Complementary effects of bundles of Corporate Governance mechanisms on the quality of financial and non-financial reporting
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2018-06-26
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en
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Abstract
Internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, like a board of directors, executive compensation, analyst following and an assurance provider, should reduce opportunistic behavior of managers by imposing management to increase the high quality financial and non-financial corporate disclosures. However, using (multiple) corporate governance mechanisms is not always efficient, because the mechanisms may affect management in a similar way and the implementation is costly. This study aims to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between different bundles of complementary corporate governance mechanisms and the quality of financial and non-financial reporting by examining the complementary effects of four bundles of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on combinations of financial and non-financial reporting quality measures. Using a sample of 427 European listed firms for 2016, the results do not provide support for the hypothesized effects of the four bundles of corporate governance mechanisms studied on the quality of financial and non-financial reporting. However, the findings provide some support for the effects of individual corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of financial or non-financial reporting.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen