin America. This is first done by including the presence of the ethnic populist party as a control variable. As it is dummy coded, a score of zero on this variable means that there is no ethnic populist party present. The estimate indicates that when there is an ethnic populist party present (scoring 1 on the dummy variable), the external political efficacy goes down by -0.380. However, the finding is not significant, so we cannot draw conclusions about the population based on the sample. Furthermore interaction terms between the different ethnic groups and the ethnic populist party presence are included in the model. As this is an individual-level variable interacting with a country-level variable, this variable is a cross-level interaction. Looking at the interaction effect, what first catches the attention is that the presence of an ethnic populist party has a positive effect on all ethnic groups compared to white individuals (the reference category). This is displayed by all the positive coefficients of the interaction term. When a country scores a 1 on the ethnic populist party presence variable, so in Bolivia and Ecuador, we can add the coefficient to the ethnicity dummy variable to see the effect of an ethnic populist party on the external political efficacy. The general score of mestizo people on external political efficacy is -0.091 lower than for white people. When an ethnic populist party is present, the score on external political efficacy is  $-0.091 + 0.344 = 0.253$ . This means that in a country with an ethnic populist party present, the score on political efficacy for mestizos is 0.253 higher than for white individuals. However, we cannot make inferences about the population as the p-value does not meet the predetermined significance level of 0.05. Nevertheless, the interaction effect for mestizos is significant at a 0.10 level. The random intercept at the country level is significant, which shows that a considerable amount of variance in external political efficacy is due to differences in countries. The intraclass correlation is  $0.120 / (0.120 + 3.818) = 0.030$ . Therefore, the country level explains around 3% of the total variance in external political efficacy. The control variables display the same direction and significance level as in the first model.

The main interest of hypothesis 2 is whether there is a difference in external political efficacy for indigenous people when there is an ethnic populist party present. Model 2 does not have a significant effect on the ethnicity variable, and it does not enable us to draw conclusions about the population in general. However, the interaction term of indigenous \* ethnic populist party is significant. The estimate is positive, and with 0.524 it shows that when an ethnic populist party is present, the external political efficacy of indigenous people is 0.524 higher compared to white people. The interaction effect of ethnic populist party presence on external political efficacy appears to be even stronger for mulatto's, as the positive and significant coefficient of 0.661 shows us. Based on this model, support is found for hypothesis 2. In countries where ethnic populist parties are present on the national level, people who belong to an indigenous minority show higher levels of external political efficacy than people who belong to an indigenous minority in countries without ethnic populist parties

present. To verify the robustness of the findings, the analysis was repeated with "mestizo" as the reference category, given that the one-way ANOVA indicated a substantial difference in the level of external political efficacy between mestizo and other groups (see table in Appendix C). In this revised model, the difference in external political efficacy between mestizo and indigenous people remained significant. However, the interaction effect was not significant. This outcome may be due to the influence of ethnic populist party presence, which affects the external political efficacy of both groups similarly, reducing the difference enough that it does not result in a significant interaction effect in the table.

Moving on to model 3, where the effect of voting for an ethnic populist party is displayed, we see that the control variables remain their direction and significance level compared to model 1. Adding to this, the effect of gender on external political efficacy is now significant at the 0.10 level, meaning that women display a higher level of external political efficacy. Furthermore, the variable 'voted ethnic party' is included. This variable is a dummy variable, and not voting for an ethnic populist party is the reference category. The variable gives a positive effect, showing that people who voted for an ethnic populist party have a higher score on political efficacy than people who did not vote for such a party. However, the finding is not significant. Therefore, we cannot generalize from the sample to the population. Because voting and ethnicity are individual-level variables, the interaction terms displayed in the model are not cross-level interactions. It is not useful to include interactions between the ethnic populist party presence and voting for such party, as an ethnic populist party needs to be present in order to vote for it. The model is still a multilevel as the data is nested and the random intercept is estimated for the country level. The hypothesis expects that indigenous people who voted for an ethnic populist party display a higher level of external political efficacy. The interaction terms analyze this for all ethnic groups. All interaction terms show a positive coefficient, except for the interaction between black\*voted, meaning that voting for an ethnic populist party has a positive effect on the external political efficacy for all groups, except for black people. However, none of the interaction terms are significant, and neither are the coefficients for the ethnicity dummy variables. Therefore, no support is found for hypothesis 3.<sup>1</sup> Appendix C shows the test results for the same analysis but with mestizo as the ethnic reference category. Here, the voted dummy is positive and significant, saying that voting for an ethnic populist party has an effect on external political efficacy. However, the interaction term is not. Therefore, also from this model, no support is found for hypothesis 3.

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<sup>1</sup> As the hypothesis only concerns Bolivia and Ecuador, a multiple regression analysis was done for these countries separately. The analysis gave similar results as shown in model 3. All interaction terms did not reach the required significance level of 0.05. Results of the analysis are displayed in Appendix D.

The last model is model 4, which estimates whether more left-oriented people display a higher level of external political efficacy in countries where ethnic populist parties are present (hypothesis 4). This is done by an interaction term between the presence of an ethnic populist party and the left/right-centered variable. This means the model contains a cross-level interaction. The positive estimate of the left/right variable in model 4 (and the previous models) shows that people who place themselves right from the mean score on the scale (5.32) display a higher level of external political efficacy than people who place themselves left from the mean score. We can conclude that in the population, more right-oriented people have a higher level of external political efficacy than more left-oriented people, as the finding is statistically significant in all the models. The interaction between ethnic populist party presence and left/right centered is in the expected direction. The slope of the effect of the left/right orientation on the external political efficacy is expected to be moderated by the presence of an ethnic populist party in their country. The interaction coefficient is -0.027, which means that for the countries in which an ethnic populist party is present, the slope coefficient of the left/right orientation effect decreases by -0.027 points. The effect of the left/right scale is 0.078 in countries without ethnic populist parties present, as seen in the left/right-centered variable. In countries with an ethnic populist party present the value of the interaction term is subtracted from the estimate of the left/right variable. This leaves us with a slope of  $0.078 - 0.027 = 0.051$ . So, in countries with ethnic populist parties present, left-oriented people report a higher level of external political efficacy than left-oriented people in countries without such a party present. Inversely, in countries with an ethnic populist party present, right-oriented people experience a lower sense of external political efficacy than right-oriented people in countries without such a party present.

However, the interaction term in model 4 is not significant, making it impossible to draw conclusions from the sample to the population. As the estimate of the left/right centered scale is significant, we can conclude that the left/right orientation has an effect on the level of external political efficacy. However, the fourth hypothesis is not supported, as no significant interaction effect between the left/right variable and ethnic populist party presence was found. To summarize, a table with the hypotheses and their support is provided below (Table 8).

**Table 8***Hypotheses and Support Overview*

Hypothesis	Phrasing	Support
H1	There is a difference in the external political efficacy between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens.	Yes
H2	In countries where ethnic populist parties represent indigenous people on the national level, people who belong to an indigenous minority show higher levels of external political efficacy compared to people who belong to an indigenous minority in countries without ethnic populist parties present on the national level.	Yes
H3	The effect of ethnic populist party representation on external political efficacy will be stronger among indigenous people who voted for an ethnic populist party.	No
H4	The effect of ethnic populist party representation on external political efficacy will be stronger for more left-oriented people.	No

## 5 Discussion and Conclusion

The following section will discuss the research findings, together with their implications and limitations. After that, the conclusion of the research will be presented, reflecting back on the central question stated in the introduction.

### 5.1 Discussion

The first caveat that needs to be discussed is the regression assumption of normally distributed errors. Appendix A shows the results of the P-P plot, Q-Q plot and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The P-P plot indicates a somewhat normal distribution of the data. However, the Q-Q plot shows a deviation from the line that displays the normal distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms this by showing that the errors are not normally distributed. The significance level that comes out of the test is  $<0.001$ . This means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, entailing that the errors are normally distributed. This has several possible implications for the analyses. First of all, the estimated effect might not be so precise. The predictions might be unbiased, but the confidence intervals around the predictions might be inaccurate, as they can be too narrow or too wide. The non-normal distribution of the errors can lead to downward biased standard errors (Field, 2017). Therefore, the F-value of the coefficient increases, and a type I error can be made. This means that the hypothesis is supported when, in fact, there is no effect of X on Y in the population. The non-normal distribution of the errors is a caveat in the data; therefore, the estimates need to be interpreted with care.

Also necessary to discuss is the operationalization of external political efficacy, as it is quite limited. The LAPOP survey question only asks the extent of the respondents feeling that those who govern the country are interested in what people like them think. Essentially, this question only asks about the sense of external political efficacy towards politicians and not, for example, governmental institutions. It would have been interesting to include multiple items on external political efficacy and combine these into a scale as the dependent variable, as it would have given a more complete image of the actors that indigenous people feel most represented by. I would also like to address the intraclass correlation derived from model 0 (Table 7). The intraclass class correlation is 0.039, which means that only about 4% of the variation in external political efficacy is due to the country level. Although the findings are significant, it is still a minimal amount of variation in external political efficacy that is explained by the country level. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to look more at individual-level factors explaining the external political efficacy between individuals and ethnic groups instead of searching for the explanation at the country level.

Even though hypothesis 1 is supported, the mean difference in external political efficacy of indigenous and other ethnic groups is not according to the theoretically expected direction. One would expect that the external political efficacy of indigenous people overall is lower than that of white people due to the history of marginalization that would have created distrust between the government elite and the marginalized group (Mansbridge, 1999). The post hoc tests in Table 6 show the opposite; the mean of the external political efficacy of indigenous people is higher than that of white people. This is striking as indigenous are generally speaking less well represented in the descriptive and substantive sense, therefore one would expect indigenous people to display a lower mean level of external political efficacy. One possible explanation is that indigenous people reach out to co-ethnic politicians at the lower governmental level, like the municipality, as their representation is often better on the lower governmental levels (Pallister, 2013). There they might feel heard by co-ethnic politicians, leading to a higher mean level of external political efficacy.

Another interesting finding in the post hoc test is that mestizos, in general, display the lowest level of external political efficacy compared to the other ethnic groups. A possible explanation could be the ambiguity of ethnic identification in Latin America and the upward social mobility associated with identifying as mestizo instead of indigenous (Madrid, 2007). Chapters 1 and 2 state that ethnic identification is more ambiguous and fluid in Latin America. Therefore, it might be possible that people who identify with indigenous customs and culture and speak an indigenous language have identified themselves as mestizo in the survey. This might cause the mestizo category to include individuals who in other situations identify themselves as indigenous. When identifying to an outsider like a researcher, social desirability bias could have slipped in leading to indigenous people identifying themselves as mestizo. This might also hold true for people who identify with the customs, culture and language of other ethnic groups than indigenous, as mestizo is a mix of multiple ethnicities. The mestizo category therefore is not as clear cut to interpret, but the mestizo ethnic category is also characteristic of the Latin American ethnic context, therefore it could not be omitted or identified as something else.

Concerning the fourth hypothesis, the emergence of no effect of voting for an ethnic populist party on the sense of external political efficacy is striking. Voting, in general, has been associated with external political efficacy, especially when voting for the winning party (Gil De Zúñiga et al., 2017), as in Bolivia. An OLS regression separately in Bolivia and Ecuador was conducted to confirm the robustness of model 3 (Appendix D). These models also do not show an effect of voting for an ethnic populist party on the external political efficacy of individuals. The same holds for model 4. An interaction effect was expected between individuals' left/right orientation and the presence of an ethnic populist party, as these parties are more left-oriented (Madrid, 2007). No significant effect was reported. Also no effect was reported when mestizo was chosen as the ethnic reference category

(results in Appendix C). This leaves us unable to explain the mechanisms that cause the ethnic populist parties to influence the external political efficacy of indigenous people. We are left with the correlation, stating that ethnic populist parties have an effect on the external political efficacy of indigenous people (and mulattos) in Latin America.

The last issue I want to address is the lack of country-level control variables in the models. Some other country-level control variables could have been included in the analysis. For example, corruption level and GDP could influence the way people perceive the responsiveness of politicians in the country. The analysis already excluded undisputedly corrupt and unfree countries (Venezuela and Nicaragua). Not all countries have the same democratic quality and corruption level. In the region quite some variability is shown. However, the intraclass correlation is only 4%, which means that only 4% of the variability in external political efficacy is due to country-level differences. This is relatively low. Therefore, including more country-level control variables to control this low amount of between-country variance might not have made a difference in the analysis.

## 5.2 Conclusion

This thesis looked at the position of indigenous minorities and the representation of their interests in Latin America. This issue was approached as an issue of descriptive representation and is based on Mansbridge's arguments on why, in some cases, descriptive representation of historically marginalized groups is desirable and necessary. The most important arguments for this thesis are, firstly, that a relation of dominance and subordination has led to ignorance and mistrust between the historically marginalized group and the governmental elite. By descriptive representation, this mistrust can be countered by the descriptive representative. Seeing one's co-ethnic in the governmental elite creates better communication between the governmental elite and the historically marginalized group and creates a sense of ability to rule among the historically marginalized group when this ability was seriously questioned in the past. Furthermore, the ability to vote for a party that represents the interests of a historically marginalized group creates a higher de facto legitimacy of the polity as more groups are included in the decision-making process (Dovi, 2002; Mansbridge, 1999).

By addressing the external political efficacy of indigenous people, this thesis attempted to look at the effect of the descriptive representation on how indigenous people feel that they are represented. I operationalized this by looking at the effect that ethnic populist parties have on the evaluation of indigenous people on the responsiveness of the governmental elite. External political efficacy is used as the dependent variable instead of the more common use of external political efficacy as an independent variable explaining political participation. Looking at the effect that ethnic populist parties have on individuals is a new way of researching ethnic populist parties. Most research on

ethnic populist parties has been done to explain the rise of these parties and what caused their success or failure. Ethnic populist party presence is then seen as the dependent variable, where indigenous movements and peoples are seen as one of the predictors explaining their success or failure. However, little research has been done on the effect that these parties have on the way indigenous people feel they are represented, which, in essence, is what these parties claim to do. Therefore, the central question of this thesis was the following:

*To what extent do ethnic populist parties influence how indigenous people perceive their political representation?*

The underlying hypothesized mechanism is that through ethnic populist party representation, mistrust between the indigenous constituents and the government is countered. This, in turn, leads to a better evaluation of the responsiveness of politicians. External political efficacy was operationalized as the feeling that the people who govern the country listened to the input of the respondent. Therefore, only a small part of the effect that descriptive representation by ethnic populist parties might have on the perceived quality of the respondent's political representation was analyzed. Due to survey limitations, the external political efficacy towards the government and institutions was not included.

To answer the question, the difference in the level of external political efficacy was assessed between indigenous people and other ethnic groups. The data showed a significant mean difference between ethnic groups and their levels of external political efficacy. However, the analysis indicated that indigenous individuals, on average, have a higher level of external political efficacy compared to most other ethnic groups. Another striking result is that mestizos displayed the lowest level of external political efficacy compared to most other ethnic groups. The literature suggests that marginalized groups would have a higher level of mistrust toward the governmental elite, leading to lower external political efficacy. This initial analysis did not find that among indigenous individuals.

To explain the mean differences in the external political efficacy between the different ethnic groups, a multilevel model was utilized, with cross-level interaction terms between ethnic populist party presence and the different ethnic categories. The expectation was that indigenous people in countries with ethnic populist parties (Ecuador and Bolivia) would display a higher level of external political efficacy than indigenous individuals in countries without such a party. The analysis showed that this is the case by the significant interaction term. This thesis could not uncover the underlying causal pathways, as the interaction term between voting for an ethnic populist party and ethnicity, and between left-right orientation and ethnic populist party presence did not turn out to be significant. Reflecting on the theoretical framework, we can conclude that the descriptive representation of indigenous people leads to a higher sense of responsiveness of the governmental elite. The causal

pathways of voting and left/right orientation proved not to be significant, therefore it is not possible to draw conclusions on the causal pathways that cause the effect of ethnic populist party presence on the external political efficacy of indigenous people.

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
# Appendices

## Appendix A: OLS Regression Assumptions

### Linearity and Homoscedasticity

Figure 4


Scatterplot with Loess Curve



### Normally Distributed Errors


Figure 5

P-P Plot Testing Normally Distributed Errors



**Figure 6**

*Q-Q Plot Testing Normally Distributed Errors*



**Table 9**

*Kolmogorov – Smirnov Test of Normally Distributed Errors*

	Statistic	df	Significance level
Standardized residual	0.073	10982	<0.001

*Note:* df = degrees of freedom.

*Source:* LAPOP (2023)

## Pearson's R Correlations

**Table 10**

*Pearsons R Correlations Between Variables*

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Political efficacy	-							
2. Ethnicity	0.028 ***	-						
3. Voted dummy	0.032***	0.007	-					
4. Gender dummy	-0.001	-0.023**	-0.020**	-				
5. Age	0.068***	-0.053***	-0.041***	-0.062***	-			
6. Political interest	-0.049***	0.016	0.020**	0.094***	0.044***	-		
7. Education level	-0.120***	-0.082***	0.017	0.006	-0.279***	-0.206***	-	
8. Left/right scale	0.122***	0.027***	-0.043***	-0.055***	0.055***	-0.071***	-0.043***	-
9. Ethnic populist party presence	-0.036**	-0.009	0.524***	-0.020**	-0.065***	0.081***	0.084***	-0.049***

*Source: LAPOP (2023)*

## Appendix B: Robustness Check ANOVA

### Welch Test with Games-Howell Post Hoc Test

**Table 11**

*Welch Test of Ethnicity Groups on External Political Efficacy*

Ethnic category	N	Mean	Std dev
White	3165	3.81	2.03
Mestizo	5070	3.56	2.00
Indigenous	828	3.83	2.00
Black	570	3.77	2.13
Mulatto	756	3.84	2.01
Other	593	4.02	2.11
Total	10982	3.71	2.02

	Statistic	df	df2	P-value
Welch	10.650	5	2115.029	<0.001

*Note:* N = number of observations, Std dev = standard deviation, SS = sum of squares, df = degrees of freedom, MS = mean squares.

*Source:* LAPOP (2023).

**Table 12**

*Games – Howell Post Hoc Comparisons*

Ethnic category	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black	Mulatto	Other
White	0.245***	-0.019	0.038	-0.026	-0.206
Mestizo		-0.264***	-0.207	-0.271***	-0.451***
Indigenous			0.057	-0.007	-0.187
Black				-0.064	-0.243
Mulatto					-0.180

*Note:* \*\*\* p < .001, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .10, two-tailed test.

*Source:* LAPOP (2023).

## Multilevel Model 1 with Indigenous as Reference

**Table 13**

*Multilevel Model of External Political Efficacy  
Indigenous as Reference*

Variable	<i>Model 1</i>	
	Estimate	s.e.
Intercept	4.493***	(0.154)
<i>Individual level</i>		
Ethnicity (reference = indigenous)		
White	-0.159**	(0.081)
Mestizo	-0.231***	(0.073)
Black	-0.123	(0.111)
Mulatto	-0.095	(0.109)
Other	-0.049	(0.106)
Political interest	-0.117***	(0.019)
Education level	-0.126***	(0.013)
Age	0.004***	(0.001)
Gender (reference = male)	0.059	(0.037)
Left/Right centered	0.074***	(0.007)
<i>Country level</i>		
Ethnic populist party (reference = not present)	-0.049	(0.269)
<i>Random effects</i>		
Variance (country)	0.120***	(0.046)
Residual (individual)	3.821***	(0.051)
N individuals	10982	
N countries	15	
-2x log likelihood	47183.34	

*Note:* s.e. = standard error, \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .10, two-tailed test.

*Source:* LAPOP (2023).

## Appendix C: Multilevel Model 2,3,4 Mestizo as Reference

**Table 14**  
*Multilevel Models of External Political Efficacy Mestizo as Reference*

Variable	Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Estimate	s.e.	Estimate	s.e.	Estimate	s.e.
Intercept	4.255***	(0.144)	4.228***	(0.143)	4.263***	(0.144)
<i>Individual level</i>						
Ethnicity (reference = mestizo)						
White	0.091*	(0.052)	0.079	(0.050)	0.071	(0.050)
Indigenous	0.193**	(0.082)	0.187**	(0.078)	0.228***	(0.073)
Black	0.118	(0.096)	0.118	(0.092)	0.109	(0.091)
Mulatto	0.133	(0.094)	0.133	(0.089)	0.137	(0.088)
Other	0.204**	(0.090)	0.188**	(0.087)	0.182**	(0.085)
Political interest	-0.117***	(0.019)	-0.113***	(0.019)	-0.118***	(0.019)
Education level	-0.126***	(0.013)	-0.122***	(0.013)	-0.126***	(0.013)
Age	0.004***	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)
Gender (reference = male)	0.059	(0.037)	0.061*	(0.037)	0.059	(0.037)
Left/Right centered	0.074***	(0.007)	0.075***	(0.007)	0.078***	(0.007)
Voted ethnic party (reference = no)			0.617***	(0.128)		
<i>Country level</i>						
Ethnic populist party (reference = not present)	-0.036	(0.271)	-0.243	(0.267)	-0.054	(0.268)
<i>Interactions</i>						
White * Ethnic populist party	-0.344*	(0.190)				
Indigenous * Ethnic populist party	0.181**	(0.183)				
Black * Ethnic populist party	-0.107	(0.329)				
Mulatto * Ethnic populist party	0.317	(0.283)				
Other * Ethnic populist party	-0.234	(0.300)				
White * Voted ethnic party			-0.291	(0.338)		
Indigenous * Voted ethnic party			0.086	(0.227)		
Black * Voted ethnic party			-0.383	(1.136)		
Mulatto * Voted ethnic party			0.303	(0.580)		
Other * Voted ethnic party			-0.112	(0.468)		
Ethnic populist party * Left/right centered					-0.027	(0.021)
<i>Random effects</i>						
Variance (country)	0.120***	(0.046)	0.116***	(0.051)	0.119***	(0.046)
Residual (individual)	3.818***	(0.051)	3.811***	(0.051)	3.820***	(0.051)
N individuals	10982		10982		10982	
N countries	15		15		15	
-2x log likelihood	47176.45		47153.30		47181.65	

Note: s.e. = Standard error, \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .10, two-tailed test.

Source: LAPOP (2023)

## Appendix D: Model 3 in Bolivia & Ecuador OLS regression

**Table 15**

*Model 3 OLS Regression Bolivia and Ecuador*

Variable	<i>Bolivia</i>		<i>Ecuador</i>	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Intercept	3.413***	(0.481)	3.204***	(0.570)
Ethnicity (reference = white)				
Mestizo	-0.029	(0.275)	0.301	(0.350)
Indigenous	0.145	(0.481)	0.532	(0.489)
Black	0.081	(0.569)	0.630	(0.506)
Mulatto	-	-	0.595	(0.477)
Other	0.204	(0.492)	-0.006	(0.694)
Political interest	0.024	(0.073)	-0.096	(0.078)
Education level	-0.122**	(0.044)	-0.020	(0.055)
Age	0.006	(0.005)	0.004	(0.005)
Gender (reference = male)	-0.094	(0.130)	0.189	(0.143)
Left/Right centered	0.042	(0.027)	0.077***	(0.028)
Voted ethnic party (reference = no)	0.658	(0.404)	-1.742	(2.081)
<i>Interactions</i>				
Mestizo * Voted ethnic party	0.297	(0.404)	1.658	(2.096)
Indigenous * Voted ethnic party	0.312	(0.599)	1.053	(2.231)
Black * Voted ethnic party	1.333	(0.851)	-1.040	(2.914)
Mulatto * Voted ethnic party	-	-	-0.403	(2.401)
Other * Voted ethnic party	-0.123	(0.719)	5.700*	(2.983)
N	736		841	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.108		0.029	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.091		0.010	

*Note:* s.e. = Standard error, \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .10, two-tailed test.

Mulatto is combined with black in the Bolivia model to increase observations. The combined variable black has an N = 21.

*Source:* LAPOP (2023)