

The Position and Consequences of Security in Liberal Political Thought

Kilian Thomas Rodda

(s1062705)

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master in Political Science (MSc)

Specialisation: Political Theory

Supervised by:

Prof. dr. M.L.J. Wissenburg

Nijmegen School of Management

Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

08 - 08 - 2022

Word count: 16,502

“Salus populi suprema lex esto”

Marcus Tullius Cicero, 51 BC

“So, this is how liberty dies; with thunderous applause.”

Padmé Amidala, 19 BBY

Abstract:

Security is increasingly becoming the primary, trumping value in current political agendas and therefore is a key issue for political theory. This paper argues that as a concept, security is central in both classic and contemporary liberal political thought. In establishing security as its most fundamental principle, liberal thought is susceptible to potential authoritarian restrictions of liberty grounded in security logic. Following a discussion of the historical development of the security concept up until current debates around securitisation and the liberty/security balance, this paper aims to deconstruct security's pivotal position in liberal theory. Through examining liberal thought from social contract theorists, Locke and other classical liberals to contemporary thinkers, the key and problematic nature of security reasoning becomes clear. This paper then turns to contemporary theorists of security, both from within and outside the liberal paradigm, to find strategies which may counteract the authoritarian tendencies of liberal security thinking. In doing so, the strengths and weaknesses of rejuvenated philosophical engagement and critical perspectives of security are laid bare. In concluding, this paper finds that multiple strategies could be applied symbiotically to best alleviate liberal thought from the authoritarian potential of its inherent need for security.

Contents

<u>Chapter I - Introduction</u>	3
<u>Chapter II - The Concept of Security</u>	6
The History of Security in Political Thought	6
Current Security Debates	8
<u>Chapter III - Security in Liberal Thought</u>	11
Security and The Social Contract	11
Security in Locke and Classical Liberal Thought	14
Security and its Consequences in Contemporary Liberal Thinking	17
<u>Chapter IV - Contemporary Theories of Security</u>	20
Jonathan Herington - Security as a State of Being	20
Jeremy Waldron - Security as a Mode	23
Ken Booth - Security as Emancipation	26
Simone Tulumello - Agonistic Security	28
<u>Chapter V - Conclusion</u>	32
<u>Bibliography</u>	34

Chapter I – Introduction

Over the last two decades, security has risen to the top of the political agenda and subsequently has shown no hint of relinquishing its throne. Bolstered by the threat of terrorism, crime, conflict, climate change and now even pandemics, security in its many forms has become a socio-political goal a level above all others. A feature of this ascent is that we now talk of *securitisation* as a political means of promoting certain goals, policies or issues. Essentially, in determining a debate as a security matter it supersedes the remaining issues and also paves the way for a discursive framework with less moral obligation. Security, being the primary political end, is granted permission to undermine other moral and political values far more quickly of course. More often than not, both in public and academic debate, the victim of this supremacy of security is thought to be liberty. Countless times, in almost all realms, security has been weighed against liberty. Whether it concerns CCTV cameras, surveillance of emails, or nationwide lockdowns, the argumentation always comes down to the balance between liberty and security. This formulation of a trade-off implies that some liberty must be sacrificed in the pursuit of the desired security (Neocleous, 2007). While this is either implicitly or explicitly accepted by the majority, the securitisation of more and more issues leads to the ever-greater potential for the reduction of liberty (Waldron, 2003). As a result, claims that state's pushes for security have overly limited the liberties of their citizens are increasingly finding footing (Neocleous, 2007). There is the distinct fear that too much security leads to authoritarianism (Subasi, 2020). Nevertheless, this works in the opposite direction too, with the view that too much liberty leads to anarchy (Subasi, 2020). Balance seems to be the necessary ideal.

Attempts to balance liberty and security are countless, with rehashings following each new terror attack or advancement of civil liberties (Neocleous, 2007; Waldron, 2003). Jeremy Waldron suggests that to think of balance between liberty and security is a common and appropriate suggestion (Waldron, 2003). Even in “normal circumstances,” let alone when significant threats seem imminent, a balance between liberty and security should be agreed upon (Waldron, 2003: 192). Naturally, the defence of liberty in this process falls first and foremost to liberals, with security left to the reactionary and authoritarian minded. The claim is that liberal thinkers must not allow the balance to sway too far in favour of security, lest liberties be eroded beyond repair. Of course, in the face of recent devastating breaches of security, it may be rational to relinquish more liberty than before, but only so far as is necessary (Waldron, 2003). Balance between these values for Waldron, is therefore relational to the “change in the scale and nature of the harms that threaten us” (Waldron, 2003: 192). A liberal's job is to defend liberties within this relational frame of balance.

However, while this kind of argument is valid, as are the numerous similar calls for a security/liberty balance, the vast majority exhibit adherence to a flawed framework for argumentation. As Mark Neocleous makes clear, striving for a balance between security and liberty is a misguided approach. He claims that using the language of balancing is a liberal tool to disguise the lack of genuine argument, declaring that liberty and security

alike, are both in fact core features of liberal thought, rather than inherently juxtaposed social, political and ethical values. Liberals, far from being staunch opponents of security, see it equally as necessary as their authoritarian counterparts. Indeed, it is only recently that these two values, previously used hand in hand, have been placed at odds with each other (Neocleous, 2007). Throughout classical liberal philosophy, security and liberty are so tightly entwined they are almost synonymous. Neocleous highlights how liberal thinkers, the likes of Bentham, Hume, Montesquieu and Mill all used liberty and security in the same breath (Neocleous, 2007). Naturally, it would be expected that liberty, here at least, is the number one, but this is not the case. For Bentham, liberty is a “branch of Security”, while for Montesquieu, it exists in the “opinion one has of one’s security” (Bentham, 1843; Montesquieu, 1986: 188). Mill makes the hierarchy clear, seeing security as the “the most vital of all interests” (Mill, 1972: 52). However, this process did not begin with classical philosophers of liberalism but can be traced along the cannon of liberal political thought from the social contract theorists, through more 19th century classics, to contemporary liberal thinkers. Consequently, security as this paper will go on to show, not liberty, is in reality the central and predominant tenet of liberal political philosophy. An accomplishment which is the deep seeded cause behind the climb of security and the whimsical eroding of liberties in modern political societies.

So, if security is in actuality the primary value of liberal thought, how can liberal political society prevent the as good as authoritarian restrictions of liberty justified on the back of securitisation? This is the fundamental issue that this paper will attempt to resolve. The obvious approach would be to try a realign liberalism with liberty as its central value, but if I am correct that security has a tight grip on this role, then any such argument would be ignorant of this long, all be it less widely known, tradition of liberal thought. Hence, I will instead analyse how reassessments of security as a philosophical concept, will provide liberal philosophy with the tools to strengthen the position of individual liberties. In essence, I seek to determine whether and how broader, more varied and even critical views of security, can confer power to individuals to secure their liberty. Thus, my approach will be carried out in three sections.

Firstly, while there has been some recent, although limited literature highlighting the link between liberal thought and security (see. Neocleous, 2007; Subasi, 2020), these have tended to leave the central concept of security underdefined. Moreover, the concept of security is primarily defined within fields of security studies and international relations, where a narrower focus is preferential (Subasi, 2020). This tends to be on military and international security, rather than in reference to everyday life of the individual within a liberal state. Of course, new views of security are numerous, presumably as a result of the power such a concept can entail. These include notions of human security, climate security, collective security, food security, cyber security, and so on and so forth. Here we find a plethora of alternative and overlapping definitions of what has been termed an “essentially contested concept” (Buzan, 1983: 6). What is necessary is some kind of conceptual clarity to begin with, hence the first section of this paper will seek to achieve this. Specifically, I will trace the history of security in political thought, before disentangling contemporary debates and definitions

within the liberal sphere. The result will be a picture of security as a concept beginning in ancient times, through the enlightenment, to current contested views and the issue of securitisation.

Secondly, this paper will aim to show how security was and still remains the central, most important, principle of liberal thought. Specifically, I intend to present how security is the key justification for the establishment of political societies, or in other words states, in liberal thought. In doing so I will examine the role of security in contractarian thinking, to show how enlightenment philosophers placed the concept at the centre of their legitimisations of authority. From here I will present how John Locke, the father of liberalism, incorporated and essentialised security in his political theory through his perceptions of property and prerogative. The result of this being that subsequent liberal thought maintains security as a central value, as a prior condition required for liberty. I will argue that this idolisation of security has led to the undercutting of liberties in modern liberal states and also continues to push contemporary politics towards authoritarian tendencies. Consequently, this section will result in showing how liberal political theory adopted security and the issues of authoritarian encroachment this has left us with.

In my final section, I will present, discuss and analyse contemporary political theories of security from multiple sources to see if and how these can provide solutions to the authoritarian nature of security thinking. Drawing on recent attempts to rejuvenate interest and find conceptual clarity through philosophical concepts of security, thinkers like Jonathan Herington and Jeremy Waldron have developed contemporary political theories of security. These exist as an excellent tool to approach the issue of authoritarian eroding of liberties from within the general liberal paradigm. I will therefore examine whether their theories of security as a “state of being” and as a “mode” are able to counter the authoritarian threat of securitisation. On the other side, I will look to Ken Booth and Simone Tulumello, to see how their critical theories of emancipatory and agonistic security critique and potentially resolve this issue from outside the liberal realm. I will conclude to show that while the first two authors do provide a useful philosophical account of security, this does not ultimately disentangle liberal thought from authoritarian security politics. The critical security theorists do go further in providing valid strategies for reducing the authoritarian nature of security reasoning, nevertheless these may not be entirely translatable into the liberal paradigm. Hence, both critical and philosophical engagement with security is a good start, more work is needed to address its problematic position in liberal political thought.

Chapter II – The Concept of Security

In common language, the terms safety and security are very often used interchangeably, usually with an almost identical intended meaning. In one way or another both arise as antitheses to dangers, threats and risks to a given subject. They equally underline a feeling or belief of comfort, as well as the physical realities of comfort. In essence they are concepts defining the protection from harm. However, within academia these terms signify distinct concepts studied predominantly by different fields (van den Berg, Prins and Kuipers, 2021). Political science and its numerous subdivisions, particularly international relations, likes to focus on the notion of security as a concept to employ, while safety is seen more as a descriptive term (van den Berg, Prins and Kuipers, 2021). Nevertheless, the result is not that the term safety is entirely void from debates in political science, but rather that it is often used in conjunction or in relation to the more conceptualized image of security. With this in mind, this chapter will seek to examine the concept of security in more detail, specifically focusing on its place within liberal political philosophy, but also assessing the state of current debates around the liberty/security balance, securitisation and the rise of multiple new security concepts. Beginning with a deeper dive into the historical underpinnings of security in traditions of political thought, I will illuminate the starting point for contemporary discourse in this field. Following on from here, I will show diverse security concepts, the “myth of balance”, and the practice of securitisation to be the key current discourses in security in liberal thought.

The History of Security in Political Thought

Today security has come to mean many things (Herington, 2015). While its contemporary usage ranges from financial apparatuses to institutions and mechanisms of defence, this seems to be a particularly recent development in the history of security as a term. In general, there appear to be four major trends in thinking about security, the relationship between and development thereof, I will elucidate in this section.

On the one hand, security has been considered a mental state, characterised by a sense of confidence, calm and freedom from care (Herington, 2015; Gros, 2019). This view can be traced back to ancient times, with both Latin and Greek antecedents for the modern term, *securitas* and *ataraxia*, implying an internal condition of serenity (Herington, 2015). Security in this sense was seen as a great virtue of the wise to be developed and nurtured through philosophical consideration and mental exercise (Gros, 2019). This was necessary as the secure state of mind was not merely free from trouble, but rather actively untroubled in threatening situations. Security as serenity, as a strong state of mind, was not abandoned with the stoic or epicurean philosophies of the ancients, but rather continued to find footing as languages and ideas have developed. Frédéric Gros notes that 18th century French dictionaries maintained the notion of security as “internal, subjective steadfastness” despite any outside reality of threat (Gros, 2019: 2). According to Jonathan Herington, the modern French *sécurité* denotes a distinct feeling

of safety above all physical external circumstances (Herington, 2015). It seems that despite its ancient beginnings and strong ties to Greek and Roman philosophy, the idea of security as an internal state of confidence and calm, irrelevant of exterior factors remains an important and relevant conception on the term.

The second dimension of security stems from and builds off the one outlined above. This is the view of security as an objective situation void of risks, dangers and threats to one's person. In essence, this is what Jeremy Waldron calls the "pure safety conception", with the primary focus of security being to ensure people's safety from potential external harm (Waldron, 2006). This is perhaps one of the more common views in the contemporary Anglo-American sphere, however this is not the only realm where it is found. Gros again notes how the previous definitions of security as a state of mind in France, had shifted to a position relating instead to the absence of danger (Gros, 2019). In fact, it seems that both the Anglo-American and Continental traditions find their roots in Greek and Roman, albeit with a different perspective than we have seen so far. The Latin *securitas* while indeed implying a carefree mental state to begin with, came to have more concrete physical connotations in the later Roman period (Herington, 2015). Security was not just a state of being but also the physical situation which allowed for this serene essence to thrive. This became a widespread ideal during the Pax Romana, with terms like *securitas publica* becoming propaganda tools to remind citizens how the peace and stability of the empire ensured the ability to live a carefree life (Herington, 2015). The connection of security to stability also has origins in Greek thought. In his *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides repeatedly uses the Greek *asphaleia*, or stability, when referring to the Athenian Empire (Herington, 2015). For him *asphaleia*, which traditionally had been a trait of individuals, could also apply to city states which is where the next dimension, the notion of state security picks up from.

With enlightenment thinking, notions of security really began to take the external contextual view much further, and in doing so established a key component of the term for contemporary political philosophy. Thomas Hobbes, having already translated Thucydides, incorporated those perspectives of security into his own work (Herington, 2015). For him security requires stability and safety from violence and war, clearly an extension of Thucydides' *asphaleia* (Herington, 2015). However, for Hobbes, individual security in this sense can only be achieved by submitting the right to defend oneself to the state (Herington, 2015; Gros 2019). In connecting his preferred view of physical security with the authority of the state in the *Leviathan*, Hobbes thus precipitated an important shift in political thought (Herington, 2015; Gros, 2019). A turn to a definition of security, where protection from harm to person and property is guaranteed by the state. For enlightenment thinkers the role of the state became an essential part of the general view of security. Following Hobbes, John Locke maintained that the very sense of a political community is to secure people against injury and violence (Locke, 1690). Similarly, Rousseau confirms that "the first objective men proposed themselves in their civil confederation was their mutual security" (Rousseau quoted in Gros, 2019). Since this enlightenment shift, state-based conceptions of security have proliferated, however be it national security, public security, international security, collective security or a contractarian view of individual security, all stem from the connection between state,

individual and security first outlined by Hobbes. As Gros defines it, security in this sense is “an element of the material public order, characterised by the absence of dangers to individuals’ life, liberty or property rights” (Gros, 2019).

The fourth dimension we will investigate in this section is the most recent development in the history of security. It concerns the many additions to the term that have become popular in contemporary academia, such as food security, energy security and human security (Gros, 2019). These are terms that while attempting to define something specific all draw from the tradition of security in political thought outlined above. As Gros writes, they are all attempting to deal with establishing the conditions in which a process can run smoothly to the completion of some operation or goal (Gros, 2019). This indicates the modern shift away from the state as the nucleus of security, towards a view centred on processes, operations and supply chains. In essence it is the security of a certain resources vital for a normal life. Gros remarks how it is an attempt to protect, control and regulate the mechanisms that are vital for humans as entities with a distinct “biological finiteness” (Gros, 2019:135).

These four dimensions trace the history of security as it developed from its ancient beginnings, through the enlightenment shift, to the modern variations we see today. In doing so we have stumbled upon different outlooks on security. Security as an individual state of mind characterised by serene confidence even in the face of situational dangers. Security as a physical contextual reality, dependent on external factors. Security as a public good guaranteed by the state for its individual citizens as well as its own institutions. This, being the view of classic political philosophers in liberal thought, will be the definition I will mostly employ in my next chapter. And finally, we encountered security as a complementary condition to the processes necessary to protect a ‘vital core’. These four modes of thinking demonstrate the conceptual focus of their times, and how this has evolved over the centuries. Nevertheless, these are not just four distinctions only relevant in the context they arose within, but rather enduring views which are still individually relevant to this day. Each has its place in modern thinking on security, and thus feature in the current debates within liberal security thinking.

Current Security Debates

In this section, having already disentangled the path of historical outlooks on security, I will now briefly turn to contemporary security discourse within the liberal realm. While my focus in this chapter until now has been the concept of security specifically within political philosophy, it would be foolish to entirely ignore the contributions of Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Therefore, I will briefly present how Buzan precipitated a shift in Security Studies leading to newfound interest in the concept across political science. Following this I will look how security is generally presented in liberal thought of today, and how this is often formulated through the “myth” of balance (Tulumello, 2020).

In 1983 Barry Buzan published his widely influential *People, States and Fear*, which initiated a turn within international relations and wider political science to reassess the idea of security. Indeed, it was a primary text in the founding of the Copenhagen School, who sought to move away from traditional approaches in IR, to a more modern, less military view of Security Studies (Herington, 2012; Waldron 2006). Buzan sees security as an “essentially contested concept”, in the sense that it has been given multiple meanings each vying to be seen as the exclusive definition (Buzan, 1983: 6; Herington, 2015). Instead, the Copenhagen school presented the concept of ‘Securitization’, a political method for elevating issues both domestic and international to the highest level of importance (Bain, 2006). In this reading, security is socially constructed and serves a political purpose (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998). Through securitisation, issues become security threats and challenges, therefore finding primacy and power in political agendas (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998). However stripping security of any inherent meaning fails to resolve the issue of its contested nature, rather it merely renders the term useless in describing that which it is seen to represent (Bain, 2006). Moreover, securitisation relies on the fact that security itself is valued, therefore if the meaning is removed from under it, the value rests solely on political supposition (Herington, 2012). As William Bain states, “these views somehow miss the value of engaging essentially contested concepts at all” (Bain, 2006: 4).

Instead, this creates a situation where absolute security is the only possible and desired result (Tulumello, 2020). Securitisation being a political process must see the end of this political process as the ultimate goal, or in other words we are only secure when we are totally secure. However, as living bodies can never be entirely secure (we all die at some point, some way or another), absolute security is an impossible end. Thus, if referents can only be secure in as far as they are *absolutely secure*, securitisation becomes an unachievable process. It is through this need for the absolute form of security and its insatiable nature, that securitisation is able to trump all other political values. What remains, is a “myth” of balance between security and other values or rights, central to liberal social order (Tulumello, 2020). Within liberal thinking, security is often considered as a value at odds with other moral goals. It is commonly said that to gain security, we must sacrifice some liberty or perhaps privacy (Neocleous, 2007; Tulumello, 2020). However, this is not an idea of balance in the traditional sense, as it is in actuality a balance where security always gets priority. To balance between an unsatisfiable right and other values seems to be a pointless project. The absolute and constant need of security will no doubt trump any other value it is balanced against. Hence, we see a liberal framework in which securitisation dictates a balance between values that is a myth in reality.

Within this structure, we again find the appearance of multiple modern security concepts simultaneously attempting to provide conceptual weight behind the process of securitisation and influence the debate by shifting the referent to be secured. That said, in doing so they remain strictly entrenched in the liberal framework of balance. If we take Human security, for example, we see a trend to direct the power of securitisation to promote the interests of human individuals within this liberal security concept. This view of security, which is quickly gaining support focuses on presenting security as a

key value in the frame of individual rights (Tulumello, 2020). This is most obvious in the UN definition combining freedom from both fear and physical interference:

We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security (UN, 2005: 143).

This is one example of how modern views of security are increasing, while still exhibiting the same predominant liberal framework of the individual and their rights. In speaking of rights, specifically individual rights, the UN definition illustrates this notion of balance. Human security can be played off against other human rights, as well as other views of security to find a situation in which the maximum security can be achieved. Not only does this highlight the ever-present myth of balance in security thinking, but also shows the political power this provides to the process of securitisation (Tulumello, 2020). Nevertheless, this myth of balance between security and other liberties is not a new phenomenon that has purely come to light under this theory of securitisation. Instead, the myth of security and liberty being values requiring balance has a far longer history (Neocleous, 2007). In Fact, throughout the canon of liberal thought, security and liberty are both seen as important facets, existing in a symbiotic relationship rather than a constant struggle. This less obvious history of security in liberal thought is the subject of my next chapter.

Chapter III – Security in Liberal Political Thought

Liberal thinking has a long tradition in the history of political philosophy and remains one of, if not the, dominant socio-political theoretical framework of today. However, defining liberal thought is a notoriously tricky task. At its core, the liberal perspective is based upon the assumptions that “people are morally equal and that each individual should be free to pursue his or her own conception of the good life” (Dodds, 2012). This is usually manifested in a commitment to individual liberty, through which people can peruse the things they desire largely free from restriction, so long as this does not infringe on other’s equal right to the pursuit of the good life. It is generally accepted in liberal thought, that the role of government is to create and maintain a political society in which this process can be maximised. Naturally, this leaves liberal theorists with much to dispute regarding the methods, processes and means through which different values, freedoms, goods and rights are distributed, and to whom. Nevertheless, the core features of individuality, liberty and the self-determination of the good life are common trends in liberal thinking.

That said, there is another value, which perhaps not always associated with liberal thought, is in fact a key characteristic: security. This chapter will attempt to show security as the central theme in liberal thinking, even in many cases above the core values I have just outlined. With this in mind, I will begin with a picture of security at the heart of social contract theory, the forerunner to classical liberal thought. I will then delve into the work of John Locke, often seen as the founder of modern liberal political philosophy, to see the role of security in more detail. This will focus primarily on his concepts of property and prerogative. Subsequently I will survey the position of security across classical liberal thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries, to trace its continued relevance. Following this I will present how security has remained central in contemporary liberal theories of social justice. Finally, I will show how this centrality of security has created significant issues for liberal political philosophy.

Security and The Social Contract

As Robert Wolff proclaims, with politics being the exercise of state power, political philosophy in a strict sense is philosophy of the state (Wolff, 1970). Thus, it must in part at least, attempt to resolve the fundamental moral dilemmas corresponding to states and statehood. Perhaps the most elemental of these questions concerns the initial reasoning behind the establishment of states in the first place. In the case of the modern liberal states of today, the philosophical roots are found in the social contract theorists of the enlightenment. Numerous thinkers put forwards political treatises and essays which sought to defend their political philosophies regarding the workings of states. A large part of this work focused on presenting justifications for certain political structures and manifestations of states. Naturally, be it Rousseau and “the *volonté générale*” or Hobbes’s “*leviathan*”, these positions were often drastically different. Nevertheless, a common strain among these political theories is the central position of

security in legitimisations of state formation. Whether its Hobbes claiming that a commonwealth is intended to establish “perpetual security”, or Locke insisting that the reason for entering into civil society in the first place is “to regain ... safety and security”, the prominent role of security in contractarian legitimisations of the state is evident (Hobbes, 1991; Locke, 1690). In placing the notion of security at the centre of their argumentation, these major authors initiated a precedent which would continue through subsequent liberal political philosophy. Namely, presenting security as the single most fundamental political value. It is here that the centrality of security in liberal thought begins, with the contractarian search for a legitimisation of states.

To utilize security as the grounds for state formation, classical social contract theorists distinguish between a dangerous and violent state of nature and an ordered civil state. The line of reasoning is as follows. Firstly, each to varying extents, showed the state of nature to be in essence a state of war. Naturally this is most clear in Hobbes as a condition where decisions are made on the basis of passions and fears, and the state of man is merely “war of all against all” (Hobbes, 1991). However, this view crops up more discretely in other writers too. Locke shows how humanity in the state of nature is corrupted, and the idyllic life where fruits of labour and freedom are enjoyed degrades through disputes into a state of war (Locke, 1690; Gros, 2019). Similarly, Rousseau depicts a slow process whereby the innocent individual first becomes a tribe and then through the advent of agriculture, technology and private property, conflicts of envy cast them into a state of war (Rousseau, 1973).

Gros claims that with state of war, these thinkers are all describing four defining characteristics of the state of nature, namely “of useless freedom, of uncertain property, of unhappy equality and negative sociability” (Gros, 2019: 80). The absence of rules in the state of nature makes freedom total but useless as each exercise of this freedom will lead to a constraint or trespass of others’ freedom. This “natural independence” as Rousseau calls it, is entirely at the mercy of one’s own strength and one’s strength to resist the impositions of others (Rousseau, 1973: 24). Hence, it is hardly a substantive freedom at all. In the same vein, property is uncertain due to the ease at which it can be taken, plundered or destroyed by others. In the state of war, it is near impossible to enjoy property and the fruits of labour as these are fragile and constantly under threat of being repossessed. It follows that all in the state of nature are equal; each can steal from, inflict harm and make claims over others as much as others may steal from, harm or makes claims over them. All have the same freedom, the same choice of action or inaction, and the same authority to judge their own case as they like. As Locke puts it, “all are kings as much as he is” (Locke, 1690). However, the equality that arises is a lonely existence of endless competition, conflict, dispute, rivalry and hostility: an unhappy equality amongst the selfish. After this description any positive sociability in the state of nature seems laughable. Interactions between individuals are characterised by distrust and greed, leading Spinoza to comment that until people forgo “anger, envy or hatred” they will be at odds with each other (Gros, 2019; Spinoza, 1670: 14).

In civil society, on the other hand, these characteristics are displayed in almost entirely the reverse manner. Freedom as an integral aspect of human nature must be fully realised and enabled by the state. However, this is not the wild freedom seen above, but

rather what Hobbes terms “innocent Freedom” (Hobbes, 1991: 285). As freedom for these early liberal thinkers was a condition only achievable through accordance with the law. In Locke’s words, “Liberty is freedom from restraint and violence by others”, which only becomes possible where there are laws to enforce this (Locke, 1690: 42). It is the same story when it comes to property; the state protects individual property through the laws it imposes. The state functions in this sense as a guaranteeing factor in the enjoyment of property. The role of law continues when it comes to equality in civil society. States work with a deeper sense of equality, with all citizens being equal before the law. As Rousseau put it, “instead of destroying the natural equality, the fundamental pact substitutes a moral and legitimate equality” (Rousseau quoted in Gros, 2019: 86). The importance of social interactions is clearly even greater within an organised political system than in the state of nature. Spinoza makes a claim for social peace highlighted by solidarity, community and reciprocal assistance opposed to the competition, mistrust and antagonism in the state of nature.

This collective painting of a state of nature rife with savagery, conflict, dispute, greed and wanton appropriation of property, opposed to an organised, peaceful and productive political system was the second step in justifying the formation of states. These thinkers had created a fictional situation where the only feasible option was the creation of a civil society, specifically one designed to enable order. The transition from the state of nature to a civil state was necessitated by the all too obvious lack of, and therefore greater need for, security. In essence, a social contract is a pact in which the individual sacrifices some autonomy and absolute negative freedom, in order to gain an assurance of security guaranteed by the state (Gros, 2019). What we see here is that both the state and a social order emerge concurrently when escaping the state of nature in pursuit of security (Subasi, 2020). This is the heart of contractarian political thought. The state of nature is void of security and thus quickly becomes an unbearable realm of existence. To resolve this, people agree on implicit or explicit social contracts to establish a political regime with an authority to create, enforce and guarantee security. With this they establish themselves as a social order subjected to the authority of this state. Security and securitisation therefore become the *raison d’être* of this political system, or indeed, security is the *raison d’état*.

Security it seems is hence both the reason for which we need states and also the end which states are continuously striving to establish. In this sense it is the key to social contract theories. That said, this does not automatically explain the subsequent continued centrality of security in liberal thought, as many contract theories do not end up with entirely liberal ideas. While all these thinkers place security at the heart of their justifications for one or another form of state authority, they do, quite decidedly result in justifications of vastly different regimes. For example, if we take Hobbes, we do not find a theorist who is particularly concerned with liberty. He may be liberal in as far as his thought contends with self-interested, independent individuals, but the political system he arrives at is decidedly authoritarian. Hobbes’s focus on violence and physical dangers, and his overly bleak presentation of the state of nature inclines him to promote totalitarian authority. The leviathan’s purpose is to secure the lives of its subjects, and through this gain its legitimacy. Clearly life under an absolute sovereign such as this, is

hardly a state of being where numerous liberties are enjoyed consistently. Evidently Hobbes's work does not immediately thrust security into the centre of liberal thought, ousting values of liberty and equality on its way. Rather Hobbes, and the other early social contract theorists, set a theoretical precedent that subsequent, more obviously liberal thinkers have followed. Security from this point on was the lifeblood of the state.

So, it is clear that security is central for contractarian legitimisations of states, however the question remains how this morphed into a fundamental facet of liberal thought, on the surface far more concerned with advancing individual freedom than the security of the state? As discussed, enlightenment thinkers conceived of security as an external reality, an antithesis to danger, which the state has the ability and duty to establish and ensure. This distinctly pertains to the absence of physical harm to an individual's body and property. When considering bodily harm, or protection thereof, we are essentially thinking about a view of security as not being subjected to physical pain, damage or death due to the actions of others. These are clearly a part of the dangers of life in the state of nature which these thinkers present as a position to escape. Hence security, for them, is a condition where violence unto one's person is protected against. This is quite easy to conceive of as the state can then become a mediator in conflicts, enforce laws and punish those who physically harm others. The state guarantees bodily security through the upholding of public order, where violence towards fellow citizens is not tolerated and life can be peaceful. As noted previously, the state also secures individual property through the same means. Property is secure when it is not at risk of theft, damage or reappropriation, which again is ensured with a stable public order. Thus, the contractarian view of security appears to be the protection of persons and property, a role the state achieves through public order.

However, this view of security is not quite this simple or even consistent amongst these contractarian thinkers. Security, for these theorists, did not only imply the protection of property and person through instituting and maintaining public order. Rather it was a broader concept, for some authors more than others, than it first appears (Gros, 2019). For Spinoza, security requires an individual to achieve social and political capacities, which the state's role it is to safeguard (Gros, 2019). It seems here, Spinoza's view of security is perhaps beginning to be a conduit for liberty and liberal values. In a similar vein, Locke's broad view of property also expands his concept of security past the simple safe enjoyment of life and physical belongings. For Locke, property does not merely refer to material goods subjected to an individual's labour, but rather any good which one has laboured over. This therefore includes more abstract facets such as intellectual property, which must of course also be secure. So, property in Locke's view is a far bigger concept than mere personal belongings. In Lockean thought, property and the right to it is the basis of a sovereign's authority. This means it plays a crucial role between security and the state, one which has significant impacts for liberal thought.

Security in Locke and Classical Liberal Thought

Locke's political philosophy, particularly his *Second Treatise of Government*, is often seen as a founding text for classical liberal theory. We have already seen how his social

contract formulation places security at the heart of the state; therefore, we will now discover how his view of property and his notion of prerogative bring security to the fore of liberal thought.

Locke depicts property as a natural right. He begins with a religious argument that God, having given earth to Adam, has placed the plants and animals of the natural world in the shared trust of humankind (Locke, 1690). However, each individual is their own property and thus has a property right over that which is gained through “the labour of his body, and the work of his hands” (Locke, 1690: 18). In other words, private property is created when natural, common goods are subjected to an individual’s labour. This view of property as a natural right situates it a priori to the formation of the state (Subasi, 2020). Nevertheless, quite obviously no property is particularly safe in the state of nature, hence the formation of an ordered civil state takes place. This alludes to the fact that the protection of private property is in part the reason for why security is such a necessary condition. Only once in an established state, can the security of property now be guaranteed. The legislative creates laws in accordance with natural rights that protect against harm to person and property. This is the condition of security in a state that Locke envisions, through the correct functioning of limited elected government.

Locke places ultimate power in the hands of this legislative, in order to restrict arbitrary abuses of power. However, even a legislative may “endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power” (Locke, 1690: 135). Here we see two things. Firstly, his fear of arbitrary power concerns two distinct values: individual property and liberty. Secondly, the apparent position of these two values in conditioning state authority. In Locke’s eyes, any kind of transgression by legislators on the property and liberty of individuals would be an infringement on natural law. Thus, when private property is threatened, individuals have the right to dissolve the social contract, rebel against the sovereign and instal a new government. Thus, we see a process of authorisation stemming from security and culminating in the assurance of property rights. Security is required for people to enjoy life and their property, so a state is established which can achieve this. However, authority is only justified as long as it adheres to natural laws. Therefore, authority is conditional on the protection and implementation of an individual’s right to private property (Subasi, 2020). What unravels here is that security has become a precondition for the enjoyment of a fundamental liberal right to property. In essence the values have become conflated, resulting in Locke’s final position that the security of property is the ultimate justification and end of political systems and authorities.

So, although the social contract makes the case for security, it is Locke’s sacred view of property that brings it into the liberal framework. Nevertheless, while authority of a sovereign is in part conditional on the security of property and property rights, there are cases where Locke’s theory makes room for political authority to make unconditional decisions. In endowing the legislative with final political authority, Locke’s preferred system ensures the property and liberty of citizens while ruling out the arbitrary abuse of power. However, he concedes that there may be times when the legislature is not able act quickly enough to always be effective at securing these ends (Neocleous, 2007). Hence, Locke’s solution is to allow the executive power to act with

discretion in matters where legislative law-making is too slow and cumbersome or in cases where no appropriate law exists (Neocleous, 2007). In Locke's words, "This power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative" (Locke, 1690: 175). So, it appears that the executive has the authority to act without and even against existing legislation as long as this is for "the public good" (Neocleous, 2007). It seems that the conditions in which, his at first so strict curbing of arbitrary authority, can be broken are dependent on how the notion of in the public good is conceived. Locke's answer is surprising as it neither refers back to natural law or the apparently ultimate goals of protecting property and liberty. Rather he claims that "Salus populi suprema lex" is a "just and fundamental rule" to guide the decisions of the executive. Once more, we see security as the ultimate guide in Locke's thought. Here, at the crucial stage where arbitrary executive power is condoned on one condition, the good of the people has fused with the security of the people. Again, it is security, not liberty or property that is the fundamental value in Locke's thought.

Neocleous claims that Locke's use of prerogative foreshadows modern political practice (Neocleous, 2007). Providing the executive with discretionary power, stems from the practical realities and inconveniences of legislative law-making. Both in Locke's thinking and today, do we see that executive power of this sort is most often used in times of emergency, when swift action is necessitated. As long as these actions are aligned with the good of the people, or more explicitly public security, Locke sees them as just. Here the comparisons to contemporary politics are unavoidable, as recent examples of expanded executive powers in times of emergency, grounded in providing greater security are almost too many to count (see Neocleous, 2007:132). Locke's preemptive reasoning does not merely serve to highlight how securitisation is not a new phenomenon, but rather betrays a deeper point about the trajectory of liberal thought. It is his notion of prerogative power justified by security that was carried forward in liberal theory. Neocleous synthesises Locke's argument to claim that he "identifies the function of the sovereign as the production of security" (Neocleous, 2007: 139). The ease with which prerogative can be employed dismantles Locke's call for political society under the supremacy of the legislative implementing the rule of law. If security is threatened, executive power can overrule the legislature, brushing aside liberties and property rights as it pleases. With close reading we can see that rather than a pure defence of liberty and property, Locke's political philosophy is, as Neocleous frames it, a liberal defence of the priority of security.

So, despite claiming to be pursuing a political system which promotes life, liberty and property, at crucial stages Locke betrays these values in favour of a pre-eminence of security. First, he grounds the initial formation of states on the need for security, all be it for other values to thrive. Secondly, he presents security as a precondition within society, necessary for liberty and property to be enjoyed fully. Finally, he determines security as the key guiding condition in the most critical political moments of emergency, going as far as to use it as justification for executive power against the rule of law. Clearly, security must be a central principle in Locke's political philosophy for it to overrule other values he more obviously promotes elsewhere. Nevertheless, this

inability to leave security reasoning to authoritarian thinkers, but rather ingrain it within liberal thought as a key argument does not stop with him.

Following in Locke's footsteps, 18th century liberal thinkers did not place liberty and security at odds with each other, but rather saw them as closely related concepts. Security, for many, was a necessary precondition for liberty and thus these two values often came hand in hand. Adam Smith, for example, describes individual liberty as dependent on the recognition one has "of his own security" (Smith, 1982: 540). Liberty in this sense is quite obviously dependent on an existing level of security. Neocleous highlights that this view seats security as "ontologically and politically prior" to liberty (Neocleous, 2007: 141). Essentially for Smith, security is a precondition that subsumes liberty, so that the latter can only exist in the presence of the former. Either they arise together, or liberty follows security. Similarly, when Bentham suggests that liberty is a subsidiary of security, he is staking a claim for it as a condition in which other goods are enjoyed. This is security as a mode, a utility above the rest, through which other facets of a liberal social order can be reached. He pronounces that "personal liberty is security against a certain species of injury", namely those afflicting individuals, whereas political liberty is security from governmental abuse of power (Bentham Quoted in Elazar, 2015: 432). In both senses, liberty is contingent on and is manifested through the experience of security. Here Bentham has gone further than Locke; security is no longer the supreme political goal which allows for the enjoyment of other values like liberty and property, but rather security *is* liberty, be it personal or political. It seems that security [has become the fabric of liberal thought, a point echoed by a host of other liberal thinkers of the time. We find Hume reiterating the position of social contract theorists, claiming that government must endeavour to establish security rather than let society fall back into the earlier "state of liberty" (Hume, 1978: 550). Again, Hume sees security as essential and liberty as secondary. It is thus unsurprising that even John Stuart Mill, sees security as the absolute human interest, "the first need[s] of society, and the primary end[s] of government" (Mill, 1972: 355). Neocleous summarises this development with the declaration that "security became the cornerstone of the liberal mind", with liberty and property being subservient values (Neocleous, 2007: 141).

Security and its Consequences in Contemporary Liberal Thinking

The importance of security within classical liberal thought is evident. Throughout the development of this liberal tradition, security as a concept has inhabited a central position and has been drawn upon to justify the existence of states, allowed arbitrary political authority in emergency situations and as a necessary prior condition for key values of liberty and property. Despite seeking to facilitate the flourishing of core values of individual liberty and private property with minimal government interference, liberal theory cannot escape the "politics of security" which ultimately justify the need to govern at all (Neocleous, 2007: 142). Rather than eschewing foundational arguments based on security, liberal thought commits to security as an integral aim of political systems and societies. Hence, the difference then between liberal and authoritarian thinking is not that of differencing preferences between liberty and security. Rather

security is central to both traditions, however for the former it must be codified in liberal terms. This leads us to a significant problem with the supremacy of security in liberal thought. If both authoritarian and liberal theorists alike, use in essence the same logic of security, what is to stop the former from exploiting the latter. In other words, surely this paves the way for liberal theories to be hijacked by authoritarians in the name of security. As Neocleous puts it, this allows the eroding of liberty in the interest of security showing how liberal thought entails the possibility for “distinctly non-liberal interventions into the lives of citizens” (Neocleous, 2007: 143). Classical liberal thought is built on the necessity of security, and thus the life of liberty it seeks to promote shares its foundations with the authoritarian world. It appears that contemporary liberals have inherited this trait and have been unsuccessful in shaking it loose.

Indeed, contemporary liberal theory fails to engage with and crack this issue of authoritarian encroachment, with work on security predominantly leading to a compounding problematic conclusion. Broadly speaking, in addressing security contemporary liberal thinkers tend to follow one of two paths. On the one hand, as we discovered in the previous chapter, thought on security within the liberal paradigm has become hung up on the idea of balance between values. This appears, however, to be a myth in which the real predilection for security is laid bare. It is not difficult to find examples of liberal theorists coming down on the side of security in dichotomies of their own construction. Perhaps most plainly, Michael Ignatieff in attempting to address why liberties are so easily exchanged for security, presents an argument in favour of their temporary suspension and almost irrelevance to anyone regarded as a terrorist (Ignatieff, 2004). Similarly, Neocleous displays a collection of other liberal thinkers who increasingly disregard individual liberties and rights in the name of security (Neocleous, 2007: 145). The result of the balance myth is that security always has the upper hand, making authoritarian advances into liberal systems all the more likely.

At the other end of the spectrum, we find liberals focussed on social justice almost entirely ignoring the issue of security. In assessing Rawls’ theories of liberty and rights, James Nickel highlights the significant omission of any kind of individual security rights (Nickel, 1994). He goes on to show that while not putting forward any clear security rights, Rawls does incorporate security matters under natural duties (Nickel, 1994: 768). Nevertheless, this does not “provide an adequate account of a government’s responsibility to protect security,” something only achievable through explicit rights (Nickel, 1994: 768). It seems that for Rawls, security is the absence of harm which can be achieved by establishing a natural duty not to harm others. However, quite clearly this simplistic approach is undone by the complexities of security issues we have already encountered. The lack of treatment Rawls gives to security is reflected in the term only appearing twice in his Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Page (Wenar, 2021). Not engaging significantly with the concept renders Rawls’ theory incapable of dealing with the issues of security and liberty especially in the face of authoritarians wielding securitisation. It is symptomatic of social justice theorists, that in attempting to escape the dangers of security through simply avoiding the subject all together, they leave themselves equally as open to authoritarian threats as classical liberal thought before them. So, as we witness the increasing securitisation of issues, alongside the

entrenchment of an emergency politics in which temporary security measures and policies become permanent, the resulting potential for the increased suppression of liberties justified by a liberal ideology of security abound. Significantly, rather than coming under harsh scrutiny from the apparent defenders of liberty, these processes are at best ignored, and at worst propped up by current thinkers within the liberal paradigm.

The question that remains for theorists of security and liberty, both within and outside the liberal framework, is how these authoritarian tendencies inherent in liberal security thought can be dealt with. As we have seen, this work is often framed in swaying the balance back in favour of liberty. Nevertheless, as we now understand this balance to be a “myth”, and that liberty and security are conjoined concepts at the centre of this problem, a more radical approach seems necessary (Tulumello, 2020). On the one hand this could be carried out through a reinvigorated defence of liberty as the central feature of liberal thought, as one which would protect against authoritarian practices in the name of security. However, as security clearly maintains an unyielding grip over post of the ultimate justifying value in liberal thought, this approach would not only be blind to this liberal tradition, but would probably also, unwittingly or not, fail to entirely escape the need for security reasoning. Hence, the more fitting method would be to analyse the concept of security with the view to providing new perspectives which would limit the possibilities for authoritarian encroachment and the eroding of liberties in its name. This has been called for by scholars of what has become known as Critical Security Studies (See Tulumello, 2020; Neocleous, 2007; Nunes, 2012). Therefore, the remainder of this paper will present and analyse contemporary political theories of security and how they are able to deal with the issue of security as a justification for illiberal tendencies, policies and practices.

Chapter IV – Contemporary Theories of Security

Recently, political theorists have attempted to rejuvenate a more philosophical outlook on security (see Waldron, 2006; Herington, 2015) through tracing the concept's historical footsteps and contemporary points of contention. However, these explicitly acknowledge, despite the plethora of work on national and collective security within international relations, there is a distinct lack of philosophical engagement with the concept from the standpoint of contemporary political theory. Nevertheless, certain efforts have been made to reconceive of security as a philosophical concept necessary in contemporary politics. Some of these are specifically aimed at critiquing security's central position in liberal thought and the consequences of this. Other approaches focus on the wider goal of creating a more rigorous security concept that can be applied to theoretical wrestling within these debates. The former tend to arise from the field of critical security studies, while the latter predominantly stem from within the existing liberal paradigm. My purpose is to use these theories to assess and attempt to resolve the issue of authoritarian encroachment into liberal thought on the back of securitisation. With this in mind, it is important to include theories both from within and outside contemporary liberal thought to see how their approaches and the potential for success differ. Thus, I will individually discuss and analyse 4 distinct theories of security representing a range of positions within current literature of political thought on security. These are works by Jonathan Herington, Jeremy Waldron, Ken Booth and Simone Tulumello. Following each discussion, I will then attempt to see whether and how these theories may be able to restrict the power of security to circumvent and erode liberties.

Jonathan Herington – Security as a State of Being

In two recent works, *The Concept of Security* (2012) and *Liberty, Fear and the State: Philosophical Perspectives on Security* (2015), Jonathan Herington presents his position on the topic. As referenced, Herington begins his discussion with a historical overview similar to the one I have outlined in chapter two. He highlights the same trend from the individual mental state view, through to the state centred perspective. Thereafter, he briefly touches on the many new conceptions of security and proposes the importance of a philosophical approach to reach conceptual clarity. With that he begins his analysis.

Herington's main thesis is that security "does not refer to a single essentially contested concept", but instead pertains to at least three distinct concepts (Herington, 2015: 9). On the one hand, he broadly acknowledges the Copenhagen School's point that security can be seen as a political or social practice, with its own inbuilt ends (Herington, 2015). However, despite mentioning it, he is rather dismissive of this view for purposes within political philosophy. Secondly, he marks the view held by Waldron (discussed later on), that security is a mode through which other social and political goods are enjoyed (Herington, 2015). The discussion of this I will leave until we confront Waldron himself.

The third concept Herington puts forward, and seemingly his personal preference, is the view of security as a 'state of being' (Herington, 2012 & 2015).

This view stems from the idea that in speaking about security we talk of what it means to *be* secure (Herington, 2015). Herington argues that we ascribe a particular set of goods to entities (i.e., states or individuals) which they require to be secure (Herington, 2015). These goods could be food or shelter, freedom from war or territorial abuses. It is however in this relation of goods to entities that all conceptions of security as a state of being share (Herington, 2015). It is important to note that these goods, while not necessarily actually valued by entities, must be enjoyed securely (Herington, 2015). Moreover, when applying this framework both goods and entities must be defined specifically, be it abstract social phenomena or concrete objects (Herington, 2015). Herington sums this up with the following formula:

"An individual referent, i, may be secure as a type of entity, x, if and only if i enjoys a set of relevant goods, (g1, g2,...gn) securely." (Herington, 2015: 14).

Conclusively, security defines the relationship between an individual referent (e.g. Bob), its type (a human being), and the goods it enjoys (hamburgers, a bed and political affiliation to the pirate party). Herington proposes the worth of this formulation as that first, it enables value judgments on specifics to be made within each field uniquely, and second that contestations of each case only effect these value judgements rather than the concept of security itself. The concept of security, for Herington, is hence not contested idea but rather a framework under which individual cases of security as entities can be contested (Herington, 2015). The core meaning of the word itself is consistent. So having established a view of security as a state of being, how can this begin to work around the issue of security as a tool for authoritarian hijacking of liberal systems and procedures.

Firstly, this approach provides a tool kit for liberal thinkers to create and build off a clearly defined notion of security. Rather than being stuck with malleable ideas about physical safety and endless broader views of human security, Herington's approach enables future work to begin with a specifically defined concept. Nevertheless, the strength and also weakness of this method for specifying security is its flexibility. Security as a state of being is effective as it allows the selection and definition of certain entities and enjoyable goods to be discretionary. In employing this perspective, we are able to decide through reasoned argument which goods are needed, to what extent, for an individual to be considered in a state of security. To ensure these goods are properly specified, Herington reminds us to consider the type of object (is it simple, numerous, or even abstract), the quantity of said object(s), whether or not it must be enjoyed through a mode (i.e. access, legal ownership, or capability to use it), or if there is a temporal capacity to this good (Herington, 2015). Through these conditions, the relevant goods required for entities to be secure can be determined and properly presented. Once these are defined, security hinges entirely on their secure enjoyment. Thus, conflicting views of security are at their heart conflicts around the enjoyment of certain goods.

Following this argument, if liberal thinkers can re-align the goods required for individual security with key themes of liberty and property, then they might be on the

right track. Of course, this is all easy to say on a very abstract level so let us envisage some more concrete approaches. The problem with security, ingrained in liberal thinking as it is, is that it can so easily be appropriated to justify the restriction of core liberties. Establishing a clearer definition of security based upon the enjoyment of specific goods already limits the instances in which the power of security may be exploited. For example, one good that could quite plausibly be considered a condition for security is an individual's access to shelter. In order for humans to be safe from both the elements and the intrusion of others, the current and future enjoyment of shelter is vital. This is outlined by the general concern for the safety and security of the homeless. So if we include the secure enjoyment of shelter (usually in terms of a home) as a condition for security we can imagine the consequences for certain authoritarian security policies. Clearly, raiding homes to remove potential security threats becomes far less justified when the enjoyment of the home in question is itself central to individual security. These kinds of policies and actions are therefore far harder to justify in the name of security when these violate the broader pre conditions for security. It is in this way that Herington's concept can be implemented to protect against increasingly authoritarian security reasoning.

However, even if this approach does provide a potential limit to the power of security holds over other liberal values, the possibilities for the limiting of liberties are not entirely eradicated when security is conceived as a state of being. Due to the key position of goods within Herington's theory, it is here where we will encounter the issues. While of course many various goods could be reasonably considered as part of individual security, pure safety in the sense of freedom from harm is not only present, but also crucial. Of course, while any of these would be considered necessary for security, they may be weighed differently in contrasting theories and opinions. What arises is that, where before security itself could be grounds for limiting liberty, in Herington's world, the specific good of physical safety may be preferential to less core goods. Thus, instead of broad security being employed with authoritarian leanings, now a specific aspect of that security concept may take-up the same role. It is not difficult to envisage both academic and public debates arguing around the relative importance of different goods necessary for general individual security. In essence we might just see a semantic shift towards a more detailed supremacy of pure safety, for example, over other aspects of this broader liberal definition of goods-based security.

Moreover, this is not only an internal issue within an enjoyment of goods conception of individual security but is also apparent in relations between the security of different entities. The first and most relevant dichotomy that springs to mind is the rift between the security of the individual and that of the state. Herington's security concept allows for differing descriptions of how each entity can achieve a secure state of being through the enjoyment of relevant goods. However, the potential for friction remains. What is more important, the security of the state or the security of the individual? Are these not contingent on each other? Quite obviously the possibilities for authoritarian advances in the name of state security are plenty. While individual security may be contingent on the enjoyment of certain liberties, these are rather less likely to feature in the requirements for state security. Thus, when the security of the state is preferential, an

argument which we have seen as central in liberal thought, individual liberties become insecure. The problem with Herington's security as a state of being is that it makes these kinds of disputes possible with its inherent flexibility. Of course, liberal theorists can try to provide strong arguments in favour of a kind of individual security more closely aligned with liberal themes, but the potential for authoritarians capitalizing on the vast array of contentions and value judgements fails to redeem this liberal security framework.

Jeremy Waldron – Security as a Mode

Jeremy Waldron is a philosopher of law who has written extensively on liberal themes like private property, theories of rights and the rule of law (New York University School of Law, 2020). He is also well known for his work on security, homelessness and torture, as well as accounts of political philosophers from Aristotle to Arendt (New York University School of Law, 2020). Waldron's 2006 essay, titled *Safety and Security*, is an attempt to refine what is meant by the term security in political, moral and philosophical debates (Waldron, 2006). Precisely, he cites the common argument that social and political structures and norms often create and the need (or belief) that security must be balanced with liberty (Waldron, 2006). While liberty has been subjected to much investigation in political thought, individual security on the other hand has hardly been considered at all (Waldron, 2006). Similar to Herington, he notes the importance and coverage of collective and national security within IR but bemoans the lack of philosophical clarity of security at the domestic individual level. From here he poses the question of whether a common interpretation personal safety equates to a conceptualization of individual security. As mentioned earlier, this is a not too dissimilar view to the second contextual perspective of security. However, while he considers this "pure safety conception" a valid starting point, Waldron finds it has significant shortcomings (Waldron, 2006: 461). Hence, he proposes that it is necessary to consider the issues this perspective does not address.

Waldron begins by reasserting the central role of individual safety for any conceptualization of security. As he puts it, any attempt to establish an improved view of security fails if it "cuts the concept adrift from the element of physical safety" (Waldron, 2006: 463). Following this, there are two dimensions to advancing the pure safety conception that Waldron contends with; depth and breadth. In confronting the former, he argues that a definition of security must accept protection against harm to a person's mode of living, possessions and economic values (Waldron, 2006). Moreover, it must reckon with the notion of fear, in as much as the fear of harm to these goods can be as debilitating as actual harm. Security should be a concept which ascribes assurance that the desired way of life and all the goods this entails can reasonably be expected to continue into the future (Waldron, 2006).

The issue of breadth relates to security of entire populations, where security becomes a social and political goal rather than just an individual end. This highlights issues of differences in the distribution of security between individuals and communities that make up a wider society. Clearly, some people or groups are more at risk from certain

security threats than others. However, the state as a provider of (at least some aspects of) security, must contend with situations where its actions reduce the security of some to advance the security of others (Waldron, 2006). Waldron consistently presents the example of terrorist attacks, where the security of the wider population maybe increased, while that of individuals who live in areas/communities alongside terrorists is lowered (Waldron, 2006). Moreover, any state approach to security that promotes some citizens over others would undermine the legitimacy of the state. Like individuals have obligations to the state, the state has obligations to *all* individuals, and regarding their security these obligations cannot be neglected to favour others (Waldron, 2006). He therefore surmises that the “maximising approach” to security should be rejected, although the arguments in favour of an equality centred approach are not conclusive either (Waldron, 2006: 494).

The results of Waldron’s survey present a unique view of the security concept. Essentially, he sees individual security as a mode in which life can be properly enjoyed rather than a good in of itself (Waldron, 2006; Herington, 2015). So opposed to Herington, whose view dictates that certain goods are required for security, Waldron proposes that security is an underlying trait that enables entities to enjoy these goods. Security, for Waldron, is an adjectival notion of a mode in which goods can be enjoyed presently and in the future. For Herington it is a state of being characterised by sufficient access to necessary goods. It appears then that these views are two sides of the same coin, with the enjoyment of goods relevant to living a normal life either a precondition or a result of a picture of security broader than mere physical safety. So, it would be safe to assume that Waldron’s view of security as a mode would encounter the same strengths and weaknesses as Herington’s security as a state of being, when applied to the task of preventing authoritarian hijacks of liberal frameworks.

While Waldron’s approach shares Herington’s focus on the enjoyment of goods, he provides more details regarding the distribution of these goods. It is in this sense that we see success in the safeguarding against the authoritarian dangers of security for liberal political thought. In the special attention given to distributive issues, Waldron highlights how restrictions of liberty, in the name of security are not equal within society. As he puts it, “it is not a case of everyone giving up a few liberties so that everyone can be more secure” (Waldron, 2006: 503). Rather, some sacrifice a little and others more liberty, so that the majority can gain security (Waldron, 2006). Some people may even loose some security so that it can be gained by the rest. Through bearing this complexity in mind, liberals can better imagine the effects security measures might have on all segments of society. This in turn, is useful in defending against overly authoritarian curbing of liberties when the security of a certain group is at risk. Waldron suggests thinking through the lens of a “distributive matrix of liberty” on the one hand, and a “distributive matrix of security” on the other (Waldron, 2006: 503). Each of these should take into consideration that these values are spread evenly across the entire population, majorities and minorities alike. A better perspective on distribution, for both security and liberty, is a good step in reducing the capacity for security to be the grounds of authoritarian reductions of liberty.

Nonetheless, Waldron's central claim of security as a preconditional mode through which other values, including liberty, can be enjoyed does not solve the issues at hand. In describing security as so essential and also prior to other values, Waldron appears to be mirroring the tradition of liberal thought that I outlined in the previous chapter. Security again seems to be the key that makes other liberal qualities possible for individuals and society generally. However, as we know this thinking tends to allow liberties and rights to be side-lined in the name of security. Waldron appears to have made this less likely through placing liberty as a clear goal of the security condition. That said, authoritarian encroachments are not so easily dissuaded, and Waldron's security concept leaves them enough room. He eschews the temptation to fall back into the common liberty vs. security trade-off balancing act by showing how both are nuanced related values, not logically independent concepts in conflict. But Waldron does confirm that security must have the concern for safety at its core, and thus liberty cannot be the whole point of security (Waldron, 2006). In this twisting manner, Waldron is establishing that to think of balance between liberty and security is too simplistic, and that rather they exhibit a symbiotic relationship. However, this does not result in liberty and security being one and the same; indeed, it would be more accurate to see security as a precondition for other liberal values (Waldron, 2006). Nevertheless, security also contains a more basic commitment to safety, one it cannot be conceptually separated from. This commitment is where authoritarian footholds are found, as once again security can be wielded to promote the restriction of liberties when the very elementary need of safety comes under threat. It seems, despite valiant efforts Waldron's theory is too grounded in the liberal tradition to escape this very central problem of liberal political thought.

Herrington and Waldron's theories of security show the important and effective role of goods-based security thinking in contemporary liberal thought. Security cannot purely be seen as individual physical safety, but must include the contributions of fear, assurance, safety of property and of values, into the concept. In this vein, security applies to collective entities, be it communities, groups or populations, in addition to individuals and states. Both Waldron and Herrington provide approaches that seem to amalgamate these concerns into clear conceptualisations of security from the perspective of political philosophy. With these more detailed approaches they both provide initial support to the position of liberty in the face of increasing securitisation. In explicitly requiring exact definitions, Herrington's view of security is more stringent than traditional outlooks and is thereby less susceptible to being employed maliciously. Waldron shows the importance of distribution of both security and liberty, depicting how trade-offs are rarely ever experienced equally amongst a population. With these contributions, both thinkers have begun to highlight the importance of in-depth philosophical reckonings with security to rectify its position within liberal thought. Nevertheless, Waldron and Herrington alike, fail to provide comprehensive protections from authoritarian security reasoning being able to restrict, erode or remove individual liberties. In both views, security retains access to the more primal need of safety, and therefore liberties may still be sacrificed. Moreover, the position of the state remains centrally vested in its own security, another plausible entrance for illiberal lines of thought. It seems both are too grounded within a liberal tradition that harbours a

problematic view of security at its heart to fully contort security into a liberty friendly concept. Thus, perhaps it is now necessary to see how critical approaches from outside the liberal paradigm can provide assistance to initialising a less dangerous concept of liberal security.

Ken Booth – Security as Emancipation

Ken Booth is an international relations scholar connected with the Welsh School of Security Studies, based in Aberystwyth. Having previously focused upon strategic studies of nuclear weapons, disarmament and naval warfare, since the mid-1980s he has shifted his centre of attention towards theories of security, IR theories and human rights (Aberystwyth University, 2021). Alongside Richard Wyn Jones, Booth began the incorporation of emancipation theory into work in critical security studies, an approach that became synonymous with the Welsh School (Vaughn-Williams and Peoples, 2010). It is this process and his wider view of security that I will present first, before analysing how this can help with rejecting authoritarian consequences of liberal security thinking.

Booth begins by highlighting the need for a broader view of security than is traditionally found in international relations, to include a more wholesome account of the concept. He claims that people in the modern world are far more at risk from power abuses of their own state, than they are endangered by the aggression of “enemy” states (Booth, 1991: 318). Moreover, state regimes themselves are more likely to be toppled by internal actors than external ones (Booth, 1991). For security to focus on interstate conflict is an outdated approach, and thus Booth suggests greater attention should be paid to “The repression of human rights, ethnic and religious rivalry, economic breakdown and so on” (Booth, 1991: 318). In essence, Booth echoes the broadening, process-oriented turn in security studies that we examined in chapter two. However, instead of promoting another revised concept of ‘human’ or ‘collective’ security, Booth introduces the role of emancipation. In his words, “Emancipation should logically be given precedence in our thinking about security over the mainstream themes of power and order” (Booth, 1991: 319). In what is essentially a Hobbesian argument, he insists that establishing order through power always comes at the expense of others. If one entity, be it an individual or a state has achieved order, it is only through exercising power, or the threat of power, over others. Furthermore, if security in simplistic terms “means the absence of threats,” then this inherently unstable power/order approach makes threatened entities insecure (Booth, 1991: 319). In focusing on creating order through power, a system results that continually deprives people of security, which in turn can only be regained by depriving others.

Emancipation, on the other hand, is a far more inclusive and effective grounding for security. Booth defines it as “the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints” so that they can do what they would otherwise choose to do (Booth, 1991:319). The greatest constraints on acting freely are, according to Booth, the existence and threat of war, poverty, political oppression and so on (Booth, 1991). The absence of these threats, or being secure, is equivalent to the absence of human constraint, or being emancipated. So, Booth concludes that “Security and

emancipation are two sides of the same coin” (Booth, 1991: 318). Moreover, in a similar vein to Waldron’s concern for distribution, Booth claims that for security to be true it must be experienced by all. Equally, emancipation at its core contains a commitment to reciprocity, epitomized by the view that “I am not truly free until everyone is free” (Booth, 1991: 322). Therefore, to strive for genuine security is to continually pursue the task of emancipation in as many circumstances as possible. In coupling security with emancipation, Booth appears to establish a theory which may have greater success in defending against authoritarian appropriation.

Firstly, in seeing security as the freedom from threats, the concept gains a strong connection to liberty. Unlike Waldron, who depicts security as merely a precondition for liberty, Booth’s view places the goal of emancipation as security’s primary purpose. Again, to be secure is to be emancipated from threat. This approach clearly gives security weight in advancing, rather than restricting, liberties. It would seem that more liberty, in the emancipatory sense, equates to greater security. Thus, the need for security can hardly be used as grounds for restricting liberty, as this is contrary to Booth’s perception of the concept. Indeed, this approach promotes a sense of security that is firmly rooted in the protection and advancement of liberty. To hijack this conceptualization in the authoritarian line of thinking would be practically impossible. Any such efforts would situate security as a constraint on humanity, or more precisely on those humans effected, and thus could be regarded as contra to emancipation. Therefore, security in its authoritarian uses, would even be perceived as a threat to security in an emancipatory sense. While effective in restricting authoritarian tendencies of security thinking, surely this creates a problem. Security can hardly be a threat to security, can it? Here we must remember Waldron’s warning that we must strive to avoid “word play” in discussing security and liberty (Waldron, 2006: 505). Reducing one concept to the other removes their inherent meaning, leaving us with nothing but void discussions.

Neocleous raises a similar criticism at Booth’s emancipatory approach. In his eyes, to fuse emancipation and security is “to be as about as mistaken as one can possibly be about security” (Neocleous, 2007: 146). He argues that talking of security issues gives power to the state and, as we have seen, states tend to respond to security issues by limiting civil liberties. In conflating emancipation with security, the state will only move further away from liberty and deeper into the vortex of securitisation (Neocleous, 2007). Nevertheless, this criticism seems to ignore Booth’s crucial distinction between individual and state security. His claim is that humans, not states are the primary referent object, and hence individual security should be prioritised (Booth, 1991). He builds of the Kantian idea that people should be treated as ends and states as means for achieving these ends (Booth, 1991). In this view, it is surely “illogical to privilege the security of the means as opposed to the security of the ends” (Booth, 1991: 320). Thus, it appears Booth’s view of security would always prioritise the position of the individual over that of the state. Perhaps though, what we are seeing here is a conflict between theory and practice. For theory, while states are important actors in security debates, they are too “unreliable, illogical and too diverse in their character” to be the primary reference objects (Booth, 1991: 320). Individuals on the other hand, do not only exist as

the ultimate ends of security, but are also “the ultimate units of the great society of all mankind,” as Booth quotes Hedley Bull (Bull quoted in Booth, 1991: 319). In practice, Neocleous has shown how states hold the power and use security often to restrict individual liberty (Neocleous, 2007). In the face of this, Booth is arguing for a security concept centred around emancipation which would help to place power in the hands of individual human beings. As, while liberal thought may not be entirely “anti-statist”, its primary concern is indeed for the position of individuals above all else (Neocleous, 2007: 143).

Booth’s efforts to establish an emancipatory security concept exhibit mixed results. On the one hand, his approach significantly restricts the potential for authoritarian co-opting of security. Clearly a security concept with emancipation as its central driving force is very much geared to promoting individual liberties. Moreover, these are further protected by the explicit hierarchy of individual above state security. Nevertheless, on the other hand, his apparent conflation of security and liberty leaves his theory conceptually weak and cut-off from the core meaning of the term. Indeed, it could be considered that such an approach is merely semantic trickery, which fails to provide actual solutions to the issue at hand. Booth’s work seems to show signs of significant progress for critical theories of security, and in doing so does provide useful frameworks for helping the liberal thought from escaping illiberal securitisation problems. However, the approach is far from sound and thus we must look further into the realm of critical security studies to find potential solutions to this issue.

Simone Tulumello – Agonistic Security

A more recent advocate for critical security studies is Simone Tulumello, an associate research professor at the University of Lisbon (Tulumello, 2020). His work focuses on critiquing security and urban policy, with specific attention on fear, crisis and planning (Tulumello, 2020). In *Agonistic Security: Transcending (de/re)constructive divides in critical security studies* (2020), Tulumello presents a unique theory of security which simultaneously critiques existing approaches and presents a new way forward for critical security studies. I will therefore begin by outlining the content of this article before analysing to what extent its suggestions and approaches can help rectify the authoritarian nature of security within liberal thought.

Tulumello’s aim is to reconcile the dichotomy between what he calls reconstructive and deconstructive approaches in critical security studies. In doing so he begins with his own critical depiction of the concept and use of security within the liberal paradigm, similar to what we have encountered in my previous chapters. He highlights the problematic nature of the myth of balance between security and liberty – a balance perpetually in favour of absolute security (Tulumello, 2020). Following this he also deconstructs major contributions from within critical security studies. He concludes that while criticising liberal perceptions of security is a valid and worthwhile endeavour, this does not require us (as many critical security theorists claim) to abandon the concept entirely (Tulumello, 2020). Rather, he proposes that it is necessary to “re-theorize security in a way capable of transcending the dichotomy between

deconstruction and reconstruction” (Tulumello, 2020: 12). In other words, security must be reframed in such a way that it both criticises its flawed liberal use, but also embraces its inherent tensions (Tulumello, 2020). The result is what he terms a “meta theory” of agonistic security.

This approach is based on the political philosophy of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, who’s central claim is that capitalist hegemony is propped up by a “discursive order” which depicts society as a “totality” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 95-96). Thereby structural cleavages, be it class, gendered or racialized, are ignored and differences and conflict are seen as “problematic and deviant” (Tulumello, 2020: 12). Liberal democracy exists in a paradox where conflict must be resolved within the liberal capitalist system whose structural inequalities are the root of this conflict (Mouffe, 2000). Mouffe and Laclau’s solution is to embrace the openness of society and the inevitability of political dispute, replacing antagonistic conflict with agonistic competition (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Tulumello claims, that the same is true for the specific position of liberal security, where the myth of balance eradicates the possibility for genuine difference and frames opponents to absolute security as societal deviants (Tulumello, 2020). Therefore, an agonistic view of security would accept its position in the “political”, that is the open sphere of contention between “friendly enemies” (Mouffe, 2000: 13; Tulumello, 2020). Following this first step in theorizing agonistic security beyond liberal balance, Tulumello highlights three more necessary conceptual shifts (Tulumello, 2020). The first is to see security, not as an absolute state of being, or as a universally required good, but rather as “a historicized, socio-politically, and geographically determined relation” (Tulumello, 2020: 15). In essence, this turns to a dynamic view of security that forgoes the obsession with future threats, in favour of accepting the inevitability of insecurity (Tulumello, 2020). Secondly, agonistic security must distance itself from universalistic tendencies of liberal (and even emancipatory) security, instead reaching for pluralism. Finally, to achieve this pluralism, agonistic security must go beyond the western/liberal individualistic human rights approach to include mutual, reciprocal and collective outlooks on security (Tulumello, 2020). Each of these steps are tools for criticising and rebuilding current security thinking, hence it seems logical to assess their applicability to the problem of authoritarian reasoning in liberal security.

The first discursive shift outlined by Tulumello entails an important point about agonistic security. If we begin to think of security not in absolute terms as the protection from present and future threats, but rather in relative terms as an ongoing but ultimately impossible task, we encounter a host of implications for broader security issues. Of particular relevance to the issues at hand is the effect this conception has on the curbing of liberties in the name of security. Traditionally policies that are grounded on security come following or in the face of attacks or threats to security. However, if security is not seen in this absolute sense, and thus that future threats are inevitable, these grounds for protective and pre-emptive policies carry far less weight. Security, in the agonistic framework, can not be the justification for strong defensive liberty stripping policies, as it accepts the inherent insecurity of the world. If insecurity is the norm, why should liberties be sacrificed to advance a misconception of security. Surely it is far more conducive to incrementally increase security within the view of a general

world system where insecurity is the status quo. In this way the difficulties of security thinking are acknowledged and approached without having to resort to a myth of balance which reduces individual liberty. Therefore, such increasingly authoritarian approaches are not possible to ground in terms of security as they are within liberal thinking. So perhaps it would be suitable for liberal thought to come to terms with the reality of inevitable insecurity, so that it can assess security and restrictions of liberty in a more considered manner. That is not to say that security is not desirable, but rather that to strive for ultimate security is a misguided approach.

The second strength of agonistic security is its ability to be highly inclusive of many different positions, criticisms and arguments, while still accounting for the basic human “desire” for security (Tulumello, 2020: 12). Similar to the emancipatory approach, Tulumello highlights the importance of including the needs of underrepresented groups and communities, who very often become the first victims of security politics. It is therefore a theory which assists limiting authoritarian curtailing of liberty and other values on security grounds, by advocating for the position of those who are directly affected by these measures. In giving a voice to people(s) who may lose their liberty, agonistic security makes it harder for their position to be overlooked when a greater need for security justifies increasingly authoritarian politics. Moreover, in rejecting universalism, Tulumello’s approach makes the case for needs and desires which may not be considered relevant or worthy in the liberal paradigm. Individuals and groups who do not subscribe to western views often have their concerns neglected when these do not conform to traditional liberal thinking. These concerns are not necessarily reflected in liberal conceptions of human rights, but nevertheless still account for core values in other cultures and societies. These core values are potentially equally at risk as western notions of rights and liberties when authoritarians adopt security reasoning. Taking a pluralistic outlook would involve recognising the need for protecting these values as well as liberal values. Agonistic security entails a commitment to a broader picture of human values and concerns that must encounter, deal with and are often sacrificed for the defence against threats and risks. In endorsing this approach, more concerns are accounted for in the face of authoritarian dangers. Thus, authoritarian overreaching becomes less likely when wider needs and wants of more human beings are taken into account through the pluralist lens of agonism.

However, this pluralist approach of agonistic security does have draw backs when adopted into a liberal framework. On the one hand, it diverges from the traditional liberal perspective focused on the individual. While this builds off the distributive issue highlighted by Waldron, it also brings in collective concepts usually outside the liberal paradigm. It does of course show the short comings of liberal thought in accounting for structural inequalities and a multitude of alternative perspectives. Nevertheless, the recommendations of agonistic security are couched in a critique of individualistic human rights and are therefore less transferable to a liberal world focused on the individual. Naturally, this is not Tulumello’s purpose, but merely the consequence of my approach. Moreover, encouraging pluralism in the agonistic sense means that authoritarian views may also be accepted into the political sphere. Agonistic politics is carried out by adversaries who “share a common symbolic space” but have different

views on how that symbolic space should be organised (Mouffe, 2000: 13). The presence of security in this political space is part of the point of agonistic security. However, there is the distinct potential for believers in an authoritarian organising of security to take part in this political process. The question remains whether these would use the same logic of security as found in liberal thought, thereby leaving the latter unable to reasonably provide a counter argument as rational liberals are so fond of doing. Of course, agonistic security is an approach that values pluralism and the downscaling of conflict through political debate; naturally these methods do not entirely align themselves with liberal thought wrestling with inbuilt authoritarian dangers. Indeed, this is not the purpose of agonistic thought, but involuntarily, Tulumello's proposals do provide liberal thinkers with some useful propositions.

These two theories of critical security studies again show the inherent and dangerous position of security within liberal thought. In response they both attempt to provide alternative theories of security with ambitions towards more pluralistic, critical and emancipatory values and realities. In doing so they dismantle the liberal focus on absolute security in favour of a broader and more contextual picture. Booth highlights the value of emancipation and reciprocity, as to be secure as an individual requires all humanity to experience security. In doing so, he places the position and value of individuals well above that of the state, classing the former as the end and the latter as the means of security. Tulumello calls for greater pluralism to incorporate non-western views, as well as a widening the conception of individual human rights towards mutual and reciprocal collective notions. He signifies the potential for agonism to be a mediating process between contesting actors with differing perspectives of security. It is through these methods that both Booth and Tulumello provide significant strides in safeguarding security from authoritarian utilisation. Many, although not all, of these can be transferred and applied to the problems within the liberal realm. In providing access points and tools for dealing with the authoritarian nature of security and securitisation, Tulumello and Booth have shown how critical theories are better placed to examine central issues of liberal thought. Nevertheless, this process has also meant they have not achieved the same level of conceptual clarity as Waldron and Herington's more philosophical approaches. It seems that these liberal theories created a more accurate and distinct picture of how security must be defined, despite not escaping the broader issues inherent in this liberal framework. Perhaps, if these philosophical approaches can be further enriched through greater application of and engagement with critical theories of security, liberal thought may be better placed to rout out authoritarian tendencies in security thinking and politics.

Chapter V – Conclusion

In this paper, I have presented the topic of security and its specific position within liberal political thought. Starting from the premise that security has become the top dog in current political agendas, I sought to show the consequences of this for a liberal paradigm that itself is at the root of this instatement. Through tracing security's conceptual roots from ancient times and enlightenment shifts, we have seen its resulting centrality in current debates. Whether it is the misguided notion of balance or the problematic process of securitisation, contemporary liberal thinking is obsessed with the issue of security. Either way, security is as fundamental to liberal thought as it is problematic, with the potential authoritarian nature of application. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the discussions and issues of today are the upshot of a long tradition in which security is the primary value of liberal thought. Beginning with social contract theorists cementing security as the ultimate grounds for state formation, Locke strengthens the concept's key position with his views on property and prerogative. 19th century liberal thinkers continued this trend, claiming that security and liberty are either one and the same, or that the former is prior to the latter. Again, we found that at its heart, classical liberal thought is committed to security above all else, which in turn has dangerous consequences. Moreover, current liberal theorists have done surprisingly little to rectify the situation. Today's thinkers have either committed to the flawed agenda of balancing security against other values or have blissfully avoided the topic altogether. The result is that security holds a strong position within liberal paradigm, one which can easily be exploited along authoritarian lines to restrict individual liberties.

This deconstructive argument served to underline the problematic nature of liberal thought with a built-in dominance of security. The second part of this paper took a more reconstructive approach to grasp at potential solutions to this (il)liberal security logic. I analysed the work of two liberal theorists and two critical theorists to firstly understand their conceptions of security, and secondly to ransack these for plausible suggestions to the above problem. We saw that both Herington and Waldron were able to provide initial rejuvenations of the concept of security within political philosophy. They succeeded in redrawing the position of security within the field through developing more complete pictures of the concept itself. These highlighted the importance of security when it comes to enjoyment of goods considered essential to living a normal life, as either a requirement for or a product of security. However, despite the value of establishing clear theories of security and some individual points about its distribution, broadly these liberal approaches do not provide any clear solutions. It seems that these, wittingly or not, fall prey to the same obstacles of security reasoning as liberal thinkers before them. Booth's position of emancipatory security is able to go further. It's critical position, shows the need for wider access to security in both a conceptual and a practical sense. He also reaffirms the position of individuals above that of the state, as the ultimate ends of security. Both these points help to restrict two power bases for authoritarian security logic: the state centred view of security and

the focus on majorities in western liberal systems. Tulumello advances these positions again. He signifies the importance of pluralism when considering security as well as the need for mutual and reciprocal notions of human rights to move from individual to a collective security basis. Ultimately security must be seen as a dynamic, relational and eventually flawed in order to overcome the problems it creates in liberal thought. For Tulumello, this is best achieved through agonistic security.

So, while it is clear that the critical approaches to security studies, provide a better lens for examining and then dealing with the authoritarian dangers of security politics, these may not translate effectively into the liberal framework. In moving beyond individualistic based thinking, these theories and suggestions have become difficult to frame in liberal terms and hence are less directly useful than it appears. Thus, I have suggested that the approaches and learnings of critical security studies must be taken on board in liberal philosophical accounts of the security concept. If these can go beyond the conceptualisations stages that we have seen, to employ these on to issues of security in liberal thought, advances will be made. However, to do so, liberal theorists must accept the criticisms that have be directed at the centrality of security and the myth of balance. Once these problems are accepted, liberal thinkers may be able to begin to address them, which in turn would benefit from considering many of the points made by critical security theorists. For the bigger picture, it is clear that security will remain a key theme in political agendas and thus it must become a central topic to be subjected to rigorous political philosophy. For liberal theory to keep up with political realities of security there seems an arduous task, but this is necessary and compelling work. Reclaiming security from authoritarian hands, if deemed worthy, is the next crusade for liberal political thought.

Bibliography

- Aberystwyth University (2021) 'Prof. Ken Booth'. Available at: <https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/staff-profiles/listing/profile/kob/> (Accessed 02/08/2022).
- Bain, W. (2006) *The Empire of Security and the Safety of The People*. Abingdon: Routledge
- Bentham, J. (1843) 'Principles of the Civil Code', in *The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. I*. Edinburgh: William Tait.
- Booth, K. (1991) 'Security and emancipation', *Review of International Studies* 17(4): 313-326.
- Buzan, B. (1983) *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Wheatsheaf Publishing: Brighton.
- Buzan, B., Waever, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Dodds, S. (2012) 'Sex Equality'. In Chadwick, R. (eds) *Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition)*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Academic Press. 68-75.
- Elazar, Y. (2015) 'Liberty as a Caricature: Bentham's Antidote to Republicanism'. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. 76(3): 417-439.
- Gros, F. (2019) *The Security Principle: From Serenity to Regulation*. Verso Books: London.
- Herington, J. (2012) The Concept of Security. In Michael Selgelid & Christian Enemark (eds.), *Ethical and Security Aspects of Infectious Disease Control: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. Ashgate.
- Herington, J. (2015) 'Liberty, Fear and the State: Philosophical Perspectives on Security'. Available at: [https://www.jherington.com/docs/Herington_Cambridge-2015_\(post-review\).pdf](https://www.jherington.com/docs/Herington_Cambridge-2015_(post-review).pdf) (Accessed 18/04/2022).
- Hobbes, T. (1991) *Leviathan (1651)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hume, D. (1978) *A Treatise of Human Nature (1740)*. Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Ignatieff, M. (2004) *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*. Ontario: Penguin Books.
- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (2001) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (1985)* (Second Edition). London: Verso.
- Locke, J. (1690) *Two Treatises of Government. Everyman's Library. ed.* London: J. M. Dent & Sons

- Mill, J.S. (1972) *Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government*. London: Dent and Sons
- Mouffe, C. (2000) *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso.
- Montesquieu Baron de (1989) *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Neocleous M (2007) 'Security, liberty and the myth of balance: Towards a critique of security politics'. *Contemporary Political Theory* 6(2): 131-149.
- New York University School of Law (2021) 'Jeremy Waldron'. Available at: <https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=26993> (Accessed 02/08/2022).
- Nickel, J. (1994) 'Rethinking Rawls's Theory of Liberty and Rights'. *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 69: 763-785. Available at: <https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol69/iss3/9> (Accessed 02/08/2022).
- Nunes, J. (2012) 'Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies'. *Security Dialogue* 43(4): 345-361.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1973) *The Social Contract* (1762). London: Dent.
- Smith, A. (1982) *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (1762-3). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Spinoza, B. (1670). *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, vol 1. London: George Bell and Sons.
- Subasi, E. (2020) 'Between Perpetual War and Perpetual Peace: Liberal Social Order As Perpetual (In)Security'. *Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences*. 29: 79-94
- UN (United Nations) (2005) *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome. A/RES/60/1*. Available at: <https://undocs.org/A/RES/60/1> (Accessed 28/05/2020).
- van den Berg, B., Prins, R., & Kuipers, S. (2012) 'Assessing Contemporary Crises: Aligning Safety Science and Security Studies'. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Available at: <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1733>. (Accessed 18/04/2022).
- Vaughn-Williams, N. & Peoples, C. (2010) *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*. Abingdon: Routledge. 17-18
- Waldron, J. (2003) 'Security and liberty: the image of balance'. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 11(2): 191-210
- Waldron, J. (2006) 'Safety and Security'. *Nebraska Law Review*. 85 (2). Available at: <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1118&context=nlr> (Accessed 18/04/2022).

Wenar, L. (2021) 'John Rawls'. *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. Available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/rawls/> (Accessed 02/08/2022).

Wolff, R. P. (1970) *In Defence of Anarchism*. New York: Harper & Row