A critique of Robert Chapman’s social-ecological relational functional analysis of mental functioning
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2025-08-27
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en
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Within the neurodiversity paradigm, Robert Chapman has recently prompted an alternative functional analysis, which is based on a social-ecological model of mental functioning. Chapman argues that a more relational understanding of mental functioning advances clinical psychiatric practices, as it challenges presumed functional norms. This paper is a critique of Chapman’s relational functional analysis. It investigates whether the alternative functional analysis based on the social-ecological model is beneficial for psychiatric practice. While I am in favour of appreciating diversity in minds and brains, and recognise the need for relational and contextual thinking to understand the complexity of mental functioning, I argue that relational functional analysis in its current form is not suitable for psychiatry. My argument is twofold: first, I demonstrate that the social-ecological model has a general problem in determining function. Second, I illustrate how the model’s conceptual liberalism and arbitrariness pose application problems for psychiatry. I discuss two examples which show that a relational social-ecological functional analysis is less appealing than Chapman suggests. This approach comes with implicit norms that can make the assessment of mental health a dangerous business.
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Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen