Compliance and attention: an attention-based view of corporate governance code compliance
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2024-06-27
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en
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Fascinated by figuring out an additional explanation why listed companies do not fully comply to a corporate governance code, this study looks into the fact whether strategic change as a contextual factor of the attention-based view and board size as a structural factor of the attention-based view, have an influence on the degree of non-compliance to a corporate governance code. Based on a multiple regression analysis of the firms listed on the Euronext Amsterdam, this research provides weak evidence, by showing only marginal support in some of the models, that more strategic change does indeed lead to a higher degree of non-compliance to a corporate governance code. However, there was no significant relationship found between board size and the degree of non-compliance. In addition, this study also confirms the literature that due to coercive and memetic pressures, companies tend to not comply to the same best practice recommendations of the code. It is also discussed what the implications of these findings are in regard to how we look at compliance to a corporate governance code.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen