The Hard Split: Replacing Cognitive Neuroscience's Implicit Ontology

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dc.contributor.advisorSlors, M.
dc.contributor.advisorBrabers, J.B.A.M.
dc.contributor.authorOude Maatman, F.
dc.date.issued2018-08-27
dc.description.abstractI introduce a new problem for cognitive neuroscience and its cognitive ontology project: the hard split, which attacks the implicit folk psychological ontology of cognitive neuroscience. First, I show the presence of this implicit ontology in cognitive neuroscience, and that it identifies the realizers of function and experience without proof for or necessity of this identity. I then argue that absent a replacement of this folk psychological ontology, cognitive neuroscientists cannot reliably make claims about experience on the basis of neuroscientific data. Lastly, I show that the ‘replacement ontology’ one chooses may have effects extending beyond the validity of experiential claims, such as entailing new empirical predictions, redefinition of concepts and changes in construct validity.en_US
dc.embargo.lift10000-01-01
dc.embargo.typePermanent embargoen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://theses.ubn.ru.nl/handle/123456789/6022
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.thesis.facultyFaculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappenen_US
dc.thesis.specialisationPhilosophy of Minden_US
dc.thesis.studyprogrammePhilosophy: Research Masteren_US
dc.thesis.typeResearchmasteren_US
dc.titleThe Hard Split: Replacing Cognitive Neuroscience's Implicit Ontologyen_US
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