



RADBOUD UNIVERSITY – Master thesis Business Administration

Is everything to your satisfaction?

The impact of a liberal redress policy on illegitimate complaining behavior, from the perspective of neutralization theory.

Nikky ten Harmsen (s4651073)

Supervisor: Dr. H.W.M. Joosten

Second supervisor: Dr. P.H. Driessen

Date: June 15, 2017



Abstract

Nowadays the value of a good service recovery is common knowledge for all marketers and organizations. Consequently, during the last decade it has become accepted practice to pro-actively encourage and welcome customer complaints, by offering liberal redress policies (such as ‘100% satisfaction guarantees’). However, these practices clearly act upon the prevailing assumption that ‘the customer is always right’. The question arises whether this actually reflects reality. Only a small portion of academic literature acknowledges that customers do sometimes engage in illegitimate, opportunistic or fraudulent complaining behavior. Additionally, it is argued that this illegitimate complaining is among other things, probably fueled by the prevailing liberal redress policies, which aspire too much customer satisfaction. Moreover, it is also expected that customers are more prone to claim in an illegitimate manner, when transacting with large firms as opposed to small ones. However, it remains peculiar that people engage in such behaviors as they are in essence illegal and therefore induce an extremely unpleasant state of mind. A possible explanation can be given from the perspective of neutralization theory, which states that individuals employ certain cognitive techniques to convince themselves of the appropriateness of their actions. The objective of this study, therefore, was to find out to what extent the firm-centric drivers; ‘liberal redress policy’ and ‘firm size’ enhance illegitimate complaining behavior and whether the use of neutralization techniques is a possible underlying mechanism which explains the behavior. In order to answer the research questions a 2x2, online, scenario-based, between-subjects, posttest-only experiment is executed. However, no significant impact of a liberal redress policy on illegitimate complaining behavior was found. Noteworthy, an additional test revealed that the presence of a satisfaction guarantee, does increase customer's intention to voice their complaint to the organization. Furthermore, results confirmed that large firms are to a larger extent confronted with illegitimate complaining behavior. Results indicated that customers held higher expectations of large firms and are therefore more easily dissatisfied if something went wrong. Finally, results regarding the use of neutralization techniques were, probably due to a design flaw, opposed to what was expected. In conclusion, organizations could offer a liberal redress policy without having to worry that it would encourage customers to cheat. However, businesses are advised to interpret these findings in light of the limitations of the research.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	1
1. Introduction.....	5
1.1 Service recovery.....	5
1.2 Liberal redress policies	5
1.3 Illegitimate complaints.....	6
1.4 Neutralization theory	7
1.5 Research aim.....	8
1.6 Theoretical relevance	8
1.7 Practical relevance	9
1.8 Structure of the report	9
2. Theoretical background	11
2.1 Customer complaining behavior.....	11
2.2 Illegitimate complaining	12
2.3 Liberal redress policies	14
2.4 Firm Size.....	15
2.5 Neutralization theory	16
2.6 Neutralization techniques in service encounters	18
3. Methodology	21
3.1 Research design	21
3.2 Stimulus materials.....	22
3.3 Measurement.....	23
3.3.1 Manipulation checks	23
3.3.2 Satisfaction.....	23
3.3.3 Intention to complain	24
3.3.4 Illegitimate complaining behavior	24
3.3.5 Neutralization techniques.....	25
3.3.6 Demographic variables	25
3.4 Pretest & manipulation checks.....	25
3.5 Procedure and research ethics	26
3.6 Sample.....	27
3.7 Statistical Treatment	27
4. Analysis and results	28
4.1 Manipulation checks	28
4.2 Factor analysis	29

4.3 Reliability analysis.....	30
4.4 Descriptive statistics	30
4.5 Assumptions.....	32
4.6 Hypothesis testing.....	34
4.6.1 Hypotheses one to three	34
4.6.2 Hypothesis four	35
4.7 Additional analyses	36
5. Discussion.....	38
5.1 Conclusion	38
5.2 Theoretical contributions	39
5.3 Managerial implications.....	41
5.4 Limitations and further research	42
References.....	45
Appendices.....	49
Appendix I: Final questionnaire.....	49
Appendix II: Pre-test and results.....	54
Appendix III: Scenarios	58
Appendix IV: Manipulation checks	60
Appendix V: Factor analysis (first attempt).....	62
Appendix VI: Factor analysis (second attempt).....	65
Appendix VII: Factor analysis (third attempt).....	67
Appendix VIII: Reliability analysis	69
Appendix IX: Outlier analysis (first MANOVA)	70
Appendix X: Normality check (first MANOVA)	71
Appendix XI: Levene's & Box' M test (first MANOVA).....	73
Appendix XII: Correlation table	74
Appendix XIII: MANOVA results (first)	75
Appendix XIV: Outlier analysis (second MANOVA).....	78
Appendix XV: Normality check (second MANOVA).....	79
Appendix XVI: Levene's & Box' M test (second MANOVA)	82
Appendix XVII: Correlation table	83
Appendix XVIII: MANOVA results (second).....	84
Appendix XIX: Additional chi-square tests.....	87
Appendix XX: Additional ANOVA	89

1. Introduction

In today's business environment, competition is order of the day. Consequently, practitioners strive to provide "zero-defect" services at the highest possible quality, to ensure customer satisfaction (e.g. Parasuraman, Berry & Zeithmal, 1991; Lewis & Spyropoulos, 2001; Weun, Beatty & Jones, 2004). However, intentions not always lead to expected superior service outcomes. Due to the unique characteristics of services, where simultaneous production and consumption, as well as involvement by customers determine the quality of the offering, shortfalls and quality discrepancies are ubiquitous and inevitable (Hess, Ganesan & Klein; 2003; Weun et al., 2004). Consequently even the best organizations, however quality driven, may be prone to situations where service failures occur.

1.1 Service recovery

The fact that service failures are inevitable, does not automatically imply that dissatisfied customers are too (de Ruyter & Wetzels, 2000). When a service failure occurs, the organization's reaction can either change the minor incident into a major problem or positively reinforce a strong customer relationship (Hoffman, Kelley & Rotalsky, 1995). These service recovery activities broadly concern any action a service provider takes in response to a failure (Swanson & Kelley, 2001).

As already mentioned by Hart et al. (1989) a long time ago, and supported by many other studies, replacing a customer costs five times more than retaining one (e.g. Bitner, Booms & Tetreault, 1990; Maxham, 2001). Moreover, an appropriate service recovery process enables companies to turn their complaining customers into very satisfied and loyal ones (Bitner et al., 1990). So oftentimes, when organizations face dissatisfied customers, service recovery processes are initiated (Michel & Meuter, 2008). Successful recovery can simply make the difference between customer retention or defection, and is therefore of great importance to profitability (Stauss & Friege, 1999). Stauss (2002) even argued that a successful recovery effort is a prerequisite for customer retention, following a service failure. Thus, organizations able to react effectively and appropriate to any form of service failure, will be in a better position to retain their profitable customers and keep them satisfied.

1.2 Liberal redress policies

Nowadays the value of a good service recovery, in order to satisfy customers, is common knowledge for almost all marketers and organizations. In addition, data obtained from service recovery also enables organizations to identify problem areas, prevent future failures and drive improvements (McQuilken & Robertson, 2011). A plethora of research, therefore, highlights the value of customer complaints associated with the service recovery and their additional learning curve (Snellman and Vihtkari, 2003; Baker et al., 2012). For that reason, researchers emphasize that customer complaints are extremely valuable and should be actively welcomed and encouraged by an organization.

Consequently, during the last decade it has become accepted practice to pro-actively encourage and welcome customer complaints (Bennett, 1997; Prim & Pras, 1998; Snellman & Vihtkari, 2003). Along with the rise of customer orientation and relationship marketing approaches, liberal redress policies like ‘100% satisfaction guarantees’ and principles like ‘the customer is always right’ are adopted. Notable, search engine Google produces 36 million results in 2016 whenever searching for the quote “the customer is always right”, which might be an adequate indication of its popularity.

So along with the widespread acceptance of the link between acting upon the interest of the customer and business performance, it is unsurprising that the primary focus of organizations nowadays is to fulfill the demand of the customer, no matter what (Reynolds & Harris, 2006). Complaining is actively encouraged in order to learn and serve customers at the utmost best. Moreover, companies tend to give customers the benefit of the doubt and on top of that, compensate them generously, regardless of the validity of their complaint, in order to make them even more satisfied (e.g. Wirtz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010; Baker, Magnini & Perdue, 2012). Consequently, nowadays firms such as Braun offers a “100-days, 100% satisfaction guaranteed, no questions asked”. Whereas the Ritz-Carlton lives upon the guiding principle: “Do everything you possibly can to never lose a guest”.

1.3 Illegitimate complaints

While the current marketing discipline clearly act upon the prevailing assumption that “the customer is always right”, the question arises whether this really reflects reality. As already indicated by Farrington (1914), customers may not always be right and will not always behave in a manner that is both rational and functional (at least from the perspective of the organization). Even though customers may well be “king”, in some respects, a small number of studies argue that the customer can also act as a dictator, in that it can be detrimental to other customers, employees, and organizations (e.g. Shamir 1980; Sturdy 1998; Harris and Reynolds 2004;). It should be realized that norm-breaking “deviant” customer behaviors are not only present, but also commonplace (Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Harris & Reynolds, 2004). However, a review by Hogueve and Gremler (2009) indicates that literature into service recovery have largely ignored this supposition.

Only a small portion of academic literature acknowledges that customers do sometimes engage in illegitimate, opportunistic, false or fraudulent complaining behavior (e.g. Harris & Reynolds, 2004; Berry & Seiders, 2008; Macintosh & Stevens, 2013). However, these findings are mostly conceptual, anecdotal or based on very limited data. “Clear empirical evidence of opportunistic or fraudulent customer complaints is hard to find” (Ro and Wong, 2012, p. 424). As research into deviant customer behavior has a sensitive nature and potential for bias, some authors even suggest that this task is challenging and fraught with difficulties.

Nevertheless, Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010) attempted to explore opportunistic customer claiming behavior in a service recovery context. Their study makes a strong case that customers sometimes act with self-serving fairness by taking advantage of a risen opportunity and claim in an

illegitimate manner. Subsequently, Baker et al. (2012) came up with several (customer-, firm- and relationship-centric) drivers of opportunism, which underlies illegitimate complaining behavior. This opportunistic behavior encompasses instances wherein customers claim what they can, rather than where they are entitled to. In a service recovery context this implies an individual who recognizes an opportunity to take advantage of a service failure and a company's recovery efforts (Baker et al., 2012). At the initiative of Yani-de-Soriano and Slater (2009) and supported by Baker et al. (2010) it is argued that this opportunistic complaining is among other things, probably fueled by the prevailing liberal redress policies, which aspire too much customer satisfaction. Customers respond with unscrupulous behavior to these policies and seem to enjoy accepting compensation in response to the illegitimate complaints they made (Yani-de-Soriano & Slater, 2009). In addition, concerning firm-centric drivers, Baker et al (2012) suggested that the size of the firm may also drive illegitimate complaint behavior. Specifically, they proposed that customer are more prone to claim in an illegitimate manner, when transacting with large firms as opposed to small ones.

Even though aforementioned possible drivers of illegitimate complaining behavior are suggested, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, they are not yet fully examined. Thus, research that examines factors associated with deviant customer behavior within the context of service recovery is requested. Echoing this, Baker et al. (2012) call for future research to deeply delve into antecedents and consequences associated with illegitimate customer complaining behavior. Therefore, the impact of the prevailing culture wherein companies generously compensate any complaint and heavily emphasize their '100% satisfaction guarantees', should be explored (Yani-de-Soriano & Slater, 2009).

1.4 Neutralization theory

Even though the presence of liberal redress policies may fuel illegitimate complaints, it remains peculiar that people engage in such behaviors as they are in essence illegal (Harris & Daunt, 2011). According to the cognitive dissonance theory such illegal behavior is suggested to induce an extremely unpleasant state of mind. Consequently, exploring illegitimate complaint behavior from a criminology point of view, could reveal valuable insights.

Within the academic criminology field it is acknowledged that crimes occur more frequently, when the bond with society is broken or at least weakened. Sykes and Matza (1957) found that people employ a bundle of cognitive neutralization techniques, in order to weaken this bond. Their neutralization theory explains how individuals employ certain techniques to convince themselves of the appropriateness of their actions, regardless the prevailing proscriptions for this behavior. Engaging in this particular behavior can then occur, while avoiding negatively labeling oneself as a criminal due to the neutralizing process. Succinctly put, techniques of neutralization are used in order to protect the individual from any blame after the act. This neutralization theory potentially offers a fruitful perspective from which customer rationalizations regarding their (complaining) misbehavior could be examined (Harris & Dumas, 2009).

1.5 Research aim

Believing that customers are always right is approved to be clearly outdated, unrealistic and naïve (Reynolds & Harris, 2006; Wirtz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010). However, an accurate picture of actual drivers of people engaging in illegitimate complaining behavior lacks. Approaching this phenomenon through the theoretical framework of neutralization theory and examining the impact of the firm-centric drivers; liberal redress policies and firm size (as suggested by Baker et al., 2012), could potentially result in new interesting insights. Therefore, the following research questions will be addressed and answered: (1) Do liberal redress policies fuel the act of illegitimate complaining behavior? Moreover, (2) What is the impact of firm size on the act of illegitimate complaining behavior? And if they voice illegitimate complaints, (3) Do customers employ neutralization techniques in order to rationalize this illegitimate behavior? Succinctly put, the objective of this study is to find out to what extent the firm-centric drivers; redress policies and firm size enhance illegitimate complaining behavior and whether the use of neutralization techniques is a possible underlying mechanism which explains the behavior.

1.6 Theoretical relevance

The prevailing service recovery literature mostly emphasize the value of service recovery and associated customer complaints (e.g. McQuilken & Robertson, 2011). Moreover, research highlights the possibilities and benefits of a good service recovery, while possible dark sides remain unexplored. However, Yani-de-Soriano & Slater (2009) were the first to suggest that employment of liberal redress policies may not only have positive results, but instead possibly fuel illegitimate customer complaints. Subsequently, Baker et al. (2012) continued with suggesting that there are several customer-, firm- and relationship centric factors which spawn opportunistic customer complaining. However, as they point out in their conceptual framework, the overall picture of the forces which trigger illegitimate complaints remains vague and largely unexplored. Regarding the firm centric drivers, they proposed that illegitimate complaining behavior is more likely to occur in large firms and in firms that employ liberal redress practices. However, even though they suggest that it would be informative to empirically test these propositions, to the best of the researcher's knowledge this has not yet happened. As a result, it still is unclear if these forces drive illegitimate claiming behavior. The present study, therefore, addresses this gap and advances the understanding of the phenomenon by empirically investigating these possible drivers of illegitimate complaining behavior.

Furthermore, as illegitimate complaint behavior is in essence an illegal activity, insights from the academic criminology field may offer other interesting explanations. More specifically, literature regarding to other forms of deviant behaviors such as shoplifting, cheating in exams and music piracy already tend to examine the application of neutralization techniques by delinquents (Cromwell & Thurman, 2003; Rosenbaum & Kuntze, 2003; Smith, Davy & Easterling, 2004). As suggested by a few authors, customers engaging in illegitimate complaint behavior may also use such techniques in order

to convince themselves of the appropriateness of their actions (Writz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010; Baker et al., 2012). Succinctly put, these neutralization techniques could potentially enable customers to act without feeling any blame after the act. However, even though it is expected that customer rationalize their behavior, it is not yet empirically examined in the context of complaint behavior. This research will therefore contribute to the existing literature by explicitly incorporating the use of neutralization techniques within the context of service recovery.

1.7 Practical relevance

Most organizations nowadays act upon the interest of the customer by employing liberal redress policies and generous service recovery practices. Moreover, the value of customer complaints are emphasized and as a result, it has been suggested that organizations should encourage customer complaints (Writz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010; Baker et al., 2012). These practices are clearly based upon the assumption that customers are reasonable and honest in their claiming behavior. However, research recently showed that the customer may actually not always be right. More and more customers attempt to take advantage of service failures nowadays, and claim what they can, rather than what they deserve (Reynolds & Harris, 2005). The pervasiveness of these illegitimate complaints suggest that organizations may be enduring vast financial costs, by way of compensating them for extreme failures which never happened. It is therefore at utmost importance that companies acknowledge the unfair behavior of several customers. The possibility that illegitimate customer complaints may negatively affect the appropriate way of service recovery cannot be underestimated. Given the narrow profit margins and fierce competition, the issue of illegitimate complaining behavior has become increasingly relevant over the past few years. Succinctly put, companies who do ignore this deviant customer behavior and who still settle all complaints at face value would be subjected to inevitable losses (Farrington, 1914).

The necessity to answer the aforementioned research questions is also amplified because there may be approaches by which companies could identify or even tackle the illegitimate complaints. If knowledge is gained about the way customers rationalize their complaining behavior, companies could respond in a way to make sure that they are not harmed more than is absolutely necessary. Furthermore, for marketing managers the answers are relevant regarding to decisions about continually (over)spending money, time and effort to welcome and encourage customer complaints. A reevaluation of the current complaint and service recovery procedures is needed. That is, as suggested before, liberal redress policies may be inadvertently encourage customers to made up service failures and illegitimate complaints.

1.8 Structure of the report

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: the second chapter provide a theoretical background regarding to illegitimate complaining in the service recovery context and neutralization theory. Additionally, an elaboration on the methodology will be given. The fourth chapter presents an

in-depth analysis and the results. Subsequently in chapter five the research is concluded by the provision of some concluding remarks and a discussion.

2. Theoretical background

In this chapter, at first the concept of customer complaining behavior is explained. Thereafter illegitimate complaining is discussed and associated key literature is presented. Furthermore, in order to get a grasp at possible underlying drivers of illegitimate complaining, the expected impact of the firm-centric drivers; ‘liberal redress policies’ and ‘firm size’ is discussed and subsequently linked to the neutralization theory. Based on the discussed theory hypotheses and a conceptual model are proposed.

2.1 Customer complaining behavior

Service recovery processes are mostly initiated when a service provider is faced with customer complaints. This process of complaining is broadly captured by the term customer complaining behavior (CCB), which is defined as “any response to a (service) failure” (Reynolds & Harris, 2005). When confronted with a complaining customer, service providers are given an opportunity to resolve the situation, learn from it in order to prevent failures in the future and possibly even make the customer more loyal than before (Snellman & Vihtkari, 2003). Since researchers and practitioners highlighted the potential value of complaints and the possible learning experience organizations can get from it, the CCB phenomenon is frequently studied (Blodgett et al., 1993; Hart et al., 1989). Within this diverse range of studies, organizations are strongly advised to pro-actively welcome and encourage CCB (Prim & Pras, 1999; Snellman & Vihtkari, 2003).

Extant customer complaining literature has forwarded useful insights into the drivers of CCB (e.g. Jacoby & Jaccard, 1981; Kowalski, 1996; Harris & Mowen, 2001; Reynolds & Harris, 2005). This large number of studies provided a lot of potential factors, of which three main categories can be discriminated. The first category consists of “personal related drivers”. Andreassen (1988) developed a personality model, whereby a lot of psychological variables are identified as driving motives to initiate a complaint. These include, among others assertiveness, personal values, (anger) emotions, alienation and attitude towards complaining (Rogers and Williams, 1990; Singh, 1990; Blodgett, 1995; Kim et al., 2003; Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005). Secondly, literature also focused on “demographic variables” as possible antecedent of complaining behavior. Summarized, the typical profile of the most heavily complaining customer is a: young, high educated female, who holds a professional job, earns above average and has children (Jacoby & Jaccard, 1981; Moyer, 1984; Heung & Lam, 2003). The third category is based on “situational drivers” of CCB. Among other things these are: intensity of the perceived dissatisfaction, purchase involvement, relationship with the service provider, type of service and reputation of the service provider (Singh, 1990; Blodgett et al., 1995).

Aforementioned findings attributed to the growing body of literature within service recovery context. However, in this regard almost all empirical research is predominantly based on the assumption that customers do not knowingly complain without cause (Harris & Reynolds, 2004). In other words, it is presumed that the motive to complain is driven by a genuine service failure and thus legitimate in

nature. However, in contrast to the central body of CCB literature, a small, but growing group of researchers questioned the assumption and espouses that in reality CCB may occur without a service failure or dissatisfaction experience (Day et al., 1981; Jacoby & Jaccard, 1981; Harris & Reynolds, 2005). It is therefore suggested that such unjust and pre-planned complaints, which are essentially “illegitimate” and “fraudulent” in nature, should be incorporated in the service recovery literature. Surprisingly, this proposition has been ignored to a large extent.

2.2 Illegitimate complaining

Since the first supposition that CCB does not always has to be driven by a genuine service failure and customer complaints, therefore, may be illegitimate or even downright false, a small portion of literature examined it. Within this range of literature a broad set of labels to describe these unjust complaints are presented. A first category classified the problematic behavior as driven by “wrong” motives of complaining customers. These are, among others: unfair customer behavior (Berry & Seiders, 2008), fraudulent complaints (Kowalski, 1996), faked complaints (Day et al, 1981), dishonest or feigned complaints (Reynolds & Harris, 2005) and opportunistic complaints (Writz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010). However, when assuming that these customers behave upon wrong motives, all unconscious behavior is excluded. Though, empirical research has not yet proven that complaining customers always have bad intentions.

Secondly, a group of labels are used which classify the concerned behavior as “not normal”. Examples in this category are: deviant customer behavior (Harris & Daunt, 2011), aberrant customer behavior (Fullerton & Punj, 1993) and jay customer behavior (Harris & Reynolds, 2004). By using such terms, indirect assumptions are made that the majority of the complaints are based upon “normal” service failures. However, service recovery research remains silent whether this problematic customer behavior is routinely or exceptional.

The third category marks the behavior as “problematic”, which results in labels such as; dysfunctional customer behavior (Harris & Reynolds, 2003), problem customers and consumer misbehavior (Harris & Daunt, 2013). Actually, in order to classify behavior, the point of view should be taken into consideration. Whereas opportunistic complaints are detrimental from an organization’s point of view (regarding the time and effort of service recovery processes), they may be perceived as functional from a customer point of view (as they will be compensated generously).

The researcher, therefore, decided to prefer the more holistic, comprehensive label: “illegitimate complaints”. An illegitimate complaint could be either an exaggeration of a minor service failure or an abuse of service guarantees in order to benefit from compensation and is in essence driven by opportunism. Put differently, according to Ro and Wong (2011) illegitimate complainants can be originally, satisfied customers who exaggerate, alter or lie about the fact or situation or abuse intentionally service guarantees. Hence, from an organizational perspective these complaints, can be deemed as unjust, unfounded, irrational, abnormal or unusual (Fullerton & Punj, 1993).

In 1981 Day et al. already suggested that fraudulent complaints do exist, but that they are rather limited and would not bias any statistical complaint research. However, Fullerton and Punj (1993) argued that in reality deviant customer behaviors, such as making illegitimate complaints, are of frequent occurrence. A study by Reynolds and Harris (2005) demonstrated, that indeed such illegitimate complaints appear to be rather commonplace nowadays. Since the majority of their respondents were able to recall a recent situation, within the last six months, in which they personally made an illegitimate complaint. Furthermore, these illegitimate complaints are not solely ‘vocalized’ in nature, but also exist in written form via letters or online means (Harris & Reynolds, 2004).

Within the limited existing body of literature concerning illegitimate complaining, different archetypes of illegitimate complainants can be distinguished. Among other things these are: honest, fraudulent, one-off, conditioned, professional and opportunistic complainants. The first one, a “honest illegitimate complainant”, is a customer who honestly, but incorrectly thinks there is something wrong with the service. In contrast, the “fraudulent complaining customer” consciously and intentionally creates an opportunity to benefit from a service guarantee. The “one-off complainant” knows that the behavior is illegal, the complaining is accompanied by feelings of anxiety and guilt and the complainant will state it as a truly, one time activity (Reynolds & Harris, 2005). Furthermore, the “conditioned complainant” is some who declared to have learned the behavior by observing relative others effectively benefit from illegitimate complaining (Reynolds & Harris, 2005). The “professional illegitimate complainer”, just like the fraudulent complainant, purposely seeks out opportunities to voice fabricated complaints, but distinguishes himself in that it is on a pro-active, regular basis. The last form is most frequently cited in the academic literature, namely the opportunistic complainant. In both satisfactory and unsatisfactory situations an opportunistic complainer tends to aggressively take advantage of a potentially lucrative opportunity as it occurs (Reynolds & Harris, 2005; Wirtz & McColl Kennedy, 2010). As Baker et al. (2012) stated, these individuals voice unjustified complaints with the goal of receiving (financial) compensation, put differently they are seeking self-interest with guile if possible.

While a range of studies have acknowledged the existence of illegitimate complaints, empirical research into the driving motives or sources have remained greatly limited. Although Jacoby and Jaccard already pointed towards possible motives for this deviant customer behavior in 1981, only a few studies subsequently followed. Within this (growing) body of literature the following, more individual driven, sources have been suggested. The first one assumes that illegitimate complaining behavior arise due to an anti-business attitude. Customers are simply driven by revenge, hate or disapproval feelings (Jacoby & Jaccard, 1981). Secondly, and probably most suggested, customers are merely driven by financial greed or monetary gains. Opportunism is the underlying concept explaining this behavior. Furthermore, Reynolds and Harris also suggested the “fault transferor” motive which implies that a customer is trying to avoid his own guilt regarding a service failure, by projecting it on the service provider itself. Another motive they found is about gaining approval of others, also called a peer-induced esteem seeker, who experience benefits from impressing others (Alicke et al. 1992). Fifth

is an individual driven motive which is named “disruptive gain”. People driven by this motive enjoy creating a negative or awkward atmosphere, therefore, they simply complain because they like the whole claiming experience (Reynolds & Harris, 2005; Goodwin and Spiggle, 1989).

Despite the lack of intensive research into these personal drivers of illegitimate complaining, a few researchers recently argued that this deviant behavior is merely caused by firm-centric drivers (Reynolds & Harris, 2005; Yani-de-Soriano & Slater, 2009). Moreover, others remarked the odd fact that even though the behavior is illegal it became common practice in society today (Harris & Daunt, 2011; Baker, Magnini & Perdue, 2012). They argued that in order to perform such illegal behavior customer must apply some sort of cognitive technique, called neutralization techniques, in order to avoid negative feelings as guilt or blame. However, these two recently appointed possible drivers of illegitimate complaining behavior are to the best of the researcher’s knowledge not yet fully examined, but could offer an extremely potential perspective.

2.3 Liberal redress policies

In order to explain the growing illegitimate complaining trend Reynolds and Harris (2005) suggested that there must be some broader, societal driven motives which may have played a part in the demonstrated extent of illegitimate complaints. They specifically pointed at the contemporary organizational and marketing practices as customer orientation and relationship marketing, which made it more convenient for customers to take advantage. Along with the rise of these marketing practices, liberal redress policies which pro-actively encourage and welcome customer complaints are also ordinary practice. These liberal redress policies not only encourage complaining but also tend to give customers the benefit of the doubts and compensate them generously regardless of the validity or legitimacy of their complaint (Wirtz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010).

Yani-de-Soriano and Slater (2009), therefore, went even further by arguing that the impact of the prevailing culture of service guarantees and generous compensations heavily contributed to the emergence of a society wherein illegitimate complaining behavior is the rule rather than the exception. This suggestion could be supported by opportunistic complaining literature, since it is suggested that opportunistic complainants simply recognize an opportunity and take advantage of it (Wirtz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010). In the context of liberal redress policies, these complainants are more easily exposed to an opportunity of which they could take advantage. In other words, from a firm-centric point of view, a heavy emphasis on customer orientation and generous redress policies invite opportunistic complaints (Baker, Magnini & Perdue, 2012). Ro and Wong (2012) therefore suggested future studies to examine the effectiveness of certain management strategies. However, the trend of organizations being even more polite and more generous seems to continue. A direct effect on a growing body of illegitimate customer complaining behavior in these contexts, is therefore expected. Since illegitimate complaining behavior in this study is operationalized as voicing complaints of service failures that did not occur, as

well as demanding more compensation than is justified (from an organizational perspective) and showing opportunism intentions, the following is hypothesized:

H1a: If a liberal redress policy is employed, customers will voice significantly more illegitimate complaints compared to the absence of a redress policy

H1b: If a liberal redress policy is employed, customers will demand significantly more compensation compared to the absence of a redress policy

H1c: If a liberal redress policy is employed, customers significantly behave more opportunistic compared to the absence of a redress policy

2.4 Firm Size

In addition to liberal redress policies, another proposed firm-centric driver of illegitimate complaining behavior is the size of the firm (Baker et al., 2012). Previous research in the service context often points at the differences between large and small firms. For example Stone (1954) already found that customers felt protective of locally owned stores, but did not feel this way about large chains. Furthermore, regarding to shoplifting, deviant behavior is considered justifiable if it took place in a large as opposed to a small store (Wirtz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010). Fullerton and Punj (2004) stated that customers, with regard to service recovery, have learned to expect more from large firms due to their liberal return policies. Misconduct, therefore, has become ingrained as part of the prevailing culture. Moreover, customers tend to behave in a more deviant way when dealing with a wealthier counterpart, for whom costs of deception appears to be low and can be easily absorbed due to their sheer size (Mazar & Ariely, 2006). Following these differences between large and small firms, specifically Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010) came across the evidence that customers are more prone to be opportunistic when transacting with large firms as opposed to small ones. Subsequently, this research will examine the following proposition of Baker et al. (2012) regarding to firm size:

H2a: Customers facing a minor service failure within a large firm will voice significantly more illegitimate complaints compared to a small firm

H2b: Customers facing a minor service failure within a large firm will demand significantly more compensation compared to a small firm

H2c: Customers facing a minor service failure within a large firm will significantly behave more opportunistic compared to a small firm

In addition, since it is expected that both firm-centric drivers liberal redress policies and firm size evoke more illegitimate complaints, an interaction effect between those drivers is likely to occur. In other

words, it is expected that whenever a large firm employs a liberal redress policy the voice of illegitimate complaints will significantly increase. Therefore, within this research the following is hypothesized:

H3: The effect of a liberal redress policy on illegitimate complaining behavior is stronger for a large firm compared to a small firm

2.5 Neutralization theory

During the last decade it is argued that organizations should realize that norm-breaking “illegitimate” customer behaviors are not only present, but also commonplace (Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Harris & Reynolds, 2004). However, it is actually peculiar that the trend of illegitimate complaining became more widely adopted, since these activities are in essence illegal (Harris & Daunt, 2011). According to the cognitive dissonance theory, such illegal activities arouses unpleasant cognitive states which people are actively trying to avoid, by either changing their behavior towards more legal practices, or otherwise by adapting their attitudes towards the illegal activity (Aronson, 1969). As an increasing group of customers are complaining in an illegitimate manner, it is therefore suggested that such activities are clearly rational and normalized to the extent that such acts occurs without significant cognitive dissonance (Harris & Reynolds, 2003). In response to these suggestions a number of scholars have found that customers employ several cognitive techniques of neutralization in order to justify and rationalize their own behaviors.

Within the academic criminology field it is generally known that crimes occur more frequently when the bond with society is broken or weakened. One way to weaken this bond is founded by Sykes and Matza (1957), who named it “neutralization”. The neutralization theory has developed over the years and have been employed to explain a variety of (illegal) activities such as shoplifting (Strutton, Vitell & Pelton, 1994; Cromwell & Thurman, 2003), consumer fraud (Rosenbaum & Kuntze, 2003) and cheating in exams (Smith, Davy & Easterling, 2004; Atmeh & Al-Khadash, 2008). Within the service recovery literature an application of neutralization theory has been requested several times but largely neglected. However, the techniques of neutralization offer a fruitful perspective from which customer rationalizations regarding illegitimate complaint behavior could be examined (Harris & Dumas, 2010).

In 1957 Sykes and Matza thus introduced the neutralization theory in order to demonstrate in what way people utilize cognitive techniques as ‘guilt-reducing mechanisms’. Despite prevailing societal proscriptions of the behavior, both consequences of their act and feelings of guilt are avoided. As a consequence one will not damage his self-image, due to the neutralizing process. Furthermore, the individual also render any social control or negative sanctions of society, as he can convince himself that criminal intent was absent. Those techniques provide the potential to enable persons to temporarily switch between deviant and appropriate behavior, whilst evading any sense of guilt and remain committed to societal espoused norms and values (Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankenship, 2005). Basically

it can be concluded that every customer facing a service encounter is equipped with a tool that makes it possible to misbehave, while being relieved from any remorse relating to the behavior.

Along with the introduction of the theory, Sykes and Matza (1957) distinguished five techniques of neutralization: 'denial of responsibility', 'denial of injury', 'denial of victim', 'condemning the condemners' and 'appealing to higher loyalties'.

1. 'Denial of Responsibility' enables any individual to declare the behavior as beyond his control. Put differently, due to outside forces, other people, or circumstances he is forced to engage in the deviant behavior and, therefore, is not responsible.
2. 'Denial of Injury' include a weakened or broken link between someone's act and his consequences. Emphasizing the lack of any actual direct harm often supported by the assumption that the victim can afford it.
3. 'Denial of Victim' is a technique by which the unethical side of the behavior is acknowledged, but the violated party is categorized as a 'wrongdoer' and therefore deserved whatever happened. The frequent use of the technique will increase whenever the possible victim is not physical attend, unknown or even vague or abstract.
4. 'Condemning the condemners' is used in order to shift the attention of owns misbehavior by attacking the (critical) other. Thereby pointing at moments in which they engage in similar behavior.
5. 'Appeal to higher loyalties' is applied whenever an individual finds himself in a dilemma between (in his eyes) two appropriate choices. For instance choosing between protecting a friend or comply with the law. The deviant behavior will therefore be categorized as a by-product of actualizing a higher order ideal.

While abovementioned neutralization techniques are most widely accepted and employed in academic literature, subsequently a lot of other techniques are identified. Among others, these are: 'defence of necessity', 'metaphor of ledger', 'claim of normalcy', 'denial of negative intent', 'claim of relative acceptability', 'justification by comparison', 'denial of the necessity of the law', 'claim that everybody else is doing it', 'postponement', 'claim of entitlement' and 'claim of individuality' (e.g. Minor, 1981; Henry, 1990; Coleman, 1994; Cromwell and Thurman, 2003). Since not all techniques are proven relevant in the service context, only those who are most frequently examined in academic literature will be explained.

1. 'Metaphor of ledger' implies the technique of counterbalancing all the good and bad behaviors and thereby reason out that a sufficient supply of good behavior credits the appropriateness of the deviant behavior (e.g. Piquero et al., 2005)
2. 'Claim of relative acceptability' or also called "Justification by Comparison", enables individuals to compare their misbehavior with other, much worse behavior. Thereby

minimizing the extent of wrongness of the exhibited behavior. (e.g. Cromwell & Thurman, 2003)

3. 'Defence of necessity' occurs when a certain act is perceived as necessary even if it is considered morally or legally wrong (e.g. Minor, 1981).
4. 'Postponement' is used in order to simply put the incident out of mind to prevent for any cognitive dissonance (e.g. Cromwell & Thurman, 2003).

Besides these added techniques, neutralization literature also suggested a possible segmentation regarding the sequential use of the techniques. Fritzsche (2005) illustrated this distinction between neutralizations, which are applied before the incident, and rationalizations, which are employed post deviance. However, this temporal distinction is not necessarily absolute, in that the technique used as a neutralization in one situation may be employed as a rationalization in a later incident (Cromwell & Thurman, 2003). Harris and Daunt (2011) examined this distinction regarding a variety of customer misbehaviors and indeed found that the various techniques were used both prior, as well as post event.

2.6 Neutralization techniques in service encounters

Relative to the overall volume of research with regard to the use of neutralization techniques and their evidence of applicability, the academic marketing literature lacks applications (Vitell, 2003). This resulted in multiple calls for future research to advance understanding of neutralization within the context of customer misbehavior in service encounters (Maruna & Copes, 2004; Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Vitell, 2003).

Harris and Daunt (2011) were the firsts to apply techniques of neutralization to explain different forms of deviant customer behavior. One of the examined forms are 'dishonest actions of customers' which refers to consumers' behaviors or actions that are knowingly deceitful or fraudulent and were in this study: fraudulent returning, avoiding payment and fraudulent compensation claims. Their study showed that behaviors in this context were only neutralized by the "denial of injury", "denial of victim", "relative acceptability" and "metaphor of the ledger" techniques.

More specifically, Harris and Daunt (2011) found that during fraudulent compensation claiming the "denial of victim" technique was most reported. This implicates that misbehaving customers cognitively neutralized their behaviors through claiming that such acts were deserved by the target firms. Customers declared that firms should expect customers to act in a deviant way and take advantage of firms' systems (Harris & Daunt, 2010). In the light of liberal redress policies the use of the denial of victim technique could be well supported, since organizations literally encourage customers to complain. These policies give customers a substantiation to condone the behavior for themselves since they could state that the targeted firm asked for it. Within the context of liberal redress policies, it is therefore expected that customers frequently use the "denial of victim" technique in order to rationalize their illegitimate complaining behavior.

Furthermore, regarding to a liberal redress policy, it is also expected that the neutralization technique “denial of injury” would frequently be employed. This technique enables customers to convince themselves from the absence of any harm, which is often supported by the assumption that the victim can afford it. With a liberal redress policy like a “100% satisfaction guarantee” firms encourage customers to complain. Thereby, also sending out a signal that they could afford any complaint. This situation makes it easier for an illegitimate complaining customer to relieve themselves from any remorse relating to the behavior, since he could state that the firm would not be hurt by his actions.

So, criminology studies have already proven that neutralization techniques enable basically every customer of misbehaving without experiencing negative guilt feelings. Harris and Daunt (2011) proved that these techniques are also applied during fraudulent customer complaining. It therefore is expected that customers who engage in illegitimate complaining behavior will apply significantly more neutralization techniques, in order to condone the behavior for themselves. In addition, since neutralization techniques may be employed prior to, as well as post behavior a causal relationship between illegitimate complaining behavior and the neutralization techniques denial of victim and denial of injury could not be assumed. Moreover, the following is hypothesized:

H4a: Neutralization technique denial of victim is used, in order to rationalize illegitimate complaining behavior in a service context

H4b: Neutralization technique denial of injury is used, in order to rationalize illegitimate complaining behavior in a service context




Figure 1. Conceptual framework and research hypotheses

Fig. 1 illustrates the proposed conceptual framework and associated hypotheses. At first it is postulated that liberal redress policies have a direct effect on illegitimate complaining behavior. Moreover, firm size is expected to be another important driver of illegitimate complaining behavior, because research showed that customers tend to claim more from large firms. Furthermore, in case of illegitimate complaining behavior, customers will apply the neutralization techniques denial of victim and denial of injury in order to rationalize the misbehavior for themselves. Since these techniques are used prior to as well as post behavior, a correlation instead of a linear relationship is expected. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, the effect of liberal redress policies on illegitimate complaining behavior, the role of firm size and the explanation in light of neutralization techniques has not been examined in this context.

3. Methodology

In this chapter the research methodology is explained in greater detail. At first the applied experimental research design is indicated. This is followed by an explanation of the used stimulus materials. Then, an elaboration on the measurement and the results of a pretest are given. Followed by a discussion of the research procedure, together with the research ethics. Thereafter, the final sample description is given. Finally, this chapter concludes with the applied statistical treatment.

3.1 Research design

Previous literature has suggested that empirical evidence with regard to illegitimate complaining behavior is almost impossible to find due to its highly sensitive nature and potential for bias (Ro & Wong, 2012). Illegitimate complaining behavior is perceived as a sensitive issue, since it is not only considered illegal, but also really unethical by many people. Given that people do have a natural tendency to answer in a way they perceived as being socially acceptable, it is unlikely that customers readily admit they filed an illegitimate complaint, which leads to bias in the results.

Fortunately, there are different ways to limit the social desirability bias. A first, simple way is by ensuring participants anonymity due to collecting quantitative data via an online channel (Wirtz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010). Moreover, by conducting an online research, construction and formulation of appropriate, neutral questions without any form of judgement could be well thought out (Nederhof, 1985). It therefore is decided that an online, quantitative study is most suitable concerning the sensitive subject of this research.

Secondly, the nature of the quantitative research has to be further declared. Since a survey relies on actual happened situations and illegitimate complaining behavior is expected to be cognitively neutralized, asking participants to retrieve such situations from memory would be a tough task. Moreover, with the risk of response bias in mind, unethical behavior is most often empirically examined through the use of scenario-based experiments (Wirtz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010). By the use of vivid and realistic stimulus material, literature suggests that it is possible to let participants experience to really be in such a situation (Cramer & Fong, 2005). With regard to creating realistic stimulus material, Hende and Schoormans (2012) argued that with narration, written scenario's are sufficiently vivid to enable the participant to imagine being in the situation and thereby compensating for a lack of realism. Since written scenario's including narratives are relatively cheap and easy to develop these are used in order to manipulate the independent variables of this study.

Consequently, in order to test the proposed hypotheses it is decided to conduct a scenario-based experiment using written scenarios as stimuli. Four different scenarios are created, in which the two independent variables of this study 'redress policy' and 'firm size' are manipulated on two levels. Respectively the presence of a liberal redress policy vs. the absence of a liberal redress policy, and a small vs. large firm. Participants were randomly assigned to either one of the four scenarios, which

enables the researcher to eliminate possible disturbances and thereby improves the internal validity of the results. Table 1 gives an overview of the content of each used scenario. After reading one of the scenarios, all participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire. Both scenarios and complementary questionnaires were fully in Dutch. Furthermore, a between-subjects design was opted for, as each participant will only be exposed to one experimental condition in order to avoid any confounded results. Succinctly put, a 2x2, online, scenario-based, between-subjects, posttest-only experiment is executed.

	Liberal Redress Policy	Firm Size
Scenario 1	Present	Large
Scenario 2	Present	Small
Scenario 3	Absent	Large
Scenario 4	Absent	Small

Table 1 Content of used scenarios

3.2 Stimulus materials

In this study both independent variables ‘Liberal Redress Policy’ and ‘Firm Size’ are manipulated in the scenarios. These written scenarios with narration are used in order to enable the participant to imagine being in a particular service situation. It is important that intended participants perceive the scenario as realistic and are able to put oneself in the described situation. The chosen service setting, therefore ideally needs to be familiar to the participants. Furthermore, a small as well as a large firm should be applicable to the service setting. And lastly the presence, or absence, of a liberal redress policy needs to be realistic in the chosen situation. After intensive consultation with possible participants and the consideration of various possible service situations, it is decided that all four scenarios will concern a service situation in a restaurant. Participants are most likely familiar with such a situation, both small as well as large restaurants exist and also several restaurants are actively employing liberal redress policies nowadays.

All scenarios were written in a first person singular perspective and followed a logical sequence. Each scenario first told participants that they would like to celebrate the weekend with a friend in an Italian restaurant. In this first part of the scenario the firm size was already manipulated, since both scenario one and three involved a large restaurant chain; Happy Italy. This manipulation was strengthened by informing participants that Happy Italy is a large, popular restaurant chain with high turnovers, which nowadays can be found in almost every city. Scenario two and four both revolved around a small, local restaurant called ‘Pizzeria Piccolo’. This manipulation was strengthened by informing participants that this small restaurant is located near their home and is run by the two brothers Piccolo. Thereafter, in all scenarios it was told that the restaurant is very crowded but the waitress,

however, managed to get you a small table in the corner. You decided to have a Carpaccio salad as an appetizer, but you end up disappointed when it is finally served. Despite the fact that you told the waitress to be allergic for pine nuts, these are all over your salad. Luckily, in contrast, your pizza did satisfy you. Afterwards, the waitress asked you whether everything was to your satisfaction. In both scenarios one and two a liberal redress policy is then mentioned by the waitress. She actively points out that the restaurant employs a '100% satisfaction guarantee' as it wants every customer to leave the restaurant satisfied. In scenarios three and four this part about a satisfaction guarantee is left out. In these scenarios it is only mentioned that you are doubting whether you should share your disappointment. All four scenarios are pretested and evaluated on their realism which will be discussed later this chapter.

3.3 Measurement

After participants are randomly assigned to either one of the four written scenarios, they all faced the similar questionnaire. Since this study focused on the Dutch population all scenarios as well as the questionnaire are translated into Dutch. The questionnaire, included in Appendix I consisted of eight different parts, which will be elaborated in the following paragraphs. These parts concern: the manipulation checks, satisfaction measures, intention to complain, the three different indicators of illegitimate complaining behavior, denial of injury measures, denial of victim measures and lastly some demographic variables.

3.3.1 Manipulation checks

In order to check whether participants perceived the written scenarios and their complementary manipulations as intended, two questions were asked. The first question concerned the size of the firm with the two answer options: 'big' or 'small'. The second question concerned the presence of a 100% satisfaction guarantee which has the answer options: 'No, not present', and 'Yes, present'. These items were used in order to eliminate participants whose manipulation had failed from further analysis. Eliminating these particular participants increased the reliability that results are due to the manipulation, instead of other possible influences.

3.3.2 Satisfaction

In order to check whether participants perceived the restaurant visit as a little bit disappointing, as was intended, Oliver and Swan's (1989) satisfaction scale is adapted to the context of this study. The final added scale consisted of three items which are measured on a seven-point Likert scale, anchored by totally disagree until totally agree. The final satisfaction construct was a composite score of the three variables and therefore considered a metric variable. The measurement scale of satisfaction can be found in Appendix I.

3.3.3 Intention to complain

Since an intention to complain is a prerequisite for real illegitimate complaining behavior, one question was added to the questionnaire to filter out all non-complainers. This question asked participants to indicate, concerning their written scenario, whether they will voice their complaint to the waitress. Answer options were simply 'Yes' or 'No'. Participants who indicated not to complain were rerouted directly to the last part of the questionnaire, which involved the demographic variables. This choice is made since participants who do not have the intention to complain, will logically not voice an illegitimate complaint and therefore do not need to apply neutralization techniques in order to condone their behavior.

3.3.4 Illegitimate complaining behavior

Participants who indicated to voice their complaint were faced several questions which measured the degree of legitimacy of their intended complaint. As discussed in the previous chapter, complaints can be illegitimate in several ways. In this study illegitimate complaining behavior is operationalized at the following three levels: 'number of arguments', 'compensation claimed' and 'degree of opportunism'.

At first, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they will use the eight given possible arguments to substantiate their complaint. These items were measured on a five-point Likert scale rating from 'I will definitely not use the argument' to 'I will definitely use the argument'. Within these eight options several illegitimate arguments, based on the scenarios, are included as can be seen in the Appendix I. Also the argument that the appetizer wasn't as requested is among these eight items, and is considered as the only legitimate complaint. For the first part of the analysis, which tests hypotheses one, two and three, a metrically scaled variable is necessary in order to conduct a MANOVA test. Participants therefore get a composite mean score for this construct, which is based on their score on the seven illegitimate complaints. In order to test hypotheses four, where 'number of arguments' functions as an independent variable, a non-metrically scaled variable had to be compiled. Participants who indicated not to voice any of the illegitimate complaints were appointed to the 'legitimate group' as all others, who did show intentions of using the arguments, were appointed to the 'illegitimate group'. This resulted in a non-metrically scaled variable consisting of two groups.

Secondly, participants had to indicate which sort of compensation they would claim, given the situation. Again eight options, ascending in value, were presented. Participants need to pick one compensation which they desire. Each of the options were associated with a monetary value, ranging from zero euros to sixty euros, the exact monetary values can be found in Appendix I. Just like 'number of arguments', this variable needs to be metrically scaled in order to test hypotheses one, two and three, but also non-metrically scaled in order to test for hypotheses four. The metrically scaled variable is based on an interval score from one to eight, associated with the monetary values. Concerning the

independent, non-metrically scaled variable it was decided to consider the claim as illegitimate when the monetary value was above that of the disappointing appetizer. This implied that people with a score above four are assigned to the 'illegitimate group', whereas the others belong to the 'legitimate group'.

At last the degree of opportunism is measured as one of the three ways to determine illegitimate complaining behavior. This construct is based on the existing opportunism scales of Ping (1993) and John (1984). In order to translate the scales to the context of this study, small changes had to be made and some items were deleted. The final scale consisted of three items (e.g. 'If deemed necessary, I will slightly adjust the facts in order to get my desired compensation') which were measured on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 'totally agree' to 'totally disagree'. The opportunism construct is, therefore, a composite mean score of these three items, which functioned as the dependent variable in the first MANOVA. Again, for the second MANOVA test, a non-metrically scaled variable of opportunism is necessary. Participants who had a score above two were considered as showing intentions to complain in an illegitimate way and were therefore ascribed to the 'illegitimate group'.

3.3.5 Neutralization techniques

After the questions regarding to illegitimate complaining behavior the items regarding to the two proposed neutralization techniques were presented. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with nine statements on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 'totally disagree' to 'totally agree'. Five of these statements are items with respect to the denial of injury technique, the other four statements belong to the denial of victim technique. Most previous, quantitative studies on neutralization techniques only used single-item measures for each technique. However, within this study it has been decided to use multiple items, in order to increase the validity. Both measurement scales were, therefore, based on different existing scales and merged into a new one (Rogers, 1974; Agnew, 1994; Piquero, 2005). By the use of a pilot-test, extensive factor analysis and a reliability test, the validity and reliability of these new measurement scales are assured.

3.3.6 Demographic variables

The last part of the questionnaire which each participant had to fill in, also the non-complainers, consists of some general information. At first participants were asked to fill in their age, thereafter also gender was being questioned. And at last a question regarding education level was included.

3.4 Pretest & manipulation checks

In order to make sure a stable, valid measurement instrument has been developed, the written scenarios as well as the questionnaire were checked at forehand. At first a total of twelve people without any knowledge regarding to the subject of illegitimate complaining behavior, neutralization theory or liberal redress policies, were personally asked to evaluate two of the four different scenarios on a realism scale. The realism scale in this pre-test consisted of three seven-point Likert scale items adapted from existing

scales of (Maxham, 2001; Ok, 2004) and appeared to have an alpha of .70. On average, all scenarios were found to be realistic ($M = 6.19$, $SD = .71$). Separate scores of each scenario can be found in Appendix II. Furthermore, participants were also asked to indicate any differences they noticed between the two scenarios they have read, or if they have any other remarks concerning to ambiguity, vagueness or indistinctiveness. The differences between the scenarios were recognized in all pre-tests. Hence, it could be assumed that the manipulation of firm size and redress policy were understood as intended. Other remarks were analysed and taken into account, which led to some minor adjustments of the scenarios.

After adjusting the scenarios and the development of the initial version of the questionnaire a small pilot test has been conducted in order to make sure that participants are able to understand and fill in the questionnaire as provided. Moreover, since all measurement items were translated into Dutch and slightly adapted to fit the research context, piloting the questionnaire was deemed necessary to check whether people really understand all questions. During this pilot test five people were again personally approached to report on any ambiguity, vagueness, errors or indistinctiveness of the items. Consequently, based on their feedback small revisions to the wording of a few questions were made. Furthermore, also the completion time to finish the study has been recorded, in order to be able to inform participants beforehand about the length of the experiment. The final questionnaire as well as the scenarios are included in Appendix I and III.

3.5 Procedure and research ethics

For data collection purposes, Dutch participants were recruited between May 10, 2017 and May 15, 2017. Via diverse online channels such as social media and mailings, they were asked to voluntarily participate in the study. Since participation of humans was required, research ethics of the APA general principles had to be considered during the whole process (Goodwin, 2003). First, concerning the confidentiality, results of this study have and will only been used for this research. Issues like anonymity have been taken care of, any harms and risks of participants were kept as minimal as possible, human dignity, privacy and autonomy were respected and openness about subject and results were ensured. When people decided to participate, the online survey tool Qualtrics randomly assigned each participant to one of the four scenario's. Participants first faced an introduction text in which they were informed about the general aim of the research. They were told that the purpose of the study is to find out how customers evaluate specific service situations. In order to avoid any bias due to foreknowledge, no reference was made to neutralization or illegitimate complaining. Furthermore, participants were assured their anonymity, informed about their rights and the opportunity to quit at every possible time and lastly an instruction of the following questionnaire was given.

After reading the introduction, participants were asked to carefully read the scenario and try to put themselves in the situation of the scenario they were assigned to. Subsequently, each participant had to fill in the same questionnaire which consists of either 30 or 9 questions, depending on their intention

to complain. After finishing the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. The entire participation took on average slightly under ten minutes.

3.6 Sample

By the means of a convenient sampling method a total of 213 native Dutch people participated in the online experiment. Since Qualtrics forced participants to answer, there were no missing data. Of those participants, 79.9% ($n = 170$) decided to complain, and were therefore useful for the hypothesis testing. According to Hair et al., (2014), the recommended minimum cell size for MANOVA is 20 participants per cell (experimental group). However, it is recommended to use larger sample sizes to maintain acceptable levels of statistical power. Additionally, equal or approximately equal sample sizes per group should be strived for. As Qualtrics equally assigned participants to each scenario and the smallest number of participants per scenario is 45 (see table 2), both requirements were considered to be met. Furthermore, concerning the sample, more women (78.9%) than men (21.1%) participated in the study. The average age of the participants was 30 years; ranging from 16 to 63 years old. And 58.5% of the participants were students, as was 41.9% currently working.

	N=
Scenario 1	57
Scenario 2	45
Scenario 3	56
Scenario 4	55

Table 2: Number of participants per scenario

3.7 Statistical Treatment

Whereas the preceding sections solely dealt with the data collection, this section shortly introduce the applied data-analysis strategy and thereby serves as a bridge to the next chapter. The study relied on an experimental design, where two non-metrically scaled independent variables and four metrically scaled dependent variables were involved. Furthermore, the aim of the study is to identify differences across groups. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) is a suitable statistical technique concerning these characteristics (Hair et al., 2014, p.665). Additionally, a MANOVA is particularly useful when used in conjunction with an experimental design.

After data collection the dataset has been obtained from Qualtrics and analysed with the use of the statistical program IBM SPSS Statistics 23.0. At first all data is renamed, prepared and transformed into an appropriate format for analysis. Manipulation checks have been conducted, as well as the performance of a factor analysis. Both analysis will be discussed in the next chapter. Finally, after checking for the assumptions the MANOVA has been executed, whereof the results will be presented in chapter four.

4. Analysis and results

The upcoming chapter presents the analysis conducted and the obtained results. First, manipulation checks will be discussed. Hereafter the executed factor analysis and the results of a reliability analysis are presented. Followed by the initial descriptive statistics of the data. Finally, this chapter concludes with the results of the hypothesis testing and some additional remarkable results found.

