Clientelism as an Alternative Voting Rationale in Latin-America

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# **Abstract**

This research analyzes the existence of an alternative voting rationale as a consequence of clientelism for citizens in Latin America. For representation in an ideal system, it is important that citizens vote based on a policy-based rationale and political parties compete on policy issues. This article hypothesizes that clientelism creates an alternative voting rationale for citizens, which in turn hinders the voting behavior based on individual political perceptions. This alternative rationale is created through the offering of a benefit by a political party in exchange for the vote of the citizen, which is controlled through machine politics. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that in countries with clientelist political parties, the offering of a material benefit in turn means that the voting rationale of individual left-right placement decreases in importance. These hypotheses are tested using multinomial logistic regression analyses using data covering nine Latin American countries. The results show that citizens in the researched countries do not seem to vote using an alternative voting rationale of clientelism with the exception of Paraguay. Furthermore, the importance of left-right placement does not seem to decrease with the offering of a benefit in exchange for the citizens’ vote.

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# **Introduction**

For representative democracy to properly function, it is important that free and fair elections are present (Sartori, 1976). This entails, as discussed by Thomassen (1994), that political parties behave according to the responsible party model. This model states that political parties should compete based on policy and that the electorate should also have political behavior that is policy-based. If this model is met, the political elites are in turn responsive to the interests of citizens. It is therefore important that in a representative democracy, citizens vote using a rationale that is based on their own policy preferences. Elections in Latin America are distinct from elections in more advanced democracies. In advanced democracies, the above-mentioned criteria for representative democracy are mostly met, however, this is not the case in Latin America. Latin American countries are mostly newer democracies, stemming from the 1980s. In these countries, ideology is not as an important factor for vote choice, as opposed to more advanced democracies. This means that the left-right placement is less prominent in Latin America, and this is therefore not as important as a predictor for voting behavior (Ruth, 2016). Ruth (2016) shows that citizens in these countries are less able to assess their own placement on this left-right scale, and furthermore, this placement on this scale is less meaningful. This leads to an absence of consistent political perceptions of the citizens in these countries, in turn meaning that the criteria of representation in an ideal system are not met, as there is no political behavior based on policy. At the same time, there is a high level of clientelism in Latin America (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011). Clientelism could be described as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?” (Stokes 2007, 649). In other words, citizens in these countries are, to a higher degree than in more advanced democracies, offered a benefit in exchange for their vote for these parties. It could therefore be expected that for these citizens, clientelism is an alternative rationale on which they can base their vote, as opposed to their left-right placement. This offering of a material benefit in exchange for the vote of citizens leads to an increased difficulty for their orientation in the political space, and this increased complexity in turn leads to a higher probability that voting behavior will be based on an alternative rationale (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998).

There are several reasons why it is relevant to research the effects of clientelism in Latin America. Based on the literature discussed above, it can be expected that in Latin America, the presence of clientelism leads to a different voting rationale of citizens on which they base their vote. This would mean that citizens in these countries base their vote choice on the offering of a material benefit, instead of their own ideology. However, the research on this topic is limited, and it is not clear whether clientelist practices by political parties indeed lead to an alternative voting rationale in citizens, as there is a lack of empirical literature on this topic. Furthermore, this research is socially relevant, as an alternative rationale for voters could be problematic. Namely, this means that the criteria of a representative democracy are not met. For a democracy to properly function, political parties should compete based on policy-based competition. However, this would not be the case if citizens do not vote according to their policy preferences, and instead use an alternative rationale due to the presence of clientelist practices (Thomassen, 1994). Therefore, this research will focus on whether there is indeed an alternative rationale on which citizens base their votes, namely clientelism instead of left-right placement. This all leads to the following research question:

To what degree does clientelism create an alternative voting rationale that influences the voting behavior of citizens in Latin America?

First of all, all relevant literature will be discussed for this research. This means that the representation in an ideal system, as already touched upon above, will be worked out. Furthermore, clientelism and its definition will be discussed. Thereafter, the different effects clientelism can have in a democracy that are currently researched will be explained, which is also where this research looks into. This is also what leads to the hypotheses, as the relevant literature shows where this research will fall into. In the chapter following the literature review, the methods of this research will be discussed, including the operationalization. Following the operationalization, the actual research will be carried out and the results will be discussed. First of all, the results will be discussed per country in what way the results are significant and thereafter the two hypotheses will be discussed more broadly. From this, the conclusion chapter follows, in which an answer will be given on the research question as stated above. In this chapter, the limitations of this research and recommendations for further research will also be discussed.

# **Literature review**

In this chapter, all relevant literature will be discussed. First of all, representation in an ideal system will be touched upon, meaning in systems without clientelism as a distortion. In this, distortion due to clientelism will also be discussed, as the criteria of representation in an ideal system are not met. Thereafter, a definition of clientelism will be given based on theory and the different related concepts. Following this, the effects of clientelism will be discussed, and in what way clientelism can therefore distort the representation of an ideal system. Lastly, the hypotheses will be given, following from the relevant literature.

**Representation and clientelism**

This research focuses on the distortion of information due to clientelism. Clientelism in turn then influences representation in an ideal system. In this part, the representation in an ideal system will be discussed, to show how this can be distorted by the presence of clientelism. Often stated in the literature is that the quality of representation is dependent on the presence of free, fair and regular elections (Sartori, 1976). Thomassen (1994) furthers this with the responsible party model, which assumes policy-based competition between political parties on the one hand and political behavior of the electorate based on policy on the other hand. It is therefore assumed that in order to have elites be responsive to citizens, citizens should be able to perceive the different policy options that parties offers (Manin et al., 1999).

These criteria are mostly met in advanced democracies, but in newer democracies, like in South America, may be more problematic (Thomassen, 1994). Dalton and Klingemann (2007) also show that the South American countries did not develop along the lines of the above-mentioned responsible party model. This means that in newer democracies, citizens lack clear perceptions of parties’ policy positions, however these are necessary for the programmatic party competition. In an ideal system, citizens use the information from structured political perceptions to orient themselves in the political world (Downs, 1957). However, it could be stated that the political perceptions are less clear in newer democracies, as their democratic experience is shorter. Van der Brug et al. (2008) find that in newer democracies, the evaluation of political parties’ policy positions is more demanding for citizens. Furthermore, political parties tend to be more volatile in their policy positions. The confidence of citizens to evaluate political parties’ policy positions increases over time.

However, the political orientation of individuals is not only dependent on the age of democracies. It also depends on the political context in which individuals are embedded, including the availability of information (Álvarez & Franklin, 1994). Clientelism can distort these information cues. If citizens do not receive clear policy signals from political parties, they are less able to place themselves on the spectrum of the political space and therefore the responsible party model is violated.

## **Definition of clientelism**

First of all, for this research it is important that a definition of clientelism is given. However, there is a lack of conceptual clarity and consensus on this definition. There is also no generally accepted definition, and many related concepts are often used interchangeably. Therefore, clientelism and related concepts will be discussed and the differences between them.

One definition that in existing literature is the most generally accepted is the definition of Stokes (2007). In this, clientelism is defined as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?”[[1]](#footnote-1) (Stokes 2007, 649). An element that is clearly present in this definition is contingency. This is the delivery of a good or service by both patron and client and therefore a reciprocal benefit. The contingency entails that politicians only supply benefits to individuals or groups that did support the patron, as can also be seen in the above definition. Important to note here is that although the relationship is reciprocal, this does not mean that the exchange is simultaneous. This means both that there should be a credible promise of such a benefit and that there is the ability of the patron to monitor and sanction the client (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).

Another element that is often present in definitions of clientelism is the element of iteration. The idea is that a clientelist exchange is not a one-off interaction. Instead, both the patron and client anticipate future interactions as part of the decisions made today (Hicken, 2011). This element creates a mechanism to overcome the challenge described above of a credible promise. These repeated interactions namely reinforce social norms on reciprocity, which can be seen as a feature of clientelism (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). This iteration lets both the voter and politician make reasonable predictions on the behavior of the other. The combination of this iterative exchange and social networks enables political parties to overcome the limitations to control imposed by the secret ballot (Stokes, 2007, p 611).

The last element that is often present in definitions of clientelism is that of hierarchy. In this, clientelism is often seen as a vertical relationship with an unequal exchange which is maintained through dependence on the patron (Montambeault, 2012). This element is also used in sociological approaches, for example, Scott (1972) defines clientelism as a relationship “in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering generous support and assistance, including personal service, to the patron.” The element of hierarchy is also present in Stokes (2005), in which she argues that the standard democratic accountability is turned into a “perverted accountability”, in which parties hold citizens accountable for their vote, instead of the standard principle-agent relationship, in which voters hold parties accountable.

***Related concepts***

Next, a few concepts related to, but distinct from, clientelism should be defined. First of all, pork barrel politics differs from the above definition of clientelism, on the basis of the distributive criterion. By contrast, pork barrel politics in the USA can be defined as benefits that are paid to one or a few districts while costs are shared across all districts (Aldrich, 1995). This therefore differs on the distributive criterion, as the benefits are paid to districts rather than individual citizens (clients). However, the element of contingency of clientelism as described above is also absent from pork barrel politics. Contingency is absent, as the benefits are not necessarily provided *only* to individuals or groups that support the patron.

Similarly, patronage differs from clientelism. Patronage is often defined in terms of what it is that patrons and clients exchange, a narrower definition. Robinson and Verdier (2013) define it as an exchange of a public sector job for political support. A similar definition is given by Scott (1972), namely an “instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron”. Patronage could therefore be seen a subtype of clientelism, in which the proffering of public resources is used as opposed to party resources for the client. In patronage, the patron holds public office and distributes state resources, while in clientelism, the political actor may or may not hold office.

This distinction between patronage and clientelism on the basis of public resources as opposed to party resources is also discussed by Medina and Stokes (2007). They state that there is a distinction between economic monopoly, goods which the patron controls independent of the outcome of an election, and political monopoly, goods that the patron controls only if office is retained (Medina & Stokes, 2007).

Vote buying is another concept related to clientelism. It differs from clientelism on the basis of the elements of contingency and iteration. First of all, the element of iteration is missing, as the exchange of resources for votes is not part of an ongoing relationship, instead vote-buying is defined more as a one-time exchange (Hicken, 2011). Related to this, the control on the reciprocity of exchange is missing, and therefore also the contingency element cannot be present, and would therefore be differentiated from clientelism (Callahan & McCargo, 1996). To differentiate from clientelism, it should be assessed to what degree the contingency is present. This can be judged by looking at how targeted vote buying is, and if voters accept vote-buying from multiple candidates (Hicken, 2011). Furthermore, it should be assessed in what way the exchange is more than a one-off interaction. If the vote-buying namely is not a one-off interaction, it is embedded in an ongoing clientelist relationship. This means that vote-buying is not necessarily distinct from clientelism, but only if it is a one-off interaction. Nichter (2008) however states that most vote buying is actually just turnout buying, as with the secret ballot and the control on the reciprocity missing, citizens can actually vote as they please. He states that parties then participate in turnout buying, only targeting citizens that are likely to vote for that party.

## **Effects of clientelism**

A lot of research is done on the causes of clientelism (e.g. Dixit & Londregan, 1996). However, the consequences of clientelism have been less often researched. The literature on the consequences can be divided into three categories that will be explained here. First of all, clientelism can have consequences for political parties. Furthermore, it has consequences for policy output. Lastly, clientelism affects voters, which is also the focus of this research.

### ***Consequences for parties***

First of all, clientelism has multiple consequences for political parties. Because of the “perverted accountability” in which parties hold citizens accountable for their vote, instead of the standard principle-agent relationship, voters can no longer hold political parties accountable for policy output (Stokes, 2005). This influences the behavior of parties, as political parties work determinedly in legislatures to secure public resources in order to distribute them (Desposato, 2006). The same holds true for individual members of parliament (MPs) of clientelist parties, as their behavior is influenced to engage in providing clientelistic services, which in turn hinders them to perform their traditional roles (Zackaria & Appiah-Marfo, 2020).

Clientelism can also have an effect on political parties to behave differently with regards to policy. For example, Chubb (1981) finds that clientelist parties have an interest to hold back income growth as a strategy to stay in power. This is also linked to the idea that a lower level of income is often named as one of the causes of clientelism (Dixit & Londregan, 1996). Lastly, clientelism has a positive effect on political parties that promote a liberal welfare state (Berens & Ruth-Lovell, 2021). The article states that this is the case for two reasons. First of all, poor voters have a vested interest to vote for redistributive policies, however this gets distorted due to clientelism. The vote buying leads poor voters to be more likely to vote for residualistic political parties. On the other hand, high income voters are also more likely to vote for residualistic social policies as clientelism leads to uncertainty in the provision of public goods, which leads high income voters to vote for these particular parties.

### ***Consequences for policy***

Linked to the consequences for political parties are the consequences it can have on policy output. This has already been touched upon above. The article by Berens and Ruth-Lovell (2021) namely shows that clientelism has a positive effect on parties that promote a liberal welfare state. This in turn has consequences for policy, which means that clientelism hinders progressive social policy. This is because both poor and higher-income citizens are more likely to support these parties (Berens & Ruth-Lovell, 2021). Above is also stated that parties have an interest to hold back income growth, which in turn also influences policy. This is done to keep constituents poor and dependent (Chubb, 1981). Other research also shows that clientelism can lead to, or sustain, poverty. This is done by parties to output policy that leads to the under provision of development-enhancing public goods (Robinson & Verdier, 2013; Medina & Stokes, 2007). Clientelism can therefore have negative implications for welfare. It is argued by Vicente (2014) that vote buying leads to worse public policies, as the redistribution stemming from vote buying is used as a substitution for public goods provision.

Furthermore, social science theory often claims that hierarchical relationships like clientelism can severely restrict collective action. Shami (2012) however shows that other factors could explain the restriction to collective action, and villages with hierarchical networks that were connected to the outside world were not more restricted in collective action than more egalitarian villages. The same lack of causation between clientelism and policy output can be found in unfinished development projects. Literature suggests that clientelist parties have an incentive to not finish development projects until after elections as a form of vote buying, however this can rather be explained as an inefficient outcome of inconsistent collective choice processes among local political actors (Williams, 2017).

### ***Consequences for voters***

A lot of other research focusses on the effect clientelism has on vote choice. For example, Wantchekon (2003) finds that there is a positive effect of clientelism on the vote choice of clientelist parties, based on an experiment in Benin. Levitt and Snyder (1997) find the same effect for pork-barrel spending in the United States, where the pork-barrel spending could increase the vote for the incumbent by up to two percent. This effect is also observed in Peru, where there is a positive correlation between expenditures and the vote share in the reelection (Roberts & Arce, 1998). This effect on vote share however is not necessarily positive. Calvo and Murillo (2004) find no positive correlation between public employment and vote share in provinces in Argentina where the Radicals are the main party. For this same party, Nazareno, Brusco and Stokes (2006) even find that patronage spending could depress the vote share. They find that patronage could even suppress the vote share of the Radicals, as there are more wealthier constituents in those municipalities, which feel that patronage spending before elections could indicate an inefficient government. This is especially the case as the Radicals is a party of middle-class constituents.

These effects on vote choice are direct effects, however it can then be wondered why clientelism is still employed with the absence of a political machine (e.g. Stokes, 2005). Munoz (2014) finds that clientelism can also have an indirect effect on vote choice. It is argued that clientelism during campaigns is crucial for signaling candidates' electoral viability. Politicians buy the participation of poor voters at campaign events. By turning out large numbers of people at rallies, candidates establish and demonstrate their electoral prospects to the media, donors, activists, and voters.

Besides the effects on vote choice, clientelism can also have an effect on the information of voters. Ruth (2016) finds that clientelism hinders the development of consistent political orientation by reducing the utility of information cues, such as left‐right labels. As stated by Ruth (2016): “Clientelistic parties generate indifference among their supporters toward the left‐right divide by offering them an alternative voting rationale, and increase uncertainty in the political realm by making left‐right labels less meaningful.” On the other hand, when voters have better access to information, voters are more likely to respond positively to public policy messages instead of clientelism (Wantchekon, 2007). The effects of clientelism can therefore be negated by increasing access to information, and campaigns to increase this are found to undermine the above effects of vote buying on voting behavior (Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009).

As stated above, Ruth (2016) focuses on the indifference towards the left-right label generated by political parties due to clientelism. She argues that clientelist parties offer an alternative voting rationale towards citizens and making the left-right divide less meaningful. However, this research does not focus on whether this alternative rationale offered due to clientelism is indeed used by citizens, when at the same time the left-right placement is not used as a rationale for vote choice. Therefore, there is a lack of research on the topic whether voters use this alternative voting rationale on the micro level to base their vote on, instead of the left-right placement of the individual. This research in turn will fall into this gap in the literature, as will be discussed below.

## **Hypotheses**

Two different hypotheses can be formulated based on the theory discussed above.

The first hypothesis is based on the premise that citizens use the information on parties’ policy positions to make vote decisions (Downs, 1957). This model of representation in an ideal system however is not met due to the alternative voting rationale that individuals have. Instead of voting regarding policy positions of parties, individuals will vote according to an alternative rationale, namely material benefits. As shown by the article of Ruth (2016), clientelism creates an alternative voting rationale for citizens, however there is a gap in the research whether this does happen on the micro level. Furthermore, Wantchekon (2003) shows that there is a positive effect on vote choice for parties engaging in clientelist practices, therefore it can be expected that the same holds true on the individual level, meaning that citizens that are offered a benefit in exchange for their vote, will use this as an alternative rationale on which to base their vote. The first hypothesis is as follows:

Clientelist political parties create an alternative voting rationale for citizens by letting citizens vote as a consequence of material benefits.

The second is also based on the literature discussed above. If it is assumed that clientelism does indeed become an alternative voting rationale if present in a country, it could in turn also be expected that the importance of left-right placement decreases for a higher level of clientelism. This leads to the following second hypothesis:

The alternative rationale increases with the level of clientelism, and therefore the higher level of clientelism the lower the importance of left-right placement as a voting rationale.

# **Methods**

In this chapter, the methods used for the analysis will be discussed. First of all, the case selection will be justified. This is necessary, to justify the nine countries that are used for the analysis in the next chapters. Thereafter, the operationalization of this research is discussed. In this part, the research that will be carried out for the next chapter will be discussed, with the dependent variable and multiple independent variables operationalized. Furthermore, the different models used will be justified. This all is necessary in order to carry out the research.

## **Case selection**

The focus of this research is on Latin America, which is important for two reasons. First of all, there is a lot of variance in the level of clientelism in Latin America between countries (Kitschelt et al., 2010). This variance is also seen in the dataset used for this research, which shows for example that the level of clientelism in Argentina is 3.4%, meaning that 3.4% of respondents state that they are offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. There are however also some countries that are clientelist to a higher degree, such as Brazil, with 10.2%, and Paraguay with 13.4% of respondents stating that they are offered a benefit. At the same time, there are some countries with a lower degree of clientelism, as shown above Argentina with 3.4%, but Chile even only has 1.4% of respondents stating that they are offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. The entire variance between countries used in the analysis can also be seen in table 10 in the appendix.

This variance is present in Latin America, even though all countries are new democracies, therefore the variance is not between new and established democracies, but within a group of new democracies. The other reason is related to this, namely that the Latin American countries have a similar historical and institutional background. This is based on the military rule that was present during the 1970s and 1980s and all countries studied are presidential regimes with similar structures of horizontal accountability. This case therefore allows the research to focus on clientelism and removing other contextual factors that could explain whether clientelism is used as an alternative voting rationale. In this research in particular however, the case selection will be limited to nine countries in Latin America, more specifically Argentina (N=557), Bolivia (N=1114), Brazil (N=774), Chile (N=623), Colombia (N=535), Paraguay (N=681), Peru (N=836), Uruguay (N=1018) and Venezuela (N=883). This research is limited to these countries, as there is both a time limitation and data set limitation in this research. The dataset used for this research is the LAPOP dataset of 2014 for these countries, with the above-mentioned number of cases for each country.

## **Operationalization**

For the statistical analysis, the LAPOP 2014 datasets of the countries mentioned above will be used. The LAPOP dataset measures the public opinion of participants in 34 countries every two years. This questionnaire is used throughout the Americas, by using a representative sample of participants. This questionnaire is mostly the same, as there is a core document of questions used in every country. This is useful, as this makes the different countries in this research comparable. This is also the reason that the dataset of LAPOP is used for this research, as the analysis will be carried out for each country individually, but this dataset makes the results between different countries comparable.

The concept of voting behavior is used as the dependent variable of this research. Voting behavior is operationalized as the party an individual citizen voted for in the latest election. For this, LAPOP is a valuable dataset, as it asks respondents the candidate and party they voted for in the latest presidential elections (item VB3N). If multiple rounds of elections were held, the questionnaire asked for the voting behavior of the first round. The responses such as “do not know” and “no answer” are all filtered out, so that only responses of a candidate and party name are left for the analysis. Besides this, a frequencies table is generated in order to look at the distribution of voting behavior in the different countries. The cases with a low response rate (<1%) were omitted, as they disproportionally influence the results of the study. As voting behavior is a nominal variable, a multinomial logisitic regression is carried out (e.g. Carreras, 2014). The dependent variable of voting behavior is a nominal variable, as the different values of the variable are political parties. For this same reason, the analysis will be done per country, as the votes between countries cannot be compared resulting from the different parties present in countries.

Besides the dependent variable, two independent variables are used in this research. First, the left-right placement of respondents is used. Left right positioning of individual citizens is operationalized as the placement of the individual citizen on the left right scale. In the LAPOP dataset, respondents are asked to place themselves on a left-right scale (item L1). The respondents had to position themselves on a 10-point scale, where 1 means left and 10 means right. This is used together with the other independent variable of clientelistic practices. Clientelistic practices is operationalized, based on the definition of Stokes (2007), as this definition is most often used in research on this topic. This also most closely fits the variable of clientelism in the dataset. Clientelism is operationalized as the offering of a material benefit in exchange for the vote of an individual citizen. In the LAPOP dataset, it asks respondents whether they were offered a benefit for their vote in the last general election (item Clien1na). The relevant answer options for the respondents were either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, meaning that this variable is a dummy variable.

Lastly, a few control variables will be added into the analysis. As the analysis is carried out per country, no macro level control variables are added. The control variables will therefore be on the individual level. In this, it is important that several proxies are used to analyze voting behavior. In the literature, it is shown that several factors on the micro level can explain voting behavior (Neundorf & Smets, 2017). These will therefore be added as control variables in this study. The control variables in this study will be confined to education (item ed), gender (item q1) and age (item q2). Several other control variables such as personal economic situation (item q10NEW) and party identification (item vb11) are also useful for this analysis, however due to the many missings on these variables, these control variables were omitted from the analysis. These control variables are also present in the datasets across all analyzed countries, meaning that the results will be comparable, and not dependent on the control variables used.

As stated before, a multinomial logistic regression analysis will be carried out. In this, the two independent variables, namely left-right positioning of individual citizens and the offering of material benefits to the citizens in exchange for the vote, will be analyzed to show whether they influence the dependent variable of voting behavior. This will be done in order to analyze whether hypothesis 1 does indeed hold true. Thereafter, an interaction variable will be added named ‘interaction’ in the results and in the datasets, which in turn can analyze whether hypothesis 2 holds true. With the dependent variable, the two independent variable and several control variables, a multinomial logistic regression analysis can be carried out. For this, three different models will be analyzed. First, in model 1, the dependent variable, voting behavior, will be analyzed using the two independent variables, clientelism and left-right placement. In the second model thereafter, the control variables will be added, to see if the significant effect of these independent variables does hold up, even after controlling for age, education and gender. Lastly, in model 3, the interaction effect will be added to the model. This could therefore show whether an increased level of clientelism leads to left-right placement to become less important predictor of voting behavior, as shown in hypothesis 2. This could in turn answer the research question whether clientelism leads to an alternative rationale of voting behavior.

Lastly, in the empirics chapter, the level of clientelism found in the LAPOP 2014 dataset will be compared to The Americas Barometer insights, which also show the level of clientelism in the researched countries. This data is used, as it can give insight into the validity of the level of clientelism in the dataset. The Americas Barometer insights are used, as this also shows the macro level of clientelism in the countries of interest, and when both the Americas Barometer insights and the dataset used in this research find comparable levels of clientelism, it will increase the validity of the results of this research. Besides this, the DALP expert survey will be used in order to discuss both the left-right placement of the political parties, in the dataset variable dw, and the level of clientelism at the party level, in the dataset variable e3. These can then be used to further interpret the results. The DALP expert survey asks experts to first of all assess the left-right placement of political parties, including the parties in the countries researched here. This is assessed using a 10 point scale, in which 1 means that a party is best located at the “left”, while a 10 means that a party is best located at the “right”. For the variable of clientelism, the survey asks experts the extent to which parties mobilize electoral support by the emphasis on the capacity of the party to deliver targeted material benefits. The answer options are the following: [1] not at all, [2] to a small extent, [3] to a moderate extent and [4] to a great extent.

# **Empirics**

In this chapter, the results will be discussed. First of all, the three different models will be shown and discussed per country, in which the different variables will be discussed, and whether they are significant or not. These countries are respectively Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Thereafter, the results will be discussed more broadly, based on the two hypotheses. This will then in turn show whether these two hypotheses hold, based on the results shown in the tables.

## **Argentina**

First of all, the different political parties in Argentina will be discussed. The political parties used in this analysis, as stemming from the answers of the LAPOP dataset are: Frente para la Victoria, Frente Amplio Progresista and Union para el Desarrollo Social. These are all the political parties that are the possible values of the variable of voting behavior, excluding the omitted political parties due to a low response rate, as discussed in the methods chapter. These parties have different levels of clientelism and differ on their left-right placement, which in turn will be used in the further discussion on the results in this chapter. First of all, Frente para la Victoria is 4.0 on the 10 point left right scale. With regards to clientelism, the expert survey states that clientelism is 4.0 for this party, meaning to a great extent. Next Frente Amplio Progresista, according to the expert survey, the party is 7.9 on the 10 point left right scale and 1.9 on level of clientelism. Lastly Union para el Desarrollo Social is 4.9 on the left right scale and 2.5 on the level of clientelism. The level of clientelism in Argentina as a whole is 3.4%, as can be seen in table 10. Because of these different levels of clientelism, Frente Amplio Progresista is chosen as the reference category for the analysis, as can be seen in table 1. This has been done, as this party has the lowest level of clientelism, and is therefore most useful for the reference category to compare the other political parties to.

In table 1, the results of the multinomial logistic regression in Argentina are shown. First, in model 1, the analysis shows whether left-right placement and clientelism are significant predictors of voting behavior. Most of the variables however are not significant in Argentina, meaning that the left-right placement and whether an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote does not predict the party an individual votes for in the election. This is with the exception of Frente para la Victoria, in which clientelism is significant (B = -14.161; p < 0.01). Looking back at the level of clientelism, this could be expected, as Frente para la Victoria is most clientelist with a 4.0 according to the expert survey. Thereafter in model 2, the control variables were added. However, most of the independent variables were not significant even in model 1, and therefore do not change in this regard from model 1 to model 2. Clientelism as a significant predictor of voting behavior for Frente para la Victoria does however remain significant (B = -15.075; p < .01). This means that for this party, which is most clientelist of the three analyzed parties, clientelism is a significant predictor for the voting behavior of these voters, even after controlling for several other variables. The control variables that are added are gender, age and level of education, of which only level of education is significant.

Lastly, in model 3 an interaction variable was added. The interaction variable, as shown in table 1, is not significant in Argentina. The interaction variable shows whether ideology as a predictor of voting behavior becomes less important if there is a higher degree of clientelism, meaning that an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is however not the case. In model 3, the ideology, meaning the left-right placement of an individual, becomes significant (B = -.649; p < .01) for Union para el Desarrollo Social. Important to notice here is that in the earlier two models, the B value of ideology for Union para el Desarrollo Social was .019 and .012 respectively. This means that after the addition of the interaction variable, the B value becomes larger and negative. This means that when there is no offer for a benefit in exchange for a vote, ideology becomes a significant predictor of the vote choice for these voters. This means that for the voters of this party, especially for the voters that were not offered a benefit in exchange for their vote, the left-right placement of these particular individuals is a significant predictor of their vote choice for this party in this model. Furthermore, the interaction variable has a B value of .336, meaning that when voters were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote, ideology becomes a less important predictor. However, it is important to note that the interaction variable is not significant.

The frequencies table in the appendix (table 10) shows that the level of clientelism in Argentina is 3.4%. This means that of the analyzed cases in Argentina, 3.4% of the valid respondents has stated that they were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This percentage however is quite low if compared to research that looks at the amount of clientelism in a country. The Americas Barometer insights namely shows that the percentage of vote buying in Argentina is 18%, which differs significantly from the 3.4% as a response in the dataset used in this analysis (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | |
| **Argentina** | | Frente para la Victoriaa | Union para el Desarrollo Sociala | Frente para la Victoriaa | Union para el Desarrollo Sociala | Frente para la Victoriaa | Union para el Desarrollo Sociala |
| Intercept | B | -29.217\*\*\* | 28.977\*\*\* | 33.764\*\*\* | 31.418\*\*\* | -32.286 | 31.876 |
|  | SE | 1.210 | .438 | 1.421 | 1.009 | 826.705 | 826.699 |
| Ideology | B | -.099\* | .019 | .075 | .012 | -.273 | -.649\*\*\* |
|  | SE | .055 | .075 | .058 | .077 | .483 | .079 |
| Clientelism | B | -14.161\*\*\* | -14.712 | -15.075\*\*\* | -15.631 | -14.334 | -15.871 |
|  | SE | .584 | .000 | .602 | .000 | 413.353 | 413.349 |
| Sex | B |  |  | -.003 | .172 | -.001 | .159 |
|  | SE |  |  | .244 | .326 | .244 | .327 |
| Age | B |  |  | -.012 | -.003 | -.012 | -.003 |
|  | SE |  |  | .008 | .011 | .008 | .011 |
| Education | B |  |  | -.186\*\*\* | -.059 | -.186\*\*\* | -.061 |
|  | SE |  |  | .034 | .044 | .034 | .045 |
| Interaction | B |  |  |  |  | .173 | .336 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  | .241 | .000 |

Table 1

*coefficients of multinomial regression analysis in Argentina*

*Note: dependent variable: voting behavior. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; Significant when sig (p) < .05. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error; N = 557; a: The reference category is: Frente Amplio Progresista.*

## **Bolivia**

First of all, the different political parties in Bolivia will be discussed. The political parties used in this analysis, as stemming from the answers of the LAPOP dataset are: MAS, PP, AS and UN. These are all the political parties that are the possible values of the variable of voting behavior, excluding the omitted political parties due to a low response rate, as discussed in the methods chapter. These parties have different levels of clientelism and differ on their left-right placement, which in turn will be used in the further discussion on the results in this chapter. First of all, MAS is 1.9 on the 10 point left right scale. With regards to clientelism, the expert survey states that clientelism is 3.2 for this party, on a 4 point scale. Next PP is not discussed in the expert survey, and can therefore not be assessed whether this party is left or right and to what degree this party is clientelist. The same holds true for AS. Lastly UN is 5.5 on the left right scale and 2.7 on the level of clientelism. The level of clientelism in Bolivia as a whole is 5.7%, as can be seen in table 10. Because of these different levels of clientelism, UN is chosen as the reference category for the analysis, as can be seen in table 2. This has been done, as this party has the lowest level of clientelism, at least of the parties of which the level of clientelism is known and is therefore most useful for the reference category to compare the other political parties to.

In table 2, the results of the multinomial logistic regression in Bolivia are shown. First, in model 1, the analysis shows whether left-right placement and clientelism are significant predictors of voting behavior. The variable of ideology is significant for two of the three parties in Bolivia, namely AS (B = -.291; p < .05) and MAS (B = -.340; p < .01), meaning that the left-right placement of the individuals significantly predicts the voting behavior for these particular individuals. Clientelism however is not a significant predictor for this first model. Important to note here is the large B value for AS, which could mean that there is a low response rate for voters for this party that are offered a benefit, which could disproportionally influence this value. Furthermore, the reference party UN already has a score of 2.7 with regards to clientelism, meaning that other parties like MAS do not largely differ on this with a score of 3.2. This could in turn explain the lack of significance of clientelism as a voting rationale. Thereafter in model 2, the control variables were added. As shown in table 2, the variable of ideology is significant for the same two parties, even after the addition of these control variables. The control variables that are added are gender, age and level of education, of which the level of education and gender is significant for at least one political party.

Lastly, in model 3 an interaction variable was added. The interaction variable, as shown in table 2, is not significant in Bolivia. The interaction variable shows whether ideology as a predictor of voting behavior becomes less important if there is a higher degree of clientelism, meaning that an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is however not the case. In model 3, the ideology, meaning the left-right placement of an individual, is no longer significant. This means that the two independent variables of interest in this research are not significant in model 3, as shown in table 2. Besides this, the B values of the two parties that were significant on ideology in models 1 and 2 have not changed significantly or in direction, like in Argentina. Another thing to note however is the party PP, of which the B value of clientelism in model 3 is 5.041 as opposed to B = -.345 and B = -.250 in models 1 and 2 respectively. This would also support hypothesis 2 in model 3 with the addition of the interaction effect, namely that for voters of PP that were offered a benefit, clientelism becomes an alternative voting rationale, however it is not significant in this model.

It can therefore be concluded that clientelism in Bolivia does not influence the voting behavior, as this is not significant in all three models in table 2. The frequencies table in the appendix (table 10) shows that the level of clientelism in Bolivia is 5.7%. This means that of the analyzed cases in Bolivia, 5.7% of the valid respondents has stated that they were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This percentage however is quite low if compared to research that looks at the amount of clientelism in a country. The Americas Barometer insights namely shows that the percentage of vote buying in Bolivia is 16.7%, which differs significantly from the 5.7% as a response in the dataset used in this analysis (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011).

Table 2

*coefficients of multinomial regression analysis in Bolivia*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | | Model 2 | | | Model 3 | | |
| **Bolivia** | | PPb | ASb | MASb | PPb | ASb | MASb | PPb | ASb | MASb |
| Intercept | B | .508\* | -28.214\*\*\* | -6.163\*\*\* | 2.201 | -25.715\*\*\* | 9.214\*\*\* | -8.251 | -22.075 | 8.452\*\* |
|  | SE | 2.084 | .619 | 1.517 | 2.345 | 1.674 | 1.769 | 9.352 | 1184.527 | 4.139 |
| Ideology | B | -.026 | -.291\*\* | -.340\*\*\* | -.027 | -.325\*\* | -.348\*\*\* | 1.349 | -.342\*\* | -.251 |
|  | SE | .081 | .125 | .057 | .088 | .134 | .066 | 1.117 | .135 | .645 |
| Clientelism | B | -.345 | 14.202 | -1.002 | -.250 | 14.088 | -.767 | 5.041 | 12.273 | -.384 |
|  | SE | 1.018 | .000 | .741 | 1.031 | .000 | .777 | 4.666 | 592.263 | 2.061 |
| Sex | B |  |  |  | -.885\*\* | -.716 | -.605\*\* | -.874\*\* | -.713 | -.603\*\* |
|  | SE |  |  |  | .374 | .516 | .262 | .375 | .516 | .262 |
| Age | B |  |  |  | .015 | .005 | .012 | .015 | .005 | .012 |
|  | SE |  |  |  | .014 | .020 | .010 | .014 | .020 | .010 |
| Education | B |  |  |  | -.089\* | -.094 | -.257\*\*\* | -.090\* | -.094 | -.257\*\*\* |
|  | SE |  |  |  | .048 | .065 | .037 | .049 | .065 | .037 |
| Interaction | B |  |  |  |  |  |  | -.702 | .007 | -.049 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  |  |  | .564 | .000 | .327 |

*Note: dependent variable: voting behavior. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; Significant when sig (p) < .05. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error; N = 1114; b: The reference category is: UN.*

## **Brazil**

First of all, the different political parties in Brazil will be discussed. The political parties used in this analysis, as stemming from the answers of the LAPOP dataset are: Rousseff, Serra and Silva. These are all the candidates of political parties that are the possible values of the variable of voting behavior, excluding the omitted political parties due to a low response rate, as discussed in the methods chapter. The names of candidates instead of political parties is used in Brazil, as the party names are not used in the dataset. These parties have different levels of clientelism and differ on their left-right placement, which in turn will be used in the further discussion on the results in this chapter. First of all, Rousseff is 3.0 on the 10 point left right scale. With regards to clientelism, the expert survey states that clientelism is 4.0 for the party of this candidate, on a 4 point scale. Next Serra, according to the expert survey, the party is 6.0 on the 10 point left right scale and 2.6 on level of clientelism. Lastly Silva is 3.1 on the left right scale and 2.5 on the level of clientelism. The level of clientelism in Brazil as a whole is 10.2%, as can be seen in table 10. Because of these different levels of clientelism, Silva is chosen as the reference category for the analysis, as can be seen in table 3. This has been done, as this party has the lowest level of clientelism, and is therefore most useful for the reference category to compare the other political parties to.

In table 3, the results of the multinomial logistic regression in Brazil are shown. First, in model 1, the analysis shows whether left-right placement and clientelism are significant predictors of voting behavior. The variables however are not significant in Brazil, meaning that the left-right placement and whether an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote does not predict the party an individual votes for in the election. Thereafter in model 2, the control variables were added. However, the independent variables were not significant even in model 1, and therefore do not change in this regard from model 1 to model 2. The control variables that are added are gender, age and level of education, of which only level of education is significant in all parties (p < .05).

Lastly, in model 3 an interaction variable was added. The interaction variable, as shown in table 3, is not significant in Brazil. The interaction variable shows whether ideology as a predictor of voting behavior becomes less important if there is a higher degree of clientelism, meaning that an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is however not the case. Unlike in Argentina, the independent variables of ideology and clientelism is still not significant in this last model, together with the interaction variable. Important to note however in this is the B values changing from models 1 and 2 into model 3, with all four B values changing direction and increasing in size. This is in accordance with the hypothesis, as for example the B values of ideology in model 3 show the voters that are not offered a benefit in exchange for a vote, and this model shows that the left-right placement of these individuals become a more important indicator for their vote. However, these independent variables are not significant in the three models, as discussed above. When looking back at the levels of clientelism of the political parties discussed, it might partly explain the lack of significance for clientelism as a predictor of voting behavior. The reference category namely has a 2.5 as the level of clientelism, while Serra and Rousseff have 2.6 and 4.0 respectively. Especially 2.5 and 2.6 is a negligible difference, meaning that voters of Serra are not more often offered a material benefit as opposed to Silva voters, meaning that it is difficult to find an effect.

It must therefore be concluded that clientelism does not influence the voting behavior in Brazil, as this is not significant in all three models in table 3. The frequencies table in the appendix (table 10) shows that the level of clientelism in Brazil is 10.2%, which is quite high in comparison to the other analyzed countries in this research. This means that of the analyzed cases in Brazil, 10.2% of the valid respondents has stated that they were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This percentage of 10.2% is more comparable to the LAPOP data on 2010, which shows clientelism in Brazil as a percentage of 13.4% (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | |
| **Brazil** | | Jose Serrac | Dilma Rousseffc | Jose Serrac | Dilma Rousseffc | Jose Serrac | Dilma Rousseffc |
| Intercept | B | .272 | 1.600\* | 1.174 | 3.654\*\*\* | 3.312 | 4.475\* |
|  | SE | 1.062 | .937 | 1.445 | 1.313 | 2.806 | 2.583 |
| Ideology | B | .035 | .050 | .011 | .016 | -.390 | -.134 |
|  | SE | .070 | .063 | .077 | .071 | .443 | .396 |
| Clientelism | B | .389 | .413 | .231 | .262 | -.923 | -.190 |
|  | SE | .523 | .462 | .533 | .477 | 1.401 | 1.287 |
| Sex | B |  |  | -.283 | -.549 | -.299 | -.557\* |
|  | SE |  |  | .365 | .335 | .366 | .336 |
| Age | B |  |  | .029\* | .025\* | .030\* | .026\* |
|  | SE |  |  | .016 | .015 | .016 | .015 |
| Education | B |  |  | -.113\*\* | -.176\*\*\* | -.109\*\* | -.174\*\*\* |
|  | SE |  |  | .049 | .046 | .049 | .046 |
| Interaction | B |  |  |  |  | .213 | .081 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  | .233 | .209 |

Table 3

*coefficients of multinomial regression analysis in Brazil*

*Note: dependent variable: voting behavior. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; Significant when sig (p) < .05. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error; N = 774; c: The reference category is: Marina Silva.*

## **Chile**

First of all, the different political parties in Chile will be discussed. The political parties used in this analysis, as stemming from the answers of the LAPOP dataset are: Enriquez-ominami, Bachelet, Matthei, Parisi, Sfeir and Claude. These are all the candidates of political parties that are the possible values of the variable of voting behavior, excluding the omitted political parties due to a low response rate, as discussed in the methods chapter. The names of candidates instead of political parties is used in Chile, as the party names are not used in the dataset. These parties have different levels of clientelism and differ on their left-right placement, which in turn will be used in the further discussion on the results in this chapter. First of all, Enriquez-ominami is not discussed in the expert survey, and can therefore not be assessed whether this party is left or right and to what degree this party is clientelist. The same holds true for Parisi, Sfeir and Claude. Besides this, Bachelet is 3.5 on the 10 point left right scale. With regards to clientelism, the expert survey states that clientelism is 2.5 for this party, on a 4 point scale. Next Matthei, according to the expert survey, the party is 8.6 on the 10 point left right scale and 3.0 on level of clientelism. The level of clientelism in Chile as a whole is 1.4%, as can be seen in table 10. Because of these different levels of clientelism, Bachelet is chosen as the reference category for the analysis, as can be seen in table 4. This has been done, as this party has the lowest level of clientelism, and is therefore most useful for the reference category to compare the other political parties to.

In table 4, the results of the multinomial logistic regression in Chile are shown. First, in model 1, the analysis shows whether left-right placement and clientelism are significant predictors of voting behavior. Model 1 shows that ideology is indeed significant for two parties, namely the political party of Matthei (B = 1.006; p < .01) and of Parisi (B = .491; p < .01). Clientelism on the other hand is significant for three political parties, namely those of Enriquez-Ominami (B = -1.996; p < .05), Parisi (B = -2.591; p < .01) and Claude (B = -2.755; p < .05). This means that for these parties, these respective independent variables are significant predictors of the vote choice of these particular individuals to vote for these parties. Unfortunately, for the three parties for which clientelism is a significant predictor, the expert survey has no data on the level of clientelism. Thereafter in model 2, the control variables were added. Model 2 in turn shows that ideology remains significant for the same two parties, even after controlling for gender, age and level of education. Clientelism however, that was significant for three parties in model 1, is no longer significant in model 2. Important to note here is that, as can be seen above, the level of clientelism in Chile as a whole is low with 1.4%. With a low number of voters for a particular party that is offered a benefit in exchange for their vote, the results for these parties gets influenced disproportionally, which can also be seen by the standard errors of the variable of clientelism for the different parties.

Lastly, in model 3 an interaction variable was added. The interaction variable, as shown in table 4, is not significant in Chile. The interaction variable shows whether ideology as a predictor of voting behavior becomes less important if there is a higher degree of clientelism, meaning that an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is however not the case. Unlike in Argentina, the independent variables of ideology and clientelism is still not significant in this last model, together with the interaction variable. Even though these independent variables do not become significant, it can be seen that the B values of most political parties for ideology changes direction, which supports the hypothesis that voters that are not offered a benefit vote according to their ideology, while voters that were offered a benefit, use an alternative voting rationale. These variables however are not significant.

It can therefore be concluded that clientelism does not influence the voting behavior in Chile, as this is not significant in models 2 and 3 in table 4. It is only significant in model 1, before the introduction of the control variables. The frequencies table in the appendix (table 10) shows that the level of clientelism in Chile is 1.4%. This means that of the analyzed cases in Chile, 1.4% of the valid respondents has stated that they were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This percentage of clientelism is quite low if compared to other countries analyzed in this research. In addition to this, the LAPOP dataset from 2010 shows a level of clientelism of 5.5%, which is also low (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011).

Table 4

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | | | | | | Model 2 | | | | | Model 3 | | | | |
| **Chile** | | Enriquez-Ominami  d | | Matthei d | Parisi d | | Sfeir d | Claude d | Enriquez-Ominami  d | Matthei d | Parisi d | Sfeir d | Claude d | Enriquez-Ominami  d | Matthei d | Parisi d | Sfeir d | Claude d |
| Intercept | B | 1.140 | | -6.137\* | .210 | -28.703  \*\*\* | | 2.052 | -2.612\* | -3.525 | 31.664 | -29.884  \*\*\* | 19.438 | 22.798  \* | -.630 | 13.623 | 1.382 | 18.597 |
|  | SE | | 1.857 | 3.173 | 1.978 | .833 | | 2.393 | 1.355 | 750.766 | 636.463 | 2.933 | 637.284 | 13.423 | 129.474 | 17.064 | 280.079 | 12.857 |
| Ideology | B | | .131 | 1.006  \*\*\* | .491  \*\*\* | .200 | | -.137 | .111 | .852\*\*\* | .422  \*\*\* | .168 | -.070 | -6.174\* | -2.878 | -3.428 | -3.884 | -3.508 |
|  | SE | | .084 | .087 | .104 | .172 | | .180 | .085 | .076 | .101 | .160 | .182 | 3.553 | 32.645 | 4.118 | 74.733 | 2.902 |
| Clientelism | B | | -1.996\*\* | -.348 | -2.591  \*\*\* | 12.042 | | -2.755  \*\* | -.081 | -2.271 | -17.813 | 11.703 | -10.710 | -12.568\* | -2.675 | -8.042 | -2.933 | -10.414\* |
|  | SE | | .934 | 1.568 | .995 | .000 | | 1.216 | .000 | 375.383 | 318.231 | .000 | 318.640 | 6.676 | 64.735 | 8.470 | 140.033 | 6.165 |
| Sex | B | |  |  |  |  | |  | -.022 | .111 | -.464 | -.350 | -1.176 | -.016 | .038 | -.475 | -.469 | -1.211\* |
|  | SE | |  |  |  |  | |  | .373 | .288 | .430 | .688 | .746 | .377 | .252 | .412 | .614 | .685 |
| Age | B | |  |  |  |  | |  | -.027\*\* | .019\*\* | -.035\*\* | -.036 | -.021 | -.025\*\* | .016\*\* | -.037\* | -.032 | -.017 |
|  | SE | |  |  |  |  | |  | .013 | .009 | .015 | .024 | .025 | .013 | .008 | .015 | .022 | .022 |
| Education | B | |  |  |  |  | |  | .116\*\* | .103\*\*\* | .150\*\* | .336\*\* | .103 | .090\* | .081\*\*\* | .104 | .234\*\* | .120 |
|  | SE | |  |  |  |  | |  | .054 | .037 | .069 | .136 | .106 | .052 | .032 | .063 | .107 | .095 |
| Interaction | B | |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3.125\* | 1.761 | 1.858 | 1.996 | 1.740 |
|  | SE | |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1.778 | 16.323 | 2.060 | 37.367 | 1.457 |

*coefficients of multinomial regression analysis in Chile*

*Note: dependent variable: voting behavior. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; Significant when sig (p) < .05. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error; N = 623; d: The reference category is: Bachelet.*

## **Colombia**

First of all, the different political parties in Colombia will be discussed. The political parties used in this analysis, as stemming from the answers of the LAPOP dataset are: Mockus, Lleras, Petro, Santos and Sanin. These are all the candidates of political parties that are the possible values of the variable of voting behavior, excluding the omitted political parties due to a low response rate, as discussed in the methods chapter. The names of candidates instead of political parties is used in Colombia, as the party names are not used in the dataset. These parties have different levels of clientelism and differ on their left-right placement, which in turn will be used in the further discussion on the results in this chapter. First of all, Mockus is not discussed in the expert survey, and can therefore not be assessed whether this party is left or right and to what degree this party is clientelist. Besides this, Lleras is 8.8 on the 10 point left right scale. With regards to clientelism, the expert survey states that clientelism is 3.5 for this party, on a 4 point scale. Next Petro, according to the expert survey, the party is 2.0 on the 10 point left right scale and 2.2 on level of clientelism. The left right placement of the political party of Santos thereafter is 8.8 and the level of clientelism is 3.6, according to the expert survey. Lastly, Sanin is 8.8 on the left right scale and 3.7 on the level of clientelism. The level of clientelism in Colombia as a whole is 9.2%, as can be seen in table 10. Because of these different levels of clientelism, Petro is chosen as the reference category for the analysis, as can be seen in table 5. This has been done, as this party has the lowest level of clientelism, and is therefore most useful for the reference category to compare the other political parties to.

In table 5, the results of the multinomial logistic regression in Colombia are shown. First, in model 1, the analysis shows whether left-right placement and clientelism are significant predictors of voting behavior. The variables however are not significant in Colombia, with the exception of clientelism for the political party of Sanin (B = -2.645; p < .05) and left-right placement in the party of Mockus (B = -.696; p < 0.01). This means that for these particular parties, clientelism and left-right placement respectively are a significant predictor of the vote choice of these particular individuals to vote for this party. In this, the party of Sanin is the most clientelist party according to the expert survey in Colombia, which could explain why clientelism is a significant predictor for this party. Thereafter in model 2, the control variables were added. Model 2 shows that after the addition of these control variables of gender, age and level of education, both the left-right placement and clientelism remains positive for one political party, although the party for which left-right placement is significant changes to Santos (B = .279; p < .01) and Sanin (B = -2.912; p < .05) remains significant for clientelism.

Lastly, in model 3 an interaction variable was added. The interaction variable, as shown in table 5, is not significant in Colombia. The interaction variable shows whether ideology as a predictor of voting behavior becomes less important if there is a higher degree of clientelism, meaning that an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is however not the case. In model 3, the ideology, meaning the left-right placement of an individual, becomes significant with p < 0.01 for another party, namely Lleras (B = .370). This means that for the voters of this party, the left-right placement of these particular individuals is a significant predictor of their vote choice for this party in this model. In this model, clientelism is no longer significant for any of the parties. Furthermore, the B values of both ideology and clientelism do not change significantly after the addition of the interaction variable.

It can therefore be concluded that clientelism does not influence the voting behavior in Colombia, as this is not significant in all three models in table 5, with the exception of one party in the first two models. The frequencies table in the appendix (table 10) shows that the level of clientelism in Colombia is 9.2%. This means that of the analyzed cases in Colombia, 9.2% of the valid respondents has stated that they were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. The Americas Barometer insights shows that the percentage of vote buying in Colombia is 15.2%, which slightly differs from the 9.2% as a response in the dataset used in this analysis (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | | | Model 2 | | | | Model 3 | | | |
| **Colombia** | | Llerase | Mockuse | Santose | Sanine | Llerase | Mockuse | Santose | Sanine | Llerase | Mockuse | Santose | Sanine |
| Intercept | B | -31.151  \*\*\* | 1.278 | 2.813 | 4.074\* | -29.760  \*\*\* | .021 | 5.257  \*\* | 2.061 | -25.560 | 5.708 | 10.595 | 6.051 |
|  | SE | .695 | 2.326 | 2.101 | 2.367 | 1.943 | 2.696 | 2.391 | 3.152 | 751.058 | 7.485 | 6.876 | 7.447 |
| Ideology | B | .194 | .140 | -.696  \*\*\* | .035 | .224\* | .171 | .279\*\*\* | .020 | .370\*\*\* | -.786 | -.607 | -.640 |
|  | SE | .119 | .098 | 1.041 | .139 | .125 | .104 | .088 | .144 | .126 | 1.060 | .926 | .989 |
| Clientelism | B | 14.984 | -.661 | 4.074 | -2.645\*\* | 14.878 | -.447 | -.626 | -2.912  \*\* | 12.766 | -3.306 | -3.310 | -4.863 |
|  | SE | .000 | 1.150 | 2.367 | 1.173 | .000 | 1.162 | 1.054 | 1.213 | 375.528 | 3.701 | 3.409 | 3.628 |
| Sex | B |  |  |  |  | -.749 | -.008 | .102 | 1.575\*\* | -.748 | -.009 | .103 | 1.593\*\* |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  | .676 | .519 | .439 | .798 | .676 | .521 | .441 | .799 |
| Age | B |  |  |  |  | -.033 | -.030 | -.026\* | .022 | -.033 | -.030 | -.027\* | .023 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  | .023 | .019 | .016 | .028 | .023 | .019 | .016 | .028 |
| Education | B |  |  |  |  | .083 | .152\*\* | -.161\*\*\* | -.088 | .080 | .148\*\* | -.164  \*\*\* | -.086 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  | .089 | .073 | .058 | .091 | .089 | .073 | .058 | .091 |
| Interaction | B |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -.065 | .487 | .451 | .313 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | .000 | .538 | .469 | .516 |

Table 5

*coefficients of multinomial regression analysis in Colombia*

*Note: dependent variable: voting behavior. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; Significant when sig (p) < .05. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error; N = 535; e: The reference category is: Petro.*

## **Paraguay**

First of all, the different political parties in Paraguay will be discussed. The political parties used in this analysis, as stemming from the answers of the LAPOP dataset are: ANR, PLRA, PQ, Avanza Pais and Frente Guasu. These are all the political parties that are the possible values of the variable of voting behavior, excluding the omitted political parties due to a low response rate, as discussed in the methods chapter. These parties have different levels of clientelism and differ on their left-right placement, which in turn will be used in the further discussion on the results in this chapter. First of all, ANR is 6.8 on the 10 point left right scale. With regards to clientelism, the expert survey states that clientelism is 4.0 for this party, on a 4 point scale. Next PLRA, according to the expert survey, the party is 7.7 on the 10 point left right scale and 3.7 on level of clientelism. The left right placement of the political party PQ thereafter is 8.6 and the level of clientelism is 2.2, according to the expert survey. Furthermore, the left right placement of Avanza Pais is 3.8 and level of clientelism is 2.0. The left right placement of Frente Guasu thereafter is 3.6 and the party has a level of clientelism of 1.8 according to the expert survey. Lastly, PUNACE is 8.2 on the left right scale and 3.8 on the level of clientelism. The level of clientelism in Paraguay as a whole is 13.4%, as can be seen in table 10. Because of these different levels of clientelism, Frente Guasu is chosen as the reference category for the analysis, as can be seen in table 6. This has been done, as this party has the lowest level of clientelism, and is therefore most useful for the reference category to compare the other political parties to.

In table 6, the results of the multinomial logistic regression in Paraguay are shown. First, in model 1, the analysis shows whether left-right placement and clientelism are significant predictors of voting behavior. The variables are significant in Paraguay for multiple parties, meaning that the left-right placement and whether an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote does predict the party an individual votes for in the election, at least for these particular parties. For three parties, left-right placement is significant, namely PLRA (B = .295; p < .01), ANR (B = .391; p < .01) and UNACE (B = .307; p < .05). Clientelism is significant for two parties, namely PLRA (B = 1.304; p < .05) and ANR (B = 1.373; p < .01). When looking at the levels of clientelism at the party level, as shown above, this could be expected, as ANR has a 4.0 and PLRA a 3.7 as their respective levels of clientelism. The only other party with a similar level of clientelism is PUNACE, however for that particular party, clientelism as a predictor of voting behavior is not significant. Thereafter in model 2, the control variables were added. The results of model 2, as shown in table 6, show that the independent variables remain significant, regardless of these control variables. This is with the exception of the ideology for UNACE, which was significant, p < .05, in model 1, but only p < .1 in model 2. The control variables that are added are gender, age and level of education.

Lastly, in model 3 an interaction variable was added. The interaction variable, as shown in table 6, is not significant in Paraguay. The interaction variable shows whether ideology as a predictor of voting behavior becomes less important if there is a higher degree of clientelism, meaning that an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. Furthermore, in model 3, clientelism is still significant, p < 0.05, for at least one party, namely PLRA. This means that for the voters of this party, an offering of a benefit in exchange for their vote is a significant predictor of their vote choice for this party in this model. PLRA is also the political party in Paraguay with the highest level of clientelism of all researched parties.

It can therefore be stated that clientelism at least partly influences the voting behavior in Paraguay, as it is significant for at least one party in all three models in table 6. The frequencies table in the appendix (table 10) shows that the level of clientelism in Paraguay is 13.4%. This means that of the analyzed cases in Paraguay, 13.4% of the valid respondents has stated that they were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote, which is quite high in comparison to the other researched countries in this analysis. Furthermore, this does not significantly differ from the percentage of vote buying in Paraguay of 16.2%, as shown in the LAPOP dataset of 2010 (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011).

Table 6

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | | | | Model 2 | | | | | Model 3 | | | | |
| **Paraguay** | | PLRAg | ANRg | PQg | Avanza  Paisg | UNACEg | PLRAg | ANRg | PQg | Avanza  Paisg | UNACEg | PLRAg | ANRg | PQ  g | Avanza  Paisg | UNACE  g |
| Intercept | B | -1.629 | -1.235 | -3.569 | -.341 | -4.652  \*\* | -4.508  \*\* | -4.954  \*\*\* | -8.265  \*\* | -5.048  \*\* | -3.352 | -6.433\*\*\* | -4.473  \*\* | -7.347 | -3.456 | -2.342 |
|  | SE | 1.014 | .951 | 2.345 | 1.174 | 2.320 | 1.759 | 1.709 | 3.985 | 2.146 | 3.275 | 2.336 | 2.071 | 5.830 | 2.649 | 4.636 |
| Ideology | B | .295  \*\*\* | .391  \*\*\* | .204 | .094 | .307\*\* | .238  \*\* | .336  \*\*\* | .139 | .012 | .268\* | .540 | .261 | -.041 | -.403 | .086 |
|  | SE | .096 | .094 | .178 | .117 | .151 | .096 | .094 | .189 | .121 | .152 | .377 | .352 | .937 | .496 | .726 |
| Clientelism | B | 1.304\*\* | 1.373  \*\*\* | .782 | .126 | 1.308 | 1.142\*\* | 1.176  \*\* | .510 | -.221 | 1.264 | 2.168\*\* | .910 | -.002 | -1.186 | .711 |
|  | SE | .545 | .514 | 1.218 | .645 | 1.175 | .570 | .542 | 1.270 | .694 | 1.187 | 1.074 | .934 | 2.766 | 1.248 | 2.241 |
| Sex | B |  |  |  |  |  | .430 | .762 | 1.166 | .935 | .131 | .421 | .759 | 1.165 | .968 | .127 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  |  | .544 | .530 | 1.065 | .667 | .900 | .545 | .530 | 1.065 | .670 | .900 |
| Age | B |  |  |  |  |  | .028 | .036 | -.044 | .023 | -.042 | .028 | .036 | -.045 | .021 | -.042 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  |  | .023 | .022 | .062 | .029 | .043 | .023 | .022 | .062 | .029 | .043 |
| Education | B |  |  |  |  |  | .217  \*\*\* | .227  \*\*\* | .475  \*\*\* | .364  \*\*\* | .042 | .216  \*\*\* | .226  \*\*\* | .476  \*\*\* | .370  \*\*\* | .041 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  |  | .070 | .068 | .168 | .087 | .111 | .070 | .068 | .169 | .088 | .111 |
| Interaction | B |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -.161 | .041 | .099 | .237 | .100 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | .213 | .201 | .504 | .278 | .392 |

*coefficients of multinomial regression analysis in Paraguay*

*Note: dependent variable: voting behavior. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; Significant when sig (p) < .05. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error; N = 681; g: The reference category is: Frente Guasu.*

## **Peru**

First of all, the different political parties in Peru will be discussed. The political parties used in this analysis, as stemming from the answers of the LAPOP dataset are: Gana Peru, Fuerza 2011, Alianza, Peru Posible and Solidaridad Nacional. These are all the political parties that are the possible values of the variable of voting behavior, excluding the omitted political parties due to a low response rate, as discussed in the methods chapter. These parties have different levels of clientelism and differ on their left-right placement, which in turn will be used in the further discussion on the results in this chapter. First of all, Gana Peru is 8.4 on the 10 point left right scale. With regards to clientelism, the expert survey states that clientelism is 2.0 for this party, on a 4 point scale. Next Fuerza 2011, according to the expert survey, the party is 2.6 on the 10 point left right scale and 2.4 on level of clientelism. Alianza thereafter is not discussed in the expert survey, and can therefore not be assessed whether this party is left or right and to what degree this party is clientelist. The same holds true for Peru Posible and Solidaridad Nacional. The level of clientelism in Peru as a whole is 6.6%, as can be seen in table 10. Because of these different levels of clientelism, Gana Peru is chosen as the reference category for the analysis, as can be seen in table 7. This has been done, as this party has the lowest level of clientelism, and is therefore most useful for the reference category to compare the other political parties to.

In table 7, the results of the multinomial logistic regression in Peru are shown. First, in model 1, the analysis shows whether left-right placement and clientelism are significant predictors of voting behavior. The variables however are not significant in Peru, meaning that the left-right placement and whether an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote does not predict the party an individual votes for in the election, with the exception of one party, namely Fuerza 2011, where the variable of left-right placement is significant (B = .104; p < .01). Thereafter in model 2, the control variables were added. However, the independent variables were not significant even in model 1, and therefore do not change in this regard from model 1 to model 2. The left-right placement that was significant for Fuerza 2011 in model 1 does however remain significant in model 2 (B = .105; p < .01). The control variables that are added are gender, age and level of education.

Lastly, in model 3 an interaction variable was added. The interaction variable, as shown in table 7, is not significant in Peru. The interaction variable shows whether ideology as a predictor of voting behavior becomes less important if there is a higher degree of clientelism, meaning that an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is however not the case. In model 3, clientelism becomes significant for one party, namely Peru Posible (B = -3.015; p < .05), meaning that the offering of a benefit in exchange for a vote for the particular individuals is a significant predictor of their vote choice for this party in this model. There is however no data from the expert survey on the level of clientelism of Peru Posible, which means that it cannot be assumed that this party has a high level of clientelism, only that for voters that were offered a material benefit, it is a significant predictor to vote for this particular party.

All in all, it can be concluded that clientelism does not influence the voting behavior in Peru, as this is not significant in all three models in table 7, with the exception of one party in model 3. The frequencies table in the appendix (table 10) shows that the level of clientelism in Peru is 6.6%. This means that of the analyzed cases in Peru, 6.6% of the valid respondents has stated that they were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is quite low if compared to the LAPOP dataset of 2010, which shows that the level of clientelism in Peru is 11.9% (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | | | Model 2 | | | | Model 3 | | | |
| **Peru** | | Fuerza  2011h | Alianza h | Peru  Posible h | Solidaridad  Nacional h | Fuerza  2011 h | Alianza h | Peru  Posible h | Solidaridad  Nacional h | Fuerza  2011 h | Alianza h | Peru  Posible h | Solidaridad  Nacional h |
| Intercept | B | -1.602  \*\* | -4.232  \*\*\* | -1.629 | -2.812  \* | -2.213  \*\*\* | -6.775  \*\*\* | -3.626  \*\* | -4.648  \*\* | -2.699 | -5.875 | .398 | -6.037 |
|  | SE | .672 | 1.491 | 1.054 | 1.536 | .801 | 1.680 | 1.432 | 1.926 | 1.950 | 4.076 | 2.730 | 4.462 |
| Ideology | B | .104\*\*\* | .092 | .104 | .023 | .105\*\*\* | .116\* | .094 | .034 | .192 | -.061 | -.779 | .298 |
|  | SE | .039 | .062 | .085 | .100 | .040 | .066 | .086 | .105 | .338 | .747 | .579 | .741 |
| Clientelism | B | .252 | .998 | -.749 | -.074 | .248 | .840 | -.832 | -.145 | .495 | .377 | -3.015\*\* | .583 |
|  | SE | .332 | .741 | .518 | .761 | .335 | .749 | .523 | .768 | .973 | 2.041 | 1.404 | 2.222 |
| Sex | B |  |  |  |  | .460\*\*\* | -.078 | .623\* | .356 | .462\*\* | -.078 | .615\* | .357 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  | .161 | .265 | .352 | .410 | .161 | .265 | .353 | .410 |
| Age | B |  |  |  |  | -.008 | .001 | .013 | -.011 | -.008 | .001 | .014 | -.011 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  | .006 | .009 | .012 | .016 | .006 | .009 | .012 | .016 |
| Education | B |  |  |  |  | .023 | .228\*\*\* | .065 | .155\*\* | .023 | .228\*\*\* | .068 | .154\*\* |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  | .021 | .042 | .046 | .064 | .021 | .042 | .047 | .064 |
| Interaction | B |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -.045 | .090 | .460 | -.138 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | .173 | .378 | .299 | .382 |

Table 7

*coefficients of multinomial regression analysis in Peru*

*Note: dependent variable: voting behavior. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; Significant when sig (p) < .05. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error; N = 836; h: The reference category is: Gana Peru.*

## **Uruguay**

First of all, the different political parties in Uruguay will be discussed. The political parties used in this analysis, as stemming from the answers of the LAPOP dataset are: Frente Amplio, Partido Colorado, Partido Nacional and Partido Independiente. These are all the political parties that are the possible values of the variable of voting behavior, excluding the omitted political parties due to a low response rate, as discussed in the methods chapter. These parties have different levels of clientelism and differ on their left-right placement, which in turn will be used in the further discussion on the results in this chapter. First of all, Frente Amplio is 3.4 on the 10 point left right scale. With regards to clientelism, the expert survey states that clientelism is 1.6 for this party, on a 4 point scale. Next Partido Colorado, according to the expert survey, the party is 6.8 on the 10 point left right scale and 1.9 on level of clientelism. Partido Nacional thereafter has a left right placement of 6.2 and a level of clientelism of 1.9 according to the expert survey. Partido Independiente lastly is not discussed in the expert survey, and can therefore not be assessed whether this party is left or right and to what degree this party is clientelist. The level of clientelism in Uruguay as a whole is 3.6%, as can be seen in table 10. Because of these different levels of clientelism, Frente Amplio is chosen as the reference category for the analysis, as can be seen in table 8. This has been done, as this party has the lowest level of clientelism, and is therefore most useful for the reference category to compare the other political parties to.

In table 8, the results of the multinomial logistic regression in Uruguay are shown. First, in model 1, the analysis shows whether left-right placement and clientelism are significant predictors of voting behavior. The variable of left-right placement is significant for Partido Nacional (B = .725; p < .01), Partido Colorado (B = .752; p < .01) and Partido Independiente (B = .364; p < .01), and therefore all three parties in model 1. This means that the ideology of an individual predicts the party an individual votes for in the election. On the other hand, clientelism is not significant for any parties in Uruguay, and therefore is not a significant predictor for voting behavior. Thereafter in model 2, the control variables were added. As shown in table 8, the variable of left-right placement is significant, even after controlling for gender, age and level of education of respondents. Important to note for clientelism is that the level of clientelism in Uruguay is quite low with 3.6% according to the dataset used. Furthermore, the different political parties discussed do not differ significantly on their respective levels of clientelism, as the reference party has a level of clientelism of 1.6, and two of the other political parties have a level of clientelism of 1.9. This means that when there is no significant difference between the reference party and the other researched parties, then clientelism is not a factor that differentiates them.

Lastly, in model 3 an interaction variable was added. The interaction variable, as shown in table 8, is not significant in Uruguay. The interaction variable shows whether ideology as a predictor of voting behavior becomes less important if there is a higher degree of clientelism, meaning that an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is however not the case. In addition to this, in model 3, left-right placement is no longer significant. Clientelism was not significant starting in model 1, and the same holds true up to model 3.

It can therefore be concluded that clientelism does not influence the voting behavior in Uruguay, as this is not significant in all three models in table 8. The frequencies table in the appendix (table 10) shows that the level of clientelism in Uruguay is 3.6%. This means that of the analyzed cases in Uruguay, 3.6% of the valid respondents has stated that they were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is similar in level to the value shown in the LAPOP dataset from 2010, namely 5.6% (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011). This is quite low in comparison to the other countries in this analysis, which in turn also shows that it is not a significant predictor for voting behavior in Uruguay. On the other hand, it is shown that left-right placement is a significant predictor, even after controlling for gender, age and level of education.

Table 8

*coefficients of multinomial regression analysis in Uruguay*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | | Model 2 | | | Model 3 | | |
| **Uruguay** | | Partido  Nacionali | Partido  Coloradoi | Partido  Independientei | Partido  Nacionali | Partido Coloradoi | Partido  Independientei | Partido  Nacionali | Partido  Coloradoi | Partido  Independientei |
| Intercept | B | -5.081\*\*\* | -5.746\*\*\* | -2.660 | -5.716\*\*\* | -7.076\*\*\* | -5.413\*\* | -4.213 | -5.251 | -2.508 |
|  | SE | 1.068 | 1.262 | 1.658 | 1.188 | 1.402 | 2.153 | 2.762 | 3.481 | 3.664 |
| Ideology | B | .725\*\*\* | .752\*\*\* | .364\*\*\* | .731\*\*\* | .769\*\*\* | .403\*\*\* | .451 | .447 | -.199 |
|  | SE | .048 | .057 | .112 | .049 | .059 | .117 | .408 | .490 | .691 |
| Clientelism | B | .191 | .059 | -1.338\* | .148 | -.058 | -1.363\* | -.623 | -.993 | -2.905 |
|  | SE | .519 | .608 | .804 | .527 | .614 | .824 | 1.376 | 1.734 | 1.833 |
| Sex | B |  |  |  | -.264 | -.411\* | .055 | -.266 | -.413\* | .053 |
|  | SE |  |  |  | .189 | .234 | .518 | .189 | .234 | .518 |
| Age | B |  |  |  | .019\*\*\* | .030\*\*\* | .024 | .019\*\*\* | .030\*\*\* | .024 |
|  | SE |  |  |  | .006 | .007 | .016 | .006 | .007 | .016 |
| Education | B |  |  |  | .016 | .059\*\* | .124\*\* | .016 | .059\*\* | .127\*\* |
|  | SE |  |  |  | .024 | .029 | .062 | .024 | .029 | .062 |
| Interaction | B |  |  |  |  |  |  | .144 | .166 | .318 |
|  | SE |  |  |  |  |  |  | .208 | .250 | .362 |

*Note: dependent variable: voting behavior. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; Significant when sig (p) < .05. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error; N = 1018; i: The reference category is: Frente Amplio.*

## **Venezuela**

First of all, the different political parties in Venezuela will be discussed. The political parties used in this analysis, as stemming from the answers of the LAPOP dataset are: Gran Polo Patriciotico and Mesa de la Unidad Democratica. These are all the political parties that are the possible values of the variable of voting behavior, excluding the omitted political parties due to a low response rate, as discussed in the methods chapter. These parties have different levels of clientelism and differ on their left-right placement, which in turn will be used in the further discussion on the results in this chapter. First of all, Gran Polo Patriotico is 3.4 on the 10 point left right scale. With regards to clientelism, the expert survey states that clientelism is 3.9 for this party, on a 4 point scale. Next Mesa de la Unidad Democratica, according to the expert survey, the party is 7.3 on the 10 point left right scale and 2.7 on level of clientelism. This party is a coalition of different parties, and the values of the different parties in this coalition are merged to come to a left-right scale and level of clientelism for this coalition of parties. The level of clientelism in Venezuela as a whole is 3.5%, as can be seen in table 10. Because of these different levels of clientelism, Mesa de la Unidad Democratica is chosen as the reference category for the analysis, as can be seen in table 9. This has been done, as this party has the lowest level of clientelism, and is therefore most useful for the reference category to compare the other political parties to.

In table 9, the results of the multinomial logistic regression in Venezuela are shown. First, in model 1, the analysis shows whether left-right placement and clientelism are significant predictors of voting behavior. The variable of left-right placement is significant for Gran Polo Patriotico (B = -.690; p < 0.01), meaning that the ideology of an individual predicts the party an individual votes for in the election. On the other hand, clientelism is not significant in Venezuela, and therefore is not a significant predictor for voting behavior. Thereafter in model 2, the control variables were added. As shown in table 9, the variable of left-right placement is significant (B = -.706; p < 0.01), even after controlling for gender, age and level of education of respondents. Besides this, it should be noted that the difference between Gran Polo Patriotico and the reference party, Mesa de la Unidad Democratica on their respective levels of clientelism is only .5 on a 4-point scale. This could mean that clientelism is not really a differentiating factor between both parties.

Lastly, in model 3 an interaction variable was added. The interaction variable, as shown in table 9, is not significant in Venezuela. The interaction variable shows whether ideology as a predictor of voting behavior becomes less important if there is a higher degree of clientelism, meaning that an individual has been offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This is however not the case. In addition to this, in model 3, left-right placement is no longer significant. Clientelism was not significant starting in model 1, and the same holds true up to model 3. It can however be seen that the B value of clientelism in model 3 is .405, while it is negative in the first two models. This could mean that for the voters that were offered a benefit, and therefore score a 1 on clientelism, clientelism does predict their voting behavior. This is in line with the hypothesis that voters that are offered a benefit, use this an alternative voting rationale. It should however be noted that this value is not significant, p < .05.

It should therefore be concluded that clientelism does not influence the voting behavior in Venezuela, as this is not significant in all three models in table 9. The frequencies table in the appendix (table 10) shows that the level of clientelism in Venezuela is 3.5%. This means that of the analyzed cases in Venezuela, 3.5% of the valid respondents has stated that they were offered a benefit in exchange for their vote. This percentage however is quite low if compared to research that looks at the amount of clientelism in a country. The Americas Barometer insights namely shows that the percentage of clientelism in Venezuela is 11.6%, which differs significantly from the 3.5% as a response in the dataset used in this analysis (Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011).

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| **Venezuela** | | Gran Polo Patrioticoj | Gran Polo Patrioticoj | Gran Polo Patrioticoj |
| Intercept | B | 4.765\*\*\* | 5.825\*\*\* | 4.600 |
|  | SE | 1.037 | 1.167 | 3.072 |
| Ideology | B | -.690\*\*\* | -.706\*\*\* | -.530 |
|  | SE | .043 | .045 | .414 |
| Clientelism | B | -.334 | -.220 | .405 |
|  | SE | .499 | .501 | 1.538 |
| Sex | B |  | .375\* | .375\* |
|  | SE |  | .200 | .200 |
| Age | B |  | .001 | .001 |
|  | SE |  | .008 | .008 |
| Education | B |  | -.164\*\*\* | -.164\*\*\* |
|  | SE |  | .029 | .029 |
| Interaction | B |  |  | -.090 |
|  | SE |  |  | .211 |

Table 9

*coefficients of multinomial regression analysis in Venezuela*

*Note: dependent variable: voting behavior. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; Significant when sig (p) < .05. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error; N = 883; j: The reference category is: Mesa de la Unidad Democratica.*

## **Hypothesis 1**

This hypothesis states that clientelist political parties create an alternative voting rationale for citizens by letting citizens vote as a consequence of material benefits. This has been tested in models 1 and 2 in the analysis, with the independent variables of left-right placement and clientelism, to show whether clientelism is indeed significant in these models, and therefore is a significant predictor for voting behavior. If this is indeed the case, it can be assumed that the hypothesis does indeed hold true, as clientelism becomes an alternative rationale on which citizens base their vote. When looking at the tables 1-9 above however, it becomes apparent that clientelism is mostly not a significant predictor of voting behavior. This is with the exception of Paraguay and Colombia, where clientelism is a significant predictor, at least for multiple parties in these countries. From model 1 to model 2, with the addition of the control variables, there is not a lot of change in the significance of this independent variable. This means that in Paraguay and Colombia, clientelism remains significant after the addition of the control variables, while the variable of clientelism does not become significant in the other countries. All in all, it can be stated that clientelism does not become an alternative voting rationale for citizens, and therefore hypothesis 1 should be rejected.

## **Hypothesis 2**

This hypothesis states that the alternative rationale increases with the level of clientelism, and therefore the higher level of clientelism the lower the importance of left-right placement as a voting rationale. This has been tested in model 3 in the analysis, with the addition of an interaction variable to the model. As shown above with hypothesis 1, clientelism does not seem to become an alternative rationale for citizens to base their vote on. In this hypothesis however, model 3 looks at whether the importance of the other independent variable of left-right placement decreases with the presence of an offering of a benefit in exchange for a vote. This has been tested in model 3 of all countries, where an interaction variable has been added. When looking at the tables 1-9 above however, it becomes apparent that this interaction variable is in fact not significant. All in all, it can be stated that an offering of a benefit in exchange for a vote does not decrease the importance of the left-right placement as the rationale to base the vote on. This means however that hypothesis 2 should be rejected.

# **Conclusion**

In this chapter, an answer will be given to the research question. This will be based on the results as shown in the chapter above. Thereafter, the limitations of this research will be discussed. Lastly, future avenues for research will be proposed.

In the introduction, the following research question has been formulated: “To what degree does clientelism create an alternative voting rationale that influences the voting behavior of citizens in Latin America?” Based on the empirics discussed above, it can be concluded that as a whole, clientelism does not create an alternative voting rationale. This means that clientelism is not a significant predictor of voting behavior in Latin America. On the other hand, left-right placement as a voting rationale is often also not a significant predictor, as discussed in the chapter above. This means that both left-right placement and clientelism are not used as a voting rationale in Latin America. For the left-right placement, this is also the focus of research of Van der Brug et al. (2008). They namely state that in newer democracies, voters are less likely to use their ideological position as a cue for the political orientations of parties, and instead use social structure and issues. Furthermore, as discussed in the research of Ruth (2016), an indifference towards the left-right label is created by political parties in Latin America due to clientelism. As shown in this research however, left-right placement of the individual is not replaced with an alternative voting rationale based on the offering of a benefit. Besides this, the interaction variable, as tested in hypothesis two, is also not significant. This means that for higher levels of clientelism, the importance of left-right placement does not decrease. This could also be expected from the start, as those two rationales were already not significant.

One important exception from this that can be identified is Paraguay. As shown in the empirics chapter, clientelism is a significant predictor for the voting behavior of citizens from Paraguay, at least for two of the political parties. On the other hand, left-right placement is also a significant predictor. This would mean that, as stated in the research question, clientelism is an alternative voting rationale for the vote choice of these individuals. Besides this, as shown in table 10, the level of clientelism in Paraguay was the highest of all researched countries, which could explain why this is the country where a significant effect has been found. All in all, it should be stated, as an answer to the research question, that clientelism does not create an alternative voting rationale that influences the voting behavior of citizens in Latin America.

This research therefore shows that clientelism does not create an alternative voting rationale on which citizens base their votes. However, this research is not necessarily a reason for optimism. First of all, this research does indeed show that clientelism does not become an alternative voting rationale for citizens, however, in most countries of this research, ideology is also not a voting rationale used by citizens. This could in turn mean that the conditions of representation in an ideal system are not met in Latin America, as voters might not vote according to their policy preferences. As discussed on the research of Van der Brug et al. (2008), voters in newer democracies might base their vote more on issues, however this could also be distorted due to clientelism, as clientelist parties distort the information voters have on political parties. Besides this, as table 10 shows, the amount of clientelism found in the researched countries is relatively low. There is however a large discrepancy between the level of clientelism according to the dataset used and other research on the level of clientelism in Latin America (e.g. Faughnan & Zechmeister, 2011). It could therefore be questioned in what way the data is correct on the level of clientelism, and in turn if this influences the lack of a significant effect of clientelism on voting behavior. Another factor that could influence the lack of a significant influence of clientelism on voting behavior could be ascribed to the reference categories used in the analysis. In all researched countries, the party with the lowest level of clientelism is used as the reference category, to show whether it differentiates from political parties with a higher level of clientelism. In some countries however, the parties are similar on their respective levels of clientelism according to the expert survey, as can be seen in Uruguay for example. This means in turn that for the researched parties, clientelism is not a differentiating factor with the reference political party, which in turn could explain the lack of significant results for clientelism.

There are several limitations to this research that should be identified. First of all, this research is limited to only nine countries in Latin America. This has been done for two reasons, namely the limitation of time and the availability of data. The countries that have been researched are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Because these are all relatively larger countries and all in South America with a similar history, the limitation that exists due to time has been negated as best as possible. Furthermore, only three control variables have been added to the research in model 2. These are age, gender and education. These have been identified, as discussed in the methods chapter, as the most important control variables. Several other control variables could have been added, such as personal economic situation and party identification, but these have been omitted due to the many missings, as discussed in the methods chapter. Other control variables could have also been added, but this research limited the control variables to the three variables mentioned above. Another limitation of this research is that the dependent variable of voting behavior used is from the presidential elections.

There are several future avenues for research that can be looked into further. First of all, further research could look into the information stemming from parties and the distortion due to clientelism. It could be researched whether clientelism distorts the information voters have on political parties and are therefore less able to assess the policy positions of political parties. Besides this, future research could look at the causal link between vote buying and voting behavior. This research only looked at the offering of a benefit and whether this influenced the eventual choice for the elections. Future research could look into whether the party that offered the benefit to the voter is also accepted by the individual and therefore engages into a clientelist relationship. This would in turn show whether there indeed is a causal link between clientelism and vote behavior on an individual level.

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# **Appendix**

Table 10

*Frequencies of independent variable on clientelism*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Yes | | No | |
|  | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| Argentina | 19 | 3.4 | 538 | 96.6 |
| Bolivia | 63 | 5.7 | 1051 | 94.3 |
| Brazil | 79 | 10.2 | 695 | 89.8 |
| Chile | 9 | 1.4 | 614 | 98.6 |
| Colombia | 49 | 9.2 | 486 | 90.8 |
| Paraguay | 91 | 13.4 | 590 | 86.6 |
| Peru | 55 | 6.6 | 781 | 93.4 |
| Uruguay | 37 | 3.6 | 981 | 96.4 |
| Venezuela | 31 | 3.5 | 852 | 96.5 |

1. Higher on the ladder of abstraction sits corruption. This is usually understood to mean the “misuse of public office for private gain”. The private gain can either accrue to the individual, groups or parties to which they belong (Bardhan, 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)