THE RMS

DIFFERENT GENERATIONS MOLUCCANS IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THEIR WISH FOR AN INDEPENDENT STATE

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Executive summary

During the 1970s a part of the Moluccan population carried out several violent actions. The prime motive for these actions was the political ideal of an independent Moluccan state. Nowadays the wish for an independent state is still alive among the Moluccan population living in the Netherlands. This thesis focuses on the differences between the second- and third-generation Moluccans living in the Netherlands regarding their wish for an own state.

The Moluccans in the Netherlands can be seen as a diaspora community, since they were forced to leave their country of origin. They are still very much orientated towards their homeland and have lived in closed communities, especially during the early years, excluded from Dutch society. To understand their longing for an own state, it is important to recognize that the Moluccan community is a community in diaspora, as this impacts on their identity forming. The identity is formed through the narratives of the ancestral homeland and the Moluccan history, as well as both the Moluccan and the Dutch culture. The literature points out that this identity formation in a diaspora context impacts the second generation in particular, as they are more inclined to radicalize. This radicalization indeed took place among the second generation of Moluccan youth, most clearly visible in their violent actions during the 1970s.

Since the 1970s there have been many changes within the Moluccan community: the focus has gradually shifted towards integration within the Netherlands and the wish for an independent state, the RMS, became more of a symbol rather than a realistic political wish. However, since the 1990s the political situation in Indonesia has changed and this resulted in new hope for the ideal of the RMS.

This thesis is based on 24 interviews with second- as well as third-generation Moluccans in the Netherlands; interviews addressing their history, their identity and their opinions about the RMS. Looking at the differences between the generations regarding those subjects, it is striking that the differences are only minor. Within both generations there are proponents and opponents of an independent state and both generations are characterized by a declining interest in the ideal of the RMS. The second generation is, however, more often interested in returning to the RMS and is more forgiving towards the violence as used during the 1970s.

The differences between the second and third generation can be explained by looking at their history; the second generation has often directly experienced the grief of their parents and the living conditions in the closed community of the camps. Members of the third generation, however, have only heard

the stories from their parents and grandparents and no direct experiences themselves. But these same narratives explain why there are only slight differences between the second and third generation, as they are passed through the generations.

Although these narratives provide an identity to the various Moluccan generations, the identity as such is not static but subject to the change of time. During the 1970s terrorism was an often used tactic; the second generation was directly confronted with the suffering of their parents, a traumatic experience. The third generation obviously grew up in another era, and did not have to deal with this traumatic experience; also the integration of Moluccans has improved since the 1980s. Those factors combined makes it less likely that the third generation will act in the same way as the second generation of Moluccans did.

Acknowledgements

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Introduction

> *"Dad and Mom, when you find this letter, I am no longer home, but with friends. I write this letter because I know dad and mom will worry about where I am. […] I am a South-Moluccan and a Christian, and I am not afraid to die. […] The weapon I carry, I carry with belief in myself. Therefore, dad and mom, don't be afraid I use it unwisely. Don't look at me as a child who intends to murder people with this weapon. […] If I die, it has a purpose, which is not meaningless. […] I know, although the way is long and rough to reach our freedom, we will reach this freedom with Gods help. […] Hansina"* (Translation of a fragment from the letter of Hansina Uktolseja to her parents) (Barker, 1981:9)

The train hijackings of the 1970s are among the few terrorist attacks taking place in the modern Netherlands (Bootsma, 2000:11). Forty years after, those hijackings still have contemporary relevance; during the fall of 2017 a court case started, in which relatives of the hijackers try to find out what exactly happened during the military action leading up to the freeing of the hostages. Unanswered questions among the relatives of the hijackers are whether the military that set the hostages free acted correctly and if the authorities did give an order to kill all hijackers (NOS, 2017).

This court case focuses on a sensitive topic, for the Moluccan population in the Netherlands but also for the wider Dutch audience. For the Moluccan population in the Netherlands it is important that the truth (in particular, did the government give orders to kill?) finally comes out, and the authorities taking their responsibilities for all the wrongdoings towards the Moluccans over time (NOS, 2017). The case is sensitive for some Dutch people as well, as they regard the train hijackings as clear acts of terrorism and perceive the court case to be an open attack on the military heroes (Facebook, 2017).

Problem formulation

Currently, the Moluccans living in the Netherlands are mainly in the news because of this court case against the Dutch state, related to the train hijackings of the 1970s – and especially with the way in which the Dutch authorities have dealt with these hijackings and the subsequent developments (NOS, 2017). Another recent news item is the granting of the veteran status to the former KNIL soldiers. These two examples might perhaps show a change in perceptions and attitudes of Dutch authorities towards the Moluccan issue, and in particularly raise the question whether or not previous governments have acted properly.

During the 1950s, the Moluccans were not warmly welcomed in the Netherlands, to put it mildly; they were housed in former concentration and work camps and were expected to leave the country after six months. It was therefore no surprise that initially the government failed to formulate proper integration policies for the Moluccans living in the Netherlands; it took a couple of years, before the authorities slowly started to realise that the Moluccan presence was not just temporary.

In the meantime, however, a new generation of Moluccans had been born. This second generation of 'Dutch Moluccans' differed from other generations. For the first-generation diaspora there was a clear difference between their place of birth, their original homeland in the Dutch East Indies on the one hand and the host country on the other. The third and next generations of Moluccans are born and raised in the Netherlands and have no direct link with the Dutch East Indies/the Moluccas/Indonesia. The second-generation diaspora is somewhere in between – although they grew up in the country where they were born, given their parents' history they are confronted with the experiences in their own homeland, their country of birth, but also with the (foreign) norms and values of their parents' homeland (Balci & Michielsen, 2013:17). This second generation of Moluccans therefore grew up in a confusing world, with little sense of belonging to the Netherlands. During the late 1960s and 1970s a relatively small part of this generation became radicalised and got involved in acts of terrorism.

These violent actions taking place during the 1970s are the starting point for this thesis. The prime focus is on the second generation of Moluccans, the generation that has carried out these actions, and on the third generation of Moluccans, to come to an understanding of the why and how of the radicalization of the second generation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands compared to the third generation.

A prime motive for the violent, terrorist actions of the 1960s and 1970s was the political ideal of an independent Moluccan state, the RMS; an ideal still in existence today. However, Steijlen (1996) argues that the political purpose of this ideal has become subordinate to the symbolic one. The question is whether nowadays the political purpose is still subordinate to the symbolic one and what this means for the third generation of Moluccans and their perspectives on the RMS ideal. The combination of the issue of the radicalization of the second generation of Moluccans and the political wish for an independent state, has resulted in the following research question:

How and to what extent does the second generation of diaspora Moluccans living in the Netherlands differ from the third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands, as far as their wish for an independent Moluccan state (RMS) is concerned?

In order to be able to answer this main research question, various sub-questions must be dealt with as well:

- What is the (theoretical) perspective on the second-generation diaspora members and their identity?
- How does radicalization play a role in the second-generation diaspora?
- What is the context of the various generations of Moluccas living in the Netherlands, and what narrative(s) do they tell?
- How do the second and third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands, respectively, speak about their history, their life in the Netherlands, and their wish/effort for an own state?

Relevance

Research into the perceptions of second-generation diaspora members is relevant, both from a social and scientific perspective. Throughout the history of humankind, people have moved across the globe. Nowadays, substantial numbers of migrants are coming to the Netherlands, be it as refugees or diaspora people. Around 20 percent of the total population of the Netherlands is made up of first- or second-generation immigrants (CBS, 2018). More often than not these immigrants take their own norms and values, habits and culture with them. In total, there are around two hundred different cultures represented in the Netherlands. For a relatively small country, this is a sizable issue to deal with, since a society has to be created and maintained where all cultures can coexist.

In the recent past, Moluccans have come to the Netherlands and during the late 1960s and 1970s a small part of the second generation of Moluccans carried out terrorist acts (while larger groups of this second generation expressed some to even strong sympathy for these acts). A better understanding of perceptions and attitudes of this second generation of Moluccans (being the generation 'in-between'), might give relevant insights for improving policies regarding the integration of second-generation immigrants in general.

Such research has scientific relevance as well. Although much has already been published about migrants, this specific group – and in particular the second generation, for reasons previously outlined – remains an interesting and relevant research object. From a second-generation perspective, the Moluccans represent a very distinct group, not only because it is a migrant group, but also because they were (partly) isolated from Dutch society and culture (Kamsteeg, 2010). Issues related to second generation migrants have been analysed from the perspective of why and how this generation is different from other generations (Huang, Ramshaw & Norman, 2016; Graf, 2017; Balci & Michielsen, 2013), but these second-generation related studies mainly focus on visiting or returning to the homeland. This case is quite different, since the Moluccans never had their own state; how does this influence their perceptions and attitudes as members of a second-generation diaspora?

Method

In order to answer the central question of this thesis, three main methodological approaches have been used. First, a literature review (Bernard, 2011) to better understand and comprehend the context and the background of the Moluccans in the Netherlands and to build a framework in which the key notions of diaspora, identity forming, and radicalization are brought together. Do the identity forming and radicalization of the second and third generation of Moluccans conform to the general theories about radicalization of second-generation diaspora? Partly based on these approaches, interviews and participatory observation were used to make a connection between the literature and reality. In addition to academic literature, I have also used newspapers and social media (Facebook) for opinions from – mostly – Moluccans living in the Netherlands. The website of the RMS government (in exile) was used to collect more information about their goals and intentions. (Auto)Biographies from former hijackers provided more understanding of their reasons to hijack trains.

I have also focused on interviews and participatory observation (Bernard, 2011; Montello & Sutton, 2012). During the period between April and July 2018, 24 interviews have been held. I used the so-called snowball sampling method for selecting the interviewees, as I did not have direct access to the Moluccan community myself. The snowball sampling method was important since I was able to keep control over the kind of participants for this research. This in turn was important to ensure the reliability and validity of the research, as there are different groups of Moluccans in the Netherlands. There is a clear distinction in the level of political polarization, caused by the island of origin; for instance, Moluccans originating from the Southeast Moluccan islands have a different background and outlook as compared to the Moluccans of the Middle Moluccan islands. Moluccans of the Southeast are religiously more diverse, have slightly different cultural habits, and they only began serving in the KNIL army at the beginning of the 20th century, whereas the people from the Middle Moluccan islands began their service already at the end of the 19th century. Middle Moluccans perceive(d) themselves superior to the Southeast Moluccans, given their position during the colonial period. After moving to the camps in the Netherlands, riots between the two groups erupted and the Southeast Moluccans demanded their own camps (Steijlen, 1996:78). In light of these differences, I decided to limit the participants to only one specific group, the Christian Moluccans, thereby excluding the Muslim Moluccans in this case study. Another obvious criterion for selecting the respondents was that they had to be second or third generation Moluccans living in the Netherlands.

The interviewees have been anonymized in this thesis as some of them asked for anonymity; the Moluccan community in the Netherlands is quite small and the strings are tight, especially within the Moluccan residential areas. For the anonymization I have used the letters of the alphabet. The letters A-P represent the group of respondents from the second-generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands.

The second generation are all Christians and are mostly from Ambon and the middle Moluccans. Another important fact about the second-generation respondents is that two-thirds of them live in residential areas in Assen, Bovensmilde and Wierden, which means that they have close links with the Moluccan community. However, I have also interviewed some second-generation Moluccans with parents originating from other islands who did not live in the Moluccan residential areas. The participants are both male and female, and approximately between 50 and 75 years of age. The letters Q-X represent the third generation Moluccans in the Netherlands. The third-generation Moluccans I have interviewed live mainly in Groningen or Assen. Some lived in Moluccan residential areas, others did not. They were all Christians. All of the third generation Moluccans had ties with the Moluccan society. The respondents are male and female, and approximately between 15 and 40 years old.

In total 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted, with people either in favor of the RMS ideal or opposed to it. In these semi-structured interviews, I was able to direct the topics discussed and questions posed, but left room for the interviewee to provide additional input and use his/her own words. Finally, in addition to the 24 interviews, I visited some Moluccan events, in particular a Moluccan church service and the April 25 celebration of the RMS government in exile. In order to be able to connect the theoretical framework and the information collected through the interviews, I have coded and structured the interviews (Bernard, 2011) along the lines of the topics of the sub-questions. After transcribing the interviews, I have first given open codes to the interviews. I have merged those open codes and the final topics of the coding resulted in culture and identity, origin and upbringing, opinions about their history and the Moluccas, vision on the RMS, and views on the Dutch government. Those topics together form the framework for the analysis, and was I able to make connections between the collected data.

Structure

Following this introduction of the thesis, Chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework, used to answer the main question. This chapter includes a description and definition of key notions, like 'diaspora group', 'identity' in relation to different generations of diaspora members and, finally, 'radicalization' of second-generation individuals. Chapter 2 contains an historical background and context, which gives more insight in the situation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands, how they came to this country and the developments since. This chapter also delves deeper into the development of the ideals of the RMS. Chapter 3 is the analysis of the interviews. it addresses how the second and third generation of Moluccans perceive their own history and life in the Netherlands and makes a comparison between these two generations, focusing on the identity of the two generations, and the differences between them. This chapter is also devoted to the wish for an own, independent state of the second and third

generation alike. Finally, the results, similarities and differences, are addressed in the chapter dealing with the conclusion and discussion.

Chapter 1. Theoretical framework

In order to be able to answer the main research question, a theoretical framework is needed. For creating such a theoretical framework, several issues need to be taken into account. First, the definition of the notion of 'diaspora' as used in this research is given, followed by a discussion about identity-formation among the second generation as well as older and younger generations of immigrants. Finally, the connection between radicalization and second- generation diaspora is addressed, given that during the late 1960s and 1970s a part of the second generation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands became involved in radical, violent actions.

1.1 Diaspora

There are many immigrant and refugee flows across the globe. There have always been migration flows, but as a consequence of globalisation and travel around the world becoming more common, immigration has become easier. Since there are numerous migrant groups, there are also numerous stories about the reasons why an individual or larger group decides to migrate. What all those groups and individuals living abroad have in common, is that they are part of the so-called diaspora.

The term 'diaspora' has been used in various different ways and the literature refers to different interpretations of what 'diaspora' entails. This research builds on the three characteristic core elements of 'diaspora', as identified by Brubaker (2005) and widely accepted.

The first core element is 'dispersion', strictly understood as a forced or traumatic diffusion, or, more broadly, a dispersal across borders or even within borders (Brubaker, 2005:3). In the case of the Moluccans, this first element is applicable in both senses. Their dispersion from the Moluccas clearly had a coercive nature, since it was ordered by the Dutch government (Kamsteeg, 2010:20).

The second element of diaspora entails 'homeland orientation', either in the sense of an orientation towards a real country or towards a so-called imagined homeland. This homeland – be it real or imagined – serves as a source for identity, for values, for loyalty. People living in the diaspora have a collective memory, sometimes collective myth, of the homeland, consider their ancestral homeland as a true and ideal home to which they one day hope to return. They are committed to and feel responsible for the restoration or maintenance of the homeland and they continue to relate to this homeland. This, of course, strongly influences the shaping of one's identity and solidarity (Brubaker, 2005:5). For the overwhelming majority of Moluccans living in the Netherlands this homeland orientation comes in the form of the RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan), being an independent Moluccan state most of Moluccans are wishing for. The RMS has been proclaimed in 1950, and for the first-

generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands it was clear that they should and would return to their own independent state (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:118).

The third element is 'boundary-maintenance'. This refers to collective boundaries, without having an individual territorially-bound state. People in the diaspora often organize themselves within a larger state as a separate society or quasi-society. The boundaries that have thus been created can be constituted and maintained, for instance by resisting assimilation (resulting in in-group marriages only), or by other forms of retaining one's own self-segregation, or, as a consequence, social exclusion. Dense social relationships and active solidarity are holding the distinctive community together (Brubaker, 2005:6). The Moluccans in the Netherlands have lived – quite literally – in social exclusion from Dutch society, because during the first years they stayed in camps, later on followed by living together within specific residential areas. The relationships are close and the community is tight – in that respect they form their own micro-society within the Netherlands (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:103). Like all migrant groups, Moluccans have their own (hi)story. The majority of Moluccans that were forced to migrate after Indonesia's independence, have been living in the Netherlands since 1950. Because their shared history is one of decolonization leading up to diaspora, the group has a slightly but distinctly different background than most other migrant groups in the Netherlands. First of all, unlike other groups, Moluccans did not come to the Netherlands voluntarily; they were brought in by the Dutch government, their former colonizer. KNIL soldiers (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger: Royal Dutch East Indies Army), including their families, were ordered to leave for the Netherlands, as it was not possible for Dutch authorities to have the KNIL soldiers demobilize in a place of their own choosing. Another reason that sets them apart from other immigrant groups, is the initial expectation – on their side, as well as on the side of the Dutch authorities – that they would only stay in the Netherlands for a relatively short period of time, a couple of months at best. As a result, the Dutch government never formulated a proper integration policy for the Moluccans (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:144). After a short stay in the Netherlands, they would return to the Moluccas, to their own independent state – an entity that, seventy years later, still does not exist.

These combined specific characteristics – an involuntary leave of the beloved homeland, the expectation and explicit wish to return and therefore sticking to the national heritage in the (new) host country – are indications that the Moluccans can rightly be seen as a diaspora group. Being part of a diaspora group, strongly influences the shaping and maintaining of identity.

1.2 Second generation and identity

Being a migrant obviously influences one's identity and so does being a descendant of migrants. Being born as a descendant of a migrant, an individual arguably has emotional attachments to the parents' country of birth as well as to one's own. Both cultures have an influence on one's identity; they are both part of someone's life. Those two different cultures are not static, however, since they interrelate. Consequently, in everyday experience the boundaries become blurred (Larrucea, 2015:79). Migration therefore has an impact, not only on migrants themselves, but on the second generation and younger generations as well – there are obvious differences in how far this influence reaches.

Next, the important characteristics of the second generation are addressed, followed by a closer look at identity and identity-formation so as to understand the differences and/or similarities between the second generation and other generations of Moluccans living in the Netherlands.

Second generation

To start, it is important to define how the notion of second-generation Moluccans is viewed in light of this thesis. In this case the second generation includes not only those children of migrant parents born in the Netherlands, but also those Moluccans who came to the Netherlands as babies or small infants, with no memories of their parents' (and to a certain extent their own) homeland, the '1.5 generation'. Since those Moluccans have not been born in their parents' homeland or have no recollection of it, they will most likely have (slightly or even totally) different images and perceptions and will therefore have different social and emotional connections with their ancestors' land (Balci & Michielsen 2013:18). Nevertheless, they grew up with narratives of their parents' homeland as being their homeland as well.

At the same time the second generation had to invest, socially, economically and otherwise, in their new homeland, the host country of their parents. The lives of the second-generation diaspora members are therefore based on the experiences in the country where they were born and raised, but also on the norms, values, expectations, and practices of their parents' homeland. This, of course, has a direct impact on their daily lives, sometimes partly resulting in the same nostalgic feelings towards 'a lost paradise' (Balci & Michielsen 2013:20).

Identity

As the second generation has to deal with both their parents' homeland and their host country, this obviously affects their own identity-formation. Identity is by no means an easy or transparent notion (Hall, 2014:35), especially not when dealing with a complex situation such as a diaspora society.

There are many definitions of what identity exactly is – identity is a multifunctional as well as multidimensional concept. It can be understood differently on different levels and in different contexts; within the various academic disciplines, identity can also have different meanings. As Larrucea (2015) summarised, there are two broad understandings of social identity. The first understanding of social identity is that identity is socially determined and in constant flux. This understanding reflects a negotiable, unstable, and multi-natured state of a person. Another understanding of the concept of identity relates to strong notions of a group. In this perspective the homogeneity and boundedness of a group are important because they underline the sameness among group members, resulting in a clear boundary between the inside and the outside. In the setting of this research, these two broad notions of identity are most important: the cultural (group) identity and the social (individual) identity.

Cultural identity

There are multiple ways of thinking about the notion of 'cultural identity' as shared by groups. Hall (2014) has pointed out the two most common ways. The first approach defines 'cultural identity' in the sense of 'one shared culture'. This cultural identity is the 'one true self', based on one shared ancestry and history, sometimes covered with more artificially or superficially imposed selves. Based on this notion of 'cultural identity', it reflects on the common history and characterizes the people as one group – a group with a continuous and unchanging framework of meanings and references. This 'oneness' of a cultural group is the foundation of one's cultural identity; this 'true identity' is in place, regardless of any possible differences at the surface. It is ultimately this 'true identity' an individual has to discover, express and represent to the outside world (Hall, 2014:223).

The second approach of 'cultural identity' is related to the first approach, but states that the 'true identity' does not exist. This approach points towards similarities but also to critical points of differences. Rather than looking at identity as a fixed phenomenon, it is seen as a process. In addition to the same experience of a group, attention is also paid to the discontinuities and ruptures within history which makes a particular case – here, the Moluccans – unique. In this second perspective both the notions of 'being' and 'becoming' are important. Cultural identity is seen as an unceasing process of change; it belongs to the past as much as it belongs to the future. 'Cultural identity' is shaped through the interaction between history, power and culture. Cultural identities are not fixed, but rather shaped by the narratives of the past, how we interpret those narratives and where we position ourselves (Hall, 2014:225).

This second notion of 'cultural identity' is particularly important for understanding the position of colonized people and the traumatic experiences of colonial times. During colonial times, native people have experienced the subjection to cultural power and normalization by the West. Not only were they

regarded, by the West, as 'the other', the colonized people also saw themselves as 'the other', in comparison to the coloniser – in this case, the Moluccans versus the 'superior Blandas' (the Dutch dominators). This traumatic experience illustrates that 'cultural identity' is not fixed, not once-and-for-all. It is subjected to the vagaries of time. There is no 'true identity' to which somebody can return. But it is more than just an imagination of the mind; one's cultural identity is rooted in the past, with real, symbolic and material outcomes, but constructed through memories and narratives, also subjected to politics and power relations (Hall, 2014:225-226).

This second notion of 'cultural identity' is important, as we analyse 'cultural identity' through time, various experiences and different generations. What does change in this cultural identity, what remains the same? It is important because it pays attention to group processes and intergroup relations (Hogg, Terry & White, 1995).

Social identity

In addition to a 'cultural identity', which is essentially a shared (group) identity, a person also has her/his own individual identity, as s/he also grows up with her/his own unique experiences, with a unique past – no one has had the exact same experiences, which makes that every person has a unique identity.

People living in the diaspora have an even more complex identity than those who have never migrated, since they often have a double relationship with or dual loyalty to places. They have their connections in the place they live, but are also (strongly) involved with their homeland (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996:16-17). This double relationship arguably has consequences for one's identity-formation. On the one hand, the past shapes the future through stories, through the remembrance of times gone by, of the former 'homeland' of their ancestors. This leads to a tight community, to a traditional identity with one's own religious and cultural expressions, like clothes, and behaviour (Evers 2002:54). This forming of identity through narratives, remembrance and story-telling is transferred, time after time, from parents to children, from older to younger generations (Bueltmann, 2012:90) – albeit differently for every family, for every person. Each individual takes in the important elements of this 'distant homeland' and of the norms and values taught to and appropriated by them. The process of unfolding one's identity is, in addition to other factors, dependent of the support one receives from the society of which one is a member (Evers, 2002:54). When society does not accept one's cultural norms and values, as for example shown through discrimination or (youth) unemployment, the unfolding of one's identity becomes a more difficult process and might eventually result in loss of identity. This threat of identity loss often leads, especially among the second generation, to confusion. To counter this uncertainty, people are looking for doctrines and certainties, which might give them an artificial identity. This artificial identity often leads to stereotyping by the dominant society (Evers, 2002:55).

Belonging, language and transnationalism

Understandings of cultural identity and social identity both give insight in what the notion of identity embodies, but they do not give a complete picture of what identity within a multicultural context is. In such a context both the notion of boundedness to groups and the idea of blurred boundaries between groups are important to one's identity (Larrucea, 2015:80). It is therefore necessary to also use more adequate concepts and include contemporary group dynamics to avoid unstable conceptions of identity.

A concept that includes this contemporary group dynamic is the notion of 'belonging'. Belonging refers to self-identity as well as to group identity. The boundedness of a group and the group loyalties can offer a sense of belonging when one takes elements or dimensions of a group identity and make them part of one's own identity (Healy & Richardson, 2016:442-444). The notion of belonging is connected to the notion of collective identities. The daily lives of second-generation migrants show the blurred boundaries of belonging to more than one group, as they live together with others in the host country and have ties to their ancestral homeland as well as to their own country of birth; this applies to younger generations as well, but arguably to a lesser extent. Everyday routines reflect how people express their identity. Language is also part of one's identity; second generation migrants often have access to at least two language options, the language of their parents and the language of their country of birth.

A third element associated with identity, and important for the identity of migrants and their direct descendants, centers around transnational practices. Transnationalism refers to economic, social, and political cross-border activities. Those activities are all tightly connected to identity and affect the migrants and their descendants regarding the negotiation, maintenance, and construction of collective identities (Larrucea, 2015:80).

In general, one can argue that the connection the second generation feels with the homeland of their parents is a complex one, a combination and interaction of nostalgic feelings of paradise lost on the one hand and a feeling of not fitting in on the other, based on the sometimes or even often confusing narratives about their roots, the development of a transnational identity, and a counter-culture of second generation diaspora within the host country (Balci & Michielsen 2013:20). The second generation diaspora is the generation that is most confused because of growing up in and between two different cultures – this generation is most of all generations looking for a sense of belonging. This sense of belonging is a desire for some kind of attachment, be it to other people, places or modes of being. It is not only social but has a spatial dimension as well. People seek a sense of belonging, a (physical) place where they feel comfortable or at home (Graf, 2017).

1.3 Radicalization

When the second generation is not supported by society in developing its own identity (Evers, 2002:55), the development of their identity can result in an artificial identity. The second generation is a generation that grows up between two cultures, with parents that generally imagine their homeland as being located elsewhere. This perception is also taught to the younger generations, partly through narratives. In this respect narratives function as transmitters of memories (Bueltmann, 2012:81), so as to make the younger generations aware of their ancestral homeland. At the same time, the covering-up of parts of history will often create a taboo atmosphere and might even lead to ignorance or radicalization among the next generations (Ngai & Huilin, 2010:513). Where the first generation in the diaspora has arguably suffered the most, in light of the forced migration, the second generation most likely will be the generation that gives voice to the grievances (Ngai & Huilin, 2010:499). When consolation is not found and grievances still simmer under the surface, acceptance will be difficult (Evers, 2002:65).

The first generation of male Moluccans were not just people living in diaspora, they were also war veterans, carrying a lot of grievances and transferring those feelings to the second generation. These feelings can be expressed in many different ways, including aggression. Sometimes this aggression focuses on one's own identity, while others want to take revenge on the society that is held responsible for the grievances of their parents. In some cases the grievances will lead to character deformation, in other to aggression towards one's own parents (Evers, 2002:66). The memories transmitted from the first to the second generation, and the painful cover-ups will lead to attachment and identity problems (Evers, 2002:66).

To be able to answer the main question of this thesis, it is important to understand how the (possible) differences between the second generation Moluccans and the third generation Moluccans in the Netherlands regarding the wish for an own state could arise. First of all, it was important to determine that the Moluccan population in the Netherlands is a diaspora community as this is important for the process of identity forming. The differences between the second and third generation Moluccans in their wish for an own state can partly be explained by looking at their connection with the ancestral homeland and their country of upbringing. This connection with the countries and their cultures is part of the identity forming process. In this thesis, the identity of the second and third generation Moluccans in the Netherlands is analysed; with what kind of narratives did they grow up? What is their boundedness with the Moluccan culture, with the Dutch culture, with the Moluccan islands, with the Netherlands, what language do they speak, who are their friends? Where do they feel at home? Looking at those different parts of their identity, differences between the second and third generation

Moluccans might be discovered. In addition to identity, the literature shows that the second generation diaspora has a different position in comparison to the next generations as this generation is a generation 'in between'. They grow up with the stories and emotions of their parents about their parental homeland, but also with the culture of their own homeland. As Evers (2002:66) shows, this generation is more vulnerable for radicalization. During the 1970s, a part of the second generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands has committed violent actions. The question is whether this was part of their identity-formation as a second-generation diaspora group, or just a political act? What does this mean for the next generations of diaspora members; are violent actions likely to happen again, this time committed by third (or next) generation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands or is it typical for the second generation?

Together those differences in identity can (partly) explain the differences in the wish for an own state.

Chapter 2. A history of the Moluccans in the Netherlands

The history of the Moluccan population in the Netherlands provides much-needed insight into their desire for an independent state. The starting point of the Moluccan history in light of this thesis is their pre-diaspora period, leading up to their displacement. Next, the initial period of their stay in the Netherlands is addressed, which eventually culminated in the violent actions of the late 1960s and 1970s. Thereafter, the development of the RMS is addressed as this process took place simultaneously with the Moluccan displacement and their stay in the Netherlands.

2.1 Decolonization, RMS proclamation, and KNIL soldiers

Before the Moluccans came to the Netherlands, three important developments took place within the former Dutch East Indies: the decolonization of Indonesia, the proclamation of the RMS, and the forced shipment of KNIL soldiers half way across the world to the Netherlands.

Decolonization process

The relationship between the Netherlands and the Moluccas started in the 17th century, when the Dutch overseas expansion began, with the trade in 'exotic' products and the occupation of foreign territory in order to increase its profits. In the process, numerous islands in Southeast Asia were colonized. These islands, nowadays known as Indonesia, were referred to as the Dutch East Indies. The years of Dutch colonization were difficult for the local population – the trade in spices with other powers was made impossible and the indigenous people of the various islands lived in poverty. Beginning in the early 20th century, nationalism gained increasing popularity. As the Dutch state feared a revolution of nationalists, they arrested the leaders of emerging nationalist organizations (Straver, 2011:173).

During World War II, the Netherlands was no longer the dominant power and Japan occupied the Dutch colony. This showed the population of the Dutch East-Indies that the Dutch colonizer was not invincible and they came to believe that they could rule the islands themselves. During the war, then-queen Wilhelmina promised that once the war would be over the Dutch government would negotiate with each colony about its independence. Those negotiations were important for the Dutch government as it wanted to keep a strong bond, administrative as well as military, because ever since the 17th century the Dutch East-Indies had always been a prime source of income for the Netherlands (Straver, 2011:68). However, two days after the surrender of Japan, on August 7, 1945, Indonesian

nationalists under the leadership of Sukarno and Hatta, already declared the independent Republic of Indonesia (Straver, 2011:164). This declaration of independence was unacceptable for the Dutch government. But since the Netherlands itself was recovering from the German occupation, it was not able to once again take over power from the Japanese occupiers. Great Britain stepped in and took over the rule over the islands. The British government prioritized the enforcement of the status quo and in particular the safety of former prisoners of war and other ex-internees. The actual rule of the islands was left to the Indonesian nationalists, who were able to gain a much stronger position. The Indonesian nationalist movement rapidly grew and within a short period of time an anti-Dutch mood spread throughout the country (Steijlen, 1996:34). Dutch authorities realized they had to take these nationalist feelings into account. Formal negotiations between the Dutch government and the Indonesian nationalists began – which would eventually last for four years. For both sides of the negotiating table it was clear that the final outcome could only be an independent Indonesian state. However, the precise terms for this decolonization were unclear. During the negotiations violent confrontations between the Dutch forces, mainly consisting of KNIL soldiers, and the Indonesian nationalists regularly erupted (Steijlen, 1996:34).

The armed conflict between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia would last for four years and officially came to an end with the transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949, in Amsterdam (Kamsteeg, 2010:10). Just two weeks earlier, on December 14, 1949, an agreement was reached at the 'round-table conference'. Two days later, on December 16, Sukarno became the first president of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) (Penonton, 1977:16). This idea of a federalist state was rather short-lived, however, since within a couple of months after the Dutch-Indonesian conference was concluded, on August 15, 1950, the RIS government, using its armed forces, merged the various federal states into one unitary state (Penonton, 1977:30). This process of turning the idea and practice of a federal system into a centralistic state, met little resistance – except for the islands located in Eastern Indonesia, where conflicts broke out, especially among the Christian population of the Ambonese (Moluccan) islands (Van Amersfoort, 2007).

Proclamation of the RMS

After World War II, the Moluccan population of Indonesia was divided as far their allegiance to the former and new rulers was concerned. During the armed conflict over independence, some Moluccans openly sided with the Indonesian nationalist movement. Some were in favor of a federalist state, while others wanted to be a Moluccan part of a Commonwealth of the Netherlands. There was also a large separatist movement, trying to create an own, independent Moluccan state (Steijlen, 1996:38-39).

There are two main explanations for why such a separatist movement in the Moluccans came about. First, because of the prominent position the Moluccan population had had during colonial times; this

position of prominence would surely disappear in a newly formed Indonesia. Moluccans would undoubtedly have been looked upon with suspicion. On top of that, secondly, the Moluccans feared reprisals, especially directed at those who had served in the KNIL during the pre-independence years – when in response to Indonesia's declaration of independence armed action was taken by the Dutch, in particular the KNIL (Steijlen, 1996:41). Although the decolonization process had resulted in a federal state system, many feared – and rightly so – that such a system would not last long as Sukarno planned for a unitary state.

In anticipation of and in response to the threatening centralization, an independent Republic of the South Moluccans, the Republik Maluku Selatan was proclaimed on April 25, 1950 (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:40-41). Its first president was Chris Soumokil. According to the Moluccans, the independence of the South-Moluccan islands was legal and legitimate since the agreement of the round-table conference had been violated by the Indonesian government (RepublikMalukuSelatan, 2018). Although the RMS-minded Moluccans claimed the RMS was legitimate, the Dutch government did not recognize RMS independence, however; neither did the rest of the world (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:48).

KNIL soldiers

During the Dutch colonial period, the Moluccan population (in particular the Christian Moluccans from the island of Ambon and its neighboring islands) had always held a prominent position. The Christian Moluccans often had better-paying, higher-status jobs, such as director, preacher, doctor, teacher, or a job in the military. Given this relative prominent position of the Moluccan population, they sometimes were referred to as the 'black Dutch' (Steijlen, 1996:35). When Japan surrendered, the vast majority of the Moluccan KNIL soldiers sided with the Dutch. As a consequence, the relationship with the rising nationalist movement worsened. Nationalist groups started to attack groups of Moluccans; in turn, Moluccan KNIL soldiers also fought the nationalists (Steijlen, 1996:35-36).

During the armed conflict between the Dutch government and the Republic of Indonesia, the Moluccan population played an important role. The Moluccans had always been the pivot of the KNIL, the vanguard of the Dutch army (Steijlen, 1996:33-57). At the time of the proclamation of the independent Republic of the South Moluccans, the KNIL soldiers – around 90% of which were Ambonese – were still in the service of the Dutch government. (Steijlen, 1996: 49) After the transfer of sovereignty, however, the role of the KNIL had come to an end. From that moment on, KNIL soldiers waited for either being integrated into the new Indonesian army, or, more likely, to be demobilized (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006: 54-72). According to the 1935 KNIL regulations, military personnel had the right to be demobilized and subsequently move to any place they wished within Dutch East Indies (now: Indonesian) territory (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006: 55). The KNIL consisted of around 65,000 soldiers; about one-third made the transfer to the Indonesian army (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:55) while a larger part had been demobilized

in the place of choice. After the proclamation of an independent RMS a part of the remaining KNIL soldiers wanted to be demobilized in RMS territory. In the eyes of the Indonesian authorities, this was an unwelcome political act (Steijlen, 1996:49). The Dutch authorities refused to demobilize the KNIL soldiers on their island of Ambon, mainly because it did not want to jeopardize the fragile relationship with the new Indonesian state. As the relations between the KNIL soldiers and Indonesian authorities threatened to escalate (Steijlen, 1996:53), the Dutch government saw no other solution than to bring the remaining 3,578 KNIL soldiers to the Netherlands (Steijlen, 1996:53). As a consequence, these KNIL soldiers were temporally given the status of members of the Royal Dutch Army (Kamsteeg, 2010:19). The soldiers were ordered, together with their family, to pack their belongings and make the passage to the Netherlands.

In the course of 1951, around 12,500 Moluccans came to the Netherlands, the remaining KNIL soldiers with their families. After arrival in the Netherlands, the Dutch armed forces immediately dismissed the former KNIL soldiers from active duty (Kamsteeg, 2010:20). After the dismissal from the Dutch armed forces, the Moluccans were sent to, among others, former concentration camps, which were considered as their temporary housing accommodations until they would return to Indonesia (Steijlen, 1996:55, 68). Partly due to this experience, the relationship between the Moluccans and the Dutch government deteriorated.

2.2 The Moluccan Diaspora

The first years of the Moluccans in the Netherlands can be characterized by several key terms: integration, homogeneity and outbursts of nationalism.

Initiatives for integration

After their arrival in the Netherlands, the Moluccans were housed in more than fifty residential areas, across the country, mostly close to small cities or in the countryside. Most of the soldiers, roughly two-thirds, had had practically no formal education and did not speak Dutch (Smeeet & Steijlen, 2006:92). Quite often the more educated Moluccans, those who were able to speak Dutch, became the leaders of those camps (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:93). Most Moluccans were frustrated because they were suddenly deprived of their military status, which had always given them an identity and status within the Dutch East Indies; now they were left with nothing as most of them had no formal education and they were forced to live (temporarily) in an unfamiliar foreign country. The Dutch authorities were frustrated as well, because they never intended to bring the Moluccans to the Netherlands in the first place and wanted to send them back as soon as possible. Given the reluctance on both sides, not much attention, if at all, was paid to their integration in Dutch society (Van Amersfoort, 2007).

Although there was no perceived need for integration, the Moluccans needed a place and means to live. For providing the Moluccans with their basic needs, a special agency was created, the CAZ (Commissariaat Ambonezen Zorg; Commissioner for Ambonese Care). This agency of the Ministry of Welfare became in fact a highly autonomous body, responsible for everything regarding the people living in the Moluccan residential areas (Van Amersfoort, 2007). CAZ was initially meant for only a restricted period of time, but as time went by it became clear to the Dutch authorities that there was no predetermined end to this 'limited time' (Steijlen, 1996:69-71).

Nevertheless, during the 1950s the Dutch government stuck to the view that the Moluccans would eventually return to Indonesia (Van Amersfoort, 2007). This may have been sufficient for temporary solutions to residence issues, but eventually it became clear that the Moluccans were here to stay (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:145). The realization that the Moluccans were most likely not just temporary guests in the Netherlands but would stay indefinitely, gradually also dawned on parliament. Politicians called for an increased attention for Moluccan permanent residency in the Netherlands (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:145-146). The kickoff of the new policy was that Moluccans were to be responsible for their own well-being and had to work if they were able to. Although a number of Moluccans had already found a job, in general this new policy was disliked; Moluccans wanted to keep on to the status of a 'special relationship with the Netherlands' (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:147). For most Moluccans the policy measure came as a realization that a return to a free Moluccan state would most likely be impossible in the foreseeable future (Bootsma, 2000:24).

In 1960, almost a decade after their first arrival in the Netherlands, special neighborhoods for Moluccans were built. More and more Moluccans moved from their 'temporary camps' to those more settled neighborhoods. The (forced) moving was met by a lot of resistance, however, because moving implied recognition of the fact that they had to stay in the Netherlands, and that an independent state was no longer within reach. During the early 1970s, the last camps were finally evicted by force (Bootsma, 2000:25).

Homogeneity and outbursts of nationalism

As the former soldiers arrived in the Netherlands, they were seen as an extremely homogenous group since they had always lived and served together within the KNIL barracks. Another important element of being a homogenous group of people was the shared (traumatic) experience of their direct dismissal from the military service right after arriving in the Netherlands (Van Amersfoort, 2007). However, this homogenous group of Moluccans that in 1951 had arrived in the Netherlands did not stay completely homogenous for long, as some of them disconnected from the ideal of the RMS (Steijlen, 1996:75).

However, most of the Moluccans still rallied behind the RMS ideal; this political ideal gained renewed momentum in 1953 when Johannes Manusama, the man who was to become president-in-exile in

1966, arrived in the Netherlands. Demonstrations were organized and the so-called 'free South Moluccans' (those who lived outside the occupied territories in Indonesia, mainly in the Netherlands) were pressured to donate financial contributions to the struggle of the RMS, with prospects of RMS citizenship (Steijlen, 1996:75). The continued, unwavering belief in the RMS was one of the most important reasons for most Moluccans for not wanting to return to Indonesia, to the 'occupied territories' of Ambon and other South-Moluccan islands. In addition to holding demonstrations, the public hoisting of the RMS flag was another recurring bone of contention, sometimes theme of conflict between the Moluccans and the Dutch authorities; the Dutch government did not recognize the RMS. As a compromise, the hoisting of the RMS flag was allowed within the camps, out of sight of the 'Dutch' world (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:93).

2.3 Moluccan violent actions, 1970-1980

The second generation of Moluccans often saw their parents suffer in the Netherlands. When in 1966 the RMS president Soumokil was executed in Indonesia, some vengeful Moluccan youngsters in the Netherlands set fire to the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague. This incident, for the first time, showed the recent radicalization among parts of the Moluccan youth (Bootsma, 2000:31).

Wassenaar (1970)

Four years later, in September 1970, Indonesian president Suharto visited the Netherlands. Although the Dutch authorities feared the reactions of the Moluccan population, the visit was deemed too important to cancel. The night before Suharto arrived, 33 Moluccans occupied the residence of the Indonesian ambassador in Wassenaar; a policeman was fatally shot in the process. The Indonesian ambassador was able to get away, but other Indonesians were held hostage. According to the Moluccans, the justification for this hostage-taking was to get attention for their ideal: a free RMS (Bootsma, 2000:42). One of their direct demands was organizing a meeting between the current RMS president-in-exile, Manusama, and the Indonesian president, Suharto. This meeting did not take place, also because Suharto decided to delay his visit to the Netherlands given the violent event. Instead of Suharto, Dutch prime minister De Jong declared he would be willing to talk to Manusama (Bootsma, 2000:46-48). During the following months it became clear, however, that De Jong was unwilling to really discuss the political issue of a separate Moluccan state; to him the Moluccan issue was primarily a Dutch social-cultural issue. This unwillingness to discuss independence, led to an even larger division between Dutch authorities and Moluccan youngsters (Bootsma, 2000:52-53).

Wijster (1975)

During the next five years, all political actions and initiatives by the Moluccans turned out to be fruitless. Frustration among young Moluccans grew. According to Abé Sahetapy (one of the train hijackers at Wijster): 'as you delve deeper into the issue, suddenly you realize: Maybe violent action is necessary' (Bootsma, 2000:79).

The idea of a train hijacking was inspired by a (failed) attempt of Syrians in Amersfoort. Since this kind of action was seen as more resourceful than a – in those days quite common – hijacking of an airplane, it would arguably gain more media attention, and thus, more attention for the justified cause of the RMS (Bootsma, 2000:80-81).

The first train hijacking took place on December 2, 1975. The driver of the train was fatally shot, albeit by accident, which made the hijackers realize there was no way back (Barker, 1980:35). One of the first demands of the hijackers was a free passage towards the airport and a plane for an unknown destination – signed 'free South-Moluccan youth, Mena Moria' (Barker, 1980:39). They planned to release their 'real' demands, which were about attention for the RMS, in the airplane as they realized they were in a fragile position as long as they stayed in the train. In addition to this demand of a free passage, the Moluccan hijackers issued a clear ultimatum; as long as the Dutch government did not respond favorably, every thirty minutes they would kill one of the hostages. After various ultimatums had passed, two passengers were killed. Long hours and days of negotiations followed, during which neither the hijackers nor the Dutch authorities showed any sign of giving in. Mediators that were called to the scene, Manusama and Soumokil's widow, told the hijackers that their actions had negative consequences for the people living on the Moluccan islands; the hijackings were counter-productive and the initial goal of bringing about a better negotiation position for the Moluccans could not be reached. The hijackers decided to end their hostage-taking; after twelve days they finally surrendered (Thenu, 1998:99).

Amsterdam (1975)

At the same time the train hijacking took place, the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam had been occupied. This was a spontaneous action, organized by Moluccans who came to realize that the train hijacking was only affecting average Dutch people, not the Indonesian people nor the Indonesian state. The main goal of this additional action was to show support for the demands of the train hijackers in Wijster (Bootsma, 2000:135). The occupation of the Indonesian consulate lasted until December 19.

In response to these violent actions that had taken place in 1975, a governmental commission, headed by Köbben (Dutch) and Mantouw (Moluccan), was founded, with the mandate of bringing the ideals

of the Moluccans in line with the Dutch legal order. The commission had four main tasks: to act as a buffer between the Dutch and Moluccan population; to investigate the situation on the Moluccan islands; to address the specific issue of Moluccan passports in the Netherlands, as the Moluccans did not want an Indonesian passport nor a Dutch passport; and to set up historical research into the Moluccan issue as the Moluccans believed that the Dutch government (had) betrayed them. Installing such a commission was regarded, especially by the Moluccan youth, as an unimpressive outcome of the actions. In the end, the commission turned out to be ineffective as both the Dutch government and the Moluccans perceived the commission as unreliable (Bootsma, 2000:175-191).

De Punt and Bovensmilde (1977)

On May 23, 1977, a second train hijacking took place. The main reason why Moluccan youngsters decided to hijack a train once more, was that "they would never expect that we will do exactly the same thing" (Bootsma, 2000:196). Not only the modus operandi, also the demands of the hijackers were identical; be it that this time the release of the first group of hijackers was added to the list of demands. Once again, the Dutch government did not give in, but this time the hijackers did not act on their threats and the ultimatums passed without any killings (Bootsma, 2000:218). The government was divided on what approach to take for freeing the hostages. Prime Minister Den Uyl was willing to negotiate, while others (for instance the minister of Justice, Van Agt) favored a hard, uncompromising approach. As long rounds of negotiations did not result in a breakthrough and the hijacking went on, the decision was made to storm the train. On June 11, early in the morning, sharpshooters targeted the train, fighter jets flew low to create a shock effect and special forces stormed the train. In the process, two hostages and six hijackers were killed (Barker, 2006:332).

On May 23, four Moluccan youngsters had also occupied a primary school in Bovensmilde. 105 young schoolchildren and teachers were taken hostage. This occupation in particular created a shock-effect in Dutch society (Barker, 2006:321). Armored vehicles attacked the school and the occupiers surrendered on the same day the train hijacking ended (Barker, 2006:352).

After these various violent actions, Moluccan society did not want any further violence, as the actions had led to an increase of discrimination against the Moluccan population; they did not seem to be helpful for the Moluccan cause at all.

Assen (1978)

Nevertheless, on March 13, 1978, three young Moluccans occupied the offices of the provincial government of Drenthe. Once again the demand was the release of all jailed Moluccans who served

prison terms for previous actions. One provincial official was executed right away. The next day the three occupiers were arrested; negotiations had not taken place at all (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:265).

2.4 Since the 1970s: the time after

After the violent period during the 1970s, the Dutch government as well as the Moluccan people focused more on integration. During the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Dutch government no longer regarded the Moluccan case as a special political issue; the policies for Moluccans were integrated in the policies for all immigrant groups (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:297). At the end of the 1980s attention focused on the socio-economic disadvantages of the Moluccan population. The situation regarding education was improved, but real improvement only came with the so-called 'thousand job plan', which resulted in a considerable decrease of the unemployment rate among Moluccan people. The late 1908s, early 1990s turned out to be especially fruitful for the integration process (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:314-317).

Moluccans in the Netherlands also focused more on a permanent stay. Their ideal of the RMS was still present, albeit not as visible as before (Barker, 2006:360-361). During this period the Moluccan population in the Netherlands began looking for a new identity, new cultural expressions came to the fore, particular in the arts. The shift from a mainly RMS-focused identity towards a broader identity went hand in hand with ongoing integration (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:317). In addition to an increased focus on staying in the Netherlands, Moluccans still cared for the family that was living on the Moluccan islands. Travelling to the (ancestral) homeland, really got off the ground after 1978. Partly based on these trips, and seeing their relatives living in poverty, the Moluccan people began to realize more and more that the main problems and needs of people are the worries of everyday life, rather than the fight for an independent state. This realization resulted in many efforts and projects to help relatives still living on the Moluccan islands (Bootsma, 2000:385).

Out of the 12,500 Moluccans who initially set foot in the Netherlands in the 1950s, the vast majority stayed in the Netherlands. It took twenty years before the idea faded that they would only stay here temporarily. Thirty years after their arrival, the first real efforts towards integration were made. In just over half a century, the Moluccan population in the Netherlands has quadrupled, having by now reached the fifth generation since the displacement (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006:376).

2.5 Development of the RMS

Besides the displacement of the Moluccans and their arrival in the Netherlands, another important development occurred at the same time, the ideal of a free Moluccan state.

The RMS proclamation

On the December 27, 1949, the transfer of sovereignty officially ended the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The federal state of the RIS (Republik Indonesia Serikat) was created. However, the RIS did not last long, and president Sukarno declared a unitary state on August 15, 1950 (Kamsteeg, 2010:16). The Moluccans in general were in favor of a federal state; a Moluccan movement striving for a federal state was founded, mainly consisting of Moluccan Christians, many of whom had served as KNIL soldiers. The movement was supported by some local Islamic leaders and villages as well (Steijlen, 1996:40). An important factor in the emergence of the Moluccan movement was, as mentioned before, that during colonial times the Moluccan Christians had held rather privileged positions and a unitary state would most likely mean the end of this privileged position (Steijlen, 1996:37). Frictions between the proponents and opponents of a unitary state resulted in political unrest. During the unrest, the Moluccan leader Soumokil flew to Ambon, in order to decide on the future of the Moluccas, together with various politicians and representatives of Moluccan society. During a meeting on April 25, 1950, it was decided to proclaim independence. The RMS was born and Soumokil became acting president of the RMS (Kamsteeg, 2010:16-17). As Moluccans proclaimed the independence of their state, they expected the backing of the Dutch government, as the Moluccans had always been their allies. In the words of Soumokil: "Beside the rightful grounds on which the proclamation is based, every right-minded Ambonese had the silent conviction that the Dutch government would not abandon its ally" (Republikmalukusalatan, 2018). The Dutch did not recognize the proclamation of the RMS, however; nor did the rest of the world. Not surprisingly the RIS did not contemplate for a second to recognize the RMS, since it viewed the RMS to be no more than a rebellion produced by years of Dutch colonialism (Steijlen, 1996:61). After several attempts at mediation, the proclamation of independence resulted in a month-long armed conflict with the Indonesian army. In December 1950 the Indonesian army was finally able to break the fight; however, resistance continued (Straver, 2011:182). Since then, the Indonesian army stayed in the Moluccan territory – until 1966. On April 12, 1966, by order of the Indonesian president Suharto, the acting RMS president Soumokil was executed. After this execution, all open resistance was broken (Van 't Foort, 2008:50). The armed conflict had lasted for 16 years, with tens of thousands of victims. After the execution of Soumokil, only small groups of RMS fighters remained active, mostly underground. Many of them were imprisoned by the Indonesian government (Republikmalukusalatan, 2018).

The RMS in the Netherlands since 1951

The proclamation of the RMS brought the Dutch government in a difficult position, as KNIL soldiers were directly involved in the RMS proclamation, while the Dutch state was still in the process of completing its decolonization, part of which was dealing with the demobilization of these same KNIL

soldiers (Steijlen, 1996:43). Demobilization of KNIL soldiers in 'RMS territory' was not acceptable, therefore a 'solution' was found in bringing them to the Netherlands (Penonton, 1977:43).

Even before the first Moluccans arrived in the Netherlands, the RMS was already present. Just two days after the RMS proclamation, Nikijuluw, a Moluccan living in the Netherlands, was appointed general representative abroad. He established the Bureau Zuid-Molukken (BZM) as the official political representation in the Netherlands. The arrival of the KNIL soldiers and their families gave the RMS supporters in the Netherlands a new boost (Steijlen, 1996:67); not only the number of Moluccans who believed in the RMS cause increased, the arrival of important actors also played a part in this. In the wake of this boost, the first power struggles within RMS ranks erupted; when minister Lokollo came to the Netherlands he soon clashed with Nikijuluw over who was more important, but also over the future of the Moluccan islands (Steijlen, 1996:75). Meanwhile, in the residential areas the CRAMS (Commissie voor de Rechtspositie van Amboneze Militairen en Schepelingen) was established. CRAMS supported and advocated the RMS ideal, but its stance was more radical and non-cooperative. In the intra-RMS cause CRAMS supported Lokollo and in February 1951 the latter was able to take over the leadership of the BZM. The power struggle between Lokollo and Nikijuluw also resulted in polarization among camp residents, and lead to riots (Steijlen, 1996:75). However, in 1952, the two groups reconciled and a new organization, the Badan Perwakilan Rajat Maluku Selatan (Representation of the South-Moluccan people), was established. The Badan Perwakilan developed into the largest Moluccan interest organization in the Netherlands (Steijlen, 1996:86-87).

The political polarization of the early 1950s is characteristic for the RMS in the Netherlands (Van 't Foort, 2008:54). During this period, several political splits followed each other, caused by interethnic conflicts or fights over policies that should be pursued, or just by differences of a personal nature. One of those important conflicts centered around the question of whether the RMS cause was more important or the rights of the ex-KNIL soldiers. Most of the Moluccans in the Netherlands follow the lines of the Badan Perwakilan, however (Steijlen, 1996:89-90). The arrival of Manusama in 1953, one of the original founders of the RMS, gave the political ideal a new momentum. He eventually brought a power shift about, from a more radical to a somewhat moderate course within the Badan Perwakilan (Steijlen, 1996:97).

The 1960s saw some new changes in the RMS struggle. First of all, in 1966 the RMS guerrilla fight on the Moluccan islands came to an end. This meant that the RMS fight only continued in the Netherlands. A second important change was that during the 1950s the RMS was a political movement of the first generation. The Badan Perwakilan and the RMS government determined the political landscape. But after 1966 the second generation of Moluccans, the youngsters with no direct recollection of the homeland, joined the fight (Steijlen, 1996:114-128). Another development came with the frustrations

about the treatment of the first-generation which resulted in demonstrations in The Hague (Bootsma, 2000:32).

The 1970s were characterized by various violent actions. Acting president Manusama tried to mediate between the hijackers and the Dutch government, but clearly distanced himself from the violent actions (Bootsma, 2010:152). After the violent end of the last train hijacking, the RMS ideal moved somewhat to the background of the daily lives of Moluccans, in the sense that people came to realize that the ideal of an independent state would most likely not be reached anymore.

During the 1980s the Moluccan population began focusing on integration within the Netherlands. Moluccan politics became more liberal, dissenting opinions more and more accepted (Steijlen, 1996:182; Van 't Foort, 2008:54). Although the third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands has no longer automatically been raised with the RMS ideal, and this ideal as such has faded into the background, it is still alive. The relationship between the Moluccans on the Moluccas and those in the Netherlands got a new impulse, due to the travels to the Moluccan islands. Visiting the islands led to solidarity and specific aid projects, but also to an emotional commitment to help one's brothers and sisters abroad. This reorientation directed at the Moluccas, in combination with some RMS-related incidents on the Moluccas, created a new interest in the RMS ideal (Steijlen, 1996:201-206; Van 't Foort, 2008:56).

Seen from a diplomatic perspective, the RMS strife has been ineffective. Historically and politically the RMS has always been divided, with too many ideas and opinions on the RMS and how to gain an independent state. Where the RMS fight started relatively strong during the 1950s and early 1960s, reaching a climax in the 1970s, it moved more to the background in the 1980s; by the early 1990s the decline was almost complete.

However, it was not the complete end of the RMS ideal. The second generation came to realize that integration, proper education and financial prosperity were necessary to succeed in life. Once this was accomplished, it would be a good base for picking up the RMS fight again. Also, after the Cold War the international environment has changed – the notion of 'self-determination' is perceived to be an undeniable right of every nation and the interest in human rights remained strong. RMS followers found new grounds for their claim of an independent state. In addition, the political situation in Indonesia has changed as well, so more space has been created for the Moluccans in Indonesia to express themselves (Van 't Foort, 2008:56).

In 1999 the so-called Kerusuhan began, a period of riots on the Moluccan islands. After the ousting of the Indonesian president Suharto, the RMS reorganized itself. So did the Muslim society, which led to clashes. This Kerusuhan ended in 2002, but gave the RMS cause a strong impulse (Van 't Foort, 2008:56-58).

In 2010, a new RMS government-in-exile, led by John Wattilete, took office. The current RMS government has three main objectives: first, it is important to join the international developments regarding the right to self-determination; secondly, the use of military means is not taken into consideration, as the international community does not accept it, especially since international support is more important than ever; and thirdly, a communications network with the underground resistance movement on the Moluccan Islands is set up and policies are adjusted accordingly (republikmalukusalatan, 2018). Since 2010 the policies have not changed much, and in 2018 those three pillars are still the foundation of the RMS policy. In his speech on April 25, 2018, acting president of the RMS in exile, John Wattilete, once more emphasized the importance of the international community. At the same time he pointed at the need to involve the third and fourth generation in the RMS cause; this cause has to be put in a broader perspective as those generations do no longer recognize the original RMS goals. According to him, the RMS cause clearly needs to be adapted (Personal communication, 2018).

Chapter 3. The analysis

In this chapter the interviews are analyzed. The chapter focuses on the narrative of the Moluccans in the Netherlands. As we have seen, the 'cultural identity' of a group is not fixed but is rather shaped by the narratives of the past and the current narratives which are told and retold, narratives in which a group believes, and that have symbolic and material outcomes (Hall, 2014). Part of the answer regarding the differences between the second and the third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands concerning their wish for an own independent state, is based on the narratives told by the different generations of Moluccans. A narrative is a tool to make sense of the world and of the events taking place in one's life (Newman & Paasi, 1998:195). A main narrative gives an explanation about what causes the current position – in the case of the Moluccans: their stay in the Netherlands –, and it characterizes the nature of the others who are not part of their own group identity; in other words, it portrays the self-collective and it also describes the conditions which are needed to reach the goal of the main group (Bar-Tal, 2013:163). This main narrative of the Moluccans is an important tool for shaping their cultural identity (Hall, 2014). In addition to this shared identity, a person also has his/her own individual identity, which makes that a group consist of individuals with their own opinions and views. Together those narratives and views result in the opinions concerning the RMS.

3.1 Narratives of the Moluccan history

Everybody has his/her own narrative to tell; the story of one's life, the story of the (cultural) background, and ultimately the story of one's own people. This is also the case for the second and third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands. In this subsection the history of the Moluccan population is given, as seen through the eyes of the second and third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands.

Second generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands

> *"The Moluccan people are not migrants, but they are the descendants of Moluccan exiles"*
> (respondent #P).

The story of many second-generation Moluccans living in the Netherlands starts with their parents. During colonial times most fathers were serving in the KNIL, as they had done for many years. This choice for serving in the army was not so much a political choice, but they became soldiers because it was a profession which made it possible to provide money for their families. Often, soldiers did not know the exact political context, they were just following orders from the officers (#H, #M, #G). When the independent state of Indonesia was proclaimed, the Dutch government brought the KNIL soldiers

to the Netherlands, together with their families. A majority of them was in solidarity with the RMS ideal and preferred to be demobilized on Ambon. (#I, #L); KNIL soldiers did not have a choice (#H, #O). In a sense, the Dutch government also had no choice other than to bring the KNIL soldiers to the Netherlands, because it did not want to offend the newly founded Indonesian state, nor, for that matter, the United States of America (#I). "It was a terrible decision to bring the Moluccans to the Netherlands" (#K).

When the first-generation arrived in the Netherlands, they were immediately dismissed from their military duties and went from the ships straight to the camps (#I, #K, #G). "Our parents were treated badly, they were not allowed to do anything. They did not deserve that fate, because they had worked hard for the Dutch government and were just cast aside" (#I). Most second-generation Moluccans agree that the Dutch government has treated the first-generation Moluccans very poorly (#H, #I, #K, #G).

The violent actions taking place during the 1970s are important parts of the narrative of the second generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands. Since it was their generation that carried out those actions, it involved their brothers and sisters, their friends and their peers. They grew up in the same camps. Interviewee #K tells that she had only been a teacher for a short period of time when the 1977 train hijacking and school hostage took place. Parents of children in her class were afraid she was about to hold their children hostage as well and immediately came to her classroom to take the children home. Around that time the fear that more Moluccans would carry out similar actions was quite common. Respondent #L was confronted with these feelings of fear during a job interview, when she was directly asked whether or not she was in favor of these actions. The violent actions themselves are perceived in different ways by the second-generation Moluccans. Although a lot of them understood why their fellow Moluccans did what they did, most of them did not approve the violence used during the actions. On the other hand, some of them are actually not against the use of violence, since violence has proven to be effective, for instance when looking at the history of Palestine; Palestinians were labeled as terrorists, but nowadays they are acknowledged by the international community. A war simply takes victims (#K, #L). The understanding but disapproval of the violent actions is a result of the opinion that the violent actions were not seen as a part of the RMS cause but as a reaction to the traumas the first- and second generation have experienced. The first generation was traumatized, which reflects upon the second generation. The second generation had to deal with the pain of the first generation. The first generation lost their family and relatives, they were dismissed from the army and had to work in factories because they had had no education. These feelings of frustration were turned against the Netherlands (#J).

In their narratives, the second generation of Moluccans gave two main explanations for the violent actions. The first one, getting attention for their struggle: "When people say the victims were innocent,

I think: the Moluccans killed during the colonial time were also innocent. But nobody speaks about them, that they were innocent. And when they say, that was a long time ago, I will say, yes – but if that had not happened, the hijackings would not have happened either. There were no actions without the politics" (#L). The other, second explanation is that it was a direct consequence of the bad treatment of the first generation by the Dutch government (#H, #I, #K), a result of the false promises made by the Dutch government (#O).

The second generation is not very positive about the welcome Moluccans received in the Netherlands. An important issue for Moluccans is that most Dutch people do not know anything about Moluccan history – except for the train hijackings; without the political and historical context one cannot really explain why these hijackings took place (#K, #S). Moluccans are only a small minority group in the Netherlands and as a minority group they have to stand up to the majority, and tell their own history in a fair way (#S). For example, most of the Dutch people do not know that the Moluccans used to live in camp 'Schattenberg', better known to the Dutch as the infamous transit camp 'Westerbork' (#K). During history classes at school, they heard all about the glorious Dutch, but never about the Moluccans who fought for the Dutch King or Queen or about their suffering during the Dutch rule, the black pages of Dutch history (#S).

Another major issue relates to the Dutch government. The Dutch government never defended the Moluccans, despite the fact that the Moluccan population had always been faithful to the Dutch Queen, since the Dutch government was afraid to lose its Indonesian market (#K). Just like the rest of the world the Dutch are playing a dirty game, pulling the strings of the Moluccan leaders and covering up everything that has happened in the past (#O). Despite continuing efforts of the Moluccan people, the Dutch government will not acknowledge it has made mistakes (#L). Although the perceptions on the Dutch government vary among Moluccans, they do agree on one thing: the first generation has been treated badly (#J).

Indonesia is also a sentimental issue for a lot of Moluccans in the Netherlands. In the words of one second generation Moluccan, #O, "I still speak of the Dutch Indies, never about Indonesia, because they [Indonesia] violated the RTC [round-table conference] accords". Interviewee #L is also not positive about Indonesia. According to her, Indonesia has annexed the Moluccan state, and not in a peaceful way, and nowadays the Indonesian government does next to nothing for the Moluccan population.

Third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands
"The Moluccan people were the victims" (#W).

Just like the second generation, members of the third generation have also shared their personal backgrounds and narratives of the broader Moluccan history.

The main subject most often referred to and underlined by the third generation, is the time before Indonesian independence, the period when KNIL soldiers were fighting for the Dutch, the loyalty towards the Dutch (#V, #W, #X). "I think it is very important to tell that my granddad fought with pride for the Netherlands, despite what happened later, he really fought with pride" (#X). The fact that the Moluccans were always loyal soldiers and were treated poorly, also generates a lot of frustration; as #W points out, "the Moluccans got nothing in return, they were just dumped by the Dutch government". The second issue revolves around the period of independence of the Indonesian state: the promise that the Moluccans would get their own state, the declaration of the RMS, and in particular the arrival of KNIL soldiers in the Netherlands (#V, #W, #X, #U). KNIL soldiers and their families were just ordered to leave for the Netherlands (#X, #U) under false promises (#W). There are diverse opinions on this issue, however. According to respondent #Q, one can understand that the first generation was angry, but the Dutch did not have a choice, since the KNIL soldiers were fighting the enemy soldiers in the struggle for an independent Indonesia. A third important issue is the bad treatment of the first-generation of Moluccans after they arrived in the Netherlands. The dismissal from the army on the (very) day they arrived here, having to live in camps on just three guilders a week without a chance to work and the fact that there was no way to return to their beloved islands (#V, #W, #X, #S). Another main theme often mentioned relates to the actions during the 1970s (#V, #W, #U, #X, #T). Although #T states he did not approve of the violence that was used during those actions, he did understand why the hijackers did what they did. Peaceful protests had been attempted, but that did not work; thus it was almost unavoidable, as the second generation had to deal with the frustrations and hopelessness of their parents while they were also raised with the idea that they would return towards a free Moluccan state (#T, #V). While talking about those actions and the violence used, a common remark is that Dutch people often tell them that innocent people have died as a consequence of these actions. But, in the end is the balance that even more innocent people have died during Dutch colonial times; the number of victims in the 1970s pales in comparison to what the Dutch did to the Moluccans (#W, #V, #X).

As members of the third generation of Moluccans speak about their history, emotions sometimes run high, in particular as the knowledge of Dutch people comes up in the discussion. "There is no acknowledgement of what happened", according to #V. There is a lot of ignorance among the Dutch, history has been disguised and distorted. The real history of the Moluccans should be told in the Netherlands; what the Dutch people only hear is a perfect Dutch history (#V, #W, #X, #U, #T). They want acknowledgement for their grandparents, for the first generation, as they have suffered a lot, as they were traumatized by what has happened (#V, #W, #X). History cannot be ignored: the Moluccan ideal is why the first generation came to the Netherlands; without the RMS the Moluccans would not have been in the Netherlands (#W).

Not only history is part of the story; the contemporary situation of the Moluccan population is part of the main narrative as well. According to respondent #V, the current situation is that the Moluccan population in Indonesia is still being suppressed by the Indonesian government. The Indonesian government does not want the Moluccans to have their own state (#V, #W). Indonesia blackmails the Netherlands: if the Dutch were to help the Moluccans in getting their own state, Indonesia will boycott its trade relations with the Netherlands (#W).

Comparison between the second and third generation

The collective narrative of an 'identity group' is a tool for maintaining the belief in a collective goal of the group. This might be reached by emphasizing one's own narrative while negating the narrative of other identity groups (Ben David et al., 2017:270). An example of this emphasizing of the narrative of the Moluccans in the Netherlands is the annual remembrance and celebrating of April 25, marking the declaration of the 'Republik Maluku Salatan' (RMS). Every year it is emphasized that their own state, the RMS, exists; they solemnly hoist their flag; the president-in-exile delivers a speech; and it is being told how they can participate in the continuing struggle.

Based on the interviews, it turns out that the narratives as told by the second and third generation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands are not that different from each other. In the narrative of the second generation as well as that of the third, three main parties are involved. First, the Moluccan people, portrayed by themselves as 'victims', 'standing in their right'. The second actor is the Dutch government, which has been the aggressor during colonial times. Currently the Dutch government is portrayed as the one that is tied to and controlled by the Indonesian state when it comes to the fate of the Moluccan homeland. The Indonesian state is the third party, seen as the 'other' in the narratives of the second and third generation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands. Today, Indonesia is the true aggressor, not willing to give the Moluccan population what they want and what they are entitled to, basic human rights. An independent state should secure those basic rights. Both main narratives contain a serious amount of anger; anger about what has happened to the first generation and anger towards Dutch politics.

However, even if the main narratives broadly match, we also see different focal points in the second and third generations. The second generation relates a more detailed story about leaving the Moluccan islands and the life within the camps, as well the violent actions during the 1970s, as they have experienced those events themselves, whereas the third generation limits itself to a more overall picture of their history starting with the Dutch colonialization, Indonesian independence, the arrival in the Netherlands, living in the camps and finally the violent actions, reproducing the narratives they have heard from their parents, grandparents, and what they have read.

