
# Resolution and Ruin

**Comparatively analysing diverging Peace Negotiation Outcomes in Colombia and Sri Lanka**

Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Nijmegen School of Management

Master in Political Science (MSc)

Specialization: Conflict, Power and Politics

Author: Giel Lenssen (s1076791)

Supervisor: Dr N.M. Terpstra

Date: 21/06/2024

Wordcount: 21898

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in Political Science (MSc)

# Abstract

This thesis is interested in analysing the diverging outcomes of the Colombian Peace Process with the FARC and the Sri Lankan Peace process with the LTTE. Both conflicts experienced peace processes in relatively similar circumstances, in a post-9/11 global context. Yet, both experienced vastly different outcomes: Colombia achieving a negotiated outcome, whereas Sri Lanka reached a military outcome. The research was also interested in the difference in outcome in terms of the quality of peace: The military outcome in Sri Lanka leading to negative peace, and the negotiated outcome in Colombia leading to positive peace. Goal of this thesis is to identify critical variables that help establish positive peace in peace processes elsewhere. By using a paired comparison analysis, the study identifies 5 variables that are critical in explaining why these negotiation processes diverged: These are; (1) negotiation setup; (2) liberal institutions and government spoilers; (3) rebel fragmentation (4) information uncertainty; (5) international context of the conflict. The research additionally concludes that, while there is still a long way to go to real peace, the quality of peace in Colombia is preferable to that in Sri Lanka.



*Keywords: Peace Negotiation, Civil War, Outcome, Positive & Negative Peace, Colombia, Sri Lanka, FARC, LTTE, Peace Process, Paired Comparison Analysis*

# Contents

# List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| **ELN** | National Liberation Army (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*) |
| **FARC** | Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)* |
| **GAM** | Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)* |
| **IPKF** | Indian Peace Keeping Forces |
| **LTTE** | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam |
| **M-19** | 19 April movement *(Movimiento 19 de abril)* |
| **MOU** | Memorandum of Understanding |
| **PA** | People's Alliance Party |
| **SLMM** | Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission |
| **TULF** | Tamil United Liberation Front |
| **UNP** | United National Party |
| **UP** | Patriotic Union *(Union Patriótica)* |

# 1: Introduction

***"I have served as a leader in times of war […] and I have served as a leader in times of making peace. Allow me to tell you, that it is much harder to make peace than to wage war"***

*Juan Manuel Santos, President of Colombia, giving Nobel Peace Lecture* (2016)

There are many theories on how and why internal conflict end up in negotiated settlements in some cases, while settlement breakdown occurs in others. By virtue of the work of many conflict studies academics, we are able to explore which theories and which factors contribute to the differing peace negotiation outcomes and which are most salient in several individual internal conflicts. The end of civil strife in a number of countries in the last couple of decades created new cases of both successful and failed peace negotiation processes for scholars to study. Most notably, the world observed the end of two distinct internal conflicts that had been ongoing for decades. These are the Colombian Conflict, with most notably the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP, hereon labelled FARC) pitted against the Colombian government, and the Sri Lankan conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the opposing government of Sri Lanka.

This research is particularly interested in studying the outcomes of these conflicts, as both of these cases showcase the end of decades-long civil strife in a relatively similar time-period but had vast differences in general outcome. '*Outcome'* in this thesis is captured by two different definitional purposes. The first and primary definition of outcome in this thesis – which also forms the bulk of the thesis – is particularly interested in the causes of different negotiation endings between the 2012-2016 Colombian peace process between the FARC and the Colombian government, which ended in negotiation success on the one hand – And the 2002-2006 Sri Lankan peace process between the LTTE and the governments of Sri Lanka, which ended in negotiation failure, followed by the Sri Lankan government destroying the LTTE by military means on the other. Outcome, in this sense, means the negotiation success versus the negotiation breakdown.

However, the thesis is also interested in general peace outcome after negotiations have concluded, albeit in a secondary research objective. Both cases now deal with significantly less violence than during their civil war periods but achieved it through different means. In Colombia, the negotiations ensured for relatively positive peace by formally integrating former FARC combatants into Colombian society and attempting to address the structural violence that provoked the FARC to get into arms in the first place. In Sri Lanka, the military victory by its government ensured that the 30-year-long civil war ended, but did not ultimately address the structural and cultural violence that was at the root of this conflict, and therefore only achieved negative peace, or the absence of physical violence. Outcome, in this sense, means the establishment of positive peace versus negative peace.

The thesis aims to understand the differing factors between these peace processes that allowed for such differing outcomes and why they were present, leading to the following research question:

*"What are the main factors that explain the difference in outcome between the Colombian peace process and the Sri Lankan peace process?"*

In a world where military conflict is re-emerging with significant concern, understanding how to resolve these conflicts peacefully becomes similarly of increasing critical importance. For policymakers, the study might provide potential additional information on what factors to consider when engaging in peace negotiations, which factors to avoid, and help them design and implement more effective peace processes in conflicts elsewhere. This can have a positive influence on the work of peacemakers around the world as well as on the population of the affected areas. For academia, understanding the

components of the divergent peace negotiation outcomes allows further insight into the salience of certain theories on peace negotiations. It may bring further insight into the complex study that is peace negotiation behaviour for academia, the conclusions of this study contributing to and/or challenging existing theories.

This study is comparative in its approach, and somewhat closely follows the methods applied in a different comparative study, instead comparing the peace processes of Aceh and Sri Lanka, undertaken by Tunçer-Kilavuz (2017). Her study takes a closer look at the differing outcomes between the successful peace settlement between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government in Aceh, and the failed peace outcome between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government in Sri Lanka. Taking an inductive look at the cases using the paired comparison analysis method, she identified three general variables as decisive in the diverging outcomes of the peace negotiations: (1) information uncertainty, (2) control over spoilers, and (3) rebel fragmentation. Her article opens up by detailing several relevant theories on the successes and failures of peace settlement, to then discuss the contexts of both the peace negotiations in detail to finalise her analysis of the proposed contributing variables that have led to differing negotiation outcomes.

While Kilavuz's work is commendable, the conclusions of her comparative study are problematic. This is most notably due to the role of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, which has severely affected the outcome of the Aceh peace negotiations in particular. In her analysis, she acknowledges the severe effects this natural disaster had on the peace processes, both in Sri Lanka and in Aceh, with the tsunami mostly bolstering cooperation between the GAM and Indonesia and furthering division among the LTTE and Sri Lanka. However, she also downplays the effects of the natural disaster, specifically in Aceh – indicating that the GAM was already willing to end the conflict and that the GAM merely took the opportunity of the tsunami to hasten its process. She argues that the negotiations were thus likely to succeed anyway. However, we can and should not accept this conclusion simply by adhering to the logic that the presence of many potential confounding variables could have altered the course of history differently. The analysis of this thesis, while naturally still pertaining many confounding variables, hopes to resolve this issue by studying peace negotiations that were not affected by freak events outside the control of the main actors to an extent such as the 2004 tsunami did on the Aceh Peace Process.

Additionally, her study only analyses the peace negotiations through the lens of bargaining theories of war, which is an individualistic rationalist approach of study developed by James D. Fearon (1995). Bargaining theories of war consider actors within a negotiation as rational players, using calculation to estimate the reachable extent of their goals and then determining what method to use to reach their intended goals, using cost-benefit analysis. Bargaining theories of war showcase that some parties continue fighting when they think it is within their best interest to do so. Thus, causes for ongoing conflicts and failed peace negotiations are the results of the rational cost-benefit analysis of rebel groups (or the government) to continue fighting. Solely implementing this perspective means that structural reasons for peace making goes underrealized in her study. This thesis will instead attempt a more multi-faceted method, employing both individualistic approaches, such as bargaining theories of war, as well as structural explanations to explain the diverging peace negotiations outcomes.

This thesis will commence with an overall literature review, gathering the different theories that discuss civil war termination and peace negotiation in general. It will additionally feature a theoretical framework discussing the theories that will be of particular interest in the research. Followed by the methodology of the study, including a justification of the selected cases and why they are relevant to compare. Finally, the thesis will cover the analysis of the two cases itself.

# 2: Literature review and theoretical framework

Like stated in the introduction, this thesis attempts a multifaceted approach towards analysing the peace processes. It is therefore required to delve deep into the vast array of different theoretical explanations and theories on how civil wars end in order to understand several concepts discussed during the analysis phase. This chapter attempts to discuss several theories on civil war termination and negotiation briefly so that the concepts used during analysis can be understood in a better capacity.

Ultimately studying peace negotiations in itself implies a rationalist perspective as peace negotiations typically entail the bargaining process of two or more parties. However, aside from the rational cost-benefit analyses of this bargaining-process, structural factors can limit an individual actor in their choice. This thesis is both interested in these cost-benefit analyses, as well as structural factors that limit a negotiating parties abilities of choice. Theories on how wars end come from different schools of thought, making it difficult to select only that which is of value. Luckily, other authors have already undertaken this endeavour through the use of transformations.

Following the bargaining processes of actors seeking peace, a necessary set of transformations are required giving the conditions for participants to seek peace. For example, the balance of war may be tipped in a participants favour by way of foreign support, intensifying the war and perhaps eliciting response from other participants to seek a peaceful resolve to the matter. Transformations could also move into the other direction; a new leader might be much more militant and thus less willing to seek peaceful ends, therefore prolonging the conflict. For a good overview of the different strands of theories on how civil wars end, it can be useful to look into the theory of peace seeking in civil wars in terms of transformations. The work of Ramsbotham, Woodshouse and Miall in *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (2012) provides a practical overview on different transformations that can take place during war, in order for war-participants to be motivated to seek an end to conflict; 1) context transformation, 2) structural transformation 3) actor transformation 4) issue transformation and 5) personal transformation. For the literature analysis the thesis follows a similar structure of transformations to cover several strands of theory on how civil wars end.

It should be stated however, that most theories find several overlaps between the different transformations noted below, and also several theories are built upon each other. The location of the theories within certain types of transformations should in no matter be viewed as solely part of that type of transformation. Rather, the placement of these theories is located to transformations that these theories are most closely related to, and are merely placed here for categorization purposes only.

## Context transformation

Changes in social, regional or international contexts can have an effect on the relationships and behaviours of civil war participants. A great example is the era of decolonization after the Second World War that brought about independence wars in European colonies in Africa and Asia during the 20th century. This shaped European views from combative in the 40s/50s towards more conciliatory stances in the later decades.

A great study encompassing this idea was developed by Jones and Stedman (2017), and showcases the impacts of international orders on the conduct of civil wars. They mainly point out that a rise in national-populism in the West and a reawakened revisionist Russia could awaken a continuous rise in the number and severity of civil wars. In the last quarter century, the international order saw continuous support for negotiated peace and conflict mitigation through liberal peacebuilding, which

will be discussed in-depth below. However, a renewed bipolar, or multipolar, world could see rebel movements, and the governments fighting them, becoming more motivated to continue fighting rather than seek peace through (international) mediation.

But contextual factors do not have to rely on international orders and cultures alone; additionally, global technological and social developments affect the way civil wars are conducted, and thus also the way we end civil wars. This is indicated by Devetak (2008), which showcase the impacts of globalization on political violence, both positively and negatively. For example, how increasing globalization has eased efforts for rebel organizations to operate globally. However, conversely, it also eased efforts for global counter-rebel cooperation.

## Structural transformation

Structural transformations relate specifically to the structure constituting the conflict; the relative strength of all combatants, the number of active combatant groups, the length of the conflict, the economy of the war etcetera. A number of theories have been developed that specifically look at how changing conflict structures affect civil wars and their termination.

### Realism and the Balance of War

While typically more engaged in the dealings of interstate conflict, some of the conclusions of the school of Realism have had an effect on how negotiations are thought to be settled in civil conflicts, most notably the concept of the *Balance of War*. Its main proponent, R. Harrison Wagner, gives a convincing argument how the relative distribution of power among war participants influences the likelihood of peace negotiations. The more power one holds, the better chances of a favourable outcome that person in the negotiation holds. Wagner points out that war and diplomacy are not dichotomous, but rather war is conducted to influence the outcome of negotiations. Every action a player takes is thus to pivot the balance of war in its favour when eventual diplomatic efforts of bargaining a peace deal have to be taken. Power in this term is thus meant to improve one's bargaining position by increasing the cost of disagreement for the enemy (Wagner, 1994).

These foundational conceptions of this balance of war have impacted several theories on how civil wars end. Mason and Fett (1996) have found that the likelihood of a conflict settlement becomes less likely the larger the government's army is, generally emphasizing the role of relative power parity in civil wars impacting the outcomes of civil wars. A further study by Hultquist (2013) is more elaborative on this relationship. He finds that both parties are more likely to negotiate when there is a similar balance of power between rebels and the government. When this balance is broken, wars are more likely to occur. A notion of the Balance of War that is particularly interesting for the thesis, is the mutually hurting stalemate. Which will be discussed in the theoretical framework.

### Liberalism and institutionalism

Another strand of thought in international relations that have greatly affected the way scholars approach civil wars is liberalism. Its conceptual foundations stemming from the ideas of Kant, liberalists believe that the determinants of politics lie in society itself, rather than from the state. This form of pluralism means that in order to channel these determinants, we need to look to the institutions that form the society. How states act, both domestically and internationally, is thus a reflection of society and how they are constructed via institutions (Moravcsik, 1992). A particular salient theory of liberalism that explains this mechanism has been the democratic peace theory which posits that democratic regimes do not engage in war with other democracies, particularly due to their domestic institutional make-up (Oren, n.d.).

Liberalist are thus particularly interested in the institutions that form the state. Since the Second World War, projects espoused by the school of liberalism has entered the forefront of international politics. The creation of the United Nations is such an extension of liberalism from the domestic sphere to the international sphere, where institutions of cooperation are constructed to stimulate peace. A salient theory of liberalism that is often used in the contexts of civil wars specifically, is liberal institutionalism. This will be discussed in more detail in the theoretical framework.

### Greed vs Grievance

A particular brand of quantitative political scholars has emphasized economic elements that contribute to war and peace. Built upon the foundations set up by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, these authors motivate that most rebels in civil war are motivated by *greed* rather than any social, religious or ethnic grievances. It posits that these rebels are often indistinguishable from bandits or pirates considering their motives, and that rebellion will spring up when its economically opportune to do so. Countries that provide lots of opportunity for rebels to seize arms are thus more likely to engage in civil conflict. A particularly good example of this is the availability of lootable resources; lootable resources are easy to procure and even easier to steal, making countries with an abundance of lootable resources more likely to face civil strife. For example, the many left-wing groups and the cocaine trade in Colombia, where the comparison is often made between these groups and the criminal cartels that are similarly involved in the Colombian drug trade (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

However, Collier, Hoeffler and their followers aren't without its critics, in particular the use of quantitative data explaining causes of war is under heavy scrutiny. Those that argue more on the *grievance* side, acknowledge the role that economic factors can play but deny that its role is the crucial element. While a link can be established toward resource lootability and the prominence of conflict, concluding that its evidence rebel groups are motivated by greed is potentially misleading (Keen, 2012). In fact, many qualitative analyses point out that the prominence of these resources can awaken grievances among combatants. An excellent example of this is given by Stewart, Brown and Langer (2008), which point out that horizontal inequalities between groups are at the root of conflict – rather than merely the presence of opportunity for criminal rebellion. Brown in particular points out how the resource-rich Aceh region had led to the Indonesian state favouring Javanese peoples in Acehnese development projects over local Aceh peoples, fostering animosity and grievances between the two groups until the GAM was eventually founded.

