

# The costs of EU's policy on external border security

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Revealing the financial consequences for the bordering industry and undocumented migrants

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Bachelor thesis Geography Planning and Environment (GPE)

Nijmegen School of Management

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June 2018



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June 2018

Word count main text: 18.330

# Radboud University





## Preface

In today's society, I often feel that citizens of 'the West' feel very tolerant towards others. However, with paying close attention to the daily news I think we might not be. This may already be part of the problem, that a classification between 'the West' and others exists. Seeing the destruction of wars around the world, together with the people fleeing them is awful. However, seeing states and their inhabitants rejecting these people is just as bad. Being depicted as fortune seekers or illegal, makes this even worse.

This year, I started the pre-master for Geography, Planning and Environment (GPE), partially because of the inequalities that do still very much exist in today's world. After completing the course 'Borders and Identities in Europe', I realised just how discriminating the policy of the European Union is towards 'outsiders'. This sparked my interest for borders more, in particular the borders of the EU, where I live. After reading more about this topic, I found the human costs of the external border policy of the EU are very high, with thousands of people dying while trying to get into the EU. I could not grasp the idea of such a big supranational entity voluntarily allowing this. Together with my supervisor, Prof. dr. Henk van Houtum, I came up with the idea of investigating the financial side of this policy, also because of my background in studying finance. Could this provide an entire different view upon this debate?

I would like to thank my supervisor and my peers for their feedback. It was nice to be able to discuss my ideas with people who were interested in the topic as well.

Sjoerd Visser

Nijmegen, June 2018



## Summary

The European Union has been fortifying its external borders the last two decades. Undocumented migrants are one of the groups who fall victim to this fortification. The human costs of this bordering policy, are widely covered by the media and the academic field (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008; Neumayer, 2006; Salter 2006; Castles, 2004; Bigo, 2002; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002), but what about the financial costs? Organisations within the security industry receive funding from the European Union in order to secure the borders, but how much money is being spent exactly? To still be able to reach the EU, undocumented migrants pay smugglers, which creates a shadow industry. But how big is this industry exactly? These two industries together form, what I call, the bordering industry. So, what are the costs of EU's policy on external border security and what are its financial consequences for the bordering industry and undocumented migrants exactly? These costs are not publicly known, yet are taxpayers' money. Can these costs be retrieved? By following the money of this policy, the aim of this thesis is to provide insight into the financial costs of EU's border security. These results add to the humanitarian side of the debate, to be able to paint a complete picture.

By doing an explorative research and using secondary data sources, the developments in, and the costs of, EU's external border security policy could be found. The methods of data collection included desk research, wherein the concepts of border security, the bordering industry and undocumented migration are described. By reviewing similar research done in the past by journalists of the Migrants' files (n.d.), I had a good sense of where to look for data within the many institutions of the EU. By combining analysis yearly financial reports of the EU, policy documents, research project summaries and other independent reports, I was able to track down most of the costs since the securitisation change after 9/11 (Zureik & Salter, 2013). I am saying 'most' of the costs, for multiple reasons. First, I only included costs that could explicitly be linked to external border security, which eliminated costs of the EU that did not have a specific destination yet. Next to this, a lot of EU funded research is still taking place. The costs do not get allocated after the timeframe, Horizon2020, is over. Also, I could not include relatively small amounts of funding that were mentioned within communication documents instead of budgets. There are hundreds of communication documents per year, which I did not have time for to include. Therefore, the total amount of costs is still conservative. This, together with the importance of the topic, leaves enough room for future research.

The results of the thesis show that since this change, borders were increasingly fortified. However, next to physical fences, passports became an effective tool for the EU to manage migration. These paper borders are the biggest obstacle for undocumented migrants, because of the shift from indentifying dangerous individuals to not allowing risk groups into the EU (Bigo, 1999). The

budgets of the EU towards border security also started increasing in this timeframe, with a budget of half a billion euro in 2006 to over 3 billion euro in 2016 (European Commission, 2017). However, because specifics were missing in a lot of the financial reports, I could only allocate around a billion euro to external border costs. Even though I felt that there was a lack of transparency in the financial reports, they did show me the agencies and budget categories which are related to external border security. A big part of the budget was allocated to Frontex, the External Border Fund, Borders and Visa fund, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the Schengen Facility, the emergency fund and the research programs Framework program 7 and Horizon2020. After reviewing these, the actual costs of the EU towards the security industry amounted to over twelve billion in this time period. This included payments, in the form of research grants, to private defence organisations such as Airbus, Selex and Thales, which also are actively lobbying for more funding and are included in the top fifteen global arms producing companies (Akkerman, 2016a; the Migrants' files, n.d.). This means, they are active in the war industry as well as the security industry. The EU is ironically very protective over its security industry and wants it to grow (European Commission, 2018d). Other remarkable payments included funding towards Turkey, Libya and other authoritarian regimes in North Africa, which amounted to 6,5 billion euro (Akkerman, 2018; Akkerman, 2016a; Sentek & Arsu, 2018). Since the year 2000, over 1,2 million undocumented migrants paid smugglers to transport them to the EU (Frontex, 2018; the Migrants' files, n.d.). With this data, I estimated the total amount of money towards the shadow industry at just under five billion euro. This is a huge amount of money, because of the fact that smugglers are the last option for undocumented migrants. The EU blocked all other forms of legal travel routes. When combining the funding for these two industries this brings the total amount of funding towards the bordering industry to over 17 billion euro.

The EU is portraying irregular migration as a threat to their internal security and are securitising this threat (Fierke, 2007), which could explain this excessive spending. However, Castles (2004) and Andreas (2001), argue that increased border control does not reduce this type of migration. This would mean the funding is only stimulating not so stable governments such as Turkey and Libya is morally questionable. Especially considering the fact that the EU deemed Turkey unfit to become a member state, it is striking that the EU does, in practice, externalise its border to Turkey. Moreover, this means private entities in the security industry, which is promoted by the EU, keep growing into a security-industrial complex (Hayes, Rowlands, & Buxton, 2009). This could change the discourse of security into an economic one, which means the policy will not change. Since the amount of funding towards the Internal Security Fund is still increasing, this seems to be the case. The result of this is that undocumented migrants will keep on losing, being caught between the war and security industry. Because of the discriminating nature of this policy, along with human costs and financial costs of over seventeen billion euro, I argue that the current external border policy of the

EU is not worth its costs. I recommend a policy that focuses on actually helping undocumented migrants, instead of spending billions on new ways of detecting and stopping these migrants. This is a waste of tax payers' money and will continue to stimulate the shadow industry. It is time to cut both the human and financial costs of this bordering policy, by changing it into a more inclusive one.



## Table of contents

1 Introduction.....	12
1.1 Project framework and relevance .....	14
1.2 Research objective .....	16
1.3 Research questions.....	16
1.4 Research model .....	17
2 Theoretical framework.....	18
2.1 External border policy of the European Union: Border security.....	18
2.2 Bordering industry.....	22
2.3 Migration: documented versus undocumented .....	24
2.4 Conceptual model .....	26
3 Methodology .....	27
3.1 Research strategy .....	27
3.2 Data collection.....	28
4 Following the money.....	30
4.1 EU budgets towards border security.....	32
4.2 Aiding the bordering industry .....	35
4.2.1 Frontex & operational costs of securing the borders .....	35
4.2.2 Research grants .....	40
4.2.3 Agreements of border externalisation.....	43
4.2.4 Costs for migrants .....	44
4.3 Total costs of the Bordering industry.....	47
5 Conclusion and discussion.....	50
5.1 Conclusion .....	50
5.2 Discussion .....	52
6 Reflection.....	55
References.....	56
Appendix I – Annual financial reports .....	62
Appendix II – Frontex expenditures .....	65
Appendix III - FP7 Research projects related to external border security .....	67
Appendix IV – Data of the Migrants’ files concerning smuggling routes .....	77
Appendix V – Full list of all the costs of the bordering industry .....	79

## 1 Introduction

'Illegal' migration is a threat against which the EU must be 'safeguarded', at least according to the European Commission (2016a). This type of migration is categorised as illegal, which legitimises this denying of entry for a lot of residents within the EU. However, the 'illegal' part has nothing to do with them being criminals, but with their way of entry. They are from a country which has some sort of authoritarian regime, is relatively poor, has a history of conflict or has another attribute such as religion to make them a 'high risk' group for the EU (Bigo, 1999). Their passports, a piece of paper and plastic, do not grant them entry to the EU. Often thousands of these migrants still come to the EU anyway each year. Why? Because they fear for their security in the place they once called home, but are not allowed in. That is why they take irregular routes towards the EU, by for example, trying to cross the Mediterranean in a boat that is barely seaworthy. The illegal part says something about their way of travelling, but implies criminal activity. The EU tries to stop these 'dangerous' people to guarantee the safety of EU citizens, which is ironic. People who live in fear are all rejected if they travel in an irregular way, just so that EU citizens can maintain their feeling of security. And this sense of security is worth a lot to the EU. More than 3 billion euro was budgeted for 2016 alone in the category of security and citizenship (European Commission, 2017). All member states, and therefore their citizens, contribute to this budget. So what is this money being spend on? Fences? Guards? Cameras? As an EU citizen, whose sense of security was also intact before this excessive spending started, I would like to find out. Would I, or anyone else for that matter, feel safer knowing how this money is spent or is this not the case at all? Is it money well spent?

Since geographical borders were written down in treaties in the eighteenth century, it has restricted mobility (Walters, 2002). This is ironic, as these borders are a man-made concept of state barriers that now restrict our freedom of movement. By defining our territories, the non-natural idea of borders also has a restricting effect on our ideas (Wilson & Donnan, 1998). Our need for security is one of the reasons for our decreasing mobility. Salter (2004), therefore, names security and crime as one of the dangers for mobility. In the past few decades, after the creation of the Schengen Area and the attacks on 9/11, the need for more border security increased. Especially the latter event affected global mobility policies in a more restricting and policing way. This securitization change resulted in intensified external border controls, which affected everyone wanting to travel internationally. States increasingly are collecting, monitoring and policing personal data for the purpose of border protection (Zureik & Salter, 2013). The increased control measures also include automated systems such as passenger screening and the detection of unusual financial transitions (de Goede, 2008). Border control is becoming more complex and less tangible post 9/11 throughout

the world, with concepts such as biometric identification, social security data and other types of surveillance (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009). The securitisation of the border has the aim to protect states from 'dangerous travellers' (Salter, 2004). Through this process of increased need for security, or self-preservation, states are creating an 'us versus them' situation, in which the 'others' immediately get a negative image. This creates an order between those who live within those borders, and those who live somewhere else (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002).

This process of 'bordering' and excluding others is also taking place in the European Union. In the past few decades the external border policy of the European Union has also become stricter with more regulations to 'safeguard' the Schengen Area (European Commission, 2016a). Whilst there is free movement within the union, the external borders are getting more fortified. Both the regulations and tangible security measures are intensifying. With visas and border control, it becomes harder for people from outside the European Union to enter. Especially if you are from a country that is on the 'negative list' (Van Houtum, 2010), mostly containing Islamic and/or relatively poor countries, getting into the Schengen Area in a legal way is difficult (Schengen Visa Info, n.d.).

During the last decades, it became painfully clear that migrants did not stop trying to get into the European Union if they could not enter in a legal way. Instead they turned to irregular ways and more dangerous ways of travelling, which opened a smuggling market (Morrison, Director, & Crosland, 2000). They kept coming because of their situation in their home countries. A lot of people fled countries such as Syria, where a civil war broke out at the time. This meant a dangerous situation for a lot of civilians, wherein their basic human needs could not be met anymore. They chose to look for a better place and often started their journey towards the European Union. Unfortunately, in 2016 alone, over five thousand migrants did not make it to the European Union and died in transit (UNHCR, 2018). Petersen (1958) calls part of the people who did make it impelled migrants, because they still had some saying in migrating. A lot of those migrants did not have a choice anymore and this type of migration can therefore be labelled as forced. The media and politicians regularly call this illegal migration, due to their way of entry. This maintains the 'criminalisation' of the migrants, which this bordering policy creates (Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007).

Still, the European Union sees the need for these bordering controls which exclude a lot of people. The budget of the European Union for these controls is hundreds of millions and includes numerous projects and organizations (The Migrants' files, n.d.). The European Union's current policy regarding its external borders affects a lot of people, so it is interesting to see what this securitizing policy actually entails. Part of the bordering policy is externalizing the border control to outside of the European Union. Examples of this are the deal with Libya (Hamood, 2008), Turkey (Bansak, Hainmueller, & Hangartner, 2016) and the pre-flight passenger control that commercial airlines have to undertake (Bendixsen, 2016).

To summarize, the external border policy of the European Union has a big financial impact due to its extensive budget and restricting measures on the smuggling industry, or shadow industry, as well as the security industry and on the industry of international commercial transport. Because these three industries combined are hugely dependent on the European Union since securing borders became more important, I will refer to them as the 'bordering industry', a concept I will explain further in the next chapter. Whereas existing literature usually focuses on the human costs of these bordering processes, I will look at the financial side that comes with it. Politics in general are often concerned with economic growth and the managing of state debt. It will be interesting to see if this bordering policy not only has a humanitarian downside, but also to look at its financial costs. In the end, this is taxpayers' money, but where does it go exactly? How does the European Union aid the bordering industry and where does this funding go? Would EU citizens feel different about the external border policy if they know where the money goes?

### **1.1 Project framework and relevance**

Whereas the next chapters of this thesis explain the most important theoretical concepts, the methods used, the analysis and the conclusion, this section states the framework it takes place in together with the aim and the research questions.

Within this thesis, most literature used is from the field of border studies, because this field of study relates to this essence of the topic described above. After all, the external border policy of the European Union and its industry revolve around political borders. However, because there are also financial and political elements in this thesis, the sources of information are broader and not limited to this particular field.

A number of researchers already investigated border security in general and the policy of the European Union towards its external borders. Fierke (2007) proposes border security should protect a state from a threat, however it is difficult to have an objective view of a threat. It depends on the community and the social construction of the discourses belonging to security. Whereas after 9/11, terrorism became a global threat to security, nowadays irregular migration is a threat that legitimises border security as well. Labelling something as a threat is not enough to securitise the matter. The issue can only be securitized if people accept it as a threat, which is definitely one of the discourses in today's society. In light of the recent 'refugee crisis', Andreas (2001) and Castles (2004) argue that increased border security does not reduce the number of arrivals from the global south to the global north, yet there is a securitization of immigration (Bigo, 2002). Border security is a danger for mobility in its functioning (Salter, 2004). Baldwin-Edwards (2008, p.1457) referred to this crisis as 'the logical outcome of nearly 30 years of mismanagement of world migration'. The number of fatalities is a 'deadly consequence' of it (Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007, p.306). This failing concept of bordering

leads to the re-thinking of the concept all together, with less restrictions (Agnew, 2008; Paasi, 2012). Most authors focus on what is wrong with the concept of borders or bordering processes, and what should change because of the humanitarian consequences. Still, the external borders of the European Union become more sealed off, especially for impelled migrants. This topic is still widely covered by the media and relevant because there are still migrants dying trying to get into the European Union. On the other hand, the European Union is claiming the protection of its territory is to 'safeguard' it (European Commission, 2016a). But where does all this funding of the European Union to safeguard its borders go? Border control institutions such as Frontex are well-known, as well as the refugee camps at the external borders. As far as I know, the actual use of the aid of the European Union towards the bordering industry has not been covered in academic literature. However, this financial side of this bordering issue has been investigated by a group of journalists who published their results under the name 'the Migrants' files'. They covered both humanitarian cost and the 'money trail', and is written in a journalistic way. This project was discontinued in 2016 due to limited funding and saturation (The Migrants' files, n.d.). I want to reinvestigate the money trail, to see where the funding from the European Union towards border security actually goes and write about it in a scientific way. This would add to the debate around border control. Now that the humanitarian costs have been covered widely, investigating the financial costs could provide a more detailed picture. It could be an addition to these humanitarian costs if there is also a financial downside. This would provide a more complete argument against the current policy. However, I might discover data which lead me to the opposite direction. I am also more interested in this financial side, because of my own background after studying finance.

It is important to state here, that I am trying to focus solely on border security and not immigration policy as a whole. Although immigration policy is greatly intertwined with border security, it entails more than that. This would be too broad of a topic, which I do not have sufficient time for to investigate. The funding behind border security will be the focus, because this protection policy is at the centre of the debate by scholars within this field of study. Are border control institutions or big corporations in the security industry receiving most of the budget? Is it even transparent where all the money goes? What are the biggest projects surrounding the external borders of the European Union? What role do documented and undocumented migrants play in this bordering industry? How costly is this policy for the European Union? And what do patterns in the funding say about the actual policy of the European Union?

Answering these questions will add to the literature about the external border policy of the European Union. It will provide information to help formulate a critical view towards this policy. Perhaps there are ethical issues with the organizations who receive funding, or perhaps states and agencies within the Union itself receive a lot. In any case, it will help shed light on where the money

of the European Union is going within this social debate of migration and border security. After all, the money that aids the bordering industry, is coming from taxpayers throughout the European Union.

### **1.2 Research objective**

Next to the social costs of the securitisation policy of the European union (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; Salter, 2004), there is also a financial side. By ‘following the money’ of this policy, the results will contribute to a complete picture of its consequences within this debate, or will show a lack of transparency. Either way, it will contribute to the literature surrounding border security. I will do this by recreating the methods of the journalists of the migrants’ files and by examining EU policy and budgets regarding its external borders.

The aim of this research is to provide insight into the financial costs of the external border policy of the European Union, since the securitisation change in border control, and to reveal where this funding is going within the bordering industry. The results will be presented visually in chapter 4.

### **1.3 Research questions**

To achieve the research objective, I have formulated a main question and multiple sub questions to be able to reach my research objective in a structured way. The sub questions cover the development towards today’s situation, its costs and its consequences respectively.

Main question:

*What are the costs of EU’s policy on external border security and what are its financial consequences for the bordering industry and undocumented migrants?*


Sub questions:

- 1. What are the developments in the policy of the European Union towards its external border security and what are its corresponding budgets for it?*
- 2. Where does the funding go within the bordering industry?*
- 3. What are the financial consequences for undocumented migrants?*

**1.4 Research model**

As said before, I will try and achieve the aim of this research by trying to recreate the investigation of the migrants’ files and by examining EU policy and budgets regarding its external borders.

To summarise this chapter, to be able to do this, a few theoretical concepts need explaining first. The first is the external border policy of the European Union. What is this policy and what are its developments during the last decades following the securitization change in border control? The second concept is the bordering industry itself. How can it be defined and what does it comprehend? The last concept is that of migration, explicitly the difference between documented and undocumented migration. To be able to understand the financial costs, these need to be explained first. That is because EU policy affects the bordering industry, which in turn has consequences for both documented and undocumented migrants. I will focus on the financial consequences for undocumented migrants. However, I will also compare their costs to the costs of travelling of documented migrants. The model below shows a very basic way how to get from the concepts to the goal of this research, which I will explain further in the theoretical framework and methodology.



**Figure 1 - Research model**

## **2 Theoretical framework**

Within this thesis, I will not use one social theory to look at this research problem. The concepts used, are specific and financial data plays an important part in this research. Social theory can be used as an introduction to understand the complexity of the debate around border security and to help explain its place in society. For instance, this debate is highly related to Bourdieu's (1990) theory of Habitus and Fields. It basically states that someone is born into a certain power structure and that people have to compete with each other to be successful. However, some groups of people have fewer resources to do so, such as undocumented or forced migrants, whereas others tend to have more and are therefore more successful in accomplishing their goals. Therefore, winners keep winning and losers keep losing. This is a valid point to keep in mind, before going into the concepts. Another interesting theory that is applicable is Foucault's earlier work, wherein he describes the dominant discourse as a power structure. People act according to this discourse (Foucault, 1977), they internalise it. In this debate this seems to be the discourse of security. The European Commission (2016a), says it is protecting its citizens from undocumented migrants, among other things, which EU citizens are, for the most part, accepting as the dominant discourse. However, the analysis of data could provide an insight into the necessity of security measures. Is it really necessary or is there an underlying economic discourse for the parties involved in this industry?

Instead of going deeper into a grand social theory, I will explain the most important theoretical concepts that can be applied at a practical level, and are therefore valuable as a framework to get to the research objective.

### **2.1 External border policy of the European Union: Border security**

While border security has always played a part in policy of the EU, it has become more important since the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 (European Commission, 2018a). This shifted the focus from internal borders of the EU to the external ones. The Schengen Area integrated the member states under European Law, which caused uncertainty among them about security issues. These concerns led to more and intensified cooperation in terms of border control and monitoring of shared intelligence (Bigo, 1999). Verstraete (2000), therefore argues that the borders of the European Union have not disappeared, but instead new ones were created. Next to increased physical external borders such as fences or walls, technological borders are becoming more important. Especially after the securitization change, which happened post-9/11, border control is important for the European Union (Zureik & Salter, 2013). The European Commission (2018b) says it is securing the EU's borders by adopting new measures to 'help to manage migration more effectively, improve the internal security in the EU and safeguard the principle of free movement of


persons'. Leonard (2010) names three reasons for the increased cooperation on border security, and the intensification of external border controls. To decrease the number of migrants entering the EU, to get new member states to address their out-dated border control and to contribute to the fight against terrorism. That is why the external borders of the Schengen Area are referred to as 'frontier zones' (Salter, 2004, p.82), where military tactics are being used on a daily basis (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2001). Migration is being viewed as a threat, which is then securitised in order to 'protect' those within the EU (Fierke, 2007).

Research has been in the budget of the EU since 2003 and is becoming more lucrative, with a rise in budget from 2007 until 2013 of 55 billion euro to 80 billion euro in the period of 2014 until 2020 (European Commission, 2013a). How much of this budget goes towards security research, will be widely covered in the main body of this thesis. The following agencies and systems are the most important in the development of the external border security since the creation of the Schengen Area and the change towards a more securitizing border policy.


The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union was created in 2004. This agency is better known as Frontex and is responsible for the policy, cooperation and monitoring of security issues around the external borders. Since 2016, it is called the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, with the goal of coordinating border control in line with the EU fundamental rights charter. While normally the border control is up to member states, Frontex trains border guards and assists at borders that are under pressure (Frontex, 2017). Frontex determines this by a risk analysis, which is composed out of data from all member states about their borders. The EU created EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System) for this, which is a system that provides member states with information regarding external border issues (European Commission, 2018b). Frontex is the foremost agency that 'deals' with impelled or forced migrants that come to the European Union using a smuggling route. Leonard (2010) argues that the activities of Frontex contribute to the securitisation of migration, which is why they get a lot of criticism from both scholars and human right groups. The way Frontex is operating might be a point of discussion, but is not discussed further before going into the expenditures later on.

An important tool for securing and controlling the borders are passports and visa applications that are necessary to enter the European Union. Not the physical borders such as fences are hindering migrants to come to the EU, but instead these paper borders are the biggest obstacle. Salter (2006, p.167) describes passports and the visa system as 'tickets that allow temporary and permanent membership in the community, and the border represents the limit of the community'. If a person is allowed into the EU based on either their passport or visa, they can travel freely through the whole EU because of its common visa policy. Someone's nationality, and therefore the passport,

either grants a person a lot of freedom or restricts someone in their movement. Where some passports allow you to travel almost the whole world without having to get a visa, other passports are almost not providing any visa-free access. For example, a Japanese passport provides free access to 180 countries, whereas a passport of Afghanistan would only provide access to 24 countries (Henley & Partners, 2018). The figures below show the free-access of these passports on a world map. The darker areas are free-access, whereas for the grey areas, a visa is required.



**Figure 2 - Mobility with a Japanese passport (Henley & Partners, 2018)**



**Figure 3 - Mobility with an Afghan passport (Henley & Partners, 2018)**

This huge difference is solely based on place of birth, yet it has a big effect on that person's international mobility. So while passports can be seen as 'tickets' to enter a community and are therefore countering bordering practises in some form, some 'tickets' are more valuable than others making it a discriminating system (Van Houtum, 2010). The EU also judges people based on their passport to see if they are 'safe' or 'dangerous' travellers. This is what Bigo (1999) sees as the shift of border policy from not allowing dangerous individuals in, towards not letting risk groups in altogether. However Salter (2004), argues that is not always the case. If someone applies for a short period, they get categorized according to risk. Yet, if they want to stay permanently, they are classified according to desirability. This is when the discourse of security suddenly changes into one

of economic benefits, which allows the EU to look past someone's nationality and therefore 'risk'. The EU uses multiple systems to share information along its borders to ensure 'the security of citizens and travellers in the EU' (European Commission, 2018b). The Visa Information System (VIS) shares information about visa data and short-stay applications. The Schengen Information System (SIS) shares information among the member states about suspected criminals or criminal activity. Then there is EURODAC, which is a system that has the fingerprints of asylum seekers in it, to quickly be able to filter them out. This is in order with the 'Hotspot' project, which is part of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). This project was developed to cope with irregular migration, in the sense of returning people who were not deemed in danger and therefore could not get asylum. Before returning 'home', migrants are placed in detention centres. However, the European Court of Human Rights (ECTHR), did not approve locking up people as a general border management technique (Pichou, 2016). Finally, since 1998 the EU also uses a system to prevent people with fraudulent documents and/or fake passports to enter, called FADO or 'False and Authentic Documents Online' (EUR-Lex, 2016).

As mentioned before passports are related to the visa system, which allows country to check up on people before they get to the 'actual' border. With the actual border I mean the political border, as it is still a social construct and not perceivable outside of this construct. The EU is using the visa system to outsource their border control to transportation companies, which have to check the visas of the people they are transporting in the country of departure. If these companies do not comply or fail to control their passengers sufficiently, then they are financially responsible for the return of those passengers and get a fine (Bendixsen, 2016; Salter, 2004). This outsourcing or externalisation of the border control, is becoming more frequent in the external border security policy of the EU. Another example is the cooperation of EU with countries in North Africa, such as Morocco, Tunisia and now Libya. The latter received 240 million US dollars for an agreement about border control (Nakache & Losier, 2017). The aim of this cooperation is to decrease irregular migration, and thus to take some of the strain of the borders of the EU. To accomplish this, coast guards are trained who will have to protect the border and only let approved migrants make the trip to the EU. A part of this cooperation with Libya is EUNAVFOR-Med, also known as operation Sophia. During this operation, the coast guard tries to 'capture and dispose of vessels used in human trafficking, to reduce the life loss at sea (EUNAVFOR-Med, 2018). This meant a lot of migrants ended up in detention centres. This cooperation has received a lot of criticism based on those detention centres, for violating human rights. These violations will continue to push them towards the EU, in search of better living conditions (Hamood, 2008). Thus, this cooperation is aiding the bordering industry from two sides, by funding the security elsewhere and by providing 'demand' for smugglers. I will elaborate this further in the next sub-chapter. These are not the only African countries that

have an agreement with the EU regarding border security. In 2015 at the Valletta Summit on Migration, the EU made an action plan with 35 African countries to prevent irregular migration. This contained measures regarding increased military protection of borders, provision of equipment and the development of intelligence sharing networks (Akkerman, 2018). These agreements can be seen within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which functions in its current state since 2015. It aims to 'build more effective partnerships between the EU and its neighbours towards a more stable EU neighbourhood, in political, socio-economic and security terms' (EEAS, 2016). The ENP countries will receive over 15 billion euro funding for the period 2014-2020 to 'strengthen their states and societal resilience' towards challenges such as migration. It might be directed towards the development of the states involved, yet another 'buffer' next to the external border of the EU is created. It will be interesting to see, if it is possible to find out where this money is going exactly.

Another example of this externalisation of the border is the EU-Turkey deal, which was agreed upon in the ending of 2015 and then again in 2016 (Akkerman, 2018). During this cooperation, migrants who are deemed undocumented, are sent back to detention centres in Turkey, awaiting a decision on entering the EU or being sent back to their 'home' countries. This transports them away from the border, but at a cost. In return for this policy, Turkey is getting 6 billion euro as funding, the visa requirements for Turkish citizens are minimised, and the discussion on the entry of Turkey to the EU is re-opened (Farcy, 2015).

## **2.2 Bordering industry**

Bordering processes were already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis. It refers to the political borders which function as a barrier of a community. Those within the borders, are 'protected' from outsiders which are excluded and hindered or prohibited from entering the community (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002). This is exactly what the EU is doing by securing its external borders to 'safeguard' its territory. The last two examples of the externalising border policy of the EU, the ENP and the EU-Turkey deal, had a budget of more than 15 billion euro. Next to this, research budgets towards border control are increasing. For the period of 2007-2013, the seventh Framework Programme (FP7), had a budget of 1400 million euro for security research. This research also included internal security research as well (European Commission, 2015). For the period of 2014-2020, the research budget for border security and VISA research alone is 2760 million (European Commission, 2018c), which is a huge increase.

These immense budgets for securing the borders are the reason I will refer to them as an industry. Defining an industry is not that easy, because classification systems have to be used. However, in short, an industry is a group of organisations that offer the same type of product (Brown

& Ball, 1967), which in the case of border security is a type of protection of the borders. As mentioned before, multiple types of actors are involved within this industry such as private organisations in the field of security, but also public bodies, commercial transportation companies and smugglers. This also means that this definition of an industry is not sufficient anymore. Security organisations produce a form of security for the external borders of the EU, whereas public bodies provide policies on the matter. Transport companies are restricted by these security policies and offer an entirely different product. Finally, the smugglers profit from this restriction of commercial transportation and offer a way around this border protection. The commercial transportation companies are the only ones who seem to lose in this industry, as they have to up their controls and have less customers. These are all different products and therefore different industries, that are tightly related to each other. Due to its bordering practises, I will refer to this collection of industries as EU's 'bordering industry', an industry which profits from increasing border security and excluding outsiders, especially impelled or forced migrants. To summarise, the concept of the bordering industry I use within this thesis, consists of the security industry, the commercial transport industry and the shadow industry. The reason for including the shadow industry within the bordering industry, is that smugglers directly profit from the bordering policy of the EU regarding its external borders. They can provide ways of travel, which the EU has forbidden.

I am certainly not the first one who refers to some sort of a border industry. A border industry used to be a description for economic activity in proximity to borders, such as Hansen (1981) his research on assembly plants in North Mexico, nearby the US border. However, nowadays this concept refers more to the industry that is created by the border itself, producing a physical, technological or paper barrier, such as in the context of the EU's external border (Van Houtum, 2010). Hayes, Rowlands, & Buxton (2009) refer to the bordering industry and EU funding as 'the EU security-industrial complex or SIC. Therefore, they are comparing it to the concept of the military-industrial complex in the US. This is a term which describes a collaboration of the government, the defence industry and military entity within a country. These three type of groups work together for economic gains, instead of military necessity (Janiewski, 2011). This term was used to explain the huge defence budget of the US and its international affairs. Similarly, this could be applied to the EU regarding its bordering industry. For starters, the European Commission promotes this industry stating European companies are among world leaders within the security sector, but could lose this position to international competitors 'if no action is launched to enhance the competitiveness of the EU security industry' (European Commission, 2018d). So is this securing of the external borders really necessary, or is there an economic discourse behind this bordering policy? I will explore this by investigating the bordering industry further, to see where the funding of the EU goes and who benefits from it, if this is possible at all.

### **2.3 Migration: documented versus undocumented**

While this thesis focuses more on the financial costs than on the human costs of the EU's external border security, it is important to explain and categorize the concept of migration to better understand the full extent of the debate. External border security cannot be seen without the context of migration, it is both a reason for the EU to continue to fund the bordering industry and is also an outcome of it.

Migration is not a new phenomenon. The first human beings originated from Africa and migrated throughout the world from there. In more recent history, there are four periods of major migration. Some are voluntary, such as the migration of people from Europe to America, and people who were looking for a better life after World War II. Other periods of migration were not voluntary, such as the deportation of millions of slaves from Africa to America a few centuries ago, or the millions of workers from India who were, up to the First World War, relocated elsewhere to work (Hayter, 2000). The point of this small overview is to demonstrate that migration has always been around, and has even been used by host countries to force people to relocate. Nowadays, the meaning of forced migration has changed entirely. It refers to people who are moving somewhere else because they cannot stay in their home countries, being afraid of persecution or worse (Petersen, 1958). However, a lot of countries of destination, together with a part of its inhabitants, do not want to take in migrants anymore. Or at least, not all migrants. Apart from being often being criminalized by the media or other entities (van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007), migrants are simply not allowed in anymore. Within the discourse of security, they are portrayed as a threat (Fierke, 2007).

This is where the relatively new concept of border control functions as a discriminating filtering tool. A passport is an easy way of regulating travellers, whereas it holds the right of entry for some, and the state to which he or she can be deported back to if declined (Salter, 2004). As mentioned before, the EU also uses passports for its 'positive and negative' list in its VISA system. One's country of birth is decisive in getting a VISA and not ending up on the negative or blacklist (Van Houtum, 2010). One group of migrants who are lucky enough to be born in a country on the 'positive' list can enter the EU with their passports, and others cannot. Countries on the negative list, are usually less wealthy, so denying them access based on place of birth, is only reinforcing the existing global inequalities (Neumayer, 2006). Furthermore, it is not stopping these migrants from trying to reach the EU. So next to categorizing migrants for their reason of departure, they are also being categorized by how they enter. The first group of migrants is allowed in by the EU, which are the documented migrants, and can therefore use commercial transportation to enter. The other group of migrants, are not allowed in by the EU, and therefore try to enter the EU through other or irregular routes. This group is called undocumented migrants (Hayter, 2000). The ways and possibilities of travelling differ, as shown below. Figure 4 shows the Mediterranean maritime sea

arrivals, according to UNHCR (2018). It shows the routes, and how many migrants made it to which country in 2018, until June 26. Figure 5 below it shows the normal flying routes, which documented migrants can utilize (FlightConnections, 2018). To demonstrate the difference in possibilities, it shows flights departing from Tunisia, which is also a place of departure for undocumented migrants.




Figure 4 - Entering the EU as an undocumented migrant. Retrieved June 26, 2018 (UNHCR)




Figure 5 – Entering the EU as a documented migrant (FlightConnections, 2018)

Moreover, these ways of travelling also determine if the migrants are affected by the bordering industry. Documented migrants, might notice some extra controls at entry points, but are not restricted by them. Undocumented migrants however, are restricted by external border security. They cannot use commercial transportation anymore, because of EU policy and therefore use alternative – smuggling – routes. The security industry tries to make this impossible, only making this

type of transport more dangerous and costly for the migrants. This will be discussed further on, when these costs are analyzed. The fates of undocumented migrants and the bordering industry are intertwined. Therefore, I will focus on this group of migrants, instead of documented migrants or migrants in general.

**2.4 Conceptual model**

The theoretical concepts described above are all related in multiple ways. The figure below shows these connections. When following the money and going deeper into the bordering industry, these connections should be confirmed as they exist within the literature of this field of study. However, when following the money, perhaps new relations or actors will be discovered. In the discussion, I will reflect back onto this conceptual model and its relations.




Figure 6 - Conceptual model of concepts used

### **3 Methodology**

#### **3.1 Research strategy**

There are multiple steps I am planning to take in order to reach my research goal.

As a start, I did a literature review to position myself within this field of research and to get a clear scope of the subject, border security of the EU, and the debate around it. Even though the aim of this thesis is to perform an in-depth analysis of EU's external border security spending, it is useful to start out in a broader way. This way, I am aware of the full extent of this debate, which helps when analysing the data and forming the conclusions. First, I started out by giving an overview of the bordering policy of the European Union and its recent developments, followed by a description of the bordering industry and its effects on migration. This is the context, wherein this research takes place and matches with the concepts within the theoretical framework. The costs of external border security do not make sense, if you are not informed about what the policy of the EU regarding its external borders is altogether. This is also the reason I started the introduction in a broader way. To show the debate around the central concepts, before trying to define them. It seems like the start of deductive research, but with regards to the results, I am working in an inductive way. This means that within the introduction and theoretical framework, working from the general debate to the specific topic is useful. However, the conclusions will be based on specific data, which is appropriate for qualitative research (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). So after the theoretical framework, the results are about specific costs of EU's external border control, whereas I want to translate this to the more general debate of migration and borders. This means the results of specific policy costs can still be valuable in the academic field, as it connected with existing literature.

The type of research of this thesis is qualitative. The topic is largely economic, involving financial data which are not normally linked with qualitative research. However, this does not mean that a quantitative approach is best suited. I am not interested in calculating probabilities of relations within the industry, nor do I think it is even possible to create a data set that would be suitable for this. I am interested in where the funding goes within the bordering industry and what connections this brings with it. That is why qualitative research seems more appropriate. By combining desk research, policy analysis, budget analysis and a review of the Migrants' files, I should find enough data to be able to reach my research goal. This also means I am mostly using secondary data, which is non-empirical. Non empirical research can just as well lead to well founded and new conclusions, as empirical research. The researcher interprets this data and bases his argument on it. This is both possible with primary as with secondary data.

The topic of EU funding is not suitable for empirical methods of research such as interviews, because all the data are either in budgets of the EU and companies involved, or in other official

documents of the EU. Because the EU needs to account for where its funding is going, this needs to be published. Interviewing policy makers or people from the industry would not add much, as the figures and strategy should already be published. The only form of interviews that could prove to be a valuable addition are questions in emails. This way, I can ask for clarification if data is unclear to me. This could be with the authors of the Migrants' files, with spoke persons of the EU or with authors of additional sources. A content analysis of documents is more appropriate. More about the specific sources of information will follow in the next paragraph. I am planning on reviewing the Migrants' files first, to see which type of costs exists in relation to external border security. After this, I will focus on official budgets of the EU and the communication documents that go with them. This will be my starting point and will determine my following steps if other sources of data are needed.

I am choosing for a more pragmatic way of research, which focuses more on the outcome than fixed methods. The reason for this is that this is an explorative research and I do not have one type of source to get information. To discover all the costs of this bordering policy, I am expecting to do more than only document analysis within an EU database, which I will elaborate more on in the next paragraph. I will try and use data triangulation to verify information where possible, to strengthen the results (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). For instance, to check the numbers within budgets of the EU, with data in independent reports. This is why a pragmatic way of doing research is perfect within this thesis and still guarantees the validity of the results of it. Next to this, I will reflect on the political and social context this debate takes place in, because it cannot be seen outside of this context (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

### **3.2 Data collection**

When performing the literature review, and collecting data to formulate the most important concepts, I did desk research of existing literature. Mostly in the area of border studies and related fields. By referring to all these sources, the reliability of the results will be maintained.

For the first step of my research, the overview of the recent developments of the European Union and its policy towards border control, I can both take a look at official policy documents as well as research that already has been conducted on the topic of the European Union. Before I can do that I need to understand the structure of the European Union and all its entities. These can be found in official EU communication and press releases or existing literature. After that, I will look into budget and policy documents. The first type of budgets that I will look into, is the master budget of the EU, which are approved overall budgets per year. These financial reports will hopefully show the overall amount of money that is budgeted each year for external border security. I will look into the reports from after the securitisation change, to have a clear scope. If there are yearly budgets for securing the external borders in these financial reports, these will be my point of reference and will

show how much of this budget I can track down. At this point, I will be able to answer my first sub question.

To go deeper into the industry itself, I can investigate certain parts of the EU policy. For instance, after orientating on the topic, I found that the EU contributed a lot of money towards Frontex and towards the research program. Both public and private organisations can try and get these research contracts. Regarding external border security, there were over three hundred projects in the period of 2007 until 2013 under the research framework FP7. By looking through the research portal of the research portal of the European Commission, CORDIS, I can follow this funding to see where it goes and who is participating in this bordering industry (European Commission, 2018e). I will therefore perform a content analysis of these 300 research projects to discover their costs. The summary of this will be included in the appendix. Next to this, like said before, a group of journalists already mapped out the financial side of the border policy of the European Union. They called it the Migrants’ Files. This can be very useful information on getting an overview of the industry and gives me a starting point on where to look. These journalists had more time and resources than I do, so it’s worth to take this data into account and see what is useful. They also used reports of research organisation, which can be useful to check data from the EU in an objective manner. As mentioned before, content analysis of official documents and budgets will be my main type of analysis. At this point I will be able to answer my second sub question.

For the third and final sub question about the financial consequences for undocumented migrants, I can look into data from previous researches with added information from the Migrants’ files. They already stated some of the researches and data that could be interesting, for example, a research of the Spanish red cross and information of border crossings from Frontex. The answers of these three sub questions combined, can be combined to get a clear view of the costs and consequences of this bordering policy. To summarise, the methods of data collection can be viewed in Table 1 below.

<b>Sub question</b>	<b>Methods</b>	<b>Objective</b>
What are the developments in the policy of the European Union towards its external border security and what are its corresponding budgets for it? Where does the funding go within the bordering industry?	Desk research on border policy EU	Overview policy and budgets involved
	Financial report analysis	
	Analysis of research Migrants files and included reports	Overview of spending towards the bordering industry
What are the financial consequences for undocumented migrants?	Research project analysis Analysis migrant studies and additional information	Insight into financial consequences for undocumented migrants

**Table 1 – Overview methods per sub question**

#### 4 Following the money

To be able to track the funding of the EU that is aiding the bordering industry, a starting point is necessary. The Migrants' Files (n.d.) consist of more than only external border security. The biggest part of their money trail consists of funding towards deportation. These costs are left out here, because this happens as a result of border security, but is not necessarily connected with costs of the process of controlling the border. Moreover, a lot of the financial data used, is linked to internet sources. A part of these sources are nowadays not functional anymore or are only referring towards a smaller institution within the EU. To be able to follow this funding, the bureaucratic structure of the EU needs to be unravelled first.

The European Union consists of 13 official institutions and 4 inter-institutional bodies, which operate for all institutions. Next to these bodies, there are more than 30 official EU decentralised agencies that 'help the EU institutions implement policies and take decisions' (European Union, 2018a; European Union, 2018b). Fortunately, not all of these institutions, bodies and agencies are involved in external border security, which would make it even harder to figure out on what this EU funding is spent on. The three main law-making institutions of the EU are the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. The first one represents the citizens of the EU, the second one represents the governments of the member states and the third represents the interest of the EU as one entity. These three are all important in investigating the external border funding, as they make and approve the budgets and laws related to it. The Council of the European Union should not be mixed up with the European Council, which is the institution that sets out the general strategy and priorities of the EU. This might seem confusing, and it is. Mostly, this confusion is associated with the terminology which the EU uses. Europe, the European Union and the Schengen Area are referring to different territories or institutions. Europe is a continent with hard to define borders, due to fact that borders are a man-made concept and have changed over the course of history. The European Union is a political body. The borders of the EU have also changed by including new member states later, but are now politically set firmly. Finally, the Schengen Area refers to an agreement between most European Union member states and some non-member states on a common policy regarding their external and internal borders. The EU interchangeably uses all three names for its external borders, contributing to this confusion. Next to these institutions, there are multiple decentralised agencies that have something to do with the external border security. Frontex (European Union, 2018b) is the most important one, being the border security agency. I will elaborate further on its operations when discussing its budget. Secondly, there is the EMSA, which is the European Maritime Safety Agency. Among other things, this agency provides maritime security. They do this by reporting vessels, observing by satellites and by controlling ports. Therefore they

work closely with agencies such as Frontex and the ESA. The ESA is the European Space Agency (ESA, 2018), but is not listed as one of these official decentralised agencies. However, it was mentioned in multiple reports as being related to border control because of the satellites which are used (Akkerman, 2016a; Hayes, 2009). It is an international space agency that collaborates with 22 member states. Next, the EUISS is the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS, 2018). The name of this agency would suggest it is part of the official list of agencies, but again, it is not included. This is the EU’s agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy. This is a research institute which publishes articles on their findings. Lastly, the REA is the Research Executive Agency (European Commission, n.d.). This is a funding body for EU research grants, which also includes border security research. This research is conducted within frameworks of seven years. The current one is Horizon 2020 and its predecessor was called FP7 (European Commission, 2013a). To demonstrate the amount of money that is available for research, I will give the development of the budget from when it started to the present day budget. Framework programme 1 started in 1984 and had a budget of less than 4 billion euro for 4 years. Nowadays, with the Horizon 2020 framework, the budget is nearly 80 billion euro for seven years, as is shown in Figure 7. There might be other agencies that are related to border security and the bordering industry, but these are not immediately as clearly related as the previous ones and will therefore only show up by looking into the funding.




Figure 7 - Growth in research budget (European Commission, 2013)

#### **4.1 EU budgets towards border security**

The first step in finding out where the funding of the EU is going, is to determine how much this funding actually is. What does the EU spend annually on external border security, according to its budget? To discover this, I looked up if the EU published an annual financial report on their official budget. The EU has published this, or at least from 2006 on until 2016. A summary of the most important statistics regarding the external border security within these reports is included in Annex I. It should be mentioned beforehand that there does not seem to be one correct budget. For instance, the overall budget for payments in 2016 is 136 billion euro, according to the final financial report. However, the EU communicates that this is in fact 143 billion euro in payments (European Commission, 2016b). Because the financial reports give a more detailed description of the budget, these numbers are used to show the development of the budget over the years.

In 2006, the budget for 'freedom, security and justice' was over 580 million euro. This is the budget category which includes external border control. However, no more details are given about the precise expenditure. So a part of this 580 million is used for securing the external border, but how much this is exactly, is not mentioned in the report.

In 2007, the budget for the same category is 567,2 million euro, which means it slightly declined. Moreover, the financial report mentions 50 million euro of this budget is going towards IT systems. Examples of these systems are the Schengen Information System (SIS), Visa Information System (VIS) and the EURODAC fingerprinting system. These systems are helping the EU with deciding who can enter, but also sharing information about those who cannot. It basically helps the EU reject people more efficiently and helps them 'cope' with irregular migration (European Commission, 2018b).

The budget for 2008 included more details. The first overall heading which includes external border security is 'citizenship, freedom, security and justice', which amounted to 1521,4 million euro and is 1.2% of the total budget. This means citizenship has merged with the existing category. This seems like a steep increase, but the former reports did not include 'citizenship' within the same category. Moreover, the report states that 319 million euro went towards 'solidarity and management of migration flows'. This category consists of four funds, being the External Borders Fund (EBF), the Return Fund, the European Refugee Fund and the European Fund for the Integration of Third-country Nationals. The first one is very relevant to this research, as its objective is to 'support an efficient, high and uniform level of control at the EU's external border'. Its priorities consist of establishing an integrated border management system, developing the European Patrol Network for the southern sea borders, issuing visas, establishing IT systems to implement border legislation and 'tackling illegal immigration' (European Commission, 2014b). The last priority is an example of the criminalization of migrants by referring to this type of migration as illegal in official

communication documents. Moreover, the word tackling almost suggests physical measures to stop undocumented migrants from entering. The budget for this fund was 133 million euro in 2008, which is 43% of the total for managing migration flows. Next to this, there is also a budget included for decentralised agencies within the budget of 1521 million euro. This is the first time Frontex is mentioned together with an expenditure towards, although it was operating since 2004 (Frontex, 2017). Its budget for 2008 was 11,3 million. Finally, the report also mentions the expenditures towards the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) with a budget of 1682 million euro. This instrument consists among other things of funding towards political governance reforms for eastern and southern neighbours, cross-border cooperation and 'projects' in eastern neighbours. These are all very vague terms and the specifics of this considerable budget are missing. The largest amounts, 473 million euro and 382 million euro, went towards sustainable development of southern neighbours and support to Palestinian Authorities and the peace process. These numbers contribute to the objectives of this instrument, respectively, to 'support EU neighbours' economically' and to 'promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law'. A stable neighbourhood seems very important for the EU, considering the amounts spent.

In 2009, the budget for citizenship, freedom, security and justice was more in an absolute way, but also relatively. It amounted to 1930 million euro, which is 1.72 % of the total budget for that year. The solidarity and management of migration flows also got more funding with an increase to 403 million. The EBF expenditures rose to 155,3 million euro and within this report, the funding got explained better. It is destined for infrastructure, IT systems, equipment and training of personnel. Next to the EBF, 12,5 million euro is set aside for 'emergency measures of mass influxes of refugees', which has the connotation of being last-minutes operations to improve the capacity of managing migrants. Because of the seriousness of the words 'emergency' and 'influxes', I would expect some sort of explanation to elaborate on the serious matter, but this is missing. This expenditure existed until 2014, but no further details are given. Therefore, I will not mention it anymore in discussing the budgets. Next to this, the funding of Frontex increased to 68,1 million, which is more than six times as much as the year before. This steep rise is attributed by the EU to operation Poseidon, which is one of the surveillance operations of Frontex. It took place along the borders of Greece and Turkey, and involved over 11.000 hours of sea patrol and over 800 hours of air patrol. Finally, the budget for the ENPI decreased to 1455 million euro.

The budgets for 'citizenship, freedom, security and justice' and 'solidarity and management of migration flows' both decreased in 2010. This caused the EBF to also decrease, to 103,8 million euro. Nevertheless, the budget for Frontex rose again, to 80 million euro. This time without any further elaboration on where the money was spent on. The budget of the ENPI slightly increased. The

most notable changes in the budget of 2011 are the increase of the EBF to 190,5 million euro and the increase of the budget of Frontex, to 111 million euro.

Then, in the budget of 2012, the total budget on citizenship, freedom, security and justice increases to 2238 million euro. However, it is still one percent of the total, meaning the budget of the EU is getting bigger. Numbers for the external border fund and Frontex are not included anymore in this report. These are the expenditures that are closely linked to expenses towards external border security, but are excluded from all following financial reports. This means the only point of reference I have for these years are the overall budgets on citizenship, freedom, security and justice. Even this budget changes in 2014, when the new timeframe, Horizon 2020, starts and is called security and citizenship. In 2016, the budget for this expenditure reached 3077 million euro, which is 2 percent of the total annual budget. This is considerably more than previous years. The budget for the ENI, previously ENPI, also increased a lot to 2140 million euro. Finally, I found it notable how, from 2009 and on, the EU included 'highlights' in front of every expenditure category. Within the category security and citizenship, this included a highlight about how many migrants were rescued thanks to Frontex. This felt as looking for approval before going into the costs of it. Moreover, it did not include total number of migrants or the number of deceased migrants trying to reach the EU. Contrastingly, the next highlight discussed which foreign film won an Oscar, which made the former feel even more out of place in this financial report.

Based on this data, in a period of eleven years, 582,6 million euro went to the external border fund and 270,4 million euro went towards Frontex. This seems like a lot of money towards securing the external borders, but is not anywhere near the actual amount of money spent. These two total numbers are added up from four years, which means the financial report of the other seven years did not specify the numbers enough to be taken into account. To clarify the missing specifics in most of the reports, I reached out to the contact centre of the EU, Europe Direct, via email. However, in the response I received a link towards the general page about budgets. These refer back to budget categories, but not the expenditures within them as I had hoped. The European Parliament (n.d.) states it is dedicated to transparency by saying 'that it represents the interests of European citizens in a fully open and transparent manner'. However, this same paragraph also explains that 'citizens must be granted a right of access to documents of the European Institutions within the necessary limitations'. These limitations of the transparency of the EU could apply to the specifics of the budget as well. Next to this, I would have expected to see budgets of the EMSA, ESA, EUISS or REA that would link it to external border security, but I did not discover these. Hopefully, these agencies are included in the security research in FP7 or Horizon 2020.

It seems that the only way to discover more of the money trail towards external border security, is to try other sources of data apart from official EU financial reports. However, the financial

reports did give a good indication of where to look. The external border fund (EBF), which changed to 'borders and visa' in 2014 holds a lot of costs for border security. Next to this, Frontex is important as the official border agency of the EU. The research programs FP7 and Horizon2020 also contain costs regarding border security. Finally, it would be interesting to see how much money from the ENPI, which changed to the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in 2016, is used for border control in countries outside of the EU. Because these components contained budgets for external border security within the financial reports of the EU, I will focus on them.

## **4.2 Aiding the bordering industry**

The first subchapter explained how much funding the EU has reserved for external border security. However, this barely said anything about where this money went. Where this funding went is subdivided into three categories. The first one is the operational costs of border security, which contains personnel and equipment, as well as fences or walls at the external borders. These are costs directly allocated to securing the borders. Border agencies such as Frontex are investigated primarily, together with funding programs such as the EBF and 'borders and visa' within the Internal Security Fund. The second category comprises research to improve future border security. This is mostly research on border security and its technologies or software within FP7 or Horizon2020. The last category is about the cooperation of the EU with neighbouring countries and the agreements that followed. Earlier on, the EU-Turkey deal and EU-Libya deal were already mentioned, but are these the only examples and where does this funding go exactly?

### **4.2.1 Frontex & operational costs of securing the borders**

The external border agency Frontex has carried out multiple missions on sea and land to try stop undocumented migrants from entering the EU. Often, these missions get impressive names such as Hera, Nautilus or Poseidon, as included in Appendix II. While it might be ironic for a mission named after the goddess of marriage and birth to stop people from entering a safer place for their future, this is not the point. The point is to find out how much money is spend on agencies such as Frontex, if this is possible at all, to hopefully re-evaluate its necessity.

Frontex has grown a lot over the past decade. In 2011 it employed 254 members in their staff, whereas in 2018 this number has increased to 775 employees. Before 2011, the number of employees has not been mentioned. So what does that mean for their expenses? Within the yearly reports about the expenditures of Frontex, these are subdivided into three categories. The first one is staff, which includes everything from salary of the personnel, to their recruitment and medical expenses. The second category is called 'other administrative expenditure'. These are expenses made towards rent, electricity, insurance, auditing, equipment and maintenance. The last category includes

the expenses made towards the operational activities, which are foremost the patrolling of borders and training of guards. These operations include patrolling borders on land, sea and in the air.

In 2006, the expenses for staff were 4,7 million euro. The expenses for other administrative costs were 1,4 million euro and the costs of operational activities amounted to slightly over 13 million euro. This brings the total expenditures for that year to slightly over 19 million euro. In 2007, the costs for patrolling sea borders alone were over 14 million euro. This number increased to over 31 million euro in 2008. Whereas a slight increase in electricity is explained, the huge increase in operational costs is not, which is a bit strange to say the least. In 2010, the costs for staff alone exceeded 20 million euro, which is more than the total costs in 2006. Whereas the amount spend on staff and other administrative expenses increases steadily each year, the biggest part of the expenses can be traced back to the operations. In 2015, there was a huge spike in operational costs, when it increased from 60 million to over 111 million euro. In the budget of the European Union, this was explained by stating the funding for the operations Triton and Poseidon tripled. However, the budget of the EU for Frontex and the numbers on its own expenditure report do not match up. This can be traced back to the fact that Frontex gets a voluntary subsidy from member states individually as well, but not even the amount of subsidy given by the European Commission equals the amount of the budget within the reports of the EU, which is also confusing. Figure 8 below shows the total increase of expenses of Frontex from 19 million euro to 320 million euro per year over the years.

If all the expenses are added up for these thirteen years, the grand total amounts to over 288 million euro for staff, 152 million euro for other administrative expenditures and 1.243 million euro for operational activities. This means the total amount spent within these years is over 1.684 million euro for Frontex alone.




Figure 8 – Increase in expenses Frontex (Appendix II)

Other financial information on ‘hardware’, such as walls, is very hard to find as the European Union usually keeps their budgets on a general level. However, there are some expenditures that are traceable that fall within the ‘borders and visa’ expenditure of the EU, the EBF or one of its predecessors.

For instance, in 2005 the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, which borders Morocco, got a 200 million euro contribution for the construction of a razor wire fence around it (Saddiki, 2010). Furthermore, the same enclave together with Melilla, which is another Spanish enclave bordering Morocco, received funding to fortify their walls even more. The journalists from the Migrants’ files (n.d.) state the costs for this were 25 million euro and 47 million euro respectively, and are based on reports of the Spanish administration.

Another category of expenses for the EU is the Schengen Facility (European Commission, 2013b). This is a facility which had a budget of slightly over 961 million euro and was used by countries which joined the EU in 2004 to upgrade their border security to ‘European standards’. These countries included Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The measures for upgrading their border security included improving border checks, border surveillance, visa management, IT systems and training. All measures had to be implemented by the end of 2007, which is why it will include these costs as well. The EU contribution can be broken down per category as is shown below in Table 2.

<i>Expense category</i>	<i>Amount paid by the EU (in euro)</i>
Improved border surveillance	383.200.000
Improved IT systems	289.200.000
Improved border checks	134.500.000
Managing the improvements	45.300.000
Enhanced training	30.600.000
Improved visa management	27.300.000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>910.100.000</b>

**Table 2 – Expenses of Schengen Facility per category**

When looking at the total, it does not add up to the amount that was initially set out for the facility.

This means a part was not utilized.

Next to this facility, there was also a Schengen Facility II (European Commission, 2014a), which had the goal to ‘finance actions at the new external borders of the Union for the implementation of the Schengen acquis and external border control’. The new external borders are the borders of Romania and Bulgaria, which had to be ‘upgraded’ if they wanted to join the Schengen Area in 2011. Following from this, these measures had to be implemented by 2011. Tables 3 and 4 below show what was actually paid for external border security to Bulgaria and Romania respectively.

<i>Expense category</i>	<i>Amount paid by the EU (in euro)</i>
Technical equipment for border checks	1.601.740
Surveillance system at the Black Sea border	49.785.893
Air surveillance	29.006.016
Technical equipment for control in border area	2.209.523
Equipment for joint police operation in border area	2.299.795
TETRA radio system along border and extension existing system	19.557.237
Implementation SIS	5.925.229
Backup for SIS	231.048
Application SIRENE system	991.857
Interface SIRENE system	618.530
Software for travel document security	691.573
Modernisation of police premises in border area	4.077.125
Training of police officials	590.977
Managing Schengen Facility projects	63.734
Setting up visa system VISION	5.217.191
Making VIS system operational	146.515
Compliance to Schengen criteria of security communication	1.518.469
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>124.532.452</b>

**Table 3 – Expenses of Schengen Facility II in Bulgaria**

<i>Expense category</i>	<i>Amount paid by the EU (in euro)</i>
Establishment of a training centre for personnel in border area	21.685.540
Increasing mobility of border police teams on land and sea	103.691.503
Modernisation of border police buildings	32.424.690
TETRA implementation	25.802.327
Another training centre for personnel in the Schengen field	7.619.594
System regarding travel documents	49.949
Upgrade of tech infrastructure for SIS and VIS	894.070
Implementation of SIRENE	3.909.238
Enhancing IT capacity for SIS	21.314.349
Development of N-VIS (national version of VIS)	11.484.992
Implementation of N-SIS (national version of SIS)	4.611.755
Tech assistance for FADO	24.871
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>233.512.878</b>

**Table 4 – Expenses of Schengen Facility II in Romania**

The expenses of the Schengen Facility II altogether are 358.045.330 euro and are all expenses made to improve the security of a part of the external borders of the EU. Expenses at both facilities show that a country cannot join the EU or Schengen Area if they do not wish participate in the militarization of their external borders. Every country has to meet the strict European standards before joining.

Akkerman (2016a) discovered specific expenses regarding the emergency fund that was mentioned in paragraph 4.1. Greece, Croatia and France received 12,8 million euro to strengthen their border security. In 2016, Greece received 13 million euro as financial support for police at their external borders and 5,2 million euro for support in the ‘hotspot’ program. Moreover, the Italian coast guard received 2,2 million euro to pay their staff at sea. Next to this, around 86 million euro was paid to Bulgaria for border surveillance, border guards and equipment.

The EUNAVFOR MED, or operation Sophia, which runs from 2015 until the end of 2018, has a budget of 11,82 million euro (Akkerman, 2016a). However, the operation is still running and therefore the exact costs are not clear yet and will be left out.

The amounts above are from research reports and communication reports from the EU. Because communication within institutions has a code as a name, it is difficult to find out what is in it, unless you read it. This is why it is difficult to get a complete picture of the operational costs in the current period. To achieve this, I would have to read communication reports of more than a decade, which is too time consuming to do within this thesis. Therefore, the financial data about the Internal Security Fund is left out if it is still a budget and has not been spent yet. The total costs of the Schengen Facility and the External Border Fund can be found in Akkerman (2016a, p.27). These are 1461,5 million euro and 1701,3 million euro respectively. Unfortunately, these numbers only refer back to how much each country received, but not how the countries allocated these funds. Still, because these funds are specifically aimed at funding external border security and are already paid

to the member states, they are included because they are costs for the EU regarding their external border security.

#### **4.2.2 Research grants**

Research plays a big part in EU policy and is receiving more funding each budgeting period, as shown in figure 7, with a budget of nearly 80 billion from 2014 until 2020. Organisations can bid on research projects in order to receive funding from the EU. This current timeframe is called Horizon2020.

However, because this period has not finished yet, it is hard to determine its costs. Therefore, I will focus on the research period before this one, FP7, which ran from 2007 until 2013. All these projects should have ended and the costs should be traceable. An overview of all research can be found in the research portal of the EU, CORDIS. To determine the costs of research that is related to external border security, I went through all research projects in the category 'security' within FP7. A summary of the costs of these projects, together with what they encompass is included in Appendix III.

