Budget allocation negotiations and coordination games: a case study at the Dutch National Police Characterization of the budget allocation negotiations with the use of game theoretical concepts
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2021-07-08
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en
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Negotiations is a process which occur in different settings and the concepts of negotiation remains a bit vague. It is yet unknown in which situation a negotiator acts cooperatively and in which situation he acts competitively. This study characterizes budget allocation negotiations with the use of game theoretical concepts which are four selected coordination games. Coordination games are a class of game theory which are particularly suitable for this research, since they describe negotiation situations in which players should choose between acting cooperatively or competitively. The game theoretical concepts are translated to characteristics which are identified in the negotiations. The characteristics are linked with the four games and thus the characteristics help with the identification of real-world negotiations as a coordination game. Moreover, the different organizational levels are compared in order to compare the differences in the type of coordination games characterized at different organizational levels (strategic, operational tactical). The findings are that the elements of the theoretical coordination games lend themselves well for empirically identified situations. Moreover, there is no difference in the type of coordination games characterized at different organizational levels.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen