



Examining the ability of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) to provide stability in Afghanistan: a comparative study

Anouk van Nistelrooij
s1026628

Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfilment of
the Requirements for the Degree of Master
in Political Science
Political Science: Conflict, Power and
Politics

Dr. N.M. Terpstra
Dr. R.A.A. Malejacq

Nijmegen School of Management
Radboud University, Nijmegen, The
Netherlands

Word count: 18121

Abstract

This thesis compared three provinces in Afghanistan and analysed multiple factors that influenced the ability of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) to stabilize a province. The ALP became vital in certain provinces to achieve and retain stability, however, it is also held accountable for making provinces less stable. The two main factors that have been analysed in this thesis were the (dis)proportionality of the composition of the ALP and if the resource requirements were met and how this affected the ability of the ALP to provide stability. The (dis)proportionality of the composition of ALPs had the most influence in regard to the ability to provide stability. The execution of the vetting procedure of the ALP was very important, but not always conducted well enough. The procedure was influenced by tensions between ethnic or tribal groups, and if the ALP in fact was disproportionately composed, this resulted in power abuse by ALP members. In general, the ALP has failed in Afghanistan. This thesis will answer to what extent the factors mentioned above, contributed to this failure.

Content

1. Introduction	5
2. Literature review	7
2.1 The use of pro-government militia forces	13
2.2 Pro-government militia in Afghanistan: The Afghan Local Police (ALP)	14
3. Theoretical framework	16
3.1 Operationalization	17
3.2 (Dis)proportionality within the ALP's composition	19
3.3 Resource shortages	21
3.4 typology	22
4. Methodology	23
4.1 Case selection	24
4.2 Data, limitation and generalisability	26
5. The analyses	27
5.1 Paktika	30
5.1.1 (Dis)proportionality within the ALP's composition.	30
5.1.2 The level of resources available for the ALP	32
5.1.3 Conclusion Paktika	33
5.2 Baghlan	33
5.2.1 (Dis)proportional composition of the ALP	33
5.2.2 Resource shortages	36
5.2.3 Conclusion Baghlan	36
5.3 Helmand	37
5.3.1 (Dis)proportional composition of the ALP	37
5.3.2 Level of resources available for the ALP	39
5.3.3. Conclusion Helmand	39
6. Discussion	40
6.1 (Dis)proportional composition of the ALP	40
6.2 Resource shortages	42
6.3 Discussion of the typology	45
7. Conclusion	46
References	49

List of figures

Figure 1: scale of stability: failing or success?.....19.

Figure 2: Typology.....22.

Figure 3: level of insecurity in Afghanistan29.

Figure 4: Discussion of the Typology.....45.

List of abbreviations

ALP: Afghan Local Police
ANA: Afghan National Army
ANDSF: Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP: Afghan National Police
AP3: Afghan Public Protection Programme
ASF: Afghan Security Forces
ARJ: Abdul Rhaman Jan
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces
CFSOCC-S: Combined Forces Special Operation Component Command Central Special
COIN: Counterinsurgency
GIROA: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HRW: Human Rights Watch
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
MOI: Ministry of Interior
PGM: Pro-Government militia
SIGAR: Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction
SOF: Special Operation Forces
SSR: security sector reform
UN: United Nations
UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
US: United States
VSO: Village Security Operations
WHAM: Winning Hearts And Minds

1. Introduction

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was an Afghan militia and local law enforcement body that was part of the international counterinsurgency campaign (COIN) (Vincent et al., 2015; Gosztonyi et al., 2015). Its main objective was to enhance security and stability on communal level, and therefore contribute to the overall stabilization of the country (Felbab-brown, 2016). COIN was mainly active in districts where the Afghan government and the US forces had limited access. The US had been involved in the Afghanistan war for many years. In the beginning of the 2000s the US was even involved in multiple military operations across the world. Therefore, the US increasingly looked into the possibilities to secure its interest with minimal involvement (Felbab-Brown, 2016). As the US couldn't be involved in all military actions in Afghanistan, it sought to embrace the strategy to increase the capacity of their partners in the conflict. The Afghanistan government was unable to challenge the Taliban on its own, and the US did not want to lose a lot of American lives and economic resources. Therefore, the US relied more heavily on supporting pro-government militias (PGM). Due to their ability to help the government gather intelligence by offering essential local expertise, PGMs contributed to an efficient and workable COIN strategy (Jentzsch et al., 2015). Local militias have historically been employed by a number of actors due to the need for local cooperation (Kalyvas, 2008). These militias also strengthened the conventional armed forces (Carey et al., 2013; Jentzsch, 2015).

However, the strategy to outsource tasks to local militia, is not new for the US, as they supported the Mujahideen in the 1980s and the Northern Alliance since 2001 (Ibid). The most notable militia that has been supported and sponsored by the US during the war in Afghanistan, was the ALP, as it was active in almost all provinces in the country. The ALP program has been established in 2010 as part of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program (Petit, 2011). VSO served as the mechanism used by special operations forces (SOF) to create conditions for ALP to be developed in Afghan districts (Wilkins, 2022). Eventually it would become part of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ALP consisted out of volunteers who had been vetted, recruited and trained to fight the Taliban, but also to fight other anti-government militia forces (Ibid.). The idea behind the localization of the program was, that ALP members were more integrated in the community and therefore would feature more knowledge about the culture, history, ethnicity and local dynamics (Moyar, 2014).

In practice, however, there were only a few instances where the ALPs were able to defend and stabilize villages. In most of the cases, militias developed a strong tendency to escape. This often was followed by power abuse, problematic behaviour, and continuous conflicts among different communities (Moyar, 2014). In this thesis I will examine the different factors which had an influence on the ability of the ALP to provide stabilization and discuss in which regard they differed from destabilizing ALPs.

As mentioned, the ALP is part of the counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. The primary objective of COIN itself is to develop an effective, stable and legitimate government (Eikenberry, 2013). The ALP, therefore, should have had a positive effect on the stability of the Afghan districts in which they were deployed. Which, according to the theory, simultaneously leads to a more stable Afghan government. Therefore, this thesis is trying to explain why in some provinces the ALP was able to provide stability and why in some provinces the ALP contributed to the destabilization of a province. Therefore, the following question is drafted:

Why did the ALP programme have stabilizing effects in some provinces while it did not have stabilizing effects in other provinces?

The ALP units will be researched in three different provinces in Afghanistan: Paktika, Baghlan and Helmand. Paktika is known for its relative peace during the conflict, as well as in the Soviet war, the civil war and during the transition of power in 2001 (Clark, 2018). Baghlan, has been selected because it has a significant Pashtun population, as do the Taliban, which makes it therefore interesting to research the impact the ALP had in that province (Gosztanyi et al., 2015). The last province that will be included in this case study is Helmand. The provinces will be compared on basis of the ability to provide stabilization by the ALP units. Therefore, two additional questions have been drafted:

What were the main stabilising effect of the ALP?

What were the main destabilizing effects of the ALP?

The scientific relevance of this thesis is that it aims to contribute to the already existing literature. Earlier research that has been conducted on the topic of the ALP were amongst others Goodhand & Hakimi (2014), who also did comparative research in three provinces and concluded that there is a need to look further than the Taliban-anti-Taliban fault

line. Also, the short-term successes the ALP booked had severe irreversible consequence for the long-term. Cecchinell (2013) conducted her research in Kunduz and discusses the complexity of ethnicity that the ALP had to deal with. This comparative research will look for stabilising elements, this is not yet conducted by other researchers. That is why this thesis is trying to comprehend that. It looks into the ALP's ability to provide stability on the basis of two main factors: the (dis)proportionality of the composition of the ALP and to which extent the resource requirements were met and how this influenced the ability to provide stabilization in the province. If these factors seem to have an influence on the ability to stabilize a province by using a PGM like the ALP, this gives the field another perspective in which to look at ALP like militias and under which circumstances they are best able to provide stability.

The social relevance builds further on these factors which determine the ability to provide stability. In practice this thesis can be used on security policies which have to deal with PGMs. To be even more specific, it can be used by counterinsurgency actors that want to make use of PGMs. This thesis can be of great help for that, because it determines the factors in which the PGMs are most likely to have stabilizing effects, and eventually help within the counterinsurgency process. Therefore, this thesis can also be relevant for multiple Ministries of Defence, as they often are on the drawing table for the implementation of counterinsurgency policy and ultimately that of the PGM's.

2. Literature review

The literature review gives an overview of COIN in Afghanistan and to what extent the topic has been researched. This will be followed by introducing the use of pro-government militias in general, after which pro-government militias in Afghanistan will be covered.

The intervention in Afghanistan was a reaction to the 9/11 attacks in 2001. In the run up to the intervention, the international community kept distant from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan between the period of 1996 and 2001 (Wagemaker, 2012). In that period, the international community did carry out humanitarian help, as the world had seen degrading scenes coming from Afghanistan under Taliban rule, but this help was limited. In the run up to the intervention in 2001, the national security interests of the US in regard to Al-Qaida and the Taliban grew, as the US had been increasingly targeted by terrorist attacks around the world (Wagemaker, 2012; Kamminga, 2021). At the same time Al-Qaida were using Afghan

soil as a training ground for terrorists. After the 9/11 attacks, the US was convinced that, if not stopped, Al-Qaida could again be planning a terrorist attack on US territory. The Taliban therefore were partly responsible for the attacks. This wasn't the first time the Taliban had been appointed partly responsible for terrorist's attack carried out by Al-Qaida. In 1998 the UN Security Council declared that the Taliban was partly responsible for terrorist attacks in Africa. Because Taliban troops continued to use of Afghan territory. The Taliban utilised the land to hide, prepare, and organise terrorist operations (Ibid.).

Eventually, on July 30th of 2001, the UN security council unanimously agreed on Resolution 1363, in which Afghanistan was declared an international security threat for international peace and stability in the region (Wagemaker, 2012). This resolution laid the foundation of the international support for the military intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11. Before the events in 2001, the international community did not have enough diplomatic and political support for a military intervention. Afghanistan itself was 'ripe' for an intervention since the Taliban took control in 1996. The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan was growing, as Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in the world and the position of women and girls was the worst in the world (Ibid). Resolution 1363 was an indicator for the growing support for a military intervention (Kamminga. 2021; Wagemaker, 2012). The 9/11 attacks in 2001 created an opportunity for the international community to intervene in Afghanistan. The intervention can be viewed as a retaliation of the 9/11 attacks. Especially in the early months of the intervention, the motivation was more akin to retaliation than humanitarian concerns (Wagemaker, 2012). The so called 'War on Terror' was also motivated by national security interests of the United States (Holland & Aaronson, 2014; Eikenberry, 2013; Terpstra, 2020; George W. Bush, 2001).

The intervention itself in the beginning was focussed on a fast overthrow of the Taliban regime, the defeat of Al-Qaida and the Taliban as a whole in Afghanistan. The legitimization for the intervention became rapidly clear. The UN Security Council judged that Article 51 was applicable. Article 51 states, that a state can only exercise its right to use force in self-defence if an armed attack occurs against that state (Feinstein, 2001). Therefore the US had the right to self-defence, which legitimized their military intervention in Afghanistan (Wagemaker, 2012; Feinstein, 2001; Kamminga, 2021). This meant that the US was at war, which simultaneously invoked NATO's Article 5 (Wagenmaker, 2012; NATO, 2022a). Therefore, the US could count on its NATO allies, as 'an attack on one, is an attack on all' (NATO).

On the 7th of October in 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom started. The early phases mainly consisted out of airstrikes, which supported the US special forces, the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces (Laub, 2014). Kabul fell in November 2001, resulting in the invitation of the UN to several Afghan factions to the Bonn conference (Wagemaker, 2012; Laub, 2014; Conrad, 2005). The intent was that the Afghan state would have taken as large a part as feasible in the statebuilding process. Lakhdar Brahimi, the conference's architect, sought to build up Afghan capacity first and foremost, therefore relying on a small number of foreign participants and as many Afghan employees as possible. (Chesterman, 2002). Therefore, goal of the conference was to make Afghanistan a stable country that was able to resist extremist groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaida. At the same time the goals of each actor sometimes differed. US' focus was still on the 'War on Terror', whereas European actors wanted to shift towards the statebuilding of Afghanistan in which democracy and human rights played a central role. This plan was highly ambitious (Shurke, 2007). The Bonn conference did appoint a transition government, with Hamid Karzai as President (Wagemaker, 2012; Conrad, 2005). Karzai had to organize elections and had to make sure a constitution was drafted. The Bonn accords can be regarded as a framework for setting up a centralized government system in Afghanistan (Ibid.). The idea was that the statebuilding process would create a long-term effect in regard to economic and social development. To achieve 'peace' in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 2001. At first ISAF only operated in Kabul and in the region of Kabul to ensure that UN personnel and the transition government could do their jobs. It did not have a mandate to limit the power of warlords or to maintain the monopoly of violence in Afghanistan (Egnell, 2011; Wagemaker, 2012). This meant that the more remote areas in Afghanistan were relatively untouched (Egnell, 2011). ISAF was only fully operational with a bigger mandate in 2006.

Paris (2004) suggested that peacebuilding efforts in fragile states, where the focus mainly lies on democratization process, such as in Afghanistan, can exacerbate the social conflicts laying underneath the society and therefore often sparked conflicts between locals. He also suggested that elections in these fragile states can only be successful when political institutions are already built and functioning. The Bonn conference is doing the exact opposite, as it appoints an interim government which was required to call elections within a certain time frame. Collier & Hoeffler (2009) argued in line in with Paris, as early elections function as catalysers of electoral conflicts between competitors. Adding up, most Afghans didn't have

experience with democratic institutions, as there had been conflict over the past two decennia and Afghans learned to survive by siding with the ‘right’ group and adapting to their morals (Wagemaker, 2012).

Tilly (1985) argues that states arise from competition and the ability to control a territory and its population, and that statebuilding starts with the monopolization of violence (Taylor & Botea, 2008). In this first phase, capital and coercion are the factors which declare state formation: the ones who are able to accumulate the most resources for the exercise of coercion becomes the ruler of the state. In the beginning of state making, as Tilly argues, there is a period of intensely fragmented sovereignty. Wagemaker (2012) argues that this is also the case in Afghanistan. As, local commanders were the most important rulers. These rulers were benefiting from a non-functioning Afghan state, as they were able to gain power via the informal economy. With this in mind, statebuilding could not be accomplished by the Afghan government alone. The intervening force, in this case predominantly the US, had to create the monopoly of violence for the Afghan government (Ibid.). Because the US was the intervening actor, the ‘coercive’ aspect of statebuilding had to be interpreted in a positive way, not the negative: violence (Ibid.). This meant that the population of Afghanistan was needed within the statebuilding process. The Afghans themselves had to be able to recognize themselves in the state. The winning of hearts and minds (WHAM) was supposed to play a crucial part in this. Since President Obama took office in 2009, the intervention in Afghanistan emphasized a more population-centric counterinsurgency approach. Securing the population (including winning the hearts and minds) and reducing civilian casualties are now centric for the counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan (Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009). Before 2009 the intervention could be better characterized as enemy centric (Egnell, 2011).

The enemy-and population-centric approach are part of counterinsurgency. But before delving into that, the topic has to be further introduced. An *insurgency* is a political and military non-state entity that aims to seize territory and thereby undermines the legitimacy of the state while enhancing the insurgent group's power and legitimacy (Jardine & Palamar, 2013; Paul et al., 2016; Hoffman, 2011). *Counterinsurgency* itself can be interpreted in a lot of different ways. In general, it is understood as a battle between insurgents and the state’s government (and its allies) for the control over the population (Kitzen, 2017). It is argued that the success or failure of counterinsurgency depends on the ability to provide order and security (Jardine & Palamar; Wagemaker, 2012). Similarly, the US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 argues that insurgents thrive from chaos and disorder, counterinsurgency succeeds when

it is able to provide order (Jardine & Palamar, 2013). Paul et al. (2016) defines counterinsurgency as an effort taken by the government (or its allies) to oppose the insurgency. Jardine & Palamar (2013) are more specific in their definition of counterinsurgency, they argue that it involves a range of political and military efforts, which includes development, warfare and political programs. All this in order to strengthen the legitimacy and popularity of the state government.

Counterinsurgency operations can be conducted in several different forms. There is a difference between enemy-centric and population-centric counterinsurgency. The *enemy-centric* approach suggests that insurgents are the main generator of insecurity for civilians. Therefore, destroying the insurgency via offensive military action, would create a secure environment for the population and at the same time eliminates the actor who challenges the state's authority, resulting in the return of stability (Jardine & Palamar, 2013). This enemy-centric idea is *as old as war*, concentrating on the enemy's forces rather than attempting to engage the population in which this enemy operates (Miron, 2019). Miron distinguishes two different forms of the enemy-centric approach: *regular* and *irregular warfare*. Regular warfare involves the more conventional state-on-state conflict, while irregular warfare is to be considered asymmetric, the conflicts between state and non-state actors. Regular warfare does not take into consideration *small wars*, instead it is based on the more conventional war approach, where the central idea: destruction of the enemy is in place. Within the irregular warfare the destruction of the enemy is not the primary goal. This is because in small wars the enemies are harder to identify.

In contrast to the enemy-centric approach, the population-centric approach addresses the importance of popular support and the underlying grievances that the insurgents have caused, rather than focussing on the insurgency itself as primary reason for instability (Miron, 2019). The population-centric approach implies that the control over the population is a matter of collaboration between the government and the local population (Kitzen, 2017). Kilcullen (2006, p3.) argues that the population-centric counterinsurgency is about building collaboration towards a set of common goals rather than to impose order through unchallenged domination. The idea behind this is that the more the government is able to collaborate, the stronger its control is over the population, and in consequence, this weakens the position of the insurgents (Kitzen, 2017). At the same time, according to Kitzen, the population-centric counterinsurgency approach argues that collaboration is crucial in order to legitimize the government's authority. As mentioned earlier, the population-centric

counterinsurgency approach has been applied in Afghanistan since 2009 (Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009).

One of the most popular population-centric counterinsurgency approaches is ‘winning of hearts and minds’ (WHAM). WHAM is considered to be one of the most successful approaches (Hultman, 2012; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Feffer & Njubi & Nesbitt, 2013). Winning hearts and minds of the population is considered to be one of the primary goals in counterinsurgency operations in general. The core idea of the approach is to apply development strategies, using minimal force, and address political grievances that drive the insurgents. This all-in order to turn the population against the insurgents and in favour for the counterinsurgents (Fishstein & Wilder, 2012). The counterinsurgency strategy of the government has to entail two aspects. First, it has to convince the population that they have the capacity to govern but also that they have the willingness and the ability to protect the population at the same time (Jardine & Palamar, 2013). Stabilizing districts therefore is of crucial importance, because otherwise statebuilding efforts cannot succeed (Fishstein & Wilder, 2012).

Another factor which is important in regard to the population-centric approach is to avoid civilian casualties during counterinsurgency operations (Hultman, 2012). In Afghanistan, counterinsurgency operations failed to do so. The number of civilian casualties increased, and many of these civilians were killed in crossfire or indirectly through imprecise attacks (Hultman, 2012.). While the Taliban are infamous for causing civilians deaths, also the counterinsurgency forces have been responsible for a large number of civilian casualties, mainly caused by US bombings in the early stages of the intervention (Herold, 2001). In 2006, the UN predicted that around one third of the people which that were killed were civilians, the other two third were alleged to be either security forces, militias or insurgents (Hultman, 2012). In 2008, around 45% of the civilian casualties were caused by international forces (Hultman, 2012). Most deaths were the consequence of the so called ‘opportunity’ strikes, which are unplanned air strikes when ground troops encountered enemy forces (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Too many civilian deaths caused by COIN actors developed distrust among the civilians. These actors were the Afghan National police (ANP), Afghan National Army (ANA), ANSF and ISAF. This led to destabilization of several district in Afghanistan and in the end in the failure of the COIN program itself (Ibid.).

2.1 The use of pro-government militia forces

Militias emerged in all kinds of civil wars, including irregular civil wars in which states seek high quality local information, ethnic insurgencies and wars against foreign occupiers (Jentzsch et al., 2015; Kalyvas, 2006; Branch, 2007). Members of militia groups, just like rebel groups, can be recruited coercively or join voluntarily (Jentzsch et al., 2015). States are delegating violence to militias as they are more and more collaborating with militias during armed conflicts (Ibid.). The reasoning behind that, is that militias are more feasible in providing local knowledge and collect intelligence necessary in the conflict. A second reason for the state to collaborate or use militias is that their own military isn't able, or it is too weak, to face domestic rebellions in certain regions of the state.

Pro-government militia forces were part of the counterinsurgency strategy applied in Afghanistan. But before delving into to these militias in Afghanistan, pro-government militias will be defined, and their pros and cons will be discussed. Pro-government militias (PGMs) are being defined by Carey et al., (2013, p.250) based on four different criteria:

1. *is identified as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or subnational)*
2. *is identified as not being part of the regular security forces*
3. *is armed, and*
4. *has some level of organisation.*

Carey et al., (2013) distinguishes three types of PGMs: informal, semi-official and government linked. Informal PGMs may be armed and trained by the government but do not have an official link with the government and are not acknowledges as such. Semi-official PGMs can be subordinate to the regular forces but are separate from regular security or police forces. The government-linked PGMs are officially connected to the state's government.

Jentzsch et al (2015) is in disagreement about the link to the state to define armed militias. According to Jentzsch et al (2015) militias are often controlled or co-opt by government representatives, but they can shift their loyalties and may pursue an agenda which are contradicting the interests of the state. This is called the anti-rebel dimension (Jentzsch et al., 2015)

There are several tenable reasons why militias are used. PGMs can have effective and feasible means within COIN, because PGMs can provide valuable local knowledge for the government and collect intelligence (Jentzsch et al., 2015). That is why, in the past, local militias were used by different actors in their need for local collaboration (Kalyvas, 2008). Also, these militias served as a force multiplier for the regular armed forces, as regular forces were sometimes weak (Carey et al., 2013; Jentzsch et al., 2015). The ideology of the state influences the way militias are implemented. For example, fragmented regimes are more likely to tolerate the use of militias by political elites for private purposes. Authoritarian regimes might create militias as a method of ‘coup-proofing’ (Ibid.). This shows that there is not just one reason for the use of PGMs. An assumption that is often made is that PGMs are subservient to the state. This is not true, as a state’s tolerance or collaborations of militia does not mean they have full control over their formation and activities (Ibid). Even in cases where the state imposes the use of militias, these militias may evolve into forces with their own agendas, goals and interests. Militias can also be established from below, out of local initiatives. Jentzsch et al (2015) argues that this occurs as a local reaction to insurgent violence. An example is given by Blocq (2014). He argues in his study about South Sudan, that the emergence of local armed self-defence forces, as a response to indiscriminate insurgent violence, depended on the perception of insurgent violence as being fuelled by neighbouring tribes, which made armed resistance both necessary and manageable.

2.2 Pro-government militia in Afghanistan: The Afghan Local Police (ALP)

The use of pro-government militias was part of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Militia forces were often used to increase the security in rural regions where the presence of the ANA, ANP and ISAF was limited (Felbab-Brown, 2016). The main goal of these militias was to decrease the military strength of the Taliban, and therefore increase the stability in the region. But sometime, militia forces served their own agenda rather than the agenda of their external supporter, as discussed above. Especially when the central government’s ability to influence and control militia behaviour was limited. Besides, some of these militias were ethnically divided, which caused instability within these militias itself (Jalali, 2016).

This thesis researched the most well-known PGM of Afghanistan: The Afghan Local Police. The program began in Kabul, the Combined Forces Special Operations Component

Command - Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), under the direction of Brigadier General Edward Reeder, was developing plans to send US and Afghan Special Forces (ASF) into villages where they would train and support "village defence forces" to fend off the Taliban (Moyar, 2014; Hulslander & Spivey, 2012). The Afghan National Police (ANP) therefore could focus on offensive counters rather than the security of villages already seized from the Taliban. The Afghan Local Police is part of the overarching Village Stability Operations program (VSO) (Moyar, 2014; Petit, 2011; Moir, 2020). The members of the ALP had to originate from the district in which they were active, and also important, had to have the intention of staying afterwards. Therefore, the ALP relied on the population of the villages itself. The ideology behind this principle is that people are intensely invested in defending their own community, a trait of which the ALP used (Jalali, 2016). This is one of the main reasons why in this thesis different units of the ALP are studied. There is no 'one' ALP. There are multiple units divided over different districts and villages in the country.

The ALP were sponsored and supported by the US and UK. They cooperated with local elders and government officials (Vincent et al., 2015). The Afghan Public Protection Project (AP3), the Local Defence Initiative, and a variety of other militia programmes, such as the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, laid the groundworks for the ALP. These programmes encouraged and reinforced the rural tradition of self-defence. All previous government organized militia were merged into the ALP, which placed them all under the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and subjected them to the Afghan National Police's command at the district and provincial level (Hakimi, 2013). As mentioned earlier, the ALP's task is to defend communalities in regions where there is limited presence of ANA, ANP and international forces (Felbab-Brown, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2011; Netherlands, The: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). In reality, Hakimi (2013) argues, that the ALP was mainly used as a tool for the US forces. The ALP would be the first to encounter Taliban fighters. In this way the US would have less military engagement and therefore have less American casualties. Besides, US special forces used the militias for night raids and targeting insurgents rather than protecting the population (Ibid.). On the other hand, local militias come with their advantages. Militias are more familiar with the population in a certain district, they are more aware of the terrain, and they know the insurgents' tactics and preferences better than the external forces (Moyar, 2014).

Goodhand & Hakimi (2014) argued that the ALP program itself was a result of a compromise of different actors. The actors involved had different interests and competing rationales. The motives of the actors involved included, fighting the Taliban, securing the state, protecting oneself or one's neighbourhood, maintaining the status quo, renegotiating power relations, extending patronage links, obtaining outside resources, and settling scores (Ibid). And even if these goals were met, it could not compete with the losses it had to encounter to reach these goals. This is especially clear when considering the number of lives lost during this conflict. Another factor was, that short term successes had severe and irreversible costs for the long term. Their study suggests that there is a need to look further than the Taliban-anti-Taliban fault line. As there is a more complex situation which contain micro cleavages. The ALP was used as a tool to settle score for old conflicts, and therefore they undermined the state's authority (Ibid). At the same time, the international forces were drawn into these local conflicts as they supported and sponsored the ALP forces.

Cecchinel (2013) conducted her research in the Chahrdrara district in Kunduz and argues that the ALP did not only compete with the Taliban, but also with its supervisor, the ANP. Although the ALP and the Taliban were the two main actors in the conflict in this district, the conflict itself was not bilateral, but, according to Cecchinel, the conflict could better be described as multilateral. As the ALP units clashed with other ALP units and civilians were often involved in the conflict. For the population in Chahrdrara it was impossible to stay out of the conflict as they either had to side with the ALP or with the Taliban. They most often decided along lines of ethnic affiliation (Cecchinel, 2013).

Felbab-Brown (2016) argues that the usage of the militia forces often requires a long-term management and deep involvement of the US. But a risk of using militia, is that they can go rogue, if this happens the chances are high that the militia will eventually contradict the interest of the US and the Afghan government (Felbab-Brown, 2016; Laub, 2014) Therefore the long-term assessment should get a more prominent role in regard to the use of militias. Especially, it has to be clear which factors influence the ability to provide stabilization the most. This has not yet been done.

3. Theoretical framework

Various factors influenced the ability of the ALP to stabilize a region. In this section these factors will be discussed. This will be done in three specific provinces: Paktika, Baghlan

and Helmand. These three provinces are selected on the basis of multiple criteria, these criteria will be discussed more elaborate in the methodological chapter. The factors which might affected the ability of stabilization of a province operate on multiple levels. These levels will be discussed in this chapter.

3.1 Operationalization

This thesis deals with a lot of different concepts that are important for the hypotheses. Therefore, it is important to first define these concepts before delving into the hypotheses of this thesis. Starting with ethnicity and ethnic solidarity.

The definition of ethnicity that I will use in this thesis is that of Gray (2001): *The ethnic group or groups that people identify with or feel they belong to. Ethnicity is a measure of cultural affiliation, as opposed to race, ancestry or nationality. Thus, ethnicity is self-perceived and people can affiliate with more than one ethnic group* (p.1).

Ethnicity in Afghanistan has played a role in politics for centuries. As the state used ethnic patterns to regulate access to public offices and goods (Conrad, 2005). Pashtuns were for a long time the dominant ethnicity in Afghanistan and therefore receiving the most valuable territories, including oases and nomads. This unequal treatment formed stereotypes amongst different ethnical groups and created ethnical hierarchy (Ibid). During the Soviet war, ethnic affiliation was used to create militias. This trend continued after the US invasion in Afghanistan. One of the most well-known examples is the Uzbek militia of Rashid Dostum. After September 11th, ethnicity was seen by the international actors as main driver for conflicts in the state. It was also a useful navigational tool, the ‘Uzbek’ Dostum, the ‘Tajik’ Rabbani helped in that process. Ethnicity for this reason is part of this thesis as, these ethnic patters, still play a role in the distribution of goods, offices and eventually also within the ALP. With the formation of militias based on ethnic affiliation, the following concept comes to notion: ethnical solidarity. Ethnic solidarity enables people to form networks of mutual respect and support, collecting resources inside the group to get around obstacles they might otherwise encounter in mainstream society (Yoon, 2013., p. 30). Ethnic solidarity is important for minority groups because it organizes the social structures and community (Ibid).


The next concept is the concept of tribes in Afghanistan. Tribes fulfil diverse political roles including serving as political administration, resolve legal issues, and occasionally

having their own local legal courts (Myers, 2013). They operate autonomously and sustain their own systems, occasionally they work together with other tribes in the region to gain political advantages. These tribes make use of their own security forces. In the Afghan tradition these tribes' security forces are called *arbakai* (Felbab-Brown, 2016; Tariq, 2008; Schmeidl & Karokhail, 2009). These local security providers have long been part of Afghanistan's history, predominantly associated with tribes. They exhibit stronger loyalty to their respective tribes than to the Afghan government. Loyalty is important within tribes, as it is derived from familial relationships and kinship, as tribes represent local interests.

It is important to state the difference between tribal militia and warlord militias, as both are powerful in Afghanistan but distinct from each other. Therefore, they may not always be seen as the same. Tribal militias are often organized based on next of kin or place of residence. Each potential call to arms involves the participation of a local council, shura or jirga. This is significantly different from warlord militias, which involve a charismatic leader focusing on the individual rather than on the community (Jones & Munoz, 2010). Their goal is to monopolize violence and power instead of protecting the community using violence, as the tribal militias do. Lastly, tribal leaders perceive themselves as part of the community and are accountable to jirgas and shuras, while warlords consider themselves above the tribe (Ibid). Malejacq (2019) uses the Orientalist definition of warlords: warlords are astute political entrepreneurs with the ability to control a territory and organize violence, and exert their authority across different spheres, including economic, military, ideology, social and political (p.4).

Important in this thesis is the ability of the ALP to provide stability. Therefore stability (and instability) has to be measured in some kind of way. The most basic measurement tool for stability and instability is the decrease or the increase of violence in a certain area. This is better defined in term of the progress towards stabilizing the operational environment (Caldwell, 2008). Adding up, stability does not stop with the decreasing of violence itself but also with the creation of conditions that support safety. This includes humanitarian access to non-governmental agencies and government agencies. In that way the whole region, or province can stabilize. Figure 1 shows the scale in which stability can balance according to Caldwell (2008). This shows that there is not either stability or instability, but it fluctuates on a scale.

Figure 1: scale of stability: failing or success?



Murphy (2010) suggests in his *handbook of assessment and measures of effectiveness in stability operations* that, not listening to elders within a conflict situation leads to instability, because, the elders, know the needs of the people best. The influence of the elders on the ALP, and to what extent the ALP and the (international) security forces indeed listen to these elders regarding local dynamics and needs, influences the stability overall. If they don't listen, this could lead to instability in the district in which they are operational.

3.2 (Dis)proportionality within the ALP's composition

The influence of ethnic disproportionality could potentially be result from inconclusive vetting and recruitment procedures (Marquis et al., 2016). The Ministry of Interior (MOI) was primarily responsible for recruiting ALP members. While some argue that the MOI were reasonably successful in this, other disagree. The MOI was not able to protect ALP units from criminal, insurgent, or powerbroker influences while preserving ethnic and tribal balances within the ALP in the long run (Ibid.).

An important part of the vetting procedure is the *shura*, which is the most important council of leaders in the community. It has an important role in the establishment of the ALP in their respective district, and therefore at the same time, a lot of influence. But sometimes the *shura* procedure was left out of the vetting process, due to the inability to reach an agreement, because of ethnic or tribal division (Moyar, 2014). Alternatively, the elders from the particular district, aligned themselves with militia leaders during the vetting process, especially if it benefits their interests, and if it involved exploiting their rival villages (Felbab-Brown, 2016). The consequence may be that the ALP imposed a tyranny of the majority. This due to ethnic and tribal disputes and eventually, resulting in disbalance in the province (Ibid.).

The composition of the ALP therefore is crucial. As local men are probably more loyal to their tribe than they are to the Afghan government. When the ALP represented the dominant tribe, they (red. the ALP) were more likely to be perceived as legitimate (Felbab-brown, 2016). However, if the composition of the district or province consisted out of multiple tribes without

one dominant tribe, it is considered to have a heterogenous composition. If tribes were not evenly represented in the ALP, or only one of the tribes was included, this led to destabilization of the district. As the men were more loyal to their tribe than they were to the ALP. Additionally, other tribes may feel underrepresented, and perceived the ALP as a threat, because one tribe in the district received significantly more resources from the government than the other (Ibid).

The same consideration applies to ethnic differences. Rather than having a single ALP unit responsible for the security of the entire province, there are multiple units assigned to different villages within the province. It is crucial to examine the ethnicity of the ALP in these districts and assess how over *or* underrepresentation of specific ethnic groups may affect provincial stability. Because underrepresented ethnic groups could feel distance from the ALP, as they felt not represented by them. Conversely, if the ALP in a certain region only consisted out of one ethnic group, while the district itself consisted out of a multitude of ethnic groups, the ALP could misuse their power to favour their own ethnic group. As a result, the following hypothesis have been formulated:

H1: *A disproportionate composition of the ALP is more likely to have destabilizing effect on the province as a whole.*

pre-existing conflicts and *the targeting of specific groups by the ALP*, are two factors that are a further effect of **H1**. The pre-existing ethnic or tribal conflicts within Afghan provinces were highly intricate, influenced by factors such as ethnicity and tribalism affiliations. Local powerbrokers often exhibit favouritism or had connections within specific groups and prey on potential rivals (Van Bijlert, 2009). Consequently, the ALP had to deal with complexities of either ethnicity, tribalism or both. During the vetting procedure of the ALP, consultations with elders, who themselves represent a certain ethnicity and/or tribe, are common. Considering pre-existing ethnic or tribal conflicts becomes crucial when determining the selection of ALP commanders within a given district. As they were, in some cases, responsible for the composition of the ALP units. If the ALP consisted out of an ethnical group which was already in conflict with other ethnical groups, they were likely to use the power and resources of the ALP, to settle disputes, rather than fighting the Taliban. This also accounted for tribalism. Tribalism tries to preserve a tribal society's structure, traditions, and autonomy (Myers, 2013). The composition of the ALP therefore is crucial in districts where there was pre-existing conflict as it could determine the ability of the ALP to stabilize the district and eventually, the province.

Another possible effect of the disproportionality of the composition in ALP units was that militias could abuse their powers against other ethnic or tribal groups. If within an ALP unit only one ethnic group or one tribe was vetted and recruited, this resulted into abuse of violence. This could go hand in hand with the pre-existing conflicts discussed earlier. If ALP units had a disproportionate composition and the district struggles with local conflict, abuse of power is more likely. This abuse expresses itself in particular against the underrepresented groups within the ALP units. The two concept, pre-existing conflict and the targeting of specific groups, therefore, are important to include in the effect of the disproportionality in the composition of the ALP.

3.3 Resource shortages

Another factor that influences on the ability of the ALP to provide stability, is the level of resources the ALPs get from the US and the MOI. Resources can be divided in military equipment and salary for the ALP's officers. In the beginning of the ALP, coalition assistance was necessary as the MOI was struggling to provide the ALP with the necessary resources (Marquis, 2016). As a result, the ALPs sometimes circumvented the MOI (Cordesman, 2020). Consequently, weapons were directly provided to the ALP by the US, bypassing the MOI. It was only since 2015 that the MOI took charge of supplying the ALP in Afghanistan. The logistics capabilities and prospects of MOI received mixed appraisals from Coalition officials in 2013. It was challenging for Afghans to push and pull military equipment and supplies in a timely manner. The Afghan logistical system was not effective and full of corruption (Marquis et al., 2016). While sometime the MOI was able to meet the ALP unit requirements, other ALP units faced serious supply and equipment shortages.

The issue of salaries of ALP personnel is the other kind of resource that could have an effect on the ability of the ALP to provide stability. The Ministry of Interior in (MOI) is responsible for the distribution of the salaries amongst the ALP members. While the US funds these salaries, the US is not directly responsible for the distribution of these salaries. In terms of salary payment, the ALP falls under the MOI but is not included in the authorized Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) personnel, for which a national fund is created by donors. Only the US and the Afghan government provide funding for the ALP (SIGAR, 2019).

The MOI struggled with the distribution of the salaries, as their system is not up to date and therefore vulnerable for corruption. This has led to payments being made to "ghosts fighters," referring to ALP members who do not actually exist. Consequently, multiple ALP members have been underpaid due to the depletion of the salary budget caused by these "ghost fighters." If salaries are not paid on time or if they fall short of what had been promised, ALP members may be more prone to rebellion or even aligning themselves with the Taliban or other anti-government militia.

Based on these two factors, the following hypothesis has been drafted:

H2: *If resource requirements for the ALP are met, they are more likely to stabilize the province.*

3.4 typology

It is interesting to put the two hypotheses, drafted in the previous part, together. This in order to create a better overview in the end and by doing so the ability to compare the provinces is even bigger. The disproportionality of the composition of the ALP units will be taken into consideration in the one side of the typology, The composition of the ALP unit can either be proportional or disproportional in regard to the ethnic or tribal proportionality of the district in which the ALP operates. The other side will contain the extent to which the resource requirements are met, these can either be low or high. See figure 2.

Figure 2: typology

	Proportionate composition of the ALP	Disproportionate composition of the ALP
Resource requirements are met	Best possible situation: The composition of the ALP is proportionate while resource requirements are met, stability in the province is most likely.	Situation in which the composition of the ALP is disproportionate, but resource requirements are met, stability in the province is possible, although hard to acquire.

Resource requirements are not met	The composition of the ALP is proportionate but at the same time resource requirements are not met, stabilizing the province is a possibility, though harder to achieve than when the requirements were met.	Worst possible situation: The composition of the ALP is disproportionate and resource requirements are not met, stability in the province is least likely.
--	--	--

*Resource requirements contain both military equipment and salaries

4. Methodology

Before delving into the analyses, the methodology will be discussed, explaining the choice for a qualitative multi-case design with a comparative aspect. Once the methodology, particularly the case selection, which is vital to the thesis, is clear, the analysis will proceed.

This thesis focusses on three particular cases concerning the ALP in Afghanistan. therefore, the qualitative method has been chosen to apply to these cases. As briefly mentioned in the literature review, this thesis will conduct research Paktika, Baghlan and Helmand. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) has been active in all of these provinces. It is interesting to compare the outcomes of the implemented policies and actions of the ALP and how they affected the stability of each province. The Afghan Ministry of State eventually took charge of the ALP, but the US provided the majority of its funding. This indicates that many actors have been involved in each of these provinces. This is important because the scope of the cases determines the boundaries of the conclusions, that are possible to make (Beach & Pederson, 2016). Simultaneously, it can be stated that this is a multiple case study, as three provinces are being researched. The research is qualitative because it examines (independent) documents, literature, and reports rather than using statistical analyses. I strive to best explain the hypotheses that have been generated within the theoretical framework using these sources. Each hypothesis will be examined in three different cases, and therefore determining which factors are important concerning the success or the failure of ALP in certain provinces.

Within the multiple case design, each case must be selected to predict contrasting results, but for predictable reasons (Yin, 2002., p. 47). That is what I am doing, as I expect the

provinces to have different outcomes for some factors, as they differ from each other. The rationale of the multiple case study design is that the cases are chosen on prior knowledge of their outcomes (Yin, 2002). As in this thesis, to some extent the success and failures of some ALP division in each of the three cases are known. Comparative research allows for complex and non-linear interpretations because it works with a small N of cases, and in this thesis, only three (Nissen, 1998). At the same time there are more variables than cases, which characterizes the comparative aspect of this research. Each case is researched by the factors discussed in the theoretical framework, therefore each case is examined as a whole. The results of each case are compared with each other as wholes (Nissen, 1998., p. 405). The comparative analyses' goal is to create an entire image and interpreted the different cases from as many factors as possible. As it is in this thesis, where the number of cases is far less than the number of factors. N is smaller than the number of factors. With the comparative component in this thesis, I aim to identify the deviant case. While I have some knowledge of the outcomes regarding the success of the ALP in certain provinces, I want to understand why they differ. Therefore, I try to identify differences *or* similarities in the factors between the provinces to ultimately assess the hypotheses outlined in the theoretical framework (Smelster, 1976).

4.1 Case selection

This thesis will include three Afghan provinces: Paktika, Baghlan and Helmand. Each case has been selected based on the mixed results they have shown during the ALP's presence in these provinces. Paktika is a province in the Southeast of Afghanistan, where the ALP presence had a seemingly positive effect on the security in the province. Elders felt more in control over their village and their neighbouring villages, as it brought tribes together in the contest with the insurgents (Hart, 2011). In contrast to Paktika, ALP was not as well received in Baghlan. While some villages in Paktika requested the ALP's presence, the ALP was mostly forced upon Baghlan. The district councils even informed the Ministry of Interior (MOI) that the ALP would not have a stabilizing effect in the region, but would create the opposite, it would destabilize the province (Human Rights Watch, 2011). In Baghlan the US forces already worked close with certain militias, but these militias, including Nur-ur Haq, were not undisputed (Ibid.). This resulted in a challenging start for the ALP in Baghlan, the opposite thus from Paktika. The Helmand province is considered by the Ministry of Defence as a 'reputational risk' (Stevens, 2013). This is because the past experiences have shown that

militias in Helmand were extremely violent during the Soviet War. But at the same time, Stevens (2013) shows the relative success of some militia forces in the Helmand province in the presence. For example, the southern Nas-e Ali region was remarkably calm, which was unexpected for many years. One could argue that implementing the ALP for that reason was a risk in a province like Helmand. Together these three provinces are well suited to comparison in this research. One appears to be successful (Paktika), the other province is balancing between success and failure (Baghlan), and the last province is not as successful (Helmand). The three provinces in this thesis were also selected based on geographical aspects. Paktika borders Pakistan, Baghlan which is in the North of Afghanistan and therefore also has to deal with the Northern Alliance, and Helmand is situated in the South of Afghanistan. By including provinces from different regions, the thesis aims to capture a more comprehensive understanding of the extent to which the ALP can provide stability and security. This approach enables the analysis to better reflect the overall situation in Afghanistan, as opposed to focusing solely on three provinces from either the South or the North.

The analyses will cover the time period of 2010, when the ALP was created, up until its dissolution in 2020 (Clark, 2020). The funding of the ALP ceased on 30 September 2020, with the expectation that the ALP would be able to function independently without US funding, relying solely on the Afghan government's financial support (Ibid.). The three provinces will be evaluated during the course of these ten years based on the occurrences and outcomes of those events in the three chosen provinces.

Since there are multiple districts within each province, this thesis will frequently discuss various districts within the chosen provinces. While the hypotheses are formulated in relation to the provinces, it is (sometimes) more reasonable to draw conclusions at the district level. To avoid generalizing the entire province while focusing solely on a single district (if possible), additional districts within each province will be discussed as extensively as possible.

There are many factors to consider when selecting cases for a thesis. The proportion of variables that are comparable is first taken into consideration when determining the comparability of variables (Sartori, 1991). Which takes me to the next consideration that needs to be made not all elements have the same significance in each case (Ibid). According to this theory, every effect in every province must be viewed as distinct before being fully

able to compare with one another. This can be done by using by comparable sources for each province.

4.2 Data, limitation and generalisability

The sources that will be used in this thesis will mainly consist of the secondary literature which will contain literature, independent reports, independent research and state documents. The Afghan Analyst Network is one of my main sources in regard to information about certain tribes, ethnic groups, militias and other events surrounding the ALP in Afghanistan. The Afghan Analyst Network is a non-profit research organization that conducts field research in Afghanistan, providing reliable information from local villages, rather than relying solely on sources with clear biased positions within the conflict, such as the US Department of State. Other independent non-profit organizations used in this study include the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). SIGAR is an independent oversight authority in the US, responsible for providing objective oversight of reconstruction budgets in Afghanistan.

I am aware of the limitations as a researcher in relying solely on secondary literature. But it is simply not possible for me to do research in Afghanistan due to obvious reasons. Adding to that, is that I am going to be (partially) dependent on state documents, which could entail some biases in favour of one party within the conflict. I take these factors into consideration as much as possible. Moreover, the availability of literature may vary among provinces, leading to a more detailed analysis of certain factors in one province compared to the others. This will be taken into account when discussing the overall conclusions of this thesis.

Inherently there is no goal of generalisability as I want to specifically know the difference between the provinces and the reasons why in some provinces ALP was able to create some stability while in other province, it did only have a destabilizing effect. But it is possible that in the end, the factors that are of influence on the stabilization and destabilization are generalizable to other Afghan provinces and even to other cases outside Afghanistan. This could be the case when an international nation/coalition sponsors local militia to create stability in regions that the government of the host-nation and the international nation/coalition is not able to reach, in a country other than Afghanistan.

5. The analyses

Militias have been a key feature in Afghanistan since the beginning of the invasion in 2001 (Felbab-Brown, 2016). Initially, the US military primarily relied on a limited number of US forces and provided support for warlords and anti-Taliban militia. The ALP is yet another militia which the US utilized in their counterinsurgency strategy.

‘no one protects their home like a homeowner’ is what the creator of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), General David Petraeus said during a NATO training mission (2011) (Ruttig, 2013). It comes to no surprise that the ALP has been one of the key instruments of the US and its allies in regard to their strategy in Afghanistan (Moyar, 2014). The program was established in August 2010 under presidential decree by President Karzai, who authorized formation of the ALP (Saum-Manning, 2012; Planty & Perito, 2013). Karzai demanded that the ALP was going to be a part of the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The name ALP was also significant to Karzai, because, in his opinion, the Afghan people associated the word "police" more positively than terms like militia. This was mainly due to the suffering they endured under militias in the 1990's (Ibid).

The ALP is part of the Village Stability operations (VSO) program, which is a broader security initiative in Afghanistan. Initially, the ALP was funded by the US Special Operations Forces (SOF) (Saum-Manning, 2012). The ALP was part of the counterinsurgency (COIN), which can be characterized as a bottom-up approach, that aims to create security and stability in regions surrounding rural villages. Its objective was to permanently transform the districts in order to assist the local government (Ibid.). The ALP facilitated connectivity between the local villages and the central government on three levels: security, governance and development. In comparison to past efforts, the main difference was that the ALP focussed more on long-term goals by addressing political, tribal, ethnic and social issues. Previous approaches primarily prioritized short-term security and stability issues (Ibid). However, ALP did show some elements of a top-down approach, as sometimes, the US and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) actively selected districts that had to participate in the ALP program. This site-selection was based on the strategic needs of a certain province. Typically, a district had to apply at the MOI to establish an active ALP program, it wasn't an easy process for a district to obtain ALP involvement (Ibid.).

The vetting procedure of the ALP is adapted to align with Afghan norms and values, relying on the involvement of the local *Shura* as the initial filter. This approach leverages traditional Afghan mechanisms of accountability (Saum-Manning, 2012.). The cultural norms that have been taken into account were the respect for local elders and family honour. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, tribalism played a role in the security and stability of the province, as ALP resources could potentially be used to settle old disputes between tribes or ethnic groups. The US argued that ethnicity and tribalism was necessary to mobilize people to join the ALP, and therefore fight the insurgents. The vetting procedure of the ALP is thus an important part concerning the stability in the province between tribal and ethnic groups (Moyar, 2014). It was never the intention of the US as well as the MOI to create more instability in the province by sparking another conflict. Because that resulted in having to deal with not only the Taliban but also with conflicts between tribal or ethnical groups. On the other hand, it is sometimes inevitable to choose sides within an ethnic or tribal dispute. Besides deciding which *Shura* to assign as creator of the ALP in the region, the MOI continued the vetting procedure by conducting background checks and drug tests.

The ethnicity as well as the level of tribalism are part of the way the MOI in recruiting the ALP members. But before the recruiting process can be analysed within the provinces, the recruiting process of the MOI has to be explained. The MOI developed a doctrine regarding this recruitment. Prospective ALP recruits had to meet the following criteria (NSCOCCA, as quoted in Marquis et al., 2016):

- Be patriotic, disciplined, and faithful to GIRoA development and prosperity.
- Receive an original, valid national identification document (Tazkera).
- Meet physical and mental health criteria and not be addicted to any drugs or alcohol.
- Be willing to serve for a three-year period; contracts can be extended based on the need and approval of the ALP Directorate.
- Be at least 18 and not more than 45 years of age (however, where there are not enough qualified recruits, an age waiver up to 50 years may be allowed by MOI).
- Sign or thumb a written copy of a service commitment document their assignments.
- Submit to background checks of their living place; recruits should be verified and endorsed by local intelligence organizations, such as anticrime and antiterrorism organizations.
- Preferably be literate; educated volunteers will be given priority to join ALP.
- Have a good reputation in the society, have no criminal record, and not be convicted of any crime of human rights.
- Fill out and provide medical forms to verify health status.
- Obey the prevailing laws of the country.
- Protect public property and safeguard their weapons and equipment.
- Carry their MOI-issued ALP identification card

Although these criteria were set up, it appeared that the criteria were not always met during the process. Adding up to that, the intention for the village elderly was to nominate these ALP commanders. In Baghlan, HRW indicated that local strongman, were nominated as commander, but did not take the recruitment criteria at hand for the selection of their members for the ALPs. Resulting into the recruitment of former fighters with the Islamist Hezb-i-Islam. Later these fighters became involved in illegal activities (Marquis et al., 2016).

Overall, all the factors that will be analysed contribute to the question to which level the ALP is able to provide security. Figure 3 provides an overview of the level of insecurity per province. This table indicates the level of insecurity in the provinces of Afghanistan around the time of the founding of the ALP.



Source: Asian foundation, *Afghanistan 2008*

The ALP was active in almost every province in Afghanistan besides: Khost, Panjshir, Samangan, Nimroz and Bamyan. Also, when ALP was active in a province it did not necessarily mean that the ALP was active in every district of a province but only in some districts (Netherlands, The: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

5.1 Paktika

Paktika consists of 19 districts. The district of which is most known in regard to the ALP is the Yahyakhel district, as it had been researched for several years by Clark. It was and is still one of the success stories of the ALP in Afghanistan (Clark et al., 2020). Two years after the implementation of the ALP, Yahyakhel went from ranking in the top three of most violent districts in Paktika in 2010, to bottom three in 2012 (Ibid.). What was even more significant is that the ALP is primarily responsible for the security in the province. In contrast to other provinces, it had a much lower proportion of the ANA or ANP present to provide security in the Yahyakhel district. So, what is happening here?

In the beginning of the ALP in 2010, the Paktika province mainly belonged to the Taliban (Clark, 2018). In the Yahyakhel district, schools were closed, and shops were only open half of the day due to the constant security threats. In that same district, the ALP became relatively huge, with a total of 300 members. Over time, the ALP gained more and more ground, with some of the main highways and checkpoints in the hands of the ALP. This resulted in less and less territorial power for the Taliban. The village of Paraw in the Ghaibikhel district was seen as an ALP hub, resulting in a lot of Taliban terrorist attacks aimed on the ALP itself. The Taliban primarily relied on suicide assaults or IEDs in the early days of the ALP. This was because territorial power of the Taliban was declining in the Paktika province. These tactics were seen as relatively costly, as a suicide attack needs specially selected and trained individuals and other valuable resources. The Taliban usually used these kinds of attacks to strike fear in the population's eyes, and therefore often attacked on crowded places. Therefore, it is significant to argue that the Taliban took the ALP as a serious threat in the Paktika province (Clark, 2018).

5.1.1 (Dis)proportionality within the ALP's composition.

Ethnicity in the Paktika province is not of the main essence in regard to the ability of the ALP to provide stability. One of the reasons is the predominantly Pashtun population. Therefore, the Paktika population is homogenous, meaning that the differences between ethnic populations are small enough for the ALP's vetting to not be concentrated on the ethnicity of the commander or its members but rather on the tribals of which the commanders and his members were part of (Mobasher, 2015). The tribal structures in Paktika were most of the essence when discussing the composition of the ALP. In the Yahyakhel district 'strength

of local tribal relations' prevented internecine bloodshed in the 20th century. Due to the lack of conflict in the district from 1978 until 2004, the old elite and social structures were still intact. Moreover, these tribal structures were relatively healthy, supported by a motivated population. This resulted in the creation of a community defence force, as the tribal system was still resilient enough to provide a strong framework for organising these community militias. This is also explained by the *arbakai* tradition, which is mostly practiced in this region of Afghanistan. The *arbakai* are voluntary, tribally based self-defence units that were set up by a tribe and mandated by the Jirga (Ruttig, 2012).

One of the important factors for the relative success of the Paktika province, and the Yahyakhel district in particular, was that different tribes made sure that the ALP's composition was relatively equal to the disproportion of the tribes. The success of the ALP system in the district of the Yahyakhel was partly because all ALP members were accountable to the elders of the three major tribes (Clark, 2018). Thereby, these elders had considerable control over the ALP men. Adding up, the tribes worked together equally and as partners, which brought the tribes as whole closer to each other, and therefore prevented conflict between the tribes. Additionally, the absence of factional infighting in the Yahyakhel district contributed to the ALP's success. (Clark et al., 2020). In other provinces, ALP units were recruited from one tribe, as this was often internationally imposed. But in the Yahyakhel district, the elders recognized the danger of creating an ALP consisting out of only one tribe. This was the main reason to include the three dominant tribes in the recruiting process (Ibid.). This did not only happen in the Yahyakhel district, but also in other districts in the Paktika province, including Sultankhel and Ghaibikhel (Clark, 2018). With the tribes working together, they did not only evade inter-tribe conflict but also reduced the risk that a tribe rejoined the Taliban in case it felt sidelined by the other tribes.

Adding to that, the tribes were able to work together well, which resulted in a low level of power abuse by ALP members. ALP members were recruited from their own village, therefore the ALP in the Yahyakhel district was local of nature. This constrained the ALP members to abuse their powers against their own people, while simultaneously, they had the strong urge to protect their own tribes from the Taliban. However, also the Yahyakhel district had to deal with rogue ALP officers. Allegedly, the Taliban infiltrated in the ALP, which resulted in a 'police officer' killing nine of his colleagues (Reuters, 2012). In other districts in the Paktika province, ALP officers used their power to commit other sort of crimes. An

example of misconduct of ALP members in Paktika occurred in May 2012, where an ALP commander and four ALP members killed a man over a land dispute (United States Department of States, 2013). Also, a commander of the ALP in the Urgun district in Paktika, Azizullah, committed acts against human rights. He and his men shot three alleged members of the Taliban and dragged their bodies around the local market (HRW, 2015; Kine, 2015). Arguably, these incidents were not systematically targeting a specific group, though power abuse will not benefit the ALP image.

In the end, Paktika was able to create a sort of stability due to the cooperation of different tribes in the province. This stability is mainly due to the proportional composition of the ALP. The proportional composition resulted not only in a more effective resistance against the insurgency, but there was almost no urge to abuse powers against other tribes or ethnic minorities. Simultaneously contributing to the stability in the province.

5.1.2 The level of resources available for the ALP

The ALP in Paktika suffered from uncertainty at the end of the ALP period, as salaries were not paid in time. This was especially significant because in that period, peace talks in Doha were held. This meant that the Taliban were getting more and more power, as international forces could retreat in a short time period. When ALP units were not paid in a timely manner or weren't paid enough, it was more likely for them to rejoin the Taliban, as the Taliban would regain their power in any day. This is exactly what happened in Yahyakhel, in Paktika, where an ALP chief quit and sided with the Taliban, alongside with all ALP's weapons (Clark, 2020). This resulted in lesser weapons for the ALP, to defend and stabilize the villages. In the beginning of the ALP in Paktika there are no signs of problems in regard to the salaries of the personnel. Mentioned above, the Yahyakhel went from ranking in the top three of most violent districts in Paktika in 2010, to bottom three in 2012. But in the end, due to resource shortages, especially the overdue salary problems contributed to the destabilization of the province. As more ALP members quit or sided with the Taliban, the Taliban regained more and more influence.

Due to the scarcity of specific information concerning weapon supply shortages in Paktika, I am not able to analyse that as much as I wanted to. I will circle back to this in the discussion.

5.1.3 Conclusion Paktika

Paktika can be considered a success story in regard to the ALP. Albeit, not every district in the province achieved complete stability, overall, the province stabilized more than average. In this province, ethnicity and tribalism have almost gone hand in hand, as the Paktika province is overwhelmingly Pashtun. This made the vetting procedure easier. The Yahyakhel district can be considered to be the success story of the ALP. The main reason for this was the proportionate composition of the ALP. Tribals in the district managed to underline the importance of the cooperation and balance of power between the three biggest tribes, therefore preventing conflict between tribes. Also, the designers of the ALP project in the district were the elders themselves. Together, this attributed to the success of the ALP in that district. This also suggests a form of 'ripeness' of the community, as they have to be able to mobilize men. Besides Yahyakhel, tribes in multiple other districts were able to work together and created a balanced composition of the ALP which contributed to the stability of the province. The salary problems at the end of the ALP, did not contribute to the stabilization. Therefore, in Paktika, there is a shift visible from the ALP that is able to stabilize certain districts in the beginning, mainly due to the success of cooperation between the different tribes. Towards destabilization as more and more ALP members sided with the Taliban due to overdue salary payments.

5.2 Baghlan

Officially, the ALP in Baghlan was active in three districts: Puli Khumri, Danhana-e-Ghori and Baghlan-e-Jadid (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014). All these districts were Pashtun dominated. Baghlan, a strategically important province in the North of Afghanistan, held significant importance to its major transit routes between the Afghan capital, Kabul, and the north (Hewad, 2015). Baghlan consists of diverse ethnicities, which play a major role in regard to the ALP in Baghlan, as the province consists of Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazara, Uzbeks, Turkmens and Ismailis (Afghan Analyst Network, 2013; Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014).

5.2.1 (Dis)proportional composition of the ALP

In Baghlan, the ALP was officially active in three districts: Puli Khumri, Danhana-e-Ghori and Baghlan-e-Jadid (Ibid.). All these districts were Pashtun dominated. However, the ALP's disproportionate composition, with Pashtuns being overrepresented, led to ethnic

tensions. These ethnical tensions resulted in confrontations between the Tajik-ANP and Pashtun-dominated ALP. Despite the fact that local shuras were generally successful in ensuring equitable tribal and ethnic representation in ALP units, some shuras deliberately opposed enrolling specific ethnicities in the ALP. This caused substantial ethnic animosity in multi-ethnic areas (Felbab-Brown, 2016).

The majority of Taliban men in the Baghlan province were Pashtun. The ALP tried to become the 'better' option for these men, therefore recruiting Pashtuns. The past conflicts the Pashtuns experienced with members of the Northern Alliance, were a major factor in the number of Pashtuns that joined the Taliban in the first place. Many Pashtuns experienced the oppression of the Andarabi-Tajiks dominated ANP and their power structures, as they extorted Pashtun-oriented villages. Therefore, the Taliban were able to easily mobilize Pashtuns after 2002. In response, the ALP tried to mobilize these Pashtuns in order to lure them away from Taliban influences. Besides trying to recruit former Taliban fighters, ALP also recruited from other violent militias, such as Hezb-i-Islami. The idea was that, through mobilising Pashtun members for the ALP, the ALP could weaken the Taliban's position in the province. However, the unintended outcome was that other ethnic groups, including the Tajiks and Uzbeks, felt extremely threatened by the 'Pashtun' ALP (Ibid.). They felt misled by the fact that their Pashtun rivals were given weaponry by the Afghan government. They believed that after years of fighting the Taliban, the Taliban's supporters had now been rewarded and had been transformed into the ALP (Ibid.). Tajiks and Uzbeks, who had been fighting the Taliban for over two decades, perceived this as unfair, leading to their resentment (Ibid.).

The consequence of this vetting procedure, and therefore overrepresenting the Pashtun community in the ALP, resulted in confrontation between ALP units and the ANP in Baghlan. This undermined the image of the ANSF as a whole, as two parties, who supposed to work alongside each other, were now in conflict with each other. In September of 2011, a devastating massacre of the ANP was nearly avoided (Ibid.). The ALP was supported by the SOF, and after the ANP shot and killed numerous ALP members, a full-scale attack was launched on a QRF unit of the ALP. After that, US armed forces were attacked, and in response, an airstrike was called by the US. Only after direct intervention of a high ranked police officer, the airstrike was called off. Nonetheless, this confrontation between the Pashtun ALP and the Tajik ANP does not only illustrate the tensions between the two groups but also creates an image of instability, as the two police forces, that supposed to protect the

population against the Taliban, were too busy with their internal ethnic conflict. The disproportionate composition of the ALP in Baghlan thus fuelled tensions among different ethnic groups in the province.

ALP recruitment in Baghlan was not always achieved through unanimous shuras, leading to ALP commanders being designated without fully community consent (Gatson, 2019). In some cases, this resulted in the targeting of specific ethnic groups. Human rights violations were not always taken into account in the designation of a certain ALP commander of a specific ethnic group. ALP commanders could, broadly speaking, appoint their own men for their ALP. The official vetting procedure was therefore not followed by all the ALP commanders, resulting in members with a past of human rights violations (Ibid.). The ALP itself has also been accused of beatings, land grabbing, rape, murder, and forced taxation (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014). The disproportionate composition of ALP units, along with the flawed vetting procedure, contributed to power abuse.

The strategy of the ALP to recruit former Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami had its setbacks. For example, a strongman of the Hezb-i-Islami that was recruited in the ALP misused its powers and was implicated in rape, land-grabs, abductions and killings (HRW, 2011). In that same year, four ALP members abducted and raped a 13-year-old boy. Despite clear evidence, no action was against these ALP members due to their connections with the government and the US special forces (Ibid). This does not only show that in the first year that the ALP was active in Baghlan there had been abuse of power, but also that the ALP members who committed these crimes were not being prosecuted or erased from the ALP. This is not conducive for the trust in the ALP overall in Baghlan.

The Baghlan regular police arrested 22 ALP members for human rights violations (Felbab-Brown, 2016). The result was an immediate decline in level of abuse cases by the ALP (Ibid). However, accusations have been made that these arrests by Tajiks ANP, was a retaliation of the fact that the ALP was mainly Pashtun. In this way the Tajiks were able to marginalize their ethnic rivals (Ibid.). Another consequence of the Pashtun arming of the ALP, was a series of violent and deadly confrontations between the Pashtun-oriented ALP and Tajik oriented-ANP. Which led to the resentment of both groups by the local population, creating more instability, as both the ALP and ANP were mistrusted by the local community (Worley, 2022). These events show the importance of primarily the correct vetting procedure

and secondly that the composition of the ALP must take into account the ethnic dynamics of the district in which these militias are implemented.

5.2.2 Resource shortages.

The elders of Baghlan doubted the ALP's capacity to defend their communities. One of their arguments was that the Baghlan ALP was not armed well enough, and they lacked modern weapons and ammunition (Ali, 2016). Many ALP members surrendered after they were unable to fend off the Taliban's assault in Dand-e Ghori for even one day. Due to a lack of more suitable weapons and resources, such as ammunition, the defeat in the village was unavoidable. As a result, ALP members joined the Taliban. The district had grown increasingly unstable as a result of the Taliban's growth and the fall of the ALP (Ibid.). This demonstrates how a district can become unstable due to a lack of reliable weapons and ammunitions.

Besides military resources, salaries of the ALP officers are important in regard to the functioning of the ALP, and in the end for the stability overall. Payment appeared to be a strong motivator for ALP members in Baghlan, as former Taliban members 'switched' to the ALP simply because they paid more than the Taliban did. Sometimes ALP members were paid 'not to fight'. The downside of 'paying your enemies not to fight' is that when the ALP is not able to fulfil its payments anymore or when other groups offer more salary, the ALP could fall apart, and its personnel and weapons will strengthen a new militia or eventually the Taliban (Felbab-Brown, 2012). The MOI has frequently failed to provide the weaponry and other equipment required to combat the Taliban in Baghlan. This was not favourable for the stability of the ALP itself, as it increased the odds of the surrender of the ALP, due to a lack of supplies. Indeed, certain ALP units occasionally did not receive their salaries on time, or not at all (Ibid.). Overall, this had a negative effect on the province's stability, because it allowed the Taliban to grow more powerful while, at the same time, leaving the ALP's troops dissatisfied and lacking equipment.

5.2.3 Conclusion Baghlan

The ALP in Baghlan struggled with the ethnic tensions in the province. Within the ALP units, the Pashtun outnumbered the Tajiks. Pashtuns were marginalized in the years leading up to the ALP by the Tajiks, who held almost all the important governmental

positions in the province (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014). After the ALP was implemented, it came under control of the Pashtuns. Therefore the Tajiks felt sidelined because they fought the 'Pashtun' Taliban in the years leading up to the founding of ALP. The disproportionate composition of the ALP only intensified the Pashtun-Tajik power struggles and their conflicts. Besides that, due to these ethnical conflicts, the Taliban were able to regain control over villages and districts in Baghlan. The disproportional composition of the ALP only contributed to these conflicts, creating more instability rather than stability as it was supposed to do. Resources that were meant to defend the villages, were used for the purpose of the ethnical conflicts, this sometimes resulted in shortages. More importantly, the ALP on its own was not strong enough to defend their villages. Without the support of the US's SOF and the ANSF, the ALP was too vulnerable to create stability in the districts. Adding up, the lack of resources contributed to the destabilization of the Baghlan province.

5.3 Helmand

The province of Helmand is located in the south of Afghanistan. In Helmand, there was a high level of tribalism and warlordism. Inhabitants of the province determined their alliance based on their family loyalties, their enemies and the location with the best access to resources to prevail best against their rivals. Also, it has experienced one of the highest levels of instability since the beginning of the ALP (UNAMA, 2013; UNAMA, 2014). After 2001, four powerbrokers, each representing a different tribe, assumed control of the government in Helmand (Rasmussen, 2015). This illustrated the difficulties the Helmand province had to deal with, as it was divided by rival tribal groups. A fact that the ALP was supposed to deal with.

5.3.1 (Dis)proportional composition of the ALP

People controlling the ALPs in Helmand depended on the British and the local elders, selecting those in charge. In the British controlled districts there were no ALPs, but the British tried to stabilize the province by setting up ALPs in the surrounding district. They made the error of not giving enough thought to whom they were equipping and how this changed the local power structures. How they divided the ALP establishment across the district did not pursue a holistic security effect (Martin, 2017). This implied that several factions of local elders were vying over a declining establishment. Due to a lot of tensions between tribal groups, it was difficult to recruit a local commander that could satisfy the community most. In

districts like Nad-e Ali, the community council was strongly opposed to the ALPs (Ibid). The reasoning behind that was that the district was very heterogeneous, if the community had been granted permission to create an ALP, everybody, meaning each tribe, would want one (Ibid.). Additionally, almost every person with the potential to be selected, had local rivals. Firstly, this would create the risk of power abuse against their rivals but also against the population. Secondly, it was likely that these potential members of the ALP would only want to protect their own people, rather than the community as a whole. In Helmand, most of the ALP units consisted of one tribe, which automatically meant that the composition was disproportional. The commander that had the most allies in the Afghan government or had good relations with the British forces, was most likely to be selected to create an ALP. Thus, going against the principles of the vetting procedure. The result was that these commanders picked their own members to join the ALP, skipping the ALP vetting procedure as a whole (Stevens, 2013). In the south of the province, both Hazaras and Iszazai were allowed to establish their ALP militias (Martin, 2017). These two groups that had have a long running water dispute and were now both armed. This illustrated the difficulties the province encountered. But there is also another side to the story. In the beginning of 2011, right after the start of the ALP programme in the Nad-e Ali district, multiple people on the social spectrum argued that the implementation of the ALP created more stability (Martin, 2017). Many 'local' Taliban men were recruited for the ALP, therefore minimalizing the influence of the Taliban. Although still some groups were excluded to be recruited, the Kharoti had been framed by its rivals as 'the greatest supporters of the Taliban'. This was not necessarily true, but each group tried to frame its rivals as 'the Taliban' in order to persuade the British to take their side. If they were able to do so, this meant that they would get more resources in order to fight their rivals.

Due to the disproportionate composition of the ALPs, some ALP units targeted specific groups, especially rivalling tribes. In the Sangin district, district governor Daud used his position to illegally tax Ishaqzai villagers (Derksen, 2014). In the Marja district, ALP officers used their official status to engage in multiple illegal activities such as, resolving disputes, illegal taxation against a rivalling group, confiscating private property and demanding money (HRW, 2011). In the Southern Nahr-e Saraj the ALP commander, Lalai, was part of the Barakzai, which had multiple disputes with the Noorzai. After a bomb attack on Lalai's ALP, which was allegedly executed by the Noorzai, Lalai took his revenge and killed a Noorzai family (Stevens, 2013). ALP troops terrorised the villages that belong to a

different tribe by using their influence and resources to establish a private militia, rather than fighting the Taliban as they were supposed to do (Rasmussen, 2015).

5.3.2 Level of resources available for the ALP

In the Helmand province there had been multiple complains about shortages of weapons and salary payment since the beginning of the ALP (Kaphle, 2012). For example, the ALP in Khar Nikah claimed they were being underpaid and needed better weapons to be able to fight the Taliban. In 2014, during an inventory, it was found that multiple districts in Helmand had to deal with equipment shortages, including weapons and vehicles (Sopko et al., 2015). Specifically, the Nehri-Saraj had a shortage of 13 ALP ranger pick-up trucks. During the same period, it was noted that the Marja district in Helmand dealt with a shortage of 114 AK-47 rifles. Although a lot of this equipment was registered in the supply system, shortages persisted nonetheless. Therefore, the requests of ALP units in the Helmand province were not granted. A lack of supplies for the ALP, resulted in instability in the districts, as ALP members were unable to protect the villages from the Taliban. According to SIGAR, the ability of the ALP in each area to maintain adequate supplies was crucial for the effectiveness of the local ALPs (Ibid.). This entailed that without the necessary supplies on the district level, the ALP's ability to provide stability in the region was hindered. Another effect of the unreliable logistic support was that it increased the level of attrition within the ALP units (Ibid.).

Another major problem in Helmand were the so called 'ghost' officers. These 'ghost' officers were registered in the system but did not exist in real life. Therefore, the ALP salary budget was lower than it should be, resulting into some ALP salaries not paid at all. If ALP officers weren't getting paid, this resulted in instability in the district, as these men were getting demotivated or didn't want to fight at all. It also, increased the risk of ALP members switching to an insurgency or anti-government militias who were able to pay them to fight (Ibid.). Overdue salary issues thus contributed to the ability of the ALP to provide stability or in this, instability.

5.3.3. Conclusion Helmand

The ALP in Helmand had dealt with different tribes. These tribes fought over control in almost every district in the province. Meaning that the ALP did not only fight the Taliban

but also attempted to keep the balance in districts between tribes. At the same time the ALP itself was also involved in these tribal conflicts. The complexity of the tribal structures in the province, resulted in the commander of a tribe selecting their own ALP unit without the necessary background checks, therefore ignoring the vetting procedure. This also resulted in a disproportionate composition of most ALP units, which affected the stability of the district and ultimately the province. Resulting in power abuse against rival tribes and violations against human rights.

6. Discussion

In this chapter the two main hypotheses, determined in the theoretical chapter, will be discussed in regard to each of the three provinces. In the end of the discussion for each province the typology will be applied, and its implication will be discussed.

6.1 (Dis)proportional composition of the ALP

H1 read like this: *A disproportionate composition of the ALP is more likely to have destabilizing effect on the province as a whole.*

To begin, in the Paktika province this hypothesis can be confirmed. As discussed in the analysis, in Paktika, most districts had tribes that were able to create a proportionate composed ALP. The tribal structures were healthy and were supported by the population, as the inhabitants were loyal towards the tribe elders. This resulted in the creation of local community forces, the *arbakai*. This was established long before the ALP was implemented in the district, meaning that there was already a base to build on in terms of militia self-defence forces. Making sure that every tribe was represented in the ALP and the tribes were able to work together, the ALP was able to provide stabilization. One of the leading examples was the ALP in Yahyakhel. It consisted of three major tribes, and the tribe elders acknowledged that a proportionate composition of the ALP would strengthen the ALP as a whole, and consequently also improved the stability in the district.

Another aspect that was important in this cooperation was the accountability of all ALP members to the tribal leaders. Taken together, the cooperation worked well due to their history with self-defence militia, the *arbakai*. This showed that the ALP can be operational in rural areas in Afghanistan and be effective simultaneously. The example of cooperation also occurred in Ghaibikhel and Sultankhel. To conclude, the cooperation of tribes has created

stability in the province to a certain level. The district was stable, and violence decreased after the implementation of the ALP. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proportionality of the ALP indeed affected the ability to provide stability. In the Paktika province this was successful, but in other provinces the composition was disproportional, such as in Baghlan.

The Baghlan province is less of a success story, but also confirms the hypothesis. While in Paktika, the ALP was composed proportionally, this had not been the case to a certain extent in Baghlan. As discussed, the ALP had been active in three districts in the Baghlan province: Puli Khumri, Danhana-e-Ghori and Baghlan-e-Jadid. All these districts were Pashtun dominated. The ALP in these districts was composed of Pashtuns. That would make a case for a reasonable proportionate distribution. The ALP's arrival increased safety in Pashtun settlements. Prior to their arrival, no one ventured to take the main road in broad daylight; even Afghan military troops shunned it. However, after the ALP arrived in those areas, this substantially changed and became safer (Felfab-Brown, 2016). But that is not the entire story of the Baghlan province, as there was another dominant player in the province, the Tajik dominated ANP. As seen in the previous part, the Tajiks and the Pashtuns were in conflict with each other before the ALP had been implemented. The Tajiks felt underappreciated, because the US forces sided with the Pashtun ALP. This resulted in destabilization of villages that were not Pashtun dominated. Therefore, the composition of the ALP had a stabilizing and a destabilizing effect. On the one hand the composition of the ALP had a positive effect on the stability in the Pashtun villages, but on the other hand, it left other ethnical groups, like the Tajik ANP, dissatisfied. Overall, the ALP was not able to stabilize the province, due to the overall disproportionate composition in the province.

In the last province, Helmand, *shuras* could often not choose a commander as the province consisted of a large number of different tribes. Therefore, the council was not unanimous about the ALP commanders. Resulting in the selection of one ALP commander per unit by the British. The commander of choice composed their own ALP. This resulted in disproportionate composition of the ALP units. As only members of one tribe would be part of the ALP unit. Resulting in destabilization, as these tribes often used the ALP's power and weapons to gain influence in the districts or marginalize other tribes. This sparked conflict between tribes, using resources provided by MOI. They often used their power to convince British forces that their rivals were the Taliban, legitimizing an attack on their rivals. These conflicts made the ALP not popular amongst the population as it did not bring stability in an

already very violent province. The disproportionate composed ALP therefore directly contributed to destabilization of the province. Therefore, the hypotheses can be confirmed in Helmand, as the disproportionate composition of the ALP was not able to stabilize the province. Moreover, it even contributed to the inter-tribe conflicts, as tribes who were not able to set up an ALP felt threatened and marginalized by the ones who were able to set up an ALP.

Overall, the hypothesis can be confirmed. In Paktika there was a proportionate distribution of the ALPs, resulting into signs of stabilization. One of the prime examples in Paktika was the cooperation between tribes in Yahyakhel. In the other two provinces, the ALP's composition was disproportionate. In these provinces there was more instability, this can be argued by the number of conflicts, not only between the ALP and the Taliban but also between different tribes and ethnical groups. In Baghlan this disproportionate composition even contributed to the friction between the Tajik ANP and the Pashtun ALP. Meaning, even governmental forces were intertwined in these conflicts. To conclude, the disproportionate composition only contributed to the instability of the provinces, as it sparked local frictions and even caused power abuses against specific groups.

6.2 Resource shortages

The same logic will be followed as in the previous part of this chapter. First Paktika will be discussed, followed by Baghlan and ending with Helmand. But before I am able to dive into the hypothesis regarding resource shortages for each province, I want to note that the weapons and salary 'problems' mostly occurred later in the ALP program, not immediately. Also, the amount of information regarding weapon supply shortages and salary payments were often hard to find or not present at all. The documentation is not well enough and often documents discuss shortages in regard to the ALP overall, instead of ALP resource requirements and salaries in specific provinces. Additionally, as this thesis focuses on three provinces, I had to gather information about each province separately to come to conclusions about the hypothesis. Therefore, some of the confirmations of the hypotheses do not have the same weight as others. I will reflect on this more in the conclusion, in which I will also provide advice for additional research on this topic.

H2 read like this: *If resource requirements for the ALP are met, they are more likely to stabilize the province.*

In Paktika, the information about the amount of military equipment is scarce, therefore, especially in the case of Paktika, the salary shortages are more relevant. The time frame in which the salary payments were overdue is foremost important. The problems occurred during the final stages of the ALP, concurrently with the peace negotiations in Doha between the US and the Taliban. The salary payment problems contributed to the destabilization of the province. Overdue salary payments resulted in commanders laying down their weapons, and even worse, joining the Taliban as they were gaining the momentum. Adding to that, some commanders were able to take the ALP's weaponry along with them, while joining the Taliban. All this only weakened the position of the ALP and its ability to provide stability. As mentioned, the time frame is important, as these actions did not occur in the beginning of the ALP. In the beginning, the ALP was able to stabilize districts, especially Yahyakhel, but now, as the US negotiate for peace with the Taliban, the momentum shifted.

In Baghlan, there was more information available about weapon shortages and salary payments. In this province, elders believed that the quality and the number of weapons the ALP possessed to defend the village were one of the main reasons that Dand-e-Ghori fell the day after the ANSF left and the ALP was on its own. This indicated that the ALP was unable to defend the village on their own, highlighting the instability in the region and the inability of the ALP itself to stabilize the district. Another effect of the supply and weapons shortages is that members of the ALP felt abandoned (by the ANSF) and therefore were more vulnerable to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. This led to a fast surrender of the ALPs, resulting in some even joining the Taliban. Another reason for switching sides was that Baghlan inhabitants were more strongly motivated by salary than in other provinces. ALP members felt marginalized in their ability to provide stability, consequently endangering their lives more than in any other previous fighting situation. This made joining the Taliban more likely. This had the following effect: the less able the ALP was to fight the Taliban, the easier the ALP members would surrender to insurgents. This would diminish the power of the ALP, therefore making them less able to provide security, and so forth. Thus, shortages in weapons, ammunition and salary payment do not only lead to a less stable ALP, but overall, also contributes to a destabilization of the district and eventually even the province. This is exactly what the hypothesis argues, which therefore can be confirmed.

In Helmand, the ALP dealt with weapon supply shortages. SIGAR suggested that this had an effect on the ability to create stability in the province. As argued before, supply shortages of the ALP resulted in the inability to effectively carry out their jobs. In a province like Helmand, this effect may even be enhanced, as the ALP dealt with both, a strong Taliban force and a lot of intra-tribal conflicts. Insufficient amounts of weapons to protect the villages left the population vulnerable to these insurgent groups, and therefore caused destabilization.

Salary payments often were irregular due to a limited budget. This limited budget was caused by failures in the payment system, because, although many ALP members were registered and paid, the salary was not always transferred to the right person. Therefore, it occurred that ALP members sometimes did not get paid at all. Logically, not being paid while risking your life, created discontent among ALP members. Resulting in members joining the Taliban or other insurgent groups. Weakening the ALP, and therefore its ability to provide stability. Overall, the hypothesis can be confirmed. In all provinces there were signs of shortages, weapon or salary concerned. The time component is important to keep in mind, as the war was coming to an end, uncertainties arose. Therefore, more and more ALP members sided with other insurgent groups, including the Taliban. This trend occurred in all three provinces. In Paktika, the overdue salaries affected the ability of the ALP to provide stability, also because the Taliban gained momentum, the overdue salary payments enticed the members towards the Taliban. This trend is also visible in the two other provinces. Not paying salaries, resulted in quitting members but also it provided an opportunity to join the Taliban more easily. Weakening the ALP and at the same time strengthening the Taliban.

The weapon supply shortages occurred most in Baghlan and Helmand. Also, in regard to this factor, the hypothesis can be confirmed. As military equipment was lacking in numbers and quality, the ALP was not able to defend the villages against insurgent groups. Without the right equipment, the ALP was left vulnerable. Among the ALP members, this created dissatisfaction, resulting in members joining the Taliban. Thus, the same effect can be observed as with the overdue salary payments. Therefore, overall, the hypothesis can be confirmed. In all three provinces the resource requirements were not met (especially at the end of the conflict), resulting in the contribution of the destabilization of the provinces.

6.3 Discussion of the typology

Figure 4: Discussion of the Typology

	Proportionate composition of the ALP	Disproportionate composition of the ALP
Resource requirements are met	Best possible situation: The composition of the ALP is proportionate while resource requirements are met, stability in the province is most likely.	Situation in which the composition of the ALP is disproportionate, but resource requirements are met, stability in the province is possible, although hard to acquire.
Resource requirements are not met	The composition of the ALP is proportionate but at the same time resource requirements are not met, stabilizing the province is a possibility, though harder to achieve than when the requirements are met.	Worst possible situation: The composition of the ALP is disproportionate and resource requirement are not met, stability in the province is least likely.

*Resource requirements contain both military equipment and salaries

Paktika can be placed into two different places, depending on the time frame from which you observe the province. In the beginning of the ALP, Paktika can be placed in the upper left corner: the *best possible situation*. As discussed earlier, Paktika had a proportionate composition of the ALP, and there were no signs of problems regarding the resource requirements. According to the typology, the province is most likely to stabilize, which it did in the early days of the ALP. But when the ALP is observed in the later stages of the conflict, during the Doha peace negotiations, the ALP is not able to provide stability anymore like they did in the 2010-2012 period. Salary payments were overdue, in other words, resource requirements were not met. Placing Paktika in the final stages of the ALP, at the bottom left

corner. The composition of the ALP was not changed but the circumstances did. Resulting in destabilization in the province overall.

In Baghlan, the situation shifted to the right side of the typology. Meaning that during the whole period of the ALP, the composition was disproportionate. As discussed earlier, this is one of the main reasons why the ALP failed to stabilize the province. At the beginning of the ALP, there were no real indications that the resource requirements were not met, this occurred more towards the end of the ALP, similar to Paktika. The difference between Paktika and Baghlan is that the composition of the ALP was disproportionate. But also resources in Baghlan were used more for the benefit of the Pashtun population. There was more power abuse in Baghlan, using the resources that the MOI had been providing.

The difference with Helmand is that Helmand had earlier dealt with problems regarding the resource requirements. Therefore, Helmand can be portrayed in the *worst possible situation*. From the beginning, the composition of the ALP was disproportionate and in the early days of the ALP there had been indication that there were equipment issues and later on the 'ghost' officers also became a problem for the ALP. Both factors contributed to the destabilization of the province. The ALP, overall, has not been able to be a stabilizing actor in the province.

7. Conclusion

This thesis conducted a comparative multiple-case study research in three provinces in Afghanistan. The stabilizing and destabilizing factors have been discussed in the previous chapters. The (dis)proportionality of the composition of the ALPs has the most influence on the ability to stabilize a district and ultimately a province. In provinces where the ALP's composition is proportional, the ALP is more likely to have a stabilizing effect. This has been the foremost the case in Paktika. In Baghlan and Helmand, the composition of the ALP was disproportionate, resulting in destabilization rather than stabilization. The disproportionality sparked inter-provincial conflict between ethnic groups, which was the case in Baghlan, and in Helmand, primarily between tribal groups.

In addition to the effect that the ALP's proportionate composition had on a province's stability, the availability of resources also had an impact on the likelihood of stability. At the beginning of the ALP, this generally complied with ALP norms, but as it went on, the three provinces' demands for resources were not met. Also affecting the ability of the ALP to

provide stability, ALP members turned their backs on the ALP and joined other insurgent groups, such as the Taliban. If these two factors occurred at the same time, a disproportional composition of the ALP and the resource requirement were not met, this meant that the ability to provide stability was least likely, as seen in Helmand.

The result of this thesis contributes to the social relevance. By providing a clear oversight of which factors determine the likelihood of the ability of the ALP (a PGM), to provide stabilization the most, this can be used by policymakers, Ministries of Defence and within security policies. They can determine whether or not to use PGM's if their goals are to stabilize remote areas of a certain country. If a certain counterinsurgency actor wants to make use of a PGM, it should note that a proportionate composition of the PGM, contributes to the ability of stabilization. But also, it has to take into account that resource requirements are met, in order to keep the PGM able to fight and also prevent dissatisfaction amongst the PGM's.

Though a footnote has to be made about the resource requirements. In general, there was enough information about Afghanistan but not on the particular provinces I wanted to research in my case study. Therefore, I was unable to fully research the implication of weapon shortages and overdue salary payments in the provinces and therefore could not compare these cases. In the discussion part, I did try to comprehend the hypotheses for this factor. Therefore, for future research, I would recommend looking further into the possible implications resource requirements of the ALP in the provinces. This accounts for military equipment and overdue salary payments, or salaries that have not been paid at all. As this possibly creates unmotivated personnel, which could lead to destabilization.

In the end, ALP can be considered a failure as they often did not stand a chance against the Taliban once the ANSF or the US military wasn't able to provide support. After the total retreat of the US in Afghanistan the ALP crumbled and the Taliban took over in no time. Still, a lot can be learned about the ALP's failures, but also their successes. It is not unimaginable that local militias are going to be funded again by the international community to try to control rural areas. This doesn't necessarily have to be in Afghanistan but can also take place somewhere else. The most important aspect that this thesis can provide to any new 'local police force', set up by the international community, is that the proportionality of composition of these militias has to be a reflection of the community, taken into consideration the heterogenous or homogeneous community and the possible conflicts between ethnic or tribal groups.

References

- Afghanistan Analyst Network (2013). Baghlan on the Brink: ANSF weaknesses and Taleban resilience - Afghanistan Analysts Network - English. Afghanistan Analysts Network - English. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/baghlan-on-the-brink-ansf-weaknesses-and-taleban-resilience/>
- Afghanistan: Rein in Abusive Militias and Afghan Local Police. (2011). Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/12/afghanistan-rein-abusive-militias-and-afghan-local-police>
- Ali, O. (2016). Taleban in the North: Gaining ground along the Ring Road in Baghlan. Afghanistan Analysts Network. 15 August 2016.
- Ali, O., Sadat, S. A., & Bleuer, C. (2019). One Land, Two Rules (8): Delivering public services in insurgency-affected insurgent-controlled Zurmat district. Afghan Analyst Network.
- Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People, Kabul, 2008
- Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2016). *Causal case study methods: Foundations and guidelines for comparing, matching, and tracing*. University of Michigan Press.
- Blocq, D. S. (2014). The grassroots nature of counterinsurgent tribal militia formation: the case of the Fertit in Southern Sudan, 1985–1989. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8(4), 710-724.
- Branch, A. (2007). Uganda's civil war and the politics of ICC intervention. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 21(2), 179-198.
- Carey, S. C., Mitchell, N. J., & Lowe, W. (2013). States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence: A new database on pro-government militias. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(2), 249–258. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312464881>
- Cecchinell, L. (2020, 9 maart). *Back to bad: Chahrdara between Taleban and ALP – a district case study - Afghanistan Analysts Network - English*. Afghanistan Analysts Network - English. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/back-to-bad-chahrdara-between-taleban-and-alp-district-case-study/>
- Chesterman, S. (2002). Walking softly in Afghanistan: the future of UN state-building. *Survival*, 44(3), 37-45.
- Clark, K. (2018). *How to Set up a ‘Good ALP’: The experience of Yahyakhel district, Paktika and how it became more peaceful - Afghanistan Analysts Network - English*. Afghanistan Analysts Network - English. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/how-to-set-up-a-good-alp-the-experience-of-yahyakhel-district-paktika-and-how-it-became-more-peaceful/>
- Clark, K., Gaston, E., Muzhary, F., Osman, B. (2020). Ghosts of the past. *Lessons form local force mobilization in Afghanistan and prospects for the future*. Afghan Analyst Network.

- Clark, K. (2020). *Disbanding the ALP: A dangerous final chapter for a force with a chequered history - Afghanistan Analysts Network - English*. Afghanistan Analysts Network - English. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/disbanding-the-alp-a-dangerous-final-chapter-for-a-force-with-a-chequered-history/>
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2009). Testing the neocon agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies. *European Economic Review*, 53(3), 293-308.
- Cordesman, A. (2020). Judging the impact of US force reductions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. *Center for Strategic & International Studies*. Washington.
- Derksen, D. (2014). Armed, disarmed, rearmed: How Nahr-e Seraj in Helmand became one of the deadliest districts in Afghanistan. Afghan Analysts Network.
- Dorransoro, G. (2009). The Taliban's winning strategy in Afghanistan.
- Egnell, R. (2011). Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency?. *International Affairs*, 87(2), 297-315.
- Eikenberry, K. W. (2013). The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan. *Foreign Affairs*, 92(5), 59–74.
- Farrell, T., & Giustozzi, A. (2013). The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012. *International Affairs*, 89(4), 845-871.
- Feffer, J., & Njubi Nesbitt, F. (2013, 17 mei). *Hearts and Minds and Empire - FPIF*. Foreign Policy In Focus. Geraadpleegd op 19 juli 2022, https://fpif.org/hearts_and_minds_and_empire/
- Feinstein, B. A. (2001). Operation Enduring Freedom: legal dimensions of an infinitely just operation. *J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y*, 11, 201.
- Felbab-Brown, V. (2016). Afghanistan Trip Report V: The Afghan Local Police: “It’s Local, So It Must Be Good” – Or Is It? Brookings.
- Fishstein, P., & Wilder, A. (2012). Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan. Feinstein International Center, 2–78.
- Gaston, E. (2019). Legal pluralism and militia regulation: international, domestic, and community accountability frameworks for sub-state forces in Afghanistan. *Journal of Afghan Legal Studies*, 2(1396), 2017.
- Giustozzi, A. (2009). *Koran Kalashnikov and Laptop* (1st edition). Oxford University Press.
- Giustozzi, A., & Reuter, C. (2010). The Northern Front. *The Afghan insurgency spreading beyond the Pashtuns (Afghanistan Analysts Network, Briefing Paper, 03/2010)*.
- Goodhand, J., & Hakimi, A. (2014). Counterinsurgency, local militias, and statebuilding in Afghanistan (Vol. 90). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Gosztonyi, K., Koehler, J., & Feda, B. (2015). Taming the unruly: the integration of informal northern Afghan militias into the Afghan Local Police. *Sicherheit und Frieden (S+ F)/Security and Peace*, 218-224.

- Gray, A. (2001). The definition and measurement of ethnicity: A Pacific perspective. *Wellington: Gray Matter Research Ltd.*
- The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days.* (2001, 10 November). US Department of State. Accessed on 23 July 2022, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm>
- Hakimi, A. A. (2013). Getting savages to fight barbarians: counterinsurgency and the remaking of Afghanistan. *Central Asian Survey*, 32(3), 388-405.
- Hakimi, A. A. (2015). *Fighting for patronage: American counterinsurgency and the Afghan local police* (Doctoral dissertation, SOAS University of London).
- Hart., L. (2011). Connecting Islands: ALP brings villages together. NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan.
- Herold, M. W. (2001). A dossier on civilian victims of United States' aerial bombing of Afghanistan: a comprehensive accounting. *Online at www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm*
- Hewad, G. (2015). The 2015 Insurgency in the North (4): Surrounding the cities in Baghlan. Afghanistan Analysts Network, October 21.
- Hoffman, F. G. (2011). Neo-classical counterinsurgency?. *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters*, 41(4), 8.
- Holland, J., & Aaronson, M. (2014). Dominance through Coercion: Strategic Rhetorical Balancing and the Tactics of Justification in Afghanistan and Libya. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 8(1), 1–20.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2013.856126>
- Hulslander, R., & Spivey, J. (2012). Village stability operations and Afghan local police. *Prism*, 3(3), 125-138.
- Hultman, L. (2012). COIN and civilian collaterals: patterns of violence in Afghanistan, 2004–2009. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 23(2), 245-263.
- Jalali, A. A. (2016). Afghanistan national defense and security forces. *Washington, DC: Unites States Institute of Peace. Recuperado de https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW115-Afghanistan-National-Defense-and-Security-Forces-Mission-Challenges-and-Sustainability.pdf.*
- Lamb, C. J., & Cinnamond, M. (2010). Unified Effort: Key to Special Operations and Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan. *Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ*, (56), 40.
- Jardine, E., & Palamar, S. (2013). From Medusa Past Kantolo: Testing the effectiveness of Canada's enemy-centric and population-centric counterinsurgency operational strategies. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(7), 588-608.
- Jentzsch, C., Kalyvas, S. N., & Schubiger, L. I. (2015). Militias in Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(5), 755–769. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576753>
- Jones, S. G., & Munoz, A. (2010). Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces. RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA.

- Kalyvas, S. N. (2008). Ethnic defection in civil war. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(8), 1043-1068.
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kamminga, J. (2021). *Je wordt bedankt Bin Laden: 20 jaar Nederland in Afghanistan*. Jalepeno Books.
- Kaphle, A. (2012, 11 februari). In Helmand, training Afghan Local Police is a challenge. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-helmand-training-afghan-local-police-is-a-challenge/2012/01/23/gIQAokHm3Q_story.html
- Katzman, K. (2004). Afghanistan: post-war governance, security, and US policy.
- Kilcullen, D. J. (2006, September). Three pillars of counterinsurgency. In *US Government Counterinsurgency Conference* (Vol. 28). Washington, DC: US Department of State.
- Kine, P. (2015). Who will police Afghanistan's policemen? Al Jazeera.
- Kitzen, M. (2017). 'Legitimacy is the Main objective': Legitimation in population-centric counterinsurgency. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28(4-5), 853-866.
- Laub, Z. (2014). The Taliban in Afghanistan. *Council on Foreign Relations*, 4(7), 1-9.
- Lefèvre, M. (2010). Local Defence in Afghanistan. *Afghan Analysts Network*. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/20100525MLefevre-LDIpaper.pdf>
- Malejacq, R. (2019). *Warlord survival: The delusion of state building in Afghanistan*. Cornell University Press.
- Marquis, J. P., Duggan, S., Gordon, B. J., & Miyashiro, L. (2016). *Assessing the Ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs to Support the Afghan Local Police*. RAND National Defense Research Institute Santa Monica United States.
- Mendoza, J. J. (2013). The Illusion of Governance: The Challenges of Providing Effective Governance as a Tool of Counterinsurgency in Eastern Afghanistan's Paktika Province. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS.\
- Miron, M. (2019). On irregular wars, insurgencies and how to counter them: enemy and population-centric approaches in comparative perspective. *Revista Científica General José María Córdova*, 17(27), 457-480. <http://dx.doi.org/10.21830/19006586.497>
- Mobasher, M. B. (2015). Understanding ethnic-electoral dynamics: how ethnic politics affect electoral laws and election outcomes in Afghanistan. *Gonz. L. Rev.*, 51, 355.
- Moir, N. L. (2020). In the Warlords' Shadow: Special Operations Forces, the Afghans, and their Fight against the Taliban: Daniel R. Green, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2017, 304 pp.
- Moyar, M. (2014). *Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police*. JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIV MACDILL AFB FL.

- Murphy, T. J.(2010) CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED FT LEAVENWORTH KS. (2010). Assessment and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Ops: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Handbook).
- Myers, C. N. (2013). Tribalism and democratic transition in Libya: Lessons from Iraq. *Global Tides*, 7(1), 5.
- NATO (2022). *NATO and Afghanistan*. NATO. [Nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm)
- NATO and Afghanistan. (2022, 19 April). NATO https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
- NATO (n.d.). Collective defence and Article 5. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:~:text=Collective%20defence%20means%20that%20an,of%20the%20North%20Atlantic%20Treaty.
- Netherlands, The: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Report on Afghanistan, November 2016, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a60d67d4.html> accessed 21 June 2023
- Nissen, S. The Case of Case Studies: On the Methodological Discussion in Comparative Political Science. *Quality & Quantity* **32**, 399–418 (1998). <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004337330700>
- Paul, C., Clarke, C. P., Grill, B., & Dunigan, M. (2016). Moving beyond population-centric vs. enemy-centric counterinsurgency. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27(6), 1019-1042.
- Petit, B. (2011). *The Fight for the Village: Southern Afghanistan 2010*. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER FORT LEAVENWORTH KS MILITARY REVIEW.
- Petraeus speaks about troop withdraw, battling al-Qaida. (2011). DVIDS. [https://www.dvidshub.net/news/73482/petraeus-speaks-about-troop-withdraw-battling-al-qaida.](https://www.dvidshub.net/news/73482/petraeus-speaks-about-troop-withdraw-battling-al-qaida)
- Planty, D. J., & Perito, R. (2013). *Police transition in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Rasmussen, S. E. (2015). *A struggle for peace in Afghan province most deadly for foreign troops*. Al Jazeera. van <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/9/the-battle-for-helmand.html>
- Reuters (2012). Afghan policeman turns weapons on colleagues, nine dead. U.S. <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE82T0CB20120330>
- Risse, T. (2013). *Governance Without a State?: Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood* (Illustrated ed.). Columbia University Press.
- Roggio, B. (2013). Afghan policeman kills 7 colleagues in Helmand. FDD long war journal.
- Rubin, B. R. (2006). Peace building and state-building in Afghanistan: Constructing sovereignty for whose security? *Third World Quarterly*, 27(1), 175–185. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500370038>

- Ruttig, T. (2012). 6. How Tribal Are the Taliban? In *Under the Drones* (pp. 102-135). Harvard University Press
- Ruttig (2013). ALP Programme Might Create a Rude Afghan Awakening. Afghanistan Analysts Network - English. Geraadpleegd op 21 juni 2023, van <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/alp-programme-might-create-a-rude-afghan-awakening/>
- Sartori, G. (1991). Comparing and miscomparing. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3: 243–257
- Saum-Manning, L. (2012). *VSO/ALP: Comparing past and current challenges to Afghan local defense* (pp. 2-3). RAND Corporation Working Paper, WR-936. Available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2012/RAND_WR936.
- Schmeidl, S., & Karokhail, M. (2009). The role of non-state actors in ‘community-based policing’ –an exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-Eastern Afghanistan. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30(2), 318-342.
- SIGAR (2019). Quarterly report to the United States Congress. Special Instructor General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2019-01-30qr-section3-security.pdf>. Virginia.
- Smelser, N.J. (1976). *Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Sopko, J. F., Brown, J., Laite, P., Sternenberger, M., DAgostino, D., Goodman, J. F., & Siddiqi, S. (2015). Afghan Local Police: A Critical Rural Security Initiative Lacks Adequate Logistics Support, Oversight, and Direction. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ARLINGTON VA.
- Stevens, M. (2013). Afghan Local Police in Helmand: Calculated Risk or Last Gamble?. *The RUSI Journal*, 158(1), 64-70.
- Suhrke, A. (2007). Reconstruction as modernisation: the ‘post-conflict’ project in Afghanistan. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(7), 1291-1308.
- Tariq, M. O. (2008). Tribal security system (Arbakai) in southeast Afghanistan. London: Crisis States Research Centre.
- Taylor, B. D., & Botea, R. (2008). Tilly tally: War-making and state-making in the contemporary third world. *International Studies Review*, 10(1), 27-56.
- Terpstra, N. (2020). Rebel governance, rebel legitimacy, and external intervention: assessing three phases of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 31(6), 1143–1173. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1757916>
- Tilly, C., Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (1985). War making and state making as organized crime. *Violence: A reader*, 35-60.

- United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). (2014). Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Annual Report 2013
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/feb_8_2014_poc-report_2013-full-report-eng.pdf
- United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (2014). Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Midyear report
<https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english20edited20light.pdf>
- United States. Department of the Army. (2007). *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual : U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24 : Marine Corps warfighting publication no. 3-33.5*. Chicago :University of Chicago Press.
- Van Bijlert, M. (2009). 7 imaginary institutions: state-building in afghanistan. *Doing Good or Doing Better*, 157.
- Vincent, S., Weigand, F., & Hakimi, H. (2015). The Afghan local police—closing the security gap?. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 4(1), 1-26.
- Vogt, H. (2016). Afghans see warlord footprints in new police force. *AP*, <http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2011/02/21/afghans-see-warlord-footprints-innew-police-force.phtml> or <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20110221/asafghan-new-force>, 21.
- Wagemaker, A. J. E. (2012). Afghanistan 2001-2011: gewapende interventie en staatsvorming in een fragiele staat Date: 2012-10-25.
- Wilkins, S. (2022). *The rise and fall of village stability operations in Afghanistan: Lessons for future irregular warfare Campaigns - Modern War Institute*. Modern War Institute. <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-rise-and-fall-of-village-stability-operations-in-afghanistan-lessons-for-future-irregular-warfare-campaigns/>
- Yin, R.K., (2002). Case study research design and methods. *Applied social research methods series*. (5)1-116.
- Yoon, S. J. (2013). Mobilizing ethnic resources in the transnational enclave: Ethnic solidarity as a mechanism for mobility in the Korean church in Beijing. *International Journal of Sociology*, 43(3), 29-54.