3.2 The identity of the Moluccans in the Netherlands

"My dad suffered from homesickness; […] every time a letter arrived from the Moluccans, we could not approach him for a day" (Bootsma, 2000:24).

To understand the differences between the various generations regarding their wish for an independent state, it is important to look at how the second and third generation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands perceive their own identity. How do they define their culture, how do they see themselves? This subsection addresses both the cultural as well as the individual identity and the differences between the second and third generation.

Second generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands

Almost all second-generation Moluccans are born and raised within a closed Moluccan community, within camps or other residential areas assigned by the Dutch government (#A, #F, #S, #U, #K, #H, #I, #M), of which camp Schattenberg (Westerbork) was the largest. In those camps there was little exposure to the Dutch society: everything took place within the camp, and there was hardly any need for outside contact (#I, #L). Life in the camp was collective and socially controlled. Rather than being an individual, one was part of an identity group (#G). Everything needed to make a living was present in the camp. Life was primitive but sociable (#K). This isolated life made that the second generation grew up feeling like "real" Moluccans (#M). After primary school, however, the second generation of Moluccans living in camp Schattenberg had to transfer from a Moluccan school to a Dutch secondary school. For some this transfer was easier than for others (#K).

During the 1960s the Moluccans had to move to Moluccan neighborhoods within cities or villages. This move had a large impact on the Moluccans, because although they still lived among Moluccan people, from that moment on they also became part of Dutch society (#H, #I, #L, #D). As they had been raised within a rather closed Moluccan community, with Moluccan norms and values, the move towards Moluccan neighborhoods outside the camps came as a culture shock since they were not familiar with Dutch norms and values (#I). Another change that came with the move was a decrease of social control; for instance, from that moment on everyone had a separate entrance to their own home, contrary to the shared entrances in the communal barracks. In other words, there was more privacy (#L).

Not only the environment influences the upbringing, parents arguably hold the most influence. The second generation had to deal with the difficult past of the first-generation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands (#E). Respondent #I tells how he noticed that for his parents the arrival in the Netherlands was very difficult. They had lived through a war, and were suddenly taken away from their homeland, from their relatives. Interviewee #K was raised with the idea to do her utmost best at school, because she might need her education to build up the country once the Moluccan islands were freed. According

to #A, for the first generation the RMS struggle was the most important. Whatever they did, they were always ready to return. Schooling was not a priority, nor was integration, just the RMS struggle was. The first generation did not talk much about their experiences, they were closed and introverted while they were grieving over their past (#O). Another clear influence of the first generation on the second one was that the upbringing was very strict as the fathers all had served in the army (#G).

Being Moluccan might mean various things, because more explanations and illustrations have been given about what being Moluccan entails. There are some shared typical Moluccan habits and traditions, however. One of the most important typical Moluccan value is the family bond; family ties are tight. An example of such a tradition relating to family bonds is the use of the term 'parental home'. A parental home is the home of the ancestors and Moluccans in the Netherlands have generally two parental homes – one in the Moluccan islands, one in the Netherlands. The notion of a parental home is important for Moluccans, since it is the place were important family matters are taking place, for example funerals and solving disagreements (#I, #H, #K, #B, #D, #O). Another important element of family-related cultural values is the surname, because it has specific meaning for the Moluccans, it has a background. According to #I, the surname is very important since after being deported to the Netherlands family is one of the few things they have left. The idea of hospitality is an often-mentioned value of Moluccan culture, just as the cooking culture and the dance culture are (#L, #N, #D). Another important part of the Moluccan identity is of course the language. As the first generation came to the Netherlands, most of them did not speak Dutch, just Malay. The second generation was raised with two languages: Malay, being the language of their parents, and Dutch which they obviously learned at school (#K, #L). Over the years, the adoption of their parents' native language became less; whereas the first generation spoke Malay fluently, the second generation did so only slightly. They were not raised in the parental homeland and therefore the common tongue used is not their own language (#K). Once parents themselves, most of the second generation decided to raise their children in the Dutch language only – not because their own knowledge of Malay was not good enough to raise them bilingually, but mainly because the future of their children was in the Netherlands (#H). As a consequence, the use of the Malay language has considerably decreased among the Moluccans in the Netherlands. According to #K, the only cultural identity that is left to them is their history, their dances and their music. Living outside their homeland has caused an identity crisis. Respondent #N is concerned about the cultural identity: the Moluccan culture is fading within the Dutch culture. The upbringing of most of the second generation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands included participating in the yearly event on April 25 in The Hague, to celebrate Independence Day (#K).

For many Moluccans visiting the Moluccan islands for the first time felt like coming home, even though they were born in the Netherlands and had never been there before. There is a feeling of recognition and belonging. There is in a sense a feeling that they never left the country (#H). In the Moluccas they

are however often seen as Dutch people, because their behavior and appearance are different from the local Moluccans (#M). Moluccans living in the Netherlands tend to be more traditional in a sense, because they cling on to the old traditions their parents brought from the Moluccas during the 1950s. In the meantime, the Moluccans living in the Moluccas have moved on, evolved and are more focused on Indonesia and on developing their culture. (#A, #O, #E, #B). The Moluccans living in the Netherlands have to deal with two cultures; growing up among the Dutch people, trying to fit in with the Dutch culture. As a consequence, their own culture has less opportunities to develop (#A).

No matter what, second generation Moluccans consider themselves "real" Moluccans; #M has adapted to the Dutch rules but is still a Moluccan, with Moluccan norms and values. Respondent #L always finds it easier to make contact with other ethnicities than with Dutch people. Her connection to Dutch people is different, more formal. That the second generation identifies with being real Moluccans and not so much with the Dutch identity, can also be a result of the fact that most Dutch people tend to see them as immigrants. They never realize they are from the Netherlands or that they are being discriminating (#G; #J, #L). Respondent #J tells that sometimes when he travels first class, people ask him if he is aware that he is in the first class. Another example is given by #L; during her youth she became aware that she had a different color of skin than her white girlfriend – her friend's mother told her to play with her daughter often, so that perhaps her skin would become lighter.

Third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands
"I am proud of being a Moluccan" (#X).

A part of the third generation of Moluccans were raised in Moluccan neighborhoods, while others grew up in Dutch neighborhoods (#U, #X, #T, #W). Unlike the previous generation, most third-generation Moluccans interacted with other ethnicities (#U, #X, #S). Nevertheless, despite the interaction with the Dutch and Moluccans having Dutch friends as well, the most important friendships are still with other Moluccans. Sometimes this is a deliberate choice, as it is easier and more comfortable to be friends with Moluccans (#X), but more often it just happens as there is more mutual recognition (#T, #W). In general, interaction with Dutch people is different than with Moluccan people. Outside the own group one plays a different role (#W). Within the third generation there are more examples of parents of mixed ethnicity (#X, #V). Because of these mixed marriages not every Moluccan has had a strictly Moluccan upbringing anymore; for example, #V was brought up Dutch. Nevertheless, he still has a foot in both cultures; in the Moluccan family the fourth generation has to call him uncle, while the Dutch family simply calls him by his first name.

For the third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands the notion of Moluccan identity might mean different things, but there is at least one thing they have in common: being Moluccan is being who

they are (#T, #X, #V, #W, #S). Knowing the background and context of being Moluccan, where they came from, who their family is – for the third generation these are important elements of understanding their identity (#Q, #V, #S). According to #U, his passport says he is Dutch, but he feels Moluccan because of his background. The parents of #T raised him with the idea that he might have Dutch nationality according to his passport, but that he really is Moluccan. Referring to his identity, #X says he is not seen by others as a Dutch person, even though his mother is Dutch. And #W says he is a very proud Moluccan, he does not feel Dutch at all, although he was born here. He only adjusts, he does speak the language, but he still is a Moluccan.

Just as for the second generation, for a lot of younger Moluccans living in the Netherlands visiting the Moluccan islands feels like coming home, even when they had never been there before; especially when they go to visit relatives (#U, #X, #T, #S). According to #U, it feels familiar, visiting relatives that still live there. The Netherlands might be home, the Moluccas are definitely a second home. It is the same feeling of being among one's own people, not being just one of the few who are not white. They are among people with the same color of skin; they feel welcome, visiting their parental home, the place where their grandparents used to live (#T). #W sometimes even feels homesick for the Moluccas, since his close family lives there and he feels connected to the Moluccas. However, the local Moluccan people see him as a foreigner, as a Dutch guy, given the culture differences, a different skin color and different habits.

In addition of this feeling of coming home when visiting the Moluccans, which is true for almost every Moluccan living in the Netherlands, there are also opposing/conflicting feelings. Respondent #X says he cannot express himself in the Moluccans the same way as he can express himself in the Netherlands. He wants to express himself as a Moluccan but feels restricted by the Indonesian authorities. The Moluccan Adat (customary rules and accepted practices), their lifestyle habits, their traditional dances, the Moluccan flag – they can all be reason to be arrested in the Moluccas.

Among third-generation Moluccans there are various perceptions of the Netherlands. According to #X, "I did not like it when we had to go back to the Netherlands. If you are honest, life is better in the Netherlands. But my heart is there, Maluku is my home". However, the most common, shared view is that the Netherlands is the place which is home, as their closer family and friends live there, it is where their social life is (#T). Although the Malay language is often no longer a part of the upbringing as the focus is on a future in the Netherlands (#X), the third generation seems to be more willing to raise the fourth generation with two languages (#X, #S).

Asked for typical Moluccan traits, third generation Moluccans in the Netherlands mention the food, the social interaction – Moluccan gatherings are sociable and lively, even at a funeral –, the music, the norms and values, respect, history (#U, #X, #T, #A, #W), and a certain hardness/strictness in the

upbringing. For example, when #X came home five minutes late he was punished, while his Dutch friends only got a warning (#X).

The culture on the Moluccas itself has changed faster than the Moluccan culture in the Netherlands, because the Moluccans in the Netherlands were taught to strictly stick to the culture and habits of the first generation. In a strange country you have to hold on to that what is yours. The third generation is moving faster forward than the second generation, however (#X). The second generation is also more closed than the third one, the latter being more open to renewal as at school they learn how to debate (#S).

Comparing the second and third generation

An important part of shaping one's identity is the upbringing. There is a big difference in how the second and third generations have been raised. Most of the member of the second generation have, during the first years of their lives, been raised in a rather closed Moluccan community. They were raised with mainly the Moluccan culture, certainly up till the moment they moved from camps to Moluccan neighborhoods. From that moment on, they also became influenced by the Dutch culture. The third generation, on the other hand, from the beginning has been mainly raised within two cultures, the Moluccan and the Dutch culture. In addition to this difference, times have obviously also changed and with it the ideas, views and perceptions (#I). For instance, at the time the second generation was being raised, it was uncommon and certainly not appreciated to speak about one's own feelings; for the third generation it was, however, not appreciated to keep one's feelings to oneself (#H).

As time moved on, both the second and the third generation became more flexible regarding Moluccan traditions, although the second generation clung to the traditions more than the third (#I, #S). However, one can see changes in the opinions of Moluccans. The traditions and culture have been more static here as Moluccans cling on to what the first generation took along from the Moluccas. Moluccans living in the Moluccas have shown more progress in the development of their traditions and culture (#G). The third generation might have grown up with the same norms and values as the second, but for the third generation there was more freedom to choose whether or not to actually follow these norms and values. The second generation grew up with more social control and coercion (#D).

Another important difference between the second generation of Moluccans and the third one is that the second generation was directly confronted with all the emotions of the first generation. Where the second generation has experienced this first-hand, the third generation only heard the stories; the emotional link with the history is not as strong (#M).

Identity depends on how one defines oneself. It is of course hard to exactly determine what the Moluccan identity is, because there are so many individuals, so many different characteristics and meanings. There is not one static Moluccan identity, but numerous dynamic Moluccan identities (#G). There are distinctive and specific cultural expressions, like for instance the cooking culture, the music culture or the notion of hospitality, mentioned by most of the interviewed Moluccans, that embody the Moluccan identity among other things. Ask a Moluccan of who he/she is, he/she will say, I am a Moluccan, whereas other ethnicities might say they are Dutch-Turkish or a Turkish-Dutch for example (#J).

The RMS ideal gives Moluccans an additional and important Moluccan identity. There might be identities based on the island someone comes from, but there is a gap and the RMS ideal fills that gap, making up a common identity (#J). Moluccans share the same history of forced resettlement, they can rally behind the same symbol, the same four-colored flag, which offers an identity.

To a great extent the focus of the identity issue has changed: the second generation was struggling with its identity, asking themselves what it meant to be Moluccan. The third generation says, I am Moluccan, but I have to focus on school, on my future (#T). The second generation had to live with all the pain, traumas and frustration of the first generation. This was their prime reality. Members of the second generation therefore also became traumatized, particularly seen the Spartan upbringing – this is a factor contributing to an explanation of the hijackings during the 1970s (#G, #S).

3.3 The wish for an independent state

"I have been raised with the idea that I, as a Moluccan, live in another land than my homeland. [...] I was a victim of unemployment, in which I had to endure racism during interviews [...] I went deeper into my past, the suffering that my parents had to endure [...] Those elements together made that I wanted to be part of the Moluccan struggle" (Sahetapy, 1980:97-99).

In this subsection the struggle for an own Moluccan state takes center-stage. Various dimensions are discussed in order to get a broader and deeper understanding of whether or not the second and third generation are in favor of the RMS. Next, the wish for an independent Moluccan state and the reasons why are given as well the means envisioned or accepted to achieve obtaining an independent state. Again, the answers of the second and third generation are compared.

Second generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands

Moluccans have their own, individual opinions about the RMS, whether they are in favor or against this ideal – or not interested at all. This is especially true for the second generation of Moluccans as

they heard the stories directly from their parents. In this part the opinions of the second generation about the RMS are addressed.

Origins

The location the parents originally came from, the island of origin, matters. This origin explains much of the perspective of how one looks at the RMS. For example, the mother of #J was half Javanese. This has had an influence during the upbringing, because among the Moluccan population there have always been anti-Java sentiments, according to #J. Because #J was raised by parents with a mixed background, he was taught to be more nuanced in his opinions about the state of Indonesia. His father originally was from a southern island in the Moluccas, during his youth discriminated against by the Ambonese people, who held a superior position during the era of the Dutch-Indies. This experience made #J's father suspicious of the Ambonese people. Most of the Moluccan people in the Netherlands came from Ambon or its neighboring islands. Among the Moluccans in the Netherlands the Ambonese culture was the dominant one; other views than the main Ambonese views were not tolerated in the Moluccan neighborhoods (#J).

Upbringing

For the second generation, the upbringing is important for how to think about the RMS. When the parents are pro-RMS, the children often are also in favor of the RMS (#H, #L, #G, #B, #C, #D). Many second-generation Moluccans grew up with the idea that the stay in the Netherlands was only temporarily, that they would have an independent state and that they would go back (#K, #G). Respondent #K remembers walking through the streets, yelling 'Viva RMS'. Her parents took the children to pro-RMS demonstrations. She was raised with the ideals of the RMS, every April 25 hoisting the RMS flag.

However, having parents who are in favor of an independent state, does not automatically guarantee that their children share their opinion. As #I tells, her father was a real soldier, he did what he was told to do. If the officers told that he had to fight for the RMS, he would fight for the RMS. For her the RMS was something from above, from the officers. At an older age she came to realize that the ideal was unrealistic. On the other side, there are also second-generation Moluccans whose parents were not very RMS minded. Interviewee #M tells he lived with his parents slightly isolated from the other Moluccans in the Netherlands because his parents criticized the 'colonial behavior' of the Moluccan society.

Moving to the Moluccas

Moluccan individuals are frequently asked if they desire to move to an independent Moluccan state, were it to come into existence. Obviously, Moluccans have their individual opinions on this issue. There

are people that certainly plan to move, most importantly to help build the country with the knowledge they have gained in the Netherlands (#K, #L). There are also Moluccans who say they certainly will not go, as their family and children are living in the Netherlands, and life is good here. Taking all Moluccans currently living in the Netherlands to the free Moluccan state might even result in a serious conflict, as the Dutch Moluccans and the Moluccans living on the Moluccas have developed their cultures in different directions (#N, #G). There are also people who are undecided; they cannot say whether they want to go or not, because there is no choice to make yet, or because they are used to the Moluccans as a holiday destination (#I, #P).

Wish for a state

Among the second generation of Moluccans there are obviously different opinions about the RMS. Most of the second generation are still in favor of an independent state (#K, #N), although there are those that oppose this idea. Reasons to be in favor of an independent state have shifted over time. For the first generation, it was mostly for themselves; they wanted to go back to an independent state instead of going to Indonesia.

Within the second generation there are different reasons to be in favor an independent state, not being part of Indonesia. First, Moluccans are a different people than the Indonesians; they have different looks, different habits, a different culture (#K). Second, in pre-colonial times the Moluccan people used to have its own reign. Since the colonial period they have been enslaved in their own country. An independent state helps the Moluccans to start profit from their own country, instead of foreigners. The Indonesian government does not care for the Moluccan citizens (#L).

There are also different reasons to be opposed to an independent state. According to respondent #J, the RMS is not an anti-colonial organization because it has no history and therefore it has no legitimacy. It is only the Moluccan elite who wanted an independent state and it has nothing to do with the Moluccan population at large. If #J asks Moluccans to share arguments for the legitimacy of the RMS, they always bring up emotional arguments like 'our parents have proclaimed the state', but fail to bring substantial arguments or facts. The RMS endangers peace, its ideal can cause many victims. It is good that there is a restriction for expressing the RMS ideals within the Moluccas, just like it is banned in the Netherlands to wave the flag of IS (#J). The RMS used to be big and strong, but those days are over. It is no longer a political movement, just an identity awareness (#M). One has to be realistic; if you really want to do something for the Moluccas, you have to do it over there, not here in the Netherlands. One also has to take into account that the Moluccans on the Moluccan islands are moving in a different direction that the Moluccans living in the Netherlands. Here, Moluccans are brought up with the RMS ideal and a certain amount of hatred towards the Dutch government. There, Moluccans are taught the Indonesian perspectives. 'They are mainly fighting against poverty, which is a different struggle. Here

they want an independent state, over there they want food', says #M. Besides, when the Moluccans have their own state, it will most likely become corrupt. It is better to focus on the life right now, making the best of the situation, than to focus on something that might or might not be there in the future (#M).

When it comes to the belief in the chances for an independent state, there are different views as well. Being pro-RMS is not the same as believing, letting alone being convinced, that it is going to happen. As respondent #K says, she hopes for an independent state but it is hard to believe in. There are, however, also more positive sounds. As #P stated: "The Indonesian government has a watch, but the Moluccan people have the time". There is belief that it is possible for Moluccans to get an independent state, as over time there have been so many examples of small countries of which people thought they could never exist. Just look at the history of the Netherlands, it took eighty years to become independent (#L).

The RMS is not the only potential outcome for the struggle of the Moluccans on the Moluccas. According to #K, she will go to Indonesia once the federal state of Indonesia is restored. Although the struggle is important for many second-generation Moluccans, it is also put into perspective. The fight might possibly end with the second generation, since future generations focus on their life in the Netherlands; that is alright, as long as they do not forget their history (#K).

Support

The second generation supports the fight for the RMS in different ways. Most common are the financial donations for the government-in-exile and participating in the celebrating of April 25 (#K). Interviewee #L says no matter when, eventually they will have their own independent state. As long as she lives she will fight for it in a peaceful way, by talking, reporting and participating in non-violent demonstrations. Regarding the fight, #K notices a difference between Moluccans living in Moluccan neighborhoods and those outside these neighborhoods. The former are more often involved in the cause for improved living conditions in the Moluccas, whereas the latter often have other priorities. Not only is there a distinction based on the place of living, there is also a difference between the various generations. The third generation is more involved in building up their lives in the Netherlands and more frequently have mixed marriages (#K). #P states that the Moluccans in the Netherlands can only achieve their goals with education and knowledge.

Although many second generation of Moluccans who are in favor of the RMS ideal want to participate in the fight, they are not very positive about their government-in-exile. A shared opinion is that this RMS government-in-exile is invisible for the Moluccan population, and it does not provide much information about its activities; for example, the RMS in exile is not even active on social media. Only at the April 25 meetings does it tell about what it is doing, but that is it (#L, #B, #G, #P). The RMS seems

more or less a leisure activity. People go to their work, live their lives and only care about the RMS at particular moments. But, since it is a political struggle, it should not be an activity for the weekends only. Besides, the RMS does not work effectively, because there is no structural support on the Moluccan islands (#G).

There are second generation Moluccans who point out that the Moluccan population is not very active when it comes to the RMS fight. There is only one RMS day, no other activities during the year, and there are just a few people who are donating. In the early years after the Moluccans came to the Netherlands, around 5,000 people (one in six) came to the RMS Proclamation Day on April 25. Now there are roughly four times as many Moluccans living in the Netherlands, but the attendance has dropped to a meagre one to two thousand people. The support has gradually declined over years (#J). Politics are changing, support for the RMS is declining. When people in the 1970s would have heard about the wrongdoings against the Moluccan people they certainly would have risen up. Nowadays they just continue with their lives here in the Netherlands (#D).

Acceptable approaches

There are also different views on what is (and what is not) acceptable for reaching an independent state. Most often referred to in this respect are non-violent actions like conversations, interaction with the Dutch government and the RMS government and speaking with the Indonesian government (#K, #N, #G). Communication is key for most of the second generation. It is also important to gain international recognition (#N). However, when a non-violent approach does not work, a violent approach might be necessary to reach the goal. Revolutions never take place without violence (#L). According to #K, she sometimes thinks it would be best to go all back together to Indonesia to fight the fight. While engaging in non-violent actions like demonstrations yielded little result and attention, the more violent hijackings created attention for the cause.

The government-in-exile has to shift its focus to human rights. Nowadays, the Moluccan population has no freedom of choice. Politics is a way to live a human life (#G).

Third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands

The RMS flag is an important symbol for the Moluccans, as it is part of their history (#X, #U, #T, #W). Third generation Moluccan #X is very proud every time he sees the flag. It is a symbol for their struggle.

Upbringing

Like the second generation, the third generation has also been raised with the ideal (or lack thereof) of the RMS (#Q, #R, #S, #U, #T, #V). They wish for an independent state, although in comparison with

the second generation there are more exceptions. Third generation Moluccans began researching the meaning of the RMS themselves and have drawn their own conclusions (#S, #X, #T).

Going to the Moluccas
Most of the third generation Moluccans state they don't desire to move to the Moluccans if a Moluccan state is proclaimed. This is because they have built a live in the Netherlands and for them a state is not important (#U, #X, #V). For the younger generations there are nowadays more possibilities to visit the Moluccans more often (#U, #X).

Wish for a state
Among the members of the third generation the opinions about getting an own independent state are divided as well, similar to is the case within the second generation. For third generation members who are in favor of the RMS it is impossible to explain their presence in the Netherlands without mentioning the RMS (#X, #T). For Moluccans the RMS is a way to express who they are, combined with being proud of that identity (#X). According to a majority of the third generation an independent state is important, primarily for the Moluccans living in the Moluccas and not so much for themselves, the Moluccans who live in the Netherlands (#X). Although there are many third-generation Moluccans in favor of the RMS, there is also skepticism about an independent state. Third-generation #W is in favor of an independent state, although he thinks this state would probably be corrupt. The state is mainly meant for the grandparents who have suffered a lot, and the Moluccans who live there, not for those next generations who live in the Netherlands. Those who are in favor of the RMS believe that an own state is achievable, since other countries reached the goal of independence as well; the Netherlands fought eighty years to gain its independence. And international support for their cause is growing (#W, #V).

The third generation of Moluccan immigrants would be less likely to move to the potential independent state, since they have taken root in the Dutch society and culture and are increasingly westernized (#X, #V, #U). However, a substantial part of them is in favor of the idea of the RMS, for the sake of the first-generation Moluccans who hold deeply to the ideal of the RMS, as well as those who have remained in the Moluccas. Simultaneously, there is a decline in support for the RMS among (another) part of this generation, simply because the process of assimilation has caused them to lose sight of the meaning and significance of the RMS ideal. Another reason for the decrease of support of the RMS ideal is how disorganized its structure has been thus far. The third generation also fears the corruption of the state once it comes into being, given the fact that the government-in-exile does not practice democracy in its current state (#Q, #R, #V, #W). Furthermore, the RMS has solely been an in-exile ideal. Those left on the Moluccas under Indonesian rule do not openly express or support the RMS. Being part of Indonesia has in fact helped the Moluccas in many ways, as the country has access

to international support and tools (#S). For these reasons, many believe the desire for an independent state is improbable and unrealistic.

Support

There are different ways in which the third generation supports the struggle for the RMS. Going to the April 25 meetings to commemorate the victims, to remember the history and supporting family members who are fighting for the RMS (#U). Financial support, education and awareness among both Moluccans on the Moluccas and among the Dutch people are important tools for third generation Moluccans who support the fight (#X, #T). According to third generation #U, he would participate in demonstrations, if they were organized. Another tool is passing on their history to their children, as it is important for them to continue the fight. If it were not for the RMS, they would have never been in the Netherlands (#X).

However, going to the Moluccans to fight is not the way to go for the third generation; discussing with politicians and education are seen as more useful weapons (#X). Not everyone who supports the RMS is actively participating in the fight; it is seen as dangerous for relatives living on the Moluccas, and it is unverifiable how the donated money is spent (#W, #V, #U).

According to the third generation the government-in-exile is not an effective institution, it is not doing enough. However, the third generation doesn't really know what it is doing; "therefore it should be more outgoing and transparent." It only reveals what it is doing during the April 25 rallies. The RMS government should really represent the Moluccan people, work together and stop fighting each other (#X, #T). Third generation #Q is even more harsh in her critique as she points out that so far the RMS government-in-exile has not achieved anything; it's all talk without any substantial progress.

Acceptable approaches

For most third generation Moluccans living in the Netherlands who are in favor of the RMS, violence or new hijackings in the Netherlands are not acceptable (#X, #T, #W). There are other, non-violent approaches that are more profitable, according to the third generation. The current court case dealing with the train hijackings is a good example of an alternative way to fight. Transferring knowledge is also important, as well as trying to achieve a state in a democratic way, through political means (#U, #X, #T, #W). Violence is only acceptable as a last resource to gain a free RMS (#U). The Moluccans on the Moluccas have to stand up themselves and fight for their rights, just like the people in Papua did. They have to fight, and although a fight is never without any victims, it is worth it (#X). However, the violence used during the hijackings did not work. The third generation fights with the same kind of passion, but in a different way (#X).

Comparing the second and third generation

The first noticeable difference between the second and third generation is that the latter had to internalize the ideal of the RMS individually. The second generation has been raised with the emotions around the RMS (#L), whereas the third is brought up in a predominantly Dutch context. The second generation has been born and raised within closed Moluccan communities, the third generation did not. They have to reach independent conclusions as to whether the RMS is worthwhile or not. In that sense, the third generation is more Dutch in their approach. Their generation needs persuasion (#G, #L, #X).

The arguments in favor or against an independent state have not changed that much during the generations, however. The same is true for whether or not the RMS ideal is achievable at all. However, the RMS is changing. When the second generation grew up, the RMS was about their own parents who wanted to go back to the Moluccans. The second generation was raised with the pain of their parents. It was a fight against the Dutch government, which had promised to help them return to their homeland. Time has passed and circumstances have changed. The first generation is almost gone, and the younger generations have assimilated into the Dutch society. Nowadays many Moluccans living in the Netherlands do not want to go back to the Moluccas all, even if it were a state of its own. The main purpose has changed, from going back themselves to an independent state to having an independent state for their relatives who are still living on the Moluccas and who are struggling. As the purpose has changed, the focus has shifted toward questions of proper continuation with the fight. (#D).

According to Steijlen (1996), the RMS has changed from a political strife to a symbol for the Moluccans in the Netherlands. For many Moluccans the RMS has become a symbol for their identity. The second generation had to adapt to these changes and the third generation had to discern and discover for themselves what the struggle was all about (#G, #M). At the same time, things that used to be normal are no longer so. Violence as used during the 1960s and 1970s is no longer used to further the cause; peaceful ways to make changes are much more encouraged through social and other media. Since communication has changed, people all over the world are more connected. In this changing world, the struggle for the RMS changes as well (#L).

Conclusion/Discussion

In this final part the question 'To what extent does the second generation of diaspora Moluccans in the Netherlands differ from the third generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands in terms of their wish for an independent state (RMS) is concerned?', will be answered. First the conclusions of the research will be given, followed by a discussion in light of the theoretical framework and finally some suggestions for further research.

Conclusion

When looking at their identity-formation, there are some big differences between the second and the third generation. Most of the second-generation Moluccans have spent their childhood in rather closed Moluccan communities. As a result, during their youth the second generation had almost no contact with Dutch people – they had a thorough Moluccan upbringing. By some, the move from the camps to Moluccan neighbourhoods was experienced as a culture shock. This upbringing within closed communities made that even after the move most of their connections remained strictly Moluccan. The third generation, on the other hand, was mainly raised within the Dutch community, sometimes still in Moluccan neighbourhoods but in Dutch neighbourhoods as well. Therefore, from the start they had more mixed contacts, with Moluccans, Dutch and other ethnicities. They were confronted with a mixture of Moluccan and Dutch norms and values.

As far as identity-formation is concerned, the second generation has directly and personally experienced the emotions of the first generation, the generation that suffered most from the traumatic events of the diaspora. The third generation did not. In this respect it is important to point out that Moluccans being in favour of the RMS is more likely if they were brought up with the ideals of the RMS.

The Moluccans participating in this research all identified themselves as 'true Moluccans', not as Dutch-Moluccans or Moluccan-Dutch. Nevertheless, there is not one static Moluccan identity ('true Moluccan'); Moluccans have different identities because they or their families originate from different island groups and obviously they all have their own experiences. In order to overcome those differences, the RMS is providing them with connections to other Moluccans. They can use the same symbol, the Moluccan flag, to show their pride of being Moluccan.

Looking at the differences between the second and third generation Moluccans living in the Netherlands regarding their wish for an independent state, it is somewhat remarkable that there are only minor differences between the various generations. First, both within the second generation and the third generation are Moluccans that are in favour of an independent state, while there are also

opponents to this idea. In both the second and third generation there is a declining interest for the RMS, however. Most second-generation Moluccans are in favour of the RMS because they are emotionally involved as their parents really desired to return to the Moluccas. Members of the third generation are more critical, having done independent research about the RMS. The other way around, when they are in favour of the RMS, they tend to be more devoted to the RMS ideal. Another, minor, difference between the second and the third generation is that the second generation is slightly less willing to disapprove of the violence used during the 1970s. The second generation is also more prepared to go to the RMS once established, in order to build the country, whereas members of the third generation mostly say they are willing to help but from the Netherlands as home base. Both generations think that the government-in-exile does not provide enough information about what it is doing or think that the government is doing too little. Both the second and third generation are prepared to contribute with educating Dutch people about their past and strengthen Moluccans on the Moluccas with knowledge, while also financial donations are considered as a way to help, although the third generation is more sceptical about what happens with the money.

Although there are currently only slight differences between the second and the third generation, there have been changes over time. Looking at the start of the history of the Moluccans in the Netherlands, the goal of the RMS struggle was first and foremost an independent state where the Moluccans could return to. Nowadays the main purpose of this RMS fight has changed; the Moluccans are still longing for an independent state, but no longer for themselves but rather for their relatives who are living in poverty in Indonesia.

Although the main narratives of the second and third generation are quite similar, in the sense of the important events pointed out, there is a different focus. The second generation primarily focusses on the first years in the Netherlands (their own youth), while the third generation rather provides an overview of the most important events in their history.

Discussion

These differences in the narratives of the second versus the third generation can first of all be explained by the fact that the second generation directly experienced living in the camps and the violent actions during the 1970s, whereas the third generation only knows from hearsay. It is important to notice, however, that although there are differences between the two narratives, the main concept is in line with the overall purpose of a narrative: "maintaining the collective goal of the group" (Ben David et al., 2017:270) within reach. That the narratives of the second and third generation of Moluccans living in the Netherlands are not that different from each other, is not really surprising, given that the transfer of a (main) narrative partly (or even strongly) depends on the upbringing

(Bueltmann, 2012:82-83). As the second generation has raised the third one, their narratives are quite similar and at least in line with each other. That is important for the group, as the main narrative is able to connect the group; it has the function to make sense of reality, of the justification of any violent acts towards the other, while the shared narrative also helps in facing difficult life conditions (Bar-Tal, 2013:164).

As Steijlen (1996) concludes, the symbolic dimension of the RMS ideal has become more important than the political one. In 2018 this symbolic dimension is still an important factor for the RMS, as it binds together and unites the Moluccan community in the Netherlands. Carrying the RMS flag brings pride and nationalist feelings. The celebration on April 25 carries an important social meaning; meeting friends and family and celebrating together. In the 1950s, upon arrival in the Netherlands, the shared traumatic experience of having to leave their beloved homeland turned them into a homogenous group. But soon differences, caused for instance by island of origin, religion, and political preferences became more important and the homogeneity of the group began to fade. As there is no 'true identity' (Hall, 2014:226), there is also no 'true Moluccan identity' that Moluccans can return to. Given the differences, the RMS is important since it provides a shared identity, artificial as it may be. The idea of the RMS brings Moluccans together, gives them a shared, communal purpose, a shared expression of identity. This is true for both the second and the third generation.

However, the identity the RMS provides is not static. As time progresses, experiences are added and norms and values of a group develop (Hogg, Terry & White, 1995:266). During the 1970s, violent acts were committed all over the world. Moluccan violent actions of the 1970s were a direct result of the traumatic experiences of members of the second generation. They were raised within closed communities by their parents who had directly suffered traumatic experiences. For the second generation these actions were an expression of their feelings – feelings they could not express otherwise (Evers, 2002:66). The third generation did not have to deal with the direct feelings of those traumatic events, since they were brought up with slightly different norms and values as they were raised in a more multicultural environment. As Evers (2002:55) concludes, the unfolding of one's identity is highly dependent on the support of society. Examples of losing one's identity in this respect are discrimination and the huge youth unemployment (see Chapter 2). Since the 1980s the integration process of Moluccans has made rapid progress and, if asked, members of the third generation often state they don't want to move to a free RMS since their life in the Netherlands is good. Those factors combined make it less likely that the third generation will act out the same (violent) way the second generation did.

However, since this is a case study, the outcome is not representative for the whole Moluccan community. As stated in the introduction, this thesis only addressed Christian Moluccans; Muslim Moluccans have not been interviewed. Participants originated mostly from the Middle Moluccans, as

those compose the majority of the Moluccan society. This thesis does not address the opinions and status of the RMS ideal among those from the South and North Moluccas. Another limitation of my thesis is that I have used the snowball method to gather my participants. Consequently, I only reached those who have strong ties to the Moluccan community and therefor to their Moluccan identity. Those who are totally integrated within the Dutch society were not interviewed. In addition, due to this snowball method and a restricted time, I have interviewed more second-generation Moluccans than third generation and most of my respondents were male.

Suggestions for research

This thesis is a case study of a rather select and limited group of Moluccans who have shared their views on their upbringing in the Netherlands, their history and their wish for an own state. All Moluccans that have been interviewed have close ties to the Moluccan community. Moluccans interviewed are going to the Moluccan church and/or have more Moluccan than Dutch connections; in general, they are raised with Moluccan norms and values. A possible topic for follow-up research is to identify to what extent Moluccans with a mixed background (Dutch and Moluccan) or Moluccans raised within a Dutch environment have different views on this topic. Another topic could be the differences between males and females regarding their wish for an own state.

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Information about the participants

Place, gender, grew up in, religion, parental homeland, raised whether or not with RMS-cause.

Second-generation:

A: Wierden, female, grew up in camp Schattenberg and camp Vossenberg, Christian, parents originated from the Middle Moluccans, her father was KNIL-soldier and she was raised with the RMS-cause;

B: Wierden, male, grew up in camp Schattenberg and camp Vossenberg, Christian, father originated from the Middle Moluccans, mother from Java, his father was KNIL-soldier and he was raised with the RMS-cause;

C: Wierden, female, Born in Hellendoorn grew up in camp Vossenberg, Christian, father originated from the Middle Moluccans, Mother from Sumatra, she was raised with the RMS-cause;

D: Wierden, Male, grew up in camp Vossenberg, Christian, parents originated from the Middle Moluccans, he was raised with the RMS-cause;

E: Wierden, Male, grew up in camp Vossenberg, Christian, parents originated from Indonesia (he is official not a Moluccan, but adopted by the Moluccan community), his father was part of the KNIL, he is politically active;

F: Wierden, female, grew up in camp Vossenberg, Christian, parents originated from the Middle Moluccans, her father was KNIL-soldier and she was raised with the RMS-cause;

G: Nijmegen, male, grew up in camp Schattenberg, Christian, father originated from the Middle Moluccans and his Mother from Timor, his father was KNIL-soldier and he was raised with the RMS-cause;

H: Assen, male, grew up in camp Schattenberg, Christian, parents originated from the Middle Moluccans, his father was KNIL-soldier and he was raised with the RMS-cause;

I: Assen, female, grew up in camp Schattenberg, Christian, parents originated from the Middle Moluccans, her father was KNIL-soldier and she was raised with the RMS-cause;

J: Assen, male, grew up in camp Schattenberg, Christian, his father originated from the South Moluccans and his mother originated partly from Java, he is not raised with the RMS-cause;

K: Bovensmilde, female, grew up in camp Schattenberg, Christian, parents originated from the Middle Moluccans, her father was KNIL-soldier and she was raised with the RMS-cause;

L: Nood-Brabant, female, grew up in camp Schattenberg in a children's home, Christian, parents originated from the Middle Moluccans, she was raised with the RMS-cause;

M: Zwolle, male, grew up in camp Eerde and camp Laarbrug, Christian, parents originated from the north-Moluccans, his father was KNIL-soldier and he was not raised with the RMS-cause;

N: Bovensmilde, male, grew up in camp Schattenberg, Christian, parents originated from the middle Moluccans, his father was KNIL-soldier and he was raised with the RMS-cause;

O: Assen, male, grew up in camp Schattenberg and in Wierden, Christian, parents originated from the middle Moluccans, his father was KNIL-soldier and he was raised with the RMS-cause;

P: Epe, male, Christian, he was raised with the RMS-cause.

Third-generation:

Q: Assen, male, grew up in the Moluccan residential area in Assen, Christian, grandparents originated from the Middle Moluccans, he was not raised with the RMS-cause;

R: Assen, female, grew up in the Moluccan residential area in Assen, Christian, grandparents originated from the Middle Moluccans, she was not raised with the RMS-cause;

S: Assen, female, grew up in the Moluccan residential area in Assen, Christian, grandparents originated from the South Moluccans, she was not raised with the RMS-cause;

T: Groningen, male, grew up in the Moluccan residential area in Farmsen, Christian, grandparents originated from the Middle Moluccans, he was raised with the RMS-cause;

U: Groningen, male, grew up in Groningen, Christian, grandparents originated from the Middle Moluccans, he is raised with the RMS-cause;

V: Hoogeveen, male, grew up in Borger, Christian, he had mixed parents, his mother is a Moluccan and grandparents originated from the Middle Moluccans his father is Dutch, he was not raised with the RMS-cause;

W: Assen, male, grew up in Meppel, Christian, grandparents originated from the Middle Moluccans, he was raised with the RMS-cause;

X: Groningen, male, grew up in Groningen, Christian, He had mixed parents, his father is a Moluccan and grandparents originated from the Middle Moluccans his mother is Dutch, he was not really raised with the RMS-cause.

The interviews were semi-structured. I used the questions below as guideline for my interviews, but that there was also room for extending the subjects.

Interview questions:

Identity:

- Where were you raised and how did this influence your life?
- What was the nationality of your parents and their island of origin?
- According to you, what involves the Moluccan identity?
- What did you receive from your parents about the Moluccan culture? What do you practice yourself?
- What does the Netherlands mean to you? To what extent do you feel connected to the Dutch culture/identity?
- Do you feel like a real Moluccan? Why?
- Have you ever been on the Moluccan islands? If so, how was your experience?

Wish for an independent state:

- What are for you the most important moments in the Moluccan history?
- What do you think about the role the Dutch government played within the history of the Moluccan people?
- What are your views about an independent Moluccan state?
- If the RMS came into existence, would you want to live in the RMS? Why (not)?
- Do you think that the establishment of the RMS is achievable?
- What is for you the most important goal of the RMS-cause? Do you recognize yourself in it?
- What is your expectation of an independent Moluccan state?
- How does the RMS-cause play a role in your life at this moment?
- Which means are acceptable to reach the goal of the RMS?
- What is your opinion about the violent actions carried out in the seventies?
- Are you involved in the process to achieve an independent state? Why (not) and how?
- Do you think that the Dutch government does justice to the Moluccan people?