



Transboundary Crisis and European Unity

Discourse analysis of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy
in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict

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Abstract

Impactful events such as Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic increased the call for more strategic autonomy in the European Union (EU). Not every member state was interested in contributing to international cooperation because of their own interests. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and posed a security threat to Europe, the question arose whether this crisis would change the sentiment and would lead to an increase in international cooperation within the Union. The literature is divided on the topic and does not provide a clear answer. By conducting a discourse analysis on the annual implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy of 2021 and 2022, I analyse whether Russia's invasion of Ukraine has changed the discourse on cooperation. I found convincing evidence that the discourse on cooperation became more positive. A change in discourse does not inevitably mean a change in behaviour. However, the annual implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy reports on accomplished, ongoing and upcoming activities which overcomes this problem. Therefore, in this research, we assume that a positive change in discourse on cooperation after Russia's invasion leads to an increase in international cooperation after Russia's invasion. More research is needed to give insights into member states' individual stances and develop the existing literature further. Nevertheless, this thesis demonstrates that a transboundary crisis leads to increased international cooperation.

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List of abbreviations

AFET	<i>The Committee on Foreign Affairs</i>
CFSP	<i>Common Foreign Security Policy</i>
CSDP	<i>Common Security and Defence Policy</i>
EEAS	<i>European External Action Service</i>
ESA	<i>European Strategic Autonomy</i>
EP	<i>European Parliament</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
EU-SA	<i>European Union – Strategic Autonomy</i>
NATO	<i>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</i>
OSA	<i>Open Strategic Autonomy</i>
PESCO	<i>Permanent Structured Cooperation</i>
SEDE	<i>Subcommittee on Security and Defence</i>
UN	<i>United Nations</i>
USA	<i>United States of America</i>
VP/HR	<i>Vice-President of the European Commission / the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</i>
WPR	<i>What is the Problem Represented to be?</i>

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Chapter 1. Introduction

A changing international political environment and several crises pressure the European Union (EU) to increase “the capacity [...] to act autonomously – that is, without being dependent on other countries – in strategically important policy areas” (Zandee et al., 2020). To put it differently, the EU needs to become more strategically autonomous to be more resilient against external crises and changing political dynamics (Zandee et al., 2020). However, not every member state is willing to contribute to a more strategic autonomous Europe, because of their own interests (Van Hooft & Wagner, 2022). After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this threat of crisis and the call for more cooperation within the Union became even more real. The question now is whether a transboundary crisis that affects the security of the European Union as a whole positively changes the willingness of states to cooperate and thus leads to an increase in international cooperation. Even though the literature is divided on the topic, this research finds convincing evidence that answers this question positively.

The first time ‘strategic autonomy’ was mentioned as a concept in an official EU document was in the European Council conclusions on EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2013 (European Council, 2013). Since then, many events such as the Trump Presidency, Brexit, China’s growing influence, the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contributed to the increasing importance of strategic autonomy for Europe. While strategic autonomy mainly concerned security and defence matters, the domains in which strategic autonomy is applied expanded due to several events (Damen, 2022).

Despite calls from the Union for more strategic autonomy, the member states are divided on the issue and their willingness to contribute to the different policy areas. France, for instance, is a strong supporter of strategic autonomy, especially on defence matters. For them, it is a security insurance in case the United States of America withdraws from Europe as military support. In contrast, Poland is very sceptical about a strategic defence policy for Europe. They see NATO, with the USA as the central player, as the only guarantee of protection against the Russian threat (Van Hooft & Wagner, 2022). As part of the strategic autonomy policy, the European Union developed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP is a policy framework of the European Union through which member states can “address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens, and strengthen international peace and security” (Krentz, 2024). According to the European Union, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the process of creating a European Union defence union (Krentz, 2024). However, the different opinions of the member states on more strategic autonomy in defence, raise questions as to whether member states want more cooperation within the Union. Because of the

different interests, it is difficult to determine whether a crisis, that causes the call for more strategic autonomy, does or does not create more unification and cooperation within the European Union.

Scholars share different views on the relationship between crisis and cooperation. Mancur Olson's (Sandler, 2015) *Collective Action Theory* argues that rational egoism undermines collaboration between a group of individuals or states, that is needed to provide a public good. If states who did not contribute can consume a certain public good in the same quantity as those who helped produce the good, a state is not motivated to contribute efforts or resources themselves and will always put its own interests first. This phenomenon is known as the 'free rider' logic. According to *Collective Action Theory* collaboration is unlikely unless it is strictly enforced, even in times of crisis (Sandler, 2015; Lowery, 2016). According to *Liberal Institutionalism* international cooperation is desirable (Keohane, 1984). A crucial role is described to international institutions in facilitating cooperation and overcoming the collective action problems raised by Olsen. International institutions provide information, coordination and enforcement. Features states cannot provide on the international level (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). *Transboundary Crisis Management* literature argues that longstanding social and political divisions are not suddenly easily overcome in times of crisis. However, international cooperation is possible if certain conditions are met (Blondin & Boin, 2020).

The relationship between crisis and international led to extensive debate in the field. As already became clear from the theories mentioned above, researchers are not unequivocal about what the relationship between the two variables is. *Transboundary Crisis Management* is a relatively new development and adds an interesting dimension to the theoretical framework. To test the relationship between a transboundary crisis and international cooperation within the European Union in the case of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a discourse analysis is conducted on two annual implementation documents on Common Security and Defence Policy. One from the year before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and one from the year of the invasion. The overall research question this research aims to answer is the following:

How did the discourse on cooperation in the annual implementation of Common Security and Defence Policy in the European Parliament change after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022?

The Russian-Ukrainian war is used in this research as a case for two reasons: Firstly, the Russian-Ukrainian war is one of the most important recent crises which has led to the call for more strategic autonomy in the European Union. Currently, the EU remains reliant on the United States for defence. However, recent years have shown that the US is not always a dependable partner. If it is necessary to

stand up against Russia, Europe needs to be able to defend itself (Damen, 2022). Secondly, the Union is directly threatened by the war. The Russian-Ukrainian war is a close-to-home crisis, directly affecting the safety of the European Union. The Union wants to protect its member states and citizens against the Russian aggressor.

A change in discourse is not equal to a change in behaviour. However, analysing discourse and comparing texts over time can highlight shifts in rhetoric that accompany changes in cooperative behaviour. This helps identify early signs of change in attitude towards cooperation. Furthermore, discourse analysis can expose underlying power dynamics, reveal who is driving the discourse, and how this is implemented in cooperative initiatives.

1.1 Societal relevance

As mentioned above, the Russian-Ukrainian war is a crisis that affects the European Union and its citizens directly. The war has had an impact on for example the EU economy (Liadze et al., 2022). Russia denies plans to attack EU member states, however, the fear that this will happen is nevertheless present among European citizens (NOS, 2024). This study identifies how cooperative the European Union's response is to a crisis such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A cooperative response will increase the feeling of safety among citizens.

Furthermore, the recent elections for the European Parliament have raised awareness of current European issues. This research gives insight to European citizens into the change in discourse on cooperation in the field of security after Russia's invasion. People can decide for themselves how important security is with a war raging on the continent and conclude if they are satisfied with the status quo of the cooperation within the EU concerning this crisis. This gives them insights into what is important for them and if they feel represented by the parliament.

1.2 Scientific relevance

The scientific relevance of this research is twofold. Firstly, this research aims to contribute to studies on the effect of crisis on international cooperation. The effect of crisis on cooperation has been studied by various scholars, however they remain divided on the topic. *Collective Action Theory* argues that international cooperation is not likely due to the egoistic nature of states, even in times of crisis (Lowery, 2016). *Liberal Institutionalism* claims that international cooperation is feasible, especially in times of crisis (Keohane, 1984). *Transboundary Crisis Management* adds that international cooperation

is possible in times of crisis if certain barriers are overcome (Blondin & Boin, 2020). This research bridges the theories and adds a valuable case study to the developing field.

Secondly, this research aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on European Strategic Autonomy. The examination of the EU's response to Russia's invasion through the theoretical lenses provides a deeper understanding of how crises influence the pursuit of greater strategic autonomy.

1.3 Structure of the chapters

This thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter will start with an overview of the relevant literature on strategic autonomy and Common Security and Defence Policy and the theoretic framework. The third chapter discusses the research design, including methodology and data. It explains the choices made for a discourse analysis and describes the case selection. The fourth chapter contains the results of the discourse analysis. The fifth chapter discusses how the results contribute to the theoretical framework. In the last chapter, the research question will be answered.

Chapter 2. Theories on Crisis and Cooperation

This chapter provides an overview of the scientific literature on the relationship between crisis and international cooperation. Firstly, *Collective Action Theory* and *Liberal Institutionalism* are discussed. These are two early and fundamental studies on international cooperation in times of crisis that reflect the main stances in the debate; academics that believe international crisis leads to more international cooperation and those that do not believe that international crisis leads to more international cooperation. Secondly, the chapter will explore the more recent developments in *Transboundary Crisis Management* within the fields of political science and conflict studies. This includes an analysis of the theory itself and its conjunction with *Collective Action Theory*. Thirdly, the two expectations for this research that flow from these theories will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

2.1 Collective Action Theory

The American economist Mancur Olson was the first to write about *Collective Action Theory* in his book *The Logic of Collective Action* in 1965 (Lowery, 2016).¹ This theory suggests that effectively providing a public good within a group of individuals or actors, such as states, is challenging because each participant has an incentive to 'free-ride'. Free-riding in this context refers to benefitting from the contributions of others without making any contribution. A public good is non-rivalrous, non-exclusive and commonly supplied to users (Lulofs, 1978). With this theory, Olson responds to the pluralist view on *Collective Action*. The pluralist core assumption is that participation and individuals joining organisations to secure common goals is natural. Olson rejects this (Lowery, 2016; Heckelman & Coates, 2003). Olson is a rationalist and therefore focuses on knowledge and reason. He argues that rational individualists would do nothing to secure collective goods if they were to be asked to join an organisation because they can profit from new policies whether they contribute or not (Lowery, 2016). This is a rational decision based on self-interest undermining the prospect of collaboration (Blondin & Boin, 2020; Heckelman & Coates, 2003).

However, Olson describes three reasons why smaller groups are likely to overcome free-riding. Firstly, in a smaller group, the benefit of every individual is bigger. The interests of the participants are more homogeneous and therefore collective action is perceived as beneficial for everyone. Secondly, free-riding is least attractive to small groups pursuing large interests. The share of each actor is at its biggest in that situation but the visibility of individual contributions is also bigger. The larger the share, the smaller the possibility of free-riding because of peer pressure. Thirdly, the organisational costs are lower in a smaller group. A group with fewer members means that there are fewer communication

¹ I was unable to access Olson's original work. Therefore, I refer to Lowery and not Olson.

and decision-making costs. Cooperation in a smaller group is thus cheaper. These factors combined reduce the urge for individuals or states to free-ride and are more likely to provide successful collective action. (Lowery, 2016).

In solving the free-riding problem, Olson assigns a crucial role to the state. He argues that the state acts as the primary agent responsible for producing and maintaining collective goods. The state must remove the contradictions between individual rationality and collective rationality by enforcing collective rationality (Lowery, 2016). Collective action is seen as a unique challenge on the international level because of the absence of an authority that can take on the role of the state in securing the development and maintenance of public goods. Cooperation is very unlikely unless it is either heavily incentivized or strictly enforced. Researchers applying Olson's theory to fields like International Relations (Oneal, 1990), regional and EU integration (Grugel, 2006), global public goods provision (Barrett, 2015), and common-pool resource management (Ostrom, 1990) have identified two main barriers to collective action on the international level. The first barrier is the lack of shared interests or mutual preferences necessary for joint action. The second barrier, even when national interests align, involves difficulties in enforcing and coordinating public goods (Blondin & Boin, 2020).

What is not been addressed by Olson and other *Collective Action* theorists, are the challenges of collaboration that emerge in times of crisis. In their article, Blondin and Boin (2020) argue that combining *Collective Action Theory* and *Transboundary Crisis Management* could provide this. This chapter will elaborate on *Transboundary Crisis Management* and the combination of *Transboundary Crisis Management* with *Collective Action Theory* later.

2.2 Liberal Institutionalism

In contrast to *Collective Action Theory*, liberal institutionalist Robert Keohane (1984) argues that global cooperation is desirable and highly feasible. In his book *After Hegemony* (1984) Keohane outlines a situation in which a hegemonic power is absent in the international field. Until that moment, realist scholars argued that the most powerful nation-states dominated world politics as hegemons (Johnson & Heiss, 2018). Without a hegemon, Keohane ascribes a crucial role to international institutions in facilitating cooperation between states because they can provide benefits that states cannot such as information, coordination and enforcement (Keohane, 1988, 1984; Johnson & Heiss, 2018). Those benefits also help to overcome the collective action problems raised by Olson (Lowery, 2016) and provide solutions for the barriers scholars identified for collective action on the international level (Blondin & Boin, 2020). The interdependence of states makes international policy coordination important for establishing cooperation. Actors can adjust their behaviour to coordinated policy and

therefore improve cooperation. However, Keohane also admits that international cooperation is not easy to establish (Keohane, 1982).

The book *After Hegemony* (1984) not only is a response to realist scholars with a focus on hegemonic powers, but Keohane also reflects on his own work. He developed the *Hegemonic Stability Theory* (Keohane, 1980) which argues that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single nation-state is the dominant world power or hegemon. To put it differently, power should be concentrated in one dominant state to develop strong regimes, because fragmentation of power will lead to regime collapse (Keohane, 1982). He rebuts this theory in *After Hegemony* (1984) because the *Hegemonic Stability Theory* does not explain the lack of change in power structures he observed after a change in international regimes. Furthermore, Keohane wants to examine what happens with cooperation if a hegemon is absent. He has observed this in a post-World War II era in which international cooperation increases without a clear hegemon being present. By including a supply-demand framework, Keohane argued that the *Hegemonic Stability Theory* focuses too much on the ability of a hegemon to create regimes (the supply side). *Liberal Institutionalism* therefore focuses more on the reasons why states seek international cooperation (the demand side) (Keohane, 1982). Institutions are better able to facilitate cooperation than states because they create an environment where cooperation is easier, more predictable and less risky. The following paragraphs will elaborate on how institutions establish this. Therefore, *Liberal Institutionalism* can overcome collective action problems containing states that do not contribute to a collective good if the benefits of contribution are worth less than the costs of contributing (Lowery, 2016).

States are more likely to cooperate if there is a mutuality of interest (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). Institutions create shared interests and align them among states (Keohane, 1984). This can result in for example an international convention on climate, which was the case with the Paris Agreements. However, the withdrawal of the United States under the Trump administration (BBC News, 2020) and the re-joining of the USA under the Biden administration (BBC News, 2021) shows one of the pitfalls of Liberal Institutionalism; it is dependent on the willingness of states to cooperate (Mearsheimer, 1995).

Furthermore, institutions establish norms and rules that cause a predictable pattern of behaviour. Influence on and consent to these norms and rules ensures that states feel committed to abiding by the rules. The predictability of behaviour also makes sure that cooperation becomes more effective in the long run, as states know they are engaging with like-minded people (Keohane, 1982). An example of this is the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations (UN). These Goals were set up in

2015 to provide norms for the behaviour of member states of the UN towards development subjects like poverty, gender equality and education. The member states agreed to keep the goals in effect until 2023, which shows their long-term commitment (United Nations, n.d.).

In line with this, institutions create repeated interaction between states which leads to long-term relationships and increases trust among member states. Trust is important for the establishment of durable international cooperation. The provision of information and transparency among members of institutions reduces mistrust and makes cooperation less risky (Keohane, 1982). The European Union is an example of an international institution which created repeated interactions that led to long-term relationships. The development of the European Coal and Steel Community and later the European Union was living proof to many liberal institutionalists of their theory. However, realists continued to question the importance of institutions (Johnson & Heiss, 2018). Even though liberal institutionalists acknowledge anarchy, the inhibiting effects on state cooperation are underestimated according to realists. They believe states will fixate on relative gains rather than absolute gains. A state will refuse participation in cooperation if another state obtains more benefit than the state itself. This makes sustainable cooperation difficult. Furthermore, realists argue that powerful states use international institutions for their own interests rather than creating a level playing field for all states. Especially in critical policy fields like security, realists argue that states will act in their own interest regardless of institutional rules or norms (Gierco, 1988).

Concerning conflict, Keohane views cooperation as a response to conflict or potential conflict, rather than a situation in which conflict is absent. He even argues that without conflict there is no need to cooperate. There is also a conflict if the policies of different countries do not align (Keohane, 1984). For example, if countries have different policies on reducing air pollution emissions, cooperation is needed to align the policies and tackle the air pollution emissions problem. In the case all countries have the same policy on air pollution emissions, they can carry on without the need to work together with other countries.

All in all, liberal institutionalists are positive about international cooperation in times of crisis. Not only is cooperation feasible and desirable, but cooperation would not be necessary if there would not be a potential conflict. According to liberal institutionalists, institutions overcome collective action problems and the barriers identified for collective action on the international level by lowering transaction costs, aligning shared interests and enforcements, establishing norms and rules, and establishing long-term relationships.

Now that this chapter has laid a foundation for *Collective Action Theory* and *Liberal Institutionalism*, it will elaborate on what a transboundary crisis is and how the developing theory of *Transboundary Crisis Management* complements *Collective Action Theory* and *Liberal Institutionalism* and its stances on international cooperation.

2.3 Transboundary Crisis Management

A crisis is an event with a great deal of uncertainty, which is a serious threat to a system and requires a quick response. Crises exist within all levels of society, in every country and on small and large scales (Rosenthal et al., 2001). *Transboundary Crisis Management* describes a specific type of crisis. Boin (2020) describes a transboundary crisis based on five characteristics:

- 1) *Multiple domains, multiple manifestations*. A transboundary crisis exceeds boundaries. Country boundaries, policy areas, cultural boundaries, public-private divisions and so on. It is not possible to organise at one centre point, policy area or geographical location. This leads to different perspectives. What a problem is for some, could be a solution for others.
- 2) *Incubation and rapid escalation*. The crisis simmers for a while under the surface and escalates in response to an event. For the majority of people, it feels like the crisis comes out of nowhere.
- 3) *Hard to chart*. Causes are difficult to understand when the crisis arises in another country or sector. In the aftermath of a crisis, it often becomes clear what happened and what measures should have been taken. During a crisis, it is extremely difficult to trace causes and to foresee consequences and possible escalations.
- 4) *Multiple actors, conflicting responsibilities*. Because of its cross-boundary character, the transboundary crisis does not fit within a defined domain. Therefore, it lacks a division among all involved actors of tasks and responsibilities. Organisational boundaries need to be redefined to facilitate an effective response.
- 5) *No ready-made solutions*. Most policy issues are provided with possible solutions, and if not, at least it is clear what the points of discussion are. In the case of a transboundary crisis, it often is not so clear and defies easy or conventional solutions.

Contemporary examples of transboundary crises are the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic crisis of 2008, the European migration and humanitarian crisis in 2015, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Transboundary Crisis Management, like *Collective Action Theory*, is sceptical about collaboration in times of crisis, but for a different reason. *Collective Action Theory* argues that international cooperation is unlikely due to differences between states' preferences, state egoism, and a lack of common ground

between states. *Transboundary Crisis Management* speaks against the idea that a transboundary crisis will dissolve long-standing social and political divisions between states. They acknowledge that it is increasingly difficult for states to combat transboundary crises independently. Effective management of transboundary crises requires international cooperation. However, history shows that this needed cooperation is not always forthcoming (Blondin & Boin, 2020). The European Union for example responded collectively to the financial crisis of 2008, which was a highly complex crisis (Parsons & Matthijs, 2015). However, the EU's response to the migration crisis in 2015 was not that cooperative. Decisions were made in an ad hoc manner and on a national level, leaving neighbouring countries fending themselves. The decision that was made on a European level related to the redistribution of refugees, had implementation problems (Blondin & Boin, 2020).

2.4 Collective Action in the Face of Transboundary Crises

Blondin and Boin (2020) combined the *Collective Action Theory* and *Transboundary Crisis Management* to examine eight factors that explain conditions that influence the necessity and nature of a joint crisis response and factors facilitating the implementation of a joint crisis response. These factors help to explain why international cooperation during transboundary crises does or does not happen. Their entry point is that cooperation between states during a transboundary crisis is unlikely but not impossible. For cooperation three barriers need to be overcome:

- 1) States must accept the necessity of international cooperation in the face of a transboundary crisis
- 2) States must agree to cooperation
- 3) States must jointly implement the agreed-upon strategy

The first two barriers are focused on whether actors within a state can agree to cooperation. The politicization of a crisis in a state, the amount of exposure to a crisis, mutual trust between states and the possibility of crisis decoupling are the factors that indicate if it is likely to overcome these first two barriers (Blondin & Boin, 2020). First of all, politicization. If a crisis triggers political debate in a country, it is harder for national leaders to agree on international cooperation. Cooperation in times of crisis can easily become politicized (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). For example, when Greece in 2015 had financial problems and needed financial support from other EU countries, not every member state was willing to put money into the collective fund, because it triggered a debate at home and endangered the position of national politicians (Pardijs, 2015). Low politicization of a certain crisis increases the possibility of cooperation. Secondly, exposure to a crisis. Similar harm from a crisis and even benefits from joint action make states more willing to cooperate. Less or no exposure and uneven benefits lead

to different interests and thus complicate cooperation. Equal exposure to a crisis does not necessarily mean that all states are harmed the same way. This too complicates cooperation due to different perceptions of the threat or its consequences (Blondin & Boin, 2020). An example of this is the migration crisis in Europe in which the southern European countries were affected in different ways than the northern European countries. Member states put forward their national interests during the effort to create a joint migration policy which delayed the process and complicated the matter extensively (Benková, 2017). Thirdly, mutual trust between states. Repeated interaction between states can establish mutual norms and conventions, and lead to institutional structures that deal with known risks. This leads to more trust between states and fosters cooperation. Liberal institutionalists also mention this as a factor contributing to international cooperation. Increased trust between states makes international cooperation more likely. Lastly, the possibility of decoupling from a crisis. The urge to cooperate is partly caused by the fact that a state cannot ignore the crisis. If the opportunity exists to de-couple from a crisis or to limit its exposure, then states will be less inclined to cooperate. The risk of de-coupling depends on the type of crisis and whether non-cooperation is cheaper than cooperation. States can for example close borders to migration flows, but you cannot close the airspace for air pollution from your neighbouring country. A country's choice to decouple is also shaped by previous decisions and sunk costs. If the costs of decoupling are too high or decoupling is practically infeasible, cooperation is perceived as necessary. If the level of integration between countries is higher, it raises the costs of non-cooperation for a country (Blondin & Boin, 2020).

	Overcome barriers 1 and 2, and increase likelihood of international cooperation	Does not overcome barriers 1 and 2, and decrease likelihood of international cooperation
Politicization	Less politicization of a crisis on the national level	More politicization of a crisis on the national level
Exposure to crisis	Equal exposure and harm to a crisis	Unequal or no exposure to a crisis
Mutual trust between states	More trust and repeated interaction	Less trust and occasional interaction
Possibility to decouple	Decoupling is complicated or impossible and decoupling costs are high	Decoupling is possible and decoupling costs are lower than cooperation costs

Table 1 - Overview of factors to overcome barriers 1 and 2. Source: Blondin & Boin, 2020

The third barrier focuses on the common ground of a set of states to cooperate. *Transboundary Crisis Management* bases this on the 'defection problem' introduced by Olson; even when there is sufficient common ground for cooperation, there is still a chance that actors do not implement their ideas into actual cooperation (Lowery, 2016). This also relates to the broader question of *Transboundary Crisis*

Management; why states sometimes do and do not cooperate. The factors that make overcoming this last barrier more likely are the number of actors, the availability of coordination mechanisms, the feasibility of solutions and the kind of leadership.

Firstly, the number of actors. Similar to *Collective Action Theory*, *Transboundary Crisis Management* suggests that a smaller number of actors increases the likelihood of international cooperation. In larger groups, it is more difficult and more costly to coordinate behaviour. Crisis management structures and cultures can differ distinctly between countries and lead to different approaches and practices. This makes transboundary crisis cooperation less likely (Kuipers et al., 2015; Boin & Bynander, 2014). Therefore, smaller groups are more likely to cooperate internationally. Secondly, coordination mechanism on the international level. The national authority that mitigates the free-rider problem described by Olson and facilitates cooperation, is absent at the international level. *Transboundary Crisis Management* argues that cooperation is more likely when it is facilitated rather than forced or directed. International organisations can take this role on the international level. Available organisational capacity makes international cooperation more likely in times of crisis (Blondin & Boin, 2020). Thirdly, the feasibility of solutions. *Transboundary Crisis Management* argues that the more feasible and precise solution is available in times of crisis, the more likely a joint response is. Vague, broad or multiple response options could lead to polarisation on different possibilities or interpretations (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). It depends on the type of crisis if a clear-cut solution is available. ‘Known’ crises such as a financial crisis are more likely to have an existing crisis plan than ‘unknown’ crises. Lastly, the kind of leadership. If states agree on international cooperation, the right leadership bridges the gap between intention and action. What the specifics of the ‘right’ leadership are, is not defined by transboundary crisis scholars but it at least needs to be a “trusted and experienced leader facilitating the implementation of transboundary crisis cooperation” (Blondin & Boin, 2020, p.206).

	Overcome barrier 3, and increase likeliness of international cooperation	Does not overcome barrier 3, and decrease likeliness of international cooperation
Number of actors	Smaller groups of states	Bigger groups of states
Coordination mechanisms	Facilitated cooperation by international organisation	Forced cooperation and no international organisation
Feasibility of solutions	Feasible and precise solution to crisis	Vague, broad and multiple response options to crisis
Leadership	Trusted and experienced leader facilitating cooperation	No international leadership

Table 2 - Overview of factors to overcome barrier 3. Source: Blondin & Boin, 2020

2.5 Expectations

This chapter shows the academic debate around the relationship between crisis and international cooperation. *Collective Action Theory* argues that international cooperation in times of crisis is not likely. The state plays a crucial role in overcoming the free-rider problem in times of cooperation and there is no equivalent of the state on the international level. The self-interest of states undermines cooperation. Small groups, however, could overcome the free-rider problem. Collective action theorists do not specifically address cooperation in times of crisis but in general, cooperation is very unlikely unless it is either incentivized or enforced.

In direct opposition to this, liberal institutionalists proclaim that international cooperation is feasible and desirable. International institutions play a crucial role in this and help overcome the collective action problems raised by collective action theorists. What contributes to overcoming these problems is repeated interaction, created norms and rules, and mutual interests. Liberal institutionalists believe that without possible conflict cooperation is not needed, therefore they are very positive about international cooperation in times of crisis.

Transboundary Crisis Management acknowledges that international cooperation is more and more needed to overcome certain crises. However, practice has proven that cooperation does not always happen, even when it is needed. Therefore, *Transboundary Crisis Management* theorists are sceptical about cooperation but also identify conditions that make cooperation more likely. It shows similarities with both *Collective Action Theory* and *Liberal Institutionalism*.

As mentioned by *Transboundary Crisis Management*, international cooperation does not always happen in times of crisis even when it is necessary or wanted by states. The academic debate does not provide an answer to the question of why this happens. This case study adds a small piece of information to unravel the systematic of international cooperation in times of crisis and the role of an international institution in this.

In this research, the question is whether the Russia-Ukraine war led to a change in discourse on cooperation within the European Union, and to an increase in cooperation itself. A positive change in discourse on cooperation does not imply that discourse leads to action. However, the annual implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy includes completed, ongoing and future events and therefore we cautiously assume in the case of this research that a positive change in discourse leads to an increase in international cooperation. Based on the literature this research expects either 1) a change in discourse and an increase in international cooperation after Russia's

invasion of Ukraine, or 2) no change in discourse and no increase in cooperation. The first expectation can be explained by *Liberal Institutionalism* and the conditions *Transboundary Crisis Management* provides for the possibility of cooperation. The European Union is an international institution with created norms and rules and repeated interaction, but this research has to point out whether states have mutual interests or if the EU has not overcome the free-riding problems in times of this crisis. If the latter is true, it is more likely to find evidence for the second expectation. This will be tested by looking at the difference between the discourse used in the annual implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy just before Russia's invasion of Ukraine and after, and at the concrete problems, strategies and solutions provided by these documents. For example, addressing a specific country could be a sign of group pressure to avoid free-riding. Providing clear solutions could fit with one of the conditions of *Transboundary Crisis Management*. Chapter 3 will provide an overview of the specific methodology.

Chapter 3. Methodology

This chapter addresses the methodology that is used to answer the research question: *How did the discourse on cooperation in the annual implementation of Common Security and Defence Policy in the European Parliament change after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022?*

To place the Common Security and Defence Policy in context, the first part of this chapter will provide some background information on strategic autonomy, the development of strategic autonomy within the European Union, the meaning and development of the Common Security and Defence Policy within the European Union, and the decision making on the Common Security and Defence Policy. Then, the choices made for the cases are discussed, namely Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the use of the annual report of the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Secondly, the research design is discussed, which explains the choice for a qualitative discourse analysis and the use of the What is the Problem Represented to be? (WPR) -approach. Thirdly, the operationalisation, coding and Atlas.ti as a coding program are discussed.

3.1 Case selection

3.1.1 Strategic autonomy

In the field of political science, there is a lot of debate around the meaning of the concept 'strategic autonomy' and the context in which it is used. To define what 'strategic autonomy' means in the context of this thesis, it is important to have a somewhat broader background of the academic debate and the meaning of the concept in and outside of the European Union.

Firstly, if the concept is defined at all by an author, there is no solid definition of the term in the overall academic debate (Lippert et al. 2019). The literal meanings of the words 'strategic' and 'autonomy' are described by the Cambridge Dictionary as respectively "relating to the way in which an organisation, country, etc. decides what it wants to achieve and plans actions and use of resources over time to do this" (Cambridge Dictionary, z.d.b) and "the right of an organisation, country, or region to be independent and govern itself" (Cambridge Dictionary, z.d.a). These are very broad definitions and it is therefore not surprising that researchers' definitions are quite varied and sometimes vague. For example, Monsonis (2010) describes 'strategic autonomy' as "a policy aiming at gaining or preserving a large degree of independence in fields identified as strategic". Brustlein (2018) does not give a concrete definition but sketches that "being able to decide upon, and to control at least in part, one's own fate" and "not something absolute" should be part of the outline. To further complicate matters, different actors within the EU do not only use different definitions but also interchangeable terms for 'strategic autonomy'. Including Open Strategic Autonomy (OSA), European sovereignty, EU-SA,

European strategic autonomy (ESA), and strategic independence (Damen, 2022; Zandee et al., 2020). Again, these concepts are not all defined in the same way, but they essentially boil down to the same thing. This thesis will stick to the terms ‘strategic autonomy’ or ‘European strategic autonomy’.

Secondly, the definition of the concept varies across countries, policy fields, governance levels and institutions. Some scholars argue that strategic autonomy should be focused on foreign policy, while others assert it should be about domestic policy. This is clearly illustrated in the next quotes related to strategic autonomy in the European Union (EU). Lippert et al. (2019) state that strategic autonomy is “the ability to set one’s own priorities and make one’s own decisions in matters of foreign policy and security”, while Broeders et al. (2023) argue that for an actor as the EU “strategic autonomy is more likely in policies built on the community method, whilst strategic cacophony is more of a risk in the foreign policy domain”. Helwig & Sinkkonen (2022) draw the definition even wider in terms of policy areas: “Strategic autonomy is a prominent framework through which policy-makers discuss the EU’s response to global challenges”.

Although a lot of scientific research around ‘strategic autonomy’ has been done in relation to the European Union, the concept is not *just* European or intertwined with the EU. In fact, the concept has a long history and has been on the agendas of states around the world, for example, to enhance dependency on their former dominators (Kutlay & Önis, 2021). Currently, emerging powers such as India (Monsonis, 2010) or countries on the European continent that are not members of the EU such as Turkey (Kutlay & Önis, 2021) have their own reasons to develop as more strategic autonomous countries. Furthermore, the ‘America First’ – movement instigated by the former president of the United States, Donald Trump - can also be seen as a form of strategic autonomy (Damen, 2022). The development of ‘strategic autonomy’ in several parts of the world adds an interesting geopolitical dimension to the debate because of shifting power dynamics and changing alliances and partnerships. Nevertheless, this will not be discussed in this thesis. This research will only focus on strategic autonomy within the European Union, specifically the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Although ‘strategic autonomy’ is a broad concept that can be defined and used in different ways, there is a common thread in all the concepts of what components of ‘strategic autonomy’ should be at its core. “Being independence” (Lippert et al., 2019), “make one’s own decision” (Monsonis, 2010) and “Being able to decide upon, [...] one’s own fate” (Brustlein, 2018) all point to a form of self-control and independence. The general idea is that an actor, Europe in this case, needs to be able to take care of himself (Zandee et al., 2020).

Different definitions of the concept of 'strategic autonomy' also persist within the European Union. In this thesis, we will therefore use a definition of the Strategic Foresight and Capabilities Unit of the European Commission as the leading principle. This unit is in charge of policymaking around strategic autonomy within the European Union. They define strategic autonomy as "the capacity of the EU to act autonomously – that is, without being dependent on other countries – in strategically important policy areas. These can range from defence policy to the economy, and the capacity to uphold democratic values" (Damen, 2022). The first part of the definition – "the capacity of the EU to act autonomously – that is, without being dependent on other countries" – implies that the EU needs to be able to act without being dependent on other countries, but not that the relation to countries outside of the EU should be cut off. The second part of the definition – "in strategically important policy areas" – implies that the emphasis is not on the type of policy area, foreign or domestic, but on the strategic importance for Europe.

3.1.2 Development of strategic autonomy within the European Union

Strategic autonomy within the European Union did not develop in a vacuum. Although suggestions for a more strategic autonomous Europe have been made before, 'strategic autonomy' was mentioned in an official EU document for the first time in December 2013 (Damen, 2022). It was named in the conclusions of a European Council meeting about EU Common Security and Defence Policy (European Council, 2013). From that moment, strategic autonomy occurred regularly in Council Conclusions and other documents, always in relation to security and defence.

Over the years, it became clear that not every member state was equally enthusiastic about the idea of a more European strategic defence policy. The main concern of member states opposed to the idea was a deteriorating relationship with NATO members and specifically the relationship with the United States. Proponents, led by France, countered this by arguing that EU-SA – a term that the European Commission uses for strategic autonomy – makes Europe stronger within NATO (Damen, 2022; Teesalu, 2019).

When the United Kingdom officially announced its Brexit in 2017 (European Council, 2017; BBC News, 2017), member states worried about the effects it would have on trade, economy and defence. The UK was considered one of the strongest defence powers in Europe. Withdrawal from the EU would mean a serious reduction of the EU's military power. Furthermore, the United Kingdom was one of the members pushing for higher defence spending. Despite its contribution to European defence in the practical sense, the UK blocked many other initiatives. For instance, they opposed further integration

of policies and did not want overlap between EU defence policy and NATO (Martill & Sus, 2018). The Brexit thus not only raised concerns but also presented opportunities.

Around 2017, researchers increasingly applied strategic autonomy to policy areas other than defence. China's economic expansion and the protectionist tone of Trump's presidency in the USA sparked discussion about a more strategically autonomous Europe in terms of economy and energy supply (Damen, 2022; Lippert et al., 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic unravelled how dependent the European Union was on China for the supply of critical products and vaccines. The pandemic contributed to a call for the expansion of a more autonomous Europe in the health area.

The emphasis on strategic autonomy in security and defence returned after Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 (BBC News, 2022). Both the EU and the individual member states put sanctions in place and made decisions to decrease their dependency on Russia (Damen, 2022).

3.1.3 Meaning and development of the Common Security and Defence Policy

Now that the outline of the development of strategic autonomy within the European Union has been presented, this section examines the meaning and development of the Common Security and Defence Policy within strategic autonomy.

The European Parliament defines the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as “an integral part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)” and “the main policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens, and strengthen international peace and security” (Krentz, 2024).

As early as 1952, a treaty was drafted to provide for a European Army. However, the plan for a European Defence Community failed due to the fear of France losing national sovereignty in security and defence (Ruane, 2000). Nowadays, the call for a European Army resurfaces from time to time but is still not established. However, with the establishment of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) as a pillar of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, a base to further deepen the EU defence cooperation has been laid (Malevoc, 2023). The CFSP aims to “preserve peace, strengthen international security, promote international cooperation and developing and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Malovec, 2023).

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon as part of the CFSP. The Treaty of Lisbon is the first document to explain the workings of the CSDP and the role of the European Parliament in the CSDP (European Parliament, n.d.b). The Treaty was signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009. Therefore, the CSDP existed already before the first mention of strategic autonomy in an official EU document in 2013 (Damen, 2022). The difference between the CFSP and the CSDP is the focus on defence within the CSDP.

Over the years, the CSDP developed as one of the fastest policies of the European Union. The most important development in relation to this research is the introduction of the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence - The Strategic Compass - in June 2021. The implementation of the EU's strategic autonomy in four key areas – crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships – is the main goal of this document. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Strategic Compass was adjusted which led to the final version in March 2022 (Krentz, 2024).

3.1.4 The annual report of the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union serves as the primary mechanism through which the member states cooperate to address conflicts and crises and strengthen global peace.

The Foreign Affairs Council, consisting of all defence ministers of the member states, chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also the Vice-President of the European Commission (VP/HR), makes the proposals for the CSDP. The VP/HR is the head of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which assists the VP/HR in the proposal making on the CSDP (European Council, n.d.). The VP/HR presents the proposals to the member states. The European Council, all heads of state, and the Council of the European Union, the ministers of all member states, make the decisions on the CSDP by unanimity (Krentz, 2024). The Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) of the European Parliament is regularly informed about the developments within the CSDP and has the opportunity to advise on its annual reports on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The European Parliament votes once a year on this report (Krentz, 2024).

This annual report describes the developments of the EU's security and defence policy by the Strategic Compass, the progress of CSDP missions and operations, and gives updates on crisis management, resilience, capabilities, and partnerships (Lazarou, 2022; Clapp, 2023). The Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), which supervises the implementation of the CSDP and the spending of the external action funds of the EU, drafts and adopts the annual report before it is presented to the European

Parliament (European Parliament, n.d.a). While the European Parliament has 'only' advisory rights on the CSDP, unlike the Council of the European Union, which votes on decisions unanimously (EUR-Lex, n.d.), the European Parliament's influence should not be underestimated. It is crucial to consider the opinions of the EP's representatives, who are directly elected by European citizens, on matters that directly affect citizens. These annual reports capture political, social, and democratic considerations, and thereby complement the technical and official perspectives of bodies like the European Commission.

One of the advantages of the annual reports over other documents is that they offer a comprehensive overview of developments, reducing the time needed to collect various disparate sources. These reports ensure reliability thanks to their consistent source, purpose, and structure, allowing for comparisons without methodological discrepancies. Another advantage is that these reports contain events that have taken place or have been implemented in the past year, or developments that are currently ongoing and will be implemented in the future. This minimizes the risk of policy implementation gaps. It's important to note that the CSDP encompasses more than just Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which is taken into account in the coding scheme to exclude unrelated codes. A significant advantage is the ability to select one annual report from before the invasion and one from after the invasion as a case. During crises and wars developments quickly follow one another. Different sources to describe a pre- or post-invasion situation lead to potential methodological issues arising from time differences between sources. For this research, the *implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2021* – the last pre-invasion report - and the *implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2022* – the first post-invasion report – are analysed.

The focus of this research on the CSDP in only two years may lead to findings specific to the context of the CSDP in particular years. This could limit the generalizability and validity to other policy areas or time periods. On the other hand, this research provides insights into if and how the EU adapts its cooperation to a crisis situation. This is generalizable to the crisis response mechanisms and development of strategic autonomy in the EU. The insights on how geopolitical crisis impacts security policies could be relevant for other international organisations. The consistency of the data reduces the risk of biases and increases the internal validity of the findings.

3.1.5 Russia's invasion of Ukraine

On February 24, 2022, Russia commenced an invasion of Ukraine, marking the inception of a conflict that persists to this day. Although the invasion took many by surprise, the hostilities between the two

nations had been escalating for years. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 was a pivotal event that exacerbated these tensions. This act represented the first instance since World War II in which a European state annexed the territory of another sovereign state (Masters, 2023).

Russia's invasion of Ukraine affects the European Union and its citizens in multiple ways. The impact on the European economy (Liadze et al., 2022), citizens' feeling of safety (NOS, 2024), the European energy market (Umar et al., 2022), changing geopolitics and instability on the borders of the EU, and refugee flows from Russia and Ukraine towards EU member states (Orenstein, 2023) are only a selection of the many consequences of the war. Hence, the war is considered one of the drivers of the idea of a more strategic autonomous Europe and the accelerating factor for creating a European defence union (Krentz, 2024).

The direct impact on the European Union and its implications for European strategic autonomy makes Russia's invasion of Ukraine a logical choice as a case study in this research. In addition, unlike other crises related to European strategic autonomy, this one has a clearly defined starting point. This makes it easier to measure the impact of cooperation by using the difference between before and after the start of the war as a benchmark.

This research uses a specific conflict with a unique socio-political context as a case. On the one hand, this limits the applicability of findings to conflicts in other regions and with actors other than the EU, the EU institutions and Russia or Ukraine involved. On the other hand, the findings give broader conclusions on the response of the European Union to similar geopolitical crises.

3.2 Research design

This research aims to study the relationship between crises from outside of the European Union and international cooperation in the European Union. It focuses on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and how this crisis affects the discourse on cooperation in the European Parliament in the annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy. To do so, this research makes use of a qualitative discourse analysis and the WPR – approach of Carol Bacchi (2009).

3.2.1 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is a qualitative research method that examines language material, such as spoken or written texts, in relation to social reality. The field of research focuses on various perspectives, including how language varies across contexts and is connected to social phenomena, how social

phenomena influence language, how language is linked to specific fields of practice, and how language creates meaning within social processes (Taylor, 2013; Fairclough, 2012). In discourse analysis, it is important to keep in mind that language is not objective or neutral. The assumption is that language is constitutive and shapes our social reality. Therefore, discourse analysis is seen as a qualitative method for social phenomena (Burck, 2005). The context of the discourse is important in this thesis because the simple count of the word 'cooperation' will not provide us with a good understanding of what cooperation means or contains in the context of the European Union, international cooperation in times of transboundary crisis, and Russia's invasion in Ukraine. By using a discourse analysis this research is able to show the relation between the social phenomena crisis, Russia's invasion in Ukraine, and the context of international cooperation within the European Union in response to this crisis.

Discourse analysis is critiqued for its methodologies and the practical implications. The analysis is an iterative process of reading, comparing and re-reading and therefore time-consuming. Furthermore, it is difficult to decide how much material is needed to perform an analysis. More data, so more texts to analyse, does not always mean that the results will be better (Taylor, 2013). Other critiques focus on the method itself. Discourse analysis does not take non-verbal communication, body language or emotions into account and only focuses on words. According to critiques, this leaves out important information. Discourse analysts however argue that every type of research reduces information to compact data and therefore misses out on certain aspects (Taylor, 2013).

There are different variants of discourse analysis and different analytical methods. For example, the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Fairclough (2012), focuses on power relations and ideologies. Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) aims to understand how political discourse influences policy-making and social behaviour (Van Dijk, 1997). The What is the problem represented to be (WPR) – approach of Carol Bacchi (2009) seeks to reveal assumptions, values and power relations underlying policy problem representations.

The latter I found the best-suited method to this research, because it offers the opportunity to critically analyse whether the European Union perceives the crisis, Russia's invasion in Ukraine', as problematic, what strategy or solution the EU proposes as a response, and if this strategy or solution includes international cooperation. From previous research, we can derive that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is one of the crises that prompted the EU to call for more strategic autonomy, and thus is seen by the European Union as problematic (Damen, 2022; Van Hooft & Wagner, 2022; Krentz, 2024). However, it is still important to conclude through this analytic method if these annual reports also refer to the crisis as problematic, to link the proposed solutions and strategies to it.

Critique of using discourse analysis to demonstrate international cooperation within the European Union as a response to a crisis is that policy put on paper does not necessarily lead to policy implementation. This phenomenon is known as the policy implementation – gap. A policy can be devised and approved, but its implementation may differ significantly, be modified, or not occur at all due to the absence of a clear policy goal or a lack of effective communication between policymakers and implementers (Haines et al., 2004; Abdullahi & Othman, 2021). Therefore, according to the policy implementation – gap, a positive discourse in EU policy on cooperation does not mean member states actually do cooperate. However, the annual reports on the CSDP that are used in this research contain policy on past and ongoing events. They combine the developments of the past year with ongoing events and implementations for the future. This decreases the risk of a policy implementation – gap.

3.2.2 What is the problem represented to be? – approach

The What is the problem represented to be? (WPR) - approach of Carol Bacchi (2009) is a discourse analytical method used to analyse policy and ask critical questions about public policy (Wu, n.d.). It is based on the assumption that the core of what one thinks is problematic and needs to change, can be derived from what one proposes to do about something (Bletsas & Beasley, 2012). For example, in order to protect majors from threats, we need to better secure their homes. The implication is that the lack of protection of their homes is the ‘problem’, and is responsible for ‘why majors are threatened’. The WPR-approach analyses how a problem is represented in a policy and critically examines this representation of the problem. The WPR-approach provides six questions and an accompanying undertaking to apply these questions to one’s own research. Table 3 shows how these questions are applied to the analysis in the paper (Bacchi, 2009; Bletsas & Beasley, 2012).

Guiding questions for WPR-approach	Underlying goal of the question	Application in current analysis
What is the problem represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal?	Assists in clarifying the implicit problem representation within the policy	What is the problem in the sentence with one or more coded concepts?
What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’?	Reflection of underlying premises in the representation of the problem	What is the solution in the sentence with one or more coded concepts?
How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?	Consideration of the practices and processes through which this understanding of the ‘problem’ has emerged	What is the strategy in the sentence with one or more coded concepts?
What is left unproblematic in this problem representation?	Scrutiny of possible gaps or limitations in this	This question will be discussed in the discussion

Where are the silences? Can the 'problem' be thought about differently?	representation of the 'problem', accompanied by inventive imagining of potential alternatives	
What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'?	Considered assessment of how identified problem representations limit what can be talked about as relevant, shape people's understandings of themselves and the issue and impact materially on people's lives	This question will be discussed in the discussion
How/where has this representation of the 'problem' been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted and replaced?	A sharpened awareness of the contestation surrounding representation of the 'problem'	This question will be discussed in the discussion

Table 3 – Application of WPR-questions to analysis. Source: Bletsas & Beasley, 2012

3.3 Operationalisation

The coding of both annual reports is based on the research question *What changed in the discourse on cooperation in the annual implementation of Common Defence and Security Policy in the European Parliament after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022?* and the relationship between crisis and cooperation. 'Cooperation' is operationalized by coding the word 'cooperation' and synonyms or similar terms. I made this decision because cooperation can not only be apparent from the literal naming of the word 'cooperation', but can also be apparent from descriptions of cooperation. The crisis in this research is Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the variable 'crisis' is operationalized as 'Russia' and 'Ukraine' and variations thereof. Table 4 shows an overview of the variables and how they are operationalized.

Variable	Coded words
Cooperation	<i>Cooperation, cooperative, work(ing) together, partner(s), partnership(s), collaborative(ly)</i>
Crisis	<i>Russia(n)('s), Ukraine(s), Ukrainian</i>

Table 4 – Operationalisation of the variables

The first step of the coding process is the coding of all words mentioned above using Atlas.ti. Secondly, all sentences that contain one or multiple codes are checked on relevance. As mentioned in 3.1.4., the annual report also mentions conflicts other than the Russia-Ukraine conflict, therefore only sentences

related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine are labelled relevant. Thirdly, about every sentence that contains one or multiple coded words and is relevant to this research, the following three questions, in line with the WPR-approach (Bacchi, 2009), will be answered:

1. What is the problem according to this sentence?
2. What is the strategy according to this sentence?
3. What is the solution according to this sentence?

This process will be performed on the *Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2021* (European Parliament, 2022) and the *Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2022* (European Parliament, 2023). For both documents, the words related to 'cooperation' are analysed first, and then the words related to 'crisis'. In this way, the two variables can easily and conveniently be distinguished during the analysis if necessary.

The complete coding scheme including all coded words, sentences and answered WPR-approach questions is enclosed in this thesis in Appendix A.

3.3.1 Atlas.ti

Atlas ti is a qualitative data analysis software that helps analyse texts. The software Atlas.ti will be used to analyse the annual reports of the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy and code the words related to the operationalized variables.

Chapter 4. Discourse on Crisis and Cooperation

This chapter presents, discusses and compares the findings of the discourse analysis on cooperation in the *Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2021* and the *Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2022*. Firstly, the results of the analysis on the annual report of 2021 are presented. Secondly, the results of the analysis on the annual report of 2022 are presented. Thirdly, the results will be compared to one another around the expectations stated in Chapter 2; crisis leads to a change in discourse on cooperation, or crisis does not lead to a change in discourse on cooperation. An overview of the complete discourse used in both reports can be found in Appendix B.

4.1 Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2021

The first document analysed by discourse analysis in this thesis is the *Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2021*. This report is the last report from before Russia invaded Ukraine.

4.1.1 Cooperation

What is immediately noticeable when analysing the coding results on cooperation in the annual report 2021, is that of the 100 coded words, only one is relevant for this research. Some coded words are excluded because they are part of a title or name, but the vast majority are mentioned in a sentence unrelated to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The one sentence that is coded as relevant is the following:

“whereas an unprecedented build-up of Russian forces in and around Ukraine linked with demands put forward by Kremlin could – if not countered – lead to the return of spheres of influence in Europe and cut short the ambitions of the EU’s eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO;”

(p.6)

The problem mentioned in this sentence is *“the unprecedented build-up of Russian forces in and around Ukraine linked with demands put forward by Kremlin [...] lead to return of spheres of influence in Europe and cut short the ambitions of the EU’s eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO”* for which the *“countering of the unprecedented build-up of Russian forces in and around Ukraine linked with the demands put forward by Kremlin”* is seen as the solution. Russia is seen as the problem here, but a clear strategy on how the build-up of the forces is not given.

However, the coded sentences do not directly reference the Russia/Ukraine tensions and therefore are not relevant for this research, they do speak of *“increased investment and assistance in security, military, intelligence, and cyber cooperation”* (p.13) for Eastern Partnership countries, of which Ukraine is a part, and maintaining *“stability at the borders of the Union”* (p.31). This shows the concerns about the buffer zone between the European Union and Russia.

4.1.2 Russia / Ukraine

The initial approach was only to analyse the words linked to the variable cooperation. However, after the results mentioned in 4.1.1, I decided to perform the same process on the words linked to the variable crisis because cooperation does not have to be discussed in a literal sense but can also be evident from a description. This yielded an interesting result.

Twenty-two out of 42 coded words had a relation to the Russia/Ukraine tensions. Others were excluded because they related to other conflicts involving Russia or the Eastern Partnerships of which Ukraine is a part. Two sentences caught the eye because they address the member states directly and call for targeted action:

“calls for increased and credible military and security assistance to Ukraine, according to its needs, including by mobilising the European Peace Facility;” (p.31)

“encourages the Member States to increase their bilateral military and security assistance to Ukraine” (p.31)

The first sentence appeals to the member states, asks for *“military and security assistance to Ukraine”* and proposes a clear strategy: *“mobilising the European Peace Facility”*. The second addresses the member states directly invoking their ties with Ukraine and asks them to *“increase their bilateral military and security assistance to Ukraine”*.

Russia is described as the problem in most relevant coded sentences. This is evident not only from the analysis using the WPR-approach, but also from the way Russia is described. The authors used for example *Russia’s aggressive behaviour* and *Russian-backed separatists*, which emphasises a negative image of Russia. In one sentence *“threat to peace, stability, and security in Europe”* is mentioned as the problem. This shows Europe’s concern about the looming tensions between Russia and Ukraine and the consequences it can have for the Union. De-escalation of the situation is clearly in Europe’s interest.

The strategy and solutions proposed focus mainly on Russia itself. The verbiage is focused on speaking out *against* Russian actions rather than *for* joint action. Think of phrases such as *“the European Parliament has a strong condemnation towards...”*, *“reiterates the call for ...”*, and *“calls on the Russian Government to withdraw its forces from the Ukrainian borders”*. Russia is seen as the problem in the Russia-Ukraine tensions. Despite Europe’s concerns about the countries in the buffer zone between Europe and Russia, and the few expressions in the text calling on member states to take collective action in supporting Ukraine, concrete strategies and solutions remain absent. Russia is called to account for its behaviour and the EU envies Russian treatment. Thus, the proposals made are mainly *against* Russia, and to a lesser extent *for* cooperation.

4.2 Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2022

The second document analysed by discourse analysis in this thesis is the *Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2022*. This report is the first report after Russia invaded Ukraine.

4.2.1 Cooperation

As in the report of 2021, this document mentions ‘cooperation’ often, but only a few times concerning the Russia-Ukraine conflict. A notable, but also unique, sentence that is found in the report is the following:

“calls on the EU and its partners, in cooperation with Ukraine, to start medium- and long-term planning to assess possible developments on the battlefield and predict potential demand for weapons and ammunition, as well as the direction and scope of potential aid;” (p.11)

The EU and its partners are called upon here to work together with Ukraine on anticipating the number of weapons, ammunition and aid needed. I find this eminently a sentence that demonstrates international cooperation at a time of crisis, as it not only calls for cooperation but also comes up with a clear proposal of how cooperation can be shaped.

Not only Russia and its negative effect on safety and security in surrounding countries but also the European Union itself and spheres of influence of Russia are put forward as problematic in the analysis: *“Serbia’s relationship with Russia and its lack of condemnation of Russia’s unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine”* and *“EU decision-making and crisis management is not effective enough”*. This broadens the appeal to countries outside the EU and places the conflict within a wider geopolitical

context. One coded sentence indicates that the *“EU has the ambition to be a global actor”* (p.11). This is evident from the way the EU addressed issues beyond its bilateral relations in this report.

The strategies primarily emphasize cooperation with partners and investing in these relationships as a path to resolving the problems mentioned above. Examples include *“investment in the EU-NATO cooperation”*, *“increase investments in European military projects in the Black Sea region”*, and *“cooperation with like-minded Western Balkan countries”*. This approach reflects a Europe that aims to address conflicts through international cooperation, extending beyond the EU. While this may seem contrary to the goal of greater strategic autonomy, by taking a leading role - *“EU as a global actor”*-, the EU positions itself as a central figure on which others rely.

The proposed solutions align with the outlined strategies, emphasizing the importance of investing in various partnerships. In response to the security and safety challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, solutions such as *“deeper military-security cooperation”* and *“stronger military security”* both within and outside the Union are frequently highlighted.

4.2.2 Russia / Ukraine

What immediately stands out when analysing the coded sentences related to the Russia-Ukraine war is the naming of that war. It varies between more factual approaches, such as *“the war against Ukraine”* and *“Russian invasion of Ukraine”*, to very outspoken and aggressive formulations: *“the brutal aggression against Ukraine and the genocide being committed on Ukrainians”* and *“Russia’s unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine”*. This highlights Europe’s support for Ukraine.

The main problem as perceived by the EU, as expected, is Russia and its war against Ukraine. This is referred to in many different ways, as mentioned above. Furthermore, countries that support Russia or countries that do not align with the EU sanctions are described as a problem in several sentences. Finally, the lack of support to Ukraine in weapons, aid, capacity building and training of Ukrainian forces is often emphasized: *“calls on the Member States to accelerate their military assistance to Ukraine, in particular, the provision of weapons in response to clearly identified needs;”* (p.12).

The connection with cooperation is best made within the strategies that can be derived from the report. Various resolutions, regulations and agreements are extensively invoked. A joint fund of 18-billion-euro to support Ukraine has already been agreed upon and the German Chancellor Scholz is personally addressed to provide weapons: *“calls in this respect on German Chancellor Scholz to*

initiate a European consortium of relevant European countries in order to deliver Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine without further delay;" (p.12).

The report outlines solutions such as sanctions against Russia, support for Ukraine, and military assistance, including a military mission (EUMAM Ukraine). While "support for Ukraine" is frequently mentioned, it lacks a detailed explanation regarding its form. The EU also emphasizes investing in its own security and defence, a logical stance given the direct threat posed by the war. However, the following comment draws attention:

"whereas Ukraine's victory is also a matter of the credibility of the EU and its security and defence policy;" (p.8)

The question this sentence immediately raises for me is: for whom does the EU want to win this war? For Ukraine or for itself? 'Credibility' is often linked to honour and status. This sentence shows that a strong Europe is part of the CSDP policy in this war and appeals to member states' European sense of belonging to strengthen cooperation and unity.

In this report, the EU tries to present itself as a global actor by engaging countries outside the European Union to cooperate against Russia. The emphasis lies on support for Ukraine and the strategies and solutions give some concrete examples of actions already implemented or to be implemented. The strategies mainly focus on making use of existing regulations and resolutions. The language of the report is very outspoken against Russia in its description of the situation between Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, the EU calls on member states and other countries to take a stance against Russia and support the sanctions. Lastly, the EU is concerned about its own safety and calls on member states to also improve its own security and defence.

4.3 Did the discourse change?

To begin with, the Russia-Ukraine issue is discussed more extensively in the report of 2022, resulting in a higher number of relevant codes. However, the increased discussion of a topic does not inherently reveal the content of the discussion. Just numbers do not answer the question of how the discourse on cooperation has changed or clarify whether the crisis has led to more cooperation.

The 2021 and 2022 reports both denounce Russia's actions, but their approaches differ. The 2021 report focuses on urging Russia to cease its aggressive behaviour, while the 2022 report emphasizes

forming alliances with like-minded countries and addressing Russia's partners about their cooperation. Both documents consistently express support for Ukraine.

Yet, there are notable differences between the documents. In this, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has influenced the 2022 report. The differences are particularly evident in the discourse on cooperation. Interestingly, this is not apparent from the analysis of the coded word 'cooperation', but rather from the descriptions related to the Russia-Ukraine war.

The tone of voice in the report of 2022 is much more negative than in the report of 2021. This is mainly caused by the way the war is referred to. What is described in the report of 2021 as "the unpredicted build-up of Russian forces", changes in the report of 2022 into "*the brutal aggression against Ukraine and the genocide being committed on Ukrainians*". Also, phrases in other parts of the text are much more urgent. Where the tensions in the report of 2021 are addressed as "*counter the build-up of Russian forces*", they are responded to in the report of 2022 with "*the European Union needs to provide military assistance and weapons deliveries*".

Another change is the way the EU presents itself as a global actor in the report of 2022. Besides explicitly stating Europe's ambition to become a global player, this goal is reflected in various phrases and wordings. The way the EU addresses countries outside its borders, and its role as a connecting factor in strategies and solutions for supporting Ukraine exemplify this ambition. Europe's proactive approach aligns with its intention to achieve greater strategic autonomy. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

In the report of 2021, Russia is identified as the main problem, with tensions between Russia and Ukraine framed as "*Russia's aggressive behaviour against Ukraine*", placing the blame squarely on Russia. Solutions are similarly focused on addressing Russia's actions. In contrast, the report of 2022 shifts the focus towards what the EU can do to address the situation, such as revising its own security policies, condemning other countries' ties with Russia, and adjusting member states' attitudes. Russia is still part of the problem, but this shift suggests a greater emphasis on cooperation to counter Russia in the report of 2022.

In the report of 2021, the European Parliament 'underlines' agreements and 'condemns' the behaviour and events of Russia as a core strategy. The report of 2022 provides more clarified strategies that help implement the solutions. Thereby, the focus is on resolutions and partnerships such as PESCO, Eastern Partnership, Military Assistance Mission Ukraine or decisions made by the European Council such as

an 18-billion-euro support package for Ukraine or the increase of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability's staffing level up to 250 personnel. The report of 2022 demonstrates enhanced attention to cooperation by actively addressing partnerships.

The report of 2021 primarily emphasizes solutions centred on Russia, addressing its actions and threats towards Ukraine. In contrast, the 2022 report shifts towards solutions involving collective action among European Union member states. This includes initiatives such as deploying more European military personnel in the Black Sea and providing weapons to Ukraine. Thus, cooperation among member states is in the foreground in the report of 2022.

Overall, it can be concluded that the discourse on cooperation changed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and that the report of 2022 contains a stronger call for cooperation than the report of 2021. This increase in cooperation can primarily be derived from the descriptions of the Russia-Ukraine war, rather than from the sentence explicitly discussing cooperation.

Chapter 5. Discussion

This chapter includes the discussion and will place the most important results of the discourse analysis in the context of the literature discussed in Chapter 2. Firstly, it will elaborate on the interpretations and implications of the results. Secondly, the limitations of this research and recommendations for future research are considered.

Based on the literature in Chapter 2 we could distinguish two possible outcomes of this research: A change in discourse and an increase in cooperation, or no change in discourse and no increase in cooperation. I found convincing evidence that Russia's invasion of Ukraine did in fact lead to a change in discourse on the annual implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy. I am aware of the possibility of a policy implementation gap. However, we have reason to assume that actual cooperation did increase, because the annual implementation on the Common Security and Defence Policy includes activities that are ongoing or already accomplished. For example, an 18-billion-euro support package for Ukraine is already established and there is an increase of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability's staffing level up to 250 personnel. Therefore, I argue that not only a change in discourse on cooperation is observed, but also an increase in cooperation.

5.1 Problem

The first difference between the report of 2021 and the report of 2022 is noticed in the use of language and the problematisation that could be derived from the text by using the WPR-approach. The results show that the language and the problematization shifted from Russia-centred in the report of 2021 towards EU-centred in the report of 2022. It is not surprising that the problematisation analysis of the annual implementation of 2021 is Russia-centred. The tensions between Ukraine and Russia have been rising since 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea. With current knowledge, a mounting tension can be read between the lines in the pre-invasion report. From phrases such as *"an unprecedented build-up of Russian forces"* and *"calls for increased and credible military and security assistance to Ukraine"*, the urgency of what is happening on the borders of the European Union is evident.

In the post-invasion report, the problem shifts to EU-centred. The European Union presents itself as a global actor and plays a central role in addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict by appealing to countries outside the Union to stand together against Russia and condemning other countries' ties with Russia. By taking a leading role, the EU is less dependent on great powers such as the United States to do so. Less dependency on others and the capacity to act autonomously are characteristics of strategic autonomy (Zandee et al., 2020). The way the EU positions itself aligns with the coordinating role that *Liberal Institutionalism* ascribes to international institutions which provide benefits states cannot, and

which overcome the problems of collective action raised by Olson (Keohane, 1988, 1984; Johnson & Heiss, 2018). *Transboundary Crisis Management* responds to the same problems with eight factors, one of which is the importance of trusted and experienced leadership in facilitating crisis cooperation (Blondin & Boin, 2020). The experienced leadership of the EU exemplifies this factor. The annual implementation of the CSDP 2022 demonstrates the approach of the European Union in facilitating crisis cooperation.

The EU also addresses their own military and defence power as a problem with the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the continent in the annual implementation of 2022. Therefore, the EU urges member states to spend more on defence and provide themselves and the EU as a whole with more weapons and ammunition. This development is explained by Krentz (2024) who declares that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the process of creating a European Union defence-union. This again shows the coordinating, but also the enforcement mechanism of the EU. The EU identifies what is needed to stand up against Russia and appeals to all its member states for their responsibilities. The creation of the defence-union demonstrates the enforcement mechanism of the union. Discussing military capacity openly and explicitly in the annual implementation not only shows the coordinating and enforcement mechanisms of the union. It is also a power move that shows Russia and the rest of the world that Europe can defend itself militarily if they have to.

In line with this, another problem raised in the report of 2022 is the support of European member states to Ukraine. Member states are urged to increase their support and deliver more weapons and aid. This way the European Union is shaping the mutuality of interest for the member states and again showing their enforcement ability. A lack of support for Ukraine means risking Russia winning the war and being at the borders of the Union.

Concerning enforcing cooperation among member states, there is one particular sentence that stands out in the report of 2022. The German Chancellor Scholz is addressed *"to initiate a European consortium of relevant European countries in order to deliver Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine without further delay"* (p.12). It is remarkable that in the whole document, only one European head of state is addressed personally. However, there is an explanation for this. Three days after Russia's invasion, the newly elected German Chancellor Olaf Scholz gave a speech in the Bundestag, that has come to be known as the 'Zeitenwende speech' (Die Bundesregierung, 2022). Scholz announced a restructuring of the German defence policy that had been cautious since World War II because of the 'nie wieder Krieg' dogma. An increase in German spending on defence to achieve the 2% of GDP target, which is a requirement of the NATO membership, and the distribution of various lighter weapons to

Ukraine were part of this restructuring. However, the delivery of heavy weaponry, such as Leopard 2 battle tanks, was delayed by the German government. This is partly because of the post-World War II policy of restraint in supplying weapons to conflict zones, and partly because Germany was concerned about the potential escalation of the conflict and sought allies, in particular the United States (Zandee & Ellison, 2024). Doubts about whether to supply heavier weapons to Ukraine led to fierce debates in the Bundestag (Von der Burchard, 2022). Two weeks before the adoption of the annual implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy 2022, Scholz and Biden released a joint press statement in which they promised expansion of the military support to Ukraine, however, they did not mention Leopard 2 tanks (Die Bundesregierung, 2023). In this light, the call for Scholz in the annual implementation to deliver Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine can be seen as one of Europe's forcing mechanisms.