### Other structural causes

Mason and Fett also find an overall 'war weariness' effect; civil wars that have endured for long times tend to result in negotiated endings. Interestingly for the Colombia and Sri Lanka cases, is that both of these peace negotiations occurred after several decades of civil strife. However, perhaps more interesting are their conclusions on what variables have *no* influence on conflict settlement occurrence. These are; the types of conflict (ethnic, non-ethnic, civil war, separatist); and the political, economic or social factors that initially were seen as the cause of war (Mason & Fett, 1996).

## Actor transformation

These types of transformation relate to the specific inherent organization within groups of participants themselves during peace negotiations. These relate to changes in leadership or the adoption of new goals, values and beliefs, but also the inherent constituency of a party; party splits, or formations of new parties – often complicating peace negotiations.

A particular stringent theory that often occurs during peace negations are Rebel Group Fragmentations. Rebel Group Fragmentations refer to "*an event where a segment of a rebel group*

*formally and collectively exits that rebel organization and either (a) establishes a new rebel organization, (b) joins an existing rebel organization, or (c) joins the incumbent government* (Woldemariam, 2018, p. 25). According to a quantitative study Duursma & Fliervoet (2021), peace negotiations often exacerbate pre-existing structural and substantial divisions within rebel organizations, therefore it is increasingly likely that rebel group fragmentations occur during peace negotiations. They indicate that rebel group fragmentations are between three to eight times more likely to occur during peace negotiations, than outside them. Organizational hierarchy also significantly impacts the likelihood of rebel group fragmentations. According to Asal, Brown and Dalton (2012), organizations that have more factional leaderships are much more likely to split, more than 4,5 times more likely than non-factional leaderships.

Outside of structural divisions within rebel groups, fragmentation can also be the result of varying forms of rebel group leadership. According to Doctor (2020), rebel leaders with prior military experience are better equipped to maintain group cohesion. Conversely, those that only enjoyed military training (rather than field experience) are more prone to fragmentation, similar to rebel leaders that only enjoyed political careers before their insurgency. It appears that genuine military experience translates well in the maintenance of order in rebel groups.

## Issue transformation

Issue transformations are in particular interested in understanding how issues are framed, managed and resolved through negotiation processes. Bargaining theories of war posit that wars are costly, and therefore any rational being would not prefer to commit to war, nevertheless wars still occur. In order to answer this paradox, bargaining theories of war explain that war is still possible between rational actors due to issues pertaining to uncertainty, commitment and the divisibility of issues. For uncertainty, rational actors may incentivize to misrepresent their military capabilities toward each other. This means actors during a war are mostly incapable of correctly estimating their opponent's capability and resolve, and therefore either miscalculate, or are tricked, into thinking they are able to defeat their opponents militarily. For commitment, actors cannot often credibly commit to not renege on their promises, making it hard for participants to find a mutually acceptable bargain. The divisibility of issues relates to some type of issues that, by their very nature, are unable to being compromised on, like land disputes (Fearon, 1995).

In the context of civil war termination through negotiation, or rather the failure of it, the theory explains that an actor within negotiations incorrectly calculates whether they are able to defeat their opponent and therefore end the negotiation. Another explanation is that an actor unable to commit to uphold a deal – or an opponent that is unable to commit to a deal - making peace negotiation a difficult process. Finally, the theory posits that on some issues, no negotiation is even possible, despite peace being preferable. The theory has become a mainstay in academic literature on wars and negotiation.

### Delineating a peace negotiation framework

Peace negotiations are never the same: Each deal with different logistics, locations, participants, time frames, mediators, etcetera. Literature on peace negotiations emphasize the importance of setting up issue frameworks during pre-negotiations dealing with all these different topics. Pre-negotiation phases are meant to alleviate fears and build trust through conciliatory gestures, but can often be abused to stall official talks or limit opportunities for actual negotiations (Anderlini, 2004).

Official negotiation phases also vary in form; exclusive talks feature solely official representatives of warring parties, while inclusive negotiations involve a variety of local, national or international actors in the negotiations, for example with humanitarian NGOs, local victims or International Organizations.

Exclusivity can also refer to only seeking peace with a single organization, rather than all participants of a war, while multi-party negotiations involve all of them at the same time. According to Anderlini (2004), an important aspect for the success of negotiation is implementing confidence-building measures within negotiations which enable a mutual culture of trust among participating parties. The success of a negotiation is highly dependent on its mediators of the conflict; these can be done at the behest of international organizations or third-party neutral governments sponsoring the negotiation process. In the case of Sri Lanka and Colombia, both processes have been led by Norway. In essence, during peace negotiations, it is on these mediators to ensure all parties remain talking. Additionally, efficient monitors that keep the peace are also required; the broader international community should be able to ensure peace remains preferable to war.

### Personal transformation

The personal leadership of groups participating in a peace negotiation is highly impactful. Both the Colombian and Sri Lankan peace processes experience challenges to leadership that can alter the course of the process heavily. According to Milburn (1998), a central tenet to effective negotiating and mediating is trust and mistrust among peace negotiation leaders. Leaders often abandon peace negotiations during periods of ambiguity of relative power status when they think their opponent is increasingly gaining more and faster.

During the analysis we will particularly deal with challenges of leadership transformation on the government side, both cases dealing with government-side spoilers that seek to resume the war. These spoilers of the peace believe that negotiated peace threaten their power, worldview or interests. Stedman (2000) gives a typology of several different types of spoilers and the various methods required to deal with them. Spoilers can be total, seeking total power, dismissing any form of peace; limited, seeking to spoil a peace process in order to get a better deal later onward; and greedy, sitting in between both.

More interesting for this thesis, however, is his analysis on how to deal with these spoilers; inducement, or taking positive measures to address the grievances of factions who obstruct the peace; socialization, by setting norms for acceptable behaviour during the peace process, socially ostracising any spoiler that behaves against these norms; or coercion, threatening or punishing potential spoilers for their behaviours (Stedman, 2000).

## Theoretical framework

The literature above gives an overall view on the several theories that have been proposed explaining the terminations of civil wars and the course of negotiations may be affected. Some of these theories may be present in the analysis below, but in order to assess what relation these theories have to each other within this thesis, this chapter briefly elaborates on the theoretical framework that premises the analysis. The theories of mutually hurting stalemate, bargaining theories of war (particularly its conclusion on uncertainty issues), geopolitics, and liberal institutionalism are essential in understanding the variables that cause the diverging peace negotiation outcomes. While understanding the concepts of positive and negative peace are essential in understanding the post-negotiation discussion.

The thesis employs a similar methodological approach that stood at the basis of the bargaining theories of war, which envisions war as part of a bargaining process. The bargaining model of war posits that military means are used as part to advance political ends (Park, 2015). For example, a warring party might seek to attack his opponent in order to pressure this opponent to surrender to its terms. This means that power is the main currency used during this bargaining process, which explains why parties

usually attempt negotiations when both parties enter a stalemate (see the paragraph on *mutually hurting stalemate* below for a more comprehensive explanation). Thus, in terms of peace negotiation, this logic of war bargaining continues.

However, the thesis also acknowledges the limited view this perspective offers, if we only look at the situation through the lens of political bargaining power, we might ignore the influence that domestic institutions themselves, the role of outside players, and/or the way the negotiations are structured might have on the negotiations. Instead, the thesis will employ a more multidimensional approach. In the thesis, numerous examples will be discussed wherein actors of peace negotiating process act in a certain manner to gain an advantageous position in the process. However, several structural reasons also exist that limit an actor's choice and sometimes even take away the actor's capability to bargain. The following chapter will begin to explain and connect the political bargaining process through the balance of war and the mutually hurting stalemate and why it affects uncertainty issues as theorized by the Bargaining Theories of War. To then further elaborate examples of structural factors limiting peace negotiations, and why they are relevant for the thesis. Finally, the theoretical framework will also briefly elaborate on the concepts of peace, and the distinctions of positive and negative peace offered by Galtung (1964), and why they are particularly relevant for the post-negotiation phase of the research.

## Balance of War, the Mutually hurting stalemate and the uncertainty issues

A theme that will be prevalent during the thesis, particularly during the first three phases of the analysis, are the notions of the balance of war and it's resulting mutually hurting stalemate. The mutually hurting stalemate is a theory developed by Zartman when discussing civil war 'ripeness' or the timing of when the conflict resolves. Rather than conflicts resolving due to the resolution of legitimate grievances, they resolve through the readiness of both parties to engage in practical talks, and are thus more a matter of timing. Identifying when a conflict is 'ripe' for resolution is when mutually hurting stalemates come into play (Zartman, 2000).

A mutually hurting stalemate is achieved when both parties find themselves unable to find a clear victory within a conflict, and where instead a deadlock arrived that is painful for both parties. These parties, being rational actors, seek to avoid their painful situation by resolving the conflict through more advantageous methods (for them) than fighting, such as negotiation. An important component of ripeness within mutually hurting stalemates is that the conflict must allow for a method where both parties are able to escape their painful situations. It should also be important to specify that the mutually hurting stalemate doesn't require to be objective: Instead, only a sense or feeling of arriving at that stage should be required. Fighting parties that have all the objective odds stacked in favour of them, still might seek to negotiate peace if they perceive their position as weaker than it actually is (Zartman, 2000). So, in that way, the theory deviates from the more positivist notions of the balance of war as it allows for a more subjective interpretation of the balance of war.

The fact that the balance of war is a subjective matter for participating actors, can lead to peace being preferable to war despite there being a power-imbalance (where a realist would say that actor would likely re-ignite the war to achieve a better bargaining position). But similarly, this subjectivity can also open up the ability for war, despite peace being an objective preferable option. Which brings us to Fearon's uncertainty issues in the bargaining theories of war. Which will be particularly relevant for the analysis of this thesis. In his paper, Fearon (1995) posits that as actors are unable to objectively assess their opponents as these opponents have the opportunity to either offer disinformation, or withhold private information about their position. All participants therefore have to gamble their position on the negotiation table.

The best-case scenario would be then, that all actors are open about their power capabilities, so that all opponents are acutely aware of the power balance in place. However, as the thesis will also showcase, this is not always what happens in real life scenarios. Discord and mistrust between warring parties often mean a lack of access to information, which lead to participants in a negotiation setting to miscalculate their positions vis-à-vis the opponent and to break the negotiations.

In the thesis, notions of mutually hurting stalemate will be discussed in order to analyse why rebelling parties decided to negotiate in the first place and to establish a similar pattern in both conflicts. However, it will also discuss when this moment of 'ripeness' had passed and how the resulting uncertainty allowed for a return to war. Specifically in the case of Sri Lanka, where both parties will enter a distinct period in where they held the belief that the mutually hurting stalemate had passed and where uncertainty issues turned their ugly heads around the corner.

## Geopolitics and their potential impact on peace negotiations

Rather than a theory on its own, geopolitics is a field of study that investigates the impact of geography on the international political actions of a state. It is a method applied to understand the way international actors behave through geographical elements such as demography, topography or the presence of natural resources. Peace negotiations never happen to the merit of domestic actors alone, but are also heavily affected by the geopolitical situation they are in, and thus impacted by the internationally relevant actors within this geopolitical situation. In this thesis, many examples will come forward wherein international actors have geopolitical interests in the peace process of Sri Lanka and Colombia, that will heavily impact the direction of the process. It is thus important to understand the geopolitical situations of both countries during these peace negotiations.

Sri Lanka is an island situated between the South Asian sphere that is dominated by a regional hegemon, India, and its continuing rivalry with its regional challenger, Pakistan. The island is additionally located within the Indian Ocean, a hotbed for global power competition for centuries. The island's demographical makeup between Sinhalese, Tamil and Moor ethnicities and its limited population compared to its neighbours allow for continuous exploitation of outsider powers within the island. Most notable recent example of which is India, which seeks to establish itself as the dominant player within the region, sometimes against the interests of the Sri Lankan government themselves. As a result, the Indians were heavily involved in the Sri Lankan conflict (Bajoria, 2009).

Colombian geography is heavily dominated by the Andean Mountain range that splits the country in half and allows for vast, isolated areas that are economically important, but challenging to control. It is in these areas that both the FARC and the Colombian drug trade was able to find the means to proliferate and the state was unable to establish sufficient state control. Colombia's strategic location at the isthmus of the South American continental plate, and their wealth in resources draw the attention of the United States, which has always been a considerable ally in assisting the Colombian government in trying to combat these challengers (Arte, 2021). However, the American grip on the South American continent has loosened since the end of the Cold War, allowing for a shift in political landscape on the continent: Leftist opposition toward the pro-American establishment had increasingly gained power in South American countries such as Bolivia, Brazil and Venezuela (Herbolzheimer, 2016).

Both conflicts also play out in a post-Cold War and post 9/11 global context. The changing global world order after the fall of the Soviet Union saw an increase in international interventions in civil wars through mediation. As a result, the world entered its most peaceful era since the dawn of history (Jones & Stedman, 2017). The peace negotiations in both Colombia and Sri Lanka were similarly affected by this change in international zeitgeist, as they were both supervised and encouraged by the

international order to seek peace. Another global event that has impacted both conflicts has been the post 9/11 global war-on-terror that delegitimized both the FARC and the LTTE in the eyes of the international order, losing their moral support to continue the fight (Höglund & Svensson, 2002).

## Liberal institutionalism

A particular salient theory of liberal thought that will be used during the analysis, is liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalism presumes that *"domestic and international institutions play central roles in facilitating cooperation and peace between and within nation-states*" (Johnson & Heiss, 2018, p. 123), and has played a dominant role in both policy-making as well as academia since the early 90s, and thus also played a role in the conflicts of Colombia and Sri Lanka. Its central tenet is that democratizing institutions such as a liberal democratic policy, a market-oriented economy and an interventionist international community give way for peace in conflict-ridden situations.

The idea of these democratizing institutions is that they should promote new norms and codes of conduct by showcasing that points of conflict can be resolved by democratic debate and healthy competition rather than imposing military or authoritarian doctrine. This naturally involves heavy reform of authoritarian structures such as the police and defence forces, state-controlled economies, illiberal judiciaries and illiberal government institutions. Because these reforms require a lot of effort and goodwill, special emphasis is given on the international community that should play the role of a mediator and guarantor of the peace within a given conflict while these reforms take place (Crocker & Hampson, 1996). In extension, it therefore emphasizes that countries with liberal democratic institutions are more likely to see a peaceful negotiated end to civil war than those that do not. Its doctrine has some stellar achievements to boot. Primarily its legitimization of liberal democracies worldwide. However, its often-lacking empirical results (particularly in the cases of Sierra Leone, Iraq and Bosnia Herzegovina) made it also a target of considerable criticism (Chandler, 2010).

In the thesis, several elements of liberal institutionalism will come forward during the analysis. Most notably when discussing the legitimacy that democratic institutions can give toward peace processes. During the analysis, it will become clear that the democratic elections have been a major component in the legitimation of both peace processes, and how autocratic elements – such as electoral boycotts and presidential overreach – in institutions have been a major constraint for the legitimation of the peace process in Sri Lanka specifically.

## Positive and Negative Peace

Another theory that sits outside the scope of civil war terminations is the concepts of positive peace and negative peace. These theories will be addressed particularly in answering the secondary concept of 'outcome', by analysing the quality of the peace post-negotiation phase. Peace is difficult to conceptualize, as its meaning is commonly constructed by the absence of violence. This makes the term 'peace' a very broad definition that can entail numerous different concepts. Johan Galtung's very first edition of the Journal of Peace Research (1964) attempted at defining peace by including an editorial discussing the matter. In this editorial, Galtung makes the distinction between negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace, according to Galtung, follows the most common denotation of peace, like described above; the absence of violence. Positive peace however, follows a much more elaborate definition of peace; the integration of human society. This latter concept identifies violence in a non-physical way, violence that is present into the very nature of social, cultural and economic institutions by denying people rights, access to basic needs or by promoting social or economic inequality. Following this concept, violence is not born from the barrel of a gun, but from things like hunger, lack of healthcare access, and ethnic discrimination. Rather than physical, the violence is structural or cultural (Barash & Webel, 2021).

