Eisenhower, the CIA, and the 1953 Coup on Mossadeq: Assessing the Role of the CIA and whether the 1953 Coup was Justified under Leffler’s National Security Principle
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2024-06-15
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en
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In 2013 the CIA declassified documents related to the 1953 coup on Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq. This thesis investigates whether the justification of the Eisenhower administration for the coup was feasible, and what the CIA’s role was in the coup. The arguments are contrasted with Leffler’s National Security Principle and Eisenhower’s fixed principles. The research question is: Why would President Eisenhower utilize the CIA to orchestrate the 1953 Iranian coup, and how reasonable was this decision? The CIA’s utilization ensured plausible deniability for the administration and enabled Eisenhower’s foreign policy of active containment. The justification was made under false pretenses due to meddling by key individuals. Operation BEDAMN and AJAX deteriorated socio-political circumstances in Iran. Declassified reports underline that the Communist threat in Iran had been exaggerated and that the coup was only justifiable to appease allies and preventing the Soviet Union from gaining access to crucial foreign resources.
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