

'Networking Peace'

Comprehensive strategies for sustainable conflict management in a complex security environment – the German approach.



Jael Aheram, "War & Peace", creative common license

Master Thesis

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List of Abbreviations

3D-Approach: Defence, Diplomacy and Development

AA: *Auswärtiges Amt* / German Federal Foreign Office

AG IPM: *Arbeitsgruppe Internationale Polizeieinsätze* / Working Group International Police Missions

AIZ: *Akademie für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* / Academy for International Cooperation

AKNZ: *Akademie für Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz* / Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection

AU: African Union

BAKS: *Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik* / Federal Academy for Security Policy

BBK: *Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe* / Federal Office for Citizen Protection and Disaster Support

BfV: *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* / Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution

BKA: *Bundeskriminalamt* / Federal Criminal Police Office

BMF: *Bundesfinanzministerium* / Federal Ministry of Finance

BMI: *Bundesministerium des Innern* / German Federal Ministry for the Interior

BMJV: *Bundeministerium für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz* / Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection

BMVg: *Bundesministerium der Verteidigung* / German Federal Ministry for Defense

BMWi: *Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie* / Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy

BMZ: *Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* / German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

BSH: *Bundesverband Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen* / Federal Association for Security Policy at Universities

BSV: *Bund für Soziale Verteidigung* / Federation for Social Defense

CA: Comprehensive Approach

CDU: *Christlich-Demokratische Union* / German Christian Democratic Union

CIMIC: Civil-military cooperation

CMCoord: United Nations Civil-Military Coordination

CSDP: EU Common Security and Defense Policy

DEval: Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit / German Evaluation Institute for Development Cooperation

DNS: *Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie* / German Sustainability Strategy

DPA: UN Department of Political Affairs

DPKO: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

ECHO: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian aid Operations

EDAP: European Defense Action Plan

ENTRI: Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRI)

EU: European Union

EUGS: European Union Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy

EUISS: European Union Institute for Security Studies

FDP: *Freie Demokratische Partei* / German Liberal Party

FES: *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* / Friedrich Ebert Foundation

FRG: Federal Republic of Germany / *Bundesrepublik Deutschland*

FriEnt: *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Entwicklung* / Working Group on Peace and Development

FüAk: *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr* / Bundeswehr Staff College

G7: Group of seven major industrial countries + EU (G8 before expulsion of Russia in 2014)

G20: Group of 19 major industrial countries + EU

GdP: *Gewerkschaft der Polizei* / German Police Union

GIZ: *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* / German Society for International Cooperation

GNI: Gross National Income

Grüne: *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* / German Green Party

HIPPO: UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

IA: Integrated Approach

ICD: International Capacity Development

IcSP: EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IHP: International Humanitarian Partnership

IPP: *Integrierter Planungsprozess der Bundeswehr* / Integrated Planning Process of the German Armed Forces

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force (NATO mission in Afghanistan)

KfW: *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* / Reconstruction Credit Institute

LKA: *Landeskriminalamt* / State Office of Criminal Investigations

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCW: Network-Centric Warfare
 ODA: Official Development Aid
 OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
 OECD DAC: OECD Development Assistance Committee
 OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
 Polizei DBT: *Polizei beim Deutschen Bundestag* / German Parliament Police
 PRTs: Provincial Reconstruction Teams
 R2P: Responsibility to Protect
 SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals
 SDIP: EU Implementation Plan on Security and Defence
 SPD: *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* / German Social Democratic Party
 TPP: Training Partner Platform
 UN: United Nations
 UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade And Development
 ZFD: *Ziviler Friedensdienst* / Civil Peace Service
 ZIF: *Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze* / Center for International Peace Operations

"Effective peace-building also requires concurrent and integrated action on many different fronts: military, diplomatic, political, economic, social, humanitarian, and the many imponderables that go to make up a coherent and stable social fabric. These efforts range from demilitarization to building up national institutions, including police and judicial systems; promoting human rights; monitoring elections; encouraging formal and informal processes of political participation; providing sustainable sources of livelihood to demobilized combatants and returning refugees and displaced persons, through training programmes, the reactivation of the economy and the provision of social services; and stimulating the normal process of economic and social development which will benefit the population as a whole and provide the most secure basis for lasting peace."
-- United Nations Department of Political Affairs, quoted in Cutter (2005)

"For the human mind absolute continuity of motion is inconceivable. The laws behind any motion become comprehensible to man only when he breaks that motion down into arbitrarily selected units and subjects these to examination. But at the same time this arbitrary sub-division of continuous motion into discontinuous units is the cause of much human error."

--- Leo Tolstoy: War and Peace, 1869

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Executive Summary

New wars and new solutions for security and development dominate the discourse around international interventions, entailing various motives and interests and building on the conviction that in an increasingly interconnected world, local conflicts are harmful to all. Yet, there is a lack of concepts and strategies for successful implementation of sustainable peace-building measures, and while conflict resolution and prevention are at the head of the agendas of many an international organization, goals and demands are scarcely met in practice. This is complicated by an increasing number of actors in the field who in many cases pursue similar aims but fail to synchronize their efforts. The contemporary understanding of a connection between peace and economic development was established in reaction to altered issues of international warfare in the aftermath of the Cold War and is often referred to as the 'security-development nexus'. In turn '*Veränderte Sicherheitslage*' (changed security situation) has been coined as a term referring to broadened security concepts and resulting in a demand for strategic reform and increased cooperation between different actors in foreign operations.

Efforts in Iraq and elsewhere have severely hampered interventionist legitimization, and any allegations of an 'unpolitical' character of peace operations have long been dismantled, especially with regards to the role of military actors. While some scientists therefore currently locate traditional Western peace-building in a dead-end situation, others demand more holistic frameworks for international security governance beyond national interests, including liability of intervening powers in order to overcome diplomatic lip service and actually pursue universal aspirations of global sustainable security. Supranational peacekeeping bodies like the UN, as well as many national governments are trying to tackle this problem and develop strategies for increased coherence. The diverse concepts for better interaction are discussed using various names and are hereunder bundled as the *Comprehensive Approach*.

An ambitious imperative, one can hardly expect for it to be operationalized without obstacles and setbacks. Nonetheless, for a principle that seems to be unanimously agreed upon by most actors, the discrepancy between theoretical aspirations and implementations in practice is striking. Conflicting values, principles and priorities are often not properly addressed, resulting in organizational and operational challenges. Unwillingness to compromise especially on a political level undermines flexibility, and one-dimensional thinking hampers cooperation not

least on the local level, obstructing local ownership. While many factors and problems are addressed in extensive debates, the Comprehensive Approach remains vague as by its nature there cannot be one precise definition.

This thesis discusses the Comprehensive Approach for cooperation and coordination of various actors within a wider arena of peacekeeping missions, focusing on the German context and supported by an internship with the Center for International Peace Operations in Berlin. An extensive literature research, in-depth interviews with representatives of military and civil governmental and non-governmental institutions, and a focus study provided multifaceted data to analyze narratives, concepts and frictions in the discourse. The CA as a normative concept, practical implications in the field and the way forward in German peace operations are suspenseful topics not only for scientific analysis but also for future political and social realities around the world. The current climate in the arena of foreign politics as well as national developments have recently pushed Germany upwards on the list for potential leadership roles in international engagement. On 14 June 2017, the long-awaited government Guidelines for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management and Peace Promotion were adopted by the German parliament. The importance of this document results from its drafting process, spanning over an entire year and including government legislation and execution in terms of all ministries and government organizations, but also a broad variety of non-governmental actors.

With the political summer break ahead, it will remain to be seen how the next government elected in September will proceed on this matter and operationalize the commitments recorded therein. While the process and developed principles are widely supported both by government entities and civil society, their conceptualization lacks substance which bears the danger of retaining established parallel structures instead of supporting comprehension, thus diminishing spaces for debate and compromise and for effects especially regarding prevention. Maintaining the current separation cannot be the answer to increasingly complex crises, and an approach for more international responsibility must not succumb to interdepartmental vanities. Yet, their severity is deeply rooted in German political culture and has proved hard to overcome.

As for the problematic nature of the Comprehensive Approach itself, it becomes clear that terminological and factual misunderstandings have hampered its development. Since it has been coined, the term has lacked a congruent narrative to fill it with meaning. It has thus often been falsely assumed to be a tool to promote certain interests, instead of a conceptual frame. The lack of its adaptation however is both symptom and cause of this: by itself, the CA is in no way sufficient for successful peacekeeping, but when mainstreamed it will improve crucial hitches and advance inclusion, local ownership and prevention. This will most likely not be achieved in one drastic paradigm change but requires many small steps and adjustments- as we have seen, the last 15 years already show slow but steady progress. For further advance, political commitment on the top must defy political and interdepartmental rivalries and support the work not only in words but also in deeds and institutionalized facilitated exchange to foster resilience and be less vulnerable to personnel and political changes.

Generally, increased dialogue including political communication seems key both in order to meet aspirations of comprehension and to advance the discourse on crisis management in general. A major realization therein must be the political character of any foreign engagement, be it military, humanitarian or anything in between, in the sense that actors from all of these groups pursue specific goals and need to voice their interests. Given that humanitarian aid is based on international principles that all nations have agreed upon, their engagement in the discussion is vital especially in the face of current human rights violations by all in conflicts, with international actors often avoiding accountability under the pretense of selfless motives. While governments can improve general frameworks for comprehensive and inclusive strategizing, a whole-of-government approach is not sufficient for effective external action and comprehension must exceed interministerial cooperation by far. As national interests can no longer be the (sole) imperative for global peace and security, a shift of focus is needed towards a holistic understanding of sustainable global peace and security. In the face of increasingly complex crises and rapidly shifting challenges in a more and more interdependent global environment, nations can no longer afford to use outdated patterns but must aspire inclusive and comprehensive tools for global security governance.

1) Introduction

Afghanistan, 2007. A US-Battle Company is deployed in Korengal Valley, comprised of complex mountain territory where heavy fighting persists. Restrepo, the award-winning documentary by Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington displays the commander rather proudly admitting that he had not done any research on the situation in Afghanistan, apparently to 'keep an open mind' to the conflict. Other pictures show meetings between soldiers briefing Afghan elders through an interpreter, catering them with packed junk food and clearly unable to apprehend the implications of violence in the country and effectively communicate with the locals.

Such absurd examples of misconduct in field operations by all parties involved, from military to development assistance reoccurred in stories and literature throughout my studies and made me wonder how after decades of peacekeeping, the various missions seemed to have applied so little of their predecessors' lessons learned and why they continued to be conducted in multiple separate efforts even under the same organizational or national flag. Initial research revealed a vast amount of literature on this phenomenon and its manifold causes, proposing various strategies to increase both efficiency and effectiveness through better coordination. International organizations and national governments all seemed to dedicate considerable resources to improve consistency in order to meet the challenges of a changed international security environment, one of them being my native country of Germany. As early as 2004 had the Federal Republic committed to tackle problems of fragmentation both on an interdepartmental level and in foreign relations, albeit so far with little to show for despite broad political consensus (Nachtwei: 2012). Such frictions between policy formulations and implementations have initially sparked my research and contribute to its relevance.

Munich, January 2014. At the annual Security Conference, Federal President Gauck, Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Defense Minister von der Leyen in their speeches commit to what would become a dictum for years to come: "Deutschlands Neue Verantwortung", Germany's New Responsibility (Major & Mölling: 2016). It is the year of the Islamic State (IS) gaining ground in Iraq, the year of Russia annexing the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, and in what seems like the blink of an eye since the end of the Cold War, foreign relations have once again become a slippery terrain. The German government, traditionally reserved in its engagement in international interventions has long profited from other nations leading the field and now set out to adopt a new leadership role in the arena of conflict management. The three years since this change of tone have only increased the urgency of efficient crisis management and reached the German state lines in the form of innumerable refugees fleeing the consequences of war in the Middle East and Africa (Grävingholt: 2016).

Consequently, this topic is very timely and will most likely increase in relevance given the current geopolitical developments such as an increased disintegration of the European Union, an American president who vowed to reduce foreign spending and challenges such as mass migration from the Global South that directly impact the national security of Germany (Major & Mölling: 2016). Despite being the biggest European economy, German support for international military interventions is largely reduced to funding, and demands for increased involvement are rising. Defense Minister von der Leyen recently promised a broad reform and expansion of German foreign military engagement as well as civilian forces (BMVg: 2017). If implemented, this will have direct implications for national and international policies as well as institutions and actors around the world. National security interests, international partnerships and global development goals all have an impact on political realignments as not least the German G20 strategy 2017 shows (BMZ: 2016). While von der Leyen seems to be comfortable in the limelight that has fallen on Germany as an important player in international security issues, a closer look suggests that the gap between theoretical framework and practical implementation remains wide and will increasingly become a problem of operationalization as well as legitimization (Borchert & Thiele: 2012). Concrete and broad reform will be needed for more effective and efficient German capacities (Wittkowsky, Hummel & Pietz: 2011). On a national level, this spreading realization has in recent years prompted various strategic evaluation processes of current policies, the most recent being interdepartmental guidelines for better conflict management published just weeks prior to this paper (Auswärtiges Amt: 2017).

In this master thesis, my aim is to critically analyze the German position on a Comprehensive

Approach has an overarching strategy for international conflict intervention. This includes an unprecedented and timely analysis of underlying concepts, levels of cooperation and practical implications, asking for goals, methods and impacts and giving an outlook for the future. The paper furthermore contributes to the ongoing debate on civil-military interaction and broader forms of cooperation in the field of international peace operations in joint efforts by means of development, diplomacy and defense towards sustainable peace (de Coning: 2016). However, given my methodological approach I focus on the German national context and the efforts for conceptualizing and implementing comprehension between the various departments. Apart from a critical in-depth literature review, my thesis is based on multiple interviews conducted with ministry officials, representatives of civil society organizations and other perspectives to gain a broad picture of the ongoing debate in Germany, for it will be demonstrated that the Comprehensive Approach as a normative concept is problematic in many regards. As often suggested, it misses a clear definition and strategy in order to become the useful tool it is proclaimed to be (VENRO: 2012). The lack of conceptual depth is closely related to the great complexity it entails (Borchert & Thiele: 2012) and an absence of functional mechanisms for operationalization (Alamir: 2012). Various voices praise or criticize German comprehensive efforts, yet there is no overarching account that combines the underlying theories and practical implications with these voices to create a broad image and evaluation of the current situation. Connecting the different concepts, actors, institutions and instruments both from a theoretical and a practical view, my thesis will depict the learning process the Comprehensive Approach has gone through in the German discourse, including underlying narratives as well as the practical use and necessary conditions on an institutional, national and international level.

This is particularly interesting as Germany traditionally has been more involved in funding operations instead of using their own troops, with the notable exception of Afghanistan (Ehrhart: 2011), which might allow them to create a fresh strategy while simultaneously based on lessons learned from decades of peacekeeping. At the same time, it seems that while a theoretical framework and various instruments have been developed and require evaluation, there is an overall lack of political courage to concrete and operationalize the strategies despite declaring their importance and urgency (Ruhnke: 2016). Not least is this national evaluation of interest in the light of current global developments: while so far, the German military is involved mostly in supranational missions such as with the UN and the EU, in the light of a nationalist momentum in many Western states including important partners such as the USA, Germany might be forced to change their course and engage increasingly unilaterally or at least adopt a leading role. Some of these changes can already be seen, with the defense ministry extending its troops that have been steadily declining ever since the end of the Cold War (Borchert & Thiele: 2012) and the 2017 G20 summit pointedly acknowledging a German role for sustainable crisis resolution and development (BMZ: 2016). However, both proponents and opponents seem to agree that there is still a long way to go before a full-fledged implementation of a broad comprehensive strategy in Germany and beyond.

2) Methodological structure: data collection and research design

A variety of assumptions manifest in different ontological and epistemological approaches are underlying the debate on violence and intervention. Theorizing conflict and its management involves diverse traditions and can offer extended and sometimes contradicting viewpoints on a specific conflict or the overall framework of the research itself. The methods used, the questions asked and the evidence provided to understand or explain conflict through individual actors or underlying structures strongly impacts scientific findings and consequent policies (Demmers: 2012). Before starting the data collection, I therefore defined the ontological and epistemological lines that guided my research, as well as their scientific implications. In order to do so, I drew extensively on Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault's *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods* (2015) as I focused on an inductive approach, using descriptive methods in order to establish a holistic overview on my research topic on which I based the analysis.

According to the principles of Grounded Theory, collection of data precedes the establishment of hypotheses in an inductive approach and allows for a flexible research in which the guiding questions are specified throughout the process of gathering and analyzing information (Glaser

& Strauss: 2009). I thus first familiarized myself with the field through extensive data collection and therein focused on patterns and frictions which lead me to initial hypotheses and subsequently allowed for a more targeted evaluation and further proceedings. However, I did not succumb to the illusion that I could enter a 'field' without prior ideas or biases. Naturally, I have chosen this topic for a specific reason and due to my subjective research interests coming from a particular personal and scientific background. Thus, inductive research is not to be mistaken with absolute ignorance or neutrality but has to be understood as an open approach within a theoretical framework in which data comes before theory – including gaps and implicit statements which are important subjects for analysis (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault: 2015).




Figure 1): One version of the grounded theory approach.

Source: Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault (2015), p.138

Figure 1 shows my scientific approach to the topic. Armed with data accumulated and processed through an extended literature review, I prepared my questionnaires and started interviewing people. For better comparability, some basic questions would be included for every interview partner, while others were more specifically directed at the respective field of expertise. Herein, I made sure to prepare well for every meeting, including a background research on the person and a review on their publications that were of interest to my thesis. After every interview, I scanned my transcripts for patterns that I had already encountered in the literature, as well as new or contradicting viewpoints and consequently formed hypotheses that I would weave into my next interviews and sought to confirm or disprove throughout the focus study (see below). Thus, in a process of constant collection, evaluation and comparison of data, the hypotheses were narrowed, expanded or abolished altogether. Hence were formed slowly but steadily the findings concluding this paper.

Inductive approaches in social sciences have often been criticized for advocating the assumption that one can enter a field without preconceptions that will hinder a 'neutral' assessment (Kelle: 2005). What is more, as Kracauer (1952) argues for content analysis, any text has multiple connotations and any interpretation will be thoroughly subjective. The same goes for semi-structured interviews: while they are designed to allow for flexibility, researchers need to be aware of their own subjectivity when collecting and analyzing data (Alsaawi :2014). Whereas I am well aware of the impact my own (educational) background can have on the data collection and evaluation as well as the way I as a person and a researcher am perceived

by possible informants, it is obviously a challenge to constantly reflect one's own position. The same goes for interviews, especially if conducted in theater. Given my focus on government organizations, I also had to constantly reflect on the national and institutional bias inherent in the data I collected with them.

My strategy was therefore based on a number of core principles for qualitative research as suggested by Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault (2015) in order to support the validity of my findings. As qualitative approaches lack the clear standardization of quantitative methods, they are far more subject to the researcher's own design and constant reflection on the methods used, techniques applied and personal biases involved on all sides. In order to obtain the clearest possible understanding of my field, I needed to be aware of the settings and perspectives involved in the data collection. This included the striving for 'natural' situations of any observation or interview and constant reflection on implications the particular setting might have on the research subject. What is more, including different perspectives without prior hierarchization (while remaining sensitive to possible exaggeration or extenuation) is an indispensable tool when targeting a balanced account of certain realities.

As my thesis does not strive to quantify concepts such as comprehension, I did not expect to find one congruent account of its mechanisms and implications. Indeed, already a superficial literature review revealed what Wittkowsky, Hummel and Pietz (2011) call a 'cacophony' of voices long even before entering the field of a specific peacekeeping operation. Instead of searching for one universal truth about the German Comprehensive Approach, I therefore collected a variety of different accounts and cross-examined them for accordance and frictions, based on a constructivist approach to (social) realities and any subjective or collective knowledge about them (Ulbert: 2003). This includes an examination of underlying norms and assumptions in order to describe and explain these constructions and their respective perceptions in a theoretical framework outlining the discourse surrounding this topic. In the third chapter of this paper, I hence aimed at providing a critical account of guiding concepts preceding the Comprehensive Approach, as well as corresponding strategies and historical developments determining them.

The combination of various methods allowed me to triangulate my analysis, combining and contrasting the findings in order to widen my understanding (Miller & Fredericks: 1994). This included firstly an exclusively theoretical part based on literature, secondly empirical interviews with experts from German political and non-governmental agencies, and finally data from the practice of German comprehension for peacekeeping missions. Other sources of information were my attendance at a public meeting of the Subcommittee on Civil Crisis Prevention and the participation in the Dutch-German Common Effort 2017 conference where I took part in a three-day working group on civil-military cooperation.

2.1) Literature Review

Before and in conjunction with my internship, I collected scientific research data and policy reports on a Comprehensive Approach in Germany and beyond with the aim of establishing a framework of the current debate. Starting with the collecting of data through a broad literature research, my aim was twofold. On the one hand, I conducted a review of the current discussion and normative assumptions behind a Comprehensive Approach in Germany and beyond, looking for patterns and frictions within the discourse. On the other hand, I searched for individuals and institutions who might be of interest for and willing to take part in an expert interview for the second strand of my data collection. Last but not least did initial literature research create a 'snowball-effect' for finding additional sources and background information.

2.2) Semi-structured guided expert interviews

My second method of choice were semi-structured guided interviews as they leave room for the informant to elaborate on their own focus in the discussion while allowing the interviewer to retain a neutral position (Russel: 2006). At the same time, open questions enable a flexible reaction to new information that go more in-depth. Thus, I hoped to obtain untainted voices from institutions through representatives while reserving the option to ask critical questions. In some cases informants asked for the anonymization of their data so that they could speak

frankly without compromising their professional integrity. Generally, my interview partners were very eager to share as much of their insights as possible as they are personally involved in the processes discussed and interested in their progress, another factor that makes expert interviews a gratifying research method (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault: 2015).

The format of gathering expert testimonies was better suited than choosing random informants involved in peacekeeping missions, as a selection of representative voices in the vast arena around the Comprehensive Approach in Germany allowed for a focused investigation instead of creating an overflow of disorganized information (Warren 2002). Thus, my aim was a varied but overseeable pool of informants ('experts') that had access to information vital to the topic and could reflect on this in a wider context. Given the specific division of labor between the various political entities, this approach allowed for the targeted selection of relevant public figures who are part of the debate and by nature of this division have different viewpoints, resulting in a multitude of accounts.

My definition of an expert in this context, based on Gläser and Laudel (2010) is a specific role of an informant as a source of specialized knowledge on the topic of interest, whose exclusive position within the discourse gives them access to information the researcher wishes to obtain. In this way, they are not an object of investigation in the classic sense of qualitative social research but rather witnesses of the issues in question. As Bogner et al. (2009, p. 2) explain,

Talking to experts in the exploratory phase of a project is a more efficient and concentrated method of gathering data than, for instance, participatory observation or systematic quantitative surveys. Conducting expert interviews can serve to shorten time-consuming data gathering processes, particularly if the experts are seen as "crystallization points" for practical insider knowledge and are interviewed as surrogates for a wider circle of players. Expert interviews also lend themselves to those kinds of situations in which it might prove difficult or impossible to gain access to a particular social field.

The problem of access to representatives of political organizations, as the evaluation of the research process shows, has indeed posed a significant obstacle which this method together with the access gained through my internship has helped overcome, to the extent that initial respondents' recommendations opened doors that I had priorly knocked at unavailingly, a tactic that Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault (2015) call 'snowball-effect'. There was no fixed number of interview partners in the beginning, and I herein benefited from the process character of my thesis. Throughout my literature research, the list of potential interviewees steadily grew, but the number of positive replies was not very high at first. As none of my interview partners was herself a parliamentary politician however, they often suggested other experts with a different view without engaging in a conflict of opinions or affiliations. What is more, most of the respondents from government agencies were additionally part of different, interdisciplinary circles such as the Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt), engaging with various departments and organizations in a less politically charged environment.

However, expert interviews are not uncontroversial as the normative assumption underlying this approach is that of an elite group somehow superior to 'ordinary' informants which might result in the reproduction of established power relations and therein contaminate the impartial aspirations of the researcher (Bogner et al.: 2009). In the case of my research, however there was only a relatively small group that actually had access to the information I sought, which on the one hand is clearly an illustration of existing power relations but on the other depends on a variety of factors such as productive labor division and the internal structures of democratic politics in Germany and elsewhere. Therefore, borrowing from Collins and Evans (2008) I assumed the position "that expertise is the real and substantive possession of groups of experts and that individuals acquire real and substantive expertise through their membership of those groups" (Collins and Evans, 2008, p. 3). These are technical experts whose insights are based on their professional affiliation with a subject beyond common knowledge which makes their informed view a relevant pillar in the discourse.

Still, individual interviews by nature are actor-centric, and the result one receives is thus a specific perception of reality (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault: 2015). In the case of talking to experts, the ability to reflect between personal and institutional viewpoints both by the expert herself and by the researcher is thus indispensable. This can be added by a thorough review of the person's professional background and publications. While experts in high positions are often used to speaking in public and can thus give a rather eloquent account of their expertise,

their professionalism might also pose the danger of 'empty phrases' in line with a specific public account (Bogner et al.: 2009). Again, thorough contentual preparation and more specific supplementary questions can help overcome this institutional bias.

In designing the questionnaire, I chose several basic questions to use for all of the experts, varying only slightly depending on their respective organizational affiliations. Before turning to inquiring about the Comprehensive Approach, I asked my subjects about their professional background which would both give me some information as to where they are coming from epistemologically, and open the conversation smoothly as this is a question every professional is probably asked frequently and is thus comfortable and efficient in answering. Subsequently, the guiding questions were structured from very general to more specific with adjusted foci depending on the respondent. Finally, I had prepared two quotes regarding the Comprehensive Approach in Germany and asked for comments on these very specific positions. That way, I was able to retain my own neutrality throughout the interview and still obtain a contrasted impression between general descriptions and attitudes towards certain positions. Both quotes were chosen for their deliberately provocative character, however I always explained their specific context. All original questions and transcripts can be found in the appendix.

The quotes focused on German security policy and the implementation of a Comprehensive Approach in conflict situations. André Wüstner, chair of the Bundeswehr alliance, an interest group of German soldiers in his quote laments the absence of discussion of German foreign engagement in parliament which in his view is political cowardice. The second quote derives from a publication by the German association for non-governmental organizations VENRO and describes the Comprehensive Approach as 'useless and without contours' (VENRO: 2012).

Following the interviews, I sent each of my informants the transcript for further clarification or comment. As I was not able to meet all of the people who had offered to help me, some of the questionnaires were filled out electronically or discussed over the phone. Subsequent to initial interviews, I shared some of my preliminary findings with the respondents and asked for their feedback as suggested by Gläser and Laudel (2010), and with my informants at the ZIF conducted feedback interviews in order to reflect on my own role during the questioning, a method I had already benefited from during research in my bachelor studies.

2.3) Focus Study: Mixed methods

As Kang (2017) and others convincingly argue, the written and spoken account of professionals and spokespersons, while being an integral part of qualitative research can often differ considerably from practice. This might not be too troubling if the research aim is to represent peoples' perceptions of social situations as is often the case in traditional ethnography (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault: 2015), but when investigating a social or political phenomenon can pose an obstacle in the effort of discovering internal frictions if one has to depend on the informants' ability of (self-)reflection. It was thus important for me to obtain data from the 'field' itself, this is to say either from a peacekeeping operation with German involvement or at the level of government cooperation. Given both the time limit and the focus of my research, I opted for the latter, choosing the Berlin-based Center for International Peacekeeping Operations (ZIF) where I was accepted for an internship in the analysis department as my focus study on the practical implementation of comprehension as a basic policy.

As an intern, while benefiting from being involved in a variety of tasks and fields of operation at the ZIF, my research at the same time faced various challenges with regards to ethics and biases. Being an employee myself for three months naturally offered the possibility of collecting data through participant and non-participant observation as I had access to vast and unfiltered data first-hand (Cooper, Lewis & Urquhart: 2004). However, my master thesis as an important mile stone towards a future career should ideally not put my professional integrity in jeopardy, let alone the non-disclosure agreement I had signed for my internship.

Therefore, I had to make very careful distinctions between information theoretically available to the interested public and that confined to me in secrecy. Luckily, self-criticism is a tool vastly employed at the ZIF, and constant evaluation processes are an important part of their daily work, which meant for me that critical questions were usually met with benevolence. Moreover, despite my wide-ranging involvement, preliminary agreements and strategies were negotiated

in high-level panels and this information usually only reached me when official, which made the distinction easier. As two of my interview partners were employed at the ZIF themselves, I involved questions regarding the practice of comprehension within the Center in the respective questionnaires. As it turned out, both the answers and independent accounts from other team members confirmed my impression that critical examination of internal practices were always welcome, and in more than one occasion I was directly asked for an outsider's opinion.

Part of the internship is the so-called 'Parcours', which gave me and the other interns an opportunity to get to know every department, respectively presented by a senior employee. These were important sources of information and offered a forum for inquiries on the practice of comprehension in the various tasks the ZIF is involved in. From the start, I had indicated my thesis topic and the fact that the ZIF was of special interest to me in this regard. My interviews inside the ZIF were known and whenever I presented myself and my scientific background, I was encouraged to ask questions and offered support throughout. Nonetheless, in order not to compromise my professional interest or risk offending the organization and its employees my research benefited from so considerably, I used these findings mainly to triangulate data from the literature or interviews and mostly relied on ZIF publications, the accounts of my two interviewed colleagues and the official accounts gathered during the 'Parcours'.

2.4) Evaluation of the research process

As the process turned out to become a much more significant factor than initially expected, I have chosen to document important steps in the planning and executing of my research, as well as major obstacles and respective solutions, starting with the expert interviews.

As he is head of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Approach at the ZIF and author of various papers I had used for the literature review, I was looking forward to an extensive interview with Andreas Wittkowsky who had already agreed to this prior to the beginning of my internship. As it turned out, however my careful planning that had even included the purchase of a high-resolution audio recorder was answered by disagreement from my interview partner who wished not to be recorded. We then agreed that this would be a valuable lesson for me on 'filtering' information in an interview and he consented to give me feedback on a summary I would draft after our conversation. However, with some interviews this proved harder, which became clear when talking to professionals from a specific scientific tradition I was less familiar with, which made it more difficult to follow the strands of thought while simultaneously taking notes. Fortunately, the respective respondents had allowed for enough room in their agenda to accommodate my various inquiries.

Another obstacle in my interview plans was of a rather physical, i.e. geographical nature. Despite the fact that Germany was reunited almost three decades ago, its political institutions remain divided between the former FRG capital Bonn and the official old and new capital Berlin. Facing the risk of not being able to include some significant voices, I decided to develop a general questionnaire that I would use for the interviews and partly adapt to each individual interviewee. Those who offered their support but who due to limits of either time or distance I could not personally interrogate I either emailed the questions or arranged interviews over the phone. When sending the forms, I made sure to offer feedback on the questions should they or their intention not be clear and arranged for the possibility of further inquiry after the examination of their answers. While not providing the benefits of directly engaging in a discussion, this method nonetheless seemed suitable as it allowed the subjects more time to ponder their answers as to what they wished to convey to me.

As for finding a case study, despite my initial optimism that I would be able to research in theater of a peace operation due to my experience and contacts in North Iraq, this proved to be considerably more difficult than expected. My internship organization could not provide me with contacts as there are currently no German civilian peacekeepers active in the country. Via reference from the German Federal Association for Security Policy at Universities (BSH), I did get in contact with a former field officer who had been part of the training mission in Erbil, but he informed me that being allowed to visit the mission would be difficult and that it would take a long time until the request would be processed. In any case, I was not sure how useful my visit would eventually have been for my research anyway as the observation of the workings of

a Comprehensive Approach seemed an ambitious task, and given the short time left after my internship I decided instead to focus on German institutions and intergovernmental strategies on networked security. This was additionally aided through information obtained and contacts developed throughout my internship with the ZIF, and I eventually chose the organization itself as the subject of my focus study, for as will become clear in the further outline it was an important catalyst for the development of a holistic security strategy in Germany. As an intern, I could effectively engage in a three-months participant observation and use my impressions as well as information I gathered in meetings and conversations. However, it was clear from the start that this new approach would require a sound methodological strategy and extensive reflection on my personal as well as professional position and consequent biases.

3) Literature review: theoretical framework and conceptual outline

In 2005 the United Nations adopted the multilateral approach of a 'responsibility to protect' (R2P), according to which the international community, if necessary, is allowed to breach national sovereignty by force in the case that this is likely to improve the abolishment of gross human rights violations among the population. In consequence, government agreement was in theory no longer a prerequisite for international intervention, a reaction based on prior bitter failures to protect civilians during intrastate wars in countries such as Rwanda (Hauff: 2012). The following paragraphs explore developments preceding the current 'intervention culture' and its underlying normative assumptions, as well as resulting practices and their critique.

Woyke (2010, p. 221) defines international intervention as an "interference of states or international organizations in matters that underlie the exclusive competencies of the national state" (*own translation from German*) in accordance with R2P. However, this simple-sounding narrative underlying current peace-building practice comprises complex theoretical procedures and structures that all too often differ from local implementation and consequent results (Daxner: 2010). In the following, I will therefore address further concepts and theories as well as new challenges facing multilateral interveners in the face of current intrastate conflicts.

3.1) The Security-Development Nexus and International Peacekeeping: critical assessment on 'global security'

"There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development". Thus reads the preamble of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as agreed upon by the UN member states in 2016 (UN: 2016). This contemporary understanding of the connection between peace and economic factors was developed in reaction to altered issues of international warfare in the aftermath of the Cold War and is often referred to as the 'security-development nexus' (Alamir: 2012).

One of the main discourses in the field of security policies is the change in global warfare and interdependence in an increasingly connected world, resulting in complex relations between regional unrest and a global system in which nation-states give power to supranational organizations and increasingly intertwined economies. Kaldor's 'New Wars' (2001) follows the lines of violence emerging beyond the end of the so-called Cold War and the consequent power vacuum after decades of bipolar tensions. She compares recent conflicts throughout the world and finds them decentralized, with globalization in times of technological innovation leading to more interconnectedness as well as more fragmentation. Along the same line, Devetak (2008) emphasizes that conflicts and state-building processes need to be understood in a global structural context with new actors and motives accounting for new violence. The term '*veränderte Sicherheitslage*' (changed security situation) has been coined in this context, referring to a broadened security concept and resulting in a demand for strategic reform and increased cooperation between different actors in foreign operations.

Despite an increasing interconnectedness, nation states remain the central actors when it comes to security policies (Brozus: 2002). However, 40 years of bipolar confrontations take their toll on national security programs and the search for clear lines has in the recent past resulted in absurd simplifications, from unipolarity and an 'End of History' (Fukuyama: 1989) to concepts apparently clearly demarcating multipolarity along cultural or ethnic lines

(Huntington: 2000). With new global actors emerging, powers shifting and national interests conflicting with one another, the only thing certain for the future of conflict seems to be uncertainty (Enskat, Masala & Sauer: 2014). Accelerated globalization processes as well as old and new media play important roles in 21st century global relations, on the one hand bridging gaps of time and space between peoples and cultures and on the other bringing to the foreground their differences in the process (Brozus: 2002). Many argue that globalization is not something new, however it is undeniable that rather recent developments especially in transport and communication technology have in many respects made the world more global within the last decades (Jackson, 2004). As an example, international trade agreements are framed by a narrative of common values while migratory movements are often rejected in a rhetoric of cultural differences, effectively reproducing power relations in the global arena (van Houtum, 2010).

Where does that leave 'international security'? A clear trend especially during the past two decades has been the massive broadening of the field, re-defining the very term and its implications (Enskat, Masala & Sauer: 2014). This includes not only the search for new solutions but also the formulation of new questions, extending the debate to 'indirect' security threats such as climate change and migration (Klüfers: 2014). With the wider term comes a broader range of challenges and fields of operation, including actors outside the classic security sector: the overall consensus today rejects purely military solutions to conflicts and includes civil state and non-state organizations and individuals as meaningful contributors to sustainable conflict resolution, and while states remain the main unit of operation, their sovereignty and borders are subject to questions of legitimacy in the face of gross violations of human rights and other threats to international stability (Kaldor: 2001). All in all, peace operations can no longer rely exclusively on national governments but must involve a variety of actors within and beyond the state, resulting in a pressing need for increased national and international cooperation for more effective global security governance (Klüfers: 2014).

Critics of this altered global security paradigm argue that there is in fact little actual change in international politics when it comes to conflict management. They argue that peace efforts are practiced only selectively and continue to be tied to economic and political interests, as is the case when it comes to the UN security council veto powers (Spreen: 2016). Operations in Iraq and elsewhere have severely hampered interventionist legitimization, and any allegations of an 'unpolitical' character of peace operations have long been dismantled, especially with regards to the role of the military (Daxner: 2008). While some authors therefore currently locate traditional Western peace-building in a dead-end situation (Chojnacki & Menzel: 2011), others demand a broader, more holistic framework for international security governance beyond national interests, including liability of intervening powers in order to overcome diplomatic lip service and actually pursue universal aspirations of global sustainable security (Jaberg: 2015). This goes along with a broadening of the term itself, from a state-centered interpretation to the UN-coined 'human security' approach, focusing on the individual as the unit of account (Futamura, Newman & Tadjbak: 2010). This ultimately includes a variety of 'securities' seen to contribute to sustainable peace and development such as food security, health and regular income, and thus takes into account individual threats beyond violence (Klüfers: 2014).

3.2) Of peacekeeping and nation-building: current intervention culture

"[P]eace, security, sustainable development and human rights are mutually reinforcing". Thus stated UN Secretary General Guterres at the Security Council meeting on 'Maintenance of International Peace and Security' on 18 April (UN Secretary-General: 2017), adding that the Agenda 2030 and related resolutions were important steps to a holistic and long-term crisis management and further conflict prevention. The debate on peacekeeping and nation-building highlights the links between peace and sustainable development which however is not undisputed and will be further discussed hereunder.

As outlined in the previous paragraph, international conflicts and their causes have changed since the end of the Cold War, as interstate wars have increasingly given way to intrastate conflicts (Talantino: 2005). However, the importance of national interests in the fight for peace has not decreased: motivations for humanitarian and/or military intervention still depend on

political relevance and public opinion as could for example be seen in the very different initial reactions to the then similar conflicts in Libya and Syria during the 'Arab Spring' (Hauff: 2012). Furthermore, strategic time slots such as election periods play an important role for central actors, and apart from state and multilateral players, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must be taken into account. Since they usually do not report to a central authority, they bear a high risk potential themselves and influence societal change (Klein & Roth: 2007; *see below*).

As already mentioned, legitimizing humanitarian intervention is a political problem. Broad social renovation is planned optimistically and political heads depend on visible results to keep their argumentation valid (Free: 2010). Hence, interveners often belie their responsibility when under the pressure of public reception the willingness to compromise initial goals and values grows according to the length of the operation, disregarding social realities and thus diminishing the chances for long-term success. This is even more problematic given the fact that in supranational efforts, the parties usually agree upon the lowest common denominator from the start and thereby widen the gap between political intentions and success on the ground (Gromes: 2010). Additionally, it is complicated to actually measure said 'success' of any such interference when taking into account the initial cause of the respective conflict and consequent intervention. Hereby, one needs to emphasize on the one hand the role of media and public reaction and on the other especially changes of structures in the overall context and time components with regards to national developments over a longer period (Seybolt: 2005).

How can an intervention take effect in a society if the intervening do not understand its culture? An obvious problem that for inexplicable reasons has long been granted little attention is the fact that social action in the context of different cultural background will be understood in very different ways (Schlichte & Veit: 2010), and that for this reason the tactics of enforcing one's cultural truths cannot lead to an independently functional democracy congruent with 'Western' understanding, leading to drastic misunderstanding based on a lack of cultural knowledge as could often be seen with the US-intervention in Afghanistan (Daxner: 2008). Experiences in the Middle East and elsewhere have lead to increasing criticism regarding the normative assumptions of a 'liberal peace-building' (Newman, Paris & Richmond: 2009), even leading to a declaration of the end of peace-building altogether (Chandler: 2017).

3.3) 'Nation-building': reconstructing 'fragile' states

Modern interventions and their mandates go beyond 'peace-building' and 'peacekeeping' in (post-)conflict countries and are these days dominated by aspirations of 'nation-building', resulting in the attempt to create 'better' states and societies when the population and institutions of 'fragile' or 'failed' states are no longer capable of doing so themselves (Bonacker et al.: 2010). This deeper involvement intensifies the complex and dynamic interrelationships between intervening and intervened, and between the manifold normative assumptions underlying (Western) international involvement such as military stabilization, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The tradition of trying to create state structures in a developing country to Western liking is an ominous reminder of colonial times, and early intervention attempts were indeed focused on reassuring dominance, as was the case with the French war in Algeria (Daxner: 2010), albeit then still predominantly a binational conflict.

At the core of the liberal peace assumption is the idea that democracy is the most stable form of statehood. Underlying this concept of "liberal peace" are both more or less empirically grounded assumptions on democracy's effect on international politics – that democracies do not fight, each other – and intranational (domestic) politics – that democratic decision-making enables conflicts to be channeled and settled in non-violent ways. But how prone to conflict are different institutional settings actually? Bellin (2012) re-interprets 'robust' authoritarian states in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and finds that depending on their crisis management, authoritarian regimes are still among the most stable in the region, although distinctions between a positive and a negative peace are in order here (Galtung: 1969). Hegre et al. (2001) in a general overview over forms of governance prone to conflict postulate that both coherent democracies and harsh authoritarian regimes are a lot less likely to engage in civil war than intermediate regimes and conclude that democratic civil peace is desirable, as long-term effects of democratic transition have historically resulted in the most durable form of

peace. Reynal-Querol (2004) however explains that democracy alone does not pre-empt civil war since political stability depends on the level of inclusiveness in democratic societies which results in its ability to prevent conflict. Fox (1994) comes to the same conclusions and advocates gradual shifts instead of singular transitions in order to create an environment of acceptance of associational autonomy and representation: transitions, always implying a shift in established power relations naturally bear a high conflict potential, creating spoilers in the process.

Governance has always been a crucial issue in this debate, and efforts to support 'good governance' have become a major strategy to promote security and development especially in the least developed nations of the Global South (Collier: 2008). Liberal assumptions on peace have been an integral part of the peace-building agenda since the early 1990s when then-UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in 'An Agenda for Peace' stated:

There is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of *good governance* need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities. (Boutros-Ghali, p. 59; *my italics*).

Given the relevance of the UN as the largest organization for peace-building operations, this document cannot be underestimated. It is an essential basis of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically Goal 16 "Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions" (UN: 2016; see figure 2). The SDGs replaced the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2016. Still, ever since the "Agenda for Peace" was published the assumptions held therein have been highly disputed amongst scholars. The critique can be roughly divided in two main camps, focusing on underlying ideas and questions of power-relations respectively.

An important notion we come across in the first debate is the paradigm of 'failed' or 'fragile' states, a Western concept of nations where a state monopoly on violence is largely absent. "Fragile states lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home and abroad." (CIFP: 2006, p.1).

The date most often associated with this major change in the international security paradigm is September 11, 2001, when terrorists associated with Al Qaida targeted the World Trade Center in New York. In consequence, the US government and its allies came to the conclusion that in 'new' wars, strong states such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War period were no longer the major threat, but that 'weak' national governments allowing for informal actors to fill the power vacuum beyond the Westphalian ideal had become breeding grounds for international terrorism, spilling over national and continental borders (Wyler: 2008). Fragility herein is thus perceived as the inability of legitimate government structures to exercise its authority, resulting in an insufficient judicial and security sector, weak institutions and poor governance (Carment, Prest & Samy: 2010). As Zoellick (2008) proclaims:

The trauma of fragile states and the interconnections of globalisation require our generation to recognise anew the nexus among economics, governance and security. Most wars are now conflicts within states, and fragile states account for most of them. But our knowledge about how best to respond remains thin.

Authors in this debate approach the aspiration of 'fixing' systems of 'weak states' from different perspectives. While Fukuyama (2004) argues that strong institutions are the very basis of a functioning economy that will result in prosperity and peace, the difficulty of state-building for him lies in the impossibility of exporting this model to conflicting states which furthermore lack local demand for reform – bluntly said, the West is willing to help but the Third World lacks initiative. This view of Western roles in developing and conflict-stricken countries feeds on an understanding of the universality of 'Western values' and fails to take into account conflicts and their actors from a local perspective.

Tilly's (1985) critique on this normative argumentation originally spearheaded the counter-debate by dismantling the centralization of the use of force in state governments as the outcome of a long and violent political process specific to Europe. Bellamy and Williams (2010) support this notion by pointing out the specifically Western tradition of power-sharing institutions and the futility of trying to superimpose this model on societies with a distinctly different tradition. Newman (2014) and Mazzar (2014) thereupon question the justification of current state-building paradigms and dismiss the idea of 'exporting' a Western-style

governance system to developing countries, but unlike Fukuyama, they seek for alternative ways of understanding conflict in post-colonial nations, as do Verkoren and Kamphuis (2013) who explore various models of state formation and explain how failing to grasp underlying local structures leads to misinterpretation and failure to create democracy (see also Daxner: 2010). Meagher (2012), building on the notions of Hagemann and Péclard (2010) sums up the discussion on 'hybrid governance' as an alternative to the state-building paradigm but warns to be critical of premature praise for non-state power substitutes and simplified views on statehood. Alternative forms of order, she illustrates, must always be seen within the wider spectrum of local power struggles and (inter-)national interests. Furthermore, the terminology of 'fragility' exclusively focuses on internal issues and indicates insufficient efforts by state actors while completely omitting external factors, from more complex international economic relations to direct influence by foreign governments (Carment, Prest & Samy: 2010).

This leads to the second strand of critique on liberal peace narratives, namely the question of ulterior motives of Western states to reproduce current (neocolonial) power-relations with the countries they officially claim to want to give democracy. Pugh (2005) from a neo-Marxist tradition points out how power hierarchies are reproduced through Western intervention by nature as the main aim is to get access to their markets and societies for economic influence. Duffield (2014) agrees that Western capitalist interests dominate motivations for intervention, strong institutions being an essential prerequisite for economic relations. What is more, positivist assumptions based on Western political culture like the 'Westphalian' state and notions of liberal political communities do not lead to individual solutions for conflicts embedded in a specific (cultural) context but reproduce dominant hierarchies of knowledge, headed by Western standards (Richmond: 2006).

Chandler (2006) proposes that state-building efforts are by no means a result of a new world order but that the underlying aspirations have not changed since the days of great empires. He critically evaluates the roles of international organizations and foreign states contributing to development efforts in Africa and elsewhere claiming that their motifs are not humanitarian but rather self-centred – using the rhetoric of development aid and empowerment, the West actually strives for influence without responsibility. This hidden agenda of patronizing developing states is furthermore procreated in Western-idealized institutions such as the UN and those of international law, at the same time rendered apolitical and inclusive. Chandler directly criticizes Fukuyama's advocacy of state-building efforts, positioning himself with Foucault in saying that these new forms of intervention aim at more complex form of regulations and influence. Žižek in the same vein (2008) argues that the motifs for currently popular state-building policies lie in the old structures of the Western empires: for him, violence is rooted in capitalism in diverse forms and he rejects a focus on open violence towards an approach to identify underlying structural violence as a natural consequence of market economy lacking a social dimension of its own while influencing the social reality of its subjects extensively. Within these inherently violent structures, neither blame nor solution can be allocated properly. This strand of argumentation focuses on the agency of the intervening parties and the ways they are concealed (even to themselves) by a rhetoric of humanitarian aid, empowerment and peace-building whereas ultimately reproducing capitalist aims. This can be seen in the differing and often conflicting roles of international and national civil, military and political organizations, NGOs, local initiatives and other actors in the field.

3.4) Civil-military interaction for peace and security

These criticisms notwithstanding, national and international strategies towards peace and development are closely interwoven nowadays and can be found on national and international agendas alike. An important consequence is the closer interconnectedness between military and civil actors, on every stage of operation from planning to evaluation (Thynne & Cherne: 2016). The forms and levels of interaction, however differ considerably depending on the respective context, as well as on actors and their position and mandate (de Coning: 2016). As we will see, what sounds like a simple and straightforward paradigm at the first glance is actually multi-faceted both in theory and operationalization.

The objective behind a closer and more coordinated cooperation between civil and military

agents in peace operations is to ensure more coherence between humanitarian aid, foreign policy, development efforts and military action towards efficient and sustainable crisis management (ibid). The need for some kind of interaction is today hardly disputed and results from a variety of experiences during the past decades, from the Balkan wars to the intervention in Afghanistan (Daxner: 2008). The fragmentation of efforts severely hampered efficiency and consequently the effectiveness and sustainability in the tackling of international conflict (Jones: 2002). This notion is supported by numerous studies, showing serious deficiencies in coordination in the field within and between agents that accounted for a considerable amount of unused strategic potential from the reduction of financial and administrative efforts to actual counter-effects due to opposed or redoubled actions by agents that ultimately pursued the same goal (Smith: 2004).

	Intra-agency	Whole-of-government	Inter-agency	Internal-External
Actors are united	Various sections of the Swedish Foreign Ministry	Various Canadian government agencies	Members of the coalition Operation Desert Storm, 1991 Gulf War	International agencies and national IEC work together to organize elections in DRC in 2006
Actors are integrated	Various components of a UN Peacekeeping mission	UK Stabilisation Unit, or Canadian Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)	UN Peacekeeping mission and UN Country Team in, e.g. Liberia, 2009	Liberia 2009: International agencies and local actors agree to use PRS as common framework and action plan
Actors cooperate	DPKO and OCHA (both UN Secretariat) work together on UN Protection of Civilians guidelines	Civilian and military pillars of USA PRT in Afghanistan, 2009	Afghanistan Bonn-process 2003; UN-EU cooperation in Chad, 2008	EULEX and the Kosovo government, 2009
Actors coordinate	DPKO and OCHA in the field	Civilian and military pillars of Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan, 2009	Humanitarian cluster approach to coordination; Kosovo UNMIK pillars; Bosnia Peace Implementation Council (PIC)	UN and Sudanese Independent Electoral Commission in April 2010 elections
Actors coexist	Various parts of EU in Chad in 2008	DFID and MOD fail to agree on common evaluation criteria for UK PRT in Afghanistan, 2008	Humanitarian community and MONUC in Eastern DRC, 2009	UNAMID and Government of Sudan in Darfur, 2008
Actors compete	Various sections of a ministry compete for funding	US State Department, US Department of Defense and CIA in Afghanistan, 2007	Humanitarian agencies and UNMIL disagree on movement of IDPs from Monrovia, 2005	Taliban and ISAF/UNAMA; Government of Chad and MINURCAT, 2010

Figure 2) Civil-military interaction matrix. Source: de Coning & Friis (2011)

So how can peace operations benefit from a better coordination between civil organizations and the military? De Coning and Friis (2011) have compared different levels of coherence and types of relationships between actors both in the field and at the planning stage (see figure 2). These range from the national to the international level, including ministries, NGOs and local institutions in the conflict theater. When working towards a common goal and especially when following the same national or international agenda, cooperation must be a logical approach, and even if the objectives are not entirely congruent, coordinated strategies and labor division can help to avoid mutual obstruction (Porter: 2002).

However, with different interaction levels come different challenges to coherent implementation (de Coning: 2016). Actors uniting various functions under one entity, as is the case for the UN will prioritize intra-agency coordination and cooperation; the same goes for various national actors under the same flag. But internal competition hinders effectiveness, especially when the national context and the prestige of a department are concerned which is especially the case during election campaigns. Donors should therefore strive to harmonize their strategic policies which will also improve cost-efficiency. At the same time, national or agency coherence must entail an extensive debate involving all actors, and once a strategy is finally agreed upon, the actors may find that their concept does not allow for flexibility when it comes to interaction with other actors in the field. Intra- and inter-agency coherence additionally poses the threat of an international primacy diminishing the role of local efforts and thus obstructing the objective of local ownership (Tardy: 2017). A lack of alignment and of comprehensive strategic frameworks has proven to be a crucial shortcoming in many peace operations (Smith: 2004).

What is more, the degree of cooperation varies considerably, depending on the context and respective objectives of the actors involved (de Coning: 2016). Figure 3 exemplifies types of interactions in conflict situations from integration to competition. The cases described thereunder already hint to the main critique the term 'civil-military cooperation' (CIMIC) has initially sparked and that continues to be held against its implementation (e.g. VENRO: 2012). In this context, it is important to distinguish between different civil actors which are all actors outside the military, including police, organizations with a government mandate or budget and those supported by private donations or associations such as political parties or companies. Hereunder, another crucial distinction still is that between NGOs in general and humanitarian aid organizations, as the latter's role is clearly outlined in International Humanitarian Law as a neutral party to the conflict. However, the law distinguishes between interstate and intrastate wars which is widely criticized as an obstacle to the implementation of humanitarian principles, weakening aid efforts in modern conflicts (Stewart: 2003).

The acronym 'CIMIC' was originally used by military actors such as NATO and therein referred to alliances with civil organizations in military missions (de Coning: 2016). The changing security environment characteristic to 'new wars' continues to be a challenge most severely affecting the military who have to renegotiate their role in crisis management, resulting in strategic changes aimed at shifting the objective "[f]rom victory to success" (Dadenker: 2010). From a military perspective, enhanced cooperation is desirable when this promises to benefit the mission – at the same time, a 'robust' military mandate allowing for the use of force will alienate especially humanitarian organizations (Müller-Hennig, Schulze & Zupan: 2011).

However, not only foreign military but also civil actors are severely affected by the change in practices of war and are often forced to alter their strategies in the face of complex security issues. Weiss (1999) hence proclaims a crisis of aid workers in post-Cold War peace missions and herein questions the value of principles set for humanitarian aid in the light of 'new wars'. Whereas Abiew (2012) argues that a return to the root principle of neutrality could solve an international aid crisis, it appears undeniable especially given the more and more intertwined contexts of modern conflicts that full neutrality can no longer be guaranteed. Interstate wars in which rivaling armies fight each other have laid the ground for the operational concepts of humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC, but conflict realities have changed. Even if an NGO is not actually affiliated with a state or governmental organization, they are often still perceived to be and treated accordingly. Furthermore, aid workers often depend on support by military actors for their own safety and that of those they try to help (de Coning: 2016).

Tactical cooperation based on profound analysis of the local situation and the people involved thus seems a better option than trying to maintain neutrality at all costs (Weiss: 1999). When civilians become explicit targets, this does not exclude aid workers; on the contrary, secondary strikes explicitly target aid convoys coming to the help of victims of a terrorist attack. In a recent publication, the international medical organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) urges parties to conflict to adhere to humanitarian principles during their involvement in conflicts as determined in the Geneva Convention (MSF: 2017). According to this report, not only regional militias threaten aid organizations but so do allied forces operating in countries such as Yemen and Syria, where air strikes have targeted hospitals and other institutions facilitating universal health care. They conclude that civilian casualties are all too often lightly

accepted when this is seen as beneficial for the overall mission objective, with fatal consequences for local communities, jeopardizing their confidence in the peace operation and thus not only destroying prior efforts but also hampering future cooperation and sustainability.

From the point of military ethics, the cost-benefit account of targeting civilians is justified under the *jus bellum iustum*-doctrine, or 'just war theory' (Lee: 2004). Under the premise that modern asymmetric conflicts cannot be fought without civilian casualties, military actors need to calculate the effects of their actions thoroughly in order to justify non-combatant victims, for which the doctrine of 'double effect' is used (ibid). Accordingly, civilians must be distinguished from combatants in a conflict and should not be harmed intentionally. However, this approach is widely criticized as short-sighted and harmful since it exclusively focuses on military operations and aims at making military action more effective; in its broad formulation, civilian casualties can still be justified as unintended. What is more, as a national or multilateral organ armies will naturally put the lives of the citizens they serve over others which leaves even more room for the interpretation of justified civilian deaths. For this reason, Walzer (2015) has proposed a new interpretation of the doctrine that focuses on protecting civilian life indiscriminate of nationality, even at a higher risk for the mission and its soldiers which clashes with military logic but brings to the foreground moral principles crucial to the legitimacy and sustainability of peace operations.

In the end, this debate leads back to the questions *whose* security should be on the basis of strategic deliberations (Müller-Hennig, Schulze and Zupan: 2011). As long as national interests focus on state security and humanitarian organizations adhere to principles of human safety and securities, their strategic approaches will hardly be compatible. While civil organizations devoted to a pacifist agenda refuse any just interpretation of military force, many others nowadays agree that at least a minimum level of *coordination* is an important asset to their own involvement in crisis management. Notably, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has issued a handbook on 'UN Civil-Military Coordination' (UN CIMCoord; OCHA: 2015), defining principles of interaction between UN humanitarian agencies and the military. While the UN acknowledges the necessity of the use of force in some contexts, their objective is to ensure *human security*, which is why humanitarian principles constitute the basis for any interaction. This includes an extensive assessment of the positive and negative impacts humanitarian aid might have in a specific context, resulting in every possible effort to reduce the latter based on the principle of 'do no harm' (Anderson: 1999). Even so, these organizations are not exempt from moral dilemmas in the increasing complexity of international intervention with innumerable factors influencing the result of any given strategy. Processes of civil-military interaction must therefore go along with constant deliberations, including on the role of external actors and their local perception.

For this reason, civil actors need to raise their voice in the discussion for national and international comprehension and make sure that even in times of complex violence, universal humanitarian principles are upheld (OCHA: 2015). This also includes a (re-)establishment of the focus of international operations to the objective of peace instead of security as their guiding principle (Vergin: 2012). Accordingly, the aim of effective civil-military interaction should be optimal, not maximum cooperation (de Coning: 2016). While communication is crucial between like-minded agents, an agreement to stay out of each others way can already be an achievement (VENRO: 2013). There has been much progress in this regard both in the field and the debate manifest in a growing involvement by civil agents in this field, a landmark of which is the UN OCHA handbook. Other examples are increasing approval and membership numbers of the Dutch-German initiative fostering the civil-military dialogue prior to field operations (Common Effort: 2017). While especially the operationalization *in situ* is far from ideal in most contexts of crisis management efforts, the conceptual development has progressed significantly, including a broadening of the actors seen as decisive to the process. As a result, a variety of approaches has come into existence which will be discussed hereafter, dedicated to more comprehension from the political arena to the field of operation.

3.5) The Comprehensive Approach

While it is by now almost undisputed that the interaction between civil and military actors must

be improved throughout all parts of peace operations, this rather narrow focus still excludes a variety of actors and perspectives subject to any given conflict. The concept of civil-military interaction has therefore been extended for various purposes, depending on the respective interests and goal orientation. As the terminology differs accordingly, I will first give an overview over several terms associated with more holistic approaches to international security.

As implied above, different stages of peace missions require corresponding forms of interaction respectively (de Coning: 2016). Taking civil-military cooperation one step further, the '3D-approach' adds foreign relations on a diplomatic level to the agenda next to defense and development (Gabriëls: 2007). These three elements are seen to be complementary for a state's or organization's international involvement and bring them together in a common effort to stabilize post-conflict countries and strengthen their institutions. As an example, Canada among other nations uses 3D as a principle to develop instruments for coherent foreign action, both on a government level and when cooperating with partner countries; the concept is furthermore part of the US National Security Strategy (Manwaring: 2006).

On a national level, many states similarly strive for a 'whole-of-government' approach, linking the tasks of their various departments in order to minimize miscommunication and mutual obstruction (Naumann: 2014). Military, police, NGOs, aid organizations and diplomats under the same flag through this premise are theoretically required to dovetail their planning, operationalization and evaluation at least to the extent that each actor is informed about the other's mission and goals and can identify overlap and possible obstacles for cooperation in the field (de Coning & Friis: 2011). Communication is thus a crucial element to ensure coherence in matters of external action, not least for increased legitimacy and sustainability. However, the critical government departments often compete with each other, be it for financial resources and prestige or independence from hierarchies compromising their priorities (Naumann: 2014).

A concept mostly associated with inter-agency coherence is referred to as an 'Integrated Approach' (IA) or 'whole-of-organization' (Tardy: 2017). As actors such as the UN or the EU often deploy more than one of their instruments in the field, it seems natural for them to pursue the same goal and thus cooperate to synchronize their efforts (Porter: 2002). However, as examples in Bosnia and elsewhere have shown coherence is seldom a reality in theater, resulting in administrative and operative overlap and other suboptimal results due to a lack of coordination already in the planning phase (Muehlmann: 2008). Lessons learned have hence sparked initiatives among these organizations to mainstream inter-department cohesion in all phases of operation; this will be further elaborated below.

All of these concepts have in common that they seek to improve interaction between different actors and levels relevant to international security. Going one step further and encompassing all of the above is the idea of a 'Comprehensive Approach' (CA), sometimes referred to as '3D plus' (van der Lijn: 2015). In the following, the term will therefore be used for all types of efforts mentioned hereunder, unless a distinction is specifically made for the purpose of dissociation. While in practice, comprehension as a hypernym can mean any kind and scale of interaction, on a theoretical level it is the most holistic concept as it goes beyond traditional actors and roles in conflict management. This includes local and regional governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions, civil society fora such as church groups and diaspora organizations, but also the private sector and economic factors such as loans and debts, including institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Proponents of the CA aim to optimize the interaction between civil and military actors as well as attune resource allocation, connecting various levels of conflict management in order to effectively react to regional unrest threatening peace, as exemplified in NATO strategic policy: "Lessons learned from NATO operations show that addressing crisis situations calls for a Comprehensive Approach combining political, civilian and military instruments" (NATO: 2016).

As demonstrated above, already the simple-sounding concept of civil-military interaction bears a multitudinous variety of actors and notions that need to be taken into account and poses challenges generally deemed impossible to overcome entirely. A fully Comprehensive Approach thus seems a utopia, putting the legitimacy of conflict interventions themselves in question. However, the key to operationalizing the CA is understanding it as a principle, not a panacea or even an instrument. The goal must be to mainstream the concept throughout all entities

involved in peace operations and try to meet common targets in an efficient and sustainable manner (Naumann: 2015). This begins at the intra-agency level and extends to the full spectrum of agents active in the field, permeating all levels from planning to evaluation.

An ambitious imperative, one can hardly expect for a CA to be operationalized without major obstacles and setbacks. Nonetheless, for a principle that seems to be unanimously agreed upon by most actors, the discrepancy between theoretical aspirations and implementations in practice is rather striking. Friis and Jamyrs in their 2008 study tried to account for the lack of achievements and found crucial hurdles in the organizational structures, most visibly manifest in leadership and management traditions (Friis & Jamyrs: 2008). Consequently, conflicting values, principles and priorities are not properly addressed, often resulting in further organizational and operational challenges. Unwillingness to compromise especially on the political level undermines the necessary flexibility, and one-dimensional thinking hampers cooperation not least on the local level, thus obstructing crucial aspirations of local ownership. The authors conclude: "a successful Comprehensive Approach requires increased organizational flexibility but also basic things like appropriate leadership, and reduction of prejudices and cultural barriers across the range of actors engaged in crisis management." (ibid, p. 24).

As one of the premises of a Comprehensive Approach is civil-military cooperation, the criticism towards that concept naturally remains in place. But as became clear during that discussion, the same phenomenon can be found in the CA-debate, namely that not the concept itself is rejected but its respective operationalization. With the political arena moving to the foreground in national and international efforts of comprehension, top-down decision making, inter-department quarrels and the prevalence of national interests under the pretext of 'international security' become central points of critique. In this vein, Jaberg (2015) deplores the persistence of old patterns of national defense, resulting in misconceptions of interrelations between security and development and consequently fostering short-sighted planning contrary to comprehension and sustainability. Other authors argue that formulating national goals is an important first step to any national strategy, increasing transparency and verifiability of foreign action and enabling national actors to bring to the international table their perspective for discussion (Wittkowsky, Hummel & Pietz: 2012).

However, current practice often shows that security policy and public debate are closely tied to contemporary events and immanent crises (Schulze & Wulf: 2016). Politicians decide on short-term, reactive measures from a national and thus fragmented perspective, instead of combining middle- to long-term efforts for sustainable peace and development. The current international system lacks instrumental interfaces due to a focus on national sovereignty. While this problem is not exclusive to security policy, the transboundary and interconnected nature of modern conflicts requires an international security architecture and real comprehension, even if only to reduce the damage resulting from uncoordinated intervention. While supranational institutions have a head-start in this field, there is of yet no universal instrument to coordinate all actors in any given field of operation, which given the vast number of entities in many conflict areas hardly comes as a surprise (Gauster: 2012).

Despite these considerable obstacles, the scientific approach remains straightforward and explores the challenges from a practical angle, starting at their roots. Notably, Alamir (2012) scrutinizes particular problems of operationalizing comprehensive interfaces between different actors, from their respective mandates to organizational, operational and communication cultures. These in turn result in differences in situational assessment, further hindered through separate training and a lack of institutionalized mechanisms for coordination. While she attests progress both on the national and supranational level, the lack of a common institution or framework for integrated crisis management remains a systemic problem, subjecting efforts for long-term, sustainable measures to the short-sightedness of national election cycles.

Lessons learned, especially from Afghanistan show that comprehension has a long way to go both outside and in the field (Rotmann: 2010). Fragmentation prevails, with strategies and operationalization oftentimes remaining uncoordinated and incomplete. While top-down approaches to comprehension alone are insufficient and counterproductive when national interests overshadow the realities on the ground, bottom-up strategies need a thorough understanding of local structures and cultural implications to take effect (Daxner: 2008). As

long as objectives are not clearly and jointly formulated and the means adjusted accordingly, cooperation will be confined to interpersonal contacts on the ground, a common practice but unfit to make up for strategic shortcomings.

In summary, ever since the concept was established various actors have joined the discussion and many an effort have been taken to optimize strategic comprehension. Once more, the premise should be *optimal* interaction instead of a hierarchical prioritization of efforts, taking into account the various mandates and institutional cultures and most importantly the respective local context – again, comprehension is not an overarching plan to be applied in conflict situations but a guiding principle to be mainstreamed throughout any operation (de Coning: 2016). However, structural shortcomings and the lack of institutionalization continue to obstruct any effective operationalization, most of all on the political front where collective aspirations of foreign missions often succumb to particular interests. This deadlock of traditional structures especially shows on the national level, where security, development and diplomatic efforts remain subject to competition and arenas of political power staging.

While many factors and problems have been addressed, the Comprehensive Approach remains vague as by its nature there cannot be one precise definition. Moving on to a concrete example, the second part of this thesis will scrutinize the German concept of comprehension to international security. As Germany has made the CA a guiding principle for foreign action since 2004, the aforementioned discussion concerning benefits and critique applies here as well. However, as we will see the German discourse and institutional setup face distinct challenges, notably due to the political system and tradition. Therefore, the research focus lies on the interaction among government agencies, mostly on the political level.

4) The German discourse

“Deutschlands Neue Verantwortung”: the dictum, meaning *Germany's New Responsibility* and referring to the demand of an increased role in the global arena of foreign engagement was coined even before the Trump administration took office and vowed to drastically reduce foreign spending such as contributions to the UN budget (Liebich: 2016). However, recent political developments in the USA and elsewhere have put foreign and security policy on the top of the German agenda after decades of diffidence in this field, including with regards to a stronger engagement in the implementation of R2P (Brockmeier: 2016). Following up on the UN example, while German monetary support to peacekeeping missions has since the 1990s been one of the highest, their troop contributions remain low compared to other donors (DGVN: 2013). The largest contingent of about 920 German soldiers is currently deployed with MINUSMA, the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (Bundeswehr: 2017); however, this commitment was preceded by persistent pressure from the Netherlands and France for more support (Spiegel: 2015). Similarly, the newly appointed U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis explicitly demanded increased German military engagement on various occasions (Spiegel: 2017).

His point was again repeated recently when foreign ministers from around the world discussed the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the Munich Security Conference 2017, confirming the need for a stronger engagement of European forces (Economist: 2017). With Germany being the largest European economy, a growing number of voices call for an increase in military support to foreign interventions and a more concrete agenda for future strategies. Yet Foreign Policy rightfully asked “Merkel and Whose Army?” (Foreign Policy: 2016), given insufficient staff, equipment and practical guidelines of the Bundeswehr and thus equally focusing singularly on the military component of international operations.

As the 'iron curtain' fell literally within the German territory, it should be little surprising that foreign engagement was not the first priority of the newly reunited state. What is more, other than many international partners the nation had no tradition of notably contributing to peace operations, and while the German colonial heritage is significant, the collective memory and consequent aversion of militarism is still deeply grounded in the aggressions and bitter consequences of two world wars (Kühne: 2007). While Germany did contribute to military interventions in Somalia and later the Balkans from the early 1990s onwards, public as well as political unwillingness persisted, further fueled by the dissatisfying results of these missions.

These and other involvements that followed were characterized by parliamentary disputes and foreign pressure, resulting in reluctant deployment without political strategy but mostly aiming to satisfy international demands for contributions (Naumann: 2012).

When peacekeeping evolved and increasingly relied on civil support, German police forces and later civilian experts contributed to a new perception of a possible role in foreign operations. Changing security contexts around the world slowly took their toll on organizational cultures in German ministries and their executive organs and in the 21st century allowed for a broader parliamentary discussion of foreign strategies (Kühne: 2007). However, the transformation from a reluctant player in the international arena to a confident peace power was a slow battle on different fronts. It was influenced both by external factors such as the increase and growing complexity of conflicts, and internal developments in the political sphere (Nachtwei: 2012).

From the Balkan wars to the engagement in Afghanistan, the discussion was accompanied by a growing consensus that neither military nor political efforts by themselves are sufficient to generate a lasting democratic peace, and especially with the building of civilian capacities since the beginning of the 21st century has civil crisis management and civil-military cooperation become an important strategic issue. Ever since the 2006 *White Papers* were published, *Vernetzte Sicherheit* (networked security) has become a keyword in the dictionary of the German Ministry of Defense (BMVg: 2006). However, the concept and its connotation have undergone significant progress since then and has today become an undisputed principle of German foreign engagement (Bagger & von Heynitz: 2012).

The following paragraph gives an overview of the conceptual emergence and development of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) in Germany based on key documents and political decisions in the past two decades. While extensive, the list of documents is not exhaustive but aims to explain the current debate in hindsight and based on national and international events accompanying the various stages of this discourse. Herein, the spotlight is cast on the legislative dimension, this is to say mostly parliamentary deliberations and decisions. In the second subchapter, I will in turn briefly examine key developments and challenges regarding a German CA within and between the different executive bodies, namely the ministries and their various extensions, before turning to international organizations and partnerships.

4.1) Timeline German Comprehensive Approach

Parallel to the research and writing of this thesis, the German Foreign Office (AA) has chaired an extensive discussion including all government agencies and representatives of civil society, science and political foundations, resulting in the drafting and publication of the *Neue Leitlinien der Bundesregierung* (New Guidelines of the Federal Government) for conflict prevention and crisis management. The cabinet decision to adapt the *Guidelines* on 14 June 2017 marked the conclusion of protracted negotiations and establishes a new German status quo 13 years after the first official basic document has passed its parliament (Auswärtiges Amt: 2017).

The new *Guidelines* replace the 2004 *Aktionsplan Zivile Krisenprävention* (Action Plan Civil Crisis Prevention) and subsequent documents to outline the course of German engagement in international missions for conflict prevention and management. Drafted under the aegis of the AA, the process included all government agencies and its outcome was an unprecedented political strategic document describing an extended whole-of-government approach to civil options and measures for conflict prevention and management as well as peace support and consolidation (Aktionsplan: 2004). The defined goal was to separate this political field from specific foreign, security and development tasks and define it as a cross-section responsibility, including economic, financial and environmental interests.

The idea for this plan had been part of the 2002 coalition agreement between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party (Grüne) and followed closely the establishment of the Berlin Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in the same year – which will be discussed in-depth further below – in a general attempt to extent civil capacities for crisis management the lack of which had been revealed especially during the involvement in the Balkan crisis (Nachtwei: 2012). For the first time, the *Aktionsplan* vowed to increase coherence within the government as well as with non-governmental and international partners, clearly

acknowledging their important contributions and the necessity of coordinated action for successful conflict management measures. While the paper focused on civil contributions to peace, it acknowledged the military role and the necessity to find interfaces for civil-military cooperation. In order to ensure the strengthening of coherent measures, an adaptation of the plan included the establishment of the so-called *Ressortkreis Zivile Krisenprävention* (Interministerial Steering Group on Civilian Crisis Prevention) including representatives of all departments together with an advisory council (*Beirat*) of roughly 20 delegates from economic and scientific institutions, NGOs, foundations, churches and other relevant organizations for professional advice (ibid). Between 2004 and 2014, four execution reports have been issued and until the adaptation of the *Guidelines*, the *Aktionsplan* continued to constitute the official government framework encompassing all departments.

While the plan emphasizes the importance of coherence, the term *Vernetzte Sicherheit* (Networked Security) only entered the discussion through the 2006 *White Papers* issued by the Defense Ministry (BMVg), now under a new government coalition between SPD and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) with conservative Minister of Defense Jung making the concept of comprehensive security a premise for any foreign military engagement and thereby alienating civil and especially humanitarian actors instead of effectively dissolving terminological boundaries (Jaberg: 2009). However, the concept slowly caught on in other departments, resulting in the 2009 establishment of the Subcommittee Civil Crisis Prevention and Networked Security (*Unterausschuss Zivile Krisenprävention und Vernetzte Sicherheit*), answering to the Foreign Committee. While tactical reasons to keep civil crisis management on the agenda after the end of a left-wing coalition played an important role in combining these two approaches, the concept of Networked Security was long disputed among the parties, with the far-left rejecting the alleged 'securitization' of civil engagement in conflict regions.

An important factor in this debate apart from the origin in military contexts such as NATO is the vagueness of the term and its implications, resulting in both premature praise and rejection (Borchert & Thiele: 2012). This terminological conflict escalated briefly when Jung demanded for NGOs to adhere to the concept as a prerequisite for state founding but later resulted in a rather fruitful exchange between military and civil actors such as between the association of German NGOs, VENRO and the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr (VENRO: 2012). Meanwhile, government politicians proceeded to foster comprehension as a guiding principle, including in supranational organizations such as the EU and NATO that had equally recognized the need for extended civil-military interaction in the face of complex crises (Nachtwei: 2012). This appreciation was further fueled by the emergence of the 'fragile state paradigm' as discussed above, implying the necessity of a multidimensional response to volatile or conflict-stricken regions.

As a consequence, another intergovernmental document was adopted in 2012, namely the Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of the Federal Government with Fragile States (*Leitlinien für eine kohärente Politik der Bundesregierung gegenüber fragilen Staaten*), the creation of which had been announced in the 2009 coalition agreement of the newly elected conservative government coalition of CDU and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). This plan had been prompted in response to the 2005 Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations published by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC) and was arguably a first major follow-up after the *Aktionsplan* of 2004 (Bagger & von Heynitz: 2012). While the AA and BMVg had included the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in the process, the Interior Ministry (BMI) had been left out of the process, a differentiation between internal and external security that seems invalid in times of terrorist threats from 'fragile states' and international police missions executed by the BMI and its regional subsidiaries and thus severely hampered the impact of this new guiding document (Nachtwei: 2012).

Nonetheless, it was the first interdepartmental document acknowledging comprehension as a guiding principle and aiming to further develop it both conceptually and in practice especially in multilateral efforts, framing the options and defining goals and principles of implementation (Bagger & von Heynitz: 2012). Recommendations include long-term comprehensive planning and resource allocation, support of local ownership and the preventive principle of do-no-harm, as well as the facilitation of country-specific task forces rooted in the AA and fulfilling broad

and comprehensive functions. These include early analysis using expert assistance, regular reports to all relevant government entities, benchmarking of clearly defined goals and criteria for German engagement, and inter-department coordination including with regards to local partners (Auswärtiges Amt: 2012).

The current legislative period, governed by a coalition of CDU and SPD, has shown significant progress in mainstreaming enhanced cooperation and already determined comprehension as a guiding principle for foreign and security policy in their 2013 coalition agreement, committing to an increased German role and responsibility including with diplomatic and other civil measures (CDU: 2013). The differentiation within the debate is additionally exemplified in the continuation of the Subcommittee under a different name: in the new legislation period, the committee members agreed to change the terminology to Civil Crisis Prevention and Networked Action (*Zivile Krisenprävention und Vernetztes Handeln*), effectively neutralizing implicit associations of securitization of development issues and coupling the term *Vernetzter Ansatz* with its English counterpart, the Comprehensive Approach (Wittkowsky: 2012). This terminological shift was mainstreamed quickly as becomes clear in the final execution report of the *Aktionsplan* as of 2014 (DIE: 2014) and even the 2016 *White Papers* (BMVg: 2016).

Under the impression of the 'crisis year' 2014 with new international threats coming both from Islamist terror in Syria and Iraq and a resurgence of Cold War rhetoric in the face of Russia's annexation of Crimea, the second half of the legislative period has been marked by even more engagement for German crisis management (DIE: 2014). This includes the adaptation of two more interdepartmental publications, headed by the new *White Papers* in 2016 and just recently added by the *New Guidelines*. Given both their currency and their specific focus on Germany's efforts at crisis management and peace building, I will focus on the latter, scrutinizing both the process and its outcomes regarding overall assumptions and induced proceedings to increase effective comprehension on the government level and beyond.

4.1.1) Preventing Crises, Managing Conflicts, Supporting Peace: Guidelines of the Federal Government

On 14 June 2017, the long-awaited government Guidelines for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management and Peace Promotion were adopted by the German parliament just in time for the political summer break preceding the September general elections. The importance of this document results from its drafting process, spanning over an entire year and including not only government legislation and execution in terms of all ministries and government organizations, but also a broad variety of non-governmental actors from scientific institutions and think tanks to development and humanitarian organizations, political foundations and the interested public, supported by various workshops and a participatory online blog (PeaceLab2016: 2016). This inclusive approach easily outdid the *White Papers* process which, while engaging with different governmental and non-governmental actors remained substantially in the hands of the BMVg (Ruhnke: 2016). While asserting the claim to be an intergovernmental document, the White Paper's outreach has thus remained limited, with its focus on military strategies even bringing back to the stage claims of attempted securitization of development efforts (Baumann & Köbler: 2016). Surely, the fact that one half of the document is dedicated exclusively to the realignment of the German forces did not help its case (BMVg: 2016). While its importance is acknowledged in the *Guidelines*, they explicitly transcend it both in scope and relevance (Auswärtiges Amt: 2017).

As I was aware of the process and the fact that many of my interview partners were involved in it, I asked them for an assessment of the ongoing negotiations. While this will be discussed in detail in the last chapter of my thesis, I will include some of the points made to introduce the *Guidelines* process and the challenges it faced. From a political angle, there were already various obstacles before the start. The three ministries mainly involved, AA, BMVg and BMZ are currently headed by three different parties and all three ministers have proven to follow their own agenda, a circumstance that is usually referred to as 'strong personalities' which is known especially of Foreign Minister Gabriel (SPD) who just recently took office when former Minister Steinmeier was elected President in March 2017 (Tagesspiegel: 2017). The BMVg is currently headed by Minister von der Leyen, a surprising personnel decision at the time that let

many to acknowledge her political ambitions (Spiegel: 2013). Development Minister Müller from the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU's Bavarian ally meanwhile had to witness his ministry's authority decreased when the Foreign Office established a new division focused on stabilization and crisis management and consequently received considerable new funds, further straining the relationship between the two ministries as will be elaborated on below (VENRO: 2015). With no claims to being a valid scientific evaluation, these remarks exemplify the political climate the negotiations took place in, especially given the general elections in 2017.

According to BMZ Minister Müller, the *Guidelines* are a "strong impulse for comprehensive action" (BMZ: 2017; *own translation*). Indeed, the document grants various subchapters to principles and strengthening of comprehension, on an intergovernmental and an international level while focusing on the former, namely "*ressortgemeinsames Handeln*" (interdepartmental action; Auswärtiges Amt: 2017). In the first part, the paper refers to the discussion outlined above, i.e. the changed security situation, fragile states and the security-development nexus, and commits to the principle of R2P and the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. As a consequence, the government vows to increase its involvement in international peace and security efforts, based on its values and own historical development from perpetrator of the Holocaust to a democratic and prosperous society (ibid; p. 18f.). Principles for engagement include universal human rights, the concept of do-no-harm, and sustainable development. Apart from physical and economic security of German citizens, the document names the reduction of irregular migration as a core national interest in supporting peace and stability.

The *Guidelines* then proceed to describe the necessary steps to achieve these goals, a crucial prerequisite of which is coherence (ibid: p.20). The importance of understanding conflicts in their specific context and local ownership of the peace process is acknowledged repeatedly, as is the difference between various conflict phases, reasserting prevention as the measure of choice. Thus, political and civil engagement is to be given priority, and military action as legitimized under international law must be the last resort, again embedded in a broader framework of development efforts (ibid: p. 24). Since a coherent national agenda is framed as a prerequisite for effective peace support, this is not reduced to civil-military cooperation. The *Guidelines* in fact support a holistic understanding including but not limited to measures of justice, education, environmental work, health, social policies, migratory regulation, culture, economy, nutrition, gender equality and trade, requiring on the German level extensive interdepartmental coordination and specific allocation and adaptation in theater. Important aspects for operationalization are the dialogue with non-governmental partners, inclusive peace processes as demanded for instance in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and extensive planning and evaluation processes to optimize the effects of lessons learned especially from decades of development cooperation (ibid: p. 25-28.).

The government aims to focus its involvement on conflicts where it is deemed most effective, repeatedly emphasizing regions sending and receiving large amounts of migrants and refugees and including diverse action from stabilization efforts in ongoing conflicts to strengthening resilience in volatile regions. Five principle fields of engagement are indicated, including legitimate politics, security, rule of law, economy and natural subsistence as well as state income and services (ibid: p. 30). These are supposed to underlie any measures taken, as is the case with so-called 'Transformation Partnerships' currently conducted in the MENA region and must be based on an interdependent understanding of governance, fragility and conflict. Human security is the goal of any mission and needs holistic involvement of military, police and civil actors as well as extensive arms control. On a practical level, this can extend to the strengthening of resilience including to natural disasters and training of local personnel as provided through the *Ertüchtigungs-Initiative* (capacity building initiative) that was started in 2016 and uses a combined budget for BMVg and AA to support training of local troops in Iraq and elsewhere (Puglierin: 2016). The *Guidelines* underline the importance of police missions and abide the employment of German troops in conflict zones, albeit under the prerequisite of broad analysis including by the principle of do-no-harm and parliament approval as determined in the 2005 *Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz* (Parliamentary Participation act; Scherrer: 2010).

While the *Guidelines* themselves clearly and deliberately outweigh the 2016 *White Papers*, they do acknowledge their importance and scope. With regards to fostering comprehension, the *White Papers* demand enhanced whole-of-government security foresight, the strengthening of

capacities and cohesion at the EU and NATO, and a strong German engagement for rule-based international order, including through increased involvement in UN Peacekeeping (Weißbuch: 2016). They affirm the cruciality of a broad understanding of security that apart from political and military connotations also refers to human, economic and environmental security. While the 2006 edition had introduced comprehensive security as a premise for foreign action, the 2016 document exclusively focuses on comprehensive *action*. It seems thus safe to assume that at least the terminological debate has reached a satisfying solution.

Subchapter 4 of the *Guidelines* is dedicated entirely to structures and partnerships for better engagement (Auswärtiges Amt: p. 51ff.). The departments commit to a whole-of-government approach for early warning, political planning and guidance, and interdepartmental cooperation in the field, combined in a consistent strategic narrative. Thus are to be ensured coherence and a faster and more strategic coordinated crisis reaction. Specifically, the post of a Special Representative of the Federal Government is to be created for distinguished conflicts and for a limited time frame, who is to be the point of contact between the different department efforts to ensure their coherence. As that person is to fulfill diplomatic functions, she will be located at the Foreign Office. In addition, networks between parliamentarians as well as with other political entities are to be broadened and the departments are to develop practical measures to improve coherence and quality of foreign engagement. In the field, the *Guidelines* foresee an extended role of German embassies as they span the globe and are usually already embedded in the host country to a certain extent. They are thus to function as the central point of contact for coordination and management of the various efforts by department agencies and other implementing partners, and through integration in country-specific task forces be more involved in conflict analysis and operative planning.

Partners in theater include German, international and local implementation organizations and intermediary institutions such as cultural and diplomatic centers, as well as international and local NGOs and cooperation from a bilateral to a multinational level. Mission staff include civil experts, police and custom officers, as well as judicial and military personnel. While civil measures are given preference, the government vows to increase its support for all aspects of peace operations, complete with 'robust' interventions as conducted for instance by NATO and the EU. On the international level, the document commits to cooperation with the EU and their Integrated Approach, combining diplomatic, political and economic efforts through its various organs and including common planning, analysis and personnel exchange. The UN and its various resolutions remain the central point of reference for multilateral peace and security engagement and their reform efforts are strongly supported. Furthermore, the commitment to NATO, OSCE and OECD partnerships are reaffirmed, as is the importance of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional multinational development banks. The document also acknowledges the contributions of various international bodies dedicated to security and development, such as G20 and G7, and campaigns for better donor coordination.

A special place is given to contributions by German civil society, science and other non-governmental actors in Germany, such as their interaction with local groups and local civil societies in the field. Their involvement in the process of drafting the *Guidelines* is praised, as is their political input through the advisory council of the Interministerial Steering Group on Civilian Crisis Prevention (see above). In order to foster their impact, the government pledges to specify its mandate and sharpen its profile (ibid: p. 62f.). In consequence, the council is to adopt three main competences, namely advising the government departments, developing independent conceptual contributions and facilitating exchange with civil society. The cruciality of science and research to generating both contextual and more general knowledge on peace and conflict management is underlined and promised a more prominent place in the future of German peace operations, aiming to enhance cooperation with scientific institutions and organizations and strengthening the impact of regional studies and ethnological expert knowledge. This is to be operationalized through a learning platform based on the experience of the PeaceLab2016-process and modeled in part after the Working Group on Peace and Development (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Entwicklung*, FriEnt) which was founded in 2001 as a community of scientific institutions, Christian aid networks, political foundations and state actors. The platform is to be used to systematically collect and evaluate knowledge from

foreign engagement and national processes to directly incorporate in national and international learning and training processes. In general, the implementation of the *Guidelines* is to entail a closer and more focused cooperation and knowledge transfer between political practice and science, religious groups, political foundations and the private sector to stronger engage them in all phases of peace and development measures.

Lastly, the subchapter turns to the question of evaluating and further developing the German interdepartmental approach through monitoring and analyzing present and past engagement, specific implementation of lessons learned and strategic evaluation through an independent panel comprised of representatives from politics, science and civil society that was created for this purpose (ibid: p. 65). Orientation will be given by the German Evaluation Institute for Development Cooperation DEval, recommendations by international panels like OECD DAC and closer coordination between the internal evaluation processes of the government departments. Comprehensive learning processes in practice entail common education and training as already conducted by the Federal Academy for Security Policy (*Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik*, BAKS) especially for embassy personnel in conflict regions and supported by local partners, best-practice exchange between departments, governments and international organizations and the development of national common rules of implementation.

While the *Guidelines* are the result of an extensive and productive working process, what we have seen so far are mostly theoretical deliberations and recommendations. However, the document closes with strategic points on how to implement and follow up on these and entails an annex indicating concrete commitment by the federal government in response to the points discussed. The Steering Group is to create strategic working groups and the government will evaluate the execution of the *Guidelines* after four years, followed by a strategic review and demand-based adaptation after eight years. The government is to strategically engage with the parliament and international fora to ensure a continuation of the dialogue initiated by the PeaceLab2016 process and enhance internal and external communication, supported by an interdepartmental working group to fulfill a pivotal function between the government and civil society as well as the media, supported by the Steering Group's advisory council (ibid: p. 67).

This document, together with the 2016 *White Papers* is the official German strategy for crisis prevention, conflict management and peace support as of June 2017 and thus as timely as possible. While published recently, reactions were not long in coming and included members of parliament, civil society organizations and the press. Notably, the head of the Subcommittee on Civil Crisis Prevention Franziska Brandter (Green Party) voiced harsh criticism, rendering the document a mere summary of common knowledge on crisis management without any concretion or ambition, let alone capital budget for any of the target measures (Brandter: 2017). Without a clarification of common goals, she is sure, the departments will continue to work alongside each other instead of comprehensively. Her subcommittee-colleague Kathrin Vogler of the opposition Left Party (*Die Linke*) agrees and denounces the inclusive process as a farce given the result that in her eyes are merely superficial policy recommendations instead of a sharp definition of a future German role that should include self-criticism when it comes to aggressive national trade policies and arms deals with dictatorships (Vogler: 2017). In an official statement, her party strictly rejects the document based on the notion that it strategically blurs the lines between civil and military contributions to peace operations and fails to commit clearly to civil measures (LINKE: 2017). In a very different tone, SPD members of the Subcommittee welcome the *Guidelines* and within them find the primate of civil crisis management confirmed (SPD: 2017). They support recommendations to strengthen diplomatic and mediation efforts together with enhanced evaluation, and find their implementation facilitated in the Comprehensive Approach and international cooperation fostered within them. Once again, one should bear in mind the fact that elections are coming up and both Green and Left Party are in the opposition while SPD is part of the current government.

Reactions from civil society organizations, all of the part of the PeaceLab2016 process, include German NGO *Weltfriedensdienst* (World Peace Service) whose reaction is two-sided: on the one hand, they soberly acknowledge that the goal of the PeaceLab2016 process was never a point by point agenda but rather an intergovernmental rapprochement of a civil primate for peace engagement (WFD: 2017). While the commitment to the principle of do-no-harm is seen as a positive development, the limited scope of comprehensive engagement as laid out in the

document is on the other hand lamented as too focused on peace and security policies instead of actually committing to extended monitoring and a critical and holistic reflection including impacts of German economic and trade policies. However, an increased support of local actors, continued dialogue with and influence of civil society, and an enhanced mandate of the advisory council are all seen as positive outcomes. *Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst* (Forum Civil Peace Service), another German NGO acknowledge these as well but criticize a lack of political will, manifest in the ongoing interdepartmental conflict regarding allocation of competencies especially between AA, BMVg and BMZ and the lack of parliamentary inclusion (Forum ZFD: 2017). Depending on the outcome of the 2017 elections, means and scope of operationalizing the *Guidelines* will differ considerably according to this statement. *Weltsichten*, a magazine on global development cooperation published by various Christian NGOs join in the critique regarding the vagueness that in their view does not do justice to the extensive process preceding the publication of the *Guidelines* (Weltsichten: 2017). What is more, while the document commits to increased monitoring, an interdepartmental comprehensive evaluation of measures is not intended, giving doubt to intergovernmental commitment.

While media reactions outside the specialized press where scarce, the largest German public media outlet ARD commented on the publication, the problems of which according to them became obvious within its process marked by the power struggle between departments and parties that eventually not only stalled the negotiations but for months even cast doubt on an eventual finalization and publication of the *Guidelines* which was allegedly facilitated by pressure from the chancellor's office as a last resort for compromise (ARD: 2017). In the process, the term 'civil crisis prevention' that was part of the draft title was stripped of the first word, which is rendered unacceptable by many representatives of civil society organizations.

In the end, the new *Guidelines* are published and adopted, setting the stage for an increased German involvement in international peace operations. With the political summer break ahead, it will indeed remain to be seen how the next government elected in September will proceed on this matter and operationalize the commitments recorded therein. While the process and developed principles are widely supported both by government entities and civil society, their conceptualization lacks substance which bears the danger of retaining established parallel structures instead of supporting comprehension, thus diminishing spaces for debate and compromise and possible effects especially regarding prevention (Wieland-Karimi: 2016). Maintaining the current separation, as ample examples show, cannot be the answer to increasingly complex crises, and a German commitment to more international responsibility must not succumb to interdepartmental vanities. Yet, their severity is deeply rooted in German political culture and has in the past proved hard to overcome, as the next chapter will show.

4.2) National actors

As we have seen, comprehensive concepts have come a long way in the German political arena during the past 15 years. The development from a securitization frame implicit in the original term has slowly and through extensive debate given way to a consensus that is almost undisputed today. However, it is obvious that the differences between political parties play an important role in the development of a comprehensive concept in Germany. As we will see, this problem is multiplied when combined with interdepartmental rivalries over the prerogative of interpretation and not least implementation, both on the government level and in theater.

In order to fully comprehend these tensions, a close look into German political culture is in order. The nation, former aggressor of two world wars and therein bereaved of democratic structures was eventually transformed into a decentralized federal republic and multiparty parliamentary democracy (Sturm: 2013). Federalism as an organizational principle was settled in the 1949 constitution and is characterized by close cooperation between the confederation and the 16 states it is composed of today. Deeply anchored in the historic interplay of division and cooperation, decentralization was at the same time a condition set by the victorious powers of the Second World War for the reestablishment of a German nation-state in order to guarantee broad democratic oversight. Later on, the embedding in the European Union as a superordinate political body helped avoid the trap of a country traditionally too powerful to align itself with its neighbors and yet too weak to rule on its own (Maull: 1999).

The result is a system divided into a federal parliament (*Bundestag*) and a federal council (*Bundesrat*) made up of representatives of the state parliaments equally representing the 16 states, within them again divided in and represented by various regional political entities on a community level (Sturm: 2013). The Bundesrat ensures the states' participation in legislation and administration of the federal republic and their say in matters concerning the EU. Its voice is equal to that of the Bundestag when it comes to the government organs, and the federal president is elected by an assembly featuring all federal parliamentarians and the same number of state representatives. What is more, one half of the members of the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) is elected by the Bundestag and one by the Bundesrat respectively (ibid). While historically equipped with considerable autonomy, state cooperation flourishes especially in economic and financial, but also social questions. However, policy fields such as education and notably also security are still mostly decentralized, the implications of which will be addressed further below.

Federalism, while undisputed as a principle has traditionally presented challenges to the nation as well. Due to lengthiness of decision-making processes, unclear responsibilities and a lack of transparency, a broad reform process readjusted the respective competences and fixed them within constitutional legislation (Selmer: 2006). The federal system furthermore extends to political parties, and while national coordination is usually striven for, decisions will often be made on the state level that are not completely approved in the federal headquarters (Sturm: 2013). In this decentralized arena of divided and shared competences, democratic negotiation processes are to thrive from healthy concurrence and incentives for compromise.

At the same time, the system is often said to contain an internal logical error that refers to this political environment clashing with the requirements of the various departments and ministries that seem to be incompatible when it comes to procedural logic (Lehmbruch: 2000). In this view, the competitiveness of the party system hampers the potential for cooperation on the national level severely and will lead to decisions based on a strategy of profiling instead of consent. Due to the coalition system, ministers will be supplied by different parties which can result in an unnecessary amplification of conflicts based on tactics especially during election periods – the *Guidelines*-process providing but a minor example. Comprehension is of course not understood as an abolition of labor division through ministries, committees and working groups, nor of political diversity and dispute. What is however highlighted by this critique is the threat that profound decision-making processes are systematically undermined on the highest levels by personal interests at the expense of consensus and comprehensive progress.

This not being a revolutionary finding, the German constitution regulates the responsibility of political leadership clearly in its Article 65 on the “power to determine policy guidelines and department and collegiate responsibility” that will therefore be quoted here in full in the official English translation :

The Federal Chancellor shall determine and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy. Within these limits each Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his department independently and on his own responsibility. The Federal Government shall resolve differences of opinion between Federal Ministers. The Federal Chancellor shall conduct the proceedings of the Federal Government in accordance with rules of procedure adopted by the Government and approved by the Federal President (BMJV: 2017a).

Theoretically, the problem is thus solved – while the ministries are to be lead independently, they are guided by an overarching framework, and differences can be solved by the Federal Chancellery as a last resort, as was allegedly the case for the *Guidelines*. While this authority can overcome political deadlocks and prevent governmental incapacity, it disagrees with the democratic principle of consensus-building and is thus only rarely invoked (Manow: 1996). Still, on the first glance it seems that Germany is well positioned when it comes to a basis for democratic pluralism capable of convergence and thus comprehension.

However, while instruments of coordination now progressed by the new *Guidelines* are benefiting a whole-of-government approach, the level of institutionalization remains low given the focus on interdepartmental labor division. At this point, I will use the opportunity for an international comparison, albeit limited as this is not the topic of my thesis. Nonetheless, a brief overview can contribute to an understanding of the German situation that did not arise in a vacuum but was accompanied by international developments and strategic reactions by allied governments. Notable pioneers in this field include the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and

Denmark, all of them displaying high levels of comprehension in working structures and decision-making processes (Rotmann & Steinacker: 2014). As international interventions are generally multilateral, incorporation of national developments in common learning processes might be fruitful (Wittkowsky & Wittkamp: 2013).

Britain follows a strategy of institutional superordination, manifest in an Integrated Approach (IA) and based on practical experience (ibid). Matching guidelines for planning and evaluation allow for flexible adjustments, and the *Stabilization Unit* as an interdepartmental competence center features representatives of all relevant ministries. The *Unit* additionally manages the Civilian Stabilization Group, consisting of roughly 1000 civilian and ministerial experts on conflict management. The National Security Council founded in 2010 connects ministers and secretaries of state in weekly meetings, and the National Security Strategy based on an IA is to facilitate prevention, early warning and quick reaction to crises. Context-specific Joint Assessments on Conflict and Stability are conducted for specific regions, and a common budget for foreign, development and defense policy facilitate prevention. However, its execution is a cumbersome process, and while based on lessons learned the overall implementation lacks a strategic framework outlining comparative advantages and an overarching approach to integration (Wittkowsky: 2012b).

Driven by characteristic pragmatism, the Dutch Comprehensive Approach (CA) is based on the notion of increased efficiency, including resource allocation (Wittkowsky & Wittkamp: 2013). The foreign ministry has established a National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismedbestrijding en Veiligheid*), interdepartmental working groups hold regular meetings on acute crises, and high-level government representatives confer once a week in the Steering Group on Military Operations (*Stuurgroep Militaire Operaties*) whose informal character allows for maximum consensus. The 2013 strategy 'A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World' (*Veilig Wereld, Veilig Nederland*) provides a common instrument for actors in and beyond the government and are accompanied by specific strategies for conflict regions, however allowing for little transferability. The Homogenous Group for International Cooperation (*Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking*, HGIS) is located in the foreign ministry and regulates the common budget for quick impact in international peace operations, its priorities determined by the cabinet (ibid). Similarly, the strategy for comprehensive action in fragile states (*Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering*) is a mutual agreement by the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, justice, and economy and development cooperation (Tweede Kamer: 2014).

Denmark's whole-of-government strategy on the stabilization of fragile states was likewise drafted by the foreign ministry and relies on civil-military cooperation especially for security and justice reform (Rotmann & Steinacker: 2014). The Danish Stabilization Fund is governed by an interministerial steering group, featuring the foreign, development and defense ministries. Other strategies include the Swedish Overarching Approach (*Allomfattande Ansats*) that focuses on the improvement of strategic intergovernmental labor division, and US efforts of enlarging their civil forces to improve efforts and retain their supremacy in the arena of international interventions (Wittkowsky & Wittkamp: 2013).

In comparison, Germany's Comprehensive Approach (*Vernetzter Ansatz*) derives from various strategic instruments as outlined above, the last of them being the 2016 *White Papers* and the 2017 *Guidelines*, providing a broad theoretical approach and toolkit. Available institutions however remain scarce, so far reduced to the *Ressortkreis Zivile Krisenprävention* (Interministerial Steering Group on Civilian Crisis Prevention) including representatives of all relevant departments, and the corresponding advisory council (*Beirat*), as well as the parliamentary Subcommittee on Civil Crisis Prevention and Networked Action (*Unterausschuss Zivile Krisenprävention und Vernetztes Handeln*), meeting biweekly (Auswärtiges Amt: 2017). As the Steering Group is little short of dormant at this point especially given its weak mandate and equipment, its future in the new legislative period is all but clear and makes the emphasis on its role as outlined in the Guidelines surprising (Wittkowsky: 2012a). Another recently established institution is the *Ertüchtigungsinitiative* (capacity building initiative), providing shared budgets of the ministries of foreign affairs and defense for training missions in the context of security sector reform (Puglierin: 2016; see above).

Commonalities between Germany and the partner countries listed above include an emphasis on the international political momentum requiring optimal collaboration, and intergovernmental strategies (and in some cases budgets) exceeding departmental boundaries. Common planning, analysis and policies are created to enhance coherence. While there is criticism from political actors as well as civil society in all of these implementing nations, a general consensus for the need of better interaction emerged during the last decade (Wittkowsky & Wittkampff: 2013). Further agreement can be found in the notion that comprehension as a concept has invoked high expectations and thus been readily adopted in strategy documents, albeit failing to deliver accordingly. The initial enthusiasm was laden with a false impression of the CA as an overriding political and strategic goal instead of understanding it as a necessary but in itself not sufficient concept to make efforts for increased security and eventually sustainable peace more efficient (ibid). Notably, the strategies prioritize comprehension among state institutions, whereas the sensitive topic of agreements with civilian organizations is of secondary strategic importance. While *ad hoc* interaction in theater has often proved less problematic, perceived and actual ministerial boundaries continue to hamper its implementation. Strategic questions thus include how to develop structures and instruments to reduce complexity and incentivize coherence, and how political leadership can contribute pertinently (Wittkowsky: 2012a).

In 2011, the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) has conducted a survey among representatives of all relevant government departments as well as selected NGOs in Germany in order to evaluate current developments in implementing a whole-of-government approach in the Federal Republic (Wittkowsky et al.: 2011). While impressions differ considerably, progress is generally acknowledged. Many interviewees lament the lack of a coherent concept as a basis for a synchronization of efforts, often resulting in faltering impact and engagement. Regular interdepartmental meetings are perceived as beneficial, but this type of cooperation lacks institutionalization, and available instruments such as exchanging personnel remain without incentives and thus fail to interrupt the prevailing silo mentalities within the departments. Comprehensive leadership and common visions remain scarce, as do specific concepts and overarching evaluation processes for managing and further processing knowledge and lessons learned. Furthermore, all respondents criticize insufficient interdepartmental communication.

The largest discord can be found in the institutional setup, namely the traditional German *Ressortprinzip* (departmental principle). One argumentation regards ministerial self-interest as a major obstacle and demands structural adjustments based on lessons learned from peace operations, while the other points out the importance of functional labor division and find the criticism one-sided and charged with general disappointments from peacekeeping experience. In this vain, they demand a strengthening of strategic interfaces and context-driven networks.

As an introduction to the specific political context in Germany, I will briefly invoke an practical example of a comprehensive effort that has been studied extensively and exemplifies strengths and weaknesses of the German concept, namely the involvement in Afghanistan explicitly conducted under the CA (Zapfe: 2011). As the engagement continued to be protracted without many visible results, public and parliamentary pressure lead to a closer cooperation between the departments and regular common meetings at the Foreign Office (AA) to discuss strategies and progress. While the military was involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) provided humanitarian and development aid. The Interior Ministry (BMI) trained local police forces and the AA provided political assistance, for instance by supporting ministerial reforms (Daxner: 2008).

While the interdepartmental working group was to ensure whole-of-government coherence, in the field this function was institutionalized in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that were created to combine military, civil and humanitarian efforts and in the German case were jointly headed by the AA and BMVg (Erhart: 2011). While the BMZ under then-Minister Niebel was at first reluctant to play a secondary role, the maintained budgetary separation and respective administration of the ministries as well as intraparty convergence (Niebel and then-Foreign Minister Westerwelle both being members of the FDP) limited this dispute. Yet, a variety of observations suggest that this attempt to comprehension was all but a success.

The most important issue seems to have been communication, spanning various levels (Jacobi, Hellmann & Nieke: 2011). While the Comprehensive Approach was used by all departments as

an umbrella term for common action, definitions differed considerably and lead to differing and often conflicting understandings and expectations both in Germany and Afghanistan, conveying the impression that efficient cooperation could almost by itself solve any conflict. Internally, existing instrument and institutions such as the 2004 *Aktionsplan* and the Steering Group were woefully neglected and departmental egotism prevailed (Erhart: 2011). The lack (or disuse) of common strategies, institutions and budgets preserved silo thinking, and especially attempts to involve non-governmental actors proved difficult who given their varying mandates, donors and principles often even struggle to find consent among themselves (Linder: 2010). Parallel public information and debate was neglected greatly, leading not only to widespread rejection of the engagement but to a further alienation between military and civilians both in the public and professional realm which lead to long-term stagnation on comprehensive exchange in the field of security policy (Jacobi, Hellmann & Nieke: 2011).

This admittedly limited glimpse on the challenges for a comprehensive concept of a German engagement in Afghanistan has already hinted to various operational pitfalls both applicable to peace operations as a whole and specifically German actors. In the end, there is no denying that the current institutional setup is at least not strengthening efforts towards the implementation of a whole-of-government approach. This being the focus of my thesis, I will now proceed to analyze strategies and linkage points of the relevant ministerial departments with regards to a Comprehensive Approach, sorted according to their official hierarchy as determined by the Federal Cabinet (Protokoll Inland der Bundesregierung: 2017). All of these ministries are represented in my interviews and further points therefore will be incorporated in the final discussion. While I was not able to conduct to question a member of the Federal Chancellery, a ZIF meeting with the chancellor's foreign policy adviser provided me with an opportunity to receive some insights from the perspective of this interdepartmental connecting link. As preceding paragraphs already indicate various key developments and challenges, the aim is no exhaustive analysis but will be reduced to a concise overview, focusing on the implications for conceptualizing and implementing comprehension in Germany and beyond.

4.2.1) Foreign Office

The German Foreign Office (AA) is responsible for the representation of German interests in the interaction with other nations and international organizations and holds the leading role in determining the course of German foreign policy (BMJV: 2017b). It thus provides and maintains the national diplomatic corps, including around 230 embassies around the world (Müller: 2016). When the first large-scale civilian pacification contingents were deployed on the Balkans in the 1990s, it was the AA that supplied civil experts from various – and limited – resources, as became evident during the recruitment process for the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Consequently, the government aimed to remedy this shortcoming and mandated the AA to create an institution dedicated to civilian personnel and expertise for international conflict management, and thus the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) was inaugurated in June 2002 (Bagger & von Heynitz: 2012). While acting independently, the ZIF is a subsidiary department of the Foreign Office and entirely financed by the AA. Furthermore, the 2002 coalition agreement emphasized the focus on civil crisis prevention and conflict management and the intention to strengthen respective structures and institutions in Germany and beyond. The ZIF was to be developed into a full-fledged sending organization for civil experts, and the previously emerged Civil Crisis Service (*Ziviler Friedensdienst*, ZFD) to be supported and its scope extended (Bundesregierung: 2002, p. 74). The ZFD, founded in 1997 consists of various German NGOs affiliated in the ZFD Forum and supports mostly grassroots initiatives in volatile regions. Albeit acting independently, it is financially supported by the Federal Government, with responsibilities shared between the Development Ministry (BMZ) and the AA (Heinemann-Grüder & Bauer: 2013).

The coalition agreement also pledged to create an interdepartmental action plan (*Aktionsplan*) on civil crisis prevention which was eventually ratified in 2004 and remained the basis document for German international engagement until the publication of the new *Guidelines*, as indicated above. As a consequence, the Steering Group (*Ressortkreis*) was initiated as a coordinating body featuring the representatives for civil crisis prevention of all government

departments, headed by the AA. Its parliamentary equivalent is the Subcommittee on Civil Crisis Prevention and Networked Action, equally launched in 2004 and subordinated to the Committee on Foreign Affairs (*Auswärtiger Ausschuss*). Thus were established for the first time several institutions on civil conflict engagement, anchored in the AA (Bagger & von Heynitz: 2012). However, as was already mentioned these monumental steps had surprisingly little reverberation in the years following their conceptualization – as an example, it was not before July 2017 that the ZIF became a full-fledged sending organization (ZIF: 2016).

The AA works with overall concepts addressing their various subject areas using differing methods and including interministerial consultation. Contextual analysis, legal evaluations and international negotiation processes constitute the basis for any formulation of interests and goals, and while German diplomatic decisions are characterized by liability, they are known to entail extensive deliberation and the biding of international voices for orientation before active engagement (Müller: 2016). International partners did not always appreciate this attitude and in the face of multidimensional international crises called for Germany to fulfill its obligations, not only as a major international power but in its economic interest also as one of the greatest beneficiaries from international peace and security that it had hitherto contributed to very little compared to other economies of its size (Heumann: 2016). When Islamist terrorism and the Russian annexation of Crimea brought back war to Europe's doorstep in 2014, then-Foreign Minister Steinmeier (SPD) decided that it was time for an adaptation of his office to the reality of a changed global security environment and initiated the 2014 *Review Process*, accompanied by extensive internal and public debate on the future of German foreign policy (Müller: 2016). Spanning an entire year, the Office engaged in open debates with political experts from around the world and engaged with the public through various events throughout the country, online panels and interdepartmental coordination (Bendiek: 2015). The broad and open discussion surrounding the Review Process were extensively backed by the Minister himself and proved a success that was later continued during the drafting of the new *Guidelines*.

The lack of institutionalized interdepartmental communication and cooperation, as mentioned above, had been acknowledged before and expressed in the 2012 Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of the Federal Government with Fragile States, jointly drafted by AA, BMZ and defense ministry (BMVg), albeit ironically excluding the interior ministry (BMI). With stabilization as the new buzzword for international conflict management, this interdepartmental task was to be spearheaded by the AA in its guiding role on foreign policy but in the spirit of a whole-of-government approach to include all relevant actors (Klingebiel: 2013). These aspirations were institutionally realized as a result of the *Review Process*, in the form of the new Department on Crisis Prevention, Stabilization and Post-conflict Rehabilitation.

Internally referred to as 'Abteilung S' (Department S) short for stabilization, its mandate comprises the political processing of all parts of conflict, from prevention to rehabilitation as apparent in its full name. While resembling the British *Stabilization Unit* in term, it is still anchored in the traditional German departmental division unlike its superordinate counterpart in the UK. Instruments for enhanced leadership and coordination capacities include about 130 employees and a significant separate budget of roughly one billion euros for all types of civil crisis intervention (Heinemann-Grüder: 2016). The department comprises a central steering group, a unit on early warning and scenario planning and another for increased interaction with non-state actors and its subsidiary ZIF. This new infrastructure considerably increases both the emphasis and scope of German potential for international intervention. While diplomatic means remain on top of the agenda and unilateral action is firmly rejected, recent international (geo-)political developments increasingly demand German leadership in the face of changing emphases when it comes to international partnerships (Müller: 2016).

While framed as a whole-of-government success, the new department and its considerable resources have all but appeased interdepartmental competition. Many of the responsibilities were traditionally located at the BMZ, and overlap has increased (Grävingholt: 2016). This frustration is emphasized in the new *Guidelines'* lack of commitment to humanitarian principles especially when it comes to common evaluation, rejected by the AA as ministry in charge of the process. The BMVg in turn had reservations from the start as the new document was (not inaccurately) feared to render the 2016 *White Papers* redundant (Ruhnke: 2016). While all three departments have recently been subject to budget raises, the AA clearly benefited the

most from the transformation efforts in German foreign policy (Bagger: 2016).

Next to interdepartmental disputes, the Foreign Office faces internal challenges as well, one important reason being this increased leadership role. While both the additional department and the *Guidelines* allocate the AA a variety of new tasks and competencies, there was a lack of qualified personnel even before the reorganization (Brockmeier: 2017). This also affects the foreseen coordination role of embassies to increase cooperation in theater, demanding a significant increase in capacities. Without them, the crucial goal of maximum inclusion of local actors in a comprehensive process will be highly doubtful and can threaten to put the broad ambitions into jeopardy. Another urgent task will be the revival of the Interministerial Steering Group (*Ressortkreis*) as the central intergovernmental institution for the implementation of the *Guidelines* (Auswärtiges Amt: 2017). The next foreign minister will thus face severe challenges in bridging the discrepancies between ambition and reality after the September elections.

4.2.2) Interior Ministry

The German interior ministry (BMI) has in the past often been sidelined in the debate on more intergovernmental cooperation for international conflict management, as I have shown for the 2012 *Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of the Federal Government with Fragile States*. This seems rather short-sighted, not only in the face of an increasing interdependence between internal and external security (see e.g. Müller: 2016), but especially given the important and growing role actors under its mandate play in international peace operations. Apart from the police, this includes both the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (*Technisches Hilfswerk*, THW) and the Federal Office for Citizen Protection and Disaster Support (*Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe*, BBK), the government civil protection and disaster management institutions. Both of them are additionally part of the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) system and database for quick response to disasters around the world (Wittling: 2000).

Given Germany's past as a totalitarian police state, it should not be surprising that the police sector today is the most decentralized of all government institutions. State and Federal Police (*Bundespolizei*) exist independently of each other, with the Federal Police fulfilling only specific tasks mostly related to border issues, due to the federal system ascribing police legislation to the state level. The respective state governments are responsible for every aspect including financially, resulting in a variety of differences between their equipment from uniforms to IT and weapon systems (Groß: 2008). While the Interior Minister can suggest measures (and create pressure by doing so publicly), he has no decisional power over them, and given the prominence of domestic topics in election campaigns, state power over their police bodies is a sensitive topic, and efforts to increase coherence are regularly blocked due to party-political rivalries and only ever implemented when public pressure ensuing spectacular blunders rises (Bäuerle: 2008). While the three federal bodies, namely the Federal Police, the Federal Criminal Police Office (*Bundeskriminalamt*, BKA) and the Parliament Police (*Polizei beim Deutschen Bundestag*, Polizei DBT) solely responsible for the parliament premises are centrally administered by the BMI, the respective state ministries are responsible for their own police units and maintenance, again divided into police and State Offices of Criminal Investigations (*Landeskriminalamt*, LKA) and subject to state legislation (Groß: 2008). The same goes for the intelligence services: on the national level, the BMI maintains the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, BfV) for internal surveillance, again supplemented by separate and independent offices in every single federal state. The Federal Intelligence Service for foreign surveillance (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*, BDN) however answers to the Federal Chancellery, while the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (*Militärischer Abschirmdienst*, MAD) is traditionally administered by the BMVg (Gusy: 2015).

Constitutional protection and police are legally separated, including personnel and processing of data on federal and state levels. However, in reality tasks often overlap with coordination gaps leading to suboptimal resource allocation and duplication (Bäuerle: 2008). When it comes to the constitutional offices, the mandate is vaguely formulated, additionally impeding legal and parliamentary control. Police decentralization on the other hand hampers investigations beyond state lines. While cooperation with the BKA could reduce this obstacle, current

regulations tend to keep federal agencies out of state affairs, often hampering efficiency and effectiveness. It seems almost absurd how little the state police units are connected compared to the extensive coordination on a European level and beyond (Knelangen: 2008). The vast counter-effects of stoic separation are however seldomly discussed and politically delicate which makes a comprehensive reform very unlikely in the near future (Gusy: 2015).

This very brief overview already suggests the problematic nature of cooperation on a national level, an issue the Federal Government is well aware of but is struggling to overcome in contexts where communication is vital, such as violent extremism. While this issue is heading the political agenda ever since the Berlin terrorist attack, problems of federal decentralization are not even mentioned in the *Guidelines*, albeit being a central point when the overall ambition is optimal coordination on a national and consequently international level. The topic was debated extensively during the 2017 Interior Ministers' Conference, given the police and intelligence state system often incompatible among one another and hence hampering cooperation beyond state lines, sometimes resulting in fatal investigation errors. Under renewed public pressure after the terrorist attack in Berlin, the ministers are now debating uniform structures and better means of communication (ZEIT Online: 2017). However, it is unlikely that this will span all fields of police and intelligence duties. Instead, the BMI has created selective interfaces such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force (*Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum*, GTAZ) allowing for coordinated action and information exchange (BMI: n.d.). At the same time, new parallel structures are established for modern security threats, as is the case with the new Bundeswehr Commando for Cyber and Information Space (*Kommando Cyber- und Informationsraum*, KdoCIR), founded in April 2017 and independent of the National Cyber Defence Centre (*Nationales Cyber-Abwehrzentrum*, NCAZ) established in 2011 by the BMI and including BfV, BKA, the Federal Police, the Federal Customs Office (subsidiary to the finance ministry), BND and the Bundeswehr itself (Deutschlandfunk: 2017).




Figure 3) German involvement in international police missions. Source: Bundespolizei (2017)

In peace operations, international police forces often provide an interface between civil and military tasks, active in security sector reform (SSR) and training of local police forces

(Naumann: 2014). Their involvement increases in importance, and German police units have since 1989 supported missions by the EU, UN and OSCE (Federal Police Academy: 2015). They are delegated from federal and state police, the BKA and the Federal Customs Office, and their deployment is administered by the BMI and the Federal-State Working Group 'International Police Missions' (*Bund-Länder Arbeitsgruppe Internationale Polizeimissionen*, AG IPM) steered by the Interior Ministers' Conference. The Working Group was established in 1994 and confers biannually. Apart from BMI, BKA and Federal Police, it includes representatives of each state, the AA and the Ministry of Finance (BMF). Figure 3 gives an overview of the current international deployments as of May 2017. With roughly 250 officers deployed in twenty missions across four continents (not all of them being peace operations), one struggles to find the ambition expressed in the *Guidelines* to focus efforts on specific regions fulfilled. What is more, while police and armed forces often share tasks in the field, this cooperation is not officially institutionalized (Borchert & Thiele: 2012). While in 2000, the German Police Union (GdP) protested a blurring of competencies and tasks (Halt: 2000), eleven years later they demand a legal basis for collaboration (GdP: 2011). This however is very complicated as the German constitution forbids cooperations between military and police with few exceptions such as logistical support for disaster relief. The strict separation of police and military forces is another unique feature of the German security landscape which apart from special police forces does not include military police like many other European countries, entailing manifold consequences for peace operations (Zimmermann: 2013). This includes the legal prohibition to serve under military command, but also a restraint of potential tasks they are capable to fulfill, and as not least the mission in Afghanistan has shown only to limited suitability to train foreign police forces given the unparalleled specialized labor division in the German security sector.

Both national and international actors have repeatedly called for more engagement of German forces in police missions, but even given the comprehensive effect of the AG IPM, internal mechanisms remain cumbersome (Stodiek: 2000). Personnel is recruited *ad hoc* and only when formally requested by an international organization. Slow recruitment and training processes delay deployment, further prolonged through mandatory operational and financial coordination between federal and state institutions. With national security concerns on the rise, police recruitment cannot even fulfill the demands within Germany, further reducing the room for foreign deployment (Borchert & Thiele: 2012). Nonetheless, the AG IPM has vowed to increase strategic preparation and use of German police in international field operations, connected via a Training Partner Platform (TPP) consisting of police training centers, training institutions of the Bundeswehr, and civilian organizations (Federal Police Academy: 2015). At the same time, past experiences from the police training mission in Afghanistan has revealed the limited compatibility of the distinct division of tasks among police components in Germany which was eventually rendered unfeasible not least due to a lack of prior reflection of these implications (Rotmann: 2010).

Another entity administered by the BMI, the THW regularly cooperates with police forces and fire brigades mostly during natural occurrences such as floods (Wittling: 2000). While its international involvement in peace missions remains restricted compared to non-conflict disaster relief engagement, it presents examples of successful cooperation in the spirit of comprehension on multiple levels. Internally, cooperation with national and international partners from fire brigades to military and aid organizations form the basis of most international deployments, and their coordination is understood as a prerequisite for effective intervention (THW: 2005). Common trainings with global humanitarian partners are regularly conducted as part of the International Humanitarian Partnership, IHP that is furthermore connected to UN OCHA (THW: 2016). Most notably, BMI and BMVg signed an official cooperation agreement for THW and Bundeswehr in 2008 in order to foster civil-military cooperation on a national and international level (BMVg: 2008). The broad deal regulates common property use, joint training, exchange of information, experiences and personnel, medical support and more. While subject to superordinate legislation and available resources, the arrangement is perpetual and binding and provides an example of the broad variety of possibilities for comprehensive action, inspired by experience in the field and operationalized on the highest level. At the same time, the THW's international embeddedness recently increased when the government organization signed an agreement with the UN to support

their monitoring mission in Colombia, where they currently establish an information and communication network. This arrangement is the first of its kind between this type of civil organization and the UN and constitutes a pilot for further cooperation. The THW has furthermore suggested the establishment of a centralized database or a cooperation with the EU ECHO system to include similar organizations from around the world (THW: 2017).

4.2.3) Ministry of Defense

When debating German foreign engagement, military involvement remains the central issue of discord as exemplified in the reactions to the formulations in the new *Guidelines* above. Little voices remain that demand the complete abolition of military involvement in peace operations, but their role and weight continue to be debated heatedly (Dieckmann: 2017). Minister of Defense von der Leyen much like her predecessors argues in favor of increased cooperation in peace and stabilization missions such as in Northern Iraq, where military tasks and training support civil reconstruction measures and humanitarian efforts (von der Leyen: 2016). To her, 'Germany's New Responsibility' demands a dissolution of traditional civil-military antagonisms, and in a position of international leadership, traditional skepticism against the use of force needs to be replaced by a productive discussion on labor division. Indeed, while the *Guidelines* emphasize the prevalence of civil measures, the actual numbers of German civil and military tasks tell another story – more than 3,000 German soldiers are currently deployed in peace operations lead by the UN, EU and others, as compared to roughly 160 civilian experts (ZIF: 2017). In fact, the number of military personnel might even be higher as some might be acting in civilian capacities such as monitoring and thus fall under the latter. These figures of course do not include humanitarian workers and NGO employees, but they present all staff directly deployed through a government ministry (or in the case of the AA through its implementing organization ZIF). The BMZ deploys most of its staff abroad through the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (German Society for International Cooperation, GIZ); as actors of 'classic' development cooperation, they are not indicated in this list and the same goes for governmental disaster relief organizations deployed by the BMI. The numbers furthermore refer to important developments the BMVg and armed forces have undergone during the past decade. As I have expounded repeatedly, the Comprehensive Approach has been introduced as a leitmotif in the 2006 *White Papers*, albeit then still referred to as comprehensive security (*Vernetzte Sicherheit*), and ignited the German debate on the scope and definition of security (Ruhnke: 2016). Ten years later, the succeeding document on the one hand reflects the terminological differentiation by referring to comprehensive *action* instead, and demonstrating the willingness for increased engagement and leadership (BMVg: 2016). However, critics reject the comprehensive claim of the *White Papers* and their process and fear a rhetoric return to securitization of foreign policy and leadership (Giessmann: 2016).

Despite the fact that modern threats to international security are brought into the limelight, their underlying political and socioeconomic causes are often ignored, as is the resulting role of development efforts and the importance of local initiatives and ownership (ibid). While emphasizing the need for preventive measures, the document lacks critical evaluations of prior engagement and so clearly focuses on defense measures that a commitment to comprehension remains mere lip service and 'new responsibility' is reduced to enhanced military contributions (Schreiber: 2016). A commitment to deploy more German troops to UN missions ratified under international law and a strengthening of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) are mentioned but not translated into a comprehensive strategy (Arnold: 2016). All in all, the *White Papers* fall far short of their ambition to represent a whole-of-government strategy for security challenges in the 21st century, evident not least in their limited impact and in contrast to the far reaching reception of the *Guidelines* and corresponding process (Nachtwei: 2016).

However, accusing the BMVg of stagnation during the ten years between the two publications would be neither fair nor true. While not as extensive as was the case during the *Guidelines* process, the *White Papers'* claims to universality stem from their own genesis through public and interdepartmental debate (Ruhnke: 2016). The German government clearly commits to its military share in international organizations such as NATO and EU and deploys troops to a variety of missions as figure 4 shows. What is more, the Bundeswehr being a 'parliamentary

army', it explicitly fulfills a political mandate and thus has a legitimate claim to support from other government agencies (ibid). However, German engagement has traditionally been low-key compared to its partners and especially given its economic position, resulting in repeated criticism of the government not fulfilling its obligations especially by allies in the NATO, but increasingly also in the UN (Katsioulis: 2004). While civil measures are naturally easier to defend politically, the reality of international peace operations is a vast predominance of military (ZIF: 2017), their contribution acknowledged not least by the 2017 *Guidelines*. One can argue that it was not the BMVg's role to set out the future path of German foreign and security policy, a responsibility constitutionally located at the AA (Major & Mölling: 2016). Still, increased German presence will include the military, and strategic neglect cannot be the answer. Instead, by changing the tactics of reluctance until the pressure is too high, a German comprehensive strategy for global transformation policies should clearly define and govern the role of military contributions and involve parliamentary responsibilities in the process (ibid).

Einsätze und einsatzgleiche Verpflichtungen der Bundeswehr




Figure 4) Foreign deployment of the Bundeswehr. Source: Bundeswehr (2017)

The political culture in Germany as became clear is in large parts anti-military as surveys show time and again (Körber Stiftung: 2014 & 2016). The reluctance is reflected in German political culture and implementation: any foreign deployment must be ratified by the parliament since 2005, and a Bundeswehr Reform initiated in 2010 aimed to reduce the budget by means of personnel and material resources (Major & Mölling: 2016). Internal guidelines consequently published by the BMVg in 2011 ultimately moved the focus on foreign deployments and away from national contingents, rendering the hitherto obligatory universal military service for men unnecessary (BMVg: 2011). The document stresses the importance of the guiding principle of German soldiers referred to as Leadership Development and Civic Education (*Innere Führung*) as distinct from other armed forces and based on the past as a totalitarian state: troops are seen as 'civilians in uniform', their training includes in-depth education in history, politics and

ethics and the acknowledgment of diplomatic means as the primary tool for foreign policy of any kind (Dörfler-Dierken: 2005). A Comprehensive Approach is not mentioned however.

This new orientation entailed increased foreign deployment and responsibility of German troops such as the leading role in Operation Atalanta against piracy at the Somalia coast, albeit rarely reflected in public discourse. Together with decreasing military presence and perception, the national awareness of issues concerning the Bundeswehr faded and resulted in little public interaction during the transformation process (Nachtwei: 2007). At the same time, this reform left the German troops in a state of undersupply, resulting in the inability to adequately respond to the regional crisis evoked by the Russian annexation of Crimea had it indeed escalated in a military intervention by NATO (Major & Mölling: 2016). At the same time, Germany's leading role in the subsequent negotiation process as one of the first practical steps towards the 'New Responsibility' prompted the BMVg to revise its strategies and attempt to counter the thinning effects with a personnel campaign and demands for an increased budget. Arms policies remain a crucial matter of debate in this, their role split between enabling an effective Bundeswehr and being a root-cause for conflict (ibid). They are decided by the Federal Security Council (*Bundessicherheitsrat*), composed of members of the Federal Cabinet (*Bundeskabinett*), including the Federal Chancellor, the ministers representing AA, BMVg, BMI, BMZ, BMF, BMJV and BMWi (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy) and if required other government agencies. While the BMVg has occasionally demanded an increased role of the Council, its informal and secretive character has often been criticized, not least due to the fact that it is not subject to parliamentary supervision (Ruhnke: 2016).

Germany's increased military position opens new debates on civil-military interaction and so far lacks adequate parliamentary and public discourse, currently often reduced to alleged leadership claims. But as figure 4 also shows, the German government unlike some partner nations does not deploy forces independently of their allies (Ruhnke: 2016). The largest contingents of troops are currently active with the NATO mission in Afghanistan and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); others are stationed with EU troops or in engagements based on multilateral partnerships as is the case with the training mission in Iraq. Bilateral agreements have led to shared troops and equipments with other European nations, most notably the 1. German-Netherlands Corps (van Loon: 2012). Apart from integrating military personnel from all across Europe and beyond, the Corps have also taken up the task to increase civil-military interaction through the creation of the Common Effort exercise, launched for the first time in 2010 and steadily developing into a sustainable partnership platform practicing comprehension on a daily basis. In a yearly exercise alternating between Berlin and The Hague, the participants engage in building trust and mutual understanding and create networks connecting all types of actors involved in peace operations, and the informal setting allows for extensive and fruitful critical debate, as I can confirm from my own participation in Common Effort 2017. Originally a fictional simulation, it developed to a mutual scenario planning exercise and its members now include not only various humanitarian and political organizations but also Dutch and German government agencies, including the BMZ and since 2017 the AA and ZIF (Common Effort: 2017).

Thus, apart from instruments such as the *White Papers*, the BMVg supports institutions for increased integration with German and foreign allies. Apart from bilateral troops, this includes the Training Partner Platform (TPP) already mentioned and notably the Federal Academy for Security Policy (*Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik*, BAKS) founded in 1992 and actively supporting the conceptual process and operationalization of a German Comprehensive Approach (Borchert & Thiele: 2012). Its main task is extensive strategic training of ministry personnel in leadership positions across departments with regards to security policy. A new concept launched in 2015 furthermore focuses on public discourse and communication with around 70 annual events alternately accessible to the public or selected experts (BAKS: 2015). Other lessons learned include the transformation of planning mechanisms into an integrated process (*Integrierter Planungsprozess*, IPP), connecting hitherto separate realms of planning, budget and controlling of the Bundeswehr (Rühle: 2014). The new structure adopted in 2012 increases transparency and efficiency and while being a top-down approach, it relies on input from all organizational levels. The IPP was inter alia designed explicitly to make the BMVg's planning structures compatible with those of other institutions and departments. In addition,

the armed forces are committed to the concept of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) for a more effective processing of information in all states of engagement (Neujahr: 2004). While so far limited to the military level, it offers various points of departure for civil-military interaction.

The various issues discussed in this paragraph make it clear that the roles of the BMVg and its subsidiary institutions are important not only given their pragmatic relevance but also their various contributions to the conceptualization and implementation of comprehensive efforts. However, the specific role and strategy for the armed forces in an increased German presence in peace operations remains vague, as does the parliamentary contribution to this alteration (Major & Mölling: 2016). Common planning and evaluation remain open questions given the sensitive handling of information in military contexts on the one hand and civil unwillingness to cooperate with armed forces on the other (Ruhnke: 2016). While plans for a European army are not (yet) official, closer integration with other European forces can help to establish more sustainable common structures and facilitate common planning and deployment in CSDP missions (Major & Mölling: 2016). Informal fora for civil-military engagement such as the Common Effort community and public events by the BAKS can benefit mutual understanding, as can coordination agreements as facilitated between the Bundeswehr and German NGOs in the past (VENRO: 2013). With military passivity out of the question, both internal and public debate need to evolve accordingly and with parliamentary backing (Major & Mölling: 2016), but also with its increased engagement despite a lack of (public) popularity of military debates (Tagesschau: 2017). This needs to include military actors of all ranks – if Germany is to take seriously the notion of soldiers as 'civilians in uniform', their views and experiences must be taken into account as an implicit contribution in this negotiation process (Bohnert: 2017).

4.2.4) Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

The Common Effort Conference 2017 ended with a high level event hosted by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in Berlin. Parliamentary Undersecretary and host Thomas Silberhorn jestingly suggested that he had never seen this amount of uniforms in his ministry, before beginning his speech in which he mentioned the Comprehensive Approach no less than eight times (*my own count*). This anecdote stands as an example for the journey the term has undergone within the German context, from a concept supposedly aiming at increasing military efficiency to an actual intergovernmental leitmotif firmly established in the BMZ's organizational culture (BMZ: 2015).

Founded in 1961, the BMZ is responsible for the conceptualization of German development cooperation based on democratic and humanitarian principles; the term officially replaced 'development aid' in Germany in the 1990s (Bohnet: 2015). The end of the Cold War had considerable impacts on this field as well, with competitive 'block thinking' slowly giving way to the awareness that stark differences in global economic development could not be solved by economic integration or structural adjustments (alone), and that underdevelopment as a driver of conflict posed a threat to international security as a whole (Andersen: 2005). At least since the prevalence of a 'failed state-paradigm' were aid and development given a prominent place on the agenda of conflict management efforts, in the German context exemplified for instance in the adding of the BMZ to the Federal Security Council in 1998 (Ruhnke: 2016). Furthermore, with state involvement in the Civil Peace Service (ZFD) beginning in 1999 and falling under its competencies, the BMZ had a new instrument at its disposal, equipped with additional funding (Grävingholt: 2016). Under the rather vague assignment of conflict prevention measures, the government furthermore increased monetary support during that time. As a core competency, the BMZ has engaged in extensive evaluation processes including for its implementation partners and administered by the German Institute for Development Evaluation (*Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*, DeVal).

Today, Germany contributes the second largest total amount of Official Development Aid (ODA) and the fifth largest by percentage of GNI (OECD: 2017). This contribution is administered by the BMZ, as is the planning and oversight of development projects ranging from bilateral partnerships to cooperative efforts of multilateral actors like the EU and UN (Bohnet: 2015). Ministry representatives are deployed in partner countries and organizations as well as to embassies around the world to coordinate local development work. Furthermore, they provide

directory personnel in international development banks, one of them being the German government-owned Reconstruction Credit Institute (*Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau*, KfW), an implementation partner since the BMZ's founding (Grävingholt: 2016). The actual work in the field is conducted by implementing organizations, most notably the Society for International Cooperation (GIZ). They currently employ roughly 17,000 people, whereof around 3,000 in Germany, 2,000 German nationals abroad and almost 12,000 local staff in partner countries (GIZ: 2016). The majority of their work is commissioned by the BMZ, while international organizations and national actors can utilize their services as well. The number of requests from the AA has risen considerably ever since its new department was installed (Grävingholt: 2016). The GIZ itself was merged from various implementation organizations in 2010, in an effort to increase efficiency and lucidity. While some critics lamented the economic focus as supporting notions of development cooperation being a mere instrument for trade growth, the reception including among the parliamentary opposition was mostly positive (Bohnet: 2015).

Ever since an interdependence of security and development has been officially acknowledged, development cooperation has been upgraded politically and financially, notably during the 'refugee crisis' of 2015 (Grävingholt: 2016). A new political focus in prevention measures was hence placed on the fights against causes of migration and flight, embedded in the paradigm of 'failed states' and manifest in Chancellor Merkel's 2016 exclamation "Africa's well-being is in Germany's interest" (Deutschlandfunk: 2016; *own translation*). The BMZ has long been contributing in conceptualization and operationalization of comprehensive measures for peace engagement, from a 2005 strategic concept for peacebuilding, emphasizing interdepartmental cooperation (BMZ: 2005) and a 2013 strategy paper for peace and security (BMZ: 2013), to the 2017 German G20 strategy dubbed 'A Marshall Plan with Africa' (BMZ: 2016). While the first two were restricted to the BMZ's operating range, the 2013 strategy paper translating the 2012 interdepartmental *Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of the Federal Government with Fragile States* into internal structures, the 2017 *Marshall Plan* for the first time allocated the ministry a leading role in conceptualizing and putting into action a whole-of-government task, operationalized in the G20 summit in Hamburg inaugurated at the very time of my writing.

The drafting process of the G20 strategy, unique in its inclusiveness clearly contains lessons learned not only from prior summits but also from the AA *Review* and *Guidelines* processes. An online blog allowed for the participation of interested citizens in German and English, several workshops included expertise and interest groups combining a multitude of voices and views and a road map displaying the ambition of global comprehensive transformation with distinct demands for actions the German government needs to take in this direction, evoking for instance the new *Guidelines* still in the pipeline at the point and the capacity building initiative jointly implemented by AA and BMVg (BMZ: 2016). Three pillars, one of them being peace and security constitute the fields of action to be taken by the G20 partners. The strategy propagates comprehension on all levels, from the local to the global and advocates a holistic view that includes a rethinking of current practices such as arms exports and unfair trade conditions, a point strikingly absent from the 2017 *Guidelines*. Similar to Merkel's thesis of an interdependence between African and German national well-being, the document leaves no doubt of the German national interest to sustainably reduce immigration. While this thesis does not ignore the broad and justified criticism the strategy has received (e.g. Annen: 2017), it also acknowledges the potential for the mediating role of a traditionally lower-ranking department in the competition for comprehensive leadership between AA and BMVg. Already the 2005 strategy paper emphasizes the principle of 'do-no-harm' as a prerequisite for any kind of intervention, now furthermore enshrined in the new *Guidelines* and thus acknowledged by all government entities as a basic requirement, including for military engagement. Here is but one example of the indispensable contribution of a BMZ perspective to the comprehensive conceptualization and practical implementation of legitimate conflict intervention.

This is not to say that there is no interdepartmental conflict potential affecting the BMZ. With the new AA department for conflict management, the Foreign Office now claims one of the BMZ's traditional core competencies, a development that might or might not have started with the establishment of the ZIF as a central entity for civil crisis management under the AA's wing. At the same time, the new part as trustee for developmental interests in the whole-of-government concept signifies a considerable revaluation of its role in the overall national

structure (Grävingholt: 2016). This is emphasized in another notable BMZ leadership role when conveying the United Nations 2030 Agenda into the German Sustainability Strategy (*Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie*, DNS) and leading its operationalization (DNS: 2016). Hereby, the BMZ has facilitated an instrument for the national implementation of the global development goals and therein a universal point of reference for all government actors by which they can be held accountable. Again the drafting process was designed inclusively and can thus legitimately claim intergovernmental validity (ibid). As acknowledged in the new *Guidelines*, decades of experience in a field increasingly heading foreign policy agendas around the world has rendered the BMZ an indispensable core partner at the round table for conflict management.

4.2.5) Non-governmental actors

Another important task for the BMZ is its mediating role between the government and civil actors in the field, such as humanitarian aid organizations and other international and local NGOs some of which are either directly employed or financially supported by them (GIZ: 2016). These have recently undergone substantive transformation processes as well, resulting in a broad and diverse landscape of actors (Roth & Klein: 2007). An overarching approach that aims at incorporating these various institutions as claimed in the *Guidelines* will meet the challenge not only of fragmentation but also of a multitude of concepts, stakeholders and not least of attitudes of cooperation attempts especially in 'robust' missions. This subchapter will therefore give a brief overview of the problematic stand NGOs hold in the question of common action in international peace operations and the surrounding debate, with a focus on Germany.

First, we need to acknowledge the differences between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, the former usually referring to short-term relief during an immanent crisis and the latter meaning long-term structural transformation efforts for sustainable self-governance. Yet, given their increasing interconnectedness and the problems inherent in their separation, hampering sustainable efforts in contexts where their funding is competitive, some argue that the divide no longer applies and that more consultation among donors is needed based on local needs instead of on outdated ascriptions (Levine: 2016). Yet, so far the official differentiation remains. Another important distinction is made between independent, state-sponsored and hybrid organizations, as their financial accountability has significant impacts not only on their work but also on local and international perceptions thereof (Debiel & Sticht: 2007).

A wider differentiation of functions such as development cooperation and humanitarian aid also entailed a growing politicization of NGOs that were consequently often forced to redefine their principles (Reimann: 2007). An important question was form and degree of interaction with state actors and especially with the military. While larger organizations such as the ICRC can 'afford' to maintain their basic principles of neutrality and non-cooperation with any parties to a conflict, smaller groups often found they had to compromise to survive, especially when depending on state funding. An important problematic is the dilemma of local actors funded by foreign donors often characterized by a gap between expectations and reality, in consequence often leading to rigid structures and restricted influence, hampering their impact (ibid). At the same time, development work was revalued as a driving force for sustainable security as part of the new threads emanating from 'fragile' states (Alamir: 2012). Good governance, state-building and democratization as new buzzwords acknowledged the limits of military impact in conflict management and enabled a momentum for long-term, politically supported efforts as traditionally conducted by NGOs. On the other hand, a state-building paradigm encompassed a multitude of tasks and competences beyond aid and development work which in consequence was to be incorporated in a larger framework together with diplomatic and often military tasks.

As already mentioned, the end of the Cold War resulted in significant changes including for development work. Peace operations not only vastly increased in numbers due to the end of the UN Security Council blockade between East and West, but so did the role and scope of non-governmental actors as a part of these efforts (Roth & Klein: 2007). More than the Rwandan genocide or the ongoing crisis in Somalia, it was the humanitarian disaster in the Balkans, taking place on the European continent that had hoped to have abolished war for good, and additionally broadcasted by media outlets like no other conflict had been before (Rieff: 2002).

While cooperation had been a reality on the ground for decades, an institutionalization of the

hitherto usually informal civil-military cooperation involved many a challenge especially for humanitarian actors (Reimann: 2007). As was extensively discussed above, the US-lead reaction to the 2001 September 11 attacks emphasized this problem considerably. No longer only having their integrity questioned, non-governmental actors found their life in danger when working in the field of military interventions such as in Afghanistan for being associated with 'the enemy', disregarding any dissociation no matter how outspoken (Roth: 2007). In light of increasingly complex conflict scenarios and hybrid warfare deliberately targeting both civilians in general and aid organizations specifically, humanitarian principles are today increasingly put in jeopardy by all sides to a conflict, including international forces (MSF: 2017).

While many NGOs today accept the advantages of strategic partnerships in conflict situations including civil-military interaction, the embeddedness in multidimensional operations has often contributed to their perception as an instrument of global security policy which complicated the work often fundamentally based on local trust (von Borries: 2007). In Germany, the idea that non-governmental actors had nothing to gain from a cooperation with the military was fueled from the very introduction of the concept of comprehension. It was already noted that then-Minister of Defense Jung had initiated the discussion on increased cooperation through the 2006 *White Papers*, and comprehensive security was hence solely associated with armed forces and their exploitation of civil expertise for military purposes (Ruhnke: 2016). This notion was exacerbated by Jung's suggestion to tie financial assistance of developmental NGOs to their commitment to a Comprehensive Approach and thereby triggering a general defensiveness among them that obstructed any constructive debate from the start (Nachtwei: 2012). The conceptual vagueness combined with the emphasis on its importance for German security policy lead many to the assumption that the military attempted to use the CA to facilitate its leadership for foreign intervention in which development aid would be but one component. This in turn lead development actors to boycott the debate for a long time (Ruhnke: 2016)

VENRO, the Association of German Development and Humanitarian Aid NGOs (*Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen*) currently composed of 128 members and often acting as a political stakeholder, published a statement in 2012 that declared comprehension as a concept to be 'useless and without contours' and demanded to dissociate financial support of NGOs from it (VENRO: 2017; 2012). At the same time, the document is an offer to open a dialogue for the conceptualization of an actual Comprehensive Approach based on a critical evaluation of past experiences. This figurative olive branch was gladly accepted by the Bundeswehr who had themselves felt the disadvantages of a charged concept – for them, cooperation was vital to fulfilling their political mandates in the field, and they had to pay dearly for Jung's alienation of potential partners in this effort (Nachtwei: 2012). Thus was initiated a first rapprochement between VENRO and armed forces that in 2013 resulted in a common document containing recommendations for the interaction of German NGOs with the Bundeswehr in the field of peace operations (VENRO: 2013). This handout was the result of a two-year dialogue involving VENRO, BMVg, AA and BMZ, including a broad evaluation of experiences especially in Afghanistan but also anticipatory concepts for future deployments, and the authors committed to a regular review of the suggestions published therein. These involve the adherence to humanitarian principles and operational independence but also acknowledges the Bundeswehr's political mandate. Possible fields of interaction herein include communication for planning, evaluation and conduct both in Germany and in theater, common training for evacuation, and the possibility to use military infrastructure (ibid). With this basic document, VENRO and their drafting partners acknowledged the common effort of civil and military actors in mission and aimed to facilitate this controversial topic, in its informal institutionalization foregrounding the unconditionality of humanitarian principles as its basis.

It seems that the development community has in the past decade figured that it cannot hush up the demands for comprehensive security efforts and thus slowly taken to appropriate the concept according to their own conditions. Their entering the discussion was an important step for better interaction, even though defense reflexes seem to have reawakened with the 2016 *White Papers* publication (see above). Associations like VENRO can help to give humanitarian organizations a potent voice since impartiality is not the same as being apolitical. For instance, Gebauer (2007) criticizes the increasing commercialization of development aid and advocates

an outspoken political role based on the principles it represents such as universal human rights instead of adhering to a dogma of independence empty of visions.

While civil-military cooperation is the most problematized issue when engaging NGOs in comprehensive tasks, it is not the only way they can contribute to enhanced coordination. Strategic partnerships and even integration of efforts can facilitate local engagement and save resources which is especially valid for NGOs acting under a common umbrella such as the UN (Klein & Roth: 2007). Options for coordination with civil actors generally remain limited, most notably with and among NGOs who are in the first place liable to their mandates and principles, and while their lack of centralization is an important tactical strength, it also raises the stakes for proving legitimacy (Lindner: 2010). Here again, the principle of optimal instead of maximum cooperation remains valid especially given the great variety of non-governmental and hybrid actors. Local cooperation must be initiated on equal footing instead of supporting harmful practices of financing from afar institutions that fit Western concepts of civil society (von Borries: 2007). International cooperation must however not create impenetrable ties between actors in a field foreign to them as this dominance can override local initiative and ownership (Tardy: 2017). Foreign NGOs need to acknowledge their own societal impact and local perception, always anticipating the consequences of their actions and affiliations (Roth & Klein: 2007). At the same time, in the current complexity of conflict intervention, adhering by humanitarian principles need no longer necessarily mean isolation from military actors, as the ICRC participation in the Common Effort-community clearly shows (Common Effort: 2017).

Active involvement in discussions on how to combine efforts in coordinated strategies increases, including in Germany as the ample role in the *Guidelines* process has shown. Strategic partnerships in Germany, for instance suggested by the VENRO handout can include learning partnerships and institutional information exchange to better implement lessons learned to prevent operational errors, the prevention of which is a core interest of many NGOs dedicated to peace facilitation (von Borries: 2007). As a member of the military exclaimed at the Common Effort Conference, "at least tell us where you are so we won't accidentally bomb you" (*non-literal recitation*). The transformation from passivity and rejection to active appropriation of comprehensive concepts according to humanitarian principles, as is the case for the UN-CMCoord handbook widens the scope for action and influence on common processes instead of reducing the influence of NGOs to forced *re-action* and protest. Still, their special position under international humanitarian law, however much disregarded in some current contexts requires them to assess any cooperation for compatibility with their principles and the consequences, requiring contextual conflict sensitivity, taking into account the multiple actors whose work alongside them, engaging in strategic (local) partnerships based on transparency, and a focus on local ownership and coherence (ibid). On a national level, this should include a closer dialogue between ministries, parliament and civil society on objectives, operational frameworks and interfaces, and common evaluations of prior experiences.

4.3) International Cooperation: NATO, EU, UN & OSCE

Unlike close partners such as France and the United States, Germany does not conduct its own peace operations, be it civil or military. Instead, the government either supports missions by supranational entities like the UN, EU or NATO, or operates in bi- or multinational partnerships in a 'coalition of the willing' as is currently the case for example in the training mission of Peshmerga fighters in Northern Iraq (Major & Mölling: 2016). It was within the operations of these organizations that the need for more coordination of the efforts conducted by an increasing number and variety of actors in any given field of crisis management was dearly felt and voiced for the first time, the organizational experience by extension translating into the national experiences of participating states (Rotmann: 2010). As was declared in the 2017 *Guidelines*, the close cooperation with international partners will continue to be a prerequisite for German engagement (Auswärtiges Amt: 2017). What is more, the UN charter and various corresponding documents are explicitly cited as the basic framework for conceptualization and implementation of German strategies, including cooperation. Consequently, even if German national comprehension were to be developed successfully, this would not by itself facilitate interaction with local or international partners (Erhart: 2011). By extension, this argument

proposes strategies and practices exceeding the nation state in order to diminish root causes of obstacles to comprehension. This being a topic vast enough for various theses, I will reduce the analysis of Germany's supranational partners to a limited glance on their respective concepts for increased comprehension and the challenges met therein. Apart from the supranational bodies mentioned above, strategic German partnerships include informal panels like the G7 and G20, as well as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose Development Assistance Committee (DAC) continues to play an important role in debating and conceptualizing the Comprehensive Approach, providing guidelines towards whole-of-government strategies for engagements in fragile states and taking security beyond a traditional understanding to include human factors (Alamir: 2012).

The end of the Cold War was the beginning of an extensive transformation of all organizations mentioned hereunder, including a diversification of the levels, scope and form of their activities as well as a tendency of increasing competencies and autonomy (Mayer: 2009). Centralized planning processes and agreements for conflict management thus had direct implications for national policies, from common guidelines to military tactics and positioning. The expansion in scope applied especially to the European Union that was consequently equipped with increased financial and personnel resources for intervention and accompanied by a diplomatic network in the countries subject to intervention in the form of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its High Representatives (ibid). In comparison, the NATO remained largely under the wing of its member states, and its independent capacities are limited.

Given that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military body, their pioneering role in coining the term 'Comprehensive Approach' might come as a surprise – in fact, it was a “necessary response to practical coordination challenges and capability gaps that affect all of the Alliance's operations” (Rotmann: 2010, p. 1). The organizations' Riga Summit Declaration of 2006 officially coined the term, substantially supported by the German government. In the field, informal cooperation had been common practice already, but without institutionalization depended on leadership and individual interpersonal relations, hampering effectiveness. At the same time, the sheer number of actors involved could only be sensibly included through official coordination structures. It was especially the need for enhanced civil capacities to achieve sustainability under the notion of an interdependence of security and development that was felt in missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan, leading the NATO to target an increase in CIMIC instruments through the inclusion of civil experts in their headquarters and field stations as well as through common training (Alamir: 2012). Given the limited autonomy, efforts however continued to depend largely on the member states and thus varied considerably. What is more, apart from urging enhanced civil-military interaction, the CA lacked both content and directions for implementation, attracting widespread civil skepticism. Especially in the German context, the perception as a military narrative was further exacerbated by the widespread sensation that then-Minister Jung had an active part in promoting this concept in the NATO to strengthen army dominance in international peace operations (Nachtwei: 2012). This debate reemerges in the current debate on increased financial contributions of at least two percent of member states' respective GDP, heated by campaign rhetoric and in stark contrast to the pledge to focus on and increase civil measure voices in the Guidelines (Rizzo: 2016).

Positive examples of implementing a Comprehensive Approach on the other hand include the bilateral operationalization of the new concept in the German-Netherlands Corps that was later deployed with the NATO mission in Afghanistan (van Loon: 2012). Generally however, the balance of implementation reveals a number of shortcomings, partly due to its organizational character and partly attributable to a lack of contributions by member states (Rotmann: 2010). Most notably, individual strategies continue to clash with each other as well as with operational realities in the field. In order to disentangle the problem of political competition between member states, the PRT system in Afghanistan was regarded a rather successful strategy, requiring mostly internal coherence of one nation. While they were suited for stabilization measures, the application of PRTs to non-violent and post-conflict scenarios proved out of proportion given their heavy military component. The lack of joint planning and evaluation processes demonstrated apparently insurmountable differences between as well as within governments, including national fragmentation, distinct organizational cultures, different opinions on the use of force and broader political differences (ibid). Especially in NATO's

decentralized structures, classic top-down strategies for comprehension are doomed to fail, as goes for national contexts which has been amply demonstrated above. Discrepancies between decisions made in various capitals and the reality in field headquarters has regularly backfired on the deployed troops, and their experiences require increased attention. A common learning process preceding inclusive conceptualization of comprehension therefore needs to start with the conscious evaluation of past interventions that also addresses sensitive issues such as the different attitudes regarding a use of force. Just as no two conflicts are alike, national cultures differ considerably, evoking a necessity for national as well as supranational conceptual negotiations and developments to go hand in hand and include bottom-up strategizing (ibid.)

This is of course true not only for NATO but for other multinational entities as well, including the UN and EU. However, given their institutional setups and broader mandates their approach to increase comprehension differs in nature and scope both from that of the NATO and from each other (Tardy: 2017). With an increased institutionalization of the security-development nexus in the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU included an endeavor to improve civil-military cooperation within their ranks and with other actors in the field through the introduction of its Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Alamir: 2012). It is this very CSDP that the *Guidelines* pledge to support and further develop, and despite issues of democratic legitimacy, plans and rumors around the establishment of a European army have been around for years which would take European integration to a new level (Major & Mölling: 2010). EU progress on comprehensive efforts accelerated in recent years, including an increase in instruments for implementation. In 2011, the Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) was launched, a comprehensive platform to facilitate the training of civilians serving in missions of EU, UN, OSCE and AU (ENTRi: n.d.). The certified methods include civil-military interaction and the program supports capacity building for national and international training centers. The current project phase is hosted and staffed by the ZIF in Berlin. 2013 saw published an EU plan for a 'Comprehensive Approach in External Conflict and Crisis: from Strategy to Practice', committing to long-term objectives in peace operations throughout its organs (Fiott: 2017). Only three years later, the paper was followed by the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) and corresponding Security and Defense Implementation Plan (SDIP), both of these taking into focus increased coherence and cooperation on all levels of conflict (EEAS: 2017). Moreover, the European Defense Action Plan (EDAF) adds a monetary dimension to ambitions of increased comprehension, introducing a new common budget to be shared between collaborative research projects and capacity building measures to increase efficiency, as goes for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) created in 2014 and providing a common budget for improved conflict prevention and response (Fiott: 2017). Moreover, the EUGS evokes conceptual changes underlying attempts to increase coherence, discernible in the terminological shift to an Integrated Approach (AI), a strategy originally introduced by the UN.

The AI, just like the CA was born out of mission experience and is closely connected to UN internal structures (Tardy: 2017). While equipped with considerable autonomy, effectiveness and efficiency proved to depend crucially on the ability to combine all relevant UN components in a common effort, through integrated mission structures and planning hubs as manifest in the various UN country teams coordination efforts in the field. Drawing from this experience and their own history of intraorganizational discord such as between EU missions in Bosnia (Muehlmann: 2008), a strengthened EU CSDP aimed to take coordination beyond the original concept of comprehension and institutionalize it on every level of operation (Fiott: 2017). Strategies for implementation are divided in four layers: multidimensionality, referring to the inclusion of all available instruments; multi-phased engagement, spanning all stages of conflict; multi-level cooperation, from a local to a global level; and multilateralism, involving not only actors within but also beyond the EU (Tardy: 2017). The IA, as compared to the CA thus demonstrates a more strategic and ambitious concept and both enhances and exceeds the operational sphere by aiming at increased coherence for improved crisis response on all levels, including political, economic and security dimensions.

Whereas studies show positive effects of this approach, they also reveal new or amplified organizational challenges (Metcalf, Giffen & Elhawary: 2011). Most notably, perceptions of a politicization of humanitarian actors deepen under an approach that presents UN field staff as

a unified body, especially when military components are equipped with a 'robust' mandate. Consequently, forms and degrees of cooperation have to be negotiated individually for any given mission and will sometimes result in mere coordination between entities. The military focus in the various current UN Stabilization Missions exacerbates the problem of alienating civil and especially humanitarian components and has the potential to harm cooperation and local perception continually (Hunt: 2017). On the other end of the spectrum, the UN expanded its political and mediation tools centered in its diplomatic branch, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). UN Special Political Missions (SPMs) however require bringing together political strategies with regional actors and expertise from planning to operation and demand structural adjustments in headquarters and on the ground (Gowan: 2011). As UN Secretary-General Guterres emphasized when taking office in 2017, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) will increase the focus on prevention, supported by an internal review he induced shortly after his inauguration. As a first step, Guterres created the post of Senior Policy Advisor responsible for supervising system-wide coherence in crisis management efforts and better communication between headquarters and field stations, following the 2016 report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) appointed by his predecessor which had for two years been involved in extensive consultation and concluded that increased cooperation based on a political primate were key to improve UN peacekeeping. The new review is due shortly and is believed to trigger substantial operational changes (Bernstein: 2017).

As the given examples indicate, challenges for an Integrated Approach are not reduced to its conceptualization in New York, Brussels and elsewhere but extent to its implementation as well. It requires increased capacities for conflict analysis, early warning and prevention, and new tools for improved communication with member states and partners (Tardy: 2017). In a second step, effective crisis response based on a broad analysis must gain in coherence which includes close consultation with local and international partners and allows for flexible, tailor-made solutions based on the individual context. Finally, inclusive post-conflict transition must guarantee local ownership and structural embeddedness. Inherent threats of integration, as was suggested before include the blurring of the distinct identities of the actors involved and a decreased flexibility in local coordination and cooperation when negotiations have already settled for the lowest common denominator before entering the field. Ultimately, any form of operationalization must be preceded by the joint effort of mainstreaming an IA throughout the entities, including diplomatic, civil, military, administrative and all other components (ibid). While an integrated, whole-of-system approach was closely approximated in response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa, applying lessons learned from this mission in conflict scenarios is bound to prove difficult, especially as long a silo mentalities prevail (Lupel & Snyder: 2017).

Nonetheless, lessons learned from internal experiences and those of other organizations as we have seen are crucial prerequisites for increased comprehension. Consequently, these concepts increasingly include instruments for coordination not only between the different entities and member states but also among supranational bodies. EU and NATO have recently signed a joint declaration to improve and institutionalize their strategic partnership, for instance (Fiott: 2017). Commitments to interorganizational cooperation span regional and global partnerships between bodies such as the EU, UN, African Union (AU) and OSCE (Alamir: 2012). Notably, the EU conducts common analysis and evaluations with UN and OSCE, and increasingly pursues dialogues and formal structures for cooperation with non-governmental entities (Mayer: 2009).

Last in this list and originally a tool for security rapprochement between East and West, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was established as a permanent institution in 1994 (Sacchetti: 2014). As suggested in its name, a lack of cooperation and coherence in multilateral security tasks is its very reason for existence, and it is today involved in diverse efforts within and beyond the European continent in close interaction with host nations, promoting liberal values from gender equality to press freedom, as well as more traditional security tasks such as border monitoring and arms control. Since its origin in the East-West stalemate that was the Cold War, conflict prevention and sustainable development have been the OSCE's leitmotifs, with the Comprehensive Approach as a mainstreaming strategy which is reflected in its broad toolkit, encompassing political, military, economic, environmental and human dimensions (Bakker & Kessels: 2012). Taking pride in being the largest regional security organization worldwide, the OSCE currently encompasses 57 nations

and 17 field missions, engaging in political dialogue and addressing root causes of conflict (OSCE: 2017). Field offices are comprised of local and international staff deployed by the member states, their professional background notwithstanding engaging exclusively in civil tasks albeit often engaged in civil-military cooperation when operating in volatile regions. In its focus on prevention and by providing a common platform for cooperation and learning processes, the organization largely lives up to its own ideal of comprehension, promoting coherence and working closely with governments, international organs including the EU and UN, and with civil society (Bakker & Kessels: 2012). However, its limited function and outreach within the international security structure often allocates it an inferior role and donor priority (Sacchetti: 2014). With prevention moving up the international policy agenda, reevaluating the unique comprehensive and consensus-driven OSCE structures and considering experiences such as measures for the prevention of violent extremism might very well be profitable in the pursuance of a sustainable and inclusive global security. As we will see in the subsequent paragraph, the origin of the Berlin Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) closely related to the OSCE, and the organizations continue to work in close strategic and operational cooperation with the ZIF regularly dispatching civil experts to OSCE missions (Köppe: 2016).

5) Practicing Comprehension: The Berlin Center for International Peacekeeping Operations

From April to July 2017, I was given the opportunity to pursue an internship with the analysis department at ZIF, supporting its multiple and extensive research functions that include the gathering, evaluation and processing of information into the various formats for internal and external communication, from policy briefings to round-table discussions (Benkler: 2016). As my intention to conduct field observations on comprehension in Iraq turned out unfeasible, I decided instead to include my internship organization and its own CA in my research as I had access to first-hand information thereon. Consequently, the focus of my thesis shifted towards a whole-of-government approach and the German arena of its negotiation. In retrospect, this unfolding greatly benefited my thesis with regards to both consistence and topicality, as it accompanied the 2017 *Guidelines* process and related developments in real-time.

During my time there, the ZIF celebrated its 15-year anniversary which was accompanied by a broad review of the years ensuing its founding. As its origin has been addressed repeatedly in the course of this thesis, I will abbreviate the history hereunder and focus on the Center's institutionalization and mainstreaming of the Comprehensive Approach throughout its purview. As the smallest government component to German engagement in peace operations, the ZIF experience additionally reflects the developments and challenges of civil experts in the German Comprehensive Approach. While this paragraph is based on official publications, my personal impressions will find entrance into this paper in the subsequent discussion, based on the notes I took mostly during internal meetings and presentations which can be found in the appendix.

It was already mentioned that the institutionalization of the OSCE and the founding of the ZIF are causally related. The civil organization's first mission to Bosnia in 1995 revealed the lack of civilian capacities in the Federal Republic, and personnel contributions were organized ad hoc by the Foreign Office (Köppe: 2016). This system was exhausted quickly when 200 additional German peacekeepers were requested for the OSCE mission in Kosovo in 1998, resulting in the realization that better national structures for civil expertise in peace operations were needed, consequently resulting in the founding of the ZIF in 2002, mandated by the AA to recruit, maintain and deploy civil experts to international peace operations and election monitoring (Bagger & von Heynitz: 2012). Originally a small team located in an office on the AA premises, extensive research and evaluation processes as well as increased political commitment to civil crisis management in the following years allowed for the young organization to quickly grow in size and importance, and resulted in a relocation to the current premises (Köppe: 2016).

Initially not undisputed in parliament, the commitment to civilian peace missions is today consented throughout the political parties (Nachwei: 2012). As was indicated above, the 2002 reelected government of SPD and Green Party in its Coalition Agreement continued to support the ZIF and pledged to transform it into a full-fledged sending organization. The *Aktionsplan* following in 2004 emphasized the need for a broad civil tool that could react quickly in

developing crises and would be supported through interdepartmental cooperation, and the Working Group Peace and Development (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Entwicklung*, FriEnt) established in 2001 provided a platform for comprehensive learning and cooperation on central challenges combining peace, development and security issues and connecting state actors, civil society, church groups and political associations, now joined by the ZIF.

Originally, its main tasks were divided into three departments, namely analysis, training, and human resources (Köppe: 2016). As an outcome of the transformation process towards a full sending organization, International Capacity Development (ICD) inspired by DPKO practice was added as a key instrument for extending the toolbox according to its new responsibilities as employer and provide a think tank for sending organizations. When the ZIF was established, a personnel pool had been created and is maintained by the human resources department for the deployment of civil experts to UN, EU and OSCE peace or monitoring missions around the world, with numbers steadily increasing (Bagger & von Heynitz: 2012). Before departure, experts are briefed and trained extensively through a variety of programs developed and continually improved by the training department and conducted in comprehensive alignment in common efforts, usually combining international civilian staff with military and police personnel to be sent in mission as well. Common training centers include the UN Training Center of the Bundeswehr in Hammelburg, the Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (*Akademie für Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz*, AKNZ) and the BAKS (Nachtwei: 2012). Additionally, the ZIF is a member of the Training Partner Platform (TPP) already mentioned, combining police academies, military training institutions, and as civilian training partners the Academy for International Cooperation (*Akademie für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*, AIZ) that is part of the GIZ, and the ZIF (Federal Police Academy: 2015). Beyond preparation for the field, the courses aim to enhance comprehensive networking and common understanding prior to deployment (Egleder: 2016).

Apart from conflict evaluation in close cooperation with international partners, the analysis department at ZIF systematically processes experiences from headquarters and field missions in order to support the advancement of concepts and practices in international operations on a national level and beyond (Benkler: 2016). Interaction with parliamentarians and ministries is part of their daily tasks, and they act as a comprehensive platform (Nachtwei: 2012). Political consultations often exceed the national level and include input to supranational organizations like the EU, AU and OSCE, notably for instance during the UN HIPPO-review on peacekeeping measures (Benkler: 2016). Strategic forecast and scenario planning processes are regularly supported by interdisciplinary exchanges with politicians, researchers and civil society fora. Inputs by experts in the field are systematically collected and evaluated in cooperation with the AA and supported by synthesis reports for current missions. A public newsletter furthermore provides summarized updates on peacekeeping operations around the world.

Lastly, the ICD team was established to improve structures and processes that accompany international peace operations (Köppe: 2016). An important task in the recruitment of civil experts is to ensure competitiveness on the job market, including questions of remuneration and reintegration after their tasks are completed, especially given the broad expertise needed for many peace operations and shortages of qualified personnel (Irrang & Wittkowsky: 2015). Consequently, as already pledged in the 2002 coalition agreement a transformation process for the ZIF to become a full-fledged sending organization was practically implemented after the AA's 2014 *Review Process* and brought with it new challenges. The necessity for an enhanced responsibility opposite deployed personnel was additionally triggered by the severe injuries of three German civil experts in a terrorist attack in Djibouti in 2014, revealing gaps in insurance and care procedures to ensure their complete protection (Köppe: 2016). Apart from acting as an interface for operational knowledge exchange manifest for instance in consultations with the African Union, the ICD department thus contributes to the development of the profile of 'civil expert' as a professional role, including the definition of goals, duties, and principles of action, methodological approaches and the principle of Duty of Care for sending organizations (Irrang & Wittkowsky: 2015). Basic guidelines thereof were established in interdisciplinary cooperation with partnerships in Germany and abroad, as the ZIF works closely together with similar international institutions such as the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy and the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands (Köppe: 2016). On a government level, working and evaluation

processes are integrated into the centralized comprehensive infrastructures of Department S in the AA to facilitate the productive processing of lessons learned (Heinemann-Grüder: 2016).

The vast majority of employees in all departments possess extensive field knowledge, and many have working experience from the supranational organizations their experts are deployed to, bringing first-hand insights into theory and practice (Egleder: 2016). Comprehension on the national level on the other hand is achieved through liaison officers from BMVg and BMZ who directly contribute to an intergovernmental dialogue (Köppe: 2016). Current Managing Director Almut Wieland-Karimi since her taking office was highly dedicated to the expansion of strategic capacities and impacts within and beyond the ZIF (Köppe: 2016). Following her initiative, the ZIF launched a working group on the Comprehensive Approach in order to increase both internal coherence and political input to government departments and the parliament. This group has originally been mandated by the BMZ liaison officer and his counterpart from the BMVg, with the ZIF itself assigned to represent and report to the AA, while cooperation with the BMI is requested occasionally. The mandate was established due to political ambitions for more interdepartmental and international comprehension in peacekeeping as manifest in the various documents referred to above, and includes the preparation of policy briefings, working papers and political statements, consulting the Steering Group on Civil Crisis Prevention and other political and parliamentary entities, briefings to NGOs and implementing organizations, and internal consultations (Bagger & von Heynitz: 2012). The aim is to enhance conceptual and practical aspects of an *optimal* German Comprehensive Approach on a government level and in the interaction with international partners. While involving relevant departments, its strategic position outside a ministry prevents competitiveness, and whereas constitutionally part of the AA, ZIF staff are not diplomats and act independently, supporting their efforts by constant evaluation processes which allow for quick reactions to political developments. The ZIF's low political profile and disputability further enhances compromise orientation, supported by an interdisciplinary personnel structure uniting a variety of experiences and perspectives.

With the ZIF, the German government has thus created a quickly evolving institution that has incorporated the Comprehensive Approach in all of its internal and external processes. While it is but one small component of the political landscape, its extensive networks provide it with unique leverage in various forms, and its independence from party politics allows for impartial assessments and consultation. The institutional logic and not least its competitive edge strives towards comprehension naturally and the concept has been internalized by operationalizing results from evaluation and analysis. However, their impact in the field of peace operations remains limited when measured in total numbers of personnel both in Germany and field missions (Köppe: 2016). The 2017 *Guidelines* vaguely pledge to increase these numbers and to revalue the professional profile of civil peace experts, results of which remain to be seen (Auswärtiges Amt: 2017). Nonetheless, the ZIF's distinct potential to enhance comprehension has been demonstrated in the 15 years since its establishment, as has its crucial contribution both for conceptualization and implementation of a German Comprehensive Approach.

6) Discussion

Progress has been made – this much can be said for this thesis as well as for the advancement of the Comprehensive Approach in theory and practice, in Germany and beyond. Perceptions of this progress however are very different, as both the survey by Wittkowsky, Hummel and Pietz (2011) and my own interviews show throughout. In total, I conducted 12 interviews with a total of 14 representatives from the relevant departments (AA, BMVg, BMZ, BMI), related organizations involved in implementing comprehension (ZIF, BAKS, 1. German-Netherlands Corps, THW, BBK), civil society in the form of a political foundation (*Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, FES, associated with the SPD), a civil association of the peace movement (*Bund für Soziale Verteidigung*, BSV), a researcher from the Bundeswehr Staff College (*Führungsakademie*, FüAk), and a parliamentarian from the SPD who is also part of the Subcommittee on Civil Crisis Prevention. The fact that the SPD appears twice is not owed to my own political partiality but to the respective persons' facility and willingness to support my research, while others I contacted were not available to answer my questions. Of the respondents, eight were male and six female, and they shared between them a considerable amount of experience and expertise,

some of them having been involved in the German debate from the start and others having joined more recently. While the process of 'recruiting' interview partners was at first often frustrating and required considerable flexibility and patience, I am glad to conclude that all of the respondents I could win to help me were immensely dedicated in their support.

The variety of voices was very insightful and added to my perception through a vast literature research you find outlined above and voices from political and operational practice. Most of my interview partners had been involved in either the political or the practical implementation of peace operations and agreed on the necessity of increased comprehension, albeit allocating it different ranks in the overall transformation process of peacekeeping practice. The respondents as well as the literature and my experience at the ZIF have revealed a variety of frictions and problem statements related to the Comprehensive Approach many of which have already been debated above, and addressing every single one of them would clearly exceed the scope of this thesis. However, various topics reoccurred in all of my data collection methods and will be discussed below assigned to one of three buzzwords that currently dominate the discourse on peacekeeping reform. This method is chosen as the Comprehensive Approach in itself is not a goal in peace operations but a concept that was developed to facilitate superordinate goals of sustainable peace, security and development. Nonetheless, all goals discussed hereunder are concretely impacted by prevailing frictions in the conceptualization and operationalization of comprehension in Germany and beyond.

6.1) Focus on prevention: anticipatory politics versus political diffidence

It is common understanding today that prevention is the key to global security and much more cost-efficient both in financial and human capital than reactive means. Peacekeeping actors from the UN to national governments and small NGOs indicate their dedication to step up preventive measures and increase resilience in volatile contexts. Prevention has additionally been the leitmotif of German engagement from the 2004 *Aktionsplan* to the 2017 *Guidelines* – at least on paper. For the reality of peace operations largely remains involved in intervening when conflict has already broken out or has indeed continued for a while, depending on the interest major donors allocate it. National interests, it is agreed still dominate the agenda of international involvement, and contributions to preventive measures remain vanishingly low compared to military expenditure, belying all experience. From Libya to Iraq, from Afghanistan to Mali, political efforts to transform conflict often remain low-scale both in scope and visibility. Hence, apart from the obvious problem of operationalizing prevention, international dedication seldom extends beyond lip service, including in the German context.

As my research has shown, the role of national interests is assessed very differently, including among my interview partners. While many criticize a prevalence of neocolonial and neoimperial claims therein, others will defend their necessity for political strategy. It is at this point not disputed that nation states continue to be the main decision makers despite increased autonomy of multilateral contracts as manifest in organizations like the EU. In consequence, their dedication to efforts beyond their own territory will always be grounded in the interest of the people they represent. While a supranational entity like the UN can claim universal human rights as the moral imperative underlying their institutional logic of action, nation states by nature will not adhere to this principle alone but firstly to internal preferences. Thus, the argument goes, the formulation of national interests including foreign strategies is an indispensable tool preceding conflict management and dedication to international efforts. Only when interests are expressed and goals formulated can international strategies be coordinated, progress be measured and national parliaments be held accountable for their actions in the field of peacekeeping operations. Ironically, prevention has moved up political agendas including in Germany as a reactive measure to increased severity and not least visibility of the consequences of war in the form of millions of refugees trying to reach Europe in recent years. Tools such as Transformation Partnerships and a G20 'Marshall Plan with Africa' might be directed at prevention – their origin, however is rooted in the classical dilemma of reactions to conflicts only when affecting national politics, often being too little too late.

It has therefore been acknowledged that a transformation is needed to allow for faster, broader and better coordinated actions that will prevent or at least contain violence at an early stage

and increase societal resilience. This paradigm change has however not reached international governments and organizations who mostly continue a security logic that fails to grasp modern conflict realities. As we have seen, traditional processes on a national and intraorganizational level continue to hamper effective measures and even the developing of effective instruments. Political rivalries are at the forefront of this issue both within supranational bodies and national governments. In Germany, interdepartmental and inter-party rivalries continue to hamper an institutionalization of agreed instruments and an effective adaptation of means for coordination to increase the leverage of currently scattered efforts around the world. A synchronization of intradepartment efforts seems sufficiently complicated already, and discords have lead to agreements on a lowest common denominator time and again with differing forms of internal implementation.

While other countries such as the Netherlands and Great Britain have adopted more pragmatic forms of institutionalized comprehension reflecting a national commitment to tackling crises, in Germany the *Ressortprinzip* continues to distort the bigger picture. Instead of committing to a comprehensive learning process, negotiations such as preceding the new *Guidelines* are always focused on specific political interests, and rivalries prevail over binding compromise. A distinct weakness in their outcome is thus a further institutionalization of interdepartmental dialogue and common decision processes and continues to be reduced to the Steering Group supplied with little political impact and leverage. As has been confirmed time and again, on a lower institutional level comprehension and often informal mutual exchange is a common practice both in the national and international field and in peace operations on the ground. In this way it however largely depends on interpersonal conditions and especially on leadership skills to enforce and broaden these networks, and they will never be able to engage all relevant actors without an official forum for continuative exchange. Such plans in turn often fail on the management level where consensus is all too often subordinated to political interests and remains volatile to personnel characteristics and contextual factors such as elections.

Various suggestions for an institutionalization of high-level comprehension have been voiced including during my interviews. With Department S at the AA, the topic has at least been centralized and acts as a link between politics, governmental and non-governmental entities. Constitutionally, the AA's task is to set the overall framework for German foreign policy in superordination to BMVg, BMZ and other entities, which is why the responsibility seems rightly located. So far, this has however not resulted in a centralized interdepartmental course for international engagement, while first steps in this direction have been taken in the form of an extensive process towards the drafting of the 2017 *Guidelines*. Given the principle of primary political leadership of the Federal Chancellor, another option that has often been given preference including by representatives of the office themselves was the establishment of a central steering body in the Federal Chancellery, but has been rejected on the grounds of inter-party competition as too politically charged by the departments. What is left is the somewhat vague demand for increased interdepartmental dialogue which will hardly suffice the claim of the national Comprehensive Approach the government prides itself in. With the summer break halting political negotiations and general elections looming on the horizon, progress including based on the *Guidelines* will depend on the new government to take office in September.

A central challenge of preventive strategies as was demonstrated lies in the mutual need for long-term strategies to tackle underlying causes of conflict and develop new tools to quickly deescalate violence when it occurs, a demand unmatched by slow political processes hampered by political rivalries. At the same time, disagreements are not reduced to the national level but include international partnerships. While continuous negotiations are a crucial prerequisite for anticipatory politics strengthening preventive and sustainable measures, bipolar stalemates in international efforts are lethal as not least the East-West conflict has shown. Nonetheless, meaningful supranational negotiations require a united voice within the parties involved. On a national level, it seems sensible to assume that a united approach shared among political parties, government departments, civil society stakeholders and involving the general public is a prerequisite for efficient international engagement, including aspirations to a New German Responsibility in the international arena. At the same time, as I have illustrated the German decentralized system is rooted in notions of vital labor and power divisions that are to insure democratic negotiation processes and prevent political solo action. A German government will

naturally take the most interest in national security and only second focus on a global security nexus. Thus, increasing efforts by multinational organizations to establish common frameworks and tools for action as with the EU Global Strategy and other multi-stakeholder partnerships appear better suited to address global security issues. In the light of a security-development nexus, security especially when aspiring sustainability has become a broad term with distinct implications for various forms of comprehension, as is discussed in the following paragraph.

6.2) Focus on sustainability: national, international and human security

When discussing the impact of a Comprehensive Approach on increased international security, one needs to be aware of the conceptual broadness this term evokes, as well as its consequent strategic implications. I have already discussed the impact of national interests which includes national security based on the Westphalian model of a state monopoly on violence. Interstate security and national sovereignty are core principles of international relations, institutionalized in diplomatic efforts from a regional to a supranational level. Nonetheless, in an increasingly interconnected world have nations agreed to delegate some of their sovereign power to shared institutions for economic reasons and especially security – not least were the United Nations founded to ensure that the Second World War would be the last of its kind. Modern conflicts exceed traditional issues of state security where one state protects its sovereignty from foreign threats – the United States were not attacked by the Afghan state but by a non-state group that claimed governance in parts of Afghanistan. In turn, the notion of a 'responsibility to protect' agreed upon by UN member states resulted in a constraint of national sovereignty in the face of gross human rights violations, the extent of which however is to be decided by the national governments especially of those states forming the UN Security Council.

In the light of modern threats exceeding national borders and challenge the perception of state responsibilities such as terrorism and mass migration, national interests are interconnected on a new scale, having lead former Defense Minister Struck to the now famous dictum that Germany's security was defended at the Hindukush as well (BMVg: 2004) – or as current Federal Chancellor Merkel was quoted above, Africa's well-being is in Germany's interest, the latter being its territorial integrity and reducing the number of refugees fleeing from war or underdevelopment to Germany. Thus when striving for international security, the term and its understanding need to be widened considerably, especially when assuming a nexus of security and development. With regards to this interdependence, the terms 'fragile states' and 'human security' have been introduced and the argumentation of just war theory discussed above. The recurring question underlying this broad discourse is *whose* security is the focus of the various efforts that are to be combined comprehensively to increase effectiveness.

It was this notion and the handicap of having been coined by military actors that gave the Comprehensive Approach a bad name among humanitarian and development actors both on a governmental and international level, with the German specific of carrying it in the name of the concept of Networked Security (*Vernetzte Sicherheit*). Despite the terminological differences having been largely solved and the concept renamed, the underlying critique remains valid as became obvious during the interviews as well. A security logic would always focus on the immanent threat in the form of a perpetrator to be neutralized, a volatile environment to be stabilized or a famine to be overcome, while failing to account for the underlying causes and thus sidelining aspirations for sustainability. National and especially capitalist interests for security are often reduced to the short-term perspective of stabilization, but as Libya and other missions under this banner have drastically demonstrated, this limited perspective is not sufficient. Various voices especially from civil society organizations therefore advocate peace logic (*Friedenslogik*) as opposed to security logic, including the principle of do-no-harm, a focus on prevention and inclusive strategies based on partnership instead of defense. One respondent from the original German peace movement rejected the Comprehensive Approach altogether due to its conceptual embeddedness in a logic focused on security.

Transformations, it was argued including during the interviews must involve political changes on the national and international level. No reactive measure, however much comprehensive can by itself solve the causal relations between economic development and sustainable peace fueled by the manifold connections between societies in a globalized world when focusing on

conflict as a dissociated national issue of the countries it takes place in. Political rethinking must firstly focus inwards and review practices in foreign politics potentially harming global security and work closely in regional partnerships such as the EU to abolish them. In Germany, those practices include trade policies for agricultural products and weapons. The currently dominant asymmetry between 'the perpetrators' endangering international security and the 'international community' selfishly (and thus without accountability) trying to free the world from them is not least revealing a hypocrisy in aspiration to solve conflicts that excludes internal reflection as on how to adjust the own international role in order to benefit sustainable development and prevent conflict, as one respondent pointed out. Naturally, development aid cannot be effective in this scenario, especially if the damage caused on the one side heavily outweighs any measures of assistance. Here, the Comprehensive Approach in the form of better communication between intervening states might even be counterproductive, as increased coherence can compromise strategies fitting the local reality if they continue to be based on a dichotomy of the local versus the international. Efforts to transform this perspective would entail extensive analysis and evaluation beginning at the local level and promoting inclusive community developments. In the following I will thus discuss the role of ownership as a crucial aspect in comprehensive measures exceeding engagement that serves self-righteous national interests to actually taking a holistic view on global security.

6.3) Focus on ownership: top-down vs. bottom-up

A paradox resurfacing throughout my research has been the demand of better leadership and incentives from the highest political level on the one hand, and the importance of contextual analysis and local ownership of peace processes on the other. Especially when acknowledging the connection between conflict and development and therein focusing on prevention, local needs must be brought to the foreground, supporting inclusive processes and strengthening civil society. While international comprehension must not hamper this premise, experiences of foreign staff deployed in peace operations has to be given more attention when planning and evaluating missions, including staff from governmental and non-governmental development and humanitarian organizations. The goal is to establish comprehensive and flexible structures on a national level that can be quickly react to the specific needs of a distinct conflict. As the *Guidelines* note, knowledge must be generated both on peacekeeping practice in general and on specific regional and national contexts, including participatory dialogues with civil society, NGOs and a broad field of social and political scientists.

Strategies on the government level need to be synchronized for various reasons as indicated, which indeed requires comprehensive leadership and agreements between ministers or state secretaries, or at least an institution with actual decision-making competencies that bridges political rivalries. So far this is reduced to occasion-related round tables and an occasional foreign policy *jour fixe* between combining either AA and BMVg or AA and BMZ, at times with consultations involving all three. A permanent and competent interdepartmental panel would instead allow for consistent and continual exchanges and decision processes and congruent communication. At the same time, comprehension must not be the dissolve of sensible labor division on a national or international level. A humanitarian aid provider does not need to train police officers, any more than a soldier has to be competent in advising health ministries. They do however benefit from knowing each other's organizational culture and background, as well as basic modes and principles of operating so that labor division can actually happen based on the knowledge of the respective competencies.

An important step has been development quite far in Germany as we have seen: common training rapidly becomes common practice and is institutionalized in partnerships and exchange platforms such as BAKS, ZIF and Common Effort. A challenge affecting all of them is the increasingly complex demands regarding skills that is especially the case for police and other civil experts, that however affect the military as well. A classic example is the deployment of German soldiers, police and civilians in Mali at the moment where a command of French is often a prerequisite but seldomly found (of course, this problem multiplies in countries like Afghanistan or Iraq). The training of soft skills as a common learning experience might prove effective not only to the mission itself but also to better civil-military understanding.

Another friction I came across continuously was the alleged 'political' or 'civil' primate that Germany commits to in all foreign efforts. It was already noted that in total numbers of women and men deployed with a political mandate includes very little civilian staff, but these numbers neither include humanitarian and development workers employed or supported by the Federal Republic, nor do they account for diplomats. The GIZ as already mentioned employs numerous local and international staff, while embassies in conflict areas often work with decreased personnel and capacities which in the current state does not allow for the coordinator function the *Guidelines* have allocated them, further complicated by frequent personnel rotation as is even more the case in high-security posts in volatile regions. The THW and BBK are involved in international disaster relief as well, including crisis management. Local ownership and preventive measures are rooted in their institutional logic, addressing the community level and strengthening civil resilience. They are thus the point of contact to support the enhancement of legitimate local structures and reforming of others based indispensably on local ownership. Building on their experience and principles for effective and sustainable efforts, involving embassies as a political interface for increased coordination and political accountability, and involving military components and as far as possible humanitarian actors in planning and operation processes would be a truly Comprehensive Approach that would at the same time require centralized national planning.

The AA with its newly created department has recently engaged in projects that reflect such a strategy, namely the already mentioned Transformation Partnerships in countries like Tunisia. In bilateral agreements, the AA strategically supports legitimate structures on national and subnational levels in close accord with local governments and civil society organizations. Implementing partners include the THW and GIZ and thereby two entities anchored in other ministries, whose dedication to local ownership was already outlined, the partnerships' civil character increasing their legitimacy. When increasingly coordinating tasks that have classically been located in development cooperation, the AA would be wise to draw extensively on the evaluation of the decades of international humanitarian involvement, a lessons that the new department gradually seems to adopt. The mutual agreement on national interests realized in such a partnership, which for Germany include reducing radicalization and irregular migration is based on diplomatic means recognized internationally as legitimate, rather than pretensions of pursuing a global security agenda and in fact abusing intervention for profit and meanwhile asserting national interests and international authority other missions have been accused of. However, involving development and especially humanitarian actors in missions where military components are deployed continues to be problematic. While we have seen an increased willingness for dialogue, they are rarely integrated in broad networks as they fulfill specific mandates. This in turn can result in a lack of coordination and consequently legitimacy on the one hand, and on the other reduce their leverage in negotiations with military or state actors. Institutions such as UN OCHA can increase internal communication and function as an interface for communication with non-humanitarian entities.

Yet, a civil primate by itself does not solve the problem of R2P, as a lack of robustness in the mandate has in the past proved fatal in conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide. Training cooperations as newly conducted through the *Ertüchtigungsinitiative* (capacity building initiative) in a shared effort by the AA and BMVg are supplements, but can never be substitutes to military engagement in volatile environments. Their implementation is and definitely needs to be disputed, even training efforts such as currently carried out in Iraq and favoring the Kurds over other ethnic groups which might cause new problems once the IS is defeated and the state needs to be reconstructed, especially given prominent voices for Kurdish independence. As this example shows once more, political measures always need to back up any form of foreign engagement both in the country of intervention and on the country of origin, in this case Germany, embedded in a broad parliamentary and public discourse that does not shy away from acknowledging the important role and *political* assignment of military actors.

The problem of legitimacy due to a lack of local ownership extends beyond the national level of course and includes supranational organizations, especially disputed for NATO and UN missions with a Chapter VII mandate that allows for the use of force. However, the UN can still evoke its legitimacy through the international agreements that all parties are subject to, including the

target of intervention. UN country teams work closely with local civil societies, and their various components include multiple humanitarian and development agencies, from UNHCR to UNICEF. The OSCE is already in the comfortable position of being contested due to its civil character, and their principles include government cooperativeness as a prerequisite for any form of engagement. While their tasks do not fall under the realms of more traditional conflict management, their role has been emphasized recently not least in the *Guidelines* and their expansion both in scope and territory is encouraged by many, including my respondents. The EU and NATO however have more trouble in legitimizing their engagement as they act outside their member countries. Comprehension over the heads of national stakeholders, as is argued convincingly, cannot lead to sustainable and locally owned mechanisms of resilience. While the EU is increasingly supplementing military missions by diplomatic efforts through its External Action Service, civil components and partnerships with local and international organizations, the NATO as an overwhelmingly dominant military body is often regarded with skepticism. Nonetheless, as one interviewee argued are they the only international force with sufficient capacities and quick enough reaction to provide a robust force in humanitarian emergencies and in strategic labor division assume crucial tasks, from training to border issues. The long-standing commitment to a Comprehensive Approach, an increase of civil staff and agreements with EU and UN might increase its legitimacy. Still, the current discussion of German involvement, so far reduced to financial contribution must go further and result in a national and international discussion on the contemporary role of an organization originally given a very distinct task and that is today part of a very complex global security network.

7) Conclusion

When first engaging with the topic, my impression was that comprehension as well as more generally strategies for effective peace operations were not very far evolved in Germany. The intense process, numerous interviews and direct involvement in comprehensive measures have however widened the picture considerably. One of the most profound insights was that coordination and informal accords are an established practice in peacekeeping planning and conducting in Germany and beyond, however practiced for the most part not on the political top levels but at what in German is referred to as the *Untere Führungsebene*, i.e. middle and lower levels of management. This finding in turn hinted at the frictions between broad official commitment to coherent efforts and the lack of effective institutionalization for high-level interdepartmental exchange and fora including civil society and other stakeholders in peace processes. These are currently reduced to the Steering Group on Civil Crisis Prevention and its advisory council which were established in 2004 as pledged in the *Aktionsplan* and possess little political influence and leverage. Other forms of exchange are the occasional *jours fixes* between ministers and state secretaries from AA, BMVg and BMZ. On the long run, increased institutionalization of interdepartmental, inter-societal and international dialogues on various levels not only increases coherence but also reduces the vulnerability to hampering effects of global political developments and rivalries fueled by election rhetoric. While comprehensive strategies must take root on all organizational levels, facilitating leadership for successful implementation continues to play a crucial role.

Some formats, many of which were established recently, however suggest that progress has been made regarding better connection and more strategic implementation of international crisis management efforts. These include the 2017 *Guidelines* and especially the corresponding PeaceLab2016 process, an extensive dialogue connecting government departments, civil society, science and other relevant actors. Most of the experts I interviewed had been part of the debate, and albeit coming from very different backgrounds and assessing the actual outcome very differently, all of them praised the constructive exchange through a multitude of workshops, panels and publications gathered in an online blog. This in turn was made possible through the year-long learning process that had been the 2014 *Review* of the German Foreign Office and the resulting centralization of conflict management efforts in the new Department S that chaired the drafting procedures and therefor sought internal support from representatives of other departments and science, who were deployed as exchange officials at the AA for the entire duration of the process. Not least had the experiences from engaging a broad public in the *Review* provided a valuable example that was further developed, and officials have pledged

to continue the PeaceLab2016 format beyond the publication of the *Guidelines*.

Progress directly linked to comprehension can also be found on the operational level, notably in the Transformation Partnerships established by the AA and implemented by a variety of organs combining their efforts in the field, focusing on the community level to strengthen civil society and resilience and reform democratic structures. The binational cooperations are based on local ownership and diplomatic agreements, they are civil in character and centrally coordinated in Department S. Employing national organizations such as the THW and GIZ and engaging in close dialogue with the local government, civil society and NGOs, the missions draw extensively on lessons learned from development cooperation and aid and are based on humanitarian principles and broad regional analyses. Their regional orientation in the Middle East and North Africa honor the commitment voiced in the *Guidelines* to concentrate efforts for more effectiveness and are designed for long-term interaction. On a German level, this can facilitate common training and preparation considerably, including for 'soft' skills such as language and cultural awareness which are still given far too little attention.

On the institutional level, both the THW and ZIF constitute positive examples of comprehensive working structures on both national and international levels, bringing together a multitude of perspectives and experiences. Coordination efforts are integrated deeply in their internal and external procedures, and continuous learning processes are based on close cooperation with global partners. Formal and informal consultations beyond political and interdepartmental rivalries strive to attain optimum consensus, and closer relations to the operational field benefit pragmatic decision-making processes. Comprehension is institutionalized on every step of the way, from planning to training and evaluation. The pilot project currently conducted between the UN and THW illustrates the advantages as well as challenges this civil approach faces in the reality of conflict management. Being government organizations, they are still limited by political decisions such as security assessments by the BKA for THW personnel that will determine deployment in any given field. While the mission in Columbia is embedded in a rather secure environment and its content bears little dispute, other engagements could pose new questions such as the extent of cooperation with armed forces in 'robust' missions. This and other problems need further discussion both on a political and a societal level and must be subjected to uncomfortable questions that are all too often skipped due to their lack of public popularity. While civilian engagement from humanitarian aid to training missions is perceived as positive and thus easy to promote including politically, military components of peace operations will remain vital and their efforts must be revalued and embedded in every part of the process including in debates which are emotionally and politically charged, such as migration, populism and the use of force. Soldiers are deployed under a specific political mandate and represent national as well as international interests, despite being a topic often avoided by politicians and other citizens. Their mandate is legitimized under international humanitarian law and it has been agreed in parliament that their work is necessary and valuable for the specific context, a notion not least supported in the *Guidelines*. A civil primate cannot result in hushing up military components for fear of alienating potential voters. Germany, taking pride in a successful *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* can surely contribute lessons learned for peace processes if engaging in a critical discourse on its own position and including self-reflection in the nation's role in international conflicts, extending comprehension beyond the political field and take into account global economic and financial interdependencies.

Generally, increased dialogue including political communication seems key both in order to meet aspirations of comprehension and to advance the discourse on crisis management in general. A major realization therein must be the political character of any foreign engagement, be it military, humanitarian or anything in between, in the sense that actors from all of these groups pursue specific goals and need to voice their interests. Given that humanitarian aid is based on international principles that all nations have agreed upon, their engagement in the discussion is vital especially in the face of current human rights violations by all in conflicts, with international actors often avoiding accountability under the pretense of selfless motives. While governments can improve general frameworks for comprehensive and inclusive strategizing, a whole-of-government approach is not sufficient for effective external action and comprehension must exceed interministerial cooperation by far. As national interests can no longer be the (sole) imperative for global peace and security, a shift of focus is needed towards

a holistic understanding of sustainable global peace and security. In the face of increasingly complex crises and rapidly shifting challenges in a more and more interdependent global environment, nations can no longer afford to use outdated patterns but must aspire inclusive and comprehensive tools for global security governance.

Consequently, even a comprehensively interconnected government has by itself little impact on global structures, all leadership aspirations aside. As the only globally ratified body that can hence claim international legitimacy, the UN appears at least at this time to be uniquely suited to adopt and implement a transformative strategy to global peace and security governance on a supranational level that incorporates comprehensive analyses, evaluations and adaptation processes and can claim legitimate global validity. While the power disparity caused by the Security Council system impacts its capacities, guidelines such as the Agenda 2030 are vital agreements for progress. It is, in an adaptation of Churchill's famous remark, the best form of the worst type of global governance. The DPKO review originally stirred by new Secretary-General Guterres is due shortly and will bear more insights on the future directions of international peacekeeping. National efforts of member states are certainly vital and can improve overall capacities; Germany can for instance contribute experiences of comprehensive training methods, as is already practiced in the ENTRi project.

As for the problematic nature of the Comprehensive Approach itself, it became clear that terminological and factual misunderstandings have hampered its development. Since it has been coined, the term has lacked a congruent narrative to fill it with meaning. It has thus often been falsely assumed to be a tool to promote certain interests, instead of a conceptual frame. The lack of its adaptation however is both symptom and cause of this: by itself, the CA is in no way sufficient for successful conflict management, but when mainstreamed it will improve crucial hitches and advance inclusion, local ownership and prevention. This will most likely not be achieved in one drastic paradigm change but requires many small and some bigger steps and adjustments- as we have seen, the last 15 years already show slow but steady progress including ambitious reforms of national and supranational organizational structures. For further advance, political commitment on the top must defy political and interdepartmental rivalries and support the work not only in words but also in deeds and institutionalized facilitated exchange to foster resilience and be less vulnerable to personnel and political changes.

As is the case for any research paper, many more articles could have been quoted, and many more topics been touched upon. This thesis does not claim to be complete or exhaustive in its discussion on the German Comprehension Approach and its implications, but tries to constructively and timely contribute to the discussion on the CA and its various implications in Germany and beyond. Aspects absent from this thesis include observations regarding an operationalization of comprehensive measures and resulting effects in the field of peace operations, for example in the current variety of efforts employed in Iraq. Further research can contribute to a better understanding of the contribution of the Comprehensive Approach in practice and the extent to which lessons learned from Afghanistan and elsewhere impact planning and operationalization. On a national level, it will be interesting to see the practical implications the 2017 *Guidelines* will have once the new government takes office after the September elections.

When it comes to the reflection on my own research, its process character has proved highly productive. The inductive approach and parallel conduct of literature research, interviews and observations allowed for maximum flexibility and constant reflection, facilitating an interlocking learning process. The variety of my respondents resulted in interesting discussions and broad contacts that often exceeded the interviews. This being the last sentence I write for my thesis, I can conclude that it was a very productive research process indeed.

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Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz



Befragte Person:

Dr. Andreas Wittkowsky

Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF) seit 2011

Leiter des Projektes "Frieden und Sicherheit"

Arbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Entwicklung (FriEnt) /

Arbeitsgruppe Vernetztes Handeln

24.04.2017

Eröffnungsfrage: Bitte erzählen Sie kurz etwas über Ihre Arbeit im ZIF und Ihren beruflichen Werdegang.

- selbst als Teil der EU-Unterstützung zur UN-Mission im Kosovo (UNMIC), EU-kontraktiert
- später über erste ZIF-Sekundierte Kontakt zum ZIF; Bewerbung auf Ausschreibung Schnittstelle EZ/politische Friedensförderung-Friedenseinsätze (Austausch, ggs. Wissenstransfer) inkl. AG Vernetzter Ansatz
- Funktionen im ZIF: AG Vernetzte Sicherheit, AG FriEnt, Liaisonfunktion BMZ

1) Was ist in Ihren Worten Vernetzte Sicherheit, wie ist dieser Ansatz entstanden und wie bewerten Sie ihn?

- „Den Begriff der 'Vernetzten Sicherheit' benutze ich selbst schon gar nicht mehr“
→ Vernetzter Ansatz schließt alle (wichtigen) Akteure ein, nicht nur sicherheitspolitisch relevant: gegenseitige Stärkung, Absprachen, Transparenz, je nach Situation & Bedarf unterschiedlich intensiv (optimale > maximale Vernetzung)
- Es geht nicht darum, alle Parteien unter einem Schirm zusammenzufassen, sondern um eine Koordinierung, die gegenseitige Behinderung und ineffektive Einsätze vorbeugen soll
- Alle Ebenen Konflikt: prä / Konflikt / post (siehe Grafik Artikel 2012)

(?) Comprehensive – Integrative – Vernetzt? EU = integrated?

- GB = integrated: interne Vernetzung, Absprache (innerhalb Regierung / Organisation) vs. Comprehensive: externe Vernetzung versch. Akteure ohne gemeinsame Führung

1.2) Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach?

- eigene Erfahrung im Kosovo hat täglich gezeigt, dass mehr Absprache dringend nötig ist; weniger strategische Diskussion im Feld als vielmehr dringendes Bedürfnis aus der Praxiserfahrung, die politische Arbeit hier voranzubringen

2) Wie wird der Comprehensive Approach supranational umgesetzt und was sind die größten Erfolge / Probleme?

- Hier gibt es keine umfassende Antwort; diese Frage kann für einzelne Organisationen innerhalb spezifischer Missionen untersucht werden, aber einen übergreifenden Ansatz für die Praxis gibt es nicht (und kann es auch nicht geben)
- obliegt Planungsstab jeweilige HQ der Missionen, verschiedene Instrumente (permanente Institutionen, ad-hoc-Gremien u.a.)

3) Wie ist das Deutsche Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit entstanden und wie bewerten Sie es? Was erwarten Sie von den Neuen Leitlinien in diesem Kontext? (Institutionelle Strukturen: Ressortkreis/ Unterausschuss → Zukünftiges Führungsgremium?) → Theorie

- Internationale Diskussion um Comprehensive Approach → über BMVg in Deutschland diskutiert (Weißbuch 2006) etc.
- Neue Leitlinien! GEMEINSAMER Selbstverständnisbeschluss aller Ressorts / Abstimmung über Prinzipien, Instrumente, organisatorische Aufstellung unter Koordinierung des AA; Diskussion läuft über die Art und Intensität der Koordinierung (Rolle Ressortkreis / Krisenreaktionszentrum / Abteilung S)? + Länderspezifische Task Forces
- Einschätzung: Wirksamkeit Ressortkreis eher eingeschränkt, Task Forces haben teilweise besser funktioniert, aber es bleibt nach wie vor viel Luft nach oben
→ Vorstellung neue Leitlinien vermutlich Ende Mai / Anfang Juni!

4) Wie zeigt sich dieses politische Umdenken konkret in Deutschland → Praxis
a) in der Politik?

- Rhetorik: C.A. wird gebraucht! Willensbekundungen, e.g. Weißbuch 2016, Neue Leitlinien, etc.

b) im Feld / bei Missionen?

- wichtig ist Vernetzung schon vor Beginn der Mission. Durch Bundeswehreinätze etwa in Afghanistan / Mali hat die Bundeswehr und das BMVg großes Interesse an mehr Vernetzung
→ Neuausrichtung, Rollenfindung angesichts „veränderter Sicherheitslage“
- Erwartungen an Zivile: müssen Beitrag leisten, weniger Skepsis ggü. Militär und Evaluierung eigener Beiträge zu Friedenseinsätzen (v.a. Bürokratische Prozesse, Reaktionszeiten, Kommunikation)
→ fördern gemeinsame Einschätzung und Zielsetzung (= Stabilisierung) statt Ressortkonkurrenz
- Im Feld selbst gibt es häufig (Versuche von) größerer Vernetzung; oft Personenabhängig
- Rolle / Potential Task Forces kann hier weiter ausgebaut werden
- mit der EZ gibt es i.d.R. keine regelmäßige Abstimmung / diplomatische Vernetzung, arbeiten intern

c) in der Nachbereitung / bei der Erarbeitung von Best-Practice Ansätzen?

- hier ist noch sehr viel „room for improvement“: gelegentliche Evaluierungsprozesse i.d.R. unkoordiniert (z.B. Review BMZ Nordafghanistan ohne Beteiligung AA)
- Lessons-learned-Dialog vom ZIF angestoßen (Treffen Ressorts): zaghaft, wenig ergiebig
- Berichte wie von World Bank oder OECD-DAC leisten wichtige Beiträge zur internat. Diskussion
→ auch UN-Review-Prozess Peacekeeping, Veröffentlichung Juni (?)
- Mehr Evaluation der eigenen Beiträge (DE) wünschenswert, Mut zu Fehlern = Lernprozesse
- Aber: Keine Blaupausen / Toolkits → individueller Kontext und politischer Prozess entscheidend!

(?) Rolle Review-Prozess AA (2014): Entstehung [Abteilung S](#) „Krisenprävention, Stabilisierung und Konfliktnachsorge“: zum ersten Mal eigene Verortung im AA; Leitung Ressortkreis / Beirat Zivile Krisenprävention + Leitlinienprozess / Frühwarnung & Szenarienplanung etc. = gute erste Schritte, muss noch viel passieren!

5) Welchen Beitrag leistet das ZIF zur Konzeptionierung und Umsetzung des Comprehensive Approach und was sind die größten Hürden?

- Inhaltliche Beiträge / Analyse = Konzeptionierung: Policy Briefings, Publikationen, Präsentationen (u.a. im Ressortkreis, Beirat, BAKS, Ministerien, Unterausschuss → Politikberatung)

- „Mainstreaming“ Comprehensive Approach als Schwerpunktthema intern und in der internationalen Kooperation: keine Zuständigkeit 'ablegen' sondern überall ansiedeln
- Gemeinsame Trainings (Zivil, Polizei, Militär, EZ), z.B. Planspiel „[Comprehensive Approaches in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations](#)“
- Verstärkte Vernetzung (= Einbezug Standpunkte) im ZIF intern: Verbindungsbeamte, die eigene Anliegen einbringen → oft (überraschende) Schnittstellen
- HR v.a. Kontakt zu OSZE / EU: Sekundierung, Abstimmung Bedürfnisse etc.
- Evaluierungsprozess (ongoing), wie Expertise aus Einsätzen weiter genutzt werden kann

6) Wie sehen Sie die Zukunft des Vernetzten Ansatzes in Deutschland und darüber hinaus?

- Wird sich weiterentwickeln, viele Hürden sind zu überwinden, viele werden nicht zufriedenstellend überwunden werden können: unterschiedliche Interessen / Handlungstraditionen / Bürokratie / Finanzierung; hier und da Vernetzung möglich
- „Es gibt keinen Hebel, den man einfach umlegen kann“: Kleine Schritte, kein plötzlicher Wandel → Mentalität muss sich ändern!
- Weit verbreitete Reformresistenz trotz Notwendigkeit angesichts „veränderter Sicherheitslage“
- Lernprozesse als Chance, inkl. Fehlerkultur = Lessons Learnt stärken; Beispiele dafür sind u.a. verschiedene nationale Herangehensweisen (Vgl. Policy Briefing 4-Länder-Vergleich)
- Kooperation muss Konkurrenzgedanken überwinden (auch wenn Ressortkonkurrenz besteht): Besinnung auf gemeinsame Ziele statt festhalten an alten Mustern, die nicht mehr für die aktuellen Herausforderungen geeignet sind

→ Erfahrungen müssen größeren Einfluss haben als veraltete Standards (Vgl. Lernprozess)

Raum für weitere Notizen:

- Wie weit soll / darf Vernetzung gehen? Vor- und Nachteile (Flexibilität vs. Schnelle Reaktion, ...)
- Ansprechpartner BMVg / BMZ / BMI / THW etc.?
 → Stefan Köppe / Ulrich Wittkamp (ZIF); GPPi (Philipp Rothmann / Sarah Brockmeier)
 → Prof. Mickley Uni Potsdam (ggf. Sebastian Dworack fragen)
 → Sabine Jaberg (FüAk)
 → Nora Röhner (GIZ)

Zitate:

"Die Debatte zur Zukunft der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik ist definitiv mangelhaft. Es ist kein Wille vorhanden, darüber in größerem Rahmen zu diskutieren. Da ist Politik zu feige"

- André Wüstner, Vorsitzender des Bundeswehrverbandes, im [Interview mit der Tagesschau](#) am 11.02.2017

(Hintergrund war die spärliche Diskussion um die Verlängerung des Mali-Einsatzes der Bundeswehr und die fehlende Debatte um das Weißbuch 2016)

- Kürze ist nicht zwangsläufig auf Feigheit zurückzuführen, möglicherweise gute Absprache im Vorfeld
- Erweiterte Diskussion ist nötig, wurde mit Weißbuchprozess 2016 angestoßen: Einbezug breitere Aufstellung Akteure (positiv)
- Allerdings ist die unterschiedliche Debattekultur zu beachten (z.B. BMVg eher frontal vs. Offener Diskussionskultur): Kommunikation und Austausch müssen noch stärker angeregt werden, z.B. über Unterausschuss oder parlamentarische Diskussion als EINE Möglichkeit

Der Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe (VENRO) veröffentlichte 2012 einen Standpunkt, in dem er das Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit „[Konturenlos und unbrauchbar](#)“ nannte.

Zitat: „die Grenzen zwischen militärischen Aktivitäten auf der einen Seite sowie humanitären und entwicklungspolitischen Aktivitäten auf der anderen Seite [werden] verwischt. NRO, die vor Ort tätig sind, werden als Teil einer Besatzungsmacht oder gar einer Konfliktpartei wahrgenommen. Dadurch wird die eigene Sicherheit gefährdet.“ - **VENRO Standpunkt, 03/2012**

(Auf der [Webseite](#) werden aktuelle Entwicklungen berücksichtigt und schon der Standpunkt weist auf die Wichtigkeit der Leitlinien hin, die Problematik wird aber nach wie vor konstatiert)

- Berechtigte Einwände und notwendige Diskussion, ist aber etwas abgeflacht und wurde konstruktiv vorangebracht (Vgl. gemeinsame Empfehlungen VENRO & Bundeswehr FriEnt)
- Hintergrund: schlechte Kommunikation (v.a. Minister Niebel: Fördergelder nur an Träger, die sich zum Vernetzten Ansatz bekennen: „kontraproduktiv und unnötig“) führt zur Abschreckung
- C.A. Bedeutet NICHT einheitliche Führung: Koordinierung, Kooperation
- Produktiver Austausch nötig, Mediation, Förderung gegenseitiges (Selbst-)Verständnis / Logik & Strategien
- Frage nach Zuständigkeiten: z.B. Autorität / Rang Zivil & Militär: Absprache statt Blockieren
- Problematik rotierendes Personal

Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz



Bundesministerium
der Verteidigung

Befragte Person:

Oberstleutnant Ulrich Wittkamp

Verbindungsoffizier am ZIF seit 2011

Bereich Analyse & Training

Arbeitsgruppe Vernetztes Handeln

05.05.2017

Eröffnungsfrage: Bitte erzählen Sie kurz etwas über Ihre Arbeit im ZIF und Ihren beruflichen Werdegang.

- 2 Jahre Dezernat Sicherheitspolitik beim BMVg, Referat „Sicherheitspolitik Neue Weltmächte“ (Fokus China / Indien; Sicherheitspolitische Interessen, Auswirkungen Interessen Deutschland)
- Zum ZIF gekommen als Verbindungsoffizier für die AG Vernetzter Ansatz, wofür das BMVg auf Anfrage einen Posten geschaffen hat (offizieller Titel: „wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter Stabsoffizier“)

1) Was ist in Ihren Worten Vernetzte Sicherheit, wie ist dieser Ansatz entstanden und wie bewerten Sie ihn? Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach?

- Vernetzter Ansatz = Einbezug aller erforderlicher Akteure (national, regional, lokal, global) zur Schaffung von Sicherheit (= befriedetes Umfeld)
- Begriff „Vernetzte Sicherheit“: Weißbuch 2006 (≈ whole-of-government): ressortübergreifende Zusammenarbeit zur Bearbeitung von Krisen (v.a. AA, BMVg, BMZ, BMI)
- Begriff Vernetzte *Sicherheit* negativ besetzt (Primat des Militärischen), daher heute eher Vernetztes Handeln/ Vernetzter Ansatz → positive Entwicklung, da veränderter Sicherheitsbegriff über innere/ äußere Sicherheit hinaus: Erweiterung, u.a. *Human Security* → über physische Sicherheit hinaus → Sicherheit ist schon lange nicht mehr nur Uniform; entspricht nicht mehr Realität [von Konflikten] → Anknüpfungspunkt EZ: Friedensschaffung & -erhaltung über militärische/ wirtschaftliche / politische Maßnahmen hinaus (z.B. Arbeitsplätze schaffen in Post-Konflikt-Situationen, WB 2016)
- Eigene Meinung: Vernetzung ist dringend erforderlich; Engagement muss koordiniert werden, vom kleinsten Level (Informationsaustausch) bis zu coordinated efforts
- Vernetzter Ansatz ist KEIN Instrument, sondern ein Mittel zu Zweck; es gibt keine Patentrezepte (Bsp. Ressortkreis: Nur Informationsaustausch, keine Entscheidungsgewalt: *Inhalte* entscheidend)

2) Wie wird der Comprehensive Approach supranational umgesetzt und was sind die größten Erfolge / Probleme (z.B. NATO, aber auch bilaterale Zusammenarbeit à la 1.GNC)?

- über 'whole-of-gov' hinaus: alle beteiligten Akteure/Levels, innerhalb und zwischen Institutionen
- große Organisationen (UN, EU) v.a. Integrated Approach: Unterorgane, z.B. UN country teams → darüber hinaus v.a. über Grundsätze (global ownership, do no harm etc.)
- Instrument/Institutionalisierung Vernetzung/Informationsaustausch fehlt (unilaterale Einsätze)

(?) NATO = Ursprung Vernetzter Ansatz / Comprehensive Approach

- Jung (BMVg) 2006: „ich habe den Vernetzten Ansatz in die NATO gebracht“
- gleichzeitig: Non-Paper mehrere Länder Vorschlag Comprehensive Approach Krisenbewältigung
- seit dem viel geändert v.a. wg. Kritik militärischer „Kontrollversuch“ → heute wird deshalb von „NATO's *contribution* to a Comprehensive Approach gesprochen: Anerkennung Wichtigkeit politische Komponente (z.B. Senior Civilian Representative NATO in Afghanistan + Resolute Support)
- Trotzdem weiterhin einziger globaler Akteur, der über robuste militärische Kapazitäten verfügt → wenn militärische Mission, dann unter NATO-Führung (z.B. nicht UN-unterstellt)

- Neuer Fokus *Krisenprävention*: Defense Capacity Building inkl. zivile Beiträge (Infrastruktur, Training, Ausbildung → nicht nur militärische- oder Polizeiaufgaben)

3) Wie ist das Deutsche Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit entstanden und wie bewerten Sie es?

- seit 2006 Diskussion veränderter Sicherheitsbegriff: inhaltlich zu Ende geführt
- Vernetztes Handeln heute politisch unumstritten (siehe z.B. Unterausschuss, Ressortkreis, Task Forces AA) → Notwendigkeit Koordination erkannt, wobei die Intensität je nach Fall variieren muss
- Praxis → Fehlen von Institutionen/Kapazitäten (Ressortkreis: nur Informationsaustausch- Wirkung?)
- besteht noch Entwicklungspotential (Wirkung nach außen, aber auch innenpolitisch), nicht schlimm
- Grenzen innere und äußere Sicherheit verschwimmen zusehends (Terrorabwehr, Cybercrime, hybride Aktivitäten abwehren, z.B. Informationspolitik gegen BRD)
- Trennung Polizei und Militär in Deutschland strikter als anderswo – wenn aufrecht erhalten werden soll, dann Evaluierung Kompetenzen und Erweiterung notwendige Kapazitäten v.a. bei Polizei

4) Wie zeigt sich dieses politische Umdenken konkret in Deutschland

a) in der Politik?

- Ressortkreis / Unterausschuss → derzeit im „Dauerschlaf“!? Aber: keine Entscheidungsmacht
- gemeinsames Budget „Ertüchtigung“ AA + BMVg (z.B. Arbeitsplatzförderung, Beispiel Finanzierung Fuhrpark Regierung + Ausbildung Mechaniker, ggf. Finanzierung Werkstatt)
- dabei wichtig: internationale Koordination (regelmäßig Doppelprojekte, etwa zwei Polizeistationen, finanziert von DE / USA), aber Einbezug nationale / lokale (etc.) Interessen
→ niemals perfekte Koordination möglich, politisches Erfordernis unterliegt nationalen Interessen
- Problem Umsetzung Strategien: Bsp. Leitlinien Fragile Staaten = ressortübergreifend, ABER völlig verschiedene Definitionen/Arbeitsweisen „fragile Staaten“ → unlogisch, inkonsequent (Vgl. *Ressortträgheit, Andreas*) → politische Kultur DE, fehlende Institutionalisierung

b) im Feld / bei Missionen?

- Trennung Polizei / Militär: deutsches Phänomen, nicht übertragbar, daher z.B. keine Beteiligung an UN Police Units; darum auch Fehlentscheidung deutsche Einsatzleitung Polizeimission Afghanistan
→ Bsp. Grenzsicherung: In DE Polizeiaufgabe anders als in den meisten anderen Ländern
- Auslandsmissionen heute z.T. mehr Polizei als Militär & mehr bilateral
→ veränderter Sicherheitsbegriff: Wichtigkeit politische Komponente unstrittig
- Irak: Bsp. Ad-Hoc Kooperation (lokal, international): Ertüchtigungsmission (aber BMVg-Budget)
→ aber keine festen Instrumente/Institutionen für Vernetztes Handeln

c) in der Nachbereitung / bei der Erarbeitung von Best-Practice Ansätzen?

- BMVg: systematische Evaluierung Einsätze Schwerpunkt taktisch/operativ; Leitfrage: tragen Mittel & Maßnahmen der Bundeswehr zur Befriedung bei? ≠ Gesamtevaluierung
- BMZ: eigene Reviewinstrumente (Vgl. *Interview Andreas: gemeinsamer Review abgelehnt durch AA*)
- AA: kein systematischer Review einzelner Operationen (aber Review-Prozess 2014 intern)
- Evaluierung insgesamt schwer, keine Fehlerkultur in DE (muss geändert werden: Lernprozesse!)
- politische Kultur in Deutschland: Erfolg messen ohne vorherige Zielformulierung (langsame Entwicklung, u.a. WB 2016) → nationale Interessen/Strategien

(?) "Ertüchtigungs-Initiative": Entscheidung und Erfahrungen? (Frage Felix)

- Entscheidung: vermutlich aus Erkenntnis dringende Notwendigkeit bessere Koordination
- gemeinsames Budget = erste Erfahrung in diesem Bereich, noch keine Evaluierungen
- Vorschneller Beschluss? Bislang fehlt klare Definition für Notwendigkeit / Ziele

- Problem internationaler Koordination besteht weiter (z.B. 2 Polizeistationen)
- Arbeit läuft erst langsam an, erste Anfragen aus AA/BMVg (u.a. ans ZIF) kommen erst jetzt
→ wie kann man im Bereich Ertüchtigung kooperieren, welche Kapazitäten stehen zur Verfügung?
- Guter Ansatz, aber Projekte dürfen nicht zu militärisch werden (Zielfindung/ Strategie!)

5) Welchen Beitrag leistet das BMVg / das ZIF zur Konzeptionierung und Umsetzung des Comprehensive Approach und was sind die größten Hürden und welche Rolle spielen etwa die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr (ab 2010) / Dresdner Erlass (2012)?

- Neuausrichtung / Erlasse = interne Umstrukturierungen ohne äußeren Bezug (≠ Vernetzter Ansatz)
- BMVg: Einsatz für mehr Koordination in der Konfliktprävention und -bewältigung: Ressortprinzip ja, aber Entscheidungsprozesse müssen auch zu Entscheidungen führen (fehlende Durchsetzungskraft)
- BMZ unterstützt Anspruch, BMI zurückhaltend, Kanzleramt inaktiv; AA erkennt Notwendigkeit an, will aber auch keine Koordinationsrolle übernehmen → Einschätzung stark personenabhängig!
- Lösung: Koordination unter Führung Kanzleramt? Vgl. [Artikel 65 GG](#): Ressort- **plus** Kanzlerprinzip!
- **Weil Kanzleramt Rolle nicht wahrnimmt, entsteht ein Machtvakuum, das dann auf die mittlere Führungsebene entfällt → politische Karriere vor ganzheitlichen Ansprüchen**
- Es fehlt vorhandenen Instrumenten an Entscheidungsmacht/eigenen Mitteln → Wirksamkeit? Gilt v.a. Für Ressortkreis/Beirat, aber auch Task Forces AA (Vgl. Leitlinienprozess/Review)
- Aktuelle Bilanz Koalitionsvertrag: Last-Minute-Vereinbarungen auf Arbeitsebene, nach außen Präsentation Erfolgsbilanz, während vieles nicht besprochen/angepackt wird
- Rolle Medien/öffentliche Meinung: besonders BMVg gerne in öffentlicher Kritik („*Flinten-Uschi*“)

6) Was erwarten Sie von den Neuen Leitlinien in diesem Kontext?

- Beteiligung AG Vernetztes Handeln: Vorschläge präsentiert inkl. Erfahrungen anderer Länder
- Veröffentlichung eigentlich im 1. Quartal geplant / angekündigt im Review 2014: polit. Uneinigkeit
- Einigung auf Prinzipien für alle gemeinsamen Beschlüsse unter Leitlinien → BMZ hat Evaluierung bereits als Grundlage (auch GIZ), ist viel weiter als AA/BMVg (und auch BMI)
- Wie geht es weiter? Rolle Minister/ Einschätzung & Rolle Bundestagswahl (auch parteipolitisch)
- Nur sinnvoll, wenn konkrete Institutionen/Instrumente + strukturierte Entscheidungsprozesse ausgehandelt werden (nicht einfach „alten Wein in neuen Schläuchen“)
- Bsp. Ertüchtigung: Gelder in Staaten, mit denen BMZ nicht kooperiert (Menschenrechte): kontraproduktiv (→ *Bestehen auf „entwicklungspolitische Unbedenklichkeit“ als Grundsatz = zentraler Knackpunkt aktuelle Verhandlungen*)

7) Wie sehen Sie die Zukunft des Vernetzten Ansatzes in Deutschland und darüber hinaus?

- Notwendig: Weiterentwicklung! (nicht Konzept, sondern Umsetzung: Instrumente, Strukturen)
- Dabei zwingende Voraussetzung: (politische) Sichtbarkeit durch Unterausschuss: können (anders als Ressortkreis/Beirat) Informationen von Ressorts einfordern (geschlossene Sitzungen)
- Leitlinien werden keine entscheidenden Veränderungen bringen; gebraucht wird ein Ressortkreis mit ENTSCHEIDUNGSBEFUGNIS, Beteiligung/Eigeninitiative aller (relevanten) Ministerien, gerne unter Leitung Kanzleramt: Besinnen auf Doppelaufgabe = Umsatz eigene und **gemeinsame** Politik

(?) Informationsaustausch ZIF ↔ BMVg und andere über Verbindungsbeamte?

- Zif will Schnittstellen schaffen bzgl. internationale Friedenseinsätze (z.B. Trainingspartnerplattform = „gelebtes Vernetztes Handeln“: weltweit einzigartig, inkl. Einbezug Internationale)
- aber wieder: Kooperation an der Basis, i.d.R. kein Einfluss auf politische Entscheidungsträger
- informeller Charakter ≠ ressortübergreifend: würde scheitern, keine Einigung möglich

- Eigene Rolle im ZIF: gemeinsame **konzeptionelle** Arbeit ≠ ministerial → keine Ressortzwänge Sachfragen (z.B. Veröffentlichungen); so nicht möglich Ministerium (wäre „politisches Eigentor“)

Zitate:

„Die Debatte um die Zukunft der Deutschen Sicherheitspolitik ist definitiv mangelhaft. Es ist kein Wille vorhanden, darüber in größerem Rahmen zu diskutieren. Da ist Politik zu feige“

- André Wüstner, Vorsitzender des Bundeswehrverbandes am 11.02.2017 im Tagesschau-Interview
(Hintergrund war die fehlende parlamentarische Diskussion über das Weißbuch 2016 und die Verlängerung des Einsatzes in Mali, im Januar nach unter 1stündiger Debatte beschlossen)

- Zunächst vertritt Wüstner einen Interessenverband; kann Meinung freier äußern als meisten Soldaten (Prinzip politische Zurückhaltung)
- Zu wenig politische Debatte Sicherheitspolitik (≠ Verteidigung!); ja, da nicht öffentlichkeitswirksam
- Mehr Diskussion nötig, aber statt Feigheit vielmehr Mangel Durchsetzungskraft: begrenztes Zeitfenster parlamentarische Debatten: öffentlichkeitswirksame Themen (→ Parteipolitik) ≠ SiPol
- **Eine sicherheitspolitische Strategie muss aber aus der Politik kommen, nicht aus den Ressorts!**
- Fehlende Diskussion WB: nicht überraschend
- WB-Prozess = öffentlich, breite Expertise einbezogen, transparent
- Formulierung Katalog deutscher Interessen als positive Entwicklung → zielführend, strategisch
- Aber: Fehler Zusammenlegung mit „Zukunft der Bundeswehr“: SiPol als Gesamtkonzept Regierung → sollte separat sein vom BMVg; WB = Kanzleramt: übergreifende Konzeptionierung, Abwendung Kritik „Primat des Militärischen“ / „Militarisierung Außenpolitik“ (s.u.)

Der Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe bezeichnete das deutsche Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit als „Konturenlos und Unbrauchbar“ und konstatierte: „NRO, die vor Ort tätig sind, werden als Teil einer Besatzungsmacht oder gar einer Konfliktpartei wahrgenommen. Dadurch wird die eigene Sicherheit gefährdet.“

-VENRO Standpunkt, März 2012 (auf der Webseite wird zwar auf aktuelle Entwicklungen hingewiesen, das Papier scheint aber nach wie vor der Status Quo zu sein)

- Altes Argument „Militarisierung der Außenpolitik“: Vermutung militärischer Führungsanspruch
- signifikanter Unterschied zwischen Streitkräften (Strategie / Zielsetzung zwingend notwendig) und anderen Regierungsorganisationen und NRO
- NROs: eigener Anspruch, Unabhängigkeit: keine Unterordnung/Beteiligung (sogar an Diskussion!?) → anderes Selbstverständnis: weniger strategisch, Fokus Arbeit vor Ort
- BMVg: Koordination & ggf. Kooperation zwingend notwendig für Effizienz /inkl. NRO)
- Gemeinsame Vereinbarung (2013): Umgang miteinander im Feld: Ist schon Koordination und damit Vernetztes Handeln!
- Problem Koordination: alle wollen koordinieren, keiner koordiniert werden
- Wenn staatliche Gelder kann Koordination verlangt werden (≠ Unterwerfungszwang)
→ **Wirksamkeit vor Ort entscheidend!**



Befragte Person:

Anonym

Wissenschaftlicher Referent

Auswärtiges Amt, Grundsatzreferat S01 (Grundsatzfragen fragile Staaten)

08.05.2017

Eröffnungsfrage: Bitte erzählen Sie kurz etwas über Ihre Arbeit und Ihren beruflichen Werdegang.

- wissenschaftliche Konzeptarbeit: Anschlussfähigkeit wissenschaftliche Themen ↔ Arbeit Bundesregierung (weit bis spezifisch)? → Transferprojekt (normalerweise nur Naturwissenschaften)
- Kooperation = enge, feinkörnige Zusammenarbeit ≠ nur gelegentlicher Austausch/Politikberatung: Prozessorientiert (z.B. Einbezug nichtstaatliche Akteure) → wie übertragbar auf Praxis?
- Auch: Aus- und Fortbildung (Attaché / Postenvorbereitung); Fokus Fragile Staaten

1) Was ist in Ihren Worten Vernetzte Sicherheit, wie ist dieser Ansatz (in Deutschland) entstanden und wie bewerten Sie ihn? Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach?

- Vernetztes Handeln als „leerer Signifikant“: vage, Resultat = verschiedene Deutungen/ Agenden / Strategien und Schwerpunkte Akteure
- C.A. bildet Erfahrung Friedenseinsätze seit 1990er ab (BiH aber auch Côte d'Ivoire und andere) → Militärkomponente „klassisches“ Peacekeeping nicht ausreichend: alle Akteure müssen an einen Tisch; Peacebuilding ↔ Peacekeeping: logische Konsequenz veränderte Kriegssituationen
- Sicherheitspolitisch („Vernetzte Sicherheit“; heute kaum noch gebraucht: Vernetzter Ansatz!): Versuch SiPol-Akteure (inkl. Militär), andere für Sicherheitskonzepte zu gewinnen → Aktionsplan für fragile Räume; „Zwangselemente“ = Spannung; Vernetzte „Sicherheit“ suggeriert Rangordnung → gemeinsames Handlungsfeld, trotzdem Ressortprinzip! Kooperation ≠ Koordination

**2) Wie zeigt sich dieses politische Umdenken konkret in Deutschland
a) in der Politik?**

- Ressortprinzip herrscht vor, Konkurrenz > Produktivität, Kooperation (+ **Ressorthierarchie! AA**) → Comprehensive, aber „on my own terms“ → keine gemeinsame Linie
- Bürokratiepolitik: Fehlanreiz, gemeinsame Entwicklung ist wichtig ≠ Dominanzstreit
- bes. Blick Informant: wissenschaftliche Perspektive! Einschätzung: ohne politischen/öffentlichen Druck (Bsp. Afghanistan) bleibt Entscheidungsgewalt bei Zentralen
- AA: interne Strategien / Gelder; Ressortkonkurrenz BMZ (auch Positionierung) → z.B. Flüchtlinge: AA > BMZ: Kompetenzen, Gelder: Krisenprävention (= Abteilung S) mehr als doppeltes Budget: große bürokratische Umwälzung, erhöhte Konkurrenz (Vgl. Artikel Brockmeier) → (Bsp. GIZ: verschiedene Auftraggeber, Kompetenzüberschneidung, fehlende Absprachen)
- Planungsprozesse: keine gemeinsame Linie/Strategie (Kriterien/prioritäre Aufgaben/Indikatoren)

b) im Feld / bei Missionen?

- pragmatische Vorgehensweise Auslandsvertretungen: C.A. viel mehr gelebt, „Decoupling“ HQ/Feld
- aber sobald wieder im Amt = strenge Trennung / Konkurrenz
- Idee für AA: Fortbildung nach einem Jahr auf Posten zusammen mit anderen Ressorts

c) in der Nachbereitung / bei der Erarbeitung von Best-Practice Ansätzen?

- Keine gemeinsame Erarbeitung Evaluationskriterien, kein gemeinsames Impact-Assessment
- Bsp.: BMZ-Evaluierung durch [DEVAL](#) ≠ AA; kein Rückgriff auf auf BMZ-Erfahrungen (60 Jahre!)
→ **Erfahrungen werden nicht strategisch umgesetzt auf Grund der Konkurrenzlogik!**
- NL/GB: mehr Pragmatik (NL: „gnadenlos selbstkritisch“), dadurch mehr Gewicht, in DE „undenkbar“

3) Was erwarten Sie von den [Neuen Leitlinien](#) in diesem Kontext?

- Leitlinien als Nachfolger Aktionsplan (HundlungseMPFEHLUNG)
- Leitlinienprozess als „Policy Window of Opportunity“ → Moment zur Etablierung neuer Konzepte, inkl. C. A. → derzeit Prüfung Nützlichkeit / applicability Leitlinienkonzept, strategische Schwerpunkte, Strukturen/Prozesse: Was braucht es zur Umsetzung?
- Ziel: effektive ressortgemeinsame Steuerung (Ebenenfrage); noch keine gemeinsame Linie gefunden
- Blick auf Afghanistan als Hauptbeispiel: Sonderfall (≠ bürokratischer Alltag): Vernetzung auf Grund von politischem Druck & **gegen Ressortprinzip**: BMZ, AA, BMVg und BMI
- Problem: „niemand will koordiniert werden“ und es gibt kein übergreifendes Instrument/Institution
- Task Forces (Vgl. [Leitlinien fragile Staaten](#)) für Krisenstaaten (Syrien, Jemen, Irak...): operatives Follow-up auf Bundesebene, Einbezug Ressorts + weitere (z.B. BND), aber letztlich wie Ressortkreis, kein Entscheidungsbefugnis, eher Austauschgremien
- Leitlinienentwurf: Idee eines Scharniers zwischen politischer Entscheidungs- und Arbeitsebene
→ mehr Steuerung, Kohärenz, Übergänge, KOORDINIERUNG (strittig: wer koordiniert wen?)
→ z.B. Staatssektretäresebene: Handlungspakete schnüren, gemeinsame Lagebilder/Zielsetzungen, ineinandergreifende Arbeitsteilung
- politische Strategie **gefordert aus dem Feld** (v.a. Bundeswehr) → unklare Mandate, Ziele
- **Knackpunkte Leitlinien**: Vorsitz / Entscheidungsformeln → Wahrnehmung nach außen (Wahrung Ressortprinzip/ -hoheit, öffentliches Image); Wahrung normative Grundsätze Entscheidungsebene
- AA: Kohärenz/Koordinierung: Fokus Außenpolitik (deutsche Ziele/ Interessen einhalten)
- BMZ: EZ-Unbedenklichkeit (Einschätzung: „Maximalposition“, wird nicht durchgesetzt)
- Anschlussfähigkeit Projekte: Vereinbarkeit/ Entgegenkommen nötig
- Rolle Wahlkampf: auch parteipolitische Überlegungen, aber geringes öffentliches Interesse SiPol
- Derzeit Diskussion Szenarien; Frage Veröffentlichung (und Zeitpunkt) obliegt Entscheidungsebene Ressorts (Kosten-Nutzen-Abwägung, wieder Ressortinteressen vor gemeinsamer Linie)
- Umsetzung ist noch andere Frage (Vgl. *Leitlinien Fragile Staaten, Wittkamp*)

4) Wie sehen Sie die Zukunft des Vernetzten Ansatzes in Deutschland und darüber hinaus?

- abhängig vom Comittment der Bundesregierung + Konfliktentwicklung, z.B. weiteres Vorgehen Afghanistan; möglicher Waffenstillstand Syrien (derzeit VN-Ebene) → stärkere deutsche Beteiligung
- generell vermutlich Erweiterung derzeitiges Engagement: damit steigt auch Druck
- Erfahrungsprozesse gibt es schon: **Lernprozesse entscheidend!**
- derzeit eher pessimistisch: Ressortprinzip überwiegt
- Militär ist anpassungsfähiger als Ressorts: direkte Konsequenz bei Nicht-Funktionieren (Sicherheit, aber auch Legitimität Einsätze); erkennen auch Wichtigkeit nicht-militärische Beiträge
- aber zu wenig Engagement auch aus NROs, z.B. Common Effort 2015: Vorbehalt gegen militärisches Primat, demonstratives Fernbleiben NROs, Verweigerung sogar Dialog (wenig produktiv)
- aber (positiv): derzeit „Generationenwechsel“ an vielen Stellen: leitende Positionen in Ministerien aus dem Feld: andere Sensibilität / Beitrag Lernkultur; kennen auch andere Sichtweisen (inkl. Zivile) und verfügen über Netzwerke (geht hoffentlich nicht in Ressortkonkurrenz unter)
- Auch: Einbezug Fachöffentlichkeit: v.a. [PeaceLab2016](#): „gesunder Beitrag“

Zitate:

„Die Debatte um die Zukunft der Deutschen Sicherheitspolitik ist definitiv mangelhaft. Es ist kein Wille vorhanden, darüber in größerem Rahmen zu diskutieren. Da ist Politik zu feige“

- **André Wüstner, Vorsitzender des Bundeswehrverbandes am 11.02.2017 im Tagesschau-Interview**

(Hintergrund war die fehlende parlamentarische Diskussion über das Weißbuch 2016 und die Verlängerung des Einsatzes in Mali, im Januar nach unter 1stündiger Debatte beschlossen)

- Fehlende Diskussion: ja, politische Kultur in DE: Sicherheitspolitik ist kein populäres Thema, öffentliche Ablehnung Einmischung (*Vgl. Körber-Stiftung*)
- Demgegenüber Machtinstinkt Politiker: Ressortkonkurrenz + Parteipolitik
- Diskussion (z.B. Mali) nicht politisch relevant/nicht gefordert; Formulierung Ziele/Interessen fehlt
- Balkan/ Afghanistan: klarere Linien
- ZIF als Sekundierungsorganisation: mehr Verantwortung, aber Debatte bleibt dahinter zurück
- Deutschland als neue Hegemonie: wichtige Rolle der EZ für SiPol (bes. durch neue US-Außenpolitik)

Der Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe bezeichnete das deutsche Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit als „Konturenlos und Unbrauchbar“ und konstatierte: „NRO, die vor Ort tätig sind, werden als Teil einer Besatzungsmacht oder gar einer Konfliktpartei wahrgenommen. Dadurch wird die eigene Sicherheit gefährdet.“

-**VENRO Standpunkt, März 2012** (auf der Webseite wird zwar auf aktuelle Entwicklungen hingewiesen, das Papier scheint aber nach wie vor der Status Quo zu sein)

- vage: ja, aber scharfe Konturen verhindern Aushandlungsprozess → Vernetztes Handeln ≠ „Grand Theory“: **anwendungsbezogen!** ; Präzisierung (Verknüpfung, Gewichtung, Nuancen) im Kontext
- gewollt negative Lesung Prinzip!? NGOs müssen sich mehr einmischen in Diskussion: Nachhaltigkeit
- Rezeption externe Akteure NROs: nicht klar trennbar (möglicherweise teilweise Ausnahmen); sind nicht unabhängig (staatliche Gelder) und werden von Spoilern politisch als Feindbild genutzt
→ eigenes Verhalten ist zweitrangig: **asymmetrische Konflikte** = Anreiz Missachtung Völkerrecht
→ veränderte Konfliktsituation (new wars) aber noch keine Antworten darauf, alte Instrumente

Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz



Befragte Person:

Oberst i.G. Jörg Knoechelmann

Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik

Studienbereich, Seminarleiter Kernseminar

16.05.2017

Eröffnungsfrage: Bitte erzählen Sie kurz etwas über Ihre Arbeit und Ihren beruflichen Werdegang.

- Heeressoldat (ABC-Abwehrtruppe) seit 1980
- später FüAK (Generalstabslehrgang), verschiedene Divisionsstäbe, u.a. im Bereich (Führungsunterstützung heißt heute u.a. Cyber)
- Dezetnet in der Deutschen Militärischen Vertretung der NATO in Brüssel u.a. für Einsatzfragen
- Zuletzt Referatsleiter im Planungsamt (BMVg untergeordnet; politische Abteilung)
- seit Kurzem Seminarleiter BAKS, Kernseminar

1) Was ist in Ihren Worten Vernetzte Sicherheit, wie ist dieser Ansatz entstanden und wie bewerten Sie ihn? Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach?

- andere Herangehensweise: wenn wir andere Strukturen hätten, bräuchten wir keinen Vernetzten Ansatz!
- Ressortprinzip, Föderalismus: Dezentralisierung! → Zusammenführung notwendig
- strategische Schnittstellen müssen geschaffen werden, um zentralisierte Bedrohungen abzuwehren
- schon auf nationaler Ebene sorgt die Vielzahl der Akteure/Arbeitsweisen im Sicherheitsbereich für großen Vernetzungsbedarf (allein die große Zahl der Geheimdienste; Polizeien, Kriminalämter,...), auch GOs / NGOs; international noch deutlich größere Anzahl Akteure
- Abstimmung/Austausch nötig, besonders angesichts neuer Bedrohungen (Cyber, Terror etc.)

2) Wie wird der Comprehensive Approach in der NATO umgesetzt und was sind Erfolge / Probleme?

- Zentralisierung im HQ: Ständige Vertreter der Mitgliedsstaaten vor Ort ermöglichen schnelle Reaktion + Planung über längere Zeit; Standardisierung Verfahren/Abläufe/Sprachgebrauch → Übernahme durch Mitgliedsstaaten; nicht zuletzt Entscheidungsgewalt HQ als strategischer Vorteil
- Integrierte Standorte/Truppenteile, aber v.a. bilateral (z.B. DE-NL/DE-FR)
- NATO = militärische Vernetzung (+ Partnerschaften) → **Beitrag** zum C.A.
- Besser geeignet für übergeordnete Vernetzung (inkl. ziviler Beitrag): UN, EU
- Kooperation vs. Integration: viele Länder bereit zur Kooperation (eigene Strukturen beibehalten), andere auch Integration: gemeinsame Planung, Institutionalisierung, neue Organe, eigene Personal- und Führungsstrukturen
- eigene Meinung: Vernetzung bis hin zur Integration (mindestens auf nationaler Ebene) notwendig: keine nationalen Lösungen für supranationale Krisen; föderale Unabhängigkeit „absurd“ in diesem Zusammenhang (auch z.B. Bildungspolitik): v.a. Profilierung Landespolitiker
- Warum sind Polizei/Kriminalämter nicht kompatibel? z.B. Ausrüstung, IT-Technik
- Zentralisierung angesichts neuer Bedrohungen (z.B. Terrorabwehrzentrale) bislang „Stückwerk“
- Deutsche Angst vor Zentralisierung, verengter Blickwinkel Akteure (u.a. Ressortprinzip)
- Vernetztes Handeln ist notwendig, aber dezentrale Strukturen widersprechen diesem Prinzip: Druck muss wachsen, damit Nachdenken angeregt wird und neue Prozesse angestoßen werden können
- Mission/Politik muss lokale/nationale Realitäten widerspiegeln: keine schnelle Lösungen, Fokus auf Prävention/Aufklärung, um Pattsituationen zu vermeiden (z.B. religiöser Fanatismus)
- hat in Mitteleuropa Jahrhunderte gedauert, nicht übertragbar/schnell lösbar (Vgl. Tilly)

3) Wie zeigt sich dieses politische Umdenken konkret in Deutschland

a) in der Politik?

b) im Feld / bei Missionen?

c) in der Nachbereitung / bei der Erarbeitung von Best-Practice Ansätzen?

- Bundeswehr: strukturelle Anstrengungen zur besseren Reaktion auf neue Bedürfnisse, z.B. durch neuen Bereich Cybersicherheit: Umsetzung neue Erkenntnisse in Strukturen ?; Personalaufstockung (hat beiden nichts mit Bw zu tun)
- Innenminister fordert mehr Vernetzung, Zentralisierung, aber Beibehaltung föderaler Strukturen: in letzten Jahren mehr Austausch, aber bisher eher „round-table discussions“, bei denen sich jeder mitnimmt, was er braucht (national)
- international: stark abhängig von bilateralen Beziehungen
- Bundeswehr/BMVg oft flexibler als andere, aber Vorbehalte NROs (+ROs) ggü. Militär bleiben, wenn auch mehr Dialog letzte Jahre: Anerkennung Wichtigkeit militärische Unterstützung in vielen Fällen
- viele Arten/Dimensionen von Sicherheit; insgesamt pragmatischere Vorgehensweise → neuen Bedrohungen kann nicht mit alten Strukturen begegnet werden (anders als noch z.B. Kosovo: oft komplette Sperrung NROs ggü. militärischen Komponenten)
- NROs = vielfältig: teilweise Kooperation, manche noch immer nicht, sehr unterschiedlicher Fokus
- zu beobachten: gewisse gesteigerte Pragmatik (unterhalb Leitungsebene) → Zielorientierung
- im Einsatz deutlich ausgeprägter als Leitungsebene: Zuspitzung Ideologien/Ressortkonkurrenz (auch Einfluss Wahlen, Parteipolitik: Profilierung)
- Bundeswehr handelt nach politischem Auftrag: niemand will Krieg führen, Fokus auf Prävention
- Primat des Zivilen unbedingt aufrecht erhalten, neue Formate der Kooperation finden

4) Welchen Beitrag leistet das BMVg / die BAKS zur Konzeptionierung und Umsetzung des Comprehensive Approach und was sind die größten Hürden?

- 3 Teile: Lehre (Aus- & Weiterbildung Personal); Öffentlichkeitsarbeit/Förderung öffentlicher Diskurs (Veröffentlichungen, Veranstaltungen); Plattform für andere SiPol-Akteure (Konferenzen etc.)
- nur relativ kleine stehende Struktur, davon etwa Hälfte Soldaten, aber keine Bundeswehrakademie, sondern getragen von mehreren Bundesministerien.
- geringer Personalaufwand, trotzdem große Wirkkraft (u.a. etwa 240 Veranstaltungen 2016)

(?) Öffentliches Interesse allgemein SiPol in Deutschland/ auch Leitlinienprozess?

- Politiker/Institutionen haben noch nicht die richtige Form der Außenkommunikation gefunden → breites Thema, sowohl in Bezug auf Kommunikation als auch auf Informationen
- Arbeit an Schulen („Staatsbürgerkunde“): Thematik ist nicht ausreichend sichtbar, gerade junge Menschen oft „zutiefst unpolitisch“

5) Was erwarten Sie von den Neuen Leitlinien in diesem Kontext?

- Federführung AA- ähnlich Weißbuch 2016!? Warum? Ähnliche Thematik, andere Linie?
- Weißbuch 2016: schwieriger, langwieriger Prozess; Dokument der Bundesregierung, BMVg = Herausgeber; 1. Teil übergreifende Leitprinzipien
- besser: **Kanzleramt** als Herausgeber (unterstreicht übergreifenden Charakter)
- überhaupt mehr Verantwortung gewünscht vom Kanzleramt: Führungsrolle, Koordination
- Richtlinienkompetenz öfter ausüben (schwierig bei derzeitiger Personalaufstellung)
- Koordinierung übergreifende Instanz dringend nötig, v.a. SiPol: zu große Differenz betroffene Ressorts, keine Einigung, evtl. gar Scheitern des Leitlinienprozesses

6) Wie sehen Sie die Zukunft des Vernetzten Ansatzes in Deutschland und darüber hinaus?

- Gezwungenermaßen mehr Vernetzung in Sicherheitsfragen: Druck steigt, befördert Kompromisse, auch durch steigende öffentliche Wahrnehmung Problematik
- Grundlage: technische Basis! Informationsverarbeitung / Austausch fördern & zentralisieren
- Konkurrenzfähigkeit ggü. Sicherheitsbedrohungen erhöhen, Resilienz
- Entscheidung in nicht allzu ferner Zukunft: Abschottung (wie lange? unrealistisch) vs. Teilweise Umverteilung: Wohlstand in anderen Ländern erhöhen, auch auf Kosten des eigenen
- Derzeitige marktwirtschaftliche Politik: maßlos, inkonsequent
- falschster Weg (Vgl. Fluchtursachen bekämpfen): Geldtransfer, Risiko Unterstützung der Abwanderung einer „afrikanischen Mittelschicht“ → Strukturen schaffen, die Menschen zum Bleiben bewegen
- teilweise gegensätzliche Ziele (z.B. EU-Agrarexporte): auch hausgemachte Probleme (in Afrika etc.)
- Spanische vs. Afrikanische Bauern; Marktwirtschaftliche Interessen → **alles hängt zusammen!!!**
- holistischer Ansatz notwendig

Zitate zur Stellungnahme:

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(Hintergrund war die fehlende parlamentarische Diskussion über das Weißbuch 2016 und die Verlängerung des Einsatzes in Mali, im Januar nach unter 1stündiger Debatte beschlossen)

–„Feigheit“ in Bezug auf Debatte im Bundestag = Populismus: Entscheidungen finden nicht im Parlament statt, Abstimmungen eher pro forma / in diesem Fall unstrittig

–Weißbuch: ja, hier wird Festlegung gescheut, Vermeidung Überprüfbarkeit: Parteipolitik, 4-Jahres-Limit, keine Verbindlichkeit/nachhaltige Strategie

–Deutschland braucht konkrete Sicherheitsstrukturen/Zielsetzung/Formulierung deutsche Interessen (auch Bundessicherheitsrat)

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-**VENRO [Standpunkt](#), März 2012** (auf der [Webseite](#) wird zwar auf aktuelle Entwicklungen hingewiesen und es gibt mittlerweile eine gemeinsame [Erklärung](#), das Papier scheint aber nach wie vor der Status Quo zu sein)

–lange Zeit Wahrnehmung (*siehe 3*)

–NATO/Bundeswehr: lange „Besatzungsmacht“ in Afghanistan/Kosovo (mind. lokale Wahrnehmung)

–aber: wenn das Leid zu groß ist, kann der Einsatz von Gewalt nicht immer vermieden werden (Druck auch aus Öffentlichkeit steigt, Vgl. Syrien)

–Dennoch: muss strategisch (& politisch!) begleitet werden, keine unsinnige Realpolitik wie in BiH/ Kosovo: mehr Beruhigung des Gewissens/ der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung (z.B. Minority returns)

→ Militär muss TEIL der Lösung sein, nicht dauerhaft

Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz



Befragte Person:

Bodo Schulze

Department for Global Policy and Development

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Berlin (vorher BMZ/GIZ)

Reflection Group „Monopoly on the use of force 2.0?“

16.05.2017

Eröffnungsfrage: Bitte berichten Sie kurz über Ihre Arbeit bei der FES und Ihren beruflichen Werdegang.

- seit 1 Jahr FES, vorher FriEnt, BMZ; Fokus MENA-Region
→ Themen: Ressortfragen (Koordinierung AA ↔ BMZ), Abgrenzungen Übergangshilfe/EZ
- FES: weniger Ressortbezug; v.a. parlamentarische Perspektive

1) Was ist in Ihren Worten Vernetzte Sicherheit, wie ist dieser Ansatz entstanden und wie bewerten Sie ihn? Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach? Wie zeigt sich dieses politische Umdenken konkret in Deutschland?

- institutionelle Ebene: staatlich, ressortübergreifende Schnittstellen schaffen
- inhaltliche Ebene: „thematische Silos überwinden“ (z.B. Vielzahl Unterausschüsse), Brücken brauen
- Stärkste Ressortkonkurrenz: AA/BMZ, noch mehr durch Abteilung S + höhere Finanzierung
- AA: Projekte eher kurzfristig angelegt, bis Review-Prozess weniger Finanzierung als BMZ
- Aber: BMZ-Perspektive ist wichtig! Krisenprävention langfristig denken, professionelles Selbstverständnis = nachhaltig, local ownership etc.
→ **wichtige Diskussion: Gesamtkonzept Selbstverständnis außenpolitisches Handeln**
- C.A. = übersektionales Konzept (+ Aktionsplan; Ressortkreis/Beirat; länderspezifische Task Forces AA); Bsp. Afghanistan: Evaluierung deutsche Rolle interministerial (+ SFB 700, FU)
- Prozessorientiert, aber KEIN Wissensmanagement über Ressortkreis hinaus → problematisch, v.a. angesichts Rotationsprinzip: keine nachhaltigen Lernprozesse, aber viele Fortschritte letzte 10 Jahre
- Austauschbeamte (BMVg, AA, BMZ), aber: Einzelpersonen; auch Einbezug andere Ressorts (Syrien)
- Referat Fragile Staaten: groß, wichtige Platzierung AA, aber „Thema ist noch kein Selbstläufer“
- Ressortkreis: wichtig, aber keine Entscheidungsbefugnis; keine gemeinsamen Beschlüsse/Budgets
→ zentrale Forderung Beirat im Leitlinienprozess: gemeinsame Prozesse/Strukturen; Perspektive: Analyse, Frühwarnung etc.)
- Ausnahme: **Ertüchtigungsinitiative** (AA/BMVg): „sang & klanglos“ ins Leben gerufen worden
→ Interessenskonvergenzen, v.a. angesichts Entwicklungen MENA/Sicherheitspartnerschaften;
→ zweiseitiges Instrument-auch gefährlich! Regierung macht es sich zu leicht, zulasten Planung, Nachhaltigkeit, Verträglichkeitsprüfung: Budget alleine reicht nicht (100 Mio 2016; 160 Mio 2017!)
→ problematisch: Beitrag Erhalt Status-quo, Regimesicherheit ≠ menschliche Sicherheit; kein Einbezug zivilgesellschaftliche/politische Prozesse: zu kurz gedacht, nicht reflektiert
→ Human Security muss größere Rolle spielen, derzeit keine + stärkere strategische Einbettung: welche Interessen stehen im Vordergrund, wer trägt die **Verantwortung?** → **WHOSE SECURITY?**
→ local ownership? Welche Akteure unterstützen? Menschenrechtsfragen, Fokus Stabilisierung/Capacity development/ Prävention, ...
→ eigentlich wollte DE weg von Unterstützung einzelner Akteure, schlechte Erfahrungen (Ägypten)
- offene Fragen: welches Verständnis Krisenprävention/-management? Gemeinsame Planung?

- Präventionsgedanke wird wichtiger (Vgl. Agenda 2030 / [DNS](#)); „Deutsche Verantwortung“
→ Sensibilisierung richtige Richtung; langsamer „Kulturwandel“ Ministerien, aber schwierig zu lobbyieren. SDGs: „atmen und leben Comprehensive Approach“: integrierte Perspektive
- Konnotation „Sicherheit“: Vernetztes **Handeln** (Vgl. Human Development Report: freedom from/of)
→ Gefahr der Instrumentalisierung normativer Logiken zu beschränken (militärisches Primat); Sensibilisierung schon weit (Begriff)
- Deutsche Debatte: geprägt durch Erfahrungen in Afghanistan, mehr Pragmatik aus Erfahrungen (z.B. auch Bundeswehr: auch Wahrnehmung als Problematik)
- Im Feld: weniger Berührungängste letzte Jahre: Lernprozesse, ggs. Annäherung
- Botschaften müssen größere Rolle spielen (vs. derzeitige Personalsituation), Vgl. Schweiz: Conflict Prevention Devices; Mediation mehr in den Vordergrund
→ Institutionslogik vs. Realität, v.a. auch Rotationsprinzip, Personalaufstellung (fachlich vs. diplo)
- Bundesebene = 'urpolitische' Entscheidung: politische Mandatierung Ressortaufgaben/Bundeswehr
→ „framing Vernetzung“: SiPol Bedrohung vs. andere frames: bedingt Analyse/Reaktion/Werkzeuge

2) Welchen Beitrag leisten deutsche NROs zur Konzeptionierung und Umsetzung des Comprehensive Approach und was sind die größten Hürden?

- Umsetzung: Nicht Aufgabe von NROs → staatlicher Ansatz!
- Inhaltliche Konzeptionierung: Fachsilos überwinden (auch andere Ebenen, z.B. international: UN)
→ mehr an einem Strang ziehen, statt sich selbst zu zersplittern, nicht in eigener Logik verharren (z.B. Finanzierungslogik: Projektbudgets vs. Nachhaltigkeit)

3) Was erwarten Sie von den [Neuen Leitlinien](#) in diesem Kontext?

- Restrukturierung: Ansatz kommt vom AA (Abteilung S): Positionierung im Diskurs (vs. WB 2016)
→ „absurd“, dass Leitlinien neben Weißbuch stehen mit unterschiedlichen Positionen! Gebraucht wird ein strategisches Dach, aus den die Ressorts ihre eigenen Konzepte ableiten können
- Friedenspolitik (auch Forderung Zivilgesellschaft): braucht übergreifende Strategie
- Fokus Zivile Krisenprävention – Formulierung gestrichen im Entwurf? Problematisch
- WB 2016: Teil 1 sind eigentlich gemeinsame Leitlinien (Federführung AA)
→ einheitliches, übergreifendes Dokument wird benötigt: besser geeignet für Debatte, wird von Zivilgesellschaft begrüßt, hätte Diskussionen vermeiden können
- Streit derzeit: Führung (BMVg will Sicherheitsrat zur Steuerung, AA lehnt das ab) → Ressortprinzip!
- BMZ: „ganz zufrieden“ mit Prozess; hat v.a. in dieser Legislaturperiode an Profil verloren (z.B. Sektorschwerpunkte; Frames à la „Fluchtursachen bekämpfen“)

4) Wie sehen Sie die Zukunft des Vernetzten Ansatzes in Deutschland und darüber hinaus?

- Schwierig: Rolle Wahlen (auch Einfluss auf Leitlinienprozess): Ressort-/Parteikonkurrenz steigt
- Starke Führung nötig, um Ressorts zur Raison zu bringen → Richtlinienkonzept Kanzleramt (Ressorts = träge, „Kooperation nur solange es nicht weh tut“); Ressorts alleine überwinden Konkurrenz nicht
- Notwendig: politische Begleitung/Koordinierung (Vgl. Realpolitik / Einfluss Populismus vs. Grundgedanke Friedensarbeit), stärkere Rolle auch Zivilgesellschaft in Beratung/Beobachtung
- Mehr Flexibilität Haushaltsmittel v.a. in Hinblick auf ziviles Engagement: wieso noch nicht passiert?
- Ausblick: Kein Rückschritt, aber Fortschritt unsicher; weitere Institutionalisierung durch Abteilung S

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- ja, aber zu einfach, es hat sich viel getan („Neue Deutsche Verantwortung“)
- auch realpolitisch wird sich etwas tun: Zugzwang (EU, NATO, Trump, Orbán etc.); Druck steigt, DE als Mittlermacht (Struktur, Politik), 4.größter Beitragszahler UN, aber kaum aktive Rolle (personell)
→ Rolle DE: außenpolitisch vs. innenpolitische Debatte als Begleitung! Diskurs findet nicht statt
- „Außenpolitik gewinnt keine Wahlen“ – Stillstand, aber stärkere öffentliche Sensibilisierung
- Diskurs Beitragssenkung USA → UN: multilaterale Anstrengungen müssen gestärkt werden, eingebunden in Reformprinzipien (Vgl. Reformprozess Guterres!)
- Sekundierungsgesetz ZIF: v.a. intern, keine große Außenwirkung (inkl. AA); ZIF als „GIZ des AA“?

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- Erfahrungen Afghanistan/ Niebel: Vereinnahmung „Vernetzte Sicherheit“ als Grundlage/Guidelines
- Einschätzung abhängig vom jeweiligen Kontext! Asymmetrien; verschiedene interne Logiken
- Kommunikationsprobleme ROs/NROs: „soft info“ relevanter/interessanter für ROs als vice versa
- **Unterschied humanitäre Hilfe & EZ!** NROs = auch Mischorganisationen (siehe VENRO): politische Affiliation als Problem für Unabhängige; Anspruch verwischt (in Debatte)
- Humanitäre: Unbedingt abgrenzen (Vgl. ICRC, MSF), aber nicht mehr Sicherheitsgarantie/Immunität
- Code of Conduct BMVg: Bezug auf EZ ≠ Humanitäre; wichtige Unterscheidung!

Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz (20. Mai 2017)

Befragte Person:

Dr. Sabine Jaberg

Dozentin Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg Mitherausgeberin der Zeitschrift Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F) Mitglied Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung e.V.



20.05.2017

Eröffnungsfrage: Bitte erzählen Sie kurz etwas über Ihre Arbeit und Ihren beruflichen Werdegang.

Seit 1999 arbeite ich als Dozentin am heutigen Fachbereich Politik und Gesellschaftswissenschaften an der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr. Mein Fachgebiet ist die Politikwissenschaft mit Schwerpunkt Friedensforschung. Von 1992 bis 1994 war ich Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH). Meine Masterarbeit beschäftigte sich mit der KSZE/OSZE, meine Dissertation mit Systemen kollektiver Sicherheit und meine Habilitationsschrift mit der Friedensforschung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

1) Was ist in Ihren Worten Vernetzte Sicherheit, wie ist dieser Ansatz entstanden und wie bewerten Sie ihn? Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach?

Wenngleich bereits der Aktionsplan Zivile Krisenprävention von 2004 die allgemeine Idee der Vernetzung propagierte, etablierte erst das Weißbuch 2006 das spezielle Schlagwort der vernetzten Sicherheit. Von ihm erhoffte sich die hohe Politik konzeptionelle Antworten auf jene Problemlagen, die sie seit Beginn der neunziger Jahre im Lichte eines weiten Sicherheitsbegriffs gezeichnet hatte.

Sicherheit markiert damit das Themenfeld. Vernetzung sagt lediglich etwas über den Bearbeitungsmodus aus. Letztlich ließe sich jedes beliebige Themenfeld „vernetzen“: Frieden, Entwicklung, Soziales etc. Vernetzung im Sinne des Weißbuchs wiederum weist mehrere Komponenten auf: Es geht um einen maßgeschneiderten Mix ziviler und militärischer Mittel sowie eine möglichst effektive Verschränkung gesellschaftlicher und staatlicher Akteure auf nationaler wie internationaler Ebene. Vernetzte Sicherheit ist damit auch ein sozialtechnologisches Optimierungsprogramm.

Comprehensive Approach gilt zwar als englisches Pendant zur vernetzten Sicherheit. Gleichwohl handelt es sich nicht um Synonyme. Während der Comprehensive Approach begrifflich nur auf einen nicht näher spezifizierten umfassenden Anspruch hinweist, verpflichtet vernetzte Sicherheit auf ein bestimmtes Paradigma (Sicherheit) und einen bestimmten Organisationsmodus (Vernetzung). Gleichwohl schließt auch der Comprehensive Approach unterschwellige paradigmatische Aufladungen nicht aus. Das gilt umso mehr, als er historisch-genetisch im Wesentlichen ein Konzept der NATO darstellt, das aber auch in der EU in modifizierter Form reüssiert. Insofern müsste im Einzelfall geschaut werden, ob der Comprehensive Approach tatsächlich mehr oder gar etwas anderes ist als smarte force protection.

2) Wie wird der Comprehensive Approach supranational umgesetzt und was sind die größten Erfolge / Probleme (z.B. NATO, EU, OSZE auch bilaterale Zusammenarbeit wie 1. Deutsch-Niederländische Korps)?

Die Gleichsetzung von NATO, EU und OSZE ist problematisch. NATO und EU sind exklusive Zusammenschlüsse von Staaten, die ihren Comprehensive Approach in Krisen und Konflikten anwenden, die außerhalb ihres eigenen Territoriums stattfinden. Insofern geht es hier auch um imperiale/hegemoniale/postkoloniale Ordnungspolitik. Die Frage, ob diese Politik mehr oder weniger umfassend, mehr oder weniger vernetzt stattfindet, ist dabei zweitrangig. Demgegenüber handelt es sich bei der OSZE wie auch der UNO, die Sie in Ihrer Frage nicht explizit ansprechen, um inklusive Organisationen. Bei ihnen sind Wirkungskreis und Teilnehmerkreis identisch. Die UNO betreibt auf Basis

ihrer Charta, die alle Mitgliedstaaten unterzeichnet haben, ordnungspolitisch betrachtet Weltinnenpolitik, die OSZE als regionale Abmachung/Einrichtung nach Kapitel VIII der Charta Regionalinnenpolitik. Im sicherheitspolitischen Vokabular handelt es sich bei der OSZE um ein kooperatives, bei der UNO aufgrund ihrer zusätzlichen Zwangsbefugnis um ein kollektives Sicherheitssystem. Diese kategorialen Differenzen zwischen NATO/EU einerseits und UNO/OSZE andererseits werden durch die unterschiedslose Subsumtion unter den „Comprehensive Approach“ eskamotiert. Sie müssten aber im Gegenteil deutlich sichtbar gemacht werden.

3) Wie zeigt sich dieses politische Umdenken konkret in Deutschland? **a) in der Politik?**

Die Einführung des „Konzepts“ der vernetzten Sicherheit steht gerade nicht für ein politisches Umdenken im Sinne eines Paradigmenwechsels. Paradigmenwechsel würde bedeuten, sich von einer einfachen Sicherheitslogik zu verabschieden und sich einer reflexiven Sicherheitspolitik, wenn nicht gar Friedenspolitik zuzuwenden. Erstes Kennzeichen der Sicherheitslogik ist ihre (einseitige) Gewaltindifferenz: Der Akteur will nicht selbst Opfer von Gewalt werden, ist dazu aber bereit, anderen Gewalt anzudrohen oder gar anzutun. Das zweite Merkmal ist ihre Asymmetrie: Gemäß Sicherheitslogik nehmen Akteure für sich Rechte selbstverständlich in Anspruch, die sie ihren Konkurrenten absprechen (z.B. auf Macht- und Gewaltausübung). Auch die Lagebeschreibung erfolgt im Modus der Asymmetrie: Demnach sind es stets die anderen, die die Probleme verursachen, die für den jeweiligen Akteur zur politischen Herausforderung werden, die er glaubt, auch militärisch bewältigen zu dürfen bzw. zu müssen. Allenfalls geriert er sich noch als Helfer in der Not. Die eigenen Anteile an der Problemgenese geraten weder analytisch noch praxeologisch in den Blick. Das wäre bei einer selbstreflexiven Sicherheits- oder Friedenspolitik anders. Vernetzte Sicherheit könnte allenfalls als Impulsgeber oder Katalysator eines interministeriellen Austausches fungiert haben, der eigentlich selbstverständlich sein sollte. Noch vor Verabschiedung des Weißbuchs 2006 und ohne den Begriff der vernetzten Sicherheit zu verwenden, ruft der Aktionsplan Zivile Krisenprävention 2004 einen interministeriellen Ressortkreis ins Leben, der unter Federführung des Auswärtigen Amts steht. Zwar ist auch ein Beirat gegründet worden, in dem zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure die Bundesregierung in Sachen Krisenprävention beratend begleiten sollen. Allerdings tut sich die Bundesregierung wohl immer noch schwer damit, zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren auf Augenhöhe zu begegnen. Außerdem gibt es Anzeichen dafür, dass sich im Ressortkreis das Gewicht zugunsten des Verteidigungsministeriums verschieben könnte.

b) im Feld / bei Missionen?

Diese Frage können Praktiker besser beantworten. Meines Wissens gibt es Nichtregierungsorganisationen, die intensiv mit dem Militär zusammenarbeiten, aber auch andere, die jede Nähe zu ihm meiden, um ihre Neutralität zu unterstreichen und ihre Sicherheit bessergewährleisten zu können. Hier dürfte eine Befragung von Vertretern einschlägiger Organisationen mehr Aufschluss versprechen.

c) in der Nachbereitung / bei der Erarbeitung von Best-Practice Ansätzen?

Diese Frage können Praktiker besser beantworten.

4) Welchen Beitrag leistet das BMVg / die Führungsakademie zur Konzeptionierung und Umsetzung des Comprehensive Approach und was sind die größten Hürden?

Diese Fragen sollten Sie mit Dr. Berns besprechen, der an der FüAk am Fachbereich PGW I dieses Themenfeld betreut.

5) Welche Rolle spielen die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr (ab 2010), der Dresdner Erlass (2012) und das Weißbuch 2016 bei der weiteren Vernetzung auf nationaler, aber auch internationaler Ebene?

Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr bzw. der deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik begann bereits mit den Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien (VPR) von 1992. Das Weißbuch 2016 stellt das derzeit aktuellste Dokument dieser Neuausrichtung dar. Es dehnt den bereits nahezu vollständig erschlossenen Raum militärischer Möglichkeiten weiter aus (z.B. Vorbeugung bzw. Beseitigung von Störungen der Handelswege etc) und baut in bestimmten Szenarien eine Hürde vor dem Eintritt in den militärischen Raum ab: Die bundesverfassungsgerichtlich vorgeschriebene Einbindung militärischer Einsätze der Bundeswehr in kollektive Sicherheitssysteme gilt nicht mehr in jedem Fall als zwingend notwendig. Darin dokumentiert sich die gestiegene Selbstverständlichkeit, in der Deutschland bereit ist, seine Streitkräfte als Ausdruck von Führungsverantwortung und gelebtem Gestaltungsanspruch einzusetzen, wie es im Weißbuch mehrfach heißt. Das bereits in den VPR 2011 eingeführte Konzept der (militärischen) Rahmennation, wird nunmehr offensiv propagiert: Demnach ginge Deutschland in Vorlage, um Partnern die Möglichkeiten zu eröffnen, ihre Fähigkeiten in einen multinationalen Verband einzubringen.

6) Was erwarten Sie von den Neuen Leitlinien in diesem Kontext?

Wenn Sie das Nachfolgedokument des Aktionsplans Zivile Krisenprävention meinen, so gilt dessen Erscheinen m.W. als fraglich. Sollte es dennoch vor den Bundestagswahlen zu einer Publikation kommen, dürfte der militärische Beitrag als integraler Bestandteil gesamtstaatlicher Sicherheitsgewährleistung bzw. Krisenbearbeitung bekräftigt, wenn nicht gar aufgewertet werden.

7) Wie sehen Sie die Zukunft des Vernetzten Ansatzes in Deutschland und darüber hinaus?

M.E. steht kein grundlegender Kurswechsel zu erwarten. Aber Prognose ist nicht mein Fach.

Zitate zur Stellungnahme:

*„Die Debatte um die Zukunft der Deutschen Sicherheitspolitik ist definitiv mangelhaft. Es ist kein Wille vorhanden, darüber in größerem Rahmen zu diskutieren. Da ist Politik zu feige“
(André Wüstner, Vorsitzender des Bundeswehrverbandes am 11.02.2017 im Tagesschau-Interview – Hintergrund war die fehlende parlamentarische Diskussion über das Weißbuch 2016 und die Verlängerung des Einsatzes in Mali, im Januar nach unter 1stündiger Debatte beschlossen)*

Zum ersten Teil der Frage: Allein die Beiträge, die die ausbleibende Debatte beklagen, sind Legion. Darüber hinaus gibt es etliche Orte, an denen sowohl intensiv als auch kenntnisreich über Sicherheitspolitik diskutiert wird (z.B. diverse Medien, kirchliche Akademien, politische Stiftungen, wissenschaftliche Institutionen oder Zeitschriften). Allerdings kommen dort oft andere (stärker militärkritische) Positionen zum Tragen, als sich dies Teile der Politik wünschen. Fehlende Zustimmung ist aber etwas anderes als ein fehlender Diskurs. Gleichwohl handelt es sich heute bei der (äußeren) Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik nicht um ein so dominantes Thema, wie dies zu Hochzeiten der Friedensbewegung in der 1980er Jahren der Fall war. Vielmehr teilt sich die Sicherheitspolitik die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit mit anderen Themen. Gegenwärtig erlebt zumindest die Debatte um die innere Sicherheit einen durchaus problematisierungsbedürftigen Aufschwung.

Zum zweiten Teil der Frage: Die Klage der hohen Politik über den ausbleibenden öffentlichen Diskurs wirkt scheinheilig. So entstanden die bisherigen Weißbücher unter der Federführung des Verteidigungsministeriums eher als eine Art Geheimkommando. Noch bei der Entstehung des Weißbuchs 2006 blieb es einer Nichtregierungsorganisation vorbehalten, einen Entwurf ins Netz zu stellen. Die für einen Diskurs über die sicherheitspolitische Positionierung der Bundesregierung notwendige Öffentlichkeit wurde mithin erst durch die Zivilgesellschaft geschaffen. Der Erstellungsprozess zum Weißbuch 2016 lief

zwar partizipativer, da Experten aus unterschiedlichen Bereichen in die Vorbereitung einbezogen waren. Als Motor einer öffentlichen, kritischen oder auch konstruktiven Debatte betätigte sich das Verteidigungsministerium aber nicht: Erstens handelte es sich hier um einen durch die Einladungspraxis „gelenkten“ Diskurs. Zweitens suchte das Ministerium vornehmlich nach Argumenten, die seinen bisherigen Kurs bestätigten bzw. ergänzten. Und drittens informierte die Homepage des Ministeriums nur grob bzw. punktuell über die Debattenbeiträge.

Der Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe bezeichnete das deutsche Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit als „Konturenlos und Unbrauchbar“ und konstatierte: „NRO, die vor Ort tätig sind, werden als Teil einer Besatzungsmacht oder gar einer Konfliktpartei wahrgenommen. Dadurch wird die eigene Sicherheit gefährdet.“

(VENRO Standpunkt, März 2012 – auf der Webseite wird zwar auf aktuelle Entwicklungen hingewiesen und es gibt mittlerweile eine gemeinsame Erklärung, das Papier scheint aber nach wie vor der Status Quo zu sein)

Das sozialtechnologische Konzept der vernetzten Sicherheit basiert auf der Annahme, dass der optimale Mix aus zivilen und militärischen Mitteln zum gewünschten Erfolg führt, und schreibt sie fort. Bleibt der Erfolg aus, dann muss eben der Mix verändert werden. Offenkundig sind aber die Probleme dergestalt, dass sie sich einem rein sozialtechnologischen Zugriff noch dazu unter Regie externer Akteure entziehen. Das gilt insbesondere dann, wenn sie mit dem ambitionierten Ansatz des state- und nationbuilding einhergehen. In diesem Kontext erweist sich das Konzept der vernetzten Sicherheit (bzw. des Comprehensive Approach) tatsächlich als unbrauchbar. Zumindest kann es bislang keine Erfolgsgeschichte vorweisen (z.B. Afghanistan, Irak, Libyen). Und es nimmt die drängenden Fragen nach den eigenen Anteilen an der Problemgenese aus dem Blickfeld. Dabei müsste es doch leichter fallen, das eigene Verhalten zu korrigieren, als „fremde“ Gesellschaften umzubauen oder andere Akteure im eigenen Sinne zu steuern.

Hätte sich im Zeichen der vernetzten Sicherheit der interministerielle Austausch verbessert, wäre dies ein sinnvoller Kollateralnutzen. Allerdings müsste ein ressortübergreifender Dialog eigentlich eine Selbstverständlichkeit darstellen. Bei einer darüber hinausgehenden Vernetzung verhielte es sich jedoch anders: Sie ist kein Selbstzweck, sondern bemisst sich an der Klugheit bzw. Legitimität der Politik, der sie dient. Ressorts, deren Agenda nationale Interessen überschreiten, benötigen derzeit einen Raum, der sie vor einer Indienstnahme für Sicherheits- oder andere Formen der Machtpolitik schützt. Ein Negativbeispiel lieferte Dirk Niebel (FDP). Als Leiter des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) verpflichtete er die bundeseigene Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) per Kooperationsvereinbarung mit dem Verteidigungsministerium auf vernetzte Sicherheit. Entwicklungshilfe mutierte somit zumindest teilweise zur force protection.

Die Frage, wie Nichtregierungsorganisationen vor Ort wahrgenommen werden, müssen Sie deren Vertreter stellen.

Keine weiteren Anmerkungen

Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz

Befragte Person:

Christine Schweitzer

Geschäftsführerin Bund für Soziale Verteidigung e.V.
Institut für Friedensarbeit und Gewaltfreie Konfliktaustragung
Redakteurin Zeitschrift Friedensforum



21.05.2017

Eröffnungsfrage: Bitte erzählen Sie kurz etwas über Ihre Arbeit im BSV und Ihren beruflichen Werdegang.

Christine Schweitzer, Geschäftsführerin erneut seit 2012, Jahrgang 1959, ist dem BSV seit seiner Gründung in verschiedenen Rollen verbunden. Sie ist von der Ausbildung her Ethnologin und hat 2009 in Coventry (England) zu zivilgesellschaftlichen Interventionen im Raum des ehemaligen Jugoslawien promoviert. Sie war viele Jahre im Management deutscher und internationaler NROs tätig, darunter dem *Balkan Peace Team* und zuletzt *Nonviolent Peaceforce*. Als Mitarbeiterin des *Instituts für Friedensarbeit und Gewaltfreie Konfliktaustragung* (www.ifgk.de) hat sie verschiedene Studien und Evaluationen zum Thema Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung und Gewaltfreiheit verfasst. Außerdem ist sie Redakteurin der zweimonatlich erscheinenden Zeitschrift *Friedensforum*.

- 1) Was ist in Ihren Worten Vernetzte Sicherheit, wie ist dieser Ansatz entstanden und wie bewerten Sie ihn? Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach?**

Bei der vernetzten Sicherheit oder englisch Comprehensive Approach geht es um das Zusammenwirken aller Akteure, die eine oder mehrere Regierungen oder eine internationale Organisation in einem gewaltsamen Konflikt einsetzen. Insbesondere wird darunter das koordinierte Handeln von zivilen Akteuren, Polizei und Militär verstanden. Nach meiner Erinnerung ist der Begriff in den frühen 2000ern entstanden. Im Weißbuch von 2006 wird er bereits benutzt.

Wir im BSV lehnen dieses Konzept ab, weil wir meinen, dass sich zivil-gewaltfreie und militärisch-gewaltsame Ansätze widersprechen. So sehen wir z.B. Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung als Alternative zu militärischen Eingriffskonzepten.

- 2) Wie wird der Comprehensive Approach supranational (NATO, UN, EU, OSCE u.a.) umgesetzt und was sind die größten Erfolge / Probleme?**

Zur Umsetzung kann man in den Papieren dieser Organisationen nachlesen oder sie befragen. Siehe die Kritik von Venro zu den Problemen.

- 3) Wie ist das deutsche Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit entstanden und wie bewerten Sie es?**

Da habe ich unter (1) schon etwas zu gesagt.

- 4) Wie zeigt sich dieses politische Umdenken konkret in Deutschland
a) in der Politik?**

Weißbuch, Leitlinien, Berichte des Ressortkreises: Alle betonen den Ansatz.

- b) im Feld / bei Missionen?**

Da kann ich nichts aus eigener Erfahrung zu sagen. Die internationalen Projekte, bei denen ich Erfahrung sammeln konnte, fanden in Ländern statt, wo keine internationalen/ deutschen Militärinterventionen/Kriege stattgefunden hatten.

c) in der Nachbereitung / bei der Erarbeitung von Best-Practice Ansätzen?

Bei der Erarbeitung der neuen Leitlinien scheint das Thema eine wichtige Rolle zu spielen.

5) Welchen Beitrag leisten deutsche Nichtregierungsorganisationen zur Konzeptionierung und Umsetzung des Comprehensive Approach und was sind die größten Hürden?

Es gibt bestimmte Think Tanks wie die SWP oder Bertelsmann.

Die deutschen Friedensorganisationen und auch ein Teil der Entwicklungsorganisationen lehnen das Konzept ab und arbeiten GEGEN es, nicht für seine Umsetzung.

6) Was erwarten Sie von den Neuen Leitlinien in diesem Kontext?

Nur Schlechtes ...

7) Wie sehen Sie die Zukunft des Vernetzten Ansatzes in Deutschland und darüber hinaus?

Ich fürchte, dass die militärische Komponente immer stärker wird.

Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz



Bundesministerium für
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit
und Entwicklung

Befragte Person:

Anonym

Verbindungskontakt BMZ

06.06.2017

Eröffnungsfrage: Bitte erzählen Sie kurz etwas über Ihre Arbeit im BMZ und Ihren beruflichen Werdegang.

- seit August wieder in DE (vorher 10 Jahre Ausland), seitdem aktuelle Position Vertreterin BMZ
- verschiedene deutsche und internationale NGOs: local security, conflict prevention, Schwerpunkte Europa & Zentralasien (Nepal); conflict & security advisor, Fokus Gender, small arms

1) Was ist in Ihren Worten Vernetzte Sicherheit, wie ist dieser Ansatz entstanden und wie bewerten Sie ihn? Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach?

- weniger Bezug DE, da 10 Jahre im Ausland; in GB zB anders, nicht nur Bezug Sicherheit („whole-of-government approach)
- Vernetzte Sicherheit: Sicherheitspolitische Aspekte + EZ nicht getrennt betrachten: gemeinsam denken, graduell unterschiedlich, gemeinsam planen und umsetzen & weiter ausdifferenzieren
- Entscheidend ist die Definition von Sicherheit! Erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff → Human Security (abhängig von Situation/Akteuren): Gemeinsame Aushandlung, gerade wenn Militär involviert ist
- eigene Erfahrungen v.a. Beobachtung / kritische Begleitung CA (Fokus Community Security: lokale Sicherheit & Konfliktprevention; auf lokaler Ebene wenig Berührungspunkte)
- Erfolg Zusammenarbeit kommt auch auf Umfeld/Lage an: wenn Sicherheitslage „entspannt“ für NGOs, erhöht sich Bereitschaft für zivil-militärischen Austausch (z.B. Balkan)

2) Wie zeigt sich dieses politische Umdenken konkret in Deutschland (hier kann gerne der Kontrast zu Großbritannien einfließen)

a) in der Politik?

- policy development DE ≠ local governments
- PeaceLab-Prozess: C.A. Positiv aufgenommen, generell Offenheit/Pragmatik festzustellen
- größtes Problem: CIMIC (aber in DE weniger als zB GB/USA: anders aufgestellt)
- Grundsatzdokumente sind teils problematisch (etwa Insecurity-Agenda / Human Peace & Security Agenda): Angst vor Instrumentalisierung von (Frauen-)Organisationen als 'neutral allies' des Militär

b) im Feld / bei Missionen?

- Kenntnisse v.a. Literatur / Fokus Polizei
- Bsp. Einschränkung Budget gerade kleinerer Organisationen im Bereich SCR 1325: werden als Risikofaktor gesehen, die Geld an Terroristen weitergeben → kontraproduktiv; Frauen werden oft als „natural allies“ gesehen (Mütter/Ehefrauen als Informationsquellen, Einfluss gerade im Bereich Terrorismus), Lage wird weiter eingeschränkt durch Budgetbescheidungen Frauenorganisationen
- Erfahrungen Kaukasus Grenzmission: Einbezug Militär/Polizei für grenzübergreifenden Austausch von Informationen, Wahrheitsfindung (Deeskalation Gerüchte); gute Erfahrung Zusammenarbeit

3) Was erwarten Sie von den Neuen Leitlinien in diesem Kontext?

- PeaceLab-Prozess als sehr positiv erlebt: Fokus auf Austausch auch mit Zivilgesellschaft und anderen relevanten Akteuren; länger und intensiver als ursprünglich geplant
- Problem: was bleibt am Ende übrig/was kommt in die Leitlinien? Substanz vs. kurz & knapp; informeller Austausch vs. tatsächliche policy
- Aber intensiver Prozess, auch hohe Beteiligung BMZ & Lieferung Texte

4) Was braucht ein Comprehensive Approach in Ihren Augen, um zu funktionieren?

- WILLEN zur Zusammenarbeit, offener Austausch, kritisches Hinterfragen im Prozess
- Konkurrenzdenken Ressorts als größte Hürde: Umdenken nötig, evtl. über neue Gremien
- Rückbesinnung auf Funktion Ressorttrennung: Abgrenzung wo es Sinn macht, aber eine Richtung, kein Profilierungsprinzip
- Auch Bezug Leitlinien: Prozess > Ergebnis
- Beispiel GB: kritischer Austausch wird aktiv gesucht
- „wach bleiben“; reflexiv, gemeinsam und kompromissbereit verschiedene Interessen verbinden

Zitat zur Stellungnahme:

„Die Debatte um die Zukunft der Deutschen Sicherheitspolitik ist definitiv mangelhaft. Es ist kein Wille vorhanden, darüber in größerem Rahmen zu diskutieren. Da ist Politik zu feige“

- **André Wüstner, Vorsitzender des Bundeswehrverbandes am 11.02.2017 im Tagesschau-Interview**

(Hintergrund war die fehlende parlamentarische Diskussion über das Weißbuch 2016 und die Verlängerung des Einsatzes in Mali, im Januar nach unter 1stündiger Debatte beschlossen)

- persönliche Meinung: Sicherheitspolitik ist in Deutschland nach wie vor ein sensibles Thema, das stark polarisiert: innere & äußere Sicherheit, Bedeutung EU, Extremismusdebatte,...
- Debatte kommt auf Ebene an: Parlament < Öffentlichkeit: mehr Diskussion; emotional aufgeladen

Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz

Befragte Person:

Ute Finckh-Krämer, MdB

Auswärtigen Ausschuss

Ausschuss für Menschenrechte und Humanitäre Hilfe

Stellvertretende Vorsitzende im Unterausschuss "Abrüstung, Rüstungskontrolle und Nichtverbreitung",

Schriftführerin Unterausschuss für Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktbearbeitung und vernetztes Handeln,

06.06.2017



Deutscher
Bundestag

Eröffnungsfrage: Bitte erzählen Sie etwas über Ihre Arbeit und wie Sie zum Unterausschuss gekommen sind.

- Friedensbewegung; Beobachtung UA zunächst von außen (Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung): Gesprächskreis, öffentliche Sitzungen
- Über Ehrenamt bekannt mit verschiedenen Mitgliedern, seit 2013 UA (Verlängerung Mandat)

1) Was ist in Ihren Worten Vernetztes Handeln, wie ist dieser Ansatz entstanden und wie bewerten Sie ihn? Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach?

- vernetzte Sicherheit entspricht Comprehensive Approach: militärischer Ansatz klar einbezogen (in DE zunächst „zivil-militärische Kooperation“)
- Vernetztes Handeln = sinnvoll, zulässig – WENN deutsche Zivile und Militär vor Ort
→ zB Afghanistan: Kommunikation > Kooperation; Austausch: was können wir einander geben?
- Politische Ebene: Austausch Ministerien; Konflikt BMZ-AA-BMVg

(?) Rolle Abteilung S – erhöhte Konkurrenz als folge größerer inhaltlicher Überschneidungen?

→ Nein, eher besser: Verantwortliche sind nicht konfliktscheu

→ Auch durch die Rolle des ZIF als Mittler: verbindender Charakter, zB Personal aus EZ, Diplomatie, Polizei, Militär

**2) Wie zeigt sich dieses politische Umdenken konkret in Deutschland
a) in der Politik?**

- Unterscheidung: Exekutive vs. Parlament
- Hauptproblem: Leitungsebene (auch personell → Profilierung), dadurch alte und in dieser Legislatur neue Konflikte zB bezüglich Aufgabenverständigung, Überlappung
- Aber: vor 10 Jahren deutlich distanzierter, v.a. BMZ/AA: auf Arbeitsebene bessere Kommunikation, auch in den Ausschüssen + mehr Austausch Fachabgeordnete verschiedener Ausschüsse (in Ministerien = Arbeitskreise); Referat Frieden & Sicherheit (BMZ) + Abteilung S (AA)
- Gemeinsames Budget AA / BMVg: „Nachtwei-Millionen“ (2006-2007) zivile Krisenprävention, jetzt wieder aufgenommen als „Ertüchtigungs-Initiative“: gemeinsames Budget erfordert Verständigung!

b) im Feld / bei Missionen?

- eigene Erfahrungen Moskau: gute militärisch-diplomatische Kooperation und Atmosphäre
- Als Abgeordnete in Afghanistan/Bosnien/Mazedonien: guter Eindruck militärisch-diplomatische Kooperation, z.T. auch mit EZ, lokalen NGOs
- Kontakte zur GIZ: Zusammenarbeit ist nicht immer konfliktfrei, auch auf Grund getrennter Sicherheitseinschätzungen AA/BMVg/BMZ, die nicht immer der Realität 'on the ground'

entsprechen → mehr geschützte Räume schaffen, gemeinsame Einschätzungen jeweils abgestimmt auf 1) diplo, 2) EZ und 3) andere Akteure; dazu INFORMATIONSAUSTAUSCH notwendig!

c) in der Nachbereitung / bei der Erarbeitung von Best-Practice Ansätzen?

- persönlich nur teilweise Infos aus Einzelgesprächen: große Bandbreite
- Bundeswehr oft wenig kritisch: planerisch 'alles prima' (Debriefing, Evaluierung), aber oft keine Begleitung bezüglich Sinn des politischen Mandats
- Parlament: Verpflichtungen abwägen, eigene politische Einschätzung Bundestag/-regierung & Umsetzung vor Ort: gemeinsamer Austausch nötig
- zivile/unbewaffnete Einsätze: bessere Auswertung heute (z.B. EU-Polizeimission Georgien), auch zwischen Nationen: Eindruck, dass gemeinsame Linie gefunden wird und auch Gespräche Fortschritte machen, die zunächst auf Eis lagen (auch deutsche Akteure)
- aber zB Irak: Kommunikation über Dritte, gründliche Auswertung nötig: passen Bemühungen aus EZ, humanitärer Hilfe, Stabilisierung, Truppenausbildung, politische Unterstützung etc. zusammen?
- Auch Syrien: ursprünglich EZ/politische Struktur- & Übergangshilfe/Flüchtlinge, jetzt Unterstützung Luftangriffe – wie passt das zusammen?

3) Welchen Beitrag leistet der Unterausschuss und Beirat „Zivile Krisenprävention“ zur Konzeptionierung und Umsetzung des Comprehensive Approach und was sind die größten Hürden? (auch: Umbenennung!)

- Umbenennung 'Sicherheit' → 'Handeln': Beschluss zur Weiterführung des UA diese Legislaturperiode, Antrag Linke zur Umbenennung, um Sicherheitsfokus abzuschwächen
- Beitrag zum CA: Diskussion, indirekte Evaluierung (direkt nicht möglich), Beobachtung Handeln Exekutive und Gespräche mit beteiligten Ressorts (auch BMI, BMWi, BMF, etc.)
- Wenig Zeit: jede 2. Sitzungswoche 1,5h. Darum Thementeilung mit Auswärtigem Ausschuss → Fokus auf Gebieten, wo Bundeswehr aktiv ist (Auswärtiger Ausschuss allgemein)
- CIMIC = geringe Rolle, mehr KOHÄRENZ (gesamtstaatlicher Ansatz): gemeinsame Zielsetzung/Linie auch für Länder ohne Bundeswehr-Beteiligung wie Burundi, Bosnien
- Abschlussbericht an Hauptausschuss + Feedback durch Plattform Zivile Krisenprävention: Diskussion zwischen Haupt- und Unterausschüssen fördern
→ müsste eigentlich von allen aus Berichte geben, sonst oft 'Wegdelegieren' von Themen
- SPD: AK der FES hat UA begleitet, zudem gab es Kommunikation mit interessierten Mitgliedern, die nicht selbst im UA sitzen; auch AG übergreifende Themen (v.a. 1325): Ausschüsse diskutieren gemeinsam und mit Zivilgesellschaft → Themenbezogene Kooperation

4) Was erwarten Sie von den Neuen Leitlinien in diesem Kontext?

- nicht direkt involviert; Hoffnung, dass AA-Arbeit beschrieben wird (da Leitung AA) und Kooperation mit Zivilgesellschaft (Deutschland und Konfliktregionen); klarere Schnittstellen als zB Weißbuch
- Größere Einflussnahme Zivilgesellschaft und klarere Abstimmungsprozesse etwa BMZ & BMVg
- Zusammenarbeit Arbeitsebene AA/BMZ/BMVg eigentlich relativ konfliktfrei, eher Leitungsebene

5) Wie sehen Sie die Zukunft des Vernetzten Ansatzes in Deutschland und darüber hinaus?

- mögliche Szenarien: **1)** strukturierte gemeinsame Auswertung unter neutraler Moderation (zB Wissenschaft, internationale Experten); **2)** stärkeres ggs. Vertrautmachen mit Aktivitäten / Ansätzen / Fähigkeiten von Ministerien bis NGOs: Austauschformate & Szenarienanalysen etablieren, Kennenlernen im Vorfeld (Round Tables: was macht wer?); vor Ort dann weitere Absprachen
- Wichtige Rolle BMI: THW, Verwaltungsprojekte, Polizei; auch BMJV (RoL, Justizreform etc.)

- Aktuell Konflikte Koalition (CDU vs. SPD) etwa in Bezug auf 2%-Finanzierungsziel NATO: Vorwahlkampf ist deutlich spürbar, aber auch verschiedene Positionen bzgl. NATO; Trumpwahl hat zudem alte Gräben aufgerissen bzgl. Beziehung DE-USA

Zitate zur Stellungnahme:

„Die Debatte um die Zukunft der Deutschen Sicherheitspolitik ist definitiv mangelhaft. Es ist kein Wille vorhanden, darüber in größerem Rahmen zu diskutieren. Da ist Politik zu feige“

- André Wüstner, Vorsitzender des Bundeswehrverbandes am 11.02.2017 im Tagesschau-Interview

(Hintergrund war die fehlende parlamentarische Diskussion über das Weißbuch 2016 und die Verlängerung des Einsatzes in Mali, im Januar nach unter 1stündiger Debatte beschlossen)

- Fehlende Diskussion Weißbuch liegt am PROZESS: zunächst breite Beteiligung Ressorts / Gesellschaft, dann nur noch einzelne Workshops, keine echte Beteiligung mehr andere Ministerien
- Am Ende fertiges Weißbuch und STELLUNGNAHMEN, aber keine echte konstruktive Diskussion
- Verteidigungsausschuss hätte WB ins Parlament bringen können, aber wohl geringe Priorität
- Konflikt [Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz](#) Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr
→ im Leitlinienprozess wurde aus diesen Fehlern gelernt (Vgl. [PeaceLab-Prozess](#): sollte Dauerprozess werden!)

Der Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe bezeichnete das deutsche Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit als „Konturenlos und Unbrauchbar“ und konstatierte: „NRO, die vor Ort tätig sind, werden als Teil einer Besatzungsmacht oder gar einer Konfliktpartei wahrgenommen. Dadurch wird die eigene Sicherheit gefährdet.“

-VENRO Standpunkt, März 2012 (auf der Webseite wird zwar auf aktuelle Entwicklungen hingewiesen, das Papier scheint aber nach wie vor der Status Quo zu sein)

- Stimmt, bzw. sollte es keine feste Vereinbarung zur Kooperation geben, ABER Kommunikation
→ funktioniert bereits besser (Vgl. gemeinsames Papier VENRO-Bundeswehr)
- Kontexte, in denen NROs selbst zum Ziel werden, erfordern deutliche Abgrenzung (zB Afghanistan, Somalia, Syrien, Irak, Mali), da sonst die 'soft targets' (= Zivile) zuerst angegriffen werden
→ erschwert Sicherheitskonzeption der deutschen NROs besonders wenn Bundeswehrebeteiligung: durch Mandat Beistand bestimmter Regierungen (auch bei Entsendung über UN o.a.): Gefahr für NROs, auch rein humanitäre: Distanz wahren + humanitäre Prinzipien! Auch ggü. lokaler Regierung
- dagegen weniger Problematik Kooperation in post-Konflikt Situationen (zB Kosovo)

Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz

Befragte Person:

Volker Halbauer

Generalleutnant a.D.

2012-2013 Kommandeur KFOR

2013-2016 Kommandierender General 1. DE-NL Korps



07.07.2017

1) Was sind Ihrer Ansicht nach die wichtigsten Eckpunkte der deutschen Entwicklung eines Vernetzten Ansatzes zur Konfliktbearbeitung? Was ist Ihr eigener Bezug zum Comprehensive Approach?

- langer Entwicklungsprozess, v.a. durch Einsatzerfahrungen geprägt
- eigene Einsätze (z.B. Kosovo): Zusammenarbeit mit GOs, NGOs, UN-Organen war ausschlaggebend für gemeinsamen Erfolg!
- Militär ist niemals Selbstzweck, sondern verfolgt politische Ziele, die es nicht alleine erreichen kann (besonders angesichts moderner Bedrohungen: hybride Kriegsführung, komplexe Szenarien)
- Auf politischer Ebene gibt es noch zu viel Eigeninteresse statt Zusammenarbeit (AA, BMVg, BMZ); hier muss Vertrauensarbeit Vorschub leisten, v.a. auch auf Grund von 'Zurückhaltungskultur' (oft militärische Skepsis, geschichtlich verankert) → politische Verständigung erforderlich, braucht viel Zeit, stabile Grundlagen (gemeinsame Dokumente, Absprachen) und Institutionalisierung wie etwa durch gemeinsames Bekenntnis der Ministerien in NL *

2) Wie wird der Comprehensive Approach supranational umgesetzt und was sind die größten Erfolge / Probleme (eigene Erfahrungen 1.GNC)?

- Im Einsatzgebiet haben (nationale) Akteure immer eine eigene Agenda (selbstverständlich und auch legitim), die in Hauptquartieren zusammengefasst & für Einsatzführung umgesetzt werden müssen
- Eigene Erfahrung zeigt, dass Vernetzung auf unteren Führungsebenen meist gut funktioniert; je höher desto schwieriger auf Grund „ideologischer Färbung“: eigene Grundlagen, Handlungslogiken erschweren Verständigung (etwa ICRC, MSF), dennoch ist Abstimmung im Einsatz oft gelungen → Erfahrung zeigt, dass CIMIC/ C.A. wesentliche Grundlagen sind für nachhaltigen Erfolg
- Daraus ist Ansatz entstanden, heute in NATO umfassend anerkannt, allerdings auf unteren Ebenen unterschiedlich angewandt; liegt auch in jeweils separater Einsatzplanung /-vorbereitung /-personal begründet: muss in allen Schritten institutionalisiert werden (v.a. auch Training, Vorbereitung)
- 1. GNC: Vernetztes Handeln „in den Genen“; hat neue Form der Vernetzung geschaffen, eigener Ansatz hat sich bewährt → von Anfang an Vertrauen schaffen durch multidimensionale Kooperation
- Durch Förderung AA / NL-Außenministerium auch politische Einbindung (Beitritt AA zum Common Effort 2017 wichtiges Zeichen, zumal er im BMZ stattgefunden hat)

3) Wie bewerten Sie die Neuen Leitlinien in diesem Kontext? (auch Vgl. Weißbuch 2016)

- Gemeinsame Grundlage wichtig, Bedeutung ist nicht zu unterschätzen, Wirkung wird sich zeigen in Umsetzung auf Arbeitsebene
- Gemeinsame Linie und Zielsetzung sind entscheidend, darf keine Restriktionen geben; Institutionalisierung ist wichtig, materialisiert sich langsam; keine großen Schritte zu erwarten, sondern mühsamer Prozess; „am Ende werden wir sagen, das haben doch schon immer so gewollt“
- Partizipative Formate (Leitlinien, Weißbuch u.a.) = positive Entwicklung, selbst zuversichtlich
- Aber fehlende öffentliche Debatte über Ziele und Grundlagen deutsche Positionen oder gar Führungsansprüche – muss initiiert werden

4) In den Reaktionen zum Weißbuch 2016 spiegelt sich gegenseitiges Unverständnis der Ansprüche und Handlungslogiken von zivilen und militärischen Akteuren. Haben Politik und Zivilgesellschaft nichts voneinander gelernt?

- ehemaliger Bundespräsident: Zivilgesellschaft zeigt „wohlwollendes Desinteresse“ ggü. Militär
- demokratischste Armee, die Deutschland jemals hatte: Parlamentsarmee, politische Führung, plus Prinzip Innere Führung: legitimes politisches Instrument, keine „Killertruppe“
- Militär: muss mehr auf Erfahrungen ziviler Akteure (GOs, NGOs) setzen, die teils seit Jahren vor Ort arbeiten; Wissen nutzen und in organisatorische Planung einarbeiten, um Fehler zu vermeiden
- Civ-Mil Vernetzung ist daher schon vor dem Einsatz essentiell
- Dazu gehört als Konsequenz auch eine klare gemeinsame Zielbildung (Endstate) auf politischer Ebene (AA + BMZ + BMVg)

5) Seit 2016 gibt es das Cyber-Abwehrzentrum der Bundeswehr. Gleichzeitig gibt es aber schon seit 2011 das ressortübergreifende nationale Abwehrzentrum (NCAZ) unter Beteiligung der Bundeswehr. Warum diese Dopplung?

- keine tiefe Expertise, aber persönliche Meinung: Bundeswehr verwirklicht berechtigtes Eigeninteresse in der Umsetzung zur nationalen Verteidigung
- Gefahren von Cyberangriffen betrifft die Gesellschaft als Ganzes; je nach Nation unterschiedliches Bedrohungspotenzial
- Deutschland ist hier im internationalen Vergleich eher Nachzügler (Vgl. etwa USA)

6) Welche Rolle spielt der MAD heute?

- nach wie vor sehr wichtiges militärisches Instrument, wenn auch nicht fehlerfrei (Bsp. Franco A.)
- Subversive Kräfte innerhalb Bundeswehr minimieren, eigene demokratische Grundlage sichern

7) Sollte Deutschland auf Grund der starken völkerrechtlichen Verankerung seiner außenpolitischen Instrumente größere Verantwortung und sogar Führungsrolle in der internationalen Konfliktbearbeitung übernehmen, auch um derzeit vermehrten Völkerrechtsverletzungen auch durch Partner wie USA in Einsätzen entgegen zu wirken?

- Nationen haben unterschiedliche Interessen bzgl. Auslandseinsätzen
- Deutsche Grundlage: parlamentarische Legitimierung, verankert im GG und intern. Völkerrecht
→ muss unterstützt durch Vernetzten Ansatz in Einsätze überführt werden
- eigene Meinung: ja; Deutschland muss rechtliche Grundsätze nachdrücklich umsetzen
- Politische Führung muss deutsche Grundsätze auch im Einsatz vertreten und artikulieren – geschieht bereits, wird parteipolitisch unterschiedlich diskutiert
- Stärkung öffentlicher Debatte / Einbezug Zivilgesellschaft in Diskussion und klare Zielformulierung und Rahmensetzung: Wollen wir eine Führungsposition? Auf welcher Grundlage? Etc.

*** Nachfrage:**

Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering. *De Nederlandse visie op een samenhangende inzet op veiligheid en stabiliteit in fragiele staten en conflictgebieden*. Gemeinsam unterzeichnet von den Ministerien für Auswärtiges, Verteidigung, Justiz und Außenhandel & Entwicklung

→ Vergleichbar mit den deutschen Ressortübergreifenden Leitlinien „Für eine kohärente Politik der Bundesregierung gegenüber fragilen Staaten“ (gemeinsames Paper AA, BMVg, BMZ) ?

A: Auch hier gilt, dass die Interessenlagen und nationalen Rahmenbedingungen unterschiedlich sind. Die Zielrichtung ist aber vergleichbar. Es kommt darauf an, die nationalen Ressourcen zu bündeln und zwar in Richtung einer einheitlichen Zielsetzung. So gesehen haben beide Dokumente denselben Zweck. Im Ergebnis sehe ich das als einen guten Schritt vorwärts, zumal ja DEU und die NDL bereits sehr eng zusammenarbeiten.

Fragebogen Vernetzter Ansatz

Anonym



Bundesministerium
des Innern

RepräsentatInnen von

- Polizei
- THW
- BBK

12.07.2017

- **Wie können negative Folgen der Dezentralisierung von Polizei, Kriminalämtern und Verfassungsschutz im Zuge von neuen internationalen Herausforderungen bewältigt werden?**
 - Föderalismus kompliziert im Polizeisystem: 16 Landespolizeien, 3 Bundespolizeien, Kriminalämter etc.; Reform derzeit politisch nicht umsetzbar obwohl oft angeregt
 - Deshalb: Kooperationsformate finden / Ersatzlösungen wie GTAZ, NCAZ in Reaktion auf aktuelle Bedrohungen → in der Regel reaktives Handeln
 - Problem auch Infrastruktur: inkompatible Systeme, selbst wenn Datenaustausch erlaubt
 - einige Länder gemeinsame Systeme (auch Kostenpunkt), etwa Norddeutschland; institutionalisierte Zusammenarbeit bleibt aber Ausnahme, braucht idR negative Fälle, um voran zu kommen, verkompliziert durch Wahlkampf, Parteipolitik Bund & Länder
 - Auf europäischer Ebene viel weiter als innerdeutsch; bräuchte breites Maßnahmenpaket in Abstimmung zwischen Bund und Ländern: sinnvolle Arbeitsteilung, abgestimmt auf Gesamtkontext
 - Bund kann keine Vorgaben machen, Zusammenführung derzeit illusorisch, niemand will Verantwortung abgeben, eigene interne Lösungen statt Kompromissen; nicht immer sinnvoll
 - Reaktionen auf aktuelle Bedrohungen eher politische Beruhigungstablette als Reformwille
- **Welche Mechanismen besitzt und benutzt das BMI zur Vernetzung mit nationalen (Militär?) und internationalen Akteuren? Was sind die größten Herausforderungen? Welche Maßnahmen zum Ausbau und zur besseren Koordination von Polizeieinheiten für Friedenseinsätze gibt es?**
 - Aufgaben im Auslands mit Wandel zu innerstaatlichen Konflikten zugenommen, Zivile wichtiger
 - aber innere Strukturen müssten substantiell aufgebaut werden, Rekrutierung schwierig
 - internationale Polizei aufgeteilt Bund-Länder durch Königssteiner Schlüssel; Länder haben Veto
 - interner Polizeibedarf wächst, gerade Experten, daher Entsendung vor allem in Einsätze wo deutsche Interesse im Vordergrund stehen (v.a. Grenzmissionen wie FRONTEX)
 - Anforderungen von oben (Kanzlerin, Minister) müssen unten umgesetzt werden
 - Qualität deutsche Polizeiarbeit im Ausland sehr hoch: TPP, AG IPM
 - Aber Ansprüche steigen, müsste mit mehr Einstellungen / Schulungen begegnet werden
 - Anders als BMVg keine zentralen Strukturen, kein Pool (würde auch nicht funktionieren: Ansprüche und Fähigkeiten in Fluktuation, auch Verfügbarkeit)
 - Trennungsgebot Militär/Polizei; Verbot Militäreinsatz im Inneren (Ausnahmen Katastrophenschutz); verfassungsrechtlich nicht ausdiskutiert
 - Institutionalisierte Interaktion durch Austauschbeamte, Lehrgänge (FüAk, TPP), anlassbezogen
 - in anderen Ländern weniger Trennung, Militärpolizei – reduziert Einsatzfähigkeit deutsche Polizei, kann zB nicht unter Militärführung arbeiten / militärische Aufgaben erfüllen
 - Robustere Mandate und Ausbildungen? Diskussion müsste härter geführt werden; gleichzeitig braucht auch Militär mehr zivile Kapazitäten, hier stetige aber vorsichtige Fortschritte
 - THW und BMVg: Vereinbarung dass Amtshilfe grundsätzlich geleistet werden darf, anders als Polizei

- **Wie wird Zusammenarbeit innerhalb des BMI und mit anderen Akteuren institutionalisiert? Welchen Beitrag leistet das BMI allgemein zur Konzeptionierung und Umsetzung eines Vernetzten Ansatzes? Fokus Nothilfebehörden (BKK, THW)**
 - AA (weniger auch BMZ) finanziert Projekte im Ausland, e.g. Transformationspartnerschaften, z.B. Tunesien: BBK / THW seit 2012, stärken Bevölkerungsschutz, Zivilgesellschaft etc.
 - Katastrophenschutzverfahren EU: gemeinsame Datenbank, zentrale Anlaufstelle GMLZ (Bund & Länder), Abstimmung auf Bundesebene, Länder können Hilfe anfordern, schnelles Eingreifen
 - Behörden können nur reagieren wenn angefordert – Souveränität, aber auch Chaos verhindern
 - Ausreise anhängig von Sicherheitslage, überprüft durch BKA (interministerielle Zusammenarbeit)
 - Krisenvorsorgeausbildung auch Botschafter, aber in der Realität oft überfordert mit Koordinierung im Katastrophenfall (besonders in gefährlichen Gebieten ohnehin reduziertes Personal)
 - Internationale Netzwerke: IHP mit Geschäftsstelle bei OCHA: gemeinsame internationale Standards
 - Verträge mit Gesetzescharakter bei großen Unglücken: zur Hilfeleistung 'verpflichtet'
 - 2015 DE / AA stärkere Einbringung Zivile (ohne Polizei): gemünzt auf THW
 - UN-THW Piloteinsatz in Kolumbien: verkürzte Vorlaufzeit, vergleichsweise „leichter“ Einsatz, Lage entspannt – noch Rollenfindung, schwierige Fragen zB CIMIC in robusten Einsätzen
 - Auch andere einbeziehen: Anregung Aufbau Datenbank für Kooperation staatliche Hilfsorgans UN in NY oder Einbezug in ECHO, sonst DE irgendwann überfordert
 - THW: ehrenamtlich, in Missionen immer auch hauptamtlich, Entschädigung / Verdienstausschlag Arbeitgeber (THW-Gesetz: Ausgleich Lebensqualität)
 - im Vergleich zu Militär-/Polizeieinsätzen positive Wahrnehmung Arbeit BKK & THW, auch politisch attraktiv und daher leichtere Prozesse (zB keine parlamentarische Entscheidung)
 - Katastrophenhilfe MUSS auch schnell funktionieren, keine lange Planungszeit, daher auch vor Einsatz schon gute Netzwerke im Zielland, zivile Netzwerke wichtig!
 - Wenn mal breite Kooperation THW & Militär Auslandseinsätze vielleicht mal parlamentarische Diskussion zumindest Aufgabenbereiche: wird komplizierter, Gefahr Wahrnehmung als Kriegsakteur
 - Evtl. Entsendung über neues ZIF-Sekundierungsgesetz? Eigene Sekundierung wäre zu aufwendig, aber Bereitschaft Kooperation besteht seitens AA/ZIF
 - Als Bundesbehörde aber immer auch eingeschränkt, Entscheidungshoheit Minister (BMI, AA), da sie politische Verantwortung tragen (anders als bei NGOs)
 - Aktuell: THW/ BBK Nordirak (kritisch aber sicher genug) capacity building → Bevölkerungs- & Katastrophenschutz, Aufbau Zivilgesellschaft, Zivilschutz
 - Präventionsmaßnahmen sind immer billiger und nachhaltiger, aber weniger Aufmerksamkeit; THW/BBK sind ausgerichtet auf Prävention, local ownership, community-based approaches
→ Kann Brücken bauen zwischen verschiedenen Akteuren von lokalem bis internationalem Level

Notes ZIF

Parcours Verwaltung (04.04.2017)

- ICD: Kooperation mit AU, finanziert von GIZ
- ENTRI ansässig beim ZIF, finanziert 90% EU, Rest Länder: 11 EU-Länder + Schweiz, Kooperation mit EU FPI / EEAS; „facilitating standardization & harmonization training courses EU and beyond“ → Handbuch, Online-Plattform, Evaluierungsprozesse

Parcours Operations (04.04.2017)

- Kosovo-Krise: „Geburtsstunde“ ZIF
- Review-Prozess AA / Abteilung S: Rolle ZIF im Prozess & Veränderungen als Konsequenz
- Verbindungsbeamte BMZ / BMVg
- Lessons Learnt, u.a. von UN

Analysesitzung (05.04.2017)

- ZIF 2016: Umwandlung in Entsendeorganisation
- Guterres-Review Peacekeeping
- Foresight-Workshop mit BAKS
- Teilnahme Beiratssitzung EEAS

Briefing SCR 1325 on Women, Peace & Security

- diversity / inclusiveness actors in peace process (social reality) = sustainability
- Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie / Weißbuch; Aktionsplan Frauen, Frieden, Sicherheit

Analysesitzung (12.04.2017)

- Ausrichtung Workshop CSDP → Studie / Global Strategy Mogherini (Planungskapazitäten?)
- Irak-Mission unter CSDP-Mandat? Unwahrscheinlich, eher Coalition of the Willing
- Treffen EU / NATO Koordinierung Friedenseinsätze, Vorstellung EUISS in Brüssel
- Interne Stellenanalyse und -bewertung, Aktivitätenberichte
- BAKS Info-Veranstaltung Offiziere
- AA S03 + BMVg: Ertüchtigung → zivile Expertise / Themen? Vernetztes Handeln, schrittweise Capacity Building
- Umfrage Bedarfe Zivile Experten Vorbereiten, Verschicken, Auswerten
- DSF Personaler-Konferenz
- AG IPM: neuer Police Advisor New York (Christoph Baldus)
- Führungsseminar Luftwaffe; Grenzen und Kapazitäten CSDP → „non-executive military missions“ vs. „battle groups“?
- Missionsbesuch SMM: Gemeinsame Sitzung aller deutschen Sekundierten + Vernetzung, Gespräch Missionsleitungen → Probleme Sicherheit, Kommunikation, Zuständigkeiten: interne Quereleien; Leadership-Probleme

Analysesitzung (19.04.2017)

- Treffen mit AA / Ständige Vertretung in NY
- Systematisierung Pressekommunikation / Kontakte für Publikationen
- Beiratssitzung ZIF
- Weltkarte neu zur 15-Jahr-Feier
- Civil-Affairs-Projekt mit UN in Uganda?
- Internationales Treffen Peacekeeping im AA
- Ressortübergreifendes Fachgespräch Syrien

- Austausch zu 1325 im AA: UN SC kaum vertreten (bes. temporäre Mitglieder)
- Informelle Liste Ausschreibungen OSZE; insgesamt mehr Monitore nötig
- Gespräche während Ukraine-Besuch mit GIZ, Caritas
- Austausch mit UNDP Crisis Response Unit: Stabilization. Prävention bleibt Utopie, weiter reaktionär
→ nach Intervention kein Machtvakuum entstehen lassen (z.B. Irak); Konflikt Handlungsbreite bei längerem Engagement / rote Linien?
- Diskussion Neue Leitlinien: Knackpunkte BMZ-AA (Entwicklungspolitische Unbedenklichkeit bei Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen; Institutionelle Struktur zur Umsetzung Leitlinien)
- Treffen Arbeitskreis ZKP
- Workshop Europäische Außenpolitik
- OECD-Report „States of Fragility“ (2016)
- ZIF-Workshop Militärattaché-Ausbildung in der BAKS
- Jahresendprodukt AU-Kooperation
- Policy-Briefing Prevention
- Dienstreise CSDP / NATO Brüssel
- Beiratssitzung Zivile Krisenprävention: Leitlinien?
- BMZ-Konferenz mit Zivilgesellschaft zu Sicherheit in Konflikten / Duty of Care: Nach Rückzug staatlicher Organisationen bleiben oft NGOs zurück, werden finanziert
- In Zukunft mehr After-Work Briefings!

Parcours Geschäftsleitung (20.04.2017)

- AA-Review → ZIF-Reform
- ZIF-Aufsichtsratschef: AA-Staatssekretär Roth
- ZIF + ZFD (2002); ZIF als „rot-grünes Baby“; Aktionsplan / Beirat Zivile Krisenprävention
- Konfliktrealitäten: multidimensionale Hybrid-Missionen; Toolbox / Lessons Learned
- Deutschland als führende Kraft in der Rekrutierung in zivilen Experten
- Enge Zusammenarbeit ähnliche Organisationen anderer Länder, v.a. FBA Schweden
- Wichtige Verbindung Deutschland-OSZE (noch stärker durch Vorsitz 2016) + DPKO, CSDP
- Loyalität / Verantwortung ggü. Zivilen Experten (Sekundierungsgesetz): Duty of Care
- Publikation nach Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz: „Deutschlands Neue Verantwortung“
- Rolle Botschaften bei der Vernetzung in Friedenseinsätzen? Problem Rotation AA, aber auch ZIF
- Aufarbeitung Erfahrungen / Lessons Learned / Einsatzwissen
- Sekundierungsfinanzierung als „Projektsförderung“
- ZIF-Projekte: UN OCHA, AU, OSCE, ENTRI

Mitarbeitersitzung (24.04.2017)

- Treffen BMI; ifa/CIVIC-Projekt
- ZIF2016: Ab Juli Entsendeorganisation
- Juni Oslo Peaceforum
- 29.5. = Internationaler Tag des Peacekeepers DGVN
- Diskussion Sicherheitsfragen EZ-Einsätze
- ENTRI: Peer-Review
- Voluntary Guidelines Duty of Care → Dialog mit IOs geplant
- Peercoaching (deutsche Politiker etc.)
- Leitbild Ziviler Experte

Parcours Training (08.05.2017)

- Vernetztes Handeln als Anspruch
- Trainingspartnerplattform (Vgl. AG IPM)

- Best-practice-System ZIF: Ständige Evaluierung von Methoden und Anwendung
- Im Training: Deutsche + National Staff / Internationale Teilnehmende: Sustainability, local ownership
- Prinzipien: local ownership, duty of care, do no harm, Leitbild Ziviler Experte
- Weiterer Ausbau Vernetztes Handeln: Zukünftig gemeinsame Grundkurse mit Polizei und BMVg

Analysesitzung (10.05.2017)

- Neuer Verbindungsoffizier vom BMVg, Referat SiPol
- Neue Kooperation mit Chatham House?
- AA-Runde Ertüchtigungsinitiative mit ZIF-Beteiligung + BMVg → Personalproblem (u.a. GIZ als Umsetzungspartner); zu wenig, zu militärlastig → Unterstützung durch ZIF-Pool? Nur wenn multilaterale Führung (z.B. ECOWAS); Fokus POLITISCHE Begleitung → Strukturelles Problem: viele Mittel, wenig Plan
- Sektorübergreifendes Fachgespräch (EZ, Zivilgesellschaft, Ressorts)
- UN: Prävention = Hauptrolle Mitgliedsstaaten!

Common Effort 2017 (29.05.-02.06.2017, Berlin)

Vom 29. Mai bis zum 2. Juni fand im Berliner Estrel Hotel die jährliche Common Effort Konferenz statt, auf der sich etwa 130 Personen aus Militär und Zivilorganisationen intensiv austauschten. Neben dem Beauftragten für Zivile Krisenprävention und Stabilisierung im Auswärtigen Amt, Ekkehard Brose und weiteren Vertretern aus Politik und Zivilgesellschaft unterschrieb in diesem Jahr auch die stellvertretende Direktorin Dr. Astrid Irrgang für das ZIF [die gemeinsame Erklärung der Common Effort Community](#).
→ Auf der Webseite des ZIF wird in Kürze ein kurzer News-Artikel zum ZIF-Beitritt beim CE erscheinen.

Hintergrund

„The Common Effort Community provides a platform for organizations that share the idea of a Comprehensive Approach to improve stability, safety and security.“

Seit 2010 gibt es jährlich ein „Common Effort“-Event, zunächst geplant als Planspiel mit fiktiven Konfliktszenarien, organisiert durch den 1. Deutsch-Niederländischen Korps mit Sitz in Münster. Klassische militärische Aktivitäten wurden hier um zivile Komponenten erweitert. Ab 2015 wurde das Konzept auf Wunsch der Community verändert und beschäftigt sich seitdem mit realen Szenarien, wobei zivile Perspektiven in den Fokus rücken. 2015 wurde jeweils in thematischen Gruppen der Südsudan, 2016 Libyen diskutiert. 2017 tauschten sich 74 zivile und 47 militärische Akteurinnen und Akteure über die Zukunft der Situation im Irak aus, aufgeteilt in sechs Thematische Kleingruppen mit den folgenden Themenfeldern:

1. Reconciliation
- 2. Security & Civil-Military Cooperation**
3. Development / Basic Services
4. Governance (incl. SSR & Transparency)
5. Humanitarian Situation & Relief
6. Regional Actors' Influence on Iraq

Am 29.05. begann die Konferenz mit einem Abendessen, das inhaltliche Programm dauerte vom 30.05. bis zum 01.06.2017 und endete am 02.06. mit einer Präsentation der Evaluierung.

Das kanadische Organisation [Defense Research and Development](#) übernahm die umfassende Auswertung. Es galten die Chatham House Rules. Teilnehmende Organisationen finden sich auf der [Webseite](#).

Tag 1) 30.05.2017

- Begrüßung durch die Organisatoren: Dr. Philipp-Christian Wachs (Haus Rissen) und Peter Essens (TNO), sowie Generalleutnant Michiel van der Laan vom 1. Deutsch-Niederländischen Korps

- Inhaltliche Einführung: „Roots of Conflict in Iraq“ (Lt. Ellert Klotz, 1.DNC); Dokumentation Kurdistan von Noah Saari (dt. Journalist) & Ansprache von Hanaa Edwar (Al-Amal Association, Irak).
- Beginn Gruppenarbeit: Vorstellung, Erarbeitung des Problem-Statements, Diskussion mit MdB Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU), Inputs militärische / zivile Perspektive
- Abends Präsentationen: „Dialog zwischen Islam und der Westlichen Welt“ (Christian Wulff), „Community Policing as a tool for migration management“ (Placido Silipigni, IOM)

Tag 2) 31.05.2017

- Gruppendiskussionen
- Abends Präsentationen: „Die Zukunft des Irak“ (Ekkehard Brose, Abteilung S, früher Botschafter der BRD im Irak); „Iraq: Complexities and Hopes“ (Joost Hiltermann, ICG MENA)
- Launch der neuen Webseite + Social Media Kanäle (FB & Twitter)

Tag 3) 01.06.2017: High Level Event

- Vormittags Gruppenpräsentationen & Podiumsdiskussion mit Ellert Klotz und Placido Silipigni; Input Generalleutnant Vollmer (Bundeswehr)
- Mittags Empfang im BMZ, Beitritt 12 weiterer Organisationen zum CE, u.a. Auswärtiges Amt, ZIF
- Reden: Wachs, van der Laan, Silberhorn, Essens, Edwar, Dr. Henk Voskamp (Botschaft der Niederlande in der BRD), Brose, Alastair Reid (Press Association), Astrid Irrgang, Elisabeth van de Steenhoven (Karama)

Ergebnisse

- Wichtigkeit und Vorteile der deutsch-niederländischen Zusammenarbeit
- Kennenlernen und Netzwerken schon vor Beginn einer Mission wichtig: gegenseitiges Verständnis Ziele, Methoden, Organisationskultur („we must know each other before we need each other“)
- Kohärentes Handeln & Kommunikation intern und nach außen, inkl. lokales Level – Vertrauen aufbauen und festigen, um Rückhalt und Nachhaltigkeit zu gewährleisten => **WIE?**
- Fokus auf dem Community-Level: Menschen müssen positive Veränderungen durch Intervention erfahren, um Vertrauen aufzubauen; Prävention von Radikalisierung, lokaler Rückhalt: ohne Sichtbarkeit & Akzeptanz der Bevölkerung können Maßnahmen nicht erfolgreich sein
- Daher Fokus auf Basic Needs (EZ, ggf. Zusammenarbeit mit Militär); dazu Ausbildungs- und Trainingsmaßnahmen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung fördern (inklusiv & nachhaltig!)
- Junge Menschen (m + w!) mehr in den Blick nehmen → aktive Rolle beim Wiederaufbau
- bestehende Strukturen verstehen und nutzen, Auf-/Ausbauen zusammen mit lokalen Akteuren
- Dezentralisierung („Community Based Security“) guter Ansatz, aber Kommunikation/Kooperation mit Governance-Level unabdingbar für nachhaltige Stabilität
- Stärkerer Einbezug lokale Zivilgesellschaft, auch durch internationale NGOs, + Akademia/Media/...
- Citizenship als Konzept muss mehr Beachtung finden in fragmentierten Gesellschaften, + Rechte
- Lessons learnt stärker im Fokus der internationalen Zusammenarbeit rücken, auch im Bereich CIMIC
- Persönlicher Eindruck: Große Unterschiede in der (Militär-)Kultur der Länder, besonders auffällig durch Beteiligung von zwei Soldaten der US Army

Irak

- Bildungssektor ausbauen: Ausbildung von Lehrern, Ausbau von Schulen, freie Bildung priorisieren
- Infrastruktur verbessern, z.B. durch landesweite Community Driven Development Projekte → direkte Wirkung, Einbezug lokale Bevölkerung, wirtschaftlicher Entwicklungsfaktor
- Diversifizierung der Wirtschaft; Umverteilung der Öleinnahmen (derzeit 90% BIP, aber nur 1% Jobs)
- Reconciliation: State & Community Level, verbunden durch „Coordination Hubs“ (unterstützt durch IOs): local ownership, Stärkung der Zivilgesellschaft, Akzeptanz der Zentralregierung → Mainstreaming von Reconciliation als Basisprinzip auch in anderen Maßnahmen
- Lokale Situation + Konfliktphase sind entscheidend: im Irak gibt es derzeit große regionale

Unterschiede bzgl. des Konfliktstadiums; Konzepte müssen angepasst werden

Follow-Up Ideen / Feedback für's ZIF

- Vorstellung des ZIF selbst
- großes Interesse am HEAT-Training (und andere gemeinsame Trainingsaktivitäten) vor allem von militärischer Seite; konkret Kontakt zu Generalleutnant (a.d.) Volker R. Halbauer
→ Interesse Zusammenarbeit zur Konzipierung weiterer Trainingsprojekte
- Vorstellung der Publikation „Duty of Care“ während des High Level Events
- Möglicherweise Input, z.B. UN OCHA CIMCoord Handbook? → Wunsch aus dem Plenum

Seit 2015 wechselt die Ausrichtung jährlich zwischen Berlin und Den Haag. Die nächste Common Effort Konferenz wird vom 4. bis 8. Juni 2018 in Den Haag stattfinden.

Mitarbeitersitzung (08.06.2017)

- ZIF als „Matrix-Organisation“: AGs (NATO, AU, EU, OSZE, UN & Vernetztes Handeln)
- Vernetztes Handeln oft mit internem Fokus: Einbezug Ops!
- Neue Taskforce UN-Personal: Mehr Deutsche Zivile in UN Friedenseinsätze!
- Fortschritt ZIF2016; Problem Budgetplanung: Zahlen Vorausplanen?
- Mehr deutsches Engagement Friedenseinsätze – aber nicht nur militärisch
- Auch: mehr Polizei: wie können (pensionierte) Polizisten als zivile Experten gewonnen werden?
- Zusammenarbeit EEAS
- Gemeinsame Ausstellung mit bpb: „Frieden machen“
- Überlegungen zur Vernetzung von AU / ZIF-Pools
- Neue Präventionsplattform UN (Guterres → Review)
- zum 30.06. Austritt FriEnt, bilateral aber weiter
- ENTRi-Förderung läuft aus – Übernahme durch EU Security & Defense College?
- Vernetzung UN Task Force Duty of Care + ZIF
- Über ZIF Rekrutierung deutsche Polizisten für OSZE-Missionen

Prioritäten für die deutsche UN-Politik. DGVN im Gespräch mit den Parteien. (BBAW, 26.6.17)

Teilnehmende:

Dr. Franziska Brandter, Grüne, Vorsitzende Unterausschuss ZKP

Niels Annen, SPD, Obmann Auswärtiger Ausschuss

Dr. Andreas Nick, CDU, Auswärtiger Ausschuss, Unterausschuss UN, IOs & Globalisierung

Dr. Alexander Neu, Obmann Verteidigungsausschuss

Moderator: Arnd Henze, ARD; Einführung durch Detlef Dzembitzki, Vorstand DGVN

Bezugsrahmen: Diskussionspapier der DGVN vom 22. Juni: „**Globale Politik aktiv gestalten – in und durch Deutschland: Zehn Prioritäten für die künftige deutsche UN-Politik**“

Themen: R2P und Konsequenzen / Position Deutschland, Deutschland Neue Verantwortung, Agenda2030, Bewerbung Deutschlands um nicht-permanenten Sitz im Sicherheitsrat, Rolle G20, EU in der UN

Brandter:

- Geldkürzungen USA UN: Deutschland müsste an Speerspitze stehen
- Deutsche Polizei- und Justizkapazitäten in Auslandseinsätzen stärken, Bund-Länder Problematik überwinden, ggf. Expertenpool schaffen: echtes Primat des Zivilen!
- R2P = wichtig, inkl. Militäreinsätze. Hier kein Konsens im Bundestag (v.a. Deutsche Truppen unter UN-Kommando), aber unverzichtbares Instrument zur Wahrung der Menschenrechte

- Libyen: Gescheitert an fehlender Nachsorge, stellt aber R2P nicht in Frage, sondern Umsetzung
- Wie mit UN-Blockade (SC) umgehen? → Generalversammlung kann entstehen, Bsp. Untersuchung Syrien. Aber: Gelder fehlen, hier müssen DE und andere beisteuern; auch Finanzierung regionaler Organisationen (AU), auch um Relevanz UN zu erhalten: wo (politischer) Wille ist, ist auch ein Weg
- Finanzierungslücke UN muss gefüllt werden, um kritische Folgen (z.B. weitere Marginalisierung von Frauen u.a.) zu verhindern – hier müssen DE/EU Initiative ergreifen, Partner finden
- 2% für Militär als nationales Ziel unsinnig, weil EU sicherheitspolitisch *gemeinsam* denken muss

Annen:

- Anspruch Deutschlands auf nicht-permanenten Sitz im UNSR legitim: anerkannt hohes Engagement (im Bereich Polizei natürlich ausbaufähig), finanzielle Unterstützung; wird zur Kandidatur/mehr Engagement aufgefordert: Deutschland wird als verlässlicher Partner der UN anerkannt
- Deutschland muss innerhalb UN den normativen Rahmen stärken (Völkerrecht), besonders angesichts gezielter Verletzungen derzeit; bestehende Systeme stärken
- Derzeit keine anderen Strukturen mit globaler Legitimation; Reformen voranbringen wo möglich, gleichzeitig an Unterstützung festhalten und durch nicht-permanenten Sitz weiter stärken
- Fokus Migration: Fortsetzung Arbeit, Verbündete finden: dauerhafte Finanzierung UNHCR sichern
- auch mehr Unterstützung Aufnahmeländer; strukturelle Lösungen finden
- R2P: Ansatz unterstützenswert, aber ambivalent: Libyen zeigt, dass auch Missbrauch möglich ist, was den Ruf geschädigt hat (auch Beziehungen zu Russland), daher ist Politik hier zurückhaltend
- Daher Abwägen nötig vor Einsatz; Vorausdenken & Nachsorge → wieder legitimieren
- Rolle G20 wird sich zeigen – kann Chance sein; auch Führungsaufgabe Deutschland / Merkel
- Wahlkampf um Mittel zur EZ- Finanzierung: bessere Koordinierung nötig statt Wettbewerb um Gelder und Kompetenzen; gemeinsames Handeln, Kohärenz: abhängig vom nächsten Bundestag
- Außenpolitische Debatte wird öffentlich wichtiger, Aufmerksamkeit erhöht Effizienzdruck
- USA dürfen nicht aus der Verantwortung genommen werden: klares, selbstbewusstes Auftreten & Verbündete finden (auch innerhalb USA: etwa Bundesstaaten, Kongress bei Klimadeal)
- US-Rückzug aus UN-Budget: Gefahr für internationale Sicherheit. Aber auch Momentum für Europa: neue Dynamik innerhalb EU (auch Thesenpapier Mogherini), Umsetzung liegt bei Staaten
- Politisches Kapital / Führungskraft nötig, z.B. binational (DE-FR, DE-NL), dann auch Stärkung UN

Nick:

- 10-Punkte-Plan DGVN: Allgemein konsensfähig im Bundestag, Kernfrage = Stärkung Legitimität & Effektivität UN & Institutionen (v.a. SR): Reformfähigkeit entscheidet schlussendlich über Relevanz
- Derzeit keine Alternativen, aber Bedrohung Reichweite durch Machtinstrument Sicherheitsrat
- G20 bietet Schnittstellen, Positivbeispiel: Staaten übernehmen Verantwortung
- R2P: Frage nach Umsetzung bleibt (siehe Versagen Syrien), Praxis: Was kann man rechtfertigen?
- Allgemeine Ernüchterung Interventionspolitik, mehr Fokus auf Prävention (EZ, Humanitäre Hilfe), auch günstiger als Intervention; muss immer auf humanitären Prinzipien /Agenda 2030 basieren
- SDGs/ Klimaabkommen: Paradigmenwechsel! Wichtiger Einfluss Zivilgesellschaft, aber auch höherer „Leidensdruck“ wichtige Player (v.a. China) – Partnerschaften abseits USA
- Abkehr von DA, stattdessen neue Mechanismen, z.B. Mobilisierung Privatkapital, Motivation Privatwirtschaft (von kleinen Start-Ups bis Multinationals)
- EU-Sitz im SR? Positive Außenwahrnehmung, auf durch Rolle DE

Neu:

- Linke ist gegen SR-Bewerbung DE, da generell gegen SR: Entspricht nicht mehr Realität, Missbrauch
- Beitritt DE nur eigener Reputationsgewinn, keine Vorteile für UN: kein außerordentlicher deutscher Beitrag, da finanziell Pflichtbetrag und personell deutlich unter Soll
- UN-Relevanz in DE ohnehin gering (Vgl. Wahlprogramme), eher NATO, EU (+ OSZE)
- Militäreinsätze unter UN-Kommando derzeit abzulehnen, nur wenn ausreichende Reform (s. Libyen)

- R2P nicht sinnvoll, da Missbrauchsgefahr zu hoch; nicht völkerrechtlich legitimiert
- Glaubwürdigkeit Internationales Strafrecht derzeit angeschlagen: muss für alle gelten (etwa IStGH: Verfolgung nur Verbrechen in Sub-Sahara-Afrika)
- Deutsche „Verantwortungsrhetorik“ ist am Ende immer Legitimation mehr Militärausgaben; muss stattdessen produktive EZ in den Fokus nehmen & selbstkritisch evaluieren (v.a. Rüstungsexporte, Handel): Paradigmenwechsel statt Almosen
- Deutschland kann moralische Führungsrolle nehmen, kann sich mehr leisten als Militärausbau

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Report Reflection Group „Monopoly on the Use of Force 2.0?“ (28.06.2017)

Zusätzlich zu Vertreterinnen und Vertretern der Arbeitsgruppe wurden als KommentatorInnen eingeladen: Jörn Grävingholt vom DIE, Ulrike Hopp-Nishanka vom BMZ und Christian Resch vom AA (wurde vertreten durch Viktoria Bechstein). Außerdem waren Vertreter/innen von GPPi, SWP, GIZ, Amnesty International, dem Kelman Institute, der Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung, der Universität Heidelberg, der Universität Duisburg-Essen und der FU Berlin anwesend. Das Gespräch wurde unter Chatham House Rules geführt.

- **The current global trend towards more fragmented and exclusive security provision undermines stability and threatens human security**, especially for vulnerable and marginal groups. Supranational threats such as terrorism and cybercrime exceed national legislation and require supranational legislative agreements.
- As **human rights are inextricably intertwined with citizenship, the future of global security governance will continue to depend largely on the nation state**, which is why interventions must strive to strengthen existing and functioning mechanisms and build up on them. While civil society plays a crucial role in these processes and especially vulnerable groups must be included, it can never replace a centralized security apparatus as provided by the state.
- Nonetheless, **the reality of security around the world is fragmented**, from private security companies to traditional non-state providers such as clans, including perpetrators of (ethnic) violence in conflict (Taliban, Al-Shabaab etc.). While the international community must acknowledge this fact and the **legitimacy of many traditional security arrangements**, an inclusive and universal national security sector requires a **normative framework and centralized coordination** to ensure its functioning.
- **While ideally security reform should be part of a larger transformation process, ‘toolbox-approaches’ have proven too static and efforts should start bottom-up** from the community level and within the specific context. On the long run, only legitimate and inclusive security governance can ensure stability and development.
- **New technologies** provide both chances and threats for international security and legislation continues to lag behind invention. Those states in power of the new technologies must pursue an interest to create binding legal frameworks from the start in order to prevent misuse and human rights violations (including their own).
- **Dynamic security challenges require scenario planning**, including for political / civil actors. While **prevention** of violence has moved to the foreground on policy papers during the past decade, it often remains lip service, and large military contingents for “quick fixes” such as in Libya have long become part of the problem, undermining legitimacy and credibility of international peace operations while evading accountability.
- **Consequences for Germany/EU**: long-term strategic planning & goal definition, increased monitoring / evaluation & lessons learnt processes. Given the findings of this and other reports, the importance of civil contributions must be emphasized and plans such as budget raises for military capacities clearly dismissed, especially on the grounds of Western values based on universal human rights and the grotesquely disproportional financial allocations between military spending and the UN Peacebuilding Fund.

- Lessons **learnt from European** (not only EU) **integration after the end of the Cold War** clearly indicate priorities as confidence-building, arms control and common security measures – we must continue on this path, strengthen common institutions and legitimacy through increased democratic oversight.
- This includes a review of national security sectors, the EU security architecture and whole-of-government approaches (*siehe Leitlinien*), a challenge especially great for Germany given its fragmented police and justice / intelligence landscape and *Ressortkonkurrenz*
- **Follow-up**: What are possible incentives for stronger and more legitimate global security governance based on the principle of human security and [logics of peace](#)?

11.07.2017: ZIF- Treffen mit Christoph Heusgen, Sicherheitspolitischer Berater im Kanzleramt

- ZIF ICD: Think Tank Personalentwicklung → Austausch, EU kann zB auch von AU lernen (kontinentaler Personalpool für zivile Friedenseinsätze)
- Vernetzter Ansatz als "Aushängeschild" deutscher Sicherheitspolitik (Heusgen)
- Rolle Kanzleramt = Vermittlung zwischen Ministerien; Grenzen! ZB kein Nationaler Sicherheitsrat im Kanzleramt, da Widerstand der Ressorts: Koalitionsregierung erschwert Konsens, verschiedene Parteien leiten Ministerien → daher Ressortabstimmung weiter verbessern
- Training nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern auch internationale Trainings und Methodenaustausch → e.g. Staatssekretärstreffen für Afghanistan: hat sich bewehrt, Nachfolgerunden u.a. Jour Fixe Außen- + Verteidigungspolitik und seit 2013 Außen- & Entwicklungspolitik, auch ggs. Austausch
- Operationalizing Prevention? → Wieland-Karimi: Fehlendes Augenmerk auf politischem Prozess in Friedensmissionen, Fokus militärische Komponente, dabei Politik entscheidend
- Deutsch-französisches (militärisches) Engagement für G5 Sahel wird verstärkt
- Keine substantielle Aufstockung Militärbeitrag UN geplant: Parlament keine Mehrheit (auch zum Ärger internationale Partner → Deutschland als „sicherheitspolitischer Trittbrettfahrer“?)
- Shortcoming Ertüchtigung: Ausbildung, aber oft fehlende Ausrüstung / Bezahlung → Instabilität
- Sekundierung in zivile Missionen: EU & OSZE durch ZIF, UN nur direkt (ZIF unterstützt Bewerbung, Training)