Bound to the core?

A statistical analysis of voters' support for radical right and left parties with diverging non-core positions in Spain, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland

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Abstract

While radical right parties' core ideology is based on cultural issues related to immigration and that of the radical left is defined by economic viewpoints, these parties also take up a position regarding non-core issues. Using supply and demand theory, the cultural and economic positions together form a two-dimensional political space I use to select four countries: Spain, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland. Here, the radical parties have diverging non-core positions. To analyse the positions' importance, I divide the respondents on this two-dimensional space. Through a logistic regression analysis, I find that the radical right receives support from respondents with strong right-wing cultural stances, but all types of economic viewpoints. The radical left receives support from respondents with strong left-wing economic views, although this only applies to those with strong cultural left or right-wing positions. Moreover, I find that with strong cultural right-wing views who perceive the economy as most salient are less likely to consider voting for a radical left party, which indicates that the cultural dimension is of greater importance. No effect on radical right support is found for those with strong left-wing economic views who perceive immigration as most salient.

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1. Introduction

Support for radical parties, on the right as well as on the left, has increased drastically over the last few decades in Europe. These parties have also been part of government coalitions more often (Mudde, 2017a, pp. 7-8; Rooduijn et al., 2017). Recent examples are the Spanish party Podemos, which has formed a coalition with the social democratic PSOE, the Italian Five Star Movement and Lega Nord who together ruled the country until 2019 and UKIP that was a major force behind Brexit. Due to their electoral rise, these parties have attracted significant attention of political scientists (Mudde, 2017, p. 4).

Some preferences of these parties are clear. Radical right parties favour authoritarianism and nativism, meaning they appreciate a strictly ordered society in which those who do not belong to the native population are a threat (Mudde, 2017a). This makes cultural issues their core ideology. Radical left parties are radical as they reject the capitalist system and left as they see economic inequalities as the main source of societal issues, making their socio-economic position their core (March, 2011).

But no party is identical. Radical right and left parties have different views on the issues that are not part of their core ideology. Cultural positions, in this thesis operationalised through views on immigration, and economic positions, here operationalised through views on economic state intervention, are the core of the radical right and left, respectively (Mudde, 2017; March, 2011). Yet, radical right parties may still have diverging economic views while radical left parties may have diverging cultural positions. For example, the Dutch radical right PVV is considered to be less interventionalist economically than its Polish party family co-member PiS, while both have strong anti-immigration stances. The radical left Czech KSČM is against immigration, while its Spanish fellow radical left party Podemos supports it (Bakker et al., 2020). Then, an empirical scientific puzzle arises. Do radical right and left voters base their likelihood to vote for them on the non-core ideology as well? Does a radical right voter still consider voting for a radical right party, even when it has economic stances the voter does not agree with? Will a radical left voter still consider voting for a radical left party when their cultural positions are incongruent? This thesis will analyse to what extent *political space*, which is the available set of parties categorised by their ideological core and non-core positions, matters for radical right and left voters' electoral preferences. I distribute the respondents on a two-dimensional political space measuring the core and non-core positions to find out if both their positions have an effect on their party preference. On top of that, I analyse whether the salience of these issues have different effects for those with particular two-dimensional positions. This way, we can gain more knowledge concerning the importance of non-core positions for voters and parties.

1.1 – Scientific relevance

Much research has been devoted to radical right and radical left voters. Some scholars have focused on comparing voters of radical right and radical left parties, concluding they share political dissatisfaction, but differ in attitudes towards immigration and economic policy (Rooduijn et al., 2017; Akkerman,

Zaslove & Spruyt, 2017). Others tried to zoom out and provide insight into the bigger picture by doing large n-research on the European level. They, for example, prove that lower education and staying behind compared to others in wage increase radical right and left support as well as indicating the embeddedness of voters in country-level structural circumstances such as the macroeconomy or a country's level of immigration as predictors (Visser et al., 2014; Burgoon et al., 2019; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). Furthermore, Arzheimer (2009) found that salience of issues important to the radical right, unemployment rates and immigration rates increase radical right support. Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) find support for the claim that structural socio-economic situations have a positive effect on radical right and left support.

With regard to the non-core positions of radical right and left parties, research is more limited, although attention has increased recently. When it comes to the radical right and its economic positions, multiple findings are worth noting. The parties themselves often remain blurry or quiet about their economic positions, although they show certain preferences, such as welfare chauvinism and prioritising consumption over investment policy (Otjes, 2019; Enggist & Pinggera, 2021). Concerning radical right voters, they are found to support a welfare state in which people must deserve their benefits to prevent free riders from profiting (Busemeyer et al., 2021). As for the cultural positions of the radical left, research is very limited. Gomez et al. (2016), however, have been able to distinguish traditionalist radical left parties from 'new' radical left parties. The first emphasize economic issues, while the latter are progressive regarding topics as gender, immigration and climate change. Krause (2020) finds that radical left parties suffer electorally if they relocate their non-core positions to a moderate position.

Despite the numerous and various valuable insights on radical right and left parties and their voters, research often takes either a national or large-n European approach which makes it impossible to properly analyse differences in support for radical parties with diverging non-core issue positions. Voters who were included in such analysis because of their choice for a radical right or left party, might have made a different choice in another political space. This, thus, influences the results of this type of research. By comparing political spaces in which the radical parties have diverging non-core positions, it will be possible to analyse in more detail whether the non-core positions matter to voters. Distributing the respondents on the two-dimensional political space, too, contributes to achieving this goal. Comparing political spaces where the parties have such divergent non-core issue positions will put generalisation of the hypotheses to a test and add to the knowledge about radical parties and the importance of their non-core issue positions.

1.2 – Societal relevance

Regarding the social relevance of this thesis, it provides for the opportunity to find out whether the political space in a country is fully covered by voters and parties. It might be possible that in countries where there is a lack of parties in a certain area of the political space, voters with attitudes congruent to that area are underrepresented, which undermines a fully functioning democracy. Voters might make a

decision at the ballot box that would have been different had a party covered the specific area in the political space. Representation of radical ideas should, however, not lead to the repression of those with other viewpoints as is happening under the leadership of radical right parties in Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, political parties can get more insight into the extent to which non-core positions matter. This naturally applies to radical right and left parties, but the results could be valuable for mainstream parties as well. They could therefore decide to pay more attention to multiple dimensions, which potentially increases representation of voters' attitudes. It could also provide knowledge for new political parties who aim to represent those that have not yet been fully represented.

1.3 – Theoretical approach and case selection

The core and non-core positions are derived from demand and supply theory. The demand side focuses on political attitudes of voters which determine their party choice. The supply side focuses, in turn, on constraints and opportunities for political parties. These include factors such as media attention or institutional frameworks. The supply related constraint/opportunity relevant to analyse in this thesis is *political space*, which determines what issues and political ideologies are 'occupied' by existing parties (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, pp. 913-914). The political space is based on dimensions, which each apply to a specific issue. In this thesis, the cultural and economic dimensions play a central role as these form the core dimensions of the radical right and left, respectively. Therefore, the political space in this research is two-dimensional.

As the political space differs in every country, this thesis analyses whether the variance in political space of countries influences the likeliness to vote for a party. A lack of congruence between voters and party supply may influence voters to make different decisions in different political spaces. Answering this will be achieved by comparing the likeliness to vote for radical right and left parties in four countries: Spain, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland. In these countries, the radical parties have diverging ideology positions on the non-core dimension. As the non-core positions of radical right and left parties differ between these countries, this case selection is appropriate to find out whether both dimensions of the political space influence likeliness to vote for a party.

How do these political spaces differ? In Spain, the pro-immigration radical left party Podemos and economically right-wing radical right party VOX are represented in parliament. Another radical left party, with communist roots, is Izquierda Unida, who, together with Podemos, the green party Equo and a number of local parties, formed an alliance: Unidas Podemos (UP). Although party positions have been measured per party, the data used in this thesis measuring likeliness to vote for a party uses UP as unit of analysis. The Netherlands includes a radical left, Socialist Party (SP) and two radical right parties, Party for Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD) (Akkerman, Zaslove & Spruyt, 2017; Meijers & Zaslove, 2020a&b). PVV is slightly more left-wing than FvD and VOX on the economic dimension. SP is more conservative regarding immigration than IU/Podemos. The political spaces in the

Netherlands and Spain, however, do not include a radical left party with strong opposition against immigration nor a radical right party with strong interventionist economic ideology (Bakker et al., 2020).

The Czech Republic is a unique case as it includes a radical left party with strong anti-immigration attitudes: the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). Additionally, there is also a radical right party with economically right-wing views: Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). Finally, the Polish governing party Law and Justice (PiS) is a case of a radical right party with a relatively strong preference for economic intervention. It also includes a radical right party with anti-interventionalist economic views: Konfederacia (idem). Unfortunately, a lack of data makes it impossible to include this party in the analysis. There is one radical left party in Poland: Spring (Razem). This party has an ideological position similar to those of IU/Podemos. *Figure 1* below provides the total overview.



Figure 1: Distribution of radical right (blue) and left (red) parties in Spain, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland on the economic and cultural dimension of the political space (Bakker et al., 2020).

To sum up, the central question of this thesis is:

How can divergence on the non-core dimensions in supply of radical right and left parties in the political space explain the party preference of voters with radical right and/or left attitudes?

1.4 – Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I will provide conceptions of the radical right and left and explain the theory I use to formulate the hypothesis. As stated above, this will be based on demand and supply theory. Theory about salience, which is the extent to which a topic is prevalent among parties and voters, will be presented too. Then, in Chapter 3a, I will elaborate on why I have chosen Spain, the

Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland as my cases. In Chapter 3b, I explain how I will perform the analysis with European Election Studies data and shed light on every variable used. In Chapter 4, the logistic regressions analyses are performed. Last, in Chapter 5, I draw conclusions from the statistical results, discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this thesis and propose future research.

2 – Theory and previous research

This section will be composed of two parts: conceptions and theory. First, I will draw upon conceptions of radical right and radical left parties and show what knowledge political science has acquainted about them and their voters. Second, I will present demand and supply theory in order to deduce four hypotheses.

2.1 – Conceptions of radical parties

2.1.1 –Radical right parties

The radical right has attracted significant interest of political scientists over the last three decades (Mudde, 2017a, p. 2). Between 1945 and 1980, political science mainly focused on post-war radical right and neo-fascist parties that were investigated in a historical context. Since the 1980s until 2000, but mostly since halfway through the nineties, radical right parties became more successful due to the increasing importance of cultural issues. This caused an increase in demand-side studies, focusing on voters responsible for their electoral success. After 2000, scholars focused more on the supply-side, seeking to identify parties' core concepts and influence on political arenas (pp. 2-3).

First, I explain the supply side of radical right parties, meaning the ideology they embrace. Mudde (2007; 2017a) argues that the populist radical right has three core characteristics: authoritarianism, nativism and populism. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) define populism as a thin-centred ideology, therefore meaning it is also applicable to the radical left, I discuss the matter of populism after elaborating on both party families. Now, the focus is on what defines a radical right party.

Regarding authoritarianism, radical right parties idealise a society which is strictly ordered and where severe punishment is the remedy against infringements of authority (Mudde, 2007; 2017a). This idealism translates into policies of strict law and order, securitisation of issues like prostitution and drugs and demanding more police on the streets. Radical right parties often call for higher prison sentences, limited rights for criminals and disciplined education. Nativism refers to a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. States should be inhabited by only those who are part of the native group. Those who do not belong to the native group, whether they live inside or outside the state, are a threat to the homogenous nation state. This does not only apply to people, but also to ideas and cultural differences. In Europe, nativism is mostly consolidated through anti-immigrant or anti-indigenous minorities attitudes. The distinction between the natives and non-natives can be based on ethnic, religious or racial dimensions. For many European radical right parties, the distinction between Islamic immigrants and the native inhabitants forms the core of their nativist character. This distinction can be strengthened and justified through socio-cultural and socio-economic arguments, for example by arguing welfare policy should only apply to native citizens.

Mudde (2017a) emphasises that these two features together with populism make the ideology of the radical right. Because of its populist element, it is generally supportive of democracy, although

its view on democracy is not necessarily liberal. The established political parties are the target of the populist rhetoric, claiming that they do not serve the will of the people and form a clique while faking opposition to distract people from them being essentially the same. That distinguishes the radical right from the extreme right, which disapproves of democracy.

Because the radical right is defined through cultural elements, its economic policy, which is the non-core ideology position, is more diverse and blurrier. De Lange (2007) found that a number of radical right parties took a centrist economic position. Rovny (2013) argues that radical right parties deliberately aim for blurring their economic stance in order to appeal to as many culturally conservative people as possible, without losing them due to different economic views. Otjes (2019) looked into the Dutch radical right PVV's economic policies over the years of its existence. He argues that three core elements described above can explain its economic policy: populism, nativism and authoritarianism. They serve as a reason to support poor groups economically, but not the elitist bureaucrats, non-native immigrants or 'lazy' unemployed people, respectively. The classic left-right scale is less useful as the PVV supports increasing pensions for the elderly and oppose higher wages for bankers (left-wing), while proposing strict anti-fraud policies and condemning welfare benefits for immigrants (right-wing).

As for the demand side of the radical right, much research has been dedicated to voters of radical right parties identifying political distrust, anti-immigration attitudes and education as key factors shaping their vote choice. First of all, radical right voters are sceptical of politics in general (Werts et al., 2012). Due to the populist character of these parties, voters see themselves as anti-establishment and vote for the radical right to express their dissatisfaction with the establishment (Söderlund & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2009). Additionally, Werts et al. (2012) found that voters of radical right parties have strong Eurosceptic attitudes and feel threatened by other ethnicities. This is in line with the nativist aspect of supply of radical right parties.

With regards to socio-economic circumstances and structures, people who are lower-educated, unemployed, not religious, young, men and unhappy with their socio-economic situation are more likely to vote for a radical right party (Werts et al., 2012, p. 194). Zooming in on class and work-related factors, radical right voters in a number of West-European countries have more insecurity on employment prospects and fear wage pressure (Oesch, 2008). However, when voters are controlled for their economic and cultural grievances over immigration, radical right voters do not differ significantly from middle-class voters. Therefore, Oesch argues that economic circumstances are less important than cultural attitudes to explain the radical right vote. In a more recent article, Oesch & Rennwald (2018) conclude that the cultural preferences of the working class are close to those of the radical right, while their economic views are closer to those of the left. So, also voters of radical right parties show blurriness regarding economic preferences, similar to the parties themselves.

Other characteristics and motivations of radical right voters have been investigated as well. When it comes to structural context in which voters are embedded, the number of asylum seekers and a country's immigration rate have a positive effect on radical right support (Werts et al., 2012, p. 195).

Regarding their gender, men are more likely to support the radical right, there are no significant differences between male and female radical right voters (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015). Additionally, a substantial share of the radical right voters is becoming less traditionalist, thus being more supportive of gender equality and LGBT rights, while opposing immigration (Lancaster, 2020). Finally, in some multi-party systems smaller radical right parties gain support from anti-democratic voters, which is not in line with the populist character of radical right parties (Donovan, 2019).

The radical right has clearly become of greater importance. Although the party family's views on immigration following from the nativist character are coherent, its economical position on the political spectrum is more diverse and blurrier. This applies to their voters as well. Therefore, it is of scientific value to compare political systems in which radical right parties take different positions on the economic dimension and see whether voters with radical right vote according to these issues as well.

2.1.2 – Radical left parties

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, not much was left of the radical left (March & Mudde, 2005). The classic authoritarian communist parties were in decline, but the downfall of communism in the East provided an opportunity for radical left parties to change. Despite that, electoral support since 1989 remained relatively stable in the first decade of the twenty-first century (March, 2011). The share of votes of radical left increased in Western Europe from 2014 onwards due to the economic crisis (Chiocchetti, 2017, p. 65). In Spain, for example, Podemos entered parliament in 2015 (Ramiro & Gomez, 2017). The party would eventually join the government coalition led by social democratic prime minister Sanchez in 2020. In Greece, Syriza became the major party in parliament and their leader Tsipras would serve as prime minister until 2019.

In order to describe the supply side of radical left parties, the core ideology of radical left parties can be explained by defining the words radical and left. They are radical because they reject the values and practices of contemporary capitalism (March, 2011, p. 8). This rejection can refer to underlying structures as consumerism and neo-liberalism or practices like private property and profit maximising. Their radicalism is further shaped by supporting an alternative economic system, which redistributes wealth from the rich elite towards the poor people. Radical left parties are left through their identification of economic inequality as the basis of political and societal inequalities (2011, p. 9). Promoting collectivism and anti-capitalism are their main agenda priorities. Extreme left parties, on the other hand, disapprove of democracy and want to establish a communist authoritarian state (March, 2011, p. 11).

Identifying differences between radical left parties has, due to a more diverse field of parties (March & Mudde, 2005), proven to be complicated. Fortunately, empirical research aiming to find distinctions between radical left parties the non-core issue position has been conducted. Selecting parties in Western Europe, Gomez et al. (2016) find that most variation between radical left parties is established through their viewpoints on 'new politics'. This term refers to environmentalism, pacifism and opposition towards traditional morality. Traditional radical left parties tend to focus only on

economic issues, while 'New Left' parties also emphasise the aforementioned themes. Thus, on the cultural dimension of politics, radical left parties are more diverse than on the economic dimension. Radical left parties with cultural values close to those of the radical right are relatively rare (Bakker et al., 2020). Krause (2020) found that when radical left parties move these cultural values more to the centre, they lose support.

This variation between radical right parties is also visible while looking into radical left voters on the demand side. It is clear that the radical left attracts voters based on ideas regarding the economy and capitalism. Supporters of radical left parties have a certain view on society, as they endeavour equal opportunities and income distribution (Visser et al., 2014). They also are more often member of a union and identify as left-wing. Additionally, radical left voters show more dissatisfaction with politics, which follows from the populist rhetoric often used by radical left parties. Euroscepticism is, too, an important factor to explain radical left support (Beaudonnet & Gomez, 2017; Visser et al., 2014).

Regarding socio-economic factors, higher educated people are more likely to vote radical left, although the effect is non-linear as the lower educated are also more likely to vote radical left (Ramiro, 2016). Visser et al. (2014) find that the higher someone's income, the lower the chance he or she voters for a radical left party. Ramiro (2016), however, notices that the lower educated radical left voters are part of a 'core' voter base, meaning the effect of income does not apply to all people with lower income. Ramiro also found that younger and urban voters are more often part of the 'wide' electorate. Voters of 'New Left' radical left parties compared to traditionalist ones, on the other hand, tend to be more successful among the higher educated, economically more centrist and less Eurosceptic (Gomez et al., 2016).

Structural level factors also partially explain radical left support. Visser et al. (2014) find that radical left voters are more supportive of income redistribution, but also take structural country-level factors into account. They find that radical left support is smaller when income inequality within a country is smaller, while poor macroeconomic conditions increase the support. Also, an authoritarian legacy in a country increases the chance of radical left support. March and Rommerskirchen (2015), too, put more structural elements into their analysis. They conclude that radical left parties flourish in countries with high level of Euroscepticism, poor economic conditions and past success of the radical right. Additionally, supply side indicators like competition from Green parties and a high electoral threshold reduce their success. Party fragmentation, however, is of no significance (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015).

In conclusion, the radical left party family is more diverse than its radical right counterpart. Despite the variation, the core of its ideology remains the critical approach towards capitalism and the support for strong income distribution as well as their voters. On the issue of immigration, most radical left parties do not seem to oppose it due to their internationalist worldview. Still, some radical left parties are more traditionalist than others. Therefore, it is worth looking more in detail into the importance of the non-core issue positions of the radical left on their level of support from the electorate.

2.1.3 – Populism

In order to understand the radical right and left, one should also understand populism. Parties on either radical side of the political spectrum tend to be more populist, as shown in Figure 2 below (Meijers & Zaslove, 2020a). Defining populism has been an ongoing debate in political science. A number of approaches have been developed regarding the phenomenon. First, the populist agency approach and the so called 'Lauclean' view see populism as a way to mobilise the people (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Second, populism can be seen as the irresponsible economic policy to please the people, especially in the South American context (2017, p. 4). Another approach views populism as a political strategy, under the authority of a strong and charismatic leader who tries to connect directly with the masses (idem; Moffit & Tormey, 2014). Last, populism can be perceived as a folkloric style of politics (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Here, its aim is to generate as much media attention and popular support as possible through unprofessional behaviour and disrespecting common norms within the political realm.

Figure 2: Plot of European parties' populism score and left-right position (Meijers & Zaslove, 2020a).

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), aiming to order the chaotic ball pit of conceptions of populism, propose another definition: the ideational approach. This perspective calls for populism to be understood as a thin-centred ideology. This means it can be combined with 'thick-centred' ideologies like socialism, fascism or liberalism. As populism as such does not provide solutions to contemporary issues, combining it with ideology is the only manner to realise these solutions. The ideology of populism in itself is rooted in three core concepts: the people, the elite and the general will (2017, p. 9).

'The people' is a construction that can be framed to gain support from voters. While it is a vague concept, its appeal to a group of voters can generate a shared identity and support for a common cause. It most often refers to either the people as (1) sovereign, meaning the people are supposed to be the

ultimate source of power, (2) the common people, often referring to the lower socioeconomic or -cultural classes excluded from power, and (3) as the nation, meant to appeal to citizens with native roots in a country (pp. 10-11). 'The elite' are most often defined by the amount of power they hold. This includes the political elite, but also the economic elite and the media, which is seen as the defender of the political or economic elite. Populists see the people as pure and the elite as an evil force ruling the state. The elites are perceived to not serve the interests of the people, and sometimes even against those (pp. 11-15). The 'general will', based on the work of Rousseau, implies that populists want to seek what the people believe through, for example, direct democracy in order to govern via that will. They criticise representative democracy where people are just seen as passive entities who vote every now and then (pp. 16-18).

Using the ideational approach, the character of the radical right and left can be further understood. Cas Mudde's (2017a) approach towards the radical right argues that populism is an inherent part of the radical right party family. Populist radical right parties claim that they speak for the people, while accusing the political elite, meaning all established parties, of not acting in the interest of the people and cooperating in a cartel. Populism is often combined with the nativist character of the populist radical right through defining 'the people' as the native citizens of the country. The elites do not serve the native citizens, but instead aliens and their ideals. Therefore, the populist radical right is not anti-democratic, but rather against liberal democracy in which minorities may be represented in parliament.

On the left side of the political spectrum, populism is more focused on the economic elite and sees the people as an egalitarian entity. It does not distinguish native people from immigrants, making this version of populism more inclusive (Katsambekis, 2019). Left-wing populists argue that economic inequalities are the result of the actions of the political elite serving the interests of the economic elite. Therefore, anti-corruption is a major element of left-wing populism, while they emphasise more transparency.

Empirical research in Western Europe shows that the level of populism within a party can be best explained by the level of radicality, instead of whether a party is more left or right-wing (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). Communist parties are also populist in nature, due to their pro-worker and anti-bourgeoisie attitudes. On both flanks, extremism and anti-democratism have transformed into anti-establishment and pro-people attitudes. This supports the idea that populist parties are not necessarily anti-democratic, but rather challenge liberal democracy. Among voters, populism seems to be strongly perceived as a solution to problems the thick-centred ideology put forward while many populist voters feel deprived (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014).

2.1.4 – The radical right and left compared

As radicalism and populism are common characteristics of the radical right and left, a number of scholars have compared the parties and their voters. On the supply side, some of the radical right and left parties share the same, critical positions on European integration and globalisation, while using a populist

rhetoric (Fagerholm, 2018). Radical right and left parties both use nationalism as a way to criticise the European Union. The radical right uses, however, a cultural approach as they see the EU as a threat to the national identity. The radical left uses an economic approach, perceiving the EU as a threat to national economic policy. The radical right uses the latter perspective as well, but the radical left does not adopt the cultural approach (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012).

On the demand side, radical right and left voters show similarities and differences with regards to their characteristics. In the Netherlands, they are both more populist and demonstrate more political mistrust than voters of mainstream parties (Akkerman et al., 2017). Furthermore, radical right voters do not differ from mainstream voters when it comes to economic attitudes or authoritarianism, despite the latter being part of the radical right conception. Radical left voters have stronger left-wing economic attitudes. The voters' values and voting motivation, however, differ strongly between the right and left (Rooduijn et al., 2017). Radical left voters favour equality, altruism, and appropriateness of government promotion of equality, while radical right voters renounce these. Also, despite both sides eschewing the European Union, radical right voters are more nationalist and more likely to oppose immigration whereas radical left voters are more cosmopolitan. Rooduijn et al. (2017) see this as an explaining variable of differences in education levels, as higher educated people are more likely to be cosmopolitan.

Further on the demand side, the voters of radical right and left parties are influenced by socio-economic circumstances. For example, 'personal deprivation', meaning that people are outpaced in household income by others within their country, has been proved to explain voter support on both sides (Burgoon et al., 2019). Income loss, however, seems to increase support for the radical left, but not the radical right, although it slightly increases nativist attitudes (Gidron & Mijs, 2019). Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018) find that radical right support decreases when economic circumstances are unfavourable, like economic crisis or low welfare expenditures. On the radical left side, support decreases when immigration levels are high. Thus, when its counterpart's core ideology is more prevalent, the respective radical party loses support.

On the whole, radical right and left voters and parties share a number of attitudes but differ on others. The differences are mainly found in the core ideology aspects, like immigration on the right and economic and social equality on the left. Usually, these are measured through one-state case studies or European wide large-n studies where all radical voters are added together. It is, however, valuable to measure the attitudes of voters of parties that differ between the non-core ideologies. Do the voters of radical left parties differ between radical left parties that have diverging positions regarding cultural issues? And do voters of radical right parties differ when one party is economically more in favour of government intervention than another? Or are those non-core issues just not relevant enough for voters to change their voting behaviour?

2.2 – Demand and supply theory

The following part provides an overview of demand and supply theory. On the demand side, political scientists measure what values, characteristics and circumstantial factors determine the preferred political party of a voter. These include, among many others, education, placement on a left-right scale or income. The supply side theory in turn, indicates what parties with specific ideas are available to choose from. Political dimensions, on which demand and supply can be positioned and compared, form the basis of this thesis' theoretical framework. Furthermore, issue salience, which is the importance voters and parties connect to specific issues, will provide an important part of the hypotheses deduced from this theoretical framework. These will predict that due to their salience, cultural and economic issues are most important for radical right and left voters, respectively. Lastly, this section provides hypothesis about demand that is not covered by supply in political dimensions.

2.2.1 – Demand

2.2.1.1 – Cleavage theory

The demand side of politics refers to voters that seek a political party to fulfil their preferences, which are based on political conflict. Cleavage theory was first developed by Lipset & Rokkan (1967). They argue that every social conflict is based on a so-called cleavage. They describe a number of cleavages that followed after political conflicts. First, there is the national revolution, which caused two cleavages: state vs. church and state vs. peripheral communities. Second, the industrial revolution brought two new cleavages to light: urban vs. rural areas and a class conflict cleavage. These cleavages are still relevant today, as many parties prioritise these conflicts in their party identity like social democrats and the radical left (class conflict), Christian democratic parties (church vs. state) or farmer's parties (urban vs. rural).

Cleavages, however, change when societies change, influencing voting behaviour. For example, globalisation has created a new cleavage (Kriesi et al., 2008). Some citizens profit from globalisation, while others experience negative effects like wage competition or factories moving to other, cheaper parts of the world. Also, national identities are more often challenged by influences from abroad, while cultures mix within a nation state due to increasing immigration. Kriesi et al. (2008) argue a new cleavage has emerged, the demarcation-integration cleavage, which will be explained below in 2.2.2.1. The emergence of this cleavage can explain the rise of radical right parties, meaning that cleavages are transformative and can change on the long term (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). As political parties have trouble with adjusting to a new cleavage, the most common way to have new cleavages represented in parliament is through new parties (idem).

Cleavages thus shape the electoral preferences of voters. As they are embedded in a certain situation, experience either beneficial or unbeneficial consequences following from new social conflicts and adapt political preferences in reaction to those, they form a preference for a political party to vote

for. The types of political parties to choose from, however, depends much on a number of factors. This will be explained in the following section on supply side theory.

2.2.2 – Supply

2.2.2.1 –Political space and dimensions

The ideological positions of political parties together form the political space. Already in 1957, Downs (1957) argued that voters determine their vote based on what ideologies are represented in parliament. He portrays this choice as an economical model, where supply (political parties) and demand (voters) find an equilibrium. Party ideology is a means political parties use to attract support from the electorate. Voters will support the party that is the nearest to their ideas. A party's and voter's ideology could be presented on a left-right dimension (Enelow & Hinich, 1984). The proximity of those positions will establish a voter's choice during elections.

Kitschelt (1995) uses this idea of existing ideological positions of political parties to explain the rise of the radical right in Western Europe. Political space is shaped by different dimensions, like the economic left-right and libertarian versus authoritarian dimensions. These dimensions are thus not only relevant on the demand side, but also the supply side of politics. Radical right voters fall within the authoritarian-right dimension, which was not properly represented by the mainstream parties, explaining the radical right's rise. Kriesi et al. (2008) explain their emergence through using a new type of dimension embedded in structural conflicts, thus a cleavage, resulting from globalisation. They demonstrate and find support for the theory that political space is based around two new dimensions: a cultural and economic one. Each dimension is the consequence of globalisation, in which parties and voters have two choices: being in favour or against more 'integration'. On the economic dimension, integration means for example more open borders and trade deals, while on the cultural dimension, integration favours for example more immigration and European integration. Bornschier (2010) also finds support for a two-dimensional political space based on economy and cultural issues. The cultural and economic dimensions will be the ones used to formulate the hypotheses later on, as the radical right's and left's core ideologies are most prevalent in these two.

Furthermore, Abou-Chadi & Wagner (2020) find that social democratic parties' progressive stances on the cultural dimension do not influence electoral results negatively, although many authors have claimed the rise of the radical right and issues related to them explain the decline of social democratic parties. Supply and demand can also be based on populist appeals (Guiso et al., 2017). They argue that the economic dimension is more likely to cause populist attitudes rather than cultural issues. Stoll (2010) finds that the socio-economic dimension is still of significant importance to party competition, while cultural issues as EU integration and ethnicity are issues that have gained importance in voting behaviour over the last few decades. Both the cultural and the economic dimension therefore have proven to matter in voting behaviour, although this remains vaguer for the radical right and left.

2.3 – Issue salience: what voters and parties consider important

Another relevant factor is salience. This is the extent to which an issue is considered most important by voters (Wlezien, 2005). Regarding the political dimensions, cultural issues and economic issues are considered most important by radical right and left parties and voters, respectively. Issue salience has been proven to determine a voter's party choice already in the early days of political science (RePass, 1971). There is little consensus about the conception of salience (Wlezien, 2005, p. 557). Some scholars see it as the topic most prominent in voters' minds, while others define it as the importance of a topic or the prevalence of leaders' characteristics in a voter's judgement. Salience can, however, also originate from political parties rather than voters (Stoll, 2010). On the elite-level, political parties use salience to promote political conflicts in order to compete with other parties. When political dimensions lose relevance because voters do not base their choice on those anymore, there is de-alignment. Re-alignment happens when new political conflicts become more salient. As stated above, conflicts regarding globalisation and ethnicity have become more salient (Kriesi, 2008; Stoll, 2010). These conflicts usually follow from demand side developments, thus parties reacting to changing dynamics among the electorate (Stoll, 2010). New parties can make a neglected issue salient in order to create a new dimension within the political space on which mainstream parties have not taken a divergent position (Meguid, 2008). The more issues are salient, the more dimension become relevant, which in the end causes more parties to emerge (García-Díaz, Zambrana-Cruz & Van Witteloostuijn, 2013). Existing parties also need to adjust their own policy preferences when a new issue becomes salient, often moving towards the preferred position of the majority (Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2020).

Furthermore, issues salience can also be stimulated by political parties themselves without a demand for it from voters. For example, immigration has become more salient by the effort of radical right parties (Hutter & Kriesi, 2021). They created a divide on the cultural dimension which resulted in electoral support. This issue then becomes also salient among the parties that thus far had not addressed the issue (Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2019). Another example is European Union policy. These issues have become more prevalent in the media and in political debate (Beyers, Dür & Wonka, 2017; Rauh, 2019). Salience of EU policy has proven to create incentives for the European Commission to take public opinion into account, but also increased Euroscepticism (Hooghe & Marks, 2007).

As the core ideologies of the radical right and radical left are nativism and anti-capitalism respectively, these topics are more salient among the parties as well as their voters. Despite that, Rovny and Polk (2020) have found evidence that economic salience among radical right parties has increased. The radical right seems to acclaim more left-wing economic policies, although they remain vague about their economic position. Experts still do not find consensus on where to place radical right parties on the economic dimension, indicating economic left-wing proposals go hand in hand with cultural right-wing proposals. On the radical left side, parties have struggled with the salience of immigration (Alonso & Claro da Fonseca, 2011). This is the result of an electorate that is divided on the issue as well.

2.4 – Voter congruence: where demand and supply meet

The underlying theoretical causal approach I will elaborate on in order to draw a number of hypotheses, together with issue salience, is voter congruence. Voter congruence is the extent to which policy positions of political parties are linked to those of voters (Costello, Thomassen & Rosema, 2012). Voter congruence has an important role in a representative democracy. The more congruence, the better the people are represented in parliament. The closer the link, the more likely it is that representatives are able to present the ideology shared by his or her electorate. Two-party systems are, for example, not able to decrease congruence between political parties and voters, as voters have a limited set of choices during elections. Multi-party systems are able to represent groups of voters who have more subtle ideological differences. Parties may strive for voter congruence in order to maximise their votes, but may also aim for the representation of a smaller group of voters with specific policy preferences (Werner, 2020). When the distance between a voter's position and those of the current existing parties in a political system are too divergent, people tend to vote for a new party representing that ideological position (Otjes & Van de Wardt, 2020).

The policy positions of parties and voters are best visualised via, the hereabove mentioned, political space and dimensions. As these dimensions change over time, topics on which voters can place themselves change as well. By placing parties as well as voters on political dimensions, one can measure to what extent voters are congruent with the parties they voted on (Costello, Thomassen & Rosema, 2012; Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014). The political space in a country, which follows from the positions parties take on the political dimensions, determines what choices the electorate has during elections. A political space with multiple parties enables voters to vote closer to their own preferences, thus increasing congruence.

Still, even in a multi-party system, some parts of the political space may be uncovered by a political party. Voters may feel a mismatch between them and the existing parties in parliament. This gap can be filled in by a new political party, but the emergence of a new party does not guarantee increasing congruence (Van Ditmars & De Lange, 2019). Sometimes, mainstream parties represent voters' policy positions better than niche parties, although these voters still vote for that niche party.

Regarding these issues, salience also plays a major role in voter congruence. Voters are more strongly linked to certain themes on the economic or cultural dimension. Voters may be very congruent on one theme a political party supports, but not on another. The voter then has to decide which topic he or she finds most important. Both policy positions and specific issues political parties prioritise determine a voter's choice during elections (Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014). In the case of radical right and radical left parties, nativism and anti-capitalism form their core ideologies and thus are probably the most important issue voters consider in order to determine their vote. As voters have these issues most prominently in mind, it is likely that these have the most influence on their voting choice. Parties belonging to these party family, however, differ on the non-core ideology dimensions.

In order to create a clear overview, all theory mentioned above is incorporated in Figure 3. The causal links in the conceptual model between issue salience and vote choice will be tested within the context of specific political spaces, while the link between cleavages and voter preferences remains untested.



Figure 3: Conceptual model of demand and supply theory.

It can be expected that voters that have certain positions on the political dimensions are more likely to vote for parties with congruent positions. Costello et al. (2021) find evidence that the congruence between voters and parties increases regarding party-specific issue salience. When one applies this evidence to the radical right, it is fair to assume that voters with congruent positions on the cultural dimension are more likely to vote for such party. It remains, however, less predictable to what extent voters with these cultural positions take their economic positions into account while voting. Due

to the core ideology being based on cultural issues, I expect that these voters do not take their economic positions into account, resulting in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Voters with strong cultural right-wing views are more likely to vote for a radical right party, no matter the party's position on the economic dimension.

Regarding the radical left, the same applies but, in this case, the economic dimension qualifies as most salient. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Voters with strong economic left-wing views are more likely to vote for a radical left party, no matter the party's position on the cultural dimension.

In order to see whether salience of a core issue makes a difference when applied to those with strong attitudes on a non-core dimension, Hypothesis 3 and 4 will be tested as well. This enables me to indicate whether the salience of a core issue causes voters to be more likely to vote for a party with the salient issue as part of its core ideology, assessing the importance of the non-core position as well.

Hypothesis 3: Voters with strong economic left-wing attitudes who perceive immigration as the most salient issue are more likely to vote for a radical right party.

Hypothesis 4: Voters with strong cultural right-wing attitudes who perceive the economy as the most salient issue are more likely to vote for a radical left party.

3. Methodology

This chapter is divided into two parts: 3a. Case selection and 3b. Data and method. In 3a, I will describe the political space in the selected cases and explain why they were selected: Spain, The Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland. In order to achieve this, I show each country's political space with a focus on their radical right and left parties and their placement on the economic and cultural dimension. Then, in part 3b, I describe what data I will use and how I have operationalised the dependent, independent and control variables. Additionally, I explain the statistical method used.

3a. - Case selection

3a.1 - Case selection method

The cases have been chosen according to the most similar systems design. Here, variance is sought in either the explanatory variable or the outcome, while other factors are kept as similar as possible (Toshkov, 2016). In this thesis, support for radical right and left parties is the outcome. Those parties obviously have similar positions regarding their core issue. Thus, this means the variance between these political parties can be found in the non-core issue dimension positions. That is exactly what Spain, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland can offer.

The variance between radical right and left parties in these countries is shown below in Figure 4. The Spanish radical right party VOX is strongly against government intervention in the economy, while the Polish PiS party is strongly in favour. The radical left Czech KSČM is not supportive of immigration, while the Spanish Podemos and Izquierda Unida are. The radical left Dutch SP has a moderate position regarding immigration, while the radical right PVV has a moderate position regarding the economy. The radical right FvD is more explicitly right-wing on the economic dimension. Through selecting these specific cases, I will be able to test whether the hypotheses hold in these four political spaces where the radical parties have such diverging non-core issue positions.

Other factors are considered similar, as all these countries are European and have a multiparty system. However, electoral systems which influence party competition differ among the countries. The Netherlands and the Czech Republic have a unitarian system, while in Spain and Poland, parliamentary seats are allocated per region. Thresholds also differ, as the Dutch threshold is very low, while a minimum of 5% is necessary to gain a seat in the other countries. Voters, thus, in the latter three countries could vote more strategically than in the Netherlands where proportional representation is optimal. Although western and eastern European countries are often separated in research, supply theory has proven to be relevant for both Western and Eastern Europe (Marks et al., 2006). In addition, including a southern, western and two eastern European countries provides an opportunity to create more generalisable results.



Figure 4: Distribution of radical right (blue) and left (red) parties in Spain, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland on the economic and cultural dimension of the political space (Bakker et al., 2020).

In Table 1 below, I have presented all other political parties in the four countries ordered by their party families. The colours in the first column represent the colours used in the figures in each country's paragraph following the table.

Table 1: Overview of parties per party family in Spain, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland (Bakker et al., 2020).

Party Family (colour refers to Figures 5, 6, 7 & 8)	Spain	Netherlands	Czech Republic	Poland
Christian democrat (light green)	-	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL)	Civic Platform (PO)
Conservative (pink)	People's Party (PP)	-	Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Tradition Responsibility Prosperity (TOP 09)	-
Agrarian (orange)	-	-	-	Polish People's Party (PSL)
Confessional (dark red)	-	Reformed Political Party (SGP), Christian Union (CU)	-	-
Greens (green)	-	GreenLeft (GL), Party for Animals (PvdD)	-	-

Liberal (yellow)	Citizens (C's)	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Democrats '66 (D66)	Mayors and Independents (STAN)	Modern (N)
No family (black)	-	DENK, 50Plus	ANO 2011, Pirates	Kukiz'15
Radical left (red)	United Left (IU), We can (Podemos)	Socialist Party (SP)	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	Left Together (LR) (in 2015: Razem)
Radical right (blue)	VOX	Party for Freedom (PVV), Forum for Democracy (FvD)	Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD)	Law and Justice (PiS), Konfederacia (in 2015: KORWiN)
Social democratic (purple)	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	Labour Party (PvdA)	Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)	Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) (in 2015: Zjednoczona Lewica), Spring (Wiosna)

3a.2 - Spain

Spanish politics has, after the democratisation following Francisco Franco's death, long known a multi-party system in which two political parties were dominant: the social democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the conservative Partido Popular (PP) (Expatica.com, 2021). However, in the last decade, a number of new parties have emerged, including radical right and left parties.

Podemos, which started off as a protest movement during the economic crisis in 2011, was founded in 2014 and participated in the European elections of that year (Delgado & López, 2015). The party has a strong anti-capitalist rhetoric and it wants to re-democratise Spain, which shows Podemos has a radical left as well as a populist identity. An older radical left party in Spain is Izquierda Unida (United Left). This party has its roots in the communist party of Spain, which was established in 1921 (Historiaelectoral.com, n.d.). IU itself was established in 1986 when a number of radical left parties merged. Currently, IU is in an electoral coalition with Podemos: Unidas Podemos. Therefore, voters of Podemos and IU are not recorded separately in the data and, as a result, will be within the same group of voters in this analysis. Regarding the non-core position, the parties are both against a restrictive immigration policy.

The radical right in Spain consists out of one party: VOX. Since 2019, VOX has been able to gain seats in the Spanish parliament (Delgado et al., 2020). The party has a clear populist radical right course, visible in their anti-immigration, anti-Islam, anti-Europeanisation and nationalist ideology. Also, the party emphasises its preference for a centralised state, mainly as a reaction to the Catalonian struggle for independence. The party is against economic state intervention. In Figure 5, other parties that are represented in the Spanish parliament are shown. However, together with these national parties, Spain

knows a large number of local parties that are able to enter parliament due to the regional electoral system. These include, among others, Catalan and Basque parties. Due to the relatively small size of these parties, and therefore small number of cases in datasets, I will exclude these parties from the analysis.



Figure 5: Position of Spanish political parties in the two-dimensional political space (Bakker et al., 2020).

3a.3 - The Netherlands

Due to the low electoral threshold, the Netherlands has a high number of parties represented in parliament (ProDemos, 2013). During the 2021 national elections for the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer), a record number of seventeen parties managed to receive at least one seat from the electorate (Verkiezingensite.nl, 2021)[1].

Two radical right parties are represented in the House of Representatives: Party for Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD). The PVV, under the leadership of Geert Wilders since its establishment in 2006, has a strong nativist narrative, mainly based around perceiving the Islam as a threat (ProDemos, 2013). The PVV has a very strong populist narrative and 'one of the best examples of a populist radical right party' (Akkerman et al., 2017). FvD, established in 2016 as a party after being a thinktank, also has a clear radical right view. Compared to the PVV, it puts less emphasis on the Islam in particular and adds climate scepticism to its ideology, while being more right-wing on the economic dimension (Rooduijn, 2019). The PVV has a more moderate stance on the economic dimension, while FvD is placed on the most anti-economic state intervention side.

[1] Two new parties, the radical right JA21 and radical left BIJ1, who entered parliament in 2021, will not be included in this thesis due to a lack of data in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and the European Social Survey.

The most important radical left party in the Netherlands is the Socialist Party (SP). Its ideology is originally rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideas, but the party left those roots in a void after the collapse of the Soviet Union (ProDemos, 2013). It still remains very critical of capitalism, while having a strong populist narrative embedded in their ideology (March & Mudde, 2005). Regarding immigration, the party has a more moderate position than radical right parties. In Figure 6, all Dutch political parties per party family are shown on the economic and cultural dimension, operationalised by their positions on to what extent the government should intervene in the economy and their positions on immigration.



Figure 6: Position of Dutch political parties in the two-dimensional political space (Bakker et al., 2020).

3a.4 - Czech Republic

Like Spain and the Netherlands, the Czech Republic has a multi-party system. It was communist until 1990 and independent since the split of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The members of the Czech Lower House are chosen through a proportional system.

The Czech Republic is home to one radical right party: Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). It has a strong nationalist and anti-Islam ideology (Bridge, 2020). It was founded in 2015, when its founder Tomio Okamura split off from another radical right party after it was in decline in the polls. The SPD entered parliament for the first time in 2017. It proposes more direct democracy, fitting in the populist rhetoric described before. Also, it has shown racist elements, for example when it called for the stop of 'Africanisation' of Europe. The party states it stands up for the 'Christian Central Europe' (idem). Okamura caused turmoil after downplaying the holocaust and called for Roma to be deployed from the Czech Republic (idem). With regards to the economic dimension, the party has a rather moderate position.

The Czech Republic is also home to one radical left party. This is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). The party has its roots in the communist history of the country and,

therefore, its programme is based on Marxist theory (CEE Identity, 2013). It has, however, attempted to accept the democratic system and try to achieve socialist policy through the democratic institutions. The party has a nationalist character, while still having Marxist internationalist values. The party has proven in the past to fill the gap on the most left side of the Czech political space (Stegmaier & Vlachova, 2009). As a result of their nationalist and pro-worker attitudes, the party opposes immigration to 'protect the Czech worker', making it the only radical left party in Europe to be positioned on that side of the political space (Visegrad Post, 2020). In Figure 7 below, all other Czech parties are shown as well.



Figure 7: Position of Czech political parties in the two-dimensional political space (Bakker et al., 2020).

3a.5 – Poland

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Poland's communist system, Poland has transformed into a democracy in 1989. Poland has adopted a multiparty system with proportional representation.

The radical right in Poland has a very important role in government, mainly because the Law and Justice (PiS) party has become the most powerful in the country. Its most important ideological idea is the protection of a Christian Poland (LSE, 2019). It presents itself as the defender of traditional family values, Polish national identity and Christian values. This includes opposition towards the LGBT community, strong anti-immigration stances and conflict with the European Union. The latter often refers to the declining democracy in Poland, due to PiS's undermining the rule of law and the judiciary. On the economic dimension, however, PiS is placed by experts as a relatively left-wing, pro-government intervention party (Bakker et al., 2020). It is likely that this is a result from its attempts to receive as many votes as possible, for example, by extending child subsidies (LSE, 2019). Furthermore, the radical right Konfederacia has similar cultural positions, but portrays itself much more as an economic right-

wing party in contrast to PiS (European Data Journalism, 2019). Unfortunately, the party is not included in the EES data, so cannot be included in the analysis.

In 2015, the radical left Razem participated in the elections, but did not receive enough votes to gain seats in parliament. The party is against a restrictive immigration policy. In 2019, this party went on as Lewica Razem and was able to enter parliament through an alliance with the social democratic SLD and Wiosna (Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2020).

Polish parties often form coalitions during elections, but as the data has been measured on the party level, it is possible to show differences between these. In Figure 8 below, all other Polish parties included in the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey are shown. As the election data that will be used is based on the 2015 national elections, names of parties named below may deviate from those voters had to choose from in 2015. Coalitions and party fusions are, however, very common. This causes names to change, contrary to ideological positions. Therefore, the former names of Polish parties are shown in between brackets in Table 1, while the 2019 positions are shown in Figure 8.



Figure 8: Position of Polish political parties in the two-dimensional political space (Bakker et al., 2020).

In sum, Spain and the Netherlands lack a party with strong economic left-wing and strong cultural right-wing views. In the Czech Republic and Poland, this space is covered by a radical left and radical right party, respectively. Furthermore, the Czech Republic is not home to a party with strong cultural left-wing views, while the other countries are. In neither of the four countries a party with strong cultural left-wing and strong economic right-wing views exists.

3b. - Data and statistical method

3b.1 – Data

The analysis will be based on data from the Voter Study of the European Election Studies 2019 (Schmitt et al., 2020). It is a post-election study which takes place after every European Parliament election. The data collection, for the most part, took place online. One thousand respondents in each European Union member state have answered the questionnaire (except for Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg, which each have 500 respondents included). This makes the total number of respondents approximately 26,500. Some questions, including questions referring to the economic and cultural dimension, have been worded according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, which makes it possible to link voters with political parties.

The interviews were conducted between June 14 and July 11, 2019, which is a month after the European elections in May 2019. The samples of the four cases (Spain, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland) were stratified by gender, age, region and type of locality. Respondents were chosen randomly from the access panel databases based on these stratification variables. Due to the use of an online survey to gather the data, the lower educated are underrepresented in the data, which should be taken into account when applying the results to the general population. In all four cases, the number of respondents is 1000. The gathering of the national data has been executed by one or multiple political scientist/s from each country. All questions are identical for every country, except for some language and party related variables.

3b.2 – Operationalisation of hypotheses

3b.2.1 – Dependent variables

In order to test the first two hypotheses, the respective dependent variables are operationalised through **voting probability**. This variable has been measured by asking the respondents: *How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties?*. They have to express this probability on a 10-point rating scale, which makes this a ratio variable. A 0 indicates that respondents consider themselves not likely at all to vote for a party, while a 10 represents an extremely high probability. I created a dichotomous dummy variable in which those who rated their voting probability 7 to 10 are marked as 1, while all others are assigned a 0. This solves the issue of the skewed 10-point scale, as many respondents often display their disapproval of a party by filling in a 0. Almost all radical right and left parties in the four countries as shown in Table 1 have been included. Only one party, Konfederacia/KORWiN, was not included, which means it is not possible to analyse both radical right parties in Poland.

Measuring the vote probability provides an opportunity to deal with the complications of using a variable measuring what party someone has actually voted for. The number of voters of a certain party within a national context is often limited, thus endangering the representativeness of the results of the entire population. The vote probability variable enables every respondent to express their opinion for

every party. Additionally, the variable makes it possible to measure the most recent attitudes towards each party. As, for example, the last Polish national election before the date of the survey has taken place in 2015, respondents' answers to what party they have voted four years ago can be considered less reliable, because respondents may have forgotten their decision in 2015 or may have changed their vote choice. Using the vote choice of the European election is less desirable as people are less likely to vote during European elections or might vote differently compared to national elections. The major disadvantage of using the 10-point scale voting probability is, as specified above, the fact that respondents often have very strong opposing feelings towards a party, which causes them to assign a 0 rather frequently. This makes the data slightly right skewed, which calls for the use of a dichotomous variable and thus a logistic regression.

3b.2.2 – Independent variables

For all four hypotheses, two independent variables need to be operationalised. In order to measure respondents' position on the cultural dimension, the ratio variable on **immigration** is used, which I have used to position the parties as well. This is a 10-point scale variable, which asked the respondents: *What do you think of immigration?*. A 0 means someone is fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration, while a 10 means a respondent is fully opposed of a restrictive policy on immigration. In order to solve the issue of skewed distributed results, I have created two categorical variables to include in the analysis. People with a moderate stance (4, 5, 6) are the reference category, while people with strong feelings in favour of a restrictive immigration policy (0 through 3) and those with strong feelings against it (7 through 10) each receive their own dummy variable. This variable is appropriate to measure the cultural dimension which forms the core of the radical right ideology, as it is in line with the demarcation-integration cleavage of Kriesi et al. (2008). It makes it possible to measure the effect of the core and non-core ideology position of voters and its effect on voter probability for radical right and left parties. There is, however, an issue with this variable. The formulation of the possible answers, *in favour/against a restrictive immigration policy*, seems to have caused confusion among the respondents. As a result, respondents who voted radical right parties have filled in a 10, which is highly unlikely. In order to solve this issue, I have taken measures by filtering out those likely to vote for a radical right party and having filled in a 10.

The position on the economic dimension is measured through respondents' view on state intervention in the economy. Also in this case, this is the same variable used to portray the parties' economic position. The respondents had to place themselves on a 10-point scale once again, asking: *What do you think of state regulation and control of the economy?*. A 0 means someone is fully in favour of state regulation and control of the economy, while a 10 means a respondent is fully opposed of state regulation and control of the economy. I have created categorical variables in order to deal with the skewed distribution of this variable. People with a moderate stance (4, 5, 6) are the reference category, while distinguishing people with strong feelings in favour of state intervention (0 through 3) from those

with strong feelings against it (7 through 10). This variable represents the core ideology of the radical left and is in line with the class cleavage of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The latter two variables thus make it possible to measure the effect of the core and non-core ideology position of voters and their effect on voter probability for radical right and left parties.

Being part of an economic-cultural group is measured by respondents' combined immigration and state intervention stances after reforming the 10-point scales into the three groups. I have created nine groups, which each get a dummy variable, except reference category EMCM. Their specifics are shown below in Table 2. The abbreviations mean E=economic, C=cultural, L=left, R=right and M=moderate. These refer to the two dimensions. In order to test the hypotheses on salience, the EL-groups and CR-groups have been combined to increase the number of respondents and make an interaction effect measurable.

Table 2: Distribution of economic-cultural groups. 0 represents support for state intervention and restrictive immigration policy, while 10 represents opposing state intervention and restrictive immigration policy.

Economic-cultural group	State intervention value	Immigration value
ELCR	0 to 3	0 to 3
EMCR	4 to 6	0 to 3
ERCR	7 to 10	0 to 3
ELCM	0 to 3	4 to 6
EMCM	4 to 6	4 to 6
ERCM	7 to 10	4 to 6
ELCL	0 to 3	7 to 10
EMCL	4 to 6	7 to 10
ERCL	7 to 10	7 to 10

Source: Own calculations based on Schmitt et al. (2020).

Lastly, in order to measure **salience** of economic and immigration related issues, I have made use of the open question variable asking: *What do you think is the most important issue or problem facing [the country] at the moment?* In order to make the open question analysable, I have coded and translated every response. The coding process is specified in Appendix A. The labels are *economic, immigration* and *other*. After the coding, I have created a dummy variable for both economic and immigration as most salient issue. The 'other' category serves as the reference category. In cases where people named an economic as well as immigration related topics, I have chosen the first one listed as the most salient issue.

3b.2.3 – Control variables

For the sake of controlling for other effects in the regression analyses, it is necessary to include a number of control variables. These are divided into four categories: demographic characteristics, socio-economic circumstances, attitudes and satisfaction.

The first demographic characteristic, I control for is **gender**. This is a dummy variable, in which *male* is considered the reference category. Therefore, *male* is assigned a value of 0, while *female* is assigned a value of 1. Due to the small size of the *other* category, those cases have been included in the reference category as well. The second variable is **age**, which has been calculated by deducting respondents' year of birth from 2019, which is the year the survey was executed. Therefore, minimal inaccuracies can occur in case a respondent's birthday took place before the day of the survey. This is a ratio variable.

Regarding socio-economic circumstances, **union membership** is measured through a dummy variable created from another variable: *Are you yourself a member of a trade union or is anyone else in your household a member of a trade union?*. Here, I have combined two answers into the dummy variable, assigning a value of 1: *Yes, you are a member of a trade union* and *Yes, you and someone else in your household are members of a trade union*. Those who indicated that they themselves are not or only someone in their household is a member of a union are assigned a value of 0.

Second, **class** is included as a control variable. Respondents were asked: *If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong to - the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, the upper middle class or the upper class?*. Middle class is the reference category for the categorical variable, having a value of 0. All other categories have been transformed into dummies. The *other class* category is included in the reference category due to the low number of cases.

Third, the type of **job** a respondent has is measured via a dummy variable. This is based on the question: *What is your current work situation?*. Respondents have a number of options: *employed (reference), self-employed, in school, working in the household, retired, unemployed and other*. The reference category has a value of 0, while the other have a value of 1 in each of their dummy variables. Due to the low number of *other* cases, these are included in the reference category.

Fourth, a respondents' **religion** is measured via a dummy variable as well, asking: *Do you consider yourself…?*. They have multiple options: *non-believer/agnostic (reference), catholic, orthodox, protestant, other Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Hindu, Atheist and other*. The reference category has a value of 0. Out of these religions, I have created four groups due to the small size of some. First, Catholics are part of one group. Orthodox, protestant and other Christians have been merged to form one category: *Other Christian*. Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Hindu and other have been merged, due to their low frequencies. It is a misfortune that these categories need to be merged, but it would be impossible to make generalisations about these categories. Lastly, atheists form their own category as well.

Fifth, one's **education** is measured through the number of years a respondent went to school. The EES has created a variable which indicated going to school for 15 years or fewer as *lower educated*, 16 to 19 years as *medium educated* and 20+ years as *higher educated*. Another category is *still studying*, which is not included as 'in school' is already included in the job variable. The medium and, due to the low number of cases, lower category are assigned as the reference category. The effect of being higher educated is analysed via a dummy variable.

The last socio-economic control variable is **urbanity**. This is also measured through a dummy variable, this time asking: *Would you say you live in a…?*. Respondents have three options: rural area, small/middle sized town and large town. I have indicated small/middle sized town as the reference category, giving it a value of 0. The others are transformed into dummies.

A number of attitudes will also be included as control variable. All these interval variables measure respondents' attitudes on a 10-point scale. Every respondent was asked for their stance on **redistribution of wealth, gay marriage, civil liberties** and **environmental protection**. A 0 means someone is fully in favour of these, while a 10 means someone is fully opposed. Respondents were asked to choose any number that describes their position best. In line with the previous attitude variables, I have created categorical variables to put into the analysis. People with a moderate stance (4, 5, 6) are the reference category, while people with strong feelings in favour of it (0 through 3) and those with strong feelings against it (7 through 10) each constitute a category.

The last two control variables refer to satisfaction with the **functioning of the national democracy** and **European democracy**. The surveyors used the following questions: *On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in ...?* and *All in all again, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?*. Both variables were measured via an interval 5-point scale. These have been transformed into two dummy variables in which *fairly satisfied* is the reference category with the value 0, while *very satisfied* and the combination *not very satisfied* and *not at all satisfied* get a value of 1 for each of their dummy variable.

For all variables, *don't know*, *refusal* and *no answer* have been assigned as missing values in order to exclude them from the regression analysis.

3b.3 – Statistical method

Due to the dichotomous dependent variable I have created out of the voting probability, I will make use of logistic regression. Every effect is measured through log odds. The log odds are derived from the calculation of odds: P / (1-P), where P is the probability of the dependent variable occurring. To use the odds in a logistic regression, they are designed into log-odds using the formula: $\ln (p / (p-1)) = b_0 + b_1 + b_2 + b_{etc}$. The betas each represent the parameter estimate of an independent variable. To express them in probability, these effects can be reformed into odds ratios by a calculation using the natural base number of the logarithm, e, $(p / (1-p)) = e^{b0} * e^{b1X1} * e^{b2X2} * e^{betc.Xetc}$. The e to the power of the b-

coefficient is depicted by Exp(B) in the output SPSS provides. That number can be transformed into percentages through the formula: (Exp(B)-1) * 100%. This number indicates by what percentage the predicted odds of the occurrence of Y increases or decreases (Field, 2016).

4 - Analysis

In this chapter, the analyses are made according to the previously described methods. First, I explain which cases I have filtered out of the analyses. Second, I present descriptive statistics of the included cases for the dependent and independent variables separately. Third, I describe the bivariate analyses per hypothesis. Fourth and last, I present the multivariate analyses in which the control variables are included to make final conclusions about the hypotheses.

4.1 – Filtering of missing and unusual cases

In order to perform the analyses, it is first crucial to filter out the cases that are missing. Missing cases include respondents who have answered a variable included in the analyses with *don't know*, *not applicable*, *refusal* or *no answer*. These values are not useful to interpret a respondent's attitude or status. Most variables have about 10 to 20 respondents missing, which is a limited number compared to the 1000 cases per country included in the dataset. However, the first question of the survey has often remained unanswered by the respondents. As salience is a crucial variable in the hypotheses, it is still necessary to exclude the missing cases of this variable.

Furthermore, a number of remarkable cases have been excluded from the analysis. As noted in Chapter 3b, a relatively high number of people who stated that they are very likely to vote for a radical right party simultaneously answered the immigration variable with a value of 10, meaning they are extremely *against a restrictive immigration policy*. A bivariate logistic regression even ascertained that being pro-immigration was a significant predictor of supporting radical right parties. This was the case in three of the four countries: the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland. The Spanish cases did not show any irregularities. It is likely that respondents have misinterpreted this question. Therefore, respondents who have stated they are likely to vote PVV in the Netherlands, SPD in the Czech Republic and PiS in Poland and assigned a value of 10 to their immigration attitude have been omitted from the analysis. This applies to 24 Dutch, 31 Czech and 31 Polish respondents.

The total number of cases included after excluding missing responses and irregularities is as follows:

Table 3: Number of Valid N per country.

	Valid *N*
Spain	776
Netherlands	545
Czech Republic	669
Poland	689
Total	2679

Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

4.2 – Descriptive statistics

4.2.1 – Descriptive statistics of dependent variables

Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables. All these variables are dichotomous. Each of the percentages show the number of respondents who are likely to vote for a certain party. Not being likely to vote for that party is the reference category, which applies to all dummy variables. Most parties are considered by around 10% of the respondents, although some parties have a bigger potential electorate such as PiS.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables.

	Total Valid *N*	Percentage
Spain		
Likely to vote for party X		
Unidas Podemos	776	18.7%
VOX	776	10.7%
The Netherlands		
Likely to vote for party X		
PVV	545	14.5%
SP	545	9.7%
FvD	545	21.7%
Czech Republic		
Likely to vote for party X		
KSČM	669	10.5%
SPD	669	9.6%
Poland		
Likely to vote for party X		
PiS	689	26.1%
Razem	689	8.3%
Total		
Radical right	2679	14.1%
Radical left	2679	12.1%

Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

4.2.2 – Descriptive statistics of independent and control variables

Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables. An overview per country can be consulted in Appendix B.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics of independent and control variables in all countries.

	Valid *N*	Mean/percentage	Standard deviation
Independent variables			
Salience			
Salience of immigration			
No (reference)	2679	91.8%	
Yes	2679	8.2%	
Salience of economy			
No (reference)	2679	74.3%	
Yes	2679	25.7%	
Attitudes			
Immigration			
Moderate (reference)	2679	30.4%	
In favour of restrictive policy	2679	40.6%	
Against restrictive policy	2679	29.0%	
Economic intervention			
Moderate (reference)	2679	43.7%	
In favour	2679	23.7%	
Against	2679	32.6%	
Economic-cultural group			
EMCM (reference)	2679	16.6%	
ELCR	2679	11.5%	
EMCR	2679	16.1%	
ERCR	2679	13.0%	
ELCM	2679	5.1%	
ERCM	2679	8.6%	
ELCL	2679	7.1%	
EMCL	2679	11.0%	
ERCL	2679	10.9%	
Control variables			
Personal information			
Age	2679	48.07	16.413

Gender		
Male (reference)	2679	53.3%
Female	2679	46.7%
Socio-economic circumstances		
Union membership		
Not a member (reference)	2679	87.7%
Member	2679	12.3%
Education		
Low/Medium (reference)	2679	40.1%
Higher educated	2679	59.9%
Class		
Middle class (reference)	2679	51.3%
Working class	2679	13.3%
Lower middle class	2679	18.7%
Upper middle class	2679	14.7%
Upper class	2679	2.0%
Job		
Employed (reference)	2679	53.7%
Self-employed	2679	8.3%
In school	2679	6.1%
Working in the household	2679	3.4%
Retired	2679	24.2%
Unemployed	2679	4.3%
Religion		
Non-believer/agnostic (reference)	2679	27.7%
Catholic	2679	43.3%
Other Christian	2679	6.3%
Atheist	2679	14.9%
Other	2679	7.8%
Urbanity		
Small/middle sized town (reference)	2679	43.0%
Rural area	2679	20.9%
Large town	2679	36.1%
Attitudes		

Redistribution of wealth		
Moderate (reference)	2679	37.7%
In favour	2679	29.9%
Against	2679	32.4%
Same-sex marriage		
Moderate (reference)	2679	20.2%
In favour	2679	52.0%
Against	2679	27.8%
Civil liberties		
Moderate (reference)	2679	33.6%
In favour	2679	38.4%
Against	2679	28.0%
Environment		
Moderate (reference)	2679	31.5%
In favour	2679	54.4%
Against	2679	14.1%
Satisfaction		
Satisfied with democracy		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	2679	38.8%
Very satisfied	2679	6.6%
Not satisfied	2679	54.6%
Satisfied with EU		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	2679	44.5%
Very satisfied	2679	5.8%
Not satisfied	2679	49.7%
Valid N (listwise)	2679	

Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

A noticeable statistic is that of education. As stated before, higher educated people are more represented in the dataset. Furthermore, the dataset includes a high number of catholic people, mainly due to the inclusion of Spain and Poland. Regarding same-sex marriage, the supporting and opposing categories include more respondents than the moderate category, indicating it is a topic with polarising opinions. The dataset also includes many people supporting environmental protection and few opposing it, indicating more consensus. Lastly, many respondents are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy at the national and EU level. In the case of satisfaction with democracy, this applies to a majority of the respondents.

4.2.3 – Parties' and respondents' positions on the two dimensions

In the figures below, I present an overview of two independent variables: attitudes towards immigration and economic intervention. These variables correspond with the party data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data (Bakker et al., 2020). Therefore, it is possible to combine these and show voters, being the respondents of the EES (Schmitt et al., 2020), and parties on the same graph. The scales refer to the exact number of respondents.

In Figure 9, I present the results for Spain. The names of the radical right parties are presented in blue, while the radical left parties are in red. Mainstream parties are shown in green. Notice that Izquierda Unida and Podemos are two separate parties in the Chapel Hill data, while the EES measured being likely to vote for the party via the parties' list combination: Unidas Podemos. The darker the circle, the more cases are within the respective category. The graph clearly shows that there is a relatively big group of respondents unrepresented by the current parties, namely the group favouring state intervention and a restrictive immigration policy (see the bottom left corner). The same applies to the top right corner, although the number of respondents is more limited.



Figure 9: Scatterplot of respondents' and parties' positions on the economic and cultural dimensions in Spain (Bakker et al., 2020; Schmitt et al., 2020).

The histogram below shows the frequencies of the economic-cultural groups as defined in Chapter 3b in the four countries. In Figure 10 below, pointing out the economic-cultural groups in Spain,

the figure clearly shows that the ELCR-group is indeed relatively sizeable. ELCM in turn, however, is rather limited.



Figure 10: Frequency histogram of economic-cultural groups in Spain. (Schmitt et al., 2020).

In Figure 11, the Dutch graph is shown. A number of observations follow from the graph. First, those who are strongly in favour of economic state intervention are not very much present among the respondents in the Netherlands. There is, however, a group in the bottom left without any party representation. This indicates that there is room for an existing or new political party to tap into these voter preferences. Furthermore, a substantial number of people are in support of a restrictive immigration policy. Most respondents consider themselves to be moderate.



Figure 11: Scatterplot of respondents' and parties' positions on the economic and cultural dimensions in the Netherlands (Bakker et al., 2020; Schmitt et al., 2020).

The number of respondents in favour of state intervention, gathered in ELCR, ELCM and ELCL are indeed limited (14% in total) compared to the other groups as visible in Figure 12. Based on this graph, the SP thus has a rather small congruent potential voter base. This also applies to ERCM and ERCL, while ERCR is larger. This implies that radical right parties with right-wing economic and cultural positions are closely aligned with a substantial number of voters. EMCR, however, is also noticeable, meaning economic moderate viewpoints can go hand in hand with opposing immigration.



Figure 12: Frequency histogram of economic-cultural groups in the Netherlands (Schmitt et al., 2020).

In Figure 13 below, the Czech respondents and parties are placed on the dimensions. The graph shows that those in the Czech Republic who are strongly against a restrictive immigration policy do not show close congruence with any of the parties. This indicates that those with strong attitudes in favour of restrictive immigration policy have a set of choices on the economic dimension, but less choice on the cultural dimension.



Figure 13: Scatterplot of respondents' and parties' positions on the economic and cultural dimensions in the Czech Republic (Bakker et al., 2020; Schmitt et al., 2020).

Figure 14 shows the percentages per economic-cultural group. ERCR, representing the bottom right corner in Figure 13, indeed consists of a decent number of respondents. Remarkably, ELCR and EMCR are rather large, meaning a considerable voter base in the Czech Republic is in favour of a restrictive immigration policy while supporting economic state intervention. Contrary to the other countries, this group is represented by a radical left party, KSČM, as well as a radical right party, SPD. The Czech parties are, however, generally not opposing a restrictive immigration policy. The number of people opposing this in ELCL, EMCL and ERCL together still form a considerable number of respondents. These voters are underrepresented by the Czech political space.



Figure 14: Frequency histogram of economic-cultural groups in the Czech Republic (Schmitt et al., 2020).

In Poland, the distribution of the respondents on the economic and cultural dimension is mainly focused on the middle, bottom left and top right corners as seen in Figure 15. The bottom left, representing those who favour economic state intervention and a strict immigration policy is mainly covered by the radical right PiS party. The radical left Razem takes a position almost identical to that of Unidas Podemos in Spain. The other parties are placed in moderate positions on both dimensions, except for the social democratic Wiosna and SLD.



Figure 15: Scatterplot of respondents' and parties' positions on the economic and cultural dimensions in Poland (Bakker et al., 2020; Schmitt et al., 2020).

The frequencies of each economic-cultural groups in Figure 16 show that remarkably, ERCL, being those who are against a strict immigration policy and against economic state intervention contains the highest number of cases. Nevertheless, the respondents who are indeed placed there on the economic and cultural dimensions are not closely represented by a party in the Polish political space. Modern (N) and Civic Platform (PO) are the most congruent to this group. Adding ELCR, EMCR and ERCR, being those who are in favour of restrictive immigration policy together each account for a substantial number of respondents. ELCM and ELCL, those who oppose restrictive policy and support economic state intervention, form the lowest frequencies. This means the social democratic and radical left parties are fishing in a relatively small pool.



Figure 16: Frequency histogram of economic-cultural groups in Poland (*Schmitt et al., 2020).*

Comparing the eight figures leads to a number of observations. The ELCR group is relatively small in the Netherlands, compared to the other countries. However, in every country, the culturally right groups all count for about 40% of the respondents. Regarding those with economic left-wing views (EL) the Dutch group is much smaller than in the other countries, meaning Dutch voters lean more to the centre. In Spain, the EL groups together are the largest, counting for 30% of the Spanish respondents. In Spain and the Netherlands, the groups with moderate stances on both dimensions are the largest. In the Czech Republic, this is the group with economic moderate and culturally right-wing stances. In Poland, this is the economic right-wing and culturally left-wing group, representing progressive liberals. Due to the differences in political space, every country has different groups that are underrepresented by the positions of the respective political parties. It, thus, is interesting to find out what parties these respondents are likely to vote for.

4.2.4 – Salience

In Figure 17, the frequencies of salient topics among voters per country is shown. Salience in Spain is mainly dominated by economic concerns. Immigration is relatively less salient. The other category includes, for example, concerns about corruption, the rise of the radical right VOX and potential Catalonian independence. In the Netherlands, immigration is more salient than in the other three countries. Economic issues are approximately as salient as immigration. Both economic as immigration related issues are not most prominent among the Czech respondents. Both categories cover about 10% of them. In Poland, economic issues form a solid 21% of the total. Immigration, however, is relatively less salient, covering no more than 4% of the respondents. As this forms the core ideology of the radical right, it would be expected to see this specific group prefer radical right parties, no matter their economic position. Those seeing economic issues as most salient, are in turn expected to prefer radical left parties.



Figure 17: Distribution of salient topics in all four countries (Schmitt et al., 2020).

4.3 – Bivariate analyses of dependent and independent variables

4.3.1 – Spain

In order to view bivariate effects, I have presented them in Table 6 below. Despite the effects being presented in the same table, they have been measured individually. First, being in favour of economic state intervention has a significant effect on being likely to vote UP. Being against has an effect on supporting VOX. Moreover, salience of economic topics has a negative effect on being likely to vote VOX, while immigration has a positive effect. This indicates that immigration is best able to predict being likely to vote VOX. Neither have an effect on being likely to vote UP. Economic salience not having an effect could be caused by the high number of respondents that indicated economic topics as most salient. Regarding the economical-cultural groups, the results show that those strongly in favour of a restrictive immigration policy are more likely to vote for VOX, no matter where they stand on the economic dimension. This provisionally confirms Hypothesis 1 for Spain. ELCL has the strongest positive effect for UP, which corresponds with the position of the party. Not all EL groups show a significant effect, which would reject Hypothesis 2. UP's immigration stance clearly influences which people are attracted to the party.

Table 6: Bivariate effects of salience and economic-cultural groups on being likely to vote for radical right and left parties in Spain.

	VOX	UP
	B(SE)	B(SE)
State intervention		
Moderate	Reference	Reference
Pro	-0.236	0.766***
	(0.266)	(0.190)
Anti	0.662**	-0.572*
	(0.241)	(0.231)
Restrictive immigration policy		
Moderate	Reference	Reference
Pro	1.780***	-0.919***
	(0.273)	(0.210)
Anti	-1.348***	1.191***
	(0.362)	(0.190)
Salience of economy		
No	Reference	Reference
Yes	-0.885***	0.108
	(0.251)	(0.184)
Salience of immigration		
No	Reference	Reference
Yes	1.719***	-1.550
	(0.466)	(1.029)
Economic-cultural groups		
EMCM	Reference	Reference
ELCR	1.635**	0.072
	(0.525)	(0.345)
EMCR	1.681**	-0.912*
	(0.516)	(0.418)
ERCR	2.225***	-0.915*

	(0.513)	(0.458)
ELCM	-0.527	0.388
	(1.110)	(0.430)
ERCM	0.590	-1.345*
	(0.690)	(0.637)
ELCL	-0.465	1.258***
	(0.849)	(0.325)
EMCL	-0.168	0.555
	(0.743)	(0.334)
ERCL	0.608	0.701
	(0.690)	(0.372)

B-coefficient
Standard errors between brackets
Significance levels indicated by * p < 0.05; ** *p* < 0.01; *** *p* < 0.001
Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

Figure 18 presents the bivariate effect of economic state intervention attitudes on vote probability. Note that the attitudinal values are divided into three groups rather than the two explained in Chapter 3b, which are the values used in the multivariate regression analyses. For Unidas Podemos, the effect is negative, meaning vote probability decreases when a respondent prefers the state to not intervene in the economy. For VOX, the effect is positive. These predicted probabilities are in line with the hypotheses; radical left parties get more support from those proposing state intervention in the economy. Regarding the radical right, the economic position of VOX has an influence, as the party attracts economic right-wing more.



VOX Unidas Podemos

Figure 18: Bivariate predicted probabilities on being likely to vote for a party in Spain, effect of economic attitude. 95% confidence interval.

Regarding the cultural dimension, the expectations from the hypotheses are confirmed by the analysis. In Figure 19, one can see that there is a negative effect of being against a restrictive immigration policy on being likely to vote for the radical right VOX. Regarding the radical left, those who are against a

restrictive immigration policy are more likely to vote for Unidas Podemos. This indicates that people vote in line with the party position of UP on the cultural dimension as well.



VOX Unidas Podemos

Figure 19: Bivariate predicted probabilities on being likely to vote for a party in Spain, effect of immigration attitude. 95% confidence interval.

4.3.2 – The Netherlands

In Table 7, the bivariate effects on being likely to vote for PVV, FvD and SP are demonstrated. Regarding economic state intervention, those in favour are more likely to vote for SP and those against are more likely to vote for PVV and FvD. Neither salient topic has an effect on being likely to vote for SP, while the salience of immigration has a strong effect on both PVV and being likely to vote for FvD. Immigration, as it is the core ideology of the parties, is significant. Regarding the economic-cultural groups, most interestingly, the effect of being in ELCR is significant for both PVV and SP. Therefore, the effect of the economic attitude variable alone does not provide the whole picture. There is no effect for the economically more right-wing FvD, indicating that economic preferences play a role in party preference within the radical right party family. Despite that, all CR-groups prefer a radical right party. This would thus confirm Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 for the Netherlands. The other groups preferring restrictive immigration policy in turn, clearly show to be likely to vote for the radical right parties. Also, being in ERCL is significant for all three parties, which is quite remarkable due to the ideological differences between the parties and the respondents.

Table 7: Bivariate effects of salience and economic-cultural groups on being likely to vote for radical right and left parties in the Netherlands.

	PVV	FvD	SP
	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
State intervention			
Moderate	Reference	Reference	Reference
Pro	-0.195	-0.607	0.745*
	(0.379)	(0.358)	(0.356)
Anti	0.804**	0.947***	-0.086
	(0.249)	(0.216)	(0.320)
Restrictive immigration policy			
Moderate	Reference	Reference	Reference
Pro	0.964***	1.213***	0.003
	(0.247)	(0.215)	(0.301)
Anti	-0.139	-0.205	0.583
	(0.289)	(0.248)	(0.305)
Salience of economy			
No	Reference	Reference	Reference
Yes	-0.167	-0.214	0.622
	(0.326)	(0.279)	(0.327)
Salience of immigration			
No	Reference	Reference	Reference
Yes	1.288***	1.341***	-0.554
	(0.260)	(0.232)	(0.421)
Economic-cultural groups			
EMCM	Reference	Reference	Reference
ELCR	1.288*	0.660	1.644**
	(0.605)	(0.564)	(0.591)
EMCR	1.375**	1.339***	0.684
	(0.436)	(0.343)	(0.494)
ERCR	1.697***	1.928***	-0.288
	(0.436)	(0.355)	(0.693)

ELCM	-0.273	-0.901	1.056
	(1.081)	(1.058)	(0.722)
ERCM	0.980	0.173	0.473
	(0.535)	(0.511)	(0.637)
ELCL	0.730	0.437	0.855
	(0.705)	(0.606)	(0.715)
EMCL	0.205	-0.224	0.850
	(0.578)	(0.503)	(0.524)
ERCL	1.499**	1.535***	1.344*
	(0.498)	(0.410)	(0.534)

B-coefficient
Standard error between brackets
Significance levels indicated by * p < 0.05; ** *p* < 0.01; *** *p* < 0.001
Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

When looking at the effect of the economic attitude on likeliness to vote for a party, it is clear that the radical right parties in the Netherlands tend to attract people who do not favour state intervention in the economy. The effect for FvD is, however, stronger than for PVV. This can be seen in Figure 20, as well as the effect of being in favour of it on being likely to vote for the radical left SP. Note that the Y-values differ per graph to have an optimal visualisation. The predicted probabilities confirm the provisional confirmation of Hypothesis 1, as it becomes clear that for both radical right parties, there is a significant positive effect of being against economic state intervention.



PVV SP



FvD

Figure 20: Bivariate predicted probabilities on likeliness to vote for a party in the Netherlands, effect of economic attitude. 95% confidence interval.

Regarding the effect of the immigration attitudes, the predicted probabilities of that attitude on radical right and left support is shown below in Figure 21. The effect for FvD is stronger than for PVV. Regarding the radical left SP, there is a very small, but insignificant, positive effect of opposing restrictive immigration policy. This indicates that the cultural position of the SP corresponds with that of the voters as they are blurrier, but that it is not likely that those with strong attitudes supporting restrictive immigration policy are likely to vote for SP. The combination of the two dimensions as described above thus shows different results than the dimensions individually, as the ELCR-group shows a significant effect and the individual effect of the immigration attitude does not.



PVV



SP



FvD

Figure 21: Bivariate predicted probabilities on being likely to vote for a party in the Netherlands, effect of immigration attitude. 95% confidence interval.

4.3.3 – The Czech Republic

The bivariate effects for the Czech parties are shown in Table 8. The economic dimension has a positive effect on being likely to vote KSČM, while it does not have a significant effect on SPD support. Being in favour of a restrictive immigration policy has a significant effect on both parties, which is in line with the parties' positions on the cultural dimension. All CR groups have a significant effect on being likely to vote SPD, which confirms Hypothesis 1 for the Czech Republic. Remarkably, economic salience has an effect on neither party, while salience of immigration has an effect on both. Regarding the economic-cultural groups, being in ELCR has an effect on both parties as well. The other cultural right groups have an effect on SPD support, but not on KSČM support. KSČM thus seems to appeal to a very specific group of voters. This, therefore, provisionally rejects Hypothesis 2 in the case of the Czech Republic, as it is clear KSČM's immigration stance in favour of restrictive policy matters.

Table 8: Bivariate effects of salience and economic-cultural groups on being likely to vote for radical right and left parties in the Czech Republic.

	SPD	KSČM
	B(SE)	B(SE)
State intervention		
Moderate	Reference	Reference
Pro	0.429	1.149***
	(0.274)	(0.257)
Anti	-0.293	-1.085**
	(0.308)	(0.368)
Restrictive immigration policy		
Moderate	Reference	Reference
Pro	1.623***	0.583*
	(0.321)	(0.257)
Anti	-0.905*	0.006
	(0.355)	(0.276)
Salience of economy		
No	Reference	Reference

Yes	0.109	0.166
	(0.423)	(0.400)
Salience of immigration		
No	Reference	Reference
Yes	0.771*	0.778*
	(0.361)	(0.349)
Economic-cultural groups		
EMCM	Reference	Reference
ELCR	2.217**	1.884**
	(0.758)	(0.559)
EMCR	1.881*	0.502
	(0.760)	(0.610)
ERCR	1.952*	0.172
	(0.777)	(0.690)
ELCM	-0.619	0.342
	(1.238)	(0.895)
ERCM	-0.121	-0.840
	(1.239)	(0.741)
ELCL	1.025	1.073
	(0.884)	(0.638)
EMCL	0.969	1.013
	(0.852)	(0.615)
ERCL	-0.431	-0.017
	(1.237)	(0.783)

B-coefficient
Standard error between brackets
Significance levels indicated by * p < 0.05; ** *p* < 0.01; *** *p* < 0.001
Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

The predicted probabilities of the economic dimension are shown below in Figure 22. As already shown in the table above, the respondents indicating they are likely to vote for SPD or KSČM both are in support of economic state intervention. This effect is much stronger for KSČM than for SPD. These, thus, indeed hint at the rejection of Hypothesis 1.



SPD KSČM

Figure 22: Bivariate predicted probabilities on being likely to vote for a party in the Netherlands, effect of economic attitude. 95% confidence interval.

Regarding the cultural dimension, the predicted probabilities are shown below in Figure 23. As for the SPD, this effect is strong and negative. The effect for KSČM, although significant, seems to be limited as the probability of being likely to vote for KSČM does not decrease strongly when one is against a restrictive immigration policy. So, while being in the ELCR group shows a strong effect, the effect of the immigration attitude alone seems limited.



SPD KSČM

Figure 23: Bivariate predicted probabilities on being likely to vote for a party in the Czech Republic, effect of immigration attitude. 95% confidence interval.

4.3.4 – Poland

The Polish bivariate effects are shown in Table 9. No economy related effects are significant for Razem. Yet, some economic effects on being likely to vote PiS are visible. Being in favour of economic state intervention has a strong significant effect, while opposing it has a strong negative effect. With regards to immigration, being in favour of restrictive policy has a positive effect on being likely to vote PiS. Being against it has a positive effect for Razem, while there is a negative effect for PiS. All salience variables have no effect on the two parties. Regarding the economic-cultural groups, every cultural right group has a positive effect on being likely to vote for PiS. This also applies to the ELCM group, indicating that the economic position of PiS plays a role in the preferences of voters. This, therefore, would confirm Hypothesis 1 for Poland, as all groups with strong cultural right-wing views are more likely to be likely to vote for PiS. However, the economic position of PiS seems to have an influence as these effects are stronger for those with economic left-wing views. For Razem, none of the groups show a significant effect. This would also provisionally reject Hypothesis 2 for Poland.

Table 9: Bivariate effects of salience and economic-cultural groups on being likely to vote for radical right and left parties in Poland.

	PiS	Razem
	B(SE)	B(SE)
State intervention		
Moderate	Reference	Reference
Pro	1.328***	-0.342
	(0.199)	(0.376)
Anti	-0.691***	0.027
	(0.182)	(0.278)
Restrictive immigration policy		
Moderate	Reference	Reference
Pro	1.419***	-0.599
	(0.183)	(0.312)
Anti	-1.174***	0.777**
	(0.228)	(0.279)
Salience of economy		
No	Reference	Reference
Yes	0.348	0.248
	(0.206)	(0.323)
Salience of immigration		
No	Reference	Reference
Yes	0.661	-1.347
	(0.418)	(0.778)
Economic-cultural groups		
EMCM	Reference	Reference
ELCR	2.715***	-0.820
	(0.409)	(0.697)
EMCR	1.378***	-0.348
	(0.389)	(0.562)
ERCR	1.205**	-0.437
	(0.387)	(0.561)
ELCM	1.399**	-0.300
	(0.449)	(0.704)
ERCM	0.224	-0.629
	(0.449)	(0.633)
ELCL	0.301	0.323
	(0.634)	(0.718)
EMCL	0.146	0.503
	(0.499)	(0.532)

ERCL	-0.078	0.351
	(0.423)	(0.457)

B-coefficient
Standard error between brackets
Significance levels indicated by * p < 0.05; ** *p* < 0.01; *** *p* < 0.001
Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

The predicted probabilities presented in Figure 24 confirm the analysis that the economic dimension is of strong influence regarding support of PiS. So, although all economic-cultural groups with strong cultural right-wing views are more likely to vote for PiS, the non-core dimension explains support of the party. As for Razem, the effect is remarkably small, which was visible in the non-significance of Razem's core dimension.



Figure 24: Bivariate predicted probabilities on being likely to vote for a party in Poland, effect of economic attitude. 95% confidence interval.

With respect to the cultural dimension, both parties show an effect in Figure 25. For PiS, this effect is negative as being against a restrictive immigration policy predicts a smaller probability to be likely to vote for the party. For Razem, this effect is the other way around. This indicates that the cultural dimension is even more important than the economic dimension for the radical left Razem, which is unexpected following theory about core and non-core positions that would expect the economy to be most important as it forms the core of a radical left party.



PiS Razem

Figure 25: Bivariate predicted probabilities on being likely to vote for a party in Poland, effect of immigration attitude. 95% confidence interval.

In conclusion, the bivariate effects show that the non-core positions of the parties in the four countries matter in many cases. Regarding the radical right parties, it occurs more often that all groups with a congruent position on the core immigration attitude prefer to vote for them. Despite that, the effects of the groups closer to the party's non-core position are sometimes stronger, for example in Poland where PiS receives more support from the ELCR than the ERCR group. As for the radical left, the non-core dimension seems to matter more. All parties only receive significant support from EL groups with non-core positions close to that of the party. Whereas Unidas Podemos receives significant support from the ELCL group, KSČM and SP gain it from the ELCR group, which is in line with their non-core positions.

4.3.4 – Bivariate interaction effects in all countries

In order to perform the interaction effects to test Hypothesis 3 and 4, it was necessary to combine the ELCR, EMCR and ERCR groups and the ELCR, ELCM and ELCL in two new groups due to the limited size of mainly the interaction of the EL-groups with salience of immigration. Through measuring the interaction effect of the dimensional position of the core position with salience of the non-core issue, as demanded by the hypotheses, the importance of both dimensions can be measured. Moreover, the dependent variable includes the respondents of all four countries. This leads to the following results:

Table 10: Bivariate interaction effects economic-cultural groups and salience.

	Radical right	Radical left
	B(SE)	B(SE)
Interaction with salience of economy		
Other EC-CUL groups	Reference	Reference
ELCR/EMCR/ERCR	0.457**	-0.209
	(0.163)	(0.209)
ELCM/ELCL	-0.725	1.145***
	(0.397)	(0.237)
Interaction with salience of immigration		
Other EC-CUL groups	Reference	Reference
ELCR/ELCM/ELCL	0.689	0.458
	(0.351)	(0.394)
EMCR/ERCR	1.366***	-0.945*
	(0.219)	(0.463)

B-coefficient
Standard error between brackets
Significance levels indicated by * p < 0.05; ** *p* < 0.01; *** *p* < 0.001
Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

Hypothesis 3, which expects that those with strong economic left-wing attitudes and perceiving immigration as the most salient issue are more likely to be more likely to vote for a radical right party, is provisionally rejected as no significant effect is found. Additionally, those with strong cultural right views and perceiving the economy as the most salient issue are also more likely to vote for a radical right party. Moreover, those with strong right-wing cultural views and economic moderate or right-wing views perceiving immigration as most salient are more likely to be likely to vote for a radical right party. This indicates that the cultural dimension is more important than the economic dimension. As for Hypothesis 4, no effect of those being in the groups with strong cultural right-wing views and seeing the economy as the most salient issue on being likely to vote for a radical left party is found. This would therefore provisionally reject the hypothesis as well. With regards to economic salience, there is, however, a significant positive effect for the groups including the strongest left-wing economic views and a significant negative effect for the EMCR/ERCR group with immigration as salient topic. This also indicates that the cultural dimension is of greater importance than the economic dimension. Those in

ELCM/ELCL that see the economy as most salient are more likely to vote for the radical left and those in EMCR/ERCR who see immigration as the most salient issue are more likely to be likely to vote for the radical left and right respectively, indicating that once both someone's dimensional position and salient issue relate to the core dimension, they are more likely to prefer a party with the respective congruent core positions.

4.4 – Multivariate analyses including control variables

To see whether the effects concluded from the bivariate analyses still hold when controlled for other variables, two multivariate analyses have been created. These are cross-country analyses, but dummies have been included to check for the effect of nationality. The dependent variable is being likely to vote for a radical right or left party in general.

Before executing the analysis, I have performed an assumption test. I checked for multicollinearity through a Tolerance test and a VIF test. The results can be consulted in Appendix C. The results do not detect any violations of the norms, which are <0.1 for the Tolerance test and >10 for the VIF test (Field, 2016).

4.4.1 – Analyses

A multivariate analysis is presented in Table 11. The table shows the effects of the independent variables for the first two hypotheses on both radical right as well as radical left party preference. These have been measured individually in separate logistic regression analyses. Model 1 includes the independent variables measuring the economic-cultural groups and salience. In Model 2, I included socio-economic circumstances to control for the effects. In the final Model 3, control variables measuring attitudes and a control variable for the countries are added to the analyses. The Nagelkerke R^2 of each model show that the predicting power of each model is increased by the added (control) variables.

Regarding Hypothesis 1, all four models confirm it as all economic-cultural groups that include the respondents with strong culturally right-wing views are more likely to vote for a radical right party. Thus, the diverging economic positions of the parties across the four countries do not matter on the cross-national level. The effect for the ELCR group is the strongest, as the coefficient of 1.193 in Model 3 means that respondents in that group are 577.5% more likely to vote for a radical right party than those in the EMCM group. For the EMCR group, this is 384.6% and for the ERCR group, this is 468.2%. Additionally, I find a positive significant effect for the ELCM group of them being 172.1% more likely to prefer a radical right party than those in the EMCM group. Looking back at the bivariate analyses, this is likely to be caused by Polish respondents as it is the only country where the bivariate effects showed an effect of that specific group. The control variable for Poland indeed indicates that the Polish respondents have a significant influence on the results. Despite the fact that Hypothesis 1 can be accepted now, the bivariate analyses have shown that voters still show differences in strength and significance of the effects of each group. Thus, although in all these countries, those with strong cultural right-wing views are more likely to be likely to vote for a radical right party, they still show preferences based on the second dimension as well.

Table 11: Multivariate regression testing H1 and H2.

	Radical right party			Radical left party		
Model	1	2	3	1	2	3
	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
Intercept	-2.963**	-3.011***	-2.845***	-2.400***	-2.316***	-2.174***
	(0.223)	(0.386)	(0.468)	(0.182)	(0.355)	(0.426)
Economic-cultural group						
EMCM	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
ELCR	2.046***	2.112***	1.913***	0.766**	0.791***	0.540*
	(0.252)	(0.262)	(0.299)	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.243)
EMCR	1.534***	1.569***	1.578***	-0.152	-0.137	-0.215
	(0.250)	(0.257)	(0.278)	(0.240)	(0.243)	(0.250)
ERCR	1.789***	1.765***	1.737***	-0.455	-0.396	-0.373
	(0.252)	(0.261)	(0.289)	(0.278)	(0.283)	(0.292)
ELCM	1.092**	1.077**	1.001**	0.368	0.389	0.146
	(0.335)	(0.344)	(0.378)	(0.301)	(0.305)	(0.316)
ERCM	0.648*	0.484	0.458	-0.600	-0.621	-0.568
	(0.317)	(0.325)	(0.347)	(0.339)	(0.342)	(0.349)
ELCL	0.256	0.307	0.659	1.181***	1.080***	0.633*
	(0.370)	(0.379)	(0.407)	(0.234)	(0.239)	(0.259)
EMCL	0.143	0.279	0.239	0.691**	0.606**	0.447
	(0.332)	(0.339)	(0.363)	(0.225)	(0.229)	(0.237)
ERCL	0.669*	0.531	0.517	0.556*	0.582*	0.568*
	(0.298)	(0.305)	(0.344)	(0.231)	(0.236)	(0.256)
Salience of economy						
No	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Yes	-0.110	-0.276	-0.312	0.447**	0.431**	0.202
	(0.139)	(0.147)	(0.165)	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.147)
Salience of immigration						
No	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Yes	0.519**	0.603**	0.588**	-0.141	-0.133	-0.022
	(0.180)	(0.195)	(0.217)	(0.251)	(0.254)	(0.262)
Age		-0.013*	-0.007		-0.007	-0.010
		(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Gender						
Male		Reference	Reference		Reference	Reference
Female		-0.473***	-0..251		0.162	0.152
		(0.127)	(0.142)		(0.125)	(0.129)
Member of union						
No		Reference	Reference		Reference	Reference
Yes		0.575**	0.532**		0.382*	0.399*
		(0.171)	(0.189)		(0.176)	(0.181)
Job type						
Employed		Reference	Reference		Reference	Reference
Self-employed		-0.062	0.106		0.042	-0.058

	(0.228)	(0.243)	(0.237)	(0.242)
In school	-0.989*	-0.805	0.119	-0.070
	(0.390)	(0.431)	(0.290)	(0.300)
In household	0.601	0.685*	-0.477	-0.516
	(0.319)	(0.338)	(0.414)	(0.419)
Retired	0.307	-0.040	0.249	0.256
	(0.201)	(0.220)	(0.212)	(0.216)
Unemployed	0.164	0.375	0.439	0.254
	(0.305)	(0.330)	(0.274)	(0.279)
Class				
Middle class	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Working class	0.300	0.275	0.438*	0.318
	(0.181)	(0.201)	(0.177)	(0.181)
Lower middle class	-0.212	-0.188	0.247	0.195
	(0.174)	(0.190)	(0.163)	(0.166)
Upper middle class	0.218	0.423*	0.028	0.061
	(0.171)	(0.187)	(0.191)	(0.196)
Upper class	0.032	-0.142	-0.167	0.066
	(0.421)	(0.465)	(0.494)	(0.501)
Education				
Low/middle	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
High	0.078	-0.045	0.058	-0.031
	(0.138)	(0.155)	(0.139)	(0.147)
Urbanity				
Small/middle-sized town	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Rural area	0.131	0.219	-0.088	-0.054
	(0.159)	(0.173)	(0.139)	(0.175)
Large town	-0.169	-0.208	0.114	0.076
	(0.138)	(0.153)	(0.137)	(0.140)
Religion				
Agnostic	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Catholic	1.291***	0.657***	-0.414**	-0.302
	(0.163)	(0.166)	(0.154)	(0.168)
Other Christian	0.080	-0.207	-0.533	-0.440
	(0.317)	(0.333)	(0.315)	(0.321)
Atheist	0.220	0.344	0.367*	0.391*
	(0.227)	(0.243)	(0.174)	(0.181)
Other religion	-0.259	-0.332	0.142	0.182
	(0.337)	(0.357)	(0.227)	(0.233)
Redistribution of wealth				
Moderate		Reference		Reference
Pro		0.202		0.460**
		(0.172)		(0.155)
Anti		-0.088		-0.205
		(0.169)		(0.178)
Same-sex marriage				
Moderate		Reference		Reference
Pro		-0.231		0.136
		(0.200)		(0.186)

Anti			0.832***			0.081
			(0.186)			(0.210)
Civil liberties						
Moderate			Reference			Reference
Pro			-0.359*			-0.135
			(0.168)			(0.153)
Anti			-0.020			-0.009
			(0.166)			(0.175)
Environmental protection						
Moderate			Reference			Reference
Pro			-0.485***			0.181
			(0.157)			(0.159)
Anti			0.129			0.114
			(0.191)			(0.225)
Satisfaction with democracy						
Fairly satisfied			Reference			Reference
Very satisfied			0.733**			0.024
			(0.235)			(0.303)
Not satisfied			-1.028***			0.298
			(0.156)			(0.152)
Satisfaction with EU						
Fairly satisfied			Reference			Reference
Very satisfied			-0.408			0.309
			(0.317)			(0.275)
Not satisfied			0.789***			-0.027
			(0.157)			(0.151)
Country						
Spain			Reference			Reference
The Netherlands			-0.390			-0.407*
			(0.239)			(0.205)
Czech Republic			-0.663**			-0.555**
			(0.227)			(0.193)
Poland			0.727***			0.641**
			(0.189)			(0.201)
df	10	29	44	10	29	44
Nagelkerke R^2	0.116	0.209	0.358	0.064	0.096	0.133
N	2679	2679	2679	2679	2679	2679

B-coefficient
Standard error between brackets
Significance levels indicated by * p < 0.05; ** *p* < 0.01; *** *p* < 0.001
Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

With regards to Hypothesis 2 about the radical left, the expectations have been disproven by the analysis. In all three models, the effects for ELCR, ELCL and ERCL are significant and positive. The effect of EMCL disappears when controlling for all the variables in Model 3. The effect of the ELCR is the strongest due to the coefficient of 0.540, which can be reformulated as being 71.6% more likely to be likely to vote for a radical left party than those from the EMCM group. For the ELCL group, this effect equals 88.3% and for the ERCL group it is 76.5%. The latter is likely to be caused by those supporting KSĈM, which would be in line with the party's position. As the ELCM group does not show a significant effect, Hypothesis 2 can be rejected. The cultural dimension definitely plays a role in the voters' choices as only those with radical left economic views and either strong right-wing or left-wing cultural views are more likely to be more likely to vote for a radical left party. The ERCL group is remarkable, as it is completely not expected to find a significant effect for those with strong right-wing economic views. While taking the bivariate analyses in account, this is likely to be caused by the Spanish and/or Dutch respondents. Regarding Spain, this could be caused by the fact that Unidas Podemos' has an outspoken pro-immigration stance. For the Dutch respondents, I cannot come up with a logical explanation for this other than respondents perceiving 'state intervention' negatively due to populist sentiments. The results are most influenced by the Spanish respondents, which can be traced back to by the significant negative effects of the three other countries in Model 3.

The third hypothesis tested in Table 12 is rejected by the interaction effects. Due to the limited size of respondents living up to the requirements of being included in the interaction effects, I have created bigger groups out of the economic-cultural groups. This has been done for both hypotheses separately in order to enable the hypotheses to be properly tested. None of the interaction effects in Model 4 can significantly predict support for a radical right party, which is the reason Hypothesis 3 can be rejected. So, even those who see immigration as the most important topic and have strong left-wing attitudes towards the economy, are not more likely to prefer a radical right party than those who are not part of the categorisation. The effect of salience of immigration disappears after controlling for the interaction effects, but Table 11 above shows there is an effect.

The fourth hypothesis is rejected as well, because the results of the interaction effects show that there is a negative effect. Being in the CR-groups and seeing the economy as the most important topic results in a coefficient of -0.637, which equals being 47.1% less likely to be likely to vote for a radical left party. This indicates that even when one believes the economy is most important, this is not enough to get them to consider voting for a radical left party. Their stances on immigration thus seem to be more important. Seeing the economy as the most important topic shows itself a coefficient of 0.436 or being 54.6% more likely to consider voting for a radical left party.

As for the control variables, which show the same significance values in both tables, a number of significant effects can be derived from the analyses. For the radical right, being female, pro environmental protection and not satisfied with democracy show negative effects. The latter can be best

explained via the Polish respondents indicating they are likely to vote for PiS, as they are often satisfied with democracy.

Table 12: Multivariate regression testing H3 and 4.

	Radical right party				Radical left party			
Model	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
Intercept	-2.615***	-2.575***	-2.809***	-2.639***	-2.140***	-2.206***	-2.121***	-2.194***
	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.332)	(0.438)	(0.099)	(0.111)	(0.324)	(0.415)
Economic-cultural group								
Other groups	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
ELCR/ELCM/ELCL	1.144***	1.126***	1.256***	1.212***				
	(0.151)	(0.157)	(0.164)	(0.196)				
EMCR/ERCR	1.304***	1.218***	1.242***	1.232***				
	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.156)	(0.174)				
ELCR/EMCR/ERCR					0.628***	0.601**	0.579**	0.230
					(0.164)	(0.207)	(0.210)	(0.223)
ELCM/ELCL					-0.150	0.053	0.082	-0.008
					(0.134)	(0.160)	(0.163)	(0.171)
Salience of economy								
No	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Yes	-0.138	-0.136	-0.271	-0.298	0.443**	0.645***	0.629***	0.436*
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.145)	(0.164)	(0.129)	(0.184)	(0.190)	(0.201)
Salience of immigration								
No	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Yes	0.569**	0.076	0.386	0.302	-0.128	-0.171	-0.159	-0.021
	(0.177)	(0.441)	(0.454)	(0.471)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.252)	(0.262)
*Salience of immigration * ELCR/ELCM/ELCL*		0.244	-0.339	-0.409				
		(0.570)	(0.596)	(0.637)				
*Salience of immigration * EMCR/ERCR*		0.770	0.726	0.853				
		(0.497)	(0.513)	(0.535)				
*Salience of economy * ELCR/EMCR/ERCR*						-0.661*	-0.601*	-0.637*
						(0.295)	(0.299)	(0.307)
*Salience of economy * ELCM/ELCL*						0.067	0.012	-0.159
						(0.342)	(0.349)	(0.361)
Age			-0.011*	-0.006			-0.007	-0.010
			(0.005)	(0.006)			(0.006)	(0.006)

Gender				
Male	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Female	-0.516***	-0.310*	0.163	0.149
	(0.125)	(0.140)	(0.123)	(0.128)
Member of union				
No	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Yes	0.500**	0.506**	0.369*	0.390*
	(0.169)	(0.187)	(0.173)	(0.179)
Job type				
Employed	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Self-employed	-0.008	0.145	0.033	-0.078
	(0.225)	(0.243)	(0.234)	(0.241)
In school	-0.881**	-0.708	0.122	-0.079
	(0.384)	(0.425)	(0.286)	(0.297)
In household	0.571	0.665*	-0.486	-0.503
	(0.315)	(0.337)	(0.413)	(0.417)
Retired	0.272	-0.035	0.322	0.312
	(0.199)	(0.218)	(0.210)	(0.214)
Unemployed	0.117	0.410	0.398	0.230
	(0.301)	(0.327)	(0.271)	(0.276)
Class				
Middle class	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Working class	0.281	0.257	0.438*	0.307
	(0.179)	(0.200)	(0.175)	(0.179)
Lower middle class	-0.174	-0.169	0.225	0.163
	(0.173)	(0.189)	(0.161)	(0.165)
Upper middle class	0.227	0.447*	0.013	0.073
	(0.169)	(0.186)	(0.188)	(0.194)
Upper class	-0.042	-0.249	-0.182	0.077
	(0.415)	(0.462)	(0.487)	(0.495)
Education				
Low/middle	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
High	0.124	0.009	0.033	-0.049
	(0.136)	(0.154)	(0.137)	(0.145)
Urbanity				
Small/middle-sized town	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Rural area	0.087	0.179	-0.113	-0.079
	(0.158)	(0.173)	(0.170)	(0.174)
Large town	-0.178	-0.215	0.110	0.071
	(0.136)	(0.152)	(0.135)	(0.139)
Religion				
Agnostic	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Catholic	1.362***	0.683***	-0.429**	-0.313

	(0.163)	(0.190)	(0.152)	(0.167)
Other Christian	0.027	-0.279	-0.568	-0.453
	(0.318)	(0.336)	(0.313)	(0.320)
Atheist	0.243	0.347	0.386*	0.383*
	(0.226)	(0.241)	(0.172)	(0.180)
Other religion	-0.214	-0.320	0.172	0.198
	(0.336)	(0.355)	(0.225)	(0.232)
Redistribution of wealth				
Moderate		Reference		Reference
Pro		0.215		0.583***
		(0.171)		(0.152)
Anti		-0.051		-0.217
		(0.164)		(0.172)
Same-sex marriage				
Moderate		Reference		Reference
Pro		-0.289		0.210
		(0.200)		(0.186)
Anti		0.852***		0.149
		(0.185)		(0.209)
Civil liberties				
Moderate		Reference		Reference
Pro		-0.332*		0.177
		(0.166)		(0.151)
Anti		0.041		0.020
		(0.164)		(0.172)
Environmental protection				
Moderate		Reference		Reference
Pro		-0.460**		0.250
		(0.156)		(0.157)
Anti		0.182		0.191
		(0.188)		(0.221)
Satisfaction with democracy				
Fairly satisfied		Reference		Reference
Very satisfied		0.778**		0.031
		(0.232)		(0.301)
Not satisfied		-1.067***		0.283
		(0.155)		(0.151)
Satisfaction with EU				
Fairly satisfied		Reference		Reference
Very satisfied		-0.430		0.432
		(0.316)		(0.272)
Not satisfied		0.841***		0.009
		(0.156)		(0.149)
Country				
Spain		Reference		Reference
The Netherlands		-0.498*		-0.488*
		(0.241)		(0.203)
Czech Republic		-0.637**		-0.523**

				(0.224)				(0.192)
Poland				0.696***				-0.642**
				(0.188)				(0.197)
df	4	6	25	40	4	6	25	40
Nagelkerke R^2	0.081	0.083	0.184	0.350	0.024	0.028	0.064	0.115
N	2679	2679	2679	2679	2679	2679	2679	2679

B-coefficient
Standard error between brackets
Significance levels indicated by * p < 0.05; ** *p* < 0.01; *** *p* < 0.001
Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

Being a union member, working in the household, self-identifying as upper middle class, being catholic, anti-same sex marriage, being very satisfied with democracy and dissatisfied with the European democracy each have a positive effect. The country dummies indicate that the Polish respondents influence the results for most part. Regarding the radical left, there are no negative effects except for the country dummies which indicate that the Spanish respondents influence the results most. The positive effects are being member of a union, being atheist and being in favour of wealth redistribution.

The results of testing the hypotheses, in conclusion, are:

Table 13: Overview of confirmed and rejected hypotheses.

H1	*Voters with strong cultural right-wing views are more likely to vote for a radical right party, no matter the party's position on the economic dimension.*	***Confirmed***
H2	*Voters with strong economic left-wing views are more likely to vote for a radical left party, no matter the party's position on the cultural dimension.*	***Rejected (no effect)***
H3	*Voters with strong economic left-wing attitudes who perceive immigration as the most salient issue are more likely to vote for a radical right party.*	***Rejected (no effect)***
H4	*Voters with strong cultural right-wing attitudes who perceive the economy as the most salient issue are more likely to vote for a radical left party.*	***Rejected (less likely)***

5. Conclusion and discussion

5.1 – Answering the research question

This thesis commenced with the following research question:

How can divergence on the non-core dimensions in supply of radical right and left parties in the political space explain the party preference of voters with radical right and/or left attitudes?

Through selecting four countries where radical parties have diverging positions on the non-core dimension of the political space, I have been able to provide more insight into the importance of these. The cultural dimension has proven to be more important than the economic dimension. With respect to the radical right, the fact that all economic-cultural groups are more likely to prefer a radical right party teaches us that the core dimension is its rationale of existence. Hence, divergence on the non-core dimension does not explain preferences for a radical right party very well. It is, however, not completely irrelevant. The bivariate analyses executed in a national political space context showed that the effects of economic-cultural groups closer to a radical right party's two-dimensional position are often stronger. With regards to the radical left, I have found that the non-core dimension is able to explain voter preference for a radical left party. Only those with economic core radical left attitudes and either culturally strong left or right-wing attitudes were able to explain preferences for a radical left party. The bivariate analyses in the national political space also showed that the cultural dimension plays a role in preferring a radical left party with a specific non-core dimension. Those with views against a restrictive immigration policy were not more likely to have a preference for the cultural right-wing Czech KSČM, while those in favour of a restrictive immigration policy were not more likely to have a preference for the Spanish Unidas Podemos. The economic dimension, thus, seems to be equally or less important that the cultural dimension to explain radical left support.

Regarding salience, the rejection of Hypothesis 3 shows that seeing immigration as most salient and being strongly economically left-wing does not increase radical right support. This indicates that immigration is not important enough for them to vote according to the core of the radical right party family. Those with strong cultural right-wing views and seeing the economy as most salient, on the other hand, are less likely to consider voting for a radical left party, which indicates that their attitudes towards immigration are more important than economic salience. Again, this proves the greater importance of the cultural dimension. Hence, one could conclude that salience is of less importance than the economic-cultural position to explain the influence of non-core dimensions on radical right and left support.

5.2 – Theoretical and methodological reflection

Regarding the theory used in this thesis, I have been able to prove that demand theory formulated through political space based on two dimension is a relevant theoretical method to explain preferences

for certain party families. I add to the knowledge that stated before that the two-dimensional political space matters. The assumption made that the core ideology should also be the dimension best explaining support has proven to be only true for the radical right, but not for the radical left. Therefore, using the anti-capitalist rhetoric of the radical left to define the party family is useful, but not to fully explain its support. Demand theory based on class conflict is not sufficient to explain whether radical left parties are successful. Salience theory has made me able to assess the effect of the issues most prominent in the minds of the respondents. The theoretical approach based on demand and supply theory in this thesis, has thus proven to be an appropriate method to explain two-dimensional support for radical right and radical left parties. Despite that, the theory could have been extended with more than two dimensions only. The causal model has proven to be applicable. However, there is an underlying dynamic, which is the importance of both dimensions individually.

While reflecting on the methodology, a number of remarks can be made. First of all, the case selection based on the non-core positions of the radical right and left parties included was a strength of this thesis. By analysing these cases, I have been able to put the hypotheses through a thorough test, while challenging the generalisability of the results. Additionally, grouping the respondents based on the two-dimensional political space has proven to provide insightful conclusions. Had I only measured the economic and cultural attitudes, this cognizance could not have been acquired. Moreover, using the variable in the EES measuring likeliness to vote for a party, rather than having voted for a certain party, enabled me to include sufficient respondents to test the hypotheses, even for parties that do not have a substantial voter base, like the Polish Razem party. Regarding generalisability, finding results in political spaces with radical parties holding such diverse non-core positions lead to important insights into the importance of the non-core dimension. Despite that, the selection of only four countries limits the generalisability for the radical right and left in total.

The methodological weaknesses mainly lay in the way economic and cultural attitudes have been measured. Measuring them through only one variable each provides insightful, but rather limited information. Alas, as explained in the thesis, the reliability of the variable measuring the cultural attitude of respondents is questionable due to the misinterpretation of the unfortunate formulation of the question. Furthermore, this thesis has only focused on two dimensions, while there are many more to be included. Examples would be attitudes regarding medical ethical issues, European integration or authoritarianism.

5.3 – Scientific relevance

As noted in the introduction, research on radical right and radical left voters is often based on a large n approach. In this thesis, I have been able to bring nuance to the image we have of those supporting a radical right and radical left parties. Although the radical right has recently received more attention in the literature regarding their economic positions (Otjes, 2019; Enggist & Pinggera, 2021), I have shown that these are not fundamental to explain radical right support. This is in line with the literature, as it

finds that the economic positions of these parties are based on their cultural core ideology of authoritarianism, nativism and populism. As for the radical left, there has been little attention to its non-core ideology. I have found, though, that the non-core dimension is of great importance. Therefore, this limited attention is unjustified. Gomez et al. (2016) have tried to find a distinction between radical left parties based on issues unrelated to the economy, which is a distinction I have been able to confirm for immigration. Krause (2020) showed that these parties lose support when they shift their positions to the middle, a conclusion which is supported by my analysis as the ELCM group did not show a statistically significant effect. As a result, large n research on radical left parties, for example performed by Rooduijn et al. (2017) and Ramiro (2016), provide a more limited view regarding the non-core dimension. What parties are selected matters greatly to the results as a voter that would prefer a radical left party in one country, would not choose the one in another country.

5.4 – Societal relevance

The results have shown that voters tend to prefer a party close to their two-dimensional views and not only the core ideology or the level of salience of that ideology. This implies that a great number of voters is not yet fully represented by a political party. Voters place themselves in positions all over the political space, but in many countries, political parties do not cover it entirely. This could apply, for example, to Dutch or Spanish voters in favour of state intervention and restrictive immigration policy as their countries lack a party with both those positions. Hillen and Steiner (2020) have already found evidence that these voters are less likely to vote in Western Europe. In such a situation, a new party or a former party shifting its non-core position could increase the number of people fully represented in parliament. Secondly, this thesis has shown that political parties could take on a more explicit position on the non-core ideologies. Both the core and non-core positions have proven to matter to the choice the people make in the voting booth. If parties provide more clarity, voters are better informed about their options and more accurately represented. Moreover, I have been able to show that demand and supply theory applies to all cardinal directions of Europe and that dividing Eastern from Western Europe in research might become inessential more than thirty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

5.5 – Suggestions for future research

The conclusions following from this thesis pave the way for future research. First, it would be absolutely valuable to dive more into the cultural attitudes of radical left voters. Although more attention has been paid to the economic attitudes of radical right voters, the non-core attitudes of radical left voters are still underrepresented in recent articles. Despite the number of European radical left parties with culturally conservative views being limited, it would be worth to analyse their cultural views and how they could be connected to their economic views in more detail and, to overcome the limited generalisability of this thesis, apply it to more parties. The latter applies to the radical right as well. Furthermore, I have solely

focused on parties with radical right and/or left attitudes. It could be gainful to apply the two-dimensional method to other, more moderate, parties as well. What specific economic-cultural groups vote for liberal, Christian democrat or social democratic parties? Are some of these voters underrepresented as well? It would also be worth measuring the effects of being in a specific economic-cultural group on likelihood of support of all party families. By including many European cases, this could also be a solution for the problem regarding generalisability in this thesis. Additionally, other dimensions than the economic and cultural could be used to apply my method. As mentioned above, these could include medical ethical issues, European integration or authoritarianism. If statistically possible, more than two dimensions could be included into the analysis. Lastly, one could test whether not being represented by a party on a two-dimensional space leads to people not voting, like Hillen and Steiner (2020) did for Western European countries, but it would be worth looking into Eastern European voters as well.

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Appendix A – Coding of variable measuring salience

Salient issue	Answers relate to…
Economy	The economy, expenses, wages, economic crisis, economic bubble, social benefits, unemployment, poverty, workload, money, pensions, inequality, lack of workers, economic development, personal debts
Immigration	Immigration, migration, specific ethnicities (e.g., Roma or Moroccans), Islam(isation), integration, foreigners, immigration policy, refugees
Other	Climate change, drought, ecology, environment, corruption, individual politicians, specific political parties infrastructure, the government, European Union, the euro, polarisation, the opposition, political discontent, state debts, fraud, food quality, demonstrations, housing, foreign countries, racism, criminality, healthcare, xenophobia, the youth, independence of media, political correctness, drugs, oak processionary caterpillar, earthquakes, overpopulation, terrorism, student loans, MH17, aging population, nationalism, lack of craftmanship, traffic safety, religion, democratisation, conspiracy theories, foreign policy, rule of law, regulations, gay rights, taxation, more than one issue, Catalan separatism, fascism, feminism, sexism, greed

Appendix B – Descriptive statistics of independent variables per country

Spain

	Valid *N*	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Independent variables			
Salience			
Salience of immigration			
No (reference)	776	97.3%	
Yes	776	2.7%	
Salience of economy			
No (reference)	776	51.2%	
Yes	776	48.8%	
Attitudes			
Immigration			
Moderate (reference)	776	29.8%	
In favour of restrictive policy	776	40.6%	
Against restrictive policy	776	29.6%	
Economic intervention			
Moderate (reference)	776	43.6%	
In favour	776	29.5%	
Against	776	26.9%	
Economic-cultural group			
EMCM (reference)	776	16.6%	
ELCR	776	13.5%	
EMCR	776	15.2%	
ERCR	776	11.9%	
ELCM	776	5.5%	
ERCM	776	7.7%	
ELCL	776	7.6%	

EMCL	776	10.4%	
ERCL	776	11.7%	
Control variables			
Personal information			
Age	776	48.38	15.999
Gender			
Male (reference)	776	52.1%	
Female	776	47.9%	
Socio-economic circumstances			
Union membership			
Not a member (reference)	776	89.2%	
Member	776	10.8%	
Education			
Low/Medium (reference)	776	31.8%	
Higher educated	776	68.2%	
Class			
Middle class (reference)	776	52.3%	
Working class	776	17.1%	
Lower middle class	776	18.0%	
Upper middle class	776	11.7%	
Upper class	776	0.9%	
Job			
Employed (reference)	776	47.9%	
Self-employed	776	11.5%	
In school	776	6.4%	
Working in the household	776	4.0%	
Retired	776	22.6%	
Unemployed	776	7.6%	
Religion			

Non-believer/agnostic (reference)	776	26.1%
Catholic	776	50.5%
Other Christian	776	4.0%
Atheist	776	13.3%
Other	776	6.1%
Urbanity		
Small/middle sized town (reference)	776	43.9%
Rural area	776	14.3%
Large town	776	41.8%
Attitudes		
Redistribution of wealth		
Moderate (reference)	776	35.1%
In favour	776	41.2%
Against	776	23.7%
Same-sex marriage		
Moderate (reference)	776	20.9%
In favour	776	63.4%
Against	776	15.7%
Civil liberties		
Moderate (reference)	776	35.9%
In favour	776	37.8%
Against	776	26.3%
Environment		
Moderate (reference)	776	28.3%
In favour	776	59.7%
Against	776	12.0%
Satisfaction		
Satisfied with democracy		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	776	32.7%

Very satisfied	776	5.3%
Not satisfied	776	62.0%
Satisfied with EU		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	776	40.7%
Very satisfied	776	5.2%
Not satisfied	776	54.1%
Valid N (listwise)	776	

Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

The Netherlands

	Valid *N*	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Independent variables			
Salience			
Salience of immigration			
No (reference)	545	79.8%	
Yes	545	20.2%	
Salience of economy			
No (reference)	545	81.5%	
Yes	545	18.5%	
Attitudes			
Immigration			
Moderate (reference)	545	39.2%	
In favour of restrictive policy	545	35.8%	
Against restrictive policy	545	25.0%	
Economic intervention			
Moderate (reference)	545	56.9%	
In favour	545	13.2%	
Against	545	29.9%	

Economic-cultural group			
EMCM (reference)	545	26.8%	
ELCR	545	4.8%	
EMCR	545	17.8%	
ERCR	545	13.2%	
ELCM	545	3.9%	
ERCM	545	8.6%	
ELCL	545	4.6%	
EMCL	545	12.3%	
ERCL	545	8.1%	
Control variables			
Personal information			
Age	545	49.68	17.543
Gender			
Male (reference)	545	54.9%	
Female	545	45.1%	
Socio-economic circumstances			
Union membership			
Not a member (reference)	545	78.5%	
Member	545	21.5%	
Education			
Low/Medium (reference)	545	41.8%	
Higher educated	545	58.2%	
Class			
Middle class (reference)	545	45.8%	
Working class	545	10.5%	
Lower middle class	545	16.0%	
Upper middle class	545	23.7%	
Upper class	545	4.0%	
Job			
Employed (reference)	545	52.2%	
Self-employed	545	7.7%	

In school	545	7.7%
Working in the household	545	2.9%
Retired	545	24.4%
Unemployed	545	5.1%
Religion		
Non-believer/agnostic (reference)	545	43.6%
Catholic	545	21.7%
Other Christian	545	17.1%
Atheist	545	6.8%
Other	545	10.8%
Urbanity		
Small/middle sized town (reference)	545	42.0%
Rural area	545	30.8%
Large town	545	27.2%
Attitudes		
Redistribution of wealth		
Moderate (reference)	545	36.1%
In favour	545	27.9%
Against	545	36.0%
Same-sex marriage		
Moderate (reference)	545	16.5%
In favour	545	70.3%
Against	545	13.2%
Civil liberties		
Moderate (reference)	545	31.5%
In favour	545	23.9%
Against	545	44.6%
Environment		
Moderate (reference)	545	41.1%
In favour	545	35.0%

Against	545	23.9%
Satisfaction		
Satisfied with democracy		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	545	53.2%
Very satisfied	545	5.3%
Not satisfied	545	41.5%
Satisfied with EU		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	545	38.2%
Very satisfied	545	2.9%
Not satisfied	545	58.9%
Valid N (listwise)	545	

Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

Czech Republic

	Valid *N*	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Independent variables			
Salience			
Salience of immigration			
No (reference)	645	90.5%	
Yes	645	9.5%	
Salience of economy			
No (reference)	645	89.1%	
Yes	645	10.1%	
Attitudes			
Immigration			
Moderate (reference)	645	24.0%	
In favour of restrictive policy	645	47.1%	

Against restrictive policy	645	29.9%	
Economic intervention			
Moderate (reference)	645	41.9%	
In favour	645	29.1%	
Against	645	29.0%	
Economic-cultural group			
EMCM (reference)	645	11.5%	
ELCR	645	15.5%	
EMCR	645	18.8%	
ERCR	645	12.9%	
ELCM	645	4.5%	
ERCM	645	7.0%	
ELCL	645	9.1%	
EMCL	645	11.6%	
ERCL	645	9.1%	
Control variables			
Personal information			
Age	645	48.285	16.328
Gender			
Male (reference)	645	54.1%	
Female	645	45.9%	
Socio-economic circumstances			
Union membership			
Not a member (reference)	645	90.5%	
Member	645	9.5%	
Education			
Low/Medium (reference)	645	61.6%	
Higher educated	645	38.4%	
Class			

Middle class (reference)	645	51.4%
Working class	645	12.2%
Lower middle class	645	23.6%
Upper middle class	645	12.2%
Upper class	645	1.6%
Job		
Employed (reference)	645	56.0%
Self-employed	645	5.9%
In school	645	6.4%
Working in the household	645	3.3%
Retired	645	26.8%
Unemployed	645	1.6%
Religion		
Non-believer/agnostic (reference)	645	34.0%
Catholic	645	22.0%
Other Christian	645	4.8%
Atheist	645	29.1%
Other	645	10.1%
Urbanity		
Small/middle sized town (reference)	645	44.0%
Rural area	645	25.9%
Large town	645	30.1%
Attitudes		
Redistribution of wealth		
Moderate (reference)	645	37.9%
In favour	645	25.4%
Against	645	36.7%
Same-sex marriage		
Moderate (reference)	645	20.6%
In favour	645	44.2%
Against	645	35.2%

Civil liberties		
Moderate (reference)	645	35.3%
In favour	645	42.5%
Against	645	22.2%
Environment		
Moderate (reference)	645	32.9%
In favour	645	56.1%
Against	645	11.0%
Satisfaction		
Satisfied with democracy		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	645	39.4%
Very satisfied	645	5.4%
Not satisfied	645	55.2%
Satisfied with EU		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	645	41.0%
Very satisfied	645	2.6%
Not satisfied	645	56.4%
Valid N (listwise)	645	

Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

Poland

	Valid *N*	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Independent variables			
Salience			
Salience of immigration			
No (reference)	689	95.6%	
Yes	689	4.4%	
Salience of economy			
No (reference)	689	79.2%	

Yes	689	20.8%	
Attitudes			
Immigration			
Moderate (reference)	689	29.5%	
In favour of restrictive policy	689	37.1%	
Against restrictive policy	689	33.4%	
Economic intervention			
Moderate (reference)	689	34.0%	
In favour	689	21.7%	
Against	689	44.3%	
Economic-cultural group			
EMCM (reference)	689	12.2%	
ELCR	689	10.2%	
EMCR	689	12.5%	
ERCR	689	14.4%	
ELCM	689	6.1%	
ERCM	689	11.2%	
ELCL	689	5.4%	
EMCL	689	9.3%	
ERCL	689	18.8%	
Control variables			
Personal information			
Age	689	46.305	16.119
Gender			
Male (reference)	689	53.2%	
Female	689	46.8%	
Socio-economic circumstances			
Union membership			
Not a member (reference)	689	90.4%	
Member	689	9.6%	

Education		
Low/Medium (reference)	689	28.5%
Higher educated	689	71.5%
Class		
Middle class (reference)	689	55.3%
Working class	689	12.6%
Lower middle class	689	16.7%
Upper middle class	689	13.4%
Upper class	689	2.0%
Job		
Employed (reference)	689	59.5%
Self-employed	689	6.8%
In school	689	4.2%
Working in the household	689	2.9%
Retired	689	24.1%
Unemployed	689	2.5%
Religion		
Non-believer/agnostic (reference)	689	10.5%
Catholic	689	74.0%
Other Christian	689	2.0%
Atheist	689	9.4%
Other	689	4.1%
Urbanity		
Small/middle sized town (reference)	689	41.0%
Rural area	689	15.1%
Large town	689	42.9%
Attitudes		
Redistribution of wealth		
Moderate (reference)	689	40.7%
In favour	689	23.5%

Against	689	35.8%
Same-sex marriage		
Moderate (reference)	689	20.5%
In favour	689	31.7%
Against	689	47.8%
Civil liberties		
Moderate (reference)	689	30.3%
In favour	689	46.4%
Against	689	23.3%
Environment		
Moderate (reference)	689	25.7%
In favour	689	61.9%
Against	689	12.4%
Satisfaction		
Satisfied with democracy		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	689	34.9%
Very satisfied	689	11.2%
Not satisfied	689	53.9%
Satisfied with EU		
Fairly satisfied (reference)	689	58.2%
Very satisfied	689	11.9%
Not satisfied	689	29.9%
Valid N (listwise)	689	

Source: Schmitt et al. (2020).

Appendix C: Tests for multicollinearity

	Tolerance-test	VIF-test
Economic-cultural group		
(Reference is Group 5)		
ELCR	0.488	2.048
EMCR	0.461	2.168
ERCR	0.475	2.103
ELCM	0.655	1.527
ERCM	0.677	1.477
ELCL	0.562	1.781
EMCL	0.638	1.568
ERCL	0.575	1.738
Salience of economy		
(Reference is no)		
Yes	0.414	2.416
Salience of immigration		
(Reference is no)		
Yes	0.341	2.933
*Salience of economy * ELCR/EMCR/ERCR*	0.425	2.352
*Salience of economy * ELCM/ELCL*	0.560	1.785
*Salience of immigration * ELCR/EMCR/ERCR*	0.576	1.737
*Salience of immigration * ECCR/ERCR*	0.406	2.462
Age	0.420	2.382
Gender		
(Reference is male)		
Female	0.894	1.119
Member of union		
(Reference is no)		
Yes	0.932	1.073
Job type		
(Reference is employed)		
Self-employed	0.909	1.100
In school	0.672	1.488
In household	0.928	1.077
Retired	0.466	2.145

Unemployed	0.924	1.082
Class		
(Reference is middle class)		
Working class	0.860	1.163
Lower middle class	0.868	1.152
Upper middle class	0.869	1.150
Upper class	0.947	1.056
Education (Reference is low/middle)		
High	0.740	1.351
Urbanity		
(Reference is small/ middle sized town)		
Rural area	0.811	1.233
Large town	0.824	1.213
Religion		
(Reference is agnostic)		
Catholic	0.550	1.817
Other Christian	0.823	1.215
Atheist	0.722	1.385
Other religion	0.825	1.212
Redistribution of wealth		
(Reference is moderate)		
Pro	0.678	1.475
Anti	0.701	1.427
Same-sex marriage		
(Reference is moderate)		
Pro	0.497	2.013
Anti	0.521	1.918
Civil liberties		
(Reference is moderate)		
Pro	0.672	1.488
Anti	0.690	1.450
Environmental protection		
(Reference is moderate)		
Pro	0.682	1.467
Anti	0.736	1.359

Satisfaction with democracy		
(Reference is fairly satisfied)		
Very satisfied	0.810	1.234
Not satisfied	0.720	1.388
Satisfaction with EU		
(Reference is fairly satisfied)		
Very satisfied	0.846	1.182
Not satisfied	0.708	1.412
Country (Reference is Spain)		
Netherlands	0.531	1.884
Czech Republic	0.515	1.941
Poland	0.540	1.853

Source: Schmitt et al. (2020)