4.1 Manipulation checks

In order to check whether the written scenarios evoked the desired mindset of the participants, two manipulation checks were performed. First, the manipulation of redress policy was checked by a chi-square test. Since both variables ‘redress policy’ and the associated manipulation check were non-metrically scaled a chi-square test appeared to be most appropriate. The test showed a significant result ($\chi^2(1, N = 213) = 90.59, p < .001$). However, looking at the cross table, around 24 percent of the participants in the scenarios without an explicitly mentioned redress policy, surprisingly stated that the restaurant did have one (see Appendix IV). Additionally, almost 11 percent of the participants in the other scenarios, with a mentioned satisfaction guarantee, indicated that the restaurant did not have one. Regarding to the validity of this study, it has been decided to exclude all participants from the original sample who wrongly indicated the presence of a redress policy. The preclusion of these 38 participants have increased the certainty and reliability that any of the results in further analysis are due to the manipulation.

Subsequently, the manipulation of ‘firm size’ has also been assessed by the means of a chi-square test. Again, results indicated that the manipulation was significantly successful ($\chi^2(1, N = 175) = 124.10, p < .001$). In this case 4.8 percent of the participants indicated to have read a scenario in which a big restaurant has been visited, although they were assigned to the small restaurant scenario. Conversely, 10.9 percent of the participants in the big restaurant scenarios indicated to have been in a small one. Just like before, those 14 participants were excluded from any further analysis in order to increase the certainty that possible effects are caused exclusively by the manipulation. As a consequence, the sample size after exclusion consisted of 161 participants.

In order to make sure that participants not only noticed the manipulations in the right way, but that they also were a little triggered to complain, a satisfaction scale was included in the questionnaire. As in all scenarios a small failure concerning the appetizer appeared, it was expected that participants would not be extremely dissatisfied, but also not extremely satisfied with the dinner. The mean satisfaction scores of all participants appeared to be as expected ($M = 3.96, SD = 1.14$), so it therefore can be concluded that the scenarios evoked the intended, desired mindset.

4.2 Factor analysis

In order to assess discriminant validity of the constructs, an exploratory factor analysis (principal axis factoring) has been performed. In other words, by the means of this factor analysis it is checked whether the items that cluster on a factor, were in accordance with theoretical expectations. Before running the initial factor analysis, one item for satisfaction had to be reversed, as it was negatively formulated. Subsequently, the fifteen items associated with the constructs ‘satisfaction’, ‘opportunism’, ‘denial of injury’ and ‘denial of victim’ were included in the common factor analysis with oblique rotation (see Appendix V). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis ($KMO = .75$), as it was above the threshold value of .50 (Hair, 2014). Furthermore, Bartlett’s test of sphericity ($X^2 (105) = 809.03$, $p < .001$) indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large to perform factor analysis. The factor correlation matrix (see Appendix V), also verified that oblique rotation was approved, since the correlation between factor one and four was $>|.30|$ (Hair, 2014). Results of the initial analysis showed that four factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1, and together explained 52.42 percent of the variance (Field, 2012). Furthermore, after examination of the communalities by the threshold value of .20, item ‘victim_1’ turned out to be unsuccessful. Additionally, when looking at the associated pattern matrix, item ‘injury_5’ appeared to be a cross loader. Since both findings concerning ‘injury_5’ and ‘victim_1’, are violations of the simple structure for factor analysis, it was decided to remove them step by step in an iterative process, of which results can be found in Appendix VI. The final factor analysis ($KMO = .75$; Bartlett’s test of sphericity $X^2 (78) = 733.03$, $p < .001$) extracted four factors with an eigenvalue above 1 and in combination explained 56.86 percent of the variance (Appendix VII). Table 3 shows the results of these analyses and the factor loadings after rotation. As can be seen, the items that cluster on the same factors are in accordance with the initial intended measurement scales.

	Factorloading				Communalities
	1	2	3	4	
Satisfaction_1				.929	.835
Satisfaction_2REV				.437	.331
Satisfaction_3				.779	.579
Opportunism_1	.858				.878
Opportunism_2	.882				.766
Opportunism_3	.955				.916
Injury_1		.624			.402

Injury_2	.657	.459
Injury_3	.577	.380
Injury_4	.716	.520
Victim_2	.565	.330
Victim_3	.775	.659
Victim_4	.555	.336

Table 3: final results common factor analysis (* Factorloadings below 0.20 were suppressed)

4.3 Reliability analysis

Not only the discriminant validity of the measurement scale needs to be assessed, also reliability is of great concern. In other words, before constructing the scales for hypothesis testing, the internal consistency of the scales needs to be assessed. This internal consistency can be explained as “the extent to which a variable, or set of variables is consistent in what it is intended to measure” (Hair et al., 2010). This extent will be checked by calculating the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of each scale, wherein an alpha coefficient of $>.70$ is desired and $>.60$ is required. For each of the four factors a reliability analysis has been performed (Appendix VIII). In all cases the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient would not have been improved after deleting certain items. Table 4 shows the results for each factor, which indicates that only the internal consistency of the ‘denial of victim’ construct was a somewhat problematic, whereas the others were satisfactory. However, since a score of $.65$ is close to the desired $.70$ value, it has been decided to continue the analysis with this construct. This implies that for all four constructs a variable had been computed, which is used in further analyses.

Construct	N of items	Cronbach’s Alpha
Satisfaction	3	.78
Opportunism	3	.94
Denial of Injury	4	.72
Denial of Victim	3	.65

Table 4: Reliability analysis

4.4 Descriptive statistics

In order to get a first impression of the results of this empirical study, table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables and constructs, after manipulation checks and the associated exclusion of some participants. As can be seen, the sample still consisted mostly of women (76.4%), where university educated students and employed people were overrepresented. Of those people, 82 percent decided to

complain in the situation described in the scenarios. Additionally, table 5 also shows that, even though some participants had been excluded, the number of participants in each experimental group remained quite equally distributed. Furthermore, as already mentioned before, all participants appeared to be not really satisfied, as also not really dissatisfied ($M = 3.96$, $SD = 1.14$), which was the purpose of the scenarios.

Regarding to the three different indicators for illegitimate complaining behavior, participants seemed to voice on average two illegitimate complaints ($M = 2.29$, $SD = .84$), which therefore can be considered as illegitimate behavior. However, the compensation claimed on average, appeared to be within legitimate limits ($M = 3.47$, $SD = 1.46$), since a score above four is considered to be illegitimate (see chapter 3.3.4). Moreover, concerning the degree of opportunism ($M = 2.33$, $SD = 1.52$), participants showed little signs of intention to behave opportunistic. Since this average score is associated with the answer category ‘a little bit disagree’, it can be interpreted that participants do consider such behavior and not completely disregard the opportunity.

The last two constructs were both forms of neutralization techniques, which were expected to be used by illegitimate complaining participants. As can be seen both scores were relatively high, which indicated that all participants did approve their own behavior ($M = 5.90$, $SD .81$), as well as did not perceived the restaurant as a victim of their behavior ($M = 5.32$, $SD = 0.89$).

		Frequency	Percentage	Mean	SD
Age				28.60	12.08
Gender					
	Men	38	23.6%		
	Women	123	76.4%		
Education					
	mbo	8	5.0%		
	hbo	40	24.8%		
	wo	57	35.4%		
	Employed	56	34.8%		
Complaining					
	Yes	132	82.0%		
	No	29	18.0%		
Firm size					
	Small	79	49.1%		
	Big	82	50.9%		
Redress policy					
	Absent	76	47.2%		
	Present	85	52.8%		

Satisfaction	3.96	1.14
Number of Arguments	2.29	0.84
Compensation claimed	3.47	1.46
Degree of opportunism	2.33	1.52
Denial of Injury	5.90	0.81
Denial of Victim	5.32	0.89

Table 5: Descriptive statistics

4.5 Assumptions

For the multivariate test procedures of MANOVA to be valid, several assumptions had to be met. Within this paragraph, therefore, examinations of the three core assumptions of MANOVA will be discussed, as well as a few preconditions. Furthermore, additional considerations regarding covariates were also assessed. As the proposed conceptual model required two MANOVA tests, the upcoming assumption examinations belonged to the first MANOVA with regard to hypothesis one, two and three. Assumptions associated with the second MANOVA in order to test for hypothesis four will be discussed later on, together with those results.

An important precondition to perform MANOVA is the measurement level of the variables included in the model. As already discussed in the previous chapter, the multiple independent variables had to be non-metrically scaled, since mean scores of groups will be compared. On the contrary, the multiple dependent variables had to be metrically scaled (Hair, 2014). Furthermore, there should be a well-founded reason, conceptual or theoretical, to include the dependent variables. As is discussed in chapter two, a sound rationale existed for including them, and as discussed in chapter three the variables fulfilled the requirements concerning their measurement level.

Additionally, another issue that had to be addressed is the fact that MANOVA is sensitive to outliers, which would affect the Type I error (Hair, 2014). Therefore, an examination of the data for outliers had been executed before starting with the actual MANOVA analysis. By the means of boxplots, the presence of outliers in the dataset was explored. As can be seen in Appendix IX the boxplots reveal certain outliers in all three dependent variables. Of these outliers, a total of four cases appeared to occur in more than one dependent variable, which was problematic. It is, therefore, decided to exclude these four cases (nr. 129-132) from the MANOVA analysis. Otherwise their impact would have been disproportionate in the overall results (Hair, 2014).

The three critical assumptions relating to MANOVA, concerns the independence of observations, normally distributed dependent variables and equality of variance-covariance matrices (Hair, 2014). So, first of all, it had to be assured that all observations were statistically independent. This assumption could be considered met, since participants have completed the questionnaire in

individual settings, Qualtrics randomly assigned participants to a scenario and participants were also randomly sampled.

Secondly, multivariate normality of the dependent variables had to be assured. In order to do so, normality histograms as well as the skewness and kurtosis values for each variable were assessed (see Appendix X). Table 6 shows that each of these scores fall within the recommended limit values of $|\leq 2|$ (Hair, 2014). It, therefore, was concluded that all dependent variables exhibit univariate normality, and analyses could be proceed.

	Skewness	Kurtosis
Number of arguments	.53	.19
Compensation claimed	.95	1.47
Degree of opportunism	1.24	.58

Table 6: Normality check dependent variables

Furthermore, MANOVA assumes an equivalence of covariance matrices across the groups, which can be assessed by the Box's M test (Hair, 2014). In contrast, ANOVA assumes variances in each group to be roughly equal, which is assessed by Levene's test. At first the univariate homogeneity of variance across four groups was assessed and appeared to be confirmed since Levene's test were insignificant for all three dependent variables (see Appendix XI). Moreover, also equality of the covariance matrices was confirmed, due to an insignificant Box M test ($F(18, 47081.96) = 1.167, p = .279$).

Lastly, although no explicit, prior expectations existed about possible effects of gender, age or education level on the dependent variables, it could be of potential value to include them as covariates in the MANOVA. However, including covariates is also accompanied by some assumptions, which had to be taken into account before analysing the data. One of them is the requirement that covariates should correlate with the dependent variables in order to explain some of the variance. Appendix XII showed that age did not correlate with any of the dependent variables, whereas gender only did with 'compensation claimed' and education only with 'opportunism'. However, covariates ideally had to be metrically scaled and moreover, groups within the variables gender and education were also not equally distributed. Since MANOVA analysis are very sensitive to violations of unequal group sizes, this will definitely impact Levene and Box M values, which at their turn would have result in violations of the important core assumption and associated distorted end results (Hair, 2014). It, therefore, is decided not to include them as covariates and consequently running a MANOVA instead of a MANCOVA.

4.6 Hypothesis testing

4.6.1 Hypotheses one to three

Given that the assumptions for the first MANOVA test were met, a 2 (liberal redress policy: absent vs. present) x 2 (firm size: small vs. big) multivariate analysis of variance on ‘degree of opportunism’, ‘number of arguments’ and ‘compensation claimed’ was conducted (see Appendix XIII). Wilks’ Lambda was selected as the statistical measure, as it is most used when core assumptions are not violated (Field, 2012). The results of the MANOVA are displayed in table 7.

Dependent	F	p	np ²
(H1) Liberal redress policy	.41	.75	.010
(H2) Firm size	2.75	.045*	.063
(H3) Liberal redress policy * Firm size	.73	.54	.018

Table 7: MANOVA results (* = $p < .05$)

First of all, to test whether customers facing a liberal redress policy did significantly voice more illegitimate complaints (H1a), demand more compensation (H1b) and behave more opportunistic (H1c), the scores of these three measures were compared in the analysis. However, in contrast with the expectations, no significant differences were found ($F(3, 122) = .407$, $p = .75$, $np^2 = .010$). As can be seen in table 8 the mean scores on each dependent (illegitimate) variable, were slightly higher for the cases in which a liberal redress policy was present. This implies that, even though the hypothesis can not be confirmed with the MANOVA, the expectations were in the right direction.

	Liberal redress policy	
	Absent, M =	Present, M =
(H1a) Number of arguments	2.24	2.24
(H1b) Compensation claimed	3.20	3.41
(H1c) Degree of opportunism	2.18	2.21

Table 8: Mean scores H1

On the other hand, the multivariate analysis showed a significant main effect of firm size ($F(3, 122) = 2.75$, $p < .05$, $np^2 = .063$), which is interpreted by the univariate analysis presented in table 9. With regard to the hypothesis that customers will voice significantly more illegitimate complaints in a large firm (H2a) and will behave more opportunistic (H2c), significant effects were found. Concerning the hypothesis that customers will demand more compensation in a large firm (H2b) a marginally significant effect was demonstrated.

Dependent	M, SD	F	p	np ²
(H2a) Number of arguments	Small: M = 2.07, SD = .10 Large: M = 2.41, SD = .10	5.66	.019*	.044
(H2b) Compensation claimed	Small: M = 3.10, SD = .16 Large: M = 3.51, SD = .15	3.40	.068**	.027
(H2c) Degree of opportunism	Small: M = 1.91, SD = .17 Large: M = 2.49, SD = .17	5.74	.018*	.044

Table 9: Univariate analysis of Firm Size (* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .10$)

Lastly, it was expected that customers facing a liberal redress policy within a large firm will behave significantly more illegitimate as compared to any other scenario (H3). In order to test for this hypothesis the interaction effect of the MANOVA was interpreted (see Appendix XIII). Again, even though this effect appeared not to be significant ($F(3, 122) = .73$, $p = .54$, $np^2 = .018$), looking at the plots in Appendix XIII it is demonstrated that mean scores were as expected. Especially in the case of opportunism, did customers on average score higher in a big restaurant with liberal redress policy ($M = 2.54$) as opposed to the other three scenarios (big restaurant, without policy; $M = 2.43$, small restaurant, with policy; $M = 1.88$ and small restaurant, without policy; $M = 1.94$).

4.6.2 Hypothesis four

Since the tested experimental design not only concerned the degree of illegitimate complaining behavior, but also a possible explanation for this behavior (neutralization techniques), a second MANOVA was performed. Within this analysis the mean scores of illegitimate complainers were compared to legitimate complainers on neutralization scores for ‘denial of victim’ and ‘denial of injury’. Before interpreting results of the MANOVA, again, some assumptions had to be assured.

At first the measurement levels of the independent variables (‘number of arguments’, ‘compensation claimed’ and ‘opportunism’) need to be non-metrically scaled. As explained in the previous chapter, for each score the margin of legitimacy was determined and groups for ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ customers were created. Furthermore, the dependent variables required to be metrically scaled, which variables ‘denial of victim’ and ‘denial of injury’ fulfilled.

Subsequently, an outlier analysis was executed which revealed a few outliers (see Appendix XIV). However, no cases were classified as outliers on both of the dependent variables. Analyses with and without these cases yield similar results. So, with the sample size in mind, it was decided not to exclude those cases and retained them in the analyses.

The first core assumption of MANOVA, the independence of observations, was already considered to be met, as the input for this MANOVA is the same dataset as was before. Furthermore, normality was checked by two histograms and skewness and kurtosis values (see Appendix XV). Table 10 contains these values, which demonstrate that ‘denial of victim’ was normally distributed. However,

denial of injury had an extreme high kurtosis score of 8.03. It, therefore, was decided to transform this variable by squaring the scores (Hair, 2010). After transforming, the normality values were strongly improved, wherefore the transformed variable is included in the MANOVA.

	Skewness	Kurtosis	Skewness after transforming	Kurtosis after transforming
Denial of injury	-2.17	8.03	-1.08	2.67
Denial of victim	-.67	.60		

Table 10: Normality scores for the dependent variables

The last core assumptions concerned the equivalence of covariance matrices across the groups, which was satisfied by a nonsignificant Box's test ($F(9,6872.71) = 1.46, p = .16$). Furthermore, also Levene's test of equality of error variances was acceptable since it was not significant (see Appendix XVI).

Finally, in order to decide whether possible covariates should be included in the analysis, a correlation matrix was checked (see Appendix XVII). Since age, gender and education did not show any correlations with one of the neutralization techniques it was preferred not to include them (Hair, 2010).

As table 11 indicates, the multivariate analysis revealed only one marginally significant main effect of compensation groups on the dependent variables ($(F(2, 121) = 3.03, p = .052, np^2 = .048)$). All other groups did not differ significantly on the dependent variables. The marginally significant main effect had to be interpreted by the univariate analysis (see Appendix XVIII). The two groups appeared to differ, especially, with regard to the denial of victim score ($F(1, 122) = 6.07, p < .05$). However, when looking at the mean scores (illegitimate $M = 4.15$; legitimate $M = 5.53$), the significant difference was opposed to the expectation that illegitimate complainers would have higher scores.

Dependent	F	p	np ²
Groups based on number of arguments	1.932	.15	.031
Groups based on compensation claimed	3.03	.05**	.048
Groups based on degree of opportunism	1.47	.23	.024

Table 11: MANOVA (* = $p < .05$ ** = $p < .10$)

4.7 Additional analyses

In addition to the MANOVA tests, which partially confirmed the hypotheses, some extra tests were run which yielded some interesting results. Although hypothesis one about the effect of a liberal redress policy on illegitimate complaining behavior could not be confirmed, a chi-square test (see Appendix

XIX) revealed that people confronted with a liberal redress policy decided to complain significantly more often ($\chi^2(1, N = 161) = 4.76, p < .05$).

Furthermore, since all scenarios did contain the same small service failure it was expected that customers were equally (dis)satisfied in all scenarios. However, mean scores seemed to differ, so a two-way ANOVA (see Appendix XX) was performed and revealed that customers in a big restaurant ($M = 3.70, SD = 1.12$) are significantly less satisfied ($F(1, 157) = 9.29, p < .01$), compared to customers in a small restaurant ($M = 4.27, SD = 1.10$). However, the presence of a liberal redress policy ($M = 3.99, SD = 1.22$) did not satisfy customers significantly more, compared to the absence ($M = 3.93, SD = 1.05$). Both results of the MANOVA, the additional tests and their implications will be discussed in the next chapter.

5. Discussion

In this chapter the research is concluded by discussing the results in light of existing literature. Subsequently, theoretical contributions as well as managerial implications are addressed. The chapter concludes with some important notes on the limitations and further topics of inquiry.

5.1 Conclusion

As customers are behaving as kings nowadays, brand communications seem to revolve around satisfaction guarantees and liberal redress policies (Harris & Reynolds 2004). However, it is questioned whether firms also benefit of such guarantees or whether there is a still unexplored dark side. As Yañi-de-Soriano and Slater (2009) and subsequently Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010) both insisted, this dark side is the number of illegitimate complaints customer voice nowadays, simply to benefit from the liberal redress policies. In order to test whether their suggestions are right, an experiment has been conducted in order to answer the following research question: *‘Do liberal redress policies fuel the act of illegitimate complaining behavior?’* To provide an answer to this research question three hypotheses were developed (see table 12). However, evidence to support these hypotheses was unfortunately not found. This implies that firms actively employing liberal redress policies, do not receive more illegitimate complaints into account, as compared to firms without explicitly mentioned guarantees. Noteworthy, an additional test revealed that even though these organizations do not receive more illegitimate complaints, they do face more complaints in general. In other words, the experiment showed that the presence of a satisfaction guarantee, increases customer's' decision to voice their complaint to the organization.

Previous research has demonstrated that illegitimate customer complaints do exist (e.g. Prim & Pras, 1999; Wirtz & McColl-Kennedy, 2010). However, situations in which they do exist or conditions that fuel them are just not fully explored. An important contextual factor which is suggested to amplify illegitimate complaining intentions is the size of the firm (Mazar & Ariely, 2006). The conducted experiment, therefore, also focused on differences between a large and small firm, in order to answer the following research question: *‘What is the impact of firm size on the act of illegitimate complaining behavior?’*. Again, three hypotheses with regard to this question were developed (table 12). Evidence supported these hypotheses as customers indicated to significantly voice more illegitimate complaints, showed more intentions to behave opportunistic and also marginally claimed more compensation. Succinctly put, large firms are to a larger extent confronted with illegitimate complaining behavior. Furthermore, an additional test showed that, even though all customers face the same small failure in the experiment, they were significantly less satisfied when dining in the large restaurant. This finding possible explains the fact that larger firms also face more illegitimate complaints.

In addition to the existence of illegitimate complaining behavior, Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010) wondered what possible underlying mechanism exist to explain why people engage in criminal

behavior, without experiencing guilt or anger. As an attempt to answer this question, the current study tried to explore the act of illegitimate complaining from a criminology perspective, via the application of neutralization techniques in order to answer the following research question: *‘Do customers employ neutralization techniques in order to rationalize their illegitimate complaining behavior?’*. Two hypotheses were constituted in order to answer the research question (see table 12), However, results were strongly opposed to what was expected and the hypotheses therefore had to be rejected. Since four out of six mean scores were higher, and one even significantly higher, for legitimate complainers, it was questioned whether the measurement method was correctly chosen. An elaboration on these results will be given in the upcoming paragraph.

Hypothesis		Result
H1a	If a liberal redress policy is employed, customers will voice significantly more illegitimate complaints compared to a restricted redress policy	Rejected
H1b	If a liberal redress policy is employed, customers will demand significantly more compensation compared to a restricted redress policy	Rejected
H1c	If a liberal redress policy is employed, customers significantly behave more opportunistic compared to a restricted redress policy	Rejected
H2a	Customers facing a small service failure within a large firm will voice significantly more illegitimate complaints compared to a small firm	Accepted
H2b	Customers facing a small service failure within a large firm will demand significantly more compensation compared to a small firm	Accepted (marginally)
H2c	Customers facing a small service failure within a large firm will significantly behave more opportunistic compared to a small firm	Accepted
H3	The effect of a liberal redress policy on illegitimate complaining behavior is stronger for a large firm compared to a small firm	Rejected
H4a	Neutralization technique denial of victim is used, in order to rationalize illegitimate complaining behavior in a service context	Rejected
H4b	Neutralization technique denial of injury is used, in order to rationalize illegitimate complaining behavior in a service context	Rejected

Table 12: Overview of hypotheses and results

5.2 Theoretical contributions

Conceptual papers and literature reviews have predominantly discussed the topic of unreasonable customer complaining without further empirical support (e.g., Fisk et al, 2010; Baker et al., 2012). Although the issue of illegitimate complaining certainly has drawn some researchers’ attention, literature has largely neglected to find evidence. This study made a first attempt to find this empirical evidence, in order to support propositions made by Baker et al. (2012). Findings of this thesis therefore,

contribute to the theoretical understanding of illegitimate complaining behavior in the context of liberal redress policies. Furthermore, as suggested by Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010), this study tried to explore whether customers engaging in illegitimate complaining do employ neutralization techniques, to rationalize their behavior.

Hence, based on suggestions of Baker et al. (2012), this experimental study provides rich insights into two possible, firm-centric drivers (liberal redress policies and firm size) of illegitimate complaint behavior. It was hypothesized that liberal redress practices of firms will evoke more illegitimate complaining behavior (Harris and Reynolds, 2003; Yani-de-Soriano and Slater, 2009; Baker et al., 2012). However, the assumption regarding to liberal redress policies could not be confirmed, since the experiment showed that these practices do not have a significant effect on illegitimate complaints. This finding is in contrast with the study of Reynolds and Harris (2005) who stated that customers routinely behave negatively and often disrupt functional encounters. Put differently, they found that service guarantees may be inadvertently encouraging and creating opportunities to engage in illegitimate behavior.

Several reasons for these contradicting results can be given. At first there is, of course, the possibility that the hypothesized effect simply does not exist. Moreover, Wirtz and Kum (2004) already argued that customers cheating on guarantees is just not of major concern, which could be the reason of the nonsignificant results. In addition, anecdotal evidence from certain firms with successful liberal redress policies seem to suggest that illegitimate complaints are not a severe problem for the firm (Wirtz, Ng & Sheang, 2015). Lastly, the lack of effect in this study could also be the result of the research design and associated limitations which will be discussed in the upcoming paragraph.

Furthermore, even though not hypothesized, this study found another important effect of liberal redress policies on complaining behavior. In line with findings of McQuilken and Robertson (2011), the results show that offering a service guarantee does encourage voice of complaints. Although the original hypothesized effect of liberal redress policies in this study was focused on possible downsides, this finding is more in line with literature emphasizing the value of complaints (Snellman & Vihtkari, 2003). They for instance state, that customers facing a service failure will frequently engage in negative word-of-mouth, which should be avoided, and should therefore be engaged in service recovery efforts (Heung & Lam, 2003). Offering unsatisfied customers a service recovery is only possible if the firm is aware of their complaints. Furthermore, complaints are assumed to be a valuable tool for firms, since complaints give insights in possible improvements. So, even though possible dark sides were expected to be found, the findings are more in line with literature streams who emphasize the value of complaints (de Ruyter & Wetzels, 2000; Heung & Lam, 2003).

This thesis also hypothesized, in addition to the liberal redress policies, that firm size is an important driver of illegitimate complaining behavior. In line with findings of Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010) it was found that customers are more prone to complain illegitimate when facing a large firm, as opposed to a small one. Sparks and McColl-Kennedy (2001) already argued that

perception of inequity of small firms and associated feelings of remorse and guilt are possible explanations of this effect. In addition, customers tend to behave more deviant when dealing with a large firm, for whom costs of deception are assumed to be low and easily absorbable. Another explanation is the fact that customers simply have learned to expect more from large firms, due to the culture of their service recovery efforts (Fullerton & Punj, 2004). This finding is also in line with another non-hypothesized effect which appeared in this study. The experiment showed that, even though the same service failure happened in all scenarios, people were significantly less satisfied in scenarios facing large firms. In line with the suggestion of Fullerton and Punj (2004), it could be argued that customers simply had higher expectations of large firms and are therefore more easily dissatisfied if something went wrong.

Finally, this thesis also tried to explore whether customers employ neutralization techniques in order to rationalize their illegitimate behavior. However, in contrast with expectations of both Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010) and Baker et al. (2012), this study was unable to confirm it. Mean scores of legitimate complainers even appeared to be higher, which was completely opposing. It is possible that these results are due to a design flaw, which will be elaborated upon in the upcoming paragraph. However, the mean scores of illegitimate complainers were also high, which indicates that they do believe that their actions are truthfully and firms will not be hurt as a result of it. So even though the hypothesis could not officially be confirmed, the scores indicated that illegitimate complainers probably have rationalized their behaviors.

5.3 Managerial implications

There is a current trend in the business world in which satisfaction guarantees are unconditionally offered. However, as explained before, mostly positive sides are examined whereas little is known about the effect of these guarantees on factors like illegitimate complaining behavior. This study tried to explore which drivers do evoke illegitimate complaints. Results of this study are therefore relevant for business practitioners and several managerial implications are deducted from the findings.

The experiment showed that there is no effect of liberal redress policies, which would indicate that businesses can use these without having to worry whether it increases the illegitimate complaint behavior of customers. In addition, considerable evidence from the service recovery literature suggests that the encouragement of customer complaining is beneficial and desirable (Heung and Lam, 2003). Undoubtedly, many restaurant owners are hesitant to offer a service guarantee because they may be concerned about fraudulent guarantee invocation. It could be concluded from this study in addition to Wirtz and Kum (2004) that organizations could offer a liberal redress policy without having to worry that it would encourage customers to cheat. However, businesses are advised to interpret these findings in light of the limitations of the research.

Managers of large firms could also act upon the previous advice, nonetheless they should acknowledge that customers will act more frequently in an illegitimate way. This is not due to a liberal

redress policy, but simply because of the firm size and the possible associated, higher customer expectations. This suggest a difficult balance to strike. On the one hand large firms are expected to be reasonable and generous in their compensation, but this also raises expectations and causes lower levels of satisfaction, which probably lead to illegitimate complaints. A good rule of thumb would be to offer a liberal redress policy, and thereby training front-line personnel in the identification and managing of unjustified customer complaints.

Even though it could not be confirmed that neutralization techniques are used in order to rationalize illegitimate behavior. Firms can try to respond to it by communicating in such a way that neutralization is reduced. This implies firms to communicate for instance about the fact that costs associated with complaints do matter to the firm, even in the largest of corporate structures. Furthermore, firms should continually engage in research iterations that identify drivers of illegitimate complaints. In order to find out which communications are actually successful, further research is deemed to be necessary. Additionally, this research raises a lot of other questions and opportunities for further inquiry, which will be discussed in the upcoming paragraph.

5.4 Limitations and further research

As with all studies of this nature, the findings and contributions of this study are constrained by the research design and methodology adopted. These limitations require to be outlined, which in turn, suggest potentially fruitful avenues for future research.

At first the research design revolved around short written scenarios with narrative text. As implied by Green (2004) the time participants in an online experiment spent reading the scenario, is too short to become really immersed into the text. In addition, the simplistic scenario may fail to capture important aspects of reality, leading to low external validity. Even though the pre-test indicated all scenarios to be realistic, participants could have experienced troubles imagining themselves being in the scenario. If they had trouble doing so, their responses may not have been indicative of their actual responses. Moreover, the manipulation checks revealed a lot of participants who had wrongly indicated the presence of a liberal redress policy or the firm size. This might be an indication that participants did not attentively read the scenarios, or did not read them at all. Results will therefore, be more externally valid if the experiment will be repeated in a field experiment with real-life interactions.

Furthermore, the sample of this experiment did not appeared to be homogeneous, which in turn would be ideal in case of an experiment. Females were clearly overrepresented in the sample as were high educated people. Since Hueng and Lam (2003) proved that these people are the most frequently complainers, this could have influenced the results. In addition, the sample was obtained on basis of convenience, which does not fully meet the required random sampling method. These violations with regard to the sample may have negatively influenced the obtained results.

A third drawback of this study concerns the fact of socially desirable answering. Since the subject of this study is in essence an illegal activity, participants could feel constrained in their response.

In light of neutralization theory, participants may have reframed and reinterpreted their behavior into something that is socially acceptable and therefore under-report, deny and not even admit to themselves that their behavior is illegitimate. As this fact was known at forehand, an attempt was made to reduce this bias, by clearly stating in the introduction that participants can give their own opinion since there are no wrong answers and results are completely anonymous

Furthermore, since no extensive measurement scale for both neutralization techniques existed, one had to be created. On basis of several dimensions and other (single item) scales, both used scales were developed. Although these scale both appeared to be reliable, it should be acknowledged that there were possible issues with the discriminant validity. Not only do people who use neutralization techniques score high on the used measures, also do people who justly classify their behavior as rational. It therefore is highly recommended that future research should design and validate a reliable measurement scale which can function as an indicator of neutralization techniques.

Regarding to the research design, the use of an existing big firm in the scenarios was intentionally chosen. However, the model did not control for familiarity with this firm, which could have explained some variance in the dependent variables. Further research is advised to take familiarity with the brand as a control measure.

Moreover, the generalizability of this study is also constrained by the applied single service context. Although results provide guidance for other service providers, caution needs to be exercised in generalizing the study findings. In addition, to improve the generalizability of the findings, the current study could be replicated in other contexts. It would, for example, be interesting to see if the findings hold in a hotel context.

The results of this study also yield some potentially fruitful avenues for future research. At first, since this study only examined the effect of a verbal mentioned satisfaction guarantee. It would be interesting to examine whether the way in which the liberal redress policy is offered would induce different results with regard to illegitimate complaining behavior. Furthermore, the scenarios applied in this study all contained a minor service failure. As Weun et al. (2004) suggested, minor failures may deter customers from voicing, which could be an explanation of the lack of results in this study. An interesting follow-up research would therefore, examine the differences in degree of service failures. In other words, explore whether illegitimate complaints due to liberal redress policies occur more frequently in cases of major failures. Regarding the nature of failure, past studies also suggested that the likelihood of customers voicing a complaint depends on whether the failure is perceived to be controllable (i.e., within control of the firm) or stable. This could also function as an interesting base for further research.

Furthermore, the level of redress policies also can induce different results. As this study offered an (unconditional) 100% satisfaction guarantee, an attribute-specific guarantee (such as on-time delivery) may present different results. Finally, in further research the conceptual model can be extended by the inclusion of the other proposed drivers by Baker et al. (2012). Since this study

exclusively focused on the firm-centric drivers, just a small part of possible influencing factors have been examined. Other drivers such as customer-centric (e.g. customer financial greed, personality traits) or relationship-centric (e.g. one-time transactions) should therefore also be explored in further research.

As has been argued, a lot of possible drivers of illegitimate complaining behavior are still unexamined. I, therefore, hope that future research will extend this current study and offer further insights into this intriguing topic.

References

- Agnew, R. (1994). The techniques of neutralization and violence. *Criminology*, 32(4), 555-580.
- Alicke, M. D., Braun, J. C., Glor, J. E., Klotz, M. L., Magee, J., Sederhoim, H., & Siegel, R. (1992). Complaining behavior in social interaction. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 18(3), 286-295.
- Andreasen, A. R. (1988). Consumer complaints and redress: What we know and what we don't know. *The frontier of research in the consumer interest*, 675, 722.
- Aronson, E. (1969). The theory of cognitive dissonance: A current perspective. *Advances in experimental social psychology*, 4, 1-34.
- Atmeh, M., & Al-Khadash, H. (2008). Factors Affecting Cheating Behavior among Accounting Students. *Journal of Accounting, Business & Management*, 15(1), 109-125.
- Baker, M. A., Magnini, V. P., & Perdue, R. R. (2012). Opportunistic customer complaining: Causes, consequences, and managerial alternatives. *International Journal of Hospitality Management*, 31(1), 295-303.
- Bennett, R. (1997). Anger, catharsis, and purchasing behavior following aggressive customer complaints. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 14(2), 156-172.
- Berry, L. L., & Seiders, K. (2008). Serving unfair customers. *Business Horizons*, 51(1), 29-37.
- Blodgett, J. G., Wakefield, K. L., & Barnes, J. H. (1995). The effects of customer service on consumer complaining behavior. *Journal of Services Marketing*, 9(4), 31-42.
- Bitner, M. J., Booms, B. H., & Tetreault, M. S. (1990). The service encounter: diagnosing favorable and unfavorable incidents. *The Journal of Marketing*, 54, 71-84.
- Coleman, J.W. Neutralization theory: *An empirical application and assessment*. Stillwater, OK, PhD thesis, Oklahoma State University, Department of Sociology, 1994.
- Chebat, J. C., & Slusarczyk, W. (2005). How emotions mediate the effects of perceived justice on loyalty in service recovery situations: an empirical study. *Journal of Business Research*, 58(5), 664-673.
- Cromwell, P. and Thurman, Q. (2003). 'The Devil Made Me Do it: Use of Neutralizations by Shoplifters'. *Deviant Behavior* 24(6), 535-50.
- David, D., & Cramer, D. (2010). Rational and irrational beliefs in human feelings and psychophysiology. *Rational and Irrational Beliefs*, 99.
- Day, R. L., Grabicke, K., Schaetzle, T., & Staubach, F. (1981). The hidden agenda of consumer complaining. *Journal of retailing*, 57(3), 86-106.
- De Ruyter, K., & Wetzels, M. (2000). Customer equity considerations in service recovery: a cross-industry perspective. *International Journal of Service Industry Management*, 11(1), 91-108.
- Farrington, Frank. (1914). Successful Salesmanship: Is the Customer Always Right?. *Mill Supplies*, 4(9), 45-47.
- Field, A. (2013). *Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics*. Sage.
- Fisk, R., Grove, S., Harris, L. C., Keeffe, D. A., Daunt, K. L., Russell-Bennett, R., & Wirtz, J. (2010). Customers behaving badly: a state of the art review, research agenda and implications for practitioners. *Journal of Services Marketing*, 24(6), 417-429.
- Freestone, O., & Mitchell, V. (2004). Generation Y attitudes towards e-ethics and internet-related misbehaviours. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 54(2), 121-128.
- Fritsche, I. (2005). Predicting deviant behavior by neutralization: Myths and findings. *Deviant Behavior*, 26(5), 483-510.
- Fullerton, R. A., & Punj, G. (1993). Choosing to misbehave: A structural model of aberrant consumer behavior. *NA-Advances in Consumer Research*, 20, 570-574.

- Fullerton, R. A., & Punj, G. (2004). Repercussions of promoting an ideology of consumption: consumer misbehavior. *Journal of Business Research*, 57(11), 1239-1249.
- Goodwin, C., & Spiggle, S. (1989). Consumer complaining: attributions and identities. *NA-Advances in Consumer Research*, 16, 17-22.
- Goodwin, D., Pope, C., Mort, M., & Smith, A. (2003). Ethics and ethnography: An experiential account. *Qualitative Health Research*, 13(4), 567-577.
- Green, M. C. (2004). Transportation into narrative worlds: The role of prior knowledge and perceived realism. *Discourse processes*, 38(2), 247-266.
- Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Babin, B. J., & Black, W. C. (2014). *Multivariate data analysis: A global perspective* (Vol. 7). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
- Harris, L. C., & Daunt, K. L. (2011). Deviant customer behaviour: A study of techniques of neutralization. *Journal of Marketing Management*, 27(7-8), 834-853.
- Harris, L. C., & Daunt, K. L. (2013). Managing customer misbehavior: challenges and strategies. *Journal of Services Marketing*, 27(4), 281-293.
- Harris, L. C., & Dumas, A. (2009). Online consumer misbehaviour: an application of neutralization theory. *Marketing Theory*, 9(4), 379-402.
- Harris, E. G., & Mowen, J. C. (2001). The influence of cardinal-, central-, and surface-level personality traits on consumers' bargaining and complaint intentions. *Psychology & Marketing*, 18(11), 1155-1185.
- Harris, L. C., & Reynolds, K. L. (2003). The consequences of dysfunctional customer behavior. *Journal of service research*, 6(2), 144-161.
- Harris, L. C., & Reynolds, K. L. (2004). Jaycustomer behavior: an exploration of types and motives in the hospitality industry. *Journal of Services Marketing*, 18(5), 339-357.
- Hart, C. W., Heskett, J. L., & Sasser Jr, W. E. (1989). The profitable art of service recovery. *Harvard business review*, 68(4), 148-156.
- Hende, E. A., & Schoormans, J. P. L. (2012). The Story Is As Good As the Real Thing: Early Customer Input on Product Applications of Radically New Technologies. *Journal Of Product Innovation Management*, 29(4), 655-666.
- Heung, V. C., & Lam, T. (2003). Customer complaint behaviour towards hotel restaurant services. *International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management*, 15(5), 283-289.
- Hess, R. L., Ganesan, S., & Klein, N. M. (2003). Service failure and recovery: the impact of relationship factors on customer satisfaction. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 31(2), 127-145.
- Henry, S. (1990) Degrees of Deviance, Student Accounts of their Deviant Behavior. Salem, WI: Sheffield Publishing.
- Hoffman, K. D., Kelley, S. W., & Rotalsky, H. M. (1995). Tracking service failures and employee recovery efforts. *Journal of Services Marketing*, 9(2), 49-61.
- Hogreve, J., & Gremler, D. D. (2009). Twenty years of service guarantee research: A synthesis. *Journal of service research*.
- Jacoby, J., & Jaccard, J. J. (1981). The sources, meaning, and validity of consumer complaint behavior: A psychological analysis. *Journal of Retailing*, 57(3), 4-24.
- John, G. (1984). An empirical investigation of some antecedents of opportunism in a marketing channel. *Journal of marketing Research*, 21(3), 278-289.
- Klockars, C.B. (1974) The Professional Fence. New York: Free Press.
- Kim, C., Kim, S., Im, S., & Shin, C. (2003). The effect of attitude and perception on consumer complaint intentions. *Journal of consumer marketing*, 20(4), 352-371.

- Kowalski, R. M. (1996). Complaints and complaining: Functions, antecedents, and consequences. *Psychological bulletin*, 119(2), 179.
- Lewis, B. R., & Spyropoulos, S. (2001). Service failures and recovery in retail banking: the customers' perspective. *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, 19(1), 37-48.
- Macintosh, G., & Stevens, C. D. (2013). Individual differences in opportunistic claiming behavior. *Journal of Consumer Behaviour*, 12(1), 10-19.
- Maruna, S., & Copes, H. (2005). What have we learned from five decades of neutralization research?. *Crime and justice*, 32, 221-320.
- Maxham, J. G. (2001). Service recovery's influence on consumer satisfaction, positive word-of-mouth, and purchase intentions. *Journal of business research*, 54(1), 11-24.
- Mazar, N., & Ariely, D. (2006). Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications. *Journal of public policy & Marketing*, 25(1), 117-126.
- McQuilken, L., & Robertson, N. (2011). The influence of guarantees, active requests to voice and failure severity on customer complaint behavior. *International Journal of Hospitality Management*, 30(4), 953-962.
- Michel, S., & Meuter, M. L. (2008). The service recovery paradox: true but overrated?. *International Journal of Service Industry Management*, 19(4), 441-457.
- Minor, W.W. (1981) 'Techniques of Neutralization: A Reconceptualization and Empirical Examination', *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 18(2), 295-318.
- Mitchell, V. W., & Ka Lun Chan, J. (2002). Investigating UK consumers' unethical attitudes and behaviours. *Journal of Marketing Management*, 18(1-2), 5-26.
- Moyer, M. S. (1984). Characteristics of consumer complainants: implications for marketing and public policy. *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing*, 3, 67-84.
- Nederhof, A. J. (1985). Methods of coping with social desirability bias: A review. *European journal of social psychology*, 15(3), 263-280.
- Ok, C. (2004). *The effectiveness of service recovery and its role in building long-term relationships with customers in a restaurant setting*. (Doctoral dissertation, Kansas State University).
- Parasuraman, A., Zeithaml, V. A., & Berry, L. L. (1985). A conceptual model of service quality and its implications for future research. *the Journal of Marketing*, 49(4) 41-50.
- Parasuraman, A., Berry, L. L., & Zeithaml, V. A. (1991). Understanding customer expectations of service. *MIT Sloan Management Review*, 32(3), 39.
- Ping, R. A. (1993). The effects of satisfaction and structural constraints on retailer exiting, voice, loyalty, opportunism, and neglect. *Journal of retailing*, 69(3), 320-352.
- Piquero, N. L., Tibbetts, S. G., & Blankenship, M. B. (2005). Examining the role of differential association and techniques of neutralization in explaining corporate crime. *Journal Deviant Behavior*, 26, 159-188.
- Prim, I., & Pras, B. (1999). "Friendly" complaining behaviors: Toward a relational approach. *Journal of Market-Focused Management*, 3(3-4), 333-352.
- Reynolds, K. L., & Harris, L. C. (2005). When service failure is not service failure: an exploration of the forms and motives of "illegitimate" customer complaining. *Journal of Services Marketing*, 19(5), 321-335.
- Reynolds, K. L., & Harris, L. C. (2006). Deviant customer behavior: An exploration of frontline employee tactics. *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice*, 14(2), 95-111.
- Ro, H., & Wong, J. (2012). Customer opportunistic complaints management: A critical incident approach. *International Journal of Hospitality Management*, 31(2), 419-427.
- Rogers, J. W., & Buffalo, M. D. (1974). Neutralization techniques: toward a simplified measurement scale. *Pacific Sociological Review*, 17(3), 313-331.

- Rogers, J. C., & Williams, T. G. (1990). Consumer personal values as antecedents to dyadic and third party public consumer complaining behavior: an exploratory study. *Journal of Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction, and Complaining Behavior*, 3(1), 71-81.
- Rosenbaum, M. S., & Kuntze, R. (2003). The relationship between anomie and unethical retail disposition. *Psychology & Marketing*, 20(12), 1067-1093.
- Shamir, B. (1980). Between service and servility: Role conflict in subordinate service roles. *Human Relations*, 33(10), 741-756.
- Singh, J. (1990). A typology of consumer dissatisfaction response styles. *Journal of retailing*, 66(1), 57-100.
- Smith, K. J., Davy, J. A., & Easterling, D. (2004). An examination of cheating and its antecedents among marketing and management majors. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 50(1), 63-80.
- Snellman, K., & Vihtkari, T. (2003). Customer complaining behaviour in technology-based service encounters. *International Journal of Service Industry Management*, 14(2), 217-231.
- Sparks, B. A., & McColl-Kennedy, J. R. (2001). Justice strategy options for increased customer satisfaction in a services recovery setting. *Journal of Business Research*, 54(3), 209-218.
- Stauss, B., & Friege, C. (1999). Regaining service customers: costs and benefits of regain management. *Journal of Service Research*, 1(4), 347-361.
- Stauss, B. (2002). The dimensions of complaint satisfaction: process and outcome complaint satisfaction versus cold fact and warm act complaint satisfaction. *Managing Service Quality*, 12(3), 173-183.
- Stone, G. P. (1954). City shoppers and urban identification: observations on the social psychology of city life. *American Journal of Sociology*, 60(1), 36-45.
- Strutton, D., Vitell, S. J., & Pelton, L. E. (1994). How consumers may justify inappropriate behavior in market settings: An application on the techniques of neutralization. *Journal of Business Research*, 30(3), 253-260.
- Sturdy, A. (1998). Customer care in a consumer society: smiling and sometimes meaning it?. *Organization*, 5(1), 27-53.
- Swanson, S. R., & Kelley, S. W. (2001). Attributions and outcomes of the service recovery process. *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice*, 9(4), 50-65.
- Sykes, G. M., & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency. *American sociological review*, 22(6), 664-670.
- Vitell, S. J. (2003). Consumer ethics research: Review, synthesis and suggestions for the future. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 43(1-2), 33-47.
- Weun, S., Beatty, S. E., & Jones, M. A. (2004). The impact of service failure severity on service recovery evaluations and post-recovery relationships. *Journal of Services Marketing*, 18(2), 133-146.
- Wirtz, J., & Kum, D. (2004). Consumer cheating on service guarantees. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 32(2), 159-175.
- Wirtz, J., & McColl-Kennedy, J. R. (2010). Opportunistic customer claiming during service recovery. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 38(5), 654-675.
- Wirtz, J., Ng, I. C., & Sheang, L. K. (2015). How to Reduce Consumer Cheating on Service Guarantees? Results from Two Experimental Studies. *Global Perspectives in Marketing for the 21st Century*, 198-203.
- Yani-de-Soriano, M., & Slater, S. (2009). Revisiting Drucker's theory: has consumerism led to the overuse of marketing?. *Journal of Management History*, 15(4), 452-466.

Appendices

Appendix I: Final questionnaire

INTRODUCTION

Beste deelnemer,

Fijn dat je mee wilt doen aan mijn onderzoek als onderdeel van mijn masterthesis! Het onderzoek gaat over de tevredenheid van mensen in restaurants.

Je krijgt zo eerst een scenario te lezen en ik wil je vragen om je daar zo goed mogelijk in te verplaatsen. Daarna zullen een aantal vragen worden gesteld. Belangrijk is dat er in dit onderzoek **geen goede of foute antwoorden** zijn, ik ben alleen geïnteresseerd in jouw mening. De gegevens en antwoorden zullen **anoniem** verwerkt worden.

Het invullen van de vragenlijst duurt ongeveer 10 minuten en is volledig **vrijwillig**. Je kan dus op elk gewenst moment stoppen.

Indien je vragen hebt, mag je altijd contact met mij opnemen via het volgende e-mailadres:

N.tenHarmsen@student.ru.nl

Alvast enorm bedankt voor je hulp!

Nikky ten Harmsen

Master Business Administration, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

**Ik heb de introductie gelezen en ga akkoord*

RANDOM SCENARIO

Lees het volgende scenario aandachtig en probeer je in te beelden hoe jij je in deze situatie zou voelen:

(Scenario 1)

(Scenario 2)

(Scenario 3)

(Scenario 4)

PART 1: MANIPULATION CHECKS

Geef aan, op basis van het scenario dat je net hebt gelezen, welke van de volgende stellingen van toepassing zijn:

Het restaurant in het scenario is:

Groot ☐

Klein ☐

Het restaurant in het scenario hanteert een 100% tevredenheidsgarantie:

Ja ☐

Nee ☐

PART 2: SATISFACTION

Gezien de situatie, geef aan in hoeverre je het eens bent met de volgende stellingen

Ik ben blij met het verloop van de avond

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Het bezoek aan dit restaurant was teleurstellend

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Ik ben tevreden over het etentje

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

PART 3: COMPLAINING

Gezien de situatie is het waarschijnlijk dat ik mijn klacht ga delen met het restaurant

Ja ☐

Nee ☐ (ga naar demographic variables)

PART 4: NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS

Je hebt besloten om je klacht te delen met het restaurant. Gezien de situatie, geef aan in hoeverre je de volgende punten meeneemt in je klacht:

Ik heb erg lang moeten wachten op een tafel

Zeker niet ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Zeker wel

De service was ondermaats

Zeker niet ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Zeker wel

Het voorgerecht was niet naar wens

Zeker niet ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Zeker wel

Ik heb erg lang moeten wachten op het eten

Zeker niet ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Zeker wel

Het personeel was niet behulpzaam

Zeker niet ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Zeker wel

De pizza was niet warm genoeg

Zeker niet ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Zeker wel

Ik heb de drukte in het restaurant als onaangenaam ervaren

Zeker niet ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Zeker wel

Ik vond de kwaliteit van het eten over het algemeen slecht

Zeker niet ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Zeker wel

PART 5: COMPENSATION CLAIMED

Geef aan, gezien de situatie, welke compensatie je verlangt (kies er één):

- | | |
|--|-----|
| <input type="radio"/> Geen | €0 |
| <input type="radio"/> Een excuus is voldoende | €0 |
| <input type="radio"/> Een gratis drankje voor jou en je vriend(in) | €5 |
| <input type="radio"/> Je hoeft je voorgerecht niet te betalen | €6 |
| <input type="radio"/> Je krijgt een gratis toetje | €8 |
| <input type="radio"/> Een tegoedbon van €25 | €25 |
| <input type="radio"/> Jij hoeft jouw complete maaltijd niet te betalen | €30 |
| <input type="radio"/> Jij en je vriend(in) hoeven beiden niet te betalen | €60 |

PART 6: DEGREE OF OPPORTUNISM

Gezien de situatie, geef aan in hoeverre je het eens bent met de volgende stellingen

Als het nodig is, zal ik de feiten iets verdraaien om de compensatie te krijgen die ik verlang

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Als ik de kans zie om meer uit mijn klacht te halen door problemen aan te dikken, zal ik dat doen

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Ik zal de problemen iets vergroten om zeker te weten dat ik de gewenste vergoeding krijg

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

PART 7: DENIAL OF INJURY

Gezien de situatie, geef aan in hoeverre je het eens bent met de volgende stellingen:

Mijn klacht is acceptabel, want ik doe niemand kwaad

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Het restaurant zal geen nadelige gevolgen ondervinden van mijn klacht

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Het restaurant kan zich de door mij gevraagde compensatie makkelijk veroorloven

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Mijn klacht was niet overdreven, het heeft immers geen verstrekkende schadelijke gevolgen

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Vragen om een vergoeding is gerechtvaardigd, want niemand heeft daar last van

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

PART 7: DENIAL OF VICTIM

Gezien de situatie, geef aan in hoeverre je het eens bent met de volgende stellingen:

Het restaurant heeft zelf om mijn klacht gevraagd

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Het restaurant verdient mijn reactie

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Mijn klacht heeft het restaurant volledig aan zichzelf te danken

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

Als het restaurant negatieve gevolgen ondervindt door mijn actie, is dat hun eigen schuld

Helemaal mee oneens ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Helemaal mee eens

PART 8: DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Tot slot nog een aantal algemene vragen:

Wat is je leeftijd:

..

Wat is je geslacht:

Man ☐

Vrouw ☐

Ik ben:

Student mbo ☐

Student hbo ☐

Student wo ☐

Werkend / werkzoekend ☐

END

Appendix II: Pre-test and results

	vraag 1	vraag 2	vraag 3
scenario 1	5,8	5,7	1,7
scenario 2	5,8	5,8	1,8
scenario 3	6,3	6,5	1,8
scenario 4	6	6,3	1,8

Table 13: Mean scores realism

Scenario 1: $M = 5.94$, $SD = 1.32$

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
RealismeScore	6	5,9444	1,32358
Valid N (listwise)	6		

Scenario 2: $M = 6.33$, $SD = .42$

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
RealismeScore	6	6,3333	,42164
Valid N (listwise)	6		

Scenario 3: $M = 6.33$, $SD = .47$

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
RealismeScore	6	6,3333	,47140
Valid N (listwise)	6		

Scenario 4: $M = 6.17$, $SD = .18$

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
RealismeScore	6	6,1667	,18257
Valid N (listwise)	6		

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,704	,656	3

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Realistisch	6,13	1,035	24
Werkelijkheid	6,25	1,032	24
Verplaatsen	6,21	,509	24

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
RealismeScore	24	3,33	7,00	6,1944	,70824
Scenario	24	1	4	2,50	1,142
Valid N (listwise)	24				

Answers open question

1&2

- Het restaurant waar we naartoe gaan is van een grote keten vs plaatselijke pizzeria.
- Het eerste scenario gaat om een groot bedrijf en het tweede scenario gaat om een kleiner bedrijf.

1&3

- Ik kon me in beide scenario's goed verplaatsen, echter het eerste scenario lijkt het mij niet erg realistisch. Ik heb nog nooit een restaurant gezien dat een 100% prijsgarantie hanteert. Daarnaast ben ik van mening dat wanneer dit wel zou bestaan, dit niet achteraf vermeld zou

moeten worden, maar juist vooraf. Hiermee voorkom je misschien ontevreden klanten in plaats van het achteraf te moeten incasseren.

- Ja, ik heb een verschil gemerkt. In het tweede scenario werd omschreven dat de serveerster vroeg of alles naar wens was. In het eerste scenario werd omschreven dat de serveerster ook aangaf dat Happy Italy een 100 % tevredenheidsgarantie hanteert. Ik zou zelf niet als serveerster zeggen: “als u nog klachten heeft”. Dit komt vrij negatief over. Ik zou zelf iets vragen als: “was alles naar wens, kunnen wij nog iets voor u doen, heeft u nog opmerkingen”

1&4

- Geen verschillen, ondanks dat bij Happy Italy werd gezegd dat er 100 % garantie was zou ik bij beide pizzeria's aangeven dat ik het eerste gerecht niet kon eten vanwege allergie. Ik zou geen onderscheid maken tussen een groot bedrijf of een klein bedrijf.....
- Scenario 1 geeft het beleid van Happy Italy goed weer (100% tevredenheidsgarantie) Scenario 2 geeft je minder het gevoel dat de Pizzeria iets met je klacht wil gaan doen

2&3

- De laatste is een grote massale restaurantketen, waardoor ik denk dat die vaker zo'n fout maken. En daarnaast maakt het hun denk ik ook minder uit, omdat ze toch genoeg klanten hebben.
- Grappig genoeg zag ik het eerste verhaal helemaal voor me, terwijl ik dat bij het tweede verhaal veel minder had. Misschien komt dat, doordat ik mezelf eerder naar een 'Pizzeria Piccolo' zie gaan dan een Happy Italy. Ik kon dit meer relateren aan de momenten die ik al eerder heb meegemaakt. In beide gevallen vind ik het realistisch dat het misgaat. Bij Pizzeria Piccolo vind ik dit realistisch, omdat ze het te druk hebben en het hierdoor waarschijnlijk wat chaotisch verloopt. Bij Happy Italy zie ik het mis gaan, omdat ze daar de pizza's maken aan de lopende band en minder rekening houden met persoonlijke wensen. Bij Pizzeria Piccolo kan ik me ook voorstellen dat ze hun klant centraal stellen en daarom 100% tevredenheidsgarantie aanbieden. Het is een kleine organisatie waarbij beleving, smaak en service centraal staat en veel dichterbij de bezoeker staan. Een Pizzeria Piccolo moet zijn eigen naam vestigen en kan niet meeliften op branding van een overkoepelende organisatie, zoals een Happy Italy. Bij Happy Italy kunnen ze door de massa geen 100% tevredenheid aanbieden, waardoor ik het realistisch vind dat ze alleen vragen of alles naar wens was.

2&4

- Dat er niet wordt gerefereerd naar wat de serveerster precies zei (bijv. de 100% tevredenheidsgarantie) in het tweede scenario, maar wel in het eerste scenario.
- Bij het eerste scenario was de serveerster meer gebrand op de tevredenheid van de klant. Vaak is de 100% tevredenheidsgarantie een onderdeel van de slogan o.i.d. maar wordt het meestal niet benoemd door serveersters. Dat maakte het eerste scenario voor mij meer onrealistisch dan het tweede scenario. Het eerste scenario nodigt wel meer uit om eerlijk te zeggen dat je teleurgesteld was over het voorgerecht en komt vriendelijker over.

3&4

- Ik vond ze beide heel realistisch en een 'typische' situatie. Bij de eerste zou ik alleen eerder verwachten om in een hoekje te worden geplaatst en dat de bestelling verkeerd gaat. Dit komt omdat Happy Italy groot is en 'commercieel'. Bij de tweede situatie kan het ook gebeuren, maar dat verwacht ik toch minder snel vanwege de goede recensies en het kleine, lokale restaurant. Dus de tweede las ik met wat meer verbazing dan de eerste. Bij de eerste situaties dacht ik alleen maar 'oja, typisch'. En bij de tweede dacht ik 'jammer dat deze dingen fout gaan'.
- Ja kan ik. Het eerste scenario ging over een grote restaurantketen de tweede over twee mannen met een pizzaoven in een klein restaurant.

Appendix III: Scenarios

(Scenario 1)

Weekend! Het is vrijdagavond en jij en je beste vriend(in) hebben besloten om dit te vieren met een pizza bij Happy Italy. Happy Italy is een Italiaanse restaurantketen met een enorme omzet in Nederland. In elke stad lijkt wel een Happy Italy te zitten en het is in de afgelopen jaren steeds populairder geworden. Tijd om daar zelf eens te gaan eten! Rond etenstijd fietsen jullie naar het restaurant, waar het erg druk blijkt te zijn. De serveerster weet een tafeltje voor jullie te vinden in de hoek. Na een blik op de menukaart is de keuze snel gemaakt. Als jouw voorgerecht wordt gebracht ben je behoorlijk teleurgesteld. Je had je zo verheugd op de carpaccio salade. Maar ondanks dat jij hebt aangegeven allergisch te zijn voor pijnboompitten, zijn die toch verstrooid over enkele plakjes carpaccio. Gelukkig valt de pizza beter in de smaak. De serveerster vraagt na afloop of alles naar wens was: “Wij van Happy Italy hanteren een 100% tevredenheidsgarantie. We willen elke klant tevreden zien vertrekken, dus als u klachten heeft laat mij dit dan weten!”. Je twijfelt of je jouw klacht wilt bespreken.

(Scenario 2)

Weekend! Het is vrijdagavond en jij en je beste vriend(in) hebben besloten om dit te vieren met een pizza bij Pizzeria Piccolo. Pizzeria Piccolo is een klein, lokaal restaurant dicht bij jouw huis. Het restaurant wordt gerund door de broers Antonio en Rinaldo Piccolo en krijgt veel goede recensies. Tijd om daar zelf eens te gaan eten! Rond etenstijd fietsen jullie naar het restaurant, waar het erg druk blijkt te zijn. De serveerster weet snel een tafeltje voor jullie te vinden in de hoek. Na een blik op de menukaart is de keuze snel gemaakt. Als jouw voorgerecht wordt gebracht ben je behoorlijk teleurgesteld. Je had je zo verheugd op de carpaccio salade. Maar ondanks dat jij hebt aangegeven allergisch te zijn voor pijnboompitten, zijn die toch verstrooid over enkele plakjes carpaccio. Gelukkig valt de pizza beter in de smaak. De serveerster vraagt na afloop of alles naar wens was: “Wij van Pizzeria Piccolo hanteren een 100% tevredenheidsgarantie. We willen elke klant tevreden zien vertrekken, dus als u klachten heeft laat mij dit dan weten!”. Je twijfelt of je jouw klacht wilt bespreken.

(Scenario 3)

Weekend! Het is vrijdagavond en jij en je beste vriend(in) hebben besloten om dit te vieren met een pizza bij Happy Italy. Happy Italy is een Italiaanse restaurantketen met een enorme omzet in Nederland. In elke stad lijkt wel een Happy Italy te zitten en het is in de afgelopen jaren steeds populairder geworden. Tijd om daar zelf eens te gaan eten! Rond etenstijd fietsen jullie naar het restaurant, waar het erg druk blijkt te zijn. De serveerster weet snel een tafeltje voor jullie te vinden in de hoek. Na een blik op de menukaart is de keuze snel gemaakt. Als jouw voorgerecht wordt gebracht ben je behoorlijk teleurgesteld. Je had je zo verheugd op de carpaccio salade. Maar ondanks dat jij hebt aangegeven allergisch te zijn voor pijnboompitten, zijn die toch verstrooid over enkele plakjes carpaccio. Gelukkig valt de pizza beter in de smaak. Na afloop vraagt de serveerster of alles naar wens was. Je twijfelt of je jouw klacht wilt bespreken.

(Scenario 4)

Weekend! Het is vrijdagavond en jij en je beste vriend(in) hebben besloten om dit te vieren met een pizza bij Pizzeria Piccolo. Pizzeria Piccolo is een klein, lokaal restaurant dicht bij jouw huis. Het restaurant wordt gerund door de broers Antonio en Rinaldo Piccolo en krijgt veel goede recensies. Tijd om daar zelf eens te gaan eten!. Rond etenstijd fietsen jullie naar het restaurant, waar het erg druk blijkt te zijn. De serveerster weet snel een tafeltje voor jullie te vinden in de hoek. Na een blik op de menukaart is de keuze snel gemaakt. Als jouw voorgerecht wordt gebracht ben je behoorlijk teleurgesteld. Je had je zo verheugd op de carpaccio salade. Maar ondanks dat jij hebt aangegeven allergisch te zijn voor pijnboompitten, zijn die toch verstrooid over enkele plakjes carpaccio. Gelukkig valt de pizza beter in de smaak. Na afloop vraagt de serveerster of alles naar wens was. Je twijfelt of je jouw klacht wilt bespreken.

Appendix IV: Manipulation checks

Manipulation FirmSize (significant)

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
FirmSize * Grootte_Manipulatie	175	100,0%	0	0,0%	175	100,0%

FirmSize * Grootte_Manipulatie Crosstabulation

			Grootte_Manipulatie		Total
			Groot	Klein	
FirmSize	Klein	Count	4	79	83
		% within FirmSize	4,8%	95,2%	100,0%
	Groot	Count	82	10	92
		% within FirmSize	89,1%	10,9%	100,0%
Total	Count		86	89	175
	% within FirmSize		49,1%	50,9%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (1- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	124,104 ^a	1	,000	,000	,000
Continuity Correction ^b	120,753	1	,000		
Likelihood Ratio	147,230	1	,000		
Fisher's Exact Test					
Linear-by-Linear Association	123,395	1	,000		
N of Valid Cases	175				

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 40,79.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Manipulation RedressPolicy (significant)

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
RedressPolicy * Garantie_Manipulatie	213	100,0%	0	0,0%	213	100,0%

RedressPolicy * Garantie_Manipulatie Crosstabulation

			Garantie_Manipulatie		Total
			Ja er is een garantie	Nee er is geen garantie	
RedressPolicy	0	Count	27	84	111
		% within RedressPolicy	24,3%	75,7%	100,0%
	Present	Count	91	11	102
		% within RedressPolicy	89,2%	10,8%	100,0%
Total		Count	118	95	213
		% within RedressPolicy	55,4%	44,6%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (1- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	90,588 ^a	1	,000	,000	,000
Continuity Correction ^b	87,981	1	,000		
Likelihood Ratio	99,865	1	,000		
Fisher's Exact Test					
Linear-by-Linear Association	90,163	1	,000		
N of Valid Cases	213				

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 45,49.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Appendix V: Factor analysis (first attempt)

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings ^a
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total
1	3,873	25,823	25,823	3,589	23,929	23,929	3,026
2	2,448	16,322	42,145	1,916	12,772	36,701	1,838
3	1,887	12,582	54,727	1,413	9,418	46,119	1,822
4	1,299	8,660	63,387	,945	6,300	52,419	2,495
5	,999	6,659	70,045				
6	,790	5,264	75,310				
7	,753	5,022	80,332				
8	,618	4,123	84,455				
9	,553	3,684	88,139				
10	,470	3,131	91,269				
11	,390	2,599	93,868				
12	,370	2,468	96,336				
13	,270	1,803	98,139				
14	,178	1,186	99,324				
15	,101	,676	100,000				

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.


Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Satisfaction_1	,589	,904
Satisfaction_2_REV	,337	,333
Satisfaction_3	,507	,541
Opportunisme_1	,824	,895
Opportunisme_2	,744	,750
Opportunisme_3	,838	,898
Injury_1	,317	,376
Injury_2	,375	,436
Injury_3	,372	,373
Injury_4	,401	,548
Injury_5	,258	,278
Victim_1	,288	,171
Victim_2	,331	,346
Victim_3	,447	,705
Victim_4	,304	,308

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.	,751
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square
	809,026
	df
	105
	Sig.
	,000



Pattern Matrix^a

	Factor			
	1	2	3	4
Satisfaction_1	,032	,072	-,032	,970
Satisfaction_2_REV	-,190	,019	,140	,423
Satisfaction_3	-,034	-,011	-,065	,734
Opportunisme_1	,862	-,011	-,020	-,172
Opportunisme_2	,850	,020	-,038	-,021
Opportunisme_3	,929	-,021	,025	-,056
Injury_1	-,027	,609	-,036	,013
Injury_2	,131	,647	,166	,016
Injury_3	-,150	,587	-,072	-,046
Injury_4	,012	,737	,003	,109
Injury_5	,104	,307	-,249	-,191
Victim_1	,155	-,016	-,386	,076
Victim_2	-,200	-,025	-,583	-,023
Victim_3	-,053	,099	-,810	-,065
Victim_4	,083	-,025	-,529	-,032

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

Factor Correlation Matrix

Factor	1	2	3	4
1	1,000	,041	-,150	-,391
2	,041	1,000	-,129	-,038
3	-,150	-,129	1,000	,250
4	-,391	-,038	,250	1,000

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

Appendix VI: Factor analysis (second attempt)

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings ^a
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total
1	3,713	26,522	26,522	3,457	24,694	24,694	2,952
2	2,314	16,527	43,049	1,779	12,704	37,398	1,701
3	1,881	13,437	56,486	1,409	10,068	47,466	1,675
4	1,296	9,259	65,745	,939	6,706	54,172	2,367
5	,999	7,133	72,878				
6	,786	5,617	78,496				
7	,630	4,498	82,993				
8	,584	4,169	87,163				
9	,473	3,378	90,540				
10	,399	2,850	93,390				
11	,373	2,663	96,054				
12	,272	1,945	97,999				
13	,178	1,275	99,274				
14	,102	,726	100,000				

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.


Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Satisfaction_1	,584	,875
Satisfaction_2_REV	,336	,333
Satisfaction_3	,507	,559
Opportunisme_1	,823	,892
Opportunisme_2	,744	,754
Opportunisme_3	,838	,899
Injury_1	,317	,403
Injury_2	,366	,428
Injury_3	,371	,376
Injury_4	,378	,523
Victim_1	,288	,171
Victim_2	,325	,338
Victim_3	,441	,739
Victim_4	,294	,294

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,737
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	773,676
	df	91
	Sig.	,000



Pattern Matrix^a

	Factor			
	1	2	3	4
Satisfaction_1	,020	,053	-,013	,942
Satisfaction_2_REV	-,191	,007	,146	,425
Satisfaction_3	-,030	-,031	-,050	,745
Opportunisme_1	,858	-,004	-,028	-,179
Opportunisme_2	,848	,028	-,047	-,030
Opportunisme_3	,924	-,015	,016	-,064
Injury_1	-,018	,628	-,058	-,010
Injury_2	,141	,636	,146	,003
Injury_3	-,137	,590	-,087	-,062
Injury_4	,027	,715	-,011	,093
Victim_1	,158	-,010	-,383	,069
Victim_2	-,193	-,015	-,570	-,029
Victim_3	-,045	,121	-,829	-,079
Victim_4	,088	-,020	-,514	-,036

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

Factor Correlation Matrix

Factor	1	2	3	4
1	1,000	,004	-,125	-,376
2	,004	1,000	-,073	,026
3	-,125	-,073	1,000	,213
4	-,376	,026	,213	1,000

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

Appendix VII: Factor analysis (third attempt)

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings ^a
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total
1	3,652	28,093	28,093	3,408	26,217	26,217	3,013
2	2,300	17,690	45,783	1,757	13,516	39,733	1,709
3	1,814	13,957	59,740	1,355	10,421	50,155	1,455
4	1,217	9,359	69,098	,872	6,706	56,861	2,435
5	,787	6,053	75,151				
6	,655	5,038	80,189				
7	,598	4,599	84,789				
8	,578	4,445	89,234				
9	,470	3,615	92,849				
10	,373	2,873	95,721				
11	,273	2,099	97,820				
12	,179	1,378	99,198				
13	,104	,802	100,000				

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.


Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Satisfaction_1	,579	,835
Satisfaction_2_REV	,327	,331
Satisfaction_3	,506	,579
Opportunisme_1	,818	,878
Opportunisme_2	,744	,766
Opportunisme_3	,836	,916
Injury_1	,311	,402
Injury_2	,349	,459
Injury_3	,315	,380
Injury_4	,366	,520
Victim_2	,298	,330
Victim_3	,405	,659
Victim_4	,294	,336

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,747
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	733,028
	df	78
	Sig.	,000



Pattern Matrix^a

	Factor			
	1	2	3	4
Satisfaction_1	,046	,056	,006	,929
Satisfaction_2_REV	-,178	,003	,118	,437
Satisfaction_3	,017	-,034	-,054	,779
Opportunisme_1	,858	-,004	-,004	-,151
Opportunisme_2	,882	,023	-,048	,025
Opportunisme_3	,955	-,021	,015	-,006
Injury_1	-,012	,624	-,070	-,005
Injury_2	,100	,657	,202	-,035
Injury_3	-,104	,577	-,157	-,022
Injury_4	,016	,716	,012	,079
Victim_2	-,135	-,019	-,565	-,013
Victim_3	,039	,116	-,775	-,058
Victim_4	,164	-,031	-,555	,017

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

Factor Correlation Matrix

Factor	1	2	3	4
1	1,000	,012	-,054	-,454
2	,012	1,000	-,085	,028
3	-,054	-,085	1,000	,213
4	-,454	,028	,213	1,000

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

Appendix VIII: Reliability analysis

Satisfaction

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,781	3

Opportunism

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,941	3

Denial of Injury

Reliability Statistics



Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,723	4

Denial of Victim




Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,648	3

Appendix IX: Outlier analysis (first MANOVA)



Appendix X: Normality check (first MANOVA)



Descriptives

			Statistic	Std. Error
NumberArguments	Mean		2,2422	,07013
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound Upper Bound	2,1034 2,3810	
	5% Trimmed Mean		2,2066	
	Median		2,1429	
	Variance		,629	
	Std. Deviation		,79338	
	Minimum		1,00	
	Maximum		4,57	
	Range		3,57	
	Interquartile Range		,82	
	Skewness		,530	,214
	Kurtosis		,190	,425
Compensatie	Mean		3,33	,109
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound Upper Bound	3,11 3,54	
	5% Trimmed Mean		3,21	
	Median		3,00	
	Variance		1,529	
	Std. Deviation		1,237	
	Minimum		1	
	Maximum		7	
	Range		6	
	Interquartile Range		2	
	Skewness		,949	,214
	Kurtosis		1,469	,425
Opportunism	Mean		2,2005	,12045
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound Upper Bound	1,9622 2,4389	
	5% Trimmed Mean		2,0787	
	Median		2,0000	
	Variance		1,857	
	Std. Deviation		1,36276	
	Minimum		1,00	
	Maximum		5,67	
	Range		4,67	
	Interquartile Range		1,67	
	Skewness		1,243	,214
	Kurtosis		,577	,425

Appendix XI: Levene's & Box' M test (first MANOVA)

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^a

	F	df1	df2	Sig.
NumberArguments	1,331	3	124	,268
Compensatie	,752	3	124	,523
Opportunism	2,221	3	124	,089

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + FirmSize + RedressPolicy + FirmSize * RedressPolicy

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices^a

Box's M	22,003
F	1,167
df1	18
df2	47081,956
Sig.	,279

Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables are equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + FirmSize + RedressPolicy + FirmSize * RedressPolicy

Appendix XII: Correlation table

Correlations

		NumberArguments	Compensatie	Opportunism	Leeftijd	Geslacht	Opleiding
NumberArguments	Pearson Correlation	1	,380**	,409**	-,062	,037	-,121
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,000	,489	,676	,172
	N	128	128	128	128	128	128
Compensatie	Pearson Correlation	,380**	1	,537**	,009	-,235**	-,125
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,000	,924	,007	,158
	N	128	128	128	128	128	128
Opportunism	Pearson Correlation	,409**	,537**	1	-,150	-,131	-,236**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000		,092	,142	,007
	N	128	128	128	128	128	128
Leeftijd	Pearson Correlation	-,062	,009	-,150	1	,173	,526**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,489	,924	,092		,051	,000
	N	128	128	128	128	128	128
Geslacht	Pearson Correlation	,037	-,235**	-,131	,173	1	,195*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,676	,007	,142	,051		,027
	N	128	128	128	128	128	128
Opleiding	Pearson Correlation	-,121	-,125	-,236**	,526**	,195*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,172	,158	,007	,000	,027	
	N	128	128	128	128	128	128

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix XIII: MANOVA results (first)

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
FirmSize	0	Klein	63
	1	Groot	65
RedressPolicy	0	0	57
	1	Present	71

Multivariate Tests^a

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	,920	468,446 ^b	3,000	122,000	,000	,920
	Wilks' Lambda	,080	468,446 ^b	3,000	122,000	,000	,920
	Hotelling's Trace	11,519	468,446 ^b	3,000	122,000	,000	,920
	Roy's Largest Root	11,519	468,446 ^b	3,000	122,000	,000	,920
FirmSize	Pillai's Trace	,063	2,754 ^b	3,000	122,000	,045	,063
	Wilks' Lambda	,937	2,754 ^b	3,000	122,000	,045	,063
	Hotelling's Trace	,068	2,754 ^b	3,000	122,000	,045	,063
	Roy's Largest Root	,068	2,754 ^b	3,000	122,000	,045	,063
RedressPolicy	Pillai's Trace	,010	,407 ^b	3,000	122,000	,748	,010
	Wilks' Lambda	,990	,407 ^b	3,000	122,000	,748	,010
	Hotelling's Trace	,010	,407 ^b	3,000	122,000	,748	,010
	Roy's Largest Root	,010	,407 ^b	3,000	122,000	,748	,010
FirmSize * RedressPolicy	Pillai's Trace	,018	,728 ^b	3,000	122,000	,537	,018
	Wilks' Lambda	,982	,728 ^b	3,000	122,000	,537	,018
	Hotelling's Trace	,018	,728 ^b	3,000	122,000	,537	,018
	Roy's Largest Root	,018	,728 ^b	3,000	122,000	,537	,018

a. Design: Intercept + FirmSize + RedressPolicy + FirmSize * RedressPolicy

b. Exact statistic

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Dependent Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	NumberArguments	3,570 ^a	3	1,190	1,932	,128	,045
	Compensatie	7,215 ^b	3	2,405	1,595	,194	,037
	Opportunism	11,088 ^c	3	3,696	2,039	,112	,047
Intercept	NumberArguments	631,283	1	631,283	1024,988	,000	,892
	Compensatie	1375,469	1	1375,469	912,057	,000	,880
	Opportunism	607,359	1	607,359	335,072	,000	,730
FirmSize	NumberArguments	3,495	1	3,495	5,675	,019	,044
	Compensatie	5,124	1	5,124	3,398	,068	,027
	Opportunism	10,410	1	10,410	5,743	,018	,044
RedressPolicy	NumberArguments	,000	1	,000	,000	,985	,000
	Compensatie	1,411	1	1,411	,936	,335	,007
	Opportunism	,025	1	,025	,014	,907	,000
FirmSize * RedressPolicy	NumberArguments	,001	1	,001	,001	,973	,000
	Compensatie	1,634	1	1,634	1,084	,300	,009
	Opportunism	,207	1	,207	,114	,736	,001
Error	NumberArguments	76,371	124	,616			
	Compensatie	187,004	124	1,508			
	Opportunism	224,765	124	1,813			
Total	NumberArguments	723,449	128				
	Compensatie	1612,000	128				
	Opportunism	855,667	128				
Corrected Total	NumberArguments	79,941	127				
	Compensatie	194,219	127				
	Opportunism	235,853	127				

a. R Squared = ,045 (Adjusted R Squared = ,022)

b. R Squared = ,037 (Adjusted R Squared = ,014)

c. R Squared = ,047 (Adjusted R Squared = ,024)

1. FirmSize




Dependent Variable	FirmSize	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NumberArguments	Klein	2,073	,100	1,874	2,272
	Groot	2,407	,097	2,214	2,599
Compensatie	Klein	3,104	,157	2,793	3,415
	Groot	3,508	,152	3,206	3,810
Opportunism	Klein	1,909	,172	1,568	2,250
	Groot	2,485	,167	2,154	2,816

2. RedressPolicy



Dependent Variable	RedressPolicy	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NumberArguments	0	2,241	,104	2,035	2,448
	Present	2,239	,093	2,054	2,423
Compensatie	0	3,200	,163	2,877	3,524
	Present	3,412	,146	3,123	3,701
Opportunism	0	2,183	,179	1,829	2,537
	Present	2,211	,160	1,895	2,528

3. FirmSize * RedressPolicy



Dependent Variable	FirmSize	RedressPolicy	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NumberArguments	Klein	0	2,077	,154	1,772	2,382
		Present	2,069	,129	1,814	2,325
	Groot	0	2,406	,141	2,127	2,685
		Present	2,408	,135	2,141	2,674
Compensatie	Klein	0	2,885	,241	2,408	3,361
		Present	3,324	,202	2,925	3,724
	Groot	0	3,516	,221	3,080	3,953
		Present	3,500	,211	3,083	3,917
Opportunism	Klein	0	1,936	,264	1,413	2,459
		Present	1,883	,221	1,445	2,321
	Groot	0	2,430	,242	1,951	2,909
		Present	2,539	,231	2,082	2,996



Appendix XIV: Outlier analysis (second MANOVA)




Appendix XV: Normality check (second MANOVA)



Descriptives

			Statistic	Std. Error
Injury	Mean		5,8867	,07188
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	5,7445	
		Upper Bound	6,0289	
	5% Trimmed Mean		5,9692	
	Median		6,0000	
	Variance		,661	
	Std. Deviation		,81319	
	Minimum		1,50	
	Maximum		7,00	
	Range		5,50	
	Interquartile Range		,75	
	Skewness		-2,173	,214
	Kurtosis		8,027	,425
Victim	Mean		5,2786	,07674
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	5,1268	
		Upper Bound	5,4305	
	5% Trimmed Mean		5,3142	
	Median		5,3333	
	Variance		,754	
	Std. Deviation		,86820	
	Minimum		2,33	
	Maximum		7,00	
	Range		4,67	
	Interquartile Range		1,25	
	Skewness		-,673	,214
	Kurtosis		,600	,425



Descriptives

			Statistic	Std. Error
InjuryTransformed	Mean		35,3096	,73300
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	33,8591	
		Upper Bound	36,7600	
	5% Trimmed Mean		35,8636	
	Median		36,0000	
	Variance		68,772	
	Std. Deviation		8,29292	
	Minimum		2,25	
	Maximum		49,00	
	Range		46,75	
	Interquartile Range		8,81	
	Skewness		-1,080	,214
	Kurtosis		2,671	,425

Appendix XVI: Levene's & Box' M test (second MANOVA)

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices^a

Box's M	13,899
F	1,458
df1	9
df2	6872,705
Sig.	,157

Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables are equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + OpportunismGroups + CompensatieGroups + ArgumentsGroups + OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups + OpportunismGroups * ArgumentsGroups + CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups + OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^a

	F	df1	df2	Sig.
InjuryTransformed	1,469	5	122	,205
Victim	1,379	5	122	,237

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + OpportunismGroups + CompensatieGroups + ArgumentsGroups + OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups + OpportunismGroups * ArgumentsGroups + CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups + OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups

Appendix XVII: Correlation table

Correlations

		Leeftijd	Geslacht	Opleiding	Injury	Victim
Leeftijd	Pearson Correlation	1	,173	,526**	-,156	,073
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,051	,000	,079	,414
	N	128	128	128	128	128
Geslacht	Pearson Correlation	,173	1	,195*	,052	-,077
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,051		,027	,561	,388
	N	128	128	128	128	128
Opleiding	Pearson Correlation	,526**	,195*	1	-,017	-,066
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,027		,852	,457
	N	128	128	128	128	128
Injury	Pearson Correlation	-,156	,052	-,017	1	,036
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,079	,561	,852		,689
	N	128	128	128	128	128
Victim	Pearson Correlation	,073	-,077	-,066	,036	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,414	,388	,457	,689	
	N	128	128	128	128	128

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix XVIII: MANOVA results (second)

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
OpportunismGroups	,00	Legitimate	89
	1,00	Illegitimate	39
CompensatieGroups	,00	Legitimate	118
	1,00	Illegitimate	10
ArgumentsGroups	,00	Legitimate	19
	1,00	Illegitimate	109

Multivariate Tests^a

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	,834	303,965 ^b	2,000	121,000	,000	,834
	Wilks' Lambda	,166	303,965 ^b	2,000	121,000	,000	,834
	Hotelling's Trace	5,024	303,965 ^b	2,000	121,000	,000	,834
	Roy's Largest Root	5,024	303,965 ^b	2,000	121,000	,000	,834
OpportunismGroups	Pillai's Trace	,024	1,470 ^b	2,000	121,000	,234	,024
	Wilks' Lambda	,976	1,470 ^b	2,000	121,000	,234	,024
	Hotelling's Trace	,024	1,470 ^b	2,000	121,000	,234	,024
	Roy's Largest Root	,024	1,470 ^b	2,000	121,000	,234	,024
CompensatieGroups	Pillai's Trace	,048	3,029 ^b	2,000	121,000	,052	,048
	Wilks' Lambda	,952	3,029 ^b	2,000	121,000	,052	,048
	Hotelling's Trace	,050	3,029 ^b	2,000	121,000	,052	,048
	Roy's Largest Root	,050	3,029 ^b	2,000	121,000	,052	,048
ArgumentsGroups	Pillai's Trace	,031	1,932 ^b	2,000	121,000	,149	,031
	Wilks' Lambda	,969	1,932 ^b	2,000	121,000	,149	,031
	Hotelling's Trace	,032	1,932 ^b	2,000	121,000	,149	,031
	Roy's Largest Root	,032	1,932 ^b	2,000	121,000	,149	,031
OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups	Pillai's Trace	,030	1,877 ^b	2,000	121,000	,157	,030
	Wilks' Lambda	,970	1,877 ^b	2,000	121,000	,157	,030
	Hotelling's Trace	,031	1,877 ^b	2,000	121,000	,157	,030
	Roy's Largest Root	,031	1,877 ^b	2,000	121,000	,157	,030
OpportunismGroups * ArgumentsGroups	Pillai's Trace	,015	,949 ^b	2,000	121,000	,390	,015
	Wilks' Lambda	,985	,949 ^b	2,000	121,000	,390	,015
	Hotelling's Trace	,016	,949 ^b	2,000	121,000	,390	,015
	Roy's Largest Root	,016	,949 ^b	2,000	121,000	,390	,015
CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups	Pillai's Trace	,000	. ^b	,000	,000	.	.
	Wilks' Lambda	1,000	. ^b	,000	121,500	.	.
	Hotelling's Trace	,000	. ^b	,000	2,000	.	.
	Roy's Largest Root	,000	,000 ^b	2,000	120,000	1,000	,000
OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups	Pillai's Trace	,000	. ^b	,000	,000	.	.
	Wilks' Lambda	1,000	. ^b	,000	121,500	.	.
	Hotelling's Trace	,000	. ^b	,000	2,000	.	.
	Roy's Largest Root	,000	,000 ^b	2,000	120,000	1,000	,000

a. Design: Intercept + OpportunismGroups + CompensatieGroups + ArgumentsGroups + OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups + OpportunismGroups * ArgumentsGroups + CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups + OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups

b. Exact statistic

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Dependent Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	InjuryTransformed	319,977 ^a	5	63,995	,928	,465	,037
	Victim	6,659 ^b	5	1,332	1,824	,113	,070
Intercept	InjuryTransformed	16971,028	1	16971,028	246,070	,000	,669
	Victim	289,913	1	289,913	397,100	,000	,765
OpportunismGroups	InjuryTransformed	18,150	1	18,150	,263	,609	,002
	Victim	2,030	1	2,030	2,780	,098	,022
CompensatieGroups	InjuryTransformed	,441	1	,441	,006	,936	,000
	Victim	4,429	1	4,429	6,066	,015	,047
ArgumentsGroups	InjuryTransformed	196,724	1	196,724	2,852	,094	,023
	Victim	,893	1	,893	1,223	,271	,010
OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups	InjuryTransformed	49,136	1	49,136	,712	,400	,006
	Victim	2,130	1	2,130	2,917	,090	,023
OpportunismGroups * ArgumentsGroups	InjuryTransformed	122,872	1	122,872	1,782	,184	,014
	Victim	,135	1	,135	,185	,668	,002
CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups	InjuryTransformed	,000	0	.	.	.	,000
	Victim	,000	0	.	.	.	,000
OpportunismGroups * CompensatieGroups * ArgumentsGroups	InjuryTransformed	,000	0	.	.	.	,000
	Victim	,000	0	.	.	.	,000
Error	InjuryTransformed	8414,123	122	68,968			
	Victim	89,069	122	,730			
Total	InjuryTransformed	168320,117	128				
	Victim	3662,333	128				
Corrected Total	InjuryTransformed	8734,100	127				
	Victim	95,728	127				

a. R Squared = ,037 (Adjusted R Squared = -,003)

b. R Squared = ,070 (Adjusted R Squared = ,031)

1. OpportunismGroups

Dependent Variable	OpportunismGroups	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
InjuryTransformed	Legitimate	36,823 ^a	2,863	31,155	42,491
	Illegitimate	39,065 ^a	2,963	33,200	44,930
Victim	Legitimate	4,714 ^a	,295	4,131	5,297
	Illegitimate	5,424 ^a	,305	4,821	6,028

a. Based on modified population marginal mean.

2. CompensatieGroups







Dependent Variable	CompensatieGroups	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
InjuryTransformed	Legitimate	39,053	2,182	34,734	43,372
	Illegitimate	35,726 ^a	4,377	27,061	44,390
Victim	Legitimate	5,530	,224	5,085	5,974
	Illegitimate	4,148 ^a	,450	3,257	5,040

a. Based on modified population marginal mean.

3. ArgumentsGroups

Dependent Variable	ArgumentsGroups	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
InjuryTransformed	Legitimate	42,738 ^a	4,266	34,293	51,183
	Illegitimate	35,547	2,236	31,121	39,973
Victim	Legitimate	5,778 ^a	,439	4,909	6,647
	Illegitimate	4,715	,230	4,259	5,170

a. Based on modified population marginal mean.



Appendix XIX: Additional chi-square tests

Liberal redress policy*Klagen

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
KlachtDelen * RedressPolicy	161	100,0%	0	0,0%	161	100,0%

KlachtDelen * RedressPolicy Crosstabulation

Count

		RedressPolicy		Total
		0	Present	
KlachtDelen	Ja	57	75	132
	Nee	19	10	29
Total		76	85	161

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4,759 ^a	1	,029	,039	,024
Continuity Correction ^b	3,905	1	,048		
Likelihood Ratio	4,799	1	,028		
Fisher's Exact Test					
Linear-by-Linear Association	4,730	1	,030		
N of Valid Cases	161				

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13,69.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

FirmSize*Klagen

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
KlachtDelen * FirmSize	161	100,0%	0	0,0%	161	100,0%

KlachtDelen * FirmSize Crosstabulation

Count

		FirmSize		Total
		Klein	Groot	
KlachtDelen	Ja	63	69	132
	Nee	16	13	29
Total		79	82	161

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (1- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,527 ^a	1	,468	,541	,301
Continuity Correction ^b	,272	1	,602		
Likelihood Ratio	,528	1	,468		
Fisher's Exact Test					
Linear-by-Linear Association	,524	1	,469		
N of Valid Cases	161				

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14,23.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Appendix XX: Additional ANOVA

Mean Satisfaction score in Scenario WITH liberal redress policy

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Satisfaction	85	1,00	6,33	3,9922	1,22039
Valid N (listwise)	85				

Mean Satisfaction score in Scenario WITHOUT liberal redress policy

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Satisfaction	76	2,00	6,33	3,9254	1,05071
Valid N (listwise)	76				

Mean Satisfaction score in Scenario with LARGE restaurant

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Satisfaction	82	1,00	6,00	3,6951	1,11874
Valid N (listwise)	82				

Mean Satisfaction score in Scenario with SMALL restaurant

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Satisfaction	79	2,00	6,33	4,2363	1,10316
Valid N (listwise)	79				

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^a

Dependent Variable: Satisfaction

F	df1	df2	Sig.
,834	3	157	,477

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + FirmSize + RedressPolicy + FirmSize * RedressPolicy

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Satisfaction

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	12,343 ^a	3	4,114	3,300	,022	,059
Intercept	2520,879	1	2520,879	2021,944	,000	,928
FirmSize	11,586	1	11,586	9,293	,003	,056
RedressPolicy	,243	1	,243	,195	,660	,001
FirmSize * RedressPolicy	,326	1	,326	,261	,610	,002
Error	195,741	157	1,247			
Total	2733,667	161				
Corrected Total	208,084	160				

a. R Squared = ,059 (Adjusted R Squared = ,041)