FROM COMPLIANCE TO DEFIANCE: EXPLAINING THE CHANGING EFFECTIVENESS OF NUCLEAR- RELATED SANCTIONS IN IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

Abstract

This research examines how changes in the international distribution of power affect the effectiveness of nuclear-related sanctions. While sanctions remain a central instrument for enforcing compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both North Korea and Iran have continued to pursue nuclear activities despite extensive international restrictions. Existing sanctions scholarship primarily focuses on institutional design, implementation and domestic factors, but pays less attention to the geopolitical context in which sanctions operate. This study therefore investigates how shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity influence sanction effectiveness. Building on structural realism, hegemonic stability theory and balance-of-power theory, it develops the concept of Great-Power Patronage to explain how sanctioned states gain access to alternative sources of economic, diplomatic and security support. Through a qualitative case study of North Korea and Iran using process tracing, the analysis demonstrates that sanctions do not operate in isolation but are embedded within a broader international system. As multipolarity emerged, the absence of a single dominant power capable of coordinating international pressure enabled rising powers to provide alternative channels of support that reduced the costs imposed by sanctions and weakened their coercive leverage. The findings show that sanction effectiveness depends not only on the design and implementation but also on the broader distribution of power and the availability of patronage networks.