The Relationship between credibility and effective deterrence

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the circumstances that bring about ineffective deterrence by reflecting on the failure of the US deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Syria in the run-up to the chemical weapons attack on Ghouta. I distinguish between two perspectives on deterrence; Classical Deterrence Theory and Perfect Deterrence Theory. Both theories hypothesize different causal mechanisms that offer alternative perspectives on the role that past actions play in determining the credibility of a current deterrent threat. By reflecting on these competing perspectives, this thesis establishes which causal mechanism can best account for the circumstances which bring about ineffective deterrence. I find that the US strategy vis-à-vis Syria failed due to the US’ weakened soft power base, a lack of domestic and international support for strikes against Syria, the absence of US national interests in the Syrian region and the fact that Syria’s provocation did not pose a threat to US territorial sovereignty.