Combining this event with *Collective Action Theory* discussed in Chapter 2, we can conclude that Germany chose Europe's collective interest over their own interest. Europe's safety and interests are of course also in Germany's interest. However, by choosing to expand their defence power they risk reviving the post-WWII fear within the EU of a military-strong Germany (Bulmer et al., 2020). Europe's safety as shared interest overcomes the first barrier to joint action raised by Olson (Lowery, 2016). However, there are some difficulties in enforcing and coordinating the public good (weapons), as expected by the second barrier of Olson. Yet, I would not argue that the establishment of cooperation is heavily incentivized or strictly enforced because Germany showed its willingness to cooperate directly after Russia's invasion. Therefore, I argue that the second barrier at the moment of voting on the 2022 report in the European Parliament has not been completely overcome, but it appears this will happen soon.

Whereas this example contradicts *Collective Action Theory*, it shows many similarities to *Liberal Institutionalism*. There is a mutuality of interest among Germany and other member states, namely Europe's safety. There have been long-term relationships between Germany and the USA but also between Germany and the European Union. At the beginning of this long-term relationship, the prudent defence policy of Germany was established because of its role in World War II. As a result of the built trust over the past years, Germany chose the European interest over its own relations with Russia, and the Union encouraged Germany to build up their defence industry again. The 'Zeitenwende speech' as a response to the invasion is in line with Keohane's view on cooperation as a response to conflict (Keohane, 1984).

As expected in Chapter 2, if an increase in cooperation is observed, the conditions of *Transboundary Crisis Management* provide an explanation. I argue that the first two barriers, accepting the necessity of cooperation and agreement on cooperation, are overcome in this case because Germany changed its defence policy and risks its relationship with Russia.² The last barrier which is the joint implementation of the agreed-upon strategy led to some difficulties in sending the heavy weaponry. However, looking at the conditions two things stand out. Firstly, to overcome the first two barriers and increase the likelihood of cooperation, less politicization of a crisis on the national level is a condition (Blondin & Boin, 2020). In the example of Germany sending heavy weaponry was politicized on the national level, but the barriers were overcome, and cooperation was established. This does not match the theory. Secondly, facilitated cooperation by international organisations helps to overcome the last barrier, whereas forced cooperation does not help to overcome the last barrier. In the case of Germany, the EU is an international organisation to facilitate cooperation. However, the sentence in which the EU calls upon Scholz gives the idea that the EU has to force cooperation between Germany and other countries by making Germany responsible for *“a European consortium of relevant European countries in order to deliver Leopard 2”* and *“without further delay”*. I argue that the reason the last barrier was harder to overcome, is because there was a facilitating international organisation but there was also a bit of force needed to establish the cooperation.

5.2 Strategy and solution

The main difference between the annual implementation of 2021 and 2022 in terms of strategy, is the clarity of the strategies. The results show that the strategies changed from disapproval of Russia's actions towards entitlement to agreements and partnerships. Where the report of 2021 'condemns' behaviour and 'underlines' agreements, the report of 2022 refers to specific decisions made by the European Council and mentions special military and security projects as a strategy. Examples of this are PESCO and an 18-billion-euro support package for Ukraine.

This line continues in the solutions. In the report of 2021 solutions are focussed on addressing Russia's behaviour, while in the report of 2022 solutions are provided in which EU member states have an active role. This includes for example deploying military personnel and providing weapons to Ukraine and requires joint action of the member states. We cannot test the free-riding problem based on the

² To be less dependent on other countries, Germany built a gas pipeline with Russia, known as Nord Stream 2. The project was very expensive and provides a significant proportion of Germany's gas demand. The project is always seen as a commercial and non-political project by Germany. However, due to deteriorating ties between Russia and Germany, the USA and the European Union are afraid the gas pipeline would be used as a hybrid warfare tool by Russia to undermine Ukraine's territorial integrity. Because Ukraine was used as a transit country for gas at the time (Mills, 2022).

text. Therefore, we cannot confirm or deny the *Collective Action Theory*. However, we can find features of *Liberal Institutionalism*. The agreements and partnerships mentioned in the strategies represent a mutuality of interest, a long-term relationship between member states and repeated interaction within the defence policy area of the European Union. This also applies to the solutions. As a member state you need to trust the institution and have a mutuality of interest if you, for example, let your military participate in one of the joint European military missions. Otherwise, what would be in it for you to contribute?

Lastly, also *Transboundary Crisis Management* can be aligned with the findings. Two factors in particular explain why these changes show more international cooperation. Firstly, an increase of mutual trust and repeated interaction improve the likeliness of international cooperation. As mentioned above, to send your people to defend Europe, mutual trust is needed so that other member states will do the same. Furthermore, not only does the EU establish repeated interaction but the agreements and partnerships are other forms of this too. Secondly, more feasible and precise solutions to the crisis increase the likeliness of international cooperation. The change in the precision of the strategies also gives more precise solutions. The solutions are more detailed, for example, “*the recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy*”. Furthermore, they are more focused on what the member states can do instead of what external parties should do. This makes international cooperation more feasible. The mentioning of strategies and solutions that are already (partly) in place, contributes to the feasibility as well.

5.3 What do results mean for the literature?

The results show that a transboundary crisis leads to an increase in international cooperation. They prove that the barriers of *Collective Action Theory* set by Olsen can be overcome by the institutional and leadership structures of the EU. We were not able to measure the self-interest of states from the text, but if it was present, we did not find evidence that it undermines cooperation. As expected in the case of increased cooperation, the results show a lot of commonalities with *Liberal Institutionalism* and *Transboundary Crisis Management*. It demonstrates the role of international institutions like the EU, in facilitating cooperation in times of a transboundary crisis, and reinforces *Liberal Institutionalism’s* claim about the importance of institutions in international cooperation (Keohane, 1984). The results show that all three barriers of *Transboundary Crisis Management* are overcome. The joint EU actions such as sanctions and military aid discussed in the annual report of 2022 imply that member states have recognised the necessity of international cooperation and have agreed on cooperation. The joint actions discussed in the annual report that have already taken place imply the joint implementation of the agreed-upon strategy. However, not every factor that the literature links

to those barriers is met according to the expectations (Blondin & Boin, 2020). In the example of Germany, politicization on the national level in the end led to an increase in international cooperation, while theory predicted the opposite. This same example showed that there is an international authority available in the form of the European Union. However, it is still possible that this authority needs to use some force to establish cooperation. The 'coordination mechanisms' could thus be considered less black and white than they appear in the theory. 'Leadership', 'Feasibility of solutions' and 'mutual trust between states' appeared in this research as expected in the theory. 'Possibility to decouple', 'Exposure to crisis' and 'Number of actors' we were not able to test.

5.4 Why did the change occur?

I concluded that change occurred in the annual implementation after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, leading to more international cooperation. One obvious reason for the change is the invasion itself. This is mentioned in the text at the beginning of the document: *"having regard to Russia's unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the occupation of Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova's region of Transnistria"* (p.4). Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a direct threat to the European safety. If Russia wins the war and annexes Ukraine, Russia will become a direct neighbour of the European Union, which poses a significant security concern. Although it is unclear how likely this scenario is, Russia's aggression against Ukraine signals that it could potentially target other countries in the future too. Ukraine's aspirations to join the EU and its partnerships with member states have forged strong ties between Ukraine and the EU. Consequently, Russia has emerged as a common threat to European member states since the conflict began.

The change between both annual implementations and the increased cooperation can also be explained by the call for more strategic autonomy in the European Union. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this process started years before Russia invaded Ukraine. However, the invasion combined with the inheritance of the Trump administration in the USA, and the possibility of a second Trump administration that will not guarantee any support if Russia attacks Europe, increases the urge for a more strategic autonomous Europe. This is mentioned in the annual implementation of 2022: *"Highlights the dramatic deterioration in European security caused by Russia's unjustified, unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Ukraine; stresses that this situation demands that the EU step up its strategic autonomy and joint efforts to achieve the necessary defence capacities and show greater willingness to continue to act in a united way in order to deliver the security expected by EU citizens;"* (p.11).

The aims and values of the European Union could have played a part in the change as well. 'Promote peace' is one of the most important aims of the Union. Freedom and Democracy are among the founding values of the Union (European Union, n.d.). Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the opposite of this aim and these values. It is in Europe's interest to do everything in its power to stop the war.

The last thing that stood out is related to my analysis. 'Russia's invasion of Ukraine' and 'cooperation' were never mentioned in the same sentence. Most sentences described Russia's actions factually and describe the invasion in disapproving terms, but never mentioned anything related to 'the member states cooperate against Russia'. I would argue this has diplomatic reasons. Focusing on the collective security of the European Union rather than emphasizing antagonism, reflects a unified stance. Aggressive rhetoric or cooperating against a particular state could complicate diplomatic efforts or ongoing negotiations and lead to fragmentation.

5.5 Limitations and Recommendations

In this research, I compared only two annual implementation reports of the Common Security and Defence Policy. I chose those because they fit my research best. However, I found annual implementation reports going back more than ten years. Future research on the Russia/Ukraine and CSDP case could do a more extensive analysis and include more events that have influenced the relationship between Ukraine and Russia and the building tensions over the past years.

Another limitation is the discourse analysis itself. Analysing discourse gives insights into underlying assumptions and how language reflects power dynamics. However, there is always the question if the things people say lead to actual consequences or whether people say things they do not mean. This limits the validity of this research. In this research, the risk of discrepancy between language and implementation is reduced by the fact that the annual implementation report also covers projects that have already been implemented or are currently being implemented. This minimizes the effect on the validity.

Furthermore, this research was not able to measure all aspects of the theories. Especially 'number of actors' is a factor that plays an important role in *Collective Action Theory*, *Liberal Institutionalism* and *Crisis Management Theory*. The effect of a change in the number of actors within the EU can only be measured at times when the EU expands or when a member leaves the EU, something which has occurred once. It could be interesting for future research to examine if and how this factor can be measured within the EU.

Factors of *Transboundary Crisis Management* we have not observed within the texts of this research were 'exposure to crisis' and 'possibility to decouple'. More member state-level research could probably give more insights on these factors by looking at the individual stances of the member states.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

The call for more strategic autonomy in almost every policy area in the European Union has increased over the past years due to several crises (Zandee et al., 2020; Damen, 2022). The need for more cooperation among member states to be less dependent on Russian gas or military support from the United States has grown (Van Hooft & Wagner, 2022). However, not every member state of the EU is as interested in contributing to more strategic autonomy because of its own interests. The question that arises is if a crisis can change that. This thesis aims to indicate whether a transboundary crisis leads to more international cooperation. There is a lot of discussion and unclarity about the relationship between these two variables. Some scholars argue that the egoistic nature of states makes international cooperation impossible, even in times of crisis (Lowery, 2016). Others approach international cooperation as highly feasible and likely, especially when an international organisation is involved (Keohane, 1984). Russia's invasion of Ukraine is used as a case because it is a direct threat to the European Union and one of the crises that led to the call for more strategic autonomy. By performing a discourse analysis of the annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy from before and after the invasion, this thesis aims to answer the following research question:

How did the discourse on cooperation in the annual implementation of Common Security and Defence Policy in the European Parliament change after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022?

The discourse on cooperation changed in the annual implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It indicated a broader sense of unity among member states in joint action against the war and showed a more autonomous Europe that ascribes itself a role as a world leader.

The European Union presents itself in the annual report of 2022 as a global actor addressing its member states and allies to cooperate. Joint defence initiatives such as coordinated military support for Ukraine and unified responses to security threats demonstrate the EU's capability to act independently. The unified and independent response signals a significant step towards strategic autonomy. And, as mentioned before, we know from the literature that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the process of creating a European Union defence-union (Krentz, 2024). This development is noticeable in the differences between the annual report of 2021 and the annual report of 2022. Even though the results indicate that the EU is moving towards a more autonomous security position, the example of Germany showed that it is also still depending on external actors to

achieve consensus among member states. Germany actively sought allies in the United States to come to joint action.

The effect of crisis on cooperation in the context of the response from the European Union to Russia's invasion of Ukraine is positive. The existing transboundary crisis led to a positive change in discourse on cooperation among member states of the Union. Together with the cooperation activities mentioned in the report of 2022 that are already implemented this supports the theoretical expectations of *Liberal Institutionalism* and *Transboundary Crisis Management*. The results show that the EU was able to overcome barriers to establish cooperation.

6. 1 Scientific relevance

This research contributed to the literature by deepening our understanding of how international actors can effectively cooperate in the face of transboundary crisis and whether existing theories are sufficient to explain such cooperation. The research bridges between three different theoretical frameworks by applying them to one of the greatest security threats in the history of the European Union. It explores how international organisations overcome collective action problems in times of crisis. It offers an example of how an international institution such as the EU fosters cooperation among states during a crisis. It applies a relatively new theory – *Transboundary Crisis Management* – to a crisis case which contributes to the further development of the theory.

Furthermore, this research is directly relevant to the ongoing discussion on European strategic autonomy, especially in the defence and security policy area. We concluded that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the process of a more strategic autonomous Europe.

The field of how crisis affect international cooperation is a growing one. This research adds a valuable case study and contributes to the literature.

6.2 Societal relevance

The Russian-Ukrainian war has a serious effect on the citizens of the European Union. Their feeling of safety decreased (NOS, 2024) and the economic consequences hit them in their daily life (Liadze et al., 2022). This research gives European citizens insights into how the European Union responds to the crisis. Knowing that member states are cooperating to increase the European defence force can increase their safety feeling and trust in the institution. The manifestation of a sense of unity among the leaders of the European countries has an influence on the sense of unity among residents of the member states.

All in all, we can conclude that the transboundary crisis the European Union is faced with in the form of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has led to a change in discourse on cooperation and to an increase in cooperation among member states. And that this international cooperation not only adds an interesting case to the literature but also answers the call of the Union for more strategic autonomy.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Complete coding scheme

Codebook: Master's thesis
Emma-Sophie Ekelmans
Version 1.0 (English)

1. Project description

This thesis aims to research the relation between transboundary crisis and cooperation within the European Union.

2. Sampling Unit

- Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2021, European Parliament resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2021 (2021/2183(INI))
- Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022, European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022 (2022/2050(INI))

3. Coding Unit

Both documents consist mainly of bullet points, containing sentences that do not end with punctuation, but are linked by ';'. Therefore, the coding units are:

- a) sentences starting at the beginning of a bullet point and finishing at the first following ';',
- b) sentences starting after a ';' and finishing at the next ';' or
- c) start after a ';' and finish at the end of the bullet point.

4. Variables

The variables of this research are 'transboundary crisis' and 'cooperation'. I translated that to the following codes:

(X) = Transboundary crisis = Russia, Ukraine

(Y) = Cooperation = Cooperation/Cooperative, Collaboration, Partnership, Work(ing) together

5. Coding process

About all coding units the following questions are answered, based on the What is the Problem Represented to Be?-approach.

- Problem: What is the problem mentioned in the sentence?
- Strategy: What is the strategy mentioned in the sentence (to get from the problem to the solution)?
- Solution: What is the solution mentioned in the sentence?

Mentioned in the coding document, but in the end excluded from coding:

- Headers
- Titles
- Names
- Cooperation/Cooperative, Collaboration, Partnership, Work(ing) together mentioned in a sentence that is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

6. Set up

The coding is structured in the following way:

Number) Quote with the **coded word** (page number of the coded word)

- Problem:
- Strategy:
- Solution:

Document 1: before Russia's invasion in Ukraine (2021)

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2021, European Parliament resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2021 (2021/2183(INI))

Cooperation/cooperative, partner(ship(s)), Work(ing) together, Collaborate/Collaboratively

1) having regard to its position of 28 April 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, and of the Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information (p. 2)

- Part of a name

2) having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations (p.2)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

3) having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (p.2)

- Part of a name

4) having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 November 2020 on the 2020 Strategic Review of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (p.3)

- Part of a name

5) having regard to the Council conclusions on a renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new agenda for the Mediterranean of 16 April 2021 (p.3)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

6) having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (p.4)

- Part of a name

7) having regard to the two Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2014 and 10 July 2018 (p.4)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

8) having regard to the EU-United States summit statement entitled 'Towards a renewed Transatlantic partnership' of 15 June 2021 (p.5)

- Part of a name

9) whereas the proliferation of cyber-attacks against strategic infrastructure during the COVID-19 crisis, and more recently the Pegasus affair, are examples that justify the rapid development of protective measures against the most recent forms of cyber-threat and the most advanced spying techniques; whereas the EU has committed to investing EUR 1,6 billion in response capacity and the deployment of cybersecurity tools for public authorities, enterprises and individuals, and to increasing cooperation between the public and private sectors in this field; (p.6)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

10) whereas an unprecedented build-up of Russian forces in and around Ukraine linked with demands put forward by Kremlin could – if not countered – lead to the return of spheres of influence in Europe and cut short the ambitions of the EU's eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO; (p.6)

- Problem: unprecedented build-up of Russian forces in and around Ukraine linked with demands put forward by Kremlin that could lead to the return of spheres of influence in Europe and cut short the ambitions of the EU's eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO
- Strategy: counter the build-up of Russian forces and the demands put forward by Kremlin
- Solution: avoiding of the return of spheres of influence in Europe and the short cut of the ambitions of the EU's eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO

11) notes that, in this context, the response to the external security challenges of the Union and its Member States lies primarily in the affirmation and practical implementation of capacities for a better assessment of crisis situations, faster decision-making and more robust action where circumstances so require, autonomously where necessary, in order to defend its interests and values, while respecting alliances and partnerships; (p.7)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

12) Stresses that the Strategic Compass must make it possible to strengthen the Union's capacity to act as an increasingly credible strategic partner and a global actor for peace which strengthens and defends a rules-based international system and multilateral cooperation, as well as the ability to act autonomously if necessary; (p.8)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

13) Stresses that the Strategic Compass must make it possible to strengthen the Union's capacity to act as an increasingly credible strategic partner and a global actor for peace which strengthens and defends a rules-based international system and multilateral cooperation, as well as the ability to act autonomously if necessary; (p.8)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

14) recalls that the EU's current level of ambition for security and defence, as set out in the 14 November 2016 Council conclusions, includes responding to external conflicts and crises, building the capacities of partners, and 'protecting the Union and its citizens' (p.9)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

15) expresses its grave concern at the growing influence of foreign private military companies and the possible plans of the Malian government to initiate cooperation with a private Russian military company, the Kremlin proxy Wagner Group, on training of its armed forces; points out that such cooperation is incompatible with security and defence cooperation with the EU, in particular EUTM Mali, and would therefore require the EU to reassess its engagement in Mali; (p.10)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

16) expresses its grave concern at the growing influence of foreign private military companies and the possible plans of the Malian government to initiate cooperation with a private Russian military company, the Kremlin proxy Wagner Group, on training of its armed forces; points out that such cooperation is incompatible with security and defence cooperation with the EU, in particular EUTM Mali, and would therefore require the EU to reassess its engagement in Mali; (p.10)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

17) expresses its grave concern at the growing influence of foreign private military companies and the possible plans of the Malian government to initiate cooperation with a private Russian military company, the Kremlin proxy Wagner Group, on training of its armed forces; points out that such cooperation is incompatible with security and defence cooperation with the EU, in particular EUTM Mali, and would therefore require the EU to reassess its engagement in Mali; (p.10)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine, only Russia

18) Notes the announcement of the reorganisation of French military action in the Sahel, in conjunction and in consultation with our international and African partners; (p.10)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

19) stresses that these developments should take place in close consultation with all international partners, particularly European ones, present in the Sahel; (p.10)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

20) Welcomes the adaptation of the new extended mandate of EUTM Mali; calls for strengthening structural cooperation and non-executive support to the armed forces and for speeding up the regionalisation process which enables the mission to provide military assistance to the armed forces of the G5 countries and in particular to Burkina Faso and Niger, which will have implications for international, European and African partners; underlines the possibilities opened up by the European Peace Facility with regard to the delivery of equipment intended for the training of the Malian armed forces, which will be essential for strengthening the action and the effectiveness of European action; is convinced that the EU needs to rapidly and effectively increase its capabilities to provide equipment so that EUCAP and EUTM missions do not lose their credibility with local authorities, provided that those security forces comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and are under democratic control; (p.10)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

21) Welcomes the adaptation of the new extended mandate of EUTM Mali; calls for strengthening structural cooperation and non-executive support to the armed forces and for speeding up the regionalisation process which enables the mission to provide military assistance to the armed forces of the G5 countries and in particular to Burkina Faso and Niger, which will have implications for international, European and African partners; underlines the possibilities opened up by the European Peace Facility with regard to the delivery of equipment intended for the training of the Malian armed forces, which will be essential for strengthening the action and the effectiveness of European action; is convinced that the EU needs to rapidly and effectively increase its capabilities to provide equipment so that EUCAP and EUTM missions do not lose their credibility with local authorities, provided that those security forces comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and are under democratic control; (p.10)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

22) Calls on the Member States to provide a significant contribution to EUTM Mali's consultancy activity and to send the staff able to contribute to it; recalls that in the Sahel, the regionalisation process of CSDP must continue to strengthen cooperation and coordination with international actors as well as with the EU Member States involved in the region, through ongoing initiatives such as the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S); (p.10)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

23) Calls on the Member States to provide a significant contribution to EUTM Mali's consultancy activity and to send the staff able to contribute to it; recalls that in the Sahel, the regionalisation process of CSDP must continue to strengthen cooperation and coordination with international actors as well as with the EU Member States involved in the region, through ongoing initiatives such as the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S); (p.10)

- Part of a name

24) welcomes and further encourages the participation of like-minded partners in order to ensure safe waterways in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean; calls for an integrated approach to tackle the development and governance issues driving piracy; (p.11)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

25) looks forward to Ukraine's participation in the Althea mission; recognises the important cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans, notably through EUFOR Althea mission, whose operation headquarters are located at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) thanks to the Berlin Plus Arrangement; (p.13)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

26) strongly condemns Russia's illegal occupation and militarisation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia in violation of international law, which poses a serious threat to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region and Europe as a whole; (p.13)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

- EaP

27) reiterates its call for the EU to ensure that the security dimension of EaP countries is properly reflected in the Strategic Compass and to consider launching a series of security compacts – frameworks for increased investment and assistance in security, military, intelligence and cyber cooperation – with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as associated countries, in order to strengthen their resilience and security; (p.13)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine
- EaP

28) recalls that EUAM Iraq is the only CSDP mission or operation that has a cultural heritage protection component included in its mandate in order to provide assistance and education to local partners in addressing security challenges related to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage; calls on the Council and the EEAS to include a similar component in other missions and operations; (p. 13/14)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

29) is concerned by the fact that NATO, which is active in the area through Operation Sea Guardian, is not effectively collaborating by means of increased cooperation cohesion or by sharing information and resources; stresses the strategic importance of public communication about the mission and its boardings of vessels, friendly approaches and inspections, including refusals; stresses the international obligations on search and rescue of people in distress at sea in full compliance with maritime law; (p.14)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

30) is concerned by the fact that NATO, which is active in the area through Operation Sea Guardian, is not effectively collaborating by means of increased cooperation cohesion or by sharing information and resources; stresses the strategic importance of public communication about the mission and its boardings of vessels, friendly approaches and inspections, including refusals; stresses the international obligations on search and rescue of people in distress at sea in full compliance with maritime law; (p.14)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

31) Commends the work of European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine); notes the EEAS's needs assessment report on the professional military education (PME) sector in Ukraine and welcomes the ongoing work in scoping possible EU engagement in Ukraine on its basis, complementing the efforts made by Ukraine and its international partners in reforming PME the country; (p.14/15)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine, only Ukraine

32) underlines in this regard the need for joint efforts by EU, Member States and partner countries, including in anticipation of hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, and of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks; (p.16)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine, only Russia in relation to the EU

33) Welcomes the cooperation capacity of European armies in helping citizens in the fight against the pandemic in 2020; (p.17)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

34) agrees with the analysis of the Commission President in her 2021 SOTEU address that the EU needs to improve intelligence cooperation; (p.18)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

35) stresses that the EEAS must closely monitor and ensure the traceability and proper use of the material delivered to our partners under the EPF, bearing in mind the EPF's 360 degree approach; (p.18/19)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

36) points out that the EPF does not solely address the provision of equipment to partners but also functions as a funding option for the common costs of military operation within the CSDP that should be used to the necessary extent;(p.19)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

37) Points out that, given current maritime geopolitical tensions, the Union must defend universal values and principles, the UN Charter, international law such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), multilateralism and international cooperation, and protect its interests by guaranteeing freedom of navigation, the safety of maritime lines of communication and offshore infrastructure; recalls that the Union's maritime interests are closely linked to the well-being, prosperity and security of its citizens, and that approximately 90 % of the Union's external trade and 40 % of its internal trade is transported by sea; (p.19)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

38) underlines the need for the Union and NATO to cooperate closely to adopt an effective common approach to threats to maritime security, such as cross-border and organised crime, including organised criminal networks involved in trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs trafficking, smuggling and illegal fishing; (p.20)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

39) insists that the Union and the Member States react firmly and in a coordinated manner against any new malicious, illegal or destabilising cyber-activity by making full use of the instruments available to the EU and in coordination with its partners; (p.20)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

40) calls for an urgent revision of the cyber defence policy framework in order to increase the prevention, attribution, deterrence and responsiveness capacity of the Union and its Member States by strengthening their position, situational awareness, tools and procedures; underlines the need for all EU institutions and EU Member States to cooperate at all levels to build a cybersecurity strategy, whose main objective should be to further strengthen resilience, and to develop common, and also better, national, robust civilian and military cyber-capabilities and cooperation in order to respond to lasting security challenges; welcomes therefore the 2021 SOTEU announcement of a European cyber defence policy; (p.20)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

41) underlines the need for all EU institutions and EU Member States to cooperate at all levels to build a cybersecurity strategy, whose main objective should be to further strengthen resilience, and to develop common, and also better, national, robust civilian and military cyber-capabilities and cooperation in order to respond to lasting security challenges; welcomes therefore the 2021 SOTEU announcement of a European cyber defence policy; (p.20)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

42) welcomes the increased cooperation among Member States on cyber defence in the framework of PESCO, including cyber rapid response teams; recalls that the successful implementation of EU missions and operations is increasingly dependent on uninterrupted access to a secure cyberspace, and thus requires robust and resilient cyber-operational capabilities, as well as adequate responses to attacks against military installations, missions and operations; (p.20/21)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

43) urges all EU institutions and Member States to continue to improve their cyber and automated technologies, and further encourages cooperation on these technological advances; recommends that options to foster the cyber capability-building of our partners should be explored, such as extending the mandate of EU training missions to also comprise cyber defence issues or launching civilian cyber missions; (p.21)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

44) urges all EU institutions and Member States to continue to improve their cyber and automated technologies, and further encourages cooperation on these technological advances; recommends that options to foster the cyber capability-building of our partners should be explored, such as extending the mandate of EU training missions to also comprise cyber defence issues or launching civilian cyber missions; (p.21)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

45) Warns that outer space has the potential to quickly become a military arena if the right international legal instruments are not put in place; insists that the Union should lead the way in strengthening the

increasingly contested area of international space law, strive to prevent the weaponisation of space by working towards a comprehensive international legal instrument, and foster alliances, international cooperation and multilateral solutions in this regard; (p.22)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

46) Insists that freedom of air traffic must be maintained; calls on the Union to protect itself against any threat to civil aviation or any failure to respect its airspace, and to defend international aviation safety in cooperation with NATO's air policing mission and with the EU's partners; calls on the VP/HR begin work to assess the advisability of extending the concept of a coordinated maritime presence to the air environment; (p.23)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

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- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

48) recalls the objective of strengthening the strategic autonomy of the European Union so that it can be a credible strategic partner, which is demanding and capable of defending its interests and values; welcomes in this regard the work and initiatives of the Commission and the activities of the EEAS; (p.24)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

49) welcomes the provisions of the Defence Procurement Directive (Directive 2009/81/EC) that aim to foster cooperative procurement in defence, and calls on the Member States to make full use of the development efforts undertaken under the EDF as well as to ensure that an adequate level of economies of scale is achieved; (p.24)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

50) stresses in this context the necessity for close cooperation between the EU and the UK on security and defence matters; (p.25)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

51) Stresses that PESCO and the EDF are first and foremost tools at the service of the Union and its Member States; stresses that PESCO and the EDF must make it possible to enhance defence cooperation with high European added value between Member States; (p.25)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

52) welcomes the participation of the United States, Norway and Canada in the military mobility project; welcomes the bilateral partnerships on security and defence dialogue, in particular with Canada and Norway, two important contributors to CSDP missions and operations; (p.25/26)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

53) highlights that these projects are important for strengthening European military capabilities in general; highlights that the results of the first CARD, which identified modernisation and the acquisition of main battle tank systems as a focus area for cooperation; (p.28)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

54) recommends that the Member States in question explore additional cooperation and funding possibilities at the European level, especially the EDF, in order to make full use of the European defence industries' innovation potential and achieve greater economies of scale; (p.28)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

55) stresses in this context the necessity for close cooperation between the EU and the UK on security and defence matters, building stronger defence partnerships and supporting the autonomy of partner countries; (p.28)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

56) stresses in this context the necessity for close cooperation between the EU and the UK on security and defence matters, building stronger defence **partnerships** and supporting the autonomy of partner countries; (p.28)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

57) stresses in this context the necessity for close cooperation between the EU and the UK on security and defence matters, building stronger defence partnerships and supporting the autonomy of **partner** countries; (p.28)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

58) Building stronger defence **partnerships** and supporting the sovereignty of partner countries (p.28)

- Title

59) Building stronger defence partnerships and supporting the sovereignty of **partner** countries (p.28)

- Title

60) Strengthening dialogue, **partnerships** and cooperation on security and defence (p.28)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

61) Strengthening dialogue, partnerships and **cooperation** on security and defence (p.28)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

62) Stresses that the Union should adopt a strategic approach to its mutually beneficial **partnerships** based, in particular, on shared values and principles on the defence of its interests and its aim to achieve strategic autonomy; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

63) underlines that it is in the Union's interest to act together with **partners**, in full respect of alliances, with strategic autonomy being a part of the multilateral framework; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

64) Calls for even deeper **cooperation** with international organisations and in particular with the UN, including between CSDP missions and peacekeeping operations, especially on joint theatres; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

65) stresses the importance of **cooperation** with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on security; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

66) stresses the importance of cooperation with the Organisation for Security and **Cooperation** in Europe (OSCE) on security; (p.29)

- Part of a name

67) Underlines the need to strengthen EU-US transatlantic **cooperation** on the basis of an equal partnership based on shared values and objectives, while respecting the other party's autonomy, interests and aspirations; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

68) Underlines the need to strengthen EU-US transatlantic cooperation on the basis of an equal **partnership** based on shared values and objectives, while respecting the other party's autonomy, interests and aspirations; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

69) stresses the operational dimension of the [partnership](#) and the importance of ensuring that the Union maintains its strategic autonomy, in particular as regards the United States' International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR); (p.29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

70) Points out that the necessary [cooperation](#) with NATO enshrined in Article 42(2) of the North Atlantic Treaty must develop with due regard for the specific characteristics and roles of NATO and the EU, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of both organisations; calls for a stronger NATO supported by a stronger European Union (the European pillar within NATO) and wishes to see very tangible development in the EU- NATO partnership, particularly in view of the growing hybridisation of threats, and which should include parameters which are not directly military in the strategic competition in peacetime; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

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- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

72) considers that the work being carried out in parallel on both the EU's Strategic Compass and the expected update of NATO's Strategic Concept represents a unique opportunity to establish clear priorities and coherence as well as identify additional synergies in order to strengthen the transatlantic bond and further EU-NATO [cooperation](#); (p.29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

73) notes with concern, however, that deep and persistent divergences with one non-EU-NATO ally are hampering [cooperation](#) between the two organisations and undermining solidarity between the Member States, particularly in the strategic area of Eastern Mediterranean; looks forward to the new EU-NATO Joint Declaration; (p.29/30)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

74) Calls for closer relations with the democratic states in the Indo-Pacific region, and in specific policy sectors (cybersecurity, hybrid, maritime, arms control etc.), with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with Latin American [partners](#); (p.30)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

75) Welcomes the signing of the Strategic Military and Defence [Cooperation](#) Agreement between Greece and France as a positive step towards European strategic autonomy and the creation of a true and functioning European Defence Union; calls for enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, the illicit trade in weapons and human trafficking; (p.30/31)

- Part of a name

76) Welcomes the signing of the Strategic Military and Defence Cooperation Agreement between Greece and France as a positive step towards European strategic autonomy and the creation of a true and functioning European Defence Union; calls for enhanced [cooperation](#) with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, the illicit trade in weapons and human trafficking; (p.30/31)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

77) Welcomes the signing of the Strategic Military and Defence Cooperation Agreement between Greece and France as a positive step towards European strategic autonomy and the creation of a true and functioning European Defence Union; calls for enhanced cooperation with [partner](#) countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, the illicit trade in weapons and human trafficking; (p.30/31)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

78) urges the Member States to continue cooperation with the Arctic Council on all issues of interest to the EU and to develop a comprehensive strategy for the region; (p.31)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

79) stresses that the EU must have a clear vision of its role in Arctic security matters and engage in effective cooperation with NATO; (p.31)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

80) stresses that the Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation, and warns against increased militarisation of the region; (p.31)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

81) Acknowledges the importance of CSDP involvement in the Eastern Neighbourhood; supports the deepening of military and security cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries to maintain stability at the borders of the Union; reiterates its call for developing a more active EU role in the peaceful resolution of ongoing conflicts and in the prevention of any future conflicts in the region; calls for support to be provided to Eastern Partnership countries and the involvement of interested Eastern Partnership countries in the activities of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats; (p.31)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine
- Eastern Partnership
- Prevention of future conflicts
- Stability at the borders of the Union

82) Acknowledges the importance of CSDP involvement in the Eastern Neighbourhood; supports the deepening of military and security cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries to maintain stability at the borders of the Union; reiterates its call for developing a more active EU role in the peaceful resolution of ongoing conflicts and in the prevention of any future conflicts in the region; calls for support to be provided to Eastern Partnership countries and the involvement of interested Eastern Partnership countries in the activities of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats; (p.31)

- Part of a name

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- Part of a name

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- Part of a name

85) calls for setting up an EU Strategic Communications-Eastern Partnership cooperation platform to address issues related to tackling disinformation with a view to improving the resilience of the Eastern Partnership countries; (p.31)

- Part of a name

86) calls for setting up an EU Strategic Communications-Eastern Partnership cooperation platform to address issues related to tackling disinformation with a view to improving the resilience of the Eastern Partnership countries; (p.31)

- Eastern Partnership countries
- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

87) calls for setting up an EU Strategic Communications-Eastern Partnership cooperation platform to address issues related to tackling disinformation with a view to improving the resilience of the Eastern Partnership countries; (p.31)

- Part of a name

88) Recognises the contribution of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to CSDP missions and operations; supports closer defence and security cooperation with these valued partners; (p.31)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

89) Recognises the contribution of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to CSDP missions and operations; supports closer defence and security cooperation with these valued partners; (p.31)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

90) welcomes the launch of EU-Ukraine dialogue on cybersecurity and encourages similar engagement with other interested Eastern Partnership countries; (p.31/32)

- Part of the name

91) Regrets the lack of a security and defence cooperation partnership between the UK and the EU on account of the British Government's lack of interest, despite the assurances given in the political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK; (p.32)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

92) Regrets the lack of a security and defence cooperation partnership between the UK and the EU on account of the British Government's lack of interest, despite the assurances given in the political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK; (p.32)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

93) underlines the need for an agreement on EU-UK foreign policy and security cooperation in order to be able to better tackle common global security challenges; (p.32)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

94) calls on the UK Government to open up negotiations for establishing strong cooperation on foreign policy, security, defence, and capability development; (p.32)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

95) calls for a closer cooperation and stronger partnership to be built up with relevant African organisations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, the Southern African Development Committee (SADC), G5 Sahel, the Pan African Parliament, promoting a greater parliamentary role in Africa; (p.32)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

96) calls for a closer cooperation and stronger partnership to be built up with relevant African organisations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, the Southern African Development Committee (SADC), G5 Sahel, the Pan African Parliament, promoting a greater parliamentary role in Africa; (p.32)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

97) Calls for cooperation on training and military capacity building with partner countries weakened by conflicts or regional threats or targeted by malicious foreign interference; (p.32)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

98) Calls for cooperation on training and military capacity building with partner countries weakened by conflicts or regional threats or targeted by malicious foreign interference; (p.32)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

99) calls for more actions to curb money laundering, and empowering partners, especially in Africa and Latin America, by means of mechanisms to curb murky financial transactions involving tax haven authorities; (p.32)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

100) Stresses the need to develop ever closer cooperation with national parliaments on CSDP matters in order to reinforce accountability and scrutiny and to strengthen defence diplomacy;

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

Russia(n), Ukraine/Ukrainian

- Multiple times Ukraine/Russia in one sentence will be coded separately, but the 'problem, strategy, solution' will be the same.

101) having regard to Russia's illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea, (p.5)

- Problem: Russia's illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea
- Strategy: The European Parliament takes the invasion into regard in the conclusions in this document
- Solution: -

102) having regard to Russia's violation of Member States' airspace and maritime borders, (p.5)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

103) whereas an unprecedented build-up of Russian forces in and around Ukraine linked with demands put forward by Kremlin could – if not countered – lead to the return of spheres of influence in Europe and cut short the ambitions of the EU's eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO; (p.6)

- Problem: unprecedented build-up of Russian forces in and around Ukraine linked with demands put forward by Kremlin that could lead to the return of spheres of influence in Europe and cut short the ambitions of the EU's eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO
- Strategy: counter the build-up of Russian forces and the demands put forward by Kremlin
- Solution: avoiding of the return of spheres of influence in Europe and the short cut of the ambitions of the EU's eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO

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- Strategy: counter the build-up of Russian forces and the demands put forward by Kremlin
- Solution: avoiding of the return of spheres of influence in Europe and the short cut of the ambitions of the EU's eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO

106) whereas the international community, and especially the EU, has a commitment to the Sahel and to Mali in particular; whereas the Malian junta has welcomed and already uses Russian military instructors and mercenaries connected to the so-called Wagner group to participate in military activities in Mali; (p.6)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

107) considers that instability and unpredictability on the Union's borders and in its immediate neighbourhood (North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, etc.), as well as in its extended neighbourhood (Sahel, Horn of Africa, etc.), together with Russian aggression against Ukraine and Georgia pose both a direct and indirect threat to the security of the continent; (p.7)

- Problem: direct and indirect threat to the security of the European continent
- Strategy: -
- Solution: more stability and predictability on the Union's borders and its immediate neighbourhood as well as in its extended neighbourhood, and less aggression from Russia against Ukraine and Georgia.

108) considers that instability and unpredictability on the Union's borders and in its immediate neighbourhood (North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, etc.), as well as in its extended neighbourhood (Sahel, Horn of Africa, etc.), together with Russian aggression against Ukraine and Georgia pose both a direct and indirect threat to the security of the continent; (p.7)

- Problem: direct and indirect threat to the security of the European continent
- Strategy: -
- Solution: more stability and predictability on the Union's borders and its immediate neighbourhood as well as in its extended neighbourhood, and less aggression from Russia against Ukraine and Georgia.

109) stresses the importance of stability in the Western Balkans; notes with concern the increasing militarisation of the Crimean Peninsula and the attempts by the Russian Federation to destabilise the Black Sea region; (p.7)

- Problem: the increasing militarization of the Crimean Peninsula and the attempts by the Russian Federation to destabilize the Black Sea region
- Strategy: -
- Solution: have more stability in the Western Balkans

110) Strongly condemns the Russian military build-up in and around Ukraine, as well as the Kremlin's demand to halt the further expansion of NATO and reshape the European security architecture based on an outdated idea of 'spheres of influence'; (p.7)

- Problem: the Russian military build-up in and around Ukraine, as well as the Kremlin's demand to halt the further expansion of NATO and reshape the European security architecture based on an outdated idea of 'spheres of influence'
- Strategy: -
- Solution: the Russian military should not build-up in and around Ukraine, condemning of the Kremlin's demand to halt the further expansion of NATO, and the European security architecture should not be reshaped on an outdated idea of 'spheres of influence' of the Russian

111) Strongly condemns the Russian military build-up in and around Ukraine, as well as the Kremlin's demand to halt the further expansion of NATO and reshape the European security architecture based on an outdated idea of 'spheres of influence'; (p.7)

- Problem: the Russian military build-up in and around Ukraine, as well as the Kremlin's demand to halt the further expansion of NATO and reshape the European security architecture based on an outdated idea of 'spheres of influence'
- Strategy: -
- Solution: the Russian military should not build-up in and around Ukraine, condemning of the Kremlin's demand to halt the further expansion of NATO, and the European security architecture should not be reshaped on an outdated idea of 'spheres of influence' of the Russian

112) underlines the fact that each democratic country is free to choose its own alliances and in this regard, strongly supports the pro-western aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, including their membership of NATO and future EU accession; (p.7)

- Problem: the Russian make it seem like not each democratic country is free to choose its own alliances and in this regard, for Ukraine and Georgia not free to have pro-western aspirations, the will to have a NATO membership or future EU accession
- Strategy: the European Parliament underlines that democratic countries are free to choose its own alliances, they support the pro-western aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia

- Solution: these pro-western aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia could lead to membership of the NATO and future EU accession, democratic countries have to choose their own alliances

113) expresses its grave concern at the growing influence of foreign private military companies and the possible plans of the Malian government to initiate cooperation with a private Russian military company, the Kremlin proxy Wagner Group, on training of its armed forces; points out that such cooperation is incompatible with security and defence cooperation with the EU, in particular EUTM Mali, and would therefore require the EU to reassess its engagement in Mali; (p.10)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

114) deplores that since 2018 the President of the CAR has turned to the Wagner Group, a private military company and Russian proxy, which is responsible for war crimes and grave violations of human rights in the CAR; (p.12)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

115) looks forward to Ukraine's participation in the Althea mission; recognises the important cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans, notably through EUFOR Althea mission, whose operation headquarters are located at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) thanks to the Berlin Plus Arrangement; (p.13)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

116) strongly condemns Russia's illegal occupation and militarisation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia in violation of international law, which poses a serious threat to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region and Europe as a whole; (p.13)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

117) is concerned about the deteriorating security situation in the occupied territories of Georgia and about the activities of the Russian Federation, which are destabilising peace and security in the EaP region; (p.13)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

118) urges the EU to keep demanding Russia to engage constructively in the Geneva International Discussions and to fulfil its obligations under the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement, in particular to withdraw all its military forces from Georgia's occupied territories and to allow the EU Monitoring Mission unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia; (p.13)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

119) reiterates its call for the EU to ensure that the security dimension of EaP countries is properly reflected in the Strategic Compass and to consider launching a series of security compacts – frameworks for increased investment and assistance in security, military, intelligence and cyber cooperation – with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as associated countries, in order to strengthen their resilience and security; (p.13)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine
- Eastern Partnership (EaP)

120) Commends the work of European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine); notes the EEAS's needs assessment report on the professional military education (PME) sector in Ukraine and welcomes the ongoing work in scoping possible EU engagement in Ukraine on its basis, complementing the efforts made by Ukraine and its international partners in reforming PME the country; (p.14/15)

- Part of a name

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- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

125) Is concerned about the increasing manipulation of information, disinformation and hybrid threats stemming in particular from Russia, and China, but also from other actors, affecting several theatres and CSDP missions and operations directly, destabilising whole regions and delegitimising the EU's missions abroad; (p.16)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

126) welcomes the imposition of sanctions against Russian, Chinese and North Korean perpetrators of cyber-attacks, including WannaCry, NotPetva and Operation Cloud Hopper; (p.21)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine
- Maar wel; sancties

127) Calls for support to be given to strengthening and preserving the arms control architecture in Europe in a context of gradual erosion marked by the United States' and Russia's withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies; (p.28)

- Sentence is not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

128) welcomes in particular the ongoing or upcoming EU-US dialogues on China, Russia and the Indo-Pacific; (p. 29)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

129) Recognises the contribution of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to CSDP missions and operations; supports closer defence and security cooperation with these valued partners; (p. 31)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

130) Reiterates its strong condemnation of Russia's aggressive behaviour towards Ukraine, notably the substantial military build-up at Ukraine's borders and in the Donbas, the occupied Crimean peninsula and Belarus, the continuous financial and military support for armed groups in the Donbas, the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the blockade of the Sea of Azov and repeated cyber and other hybrid attacks against Ukraine; (p. 31)

- Problem: Russia's aggressive behaviour towards Ukraine, the substantial military build-up at Ukraine's borders and in the Donbas, the occupied Crimean peninsula and Belarus, the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the blockade of the Sea of Azov and repeated cyber and other hybrid attacks against Ukraine
- Strategy: the European Parliament has a strong condemnation towards this behaviour

- Solution: no aggressive behaviour from Russia towards Ukraine, stop the military build-up at Ukraine's borders and in the Donbas, the Crimean peninsula and Belarus, stop financial and military support for armed groups in the Donbas, stop the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, stop the blockade of the Sea of Azov and stop the repeated cyber and other hybrid attacks against Ukraine

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- Problem: Russia's aggressive behaviour towards Ukraine, the substantial military build-up at Ukraine's borders and in the Donbas, the occupied Crimean peninsula and Belarus, the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the blockade of the Sea of Azov and repeated cyber and other hybrid attacks against Ukraine
- Strategy: the European Parliament has a strong condemnation towards this behaviour
- Solution: no aggressive behaviour from Russia towards Ukraine, stop the military build-up at Ukraine's borders and in the Donbas, the Crimean peninsula and Belarus, stop financial and military support for armed groups in the Donbas, stop the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, stop the blockade of the Sea of Azov and stop the repeated cyber and other hybrid attacks against Ukraine

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- Solution: no aggressive behaviour from Russia towards Ukraine, stop the military build-up at Ukraine's borders and in the Donbas, the Crimean peninsula and Belarus, stop financial and military support for armed groups in the Donbas, stop the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, stop the blockade of the Sea of Azov and stop the repeated cyber and other hybrid attacks against Ukraine

134) underlines that Russia's military build-up and repeated breach of the ceasefire represent a threat to peace, stability and security in Europe; (p.31)

- Problem: threat to peace, stability and security in Europe

- Strategy: if Russia stops its military build-up and repeated breach of the ceasefire than that would be better for the peace, stability and security of Europe
- Solution: Russia's military build-up needs to be stopped and Russia needs to uphold its ceasefires

135) calls on the Russian Government to withdraw its forces from the Ukrainian borders and stop threatening its neighbours; (p.31)

- Problem: Russia's forces at Ukraine's borders and the threatening of Ukraine by Russia
- Strategy: European Parliament calls on the Russian Government to withdraw its forces and stop the threatening
- Solution: Russian Government withdraws its forces from the Ukrainian borders and stops its threatening against Ukraine

136) calls on the Russian Government to withdraw its forces from the Ukrainian borders and stop threatening its neighbours; (p.31)

- Problem: Russia's forces at Ukraine's borders and the threatening of Ukraine by Russia
- Strategy: European Parliament calls on the Russian Government to withdraw its forces and stop the threatening
- Solution: Russian Government withdraws its forces from the Ukrainian borders and stops its threatening against Ukraine

137) recalls that the Normandy Format and Minsk I & II Agreements are the only diplomatic initiatives that aim to end hostilities between Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk and calls for support for efforts to restart Normandy Format talks and achieve tangible results; (p. 31)

- Problem: hostilities between Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk
- Strategy: restart Normandy Format talks and achieve tangible results
- Solution: Normandy Format and Minsk I & II Agreements are the only diplomatic initiatives that end the hostilities

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- Problem: hostilities between Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk
- Strategy: restart Normandy Format talks and achieve tangible results
- Solution: Normandy Format and Minsk I & II Agreements are the only diplomatic initiatives that end the hostilities

139) commends the considerable efforts to sustain intense cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the United States and among Member States as regards the situation; calls for increased and credible military and security assistance to Ukraine, according to its needs, including by mobilising the European Peace Facility; (p.31)

- Problem: not enough military and security assistance to Ukraine according to its needs
- Strategy: mobilising the European Peace Facility, considerable efforts to sustain intense cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the United States and among Member States as regards the situation
- Solution: increased and credible military and security assistance to Ukraine, according to its needs, including mobilized European Peace Facility

140) encourages the Member States to increase their bilateral military and security assistance to Ukraine; (p.31)

- Problem: not enough bilateral military and security assistance to Ukraine
- Strategy: European Parliament encourages the Member States of the European Union to increase their bilateral military and security assistance to Ukraine
- Solution: increased bilateral military and security assistance to Ukraine

141) acknowledges the first meeting of the EU-Ukraine cyber dialogue and stands ready to support, if needed, an increase in EU cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine; (p.31)

- Sentence not related to the relation Russia and Ukraine

142) acknowledges the first meeting of the EU-Ukraine cyber dialogue and stands ready to support, if needed, an increase in EU cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine; (p.31)

- Sentence not related to the relation Russia and Ukraine

143) welcomes the launch of EU-Ukraine dialogue on cybersecurity and encourages similar engagement with other interested Eastern Partnership countries; (p. 31/32)

- Sentence not related to the relation Russia and Ukraine
- Eastern Partnership countries

Document 2: after Russia's invasion in Ukraine (2022)

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022, European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022 (2022/2050(INI))

Cooperation/cooperative, partner(ship(s)), Work(ing) together, Collaborate/Collaboratively

144) having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, (p.1)

- Part of a name

145) having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States, (p.1)

- Part of a name

146) having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/2444 of 12 December 2022 on a European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger), (p. 2)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

147) having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – a new Agenda for the Mediterranean, (p.3)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

148) having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 January 2022 on taking the UN-EU strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management to the next level: Priorities 2022-2024, (p.3)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

149) having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023, (p.4)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

150) having regard to the EU-United States summit statement of 15 June 2021 entitled 'Towards a renewed Transatlantic partnership', (p.5)

- Part of a name

151) having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations, (p.6)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

152) having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2022 on security in the Eastern Partnership area and the role of the common security and defence policy (p. 7)

- Part of a name

153) having regard to its recommendation of 14 September 2022 to the Commission and the Commission Vice President/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new agenda for the Mediterranean, (p.7)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

154) whereas Russian-Chinese military cooperation significantly increased in 2022, as showcased by multiple joint military drills; (p.9)

- Not about the relation between Russia and Ukraine

155) whereas in late December 2022, Japan and South Korea, two important partners of the EU, underlined the need for cooperation with the EU in their updated security strategies; whereas Japan furthermore has announced a doubling of defence spending to reach 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP); whereas both Japan and South Korea are faced with a triple security challenge stemming from threats posed by Russia, China and North Korea; whereas in 2022 North Korea conducted more than 90 missile tests, by far the highest number ever, and rumours have been circulating about a 7th nuclear test, the first since 2017, which would seriously worsen regional and global security; (p.9)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

156) whereas in late December 2022, Japan and South Korea, two important partners of the EU, underlined the need for cooperation with the EU in their updated security strategies; whereas Japan furthermore has announced a doubling of defence spending to reach 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP); whereas both Japan and South Korea are faced with a triple security challenge stemming from threats posed by Russia, China and North Korea; whereas in 2022 North Korea conducted more than 90 missile tests, by far the highest number ever, and rumours have been circulating about a 7th nuclear test, the first since 2017, which would seriously worsen regional and global security; (p.9)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

157) whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security, and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is negatively affected by Russia's invasion of Ukraine; (p.9)

- Problem: negative effect of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on security in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkan regions
- Strategy: improved stability and security and increased mutual cooperation
- Solution: peaceful conflict resolution and more security in the region

158) whereas the Member States only procured some 11 % of their total equipment collaboratively in 2020, and 8 % in 2021, despite co-financing via EU budget-funded programmes such as the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), and despite their pledge to reach 35 % of common defence procurement; (p.9)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

159) whereas Member States have agreed on more and better defence spending that should be primarily channelled into cooperative initiatives and aligned with the defence spending commitments of EU NATO members; (p.9)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

160) whereas the EU's ambition to become a capable security actor dates back over 20 years, while results with regard to capabilities, interoperability and cost-effective cooperation remain somewhat limited despite the establishment of various structures and processes, such as the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); (p.9/10)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

161) whereas the EU's ambition to become a capable security actor dates back over 20 years, while results with regard to capabilities, interoperability and cost-effective cooperation remain somewhat limited despite the establishment of various structures and processes, such as the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); (p.9/10)

- Part of a name

162) whereas security and defence **partnerships**, as well as sustainable cooperation in the area of security and defence, are essential instruments in supporting the EU's ambition to be a global actor; (p.11)

- Not directly related to Russia and Ukraine, but interesting in regard to EU as a global actor cooperating and responding to crisis
- Problem: the EU needs support for their ambition to be a global actor
- Strategy: security and defence partnerships, sustainable cooperation in the area of security and defence
- Solution: these instruments are essential in the support of EU's ambition to be a global actor

163) whereas security and defence **partnerships**, as well as sustainable **cooperation** in the area of security and defence, are essential instruments in supporting the EU's ambition to be a global actor; (p.11)

- Not directly related to Russia and Ukraine, but interesting in regard to EU as a global actor cooperating and responding to crisis
- Problem: the EU needs support for their ambition to be a global actor
- Strategy: security and defence partnerships, sustainable cooperation in the area of security and defence
- Solution: these instruments are essential in the support of EU's ambition to be a global actor

164) whereas EU-NATO **cooperation** and other **partnerships** such as with the UN, the OSCE, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia as well as the African Union and certain African countries constitute an integral pillar of the CSDP; (p.11)

- Problem: -
- Strategy: investment in the EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships
- Solution: EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships constitute an integral pillar of the CSDP

165) whereas EU-NATO **cooperation** and other **partnerships** such as with the UN, the OSCE, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia as well as the African Union and certain African countries constitute an integral pillar of the CSDP; (p.11)

- Problem: -
- Strategy: investment in the EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships
- Solution: EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships constitute an integral pillar of the CSDP

166) calls on the EU and its partners, in **cooperation** with Ukraine, to start medium- and long-term planning to assess possible developments on the battlefield and predict potential demand for weapons and ammunition, as well as the direction and scope of potential aid; (p. 11)

- Problem: the battlefield
- Strategy: European Parliament calls on the EU and its partners, in cooperation with Ukraine, to start medium- and long-term planning to assess possible developments on the battlefield and predict potential demand for weapons and ammunition, as well as the direction and scope of potential aid
- Solution: developments on the battlefield, predict potential demand for weapons and ammunition and the direction and scope of potential aid

167) calls for increased funding opportunities for the European defence industry provided that they are invested in **collaborative** projects and generate added value; (p.13)

- Sentence is not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

168) welcomes the European Investment Bank's Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) announced on 10 March 2022 which aims to mobilise EUR 6 billion in investment to support Europe's dual-use security and defence systems and encourages it to explore all possible funding options for the European defence industry's **collaborative** projects including by revising its rules; (p.13)

- Sentence is not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

169) welcomes the particular focus on Eastern European **partners** in the Strategic Compass and calls on the EU to strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats and disinformation; (p. 14)

- Sentence is not related to relation Russia and Ukraine
- Eastern European partners

170) welcomes the particular focus on Eastern European partners in the Strategic Compass and calls on the EU to strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats and disinformation; (p. 14)

- Sentence is not related to relation Russia and Ukraine
- Eastern European partners

171) reiterates the call for deeper cooperation with international organisations, such as, but not limited to, the UN, the African Union, and its peacekeeping missions in joint theatres, and the OSCE on security; (p.14)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

172) underlines the importance of accurate and timely intelligence for effective EU decision-making and crisis management as well as the need to significantly enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation among the Member States, including at Union level, and with like-minded partners; (p.15)

- Crisis management and cooperation
- Problem: intelligence sharing and cooperation among the Member States and like-minded partners needs improvement. EU decision-making and crisis management is not effective enough
- Strategy: accurate and timely intelligence
- Solution: effective EU decision-making and crisis management and improvement of intelligence sharing and cooperation among the Member States and like-minded partners

173) calls for all CSDP missions and operations to enhance their cooperation and information sharing with the EU IntCen, EUMS, MPCC and CPCC; underlines the importance of secure communications for reliable intelligence; calls for the continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EU on foreign and security issues occurring outside the Union; (p.15)

- Sentence not related to the relation between Russia and Ukraine

174) emphasises the need to assist, in close cooperation with NATO, partner countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, to effectively combat cyberattacks and hybrid warfare; stresses that to combat the increasing threats and the rise of anti-European narratives by third countries, the EU has to step up its efforts to provide support, training and capacity-building with like-minded partner countries; (p.15/16)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

175) reiterates the urgent need to develop their strategic communication capabilities including secure communication systems and a rapid reaction capacity; emphasises the need to assist, in close cooperation with NATO, partner countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, to effectively combat cyberattacks and hybrid warfare; stresses that to combat the increasing threats and the rise of anti-European narratives by third countries, the EU has to step up its efforts to provide support, training and capacity-building with like-minded partner countries; (p.15/16)

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- Part of a name

177) reiterates the urgent need to develop their strategic communication capabilities including secure communication systems and a rapid reaction capacity; emphasises the need to assist, in close cooperation with NATO, partner countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, to effectively combat cyberattacks and hybrid warfare; stresses that to combat the increasing threats and the rise of anti-

European narratives by third countries, the EU has to step up its efforts to provide support, training and capacity-building with like-minded partner countries; (p.15/16)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

178) stresses that the EU must engage in effective cooperation with NATO, including cooperation on situational awareness; (p.16/17)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

179) stresses that the EU must engage in effective cooperation with NATO, including cooperation on situational awareness; (p.16/17)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

180) stresses that the Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation, while taking into account the new security realities resulting from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, and warns against increased militarisation of the region; encourages EU Member States to use PESCO as a platform to promote enhanced search-and-rescue training and exercises in the Arctic, as well as better crisis management of environmental disasters, such as oil spills; (p.17)

- Problem: new security realities resulting from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and increased militarization of the region
- Strategy: encourages EU Member States to use PESCO as a platform to promote enhanced search-and-rescue training and exercises in the Arctic, as well as better crisis management of environmental disasters, such as oil spills;
- Solution: Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation

181) underlines the importance of close cooperation and complementary action with other CSDP operations in the region, including the EU NAVFOR Atalanta operation, among others; supports the valuable work of the CSDP missions EUBAM Libya and EU NAVFOR MED IRINI, which are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability; continues to support, in particular, IRINI's core task in enforcing the arms embargo on Libya imposed by the UN; (p.17)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

182) considers it crucial to fill the identified defence investment gaps such as replenishing stockpiles, in particular replacing Soviet-era systems, reinforcing air and missile defence systems, including a discussion on the feasibility of a European-wide anti-ballistic missile shield and calls for liaison with NATO's European Sky Shield Initiative, operationalising the 'Eurodrone', expanding existing main battle tank and armoured vehicle capabilities, strengthening Europe's ship-building capacity and naval forces, intensifying maritime cooperation to counter hybrid threats against offshore cables and pipelines that are vital to Europe's energy and connectivity security, improving satellite-based secure connectivity, investing in industry partnerships that prioritise collaboration with SMEs and stronger investment in research and development (R&D) while contributing to a stronger European cyber-defence ecosystem and expanding the EU's military mobility programme; (p.19)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

183) considers it crucial to fill the identified defence investment gaps such as replenishing stockpiles, in particular replacing Soviet-era systems, reinforcing air and missile defence systems, including a discussion on the feasibility of a European-wide anti-ballistic missile shield and calls for liaison with NATO's European Sky Shield Initiative, operationalising the 'Eurodrone', expanding existing main battle tank and armoured vehicle capabilities, strengthening Europe's ship-building capacity and naval forces, intensifying maritime cooperation to counter hybrid threats against offshore cables and pipelines that are vital to Europe's energy and connectivity security, improving satellite-based secure connectivity, investing in industry partnerships that prioritise collaboration with SMEs and stronger investment in research and development (R&D) while contributing to a stronger European cyber-defence ecosystem and expanding the EU's military mobility programme; (p.19)

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- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

185) urges the VP/HR and the Member States to establish another off-budget financial facility which would pool parts of national defence budgets and urgently address the entire life-cycle of military capabilities at EU level to ensure they are effectively and efficiently implemented from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply; (p.20)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

186) calls for more and smarter defence investments in order to foster industrial cooperation, cost savings and increased interoperability; (p.20)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

187) recalls that the EDF and PESCO are crucial to the development of a genuine European Defence Union by enhancing defence cooperation between Member States; calls for other EU policies to be consistent with the EU's efforts to strengthen the defence industry; (p.20)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

188) stresses the need for the EU to increase cooperation with like-minded partner countries and to provide support, training and capacity building with them to counter hostile foreign information manipulation and interference; (p.22)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

189) calls for collaboration between CSDP missions and operations and the European Institute for Gender Equality; (p.23)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

190) calls for the strengthening of the staffing, response capability, resources and strategic communication of CSDP missions and operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Georgia and the reinforcement of the EU's diplomatic presence in the Eastern Partnership countries and in the Western Balkans; (p.23)

- Part of a name

191) Welcomes the cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans, including through the EUFOR Althea and the Kosovo Force operations; (p.23)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

192) calls for the strengthening of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina in close cooperation with NATO and other allies, in order to guarantee the necessary stability for the country and the whole region; (p.23)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

193) underlines the need to bilaterally enhance military-security cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina in parallel with the EUFOR framework; (p.23)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

194) Stresses the need for continued close cooperation with African and international partners in a bid to ensure a collective effort to achieve stabilisation and development, involving in particular the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the UN and international financial institutions, as well as other key bilateral and regional players; (p.24)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

195) Stresses the need for continued close cooperation with African and international partners in a bid to ensure a collective effort to achieve stabilisation and development, involving in particular the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the UN and international financial institutions, as well as other key bilateral and regional players;

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

196) Welcomes the Council decision establishing the military partnership mission to support Niger (EUMPM Niger), aimed at enhancing the ability of the Niger Armed Forces to contain the threats to the country, protect the population in the country and ensure a safe and secure environment, in compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law; (p.25)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

197) urges China to halt all these actions, which pose a threat to the stability of the entire region and have, overall, a direct impact on European security and prosperity; reiterates its support for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan; (p.25)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

198) Strongly welcomes the robust references to EU cooperation in both Japan's recent update of its National Security Strategy and South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy; (p.25)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

199) reiterates the strong partnership with both Japan and South Korea and calls on the EU to further deepen its military and defence cooperation with both key partners; (p.25)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

200) reiterates the strong partnership with both Japan and South Korea and calls on the EU to further deepen its military and defence cooperation with both key partners; (p.25)

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201) reiterates the strong partnership with both Japan and South Korea and calls on the EU to further deepen its military and defence cooperation with both key partners; (p.25)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

202) Systematisation of security and defence partnerships (p.26)

- Title

203) Calls for the strengthening, when strategically relevant, of security and defence partnerships with like-minded partners worldwide to meet the EU's level of ambition as a security provider; (p.26)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

204) Calls for the strengthening, when strategically relevant, of security and defence partnerships with like-minded partners worldwide to meet the EU's level of ambition as a security provider; (p.26)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

205) welcomes plans to convene the first ever EU Security and Defence Partnership Forum; (p.26)

- Part of a name

206) welcomes the third EU-NATO Joint Declaration and underlines the importance of further steps aimed at deepening this partnership, building on the contents of the EU's Strategic Compass and NATO's new Strategic Concept and on concrete steps to further enhance cooperation, especially in the fields of military mobility, dual-use infrastructure and resilience as well as increased joint exercises; (p.26/27)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

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new Strategic Concept and on concrete steps to further enhance cooperation, especially in the fields of military mobility, dual-use infrastructure and resilience as well as increased joint exercises; (p.26/27)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

208) underlines the need to strongly upgrade the strategic partnership with NATO to base it on the strengthening of political unity and solidarity and enhanced political dialogue on all aspects of common challenges and strategically relevant issues, including challenges related to climate change and rapid digitalisation; (p.27)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

209) notes with concern the deep and persistent periods of tension between EU Member States and Türkiye, a NATO ally, which are hampering cooperation between the EU and NATO; (p.27)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

210) While recognising the importance and potential of a strategic partnership with Türkiye, regrets Türkiye's overall destabilising role in many areas of concern for the EU and in its neighbourhoods, which threatens regional peace, security and stability; (p.27)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

211) reiterates the EU's condemnation of the signature of the two memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones, which are against international law; (p.27)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

212) invites the EU and NATO to reinforce cooperation on supporting the capacity- building of our partners; (p.27)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

213) invites the EU and NATO to reinforce cooperation on supporting the capacity- building of our partners; (p.27)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

214) Considers synergies and coherence with the implementation of NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass essential, particularly in the areas of countering aggression against Ukraine that is being waged by Russia and countering Russia's accomplice the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, addressing the challenges posed by China's coercive policies, the spread of malign disinformation, as well as cyber- defence, hybrid threats and support for partners; (p.27)

- Problem: aggression against Ukraine that is being waged by Russia and Russia's accomplice the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, spread of malign disinformation, cyber-defence, hybrid threats and support for partners
- Strategy: countering this accomplice and aggression against Ukraine
- Solution: implementation of NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass

215) underlines the need for the EU to develop its own defence capabilities and strategic autonomy in order to also enhance its capacity to be a stronger partner to its allies; (p.28)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

216) reminds participating Member States to PESCO of the need for swift implementation of their operational and collaborative commitments; welcomes the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility; (p.28)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

217) underlines the need for additional funding for this flagship EU-NATO cooperation initiative; calls on the EU to consider inviting Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to participate in PESCO projects such as military mobility; (p.28)

- Sentence does not clearly link to Russia's invasion in Ukraine

218) Welcomes the EU-US security and defence dialogue as an important milestone in closer transatlantic cooperation; (p.28)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

219) Reiterates its call for institutionalised security and defence cooperation with the United Kingdom; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

220) underlines that the EU's security is closely interlinked with the security of our immediate neighbours in the EU's Eastern and Southern neighbourhood as well as in the Western Balkans; calls for deeper military-security cooperation with like-minded Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, including by strengthening the security dimension of the EaP and for enhanced security and defence policy dialogues, particularly with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; (p.29)

- Problem: EU's security is closely interlinked with the security of our immediate neighbours in the EU's Eastern and Southern neighbourhood as well as the Western Balkans and the security is instable there
- Strategy: by strengthening the security dimension of the EaP and for enhanced security and defence policy dialogues, particularly with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova;
- Solution: deeper military-security cooperation with like-minded Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries,

221) underlines that the EU's security is closely interlinked with the security of our immediate neighbours in the EU's Eastern and Southern neighbourhood as well as in the Western Balkans; calls for deeper military-security cooperation with like-minded Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, including by strengthening the security dimension of the EaP and for enhanced security and defence policy dialogues, particularly with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; (p.29)

- Part of a name

222) calls for increased cooperation in the security and defence field with partners in the Southern Neighbourhood; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

223) calls for increased cooperation in the security and defence field with partners in the Southern Neighbourhood; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

224) calls for enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, human trafficking and the illicit trade in weapons; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

225) calls for enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, human trafficking and the illicit trade in weapons; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

226) Calls for the strengthening of EU-NATO cooperation on the Alliance's eastern flank and for an increase in European military personnel in the Black Sea; believes it essential to recognise and capitalise on the strategic position of the Black Sea in the context of Russia's war in Ukraine and to increase investment in European military projects in the region, including when it comes to modernising and strengthening its military industry and infrastructure;

- Problem: Russia's war in Ukraine
- Strategy: recognize and capitalize on the strategic position of the Black Sea in the context of the war and to increase investment in European military projects in the region, including modernizing and strengthening its military industry and infrastructure
- Solution: strengthening of EU-NATO cooperation on the Alliance's eastern flank and for an increase in European military personnel in the Black Sea

227) with regard to the Western Balkans, brings attention to Serbia's relationship with Russia and its lack of condemnation of Russia's unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine and the consequences of this relationship in the Western Balkans; calls for stronger military security, including civilian/military as well

as police/military security, cooperation with like-minded Western Balkan countries, in particular in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation; (p.30)

- Problem: Serbia's relationship with Russia and its lack of condemnation of Russia's unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine and the consequences of this relationship in the Western Balkans
- Strategy: cooperation with like-minded Western Balkan countries in particular in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation
- Solution: Stronger military security including civilian/military as well as police/military security

228) Calls for closer relations and cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to achieve common goals and interests in the fields of security and defence; (p.30)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

229) Calls for closer relations and cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to achieve common goals and interests in the fields of security and defence; (p.30)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

230) strengthening cooperation across Parliamentary committees where security and defence matters are discussed (p.30)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine (but it does call for more cooperation within the Union)

231) reinforcing inter-parliamentary dialogue and cooperation with national parliaments on European security and defence, including through the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, with the aim of reinforcing accountability and scrutiny of security and defence policy; (p.30)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine (but it does call for more cooperation within the Union)

232) Calls for further strengthening of Parliament's relations with the NATO PA, in the framework of which Parliament should support the establishment of the NATO Centre for Democratic Resilience aimed at monitoring and identifying challenges to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and facilitating democracy and governance assistance to member and partner states; (p.31)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

Russia(n), Ukraine/Ukrainian

233) having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/638 of 13 April 2022 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (p.2)

- Part of a name

234) having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/638 of 13 April 2022 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (p.2)

- Part of a name

235) having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 establishing the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) (p.2)

- Problem: Ukraine needs support
- Strategy: establishing the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine
- Solution: to support Ukraine

236) having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 establishing the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) (p.2)

- Part of a name

237) having regard to [Russia's](#) unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the occupation of Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova's region of Transnistria, (p.5)

- Problem: Russia's unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the occupation of Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova's region of Transnistria
- Strategy: European Parliament takes it into account in this document
- Solution: Russia should not have an unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine

238) having regard to [Russia's](#) unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against [Ukraine](#), its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the occupation of Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova's region of Transnistria, (p.5)

- Problem: Russia's unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the occupation of Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova's region of Transnistria
- Strategy: European Parliament takes it into account in this document
- Solution: Russia should not have an unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine

239) having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the [Russian](#) aggression against Ukraine (p.6)

- Problem: the Russian aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: European Union's resolution of 1 March 2022
- Solution: -

240) having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against [Ukraine](#) (p.6)

- Problem: the Russian aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: European Union's resolution of 1 March 2022
- Solution: -

241) having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against [Ukraine](#) and the EU sanctions against [Russia](#) and their implementation (p.6)

- Problem: the war against Ukraine
- Strategy: EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation
- Solution: sanctions need to obstruct Russia in its war against Ukraine

242) having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against [Russia](#) and their implementation (p.6)

- Problem: the war against Ukraine
- Strategy: EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation
- Solution: sanctions need to obstruct Russia in its war against Ukraine

243) having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the [Russian](#) war of aggression against Ukraine (p.7)

- Problem: Russian war of aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: include the recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
- Solution: -

244) having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against [Ukraine](#) (p.7)

- Problem: Russian war of aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: include the recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
- Solution: -

245) having regard to its legislative resolution of 14 December 2022 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) (p.7)

- Problem: Russia's war against Ukraine
- Strategy: legislative resolution of 14 December 2022 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine
- Solution: providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance)

246) whereas Europe is facing the most complex combination of both military and non- military threats since the end of the Cold War, accentuated by Russia's unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; (p.7)

- Problem: Russia's unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats since the end of the Cold War
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

247) whereas Europe is facing the most complex combination of both military and non- military threats since the end of the Cold War, accentuated by Russia's unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; (p.7)

- Problem: Russia's unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats since the end of the Cold War
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

248) whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order; (p.7)

- Problem: Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

249) whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order; (p.7)

- Problem: Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

250) whereas this war of aggression is an attack on the European security architecture that was built after the Second World War and the end of the Cold War to which Russia was a party; (p.7)

- Problem: the war is an attack on the European security architecture that was built after the Second World War and the end of the Cold War to which Russia was a party
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

251) whereas in his war against Ukraine and his aggression against Europe and the West, President Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons; (p.7)

- Problem: war against Ukraine and Putin's aggression against Europe and the West
- Strategy: Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson

- and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons
- Solution: Stop Putin, he is the problem

252) whereas in his war against Ukraine and his aggression against Europe and the West, President Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons; (p.7)

- Problem: war against Ukraine and Putin's aggression against Europe and the West
- Strategy: Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons
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253) whereas in his war against Ukraine and his aggression against Europe and the West, President Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons; (p.7)

- Problem: war against Ukraine and Putin's aggression against Europe and the West
- Strategy: Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons
- Solution: Stop Putin, he is the problem

254) whereas President Vladimir Putin's decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation caused migratory pressure from Russians fleeing their country across the borders with Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic countries, but above all, with the brutal aggression against Ukraine and the genocide being committed on Ukrainians, he brought unimaginable suffering, resulting in the biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War; (p.7)

- Problem: President Vladimir Putin's decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilization in the Russian Federation led to biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War and brutal aggression against Ukraine resulting in genocide
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

255) whereas President Vladimir Putin's decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation caused migratory pressure from Russians fleeing their country across the borders with Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic countries, but above all, with the brutal aggression against Ukraine and the genocide being committed on Ukrainians, he brought unimaginable suffering, resulting in the biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War; (p.7)

- Problem: President Vladimir Putin's decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilization in the Russian Federation led to biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War and brutal aggression against Ukraine resulting in genocide
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

256) whereas President Vladimir Putin's decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation caused migratory pressure from Russians fleeing their country across the borders with Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic countries, but above all, with the brutal aggression against Ukraine and the genocide being committed on Ukrainians, he brought unimaginable suffering, resulting in the biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War; (p.7)

- Problem: President Vladimir Putin's decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilization in the Russian Federation led to biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War and brutal aggression against Ukraine resulting in genocide

- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

257) whereas Ukraine is defending not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also common European values of democracy; whereas no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine; (p.7/8)

- Problem: no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: Ukraine is defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity and the common European values of democracy
- Solution: -

258) whereas Ukraine is defending not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also common European values of democracy; whereas no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine; (p.7/8)

- Problem: no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: Ukraine is defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity and the common European values of democracy
- Solution: -

259) whereas Ukraine is defending not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also common European values of democracy; whereas no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine; (p.7/8)

- Problem: no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: Ukraine is defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity and the common European values of democracy
- Solution: -

260) whereas Russia has repeatedly threatened Ukraine as well as NATO and EU Member States with nuclear war; (p.8)

- Problem: Russia has repeatedly threatened Ukraine as well as NATO and EU Member States with nuclear war
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

261) whereas Russia has repeatedly threatened Ukraine as well as NATO and EU Member States with nuclear war; (p.8)

- Problem: Russia has repeatedly threatened Ukraine as well as NATO and EU Member States with nuclear war
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

262) whereas Ukraine's victory is also a matter of the credibility of the EU and its security and defence policy; (p.8)

- Problem: Russia's war on Ukraine
- Strategy: credibility of the EU and its security and defence policy
- Solution: Ukraine's victory

263) whereas there is a new urgency to boosting EU security and defence capabilities, including building on the unprecedented support for Ukraine, most notably through the European Peace Facility (EPF), and ensuring complementarity with NATO; (p.8)

- Problem: urgency to boost EU security and defence capabilities, including building on the unprecedented support for Ukraine
- Strategy: the European Peace Facility (EPF), and ensuring complementarity with NATO
- Solution: boost EU security and defence capabilities, unprecedented support for Ukraine

264) whereas [Russia's](#) hybrid aggression makes it necessary to design the defence of a free Europe in a comprehensive and multifaceted manner incorporating all critical areas, from the improvement of traditional military capacities, to the protection of critical civilian infrastructure, supply chains and energy facilities, as well as the active fight against disinformation and cybersecurity threats; (p.8)

- Problem: Russia's hybrid aggression
- Strategy: the aggression makes it necessary to design a defence of a free Europe
- Solution: designing the defence of a free Europe in a comprehensive and multifaceted manner incorporating all critical areas, from the improvement of traditional military capacities, to the protection of critical civilian infrastructure, supply chains and energy facilities, as well as the active fight against disinformation and cybersecurity threats

265) whereas [Russia's](#) aggression against Ukraine has underlined the lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO Member States; (p.8)

- Problem: the lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO Member States that is underlined by Russia's aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: underlining of the lack of investment
- Solution: showing EU and NATO Member States that they should invest more in security and defence

266) whereas [Russia's](#) aggression against [Ukraine](#) has underlined the lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO Member States; (p.8)

- Problem: the lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO Member States that is underlined by Russia's aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: underlining of the lack of investment
- Solution: showing EU and NATO Member States that they should invest more in security and defence

267) whereas NATO is helping to coordinate requests for assistance on behalf of [Ukraine](#); (p.8)

- Problem: Ukraine needs more assistance
- Strategy: NATO helps to coordinate requests for assistance on behalf of Ukraine
- Solution: more assistance for Ukraine

268) whereas Belarus has become an accomplice to [Russia's](#) war against Ukraine; (p.8)

- Problem: Belarus has become an accomplice to Russia's war against Ukraine
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

269) whereas Belarus has become an accomplice to [Russia's](#) war against [Ukraine](#); (p.8)

- Problem: Belarus has become an accomplice to Russia's war against Ukraine
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

270) whereas in December 2022 the Parliament and the Council agreed on an EUR 18 billion support package to be transferred to [Ukraine](#) for support throughout 2023; (p.8)

- Problem: Ukraine needs support
- Strategy: in December 2022 the Parliament and the Council agreed on an EUR 18 billion support package to be transferred to Ukraine
- Solution: EUR 18 billion support package for Ukraine for support throughout 2023

271) whereas the People's Republic of China is not taking a clear stance against [Russia's](#) war of aggression against Ukraine, which violates core principles of international law; (p.9)

- Problem: People's Republic of China is not taking a clear stance against Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and that war violates core principles of international law
- Strategy: -
- Solution: China should take a clear stance against Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and by that acknowledge that this war violates core principles of international law

272) whereas the People's Republic of China is not taking a clear stance against Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which violates core principles of international law; (p.9)

- Problem: People's Republic of China is not taking a clear stance against Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and that war violates core principles of international law
- Strategy: -
- Solution: China should take a clear stance against Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and by that acknowledge that this war violates core principles of international law

273) whereas Russian-Chinese military cooperation significantly increased in 2022, as showcased by multiple joint military drills; (p.9)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

274) whereas both Japan and South Korea are faced with a triple security challenge stemming from threats posed by Russia, China and North Korea; (p.9)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

275) whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security, and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is negatively affected by Russia's invasion of Ukraine; (p.9)

- Problem: security in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans regions are negatively affected by Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- Strategy: peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security and increased mutual cooperation
- Solution: more security in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkan regions

276) whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security, and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is negatively affected by Russia's invasion of Ukraine; (p.9)

- Problem: security in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans regions are negatively affected by Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- Strategy: peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security and increased mutual cooperation
- Solution: more security in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkan regions

277) whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while at the same time it is facing challenges linked to climate change, militarisation and migration; whereas Russia's increasing military activity and build-up in the Arctic is alarming; (p.9)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

278) whereas Russia's influence in Africa has developed, in particular due to the expanding footprint of the Wagner Group on the continent; (p.9)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

279) whereas the Wagner Group has reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the CAR; (p.9)

- Because the Wagner Group is related to Russia, this sentence is included in the analysis
- Problem: the Wagner Group has reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

280) whereas from 1999 to 2021, combined EU defence spending rose by 20 % compared with 66 % in the United States, 292 % in Russia and 592 % in China; (p.9)

- Not direct relation to the conflict, but it gives an alarming sense on how much Russia spends on defence
- Problem: the combined EU defence spending rose by 20% while Russia's rose with 292%
- Strategy: rising defence spending

- Solutioning: EU needs to spend more on defence

281) whereas conflicts disproportionately affect women and girls and, among other things, intensify gender-based violence as also demonstrated by Russia's unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; (p.10)

- Problem: Russia's unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated intensified gender-based violence
- Strategy: conflicts disproportionately affect women and girls
- Solution: Russia's unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine should be stopped to stop the intensified gender-based violence and to stop the disproportionately affection of women and girls

282) whereas conflicts disproportionately affect women and girls and, among other things, intensify gender-based violence as also demonstrated by Russia's unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; (p.10)

- Problem: Russia's unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated intensified gender-based violence
- Strategy: conflicts disproportionately affect women and girls
- Solution: Russia's unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine should be stopped to stop the intensified gender-based violence and to stop the disproportionately affection of women and girls

283) Highlights the dramatic deterioration in European security caused by Russia's unjustified, unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Ukraine; stresses that this situation demands that the EU step up its strategic autonomy and joint efforts to achieve the necessary defence capacities and show greater willingness to continue to act in a united way in order to deliver the security expected by EU citizens; (p.11)

- Problem: dramatic deterioration in European security caused by Russia's unjustified, unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: EU needs to step up its strategic autonomy and joint efforts to achieve the necessary defence capacities and show greater willingness to continue to act in a united way
- Solution: deliver the security expected by EU citizens

284) Highlights the dramatic deterioration in European security caused by Russia's unjustified, unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Ukraine; stresses that this situation demands that the EU step up its strategic autonomy and joint efforts to achieve the necessary defence capacities and show greater willingness to continue to act in a united way in order to deliver the security expected by EU citizens; (p.11)

- Problem: dramatic deterioration in European security caused by Russia's unjustified, unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: EU needs to step up its strategic autonomy and joint efforts to achieve the necessary defence capacities and show greater willingness to continue to act in a united way
- Solution: deliver the security expected by EU citizens

285) Underlines the unprecedented and united EU response to Russia's war against Ukraine, including the provision of military equipment through the EPF; remains committed to supporting Ukraine's defence of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and European values; (p.12)

- Problem: Russia's war against Ukraine threatens Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and European values
- Strategy: the unprecedented and united EU response to Russia's war against Ukraine, including the provision of military equipment through the EPF
- Solution: supporting Ukraine's defence of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and European values

286) Underlines the unprecedented and united EU response to Russia's war against Ukraine, including the provision of military equipment through the EPF; remains committed to supporting Ukraine's defence of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and European values; (p.12)

- Problem: Russia's war against Ukraine threatens Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and European values
- Strategy: the unprecedented and united EU response to Russia's war against Ukraine, including the provision of military equipment through the EPF
- Solution: supporting Ukraine's defence of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and European values

287) calls on the EU to increase and speed up its efforts and provide Ukraine with the necessary financial, humanitarian and military aid and equipment, including lethal equipment and especially heavy weaponry, including Leopard tanks and modern air defence systems, needed to win this war; (p.12)

- Problem: the EU efforts and aid provision to Ukraine are not going fast enough
- Strategy: European Parliament calls on the EU to increase and speed up its efforts and provide Ukraine with the necessary financial, humanitarian and military aid and equipment, including lethal equipment and especially heavy weaponry, including Leopard tanks and modern air defence systems
- Solution: win the war of Russia against Ukraine

288) strongly welcomes the Council's decision to set up, after a call by Parliament, a military assistance mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), aimed at enhancing the military capability of Ukraine's armed forces to effectively conduct military operations, in order to allow Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, effectively exercise its sovereignty and protect civilians; (p.11/12)

- Problem: Ukraine needs assistance in defending its territorial integrity
- Strategy: set up a military assistance mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), aimed at enhancing the military capability of Ukraine's armed forces to effectively conduct military operations
- Solution: to allow Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, effectively exercise its sovereignty and protect civilians

289) strongly welcomes the Council's decision to set up, after a call by Parliament, a military assistance mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), aimed at enhancing the military capability of Ukraine's armed forces to effectively conduct military operations, in order to allow Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, effectively exercise its sovereignty and protect civilians; (p.11/12)

- Part of a name

290) calls on the Member States to accelerate their military assistance to Ukraine, in particular the provision of weapons in response to clearly identified needs; (p.12)

- Problem: Ukraine has clearly identified needs but Member States don't respond quickly enough to that
- Strategy: Member States need to accelerate their military assistance to Ukraine, in particular the provision of weapons
- Solution: faster response leads to a good assistance to Ukraine

291) calls in this respect on German Chancellor Scholz to initiate a European consortium of relevant European countries in order to deliver Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine without further delay; (p.12)

- Problem: delivery of German Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine has a delay
- Strategy: German Chancellor Scholz needs to initiate a European consortium of relevant European countries
- Solution: in order to deliver Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine without further delay

292) calls on the EU and its Member States to help Ukraine enhance its ability to regenerate its forces and effectively conduct operations so as to help the country restore its territorial integrity and effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect civilians and deter and respond to military offensives by Russia; (p.12)

- Problem: Ukraine needs help in order to exercise its sovereignty, protect civilians and deter and respond to military offensives by Russia
- Strategy: calls on the EU and its Member States to help Ukraine enhance its ability to regenerate its forces and effectively conduct operations
- Solution: Ukraine can restore its territorial integrity and effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect civilians and deter and respond to military offensives by Russia

293) calls on the EU and its Member States to help Ukraine enhance its ability to regenerate its forces and effectively conduct operations so as to help the country restore its territorial integrity and

effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect civilians and deter and respond to military offensives by [Russia](#); (p.12)

- Problem: Ukraine needs help in order to exercise its sovereignty, protect civilians and deter and respond to military offensives by Russia
- Strategy: calls on the EU and its Member States to help Ukraine enhance its ability to regenerate its forces and effectively conduct operations
- Solution: Ukraine can restore its territorial integrity and effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect civilians and deter and respond to military offensives by Russia

294) calls for the imposition of further sanctions against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for the various crimes committed against [Ukraine](#); (p.12)

- Problem: crimes committed against Ukraine
- Strategy: imposition of further sanctions against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for the various committed crimes
- Solution: sanctions against individuals, entities and bodies as punishment for their committed crimes against Ukraine

295) Condemns in the strongest possible terms [Russia's](#) illegal annexations of Crimea and the four [Ukrainian](#) oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, and condemns [Russia's](#) threats to use nuclear weapons;

- Problem: Russia's illegal annexations of Crimea and the four Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson and Russia's threat to use nuclear weapons
- Strategy: European Parliament condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's illegal annexations of Crimea and the four Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, and condemns Russia's threats to use nuclear weapons;
- Solution: condemn Russia's actions

296) stresses that the enforcement of restrictive measures against [Russia](#) remains one of the key elements in the EU's toolbox for countering [Russian](#) military aggression against [Ukraine](#); (p.12)

- Problem: Russian military aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: the enforcement of restrictive measures against Russia as key element in the EU toolbox for countering Russian military aggression against Ukraine
- Solution: the European Union counters Russia's military aggression against Ukraine with restrictive measures

297) welcomes the Commission's ninth package of restrictive measures in response to the illegal referendums organised in the [Ukrainian](#) regions, the mobilisation of [Russian](#) conscripts and Putin's threat to use nuclear weapons and welcomes preparations for a ninth package;

- Problem: illegal referendums organized in the Ukrainian regions, the mobilization of Russian conscripts and Putin's threat to use nuclear weapons
- Strategy: responding to the actions of Russia/Putin
- Solution: ninth package of restrictive measures

298) underlines that the impunity which followed the 2008 invasion of Georgia is one of the factors leading to [Russia's](#) war of aggression against [Ukraine](#); (p.12)

- Problem: the impunity which followed the 2008 invasion of Georgia lead to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: -
- Solution: we should punish Russia for its invasion this time

299) Urges the EU and the Member States to significantly narrow the gap between the military assistance 'promised' and 'delivered' to [Ukraine](#); calls on them to overcome the political bottlenecks which are hampering the delivery of long-range missiles, tanks and armoured vehicles to [Ukraine](#) in sufficient quantities to support the launch of a scaled-up counter-offensive; (p.12)

- Problem: the gap between the military assistance 'promised' and 'delivered' from the EU Member States to Ukraine

- Strategy: overcome the political bottlenecks which are hampering the delivery of long-range missiles, tanks and armoured vehicles to Ukraine in sufficient quantities to support the launch of a scaled-up counter-offensive
- Solution: narrow the gap between the military assistance 'promised' and 'delivered' from the EU Member States to Ukraine

300) calls on the EU and its partners, in cooperation with Ukraine, to start medium- and long-term planning to assess possible developments on the battlefield and predict potential demand for weapons and ammunition, as well as the direction and scope of potential aid; (p.12)

- Problem: there is not planning to assess possible developments on the battlefield or predict demand for weapons and ammunition or the potential needed aid
- Strategy: EU and its partners, in cooperation with Ukraine, start medium- and long-term planning
- Solution: assess possible developments on the battlefield and predict potential demand for weapons and ammunition, as well as the direction and scope of potential aid

301) Strongly welcomes the continuation of important military support to reinforce Ukraine's air defence and infantry capacities; calls upon EU and NATO members to increase their military assistance, in particular by delivering the necessary heavy weaponry; (p.12)

- Problem: Ukraine's air defence and infantry capacities needs reinforcement and a lack of necessary heavy weaponry
- Strategy: continuation of important military support and EP calls upon EU and NATO members to increase their military assistance, in particular by delivering the necessary heavy weaponry
- Solution: reinforce Ukraine's air defence and infantry capacities

302) Is deeply shocked that several Ukrainian nuclear power plants have been attacked and occupied, and have repeatedly been the scene of hostilities since Russia started its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; (p.12)

- Problem: Ukrainian nuclear power plants have been attacked, occupied and been the scene of hostilities by the Russian
- Strategy: -
- Solution: -

303) is deeply concerned about the fact that Russian forces continue to occupy the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) which is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and its staff, some of whom have been temporarily abducted, has been working constantly under pressure from the occupying forces; is equally concerned about the fact that power supplies to the power plant have repeatedly been cut owing to fighting in and around the plant, severely increasing the risk of a nuclear catastrophe; (p.12)

- Problem: Russian forces continue to occupy the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) which is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and its staff works constantly under pressure from the occupying forces, power supplies to the plant have been cut, this increases the risk of a nuclear catastrophe
- Strategy:
- Solution:

304) demands the immediate withdrawal of Russian military personnel from within and around the ZNPP, and the creation of a demilitarized zone around the plant, recognizing that fighting around the plant could lead to a major disaster with unimaginable consequences; urges the EU to help the International Atomic Energy Agency and other organisations to implement the necessary nuclear safety measures without delay; calls on the EU and its Member States to promote a full prohibition of military attacks on or from within nuclear installations, without exception, under international law (p.12/13)

- Problem: implementation of necessary nuclear safety measures, Russian military personnel occupying and fighting around the ZNPP
- Strategy: EU needs to help IAEA for nuclear safety measures, promote full prohibition of military attacks on or from within nuclear installations under international law
- Solution: EP demands immediate withdrawal of Russian military personnel from within and around the ZNPP, creation of demilitarized zone around the plant, urges EU to help the IAEA implement necessary nuclear safety measures

305) welcomes the particular focus on Eastern European partners in the Strategic Compass and calls on the EU to strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats and disinformation; (p.14)

- Problem: hybrid threats and disinformation
- Strategy: focus on Eastern European partners in the Strategic Compass
- Solution: strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats and disinformation

306) Strongly welcomes the EUR 18 billion support package agreed by the EU in December 2022 and sees it as proof of the unwavering support for Ukraine by the EU and its Member States and as a powerful testament that this support will continue for as long as it is needed; (p.14)

- Problem: there is a proof needed of the unwavering support for Ukraine by the EU and its Member States
- Strategy: EUR 18 billion support package agreed by the EU in December 2022
- Solution: proof of support for Ukraine by the EU and its Member States and testament that this support will continue

307) calls on Member States to increase the EPF's budget to enable the EU to strengthen the resilience and defence capabilities of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia; (p.14)

- Problem: the resilience and defence capabilities of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia need to be improved
- Strategy: Member States need to increase the EPF's budget to enable the EU to strengthen the resilience
- Solution: strengthening resilience and defence capabilities of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia

308) recalls the need for military assistance and weapons deliveries by the EPF to meet the growing operational requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces while fully complying with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, as well as providing adequate transparency and accountability; (p.14)

- Problem: there is need for military assistance and weapons deliveries by the EPF to meet the growing operational requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces
- Strategy: military assistance and weapons deliveries to Ukrainian armed forces while fully complying with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, as well as providing adequate transparency and accountability
- Solution: European union needs to provide military assistance and weapons deliveries by the EPF to meet the growing operational requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces while fully complying with the EU Common Position on arms exports

309) Calls on the EU to support the principles of the Kyiv Security Compact as an immediate interim solution for Ukraine's security; (p.14)

- Problem: Ukraine's security
- Strategy: European Parliament calls on the EU to support the principles of the Kyiv Security Compact
- Solution: for the EU to support the principles of the Kyiv Security Compact

310) Welcomes the Council's decision of December 2022 to increase the EPF budget and calls for its swift implementation but stresses that this increase will probably not suffice and hence reiterates the need to further raise the ceiling of the EPF and to create a separate EPF envelope for Ukraine that guarantees adequate support for the country; (p.14)

- Problem: the ceiling of the EPF needs to be raised further and a separate EPF envelope for Ukraine needs to be created
- Strategy: a swift implementation of the increased EPF budget after December 2022, but also stressing that the increase will not be sufficient
- Solution: further raise the EPF ceiling and create an envelope for Ukraine

311) Calls for additional support in training and capacity building in border and crisis management for countries affected by significant migration flows, including those countries faced with inflows of Russian citizens fleeing the Russian Federation since the mobilisation, while fully respecting their fundamental rights, especially for Member States and countries with existing CSDP missions or operations present on their territory; (p.16)

- Problem: additional support in training and capacity building is needed in border and crisis management for countries affected by significant migration flows, including those countries faced with inflows of Russian citizens fleeing the Russian Federation since the mobilisation
- Strategy: the European Parliament calls for additional support
- Solution: additional support in training and capacity building

312) stresses that the Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation, while taking into account the new security realities resulting from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, and warns against increased militarisation of the region; encourages EU Member States to use PESCO as a platform to promote enhanced search-and-rescue training and exercises in the Arctic, as well as better crisis management of environmental disasters, such as oil spills; (p.17)

- Problem: security realities resulting from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and increased militarization of the Arctic region
- Strategy: European Parliament encourages EU Member States to use PESCO as a platform to promote enhanced search-and-rescue training and exercises in the Arctic, as well as better crisis management of environmental disasters, such as oil spills
- Solution: Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation

313) laments the use of Russian hypersonic missiles in Ukraine and believes that the EU should seek to help prevent an international hypersonic missile arms race; (p. 17/18)

- Problem: the use of Russian hypersonic missiles in Ukraine
- Strategy: European Parliament believes that the EU should seek to help prevent an international hypersonic missile arms race
- Solution: prevent an international hypersonic missile arms race

314) Reaffirms its full support for the commitment by the EU and its Member States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); insists on the need to ensure that the EU plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing global rules-based non-proliferation efforts; expresses deep concern that no outcome was reached at the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NPT due to Russia's unwillingness to join the consensus; (p.18)

- Problem: no outcome was reached at the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NPT due to Russia's unwillingness to join the consensus
- Strategy: insists on the need to ensure that the EU plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing global rules-based non-proliferation efforts
- Solution: stay constructive to not drive Russia further away

315) Stresses the urgent need to establish the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations, in particular with regard to the use of the future Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC); demands that its Full Operational Capability should be reached immediately, in line with the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018, which envisaged a 2020 deadline; also demands that the MPCC's staffing level should be increased considerably up to 250 personnel; believes that one of the existing four national Operational Headquarters should be designed as fall-back option; reiterates its call to enable the secure exchange of classified information, including with Member States and CSDP missions or operations; stresses the need for the MPCC to plan and conduct all military missions with a clear chain of command and to be provided with the necessary personnel, funds and infrastructure; points out that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine renders progress in that regard more urgent; (p.22)

- Problem: Russian war of aggression against Ukraine renders progress in the regard of the MPCC to plan and conduct all military missions with a clear chain of command and to be provided with the necessary personnel, funds and infra structure more urgent
- Strategy: its Full Operational Capability should be reached immediately, in line with the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018, which envisaged a 2020 deadline; also demands that the MPCC's staffing level should be increased considerably up to 250 personnel

- Solution: establish the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations

316) Is concerned about the increasing manipulation of information, disinformation and hybrid threats and attacks stemming in particular from Russia and China but also from other actors, affecting several theatres and CSDP missions and operations directly; stresses the need for the EU to increase cooperation with like-minded partner countries and to provide support, training and capacity building with them to counter hostile foreign information manipulation and interference; (p.22)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

317) Welcomes the launch of the non-executive CSDP military assistance mission for Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine); expects it to allow for the training of the Ukrainian armed forces in a flexible way through strategic advice, non-executive support, capacity building, and overall military support to combat Russian aggression and assist in the liberation of the occupied regions of Ukraine; considers that EUMAM will be effective provided that the MPCC is reinforced, and will be able to exercise strategic command and control over the mission; (p.23)

- Problem: Ukrainian armed forces are not trained, needs strategic advice, non-executive support, capacity building and overall military support to combat Russian aggression and assist in the liberation of the occupied regions of Ukraine
- Strategy: expects it to allow for the training of the Ukrainian armed forces in a flexible way through strategic advice, non-executive support, capacity building, and overall military support to combat Russian aggression and assist in the liberation of the occupied regions of Ukraine
- Solution: the launch of the non-executive CSDP military assistance mission for Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), EUMAM will be effective provided that the MPCC is reinforced, and will be able to exercise strategic command and control over the mission

318) Welcomes the launch of the non-executive CSDP military assistance mission for Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine); expects it to allow for the training of the Ukrainian armed forces in a flexible way through strategic advice, non-executive support, capacity building, and overall military support to combat Russian aggression and assist in the liberation of the occupied regions of Ukraine; considers that EUMAM will be effective provided that the MPCC is reinforced, and will be able to exercise strategic command and control over the mission; (p.23)

- Part of a name

319) calls on the EEAS to open this mission to the participation of third states; calls on the Member States to provide the necessary support for its implementation; stresses the importance of communicating to the Ukrainian people that the EU will remain by their side throughout the period of Russian aggression; (p.23)

- Problem: Russia's aggression against Ukraine
- Strategy: EEAS needs to open the EUMAM mission to the participation of third states, Member States need to provide necessary support for the implementation of the EUMAM, communicating to the Ukrainian people that the EU will remain by their side throughout the period of Russian aggression
- Solution: show support to Ukraine by including third parties, implementing support nationally and communicating to Ukraine

320) Commends and underlines the importance of the work of the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine); notes its new tasks, which include providing support to law enforcement agencies to facilitate the flow of refugees from Ukraine to neighbouring Member States, the entry of humanitarian aid into Ukraine and advice, training and support to rule of law institutions to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of international crimes; (p.23)

- Problem: the refugee flow from Ukraine to neighbouring Member States of the EU, the entry of humanitarian aid into Ukraine and advice, training and support to rule of law institutions to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of international crimes
- Strategy: providing support to law enforcement agencies to facilitate the flow of refugees from Ukraine to neighbouring Member States, the entry of humanitarian aid into Ukraine and advice, training and support to rule of law institutions to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of international crimes

- Solution: the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)

321) Commends and underlines the importance of the work of the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine); notes its new tasks, which include providing support to law enforcement agencies to facilitate the flow of refugees from Ukraine to neighbouring Member States, the entry of humanitarian aid into Ukraine and advice, training and support to rule of law institutions to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of international crimes; (p.23)

- Part of a name

322) calls for the review and strengthening of the mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in order to adapt to the new geopolitical reality; (p.23)

- Problem: Republic of Moldova and Ukraine need to adapt to the new geopolitical reality (Russia's invasion in Ukraine)
- Strategy: strengthening of the mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)
- Solution: strengthening of the mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in order to adapt to the new geopolitical reality

323) calls for the strengthening of the staffing, response capability, resources and strategic communication of CSDP missions and operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Georgia and the reinforcement of the EU's diplomatic presence in the Eastern Partnership countries and in the Western Balkans; (p.23)

- Sentence not related to Russia Ukraine relation
- EaP

324) underlines the particular responsibility of China and Russia when it comes to North Korea and calls on them to use their influence to prevent any further escalation; (p.26)

- Sentence not related to Russia Ukraine

325) Strongly condemns Iran for supplying Russia with drones and missiles to use in its illegal war against Ukraine, and recalls that in doing so it is violating UN Security Council Resolution 2231(2015); (p.26)

- Problem: Iran supplying Russia with drones and missiles to use in its illegal war against Ukraine and therefore violating UN Security Council Resolution 2231(2015)
- Strategy: European Parliament condemns Iran
- Solution: Iran should not supply Russia with drones and missiles to use in its illegal war against Ukraine and therefore violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231(2015)

326) welcomes Council's decision of 12 December 2022 to adopt further sanctions against Iran both for the ongoing violations of the human rights of its own people as well as for Iran's active support to Russia, which is being used against the Ukrainian people; (p.26)

- Problem: Iran's ongoing violations of the human rights of its own people and its support to Russia, which is being used against the Ukrainian people
- Strategy: further sanctions against Iran
- Solution: sanctions against Iran

327) reiterates its call on Türkiye to align with the EU sanctions against Russia; (p. 27)

- Problem: Türkiye does not align with the EU sanctions against Russia
- Strategy: European Parliament reiterates its call on Türkiye to align with the EU sanctions against Russia
- Solution: Türkiye needs to align with the EU sanctions against Russia

328) Considers synergies and coherence with the implementation of NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass essential, particularly in the areas of countering aggression against Ukraine that is being waged by Russia and countering Russia's accomplice the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, addressing the challenges posed by China's coercive policies, the spread of malign disinformation, as well as cyber- defence, hybrid threats and support for partners; (p.27)

- Problem: aggression against Ukraine by Russia, Russia's accomplice the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, challenges posed by China's coercive policies, the spread of malign disinformation, as well as cyber-defence, hybrid threats and support for partners
- Strategy: synergies and coherence with the implementation of NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass essential
- Solution: countering aggression against Ukraine that is being waged by Russia and countering Russia's accomplice the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, addressing the challenges posed by China's coercive policies, the spread of malign disinformation, as well as cyber-defence, hybrid threats and support for partners

329) underlines the need for additional funding for this flagship EU-NATO cooperation initiative; calls on the EU to consider inviting Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to participate in PESCO projects such as military mobility; (p.28)

- Sentence not related to Russia/Ukraine relation

330) values the United States' and its current administration's commitment and engagement to the territorial defence of Europe, especially in the light of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine that threatens the whole continent; (p.28)

- Problem: Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the threat of that war to the whole continent
- Strategy: the United States' and its current administration's commitment and engagement to the territorial defence of Europe
- Solution: territorial defence of Europe

331) welcomes the UK's support for Ukraine; (p.29)

- Problem: the European Union wants countries to support Ukraine
- Strategy: -
- Solution: UK supports Ukraine alongside with the European Union

332) calls for deeper military-security cooperation with like-minded Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, including by strengthening the security dimension of the EaP and for enhanced security and defence policy dialogues, particularly with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

333) believes it essential to recognise and capitalise on the strategic position of the Black Sea in the context of Russia's war in Ukraine and to increase investment in European military projects in the region, including when it comes to modernising and strengthening its military industry and infrastructure; (p.29)

- Problem: Russia's war in Ukraine
- Strategy: essential to recognise and capitalise on the strategic position of the Black Sea in the context of the war and increasing investment in European military projects in the Black Sea region including when it comes to modernising and strengthening its military industry and infrastructure
- Solution: to have a strategic position in the war

334) Expresses deep concern about the increasing tensions and recurrent outbreaks of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, where Armenia has been attacked within its internationally recognised borders and where Russia has not played a stabilising role; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

335) Stresses that Russia is still not fully complying with the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia of 12 August 2008; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

336) strongly condemns Russia's illegal military presence in, and occupation of, the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia; (p.29)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

337) calls on the EEAS to prepare a thorough report of violations of the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement, an agreement for which the EU bears special responsibility as the mediator, identify and

communicate clearly the provisions which have still not been fulfilled by the Russian Federation and submit recommendations, which could induce the Russian Federation to fulfil its international obligations, notably to withdraw its military forces from Georgia's occupied territories and allow the establishment of an international security mechanism in these territories, and to allow the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia, pursuant to its mandate; (p.29/30)

- Sentence not related to relation Russia and Ukraine

338) Underlines the importance of close alignment with CFSP positions by EU candidate and potential candidate countries; with regard to the Western Balkans, brings attention to Serbia's relationship with Russia and its lack of condemnation of Russia's unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine and the consequences of this relationship in the Western Balkans; calls for stronger military security, including civilian/military as well as police/military security, cooperation with like-minded Western Balkan countries, in particular in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation; calls, in this regard, on the EEAS to strengthen the role of the EU delegations and CSDP missions in third countries in order to reinforce their ability to detect and debunk disinformation campaigns orchestrated by foreign state actors; (p.30)

- Problem: Serbia's relationship with Russia and its lack of condemnation of Russia's unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine and the consequences of this relationship in the Western Balkans
- Strategy: calls for stronger military security, including civilian/military as well as police/military security, cooperation with like-minded Western Balkan countries, in particular in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation, EEAS needs to strengthen the role of the EU delegations and CSDP missions in third countries in order to reinforce their ability to detect and debunk disinformation campaigns orchestrated by foreign state actors
- Solution: Serbia needs to wind down its relationship with Russia and needs to condemn Russia's unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine and the consequences of this relationship in the Western Balkans

Appendix B: Overview discourse answering WRP-questions

	Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2021	Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2022
What is the problem?	Russia’s illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea, unprecedented build-up of Russian forces, demands put forward by Kremlin, the return of spheres of influence in Europe, threat to the security of the continent, increasing militarization of the Crimean Peninsula, Kremlin’s demand to reshape the European security architecture, outdated idea of ‘spheres of influence’, Russia’s aggressive behaviour towards Ukraine, not enough military and security assistance to Ukraine.	Negative effect of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on security in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans regions, battlefield, EU decision-making and crisis management, new security realities resulting, increased militarization of the Arctic region, Russia’s war in Ukraine, Serbia’s relation with Russia and its lack of condemnation of Russia’s unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine, Russia’s attack on the rules-based international order, Putin’s aggression against Europe and the West, President Vladimir Putin’s decree of 21 September 2022, biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War, brutal aggression against Ukraine, genocide, no robust and effective measures, EU security and defence capabilities, lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO Member States, Ukraine needs assistance, Belarus, People’s Republic of China is not taking a clear stance, The Wagner Group, gender-based violence, Member States don’t respond quickly enough to Ukraine’s needs, Ukrainian armed forces are not trained, lack of military support to combat Russian aggression and assist in the liberation of the

		occupied regions of Ukraine, Iran's support to Russia, Türkiye does not align with the EU sanctions against Russia.
What is the strategy?	The European Parliament underlines that democratic countries are free to choose its own alliances, the European Parliament has a strong condemnation towards Russia's behavior, European Parliament calls on the Russian Government to withdraw its forces and stops the threatening, restart Normandy Format talks and achieve tangible results, mobilizing the European Peace Facility, encourage the member states of the EU to increase bilateral military and security assistance to Ukraine	improve stability and security, mutual cooperation, investment in the EU-NATO cooperation, EU and its partners in cooperation with Ukraine assess possible developments on the battlefields, accurate and timely intelligence, use PESCO, investment in European military projects in the Black Sea region, cooperation with like-minded Western Balkan countries, Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, European Parliament takes into account..., European Union's resolution of 1 March 2022, EU sanctions against Russia, the recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, legislative resolution of 14 December 2022, Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine, Ukraine defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity and the common European values of democracy, credibility of the EU and its security and defence policy, the European Peace Facility (EPF), ensuring complementarity with NATO, a defence of a free Europe, NATO helps to coordinate requests for assistance on behalf of Ukraine, peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security and increased mutual cooperation, Member States need to accelerate their military assistance to Ukraine, German Chancellor Scholz needs to initiate a European consortium of relevant European countries, position of

		<p>further sanctions, EUR 18 billion support package agreed by the EU in December 2022, Full Operational Capability should be reached immediately, the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018, the MPCC's staffing level should be increased up to 250 personnel.</p>
<p>What is the solution?</p>	<p>Counter the build-up of Russian forces around Ukraine, more stability and predictability on the Union's borders, more stability in the Western Balkans, condemning of the Kremlin's demand to halt the further expansion of NATO, stop aggressive behaviour from Russia towards Ukraine, stop the military build-up at Ukraine's borders, Russian Government withdraws its forces from the Ukrainian borders and stops its threatening against Ukraine, Normandy Format and Minsk I & II Agreements as the only diplomatic initiatives able to end the hostilities.</p>	<p>peaceful conflict resolution, EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships, predict potential demand for weapons and ammunition and scope of potential aid, improve intelligence sharing and cooperation among member states, Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation, deeper military-security cooperation with like-minded Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, strengthening of EU-NATO cooperation, increase in European military personnel in the Black Sea, stronger military security, support for Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance), Stop Putin, Ukraine's victory, boost EU security and defence capabilities, unprecedented support for Ukraine, EU and NATO Member States should invest more in security and defence, China should take a clear stance against Russia's invasion in Ukraine, stop gender-based violence, deliver the security expected by EU citizens, supporting Ukraine's defence of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and European values, sanctions, European union needs to provide military assistance and weapons deliveries by the EPF, raise the EPF ceiling and create an envelope for Ukraine,</p>

		additional support in training and capacity building, stay constructive to not drive Russia further away, the launch of the non-executive CSDP military assistance mission for Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), EUMAM
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Table 5 – Overview of used discourse answering the WPR – questions per annual report.