Power, economics or identity? Human rights voting behaviour within the United Nations Security Council (1976-2007)
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What explains the voting behavior of member countries regarding resolutions on human rights within the United Nations Security Council between 1976 and 2007? Based on the theories of realism, world systems theory and social constructivism (and making a difference between civil and political rights, social and economic rights and solidarity rights) different hypotheses on this voting behavior are constructed. The role of the independent variables power, economic interdependence and democracy are tested in a multilevel quantitative research design. The analysis includes data on both adopted and vetoed draft human rights resolutions, based on the United Nations Bibliographic Information System. Results suggest that power is the most important predictor of human rights voting behavior and therefore, the best fitting explanation is realism. Permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are more likely to vote against human rights resolutions than rotating members, regardless of the type of human rights a resolution is about.
Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen