Getting clear on just-so stories
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2023-08-31
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en
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Evolutionary scientists and philosophers often call supposedly substandard explanations that aim to account for the origin of a trait in terms of a selective scenario ‘just-so stories’. However, recent philosophical work shows that this notion lacks a clear and consistent definition. To address this issue, I integrate observations on the features—and shortcomings!—of what evolutionary biologists consider well-supported selective scenarios to arrive at a precise and faithful distinction between just-so stories and superior adaptive explanations. Contrary to popular belief, I argue that in evolutionary contexts, just-so stories are best understood as abductive inferences that lack independent evidence for their assumptions, rather than (whimsical) explanations based on low quantities of evidence and/or speculation. In support of this view, I show that by assuming that only just-so stories are evidence-outrunning, the very distinction between this notion and more well-regarded adaptive explanations threatens to collapse. Finally, I stress that focusing on the evidence-outrunning nature of just-so stories risks overlooking that diversity of evidence is at least important as abundance_of evidence.
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Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen