

The fine line between peaceful protest and violent escalation

A process tracing study of political violence from a Social Movement

Theory perspective

In the past few years incidents of political violence by extreme organizations got often highlighted in the media. Political violence is not only an issue in the media, but also a widely studied phenomenon by researchers, who try to find explanations on different levels of analysis. In this thesis, I approach political violence from a Social Movement Theory perspective on a macro-, meso-, and micro-level. By applying process tracing as a research method I seek to uncover the causal mechanism at stake. I approach political opportunities on a macro-level, and mobilizing structures on a meso-level by using primary and secondary sources. I approach individual motivations on the micro-level via semi-structured interviews with right-wing activists in The Netherlands. Noteworthy, I show that protest policing is not a good barometer to measure political opportunities in order to explain political violence in four Western-European countries. Subsequently, I show that internal and external organizational structures of a radical social movement organization influence its engagement in political violence. Furthermore, I show that instrumental, identity, and ideological motivations do influence activists' engagement in political violence. More importantly, this thesis contributes to the existing literature by acknowledging the relational, constructivist, and emergent sphere in which political violence develops and escalates.

Keywords: Political Violence; Social Movement Theory; Political Opportunities; Mobilizing Structures; Individual Motivations.

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Abbreviations

AfD	German radical right-wing party; ‘ <i>Alternative für Deutschland</i> ’
COP	Strategy document; ‘ <i>politie in verandering</i> ’
CRS	French national police forces; ‘ <i>Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité</i> ’
IB	German Identitarian Movement; ‘ <i>Identitäre Bewegung</i> ’
PEA	Protest event analysis
SM	Social movement
SMF	Social movement family
SMO	Social movement organization
SMT	Social Movement Theory
UK	United Kingdom

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Manouk Smeets

Nijmegen, 17 January 2019

1. Introduction

21 April 2018: The extreme right-wing group Identitair Verzet squats a house in Amsterdam, in reaction to the squatting of houses by the refugee collective We Are Here. In the afternoon the protest action attracts opponents. These extreme left-wing activists start throwing rocks and fireworks through the windows of the squatted house. Hereafter, the police decides to intervene, and end disturbances (Het Parool, 2018, 21 April).

15 April 2018: On Sunday 15 April 2018 a new extreme right-wing group, Generation Identity, organizes their debut conference in The Stag Theatre, London. The meeting is supposed to be held in secret, but its location is revealed on social media. Anti-racism campaigners decide to come to the place and reveal their displeasure. The confrontation between extreme right- and left-wing activists escalates into violence, hereafter the police intervenes and tries to disperse the crowd (Shephard, 2018, 18 April).

6 April 2018: Since the end of March extreme left-wing groups are occupying universities all over France in reaction to the higher education reforms of President Macron. One of these occupied places is Tolbiac center, of the Pantheon-Sorbonne University in Paris. In reaction, extreme right-wing groups decide to end the occupation in the night of 6 to 7 April 2018. The masked right-wing activists storm the building and throw smoke bombs and bottles towards the extreme left-wing activists. Only when the police arrives the extreme right-wing activists flee the place and disturbances are ended (Decouty, 2018, 20 April).

24 March 2018: As a response to the death of a 15-year-old girl by her ex-boyfriend, a refugee from Afghanistan, groups organize demonstrations and counterdemonstrations in Kendal, Germany. During these demonstrations extreme right-activists carry banners with texts as 'Freedom instead of Islam' and 'Merkel must go', while extreme left-wing activists shout slogans as 'Nazis out!' and 'Together against racism'. Despite heavy police presence, demonstrations take a violent turn on 24 March 2018. Clashes erupt between the two opposing groups and the police. During this escalation eight police officers are slightly injured. There are fourteen arrests, among which three right-wing activists and eleven left-wing activists (dpa RegioLine, 2018, 4 April).

What do these events have in common? Of course, these events show some sort of escalation between, what is referred to in the media as, extreme right- and left-wing organizations. However, these organizations are oriented towards the achievement of political goals, that are more or less clearly stated by the activists. As one will understand, there are differences among the individuals' motivations, among the groups they belong to, and among the contextual situations in which they are located. What is puzzling is under what circumstances individuals choose to engage in political violence. To shed light on this complicated matter this thesis will try to answer the following question:

How can the choice for political violence by individuals be explained?

The puzzle of why people commit political violence is often approached from a range of different perspectives. Some researchers explain political violence by focusing on institutions, and the opportunities these institutions create for individuals to mobilize and commit political violence (Balcells, 2014; O'Neil, 2015). Other researchers argue that the choice for political violence is a strategy, and only adopted by rational actors that perceive political violence as the option with the highest returns after making a cost-benefit analysis (Crenshaw, 2008; Shughart II, 2011). Another group of researchers find explanations in the personal characteristics of individuals that make them more vulnerable for radicalization and lead them to committing political violence (Barlett and Miller, 2012; Borum, 2011; Victoroff, 2005). However, these explanations are only focused on one level of analysis, and do not take the relational and emergent sphere in which political violence develops into account. To overcome this problem, and to explore the causal mechanism on a macro-, meso-, and micro-level, I will approach political violence from a Social Movement Theory perspective. From a Social Movement Theory perspective political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations explain the choice for political violence on, respectively, the macro-, meso-, and micro-level. Therefore, this thesis is guided towards the following explanatory research question:

To what extent do political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations explain the choice for political violence by individuals?

1.1. Scientific relevance

First of all, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the broader field of social movement studies. By doing in-depth research on the causal mechanisms that are driving the interactions between the state, social movements and counter-movements I seek to find an explanation for the choice of political violence by individuals in radical social movement organizations (SMOs). Often, research in the field of social movement studies only focuses on more widespread and accepted forms of protest (della Porta, 2013, p15). In doing this research I seek to go further than explaining mobilization alone, rather I will explain how mobilization entails political violence as a form of protest.

Furthermore, I seek to contribute to the field of social movement (SM) studies by combining insights from the macro-, meso-, and micro-level in order to come to an overarching view of the subject of study. Even SM researchers often focus at only one of the levels. For example Klandermans and Mayer (2005) explore the micro-level by doing life-history interviews in order to understand motivations to join extreme right-wing SMs. The meso-level is studied by Rydgren (2003, p60) as he explores causes for increasing xenophobia and racism in the presence of a xenophobic radical right party that influences people's frame of thought and other political actors. Studies on the macro-level focus on the political opportunity structure of a state. Think of the openness or closure of a political system, stability or instability of elite alignments, presence or absence of elite allies and the state's level of repression (Brockett, 1991; Kriesi, et al., 1992; Tarrow, 1994). By combining these three levels in one study I seek to reveal what causal mechanisms are at play during the interactions among SMs, counter-movements and the state, and how interactions contribute to acts of political violence.

In structuring the thesis like this I approach political violence from a relational, constructivist, and emergent approach (della Porta, 2013, p5). The approach is relational because I focus on the interaction of both institutional (the state) and non-institutional (SM and counter-movements) actors. The approach is constructivist because I not only focus on external opportunities, but also on the construction of meaning by participating actors in SMOs. Lastly, the approach is emergent because I recognize that political violence develops gradually in a specific action. And because I try to explore causal mechanisms on the macro-level, in which political violence develops, the meso-level, in which radical SMOs form, and the micro-level, in which personal motivations develop.

Lastly, the thesis contributes to the fields of political science and sociology, as the subject is situated at the interface of these fields of research. On the one hand, this thesis is dedicated to political science because I make a comparison of protest handling and its effects

on political violence in four different Western-European countries, and because I take a look at the different conflictual situations, institutions, and mobilization patterns. On the other hand, this thesis is dedicated to sociology because it focuses on patterns of social relationships, and social interactions between various actors that are relevant to SMOs.

1.2. Societal relevance

In addition to the scientific relevance, it is crucial to understand the societal relevance of this thesis. In the situation sketches above one could see that the issue of activists using political violence against political targets and counter-movements becomes a more pressing issue in societies. A better understanding of the causal mechanisms that drive individuals to political violence could be crucial for creating more effective policy towards this phenomenon. By making the authorities more aware of personal motivations of activists, group structures in which activists act, and more importantly, the implications of the authorities' own policy, this thesis contributes to an increased consciousness of the phenomenon, which could lead to better policy-making processes. More effective policy could lead to a better capacity of coping with situations of political violence, and could lead to the prevention of escalation in the future.

1.3. Structure of the thesis

In the next chapter, I will present the theoretical framework. The chapter starts by defining the concepts of mobilization and political violence. Next, I will explain the use Social Movement Theory (SMT) as an explanation for political violence. SMT is composed of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations. By focusing on these three concepts I will be able to make analyses on the macro-, meso-, and micro-level. In chapter three I discuss the research approach, case-selection, and data. In Chapter four I will present trends in political violence across four Western-European countries. After having presented the more general trends in political violence, I will dedicate chapter five, six, and seven to analyzing, respectively, the macro-, meso-, and micro-level. On the macro-level I analyze the effect of protest policing on political violence in four Western-European countries. On the meso-level I analyze the influence of internal and external organizational structures on political violence, by focusing on PEGIDA and Antifa in Germany. The micro-level analysis explores individual motivations of right-wing activists in The Netherlands. Chapter eight consists of a conclusion and discussion, where I will summarize the most important findings of this thesis, reflect on the cases that I use, and present suggestions for further research.

2. Theoretical framework

As is formulated in the research question of this thesis, I am interested in activists' engagement in political violence. I will present a theoretical basis within this theoretical framework. At first, I will define mobilization and political violence. Next, I will give a literature overview and acknowledge why the existing literature is unable to explain the phenomenon of political violence as a whole. To come to a better understanding of the choice for political violence, I will move to another level of explanation. Instead of focusing on general theories, I move to middle-range theories. Social Movement Theory (SMT) can be classified as a middle-range theory that tries to explain political violence. In explaining SMT I will give attention to the concepts of political opportunities (macro-level), mobilizing structures (meso-level), and individual motivations (micro-level).

2.1. Defining mobilization and political violence

In the general introduction of this thesis I stated that I am interested in activists' engagement in political violence. In order to come to a better understanding I will first explain the concepts of mobilization and political violence.

2.1.1. Mobilization

The concept of mobilization is widely studied within the field of social sciences, and is generally used in combination with contentious politics, or in other words, in combination with studies of disruptive techniques to express a political point. Contention begins when a group of people start making claims on other people, and when the claims are being realized they would have an effect on the interests of those other people (McAdam, *et al.*, 1996b, p1). This assumption makes contention dependent on mobilization because only via mobilization the capacity for collective interaction can be created. Mobilization in this sense means bringing people together, or prepare people for action. So, when I speak of mobilization in this thesis, I mean the process by which people are brought together and prepared for action.

2.1.2. Political violence

The concept of violence, and also political violence, is widely studied within the field of social science. Definitions of violence are comprised of those intentional acts that are meant to cause physical harm to people or to damage property (Graham and Gurr, 1969, pXVII; Zimmerman,

1983, p7). Other definitions add that attacks are non-governmental and committed within a political unit, or view violence as an interaction where people or property get damaged, despite resistance (Gurr, 1968, p247; Tilly, 1978, p176).

Political violence moves to another level, and includes a political aspect, which makes it different from acts of violence mentioned above. Therefore, definitions of political violence comprise “*of those repertoires of collective action that involve great physical force and cause damage to an adversary to achieve political aims*” (della Porta, 2013, p6). I will view ‘*damage to an adversary*’ as violent acts against people or property, whereby specific political aims, often against a political regime, its agents or its policies, are pursued (Gurr, 1970, p3-4; Gurr and Duval, 1976, p141). Political violence is committed within a political community or system and is often viewed, by the authorities, as illegitimate behavior that could entail political consequences (della Porta, 2013, p6; Gurr, 1970, p3-4; Zimmerman, 1983, p1).

As I am only interested in the use of political violence by SMOs, this thesis will only take organizational political violence into account. Operationally, one could think of hijackings, armed seizures of people or areas, random bombings, clashes with the police, physical attacks on specific targets, rioting, or destroying property (della Porta, 2013, p6). Forms of political violence that are excluded in this thesis are for example state or state-sponsored violence. An important advantage of using SMT in exploring the phenomenon of political violence by SMOs, is that this theory places the acts in a broader context and tries to reveal the complex processes that are driving political violence (della Porta, 2013, p15).

2.2. Theories about political violence

Literature review

To come to a better understanding of the choice for political violence it is important to make use of theoretical models. Theoretical models provide us with a context in which substantive societal problems, such as political violence, can be understood, and give a better insight in the causal mechanisms at stake (Kiser and Hetcher, 1998, p793; Somers, 1998, p748). In the introduction of this thesis I already mentioned that this thesis will approach political violence from a Social Movement Theory perspective. However, not only SMT offers an explanation of the phenomenon. Throughout the years many researchers focused on political violence and found many explanations. In this part of the thesis I will elaborate on structural, cultural, and individual approaches. Next, I will explain why I use SMT to approach political violence in this thesis.

First of all, researchers approach political violence from a structural perspective. From a structural perspective individual behavior cannot explain social phenomena because actors are embedded in structural relationships that cause visible outcomes (Lichbach, 2003, p13). This means that macro-level structures explain individual behavior and individuals are reduced to ‘*rule-following satisficers*’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p8). When it comes to explaining political violence, researchers found that institutions create opportunities and capacities for individuals in order to commit political violence (Balcells, 2014, p278; O’Neil, 2015, p211). An example can be drawn from Robinson, *et al.* (2006, p2011), who argue that partial democracies and quasi-authoritarian systems provide more opportunities to individuals to commit political violence, when compared to authoritarian states and democracies. More commonly, the structural approach is focused on the democratic system. Political violence could be used in a democratic system because its structure provides people with some basic political rights and civil liberties, and encourages people to associate, which gives them an opportunity to mobilize and use political violence (Eubank and Weinberg, 2001, p163; Li and Schaub, 2004, p249; Weinberg and Eubank, 1998, p114). Moreover, researchers have a focus on the behavior of different institutions, rather than on regime type. Robinson, *et al.* (2006, p2012) argue that more repressive state behavior could lead to an increase in political violence.

Researchers also approach political violence from a cultural perspective. Cultural theory is mainly involved in exploring the significance of intersubjective beliefs and values (Lichbach, 2003, p13). Whereas a structural approach focuses on the political domain, cultural analyses are broader (Ross, 2009, p134). Understandings of the world are embedded in institutions, such as religion, politics, and the economy (Lichbach, 2003, p73). In this sense, culture prescribes individual behavior because of its common rules and values, and no longer views society as random because it structures preferences (Lichbach, 2003, pp78-79). Explaining political violence from a cultural approach means that one has to focus on extreme ideologies of groups. O’Neil (2015, p211) for example argues that ideas do not necessarily have to be institutionalized. Extreme beliefs filter the objective reality of an individual, thereby causing a subjective interpretation based on experiences and memories, in which actions of political violence are committed (Crenshaw, 1988, p12). So, from a cultural perspective, individuals’ beliefs could affect their repertoire of action and provide a motive for committing political violence (Drake, 1998, p52). Patterns of socialization of the individual into this extreme ideology could follow social, linguistic, and/or religious traditions. Ideologies are thus cognitive structures that give meaning to concepts of power and interests (Hasenclever and

Rittberger, 2000, p648). So, individuals who commit political violence should be understood in their cultural context.

Moreover, researchers tend to focus on the individual to explain political violence. A first approach explains political violence from rational choice theory. In this theory individuals are seen as rational actors who make decisions based on an analysis of the actions of others, and where the decisions of others have an influence on the personal outcome (Levi, 1997, p23). From a rational choice perspective macro-level outcomes often represent the unintended consequences of actions that are individually rational (Lichbach, 2003, p33). Political violence is explained as an individual strategy by rational choice researchers. For example Crenshaw (2008, p24) argues that when the costs of using political violence are too high, individuals will not commit it. Shughart II (2011, p126) makes a similar argument, arguing that individuals make a cost-benefit analysis and choose for the highest returns. So, political violence develops when the individual perceives that its use of political violence could enforce the highest returns.

A second approach that focuses on the individual to explain political violence comes from psychological research. Individual motivations from a psychological approach are inspired by personal experiences, such as grievances about societal conditions and economic development. Instead of focusing on rationality, psychological approaches focus on frustration as a determinant for political violence. For example the relative deprivation theory of Gurr (1970, p13), where deprivation about societal conditions is a determinant for political violence. Or think of radicalization theories, where a changing mind-set of individuals will drive them to committing political violence (Barlett and Miller, 2012, p2; Borum, 2011, p41). Moreover, researchers who take a psychological approach search for specific characteristics of individuals that could determine the choice for political violence. For example Victoroff (2005, p22) argues that young people with a lack of self-esteem, and who are in search of an own identity are more prone to committing acts of political violence than other individuals.

The choice for Social Movement Theory

The general theories above all seem to offer a complete explanation for political violence. However, in practice it is hard to formulate a consistent explanation for political violence by using one of the theories on its own. Structural theory is criticized for ignoring the choice and creativity of individuals because fully determining individual behavior to structures would not represent actual life in society (Luckman, 1975, p6). Cultural approaches are hard to apply, as norms and values are subjective and multi-layered, which makes them multi-interpretable, and hard to analyze because norms and values are not directly visible in societies

(Lichbach, 2003, pp90-93). Rational choice theory only focuses on the rationality of individuals, and thereby ignores the role of institutions and structures or the existence of non-rational behavior of individuals (Kincaid, 1988, p265). And lastly, psychological approaches are not able to bridge the gap between the individual and the collective. It is clear how individuals perceive certain conditions, but theories are unable to explain why and how this is turned into collective action (Brush, 1996, p535). Furthermore, Collier (1999, p1) argues that it is hard to uncover real motives of individuals in using a psychological approach, as individuals tend to express grievance motivations as an explanation for their acting, rather than acknowledging it is done for strategic purposes.

Political violence, a complicated phenomenon, develops in a relational and emergent sphere. Therefore, understanding of the macro-, meso-, and micro-level is necessary to come to an all-encompassing explanation for political violence. None of the theories described above is able to provide an all-encompassing explanation, that focuses on the macro-, meso-, and micro-level, on its own. Therefore, I will focus on a lower level of abstraction and use a middle-range theory to explain political violence. Middle-range theories are those theories “*that lie between minor but necessary working hypothesis that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and all-inclusive systematic effort to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization and social change*” (Merton, 2012, p531). A middle-range theory that is less abstract, tries to make empirical generalizations, and provides a more interactive approach is Social Movement Theory.

SMT is a very broad theory, and finds its origin in different traditions developed in the United States and Europe (Klandermans, 1991, p89). Whereas the American research tradition provided political process theory (McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978) and resource mobilization theory (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy and Zald, 1977a), the European tradition focused on the development of theories on New Social Movements (Buechler, 1995; Kitschelt, 1986, 1985; Koopmans, 1995, Kriesi, 1989a). However, these theories have overlapping elements that enable us to create a synthesis. From these theories three central core concepts can be derived that together form a macro-, meso-, and micro-level explanation for political violence. These concepts are *political opportunities* or constraints to social movement organizations, *mobilizing structures* that are available for those who commit political violence, and *individual motivations* that determine the choice for political violence. In the following part of this thesis I will elaborate further on Social Movement Theory by explaining what social movements and social movement organizations are, and by explaining how political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations enforce political violence.

2.3. Social Movement Theory

2.3.1. Defining social movements

By using Social Movement Theory (SMT) I seek to find an all-encompassing explanation for the use of political violence. In order to clarify this phenomenon I will first describe what social movements (SMs), and social movement organizations (SMOs) are. SMs are widely studied and broadly conceptualized by many scholars (della Porta, 2013; della Porta and Diani, 2009; Kriesi, 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1977b; Melucci, 1988; Tarrow, 1998). I will use the following definition of social movements in this thesis: “*voluntary collectives that people support in order to effect changes in society. Using the broadest and most inclusive definition a social movement includes all who in any form support the general ideas of the movement*” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977b, p2). By using this definition I encompass three general features that are visible in almost all conceptualizations of SM scholars, namely: 1) commitment to collective action and pursuing common political goals, 2) bring about or oppose societal change, 3) mobilization of potential supporters via organizational means (della Porta and Diani, 2009, pp20-21).

In this thesis I will focus on the organizational means of SMs, which are social movement organizations. SMOs form the building blocks of SMs, and have two functions. Firstly, a mobilizing function because a SMO mobilizes supporters, and secondly, a political function because a SMO strives to obtain a collective good or tries to avoid a collective bad (Kriesi, 1996, p153). SMOs use many different forms of collective action in order to enforce societal change. Since the 1970s innovative forms of collective action were developed, think of roadblocks, occupations, petitions, boycotts, and marches (della Porta, 2013, p14). These forms of protest are in essence nonviolent, but break with the everyday course of events and challenge authorities. So, these protest forms trigger interaction between activists and the police, and can lead to political violence.

Not all SMOs are equally prone to using political violence. One can distinguish moderate SMOs from radical SMOs. From table 1, one can deduce that there are main differences in organizational structure, ideology, tactics, communication, and assessment of success (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000, p578). Especially the differences of tactics are crucial for this thesis. Whereas moderate SMOs use nonviolent legal tactics, radical SMOs rely on direct action, mass action, and innovative tactics. The radical SMO primarily pursues nonviolent direct action. However, during moments of intense interaction between SMOs, opponents, and authorities (for example the police) these nonviolent actions can evolve into political violence (della Porta, 2013, p15). Therefore, this thesis only focuses on radical SMOs.

	Moderate SMOs	Radical SMOs
Internal structure	Hierarchical leadership; formal bureaucratic organization; development of large membership base for resource generation	Nonhierarchical leadership; participatory democratic organization; egalitarian; 'membership' based upon involvement; support indigenous leadership
Ideology	Reform agenda, emphasis on being a contender in the existing political system; national focus; support government military involvement	Radical agenda; emphasis on structural change; flexible ideology; radical networks; global consciousness and connections; antimilitaristic stance
Tactics	Nonviolent legal action	Nonviolent direct action; mass actions; innovative tactics
Communication	Able to rely on mainstream forms of communication	Ignored/misrepresented by media; reliance on alternative forms of communication (music, street theater, pamphlets, newsletters)
Assessment of success	Potential for plentiful resources; manipulate resources for the self-interest of the organizations' longevity; formal rationality; success measured in terms of reform of existing political/economic system	Limited resources; may be purposefully short-lived; substantive rationality; contribute to larger radical agenda; subject to intense opposition and government surveillance

Table 1: Ideal type characteristics of moderate and radical SMOs (Fitzgerald & Rodgers, 2000, p578).

After defining social movements and social movement organizations. I will now turn to the core concepts of Social Movement Theory. These are political opportunities (macro-level), mobilizing structures (meso-level), and individual motivations (micro-level).

2.3.2. Political opportunities

The first core concept of SMT is political opportunities, and focuses on the macro-level. In this part of the thesis I will explain how traditional research on political opportunities is structured, and I explain why I use protest policing as a barometer of political opportunities.

Traditional research on political opportunities

The use of political opportunities as an explanation for committing political violence, and for the mobilization of SMOs in general, is derived from different research agendas. A first notion was made by Eisinger (1973, p11), who noticed that the formal political structure of a state influences the conditions of protest behavior. From this point on, a lot of research has been conducted, in which many different dimensions of political opportunities were developed (Brocket, 1991, p254; Kriesi, *et al.*, 1992, p220; McAdam, 1996, p27; Tarrow, 1994). Traditionally, political opportunities are measured according to the relative stable and more volatile elements of the political context of a given system (Kriesi, *et al.*, 1995, p26).

The stable elements of political opportunities are formed by two dimensions. The first dimension is the formal institutional structure of a political system (Kriesi, *et al.*, 1992, p220; Kriesi, *et al.*, 1995, p26; McAdam, 1996, p27; Rucht, 1996, p190). These formal structures determine the access for a SM to the system and determine the possibility for a SM to mobilize, which is necessary for the commitment of collective action. The second dimension are the informal power relations and prevailing strategies of political elites (Rucht, 1996, p190; Kriesi, *et al.*, 1995, p33; McAdam, 1996, p27). Part of these informal relations and prevailing strategies are the political heritage of a nation, which has an influence on the possibility for a SM to mobilize and commit collective action. Think in this case of more repressive, or more integrative strategies of the state according to the mobilization of SMOs.

The volatile elements of political opportunities are also formed by two dimensions. The first dimension has to do with the availability of (elite) allies and other support groups, which are defined as ‘alliance structures’ (Brocket, 1991, p254; della Porta and Rucht, 1995, p235; Kriesi, 1989b, p295; McAdam, 1996, p27). Alliance structures are those political actors that support the SMO and will create opportunities for movement activists to mobilize and commit acts of political violence. The second dimension focuses on the ‘state’s capacity and propensity for repression’ (Brockett, 1991, p254; McAdam, 1996, p27; Tilly, 1978, p149). In this sense, repression should be viewed as an interactive process between authorities, often represented by the police, and challenging SMOs (della Porta, 2013, p35). Strategic choices of the one, influence strategic choices of the other, thereby creating a process where innovation and adaption on tactics of both sides will happen.

Protest policing as a barometer of political opportunities

Instead of focusing on the traditional research on political opportunities, I will apply protest policing as a barometer for political opportunities in this thesis. Focusing on protest

policing as a barometer of political opportunities has two advantages over the traditional research on political opportunities. Firstly, when focusing on protest policing, only one variable is taken into account, instead of measuring all the dimensions that come along with measuring the stable and volatile elements of political opportunities (della Porta, 1995, p56). Focusing on one variable, instead of focusing on several variables, encourages you to develop a better understanding of the interactions between SMOs and their environment. These interactions play a crucial role in explaining commitment to political violence (della Porta, 1995, p56). Secondly, by focusing on protest policing one uses a variable that directly impacts the SMO (della Porta, 1995, p56). Hereby, another problem of traditional research on political opportunities is addressed. The traditional approach on political opportunities creates a distance between the structure of the political system and the assumed effects on the SMOs, which makes it hard to show the connections between the structure and the presumed effect on SMOs (della Porta, 1995, p56).

As mentioned earlier, making an analysis of protest policing enables one to better understand the interactive processes that fuel commitment to political violence and escalation (Klukkert, *et al.*, 2008, p185). Especially, in this thesis I will focus on the interaction between SMO-activists and the police. The choice for specific strategies by one of these actors immediately influences the choice of strategies by the other. A third reason to focus on protest policing as a barometer for political opportunities, is that the police has a monopoly on the use of violence in a political system (Van der Vlugt, *et al.*, 2013, p15). So, if one wants to see how interaction between the state and SMOs happens, and wants to see how escalation gradually evolves, a focus on the police could provide this insight. Whereas traditional research on political opportunities is perceived as a social construct of researchers that cannot be observed because the researcher is not part of the SMO itself (Brockett, 1991, p255). Focusing on the police could bridge this gap, as the police is often perceived as a long arm of the state by members of a SMO.

To explore protest policing I will analyze the following five dimensions that are formulated by della Porta (1995, pp57-58). The first dimension focuses on ‘*repressive*’ versus ‘*tolerant*’ behavior of the police according to the range of prohibited behaviors. One could ask the question if the police should directly intervene when protestors commit acts of political violence, or the police should be more tolerant towards the activists. More tolerant tactics by the police are expected to lead to a dismantling of protest, and more repressive tactics are expected to lead to more political violence by radical SMO activists (della Porta, 1995, pp79-80). The second dimension focuses on the ‘*selective*’ versus ‘*diffuse*’ behavior of the police

according to the range of groups that are subject to repression. So for example, is the police more repressive towards minority groups, students, left- or right-wing protesters. The more selective tactics are, the more it would favor diffusion of political violence (della Porta, 1995, p79). The third dimension of protest policing focuses on ‘preventive’ versus ‘reactive’ behavior according to the moment that the police decides to intervene. By preventive strategies I mean that police intervention is employed before escalation evolves, for example the police decides to separate the two opposing SMOs or decides to ban a demonstration in order to maintain public order. Reactive strategies are police strategies that are employed at the moment escalation happens. Although the police is well prepared for mass demonstrations, it can be the case that these preventive strategies do not work. When the police is not able to control the demonstration, the police uses reactive tactics that fuel political violence and lead to an escalation (della Porta, 1995, p78). Therefore, reactive tactics are expected to lead to more political violence by movement activists.

The fourth dimension I focus on is the ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ tactics that are employed by the police when it comes to the use of force. In this case, one could think of the police that uses teargas or water cannons, or the police who simply tries to form a block between the two groups of opposing protesters. Hard tactics employed by the police are expected to meet more political violence from the SMO-activists, especially from the more radical fringes (della Porta, 1995, p78, p80). So, hard tactics on behalf of the police will eventually lead to more violent escalations. The fifth dimension focuses on the ‘dirty’ versus ‘lawful’ behavior of the police according to which they have respect for the legal and democratic procedures in a political system. Here, I will acknowledge if the police officers in a specific country handle according to national and international law, and acknowledge if and when the police ignores these procedures and laws. Dirty police tactics are expected to meet more violent behavior on behalf of the SMO-activists because the perception of fighting a dirty war encourages activists to become more radical (della Porta, 1995, p80). On the basis of these five dimensions of protest policing as a barometer for political opportunities, the following hypothesis is deduced:

H1: The more repressive, selective, reactive, hard, and dirty police tactics are, the more prone activists will be to engage in political violence

2.3.3. Mobilizing structures

The second core concept of SMT is mobilizing structures, and focuses on the meso-level. In this part of the thesis I explain what mobilizing structures are, and I explain how the internal and external organizational structure of a SMO have an influence on political violence.

Mobilizing structures try to find an explanation for political violence on the meso-level, and are best defined as “*those collective vehicles, informal, as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action*” (McAdam, *et al.*, 1996a, p3). Following this definition, mobilizing structures focus on a combination of small group structures, and forms of organization to explain mobilization and political violence (McAdam, 1988, pp134-135). Mobilizing structures have a role in bringing people together, create coalitions among SMOs, oppose challengers, and take care of their own organizational survival after moments of intense mobilization (Tarrow, 1998, p124). To see how mobilizing structures have an influence on enforcing political violence I will elaborate on the internal and external organizational structure of SMOs in the following part.

Internal organizational structure

The first dimension that is part of the organizational level of mobilizing structures is the internal organizational structure (Kriesi, 1996, pp155-156). The focus is on the structure of the SMO itself. Based on several indicators that determine the organizational structure of a SMO, one could argue that some SMOs are more prone to committing political violence than others. These indicators are described as formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, territorial decentralization, and lastly, institutional integration (Kriesi, 1996, p155).

Formalization refers to the process by which a SMO creates criteria of formal membership, and establishes formal procedures and statutes (Kriesi, 1996, p154). An organization with low levels of formalization is characterized by a loose and informal structure. Furthermore, the organization cannot be held accountable by its members for the simple reason that the organization has no members. The lack of this accountability makes it more easy to engage in radical forms of protest. Professionalization relates to the development of a SMO towards an organization where paid employees are hired (Kriesi, 1996, p154). This means people are making a career in the movement, and that professional careers are at stake when the SMO engages in political violence. This makes it unlikely for the SMO to engage in radical forms of protest. Internal differentiation means that tasks within the SMO are functionally distributed (Kriesi, 1996, p154). This means a SMO is growing, and can no longer maintain its loose and nonbinding structure. Losing this structure entails responsibilities for movement participants,

and when personal responsibilities are at stake, people will be less likely to engage in political violence. Territorial decentralization is the process where smaller sub-organizations are formed in different territorial areas (Kriesi, 1996, p154). The achievement of this territorial decentralization is the result of a horizontal coordinated mechanism. This implies that there is a formal centralized structure of the organization. Having a formal structure, leaves little space to engage in radical protest actions. Institutional integration is the process of becoming a more institutional organization that is formed according to centralized decision-making processes. When an organization follows this process they are expected to act according to democratic rules and procedures, like all other institutionalized bodies. Therefore, the SMO is no longer able to deploy radical protest tactics.

So, scoring low on these five indicators means that the SMO will be more prone to engage in political violence, compared to SMOs that score high on these five indicators. As clarified earlier, I focus on radical SMOs (Rucht, 1996, p188). Radical SMOs are characterized by their decentralized, loose, and informal structures of groups, networks and organizations. Instead of focusing on electoral processes, and moderate forms of protest, the radical SMOs described in this thesis, focus on ‘*rebellious*’ and radical protest politics. This means that radical SMOs will be more prone to political violence, compared to moderate SMOs. Following this line of reasoning, I formulate the hypothesis about the internal organizational structure of a SMO as follows:

H2: The lower the levels of formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, territorial decentralization, and institutional integration of a radical SMO are, the more prone activists will be to engage in political violence

External organizational structure

The second dimension of the organizational level of mobilizing structures is formulated as the external organizational structure. In contrast to the internal organizational structure, the external organizational structure focuses on organizational developments and relations in the external environment of a SMO to explain the use of political violence (Kriesi, 1996, p155). Within this dimension, three spheres of influence are identified, namely constituency, allies, and opponents. The first sphere of influence, constituency, focuses on the relation of the SMO with its constituency. Committed adherents are the most important resources for a SMO (Kriesi, 1996, p155; Rucht, 1996, p187). Without a strong constituency a SMO is not able to mobilize, and therefore not able to use political violence. The second sphere of influence is defined as

allies. A SMO does not work in total isolation, but its actions and resources could be influenced by other SMOs, that have common ideas or a common ideology. These SMOs together form a social movement family (SMF) (della Porta, 2013, p74). Especially, during moments of intense mobilization or cycles of protest, SMOs (within a SMF) are more interconnected, as they share participants and provide each other mutual support (Staggenborg, 1988, p182). Furthermore, one SMO could use tactical opportunities and resources of other SMOs (Tarrow, 1998, p134). However, the radical SMOs will probably break with the larger, more moderate, nonviolent SMOs, in order to create new resources (della Porta, 2013, p147). So, a cycle of protest could also increase the competition between SMOs with a common ideology, which will lead the competing SMOs to change their repertoire of action, and thereby creating some radical SMOs that are using political violence in order to distinguish themselves from other SMOs (della Porta, 2013, p111).

The last sphere of influence, is that of opponents. This sphere is constituted by opposing SMOs, and authorities or political elites. Commitment to political violence in relation to opponents should be seen as a gradual process, by which repertoires of action will gradually escalate (della Porta, 2013, p76). The organizational competition during cycles of protest, creates more intense relations between the SMO and opponents, which will on the one hand socialize movement activists to more violent forms of action in order to defend themselves to counter-movements and authorities. On the other hand, this process will give authorities or political elites the opportunity to use more repressive forms of action, which could lead to more political violence. Following this line of reasoning, I formulate a hypothesis about the external organizational structure of a SMO as follows:

H3: The more intense the relations with the constituency, allies, and opponents of a radical SMO are, the more prone activists will be to engage in political violence

2.3.4. Individual motivations

Whereas political opportunities focus on macro-explanations and mobilizing structures on meso-explanations, the thesis will now focus on questions of how activists and groups perceive and interpret those opportunities and structures in order to come to a micro-explanation of political violence (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009, p14). By focusing on the micro-level I explore the processes by which political opportunities and mobilizing structures are translated into beliefs, behavior and attitudes of the activists (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p13). In general, activists' motivations to participate in a SMO are categorized in three

general motivations: 1) instrumentality, 2) identity, and 3) ideology. A SMO will give activists the opportunity to achieve these demands, by which the activists will perceive their participation as a delightful experience. In the following section I will elaborate on these three fundamental motives and its explanation for political violence.

Instrumental motivations

Instrumental motivations refer to the activists' choice to participate in a SMO in order to have influence on the social and political environment (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p8). Such motivations imply that activists' primarily want to change the world they live in. This statement holds that the behavior of activists is determined by the perceived costs and benefits that participation will bring to them (Klandermans, 2004, p361). From an instrumental motivation perspective grievances alone are not enough to explain the choice to participate in a SMO, rather the individual has the perception that her actions, at affordable costs, could change the position in which she is located (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p8; Van Zomeren, 2013, p380).

However, from Olsen's (1965, p2) collective action theory one can derive that activists face a so-called '*collective action dilemma*' during the decision-making process that motivates them to participate in collective action. If collective action succeeds and goals are achieved, the collective goods will benefit everyone, even to individuals who decided to withdraw from participation. Under these circumstances rational individuals will choose to take a free ride (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017, 107). So, how does that explain the choice of individuals to participate? Activists' will choose to participate when there are personal selective incentives at stake. These incentives can be of material or non-material nature and will motivate activists to participate in the movement (Gaxie, 1977, p128-129; Rydin and Pennington, 2000, p157). Material selective incentives are among others formed by the achievement new goods, whereas non-material selective incentives are for example the opportunity to build a career within the movement, or the advantage of new social relations. Furthermore, Klandermans (1984, p585) argues that the people who concern participation in SMOs are aware of the fact that the desired goal would not be produced if everyone set back and waited for participation of others. This also makes their participation more likely. So, instrumental motivations to join a SMO are based on the individual's perception that participation has an influence on the social and political environment, and that goals can be achieved at affordable costs. When activists perceive the costs of committing political violence as an affordable way to achieve some

political goals, they will not hesitate to use it according to the instrumental motivation perspective.

Identity motivations

Identity motivations refer to the activists' choice to participate in a SMO as an expression of one's identification with a group (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p8). Such motivations imply that activists' primarily want to be part of a group, and the identification one has with that group makes participation on behalf of the group more likely (Klandermans, 2004, p364). In order to be able to create a shared identity within the group three factors have to be present. First of all, there needs to be a clear definition of a group's ideology and actions. Secondly, social relations should be available and lastly, there needs to be some sort of personal identification (Melucci, 1988, p343). From these factors one can derive that a reason to join a SMO is that people identify with the unjustly treated SMO and perceive that their participation could improve the situation of the SMO (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p9).

However, the existence of these shared ideas, feelings and interests, and the awareness of these indicators alone are not enough to predict an individual its readiness and willingness to participate in collective action (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017, p109). Besides identification with the SMO, individuals should develop a clear idea of who or what is responsible for the injustice that is done to the SMO. As a result of this development individuals will perceive an in-group, the 'we', as a group that is treated unjustly, and an out-group, 'they', the authorities or institutions that are responsible for the injustice that is done to them (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p9; Van Zomeren, 2013, p380). The clear separation of an 'us' and 'them' creates a feeling among individuals that they should protect their group and maintain their group's identity and interests. In this sense, group identification is a strong predictor of activists' likeliness to participate in political violence (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017, p48). Commitment to the group will give activists a positive social identity. It could give people the feeling that they are no longer marginalized, but recognized, and perceive that other people are thinking like them (Orfali, 1990, p209). The perceived feeling that the activists' group is threatened could lead them to political violent acts. So, identity motivations to join a SMO are based on the individual's decision to express ones identification with a group. In this sense, committing political violence is a way to express ones identification with a group.

Ideological motivations

Ideological motivations refer to the activists' choice to participate in a SMO as a search for meaning and in order to express their views (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p10). Such motivations to participate in a SMO go further than the wish to create political change, rather the activists hope to gain dignity and try to make their angry feelings about the state of affairs or government outcomes known (Klandermans, 2004, p365; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017, p53). Rochon (1988, p31) formulates it like this: "*In the hands of movement leaders, new ideas become ideological frames*". So, SMOs are the carriers of meaning that seek to propagate their moral views to society via among others framing processes (Goffman, 1974, p21; Snow, *et al.*, 1986, p464).

On the one hand, ideological motivations show that people join a SMO in order to give meaning to their world, to express their views, and to express the views of the SMO. On the other hand, as a part of ideological motivations, people are also attracted to a SMO because they are puzzled by specific aspects of society or reality and try to grasp what is going on (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p9). People try to find like-minded people with similar experiences in a SMO, in order to exchange their stories. In this sense, the SMO gives people an opportunity to act according to their thoughts and understanding of the world. In conclusion, from an ideological motivations perspective individuals will join and participate in a SMO as a search for meaning, and in order to express their views. In this sense, committing political violence is a way to express a view.

Mobilization and political violence

But how exactly do these individual motivations lead to engagement in political violence? In order to explain how individual motivations lead to political violence one has to link them to structural conditions and group dynamics, so one needs to take the '*demand*' and '*supply*' side into account (della Porta, 2012, p231; Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p10). It is not only a matter of people that are motivated for participation (demand), but attractive opportunities to participate have to be present too (supply). Mobilization can follow different steps by which the demand and supply side of collective action come closer together after every step (Klandermans, 2004, p370). At first, people need to sympathize with the causes of the radical SMO. Next, if people sympathize with the radical SMO, people need to be a target of mobilization. If people are targeted for mobilization, they also need to be motivated to participate in specific activities. The final step is where motivated individuals make the decision to participate in collective action of the radical SMO. During each step more and more

people get excluded. So, in the end only a small group remains that is willing to participate in acts of political violence. In this sense, one could value individual motivations as a necessary but insufficient cause (Mahoney, 2008, pp418-419). Individual motivations are a necessary condition because individuals need to have instrumental, identity, and/or ideological motivations to become involved in a radical SMO. However, these motivations are insufficient to explain engagement in political violence because attractive opportunities to participate have to be present as well.

After elaborating on the three fundamental motives and explaining the mechanism that drives individuals to participate, one needs to come to the conclusion that these motivations are not mutual exclusive or competing (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005, p8). It is possible for activists to be driven by only one of the three motivations. However, more often all three motivations have to be understood in order to give an explanation for activists' participation in a radical SMO. During the activists' participation they can commit acts of political violence which will be the result of intense moments of interaction. On the basis of these individual motivations, the following hypothesis is deduced:

H4: If movement participants have instrumental, identity, and/or ideological motivations to join a radical SMO, then they are more prone to engage in in political violence

2.4. Overview of the hypotheses

There are several expectations that can explain the choice for political violence by activists in a radical SMO. These hypotheses are deduced from the Social Movement Theory explained above. As I focus on the macro-, meso- and micro-level, there are hypotheses for all these levels. Table 2 will give a brief overview of the hypotheses. In the next chapter I will present the methodology that I use in this thesis.

Indicator SMT	Measurement level	Hypothesis
Political opportunities	Macro	H1: The more repressive, selective, reactive, hard, and dirty police tactics are, the more prone activists will be to engage in political violence
Mobilizing structures	Meso	H2: The lower the levels of formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, territorial decentralization, and institutional integration of a radical SMO are, the more prone activists will be to engage in political violence H3: The more intense the relations with the constituency, allies, and opponents of a radical SMO are, the more prone activists will be to engage in political violence
Individual motivations	Micro	H4: If movement participants have instrumental, identity, and/or ideological motivations to join a radical SMO, then they are more prone to engage in in political violence

Table 2: Overview of the hypotheses

After exploring Social Movement Theory and formulating hypotheses concerning my research question, I will now turn to the methodological chapter of this thesis. Here the research approach, operationalization of the dependent and independent variables, and the data that I use in this thesis are discussed.

3. Methodology

In this chapter I will discuss the research approach, operationalization of the dependent and independent variables, and the data that I use in this thesis. At first, I will introduce process tracing as a research approach, then I will operationalize the dependent variable and explain the case-selection and data. Thereafter, I will operationalize the independent variables, discuss the details of the specific case-selection techniques and data of the different methods of use in the macro-, meso-, and micro-analysis.

3.1. Process tracing as a research approach

When doing research one should be aware of the trade-offs between large-N cross-case analysis and small-N case-study designs (Gerring, 2007a, p37). Whereas large-N studies allow for systematic comparison between many cases in order to find representative explanations for a broader population, small-N studies provide more in-depth knowledge about causal mechanisms and allows to go beyond theoretical implications (Gerring, 2007a, p45). As I am interested in the causal mechanism that drive activists to use political violence in a SMO, I will choose for a qualitative small-N design.

From the large range of options that are available when doing case-study research, I choose to apply theory-testing process tracing. This means that there is a theory (Social Movement Theory) and following that theory I will try to formulate a consistent causal mechanism for the phenomenon of political violence (Beach and Pederson, 2013, p14). In doing theory-testing process tracing I will not trace a series of empirical events, but focus on the underlying theorized causal mechanism, by observing whether the expected implications are present in the different case-studies.

3.2. Operationalization of the concepts

The dependent variable is the use of political violence. By political violence I mean *“those repertoires of collective action that involve great physical force and cause damage to an adversary to achieve political aims”* (della Porta, 2013, p6). *“Damage to an adversary”* is defined as violent acts against people or property, whereby specific political aims are pursued (Gurr, 1980, p3-4; Gurr and Duval, 1976, p141). In this thesis I use Social Movement Theory to come to an understanding of political violence. In line with Social Movement Theory the independent variables are: political opportunities, mobilizing structures and individual

motivations. The causal mechanism of study is displayed in figure 1. In this causal mechanism there is both a supply and demand side. The supply side is represented by political opportunities and mobilizing structures, that offer incentives for individuals to engage in political violence. The demand side is represented by individual motivations, that offer individuals concrete reasons to engage in political violence. I will operationalize the independent variables later in this methodology chapter when I come to the explanation of the macro-, meso-, and micro-cases.




Figure 1: Causal mechanism Social Movement Theory

3.3. Case-selection

As I am applying a small-N research design, it has consequences for the case-selection. The question guiding this research focuses on why people use political violence. The expectation is that political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations have an influence on people’s choice to mobilize and on their engagement in political violence. The independent variables I focus on are structured on a macro-, meso-, and micro-level. To come to a macro-level understanding, I focus on four different countries. To grasp the meso-level I focus on two opposing SMOs in once country. In addition, I focus on individual motivations of activists in different right-wing radical SMOs in one country to explore the micro-level. While it is desirable for the research approach to make a random selection of the subjects of study, the nature of the case-study design makes it impossible to apply random sampling (King, *et al.*, 1994, p124; Ritchie, *et al.*, 2003, p79). Therefore, this thesis will use purposive sampling. In doing so, I specifically choose for certain cases because they have

particular characteristics that will help exploring the central puzzle of this study (Ritchie, *et al.*, 2003, p79).

In order to carry out theory-testing process tracing properly, this thesis uses several cases to test the proposed causal mechanism. Testing a causal mechanism, and finding confirmatory or disconfirmatory results for the proposed hypotheses means this thesis is described as a X_1/Y -centered thesis (Gerring, 2008, p647). One of the most important features of performing a few smaller case-studies is the choice of cases. In order to be able to infer generalizability it is evident to select cases that are more or less representative of the broader phenomenon, i.e. political violence (Gerring, 2008, p645). Furthermore, the cases I choose should provide causal leverage, this means that the cases should provide variation along the dimensions of theoretical focus (Gerring, 2008, p645). In the next section I will explain more about the data that I use. Hereafter, I will reveal the details about the case-selection techniques for each of the measuring levels when I turn to the explanation of each case-study on the macro-, meso-, and micro-level.

3.4. Data

In order to see how political opportunities (X1), mobilizing structures (X2), and individual motivations (X3) have an influence on political violence (Y), I will combine different data sources. At first, I will give a general overview of the use of political violence in the four Western-European countries of focus by mapping the mentioning of political violence in newspaper articles across the four countries. Next, I will use primary and secondary literature to come to the macro- and meso-level analysis. Lastly, I will perform semi-structured interviews to grasp individual motivations of activists that decided to participate in a radical SMO. As one can see I use multiple data collection methods and data sources, which means I make use of data triangulation (Ayoub, *et al.*, 2014, p67). By using these different collection methods and sources I seek to overcome the methodological limits of a single method, while at the same time seek to better account for a valid explanation on the macro-, meso-, and micro-level. In the following parts I will reveal more details about the data for each specific part of the analysis.

3.5. Measuring trends in political violence

Case selection and method

Before starting with my analyses on the macro-, meso-, and micro-level I will present trends concerning political violence in a descriptive chapter. In this chapter it is important to

have a representative set of cases of the broader phenomenon, i.e. political violence. Therefore, it would be valuable to use typical cases in order to explore trends in political violence. Typical cases are cases that are typical examples of the phenomenon of focus (Gerring, 2008, p648). Moreover, a typical case is by definition a representative case (Gerring, 2007a, p89). On the basis of SMT I expect that political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations do explain the choice of political violence. Many European countries could be valued as typical cases because I expect them to perform like SMT formulates. The assumption that European countries do perform like SMT formulates is made on the basis of research of several scholars (Kriesi, *et al.*, 1995; Kriesi, *et al.*, 1992; Rucht, 1996). However, I choose to focus on only four Western-European democracies: 1. The Netherlands, 2. The United Kingdom (UK), 3. France, and 4. Germany. The reason to focus on these four typical cases is because I master the four languages spoken and written in the countries.

One could value this type of analysis as a mini protest event analysis (PEA) because I map, analyze, and interpret the occurrence of political violence (protest events) by using newspaper sources (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002, p335). The aim of this method is to link the protest data to other data sources, and study the causes and consequences of political violence. Choosing for PEA allows for quantification of protest characteristics (Hutter, 2014, p336; Koopmans and Rucht, 2002, p331). However, representativeness is discussed within PEA because you are dependent on reports of political violence by the mass-media. It is likely to assume that minor events of political violence are not reported by the mass-media, while the most violent events are definitely covered (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002, p236). One should be aware of this selection bias in analyzing the results of a PEA.

Data

The data that I use for the chapter is derived from a dataset in which newspapers are coded. The newspapers are coded in three different years (2014, 2016, 2018). From each year I took the first six months (1st of January till 30th of June) and used electronic keyword search in Lexis Nexis to cover all sorts of newspapers. Appendix 1 shows the comprehensive list of keywords that I used during the coding process. Due to time scarcity issues I decided to only code acts of political violence that are mentioned on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. In the dataset you will find newspapers of country level (for example Le Monde), and regional level (for example Dagblad de Limburger), but also international newswires such as Agence France Presse. Furthermore, I did not distinguish between, the so called, quality press (for example Die Welt) and tabloids (for example Daily Mail). In order to be as consistent as possible I created a

comprehensive list of keywords that I used for all countries. During the coding process I will code several indicators, these are: 1. left-, or right-wing affiliation of the activists, 2. the organization an activist belongs to, 3. sort of violence (a. symbolic, b. physical, c. use of weapons, d. homicide) used by the activist, 4. description of the use of violence, 5. police intervention, 6. use of violence by the police.

3.6. Case-study 1: Macro

After explaining how I measure trends in political violence, I will now turn to explaining the methods I use on the macro-level. First, I will operationalize the independent variable of focus, political opportunities. Thereafter, I will explain the case-selection technique and data.

Operationalization of the independent variable

The first independent variable that affects the choice for political violence is '*political opportunities*'. Political opportunities are those institutions or structures that create opportunities or adversities for individuals in which political violence develops. In the theoretical framework, chapter two, I explained that this thesis focusses on protest policing as a barometer for political opportunities. To measure protest policing I will focus on five dimensions concerning police handling (della Porta, 1995, pp57-58). These are 1) repressive versus tolerant behavior of the police concerning prohibited behavior of activists, 2) selective versus diffuse behavior of the police concerning the radical SMOs, 3) preventive versus reactive behavior of the policing according to the timing of intervention, 4) hard versus soft tactics of the police, and 5) dirty versus lawful behavior of the police according to which respect for the legal and democratic procedures is emphasized.

Case selection and method

To measure the five dimensions of protest handling, one should focus on different countries, with different protest policing systems, in order to see if differences in police handling have an effect on the use of political violence across countries. This implies that it is important to generate a full range of variation on the X_1 variable, which makes me choose for cases that are valued as diverse cases (Gerring, 2008, p650). Choosing for diverse cases enhances the representativeness of the analysis because of the fact that the chosen cases include the full range of variation on X_1 (Gerring, 2007a, p100). In order to include the full range of variation on X_1 the researcher has to choose for extreme values (high and low), and for

intermediate values (Gerring, 2008, p651). Whereas The Netherlands, the UK, France, and Germany were valued as typical cases in the descriptive chapter on trends of political violence, they are now valued as diverse cases. Diversity across the cases is visible in the range of variation on X₁, i.e. protest policing. Whereas protest policing in France is characterized by repressive, selective, hard, and dirty police tactics, the UK is structured according to tolerant diffuse, preventive, soft, and lawful tactics. The Netherlands is characterized by tolerant, preventive, soft, and lawful tactics, but takes an intermediate position when it comes to diffusion/selection. Protest policing in Germany is structured according to the same tactics as The Netherlands, but takes an intermediate position when it comes to tolerance/repression. So, in this study France and the UK are representing the extreme values, while The Netherlands and Germany take a more intermediate position. It is assumed that the differences in protest policing will explain the differences in the use of political violence across the four countries. Therefore, I choose to focus on The Netherlands, the UK, France, and Germany, as diverse cases, in my macro-analysis.

Data

To come to an understanding of protest policing across the four different countries of focus, the choice was made to engage in data triangulation regarding the collection of sources. Hereby I mean, that I use multiple types of sources to investigate police handling and its influence on political violence. Firstly, I did look for primary sources, such as historical and legal documents, to uncover institutional structuring of protest policing (Hox and Boeije, 2005, p593). Examples of those primary sources are among others strategy documents of the police, ‘*Politie in verandering*’ for the Netherlands and the ‘*ACPO manual of guidance on keeping the peace*’ for the UK, but also legal documents from the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, I use police websites as primary sources because the sites describe when the police is allowed to use violence and what the rights and boundaries are during demonstrations.

Secondly, I use secondary sources, these are sources that summarize, interpret, describe, analyze and/or discuss primary sources in order create an understanding of the phenomenon (Hox and Boeije, 2005, p596). Examples of secondary sources that I use are scientific journal articles, Ph.D. projects, and books about protest handling in the different countries. A last piece of sources that I use are newspaper articles. Dependent on the content, a newspaper article can be both a primary or a secondary source (Hox and Boeije, 2005, p596). When an article describes a factual account of a protest event, or of political violence, the article is a primary

source. However, if the article is an interpretation or offers an opinion the article should be seen as a secondary source. I use both types of newspaper articles.

3.7. Case-study 2: Meso

After explaining the methods for the macro-level, I will now turn to explaining the methods I use on the meso-level. First, I will operationalize the independent variable of focus, mobilizing structures. Thereafter, I will explain the case-selection technique and data.

Operationalization of independent variable

The second independent variable that affects the choice for political violence is ‘*mobilizing structures*’. Mobilizing structures are “*those collective vehicles, informal, as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action*” (McAdam, *et al.*, 1996a, p3). In the theoretical framework of this thesis I explained that I will focus on two sorts of structures to measure mobilizing structures, these are the internal organizational structure and the external organizational structure of a SMO. To measure the internal organizational structure I will explore five indicators of a SMO. These are formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, territorial decentralization, and institutional integration (Kriesi, 1996, pp155-156). To measure the external organizational structure I will explore three indicators of a SMO. These are the SMOs constituency, its allies, and its opponents (Kriesi, 1996, p155).

Case selection and method

To measure the influence of the internal and external organizational structure of a SMO on the choice for political violence, I will compare two opposing radical SMOs. In order to choose two opposing radical SMOs I had to take a look at the dataset of the mini PEA. Most political violent incidents are measured in Germany, therefore I choose Germany as the country of focus. When choosing for two opposing SMOs, one wants to choose for cases that are representative for the phenomenon of focus, and therefore chooses for typical cases (Gerring, 2007a, p89). Typical cases are cases that are typical examples of the phenomenon of focus, and are by definition representative for a wider population (Gerring, 2008, p648). From SMT I expect that SMOs with low levels of formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, territorial decentralization, and institutional integration make activists more prone to engage in political violence. Furthermore, more intense relations with a SMOs constituency, allies, and opponents make activists more prone to engage in political violence. I should choose for radical

SMOs that are expected to have these characteristics, in order to see if the assumed hypotheses can be confirmed or disconfirmed, and to generalize the results for a broader population. Moreover, comparing two opposing radical SMOs is most easy if the two got in confrontation with each other. Therefore, I choose to focus on one event where the two SMOs got in confrontation with each other, and where political violence developed. The event of focus is a demonstration in Jena, Thüringen, on 20 April 2016. During this demonstration two opposing SMOs got in conflict with each other, and political violence is used by both sides. The two typical cases of focus are PEGIDA, a right-wing radical SMO, and Antifa, a left-wing radical SMO, that are valued as typical cases.

Data

To come to an understanding of the mobilizing structures of the two radical SMOs, I made the choice to engage in data triangulation regarding the collection of sources. I work in a similar way, as I will do during the macro-analysis. Hereby I mean, that I use multiple types of sources to investigate the structuring of SMOs and the influence of that structuring on political violence. Primary sources that I use are websites of the two radical SMOs in order to look at statements and publications. Furthermore, I use interviews with activists from the radical SMOs as primary sources of information. Secondary sources that I use are governmental publications about the organizations, for example the ‘*Verfassungsschutzbericht Freistaat Thüringen 2016*’ or ‘*Linksextremismus in Thüringen*’. Other secondary sources are scientific journal articles. Just like the macro-methods I will use newspaper articles as both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources when it comes to describing the course of events during the demonstration of 20 April 2016. Secondary sources when the newspaper article offers an opinion or analysis of the radical SMOs.

3.8. Case-study 3: Micro

After explaining the methods for the meso-level, I will now turn to explaining the methods I use on the micro-level. First, I will operationalize the independent variable of focus, individual motivations. Thereafter, I will explain the case-selection technique and data.

Operationalization of the independent variable

The third independent variable that affects the choice for political violence is ‘*individual motivations*’. Individual motivations focus on questions of how activists and groups perceive

and interpret political opportunities and mobilizing structures as a basis for understanding the choice for political violence (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009, p14). I will focus on three sorts of indicators to measure individual motivations, these are instrumental, identity, and ideological motivations.

Case selection and method

To explore these personal motivations I will use semi-structured interviews as a tool (Rathbun, 2008, p685). The semi-structured interview is a verbal interchange, where the interviewer asks a list of predetermined questions to another person, the interviewee (Longhurst, 2010, p105). By choosing for semi-structured interviews, over structured and non-structured interviews, I hope to give participants in radical SMOs the chance to elaborate on issues that are important for them concerning their participation in the SMOs on the basis of different themes that I will present. The interview guide is structured as follows, at first, I will ask questions about '*becoming a member*' of the SMO. Next I will focus on '*staying a member*'. Then, I will ask questions about the '*repertoire of action*' of the SMO, followed by questions about the SMO's ideology, and the identity of the participant. Lastly, I will ask demographic questions. The interview guide is based on the interview scheme of Klandermans and Mayer (2005), which they used as a tool for doing life-histories in order to grasp motivations of extreme right-wing activists to participate in a right-wing SMO. In appendix 2 a full version of the interview guide is attached.

One of the biggest difficulties of this thesis is to sample respondents. There are no official lists available of active participants in left- and right-wing radical SMOs in The Netherlands, therefore potential respondents had to be approached in various ways. I did online research on several left- and right-wing SMO-websites, related newswires such as *indymedia.nl*, and via social media channels, such as Facebook and Twitter. Potential respondents were approached via 1) personal Facebook-pages, and 2) via email. In total I approached seven people who I assumed that were participating in left-wing organizations (four via Facebook, three via email), only one person decided to participate in a face-to-face interview. Hereafter, I did approach another twelve left-wing organizations (three via Facebook, nine via email). Unfortunately none of them accepted my interview invitation. On the right-wing, I approached ten people who I assumed were participating in right-wing organizations (seven via Facebook, three via email). Two of them accepted a face-to-face interview, one interview was done via telephone, and one respondent wanted to do the interview via email. After these first interviews I also gained an additional two telephonic interviews via

personal contacts of the other respondents. In total I had six right-wing respondents and one left-wing respondent.

Of course employing a method of semi-structuring interviewing has its drawbacks. First of all, the position or identity of the interviewer could affect the interaction during the interview and has an influence on the results (Diefenbach, 2009, p880; O'Reilly, 2005, p113). To overcome this drawback the interviewer should reflect on its own position, and recognize how its own position and identity could affect the interview. Furthermore, the method is criticized for being unreliable because only limited numbers of interviews are conducted (O'Reilly, 2005, p113). However, as I am interested in the in-depth exploration of my research question, it would be unfair to depend success on the quantity of interviews, rather its success should be valued on the quality of the conversations (O'Reilly, 2005, p113). Another problem concerning interviewing, is poorly phrased questions (Leech, 2002, p666). The way the interviewer asks questions influences the answers of the interviewee. Therefore, the interviewer should steer the interviewee as little as possible, so that the interview becomes a conversation guided by the insights and concerns of the interviewee.

The choice of doing semi-structured interviews with right-wing activists in The Netherlands is based on the least-likely crucial-case technique (Gerring, 2007a, p89). A least-likely crucial-case is "*one that, on all dimensions except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a certain outcome, and yet does so*" (Gerring, 2008, p659). The Netherlands can be viewed as a least-likely crucial-case because it is characterized by a political culture that tries to avoid conflict (De Graaf and Malkki, 2010, p629). An aversion against political conflict, leads to an avoidance of confrontation for the authorities as well. This has an influence on activists their motivations. The inclusive and consensual culture leads to a reluctance of political violence on behalf of the activists because the political culture weakens the 'breeding conditions' for radical SMOs to develop (De Graaf and Malkki, 2010, p629). In other words, the demand side of political violence is taken away by having an inclusive and consensual political culture. Therefore, I assume that if individual motivations in The Netherlands are present among right-wing activists as an explanation for their engagement in political violence, it is likely that the causal mechanism is also found in other countries. If I can confirm my hypothesis based on evidence found among right-wing activists in The Netherlands, the case is representative for the broader population. However, the choice for this case selection technique is quite controversial because it is not widely accepted among researchers that only one case plays a critical role in explaining outcomes for an entire population (Gerring, 2007b,

p232). Nevertheless, based on my argumentation explained above I apply the least-likely crucial-case to this thesis.

Data

After doing interviews with six right-wing respondents and one left-wing respondent it became clear that I could not make a representative comparison of the left and right on the basis of these results. As I was not able to conduct more left-wing interviews, I decided to only focus on the right-wing respondents when making the analysis. All interviews were recorded and transcribed afterwards. In the transcription process I decided to write out every word. Moreover, I offered respondents the possibility to make comments on the transcript, some respondents made use of the option, but these were only small changes that would enhance more clarity. In appendix 4 one can find the transcripts of the interviews. Next, I coded all the interviews in order to uncover the essential features of the interviews (Blee and Taylor, 2002, p111). For this coding process I used the existing codebook of Klandermans and Mayer (2005, pp289-292) and extended the scheme by adding codes about political violence. In appendix 3 one can find the codebook. While there are specific qualitative-data analysis systems, such as '*atlas.ti*', to code interviews like these, I decided to do the coding manually because it would cost me too much time to teach myself the analysis system.

After explaining the methods for the macro-, meso-, and micro-level, I will now turn to the analyses. At first, I will explore the trends in political violence across four Western-European countries. In the three chapters that follow I will present the analyses on protest policing, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations.

4. Trends in political violence

To understand why individuals mobilize and commit acts of political violence from a Social Movement Theory perspective it is interesting to describe trends in the use of political violence across different countries. In this descriptive overview I will present trends concerning political violence derived from a dataset in which newspapers in The Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany are coded from the 1st of January till the 30th of June in 2014, 2016, and 2018.

4.1. Political violence throughout the years

The dataset consists of a total of 275 incidents, distributed over three years. In 2014, 59 incidents are measured, whereas 119 in 2016, and 97 in 2018, as one can see in figure 2. Overall, this means violence seems to grow throughout the years, with a peak in 2016. As is mentioned earlier, political violence does not happen on its own, it is a gradual evolving process that happens in cycles of protest (della Porta, 2013, p30). The peak in political violence in 2016 can be explained by the high tensions in Europe between the left and right over the refugee crisis¹ that dominated the news in 2015 and 2016 (BBC News, 2016, 4 March; Trilling, 2018, 5 June).




Figure 2: Political violent incidents per year

¹ By the term refugee crisis I refer to the events during 2015 and 2016 where there was a sharp rise in refugees and migrants that crossed the Mediterranean to claim asylum in Europe (Spindler, 2015, 8 December; Trilling, 2018, 5 June)

In figure 3 one can see the distribution of the different types of political violence throughout the years. Sort of violence is counted as a nominal variable ranging from 1 to 4 based on the Seven-Stage Hate Model (Schafer and Navarro, 2003, pp4-5). As the name explains, the Seven-Stage Hate Model is based on seven stages, I will only use the last four because these are the ones where violence is used. Stage 4: The Hate Group Taunts the Target, is coded as symbolic violence. In the model it is described as *'ever-increasing degrees of rhetoric and violence to maintain high levels of agitation'*, examples are performing Nazi salutes and creating racist graffiti (Schafer and Navarro, 2003, p4). In my dataset I also count the destruction of buildings, cars, etc. as forms of symbolic violence. Stage 5: The Hate Group Attacks the Target Without Weapons, is coded as physical violence. In the model it is described as a stage in which groups become more aggressive and physically abusive to their targets (Schafer and Navarro, 2003, p4). Stage 6: The Hate Group Attacks the Target with Weapons, is coded as use of weapons. Different from stage 5 is that hate groups use weapons to attack their targets, these weapons include among other bottles, baseball bats and bricks (Schafer and Navarro, 2003, p5). Stage 7: The Hate Group Destroys the Target, is coded as homicide. This last stage is seen as the ultimate goal of hate groups (Schafer and Navarro, 2003, p5).

As one can see in figure 3 below the most commonly used form of political violence, as mentioned in the newspapers, is symbolic violence. What is interesting is that the 'use of weapons' occurs more often than the use of 'physical violence'. When looking at the qualitative data measured in the dataset, one can see that in first instance many incidents start as an act of symbolic violence, and after intervention of a counter-movement or the police, escalates in clashes where weapons are used against the new target. For example the German B.Z. wrote on 24 June 2016 in their article that *"After the police intervened in the Rigaerstraße, autonomen started fighting back, they burned street barricades, destroyed a bus shelter and shop windows, destroyed (police)car windows and set cars on fire. Also threw stones to the police"* (B.Z., 2016, 24 June). Another example comes from Agence France Presse, in their article written on 7 May 2014 they describe that *"Anti-fascists and far right activists clashed lightly in Grenoble on the sidelines of a meeting of Jean-Marie Le Pen. The activists threw projectiles at the police and far right activists sang the Marseillaise"* (Agence France Presse, 2014, 7 May). Both these examples show that where in first instance an event was nonviolent, or only of symbolic violence, it escalates when others (opponents/the police) intervened. Another finding that is interesting is that homicide only occurred in the UK.




Figure 3: Different sorts of political violence

4.2. Country specific political violence

As one can see in table 3, and figure 4, newspapers in Germany (34,5%) have mentioned the most violent incidents of all countries, followed by respectively, the UK (25,8%), France (25,1%), and The Netherlands (14,5%). These numbers are valuable to keep in mind for the next chapter, when I will analyze the macro-level. Furthermore, as one can see in the split of political violence in the four countries per year, the 2016 peak is only visible in the UK and Germany. Whereas The Netherlands faces a rising trend in the use of political violence, the results are more or less stable in France.

Country	Political violent incidents	Percentage
The Netherlands	40	14,5%
The United Kingdom	71	25,8%
France	69	25,1%
Germany	95	34,5%
Total	275	100%

Table 3: Political violent incidents per country




Figure 4: Political violent incidents per year per country

4.3. Left- and right-wing political violence

In the coding process I was not only interested in the use of political violence, but also to what kind of group the activist belonged. Therefore, I coded to which side of the political spectrum the group or individual involved in the incident belongs. Is it a radical left-wing or radical right-wing activist, or were both groups involved in the incident? As one can see in table 4, and figure 5, most incidents are coded as right-wing (53,5%), against 33,8% coded as left-wing. In only 12,7% of the incidents both groups were involved.

Group's affiliation	Political violent incidents	Percentage
Radical left-wing	93	33,8%
Radical right-wing	147	53,5%
Both involved	35	12,7%
Total	275	100%

Table 4: Distribution political violent incidents according to group's affiliation




Figure 5: Distribution political violent incidents according to group's affiliation

When one compares the left- and right-wing incidents per year, one will see that right-wing scores the highest amount of incidents each year. Previously, I discussed the peak of political violence in 2016. This is also visible in figure 6. One can see that, in particular, the amount of incidents committed by right-wing activists are doubled when 2014 and 2016 are compared. Once again, I would like to mention that this rise could possibly been related to the refugee crisis in 2015/2016. Furthermore, left-wing incidents turn out to be a more or less stable phenomenon in the years 2014, 2016, 2018. Another feature that I would like to mention concerning left- and right-wing violence is that there might be a selection bias in the media, which could account for higher amounts of right-wing violence in this dataset. Based on (newspaper) articles I got the feeling that left-wing violence is often modestly mentioned, or not mentioned at all, while right-wing violence is highlighted (Lindhout, 2019, 8 January; Malone, 2018, 2 November). This media bias would not only generate the problem of misinforming people, but could also push people further to the extremes which could account for more political violence in the end (Malone, 2018, 2 November). However, such an assumption is not supported by scientific sources.




Figure 6: Distribution political violent incidents according to group's affiliation per year

After discussing the amount of incidents by left- and right-wing activists in general it is also interesting to split the incidents up per country, to see if there are country specific trends. Whereas right-wing political violence scored the highest amount of incidents in general, in the country specific figure 7, we see this is only the case for The Netherlands, UK, and Germany. In France, most of the incidents are committed by left-wing activists.




Figure 7: Distribution political violent incidents according to group's affiliation per year per country

5. Case-study 1: Protest policing in four Western-European democracies,

A macro-level explanation

After describing the trends in political violence, I will now turn to the macro-level analysis. In the theoretical framework of this thesis I explained how protest policing could function as a barometer of political opportunities, and how it influences the development of political violence. To test the hypothesis I will focus on four Western-European countries: The Netherlands, the UK, France, and Germany. At first I will introduce a brief history of the police-structure of each country. Thereafter, I will get into detail about protest policing in the country. At the end of the chapter, I will compare the different countries and explain how protest policing influences political violence.

5.1. The Netherlands

Brief history

Traditionally, the police in the Netherlands was a state-centered institution, with great focus on repression, hard tactics, and state-control in order to maintain public order (Punch, 2010, p203). However, this view came under attack when the 1977 strategy document '*Politie in verandering*', known as COP, was introduced (Van Sluis, *et al.*, 2013, p230). COP would bridge the gap between police and society, and the police would become an institute that serves society, rather than functioning as the long arm of the state (Projectgroep Organisatie Structuren, 1977, p55; Van Sluis, *et al.*, 2013, p230). COP embraced more preventive and softer police tactics. However, experiments with the new strategy lead to criticism for not being 'real cops'. Nevertheless, during the late 1980s and early 1990s experiments turned out to be successful, which led to the adoption of COP as the main policing strategy.

During the late 1980s the squatter movement grew significantly, which reinforced the previous image of the police as a strong arm of the state. Tolerance towards protesters became less important, and particularly in the big cities, policing was focused on zero-tolerance (Van Sluis, *et al.*, 2013, p234). Due to the 1993 police reform the structure of the police was changed from 148 municipal forces to 25 regional forces, where the regional forces should be focused on strengthening bonds with local communities (Cachet and Marks, 2009, p93). Community policing became even more important in the 2005 strategy document '*Politie in ontwikkeling*'. On the one hand, the police is expected to be actively involved in citizens' networks. On the other hand, the police is still expected to function as the traditional long arm of the state (Van Sluis, *et al.*, 2013, p235). This hybrid approach creates strong local relationships, but hard

policing tactics as well. The centralization process went on in 2013, when a national police force was created in order to improve police management (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015, p528). However, community policing remained a building block of the strategy.

Protest policing

But what does this structure mean for protest policing? Like all other police systems under review, the Dutch police has a monopoly on the use of violence (Van der Vlugt, *et al.*, 2013, p15). Police violence is only legitimated in accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity (Van der Vlugt, *et al.*, 2003, p1). Protest policing in The Netherlands is tolerant according to the range of prohibited behaviors of activists because the police is only legitimate to use violence when all other means are used. Protest policing starts from the point: *'no violence, unless...'*. Police actions focus on de-escalation. The police communicates with activists to prevent escalation and sometimes use harder policing tactics to prevent escalation in the near future (Van der Vlugt, *et al.*, 2003, p4). Tolerance of the Dutch police is for example visible on 21 April 2018. The right-wing radical SMO Identitair Verzet squatted a house as an act of protest against the refugee collective We Are Here (Kieft, 2018, 23 April; NOS, 2018, 21 April). Left-wing activists threw stones and firecrackers towards the squatted house, thereby posing a threat to the right-wing activists inside the house, but to public order as well (Het Parool, 2018, 21 April). Only after political violence tends to escalate the police decides to intervene and end disturbances.

In principle, protest policing in The Netherlands is structured according to soft police tactics, by using soft tactics the chance of escalating political violence will be smaller. The police has to communicate with the crowd, and only when activists do not respond, or when a situation becomes threatening for the police, third parties, and/or public order, the police is allowed to use physical violence. If the situation does not improve officers are allowed to use pepper spray or batons. If these tactics do not generate an improvement of the situation, officers can restore to more heavy equipment, like service dogs or a gun (Politie, 2018). Prior to using violence the police should warn activists. An example of soft tactics can be drawn from the arrest of Edwin Wagenveld, spokesman of PEGIDA Nederland, during the PEGIDA demonstration of 27 February 2016 (RTL Nieuws, 2016, 27 February). Wagenveld got arrested for showing the swastika symbol (which is part of the PEGIDA flag), a forbidden symbol during the demonstration. The police warned Wagenveld to hide the symbol. However, Wagenveld did not anticipate on this instruction, therefore the police decided to arrest Wagenveld. Police tactics are not always soft. The police is allowed to use harder tactics if it serves the purpose of

de-escalation. This means, harder tactics are allowed if it prevents more political violence in the end.

Reluctance to the use of violence and focus on de-escalation are part of preventive strategies of protest policing. This is visible in communication techniques of the police, that do not only focus on communication during demonstrations, but also focus on getting in touch with activists prior to the events (Kansil, 2014, p26). By focusing on communication the police tries to bond with activists, which would make the activists more reluctant of using political violence. Another preventive technique is keeping opposing SMOs separately during demonstrations (NOS, 2018, 11 March). An example of this preventive technique is found in the PEGIDA demonstration of 27 February 2016. PEGIDA-opponents did not formally announce a counter-demonstration. However, the police signaled that the PEGIDA-manifestation could get disturbed and took preventive measures to protect PEGIDA-activists in order to guarantee their freedom of assembly (Leidsch Dagblad, 2016, 27 February). Moreover, the police separated the two opposing SMOs during the demonstration in order to prevent political violence (NOS, 2018, 11 March). When the police would not separate the SMOs as a preventive strategy, the two opposing SMOs could get in confrontation with each other, which could lead to the use of political violence. So, employing this tactic prevents the development of political violence.

Protest policing in The Netherlands is lawful according to the legal and democratic procedures. This is reflected in the low numbers of complaints filed against the police (Van der Vlugt, *et al.*, 2013, p15). The police respects the rules and warns activists prior to the use of force (RTL Nieuws, 2016, 27 February). However, there are no guidelines or legal procedures concerning the use of physical violence, batons, and service dogs. The absence of these guidelines is a consequence of the assumption that the decision to use such equipment is made in a split-second, and is therefore hard to formulate in a simple protocol (Van Laarhoven, 2018, 18 February). Furthermore, the police is accused of deploying excessive forms of violence during demonstrations since a few years (De Koning, 2016). This is not only a dirty tactic that harms activists, but shows the capability of the police to use hard tactics as well. Such tactics could enforce a violent reaction by radical SMOs because the activists perceive that they are treated unjustly. Thus, it is likely that violent police tactics are countered with a violent response. Besides, the police is accused of selective behavior against minorities, whereas the law states that all individuals should be treated equally (Nieuwenhuis, 2015). In conclusion, protest policing in The Netherlands is characterized by tolerance, prevention, and lawful tactics. However, tactics are in principle soft, but sometimes hard, and a concerning trend of using

selective tactics is visible. These police tactics would make activists medium prone to engage in political violence during moments of interaction.

5.2. United Kingdom

Brief history

All British police forces are almost unarmed and structured according the same principles, in terms of their uniforms, and cultures. However, the Police Service in Northern Ireland forms an exception (Jordan, 2012, p111). The UK does not have a written constitution, which makes the structuring of protest policing complex because their basis is found in common laws, treaties, and statutes (Jordan, 2012, p112). Traditionally, the UK had 239 territorial areas that had their own police forces, due to centralization there are only 43 police forces deployed nowadays.

The establishment of a professional police force is the result of industrial developments in the eighteenth century. Because of new dynamics the traditional system could no longer handle the growing population, increasing poverty, and changing character of crime (Lentz and Chaires, 2007, p76). Therefore, the ‘*Metropolitan Police Act 1829*’ was established and offered a more professionalized, modern and bureaucratized police force that had a militaristic policing style to cope with disorder (Reiner, 1998, p38). Between 1936 and 1986 demonstrations were regulated by the ‘*1936 Public Order Act*’. This Act gave the police the power to impose restrictions on the procession, or to fully ban it when public order was at stake (Joyce, 2016, p70). The 1950s and 1960s are characterized by a more tolerant policing style. However, because of conflict and controversy in society a more paramilitary mode of policing was implemented during the 1970s and 1980s (Reiner, 1998, p36). The police made use of heavy riot control equipment and wore protective uniforms. The police was still not able to cope with riots, therefore the ‘*1986 Public Order Act*’ was adopted. The Act prescribed how the police should act during violent disorder and riots (Joyce, 2016, p71). Whereas previous policing styles focused on reactive tactics, the Act prescribed a preventive style and valued tolerance according to the range of prohibited behaviors of activists (Reiner, 1998, p46).

Protest policing

Protest policing in the UK is characterized by tolerance, diffusion, and integration in the community (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004, p219; HMIC, 2009, p5). During demonstrations the police tries to keep the peace, ensures safety, and only uses force if it is absolutely necessary

(ACPO, 2010, p35). Employing this method would make activists less prone to use political violence. Furthermore, police tactics are soft because the police is almost unarmed (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004, p219). An example of these tactics can be drawn from the March for England in 2014, where one can see that a large part of the officers is unarmed (Ruptly, 2014, 27 April). However, when political violence starts to escalate and the unarmed officers and third parties need to be protected, armed officers warn activists twice before using batons, which is in line with British guidelines (ACPO, 2010, pp106-107). However, employing violent tactics is not preferred because violent police tactics are expected to be countered by more political violence of the activists.

Protest policing is lawful according to the degree to which respect for legal and democratic procedures is emphasized. The UK follows principles of the European Convention of Human Rights. One of the driving principles during protest policing is Article 11: freedom of peaceful assembly and association (European Court of Human Rights, 2010, p12), which is interpreted by the police forces as a right to protest (ACPO, 2010, p24). The police is not allowed to prevent or hinder a peaceful assembly, but can make exceptions when there is a threat of crime, and/or when national security and public safety are at stake (ACPO, 2010, p24). An example of this tactic can be drawn from the March for England in 2014. The police posed restrictions on the demonstration (Channel 4 News, 2014, 26 April). By posing restrictions the police hopes to prevent activists from using political violence during the demonstration.

Preventive tactics characterize protest policing in the UK. For example, during the March for England in 2014, the police separates the opposing groups to avoid public disorder (BBC News, 2014, 4 June). Another preventive tactic of the British police is kettling, this is a tactic where the police contains large crowds within a limited area by forming large cordons of officers (Joyce, 2016, p77). During the 2014 March for England the policed kettled the right-wing activists and escorted the group to the train station (James, 2014, 28 April). When a group is kettled the activists are often not able to use political violence anymore, therefore the demonstration will not escalate further. However, kettling is not always seen as a legitimate tactic to prevent public disorder because once kettled the activist has no space to escape (Amnesty International, 2017, p25). In conclusion, protest policing in the UK is characterized by tolerant, diffuse, preventive, soft, and lawful tactics. These police tactics would not make activists prone to use political violence during moments of interaction.

5.3. France

Brief history

Protest policing in France has gone through different phases throughout the years. Before World War II protest policing was characterized by its harsh and repressive style, and the police was armed and under strict control of the central government (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004, p219). After World War II a more progressive style developed, characterized by softer police tactics and acceptance of demonstration rights for activists (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004, p220; Fillieule and Jobard, 1998, p70). During the 1970s cooperation between the police and activists became important, thereby placing value on preventive tactics. Organizers of a demonstration are obliged to announce the event to authorities between three and fifteen days before the event is scheduled. The official document must be signed by three organizers and should include the date and time, purpose, and proposed route (Amnesty International, 2017, p12).

Despite the focus on cooperation, main priority of French protest policing is to maintain public order, and to control activists at all levels (Mouhanna, 2009, p175). Nevertheless, the banning of demonstrations became rare (della Porta, *et al.*, 1998, p116). The French police is a centralized organ, and protest policing is done by ‘*Gendarmes Mobiles*’ (military forces) and the ‘*Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité*’ (CRS; national police forces) (Fillieule and Jobard, 1998, p72; Joyce and Wain, 2014, p276). The centralized structure makes it hard to bond with local communities. Centralization makes it happen that officers are removed from their regions of origin. Officers are for example born and raised in Lyon, and deployed in Paris (Mouhanna, 2009, p177). This encourages an ‘*us*’ versus ‘*them*’ culture in French protest policing, where the police considers itself as an outsider of the environment.

Protest policing

Protest policing in France is characterized by selective and repressive behavior towards some SMOs. SMOs that face more selectivity and repression are perceived as a threat by the police. Selectivity is often directed towards migrants, foreigners of other ethnic origins, young people or students, and the extreme-left (Peltier, 2018, 2 February; della Porta, *et al.*, 1998, p119). Performing these tactics will lead to a negative perception of the police by these groups, and repressive behavior of the police is expected to enforce a political violent reaction by the activists. Besides, there is another development that influenced protest policing in France massively. After the terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015, President Hollande proclaimed a

State of Emergency in France, which lasted till November 2017 (Jacquin and Pascual, 2017, 31 October).

The State of Emergency marked a new episode in French protest policing. Soft and tolerant tactics seem to be forgotten, and the police is limiting activists' rights to freedom of assembly (Osborne, 2017, 31 October). The police uses repressive tactics according to the range of prohibited behaviors. Political violence during demonstrations, which is often carried out by only a minority of the activists, is tackled down in a violent manner by the police, which will make activists more prone to use political violence in return (Amnesty International, 2017, p7). Prior to the State of Emergency the use of teargas was already a common tactic for the French police. However, since the State of Emergency teargas is used more often, and equipment expanded with more heavy sources of force that are excessively used (Jordan, 2012, p170). The police sometimes uses teargas and batons against peaceful demonstrators even if there is no threat to public order. In other cases, the police uses rubber bullets or string-ball grenades even if there is no immediate threat to the police or third parties (Amnesty International, 2017, p7). During the 1 May demonstration of 2016 excessive use of force by the police is visible in Paris. Violence developed gradually as activists were using political violence against the police. The police, in return, used a disproportional amount of force by deploying teargas and batons, which encouraged activists to use more violence as well (Pham Lê, 2016, 2 May). These hard tactics not only demonstrate repressive forms of protest policing, but also show the dirty manner in which the police refuses to act in accordance with legal and democratic procedures.

For two reasons protest policing in France can be determined as dirty. First, deploying repressive and hard tactics is in contradiction with international law as the police does not follow the principles of necessity and proportionality (Amnesty International, 2017, p26). Another international law that is violated concerns the law in which the right of peaceful assembly is guaranteed because the French police often bans demonstrations on the basis of illegitimate justifications (Amnesty International, 2017, p36). Second, these tactics also challenge French law. Police officers are permitted to use force, and allowed to use several weapons, under specific circumstances. Force may only be deployed in order to disperse a demonstration that is threatening, or likely to threat, public order (Amnesty International, 2017, p27). When an officer perceives a situation as such, she has to give two warnings to the activist prior to the use of violence. Exceptions are made when the officer is subject to violence, or when the officer is not able to defend her own position (Amnesty International, 2017, p27). However, one can deduce that the French police is not always acting according to these rules on the basis of several cases presented in the Amnesty International (2017, pp32-34) '*A right*

not a threat' report. Activists develop negative attitudes of the police because of these dirty tactics, and are likely to respond in a dirty manner as well.

Protest policing in France is focused on prevention of escalation. The French police strives to maintain public order by having a dialogue with activists prior to, and during a demonstration (GICAT, 2015, p2). Making protest policing easier, activists are obliged to officially announce the demonstration between three and fifteen days before the event is scheduled. Furthermore, by community policing the French police tries to bond with local communities in order to make public disorder less likely. However, as noted before, the centralized structure of the French police makes it hard to bond with local communities. The police perceives an 'us' and a 'them', which is also the case for activists. A lack of mutual understanding would make both more prone to engage in political violence during moments of intense interaction. In conclusion, French protest policing is often repressive, selective, hard, and dirty, compared to the other countries of focus. The French police moreover tries to deploy preventive tactics, but these are not always successful. These police tactics would make activists prone to political violence during moments of interaction.

5.4. Germany

Brief history

Protest policing in Germany also went through different phases throughout the years. The 1950s and early 1960s are characterized by repressive tactics. The police deployed a hard and selective policing style (della Porta, 1995, p63, p70). A less repressive period during the late 1960s followed. The beginning of the 1970s was characterized by major changes as protest policing became more tolerant, tactics more soft and focused on de-escalation (della Porta, 1995, p64). However, a conservative rollback is visible in the mid-1970s as protest policing became more repressive and selective, and soft tactics were occasionally exchanged for hard tactics. Despite a few escalations in the 1980s, protest policing became once again more tolerant and characterized by soft and preventive tactics (della Porta, 1995, p70).

In general, throughout the years the police structuring changed from a more state-oriented policing style towards a civilian style of protest policing characterized by a focus on communication, rather than the use of force (Winter, 1998, p190; Feltes, 2002, p219). After unification of East- and West-Germany in 1990, the country was divided into sixteen Federal States, '*Bundesländer*', that all have their own police forces and laws (Feltes, *et al.*, 2013, p94). However, protest policing is more or less structured according to the same principles across the

different Bundesländer, based on the principles of the land Berlin (Amnesty International, 2010, p18; Klukkert, *et al.*, 2008, p187). At larger demonstrations, like G8 summit meetings or comparable events, the police of one Federal State asks support of other states. In those cases the protest policing law of the Federal State where the demonstration is taking place is leading (Amnesty International, 2010, p9).

Protest policing

In article 8 of the German constitutional law it is secured that all people have the right to peacefully demonstrate, and that the police should facilitate demonstrations and counter-demonstrations (Polizei für Dich, 2018). The law also gives the government the right to limit the right of peaceful assembly for open-air gatherings on the basis of other laws (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949). The police enforces a preventive strategy by contacting organizational activists to discuss and plan the details of the demonstration (Faturechi, 2017, 22 August). During the demonstration protest policing is also focused on preventing escalation. Specialized forces are wearing distinct yellow vests, and will not wear riot gear during the event. Activists perceive the specialized forces as less threatening, which makes it more easy to communicate, and makes activists less prone to engage in political violence (Faturechi, 2017, 22 August). An example of preventive protest policing can be drawn from the 2018 rallies in Kandel, that broke out after the murder of a 15-year-old by her Afghan boyfriend, who was a refugee (Meschede, 2018, 26 March). Right-wing activists organized rallies, which led to left-wing counter-demonstrations. The German police kept the two groups separated to prevent escalation. The police used pepper spray and batons at moments when activists try to get through the police cordon. The same tactic is visible during the May Day rallies of 2016 (Kölner Stadt Anzeiger, 2016, 2 May). By separating the two opposing SMOs it is more difficult for the activists to use political violence against each other.

While deploying preventive tactics, protest policing, as performed in Kandel, could also be determined as repressive. Especially, if one compares it to the other countries of focus in this thesis. The police has the right to disperse and dissolve a demonstration if violence is perpetrated by activists (Polizei für Dich, 2018). When the police dissolves a demonstration, so does the fundamental right to peacefully demonstrate of an activist. If demonstrators do not follow police instructions, the police will enforce order, if necessary with force. Furthermore, the police is allowed to use force out of self-defense. Whereas activists perceive pressing a police cordon as a nonviolent protest tactic, the police could perceive it as political violence. This could encourage a violent reaction of the police, which in turn is perceived as police

brutality by the activists, which will make them more prone to use political violence in return (Pelzer, 2012, 14 June). This example shows the relational character in which political violence develops.

Protest policing is structured according to soft tactics because the police is only allowed to use force when all other means are insufficient, and may only use as minimal force as possible. However, in practice not only soft tactics are employed (Amnesty International, 2010, p16). Deploying hard or soft tactics is determined by the police's perception of resistance by activists. When the police perceives high levels of resistance, it is more likely that hard tactics are deployed, while low levels of resistance are expected to face softer tactics (Klukkert, *et al.*, 2008, p185). While performing force is a rare phenomenon, it is known that a significant percentage of the officers is willing to use more violence than is allowed by law (Klukkert, *et al.*, 2008, p185). An example are the May Day rallies of 2016 in Hamburg (Agence France Presse, 2016, 2 May). During the demonstration left-wing activists threw bottles and stones at officers. In reaction the police immediately dismantled the demonstration by using water cannons on the activists, which is countered by more political violence by the activists. The example not only shows German repressiveness towards prohibited behavior, but also the willingness to deploy hard protest policing tactics.

In principle, protest policing is structured in a diffuse way because all activists should be handled in a neutral way to ensure public order and security (Pelzer, 2012, 14 June). However, diffuse tactics are not always guaranteed in practice. In some cases the German police is accused of cooperating with right-wing radical SMOs and political parties, thereby being selective when it comes to protest policing (Crossland, 2018, 30 August; Stancil, 2018, 7 September). Furthermore, research shows that the intention to infringe is higher when citizens of a foreign ethnic origin are involved (Klukkert, *et al.*, 2008, p184). Other factors influencing selectivity by the police is a lack of self-confidence of the officer, or failing of initial responses (Klukkert, *et al.*, 2008, p184). Activists' perception of a selective police makes them more prone to using political violence during interactions. When it comes to lawful protest handling the German police is improving its results. Where other countries had long ago established committees to register and review police violence, Germany only created such an institution in 2015 (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2015, 24 May). The '*Sonderbeschwerdestelle*' forces the police to act more lawful because their violent actions are under review. Besides some cases of disproportional use of force, it seems protest policing is lawful according to the broad range of regulations that Germany has for the use of force by the police (Feltes, 2006, p542). In conclusion, German protest policing is preventive, lawful and soft, but occasionally hard.

However, policing takes an in-between position when it comes to tolerant or repressive behavior, and diffuse or selective strategies. These police tactics would make activists medium prone to political violence during moments of interaction.

5.5. The four countries compared: Influence on political violence

In the theoretical framework of this thesis I formulated several expectations concerning the effects of protest policing on the choice for political violence by activists in radical SMOs. In the previous part I analyzed protest policing in four different Western-European countries. In this part I will compare protest policing across these countries, and formulate how the expectations from the theoretical framework are represented by these four cases. Derived from Social Movement Theory, I expected that the more repressive, selective, reactive, hard, and dirty protest policing was, the more activists are prone to use political violence. Table 5 shows how these indicators are structured per country.

Country	Tolerant vs. Repressive	Diffuse vs. Selective	Preventive vs. Reactive	Soft vs. Hard	Lawful vs. Dirty
The Netherlands	+	+/-	+	+*	+
The United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+
France	-	-	+	-	-
Germany	+/-	+/-	+	+* ¹	+

Table 5: Protest policing in four Western-European countries
Scale: - =repressive, selective, reactive, hard, dirty; +/- =in-between; + =tolerant, diffuse, preventive, soft, lawful
** Only hard to prevent expected escalation in the near future*
**¹ Occasionally hard*

Based on the expectations and by exploring table 5 one would expect that most political violent incidents are measured in France, followed by Germany, The Netherlands, and the UK. However, based on the dataset in the previous chapter Germany counted most political violent incidents, followed by the UK, France, and The Netherlands. This means I cannot confirm hypothesis 1 on the basis of my analysis. How can the discrepancy between my expectations and the achieved results be explained?

It could be the case that, when analyzing the macro-level, protest policing is not a good barometer to measure the effect of political opportunities on political violence. The reason for using protest policing as a barometer of political opportunities was twofold. Firstly, it has the

advantage of taking only one variable into account. Secondly, it has the advantage of measuring a variable that directly impacts the radical SMO (della Porta, 1995, p56). From the analysis above one can see that it is the case that the choice for specific strategies by the police or by the activists influences the choice of strategies by the other. On the basis of the two reasons explained above it seems that the choice for protest policing as a barometer of political opportunities seems to be a good one. So, there must be another reason that explains why protest policing is not a good barometer for political opportunities.

By measuring protest policing alone it could be the case that specific structural characteristics, that have an influence on the culture of political violence in a country, are not taken into account. Protest policing is only one form of a wide range of repressive tactics from which a government can choose (Earl, *et al.*, 2003, p585). Measuring protest policing alone would for example not take the political violent cultural heritage of a country into account, and therefore does not account for the process of ‘institutionalization’ of protest repertoires (della Porta, 1996, p65). Think of for example Germany who had a rich political violent culture during the 1960s and 1970s, while there was no such culture in The Netherlands. These cultures could influence the choice for political violence by activists as well. The question of which political opportunities influenced the cross-national differences in protest policing, and therefore generates differences in political violent outcomes, remains. Therefore, it would be better to measure a higher institutional level to come to an explanation of political violence. Thereby focusing on the structuring of political systems in terms of the formal institutional structure of a country (Kriesi, *et al.*, 1995, p26). These formal institutional structures, e.g. constitutional rights, laws, structure of the judiciary, and police organization, could define the constraints and opportunities of protest policing (della Porta, 1996, p80). This means that the formal institutional structure creates the conditions by which protest policing strategies are formulated. Therefore, to come to a macro-level analysis of the influence of political opportunities on political violence, it would be better to systematically compare countries on the basis of the traditional stable and volatile elements of a given system.

Conclusion

Based on the macro-level hypothesis I expected to find that political violence was mostly used in France, followed by Germany, The Netherlands and the UK. However, based on the dataset in the previous chapter that was not the case. So, I cannot confirm hypothesis 1. The discrepancy could be the result of protest policing being not a good barometer for political opportunities in order to explain the use of political violence across the countries of focus.

6. Case-study 2: Mobilizing structures of two radical organizations in Germany,

A meso-level explanation

After doing the macro-analysis on political violence, I will now turn to the meso-level. In the theoretical framework of this thesis I explained how mobilizing structures, divided in the internal and external organizational structure of a SMO could influence political violence. To test the formulated hypotheses I will focus on two opposing SMOs, PEGIDA and Antifa, in Germany, that got in confrontation with each other during a demonstration. At first I will pay attention to the context of the demonstration, next I will explain the internal and external organizational structure of PEGIDA and Antifa. Lastly, I will compare the two SMOs on the basis of their organizational structures, and explain how the structures have an influence on political violence.

6.1. The context: A demonstration in Jena

THÜGIDA, a subgroup of the radical right-wing SMO PEGIDA, organizes a demonstration on 20 April 2016 to celebrate Hitler's birthday (Berliner Zeitung, 2016, 22 April). The city council of Jena tried to postpone the demonstration because of its historical significance, and the risk for public disorder. However, the Gera administrative court decides the reasoning does not justify a ban of assembly (Agence France Presse, 2016, 21 April). So, on 20 April 2016 several hundred policemen are deployed, that not only came from Thüringen, but also from Bavaria and Brandenburg (dpa, 2016, 21 April).

Radical left-wing SMOs organize counter-demonstrations (Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, 2016, 22 April). There are 200 THÜGIDA-activists and 3.000 counter-demonstrators, that come from Antifa-groups in the region (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2016, 22 April). The mood among the activists is aggressive and policemen form a block between the two blocks to prevent escalation (Spiegel Online, 2016, 21 April). At some point, left-wing activists start throwing bottles, stones, and water-balloons at THÜGIDA-activists, and the activists try to get through the police barriers. In response, the police forces use pepper spray (dpa-AFX, 2016, 21 April). Left-wing activists continue to throw stuff at the police and at THÜGIDA-activists. In response, THÜGIDA-activists start throwing stones to the left-wing activists and the police (Nürnberger Nachrichten, 2016, 22 April). There are scuffles with activists from both sides and the police. The police decides to use more force and detain several people. Furthermore, the police filed 35 complaints against activists from both sides on the basis of dangerous bodily injury, violation of the weapons law and property damage (Frankfurter Neue Presse, 2016, 22 April). Fifteen

police officers got injured, and it remains unknown if any activists got harmed (Berliner Zeitung, 2016, 22 April). Not only people got hurt, but several cars got damaged too. Furthermore, a railway cable in Jena was set on fire, causing suspension of the route for several days (dpa-AFX, 2016, 21 April). This violent action is not claimed by any of the two groups, nor could the police file any perpetrators, but left-wing activists are suspected (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p125).

6.2. PEGIDA

THÜGIDA is a regional offshoot of PEGIDA, a right-wing radical SMO originated in Dresden in 2014. Because I am interested in the group structures of main organizations I will focus on PEGIDA's organizational structure, and sometimes use THÜGIDA as an explanatory example. At first I will discuss PEGIDA's internal organizational structure, which focuses on formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, territorial decentralization, and institutional integration. Thereafter, I will focus on PEGIDA's external organizational structure, which focuses on constituency, allies, and opponents.

6.2.1. Internal organizational structure PEGIDA

Formalization

Formalization of a SMO refers to the process where an organization develops criteria of formal membership. PEGIDA does not have a formal membership structure. Nevertheless, PEGIDA was the first right-wing radical SMO that mobilized protesters on a massive scale and tries to bond with activists during demonstrations (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p1). Despite the fact that activists cannot become formal members, PEGIDA encourage activists to make donations and to subscribe to the newsletter (PEGIDA, 2018b). Furthermore, PEGIDA has its own online store where activists can buy merchandise, such as t-shirts, hoodies, and hats (PEGIDA, 2018a). So, unless the fact that there are no criteria of formal membership PEGIDA tries to bond with activists by asking for donations, offering a newsletter and selling merchandise. This low level of formalization would make PEGIDA prone to engage in political violence.

Professionalization

Professionalization refers to the process where a SMO starts hiring paid employees. PEGIDA does not have paid employees because the organization operates as a protest movement. However, Lutz Bachmann, founding father of PEGIDA, used PEGIDA-money to

pay fines of personal court cases in which he was convicted for sedition and for insulting two mayors on Facebook (Honnigfort, 2016, 25 October). According to Bachmann it is in line with PEGIDA's statutes to pay for court cases of PEGIDA-activists when it is about something they post on a site belonging to the group (including their private pages), and if the statement is in line with the logic and goals of PEGIDA (The Local, 2016, 26 October). Furthermore, it remains unclear how Bachmann foresees in his living and how PEGIDA-money is spent (Honnigfort, 2016, 25 October). This low level of professionalization would make PEGIDA prone to engage in political violence.

Internal differentiation

Internal differentiation refers to the process where a SMO starts distributing tasks functionally. In the case of PEGIDA, one can see that the organization is largely build around one leader, Bachmann. Officially, Bachmann stepped down as PEGIDA-spokesman in January 2015 after leaked pictures of him doing a Hitler imitation (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p8). However, unofficially, Bachmann remained in charge. Furthermore, PEGIDA had a twelve-men organizational team that organized the weekly demonstrations in Dresden. The team also felt apart in January 2015 after an internal dispute about the future of the movement. These are only two examples of internal disputes around the functional distribution of tasks within PEGIDA. So, there is an intermediate level of internal differentiation at PEGIDA. PEGIDA tries to functionally distribute tasks, but fails to do so because of internal disputes and troubles. This accounts for an intermediate position of the organization when it comes to engaging in political violence.

Territorial decentralization

Territorial decentralization refers to the process where a SMO starts forming territorial subgroups. PEGIDA's early successes in winter 2014/2015 and during the refugee crisis in the summer of 2015 triggered its territorial decentralization. Abroad, offshoots developed in The Netherlands, the UK, Austria, Spain, and Australia (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p5). In Germany, territorial offshoots developed in among others Leipzig, LEGIDA, and Thüringen, THÜGIDA. However, none of the regional subgroups were as successful as the original PEGIDA-movement in Dresden.

To keep all PEGIDA-groups structured according to the same principles, PEGIDA demanded the regional subgroups to sign a declaration of commitment, based on the '*Dresdner thesen*', a nineteen-point position paper in which PEGIDA published its ideology and political

views (PEGIDA, 2018c; Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p13). The ‘*Dresdner thesen*’ was based on PEGIDA’s original nineteen-points paper of December 2014 (PEGIDA, 2014). Only by signing the declaration, the subgroups would be recognized as official offshoots of PEGIDA. However, not all offshoots wanted to sign the declaration, for example the subgroups in Bonn, Cologne, and Düsseldorf declined (Geiges, *et al.*, 2015). Despite PEGIDA’s attempt to structure all regional subgroups according to the same ideological principles, a discrepancy between the groups remain. THÜGIDA, for example, has a far more right-wing extremist character than the original PEGIDA-movement (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p26). This high level of territorial decentralization would make PEGIDA less prone to engage in political violence.

Institutional integration

Institutional integration is the process whereby a SMO becomes formed according to centralized decision-making processes and becomes part of the national institutional structure. As explained in the previous part, PEGIDA tries to control its regional subgroups by making them sign the ‘*Dresdner thesen*’. However, in practice it is not possible to structure PEGIDA according to centralized decision-making processes. On the one hand, PEGIDA lacks the mandate to engage in negotiations and public debates. On the other hand, there is no proper leadership structure, no legitimacy, and no infrastructure to engage in German party politics (Van Herpen, 2015, p32). Another development that has a negative effect on PEGIDA’s institutional integration is the electoral success of ‘*Alternative für Deutschland*’ (AfD). In fact, it seems that PEGIDA does not want to be institutionally integrated, and remain a radical SMO because PEGIDA paved the way for the AfD to develop as a stable political party in Germany (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p56). This low level of institutional integration would make PEGIDA prone to engage in political violence.

6.2.2. External organizational structure PEGIDA

Constituency

One of the most important determinants of a SMO’s success is the strength of its constituency because without a strong constituency the SMO is not able to mobilize. PEGIDA is an interesting case because it is the first right-wing radical SMO that is able to mobilize tens of thousands activists on a weekly basis (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p1). The strength of PEGIDA’s constituency is discussed, as protest attendance is marked by highs and lows. A mobilization peak was visible during the winter of 2014/2015, followed by a rapid decline till July 2015.

Then, in the summer of 2015, the refugee crisis provided a new impetus for protest, which also led to a more radical turn of PEGIDA (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p2). In turn, the electoral successes of the AfD in 2016 caused a decline in protest attendance during PEGIDA-demonstrations.

The media portrayed the weekly demonstrations as the outcome of another narrow-minded, xenophobic, and Islamophobic group (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p1). However, participating activists consider themselves as '*concerned citizens*' who dare to express criticisms, that are shared by large parts of the population. Despite the created image of PEGIDA, its constituency is very diverse, consisting of middle-aged (men), couples, young people, pensioners, as well as hooligans and neo-Nazis (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p1). Besides these moderate PEGIDA-activists, the constituency of some regional offshoots differs greatly. THÜGIDA is for example far more extreme than PEGIDA (DOKMZ, 2017, 2 March). With leaders as David Köckert (affiliated with extreme right-wing party NPD) and Alexander Kurth (affiliated with extreme right-wing party Die Rechte), THÜGIDA attracts more extreme activists and organizes more controversial activities (Paterson, 2012, 24 December). This intermediate strength of PEGIDA's constituency makes them intermediate prone to political violence.

Allies

Intense relations with allies could make a SMO more prone to political violence. PEGIDA has several allies in the German right-wing landscape, for example the AfD. Whereas PEGIDA is a radical SMO, AfD is an institutionalized political party. Since the AfD leadership change in summer 2015 the two seek rapprochement because they want to achieve the same issues and have similar demands (Grabow, 2016, p173). Whereas the AfD have to maintain a more moderate position, PEGIDA claims more radical behavior. The AfD could be seen as a parliamentary arm of PEGIDA, while PEGIDA serves as a bridge between society and politics (Grabow, 2016, p173). This means, Germany has a growing right-wing political party, and a right-wing radical SMO that encourages mobilization of dissatisfied, xenophobic, and nationalistic people. The organizations are reinforcing each other and are interconnected because they share participants, and provide each other mutual support. There is no competition at the moment because the organizations serve different purposes: PEGIDA is a radical SMO, while the AfD is an institutionalized political party. However, tensions do develop sometimes (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p56). For example when Bachmann announced that PEGIDA would create its own political party at to compete with the AfD.

Other allies are formed with other right-wing radical SMOs. Think of *Neue Rechte*, and the pan-European Identitarian Movement, i.e. *Identitäre Bewegung* (IB) (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p62). These alliances are based on mutual cooperation. For example, Götz Kubitschek, spokesman of *Neue Rechte* often took stage at PEGIDA-demonstrations to spread his ideas to a wider public, while PEGIDA profits from Kubitschek's publisher network. A similar relationship is observed with IB. While prominent IB spokesmen take stage during PEGIDA-demonstrations, PEGIDA takes advantage of IB's European network. Due to PEGIDA's mobilizing successes the organization functioned as a catalyst for other developing right-wing radical SMOs, and therefore PEGIDA acted as a role model. In conclusion, relationships with other radical SMOs are dedicated to profit from each other's constituency and network, therefore the organizations seem to mutually benefit from each other. Furthermore, PEGIDA's alliances with the AfD makes them more prone to political violence because PEGIDA wants to maintain its radical character in order to deviate from the AfD.

Opponents

Intense relations with opponents could also lead to more political violence. Activities of PEGIDA are always targeted at their main opponent: the political elites (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, p1). Political elites are perceived as an opponent because of their lack of involvement in society, authoritarian style of administration, and incompetence concerning housing and integration of refugees and asylum seekers (Vorländer, *et al.*, 2018, pp3-4). Another opponent is the media because PEGIDA perceives the majority of the media-statements as untrue, '*Lügenpresse*' (lying press). However, intense relations with opponents do not always result in political violence because PEGIDA tries to organize the majority of their events in a peaceful manner. Political violence often erupts during intense relations with other opponents.

These other opponents are left-wing radical SMOs, like Antifa, because their ideology opposes PEGIDA's ideology. During demonstrations these intense relations become clear, which is also visible in the event of focus where the two groups stood aggressively against each other. While the demonstration started peacefully, political violence develops as a result of intense interactions between the opposing SMOs and the police. So, PEGIDA's intense relationships with opponents makes them more prone to engage in political violence.

6.3. Antifa

Whereas PEGIDA is a young SMO, Antifa's history starts in the 1980s. During the 1980s the Autonomen were popular left-wing radical SMOs that had a loose, non-binding organizational structure and rejected the hierarchy of party politics and the state (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). Political violence was perceived as a legitimate resource for achieving political goals. However, the non-binding structure made it hard to survive. Therefore, the Autonomen made the strategic decision to become Antifa-organizations during the 1990s (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p112). Within this Autonomen-Antifa mixture the SMOs could continue their critique on the capitalist society by mobilizing a younger generation on themes like anti-racism, antifascism, and anti-globalization (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2010, p21, p24; O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). The function of the Antifa SMOs was to connect the heterogeneous Autonomen with the democratic discourse (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p33). But what does that mean for its organizational structure?

6.3.1. Internal organizational structure Antifa

Formalization

Developing formal criteria of membership would for Antifa mean that the organization loses its traditional character. Therefore, Antifa has no criteria of formal membership. Instead, the organization works via self-organization and networking as a way to stay apart from the state-apparatus (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). People are free to come and go, and have no clear responsibilities. Like PEGIDA, Antifa tries to bond with activists via internet, for example via a website and social media, and via e-mail (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p119). Furthermore, Antifa tries to develop more formal characteristics by organizing regular meetings and by creating a membership structure in for example the Antifa Youth Front (Haunss, 2013, p28; O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). Despite the fact that there are no formal criteria of membership, Antifa develops a structure that binds activists to their causes. However, this low level of formalization makes Antifa prone to engage in political violence.

Professionalization

Because of Antifa's lack of formal structures, there is also no professional network of paid employees within the organization. The organization works on the basis of informal, non-hierarchical connections, whereby the SMO is managed via self-organization and networking (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November. As people are free to come and go whenever they want, and

have no clear responsibilities, it seems logic that there are no paid employees within the organization as well. Nonetheless, Antifa always have a strong core of dedicated people that take care of the SMO's survival. This low level of professionalization makes Antifa prone to engage in political violence.

Internal differentiation

Antifa is characterized by a non-hierarchical, non-dogmatic, and project-based networking structure (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). This means that the organization has no formal leadership structure. However, even without a formal leadership structure, tasks within a SMO could be functionally distributed. This is not the case for Antifa. The organizational structure is formed according to a 'general assembly' where decisions are made on the basis of consensus via direct democratic procedures (Smaligo, 2017, 14 November). All people are equal within the movement, and participation or performance of tasks is done on a voluntary basis. Therefore, there is no functional distribution of tasks in Antifa, which means the SMO has a low level of internal differentiation. This low level of internal differentiation makes Antifa prone to engage in political violence.

Territorial decentralization

Antifa's organizational structure is comprised of many small regional organizations. However, a national organizational structure is missing. The choice to organize Antifa on the basis of small territorial organizations comes from the focus on specific themes in different territorial regions. Some regions are focused on squatting, while others focus on anti-war or anti-imperialism (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). Despite their focus on regional themes, Antifa organizations are focusing on antifascism, and fighting radical right-wing movements in general. These overarching themes create more interconnected national Antifa networks (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p116). An example of this territorial decentralization can be drawn from Thüringen. There are different Antifa groups in cities like Jena, Erfurt, Suhl, Weimar, and Gera (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p27). In Thüringen most activities are carried out in Jena, for the simple reason that Jena is a university city (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p119). However, a more permanent structural connection between the Antifa SMOs on national level remains undetectable (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p119). So, while other organizations are structured from a national level, towards more territorial decentralization, this is not the case for Antifa. This means Antifa has an intermediate

position when it comes to territorial decentralization. An intermediate level of territorial decentralization makes Antifa intermediate prone to engage in political violence.

Institutional integration

A specific characterization of Antifa is that the organization does not want to become institutionally integrated because they are explicitly against all kinds of state-institutions and the state-apparatus (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). Antifa groups refuse to act according to the rules formulated by the government, and do not want to be structured like classical political forms, rather Antifa acts as an anti-model of the established system (Haunss, 2013, p28; Smaligo, 2017, 14 November). More recently Antifa starts forming itself on a more national level, whereby it tries to keep its open structure. However, this turn to the national level does not encourage the organization to become more institutionally integrated. So, within Antifa there is no question of institutional integration. This low level of institutional integration makes Antifa prone to engage in political violence.

6.3.2. External organizational structure Antifa

Constituency

As mentioned earlier, the Autonomen, and later on Antifa too, have troubles in keeping a strong constituency. This lack of a strong constituency is explained by the non-binding nature of the organization (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). Strong structures, a permanent basis, and overarching forms of organization contradict the basic understanding of a Antifa SMO. The scene is composed of heterogeneous SMOs that reject hierarchic leadership structures (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p118). Therefore, it is understandable that it is hard for Antifa to build a strong constituency.

Whereas, it is hard for Antifa to have activists involved in terms of numbers, the organization scores a lot better when one takes a look at the quality of involvement. Antifa SMOs are built upon a strong core of few activists, who dedicate (parts of) their lives to the SMO. Without these powerful cores it would be unlikely to remain an active organization. However, a strong core alone is not enough to survive as a SMO, at some moment there needs to be a knowledge transfer from an older to a younger generation. The lack of this transfer is for example visible in the dismantling of the Antifa Task Force Jena in January 2016 (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2016, p113; Antifa Task Force Jena, 2016, 14 January). After being active for more than a decade there were no activists that could take over the task of the older

generation of activists. This intermediate strength of Antifa's constituency makes them intermediate prone to political violence.

Allies

Whereas the traditional Autonomen only wanted to form alliances with similar left-wing radical SMOs, it was the task for Antifa to act more in accordance with democratic procedures. Antifa is less closed to outsiders, busy with non-extremist themes as well, and engages in broader alliances in order to cooperate with official institutions, like political parties, trade unions, and the mass media (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2010, p6). Therefore, Antifa finds an ally in the left-wing political party *Die Linke*. *Die Linke* wants to dissociate themselves from the radical character and the use of political violence by Antifa (Beringer, 2016). Their alliance is focused on cooperation, keeping in touch, and keeping each other informed. *Die Linke* serves as a hinge between the radical SMO and institutionalized organizations (Beringer, 2016). The goal of their alliance is not to play against each other, accept structural differences, and focus on similarities.

However, for some Antifa SMOs this alliance contradicts their traditional character because they want to stay radical, and keep away from moderate parties. Furthermore, some Antifa SMOs feel there is not enough (media)attention for their goals and ideology as they deserve. Therefore, SMOs sometimes break with moderate protest forms, and demolish property, in order to get nationwide attention (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). The use of political violence serves, on the one hand, as a strategy to distinguish themselves from moderate alliances. On the other hand, political violence is perceived as a legitimate strategy to achieve political goals, and is part of their traditional character (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2010, p7). Nonetheless, Antifa acknowledges that political violent strategies are, in non-revolutionary times like these, only a symbolic strategy (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). So, these intense relations with alliances make Antifa prone to engage in political violence.

Opponents

Antifa critiques capitalist society, therefore the capitalist state and capitalist institutions are an opponent for Antifa (O'Banion, 2017, 20 November). Antifa's actions are always targeted towards this opponent, think of for example the G20 clashes in Hamburg in 2017. Activists showed their mistrust in the capitalist system by directing political violence on the symbols of capitalism, like windows of banks and shops. The police, a long arm of the capitalist

state according to Antifa, reacted with water cannons and teargas, thereby creating an impetus for left-wing activists to use more political violence (Oltermann, 2017, 7 July).

Moreover, Antifa fights themes like fascism and racism, and therefore perceive right-wing radical SMOs and political parties as opponents too (Beringer, 2016). Antifa fights against the development of growing right-wing organizations like PEGIDA and AfD by organizing demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. During these demonstrations activists do not hesitate to get in confrontation with opponents (Amt für Verfassungsschutz, 2010, p27). An example can be drawn from the demonstration of focus, where Antifa-activists started throwing bottles, stones, and water balloons at THÜGIDA-activists. However, police intervention and a violent reaction by THÜGIDA created intense relations between the opposing SMOs, which lead to an even further escalation of political violence. So, these intense relations with opponents make Antifa prone to engage in political violence.

6.4. The two radical organizations compared: Influence on political violence

In the theoretical framework of this thesis I formulated several expectations concerning the effect of a SMO's internal and external organizational structure on political violence. In the previous part I analyzed the internal and external organizational structure of two opposing SMOs in Germany. In this part I will compare these different organizational structures and formulate how the expectations from the theoretical framework are represented by these two cases. Derived from Social Movement Theory, I expected that SMOs with low levels of formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, territorial decentralization, and institutional integration were prone to engage in political violence. And, I expected that SMOs that have intense relations with their constituency, allies, and opponents were prone to engage in political violence. Table 6 shows how these indicators are structured per SMO.

Based on the expectations and by exploring the indicators in table 6 one would expect that both the radical SMOs are prone to engage in political violence. While the scores on external organizational structure are similar for the radical SMOs, Antifa's lower scores on the internal organizational structure make me to conclude that Antifa is more likely to engage in political violence compared to PEGIDA. In the context of the event of focus, the demonstration in Jena on 20 April 2016, Antifa initiated the use of political violence, thereby creating an impetus for a violent reaction by the police and THÜGIDA. This confirms the expectation that Antifa would be more likely to engage in political violence. So, based on these findings I will

conclude that mobilizing structures have an effect on the likeliness of a SMO to engage in political violence, and thereby confirm hypothesis 2 and 3.

	PEGIDA	Antifa
<i>Internal organizational structure</i>		
Formalization	-	-
Professionalization	- *	--
Internal differentiation	+/-	--
Territorial decentralization	+	+/- * ¹
Institutional integration	--	--
<i>External organizational structure</i>		
Constituency	+/-	+/-
Allies	+	+
Opponents	++	++

Table 6: Internal and external organizational structure of PEGIDA and Antifa

-- = Very weak; - = Weak; +/- = Intermediate; + = Strong; ++ = Very strong

* = No paid employees, but fines/court cases of constituency paid with PEGIDA money (example Bachmann).

*¹ = Territorial decentralization works other way around. At first decentralized, later more centralization.

Conclusion

Based on the meso-level hypotheses I expected to find that the internal and external organizational structure of a SMO have an effect on political violence. On the basis of the analysis I did on the meso-level I have to conclude that differences in the internal and external organizational structure of a SMO have an effect on political violence. Both, PEGIDA and Antifa turned out to be equally likely to engage in political violence based on the scores of their external organizational structure. However, based on differences in the internal organizational structure Antifa would be more likely to engage in political violence compared to PEGIDA, which turned out to be the case in the event of focus. In conclusion, this chapter shows that hypothesis 2 and 3 can be confirmed on the basis of the collected data. Furthermore, this chapter shows that political violence has a relational and emergent character. Relational because the use of political violence, and its escalation, is the result of intense interactions between radical SMOs and institutional actors (such as the police). Emergent because escalation of political violence could only develop during demonstrations of both the radical SMOs.

7. Case-study 3: Individual motivations of right-wing activists in The Netherlands,

A micro-level explanation

After analyzing the macro- and meso-level, I will now turn to the micro-level. Following the theoretical framework there are three different motivations that activists have in order to join a SMO. In this chapter I will explore these instrumental, identity, and ideological motivations. At first I would like to explain how right-wing activists in The Netherlands came to participate in radical SMOs. Next, I will explore what reasons activists' have to stay involved in radical SMOs. In conclusion, I will elaborate on the influences of these trajectories on political violence. I will focus on questions of how the individual and organizations position themselves with respect to political violence, how they perceive political violence, and I will pay attention to the activists' perceptions of authorities, the police, and counter-movements in dealing with activism and political violence.

7.1. Becoming a radical right-wing activist

7.1.1. Instrumental motivations to join

How does instrumentality work as a motivator to join a right-wing radical SMO? Instrumental motivations refer to the activists' choices to participate in a radical SMO in order to have influence on the social and political environment. The behavior of activists is determined by the perceived costs and benefits that participation will bring to them, and to personal selective incentives that are at stake (Klandermans, 2004, p361; Rydin and Pennington, 2000, p157).

During the interviews respondents never spoke about perceived advantages or disadvantages that played a role before joining the radical SMO. The activists' always pointed to other incentives that were driving their participation. None of the respondents mentioned material or non-material incentives as driving factors for their involvement. However, some activists' had the perception that their participation has an influence on the SMO or on the social and political environment. This perception is key in the instrumental motivation approach because when this feeling is not present a rational actor would not participate. Respondent 3 for example felt its participation was a way to matter:

“I have a background of family members that are part of the Islam. I know that pressure is exerted. It is a way to express that I will not let it get to me. And if I will not do it, who else

will? Will we let us put ourselves in a corner because of violence? Then it will become impossible to stop at all.” (Respondent 3)

So, on the basis of the collected data, one cannot assume that a rational analysis of advantages and disadvantages played a crucial role for activists’ to join a radical SMO. Whereas, from the instrumental perspective one would assume that no individual would join a radical SMO if there are no personal selective incentives at stake, the conversations with the interviewees do not support a assumption like that.

7.1.2. Identity motivations to join

What role does identity play when it comes to joining a right-wing radical SMO? Identity motivations refer to the activists’ choice to participate in a radical SMO as an expression of ones identification with a group. Some respondents mentioned the desire to become part of a group that fit their values and believes, and give guidance to their world. An example is drawn from the conversation with respondent 6:

“I was sometimes talking with others about the abnormality of those pronunciations [pronunciations of classmates about gassing Jews, and the good things that were happening in IS territory and in Syria], it is not normal that people are living in this world and think like that. My friends were always telling me: ‘yes, you are totally right and we want to do something about it too’, but always when I said I want to take to the streets, I want to speak out and do something. Then eventually, I always saw I was the only one. So, I started looking for a group that fits my vision.” (Respondent 6)

Another example can be drawn from the conversation with respondent 7:

“I have to stand up for my Christian religion, against Islamization of Europe and our norms and values. That is all broken down bit by bit, of course, nowadays. Yes, I think that something has to be done about that. So, I sent a Facebook-message to them [the right-wing radical SMO], then I spoke to someone and since then I am a member” (Respondent 7)

These examples show that the first encounters with the right-wing radical SMO gave respondents an identity or a meaningful and positive role in the movement, which influenced their decision to become more structurally involved after participating in several activities. However, encounters with a radical SMO did not always meet activists’ expectations, therefore

it is possible that activists' keep on searching for other groups. For example respondent 1 decided to create an own right-wing radical SMO:

“Personally, I was looking around, and took friends with me. Often we came out at [*name of a right-wing radical SMO*], at those groups that were already organizing things, you wanted to support that. But effectively it got destroyed by themselves, the left-wing media and the left-wing authorities, so that no one was interested any longer. They [the right-wing radical SMO] gained a bad name. It started with 250 to 300 men and now they are with only 25 on a lawn somewhere. Then, I started to look further.” (Respondent 1)

7.1.3. Ideological motivations to join

How does ideology work as a motivator to join a right-wing radical SMO? Ideological motivations refer to the choice of activists' to participate in a radical SMO as a search for meaning and a way to express their views. Instead of political change, the activist hopes to gain dignity and makes her angry feelings about governmental policy or other affairs known. All respondents expressed angry or dissatisfied feelings with the current state of affairs:

“Why I became a member of the mentioned parties is because I saw that our national identity is at risk.” (Respondent 2)

“I have been in contact with Muslims in my family since I was ten years old. Uhm, then, you see, uhh, the truth, and not what is told in de media and newspapers. Two couples within a short distance of you and you see what happens, how they treat women, non-Muslims, and also children.” (Respondent 3)

“At my previous school I always saw things on the news that made my frustration about immigration grow.” (Respondent 6)

On the basis of these dissatisfied feelings, respondents come to the conclusion that they want to express their views, and make their feelings known. The direct reason to become an activist can come from a critical event, or follow a gradual process, respondent 1 and 3 put it this way:

“The straw that broke the camel's back was the way in which mayor Bruls pressed charges [against Geert Wilders²], wearing his chain of office, surrounded by half the elite of Nijmegen.

² Mayor Bruls of Nijmegen pressed charges because of discrimination against Geert Wilders about his 'less, less, less' pronunciations about Moroccans in March 2014 (NOS, 2014, 25 March).

Completely shutting down his own police station, the headquarters of the regional police force. We thought it was so offensive, that we had to do something.” (Respondent 1)

“Then on a specific moment you come to a position, a position you do not do anything with. Until 2014 I have never been a member of a political party, or a trade union, or something like that, I have never taken part in a demonstration. The first demonstration in which I participated was a [*name of right-wing radical SMO*] demonstration.” (Respondent 3).

From the interviews it can be deduced that predominantly ideological and identity motivations played a major role in becoming a right-wing activist, whereas respondents seemed less concerned with making a cost-benefit analysis. But how do these motivations influence the process of staying involved in a right-wing radical SMO?

7.2. Staying involved in radical right-wing activism

The following part of this analysis is focused on the question of why activists stay involved in right-wing radical SMOs. In this part I will take a look at the structural integration of activists in the SMO, and see how costs and benefits influence commitment to the radical SMO.

7.2.1. Structural integration

The process of structural integration is important to point to because it forms the basis of why activists decide to be involved in the right-wing radical SMOs for several years. Deduced from the theoretical framework one could value structural integration as the path by which the ‘*demand*’ and ‘*supply*’ side of mobilization come closer together, and therefore is valuable in explaining political violence. First of all, the different sorts of events organized by a SMO enforce structural integration of its participants. These events range from large scale demonstrations to smaller scale political protest actions, and the organizations are also concerned with social gatherings on several levels that could lead to more structural integration into the movement. Respondent 7 puts it as follows:

“We have for example our own gym. We train together. We have ‘*vormingsavonden*’, there we deepen our knowledge about who we are as West-Brabanders, to say it like that. What is our history, that kind of stuff. Besides that we are campaigning, yes, uhm, if something becomes an issue, now they want to build an Islamic school in Roosendaal, than they will hear from us.” (Respondent 7)

Another respondent explained how involvement in demonstrations led to further integration into the right-wing radical SMO. As one can see, the activist does not consider it as an active choice to become more involved, but as an unconscious development:

“It is not a choice for more activism, I wanted to be present at one demonstration only. It was the second demonstration [of the organization], I saw the first one on the internet ... I participate in the demonstration and read the press releases that evening, and get the feeling that it is about a totally different demonstration. It is simply not right. That moved me to, okay well, I will go the next time again.” (Respondent 3)

Furthermore, one should take a look at the time spent of an activist within the organization. Respondent 1 explains that “*it is the first thought I have when I wake up and the last before I go to bed*”. However, respondent 1 also mentions that this is not the case for all activists:

“We have a stronger core of 25 persons and we have even more sympathizers. Those who support us financially, but also people that we can call for attractive actions. I will always try that, and see if they are willing to participate.” (Respondent 1)

Also other respondents mention the fact that they spend a lot of time within the radical SMO:

“It costs so much time, that it is rather a burden than satisfying” (Respondent 3)

“Q: Are you active in other organizations or associations? A: No, not at all. This is a good activity, I will keep it up for a while.” (Respondent 6)³

Though the respondents are aware of the excessive amount of time they spend in the radical SMO, it has never been a reason to consider exit from the movement. These things are turned into positive thoughts, and makes them more motivated to keep on going.

7.2.2. The costs of staying a member in a radical SMO

None of the respondents mentioned any disadvantages with which they were concerned while entering the radical SMO. However, once they become an activist in the right-wing radical SMO they are experiencing costs concerning their participation. These costs can be categorized in material, social, and identity costs. In the following part I will elaborate on the experiences of these costs by the activists, and if or how they influence motivations to leave the

³ Q = Question of the interviewer; A = Answer of the respondent

radical SMO. Almost all respondents agree that material costs, such as money and time, are made within the radical SMO:

“It is the first thought I have when I wake up and the last before I go to bed” (Respondent 1)

“It costs so much time, that it is rather a burden than satisfying” (Respondent 3)

“Today is the final payment term of a fine of 750 euros that I received for the organization of a demonstration that was not registered in time. I refuse to pay that because many other demonstrations are also not registered or not registered in time. For example the demonstration two days ago in the Mediapark⁴. Or the Turkish demonstration on the Erasmus-bridge⁵.” (Respondent 3)

“On average it takes me every day an hour. If a large event or demonstration is coming it can increase to multiple hours a day. These are of course preparation hours. On the day itself (often weekends) I will usually spend all day (Respondent 5)

Other costs mentioned by the respondents have to do with their social lives. Think about the negative influences participation has on friends, families, and professional relationships of the activist. From all the interviews examples of social costs can be drawn:

“I lost some friends, and girlfriends. Many girlfriends.” (Respondent 1)

“My mother is once threatened in a supermarket. I find that very terrible. I have a brother who died, and mom told me, yes, that she is scared that I will pass away some day too. Those are bad things.” (Respondent 1)

“Also on social media I get blocked all the time. In my current Facebook-account one character of my name is omitted. On Twitter I am not allowed anymore, that is an account of my wife. Without me being ever convicted for hate or something alike, and without any complaint for hate or something alike.” (Respondent 3)

Also professional relationships are at stake. Again, almost all respondents mention the fact that the police visits their boss at work, which has consequences for the activists’ professional life:

⁴ Monday 12 November 2018 activists of the anti-Black Peet movement organized a demonstration at the entrances of the Mediapark in Hilversum (Het Parool, 2018, 12 November).

⁵ Monday 29 January 2018 Kurdish activists organized a demonstration on the Erasmus-bridge against the Turkish invasion in Syria (Rubio, 2018, 29 January).

“Some people are visited by the police at their work, those just seem like ‘*statiebezoekjes*’”
(Respondent 3)

“On a professional level, uhm, yes, we are always associated as an extreme-right organization, so many people are making, uh, uh, yes, if the word extreme is used, they are making very strange connections with other organizations that we have nothing to do with. The problem with that is, for example, an employer thinks that I have problems with other groups in The Netherlands.” (Respondent 6)

“Uhm, the police who immediately appears at your work, that wants to talk with your boss, that kind of stuff.” (Respondent 7)

However, one activist mentions that the problem seems to be less important than it was back in the days:

“Back in the days you had the struggle of finding work because of [*name of the organization*] activities, nowadays it is less of a sensitive issue.” (Respondent 5)

Furthermore, it seems that activists handle their participation with care, and do not feel free to be open about their participation to everyone, which can also be explained as a social cost. An example can be drawn from the conversation with respondent 6:

“My friends know about it [participation in the right-wing radical SMO]. My parents, I live on my own, my parents do not know about it, and do not have to be informed about it. That is why I am always unrecognizable in the media. I try to be as little visible as possible in the media” (Respondent 6)

Other costs have an impact on the identity of the respondent, think of stigmatization, fear, and all other things that are affecting the self-esteem of a respondent in a negative way. Identity costs are the costs that are mentioned the most by respondents. All respondents have to deal with stigmatization and prejudices. I will present some examples from the interviews:

“A columnist of the NRC [Dutch newspaper] approaches me. I think ‘oh well’, a columnist, that is alarming anyway, and from the NRC too, they are not wise at all. He creates some sort of poem. Like, Respondent 1, he looked at me with his clear blue eyes. I do not have blue eyes at all. I had a lot of hair, for me. With his short shaved spikes, and yes, he just creates some sort of a fantasy story. If I was there like some sort of wired Aryan in the courtroom.”
(Respondent 1)

“One wants to value this opinion as extreme, despite we actually know a lot of people agree with us. ... One tries to criticize my personality, but often not the content, actually almost nowhere.” (Respondent 3)

“Often others call you something which you are not. Nazi or fascist or something.” (Respondent 7)

The exposure to these different costs are not perceived as a reason to quit the radical SMO. Some respondents mention that leaving the organization sometimes passes their minds, but they are not willing to do so eventually. Another respondent explains that there is no way back, and that there will always be people who will try to make a life miserable, and that it is no reason to quit. The possibility to remain anonymous during movement activities is also a reason for one of the respondents to stay involved.

7.2.3. The benefits of staying a member in a radical SMO

Despite the costs mentioned above, the respondents also perceive benefits from their involvement in the right-wing radical SMOs. These benefits, or positive developments, are seen as a reason to stay involved in the SMO. Just like the costs, the benefits can also be categorized as material, social, and identity. In the following part I will elaborate on the benefits that are experienced by the respondents.

First of all, I will consider material benefits, these are having a job in the movement, or earn money because of involvement in the radical SMO. None of the respondents directly mentioned material benefits, but at least one of the respondent was able to have a professional career within the movement:

“Yes, I am chairman of [*name of the organization*] and I preside the board of directors with two other people ... This means we are leading the party, as that is called. Besides that, we publish the magazine ‘*Wij Europa*’. An advantage is that I gained a graphic education, so I help with shaping and finalizing the magazine. I also help with designing the webpage, so I know some things about that too. I am multi-functionally present in the party, together with the other employees we have.” (Respondent 2)

So, on the basis of the interviews I did for this thesis there is no significant reason to assume that material benefits, such as financial or professional gains, are a major driving factor in the explanation of the activists’ involvement in right-wing radical SMOs. Furthermore, none

of the respondents did mention other practical gains that are concerned with their movement involvement. As one could see in the previous part, there are primarily material costs concerned with involvement in the movement.

What other reasons could activists' have to stay involved in the radical SMO? When it comes to social benefits, the interviewees share a lot of positive experiences. These are not only based on friendships within the radical SMO, but also on the relationships with other groups. I will present some example from the interviews:

“In some cases they [other activists] became real friends, and their partners became friends too. ... An advantage for me is comradeship.” (Respondent 5)

“We get in touch with other organizations at home and abroad. Abroad: we will visit each other's meetings, write for each other's magazines, are interested in each other's developments. At home: we keep in touch with organizations that we sometimes come across. The main goal is to not get in each other's way. Not organize activities twice and give each other space to move.” (Respondent 5)

“Those were very ordinary boys, with ordinary jobs, that made me very happy. Those boys are totally different of what you read in the media, extreme right. They are not extreme at all. I thought that was very nice. It lead to a certain relationship of trust” (Respondent 6)

All respondents acknowledge that activism yielded new friendships within the radical SMO. Therefore, I conclude that movement participants do have social motivations to stay involved in the different right-wing radical SMOs.

The last category of benefits for movement involvement is described as identity benefits. These benefits are best described as a sense of fulfillment, ideological benefits, and the perception of giving meaning to the world. In other words, all experiences that affect the self-esteem of an activist in a positive way. All respondents mentioned identity benefits. Most respondents recall that activism give them a way to give meaning to the world and provide a way to anticipate on their frustrations:

“It gives me a feeling of empowerment. That I, uhm, not standing alone anymore. That is how it feels.” (Respondent 1)

“Most of all for me the feeling that I know that I do something against it, that I am not at home suppressing my frustration. I know that if I want to make a case against something, there will always be a group that qua vision and way of thinking is on my side. (Respondent 6)

“An advantage is that it makes me more calm. Before, I was watching the news and I got more frustrated et cetera. And yes, you want do something about it, and now I have that feeling, that I am actually doing something about it. To the things that I am contra or pro to. So, it has a positive effect on my state of mind.” (Respondent 7)

But activism did not only affect the respondents’ perception of giving meaning to their worlds. Moreover, the respondents’ did have the feeling that they could actually reach specific goals. Some respondents note that what they are preaching for years, is finally taken over by some national political parties, and therefore proclaim their goals are accomplished or are soon to be accomplished:

“You should see it like this, the subjects that I am handling for thirty years are shifting, they are shifting to other parties, and if I hear the CDA and VVD say that people in specific neighborhoods show some criminal behavior, ethnic profiling, they should be punished soon, than it means that those parties are shifting to what we are calling for years. And if the Minister says, uhh, that she at some moment wants to punish people from some specific neighborhoods harder, that is what the Minister or Secretary of State said lately. Then I think, you are thinking about certain things, but implementation is a second. So, you just see that what we are telling for years, is now taken over by other parties, that is something I do not mind. As long as the borders will close eventually.” (Respondent 2)

Another respondent recalls a similar experience:

“Satisfaction will come when, uhm, when there is an actual change. Change is now really starting. In Germany it starts because Merkel is leaving. We are calling since 2014 that Merkel should go, well, she leaves now. We also see that the AfD is growing since PEGIDA’s presence. A party that states that they would not have been as big as they are when PEGIDA was not present. That is what the AfD says. There [in Germany] you have more visible points to mention than in The Netherlands, but even in The Netherlands we see things are changing. There is a shift. And uhh, yes, that is what we have contributed to, but it is still not satisfying.” (Respondent 3)

Concluding on benefits that offer a reason to stay involved in the radical SMO, one can see that there are no clear material benefits for the respondents. Only one respondent mentions the opportunity to build a career within the movement. However, there are loads of social and

identity benefits for the respondents. These benefits explain their motivation to participate in the right-wing radical SMO, and offer a reason to stay involved.

7.3. Influence of instrumentality, identity, and ideology on political violence

In the theoretical framework I explained that intense involvement in a radical SMO could drive an activist to commit acts of political violence when the ‘*demand*’ and ‘*supply*’ side of mobilization come together. In the previous part one could see that intense movement involvement is created by instrumental, identity, and ideological motivations, which means that the necessary (but insufficient) condition to explain political violence is present. Therefore, I will explore the perception of the ‘*supply*’ side by the activist in this part of the micro-analysis. This means that I focus on how these motivations influence the position of the individual on political violence, how the respondent describes political violence during movement activities, and I will explore activists’ perceptions about authorities, the police, and counter-movements.

7.3.1. Individual and organizational positions on political violence

What became immediately clear from the interviews is that the respondents did have a negative attitude concerning political violence. None of them saw political violence as a legitimate strategy of the organization. Some examples of these attitudes are:

“I know the boys who threw a bomb to a mosque, I think it is super, super stupid. That is the reason why have organizations like they are, to give those boys any direction. Instead of such a retarded action of throwing a methylated spirits bottle to a mosque, we try to inform them. Try to do something useful with your frustration, and do not take a violent turn.” (Respondent 1)

“There is no confrontation at all ... We are never acting confrontational.” (Respondent 2)

“[*name of organization*] does not use violence, it is not on behalf of [*name of organization*].” (Respondent 3)

“Everyone has the right to speak out, it is abnormal to get punched in the face for having a different opinion.” And “I know that if I want to make a case against something, there will always be a group that qua vision and way of thinking is on my side. Uhh, by which, in a non-violent manner, by proposing peaceful solutions, get on with it.” (Respondent 6)

“Because we never violate laws.” (Respondent 7)

But if activists are reluctant to use political violence, how is it possible that political violence is used by activists of radical SMOs? Some of the interviewees were present or concerned with political violent incidents. In the following part I will turn to these incidents and see how the incidents originated and developed.

7.3.2. Origin and development of political violence

Deduced from the theoretical framework of this thesis, and based on the analyses on the macro-, and meso-level I expect that political violence erupts and escalates during intense moments of interactions between radical SMOs, counter-movements, and the authorities. Exactly this pattern, is described by the respondents. One respondent describes a demonstration that took a political violent turn:

“In terms of numbers of people it was one of the biggest right-wing demonstrations that occurred in The Netherlands, there were about 500 to 600 people. It is a pity, yes, there are a lot of images, if you explore them, than you see that, unfortunately the state from the very beginning makes it hard, and despite agreements that are made in order to keep the two parties separate, the police approaches us via the square, besides banners, and then things started to escalate. Counter-demonstrators were throwing smoke bombs and other stuff on the Vredenburgplein in Utrecht, and at a certain moment the horses [police horses] were deployed to disperse the crowd, it was such a pity. Many people that watched the images got deterred to participate again. It is such a pity.” (Respondent 3)

Another respondent recalls a squatting action in Amsterdam, whereby political violence developed:

“A: The police is watching how they [left-wing activists] throw things through all the windows, how they [left-wing activists] throw fireworks inside. The police just let it happen. Next, the police knocks on the door and tells us, yes boys, now all the windows are broken, tonight it is easy to start a fire. So, the one who was responsible had to pull the plug. ... Q: Are you afraid at certain moments, are there things that. A: No, something takes over. It is adrenaline, I shall not say you are afraid, but in a certain way I was looking for stuff to keep the window intact. They were throwing stones against the window, so I was looking for something that would keep the window intact. You are looking for things to throw back at them, that is what takes over from you at that specific moment. But it is astonishing to see

that the police is watching, and that it seems an agreement, a stitch-up by the municipality and AFA [left-wing radical SMO].” (Respondent 1)

Both examples show that in first instance the activities were nonviolent, but because of (unintended) interactions with other actors, such as counter-movements and authorities, things start to escalate. Because of these intense interactions I asked the respondents to their relations with authorities, the police, and counter-movements. In the following part I will explain how these relations are structured, and how it does influence the escalation of political violence.

7.3.3. Relationship with authorities, the police, and counter-movements

First of all, I will acknowledge the relationship between the right-wing radical SMOs and the authorities as an determinant to explain political violence. In the theoretical framework I stated that the police is often perceived by activists as the long arm of the state and expected to find that specific protest policing tactics lead to political violence of activists. However, during my macro-analysis I did not find support for this hypothesis. During the interviews I tried to discuss the role of authorities and the police during demonstrations, and how activists perceive that policy is encouraging or repressing activists’ rights. All activists show some compassion with the police, and acknowledge that the police is a long arm of the state, but that you cannot hold the police responsible for the policy that is implemented. The repressive behavior towards the right-wing activists is perceived as a creation of the ‘elite’ authorities. This is visible in the following statements of the respondents:

“A major rule for us is to have respect for the police, even if they are not respecting you. The beautiful thing is that our experiences with the street police is that they have respect for us, but their boss or the prosecutor do not. They have an aversion towards right-wing action groups, or created policy in which right-wing action groups get as little room in public space as possible. Therefore, uhm, therefore a lot of manpower have to be employed when they get alarmed for such an action.” (Respondent 1)

“Five times the police is unable to guarantee our safety during a demonstration. Well, that is sad. It is not the police, it really is the authorities and the upper layer of the police. That is not a chosen upper layer. It is what you see at the security services too. ... The one of the NIVD replaces the one of the AIVD, and the one of the AIVD replaces the one of the police force Amsterdam. You know, it is such a shift whereby power remains in the hands of the same.” (Respondent 3)

“Q: Do you have the feeling your demonstration rights are repressed? A: Yes, yes, yes, that is the feeling I have. It is not so much to blame of the police, but it really is the government and the municipalities.” (Respondent 7)

Respondent 3 compares the situation in The Netherlands with Germany, and claims it is totally different there:

“The right to demonstrate, well yes, it sucks in The Netherlands. I live in Germany, there the right to demonstrate is more sacred, almost nothing is prohibited, almost never. Almost never something is limited, that is totally different in The Netherlands.” (Respondent 3)

So, whereas I did not find support for hypothesis 1 during my macro-analysis, on the basis of the interviews one could assume that protest policing does have an effect on the use of political violence by activists. Nonetheless, right-wing activists do not hold the police accountable, but explain that the problem comes from the national or municipal authorities. Furthermore, activists hold counter-movements accountable for the escalation of political violence. Several respondents note that political violence erupts and escalates when counter-movements got involved:

“A: Actions are escalating sometimes, but not so often. Always this is because of intervention by others, left-wing organizations such as Antifa try to get in our way and throw stuff. It depends on the police how it ends. Q: Could you maybe describe a specific example or situation? A: We have asked for a legal action if a group of squatters or anarchists is looking for a confrontation. The police does not intervene, let the squatters go their own way. Then, we are not people who move. In the first place, we asked for a legal manifestation. There is enough police (flying squad) present, if they refuse to intervene, then we have the right to defend ourselves physically.” (Respondent 5)

“Personally, I do not visit demonstrations that often, but when I do, I sometimes see things escalate. In my view this never comes from the right-wing, but always from the left-wing corner. My first demonstration was in Nijmegen. They were everywhere, especially demonstrators who demonstrated against [*name of right-wing organization*]. I was there to watch and I saw 150 man [right-wing activists] got attacked by a group who approached the demonstrators in order to use violence.” (Respondent 6)

In addition, the activists perceive a discrepancy between repression of left-wing radical SMOs and right-wing radical SMOs. On the one hand, the activists have the feeling that their actions are more often faced by repression of the government. On the other hand, the activists have the feeling that prohibited or violent behavior by left-wing radical SMOs is more often tolerated by the authorities. Respondent 3 gives an example of this:

“No, it is government. Very easy. The easiest example is of last Monday, where a tunnel was blocked at the Mediapark by anti-Black Peet demonstrators. These people are allowed to stay almost an hour, a non-registered demonstration. The police just admits it too. An hour. The police does not remove them, at a certain moment they [the police] push a little, but no one is arrested. Now we go back. The most beautiful example is always a Powned video, I believe in February 2017, at the Janskerkhof in Utrecht. Where I was standing on an almost empty square, 90 minutes before a demonstration of a counter-party would take place, and I was giving an interview to Powned on that almost empty square. Then, a police van arrives and arrests me, take me with them because I was accused of demonstrating. Not announced, and not registered. That is the application of double standards. It has not happened once, but it happens to me more often.” (Respondent 3)

And also respondent 1 and 6 mention selective behavior on behalf of the police:

“Because when it was the other way around. Try to imagine that right-wing groups would throw things through the windows of those illegal squatters, that is European news, it would be news: an attack on. And now it is the other way around, then those people say: bad luck for them.” (Respondent 1)

“Left, there I see that they are allowed to use so much more violence and such things to be prosecuted. For example the case of the squatted house by We Are Here, that was a group of asylum seekers who squatted several houses. A group of us went there to take a house on their own. The police was watching how activists got attacked. Yes, they [right-wing activists] just got attacked, they [left-wing activists] threw smoke bombs, firework bombs, and, uhh, the police is just watching. None of those boys [left-wing activists] got prosecuted, nothing is done with that, it is all tolerated. At such a moment, I think that they [the police] should not necessarily intervene during a demonstration, but they should prosecute someone when something happens.” (Respondent 6)

Conclusion

Based on the micro-level hypothesis I expected to find that if movement participants have instrumental, identity, and/or ideological motivations to join a radical SMO, then they are more prone to stay involved in the SMO, and are therefore more likely to engage in political violence. This means, I can confirm hypothesis 4 on the basis of my micro-analysis. Primarily, it seems that there are no intentions of using political violence by activists. However, just like expected from the theoretical framework: if activists perceive a situation as threatening, which could be the consequence of intense interactions with counter-movements and/or authorities, political violence could erupt and escalate. In accordance with some of the statements of the respondents, if the activist is threatened or attacked, she will not hesitate to use political violence on her own.

Furthermore, the analysis shows that right-wing radical SMO participants have the feeling that they are not taken seriously, and not treated equally compared with other radical SMOs by the authorities. These feelings of unequal treatment could lead to more intense involvement in the right-wing radical SMO, which could contribute to a more intense perception of inequality and unlawful acting by other actors. This, in turn, could have a negative impact on interactions with counter-movements and authorities, by which political violence could escalate. This analysis shows that instrumental, identity, and ideological motivations are driving activists' involvement in radical SMOs, and because the activists have attractive opportunities for mobilization available to them, it explains their engagement in political violence. More importantly, this analysis shows that a gradual process develops in which the choice for political violence becomes a more legitimate choice when activists get more structurally involved in the radical SMO, and where political violence is the result of intense interactions with counter-movements and authorities.

8. Conclusion and discussion

The aim of this thesis is to generate a better understanding of engagement in political violence by individuals. In order to provide an answer to the general research question I have used existing theoretical insights, derived from Social Movement Theory, and empirically tested the hypotheses with data on a macro-, meso-, and micro-level. In the previous chapters I have presented, and interpreted, the results of this study. In this concluding chapter I will come to a final assessment of my research question. At first, I will summarize the most important outcomes and conclusions with regard to the hypotheses I formulated, and I will reflect on the central research question. Next, I will discuss the theoretical contributions of this thesis, and I will reflect on the cases that I used. In the last part of this conclusion I will formulate some suggestions for further research.

8.1. Summary of research question and findings

The aim of this thesis is to generate a better understanding of the choice for political violence by individuals. To come to a concrete understanding, this thesis tries to answer the following question:

How can the choice for political violence by individuals be explained?

To answer this question, I have used theoretical insights from Social Movement Theory. Whereas other theories on mobilization and political violence do only focus on one level of explanation, SMT provides insights to explore the causal mechanism on a macro-, meso-, and micro-level. Three core concepts provide a basis for individuals to engage in political violence. These are political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations. Political opportunities, in this thesis measured as protest policing, provide structural opportunities to individuals that motivate them to engage in political violence. More repressive, selective, reactive, hard, and dirty police tactics, would make activists prone to engage in political violence during moments of intense interaction. Mobilizing structures, in this thesis measured as the internal and external organizational structure of a SMO, provide organizational opportunities to individuals to engage in political violence. Low levels of a SMO's formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, territorial decentralization, and institutional integration would make SMO-activists more to engage in political violence. Furthermore, intense relations with a SMO's constituency, allies, and opponents would make

activists prone to engage in political violence during moments of intense interactions. Individual motivations, measured as instrumental, ideological, and identity motivations in this thesis, provide personal incentives for individuals to engage in political violence. So, when movement participants have instrumental, identity, and/or ideological motivations to join a radical SMO, then they are prone to stay involved in the SMO, and are therefore more likely to engage in political violence. Based on insights from Social Movement Theory, this thesis approached the following explanatory research question:

To what extent do political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations explain the choice for political violence by individuals?

To answer this question I applied process tracing as a research method, thereby using data triangulation, which allows to use multiple data collection methods and data sources. First I did a mini Protest Event Analysis to generate an overview of the use of political violence in four Western-European countries. After doing the Protest Event Analysis more in-depth case-studies analyses were conducted to provide an explanation of political violence on the macro-, meso-, and micro-level.

On the macro-level findings indicate that: whereas I expected that repressive, selective, reactive, hard, and dirty police tactics make activists prone to engage in political violence during moments of intense interaction, the results of the comparison of the four Western-European countries did not show that. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is disconfirmed on the basis of these results. The discrepancy between my expectation and the results can be explained by the fact that protest policing might not be a good barometer to measure political opportunities in order to explain political violence. However, on the micro-level I did find support for the assumption that protest policing influences activists' strategies. So, maybe protest policing should be measured on another level.

On the meso-level findings indicate that differences in a SMO's internal and external organizational structure do account for the SMO's likeliness to engage in political violence. In the case of PEGIDA and Antifa, the external organizational structure was more or less the same, which made them equally prone to engage in political violence. However, Antifa has lower levels of internal organizational structure, which would make the SMO more prone to engage in political violence. In the event of focus, Antifa initiated political violence. So, the hypotheses that state that internal and external organizational structures have an influence on political violence are supported.

On the micro-level findings indicate that instrumental, identity, and/or ideological motivations do play a role in the explanation of activists' engagement in political violence. The interview data show that activists were not so much concerned with making a cost-benefit analysis before joining a radical SMO. However, the activists all had identity and ideological motivations to join. Once in the movement, all activists perceived instrumental, identity, and ideological costs and benefits. For all the respondents the benefits weigh heavier than the costs, which accounts for their involvement in the movement. Concerning political violence, all respondents acknowledge that there are no intentions to use political violence in advance. However, during moments of intense interactions with counter-movements or authorities, activists show that political violence could erupt and escalate. So, the hypothesis that states that individual motivations influence political violence is supported

Besides the generated findings on the basis of the formulated hypotheses the most important finding is that violence develops in a relational, and emergent way. Relational because the analyses on the macro-, meso-, and micro-level all show that the use of political violence, and its escalation, is the result of intense interactions between activists of opposing radical SMOs and institutional actors (such as the police). Emergent because escalation of political violence could only develop during demonstrations or other critical events of radical SMOs.

8.2. Theoretical contributions

In writing this thesis, I have provided insights that lead to a better understanding of engagement of individuals in political violence. Much of the traditional literature that focuses on political violence does not provide a consistent causal mechanism at a macro-, meso-, and micro-level. Researchers try to explain the phenomenon from only a structural, organizational, or individual perspective, and are therefore unable to explain political violence as a whole. Therefore this thesis used Social Movement Theory to come to an all-encompassing perspective.

The main contribution of this thesis therefore lies in the attempt to provide a causal mechanism that combines insights from the macro-, meso-, and micro-level in order to explain political violence. In doing so, this thesis contributes to SM literature by providing an all-encompassing view of political violence. Besides explaining political violence on the basis of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and individual motivations, this thesis shows the relational, constructivist, and emergent character of political violence. Relational because the

collected data shows that political violence develops, and escalates, during intense interactions between both institutional (the state or the police) and non-institutional (SMOs and counter-SMOs) actors. Constructivist because political violence is not only explained by structural opportunities, but also focuses on the construction of meaning by activists in radical SMOs. Lastly, emergent because the collected data shows that political violence develops gradually during demonstrations or other critical events of radical SMOs.

Furthermore, by approaching political violence from a SM perspective this thesis is situated at the interface of two fields of study, namely political science and sociology. Thereby contributing to political science literature as well as to sociological literature. I contribute to the political science literature by making a comparison of protest handling and its effects on political violence in four different Western-European countries, and because I take a look at different conflictual situations, institutions, and mobilization patterns. I contribute to sociological research by focusing on patterns of social relationships, and social interactions between various actors that are relevant to radical SMOs.

8.3. Reflection on the cases

Despite the theoretical contributions mentioned above, I should also reflect on the cases that I used. The choice for these specific cases might have influenced the final outcomes, and therefore have an influence on the generalizability of the results. In this part I will discuss the influence of the cases on the outcomes of my macro-, meso-, and micro-level analyses.

To start with the cases on the macro-level, it is important to note that protest policing as a barometer for political opportunities turned out not to be a good indicator for measuring political violence. Based on the data of the mini PEA and based on the analysis of protest policing in The Netherlands, the UK, France, and Germany a discrepancy between the hypothesis and the actual results is visible. The choice for a diverse case-study design allowed me to show the full range of variation of protest policing on political violence, and is therefore likely to be representative for the broader population. Table 5 shows that the full range of variation of X_1 is present in the macro-analysis because the UK and France represent, respectively, high and low values of X_1 , and The Netherlands and Germany intermediate levels of X_1 (Gerring, 2008, p651). This makes the results generalizable for the broader population, and therefore it is expected that even when other countries are taken into account in a macro-level analysis of protest policing it will generate the same results as this analysis did. Nonetheless, on the basis of the interviews on the micro-level I did find that protest policing

has an influence on activists' strategies. Therefore, it could still be valuable to extend research to other countries and explore if protest policing, is, or is not, a good barometer to measure political opportunities in order to explain political violence.

On the meso-level I chose for a typical case-study design. The choice for a typical case-study design makes one choose for typical examples of a cross-case relationship, and is therefore, by definition, representative for the broader population (Gerring, 2008, p648). In the theoretical framework I acknowledged that radical SMOs had different internal structures, ideologies, and tactics than moderate SMOs. This would make radical SMOs more prone to political violence than moderate SMOs. I acknowledged that differences in the internal and external organizational structure of a SMO are an explanation for political violence. PEGIDA and Antifa were typical radical SMOs and show that low levels of formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, territorial decentralization, and institutional integration make activists prone to engage in political violence. Furthermore, PEGIDA and Antifa show that intense relations with the constituency, allies, and opponents make activists more prone to engage in political violence. Because of the typicality of the cases I expect that analyses of other radical SMOs, even in other countries, would yield the same results as I did. Therefore, the results are generalizable for the broader population in which PEGIDA and Antifa are situated.

On the micro-level I chose for a least-likely crucial case-study design. As I acknowledged in the methodology chapter of this thesis, this was a risky choice because some researchers find it controversial to explain outcomes on the basis of a critical role of one case (Gerring, 2007b, p232). It is hard to assess representativeness from a least-likely crucial case because if the outcome is not present in the case it will not automatically be not present in other cases. However, presence of an outcome in a least-likely crucial-case would mean that the outcome is definitely present in other cases as well. So, based on this explanation I expect that if I find that individual motivations explain political violence in The Netherlands, it is likely to find the outcome in other countries as well. On the basis of the micro-analysis I found evidence that individual, identity, and/or ideological motivations explain the choice of right-wing activists in The Netherlands to engage in political violence. The fact that The Netherlands is a least-likely crucial-case, makes me to expect that these results are generalizable for the broader population as well.

8.4. Avenues for further research

Several suggestions for further research arise from the results and reflections of this thesis. First of all, one could choose to extend the research project to other geographical and ideological areas. SMT suffers from a geographical concentration on social movements in Europe and the United States (della Porta, 2013, p18; Edelman, 2001, p287). Researchers tend to focus on these specific geographical areas because that is where the theoretical construction of the most important concepts of SMT were developed. Furthermore, SMT suffers from an ideological bias because most studies are focused on traditional left-wing movements (della Porta, 2013, p18). I have tried to overcome ideological concentration by focusing on right-wing activists on the micro-level, and by comparing a left- and right-wing radical SMO on the meso-level. However, my thesis does not form an exception when it concerns the geographical focus. Researchers that want to extend SMT further could focus on other geographical areas where social movements are also likely to explain political violence, think of radical SMOs in Latin-America, Africa, and the Middle-East. Moreover, to overcome the problem of ideological concentration, social movement researchers could focus on ethno-nationalistic SMOs that strive for independence, or on SMOs that are formed on the basis of religious principles.

Another suggestion for further research should be to focus on the role of the media in explaining engagement of SMO-activists in political violence. While activists primarily want to influence policymakers or authorities, they also need to mobilize people and resources in society, in order to accomplish their political goals. To do so, activists could use the media to create a larger audience. During the meso-, and micro-analyses I found examples that the media has an influence on the strategies of a SMO. For example, on the meso-level Antifa feels that she does not generate enough (media)attention for her goals and ideology as she deserves. Therefore, Antifa sometimes breaks with moderate protest forms in order to get nationwide attention. On the micro-level, almost all respondents acknowledged a role of the media concerning framing of the right-wing radical SMO, for example respondent 1 and 3:

“A columnist of the NRC [Dutch newspaper] approaches me. I think ‘oh well’, a columnist, that is alarming anyway, and from the NRC too, they are not wise at all. He creates some sort of poem. Like, Respondent 1, he looked at me with his clear blue eyes. I do not have blue eyes at all. I had a lot of hair, for me. With his short shaved spikes, and yes, he just creates some sort of a fantasy story. If I was there like some sort of wired Aryan in the courtroom.”
(Respondent 1)

“Also on social media I get blocked all the time. In my current Facebook-account one character of my name is omitted. On Twitter I am not allowed anymore, that is an account of my wife. Without me being ever convicted for hate or something alike, and without any complaint for hate or something alike.” (Respondent 3)

Therefore, an suggestion for further research would be to acknowledge the role of the media in explaining the choice for political violence by individuals.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Comprehensive list of keywords

To create the dataset on political violence I made use of electronic keywords search in Lexis Nexis to cover all sorts of newspapers. In order to perform the coding of the newspapers in a consistent way, I made a comprehensive list of keywords for each country. In this appendix one can see what keywords are used for each country.

Keywords used for The Netherlands:

"radicaal links" AND "actie"

"radicaal links" AND "geweld"

"links" AND "geweld"

“antifascisme” AND “geweld”

"antifa" AND "geweld"

"antifascistische aktie" OR "antifascistische actie" OR "anti-fascistische aktie" OR "anti-fascistische actie" AND "geweld"

"antifascistische aktie"

"anti fascistische aktie"

"AFA" AND "geweld"

"antifascisten" AND "geweld"

“antifascisten”

"extreem links"

"links extreem"

"links extremisten"

"krakers" AND "geweld"

“Black Bloc”

"anarchisten"

"radicaal rechts" OR "radicaalrechts" AND "geweld"

"rechts radicaal" OR "rechtsradicaal" AND "geweld"

"radicaal rechts" OR "radicaalrechts"

"rechts extreem" AND "geweld"

"extreem rechts" AND "geweld"

"rechts-extremistisch"

"pegida"
"Rechts in verzet"
"Nederlandse Volksunie"
"NVU"
"Voorpost"
"Identitair Verzet"
"Erkenbrand"
"neonazi"
"stormfront"

Keywords used for the United Kingdom:

"radical left" AND "violence"
"radical left"
"left wing" AND "violence"
"left-wing" OR "left wing" AND "extremism"
"anarchism"
"anarchism" AND "violence"
"anarchist"
"antifascism" OR "anti-fascism" OR "antifa" AND "violence"
"antifascism" OR "anti-fascism" OR "antifa"
"extreme left" OR "extreme-left" AND "violence"
"left-extremism" AND "violence"
"left-wing extremism" OR "left wing extremism" AND "violence"
"left-wing extremism" OR "left wing extremism"
"left-wing extremists" OR "left wing extremists"
"leftist" AND "violence"
"left-wing" OR "left wing" AND "violence"
"Black Block" OR "Black Bloc"
"far left" OR "far-left" AND "violence"
"informal anarchist federation" OR "FAI"

"far right" OR "far-right" AND "violence"
"radical right" OR "radical-right" AND "violence"
"extreme right" OR "extreme-right" AND "violence"

"right extremist" OR "right-extremist" AND "violence"
"right wing" OR "right-wing" AND "violence"
"right wing extremist" OR "right-wing extremist" AND "violence"
"neonazi" OR "neo-nazi" AND "violence"
"Aryan Unity"
"Blood and Honour"
"English Defence League" OR "EDL" AND "violence"
"Racial Volunteer Force"
"Combat 18"
"National Action" AND "violence"
"Britons against Left-Wing Extremism"
"Generation Identity"
"Britain First" AND "violence"
"North West Infidels"

Keywords used for France:

"extrême gauche" AND "violence"
"extrême-gauche" AND "violence"
"anarchisme" AND "violence"
"black block" AND "violence"
"Black Bloc" AND "violence"
"radical gauche" AND "violence"
"anti fascisme" OR "anti-fascisme" AND "violence"
"antifa" AND "violence"
"antifa"
"ultra gauche" OR "ultra-gauche" OR "ultragauche" AND "violence"
"anticapitalistes" AND "violence"
"extrémiste de gauche" AND "violence"
"extrémiste" AND "gauche" AND "violence"
"anarchisme" OR "anarchiste"
"anti fascisme" OR "anti-fascisme"
"Black Block" OR "Black Bloc"

"radical droite" AND "violence"
"radicaldroite" AND "violence"
"extrême droite" OR "extrême-droite" AND "violence"
"droite" AND "extrémiste" AND "violence"
"extrémiste" AND "violence"
"extrémisme" AND "violence"
"skinhead" OR "skinheads" AND "violence"
"skinhead" OR "skinheads"
"ultra droite" OR "ultra-droite" OR "ultradroite" AND "violence"
"d'Action des forces opérationnelles" OR "AFO"
"Volontaires pour la France" OR "VPF"
"Génération Identitaire"
"néonazi" OR "néo-nazi" OR "néo nazi"
"pegida"
"ADSAV" OR "adsav" OR "le parti de l'indépendance Bretonne"
"L'Action Française"
"Blood and Honour"
"extreme droite" AND "violence"

Keywords used for Germany:

"radikal links" OR "radikallinks" OR "radikal-links" AND "gewalt"
"linksradikale" AND "gewalt"
"linksextremistischen" AND "gewalt"
"Linksextremen" AND "gewalt"
"Linksextremisten" AND "gewalt"
"ultra links" OR "ultralinks" OR "ultra-links" AND "gewalt"
"links radikale" AND "gewalt"
"Anarchismus" OR "Anarchisten" AND "gewalt"
"Antifaschismus" OR "Antifascisten" AND "gewalt"
"Antifa" AND "gewalt"
"Antifaschistische Bewegung" AND "gewalt"
"Revolutionären 1 Mai"
"Black Bloc"
"Redical M"

"Rigaerstraße" AND "gewalt"

"Autonomen" AND "gewalt"

"Schwarzer Block" AND "Gewalt"

"radikal rechts" OR "radikal-rechts" OR "radikalrechts" AND "gewalt"

"radikal rechts" OR "radikal-rechts" OR "radikalrechts"

"rechtsextrem" OR "rechtsextremen" AND "gewalt"

"Rechtsextremisten" OR "Rechtsextremistisch" AND "gewalt"

"ultra-rechts" OR "ultrarechts" OR "ultra rechts" AND "gewalt"

"rechtsradikale" OR "rechts radikale" OR "rechts-radikale" AND "gewalt"

"Pegida" AND "gewalt"

"Neonazi" OR "Neo-Nazi" OR "Neo nazi" AND "gewalt"

"Neonazi" OR "Neo-Nazi" OR "Neo nazi"

"Identitäre Bewegung"

"Weisse Wölfe Terrorcrew"

"Gruppe Freital"

"Autonomen Nationalisten"

"Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund"

Appendix 2: Interview guide

From: Klandermans, B. & Mayer, N. (2005). *Extreme right activists in Europe. Through the magnifying glass*. New York: Routledge.

A large part of the interview guide of Klandermans and Mayer (2005) is used, however I made some changes in the questions: I did remove some questions and extended the interview guide with questions about actions, demonstrations and the use of political violence of the right-wing radical SMO.

1. Introduction

As I explained in my interview invitation to you, my thesis focuses on social movements. I would like to gain more knowledge about the motivations and ideas of people who are part of SMOs. Besides that, I am also interested in the group itself, think of the form of the group and particularly in the actions that they undertake, and how they get in touch with other organizations (opposing movements) and authorities. For my thesis I compare left-wing and right-wing organizations in The Netherlands.

2. Becoming a member

Introductory question (**IQ**): You are a member of X (right-wing radical SMO), could you tell me how you became a member of this organizations? (1)

Follow up questions (**FQ**):

Could you tell me a bit more about the first contact you had with this organization? (1a)

Could you tell me when you first got involved in X? (1b)

Probes for:

- Personal contacts or influences (family, friends, parents)
- Situational context (school, work, free time)
- Critical events (personal, political)
- Any readings
- Media.

3. Being a member

IQ: Could you tell me what your activities are in this organization? (2)

Probes for:

- Action repertoire (attending meetings, distributing publications, writing articles or leaflets, visit protests)
- Role in organization (position, responsibilities)
- Level of involvement (time spent).

FQ: Are you satisfied with your role in the organization? (2a)

FQ: Could you tell me about the people you spend time with in the organization? (2b)

Probes for:

- Their role
- Who are they, friends, comrades, fellow activists
- Did you recruit members yourself?

4. Action repertoire

IQ: We just spoke about your activities in the organization, can you tell me a little more about the action repertoire of your organization? (3)

FQ: What is your role during protest events? (3a)

FQ: Why do you attend protest events? (3b)

FQ: What is happening during protest events? (3c)

FQ: Do the protest events sometimes escalate? And if, how come? (3d)

5. Staying a member

IQ: What would you say that are advantages and disadvantages of being a member of X? (4)

Probes for:

- Personal
- Professional
- Social.

FQ: Could you tell me whether you have ever considered leaving? (4a)

FQ: What would you lose if you were to leave? (4b)

6. Ideology

IQ: Could you tell me about the ideas and goals of X? (5)

FQ: Could you tell me which among them are the most important for you? (5a)

FQ: How did you come to adhere to these ideas? (5b)

FQ: Have you always felt that way? (5c)

FQ: What do you think about the political situation in the Netherlands (5d)

FQ: If something could be changed in this country in the future what would you like the most to be changed? (5e)

FQ: Who are the politicians you admire most and who do you despise most? (5f)

7. Identity

IQ: We have been speaking now a long time about your membership in X and many other issues. Could you tell me what it means to you personally to be a member of X? (6)

FQ: What is the effect of your membership on how you see yourself as an individual? (6a)

8. Demographics

Data and place of birth

Date of entry in the organization

Current occupation

Education

Religion

Neighborhood

Last vote

Left-right self-placement

Party one would never vote for

Active membership in other organizations.

Appendix 3: Code book

From: Klandermans, B. & Mayer, N. (2005). *Extreme right activists in Europe. Through the magnifying glass*. New York: Routledge.

The code book is divided into six sections. Each section consists of code families. A code family is represented by one or more key questions (Q). Code families are divided into groups of codes. Codes may be illustrated through examples. The original code book was divided into five sections, I extended the code book with a section about the use of political violence. Furthermore, I made some minor changes concerning the right-wing radical SMOs of focus.

1. Process of socialization

1.1. Interpersonal relations

Different phases in life are coded here. Which supporting factors and barriers do interviewees encounter in the course of their life that relate to what they are doing today as activists? The focus here is on the past of the individual.

Q: In what way did interpersonal relations in the following domains of the interviewee's social life contribute to his or her current activism?

- 1.1.1 Intra-family relations: relations with father, mother, siblings, extended family; leaving home
- 1.1.2 Relations at school: relations with teachers, class-mates, friends and peers
- 1.1.3 Other social relations: dealing with scouts, sport, music, religion
- 1.1.4 Army relations: army, civil service and equivalents
- 1.1.5 Relations at university
- 1.1.6 Professional relations: professional milieu and training
- 1.1.7 Own 'family': partnership, children.

1.2 Political and ideological socialization

Here we focus on agencies and content of socialization: how and why is it transmitted?

Q: What is the content of socialization and through which agencies are values transmitted?

- 1.2.1 Values transmitted through the family: moral, politics and religion; activist habitus
- 1.2.2 Values transmitted through the school
- 1.2.3 Values transmitted through other social groups

- 1.2.4 Values transmitted through army
- 1.2.5 Values transmitted through university
- 1.2.6 Values transmitted through professional milieu
- 1.2.7 Values transmitted through own family
- 1.2.8 Other sources of socialization: libraries, media, newspapers, books.

1.3 Social-psychological explanations

Explanations and justifications given or suggested by interviewees to explain why they became politically active in right-wing radical SMO. Also, elements of social change, mobility and breakdown that could appear in the interviewee's life history presentation.

Q: What explanations does an interviewee give for becoming an activist of a right-wing radical SMO?

- 1.3.1 Injustice frame: any negative pattern enriching feeling of injustice – entitlement, comparison, envies foreigners, deprivation, everybody is against me, being discriminated, discontent, unhappiness, anger; social mobility: downward social mobilization, little man, repression, paradise lost, pessimism
- 1.3.2 Excitement – thrill – pleasure: sensation seeking: positive element; breaking taboo, excitement, something secret, provocation, revolutionary vision, expectation
- 1.3.3 Identity search, affirmation, development.

2. Critical events

Critical events may be looked upon as turning point in someone's life. The effect of the turning point may differ, however. In some cases one event can have a dramatic impact of itself, in other cases accumulation of events can finally lead towards taking the 'last' barrier.

Q: What events did play an important role in becoming a right-wing activist in a radical SMO according to the interviewee?

3. Entry to the organization

This part deals with the moment the interviewee joined the organization.

Q: How does an interviewee get in contact with a right-wing radical SMO for the first time?

3.1 Joining on personal initiative

3.2 Joining on exterior recruitment (networks)

4. Maintenance of commitment

4.1. Structural integration

Q: How much time is spent as an activist?

Q: In what type of activities is the interviewee involved?

Q: What is the position of the interviewee in the organization?

4.1.1. Special events dealing with organization life

4.1.2. Totality of integration: participation in other groups, social networks within the movement and out.

4.2. Psychological meaning

What does it mean to be active? What do people get out of being active? Does it give a sense of fulfilment to be active? Why does it make sense to be active? Does it give – through ideology – meaning to the world? I examine these questions first on a instrumental perspective, second on an identity analysis and finally on an ideological perspective.

4.2.1. Instrumentality

Q: What are the costs and benefits of activism?

4.2.1.1. Material costs: money, time

4.2.1.2. Social costs: friends, social relations, family, occupational, social isolation loss of respect for oneself, careful about discussing political issues

4.2.1.3. Identity costs: stigmatization, moral reprobation, fear; everything affecting self-esteem negatively

4.2.1.4. Material benefits: job, money, etc.

4.2.1.5. Social benefits: friendships, responsibilities

4.2.1.6. Identity benefits: substitute family, sense of fulfilment, overcoming stigmatization, ideological benefits, meaning to the world, pride in being different, affecting self-esteem positively.

4.2.2. Identity

Q: How does interviewee define itself in terms of social categories and groups it belongs to?

Q: What does it mean to be active within the group as an activist?

Evaluation of activity for oneself, importance of activism, emotional bonding to activism.

4.2.2.1. Groups; level of inclusiveness

- Generational (ex. generation of war/generation of economic crisis)
- Gender (ex. man/woman)
- Social (ex. bourgeois/poor)
- Ethnic (ex. white/blacks)
- Cultural (ex. French/US, west/south)
- National (ex. the Dutch/the Turks)
- Religious (ex. atheists/believers, Christians/Muslims)
- Political groups (ex. right/left, PVV/GroenLinks).

4.2.3. Ideology

Q: What norms and values does the interviewee hold?

4.2.3.1. Ideology of right-wing radical SMO: racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, anti-democratic attitude, etc.

4.2.3.2. How the interviewee sees the ideology of the movement and eventual perceived discrepancies

4.2.3.3. Links with past ideologies: does interviewee link or disconnect present and past?

5. Political violence

Q: How does political violence origin and does it develop?

5.1. Starter of political violence according to interviewee

5.2. Is political violence used on purpose according to the interviewee

5.3. Role police

5.4. Role government/authorities

Q: How does the interviewee think about political violence?

5.5. Argumentation of oneself

5.6. Argumentation on behalf of the organization

6. Exit

Q: Did the interviewee ever consider quitting activism?

6.1. Physical, actual exit

6.2. Psychological exit

6.3. Costs and benefits of disengagement

6.3.1. Material costs

6.3.2. Social costs

6.3.3. Identity costs

6.3.4. Material benefits

6.3.5. Social benefits

6.3.6. Identity benefits.