Who still protests?

HOW TRUST ALTERS THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON PROTEST PARTICIPATION IN CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA

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Abstract: This thesis studies the effect of corruption on protesting. In particular, the question if citizens concerned with corruption protest more and if this effect is moderated by the effects of social and political trust. Protesting is an increasingly relevant anti-corruption tool. Literature concerning the effect of corruption on protesting shows varying effects, which is why I include trust as a potentially clarifying factor. I employ a binary logistic regression analysis using data from the Latinobarometro survey in 2020. Analyzing 12,412 individuals from 15 highly corrupt Central and Latin American countries, the results suggest that citizens concerned with corruption tend to protest more. There are the additional hypotheses that low political trust and high social trust increase this effect. However, the effect of perceived corruption is not significantly altered by individuals' level of political or social trust. Social and political trust show significant positive effects on protesting, however both effects become statistically insignificant when controlling for political interest. I conclude that concern with corruption is a strong and significant predictor of protest participation in corrupt countries in Central and Latin America and this effect is not moderated by the degree of political or social trust.

List of acronyms

CI	-	95% Confidence Interval
CwC	-	Concern with Corruption
CVM	-	Civic Voluntarism Model
DV	-	Dependent Variable
OLS	-	Ordinary Least Squares

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1. Introduction

After the third wave of democratization, scholars noticed that some countries democratization process decelerated, stagnated, or even started to reverse (Berg-Schlosser, 2018). The failure to fully democratize is associated with several causes, one of them being corruption (cf. Carothers, 2015; Diamond, 2020). Not only from scholars of democratization but also from scholars and practitioners in anti-corruption there is now an increased awareness of the importance of popular protest to fight against corruption. Carothers (2015) calls democracy aid practitioners to help citizen convert their anger at corruption into political activism thereby establishing a more transparent and accountable political system and ultimately foster democratization. Similarly, Della Porta (2017) stresses the increasing importance of citizen protest in combatting corruption. However, research shows that citizens in corrupt countries might become apathetic to politics and abstain from protesting (Olsson, 2014; Bauhr & Grimes, 2014). Other evidence suggests that in corrupt countries citizens protest more (Bonifacio & Paulino, 2015). The question thus arises, how can (more) citizens be mobilized in corrupt countries? And why does corruption sometimes lead to apathy and sometimes to activism?

While there is extensive literature on what motivates citizens to protest, the effect of corruption on protest behavior is still unclear. Popular protest has become a normalized part of democracy (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001) and can be a powerful tool for citizens to achieve substantial change in their political system: Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) in their book analyze peaceful protest and its effectiveness. They find that peaceful protest tends to be more effective in achieving regime change than violent resistance, because it attracts a greater number of participants. The more people participate, the greater the incentive for change for the ruling elite. Armenia serves as a hopeful example: in 2018 nationwide protests overthrew the corrupt government and the country's political landscape was thoroughly redefined in the following months (Lanskoy & Suthers, 2019). Consequently, Armenia's perceived level of corruption enhanced by 14 points within only two years, showing the biggest reduction in corruption in global comparison in this time frame (Transparency International, 2020).

Previous research considers how the perception of corruption, experience therewith or tolerance thereof influences protest participation, with incoherent results (Školník, 2020). Several studies have found significant positive effects of individuals experience of corruption on noninstitutionalized forms of political participation, including protesting (Bonifacio & Paulino, 2015; Školník, 2019; Školník, 2020), while again other scholars find a significant negative effect (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Olsson, 2014). With this thesis I would like to contribute to the question of which citizens participate in protests in corrupt settings by considering the role of trust in protest mobilization.

The mechanism of how corruption influences social and political trust strikes me as crucial in a democracy: through democratic processes, representatives are entrusted to fulfill citizens' needs and interest on their behalf. Democracy hence requires a certain level of trust, as citizens must entrust the fulfillment of their interests onto politicians. As politicians have more insights into resource information, that is how much money the state has access to, what it is spent on and how much money is required to pay for certain policy implementations. This imbalance gives room for corruption, as politicians can divert resources from investments intended to fulfill citizens' needs, to their own benefit without notice. While there is always a level of uncertainty if politicians do act in the public interest, evidence of corruption will erode trust in political institutions and authorities, leading to lower levels of trust (Adam & Fazekas, 2021). Seligson (2002) for example, based on evidence from Latin America finds that corruption erodes trust in the political system and in society. Thus, in corrupt countries, people feel that they cannot trust

anybody, including family and friends, which makes political activism and satisfaction with democracy less common (Radin, 2019).

Social and political trust's effect on protesting show coherent results in Europe: Hooghe and Quintilier (2014), Bäck and Christensen (2016), and Valgarðsson et al. (2022) find that lower trusting citizens are more inclined to protest in Europe. However, Dalton (2004) when extending the scope of the analysis to other industrialized democratic countries finds no significant effect. Concerning social trust, research on the relationship of social trust with protesting shows that higher social trust weakly correlates with a higher likelihood of protesting in Europe (Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Bäck & Christensen, 2016). Klesner (2007) concurs that social trust in Latin America correlates with more noninstitutionalized political participation, including several forms of protest.

In this thesis I will address the relation of trust on protesting in contexts of corruption. I hope to contribute to the question of how to end the vicious cycle of corruption and corruption induced distrust in democratizing countries. Therefore, I formulate the following research question:

What role does trust play for protest mobilization in highly corrupt contexts?

To answer this question, I conduct a binary logistic regression analysis using individual data from the Latinobarometro survey 2020. The analysis includes 12,412 individuals from 15 Central and Latin American countries.

In the following chapters I report on my research in the following order: I will first review the state of the art, by circling in on my research question, going from broader topics to more and more specific issues. I start by discussing theories about corruption's deteriorating effect on democracies and general anti-corruption strategies before going over to mechanisms of protest mobilization, and more specifically protest mobilization in corrupt contexts. Based on the state of the art I formulate three hypotheses. Second, I present the data, measurements and method used for the analysis. This includes the case selection, the selection and composition of all variables, and the statistical method I employ. In the ensuing analysis I present and interpret the results of the binary logistic regression analysis in order of my hypotheses. This chapter includes a discussion of the robustness of the findings. Additional tables can be found in the appendix. In the final chapter I discuss the findings, limitations, and potential implications of this thesis.

2. State of the art

In this chapter I will map out the state of the art in the study of protest mobilization in corrupt settings. I start by reviewing the effects of corruption on democratic systems, to stress the importance of anti-corruption measures in democratization efforts. I then highlight some approaches to corruption reduction and their respective hurdles. I am interested in the question of what citizens can do in a democracy to combat corruption and therefore focus my attention on protesting. To find out what kind of people protest in corrupt settings I first examine who is expected to protest in general, that is in a not-specifically corrupt context. Therefore, I review existing theories explaining protest participation, mainly using Brady, Verba, and Schlozman's (1995) civil voluntarism model. I believe trust to play a special role in protest mobilization in corrupt countries, due to effects of corruption on trust. Hence, I also review current theories on

how social and political trust may influence protest behavior. I use these theories as theoretical framework and then set them in a context of high corruption. This allows me to gain a deeper insight into how I expect protest behavior to vary in these contexts. Based on the empirical evidence, I then identify the hypotheses I address with this thesis.

Why is corruption toxic for democracies?

Scholars of democratization define modern democracy as a "system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives" (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 76). The main idea thus is that citizens can elect among their fellow citizens representatives, which will act in their best interest. However, citizens' responsibility in a democracy is not limited to occasional voting: democracy is fragile as it has the power and need to adapt to ever new circumstances. It is a never fixed open ended process of public discussion adapting to societal change (Tambakaki, 2019). As 'the people' are effectively ruling themselves, they need to be politically active, being aware of political discussions and issues, constantly monitoring the moral implications of their representatives' decisions (Uslaner, 2017; Arendt, 1960).

Democracy is upheld and enforced through institutions such as elections, parliament, the police, or the judiciary, as voters and other representatives may punish deviant behavior by ridding politicians of their power (Warren, 2017). This requires that citizens and incumbents alike must obey the law and be held accountable to it (O'Donnell, 1996). A major challenge to uphold democratic institutions is corruption, which is "the misuse of public office for private gain" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 112). This can encompass a variety of actions such as taking bribes, embezzling money, nepotism, and fraud (Adam & Fazekas, 2021). When corruption is widespread within the state, accountability and responsiveness cannot be ensured as representatives' considerations of voter and public interest are influenced by calculations of personal gain. Thus, citizens call the adherence to the rule of law into question and as a result will be dissatisfied with democracy (Keane, 2022).

Systematic corruption can undermine any institution, allowing political elites to enrich themselves with impunity, as controlling and monitoring institutions such as the judiciary or the media can be influenced to ignore deviance from the law (Rothstein, 2011). To draw a clearer picture of how corruption undermines political institutions I highlight the example of corruption and the media. Voltmer & Rawnsley (2018) describe that journalists are pressured into reporting in line with the political agenda of powerful corrupt politicians: Due to low wages and a volatile job market in journalism, the state is often the main source of income for the media in lower income countries. This reduces the medias power to hold politicians accountable and reduces citizens ability to detect misbehavior and punish it. This is one example of how corrupt leaders control institutions to continue self-interested practices with impunity (Adam & Fazekas, 2021). As non-compliance has higher rewards and the risk of punishment is perceived to be low because the rule of law and potentially enforcing institutions are weak, in corrupt systems actors have little incentive to act according to the rules (Aguirre Fernandez, 2022).

In addition to its capacity to deteriorate democratic institutions, corruption decreases state capacity to provide services to its citizens as funds are diverted to politicians' private pockets (Chêne, 2014). Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) for example show that corruption reduces the quality of public healthcare and education due to lowered investments, and Mauro (1998) concludes that corruption correlates with lower investment in education, which in turn leads to less economic growth. As a result, economic inequalities are increased and further stabilize corruption practices: when public services cannot satisfy citizens' needs, people who are rich enough will pay to get what they need (Uslaner, 2017). As no one can be expected to adhere to the rules, people feel less inclined to do so themselves, despite being aware that corruption is

morally reprehensible. This implies a top-down effect, where people in under a corrupt government expect everything to be a commodity, making money the only law. This leads to a further spread of corruption. Therefore, corruption can become self-reinforcing (Rothstein, 2011).

How to counter corruption?

There are many approaches described in the literature of how corruption should be fought (cf Rothstein (2011) for a comprehensive summary). In this section, I will briefly discuss top-down approaches, and then focus my attention on bottom-up strategies, which are the focus of this thesis.

Top-down approaches to curb corruption are anti-corruption strategies that have the political elite as the initiator. The first option would be that office holders install institutions that prevent and combat corruption, such as legal instruments, education campaigns, reforms for transparency and the formation of corruption fighting government bodies (Radin, 2019). Yet, who is to be entrusted with the implementation? Powerful (corrupt) politicians will not be interested in effectively combating corruption, as they are the main beneficiaries of systematic corruption (Rothstein, 2011). Politicians instating anti-corruption policies and institutions are suspected to do so in order to appease the people and gain votes, while keeping on with corrupt practices. Accordingly, anti-corruption measures in contexts of high corruption do not automatically reinstate citizens' trust in politics. As people distrust the anti-corruption strategies and their implementation, their trust relation remains unchanged. What is more, anti-corruption measures may have the contrary effect: they can lead to an increased awareness of the extent of corruption within the political system and decrease trust in politics further (Radin, 2019).

When individuals fail, institutions are sometimes a potential approach to ensure success: there are multiple international organizations with the aim to increase the degree of politicians' compliance with anti-corruption measurements. Those international organizations are at least in theory independent and trustworthy. For the last two decades organizations such as Transparency international, the OECD and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have fought global corruption by installing anti-corruption conventions and encouraging states to implement these conventions through laws and regulations (Heimann, 2018). International organizations cannot force a country however to install anti-corruption laws since states remain sovereign. Thus, international organizations are not a failproof measure against corruption either.

For this thesis I ignore top-down approaches and focus my attention on bottom-up strategies. Bottom-up strategies are those, that origin from citizens and civil society (Della Porta, 2017). As argued above, in a democracy the people rule themselves and need to be active to achieve change. If they are unsatisfied with the state of politics, they ideally use the institutions provided by democracy to ensure the fulfillment of their needs (Warren, 2017).

Citizens usually have three basic options to react to dissatisfaction according to Hirschman (1978): voice, exit, or loyalty. They can either become active, angry and fight (*voice*) or become hopeless that change is possible and withdraw (*exit*) or accept the system as it is, become passive and play along, despite discordances (*loyalty*). Depending on the context, these three options can translate into different actions. For example, dissatisfaction with the catholic church may lead to either members organizing in groups to advocate for change (voice), leaving the church (exit) or remaining a member without voicing disagreement or inciting change in any way, or even defending the church despite contrary feelings (loyalty).

When it comes to citizens approaches to curbing corruption, some people use voice to fight corruption while others might exit or stay loyal to the system. Voice can be expressed through a variety of channels: For many people political participation in a democracy equals voting.

Nonetheless, the available activities to express oneself are manyfold: protests, petitions, rallies, boycotts, occupations (Schlozman & Brady, 2022), and also online activism such as flash activism like the online protests under the hashtag '#MeToo', or producing and sharing political content (Earl & Kenski, 2022). In political science these activities are nowadays usually categorized as institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political participation (Christensen, 2011). Institutionalized participation are activities that take place within the institutions of representative democracy such as voting, contacting politicians or being active in or for a party. Non-institutionalized forms of participation are activities that are rather outside of representative institutions, such as petitions, demonstrations, or boycotts for example (Barnes & Kaase, 1979).

Fighting corruption, citizen may use institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of participation. Institutionalized participation tends to be less radical, as citizen chose an option from the ballot or contact a politician already in office. They use the institutions at hand to make their move within the system, which shows a certain degree of system support. See for example the case of voting: citizens may vote to remove corrupt politicians and replace them by non-corrupt ones in an election (Xezonakis, Kosmidis, & Dahlberg, 2016) but could also abstain from voting as a form of protest. For others again it might be a sign of loyalty, as they support the overall system which their candidate should enforce. Voting can thus be a sign of loyalty or voice and non-voting can be a sign of voice, loyalty, or exit. On the other hand, non-institutionalized participation urges politics to include certain issues on their agenda or else loose political support. Protesting is then necessary when the desired policy outcome is not (sufficiently) represented by any party. It is a less ambiguous sign of voice, saying that the protester is dissatisfied with the current affairs and is on the streets for change.

Exit strategies might be leaving the country, grouping together in small auto-regulated communes. Loyalty strategies could be institutionalized forms of participation, such as working for a party or being part of the clientelistic network of a politician. Alternatively, loyalty can be expressed through abstaining from political participation. Thus, people are dissatisfied with the system, but do not do anything to change it.

In recent years, social movements are growing and yield increasing power in the anti-corruption struggle (Heimann, 2018). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue from a pacifist perspective that protests against autocratic leadership are successful when they mobilize a large and diverse group of people, which brings greater costs of defections and repression to the current government. It is worth noting that their study is conducted contrasting violent and non-violent protest power to overrule autocratic leadership and does not focus on protest as an anti-corruption strategy. While some authors assess the effectiveness of a variety of anti-corruption institutions and (digital) tools (cf. Doig & Riley, 1998), a general assessment of anti-corruption protests effectiveness does not seem to exist at this point.

As top-down approaches bear their difficulties, so do bottom-up approaches: when corruption is systematic, how can anyone be trusted to implement changes in the public interest and not to their own advantage? Leaders of anti-corruption movements are suspect of becoming corrupt one they seize power. Also, when citizens cannot trust each other, the perception and expectation that others are corrupt might remain high, despite actual reduction in corruption. This makes combatting corruption difficult, as people need to trust each other to be able to effectively work together. In a corrupt system people have no incentive to adhere to the rules when they believe they would be the only ones not cheating. Therefore, collective action is unlikely in a corrupt society (Rothstein, 2011).

Succinctly, corruption can undermine democracy and the provision of public services. A bottom-up way of fighting corruption is via citizen's protests, holding their representatives and

government to account. Yet in contexts of endemic corruption, mobilizing citizens for protests might be difficult because corruption undermines collective action (Warren, 2017). There are however citizens who manage to unite in protest. Thus, the question arises, what distinguishes the two groups. Who are those that protest and who are those that do not?

To answer this question, it is necessary to first recount what is already known about protest participation, the role of trust in protest mobilization and protest participation in corrupt settings specifically.

What (de)motivates protest participation?

In this section I present findings from the literature on what motivates individuals to protest. I will not discuss issue specific determinants, since in my analysis I cannot analyze such motivations due to a lack of data. In the first part I will mainly focus on Brady, Verba and Schlozman's (1995) civic voluntarism model, which is well-established in protest research. In the second part I discuss findings on the role of social and political trust in motivating protest participation.

The Civic Voluntarism Model

The questions of why people (do not) become politically active are two sides of the same coin for Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995): activity is based on ability, recruitment, and volition, while the absence thereof results in inactivity. Either people cannot act due to a lack of resources (ability), they were not called on to act (recruitment), or they do not want to engage (volition). The scholars call this model the 'civic voluntarism model' (CVM), which replaces the previously commonly used socioeconomic model. The main contribution of the CVM is that it adds to the socioeconomic model the factors of volition and recruitment as drivers of political participation. All three indicators are interrelated, as one can be recruited but not have volition nor ability to go or have the ability and volition but not be recruited, missing the opportunity to protest. The scholars' study is based on data from short telephone interviews with 15 000 US Americans, followed by in-depth interviews of a subset of roughly 2500 of the same participants. More recent studies as for example Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) and Grasso and Giugni (2022) confirm the model based on data from Europe and other studies using several of the resources specified below also found significant effects in an Latin American sample (Bonifacio & Paulino, 2015) and in a global sample (Olsson, 2014).

In the following paragraphs I give a detailed account of what kind of factors are commonly used to measure ability, recruitment, and volition. I start with ability, which is mainly composed on education and income, followed by recruitment and volition. I explain how all individual components of these factors theoretically relate to protest participation.

Regarding ability, factors that mainly determine the ability to engage in political participation have been identified previously in the socioeconomic model (SES) as education and income. While protesting until the late 1980s was believed to be practiced by the lower income and uneducated citizen, it is nowadays known to be associated with the educated and wealthy (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001). It is worth noting that the possession of resources is not only relevant for voting and other institutionalized forms of participation but also protesting and to a greater extent so: resources are a greater predictor for protesting than for voting (Dalton, 2022). Therefore, scholars like Dalton (2022) and Schlozman (2018) point out that protests – similar to other democratic tools – are not representative of the whole population but tend to overrepresent those with more resources.

The mechanism how higher education should influence protesting is the following: education offers skills such as writing and speaking, organizing, and navigating in the political sphere. Education further helps in obtaining a well-paid job, granting economic power, with leadership

opportunities, allowing people to obtain mobilization skills and opportunities (Schlozman & Brady, 2022). This is supported for example by evidence by Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) that political activity correlates with high education and socioeconomic status.

Theories explaining why citizens with higher income are more likely to protest have four angles of explanation. The first is to explain why lower income citizens do not participate: Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) for example theorize that poorer citizens might not have the time, interest, or mobilization networks to join protests. Poor citizens would thus be preoccupied with making ends meet and have no mental capacity to engage with politics.

The second angle is that citizens who are unemployed, tend to be isolated: As they lose social networks from work and have less money to participate in leisure activities, they have fewer social networks. Even though they are a group that would benefit most from protesting to make their needs heard, they often do not engage in politics anymore, as protesting is a social activity that many protesters do with friends or family (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001; Schlozman, 2018).

The third angle is explaining the impact of income from the perspective of high income: there is a mix of reasons for high income citizens to generally participate more in politics, namely efficacy, time, and interest. High income citizens have more efficacy as they know that politicians care about what they think because they are potential donors for campaigns (Dalton, 2022). So, they likely participate in protest because they believe that it will have an impact while low-income people are used to being sidelined in politics and do not believe that their protest will be heard.

A fourth explanation is that higher income can also give more free time as it enables citizens to pay others to take over tasks such as housework and childcare. Therefore, they might have time to inform themselves about and engage in politics. The argument is contested however, as high-income citizens might have more demanding jobs, resulting in less leisure time (Dalton, 2022; Schlozman & Brady, 2022).

Apart from high income's direct contributions to being able to protest, it might have an indirect effect on participation through political interest: high income citizens often had educated, high income parents. Thus, they grew up in a household that was likely more engaged with politics and closer to the political elites. The actual income is thus not the determining factor but rather the parents' level of education (Schlozman, 2018).

I now move on to recruitment, which is the second important driver of political participation identified by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995). Recruitment seems to have a catalyst effect on participation, as potentially willing and politically able groups are more frequently approached to attract their participation (Schlozman & Brady, 2022). High income and educated citizens tend to be more likely to be in nonpolitical organizations that can be recruited for protest and are more willing to volunteer within these organizations (Schlozman, 2018). Political activists and parties contact such organizations for mobilization. Therefore, citizens with higher income and levels of education are more likely to be recruited. Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) show that among protesters there are disproportionally more members of associations, unions, and political parties as compared to the population. This is confirmed in several other studies, such as Klesner (2007) and Grasso and Giugni (2022).

Lastly, volition is generally measured through political interest and efficacy. Political efficacy – the belief that one can influence politics – has a strong influence on participation. Gamson (1968) hypothesized that for optimal mobilization both a perceived high political efficacy and low political trust is necessary. This is because participants need to believe that change is possible while expecting change to only happen if they do it themselves. Testing this hypothesis Paige (1971) found that low trust and high efficacy are associated with riot participation.

As for political interest, Aytaç and Stokes (2022, p. 763) write: 'Ask a person why she takes part in collective political action, and she will frequently explain that she cares a lot about the outcome.'. Following this line of thought the authors hypothesize that people base their willingness to act on a cost-benefit calculation of not only participation but also abstention. If the outcome of failure is more hurtful than the effort of partaking in a demonstration, then people will engage. Political interest however is not only influencing political activism but also vice versa. Hence, if one accompanies a friend to a protest, they might discuss politics and therefore gain more interest in it, which again may lead to more participation (Schlozman, 2018).

Mobilizing trust?

Apart from factors described in the CVM, trust is frequently used as a predictor for protesting. Levi and Stoker (2000, p. 476) define trust as "an individual making herself vulnerable to another individual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do her harm or to betray her.". They argue that trust inspires the course of action of individuals, for example the degree of vigilance or cooperation they show. Trust has thus an observable impact. The question is then if those that retain their political activism are more trusting and if so, trusting in who? For this thesis, I will differentiate social trust and political trust, which I argue to be necessary in a democracy to foster protest participation. I will first recount theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from the literature on the effects of political trust and then review by the effects of social trust on protest participation.

It might be surprising to some readers that political distrust is not necessarily a problem for democracy: Barber (1983, p. 166) argues that "a certain amount of rational distrust is necessary for political accountability in a participatory democracy". In other words, democracies intend their citizens to distrust and therefore monitor elites, for example through elections. Attentive and rightly distrusting citizens should be motivated to keep other powers in check, ideally using the provided democratic institutions (Warren, 2017). Political distrust might therefore motivate participation, in order to hold representatives to account.

Evidence on how political trust influences political participation is quite diffuse, often showing contradictory findings (Levi & Stoker, 2000; Bäck & Christensen, 2016). Some scholars like, for example, Dalton (2004) find no significant effect of trust in government on protest participation in several 'advanced industrialized countries' [1]. Likewise, Andersen and Hoff (2001) in Scandinavian countries do not find a significant correlation between several forms of protest participation and political trust in Denmark and Sweden but do find a significant positive correlation between political trust and protesting in Norway. The authors suggest that the link between protesting and trust does not exist anymore because protest is normalized as a part of democracy. In countries where protest is not normalized due to lower levels of democracy or a shorter history thereof in the country, the link would probably be different.

Contrary to this evidence, Hooghe and Marien (2013) in a multilevel analysis of 25 European countries find that high political trust – measured in an index of trust in parliament, politicians, political parties, the legal system, and the police – correlates with institutionalized participation while low political trust correlates with noninstitutionalized participation. Bäck and Christensen (2016) in a European sample and Valgarðsson et al.s' (2022) analysis in a global sample confirm these findings. Trust in political institutions could be seen as an indicator for citizens trust in the system: citizens vote and entrust "the rest" to politicians, the president, parliament, the judiciary etc. In other words, citizens with high levels of political trust believe that all institutions are doing their part and do not need extensive supervision. Conversely, citizens that distrust

[1] Countries in the analysis are Australia, Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the US.

political institutions would feel the need to keep said institutions under check and be more active in politics.

However not any type of distrust is theoretically conducive to mobilization. *Social trust*[2], which is the assumption that people adhere to norms and share similar interests (Warren, 2017), is argued to be necessary for democracy: it enables collaboration and a rich civil society as citizens trust that others will match their investment into society with similar dedication (Uslaner, 2002; Benson & Rochon, 2004). For example, a citizen sees a problem in their neighborhood like a road full of potholes. They might see the necessity to repair it. However, they cannot do it alone and rely on other neighbors to collaborate. With low social trust, the concerned neighbor will believe that no-one else will show up to repair the street or that others show up but do not work as hard as they will. We see thus a classic prisoner's dilemma, where everyone would benefit from collaboration, but no one trusts that others will adhere to the norm.

Social distrust might therefore de-motivate citizens to participate, as they do not trust other citizens will invest as many resources such as time and money to fight for their collective good. Almond & Verba (1989) amongst other scholars theorize that social trust is important for fostering political activism. Likewise, Uslaner (2002) shows that higher social trust leads to more cooperation and a strong civil society. In line with this argumentation, Inglehart and Norris (2003) and Bäck and Christensen (2016) find that higher social trust correlates with higher levels of non-institutionalized participation, including protest. Benson and Rochon (2004) using data from 33 mainly european and american countries find that social trust is a strong positive predictor of political activism. The effect is hightened each time when adding more and more 'militant' (authors wording, for example p. 1) forms of political action: the effect size increases when inluding demonstrations, agin when including unofficial strikes and yet again when adding to all previous factors the occupation of buildings and factories.

To summarize the known predictors of protest mobilization, I hold that following the CVM, I would expect educated and well-off citizens, who are interested in the policy outcome and are part of an organization to protest. Additionally, citizens with higher social trust and citizens with lower political trust are expected to protest more. Since my research question is "What role does trust play for protest mobilization *in highly corrupt contexts*?" I must, however, consider the context for mobilization. The previous empirical evidence and theories are all set in a non-specifically corrupt context. In a corrupt system the logic behind mobilization can be different and additional effects of corruption might interplay. Therefore, in the following section I outline existing research on protest mobilization in corrupt contexts and add my own considerations to how corruption influences protest participation.

Mobilization in corrupt contexts

In the following I explain who would be expected to participate in protest according to the civic voluntarism model when applied in a corrupt system.

Corruption affects all three CVM-predictors of participation: First, it affects ability by fostering inequalities. As funds get diverted from public services, the quality of education and social security services such as unemployment benefits is reduced. This widens the gap between the rich and the poor, leaving people with less equal political skills and mobilization opportunities (Uslaner, 2017). Thus, corruption affects the ability of citizens to become politically active, due to increased poverty, less social security, and a lower quality in education. Therefore, in corrupt systems I expect less people to be able to participate in protest, due to lower income and education throughout the population.

[2] Also called impersonal trust (e.g., Radin, 2019), generalized trust (Warren, 2017), generalized interpersonal trust (e.g., Bäck & Christensen, 2016) or generalized social trust (Muhlberger, 2003).

Second, corruption affects recruitment since political elites would be less inclined to involve all citizens into politics to make the use of their position for personal gain easier. Rather the rich should be approached to support political campaigns. Additionally, membership in associations, unions and other organizations could be lower, since the number of educated and wealthy citizens is reduced.

Thirdly, corruption affects volition, which should lead to the biggest effect on protest participation. In a corrupt system one might expect that everyone protests because of the corrosive effects of corruption which affect everyone. So, political interest should be very high, leading to more protests. Low-income citizens would have more interest in combatting corruption, since they have less ability to use the corrupt system to their advantage. However, because of the effect of corruption on ability the effect of interest might be reduced. Additionally, Canache et al. (2019) find that the wealthy and educated have a higher perception of corruption. Contrary to what one might expect, Dong and Torgler (2009) find evidence that perceptions of corruption correlate with lower levels of political interest, which might speak for political apathy and reduced protesting in corrupt contexts.

Corruption might indeed seem like an undefeatable hydra. It is persistent, self-restoring, and can infiltrate any institution (Rothstein, 2011). So, in corrupt systems we might expect less people to keep their fighting spirit and become active. When options of participation are inefficient and all efforts (seem) futile due to corruption (Warren, 2017) it is reasonable to disengage and exit: it might seem insane to try to fight corruption, as anti-corruption strategies keep on failing (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). Thus, it is not surprising that scholars have found evidence that corruption correlates with less political participation: Olsson (2014) for example in a quantitative analysis presents evidence that perception of corruption leads to lower turnout. Bauhr and Grimes (2014) also conclude that an increase in transparency of corruption leads to political apathy as people show less interest and non-institutionalized participation in politics. In their quantitative study, they analyze the effect of citizens access to information about corruption on political activism. They find that in countries where citizens can easily find out about corruption through transparency of the budgeting process or the publication of economic data for example, resignation from politics is more frequent.

On the other hand, due to corruption's momentous effects, many people should care about corruption and protest in response. Contrary to Olsson (2014) and Bauhr and Grimes (2014), Bonifacio and Paulino (2015) based on a quantitative time-series study in Latin America and the Caribbean found that experience with corruption has a mobilizing effect, leading to more political activism, but not voting. Similarly, Školník (2019) based on a quantitative study in Colombia finds that experience with corruption increases the likelihood of protesting, while perception thereof reduces protest participation. Bonifacio and Paulino (2015) also study the effect of perceived corruption, though the effect is only significant in some years and sometimes is positive and sometimes negative. The four studies vary in context. While Olsson (2014), Bauhr and Grimes (2014) use global data, Bonifacio and Paulino (2015) focus on Latin and Central American countries and Školník (2019) on Colombia. Since my focus in this thesis will be on Latin America, I formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: Citizens who are concerned about corruption are more likely to protest.

However, I do not want to neglect the fact that there have been contradictory findings in the literature on the effect of corruption on protest participation. I theorize that this is due to another effect corruption has on volition: a reduction in trust in political institutions and society at large.

Several authors have shown that corruption leads to distrust in political institutions, such as the parliament, the head of state, government, political parties, the police and judiciary, elections, the overall political system, and interpersonal trust (Seligson, 2002; Uslaner, 2017; van der Meer, 2017; Beesley & Hawkins, 2022; Della Porta, 2000; Hakhverdian & Mayne, 2012). Beesley and Hawkins (2022) based on their findings in Peru additionally note that while corruption lowers political trust, it does not increase citizens willingness to fight corruption. They measure the willingness to counter corruption as the willingness to donate to a small anti-corruption NGO. I criticize that donating does not necessarily determine the willingness to fight corruption since citizens might not trust that the NGO itself is not corrupt, that they are effective, or that other citizens will also invest in the NGO for it to be able to have an impact.

Considering the increased participation in corrupt states presented by Bonifacio and Paulino (2015), I believe it could be due to low levels of political trust: if in the sample citizens distrust politicians, they could see this as motivation to be active. I therefore formulate my second hypothesis as follows:

H2: High levels of political trust reduce the effect of perceived corruption on protest behavior, while low levels of political trust increase the effect of perceived corruption on the likelihood of protesting.

When institutions in a country work as intended, they reduce the risk of trusting others by monitoring and sanctioning the adherence to norms of all citizens (Warren, 2017). Yet, corruption prevents institutions from working as intended. This has two effects: first, it lowers trust in political institutions. Second, it reduces social trust because interpersonal interactions and trust decisions such as collaboration and activism are not equally protected by institutions. Institutions may be bribed to comply with one person's wishes more than another. As citizens cannot trust in institutions to protect them from their fellow citizens, they cannot trust commitments and hence have lower social trust. As Rothstein (2011) explains: in corrupt systems the general assumption is that of free riding.

Corruption also lowers social trust through a second pathway: As people infer from public officials to everyone else, when they perceive public officials to be corrupt or amoral, they project this judgement on the population at large (Rothstein & Eek, 2009; Tao, Yang, Li, & Lu, 2013). Thus, citizens might believe that a replacement of representatives is futile as anyone given the chance will abuse their power. Citizens need social trust to be able to believe that there are good people in the world, who will not abuse their power even if they have it. This allows them to fight for the replacement of representatives. Thus, they need social trust for internal political efficacy. In a context of high corruption, socially distrusting citizens might feel that nobody can be trusted, and that any candidate will be corrupt, even without inculpatory evidence against the candidates. This can be described as political cynicism, which is the perception that political actors are inherently incompetent and uncaring (Van der Meer & Zmerli, 2017). In such a context citizens might not punish corrupt leaders or parties anymore, feeling that there is no good choice among candidates, leading to political apathy (the exit option).

In a corrupt system the expectation would be lower levels of social trust. This is supported by a report by Lupu, Rodriguez, and Zechmeister (2021) which shows that overall social trust levels in Latin America are exceptionally low. Social distrust, which is distrust in everyone would in turn lead to less political participation. Warren (2017) argues that social distrust can lead to political apathy. So, in a corrupt system overall protest participation may be reduced. On a micro-level however, those that have social trust despite corruption should be more inclined to protest.

The decrease of political activism in corrupt settings found in Olsson (2014) and Bauhr and Grimes (2014) could thus be the result of lower social trust which suppresses the effect of corruption on protesting. I therefore formulate the following hypothesis:

H3: High levels of social trust increase effect of perceived corruption on protest behavior, while low levels of social trust decrease the effect of perceived corruption on the likelihood of protesting.

Summary of the argument and Hypotheses

Based on the literature above I establish the following causal argument: Corruption is a problem for democracies, which should spark citizens' political activism, especially protest. However, citizens actions are influenced by the effects of corruption on the mechanisms of mobilization. While corruption decreases the number of citizens recruited for protest and politically able to protest, it might increase volition to protest.

Corruption also influences citizens' degree of social and political trust. High social trust will increase volition, as it enables citizens to invest efforts into political activism, as they believe that others can be trusted to do the same effort. High social trust should therefore increase the likelihood of protesting. Low social trust is expected to lower the likelihood of protesting, as citizens fear free riding and efforts to be futile as everyone is corrupt when given the chance.

Citizen who are concerned with corruption but have high trust in political institutions might believe that institutions are already working hard to fight corruption and that there is nothing they can add to reduce corruption. Therefore, citizen with high political trust would be less likely to protest. Citizen who are concerned with corruption and distrust political institutions on the other hand would be more willing to protest because they see themselves as the only possible source of change and other means of voice would be seen as ineffective. I therefore hypothesize the following:

H1: Citizen who are concerned about corruption are more likely to protest.

H2: High levels of political trust reduce the effect of perceived corruption on protest behavior, while low levels of political trust increase the effect of perceived corruption on the likelihood of protesting.

H3: High levels of social trust increase the effect of perceived corruption on protest behavior, while low levels of social trust decrease the effect of perceived corruption on the likelihood of protesting.

3. Data, measurement, and Methods

To test the hypotheses identified in the previous chapter I will employ a logistic regression analysis with country fixed effects. I opted for a quantitative analysis as I would like to produce more generalizable findings. Also, I want to empirically test my hypotheses in the context of high corruption as it has not been done before and can add to the literature by investigating whether the relation between trust and participation differs when considering a corrupt context.

As a next step I present the data and measurement of all variables before I analyze the findings from the analysis in the next chapter.

3.1. Data

Several authors have pointed out the importance of considering the political context in which trust and participation are situated (cf Bäck & Christensen, 2016; Valgarðsson, Stoker, Devine, Gaskell, & Jennings, 2022; Schlozman & Brady, 2022). In their analysis Valgarðsson et al. (2022) differentiate between free, partly free, and unfree states, resulting in the finding that in democracies trust in parliament correlates with more protest behavior while in unfree states it leads to less protest. They stress the importance of considering the regime type in view of the differences in citizens' rights and participation opportunities. For example, some countries have compulsory voting, which makes abstaining from voting potentially an act of political protest and not apathy. Latin America shows very high levels of both corruption (Transparency International) and political and social distrust (Lupu, Rodriguez, & Zechmeister, 2021). Therefore, I hope to add to the literature by studying how trust affects the relation of concern with corruption on political participation specifically in corrupt countries in Latin America.

Like regime type I believe that the level of corruption also matters for the effect of trust on political participation. Many free countries have a high CPI (low corruption) but not all. Countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru or Panama are classified as free (Freedom House, 2020) but have low CPI scores, which equals high perceived levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2022). This effectively changes the possibilities of equal citizens' influence.

I therefore set my focus on corrupt countries in Central and Latin America. This region is composed of countries showing high levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2022) and which share a similar colonial history. The unit of analysis is the individual, with data being taken from the Latinobarometro survey 2020. The original dataset is composed of 20,205 respondents from 18 Latin and Central American countries. However, my interest lies only in those states that are highly corrupt. I therefore select countries based on their CPI score in the year 2020 (Transparency International, 2020). I exclude Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay based on three reasonings: First, the global and American average is a CPI of 43. All three countries CPI scores are above average. Second, all three have a CPI above 50 points. As the CPI ranges from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt), countries with a CPI above 50 are rather on the 'clean' side of the CPI. Thirdly, especially Chile and Uruguay have quite high scores with levels comparable to nations that are usually not described as highly corrupt: Chile has a CPI of 67, same as the USA and Uruguay has a CPI of 71, as has France. Costa Rica's CPI is 57, which is the same as Cyprus and above the CPI scores of Italy, Poland, or Greece.

The sample size after excluding all cases with missing responses in the variables of interest is N=12,421. Respondents are from 15 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. In the analysis Argentina serves as the reference category. The distribution of respondents varies between 559 and 998 cases per country.

3.2. Measurement

In the following I will define the dependent variable of political participation, the independent variable of perceived corruption, followed by the moderator trust. Subsequently, the control variables as identified in the literature are defined.

Dependent Variable: Protest

Latinobarometro includes a battery of questions on protest participation: Have you ever participated in: authorized protest, unauthorized protest, traffic blocks, occupying buildings and factories or looting. In a first step I conduct a factor analysis, to find out which of these activities can be considered 'normal' protest participation and which of them might be something else.

Looting for example might come from a different set of motivation, as it entails personal enrichment, comparable to robbery. It is thus questionable, if this activity can be counted as protesting or is another potentially more aggressive from of political activity, such as political resistance. It would also hold a different relation to social trust, since destroying other people's property harms the trust relation and people might infer from their own behavior to others.

The factor analysis shows two dimensions, which can be inquired in the Appendix (Table A.1). Authorized protest, unauthorized protest and blocking traffic load on component 1 and looting together with occupying buildings and factories load on component 2. There are no cross loadings. I choose dimension one, as very few respondents participated in protest actions of the second dimension.

The variable is for this reason measured as taking part in authorized demonstrations, unauthorized demonstrations and blocking traffic. In the Latinobarometro each of these variables is measured with options of 'have ever done' (1), 'would ever do' (2), and 'would never do' (3). I code 1 as 'have done'(1), and 2 and 3 as 'have not done'(0). I then combine the three variables as follows: as long as respondents participated in one form of protest, they are coded as having participated in protest (1). All others are coded as 'have not protested' (0).

Independent Variable: Corruption

Corruption will be measured as concern with corruption. The Latinobarometro asked participants to name the most pressing issue their country is facing. Nine percent of respondents answered with: corruption. The variable will be recoded as *Concern with Corruption* (CwC) as a binary variable: respondents that stated other issues as most pressing are coded as 0 while those that answered with corruption are coded as 1.

Alternatively, the degree of tolerance for corruption could be used, like Bonifacio and Paulino (2015). I do not choose this option, as I believe that those tolerant for corruption are potentially more inclined to be apathetic to politics or be part of the clientelistic networks of politicians. Their motivation to (not) participate in protest would thus include a greater set of insecurity, making results harder to interpret.

Another option would be to use the willingness to fight corruption on a scale from 0 to 10, though here social desirability is a factor that would increase insecurity in the analysis. What is more, Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) argue that willingness to protest is not equivalent to actual participation but rather shows the norm people perceive. Measuring willingness would hence not measure volition to protest, but rather the norm if corruption should be countered in protests.

I also do not use experience with corruption in this thesis, because the Latinobarometro only asks respondents whether they had experience with corruption within the last 12 months. An individual's general tenor concerning corruption might not be well reflected by experience within that timeframe. Experience shaping individuals' attitudes might lie more years back and still shape their perception of corruption.

A last option I do not use, is to measure respondents' perception of how far corruption is spread. The Latinobarometro asks respondents which institutions they believe to be corrupt and offers a list of options. The idea is that when participants believe that many institutions are corrupt, they perceive corruption to be widespread. I do not choose this option because of two reasons: first, the fact that an individual sees corruption as endemic does not mean that they see corruption as a problem that needs to be addressed. Their motivation to protest might thus be unrelated. As to the second reason, the measurement is intended to be an equivalent to an individual's corruption perception index. Taking the average per country however, the scores do

not correlate with the national CPI score and show contradicting tendencies. For example, some countries have a low CPI, which indicates a high degree of perceived corruption. The average score of individuals perceived corruption however is low, indicating that most respondents do not believe corruption to be widespread. Considering this contradiction, I judge that this alternative is not a good measurement of individual perceived corruption.

Moderator: Trust

For hypotheses two and three, two moderator variables are included: Political and social trust.

In the literature political trust is measured including differing institutions: While some include only partisan institutions, others only include non-partisan institutions and others again include both. Similarly, the number of institutions included to measure political trust varies greatly. In order to be able to investigate the effects of political trust, I first need to know what classifies as political trust in my sample. To measure and extricate different types of political trust, I choose several items that might be considered political trust from the Latinobarometro 2020 and analyze them in a factor analysis (see Table A.2 in the Appendix for all results) to devise an index. From the literature the expectation would be that political trust is split into two dimensions: trust in partisan institutions and trust in non-partisan institutions. However, according to the factor analysis, respondents in the sample do not differentiate these categories. Instead, political trust can be classified on one dimension.

In the Latinobarometro survey (2020) participants are asked to make statements of trust by asking: 'Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot (1), some (2), a little (3) or no trust (4) in' followed by a list of institutions. The variables included in the index are: trust in the police, the judicial branch, national congress or parliament, electoral institutions, political parties, the national government, and the president. These variables are measured on a 4-point scale from 1 (A lot of trust) to 4 (no trust). Before the analysis all variables were recoded so that low values indicate no trust (0) and high values indicate high trust (3), to make the interpretation of results more intuitive. I aggregate the variables by taking the sum of scores for each respondent. Thus, a respondent who high trust in the judiciary with a score of 3 and no trust in all other institutions has an aggregated score of 3. Likewise, an individual with little trust (1) in the police, the president, and political parties but no trust in other institutions will also have a score of 3. The index thus has a scale from 0 to 21 since seven variables with a maximal score of three for each were included. Political Trust is measured as a continuous variable with a scale from 0 to 21, with 21 being the highest degree of trust and 0 being the absence of trust.

Social trust will be measured through the "Interpersonal Trust" variable, in which respondents are asked the following question: 'Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, or that you can never be too careful in dealing with others?' (Latinobarómetro, 2020). It is measured dichotomously as either 'One can trust most people (1)' or 'One can never be too careful in dealing with others (2)'. The variable is recoded into 'have social trust' (1), and 'have no social trust' (0).

Control Variables

Previous research found correlations between political participation and the following variables. Education and income are possible confounders as they influence concern with corruption and protest participation. High-educated and high-income citizen are more aware of corruption (Canache, Cawvey, Heyes, & Mondak, 2019). Income and education are simultaneously protest mobilizing factors (Schlozman & Brady, 2022). The Latinobarometro offers a continuous variable

for education and another for income. The education variable (S16) in the robustness tests shows issues of non-linearity in relation to protesting. By inserting the variable as categorical variable I avoid a violation of the linearity assumption in a regression analysis.

Latinobarometro's education variable has 17 categories which were recoded in the Latinobarometro data set into seven categories (REEDUC.1): illiterate, incomplete basic education, complete basic education, incomplete secondary education, complete secondary education, incomplete Universitary education, complete Universitary education. I decided to again recode the variable due to two reasons: First, including 7 categories unnecessarily complicates the reading of the outcomes in a table. Second, three of the categories are unfinished primary, secondary, universitary education. These categories can easily be added to the respective lower category. For example, someone who started primary education but never finished it is coded as 'low education' together with 'illiterate' respondents, while someone who did not finish secondary education is coded into the category 'primary education'. The resulting education variable thus has four categories of low education (1), primary (2), secondary (3), and university education (4). To clarify how I recoded, I provide a table in the appendix (Table A.3).

Income is likewise a potential confounder as high-income citizens are more likely to personally observe situations of corruption, as they can pay bribes (Canache, Cawvey, Heyes, & Mondak, 2019). It is also a mobilizing factor since wealthy citizen may have more time to be politically active and have more power to mobilize people to join their cause (Schlozman & Brady, 2022). Income is measured on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the highest and 1 being the lowest income group.

Interest in politics (P46STGBS) would influence concern with corruption as interested citizens are more informed about current political processes and thereby potential misbehavior. They may be more informed about cases of corruption. Interest in politics would influence participation as more interested citizen might be more invested in influencing the outcome of current political debates (Schlozman & Brady, 2022). In the Latinobarometro data set, interest in politics is measured on a 4-point-scale with the following options for answers: 'very interested' (1), 'fairly interested' (2), 'a little interested' (3) and 'not at all interested' (4). I reverse the order of the categories to make the interpretation more intuitive, coding it from low interest (1) to high interest (4).

I control for age (EDAD) as a potential confounder, because older people have had more opportunities in their lives to engage in protest and have had more time to collect experiences with corruption (Canache, Cawvey, Heyes, & Mondak, 2019).

Citizenship status (S21) has shown to influence participation (Schlozman & Brady, 2022). This might be due to non-citizens feeling that politicians do not owe them to act in their interest and take responsibility for their interest. Non-citizens might feel that they do not have a right or responsibility to decide over the country, which could influence their protest behavior. Citizenship is measured categorically with 1 meaning that the respondent holds citizenship and 2 meaning that the respondent does not. The variable is dummy coded into 0 (citizen) and 1 (non-citizen) for the analysis.

3.3. Methods

In this section I describe the statistical tools I employ for the analysis and the assumptions that need to be fulfilled to ensure reliable results.

Since my dependent variable of protest participation is measured as either 0 or 1, I cannot employ a linear ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis because the assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity and normally distributed errors would be violated. The appropriate

analysis is a logistic regression analysis which I conduct using SPSS. I employ two analyses, one with political trust as a moderator and one with social trust as a moderator. I use country fixed effects to correct for potential correlated errors within countries. In each analysis I add the variables step-by-step, starting with concern with corruption (CwC). In the political trust analysis, I then add political trust, followed by the interaction term, then the country dummies and finally I add all control variables. In the social trust analysis, I proceed in a likewise manner, by introducing social trust and its interaction term as a second and third step.

A logistic regression uses the log-odds of an event occurring, creating an S-shaped curve. The logistic regression model rests upon similar assumption as a linear regression analysis. However, logistic regression does not assume normally distributed errors and homoscedasticity (Osborne, 2015), so I do not test for those assumptions in the robustness analysis in chapter 4.3. The logistic regression analysis nonetheless requires some of the OLS assumptions and some additional assumptions. In the following paragraphs I will describe the assumptions of the logistic regression, starting with linearity, non-collinearity, and independence of errors. I then discuss sparse data followed by outliers and influential cases.

The assumption of linearity in a logistic regression differs from that in a linear regression analysis. Since the dependent variable is either 0 or 1, there can be no straight line representing the outcome. Instead, the logit of the DV is used. The assumption of linearity is met, if all continuous variables have a linear relationship with the log of the DV (Field, 2013). I test this by adding the interaction term of each continuous variable with its own log to the logistic regression. If the interaction term is significantly correlated with the log of the DV, the assumption of linearity is not met.

If the assumption of non-collinearity is not met, standard errors might be incorrectly high, causing unreliable coefficients. Issues with collinearity can be tested using SPSS collinearity statistics. SPSS calculates the variance inflation factor ("VIF") and the tolerance. As a rule of thumb values should be below 10 for the VIF. Conversely, the tolerance is 1 divided by the VIF, so here high values are desirable, and values below 0.2 problematic. Additionally, one can employ a correlation matrix to test for collinearity. Interpreting spearman's rho correlation matrix, *r* should not exceed the critical value of 0.8 (Field, 2013).

A violation of the independence of errors leads to overdispersion in a logistic regression. Overdispersion might cause too small standard errors resulting in wrong p-values. Thus, type I errors become more likely, meaning that results might be interpreted as significant but are in fact not. Osborne (2015) proposes taking potential hierarchies into account to solve this issue. I argue that the country dummies I employ in my analysis correct for potential clustering of errors within countries and thus prevent overdispersion.

Sparse data refers to the issue that in a logistic regression there must be respondents of each category representing both outcomes. For example, there must be respondents with no -, low -, some -, and high political interest that protest but also some that do not protest for each category. This can be tested in a contingency table. If there is an empty field in the table, the exponentiated coefficients can be falsely very small or very large. If there should be an empty field, data needs to be recoded to combine categories until there are no empty ones. Note that this has to be tested exclusively for categorical variables, not for continuous variables (Osborne, 2015).

In a last step, I now clarify the effects of outliers and Influential cases and how to test for them. Outliers may be influential cases, that alter the outcome of the analysis by being very different from other cases and changing the coefficient. In a logistic regression one cannot use residuals to identify outliers and influential cases, as would be done in an OLS regression. Instead, one must rely on a series of statistic provided by SPSS. In the logistic regression, I save the predicted

probabilities, cook's distance, deviance and the standardized residual along with the DFBeta of the constant and of the independent variable. The statistics should not exceed critical thresholds: Cook's distance and the DFBeta values should be lower than 1, while leverage should be around a value calculated by the number of predictors (26) plus one for the constant, divided by the sample size: (26+1)/12,412≈0.0022. Leverage may be up to 3 times bigger the calculated average, so in this case up to 0.0065. The residuals and the deviance should mostly be within the ±1.96 range and not exceed ±3 (Field, 2013).

4. Analysis and results

In this chapter I first provide a descriptive analysis to enable the reader to understand the empirical distribution of all variables in the sample. Since I aim at explaining the variance in protest participation it is necessary that the variance is well known. I then move on to the explanatory analysis, which presents and discusses the findings of the logistic regression analysis. While interpreting the results of the analysis I also draw conclusions about the hypotheses specified in Chapter 2.

4.1. Descriptive analysis

The following Table 1 presents the frequency of the key variables protest participation, concern with corruption, political and social trust. A table with descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in the Appendix in Table A.4. The number of valid observations is 12,412 for all variables, since cases where one of the variables was missing were excluded from the analysis. It can be observed that the cases of no trust, no concern with corruption and no protesting overweigh. In the sample 15.5% have participated in protests, 11.1% see corruption as the most pressing issue in their country and 11.8% believe that other people can generally be trusted. The average citizen has a score of 6.381 on political trust meaning for example they fully trust two institutions or have little trust in almost all institutions.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics for main variables

	Valid N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Protest Participation	12 412	0.155	0.362
CwC	12 412	0.111	0.315
Political Trust	12 412	6.381	4.688
Social Trust	12 412	0.118	0.323

Source: Latinobarometro, 2020.

Figure 1 Histogram of Political Trust with normal Distribution line



(Latinobarómetro, 2020)

Political trust is the only main variable in the analysis that is continuous. While the distribution of all other variables can be observed through the mean, the mean of political trust does not allow conclusions of the distribution of this variable. I therefore provide a histogram of political trust to illustrate the distribution of political trust in more detail (Figure 1). Those that have high political trust are in the minority with 0.7% against 11% who do not trust political institutions at all. Looking at the distribution of political trust more closely, we can see that political distrust overweighs as the distribution is positively skewed, with proportionally more people having low political trust scores and very few respondents having higher or the highest degree of political trust.

4.2. Explanatory analysis

I start my analysis by testing Hypothesis 1 in a logistic regression analysis. Concern with Corruption (CwC) is used as the independent variable, while I use Protest Participation as the dependent variable. I then add political trust, the moderator and control variables to test hypothesis 2. The results thereof can be seen in Table 2 below. Following this, I will repeat the logistic regression analysis with social trust instead of political trust to analyze hypothesis 3. Results are presented in Table 3. In a last step I will briefly analyze the results of the control variables.

Table 2 Logistic Regression of the Effect of Concern with Corruption (CwC) on Protest Participation moderated by Political Trust.

Model	1 Exp(b)	2 Exp(b)	3 Exp(b)	4 Exp(b)	5 Exp(b)
Concern with Corruption	1.541*** (0.071)	1.580*** (0.067)	1.788*** (0.119)	1.955*** (0.121)	1.533*** (0.122)
Political Trust		1.019*** (0.005)	1.020*** (0.006)	1.025*** (0.006)	0.999 (0.006)
CwC*Political Trust			0.977 (0.018)	0.976 (0.018)	0.980 (0.018)
Education					
Low					Reference
Primary					0.986 (0.088)
Secondary					1.241* (0.088)
University					1.695*** (0.101)
Income					1.066*** (0.011)
Interest in politics					
1 No interest					Reference
2 Little interest					1.286*** (0.068)
3 Fairly interested					2.058*** (0.074)
4 Very interested					3.788*** (0.083)
Non-Citizenship					0.599 (0.281)
Age					1.005** (0.002)
Country				SeeTable A.55***	See Table A.55***
Constant	0.174*** (0.027)	0.155*** (0.045)	0.153*** (0.046)	0.224*** (0.100)	0.168*** (0.123)
Chi-Square Block	34.743***	10.856***	1.670	231.111***	122.603***
Chi-Square Model	34.743***	45.599***	47.269***	278.380***	400.983***
Nagelkerke R^2	.005	.006	.007	.038	0.055

N = 12 412
Exp(b) odds ratio, Standard errors in parentheses
See Table A.5***individual country effects are listed in the Appendix in Table A.5

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; (two-tailed)
Source: Latinobarometro, 2020.

Hypothesis 1: Concern with Corruption effect on Protesting

Under Hypothesis 1 I expect that people who are concerned about corruption are more likely to protest. If those concerned with corruption are significantly more frequently among the protesters than those not concerned with corruption, there would be support for H1.

The logistic regression analysis shows that concern with corruption has a significant positive effect on protest participation. The coefficient of CwC is 0.432 with a standard error of 0.071 which is highly significant at p<0.001. The exponentiated coefficient is 1.541 with the 95% confidence interval showing a lower bound of 1.341 and an upper bound of 1.772. Accordingly, citizens who are highly concerned with corruption are 1.341 times more likely to participate in protest than citizen who prioritize other issues. In other words, the odds that they participate in protest are 34.1% higher. The effect increases after adding the moderator variable and the controls, to an exponentiated coefficient of 1.533. This means that when taking all controls into account, people concerned with corruption are 53.3% more likely to protest compared to people scoring 0 in CwC. I can thus reject the null hypothesis that there is no effect of concern with corruption on protest participation. The evidence supports hypothesis 1, that citizen who are concerned with corruption are more likely to engage in protest.

The constant in Model 1 has a coefficient of -1.748 with a standard error of 0.027. The odds ratio is 0.174 which is highly significant at p<0.001. The value indicates that when only taking CwC and the mean of protest participation into account, the prediction for each respondent would be that they did not participate in protest. Model 1, despite including Concern with Corruption, like model 0, which consists only of the constant, predicts everyone to be non-protesters, having an accuracy of 84.5%. Seeing that 15.5% of the sample participated in protest, models 0 and 1 predict all non-protesters correctly as such but all protesters incorrectly as non-protesters. Still, the model fit of model 1 is highly significant with a chi-square of 34.743, explaining 0.5% of the observed variance.

Hypothesis 2: Political trust negatively moderates the effect of CwC

Under hypothesis 2, I expect that political trust reduces the likelihood of protest for citizens concerned with corruption. Therefore, in Model 2 I first need to add the political trust variable, which has a coefficient of 0.017 with a standard error of 0.005. The coefficient is significant at p<0.001. The exponentiated coefficient is 1.018, indicating that, contrary to the theoretical reasoning, the likelihood of participating in protest is increased by 1.8%% per one unit increase in political trust. Citizen with the highest levels of trust would thus – contrary to my expectation – be 37.8% more likely to participate in protest compared to citizen who show no political trust. The constant and CwC are still both highly significant and show only minor changes in the (exponentiated) coefficients. Model 2 is a significantly better fit compared to Model 1, as the chi-square increases by 10.856 points which is significant at p<0.001. Nagelkerke's R^2 increases to by 0.001 to 0.006. The model thus explains 0.6% of the total variance observed.

My hypothesis however is not concerned with the effect of political trust on protesting per se, but its moderating effect on the effect of CwC on protesting. Therefore, Model 3 adds the interaction term, which has a coefficient of -0.023 and a standard error of 0.018. The odds ratio is 0.977, indicating a negative moderation effect on protest participation. Citizen concerned with corruption and with higher political trust would thus tend to participate 2.3% less in protests. The direction of the effect is thus as hypothesized negative. However, the result is not significant with p=0.198, which is above the critical p-value of 0.05. This is reflected in the confidence interval, which has a lower bound of 0.944 and a higher bound of 1.012, thus indicating that it is possible that the true odds ratio might be 1, which would mean that there is no effect. Model

3 is not a significantly better fit compared to Model 2, as the chi-square value only changes by 1.670 which is not significant at 0.196 but increases Nagelkerke's R^2 to 0.007.

So far, all three models ignored the hierarchical structure of participants being embedded in countries. Adding a dummy coded country variable to model 4, the effect of Concern with corruption increases to an odds ratio of 1.955., while the exponentiated coefficients for political trust and the interaction term of political trust does not change much. It is worth noting, that the significance of the interaction term in this model becomes closer to the critical p value of 0.005, reporting a value of 0.088. Since the list of countries is expansive, I do not list the individual country effects in the table above. Interested readers can see the individual effects in the appendix in Table A.5. Overall, adding county dummies increases the model fit significantly, changing the chi-square by 231.111 points. The model now explains 3.8% of the observed variance.

In Model 5 all control variables are added. In this model Concern with corruption shows little differences in its statistics compared to the initial model, with a coefficient of 0.427 (SE 0.125) and an exponentiated coefficient of 1.533 (95%CI 1.201 to 1.958) which is significant at p<0.001. The constants coefficient is still negative with an odds ratio of 0.071 (p<0.001, SE 0.169). The statistics for the political trust variable changed substantially, now indicating a non-significant slightly negative effect in contrast to the significant positive effect indicated before the controls. Political trust now has a coefficient of -0.001 with a standard error of 0.006, which is not significant at p=0.854. The exponentiated coefficient is 0.999 with a confidence interval of 0.987 to 1.011. The odds of someone participating in protest are thus lowered by 0.1% when trust in politics increases by one point. For people with the highest level of political trust this means a decrease of 2.1% in the likelihood of participating in protest.

The interaction between CwC and Political trust remains negative, with a coefficient of -0.020 (SE=0.018) which is not significant with p=0.276. The odds show a negative trend with a value of 0.980, however the confidence interval includes 1 (95%CI 0.987 to 1.011), confirming that the true odds ratio might be 1, which would indicate no effect. Political trust on that account does not moderate the effect of concern with corruption on protesting. Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no moderation effect of political trust on the effect of concern with corruption. The evidence does not support hypothesis 2.

After including all variables, the model fit increases by 478.663 points, which is highly significant at p<0.001. Model 5 explains 10.2% of the observed variance. It is the only model that classifies some of the protesters correctly as protesters. While all previous models, like model 1, predicted all respondents to be non-protesters, model 5 predicts 50 (2.6%) of the 1,928 protesters correctly as protesters. However, the model also predicts an almost equal amount of people, namely 49 respondents, incorrectly as protesters. Accordingly, the model's predictive accuracy remains the same with 84.5% of the sample being predicted as the correct categories.

Hypothesis 3: Social Trust positively moderates the effect of CwC

I now move on to the results of the second logistic regression analysis which instead of political trust analyzes the moderating effect of social trust. The results of this analysis can be seen in Table 3 below. The first model again only includes the independent variable and the constant, the results are identical to those in Model 1 of the analysis with political trust already described above.

Model 2 adds social trust, which has a close-to-significant positive effect on protest participation with a coefficient of 0.139. The standard error is 0.074 with a p value of 0.061. The odds ratio is 1.149, meaning that the odds that a citizen participates in protest increase by 14.9% for people with social trust, which is in line with my expectations. The exponentiated coefficient and

constant show no major changes. The model fit increases by 3.439 points, which is not significant with a p value of 0.064, approximating the critical value of 0.005. The explained variance remains the same with Nagelkerke's R^2 being 0.005.

Model 3 adds the interaction effect of concern with corruption with social trust. The coefficient of the interaction is 0.168 (SE=0.206), indicating a positive effect, as hypothesized. The exponentiated coefficient is 1.183 with the CI including 1 (95%CI 0.790 to 1.771), indicating that the true effect might be 0. The result is not significant since p is greater than the critical value of 0.05 with p=0.415. The exponentiated coefficient and constant again show only miniscule changes. The model fit increases only by 0.654 points, which is not significant (p=0.419). The explained variance again remains unchanged.

Model 4 accounts for respondents being embedded in countries. In this model the effect of concern with corruption increases slightly to an odd of 1.590 and the effect of social trust becomes significant at p=0.043. Respondents with social trust would thus be more likely to protest, as their odds of participating increase by 18.1% as compared to respondents without social trust. The individual country effects are again listed in the Appendix, in Table A.5. Accounting for country effects improves the model fit by 226.634 points, which is significant at p<0.001. The explained variance increases to 3.7%.

The final model includes all control variables, which again eliminates the effect of social trust on protest participation, as the p value rises to 0.998. The social trust coefficient in this model is 0.000 (S.E. 0.085) with an odds ratio of 1.000 (95%CI 0.847 to 1.182). The interaction of social trust and CwC remains positive, with a coefficient of 0.172 (S.E. 0.216) and an odds ratio of 1.188. The interaction term remains not significant, with the p=0.426. Due to the control variables effect, the chi-square raises by 490.839 points, which is highly significant at p<0.001. The total explained variance is 10.2%.

Uniform to the political trust analysis, model 5 is the only model that classifies some of the protesters correctly as protesters. While all previous models, like model 1, predicted all respondents to be non-protesters, model 5 predicts 50 (2.6%) of the 1,928 protesters correctly as protesters. However, the model also predicts an almost equal amount of people, namely 49 respondents, incorrectly as protesters. Accordingly, the model's predictive accuracy remains the same with 84.5% of the sample being predicted as the correct categories.

To conclude, social trust shows a significant positive effect on protest participation when accounting for between country variances. This effect disappears however when controlling for education, income, and political interest. Social trust does not positively moderate the effect of concern with corruption on protesting, as hypothesized. The moderation effect is zero after adding the control variables, results being not significant, and the true effect might as well be negative or positive. Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no moderation effect of social trust on the effect of CwC on protesting. Hence, the evidence does not support Hypothesis 3.

Table 3 Logistic Regression of the Effect of Concern with Corruption (CwC) on Protest Participation moderated by Social Trust

Model	1 Exp(b)	2 Exp(b)	3 Exp(b)	4 Exp(b)	5 Exp(b)
CwC	1.541*** (0.071)	1.540*** (0.071)	1.506*** (0.071)	1.590*** (0.080)	1.351*** (0.083)
Social Trust		1.149 (0.074)	1.121 (0.081)	1.181* (0.082)	1.000 (0.085)
CwC*Social Trust			1.183 (0.206)	1.114 (0.208)	1.188 (0.216)
Education					
Low					Reference
Primary					0.986 (0.088)
Secondary					1.243* (0.088)
University					1.696*** (0.101)
Income					1.066*** (0.011)
Interest in politics					
1 Not interested					Reference
2 Little interested					1.279*** (0.067)
3 Fairly interested					2.038*** (0.072)
4 Very interested					3.754*** (0.080)
Non-Citizenship					0.603 (0.280)
Age					1.005** (0.002)
Country				See A.5***	See A.5***
Constant	0.174*** (0.027)	0.171*** (0.028)	0.172*** (0.029)	0.254*** (0.094)	0.071*** (0.167)
Chi-Square Block	34.743***	3.439	0.654	226.634***	490.839***
Chi-Square Model	34.743***	38.182***	38.836***	265.470***	756.309***
Nagelkerke R^2	.005	.005	.005	.037	0.102

N = 12 412

Exp(b) odds ratio, Standard errors in parentheses
See A.5*** individual country effects are listed in the Appendix in Table A.5
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; (two-tailed)
Source: Latinobarometro, 2020.

Control variables

For the control variables high levels of education, income, and political interest correlate with an increase in the odds of protesting. In both analyses, citizens with higher education are significantly more likely to protest. Respondents with university education are about 70% more likely to protest ($p<0.001$). Respondents with a secondary education also show a significant positive effect, being about 24% more likely to protest than respondents with low education. Primary education shows no significant increase in the likelihood of protest participation.

Income has an odds ratio of 1.066, indicating that per 1 unit increase in income, the odds of participating in protest increase by 6.6%. That means that citizens in the highest decile of income are 66% more likely to protest compared to those in the lowest income group.

Political interest also significantly predicts protest participation, the odds of participating increases by about 1.286 (1.279 in the social trust model) for citizen with little political interest, by 2.058 (2.038 in the social trust model) for fairly interested citizens, and by 3.788 (3.754 in the social trust model) for very interested citizen. Thus, citizens with the highest level of political interest are more than 275% more likely to protest than politically uninterested citizen across both analyses.

Citizenship has no significant effect on protest participation in both analyses. There is a negative trend however, indicating that non-citizens tend to protest less and their likelihood to protest is reduced by almost 40% as compared to people who hold citizenship of the respective country.

Age has a significant positive effect on protest participation, with a exponentiated coefficient of 1.005 in both analyses. This indicates that the likelihood of protesting increases with each year a person is older by 0.5%. The youngest person in the sample is 16 years old and the eldest 96 years old. According to the analysis, the 96-year-old is thus 40% more likely to have protested than the 16-year-old. Considering how protest is measured, this is not surprising however, since the 96-year-old potentially had more opportunities to protest than the 16-year-old.

To find out which control variable erases the effect of political trust on protest I conduct another analysis where all control variables are added step by step. The results indicate that after adding political interest the effect of political trust on protesting becomes insignificant and slightly negative. Therefore, political interest is a confounder, as it correlates with both political trust and protesting. The initial significant positive effect of political trust on protesting is thus a spurious relationship. It requires further research to establish a solid theoretical explanation of why politically interested citizen are also those that have more political trust. A similar analysis which includes social trust instead of political trust shows that political interest is likewise the variable that mainly erases the positive effect shown before adding the control variables.

The step-by-step analysis also reveals that political interest is the variable that mainly allows the model to predict some protesters as such. By adding political interest 2.3% of protesters are predicted correctly. Seeing that the overall model only achieves to predict 2.6% of all protesters correctly, political interest attributes most to the predictive accuracy of the model.

Some readers might ask whether adding political trust or social trust as a control variable to each other model changes the results. Thus, in another step, adding social trust as a control variable in the first regression analysis and political trust to the second analysis, I find that the results do not change substantially, neither for the main effects nor the controls.

4.3. Robustness Analysis

In this section I present and discuss the findings of the robustness analyses. First, I analyze cook's distance, the DFBeta, leverage, deviance, and residual statistics to check for influential cases and outliers. I then test whether the assumptions of no sparse data, linearity, and finally non-collinearity are met.

Outliers and Influential cases

In this section I identify outliers and potential influential cases. Table 4 below shows the descriptives of the saved residual statistics for both analyses. The statistics of the analysis with political trust are reported first, with the respective statistics of the analysis with social trust being reported in the row below.

Table 4 Descriptives of residual statistics

	Valid N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Cook's Distance					
Pol. Trust Analysis	12 412	0.000	0.088	0.002	0.005
Soc. Trust Analysis	12 412	0.000	0.086	0.002	0.005
DFBeta constant					
Pol. Trust Analysis	12 412	-0.008	0.019	0.000	0.002
Soc. Trust Analysis	12 412	-0.008	0.019	0.000	0.002
DFBeta CwC					
Pol. Trust Analysis	12 412	-0.013	0.012	0.000	0.001
Soc. Trust Analysis	12 412	-0.004	0.006	0.000	0.001
Leverage					
Pol. Trust Analysis	12 412	0.001	0.026	0.002	0.001
Soc. Trust Analysis	12 412	0.001	0.024	0.002	0.001
Predicted probability					
Pol. Trust Analysis	12 412	0.028	0.651	0.155	0.094
Soc. Trust Analysis	12 412	0.028	0.660	0.155	0.094
Standard Residual					
Pol. Trust Analysis	12 412	-1.454	2.642	-0.177	0.879
Soc. Trust Analysis	12 412	-1.468	2.643	-0.177	0.879
Deviance					
Pol. Trust Analysis	12 412	-1.450	2.641	-0.177	0.878
Soc. Trust Analysis	12 412	-1.466	2.642	-0.177	0.878

Source: Latinobarometro, 2020.
Pol. Trust Analysis=statistics from the logistic regression analysis with political trust as a moderator.
Soc. Trust Analysis=statistics from the logistic regression analysis with social trust as a moderator.

As can be seen in Table 4, Cook's distance does not exceed 1 and has an average of 0.002 in both analyses, which indicates that there are no influential cases. The DFBeta values are below 1, which confirms the absence of influencers. Leverage, however, shows that there are values outside the 0.006 margin, as the maximum values observed are more than 10 times the calculated average. Further analysis shows that for the political trust analysis 156 cases have values outside the boundary of the three-time average. However, the leverage statistic is only reliable for cases with a predicted probability between 0.1 and 0.9 (Osborne, 2015). By excluding cases that do not fall into this range, still 28 cases show high values of leverage. The cases are spread across all countries and do not show theoretical reasons for exclusion. Running the

logistic regression analysis excluding the potential influential cases does not change the results either, with coefficients, standard errors and significance showing only very minor changes.

Checking leverage issues for the social trust analysis, 223 cases have leverage values outside the boundary of the three-time average. Excluding cases outside the critical predicted probability range still 27 cases show high values of leverage. Again, excluding these cases from the logistic regression does not alter the results substantially.

The deviance shows values between -1.450 and 2.642. Further analysis shows that 95% of all cases are within the ±1.96 boundary and only 3 cases are outside the ±2.58 boundary, indicating that there is no issue of overdispersion caused by a violation of independent errors.

Sparse Data

Logistic regressions require that there are no empty fields in a crosstab of the dependent and categorical independent variables. In a crosstab with CwC and Protesting there are no empty fields, and neither for social trust, education, political interest, and citizenship.

Linearity

The initial results show issues of non-linearity for education, which is another reason why education is recoded into categories before testing the hypotheses (s. page 15 for a detailed description of how education is recoded). After including education as a categorical variable, none of the interaction terms of the continuous variables with its own log is significantly correlated with the dependent variable of protest (see Table A.6 for results). Thus, it can be concluded that all continuous variables have a linear relationship with protesting and the assumption of linearity is fulfilled.

Collinearity

I present the results from the SPSS collinearity statistics in Table 5 below. The VIF values of all variables included are between 1.003 and 1.220 while tolerance values are between 0.820 and 0.997. This indicates that there is no issue with collinearity for the variables in the sample. Double checking with a spearman's rho correlation matrix, there is significant correlation between several variables. However, no variable correlates highly with one another, with the highest spearman's rho being 0.327.

Table 5 Collinearity test: VIF and Tolerance statistics for all variables.

	VIF	Tolerance
CwC	0.965	1.036
Political Trust	0.871	1.148
Social Trust	0.981	1.020
Income	0.835	1.198
Education	0.820	1.220
Political Interest	0.875	1.142
Citizenship	0.997	1.003
Age	0.947	1.056

Country	0.927	1.079

Source: Latinobarometro, 2020.

5. Conclusion and Discussion

In this final chapter I answer the research question, discuss the expectations under my hypotheses and compare them to the results of the analysis, identify theoretical implications and acknowledge limitations of this study.

With this thesis, I aim furthering scholarly understanding of protest behavior in corrupt contexts. Specifically, I wanted to find an answer to the research question: What role does trust play for protest mobilization in highly corrupt contexts? The premise of this thesis is that those concerned with corruption protest more. I further hypothesize that the effect of concern with corruption is stronger for those who have social trust. Conversely, people concerned with corruption but with high levels of political trust would be less likely to protest. Revising the existing literature, I find that there are other well-studied predictors of protest, namely education, income and interest.

In my analysis I find that, aside from the 'classic' predictors of protest participation such as education, income and political interest, concern with corruption in corrupt countries is a comparatively strong predictor of protest participation as education and income. From my analysis I conclude that political trust is not a moderating factor, meaning that people concerned with corruption are not more or less likely to protest given their level of political trust. While both concern with corruption and political trust are significant predictors of protest participation, the two effects do not interact with one another. What is more, the positive significant effect of political trust disappears when accounting for political interest, making the effect close to zero and not significant.

The weakly significant effect of social trust also disappears when controlling for political interest, indicating that people with social trust are not more likely to protest than people who have no social trust. Furthermore, social trust does not show a significant interaction effect: having social trust does not influence the likelihood to participate in protest for people concerned with corruption.

To answer the research question, I find that in corrupt countries, being concerned with corruption is an important predictor for protest participation. However, both final models either with political or social trust predict only 84.5% of the population correctly with categorizing only 2.6% of all protesters as protesters. Ergo, a large part of the protesters is not predicted correctly by the model and would require additional theory to predict more protesters correctly.

Future research would thus benefit from more detailed data on protest participation, including frequency and protest topic. The issue protested is relevant since interest in one topic would spark activism only in that specific topic and not in non-related issues. So, from the data I do not know if people protested corruption, or something less directly related such as for example animal cruelty. Even though I believe that concern with corruption fosters protest participation in general, I expect this effect to vary depending on the issue's relatedness to social justice. If the issue at hand is believed to be unrelated to national corruption, such as a foreign country's immigration policy or the war in Ukraine, concern with corruption should play a minor role. In

these cases, concern with corruption could still play a role, but only as predicting previous participation in protest which makes future protesting more likely.

Another question not answered in this research is protesters motivation to participate. Research would benefit from studying protesters and non-protesters logic behind their actions. What do protesters argue as to why they protest? Do they have hope of change in the foreseeable future? What kind of change do they envision and if it involves a change in representatives, who do they entrust with the responsibility? Do they only trust their own political milieu, or do they strive for power themselves? Can overall motivation be attributed to personal benefit or do people want a fairer system. Recruitment also plays into this: for example, citizens who are recruited by politicians, would protest according to politician's political agenda. Those protesters could be part of the politicians clientelistic network and not strive for a change in the political system.

Concerning the measurement of the dependent variable there are some constraints due to data availability. It is unfortunate that the frequency of participation is not included in the questionnaire, since having done something at any point of one's life might not say much about their current disposition and result in misleading interpretation. In my analysis the measurement of protest only shows that a person protested at some point in their life, not how often or about which topic. So, if someone protested twenty years ago about climate change and since then has completely changed their life including their (trust) relationship with society and politics, their current concern with corruption and trust are hardly connected to protest activity before.

Future analysis could discern whether political trust does show the interaction effect hypothesized in this thesis, when analyzing it not with an index but with all individual political institutions separately. Likewise, the measurement of social trust does leave room for improvement: while the Latinobarometro (2022) does not offer an alternative, it could be informative to see a more nuanced data collection of social trust and what kind of relation it has on protesting.

Another option would be to conduct a multilevel logistic regression analysis to see if the hypothesized interaction effects are present in some countries. This would require a theory as to in which countries the effect should be present. Potential ideas could be the level or history of democracy, or the overall levels of social and political trust in the country, similar as in Bäck & Christensen's (2016) analysis.

Throughout the literature different indices of corruption are used, from perception of corruption to tolerance, increased media coverage about corruption, personal experience with corruption and observing punishment of corruption, all showing varying effects on trust and participation. I think our understanding of corruption and how it affects people as political being could be broadened immensely with in-depth interviews. Likewise, the context of the findings has to be considered, since findings about corrupt incidences in low-corrupt countries in Western Europe might vary greatly from findings in high-corruption contexts in Latin America.

Lastly, it must be considered that in the year 2020 the COVID-pandemic was a big political topic worldwide. Accordingly, 6.7% in the sample reported the pandemic as the biggest issue in the country. Some of those respondents might otherwise have chosen corruption as the biggest issue. More importantly however, their trust relations might be different due to the pandemic because it gave rise to conspiracy theories and divided society in any parts of the world into pro-vaxxers and anti-vaxxers. Also, dissatisfaction with COVID-policies might influence political trust, as politicians might be seen as part of the conspiracy or not responding to citizens economic needs as many countries struggled to maintain the economy working. Once the new wave of the Latinobarometro survey is published a follow up analysis could discern whether the effects hold true. Following this, comparing the results to pre-COVID data would allow to judge how big the influence of the pandemic is on the results of this analysis.

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Appendix

Table A.1 Factor Analysis Protest Participation with Oblique rotation

	Component	
	1	2
Authorized Protest	0.724	-0.122
Unauthorized Protest	0.746	0.136
Block Traffic	0.783	0.040
Looting	-0.026	0.795
Occupy buildings and Factories	0.038	0.767

Latinobarometro: 2020

Table A.2 Factor Analysis Political Trust

	Component
	1
Trust in	
Judiciary	0.769
Police	0.604
Political Parties	0.714
Parliament	0.719
Electoral Institution	0.744
Government	0.812
President	0.750

Latinobarometro: 2020

Table A.2 shows that all political trust items load on one component, there are no cross loadings.

Table A.3 Recoding of the Education variable

REEDUC.1			Education	
Label	*N*		*Label*	*N*
Illiterate	705	}	Low education	2070
Incomplete basic education	1365			
Complete basic education	2280	}	Primary education	3655
Incomplete secondary education	1375			
Complete secondary education	3684	}	Secondary education	4858
Incomplete Universitary education	1174			
Complete Universitary education	1829	}	University education	1829
Total	12 412			12 412

Table A.4 Descriptive Statistics of all variables

	Valid N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Protest Participation	12 412	0	1	0.155	0.362
CwC	12 412	0	1	0.111	0.315
Political Trust	12 412	0	21	6.381	4.688
Social Trust	12 412	0	1	0.118	0.323
Education	12 412	1	4	2.520	0.936
Income	12 412	1	10	3.170	2.450
Political Interest	12 412	1	4	1.995	0.989
Age	12 412	16	96	39.240	15.667
Citizenship	12 412	0	1	0.01	0.110

Latinobarometro: 2020

Table A.5 Country effects from the logistic regression analysis without (4) and with control variables (5) for both moderation analyses

	Political Trust Analysis		Social Trust Analysis	
	4 Exp(b)	5 Exp (b)	4 Exp(b)	5 Exp (b)
Argentina	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Bolivia	0.683**	0.966	0.695*	0.966
	(0.128)	(0.136)	(0.128)	(0.136)
Brazil	0.799	1.015	0.849	1.010
	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.124)	(0.131)
Colombia	0.804	1.055	0.829	1.046
	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.124)	(0.132)
Dominican Republic	0.976	1.489**	1.045	1.479**
	(0.130)	(0.139)	(0.129)	(0.138)
Ecuador	0.429***	0.614***	0.429***	0.619***
	(0.138)	(0.146)	(0.137)	(0.146)
El Salvador	0.251***	0.363***	0.274***	0.361***
	(0.175)	(0.181)	(0.173)	(0.180)
Guatemala	0.395***	0.662*	0.397***	0.663*
	(0.169)	(0.177)	(0.169)	(0.177)
Honduras	0.525***	0.916	0.509***	0.921
	(0.151)	(0.159)	(0.150)	(0.159)
Mexico	0.544***	0.848	0.557***	0.844
	(0.134)	(0.145)	(0.134)	(0.145)
Nicaragua	0.560***	0.914	0.591***	0.912
	(0.151)	(0.160)	(0.150)	(0.159)
Panama	0.452***	0.704*	0.466***	0.702*
	(0.146)	(0.156)	(0.146)	(0.156)
Paraguay	0.840	1.373*	0.834	1.383*
	(0.125)	(0.134)	(0.125)	(0.134)
Peru	0.454***	0.562***	0.458***	0.562***
	(0.138)	(0.147)	(0.138)	(0.130)
Venezuela	1.151	1.528***	1.138	1.532***
	(0.121)	(0.130)	(0.121)	(0.130)

N = 12 412
Exp(b) odds ratio, Standard errors in parentheses
Political trust analysis=model 4 and 5 with political trust as a moderator.
Social trust analysis=model 4 and 5 with social trust as a moderator.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; (two-tailed)
Source: Latinobarometro, 2020.

Countries have odds ratios below and above 1, indicating negative and positive country effects. The Dominican Republic and Venezuela show significant positive effects while Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru show significant negative effects. I will discuss the case of El Salvador and Venezuela to exemplify how to interpret the odds ratios. El Salvador has the lowest significant odds ratio around 0.362 when including all control variables. Thus, citizens from El Salvador are 63.8% less likely to protest compared to Argentinians. Venezuelans on the other hand seem to be comparatively more eager to protest: the country has an odds ratio of about 1.530 across both analyses when adding all controls. Thus, Venezuelans are about 53% more likely to protest compared to Argentinians.

Table A.6 Linearity of log-odds

Model	1 Exp(b)
CwC	1.541**
	(0.142)
Social Trust	1.003
	(0.086)
Political Trust+1	1.003
	(0.048)
CwC*Social Trust	1.224
	(0.218)
CwC*Political Trust+1	0.978
	(0.019)
Education	
Low	Reference
Primary	0.978
	(0.089)
Secondary	1.232*
	(0.089)
University	1.659***
	(0.102)
Income	1.095
	(0.081)
Interest in politics	
1 Not interested	Reference
2 Little interested	1.283***
	(0.069)
3 Fairly interested	2.062***

	(0.075)
4 Very interested	3.781***
	(0.083)
Non-Citizenship	0.600
	(0.280)
Age	1.074
	(0.042)
Country	Cf. Table A.5.
Age*Ln(Age)	0.986
	(0.009)
Income*Ln(Income)	0.989
	(0.033)
PoliticalTrust+1*Ln(PoliticalTrust+1)	0.999
	(0.015)
Constant	0.040***
	(0.408)

N = 12 412
Exp(b) odds ratio, Standard errors in parentheses
Cf Table A.5*** individual country effects do not vary greatly from those listed in Table A.5
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; (two-tailed)
Source: Latinobarometro, 2020.