Surprisingly, the projects that came up were sometimes outside the FP7 timeframe as well. Some projects even stretched out to early 2018 and one project runs until June 2019. This means the division made in EU policy in research frameworks does not necessarily pan out this way in reality. I discovered a total of 44 projects that I could link to external border security with a total contribution of the EU of over 270 million euro. This means the average cost of the EU was 6,1 million euro per project. There were some interesting features I found out from reviewing these research projects. First of all, the type of institutions or organisations involved. Private entities, research organisations, academic institutions, defence organisations, public institutions and supranational agencies from within the EU, all received funding and were working together on these projects. This means that the legislative institutions of the EU are also partially responsible for its execution, which is against the basic principles of separation of power (Locke, 1690). Normally, this type of research would be expected from defence entities together with research organisations. However, this is not the case. Next to the institutions of the EU, private companies also play a big role within these projects. This means the responsibility of protecting the borders is shifting more towards the private sector. However, some of the research organisation or private organisations are owned by a public entity or they have to report to a government, because they are the majority shareholder. The EU classifies the organisations that play a part within these projects as private or publicly owned, or as an academic entity. They do not mention if the private entity has to report to a public entity, which is a bit misleading. Next to this, space agencies play a big part in these projects as well, because of satellite surveillance technologies. This type of institutions is not included either in the classification of the EU. The development of surveillance systems or software seems to be the main objective within border security research. Another point I noticed was that in certain projects, such as TANGO

and LIMES, the financial breakdown between beneficiaries was missing. Therefore, an overview of companies within the bordering industry that profit the most could be different from reality. Still, a few entities received a bigger share of funding than others and were in the top 3 beneficiaries in at least two projects. Examples of these beneficiaries are FOI, VTT, Fraunhofer, TNO, CEA, PIAP, Thales, Airbus, Indra systems, Idemia, Selex (owned by Leonardo, which was previously known as Finmeccanica), E-Geos, BMT and Israel Aerospace. The FOI, VTT, Fraunhofer, TNO, CEA and PIAP are all research organizations funded by their government. These governments are Finland (for the first two), Germany, the Netherlands, France and Poland respectively. Thales, Airbus, Indra Systems, Idemia, Selex, E-Geos and BMT are all private entities. Their exact earnings and countries of origin can be found in Appendix III. They all conduct their business partially in the defence industry and most companies also have a branch that invests in space technology. Next to this, Airbus, Thales and Selex are also within the top 15 of global arms producing companies (Akkerman, 2016a). The highest European arms producing company is BAE Systems, which is also a beneficiary within these projects. All three companies are also active in lobbying for increased border security through the European Organisation for Security, which they are all part of. This means they both set the agenda for this research and profit from it. The fact that they are also producing arms to countries in conflict makes this lobbying questionable to say the least. Another interesting fact is that states within the EU are shareholders of these huge corporations as well. For instance, France is a stakeholder within Thales. The beneficiaries who have ties with governments are displayed below in Figure 9, which shows member states and other government also profit from this industry.



Figure 9 – Ties between beneficiaries of research grants and governments (Google maps, 2018).

France, Spain and Italy have the most ties with the biggest beneficiaries of the research grants. This means it is hard to say who has the most power in the security industry, as this could be both private or public entities. It is clear though, that both are very present, which could explain the massive budgets towards the industry. Finally, it is noteworthy that Israel Aerospace is one of the bigger beneficiaries of funding, as they are the only entity which is not from the EU and is also from a country with a controversial history of conflict.

All research projects need a description of their objective and contents in CORDIS. Multiple of these projects name migration as a threat and use the term ‘illegal migration’. Because satellite surveillance can also be used to combat criminal activities such as terrorism and organised crime as well, ‘illegal migration’ is sometimes even mentioned as a problem that is equal to these activities.

#### **4.2.3 Agreements of border externalisation**

Next to funding for operations and research on border security of the external borders of the EU, it also spends money outside of the EU. This money goes towards countries in the neighbourhood of the EU or countries that have parts of important irregular migration routes within their borders. The governments of these states make agreements with the EU regarding border security, in exchange for funding. These projects usually have the official aim to help 'develop' the country, but some of these projects can be explicitly linked to the externalisation of the EU borders. This way, the EU probably hopes to reduce the amount of undocumented migrants trying to enter, by stopping them early. The most important deals since the securitisation change of borders are mentioned below, starting with the EU-Turkey deal. It must be noted that only funding towards border security projects are included. If the funding goes towards the deportation of these migrants or temporary shelters for them, I will not include the funding because this is a process that take place after the undocumented migrants are prohibited from entering the EU. Therefore, this process is not related to the primary process of securing the borders.

In 2015 and 2016, the EU promised Turkey 6 billion euro in total, among other conditions, in order for the country to take the strain of the borders in Greece. All new arriving undocumented migrants in Greece, would be transported back to Turkey and the country had to increase their border control with neighbouring country Syria (Akkerman, 2016a; Akkerman, 2018), which they did. Of that 6 billion euro, 83 million was spent on armoured military vehicles and equipment for further surveillance (Sentek & Arsu, 2018). Next to this, Turkey also invested 560 million in a wall between them and Syria (Akkerman, 2016b). So in order to relieve the pressure of the borders of Greece, the EU shifted this pressure to Turkey in exchange for quite some money and easier access for Turkish citizens into the EU. This is already a questionable strategy, but with the controversy around Erdogan in the last few years, this deal is even more dubious.

Another agreement that demonstrates EU border externalisation practices, is the deal with Libya. In 2008, Italy made a deal with Libya for 5 billion euro. The official aim was to compensate Libya for colonial rule, but Berlusconi later said it also had the aim to counter irregular migration (Akkerman, 2018). Because I cannot prove this, I will not take this into account as funding towards the bordering industry. However, in 2013 the EU launched EUBAM, which is an operation providing Libya with border assistance. The expenses for this mission were 31,2 million euro (EEAS, 2015). Furthermore, in 2014 the EU invested another 18,1 million euro in border security of Libya to keep undocumented migrants from trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea (Akkerman, 2018). Finally, a deal was made in 2017 between EU member state Italy and the Libyan coast guard for 220 million euro. This money is used to provide training for the to the coast guard, in order for them to intercept

vessels. The agreement received a lot of criticism because of the unstable political environment in Libya and the absence of one real government (Merelli, 2017).

Next to these two deals, there are also deals in the neighbourhood of these countries. Most of these agreements are between the EU and North African states. The first example of this is the funding of the AENEAS Programme. This was a program that started in 2004 and ran until 2006 with the aim to provide 'financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum' (Akkerman, 2016a, p.29). The programme funded 107 projects in total in order to develop a policy in countries, such as Niger and Mali, against irregular migration. The total amount of funding that went towards this programme was 120 million. Also, between 2004 and 2011 the EU funded multiple projects in North African countries to combat irregular migration and to help these states to fortify their borders. The funding for these projects was 41,6 million euro in total (Akkerman, 2018). Next to these projects, Lebanon received 14 million euro spread out over 2014 and 2015 for the 'Integrated Border Management' programme. This mostly included providing equipment and technology to examine travel documents of migrants. Furthermore, Tunisia received 23 million euro in 2015 in order to improve their 'technical and operational capacities of land border security services' (Akkerman, 2016a, p.29).

In order to 'tackle root causes of migration' (European Commission, 2016c, p.2), the EU launched a new Migration Partnership Framework in 2016 that included agreements with countries such as Jordan, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Libya, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan (Akkerman, 2016b). Whether or not the money within this programme is an example of border externalisation, is not mentioned because there are no specific numbers included. However, it is interesting enough to see that the EU is trying to tackle root causes of migration. In earlier communication documents the EU always referred to irregular migration as being problematic, but in this document migration as a whole is depicted as a negative phenomenon. Akkerman (2018) has conducted multiple case studies to find out what was spent on border externalisation by the EU. He found that Mauritania received 9,5 million euro in total to strengthen their border security. Next to this, Egypt received 11,5 million euro in 2016 to strengthen migration management along their borders. In the same year, Sudan and Eritrea received training, technical assistance and equipment to improve their border management for a total of 40 million euro. Also in 2016, Mali received 29 million euro to improve their border security and decrease irregular migration. Finally, in 2017, Niger received 36 million euro spread out over multiple projects that set out to stop migrants from trying to go towards the EU.

#### **4.2.4 Costs for migrants**

Up until this point, the funding of the EU towards the part of the bordering industry that tries to keep undocumented migrants from entering the EU has been discussed. This funding goes to research

organisations, private entities, government institutions inside and outside the EU, and agencies within the supranational structure of the EU itself. The commercial transportation industry has been disregarded in this equation, because the industry does not receive funding for their border checks. All organisations that offer a commercial way of transportation are responsible for their passengers. Instead of funding, they get a fine if an undocumented migrant tries to enter the EU with them (Bendixsen, 2016; Salter, 2004). If companies within this industry conduct research regarding border security, they are still included in the costs. However, then these organisations are being considered as within the security industry. In contrast to the commercial transportation industry, there is still an industry that offers transportation for undocumented migrants, which is the smuggling industry. These make up the shadow industry which formed because of the external border policy of the EU. The rule of supply and demand is applicable here. There is high demand for ways of entering the EU among undocumented migrants. Because transportation companies may not satisfy their demand, other agents will. Due to the fact that smugglers know how desperate their passengers are, they can pretty much ask whatever they want. Whereas in 2003 until 2005 an average payment of between 1000-1200\$ (Hamood, 2008) was sufficient for undocumented migrants to enter the EU, this amount has increased over the years. The average price between 2010 and 2015 went up to an average of at least 1500 euro for most smuggling routes. That being said, there were still undocumented migrants who paid a very different amount, ranging from 45 euro to over 10.000 euro (the Migrants' files, n.d.). These prices are much higher than the prices a documented migrant would pay. For example, when using the same route as in the example within the theoretical framework, a documented migrant could fly from Tunisia to Italy for around 275 dollars in 2017 (faredetective, 2017). This puts the undocumented migrant at yet another disadvantage. The data of the Migrants' (n.d.) files are used to compose a total amount of revenue generated by the smuggling industry, and is included in Appendix IV. The journalists used sources such as a dataset of the Spanish Red Cross, direct testimonies, journal articles, court documents and private archives to establish of around 2000 prices paid by undocumented migrants to smugglers to enter the EU. By multiplying these average prices per smuggling route with the amount of migrants that used these routes, they made an estimate of the total amount paid by migrants to smugglers. However, this was based on the data of Frontex on irregular border crossings. These are only based on persons who were detected by border guards. The real number of border crossings should therefore be higher. Next to this, there were also undocumented migrants who did not pay for their journey at all. According to the authors of the Migrants' files, the Turkish police estimated 15% of the migrants were travelling for free, whereas the Spanish Red Cross believes this number lies at 3%. To make a conservative estimate, the revenue of this shadow industry is based on the detected number of undocumented migrants by Frontex and is corrected by 15% to account for non-paying migrants.

Within the dataset, there is a distinction made between irregular routes and within timeframes. There are seven irregular routes that are distinguished from another, being the Central Mediterranean, the Eastern Borders, the Eastern Mediterranean Land, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the West African, the West Balkans and the Western Mediterranean route. Furthermore, the data are divided into three timeframes. From 2000 until 2005, from 2005 until 2010 and from 2010 until 2015. In Appendix IV, I have included the average prices per route and timeframe, the total amount paid for a route in a specific timeframe, the total amount paid within a timeframe and finally, the total amount paid by route. With the numbers that are included in the dataset from the Migrants' files, the total amount paid by undocumented migrants to smugglers is just over 15,6 billion euro from 2000 until 2015. However, when going through their numbers, I found that this is too high. In every timeframe, the amount spent had an extra zero behind it. The total amount after using the same numbers, should be 1,56 billion euro instead of 15,6 billion euro, which is a huge difference. After contacting the author, this has been addressed.

Within the first five years, migrants paid 270 million euro to human traffickers, whereas in the second five years this number increased to 460 million euro. In the last five years, this revenue for this shadow industry increased further to almost 840 million euro. When looking at specific routes, the data shows that the largest share of revenue is earned on the Central Mediterranean route, which is just over 620 million euro. This route is followed by the Eastern Mediterranean Land route and the Western Balkan route, with 360 million euro and 240 million euro total respectively. Because of the fact that the number of migrants is very conservative, the actual amount earned within the smuggling industry will be higher. The average amount spent by undocumented migrants for their journey is just over 1200 euro, calculated from 2000 until 2015. Because of the fact that this data set only includes data up until 2015, the year with the most arrivals is excluded. In 2015, the number of sea arrivals alone, accumulated to over 1 million people (UNCHR, 2017). This means, the total revenue is much higher in reality. I will try and make an estimate for the years 2015 until April 2018, with data about irregular border crossings from Frontex (2018). However, because there is no data available about the prices in this period, I have to speculate about these. I found that on all the routes, the average price within the last five years was 1577 euro. By multiplying this with the data from Frontex about irregular crossings, the total amount spent in this timeframe is about 3,4 billion euro, including the correction for non-payers. This brings the total amount spent on irregular migration from 2000 until April 2018 to just under 5 billion euro.

**4.3 Total costs of the Bordering industry**

In the first two subchapters within this chapter, the costs of the EU towards the security industry regarding their external border security are discussed. In the last subchapter, the costs of the undocumented migrants are discussed. These costs are the consequence of the EU’s external border security policy. But how much are all the costs together? And how does the security industry stack up against the shadow industry? That is what this subchapter is about, the total profit and loss account of the EU’s external border security policy since the securitisation change.

If the costs of the smuggling or shadow industry are added to the costs of the EU towards the security industry, the total amount of money towards the bordering industry becomes clear. The reason that I am adding both together is to reflect back on the conceptual model within the theoretical framework. This shows the bordering industry is made up from three industries. The two industries that receive funding from either the EU or undocumented migrants are the security industry and the shadow, or smuggling, industry. The security industry makes its money by securing the borders, while the shadow industry makes its money by trying to get around this border security. The total amount of money for the bordering industry, just over 17 billion euro, together with the breakdown per relevant sub industry, is shown in Table 5 and Figures 10 & 11. These are the total costs of EU’s policy on external border security, which has positive financial consequences for the security industry and smugglers. Undocumented migrants and the EU are the ones who pay, a whopping 17 billion euro to be exact.

**Total amount of funding towards the bordering industry**

<i>Security Industry</i>	
Operational costs	€ 5.238.616.228
Research costs	€ 270.100.277
Agreements costs	€ 6.593.900.000
	€ 12.102.616.505
<i>Shadow Industry</i>	
From 2000 until 2015	€ 1.566.681.258
From 2015 until April 2018	€ 3.428.935.442
	€ 4.995.616.699
<b>Total Costs</b>	<b>€ 17.098.233.204</b>

**Table 5 – Total costs of the bordering industry**

The absolute amounts above are based on all data from the results. This includes spending of the EU towards the security industry and spending of undocumented migrants towards the shadow industry. The latter was created by the policy of the EU towards securing its external borders, as mentioned before. Figures 11 and 12 below, show the breakdown per spending category within these consecutive industries, together with the percentages of those categories.

## Security Industry




Figure 10 – Spending towards the security industry

## Shadow Industry




Figure 11 – Spending towards the shadow industry

It would be ideal to now compare these costs of the bordering policy of the EU to the budget of the EU. This would show how much of the budget I have actually been able to track down as being spent. However, because of the fact that the financial reports of the EU did not give a consistent insight into their budget on external border security. For instance, their budget for external border security is included in the category 'security and citizenship', which also includes internal security within the EU and everything that has to do with citizenship. Therefore, I can only say something about the results I found, without having a benchmark to start with. The full list of all cost is included in Appendix V.

## 5 Conclusion and discussion

### 5.1 Conclusion

Securing the external borders had become a big point of interest for the EU since the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 (European Commission, 2018a). However, the real fortification of the borders did not start until after the securitisation change in the world, which happened after 9/11 (Zureik & Salter, 2013). The European Commission (2018b) states it is securing its borders to 'help manage migration more effectively, improve the internal security in the EU and to safeguard the principle of free movement of persons'. An important tool for the EU to help them to manage these borders are passports. Not the physical borders, but these paper borders are the biggest obstacle for undocumented migrants. The evaluation criteria for this changed from identifying dangerous individuals, to not letting in risk groups altogether (Bigo, 1999). This is the reason undocumented migrants cannot enter the EU through regular routes. More and more technology is used to secure the borders, which also shows in the budgets towards it. These budgets are described in the financial reports of the EU. The category that included border security had a budget of half a billion euro in 2006, which increased to over 3 billion euro in 2016. However, the expenses that could be linked to border security amounted to just under a billion in eleven years and were spent on Frontex and the External Border Fund. The real amount is way higher, but could not be found in the budgets because specifics were missing on these expenditures in seven of the reports. The EU claims it is all about transparency, but these reports contradict that. The budgets did give a good indicator of where to look for the costs, such as the EBF, Borders and Visa fund, Frontex, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the Schengen Facility, the emergency fund and the research programs FP7 and Horizon2020. Financial data from Frontex revealed it received 1,6 billion euro from 2006 until 2018. Additional data about the emergency fund, Schengen Facility and External Border Fund (Akkerman 2016a; Akkerman 2016b) revealed the total amount of operational costs towards external border security was just over 5,2 billion euro since the securitisation change. Most of this money went to member states and Frontex, but information on what this money was spent on, is missing for the most part. After reviewing over 300 research projects on security within the EU (European Commission, 2018e), I discovered 44 that could be linked to external border security with a total cost of over 270 million euro. The beneficiaries within these projects ranged from research institutions, to academic institutions, space agencies, defence entities, public institutions, private organisations and supranational agencies inside and outside the EU. This indicates that EU determines the strategy, carries out actions in the bordering industry and has legal power within the industry, which is a questionable combination of power. Next to this, a lot of the border control is outsourced to private defence organisations. The biggest examples of this are Thales, Airbus, Indra Systems and Selex.

Coincidentally, Thales, Airbus and Selex are in the top 15 global arms producing companies (Akkerman, 2016a). They also lobby for increased spending towards the security industry. This means they are both involved in the war industry, as well as the security industry. A lot of member states are shareholders of the beneficiaries of these projects or own them altogether. Other data revealed that agreements with Turkey, Libya and other unstable regimes in North Africa cost the EU over 6,5 billion euro. Finally, over 1,2 million undocumented migrants paid smugglers an estimate of just under 5 billion since the year 2000 (Akkerman, 2018; Akkerman, 2016a; Frontex, 2018; Sentek & Arsu, 2018; the Migrants' files, n.d.). Because normal routes of travelling to the EU were prohibited, undocumented migrants now turn to smugglers for more expensive and more dangerous ways of travelling. These payments bring the total amount of costs of EU's policy on external border security to just over 17 billion euro since the securitisation change.

To reflect back onto the debate regarding EU's bordering policy, our need for security is one of the dangers for mobility (Salter, 2004). It seems this is working in favour of the bordering industry, which restricts the mobility of especially undocumented migrants even more. This does fit into the trend of increased border protection since the securitisation change of 9/11 (Zureik & Salter, 2013), but increases the inequality between those who are included in these borders and those who are excluded. These practices of bordering, ordering and othering (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002), seem unlikely to change because of the vast amount of money that can be earned from them. As long as the EU wants their security industry to grow, to protect it from international competition (European Commission, 2018d), and those within the industry can profit from border control, this policy will continue to exist. So is it money well spent? I for one do not think so, but I do not see migration as a threat. The EU is portraying irregular migration as a threat to the internal security of the EU, which could partially explain the excessive spending. However, Andreas (2001) and Castles (2004) argue that increased border control does not reduce this type of migration. This funding supports governments with questionable stability as well, such as Libya and Turkey. If this is not achieving its aim of reducing irregular migration, it seems like wasted money. However, if there is an economic discourse behind this policy, it would make more sense. Leonard (2010) named three reasons for intensified border controls in the EU. To decrease the number of migrants entering the EU, to address outdated border controls of some member states and to contribute to the fight against terrorism. Boosting their security industry could be a fourth reason and would explain the expenses of the external border security. This means the undocumented migrants will keep on losing, being caught between the war industry and security industry, which have a lot of the same actors. On the financial side, the undocumented migrants paid smugglers an estimate of around five billion euro since 2000, which still excludes the human costs. Both the financial consequences and the deadly consequences are product of the mismanagement of migration (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008; Van

Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). Just as within the social side of this debate, the costs are high at the financial side as well. This makes the border security policy of the EU even more controversial. Next to all the migrants that are dying trying to reach the EU, the border security policy is also costing billions each year.

For the future, only if the citizens of the EU, which are represented by the European Parliament and pay taxes for the funding of the EU, make a stand against this policy there might be a slight chance of reform. Since the amount of funding of the Internal Security Fund is still increasing, I for one am not counting on a change in policy. This means the bordering industry will keep on thriving. Undocumented migrants will keep paying both the financial and human costs that come with it.

## **5.2 Discussion**

As described in the results I found the costs of EU's external border policy, so my main question is answered. The results show that the financial costs of the bordering industry are very high, next to the human costs, which have been widely covered in the academic field. However, there are a few things that have to be taken into account.

First, before I started this thesis, I already read a lot about the human costs of the border security since 2015, when the refugee crisis was covered widely in the media. Whereas this probably created a bias against a closed border, this hardly matters within this research because the results consist of financial data. My biases will not change these data and therefore, it will not harm the validity of the results. That being said, the results are not complete as is. I only included results that I would be sure, could be linked to the external border security of the EU. This means the total costs are a conservative amount. This together with the fact that I had limited time to do this research meant I could not include everything. Horizon2020 is still running, which means new researches, operational costs and international agreements regarding external border security. To remain on this conservative side of the cost, I did not include research or funding towards 'borders and visa' within this timeframe. Because this research is still ongoing, costs are not final yet and often missing. I did not want to include budgets, because these are not costs yet. Therefore, the costs of this research can only be depicted after the timeframe has ended. The same thing applies for funding for budgets on 'borders and visa' within the Internal Security Fund. Just like the Schengen Facility and the External Border Fund, this money goes towards external border security. But it ends there in all the budgets and reports, there are no specifics in these. I did include the funding towards the Schengen Agreement and EBF because these timeframes have already ended and therefore these funds are now costs. With 'borders and visa' these are still budgets linked to operational activities, which might

not even have taken place. The only way to know this is by going through all the communication documents of the EU, which are hundreds of documents per year. Because I looked into the costs of almost two decades, this was impossible within the time I had. I started from the budgets in the financial reports, which together with the data of the Migrants' files, determined where to look. All the different institutions and systems belonging to the EU did not make this easy though. Because I explained my choices for how I looked for information or included data, and documented all sources in the references or included them as an Appendix, the data are reliable. However, I do think there is a need for future research on this topic. The human costs of the external border policy are still very present, and there is still more financial information to be discovered. After Horizon2020, future research could take a look at the financial costs of this timeframe and compare it to my results. This would show a trend in costs and could be compared to the trend in human costs. Ideally, to discover all costs, all relevant communication documents should be looked at through EUR-Lex, but this is very time consuming.

To reflect back on my conceptual model, the most important relation in it has been proven. While the relationships of actors within the external border policy had already been explained in the theoretical framework, showing the restrictions of the border policy (Bendixsen, 2016; Van Houtum, 2010; Salter, 2004; Bigo, 1999), the funding of the EU towards the security industry has been addressed in the results. This revealed that funding of the EU went towards organisations of public, private and military nature worked closely together (Akkerman, 2018), which earned the EU policy the name of security-industrial complex (Hayes, Rowlands & Buxton, 2009). The security industry should be based on necessity, instead of economic gains (Janiewski, 2011). The results also showed the amounts of money made in the shadow industry, which is a direct consequence of closing of borders (Nakache & Losier, 2017; Hamood, 2008; the Migrants' files, n.d.). The academic literature does focus a lot on what is wrong with EU's external border policy, instead of if these measures are partially necessary. However, the discriminating nature of this policy, together with the human costs and financial costs of over 17 billion euro, should be reason to doubt the discourse of security. The policy is unacceptable in many ways. It is violating human rights, not only by causing a lot of deaths during transit, but also by externalising border control. On the one hand, Turkey cannot join the EU because of its political instability, but on the other hand it is capable enough to deal with EU's border problem. Morally, this is not right, as undocumented migrants are left in worse conditions than they were before.

Because of these legal, moral and financial reasons, I argue that the current bordering policy is definitely not worth it. Instead, the bordering industry should be viewed from a discourse of economic gains for the private sector. If the public internalise this as their dominant discourse (Foucault, 1977), I doubt they would agree with this excessive spending and would force policy

change. Therefore, I recommend policy makers of the EU to focus on actually dealing with undocumented migrants, instead of figuring out new ways of detecting and stopping them at borders. This only leads to spending billions of euros of tax payers' money per year and the stimulation of the shadow industry. It is time to cut both the human and financial costs of this bordering policy.

## 6 Reflection

Now that the process of writing a thesis has come to an end, it is important for me to reflect on what I experienced during this process. Which problems did I face and what would I do differently the next time? This is important, because I will hopefully have finished my Master thesis by this time next year. It would be a shame if I would not learn from the writing process and the experiences of this thesis.

Looking back, I am content with the research topic and the perspective I took towards the topic of borders and migration within the EU. However, it took me way too long, to come up with the specific topic, because I wanted to include too much. I did not have the same time for completing this thesis, as I would have, for example, for completing a PhD. That is why the next time I would want to more specific in my research proposal. If I would have investigated my sub questions better when writing my proposal, instead of focusing on my main question and the debate around it, this process would have gone better.

Next, I got stuck on the methodology. Because of the fact that there is no standard method for conducting this type of explorative research with secondary data, this made writing this chapter extremely difficult. I should have focused sooner on explaining the choices I made, instead of being caught up in trying to find a formal method within a book about qualitative methods that I could use. This would have saved me some time.

Finally, a lot of my data used, is financial. This sometimes made it hard to make a distinction between budgeted expenses and actual costs. After specially mentioning what to include and what to exclude, this became easier. Also, defining a timeframe helped, because there are still expenses being made each day which I cannot include. Otherwise I would still have to update the costs today.

Overall though, I am pleased with how the writing process went and with how the thesis itself turned out.

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## Appendix I – Annual financial reports

Year	Budget Info	Extra	Source
2006	580 million on freedom, security and justice		<a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/tran20071120accountscom2006_/tran20071120accountscom2006_en.pdf">http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/tran20071120accountscom2006_/tran20071120accountscom2006_en.pdf</a>
2007	567.2 million on freedom, security and justice  50 million to IT systems (such as Schengen information system, visa information system or Eurodac system for fingerprints of asylum seekers.		<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2007/fin_report/fin_report_07_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2007/fin_report/fin_report_07_en.pdf</a>
2008	1521.4 million on citizenship, freedom, security and justice (1.2%)  319.1 (49.8%) towards solidarity and management of migration flows - External borders fund 133 million (43%) 125.9 (19.6%) towards decentralised agencies - 11.3 million (9%) of this towards Frontex  European Neighbourhood and partnership instrument 1682.3 million (22.9%)	4 Funds in managing migration flows	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2008/fin_report/fin_report_08_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2008/fin_report/fin_report_08_en.pdf</a>
2009	1930 million on citizenship, freedom, security and justice (1.72%)  Solidarity and management of migration flows 403 (60.44%) - 155,3 million towards the external border fund (infrastructure, IT systems, equipment and training) - 12,5 million towards 'emergency measures of mass influxes of refugees' Decentralised agencies 127 million (19%) - 68.1 million towards Frontex (operation Poseidon)  ENPI 1455 million (18.68%)	'Highlights': 1.075.535 illegal immigrants apprehended  Poseidon involved 11.000 hours of sea patrols and 802 hours of air patrol).	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2009/fin_report/fin_report_09_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2009/fin_report/fin_report_09_en.pdf</a>

2010	<p>1306 million on citizenship, freedom, security and justice (1.08%)</p> <p>Solidarity and management of migration flows 299 million (44.74%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 103,8 million towards the external border fund (infrastructure, IT systems, equipment and training)</li> <li>- 7,8 million towards 'emergency measures of mass influxes of refugees'</li> </ul> <p>Decentralised agencies 233 million (34.91%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 80 million towards Frontex</li> </ul> <p>ENPI 1486,3 million (20.25%)</p>	'Highlights': 575.295 illegal immigrants apprehended	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2010/fin_report/fin_report_10_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2010/fin_report/fin_report_10_en.pdf</a>
2011	<p>1.728 million on citizenship, freedom, security and justice (1%)</p> <p>Solidarity and management of migration flows 406 million (49%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 190,5 million (47%) towards the external border fund (infrastructure, IT systems, equipment and training)</li> <li>- 17,5 million towards 'emergency measures of mass influxes of refugees' (4%)</li> </ul> <p>Decentralised agencies 270 million (33%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 111 million towards Frontex (41%)</li> </ul> <p>ENPI 1394 million (20%)</p>		<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2011/fin_report/fin_report_11_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2011/fin_report/fin_report_11_en.pdf</a>
2012	<p>2.238 million on citizenship, freedom, security and justice (1%)</p> <p>Solidarity and management of migration flows 427 million (50%)</p> <p>Decentralised agencies 237 million (28%)</p> <p>ENPI 1298 million (19%)</p>	No specifics on Frontex and the external border fund anymore	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2012/pdf/financialreport-2012_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2012/pdf/financialreport-2012_en.pdf</a>
2013	<p>1.712 million on citizenship, freedom, security and justice (1%)</p> <p>Solidarity and management of migration flows 559 million (53%)</p> <p>Decentralised agencies 264 million (25%)</p> <p>ENPI 1379 million (20%)</p>	No specifics on Frontex and the external border fund anymore	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2013/lib/financial_report_2013_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2013/lib/financial_report_2013_en.pdf</a>

2014	<p>1.656 million on security and citizenship (1.2%)</p> <p>Internal security fund (ISF) 207 million (12.48%)  Asylum, migration and integration fund (AMIF) 180 million (10.87%)  Decentralised agencies 460 million (27.77%)</p> <p>ENPI 1627 million (23.56%)</p>	<p>Budget structure changed, probably because of a new time framework (Horizon 2020).</p> <p>Borders and visa (formerly external borders fund)</p> <p>No specifics.</p>	<p><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2014/lib/financial_report_2014_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2014/lib/financial_report_2014_en.pdf</a></p>
2015	<p>1.958 million on security and citizenship (1%)</p> <p>Internal security fund (ISF) 350 million (18%)  Asylum, migration and integration fund (AMIF) 403 million (21%)  Decentralised agencies 550 million (28%)</p> <p>ENPI 1600 million (21%)</p>	<p>highlights: 'funding in support of security, migration, border control, addressing the root causes of migration, and integration of refugees was doubled to over EUR 10 billion for 2015-2016.'</p> <p>highlights: 'over 350.000 migrants were rescued in the Mediterranean thanks to the tripling of funding for Triton and Poseidon interventions and the reinforcement of staff.'</p> <p>No specifics</p>	<p><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2015/lib/financial_report_2015_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2015/lib/financial_report_2015_en.pdf</a></p>
2016	<p>3.077 million on security and citizenship (2%)</p> <p>Internal security fund (ISF) 480 million (16%)  Asylum, migration and integration fund (AMIF) 1006 million (33%)  Decentralised agencies 696 million (28%)</p> <p>ENI 2140 million (21%)</p>	<p>Highlights: '174.500 migrants were rescued in the Mediterranean thanks to Frontex.'</p> <p>Feels like an obligation for them to say this. 'Look what we've accomplished', within giving the total figures.</p> <p>No specifics.</p>	<p><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2017/financial-report_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2017/financial-report_en.pdf</a></p>

## Appendix II – Frontex expenditures

Year	Expenditures	Extra comments	Source
2006	Staff: 4.700.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 1.400.000 EUR Operations: 13.066.300 EUR <b>TOTAL: 19.166.300 EUR</b>	Operations also includes training, risk analysis and research & development	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2006.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2006.pdf</a>
2007	Staff: 9.397.500 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 5.256.500 EUR Operations: 27.326.000 EUR <b>TOTAL: 41.980.000 EUR</b>	Sea borders operation alone are 14.465.000 EUR	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2007.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2007.pdf</a>
2008	Staff: 13.860.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 5.937.000 EUR Operations: 50.635.000 EUR <b>TOTAL: 70.432.000 EUR</b>	Sea borders operation alone are 31.100.000 EUR. Increased expenses for heating are explained, whereas operations are not	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2008.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2008.pdf</a>
2009	Staff: 15.956.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 10.044.000 EUR Operations: 62.250.300 EUR <b>TOTAL: 88.250.300 EUR</b>	Sea borders operation alone are 34.890.300 EUR. Impressive names as Hera (Goddess of marriage and birth), Nautilus (type of squid) and Poseidon	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2009_N1.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2009_N1.pdf</a>
2010	Staff: 20.085.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 11.150.085 EUR Operations: 61.611.843 EUR <b>TOTAL: 92.846.928 EUR</b>	18.377.000 on active staff	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2010.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2010.pdf</a>
2011	Staff: 21.447.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 10.009.500 EUR Operations: 86.730.500 EUR <b>TOTAL: 118.187.000 EUR</b>	No subdivision in operations anymore within Budget N3 2011	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2011_N3.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2011_N3.pdf</a>
2012	Staff: 20.550.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 10.077.000 EUR Operations: 58.951.000 EUR <b>TOTAL: 89.578.000 EUR</b>		<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2012_N02.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2012_N02.pdf</a>
2013	Staff: 21.641.000 EUR		<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/asse">https://frontex.europa.eu/asse</a>

	Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 9.758.100 EUR Operations: 62.550.900 EUR <b>TOTAL: 93.950.000 EUR</b>		<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2013.pdf">ts/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2013.pdf</a>
2014	Staff: 20.472.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 12.590.000 EUR Operations: 60.348.700 EUR <b>TOTAL: 97.945.077 EUR</b>		<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2014_N2.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2014_N2.pdf</a>
2015	Staff: 22.768.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 9.304.000 EUR Operations: 111.228.000 EUR <b>TOTAL: 143.300.000 EUR</b>	Huge increase in operations	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2015_N3.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2015_N3.pdf</a>
2016	Staff: 28.850.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 15.010.000 EUR Operations: 188.897.000 EUR <b>TOTAL: 232.757.000 EUR</b>	Another significant increase in operations	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2016_N2.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2016_N2.pdf</a>
2017	Staff: 33.686.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 21.221.206 EUR Operations: 225.652.794 EUR <b>TOTAL: 280.560.000 EUR</b>	Another significant increase in operations	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2017_N3.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2017_N3.pdf</a>
2018	Staff: 55.000.000 EUR Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 30.800.000 EUR Operations: 234.398.000 EUR <b>TOTAL: 320.198.000 EUR</b>	Still the 'voted' budget, so not final. Huge increase in staff and administrative expenditures	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2018.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2018.pdf</a>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Staff: 288.412.500 EUR</b> <b>Buildings and other administrative expenditures: 152.557.391 EUR</b> <b>Operations: 1.243.646.337 EUR</b> <b>TOTAL: 1.684.616.228 EUR</b>	2006-2018  254 employees (2011) to 775 employees (2018)	

### Appendix III - FP7 Research projects related to external border security

Project	Description	Amount spent by EU	Biggest beneficiaries	Period	Source
ABC4EU (Project ID: 312797)	ABC Gates, improving border crossing processes	12.015.246 EUR	1 - Vision box (private entity) in Spain with 2.552.437 EUR 2 - Atos (private entity) in Spain with 1.932.744 EUR 3 - Indra systems (private entity) in Spain with 1.893.179 EUR	01-01-2014 until 31-03-2018 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/111518_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/111518_en.html</a>
AEROCEPTOR (Project ID: 285144)	Stop non-cooperative vehicles on both land and sea with UAV's	3.468.860 EUR	1 - Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial (space agency) in Spain with 618.846 EUR 2 - ONERA (space agency) in France with 553.046 EUR 3 - PIAP (research organisation) in Poland with 457.125 EUR	01-01-2013 until 31-05-2016 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/106475_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/106475_en.html</a>
AMASS (Project ID: 218290)	Development of the Autonomous Maritime Surveillance System	3.450.460 EUR	1 - Carl Zeiss Optronics GMBH (private entity) in Germany with 638.809 EUR 2 - Fraunhofer gesellschaft zur foerderung der angewandten forschung e.v. (research organization, partially owned by the state) in Germany with 629.000 EUR 3 - Instituto Canario de ciencias marinas (research organisation) in Spain with 592.812 EUR	01-03-2008 until 31-08-2011 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/86259_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/86259_en.html</a>
ARGUS 3D (Project ID: 218041)	Radar based border surveillance system	3.262.050 EUR	1 - Universita degli studi di roma la sapienza (academic entity) in Italy with 417.040 EUR 2 - University college London (academic entity) in the UK with 282.000 EUR 3 - Bumar Elektronika SA (research organisation) with 251.880 EUR	01-12-2009 until 28-02-2013 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/93528_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/93528_en.html</a>
BEAT (Project ID: 284989)	Building a platform to evaluate biometric systems	3.499.784 EUR	1 - Fondation de l'institut de recherch� IDIAP (research organisation) in Switzerland with 958.797 EUR	01-03-2012 until 29-02-2016 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102363_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102363_en.html</a>

			2 - Universidad Autonoma de Madrid (academic entity) in Spain with 530.400 EUR 3 - CEA (research company which is government funded) in France with 435.759 EUR		
CLOSEYE (Project ID: 313184)	Development of framework for surveying of external borders of the EU	9.218.256 EUR	1 - ISDEFE (research company which reports to ministry of defence) in Spain with 4.670.465 EUR 2 - Ministry of home affairs in Spain with 1.764.782 EUR 3 - Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (space agency) in Italy with 1.210.388 EUR	01-04-2013 until 28-02-2017 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/108227_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/108227_en.h tml</a>
CONTAIN (Project ID: 261679)	Border control of shipping containers	10.044.904 EUR	1 - FOI (research company which reports to ministry of defence) in Sweden with 1.814.104 EUR 2 - Consorzio IB innovation (research organisation) in Italy with 855.953 EUR 3 - BMT Group Ltd (private entity) in the UK with 830.797 EUR	01-10-2011 until 31-03-2015 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/100574_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/100574_en.h tml</a>
DIRAC (Project ID: 242309)	Detection of drugs at the external border	2.985.508 EUR	1 - CREO (Research Organisation) in Italy with 647.832 EUR 2 - Fraunhofer gesellschaft zur foerderung der angewandten forschung e.v. (research organization, partially owned by the state) in Germany with 472.875 EUR 3 - CNR (research organization, supervised by ministry of education) in Italy with 389.100	01-06-2010 until 31-03-2014 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/94693_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/94693_en.ht ml</a>
DOGGIES (Project ID: 285446)	Development of sensors to detect hidden persons or substances	3.499.966 EUR	1 - CEA (research company which is government funded) in France with 539.636 EUR 2 - Gasera Oy (private entity) in Finland with 508.876 EUR 3 - III-V Lab (private entity) in France with 406.643 EUR	01-06-2012 until 30-11-2015 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/103810_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/103810_en.h tml</a>
DOLPHIN (Project ID:	Development of a satellite based maritime	3.992.375 EUR	1 - E-Geos Spa (private entity) in Italy with 800.796 EUR	01-06-2011 until 30-11-2013	<a href="http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/99158_en.html">http://cordis.europa.eu/p roject/rcn/99158_en.htm</a>

263079)	surveillance system		2 - Collecte Localisation Satellites SA (private entity) in France with 520.000 EUR 3 - Kongsberg Satallite services SA (private entity) in Norway with 424.776 EUR	(closed)	I
EFFISEC (Project ID: 217991)	Developing technology for border checkpoint controls	10.034.837 EUR	1 - Idemia identity & security France (private entity) in France with 1.859.921 EUR 2 - FOI (research company which reports to ministry of defence) in Sweden with 1.334.751 EUR 3 - Selex es spa (private entity) in Italy with 1.111.421 EUR	01-05-2009 until 31-01-2014 (closed)	<a href="http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/90955_en.html">http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/90955_en.html</a> I
			Not all data can be viewed		
EWISA (Project ID: 608174)	Early warning system for threats outside of the EU borders	10.893.914 EUR	1 - Kentro meleton asfaleias (research organisation, thinktank within the Ministry of Public order and citizen protection) in Greece with 7.239.377 EUR 2 - Ministry of the Interior (public body) in Finland with 1.580.912 EUR 3 - Ministerio del interior (public body) in Spain with 1.580.035 EUR	01-09-2014 until 30-06-2019 (ongoing)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/192052_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/192052_en.html</a>
FASTPASS (Project ID: 312583)	Developing of a central automated border control system (ABC) for all EU borders	11.287.715 EUR	1 - AIT Austrian institute of Technology GMBH (research organisation with ministry of transport as its majority shareholder) in Austria with 2.758.324 EUR 2 - Teknologian tutkimuskeskus VTT Oy (research organisation) in Finland with 1.147.825 EUR 3 - The University of Reading (academic entity) in the UK with 883.230 EUR	01-01-2013 until 31-03-2017 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/106743_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/106743_en.html</a>
FIDELITY (Project ID: 284862)	Testing and analysing of ePassport system	12.013.194 EUR	1 - Idemia identity & security France (private entity) in France with 1.760.217 EUR 2 - Hogskolen I Gjovik (academic entity) in Norway with 1.299.680 EUR	01-02-2012 until 31-01-2016 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102324_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102324_en.html</a>

			3 - Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (academic entity) in Belgium with 1.136.076 EUR		
GLOBE (Project ID: 218207)	Improvement of current technological border management system	999.891 EUR	1 - Telvent Interactiva SA (private entity) in Spain with 169.476 EUR 2 - Altran Technologies (private entity) in France with 140.012 EUR 3 - Amper Sistemas SA (private entity) in Spain with 116.219 EUR	01-07-2008 until 30-06-2009 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88217_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88217_en.html</a>
G-MOSAIC (Project ID: 218822)	Testing satellite system for border surveillance	9.600.000 EUR	1 - E-Geos Spa (private entity) in Italy with 1.844.653 EUR 2 - European Union Satellite Centre (public body within the EU) in Spain with 767.402 EUR 3 - DLR (Space agency) in Germany with 626.832 EUR	01-01-2009 until 31-03-2012 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/89405_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/89405_en.html</a>
HANDOLD (Project ID: 284456)	Development of detection sensors	3.495.805 EUR	1 - University college cork (academic entity) in Ireland with 839.994 EUR 2 - The queen's university of Belfast (academic entity) with 735.803 EUR 3 - Karlsruher institut fur technologie (academic entity) with 668.053 EUR	01-04-2012 until 31-03-2016 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102760_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102760_en.html</a>
I2C (Project ID: 242340)	Development of sea border surveillance system	9.869.621 EUR	1 - DCNS SA, now Naval (private entity owned by the French state and Thales) in France with 1.754.533 EUR 2 - ONERA (space agency) in France with 1.258.750 EUR 3 - Kongsberg Norcontrol IT AS (private entity) in Norway with 835.420 EUR	01-10-2010 until 30-09-2014 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/96259_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/96259_en.html</a>
INEX (Project ID: 218265)	Analyzing ethical issues regarding internal/external security	1.890.248 EUR	1 - Institutt for fredsforskning stiftelse (research organisation) in Norway with 431.693 EUR 2 - Vrije Universiteit Brussel (academic entity) in Belgium with 228.117 EUR 3 - Centre d'etudes sur les Conflits (research	01-04-2008 until 31-03-2011 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88231_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88231_en.html</a>

			organization) in France with 227.075 EUR		
INGRESS (Project ID: 312792)	Development of fingerprint scanning	3.233.782 EUR	1 - CSEM SA (research organisation) in Switzerland with 534.654 EUR 2 - CNRS (research organisation owned by the French state) in France with 495.310 EUR 3 - Idemia identity & security France (private entity) in France with 461.530 EUR	01-11-2013 until 30-04-2017 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/110929_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/110929_en.h tml</a>
LIMES (Project ID: 31046)	Development of information services for to support security management	11.928.618 EUR	No data available	01-12-2006 until 31-05-2010 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/86273_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/86273_en.ht ml</a>
MOBILEPA SS (Project ID: 608016)	Developing mobile equipment for external border crossings	3.141.322 EUR	1 - AIT (research organisation, owned by the state) in Austria with 1.096.080 EUR 2 - Fraunhofer gesellschaft zur foerderung der angewandten forschung e.v. (research organization, partially owned by the state) in Germany with 807.869 EUR 3 - Videmo intelligente videoanalyse gmbh (private entity) in Germany with 332.021 EUR	01-05-2014 until 31-12-2016 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/185506_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/185506_en.h tml</a>
NEREIDS (Project ID: 263468)	Maritime sea surveillance using space technology	3.999.852 EUR	1 - GMV Aerospace and defence SA (private entity) in Spain with 764.921 EUR 2 - Thales communications & Security SAS (private entity, part of Thales group, partially owned by the French state. Huge military contractor) in France with 325.000 EUR 3 - NATO science and technology organisation (research organisation of NATO) in Belgium with 320.000 EUR	01-06-2011 until 31-05-2014 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/99070_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/99070_en.ht ml</a>
OPARUS (Project ID: 242491)	Development for a framework for UAV surveillance	1.188.313 EUR	1 - Safran electronics & Defense (Private entity) in France with 253.263 EUR 2 - Airbus defence and space (private entity, part of Airbus group, huge military and space contractor) in Spain with 113.713 EUR	01-09-2010 until 31-05-2012 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/95504_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/95504_en.ht ml</a>

			3 - Israel Aerospace Industry (private entity, but wholly owned by Israel) in Israel with 110.638 EUR		
OPERAMAR (Project ID: 218045)	Developing foundations for an EU-wide Maritime security system	669.132 EUR	1 - Thales underwater systems (private entity, part of Thales group, which is partially owned by the French state) in France with 188.812 EUR 2 - Quintec Associates Ltd (private entity) in the UK with 85.600 EUR 3 - Selex sistemi integrati spa (private entity) in Italy with 73.972 EUR	01-03-2008 until 31-05-2009 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/86254_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/86254_en.html</a>
ORIGINS (Project ID: 607663)	Improve external border security by analyzing e-Passports	1.727.362 EUR	1 - Idemia identity & security France (private entity) in France with 409.940 EUR 2 - Hogskolen I Gjovik (academic entity) in Norway with 225.155 3 - Gemalto SA (private entity) in France with 203.942 EUR	01-12-2014 until 31-07-2017 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/192602_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/192602_en.html</a>
PERSEUS (Project ID: 261748)	Large scale EU maritime surveillance system in accordance with EUROSUR	27.847.579 EUR	1 - Indra sistemas SA (private entity) in Spain with 4.883.334 EUR 2 - Airbus defence and space SA (private entity, part of Airbus group, huge military and space contractor) in Spain with 2.619.273 EUR 3 - Airbus DS SAS (private entity, part of Airbus group, huge military and space contractor) in France with 2.416.974 EUR	01-01-2011 until 30-06-2015 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/97515_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/97515_en.html</a>
SAGRESS (Project ID: 313305)	Analysing of EUROSUR's network to improve maritime surveillance	3.434.467 EUR	1 - GMV Aerospace and defence SA (private entity) in Spain with 501.716 EUR 2 - Engineering – ingegneria informatica SPA (private entity) in Italy with 328.138 EUR 3 - EU satellite centre (public body) in Spain with 327.360	01-01-2013 until 31-12-2014 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/106574_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/106574_en.html</a>
SEABILLA (Project ID: 241598)	Development of Sea border surveillance	9.841.603 EUR	1 - Selex es SPA (private entity) in Italy with 1.277.426 EUR 2 - Nederlandse organisatie voor TNO (research	01-06-2010 until 28-02-2014 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/94732_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/94732_en.html</a>

			organisation) in the Netherlands with 826.304 EUR 3 - Indra sistemas SA (private entity) in Spain with 731.220 EUR		
SECTRONIC (Project ID: 218245)	Development of surveillance system for maritime infrastructures	4.433.502 EUR	1 - Marine & remote sensing solutions (private entity) in the UK with 1.499.529 EUR 2 - Chalmers Teknisa Hoegskola AB (academic entity) in Sweden with 492.478 EUR 3 - Advanced computer systems SPA (private entity) in Italy with 369.675 EUR	01-02-2008 until 31-01-2012 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/86257_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/86257_en.html</a>
SIMTISYS (Project ID: 263268)	Tool for vessel detection	1.643.701 EUR	1 - Thales Alenia Space Italia (private entity, part of Thales group, which is partially owned by the French state) in Italy with 387.726 EUR 2 - Sistematica Spa (private entity) in Italy with 317.128 EUR 3 - Rina Consulting (Private entity) in Italy with 209.442 EUR	01-06-2011 until 30-11-2013 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/99196_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/99196_en.html</a>
SMART (Project ID: 261727)	Determining risk for security technology including border control	3.456.017 EUR	1 - Universita Ta Malta (academic entity) in Malta with 519.655 EUR 2 - Interpol (public body) in France with 348.899 EUR 3 - Universitetet I Oslo (academic entity) in Norway with 213.600 EUR	01-06-2011 until 31-05-2014 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/99234_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/99234_en.html</a>
SNIFFER (Project ID: 285203)	Development of an artificial 'sniffing' system to detect people and substances at borders	3.493.820 EUR	1 - CEA (research company which is government funded) in France with 586.820 EUR 2 - The University of Manchester (academic entity) in the UK with 493.552 EUR 3 - Arttic (private entity) in France with 396.788 EUR	01-02-2012 until 31-05-2015 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102348_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102348_en.html</a>
SNIFFLES (Project ID: 285045)	Development of an artificial 'sniffing' system to detect people and substances at borders	3.493.625 EUR	1 - The University of Liverpool (academic entity) in the UK with 680.723 EUR 2 - TWI (research organisation) in the UK 633.510 EUR	01-01-2012 until 31-07-2015 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102069_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102069_en.html</a>

SNOOPY (Project ID: 313110)	Development of an artificial 'sniffing' system to detect people and substances at borders	1.835.891 EUR	3 - Universite d'aux Marseille (academic entity) in France with 463.631 EUR 1 - C-tech innovation (private entity) in the UK with 399.598 EUR 2 - Airbus defence and space gmbh (private entity, part of Airbus group, huge military and space contractor) in Germany with 341.694 EUR 3 - Kentro meleton asfaleias (research organisation, thinktank within the Ministry of Public order and citizen protection) in Greece with 320.600 EUR	01-01-2014 until 31-12-2016 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/111313_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/111313_en.html</a>
SUNNY (Project ID: 313243)	UAV border surveillance	9.569.978 EUR	1 - BMT Group Ltd (private entity) in the UK with 1.646.141 EUR 2 - Altus LSA Commercial and Manufacturing SA (private entity) in Greece with 1.009.886 EUR 3 - INESC Tec (research organisation) in Portugal with 926.229 EUR	01-01-2014 until 30-06-2018 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/111498_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/111498_en.html</a>
TALOS (Project ID: 218081)	Development of ground platform which should protect the border	12.898.332 EUR	1 - Israel Aerospace Industry (private entity, but wholly owned by Israel) in Israel with 2.854.411 EUR 2 - PIAP (research organisation) in Poland with 2.782.283 EUR 3 - Teknologian Tutkumuskeskus VIT (research organisation) with 1.348.761 EUR	01-06-2008 until 31-05-2012 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/86712_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/86712_en.html</a>
TANGO (Project ID: 30970)	Satellite surveillance	5.192.662 EUR	No data available	01-11-2006 until 31-10-2009 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/84918_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/84918_en.html</a>
TASS (Project ID: 241905)	Upgrading airport security	8.986.696 EUR	1 - Verint Systems (private entity) in Israel with 1.167.068 EUR 2 - Elbit Security Systems LTD (private entity) in Israel with 844.200 EUR 3 - LHR Airports Ltd (private entity) in the UK with 626.350 EUR	01-04-2010 until 31-03-2014 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/94264_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/94264_en.html</a>

TERASCREEN (Project ID: 312496)	Border checks consisting of Terahertz scanning	3.489.932 EUR	1 - Fraunhofer gesellschaft zur foerderung der angewandten forschung e.v. (research organization, partially owned by the state) in Germany with 856.020 EUR 2 - Rise Acreo AB (research organization) in Sweden with 601.226 EUR 3 - I.C.T.S. Ltd. (private entity) in the UK with 387.077 EUR	01-05-2013 until 31-10-2017 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/108442_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/108442_en.html</a>
TWOBIAS (Project ID: 242297)	Detecting airborne threats regarding EU territory	3.577.834 EUR	1 - FFI (research company which reports to ministry of defence) in Norway with 817.786 EUR 2 - FOI (research company which reports to ministry of defence) in Sweden with 614.300 EUR 3 - Q-Linea AB (private entity) in Sweden with 357.682 EUR	01-07-2010 until 31-12-2013 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/94832_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/94832_en.html</a>
UNCOSS (Project ID: 218148)	Maritime surveillance system to detect underwater threats	2.763.819 EUR	1 - CEA (research company which is government funded) in France with 913.169 EUR 2 - A.C.T d.o.o. (private entity) in Croatia with 660.256 EUR 3 - Ruder Boskovic Institute (research organisation which is funded by the government) in Croatia with 468.528 EUR	01-12-2008 until 31-07-2012 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/89678_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/89678_en.html</a>
WIMAAS (Project ID: 217931)	Airborne maritime surveillance	2.737.169 EUR	1 - Thales Systemes Aeroportes (private entity, part of Thales group, which is partially owned by the French state) in France with 677.808 EUR 2 - FOI (research company which reports to ministry of defence) in Sweden with 312.075 EUR 3 - Selex Galileo Spa (private entity) in Italy with 272.150 EUR	01-12-2008 until 30-11-2011 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88640_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88640_en.html</a>
XP-DITE (Project ID: 285311)	Developing integrated security checkpoints at airports	9.992.635 EUR	1 - Nederlandse organisatie voor TNO (research organisation in the Netherlands with 2.473.198 EUR 2 - Fraunhofer gesellschaft zur foerderung der angewandten forschung e.v. (research	01-09-2012 until 31-07-2017 (closed)	<a href="https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/104801_en.html">https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/104801_en.html</a>

TOTAL (44 Projects)	270.100.277 EUR	6.138.643 EUR on average	organization, partially owned by the state) in Germany with 1.623.176 EUR 3 - FOI (research company which reports to ministry of defence) in Sweden with 1.140.861 EUR
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#### Appendix IV – Data of the Migrants' files concerning smuggling routes

*Average prices per route per timeframe (the Migrants' files, n.d.)*

Year range	Median price in EUR 2014	Minimal Price	Maximal Price	Route
2000-2005	€1,088	€676	€2,933	Central Med
2005-2010	€1,685	€676	€3,340	Central Med
2010-2015	€1,500	€134	€8,000	Central Med
2000-2005	€1,336	€733	€1,449	East Borders
2005-2010	€1,620	€1,449	€1,854	East Borders
2010-2015	€1,620	€1,508	€2,095	East Borders
2000-2005	€1,905	€100	€9,000	East Med Land
2005-2010	€1,905	€100	€9,000	East Med Land
2010-2015	€1,905	€100	€9,000	East Med Land
2000-2005	€634	€165	€5,866	East Med Sea
2005-2010	€634	€165	€5,866	East Med Sea
2010-2015	€2,000	€378	€6,500	East Med Sea
2000-2005	€493	€493	€493	West African
2005-2010	€693	€0	€10,388	West African
2010-2015	€500	€500	€500	West African
2000-2005	€1,523	€493	€3,974	West Balkans
2005-2010	€1,300	€869	€1,731	West Balkans
2010-2015	€2,514	€105	€3,625	West Balkans
2000-2005	€1,207	€785	€3,212	West Med
2005-2010	€1,207	€785	€3,212	West Med
2010-2015	€1,000	€45	€5,000	West Med

*Amount of undocumented migrants per year*

Year	Migrants
2000	62.574
2001	55.953
2002	46.589
2003	51.466
2004	48.097
2005	53.066
2006	82.544
2007	57.403
2008	115.635
2009	64.043
2010	68.758
2011	135.770
2012	62.390
2013	93.300
2014	274.342

Total amount paid per route and per timeframe (the Migrants' files, n.d.)

Route	Period	Av Price	Migrants	Total amount adjusted	Total amount MGF	Per timeframe	Amount	Per Route	Amount	Migrants	Average Price
Central Med	2000-2005	1088	126.982	€ 117.432.954	1.174.000.000	2000-2005	€ 271.356.695	Central Med	€ 625.839.229		
Central Med	2005-2010	1685	100.638	€ 144.138.776	1.442.000.000	2005-2010	€ 459.204.687	East Borders	€ 11.913.804		
Central Med	2010-2015	1500	285.700	€ 364.267.500	3.643.000.000	2010-2015	€ 836.119.877	East Med Land	€ 358.225.058		
East Borders	2005-2010	1620	3.435	€ 4.729.995	47.000.000	TOTAL	€ 1.566.681.258	East med Sea	€ 164.910.158		
East Borders	2010-2015	1620	5.217	€ 7.183.809	72.000.000			West African	€ 49.915.099		
East Med Land	2005-2010	1905	113.140	€ 183.201.945	1.832.000.000			West Balkans	€ 235.098.981		
East Med Land	2010-2015	1905	108.089	€ 175.023.113	1.751.000.000			West Med	€ 120.778.929		
East Med Sea	2000-2005	634	57.363	€ 30.912.921	309.000.000			TOTAL	€ 1.566.681.258	1271930	€ 1.232
East Med Sea	2005-2010	634	53.312	€ 28.729.837	287.000.000						
East Med Sea	2010-2015	2000	61.922	€ 105.267.400	1.053.000.000						
West African	2000-2005	493	38.926	€ 16.311.940	163.000.000						
West African	2005-2010	693	56.296	€ 33.161.159	331.000.000						
West African	2010-2015	500	1.040	€ 442.000	4.000.000						
West Balkans	2000-2005	1523	36.386	€ 47.103.496	471.000.000						
West Balkans	2005-2010	1300	26.356	€ 29.123.380	291.000.000						
West Balkans	2010-2015	2514	74.347	€ 158.872.104	1.589.000.000						
West Med	2000-2005	1207	58.088	€ 59.595.384	596.000.000						
West Med	2005-2010	1207	35.206	€ 36.119.596	361.000.000						
West Med	2010-2015	1000	29.487	€ 25.063.950	251.000.000						
TOTAL			1.271.930	€ 1.566.681.258	15.667.000.000						

## Appendix V – Full list of all the costs of the bordering industry

<i>Source of Costs</i>	<i>Amount of Costs</i>
<b>Operational</b>	
Frontex 2006	€ 19.166.300
Frontex 2007	€ 41.980.000
Frontex 2008	€ 70.432.000
Frontex 2009	€ 88.250.300
Frontex 2010	€ 92.846.928
Frontex 2011	€ 118.187.000
Frontex 2012	€ 89.578.000
Frontex 2013	€ 93.950.000
Frontex 2014	€ 93.410.700
Frontex 2015	€ 143.300.000
Frontex 2016	€ 232.757.000
Frontex 2017	€ 280.560.000
Frontex 2018	€ 320.198.000
Walls Ceuta	€ 200.000.000
More walls Ceuta	€ 25.000.000
More walls Mellila	€ 47.000.000
Emergency fund 1 GCF	€ 12.800.000
Emergency Fund 2 Greece	€ 13.000.000
Emergency Fund 3 Greece	€ 5.200.000
Emergency Fund 4 Italy	€ 2.200.000
Emergency Fund 5 Bulgaria	€ 86.000.000
Schengen Facility	€ 1.461.500.000
External Border Fund	€ 1.701.300.000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>€ 5.238.616.228</b>
<b>Research Funding</b>	
Project 1	€ 12.015.246
Project 2	€ 3.468.860
Project 3	€ 3.450.460
Project 4	€ 3.262.050
Project 5	€ 3.499.784
Project 6	€ 9.218.256
Project 7	€ 10.044.904
Project 8	€ 3.499.966
Project 9	€ 3.992.375
Project 10	€ 10.034.837
Project 11	€ 11.287.715
Project 12	€ 12.013.194
Project 13	€ 999.891
Project 14	€ 9.600.000
Project 15	€ 3.495.805
Project 16	€ 9.869.621
Project 17	€ 3.233.782
Project 18	€ 11.928.618
Project 19	€ 3.999.852

Project 20	€ 1.188.313
Project 21	€ 669.132
Project 22	€ 27.847.579
Project 23	€ 3.434.467
Project 24	€ 9.841.603
Project 25	€ 4.433.502
Project 26	€ 1.643.701
Project 27	€ 3.493.820
Project 28	€ 3.493.625
Project 29	€ 1.835.891
Project 30	€ 9.569.978
Project 31	€ 12.898.332
Project 32	€ 5.192.662
Project 33	€ 2.737.169
Project 34	€ 9.992.635
Project 35	€ 8.986.696
Project 36	€ 10.893.914
Project 37	€ 3.489.932
Project 38	€ 1.890.248
Project 39	€ 3.577.834
Project 40	€ 3.456.017
Project 41	€ 2.985.508
Project 42	€ 2.763.819
Project 43	€ 1.727.362
Project 44	€ 3.141.322
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>€ 270.100.277</b>
<b>State agreements</b>	
EU-Turkey deal	€ 6.000.000.000
EU-Libya EUBAM	€ 31.200.000
EU-Libya 2014	€ 18.100.000
EU-Libya 2017	€ 220.000.000
AENEAS Programme	€ 120.000.000
North African Borders 2004-2011	€ 41.600.000
Libanon IBM 2014-2015	€ 14.000.000
Tunesia 2015	€ 23.000.000
Case study Mauritania	€ 9.500.000
Case study Egypt	€ 11.500.000
Case study Sudan	€ 40.000.000
Case study Mali	€ 29.000.000
Case study Niger	€ 36.000.000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>€ 6.593.900.000</b>
<b>Paid to smugglers</b>	
Central Med Route	€ 625.839.229
East Borders Route	€ 11.913.804
East Med Land Route	€ 358.225.058

East med Sea Route	€ 164.910.158
West African Route	€ 49.915.099
West Balkans Route	€ 235.098.981
West Med Route	€ 120.778.929
Estimate for 2015 until April 2018	€ 3.428.935.442
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>€ 4.995.616.699</b>
<b>Total of all costs of the bordering industry</b>	<b>€ 17.098.233.204</b>