Making this distinction is important for our thesis as peace negotiations implies seeking an end to violence. Whether physical, by stopping the use of weaponry – or structural, by stopping the grievances that awakened the war in the first place. Peace negotiations thus often imply seeking positive peace. However, they do not always end up in states of positive peace. As a civil war terminates, the physical violence may stop – however, the structural violence and the inequalities they produce may continue. The post-negotiation phase of the research is dedicated towards these notions of negative and positive peace, and why one peace outcome is preferable to the other.

# 3: Methodology

The thesis aims to inductively unpack what potential variables have been causes for peace negotiation success or failure in the Colombian and Sri Lankan cases. It attempts to identify these variables by way of qualitative case analysis through document analysis, either from secondary sources such as other academic articles and their analysis on the peace process, or from primary sources such as documents reporting the peace process, news reports, and comments made by relevant stakeholders.

This thesis will incorporate process tracing methods, specifically a paired comparison analysis, to signify the differences in outcomes between the Colombia and Sri Lanka cases. It will take a case study design using most-similar case selection as its justification for selecting the cases. This chapter will briefly elaborate on the methods that will be applied and then move towards a discussion on the selection of the case studies of Colombia and Sri Lanka.

## Methodological approach

Regular process tracing methods are tools to study causal mechanisms in a historical single-case research design. They weigh certain evidence against the tested hypothesis, which can guide the researcher into pointing in the direction where the researcher can be confident that its hypothesis is likely to be true and can be generalized. According to Beach & Pedersen, in the case of theory-testing process tracing, the researcher "*deduces a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of a hypothesized causal mechanism is present in a given case"* (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 3). It allows the researcher to look for what actors' actions and/or other contextual factors have resulted in a specific political or social outcome. Like a detective solving a crime, the researcher is able to test its hypothesis by finding types of evidence pointing in the direction of said hypothesis.

However, regular process tracing is not without its methodological limits, namely that its methods don't allow for systemic comparison between two or more historical cases, as the relationship of variables and the evidence pointing to certain hypotheses can vary widely between single cases (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2017). It is thus hard to generalize its results. Instead, a paired comparison analysis is used, which allows us to look at the differences in both cases, from which more generalizable conclusions can then be extracted.

While qualitative case-study research is normally interested in finding commonalities between cases, paired comparison analysis is interested in studying diversity, an approach more common among comparative studies (Ragin & Amoroso, 2019). However, regular comparative studies often seek a large pool of cases to draw their conclusions on the diversity of outcomes by simply looking at the differences in the analysed variables. Paired comparison is instead more interested in the deep dive that qualitative analyses of a few (typically two) case studies can extract. Paired comparison analyses therefore draw influence from both quantitative as well as qualitative studies but are ultimately a qualitative form of analysis.

Paired comparison analysis is a tool that is widely used but seldom theorized until Sidney Tarrow wrote about it in his article *The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice* (2010). This article will form a major source of inspiration for discussing the methods behind paired comparison and this thesis further in the methodology chapter. Tarrow proposes that paired comparison is distinct from other methodological approaches exactly because of the reasons stated in the paragraph above. Paired comparison, stemming mostly from comparative approaches, is able to use two case study selection methods from which it can study diversity in most-different and most-similar case study selections.

According to Tarrow, there are several key advantages to using paired comparison over regular comparative analysis as an approach, which is also why its use is so widespread; First, it provides an intimacy of analysis that is unattainable using a comparative large-N analysis. Naturally, by only using two cases, the researcher becomes intimately aware of the nuances that are present and can confound the relationship, which could go unnoticed when using a quantitative study. Second, it draws on deep background knowledge of the countries being examined and thus requires the researcher to be well aware of the background of the analysed countries, rather than just a superficial amount of knowledge being sufficient. Third, it facilitates causal-process analysis rather than simply inferring information based on numbers of a graph. Paired comparison also has the advantage over single-case studies as its design is more experimental in its ability to compare the impact of certain variables or mechanisms on outcomes of interest. It thus attempts to correct generalizations from single-case studies; one pertinent conclusion in a single-case study can be compared in other contexts to see if the initial conclusions still hold in similar contexts.

Despite its positives, Tarrow also mentions several downsides by using paired comparisons, which cannot go unnoticed within the thesis. The most common critique of this, is a critique levied on qualitative studies in general; a lack of degrees of freedom that reliably explain the relevant variables in a causal relationship. However, quantitative research on how civil wars end is quite exhaustive already. Instead, the research is mostly interested in which of these already-researched theories are most salient, it is thus more interested in the quality of the evidence, than the quantity (Tarrow, 2010).

Another problem with paired comparisons, is non-representativeness. In Tarrow's article specifically, he mentions the traditional use of cases that are chosen because of their familiarity or geographic proximity to each other, often leaving out comparisons further away that could be of interest. Interestingly, Colombia and Sri Lanka are not geographically proximate at all; in fact, their locations are almost antipodal. I am inclined to agree with Tarrow that we should not limit our analysis to geographic proximity, sometimes comparisons of states far outside their geographic boundaries could illustrate interesting results. Besides, both the Colombian and Sri Lankan climates are still very similar, both are located near the equator, and both report similar development indexes (UNDP, sd). However, naturally, issues of non-representativeness remain; you are ultimately choosing to compare two peace negotiations out of many, and each of them can report different results.

As such, the analysis of the thesis will begin by giving a brief but detailed historical background on both the Sri Lankan conflict and the Colombian conflict. Identifying the key players, the root causes of conflict, and their path towards the negotiations allows the research to situate the negotiations and their players before the start of analysis. Afterwards, the process tracing will begin by splitting up the timeline of negotiations into four distinct phases: (1) A pre-negotiation phase that allows us to look into the reasons why the negotiations occur in the first place; (2) a negotiation phase that showcases the differences that have led to the diverging outcomes; (3) a specific look into the critical juncture – the place of no return – where we can delve into the reasons behind why these occurred; and (4) a post-negotiation phase wherein the quality of the established peace is discussed.

In this pre-negotiation phase, the emphasis is primarily on identifying commonalities between both cases, which will further justify why these cases can be comparatively analysed. This part of the research will focus on the common reasons that have driven the pursuit of peace. In the negotiation phase, the emphasis will instead lay on identifying the differences between the two cases, primarily on what has driven these similar cases apart. The critical juncture phase will extrapolate these differences and look into more detail within specific events in order to look into these differences more clearly. According to Bengtsson & Ruonavaara (2017), comparative process tracing assumes a path of

dependence, a process wherein both cases should move forward in a relatively similar manner. However, this path dependence is broken during critical junctures. Events wherein certain decisions definitively alter the course of the process. Looking in-depth into these critical junctures, we can see exactly what decisions have been made, what the consequences were of these decisions, and why they were made in the first place. The post-negotiation phase will analyse the difference between 'negative peace' and 'positive peace' and what this means for the likely future of both conflicts, though this part of the analysis is more speculative in nature.

## Operationalization

Of course, using these steps requires operationalization. When do we speak of each of the phases, and why do we distinguish between them? The following chapter will briefly dedicate the answers to these questions. For pre-negotiation, I will briefly refer back to Anderlini's work on peace negotiations. According to Anderlini (2004), pre-negotiations refer to *talks before talks*. It is the time when warring parties come together informally, setting up the conditions under which the peace negotiation should take place. These conditions entail the logistics of the talks, the location, the security during the peace talks, who is allowed to participate, the time frame of the peace talks, who mediates the talks, and the goals and topics of the talks. It should be noted that during this timeframe, war continues as usual. However, delegates from both sides had some form of informal contact to establish the conditions above. For the operationalization of the thesis, I start our pre-negotiation phase when both parties made genuine attempts at seeking to talk about these conditions. For Sri Lanka, this was the February 2000 invitation of Norwegian delegates to broker peace between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. For Colombia, this was the letter exchange between the FARC and the government that took place from September 2010 onwards. The pre-negotiations end when the first formal peace negotiations begin.

The formalised structure of the peace talks makes it more straightforward to operationalize the negotiation phase; however, identifying its ending can be quite complicated. Peace negotiations entail a formal arrangement between two or more parties to sit together in several negotiation settings, discussing the conditions that were set during the pre-negotiation phase. However, during peace negotiations, it can happen that some members of the negotiation table refuse to show up and continue negotiations. Yet despite this, we still talk about a negotiation phase in the thesis. This is because negotiations in this case have *stalled,* but not *ended*. The road towards peace is a rocky one, with spoilers often seeking to renege on negotiations in order to gain a more advantageous negotiation position (Stedman, 2000). This does not mean that negotiations have ended however, as continuation of the talks is still possible during or after periods of violence. This research follows the notion that war is simply an extension of political interaction by other means. For this reason, the thesis will scope out the negotiation phase to include the full formalised peace negotiation structure until its critical juncture – the point of no return. This can mean the point of a full return to warfare, or the point wherein the peace negotiations have been successfully implemented.

Like stated before, comparative analysis is interested in why two cases differ by looking at critical junctures. Critical junctures are best understood colloquially as 'turning points' – or "*events and developments in the distant past, generally concentrated in a relatively short period, that have a crucial impact on outcomes later in time"* (Capoccia, 2016, p. 89)*.* Critical junctures offer a good theoretical structure for analysing this difference between both cases, as they are interested in studying a big, discontinuous change that had a large effect on an outcome. It does this by delving into the depths of a very specific event that causes diverging outcomes. Generally, identifying critical junctures means delving into the brief periods of momentous political upheaval (Capoccia, 2016). In the scope of the thesis, this means a critical event wherein the success of the peace negotiations suddenly, or

surprisingly, hanged on a thin thread. For Sri Lanka, this was the LTTE attack on the Mavil Aru sluice, threatening the lives of many thousands of local residents. For Colombia, this was the Peace Plebiscite, which saw the 'no' campaign surprisingly win. Analysing these events allows the thesis to critically extrapolate what differences have caused the different outcomes: for the Sri Lankan actors to revert to war and for the Colombian actors to commit to peace.

Finally, as the post-negotiation phase is mainly interested in the type of peace that has been established after the critical juncture, the thesis is similarly interested in the period after the critical juncture up until the current day. This period is relatively broad, but its length is necessary for the analysis. The longer time span allows the research to delve into both the short- and long-term consequences of the civil war outcomes and come to a better conclusion. For Sri Lanka, this period means the end of the Fourth Eelam War onwards. For Colombia, this period means the signing of the peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government onwards.

## Case selection scope

For its case selection, it is important to set up the scope for which case studies are eligible for analysis. It seeks case studies that have been initiated around a relatively similar time-period. This is mostly to control for global contextual factors that could impact the prominence (or lack thereof) of peace agreements. In a hyperbolic example, it seems unfruitful to compare a current-day conflict with a conflict that occurred in ancient Greek times, where war was considered a common seasonal occurrence. However, even in recent times, we can distinguish several global trends that impact the quantity of peace negotiations. The early 2000s were exceptionally peaceful, recording the least number of battle-related deaths, only to pick up the pace again in 2014, having several conflicts (re-)ignited since (Strand, Rustad, Urdal, & Nygård, 2019). It is generally defined as the height of liberal peacebuilding and peacemaking, and many scholars were initially hopeful that we would enter an era of peace. It is against this backdrop that the peace negotiations between the FARC, LTTE, and the respective governments of the countries that these rebel groups operated in occurred, making for an interesting contextual comparative study.

Another scope of analysis for case selection is that peace negotiations had to occur between the rebel group and the government they fought against, and that the war of these negotiations had to conclude one way or another. This can mean both in terms of a successful transition towards peace, as well as because either warring party has surrendered, ending the conflict through military victory. It is unwise to compare still-ongoing peace negotiations, as we do not know their final results yet; therefore, it is impossible to conclude that the peace negotiations were a failure or were successful. Making comparisons towards situations with no peace negotiations is equally futile, as the thesis is particularly interested in studying peace negotiations in general.

A third scope is that these negotiations should not have been impacted to a considerable extent by outside factors. Although I acknowledge that this scope is admittedly vague, I will argue that it is reasonable. The main negotiators involved should exclusively be the rebel group and the government this rebel group operates in; outside negotiators should only play the role of facilitators. Peace processes such as, for example, the Afghan-Taliban peace process would thus be excluded due to the active role the United States had in this process. While outside elements do impact the peace negotiations, the ultimate decision-making should be done at the behest of the main actors themselves. Additionally, peace processes that have concluded due to a major event outside of the main player's control, such as the 2004 tsunami on the Aceh peace process, are equally excluded as they don't provide the basis for an accurate comparative analysis as discussed in the introduction.

Using these scopes alone, there is another matter that severely impacts case selection, which is availability. Unfortunately, conflict resolution is a rare event. Conflict resolution through negotiation is even more uncommon. The decision to focus on the LTTE and the FARC has ultimately been motivated by the major status of both rebel groups, both of which were the two biggest rebel groups of their time, allowing for a greater number of available sources to analyse.

## Selected case studies

As the method is interested in different outcomes from similar starting points, the use of a most-similar-case selection in logical/required. Most probably, many people wouldn't perceive the Colombian and Sri Lankan cases as being similar, due to their distance from each other and their cultural and historical differences. However, I make the case that this intuition is incorrect. Both countries dealt with a decades-long-conflict, both countries comprise dense jungles that are feeding grounds for rebel group retreats, both rebel groups stem from similar Marxist ideologies, both rebel groups are relatively similar in size, both were also the number one and two alleged richest rebel groups in this period (Reuters, 2007), both countries report similar development indexes (UNDP, sd), and both groups entered peace negotiations at a relatively similar timeframe, namely the early 21st century in a post-9/11 global context – yet, both cases showcase vastly different outcomes.

This is not to say that there were no major differences in both cases, as no single case study is exactly alike. A major difference, for example, is the rebel type involved in each conflict. While the FARC is mainly interested in systemic change through revolution, the LTTE is a separatist group seeking independence. However, the type of rebel group could in fact be an interesting avenue to look for if it affects peace negotiations in general. Perhaps if the LTTE were not a separatist group, the end result would be more positive. Evidence in the analysis should provide answers to the extent to which rebel group type influences peace negotiations; If this evidence is absent, we can naturally conclude that differences in rebel types do not impact peace negotiations. If evidence is present, we can conclude that rebel group type has an impact on peace negotiations. Additionally, like stated before in the literature review, the illustrious study done by Mason and Fett found that rebel type had no impact on whether peace negotiations were more likely to occur or be successful (Mason & Fett, 1996).

Another point of diversion is its geographic location. However, like stated before, many paired comparison case studies have been conducted in contexts that are not intuitively similar geographically, but regardless, they have brought interesting conclusions (Johnson C. A., 1962; Bunce, 1981; Samuels, 2003). Instead, it can be prudent to look outside the scope of geographical and cultural similarities, as noted by Farrow, as this could provide interesting avenues for research that could otherwise go overlooked because of their geographic non-alignment.

# 4: Historical Overview

This chapter is dedicated to the historical overview of the Sri Lankan and Colombian conflicts. What exactly brought all parties together? What did not bring them together before? What has been the trajectory of the conflict so far? Explaining these questions is relevant when we want to analyse both cases in more detail, as intimate knowledge of the conflicts is required to analyse the peace process in the first place. The chapter will introduce many historical events and characters that are relevant if we want to understand the peace negotiation contexts, their conduct and their outcomes. The historical analysis will commence with Sri Lanka; afterwards a historical overview of Colombia will be given. This order of analysing case studies will follow in Chapter 5 as well.

## Sri Lanka and the LTTE

A discussion on Sri Lanka is impossible without mentioning the enmity between the Sinhalese and Tamil nationalist communities. The Sinhalese people make up the majority of the current population of the country and historically occupied the southern regions. The Tamils make up the minority of the population, which historically lived both in the north and east of the island. An additional minority Muslim Moor population finalises the general ethnic composition of the island; however, this latter group is of lesser relevance within the scope of this thesis. Initial animosity between the two groups was fostered by the British colonial administration as a method of 'divide and conquer', by importing Indian Tamils to work for the plantations that dotted the island. When independence eventually arrived in 1947, the Singhalese dominated state immediately deprived these Indian Tamils of citizenship, making them stateless and unable to participate in Sri Lankan politics despite living on the island for centuries. Emboldened by the success of ostracising the Indian Tamils, Sinhalese nationalism grew stronger, with Solomon Bandaranaike of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party becoming the first prime minister to advocate for 'Sinhala-only' legislation in 1956, this time also attempting to ostracise Sri Lankan Tamils. The policy made Sinhala the sole official language, excluded all Tamils from government jobs – a major source of employment, normalised discrimination against the Tamils, and indirectly promoted anti-Tamil pogroms by Sinhalese communities (Feith, 2010).

The initial Tamil political parties opted for a federal system on the island. However, episodes of anti-Tamil violence fuelled a surge in Tamil nationalism. Various Tamil parties began to coalesce around the Tamil United Front in 1972 (later named Tamil United Liberation Front – TULF), openly discussing the possibility of political secession. Among the Tamil youth, which was hit particularly hard by a 'Sinhala-only' policy excluding them from universities in 1972, the belief that independence could be achieved by political means was not shared, instead opting for more radical methods. Youth organisations associated with the TUF, like the Tamil Student League, the Tamil Youth League, and youth militant organisations such as the Tamil New Tigers formed the basis of the eventual LTTE in 1976, with Velupillai Prabhakaran as its leader until the LTTE met its end with his death (Richards, 2014).

The surprise success of the TULF in the 1977 elections was met with anti-Tamil pogroms in the Tamil-dominated northern province of Jaffna, prompting the LTTE to respond with the murder of four policemen. In response to the events, the Sri Lankan government declared a state of emergency in Jaffna and sent in the Sri Lankan police and army to restore order. However, the brutal conduct of both the police and the army only bolstered LTTE popularity among the Tamils, making it the largest nationalist pro-Tamil rebel group (Richards, 2014).

The 1980s followed an intensification of conflict. The LTTE killings of Sinhalese military personnel prompted the Sinhalese community, as well as security personnel associated with the Sri Lankan government, in Colombo to go on a raiding and killing spree on Tamil communities for a whole week

in 1983. This period, now known as Black July, resulted in the deaths of 371 Tamils, left 100,000 people homeless, and forced another 130,000 to seek refuge. The Sri Lankan government additionally did very little to prevent the raids, nor did it conduct any investigations after the fact. The magnitude of the violence prompted a high-intensity civil war (conventionally called the Eelam War, after the native Tamil name for the island) between the government and the Tamil-led rebel groups, that would eventually last more than 25 years (Pavey, 2008). Conflict also intensified among the Tamil rebel groups themselves. While initially united in a common front, the LTTE eventually broke away from several of their former Tamil allies and spent the better part of the decade devouring the other rebel groups (Ross & Savada, 1988).

In 1987, after 4 years of warfare, the Tamil infighting had cost the LTTE nearly their war, only to be saved by Indian intervention. Due to pressure from over 50 million Indian Tamil citizens who supported the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka because of their ethnic ties, the Indian government decided to step in. The Sri Lankan government, unable to resist a full-scale Indian military intervention, instead opted for peace with the Tamils. Initiating the peace negotiations now known as the *Indo-Sri Lankan Accord*. Sri Lanka was to withdraw from the North, and the Tamils were granted more rights and autonomy, and the Sinhalese-only policy would be discontinued. Conditions for these measures was that all Tamil rebel groups were to disarm and that Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) would secure order in the region, formally ending the First Eelam War (De Silva P. , 2018).

Unlike other Tamil groups, the LTTE refused to disarm and began to actively resist Indian occupation of the region, citing their lack of invitation to - and subsequent lack of involvement in - the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. As a result, the brutal violence of the LTTE continued in the North. This time fighting the Indians instead of the Sinhalese forces. The popularity of the LTTE among the Tamils in both India and Sri Lanka began to dwindle, and the Indian government no longer sought interest in the disastrous continued occupation and left the island three years later in 1990. In the meantime, the LTTE had acquired a reputation for particular brutality through its indiscriminate killings of Sinhalese and Moors in the areas they consolidated. Combined with the lack of interest from the Indians, the Sinhalese government prompted the start of the second Eelam War. The LTTE would hit a reputational low point the year after, in 1991; the assassination of popular Indian ex-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a LTTE bomber would thoroughly dispel any former support from the Indian government for the Tamil cause, killing any potential for India to help out the Tamils in the future (Joshi, 1996).

The 1990s would see continuous violence between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government as another 5-year period of warfare continued between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. In 1994, however, things were poised to change. The surprise election of Sri Lanka's first female president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, managed to topple 17 years of United National Party (UNP) dominance with her People's Alliance party (PA) platforming for peace with the LTTE (Keerawella & Samarajiva, 1995).

Thus, in 1995, a ceasefire was arranged between the two sides, ending the second part of the Eelam War. Yet, on its 100$^{th}$ day centenary, the ceasefire would be broken when the LTTE attacked two patrol boats and shot down two transport planes, killing 79 soldiers. This event marked the end to the brief peaceful period, and the third period of the Eelam War would commence. Kumaratunga, no longer confident in a peaceful end of the conflict, similarly intensified her attacks on anyone associated with the LTTE (Human Rights Watch, 1996). A further assassination attempt by the LTTE on Kumaratunga while on the presidential re-election campaign in 1999, which gave her permanent eyesight loss in her right eye, would further embolden her opposition to talking with the rebels. Her main opponent, Ranil Wickremesinghe, who instead platformed for peace this round, was soundly defeated. However, the elections were fraught with allegations of electoral misconduct and intimidation by the PA, and the

poorly timed assassination attempt gave her the necessary boost to win the population's confidence (BBC News, 1999).

Nonetheless, chances for peace would soon turn out more in its favour when, in the 2001 parliamentary elections, Wickremesinghe would win prime ministership, once again platforming for negotiations with the LTTE. Additionally, the LTTE announced its sudden interest in engaging in negotiations. Despite the tumultuous spoiling history of the LTTE, the Wickremesinghe cabinet was confident it would reach peace with the rebel group this time. At the same time, the LTTE was dropping its claims for independence and instead sought to arrange a deal with the Sri Lankan government. Where did this confidence from Wickremesinghe come from? Why did the LTTE drop its independence claims? What changed between the two sides in the years leading up to the peace negotiations? And why did the peace negotiations ultimately fail anyway?

## Colombia and the FARC

The Colombian conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government had been a low-intensity conflict, ongoing for decades. Its geography allowing for vast isolated areas and a decentralised government, has been a hotbed for civil strife in the country ever since its independence, with its population historically deeply associated with political associations that served as supra-local institutions and a two-party system of Liberals and Conservatives that is characterised by fraud, clientelism, and violence. The height of which saw the bloodiest period in Colombia's history; *La Violencia*, resulting in a military coup forcing the two parties to work together under General Pinilla's *National Front* military government (Scarpetta, 1991).

It was amidst these circumstances that we see the birth of the FARC. In 1946, the traditionally conservative peasantry was armed during *La Violencia* by the new Conservative government to combat previously implemented land reforms of the Liberal government with violence. In response, the Liberal Party armed the peasants that opposed the Conservatives with assistance from the Communist Party, forming the first left-winged agrarian guerillas. The confrontation between both groups eventually cost the lives of 300,000 Colombians. Despite the military coup and the resulting forced cooperation between the Conservatives and Liberals, the fighting among the peasantry remained. The anti-Communist administration of General Pinilla launched several military operations in order to clean up the left-winged guerilla movements, forcing these guerillas to move into the jungles of the Andean foothills, where the FARC was born.

While left-winged guerilla groups were initially small, the FARC grew sixfold its original size in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Several reforms during the National Front's tenure in the 1970s emboldened these guerillas by repressing Colombian peasantry and encouraging economic reforms that harmed peasant financial interests. In conjunction with these developments, several of these economic reforms brought displaced peasants towards the cultivation of the highly profitable coca plants. While initially apprehensive, the FARC wound up incorporating this as their main method of fund procurement by way of coca taxation (Molano, 2018).

After the official breakup of the *National Front* in 1974, its infamous legacy brought Colombian politics towards a crisis of political legitimacy among the Colombian populace in the 1970s and 1980s. Party membership of the Liberal and Conservative parties hit an all-time-low as trust in the Colombian political system dipped. The *National Front* and its less formalized successors all relied extensively on the *State of Siege*, giving extensive autonomy toward the armed forces and a disregard for human rights to combat civil disorder and even legitimate political opposition towards the major two parties. As a result, increasing violence by both the Colombian government, mostly through the sponsorship

of “death squads,” as well as opposing guerillas contributed to an increase in civil disobedience and social violence. At the same time, the *Movimiento 19 de Abril* (M-19), another left-winged guerilla movement inspired by the Cuban revolution, brought left-winged violence towards the major Colombian cities for the first time. Attempting to deal with these circumstances, the 1982 Betancur administration was interested in reopening the Colombian democratic system, allowing legitimate opposition, amnesty for political prisoners and insurgents, and negotiations with all guerilla factions (Chernick, 1989).

Contrasted to the negotiations with the M-19 movement, the negotiations with the FARC were relatively peaceful. With ongoing clashes with M-19 leaving the Colombian government in a precarious position, the FARC gained considerable leverage, allowing it to demand significant concessions from the government. This shift in focus enabled the FARC to negotiate a truce with the government in 1984 under conditions of amnesty and political participation while still allowing the FARC to remain armed. Meanwhile, the conflict between the Colombian government and the M-19 ensued. Which brought the M-19 to its climactic end at the failed Palace of Justice siege in 1985, killing a sizeable part of their leadership. During all this, the truce with the Colombian government allowed the FARC to enter Colombian politics through the *Union Patriótica* (UP), a political movement of FARC-affiliated left-wing political parties that earned 4% in the 1986 elections. The electoral campaign was fraught with violence however, as the Palace of Justice siege reinvigorated military activity and public opposition towards the peace negotiations. As such, over 165 UP members were killed during clashes between the Colombian military, far-right death squads, and the FARC during the 1986 election cycle, another 33 UP members were assassinated in the six months following the election, including one senator (Chernick, 1989).

A further 3,000 to 4,000 UP members were assassinated between 1986 and 1992, with notable passivity from the Colombian administrations, failing to protect UP members as well as failing to prosecute militias carrying out the assassinations. The assassination of FARC co-founder Jacobo Arenas in 1992 prompted the rebels to break the truce, calling for efforts to topple the Colombian regime. Since then, numerous different strategies have been taken by different subsequent administrations to deal with the FARC, all with middling success. The 1998-2002 Pastrana administration, in an attempt to quell the violence and start up the negotiations on good terms, created a demilitarised zone the size of Switzerland. This zone was subsequently used to bolster the FARC’s own military and political capacity within this area, making it the largest left-wing rebel group in the world. As a result, the following 2002-2010 Uribe administration’s response to the FARC was much less conciliatory; allowing far-right paramilitaries to kill without cause, covering up massacres, and branding those that opposed the government’s methods as ‘narco-terrorists’ (Rochlin, 2011).

In 2010, Uribe handed the presidency over to his Minister of Defence, Juan Manuel Santos, who was expected to continue Uribe’s policies. Instead, in 2012, Santos announced the kick off of new negotiations with the FARC (Gomez-Suarez, 2020). Those whose fate would ultimately mean the end of the FARC as a major left-wing paramilitary organisation. Based on the FARC’s history, its dissolvement seems quite unexpected, especially because multiple attempts have failed before, with both the Colombian government and the FARC being quite complicit in spoiling earlier peace attempts. Additionally, the peace negotiations initiated by Santos occurred only about a decade after the FARC reached its greatest territorial and military extent, only to eventually wind up demilitarized. What happened, and how were the Santos administration and FARC able to do it?

# 5: Analysis

The following chapter is dedicated to the main analysis of the case studies. Like stated before, it will follow four distinct phases. Phase I will elaborate on the similarities between the two cases and how they got on the path-dependent course of peace negotiations. Phase II will instead look into the differences that were present during the negotiations. Phase III will elaborate on these differences further by looking at the critical juncture of the negotiations. Phase IV will be dedicated to assessing the quality of peace in both countries for the research's secondary question.

## Phase I: Pre-negotiation

### Sri Lanka (2000-2002)

In Sri Lanka, the initial pre-negotiations for the 2002 peace process began in the year 2000 at the behest of the Norwegians, in the hopes that lasting peace was a goal they could look for. The newly elected 2001-2004 Wickremesinghe cabinet responded more favourably towards reconciliation with the rebels after the failure of the previous cabinet to effectively deal with the LTTE (Bouffard & Carment, 2006).

However, these developments were also met with a dose of scepticism among analysts (Höglund & Svensson, 2002; Norell, 2000). Especially considering the possibility of spoilers within the peace process. Mainly Sri Lankan politics, which have always been highly divisive on the subject of peace with the LTTE. Coupled with the power of the rather reluctant Sri Lankan president, Kumaratunga, which has the constitutional ability to declare the peace negotiations illegal and return to a state of war (Höglund & Svensson, 2002). On the side of the LTTE, Norell (2000) brings up the way the rebel group is built up between two pillars, a military wing and a political wing. These wings often have trouble communicating with each other during prior peace negotiations, and the dominance of the military leadership remains an obstacle for the LTTE to pursue political goals. The dominance of the military wing furthermore affects the legitimacy the LTTE claims to hold over representing the needs of the Tamil people.

Despite initial worries, the 2002 Sri Lankan elections almost reverted concerns. According to de Silva (2003), the newly elected Wickremesinghe cabinet realised that military victory over the LTTE was nowhere close to reality; in fact, many of the attempts of the previous government had only strengthened it. During a Sri Lankan Army retreat in May 2002, the LTTE acquired a significant amount of modern weaponry. Aside from this, de Silva (2003) concludes that the high costs of the ongoing military operations put a strain on the Sri Lankan government's budget, leading to difficulty in paying soldiers, resulting in a large number of soldiers deserting. As a result, Wickremesinghe announced that everything except independence for the Tamils was on the table, an idea that the LTTE would be open to.

Discouragement to continue the war spread within the LTTE as well. It was losing support from the South Indian Tamils, and it suffered from an unsavoury reputation in international contexts. Especially directly after the 9/11 attacks, where the use of violence by non-governmental actors particularly lost legitimacy among the international community and where organisations deemed 'terrorist' by the West were under particular scrutiny (Höglund & Svensson, 2002). Additionally, de Silva speculates that a mutually hurting stalemate had arrived during the Third Eelam War, with almost a third of the Tamil population fleeing the country, and that the military operations of the Sri Lankan government killed about half of the LTTE forces. This, combined with the failure of the LTTE to capture the city of Jaffna – which would have doubled their recruitment pool – encouraged the LTTE to enter the negotiation table so that it could at least secure the territories it did control (De Silva C. R., 2003).

## Colombia (2010-2012)

Secret talks between the Santos administration and the FARC were initiated in September 2010, just a month after Santos took office, by means of exchanging letters and communications through third-party delegates exploring the possibility of a negotiated peace. In February 2012, both parties agreed to attend ten public rounds of talks within half a year in the Cuban capital of Havana, presided over by delegates from Norway and Cuba. On the 26th of August, the talks produced a six-point agenda that would guide the course of the talks during the public stage of the negotiations, known as the *general agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,* hereon called the six-point agenda (Bapp, sd).

Initial analyses of these talks were wary, with analysts fearing that these talks could be a repeat of the Pastrana talks that ended up disastrous for the Colombian government. On the side of the FARC, some believed that the FARC was not the rebel group it used to be. Mainly due to the loss of several ideological heavyweights in the decade before, the rebel group's cohesiveness was thought to be eroded, making the rebel group rather criminal in character, being a political rebellion in name only. Thus, questioning the commitment the FARC was able to offer during negotiations (Ramsey, 2012). Additionally, due to the areas of FARC control being separated, middle-ranking commanders enjoyed great autonomy in their day-to-day operations on the field (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003). If they were to disagree with the central leadership, they could easily spoil the peace process (Nussio & Howe, 2012). On the other side of the negotiating table, trouble was brewing among the Colombian delegation: Preceding president Uribe accused Santos of having betrayed his legacy of maintaining his hardline policies against FARC, pitting his far-right allies against the current Santos administration in a major schism amongst members of the Colombian government (Otis, 2012).

Despite this, delegates from both sides appeared more committed to peace than expected. According to Carlo Nasi (2018), the FARC's vast, inaccessible territory would likely have convinced President Santos that a decisive military victory was going to be very costly, if not unattainable. Uribe's victories over the FARC over the past decade, while popular with its voters and effective in limiting the FARC's territorial extent, were a far cry from a complete victory and additionally brought high costs in both the material sense - which the United States was less and less willing to provide for over the years - as well as the humanitarian sense, of which Santos was particularly concerned about (Nasi, 2018).

Nussio and Howe (2012) argue that the FARC is much more cohesive than some analysts were led to believe; indicating that the FARC is highly organised with a strict vertical hierarchy. Despite the organisation being actively involved in the criminal drug trade, its funds are used for achieving their ideological goals only; looting or any acts to obtain personal wealth are strictly forbidden within the FARC. The FARC can thus not be considered a strictly criminal enterprise but rather an ideological organisation. In such organisations, the rank and file of the FARC is very likely to obey commands from high-level commanders, as their motivations for joining the FARC cannot be for criminal gain (Nussio & Howe, 2012). It is thus unlikely that the FARC will be able to change course once the leadership is convinced that peace is the only option. It seemed that during the Pastrana peace talks, this same leadership sought to use the peace negotiations solely for tactical reasons (Nasi, 2018). However, this time the FARC's intentions seemed more genuine, as seen when the FARC selected Rodrigo Londoño, also known as Timochenko, as their leader in 2011. The FARC under Timochenko continued the peace talks despite the killing of his predecessor, Alfonso Cano, which could have reignited conflict. Timochenko became one of the eventual architects of the Colombian peace process (Colombia

Reports, 2018). However, Nussio and Howe do acknowledge that potential spoiling middle-ranking commanders remain.

Another motivation for the FARC to engage in diplomatic talks, according to Herbolzheimer (2016), is that the rise of democratically elected left-wing politicians, and former guerilla combatants turned political leaders in other South American countries made the FARC realise that military means of achieving left-wing revolution might not be the only end of achieving left-wing goals, indicating that a post-Cold-War global context allowed for the FARC to open up for negotiation.

### Conclusions on pre-negotiations

Comparatively analysing both cases based on the pre-negotiations and the contexts they were set in, there have been a number of commonalities, but also some differences identified. Both countries dealt with a regime change for both the government and the rebel groups in the years preceding the negotiations, allowing for the negotiations to occur. On the government side, both cases dealt with an electoral victory for a pro-peace candidate before negotiation. These candidates both seemed intent on seeking peace with the opposition on the merits of the higher costs of the conflict. On the rebel group side, both the FARC and the LTTE suffered major military defeats preceding the negotiation, making them realise that military victory is no-longer attainable and motivating them to seek peace. Both conflicts also dealt with changing international environments: In Sri Lanka, the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing Global War of Terror campaign had a damaging reputational impact on the LTTE, forcing them to change course. In Colombia, this same Global War of Terror campaign was losing its momentum, resulting in less military support from the US in Colombia, which was now unable to keep up the pressure on the FARC. Another international factor was the changing dynamics of far-left radicalism in Latin America, now gaining power through political means instead of revolutionary means. These factors ultimately contribute to a final commonality in both cases, namely that both conflicts had entered a mutually hurting stalemate whereby military victory seemed unattainable for both the respective governments as well as the rebel groups, forcing both groups to take a seat at the negotiating table.

However, several differences can already be reported from the pre-negotiating phase. Namely the structure of rebel groups impacting the control of spoilers, in Colombia, the FARC's highly cohesive organisational structure allowed for a relatively peaceful pre-negotiation sphere. Meanwhile, the divisive, two-winged internal structure of the LTTE has provided for difficulties in the past and could become a major obstacle for the coming peace negotiations. Another difference is the institutional make-up of both countries. While both countries faced severe political opposition towards the peace negotiations, Uribe and his allies held significantly less power in Colombia than the constitutional power of Kumaratunga, being able to unilaterally declare the peace negotiations as void and continuing the war. The act of balancing both domestic politics and the interests of maintaining peace would thus likely provide much more difficulty for the Sri Lankan government than for Colombia. Whether these differences could already explain the causes of divergent peace negotiations is discussed further in the steps below.

## Phase II: Negotiation

### Sri Lanka (2002-2006)

In February 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The MOU was considered ambitious by declaring a general ceasefire and already initiating the decommissioning of weapons, the opening of the LTTE-controlled Jaffna peninsula with the rest of Sri Lanka, and the lifting of the ban on the LTTE as a political organization (Petersen, 2002). Both sides initially were optimistic about the chances of a final agreement; the LTTE dropped its claims

for unilateral independence and instead opted for greater autonomy, conditions that the Wickremesinghe government found acceptable. Meanwhile, the MOU would be observed by several Nordic countries via the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which would report on any violations of the ceasefire (Bouffard & Carment, 2006). While this ceasefire would become the longest period of relative peace and stability since the start of the Eelam War, this did not mean the peace process was particularly successful.

Despite the agreed-upon ceasefire, the peace negotiations lasting from 2002 until 2006 were quite violent, and many challenges were present that ultimately toppled these negotiations during these years. Its first challenge would arise in April 2003, when, after six rounds of successful talks, the LTTE pulled out of the negotiations, citing a lack of effort committed by the Sri Lankan government. Tensions had risen over the course of the year, as the LTTE made increasing demands for more political power, including co-rulership with the current government after negotiations, and for the Sri Lankan government to retreat their forces from the north. Ultimately threatening to end the ceasefire if these demands were not met (Al Jazeera, 2003). However, in November, the LTTE reneged on their threats when the political wing of the LTTE proposed a new set of peace proposals, instead opting for independently led elections that would oversee an interim self-government authority for 5 years after the negotiations (Al Jazeera, 2003).

In the meantime, a second challenge had arisen when the Wickremesinghe cabinet came under increasing pressure from President Kumaratunga, who, despite repeated promises of a commitment to the peace talks, continuously obstructed the cabinet from continuing the peace process. First by firing three cabinet ministers and initiating a state of emergency since late 2003. Afterwards, in February 2004, she dismissed the cabinet altogether and called for snap elections, citing Wickremesinghe's failure to deal with the LTTE effectively. With the cabinet first handicapped and then dismissed, the peace negotiations stayed in limbo, but promises were made by Kumaratunga that the truce would be upheld until new elections took place in April (Al Jazeera, 2004). During this election cycle, the LTTE urged all Tamils to boycott the election, ensuring the defeat of Wickremesinghe, whose success relied on their votes (Fazil & Fowsar, 2020). In April, Mahina Rajapaksa, Kumaratunga's hawkish ally, would become the new prime minister and gradually reversed Wickremesinghe's approach to the peace process, despite his post-electoral promises of not doing so (Mayilvaganan M. , 2009).

Despite the change of hands and the renewed policy, a ceasefire would continue in operation during the course of 2004, and the prospects for renewed talks under Norwegian arbitration would continue to be hopeful. However, in the summer of 2004, tensions within the LTTE reached a boiling point when the Tamil rebels living in the East, led by Karuna Amman, split from the more dominant Northern faction. While Karuna cited a sudden change of heart and frustration with the LTTE leadership (as he was likely due to be replaced for his post) (Daily Mirror Sri Lanka, 2024). In fact, Karuna had been covertly approached previously by the Wickremesinghe cabinet to defect, bringing with him 5,000 LTTE troops, marking the biggest expression of dissension in the history of the LTTE, now known as the "Karuna affaire" (Mayilvaganan M., 2009). A war broke out between the LTTE and Karuna's troops, which now sought support from the Sri Lankan government. The hardline Rajapaksa cabinet, eagerly waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, decided to support Karuna (Staniland, 2012; Richards, 2014). For the LTTE, this collusion rubbed extra salt in the wound, as Karuna was a member of the negotiation delegation for the LTTE (Mayilvaganan M. , 2009).

The Karuna split also induced a loss of strength and legitimacy for the LTTE as a cohesive organisation capable of maintaining peace among the Sri Lankan government as well as the international

community. Even in an international regional context, the LTTE seemed to draw upon its last straws; having already eliminated any former Indian support with the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi in the years before, the current disinterest by India allowed for newer powers to meddle in the conflict. As was the case with Pakistan, which sought new geopolitically strategic allies in the south to counter India, and consequently provided the Sri Lankan state with state-of-the-art weaponry against the LTTE that a reluctant India earlier denied to supply (Fazil & Fowsar, 2020).

It seemed clear that by 2006, neither party was particularly interested in peace negotiations. The 2005 presidential election of Prime Minister Rajapaksa, once again due to LTTE announcements for a Tamil boycott, further embedded the government's hardline policies (The Guardian, 2005). On the side of the LTTE, they lost all trust in the peace process when it turned out that Karuna, as a member of the negotiation process, appeared to have been colluding with the Sri Lankan government. Additionally, they felt betrayed by the West (and thus also Norway as the mediator by extension), when the EU announced an EU-wide ban on the rebel group and lost confidence in the peace negotiations broadly (Nadarajah & Vimalarajah, 2008). According to Mayilvaganan (2009), the LTTE in 2006 seemed to consider provoking another war as a certain endgame move; drawing international attention and sympathy for the Tamils. Additionally, the LTTE hoped it would be able to defend its current territory so that the Rajapaksa government would realise that negotiation with the LTTE was necessary.

### Colombia (2012-2016)

Peace negotiations in Colombia officially started in 2012 and lasted until September 2016. As stated before, the pre-negotiation phase established that the public peace negotiations were to be held on a six-point agenda. This meant that no other concessions were possible and, in essence, laid the confines for the peace treaty to operate in and no agreement could be signed without these points. These six points are the following (Presidencia de la República, 2016);

1. Rural land reform
2. Political participation of the FARC
3. Disarmament of the guerillas
4. Trafficking of illicit drugs
5. Rights for victims of the conflict
6. Implementing a peace treaty

According to Hataway (2015), seeking agreement on a majority of these six points went relatively smoothly. In May 2013, both parties announced they had agreed on an ambitious rural land reform that would distribute land among the poor, the issue that elicited the FARC rebellion in the first place. A few months later, in November, both parties announced they had reached an agreement on the political participation of the FARC as a legitimate political actor. In May 2014, the FARC agreed to give up their most significant source of income by agreeing to assist in the dismantlement of illicit drug production and trade. This was perhaps most surprising, as this was the first time the FARC acknowledged its role in the cocaine trade. In return, the Colombian government would provide aid and expand aid programmes to coca farmers in order to allow for a gradual transition into the production of legal goods. It also acknowledged its complicity in setting the conditions upon which drug cultivation started in the first place and designated the FARC's crimes related to drugs as political crimes, rather than criminal. This being a condition of the FARC for their cooperation (Hataway, 2015). According to Filippidou and O'Brien (2022), the momentum of these agreements and the fact that the agreement would only be achieved if all agenda points were signed were factors in why parties weren't keen on breaking the process.

However, several challenges to the peace negotiations would occur during this period that could have derailed the process. A primary challenge was that the peace negotiations occurred without a general ceasefire. Contrasting the Pastrana and Sri Lankan talks, the Santos negotiations did not initiate a ceasefire during negotiations and did not implement a demilitarised zone for the conduct of these talks, especially because these circumstances caused the FARC to take advantage of the situation in the Pastrana negotiations in the first place. Instead, the negotiations were to occur outside Colombia – In Norway and Cuba – and the war between the FARC and Colombia would continue (Nasi, 2018). While the negotiations were marked by intermittent truces, these were not required for the negotiations to continue, but rather used as an asset of goodwill among negotiating the parties. This strategy carried great risks, as a spate of increasing violence raised tensions during the negotiation phase. This was most evident in 2015, when Colombian patrol units were ambushed and killed by the FARC, almost derailing the whole peace process (France24, 2015). Despite this low point, the nature of ongoing talks facilitated trust between the negotiating parties, motivating all parties to continue talking (Filippidou & O'Brien, 2022).

Another challenge has been the constant opposition provided by Uribe and his allies among the Colombian political elite. A threat that became particularly potent during the 2014 Colombian presidential elections, where Santos sought re-election, as it was the one opportunity Uribe had to spoil the peace negotiations (Bouvier, 2014). A central feature of contention during these elections were the FARC negotiations. Uribe, constitutionally blocked from seeking another presidential term, distanced himself from his former political party, Santos' *Partido de la Unión por la Gente*, and created a rival party, *Centro Democrático*, which nominated Óscar Zuluaga for the presidential elections. As the runoff seemed to coalesce around the candidature of Santos and Zuluaga, the success of the peace negotiations seemed to be determinant of the outcome of these elections. Despite the policy differences between both candidates, the campaigns seemed to mainly focus on each other's political scandals, while marked policy differences remained in the background (Botero, 2014). Perhaps this was the reason why Santos ultimately won the election. However, the results being almost a 50/50 split between those favouring seeking a negotiated end with the FARC and those that sought military means, perhaps motivated Santos to seek a plebiscite surrounding the peace treaty two years later.

Despite these challenges, there was room for optimism during the negotiations. For every time a truce was intermittently broken, both negotiating parties were adamant about continuing negotiations, and both the FARC and the Santos government remained committed to the peace agreement. According to Ince (2013), the reasons for this were that the past decade of fighting had made the FARC considerably weaker and less influential than it has been in the past. Not only materially but also morally, the FARC are as seen out of touch and severely unpopular in Colombia, with rural support for the FARC having lapsed ever since the Pastrana talks. Instead of continuing their destructive paths, the FARC were motivated to seek a more graceful end while still achieving to ensure some of their main concerns for rebellion. At the same time, the peace deal framework under the six-point agenda made sure that the conditions of wiggle room were set up beforehand by the government, thus making the Santos government hold all the cards and ensuring that a repeat of the Pastrana disaster is averted. This set-up thus also ensured that the Santos government remained committed as well, or else it would lose out on its dominant position.

The report by Herbolzheimer (2016) analysing the causes of Colombian peace process success attributes a number of other innovations that have led to sustainable peace in Colombia. One of which was placing victims at the centre of inclusive talks, allowing victims (of both the FARC and the Colombian government) to contribute to the peace talks. The impact of these contributions on the negotiating parties has been huge, according to the report, and have paved the way for a more

conciliatory approach between both sides of the negotiating table. Another innovation has been the presence of a gender commission to oversee the agreements. This commission is built upon experiences in Sri Lanka, which had a limited impact. Instead, in the Colombian peace process, the commission was much more involved – even addressing LGBTI rights in the peace negotiation.

Aside from the inclusion of victims, Filippidou and O'Brien (2022) conclude that the mutual trust building within the talks as well as the momentum of the agreements made spoiling the peace project and a risk to the return of the status quo a costly endeavour.

### Conclusion on negotiating phase

The research above showcases four major differences in the negotiation-phase that have contributed to diverging outcomes; (1) negotiation setup; (2) liberal institutions and government spoilers; (3) rebel fragmentation; and (4) information uncertainty.

A major contributor to peace in Colombia has been the peace negotiation setup that was agreed upon by the FARC and the Santos administration, both the six-point agenda as well as the agreement to not initiate a ceasefire during the negotiation phase. Both of these measures were absent in Sri Lanka. The agreement to limit all negotiations to only the six-point agenda allows for the confinement of acceptable demands. The case of Sri Lanka showcases precisely what this is meant to prevent, as these negotiations were met with an attempt by the LTTE to change the scope for negotiation in its early phases; most notable its sudden demand for an interim government of unity and its demands not to disarm. When these changes in scope were not met by the Wickremesinghe cabinet, negotiations instantly broke down, never to be picked up again. Another benefit of the six-point agenda is that it motivated the Santos administration to continue the peace process, despite several events that could have derailed this, as the setup allowed the Santos administration to manage some type of control over the demands of the FARC.

Despite the FARC and the Santos cabinet not agreeing on a ceasefire, this was likely to contribute positively to the peace in Colombia. Santos followed a similar mantra as did Yitzhak Rabin during the First Intifada, to which the following quote is attributed to Rabin that shares a similar parallel: "We must fight terrorism as if there's no peace process, and work to achieve peace as if there's no terror" (Rabin, 1993). There was no expectation that violence would cease; instead, periods of truce were established as a matter of goodwill among both parties, and the extent of 'peacefulness' would improve the better the negotiations were going. In Sri Lanka, while an overall ceasefire was initiated since the very beginning of the negotiation phase, it had been breached by both the LTTE and the government numerous times, establishing a culture of hostility instead. As the negotiations always continued in Cuba, the Santos administration and the FARC could build a repertoire of mutual trust among the peace delegates. In Sri Lanka, instead, the absence of negotiations only further divided the parties, allowing for uncertainty (see point 4). Ever since the last negotiation in 2004 (which was already tainted by a culture of distrust due to Karuna's betrayal), delegates from both sides did not meet up together and thus were unable to establish a culture of mutual trust.

Additionally, extra attention should be given to the momentum of the Colombian peace process and the inclusion of victims of war in the Colombian peace process. The momentum of agreements on the six-point agenda in Colombia ensured that breaking the peace agreement would increasingly become more costly the longer the peace negotiations went on, disincentivizing spoiler behaviour. Additionally, the inclusion of victims had a great effect on bringing delegates from both sides closer together, building further trust. Both of these processes were absent in Sri Lanka, making it unable to create and develop incentives to seek peace.

A second contributor to the difference in outcome is the institutional makeup of both democratic systems, which allowed for some government actors to spoil the peace process more than others. The rather autocratic measures undertaken by Kumaratunga to spoil the peace process as part of a bitter political feud with Wickremesinghe had a great impact on ensuring no efforts were made to continue the peace process when the LTTE was ready to engage in talks again. In the meantime, Uribe was politically very influential as a government-sided spoiler to the peace process, but at the same time, held no constitutional power. Liberal institutions further advanced the peace: With Santos re-election, the peace process received a boost in legitimacy by carrying a democratic mandate towards peace by the Colombian people. Adversely, with the electoral boycott of the LTTE and the subsequent election of Rajapaksa, the legitimacy of the peace process was severely weakened as the LTTE boycott made clear that they were not really interested in engaging with a pro-peace government while simultaneously giving the government hawks their mandate to continue breaking down the peace process. Both examples thus give credence to the theories established by Liberal Peacebuilding that effective democratic institutions contribute to peace. However, it should be noted that the 2014 elections between Santos and Zuluaga were particularly close and that the situation could have easily been reversed in Colombia.

A third major difference was the internal organization of rebel groups, with the FARC being uniform and disciplined while the LTTE was internally divided. This division within the LTTE culminated with the breakaway of Karuna. According to Richards (2014), the LTTE in the East under Karuna enjoyed great autonomy due to the difficulty of travelling between the LTTE controlled areas in the East and the North. However, the ceasefire allowed safe passage for LTTE members again, and as a result, the more numerically superior Northern LTTE faction tried to uniformly integrate the East into a single cohesive structure, much to the dismay of Karuna. Ultimately leading to his betrayal of the LTTE. Interestingly, the FARC dealt with similar large and separate areas where the local leadership, due to their lack of access, enjoyed greater autonomy from the upper leadership (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003). However, these did not lead to problems of internal cohesion in the FARC, as they still obeyed commands from the leadership during peace negotiations, and thus major internal dissension would not occur. A testament to a greater form of discipline amongst the FARC vis-à-vis the LTTE.

The final difference of importance relates heavily to bargaining theories of war; namely the realisation of the capability limits differed between the FARC and the LTTE. It seemed that the FARC was acutely aware of their limited reputation and capabilities and was convinced that a military strategy to achieve their ideological goals was no longer realistic. As a result, it remained committed to ensuring that their ideological goals could be achieved through peace. Evidence of this is their commitment to rural reform, seeking legitimacy through political participation, and their willingness to drop their participation in the drug trade in return for political legitimacy and amnesty. On the side of the LTTE, however, their continuous provocations for war – despite being embroiled in an internal conflict with Karuna and having no real international allies, and their electoral contributions towards Sri Lankan war hawks, showcase that they greatly overestimated their position, thinking war is preferable to peace. This can likely be attributed to the lack of negotiations that occurred, making it hard for the LTTE to disseminate their rivals' capabilities vis-à-vis theirs. Their miscalculation of reality is especially noticeable when considering their motivations for provoking war; the LTTE figured that when war would break out, support from the international community would help them out. We will read in the next chapter, however, how gravely they were mistaken.

# Phase III: Critical juncture

## Sri Lanka (2006 – 2009)

The critical juncture of the Sri Lankan peace process occurred on July 20, 2006. When the LTTE launched an attack on the Mavil Aru Anicut, a sluice controlling the Mavil Aru river, stopped the flow of water to 20 villages near Trincomalee on the east of the island. Destroying 15,000 acres of rice fields and depriving 15,000 local farmer families of water (Thalpawila, 2017). The SLMM manages to convince the LTTE to pull back, but government forces launch an official ground offensive regardless in the Trincomalee area on the 31st of July (Norad, 2011). As the battles intensified over the months and attempts at settling peace in a Geneva meeting in October failed, the Norwegian delegation became convinced that peace was no longer a material reality, and by December, all direct attempts at settling peace by the Norwegian delegation had stopped. A year later, the Sri Lankan government officially withdrew from the negotiations, and the Norwegians were sent home (Norad, 2011). The Fourth Eelam War had officially begun.

Initial fighting mainly concentrated in the east of the island, where the LTTE unexpectedly experienced heavy losses among both high-ranking commanders and LTTE recruits. This was mainly due to the Karuna split, as Karuna was able to provide the Sri Lankan government with Eastern LTTE military intelligence and his extensive knowledge of its local geography. At the same time, apprehension by the LTTE in the east about people's potential loyalty in Karuna had limited LTTE recruitment in the area. The LTTE East was thus heavily under-armed and lacked the military expertise of the Sri Lankan forces (Richards, 2014). By August 2007, the LTTE eastern branch was completely destroyed. Encouraged by its successes in the East, the Sri Lankan Army would then move towards the North (Richards, 2014). The loss of the East was devastating for the LTTE, having lost thousands of fighters, several key commanders, and a major recruitment pool for further operations.

Another blow for the chances of peace came in November 2007, when the last major political LLTE leader and negotiator in the earlier peace process, Tamilchelvan, was killed during an air raid (NBC News, 2007). Not only did this kill off the political wing of the LTTE, which often sought a more peaceful resolution to the conflict, his death also boosted the Rajapaksa governments' beliefs that they could kill off the LTTE leadership and was a major contributor for Rajapaksa to deny further peace attempts (Mayilvaganan M. , 2023).

The LTTE provoked a war in the hopes that an international response would be favourable to the LTTE; however, this did not materialise. Instead, it was the Sri Lankan government that found new allies during the Fourth Eelam War. Countries like China, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, and Israel supplied tanks, jets, radars, and other military equipment. Especially China and Pakistan have been key contributors to the conflict (Layton, 2015). Sri Lanka became the number one recipient of Chinese foreign aid (DW, 2010). India, reeling from the Ghandi assassination but having to deal with considerable Tamil populations within its territory, decided to covertly support the Sri Lankan army, in the hopes of finally ending the decades long debacle. Meanwhile, western support for an organisation they themselves designated as terrorist, was not likely to materialise in a post-9/11 global context, however they did not explicitly support Sri Lankan efforts (Fazil & Fowsar, 2020). Regardless, the LTTE was internationally completely isolated, while the Sri Lankan government's efforts were legitimised by considerable members of the international community.

The restart of the Eelam War had thus been tacitly accepted by the international community as a necessity in an effort to combat terrorism in a post-9/11 context. The brutality of the war that later came to light spurred the international community to respond. Urging both parties to return to the negotiating table. The Sri Lankan government, already set on destroying the last vestiges of the LTTE,

was unwilling to accept the demands made by the international community to limit themselves. Instead, the Rajapaksa government accused the international community of hypocrisy and ambivalence and promptly ignored all their efforts for peace (Chamalie Jirasginhe, 2016).

The final months of the LTTE, proved to be the most brutal. While the last bastions of LTTE rule kept its inhabitants as hostages, a continuing siege of the Sri Lankan Army saw a devastating disregard for both captured LTTE combatants as well as local civilians. The besieged areas would turn into the most dangerous places to work for international aid workers, journalists, and diplomats. The brutality of the Sri Lankan Army was carefully covered up by the Rajapaksa administration, while the international community was unable or unwilling to pressure the Sri Lankan government to ease their methods. After the death of LTTE's military commander Prabakharan, President Rajapaksa announced the Eelam war to be over, the LTTE's leadership was completely annihilated, and decades of civil strife ended (Weiss, 2011).

### Colombia (2016 – 2017)

A peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government was signed on September 26, 2016. Signed by President Santos, FARC commander Timochencko, UN secretary General Ban Ki Moon, and several representatives from Latin America, the EU, Norway, and the United States in a showcase of active international involvement in the signing of the peace agreement (Semana, 2016). The contents of the peace agreement would entail: land redistribution for the rural poor; guaranteed political participation of the FARC; re-integration of FARC combatants into civilian life, including security guarantees; dissolving the FARC-led drug production; compensation for victims affected by the conflict; and the creation of a commission overseeing these changes (Presidencia de la República, 2016).

Colombia's critical juncture can be pinpointed a week later, on the 2nd of October 2016, when the people of Colombia could vote on ratifying the peace agreement. A majority of political parties, political pundits, and the international community advocated for a 'Yes' to ratify the agreement. With the 'No' campaign mainly spearheaded by Uribe's Democratic Centre Party opposing the agreement. Polls indicated a comfortable victory for the 'yes' campaign. However, in a turn of shocking unexpected events, the results fell in favour of the 'No' campaign with a mere 0,44% difference (BBC News, 2016).

The plebiscite had a historically low turnout of 37%. According to analysis done by Dávalos et al. (2018), the victory of the 'No' campaign was mainly due to electoral support for the Democratic Centre Party and the disapproval of the Santos regime in general, rather than legitimate opposition to the peace process. Differences in results between Colombian provinces were staggering; areas heavily affected by FARC violence were heavily slanted in favour of the peace accords, while areas historically associated with the Democratic Centre's more conservative ideology voted to oppose the agreement. The 'no' campaign was thus more effective in motivating their constituents to vote. However, legitimate concerns pertaining to the FARC's commitment to the peace agreement were also raised by the 'No' campaign.

In an attempt to save the agreement, the Santos regime went to Uribe and his allies to hear their concerns and then met with the FARC to renegotiate the terms. Interestingly, the FARC decided not to veto most of the renegotiated changes demanded by Uribe. According to Nasi (2018), the plebiscite made the FARC intently aware of their unpopular reputation among concerned Colombian citizens, and, in order to salvage it, decided to showcase its commitment to the peace agreement by not vetoing the majority of the changes. This negotiated changed peace agreement was ratified, this time not by popular plebiscite but by Congress, on the 1st of December 2016 (The Washington Post, 2016).

Regardless of the implemented changes, the opposition was not satisfied with the results. They decried the Santos regime for opting to use congressional ratification instead of popular. They were also kept out of the loop on the renegotiation process, and the quick ratification barred the opposition's chances of scrutinising the new accord, something they hoped they could delay until the presidential elections of 2018. Regardless, the peace negotiation phase successfully concluded, with both negotiating parties willing and motivated to end the decades-long war.

### Conclusion of Critical Juncture

In both instances, had the rebel groups and their respective governments handled things differently, the outcomes could have gone the opposite way: the LTTE could have realised its perilous position and not attacked, and the Rajapaksa government could have retreated their forces when the LTTE agreed to back down. The FARC could have left the peace process realising it does not hold the support of the people, and the Santos government could have listened to its critics and demanded harsh, unable-to-realise, demands from the FARC. Yet all of this didn't happen. The critical junctures of both cases emphasise two of the four critical differences elaborated during the negotiations that explain this. The First being the lack of information certainty, and the second being the institutional powers of government spoilers.

The LTTE had provoked a war for a few years already by boycotting pro-peace candidates in Sri Lankan elections. But by 2006, the attack on the Mavil Aru Anicut gave the LTTE what they wished for. The resulting rapid defeat of the LTTE in the east showcased that they were outclassed by Karuna's defection to the government. With the lack of LTTE recruitment in the east, the appointment of Northern commanders unfamiliar with the local geography of the Sri Lankan East, and the local expertise of Karuna as an opponent in the area, the LTTE's decision to provoke a war here seemed highly irrational. However, using *bargaining theories of war*, this apparent stroke of irrationality by the LTTE in this regard makes total sense. The LTTE overestimated its own capabilities vis-à-vis their opponent due to a lack of information, which was mainly the result of zero communications between both parties, leading to a miscalculated strategy of provoking conflict. Contrastingly, the FARC's decision not to veto most of the implemented changes given by Uribe and his allies showcases the FARC's astute awareness of their lack of popularity in Colombia and likely contributed to not causing trouble in order to not further damage their image.

Meanwhile, Sri Lankan government spoilers, fully legitimised by both domestic (through elections) and international politics (through military aid), were likely completely uninterested in a peaceful resolution to the conflict and had no further reason to do so. With the LTTE provocation, they found the opening they were looking for to resume the war. In Colombia, instead, the government spoilers were unexpectedly handed legitimacy with their plebiscite victory. While they got some of their demands included, the Santos regime ultimately circumvented their popular momentum by instead ratifying the peace agreement through Congress, effectively sidelining the government spoilers again. While the democratic plebiscite almost derailed the peace process within the critical juncture, the use of Congress as a liberal institution saved the peace during the critical juncture regardless.

However, additionally important, a new element can be included that explains the difference between both processes; the international contexts surrounding both conflicts had a sizeable impact on how the process developed, specifically the lack of a determined international reaction in Sri Lanka. While the Rajapaksa government was legitimised by several new allies and even old rivals, the LTTE stood entirely alone – clearly affecting the balance of power in favour of the Sri Lankan government. In the final stages of the conflict, the international community did little to prevent the excessive violence in Sri Lanka committed by both the LTTE and the government. In Colombia, the peace process was

legitimised when the ratification was attended by major leaders of South America, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union and their advocacy for the 'yes' campaign in the plebiscite. No side of the Colombian conflict would have likely dared to lose this form of international support for peace, stacking the balance of power against them.

## Phase IV: Post-negotiation

As was stated before, the post-negotiation phase is dedicated to analysing the quality of the peace after the negotiation periods have concluded. In general, this chapter is to argue why a negotiated peace is preferable to a peace achieved through military victory. In its argument, the chapter uses the concepts of 'positive peace' and 'negative peace' to make its point.

### Sri Lanka (2009 – 2024)

Though the LTTE were soundly defeated, the grievances of the Tamils that provoked the conflict in the first place still remained. The Rajapaksa government announced the foundation of a reconciliation commission in 2010. This report suggested a range of practical solutions to bring about reconciliation between the two ethnicities: reconciliation with Tamil politicians, resettling of the internally displaced, and Tamil representation in the armed forces and the government (Ganguly, 2018), all of these are yet to be implemented.

In fact, Tamil repression seems to be the *modus operandi* of the current Sri Lankan administrations. Violations by security forces are commonly covered up. Despite international pressure, the establishment of several truth and reconciliation committees overseeing these violations and attempting to bridge the gap between the Tamil and Sinhala peoples is merely set up to deflect this pressure. Examples of Tamil repression include the detention of Tamil activists and victims' families under the guise of terrorism prevention; the land-grabbing of Tamil property; the destruction of historical Tamil monuments; and attacks and abductions on Tamil residents (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

It is no surprise, then, that the LTTE is still worshipped among many Sri Lankan Tamil residents. Decades of LTTE legitimation as the solution to Sinhala oppression under the rule of the LTTE have engrained these beliefs even years after the dissolution of the LTTE, with some even believing Prabhakaran is still alive and awaiting the right moment to strike (Terpstra & Frerks, 2017). While this latter statement is unlikely to be true, it does reflect the attitudes of some Tamils in Sri Lanka that the final battle had not been fought. The current peace relies heavily on the military repression of Tamil peoples, but with the ongoing economic crisis and the resulting shutdowns of several government institutions since 2022 (Gavin, n.d.), it seems the current military occupation of the north is another strain on the administration's limited budget. Speculations arise about what this will mean for the government's capability of repressing Tamil nationalist sentiments. Combined with a newer generation that has never actively experienced the war, a reignited conflict is never out of the question once a new charismatic figure transcends Prabhakaran.

### Colombia (2017 – 2024)

Even during peace negotiations, worries about rebel group fragmentation permeated the debate surrounding engaging with the FARC. Due to Uribe's policies, many of the FARC's old-guard leadership were no longer alive, thus giving the reigns to a newer generation of leaders. This new leadership has likely not earned the same level of respect and would then likely struggle to convince the troops to lay down their arms. Similarly, the FARC continued to cooperate with several criminal drug cartels during the peace negotiations. These interactions could motivate FARC troops to transfer to these groups (Ince, 2013). In fact, several of the more radical components of the FARC have already transferred to

another radical left-wing rebel group, the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN), which welcomed them with open arms (Razo, 2016). Others have instead fractionalized into new groups, the most popular of which is the Segunda Marquetalia. While these groups do not hold the same amount of power, they are described as more violent and more criminal than the FARC was (International Crisis Group, 2021).

However, most members of the FARC overwhelmingly supported the accord and began to disarm in a span of a record 150 days. Eventually, almost 14,000 former FARC members agreed to stand down and demobilize. Reintegration into society turned out to be a major stumbling block for these former combatants however. The FARC would take the lead in building local communities for former FARC members, but found itself highly unqualified, lacking the infrastructure to do so. The sites of these communities were also located hours from civilisation and ill-suited for agricultural cultivation. The resulting issues led to an economic downturn in the local communities, and many former FARC members quickly left to look for better opportunities elsewhere. Additionally, former FARC members are also threatened and sometimes even assassinated due to their former occupations. Violence in dissident-controlled areas has returned to levels similar to pre-agreement times. Indicating that despite the positives, Colombia still has ways to go to consolidate the accord (International Crisis Group, 2021).

Regardless of the several issues that arise, progress has been made in creating enduring peace for Colombia. A report by Canal et al. (2024) showcases that most of the procedural and distributive justice elements of the peace agreement have been carried out. The main limitations of the current peace agreement are due to the lack of coverage for periphery regions, a lack of interest of the 2018-2022 conservative Duque government, and the power vacuum left by the departure of the FARC in several remote areas. The report showcases that the current FARC peace process is part of a first step of many, in a long and slow process of durable peace. Current Colombian President, Petro and his "*Total Peace Campaign"* (Shiraz & Gomez Benavides, 2024), seem to reflect these conclusions. How they will end up, is equally as hard to predict as the reignition of the Tamil conflict. However, we can conclude that the conditions that allow for durable peace are more present in Colombia than in Sri Lanka.

### Conclusion on post-negotiations

In both cases. we see a different interpretation of peace. In Sri Lanka, the presence of 'negative peace' means the absence of total violence, even if that comes at the cost of Tamil repression through limited violence. Forms of structural and cultural violence still persist through the use of land grabbing, the destruction of Tamil property, and the discrimination of Tamil people in government jobs. In Colombia, meanwhile, despite its implementation issues, we see that the peace accord attempts to create a 'positive peace', allowing former FARC combatants to, sometimes without success, reintegrate into Colombian society.

Whether either form of peace is enduring, time will tell. However, indications that one peace is more enduring than the other are already present: While former LTTE members are not militant, for now, the situation is highly dependent on the ever-presence of the Sri Lankan military, and legitimate grievances within the conflict go unaddressed. Combined with the current financial crisis, which is devastating the current Sri Lankan economy, it will be difficult to maintain this presence. Meanwhile, in Colombia, most former FARC members have legitimately laid down their arms and are attempting to rejoin Colombian society. While the process is far from perfect, the cooperation between the FARC and the government has been commendable and has had a positive effect on peace in Colombia overall. With additional multiple peace processes on the way, the future looks brighter for the Colombian victims of war than for the Sri Lankan victims, many of whom still have to face repression to this day.

# 6: Conclusion & Reflection

Heavily inspired by the earlier work of Tunçer-Kılavuz (2017), this research attempted to answer what have been the main factors that explain the difference in outcome between the Colombian peace process and the Sri Lankan peace process. In order to answer this, the research applied a paired comparative analysis, as followed by the theoretical foundations laid out by Tarrow (2010). It chose to analyse the cases of Colombia and Sri Lanka on the merits of there having been an internal conflict that has recently been resolved involving a peace negotiation process, and each of the processes having a diverging outcome. Before the comparative analysis, the research focused on giving a historical overview of both cases.

Based on the comparative analysis, I found numerous similarities that brought both the Sri Lankan and Colombian conflicts to the negotiating table. The first parallel is that both peace negotiations were initiated due to governmental shifts within both respective countries, diverging radically from the previous administrations. Another similarity is that both conflicts entered peace negotiations under some form of international pressure; with the Colombia case having to deal with dwindling US military support and the Sri Lanka case dealing with a loss of international legitimacy among the LTTE and its former allies in southern India. Similarly, both dealt with a global context that no longer gave the rebel groups reasons to fight. All of these ultimately contributed to a balance of power that reinforced a mutually hurting stalemate wherein fighting was no longer a reasonable option for parties to continue.

However, ultimately, the research was interested in why these cases diverged. The analysis of the negotiation phase and the critical juncture phase provided five critical variables that caused this diversion. These are; (1) negotiation setup; (2) liberal institutions and government spoilers; (3) rebel fragmentation; (4) information uncertainty; and (5) the international context of the conflict.

For negotiation setup, the 6-point negotiation agenda in Colombia allowed some form of controlling mechanism in the negotiation process. Additionally, the decision to continue fighting as if no negotiation took place had contributed positively to the peace process as it allowed both sides to continue to engage in talks and establish a culture of mutual understanding. This culture was further reinforced through the inclusion of victims in the process. In contrast, the sizeable but vague preconditions of the Sri Lankan MOU allowed for continuous breaches of the ceasefire and an absence of ongoing negotiations, allowing for a culture of hostility and mistrust between both parties.

The institutional makeup of both democratic systems allowed for some government actors to spoil the peace process more than others. In Sri Lanka, government-side spoilers were able to take advantage of their institutional position by blocking the Wickremesinghe cabinet from engaging with the LTTE. Instead, government-side spoilers in Colombia were unable to block the Santos cabinet from negotiating. Both sides also dealt with elections during the peace process, which had a converse effect on both cases; in Colombia, the elections further legitimised the peace process; while in Sri Lanka, the elections (and its electoral boycott by the Tamils) further delegitimised the peace process. However, the power of liberal institutions should be taken with a grain of salt; during the critical juncture of the Colombian peace process, the popular plebiscite almost derailed the entire peace process.

The internal organisation of rebel groups allowed for a major contingent of LTTE fighters to fragment and swap sides with the government. As both rebel groups were faced with separately held areas that allowed for greater autonomy for middle-ranking commanders such as Karuna, these autonomous middle-ranking commanders were considered a threat to dissent from the leadership's ambitions of peace. However, only the LTTE faced problems with the internal structural cohesion of the rebel groups

during peace negotiations. Meanwhile, the FARC stayed largely uniform, with only small contingents ultimately breaking away, and only after the peace negotiations ended.

However, the final nails in the coffin came during both conflicts' critical junctures; when the LTTE, due to a lower access to information of war, overestimated their position and renewed the war despite facing unlikely odds that they would come out on top. Meanwhile, the FARC remained astutely aware of their perilous position and instead chose to back down when they were given the opportunity to resist by government-side spoilers. Another critical difference during both conflicts' critical junctures was the international context both conflicts operated in. The lack of an international reaction for peace in Sri Lanka, ultimately contributed to the violent end of the Eelam War. Contrastingly, the international reaction for peace in Colombia legitimised the peace process even further, allowing for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Finally, the research also briefly looked at the outcome of conflict in terms of what type of peace was established in the aftermath of the peace process. While both conflicts deal with a lower intensity of violence, the research concludes that the negative peace in Sri Lanka due to military victory is likely a fragile peace; heavily dependent on the costly military occupation of Tamil dominant areas. For Colombia, the negotiated outcome of the conflict allowed for some establishment of a positive peace and additionally motivated the current Petro government to repeat the process for all of their other remaining adversaries still fighting. In general, the research concludes that the quality of peace established in Colombia is preferable to that of peace established in Sri Lanka. However, it should be mentioned that these conclusions are largely speculative, and future research delving deeper into the topic would be required.

The conclusions of this thesis signify the salience of several theories on civil war termination and negotiation. Namely, the Balance of War theory and its resulting Mutually Hurting Stalemate found particular salience in explaining why parties to a conflict come together for negotiation in the research. The research also supports the conclusions of Liberal Intergovernmentalism; democratic institutions have contributed to a peaceful resolution of the Colombian conflict, while abuse of these institutions has contributed to a violent resolution of the Sri Lankan conflict. A final prominent theory that came forward during the research is the Bargaining Theories of War and its Information Uncertainty. The lower access to information with the LTTE ultimately contributed to its downfall, while the higher access to information with the FARC contributed to a successful disarmament.

## Alternative Explanations

Several theories have been brought up during the literature review that have not been discussed further in the research. These alternative explanations mainly come from the quantitative theories describing civil war termination. That is, because this research could find no, or only weak, indications of these theories being true in the cases of Colombia and Sri Lanka. Particularly the 'greed' theories of war. Following the logic of this theory, the availability of lootable resources and the quantity of natural resources in Colombia in general should motivate the FARC to continue fighting, as it offers the rebel group the economic means to continue their fight. Yet, we see the opposite happen. The FARC were entirely willing to give up their main methods of economic proliferation and even assist the Colombian government in combating the drug trade if it meant solving and legitimising their political grievances in return. Similarly, the LTTE kept on fighting in order to attain a better negotiation position, not because it was necessarily economically opportune to do so.

Another alternative quantitative explanation, which found little evidence during the research, was the war weariness effect. In the Colombian case, the actors did seem motivated to seek an end to the war

due to the heavy financial, humanitarian, and strategic costs it had procured for both sides. In the Sri Lankan case, both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government seemed to look for a return to conflict only two years into the MOU. Intermittently provoking the other party to start the war, despite the heavy humanitarian and financial costs incurred from the previous three Eelam Wars.

## Limitations

Of final importance, the research should briefly pay attention to its limitations. First acknowledging the limitations that the chosen method has upon the overall case representativeness of analysing the Sri Lankan and Colombian peace processes. All peace processes are highly unique, and thus, analysing the differences between any of them can offer different results due to their unique circumstances. The research should thus not be seen as setting up a 'grand theory' on how the ideal peace negotiation should function, but rather point to certain variables that can be present in a peace process that should be followed or avoided.

The second shortcoming is the problem of missing data, an inherent problem with process tracing in general. When the patterns of evidence are open to interpretation by the author, some causal processes might go overlooked. By giving the complete bibliography below, I invite everyone to scrutinise and attempt to reproduce the patterns that I have established here in my research.

I also acknowledge that the quality of the sources of the Sri Lankan peace process could be improved. Specifically, the loss of the SLMM database made finding information particularly challenging. It therefore had to rely more on secondary accounts made by academic authors and news articles to maintain the quality vis-à-vis the Colombian peace process, where reports on the peace process were more abundant.

Finally, I would also like to acknowledge the limited availability of sources analysing the current Tamil situation. Academic interest in assessing the peace in Sri Lanka, Tamil nationalism and the current situation in the Tamil held areas is much more limited than the interest in Colombia post-FARC. This shortage could provide an interesting avenue for future research.

# Bibliography


Al Jazeera. (2003, November 2). Fresh peace offer by Sri Lankan rebels. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2003/11/2/fresh-peace-offer-by-sri-lankan-rebels

Al Jazeera. (2003, September 4). Lanka Tigers give ultimatum. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2003/9/4/lanka-tigers-give-ultimatum

Al Jazeera. (2004, February 12). Sri Lankan ministers sacked. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/2/12/sri-lankan-ministers-sacked

Anderlini, S. N. (2004). Peace Negotiations and Agreements. In International Alert and Women Waging Peace, *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocay and Action* (pp. 16-32). London: International Alert.

Arte. (2021, August 28). *Mapping the World - Colombia: A Nation in Revolt.* Retrieved from https://www.arte.tv/en/videos/103960-002-A/mapping-the-world/

Asal, V., Brown, M., & Dalton, A. (2012). Why Split? Organization Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56*(1), pp. 94-117. doi:10.1177/0022002711429680

Bajoria, J. (2009, May 18). The Sri Lankan Conflict. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sri-lankan-conflict

Bapp. (n.d.). *Exploratory Phase*. Retrieved from Bapp - Open Library of the Colombian Peace process: https://bapp.com.co/en/exploratory-phase/

Barash, D. P., & Webel, C. (2021). Chapter 1: The Meanings of Peace. In D. P. Barash, & C. Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies* (pp. 3-18). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishing.

BBC News. (1999, December 22). Kumaratunga re-elected in Sri Lanka. *BBC News*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/574780.stm

BBC News. (2016, October 3). Colombia referendum: Voters reject FARC peace deal. *BBC News*. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252

Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines.* Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. doi:10.3998/mpub.10072208

Bengtsson, B., & Ruonavaara, H. (2017). Comparative Process Tracing: Making Historical Comparison Structured and Focused. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 47*(1), pp. 44-66. doi:10.1177/0048393116658549

Botero, F. (2014). The legislative and executive elections in Colombia, 2014. *Electoral Studies*, pp. 1-5.

Bouffard, S., & Carment, D. (2006). The Sri Lanka Peace Process: A Critical Review. *Journal of South Asian Development, 1*(2), pp. 151-177. doi:10.1177/097317410600100201

Bouvier, V. M. (2014, June 13). Could Colombia's Election Kill Its Peace Process? *United States Institute of peace*. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/06/could-colombias-election-kill-its-peace-process

Bunce, V. (1981). *Do new leaders make a difference? Executive succession and public policy under capitalism and socialism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Canal, M. A., Kesting, P., Castro, D. A., & Smolinski, R. (2024). Possibilities and limits of procedural and distributive justice in complex conflicts: a study of the Colombian peace process. *International Journal of Conflict Management, 35*(1), pp. 30-60. doi:10.1108/IJCMA-12-2022-0217

Capoccia, G. (2016). Critical Junctures. In K. O. Fioretos, T. G. Felleti, & A. D. Sheingate, *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Insitutionalism* (pp. 89-106). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chamalie Jirasginhe, R. (2016). The International Community's Intervention during the Conclusion of the War in Sri Lanka. *Strategic Analysis, 40*(4), pp. 291-306. doi:10.1080/09700161.2016.1184789

Chandler, D. (2010). The uncritical critique of 'liberal peace'. *Review of International Studies, 36*, pp. 137-155. doi:10.1017/S0260210510000823

Chernick, M. W. (1989). Negotiated Settlement to Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process. *Cambridge University Press, 30*(4), pp. 1988-1989. doi:10.2307/166057

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers, 56*, pp. 563-595. doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064

Colombia Reports. (2018, February 1). Rodrigo Londoño, a.k.a. 'Timochenko'. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from https://colombiareports.com/timochenko/

Cragin, K., & Hoffman, B. (2003). *Arms Trafficking and Colombia.* Santa Monica: RAND.

Crocker, C. A., & Hampson, F. O. (1996). Making Peace Settlements Work. *Foreign Policy, 104*(Autumn), pp. 54-71. doi:10.2307/1148990

Daily Mirror Sri Lanka. (2024, March 23). Fractricidal conflict between LTTE and Karuna Eastern Tigers. *Daily Mirror Sri Lanka*. Retrieved from https://www.dailymirror.lk/opinion/Fratricidal-conflict-between-LTTE-and-Karuna-Eastern-Tigers/172-279455

Dávalos, E., Morales, L. F., Holmes, J. S., & Dávalos, L. M. (2018). Opposition Support and the Experience of Violence Explain Colombian Peace Referendum Results. *Journal of Politics in Latin America, 10*(2), pp. 99-122. doi:10.1177/1866802X1801000204

De Silva, C. R. (2003). Peace in Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects. *Asia Pacific Law Review, 11*(1), pp. 1-22. doi:10.1080/18758444.2003.11788114

De Silva, P. (2018, July 30). Indo-Lanka Accord: 31 years on. *Daily News Sri Lanka*. Retrieved from https://archives1.dailynews.lk/2018/07/30/features/158264/indo-lanka-accord-31-years

Devetak, R. (2008). Globalization's shadow. In R. Devetak, & C. W. Hughes, *The Globalization of Political Violence* (pp. 1-27). New York: Routledge.

Doctor, A. C. (2020). A Motion of No Confidence: Leadership and Rebel Fragmentation. *Journal of Global Security Studies, 5*(5), pp. 598-616. doi:10.1093/jogss/ogz060

Duursma, A., & Fliervoet, F. (2021). Fueling Factionalism? The Impact of Peace Processes on Rebel Group Fragmentation in Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 65*(4), pp. 788-812. doi:10.1177/0022002720958062

DW. (2010, October 5). China: Sri Lanka's 'unconditional' ally. *DW*. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/china-sri-lankas-unconditional-ally/a-5559827

Fazil, M. M., & Fowsar, M. A. (2020). The End of Sri Lanka's Civil War and the Fall of the Liberation Tigers. *Journal of Politics and Law, 13*(4), pp. 147-155. doi:10.5539/jpl.v13n4p147

Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization, 49*(3), pp. 379-414. doi:10.1017/S0020818300033324

Feith, D. (2010). Tamil and Sinhala relations in Sri Lanka: A historical and contemporary perspective. *Global Change, Peace & Security, 22*(3), pp. 345-353. doi:10.1080/14781158.2010.510270

Filippidou, A., & O'Brien, T. (2022). Trust and Distrust in the Resolution of Protracted Social Conflicts: The Case of Colombia. *Behavioural sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 14*(1), pp. 1-21. doi:10.1080/19434472.2020.1785524

France24. (2015, April 15). Deadly rebel assault puts Colombia peace talks in jeopardy. *France24*. Retrieved from https://www.france24.com/en/20150415-colombia-farc-soldiers-attack-santos-revolutionary-armed-forces-ceasefire

Galtung, J. (1964). An Editorial. *Journal of Peace Research, 1*(1). doi:10.1177/002234336400100l0

Ganguly, S. (2018). Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War. *Daedalus, 147*(1), pp. 78-89. doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00475

Gavin, J. (n.d.). The fall of the Sri Lankan economy. What happened? *Vision of Humanity*. Retrieved from https://www.visionofhumanity.org/the-fall-of-the-sri-lankan-economy-what-happened/

Gomez-Suarez, A. (2020). A Short History of Anti-Communist Violence in Colombia (1930-2018): Rupture with the Past or Rebranding? In C. Gerlach, & C. Six, *The Palgrave Handbook of Anti-Communist Persecutions* (pp. 383-403). Palgrave Macmillan: London.

Hataway, B. (2015). The FARC's Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success of Colombia's Peace Talks. *North Carolina Journal of International Law, 41*(1), pp. 163-188.

Herbolzheimer, K. (2016). *Innovations in the Colombian peace process.* Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre [NOREF].

Höglund, K., & Svensson, I. (2002). The Peace Process in Sri Lanka. *Civil Wars, 5*(4), pp. 103-118. doi:10.1080/13698240208402519

Hultquist, P. (2013). Power parity and Peace? The role of relative power in civil war settlement. *Journal of Peace Research, 50*(5), pp. 623-634. doi:10.1177/0022343313486281

Human Rights Watch. (1996). *Sri Lanka 1996.* New York City: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Asia-08.htm

Human Rights Watch. (2023). *"If We Raise Our Voice They Arrest Us": Sri Lanka's Proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission.* New York: Human Rights Watch.

Ince, M. (2013). Defeating Colombia's Oldest Insurgency. *The Rusi Journal, 158*(1), pp. 20-27. doi:10.1080/03071847.2013.774636

International Crisis Group. (2021). *A Fight by Other Means: Keeping the Peace with Colombia's FARC.* Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Johnson, C. A. (1962). *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Johnson, T., & Heiss, A. (2018). Liberal Institutionalism. In T. G. Weiss, & R. Wilkinson, *International Organization and Global Governance* (2 ed., pp. 123-34). London: Routledge.

Jones, B. D., & Stedman, S. J. (2017). Civil Wars & the Post-Cold War International Order. *Daedalus, 146*(4), pp. 33-44. doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00457

Joshi, M. (1996). On the Razor's edge: The Liberation tigers of Tamil Eelam. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 19*(1), pp. 19-42. doi:10.1080/10576109608435994

Keen, D. (2012). Greed and grievance in civil war. *International Affairs, 88*(4), pp. 757-777. doi:10.1111/J.1468-2346.2012.01100.X

Keerawella, G., & Samarajiva, R. (1995). Sri Lanka in 1994: A Mandate for Peace. *Asian Survey, 35*(2), pp. 153-159. doi:10.2307/2645024

Layton, P. (2015, April 9). How Sri Lanka Won the War: Lessons in strategy from an overlook victory. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-sri-lanka-won-the-war/

Mason, D. T., & Fett, P. J. (1996). How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40*(4), pp. 546-568. doi:10.1177/0022002796040004002

Mayilvaganan, M. (2009). Is it Endgame for LTTE. *Strategic Analysis, 33*(1), pp. 25-39. doi:10.1080/09700160802518536

Mayilvaganan, M. (2023). War Against the Tamil Tigers: How Did Sri Lanka Win? *Journal of Contemporary Politics, 2*(2), pp. 55-62. doi:10.53989/jcp.v2i2_7_Mayilvaganan

Milburn, T. W. (1998). Psychology, negotiation, and Peace. *Applied & Preventive Psychology, 7*, pp. 109-119. doi:10.1016/S0962-1849(05)80008-3

Molano, A. (2018). The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerilla Group's Long History. *NACLA Report on the Americas, 50*(3), pp. 279-283. doi:10.1080/10714839.2000.11722627

Moravcsik, A. (1992). Liberalism and International Relations Theory. *self published, 92*(6), pp. 1-38.

Nadarajah, S., & Vimalarajah, L. (2008). *The Politics of Transformation: The LTTE and the 2002-2006 peace process in Sri Lanka.* Berlin: Berghof Research Center.

Nasi, C. (2018). The peace process with the FARC-EP. In F. A. Diaz Pabón, *Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia* (pp. 33-48). Routledge: Milton Park.

NBC News. (2007, November 3). Sri Lanka kills Tamil Tigers' top political leader. *NBC News*. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna21604362

Norad. (2011). *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009.* Oslo: Norad.

Norell, M. (2000). Is Peace possible? The case of Sri Lanka. *Civil Wars, 3*(4), pp. 105-118. doi:10.1080/13698240008402457

Nussio, E., & Howe, K. (2012). What if the FARC demobilizes? *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 1*(1), pp. 68-67.

Oren, I. (n.d.). Democratic Peace. *Britannica*. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/topic/democratic-peace

Otis, J. (2012, July 13). In Colombia, the War Between the Presidents. *Time Magazine*. Retrieved from https://world.time.com/2012/07/13/in-colombia-the-war-between-the-presidents/

Park, S. (2015). Power and Civil War Termination Bargaining. *International Studies Quarterly, 59*, pp. 172-183. doi:10.1111/isqu.12174

Pavey, E. (2008). The massacres in Sri Lanka during the Black July riots of 1983. *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence*. Retrieved from https://tamilnation.org/indictment/genocide83/pavey.pdf

Petersen, J. (2002, February 22). Agreement on a ceasefire between Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. *Reliefweb*. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/agreement-ceasefire-between-sri-lanka-and-liberation-tigers-tamil-eelam

Presidencia de la República. (2016). *Summary of Colombia's Agreement to End Conflict and Build Peace.* Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.

Rabin, Y. (1993). Responding to terrorist attacks that imperiled the Oslo peace process.

Ragin, C. C., & Amoroso, L. M. (2019). Chapter 6: Using Comparative Methods to Study Diversity. In C. C. Ragin, & L. M. Amoroso, *Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method* (pp. 101-122). SAGE publications Ltd.: London.

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2012). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (3 ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ramsey, G. (2012, August 31). Colombia to Negotiate with FARC. *InSight Crime*. Retrieved from https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/colombia-to-negotiate-with-farc/

Razo, C. (2016). *Including the ELN in Peace Negotiations.* Washington: Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

Reuters. (2007, July 25). Tamil Tigers may be second richest rebel group worldwide. *Reuters*. Retrieved from https://www.livemint.com/Politics/OQWWOS6DFlqcBV8Ov4gM5H/Tamil-Tigers-may-be-second-richest-rebel-group-worldwide.html

Richards, J. (2014). *An Institutional History of the Liberal Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).* Geneva: The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding [CCDP].

Rochlin, J. (2011). Plan Colombia and the Revolution in military affairs: the demise of the FARC. *Review of International Studies*(37), pp. 715-740. doi:10.1017/S0260210510000914

Ross, R. R., & Savada, A. M. (1988). Tamil Militant Groups. In R. R. Ross, & A. M. Savada, *Sri Lanka: A Country Study.* Washington: Library of Congress.

Samuels, R. J. (2003). *Machievelli's Children: Leaders and their legacies in Italy and Japan.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Santos, J. M. (2016, December 10). "Peace in Colombia: From the Impossible to the Possible". Retrieved from https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2016/santos/lecture/ (08:54)

Scarpetta, O. (1991). Political Traditions and the Limits of Democracy in Colombia. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 5*(2), pp. 143-166. doi:doi.org/10.1007/BF01417403

Semana. (2016, June 25). Tras cese al fuego, el mundo está pendiente de Colombia (Spanish). *Semana*. Retrieved from https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/cese-al-fuego-y-proceso-de-paz-mundo-mira-a-colombia/479185/

Shiraz, Z., & Gomez Benavides, J. C. (2024, January 12). The policy of 'Paz Total' (Total Peace) in Colombia: Challenges, Failures and Opportunities. *Leiden security and Global Affairs*. Retrieved from https://www.leidensecurityandglobalaffairs.nl/articles/the-policy-of-paz-total-total-peace-in-colombia-challenges-failures-and-opportunities

Staniland, P. (2012). Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56*(1), pp. 16-40. doi:10.1177/0022002711429681

Stedman, S. J. (2000). Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. In P. C. Stern, & D. Druckman, *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War* (pp. 178-224). Washington: National Academy Press.

Stewart, F., Brown, G., & Langer, A. (2008). Major Findings and Conclusions on the Relationship Between Horitzontal Inequalities and Conflict. In F. Stewart, *Horitontal Inequalities and Conflcit* (pp. 285-300). London: Palgrave.

Strand, H., Rustad, S. A., Urdal, H., & Nygård, H. M. (2019). *Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018.* Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

Tarrow, S. (2010). The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice. *Comparative Political Studies, 43*(2), pp. 230-259. doi:10.1177/0010414009350044

Terpstra, N., & Frerks, G. (2017). Rebel Governance and Legitimacy: Understanding the impact of Rebel Legitimation on Civil Compliance with the LTTE Rule. *Civil Wars, 19*(3), pp. 279-307. doi:10.1080/13698249.2017.1393265

Thalpawila, O. N. (2017). The Escalation of the LTTE's Violent Activities and the Civil War in Sri Lanka. *Girihisa Felicitation Volume*, pp. 95-106.

The Guardian. (2005, November 18). Hardliner wins Sri Lankan presidency. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/nov/18/davidfickling

The Washington Post. (2016, November 30). Colombia's congress approves historic peace deal with FARC rebels. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombian-congress-approves-historic-peace-deal/2016/11/30/9b2fda92-b5a7-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_story.html

Tunçer-Kılavuz, I. (2017). Success or Failure in the Peace Process of Aceh and Sri Lanka: A Comparative Study. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 31*(4), pp. 712-732. doi:10.1080/09546553.2017.1282860

UNDP. (n.d.). *Human Development Index (HDI)*. Retrieved from UNDP.org: https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI

Wagner, R. H. (1994). Peace, War, and the Balance of Power. *The American Political Science Review, 88*(3), pp. 593-607. doi:10.2307/2944797

Weiss, G. (2011). *The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka & The Last Days of the Tamil Tigers.* London: The Bodley Head.

Woldemariam, M. (2018). *Insurgent Framentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and its Discontents.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zartman, W. I. (2000). Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond. In P. C. Stern, & D. Druckman, *Conflict Resolution After the Cold War* (pp. 225-250). Washington D.C.: National Academcy Press.