

# Strategic alliances in the Dutch personal injury industry

A qualitative study about the success factors  
of cross-sector strategic alliances

**Radboud Universiteit**



mr. L.A. Bach Kolling  
Student number: 4359194  
Master thesis  
Business Administration  
Specialisation: Strategic Management  
Supervisor: prof. dr. N.A. Dentchev  
Second examiner: dr. H.L. Aalbers  
April 2021



## **Abstract**

Dutch personal injury victims may subsequently fall victim to poor representation due to insufficient measures for high-quality representatives and a lack of information. DLR is expected to play a coordinating role to counter this problem of secondary victimisation by strengthening its quality system, the Register Letselschade, which is based on collaborations between NPOs from different sectors. The aim of this research is to study how the success factors of strategic alliances can optimize cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry in order to strengthen the Register Letselschade and thus prevent secondary victimisation. Semi-structured interviews ( $N=20$ ) were conducted to answer this research question. Alliance networks, resource interdependence and compatibility are found factors that have a direct and positive influence on the success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry. No new success factors were found compared to existing theory. The results show that relational capital might directly influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success in this industry. It also shows that alliance networks and compatibility might indirectly influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success in this industry through relational capital. This study therefore provides sufficient grounds for further research into these relationships.

*Keywords:* alliance networks, compatibility, cross-sector strategic alliances, partner selection, relational capital, resource interdependence

**Preface**

As a law graduate, I became familiar with the problem of secondary victimisation caused by poor representation. My interest in this current and social problem increased the more I delved into it. My legal background allowed me to better understand this issue and the Dutch personal injury industry. However, my legal background also turned out to be a pitfall in this graduation process. I have encountered several challenges during this process, but learnt to overcome them. My strategic management knowledge, research skills and writing style have grown during this process. Moreover, I have learnt a lot about one of the sectors in which I would like to be active in the future.

I would like to thank my supervisor prof. dr. Dentchev and second examiner dr. Aalbers for their constructive criticism. They provided me with valuable advice that helped me grow and take this research to the next level. In addition, I would like to specially thank all respondents and everyone who have assisted in the data collection process for their effort and time. Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends. Their support and motivational words helped me to successfully complete this master's thesis.

Leonie Bach Kolling

Arnhem, 28th April 2021

## Content

|  |    |
|--|----|
| List of abbreviations.....   | V  |
| CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION.....  | 1  |
| CHAPTER 2 – RESEARCH BACKGROUND.....   | 2  |
| 2.1 The Dutch personal injury industry.....                                    | 2  |
| 2.2 The Register Letselschade.....   | 4  |
| 2.3 The network event.....   | 4  |
| CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.....  | 5  |
| 3.1 Alliance networks.....   | 5  |
| 3.2 Resource interdependence.....  | 6  |
| 3.3 Compatibility.....   | 8  |
| 3.3.1 Strategic fit.....   | 8  |
| 3.3.2 Organizational fit.....  | 9  |
| 3.3.3 Operational fit.....   | 10 |
| 3.3.4 Cultural fit.....  | 11 |
| 3.3.5 Human fit.....   | 11 |
| 3.4 Relationship capital.....  | 12 |
| 3.4.1 Trust.....   | 12 |
| 3.4.2 Information sharing.....   | 13 |
| 3.4.3 Commitment.....  | 13 |
| 3.5 Indirect effects.....  | 14 |
| 3.5.1 The influence of alliance networks through partner characteristics.....  | 14 |
| 3.5.2 The influence of alliance networks through relationship capital.....     | 15 |
| 3.5.3 The influence of partner characteristics through relational capital..... | 17 |
| 3.6 Conceptual model.....  | 19 |
| CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY.....   | 19 |
| 4.1 Research design.....   | 19 |
| 4.2 Methods of data collection.....  | 20 |
| 4.3 Data sample.....   | 21 |
| 4.4 Data analysis.....   | 22 |
| 4.5 Research ethics.....   | 22 |
| CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS.....   | 23 |
| 5.1 The alliance network.....  | 23 |
| 5.2 Resource interdependence.....  | 25 |
| 5.3 Compatibility.....   | 28 |
| 5.3.1 Strategic fit.....   | 28 |
| 5.3.2 Organizational fit.....  | 30 |
| 5.3.3 Operational fit.....   | 31 |
| 5.3.4 Cultural fit.....  | 32 |

|  |    |
|--|----|
| 5.3.5 Human fit .....  | 33 |
| 5.4 Relational capital.....  | 33 |
| 5.5 Indirect effects.....  | 35 |
| 5.5.1 Influence of the alliance network through partner characteristics .....  | 35 |
| 5.5.2 Influence of the alliance network through relational capital .....       | 35 |
| 5.5.3 Influence of partner characteristics through relational capital .....    | 37 |
| 5.6 New success factors of cross-sector strategic alliances.....               | 39 |
| CHAPTER 6 – DISCUSSION .....   | 39 |
| 6.1 Theoretical implications.....  | 40 |
| 6.2 Practical implications .....   | 46 |
| 6.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research.....                   | 49 |
| CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION .....   | 50 |
| References .....   | 51 |
| Appendices .....   | 61 |
| Appendix A. Network members .....  | 61 |
| Appendix B. Overview of characteristics of respondents .....                   | 62 |
| Appendix C. Interview protocol.....  | 63 |
| Appendix D. Translation quotes .....   | 65 |
| Appendix E. Invitation to participate in this research on social media .....   | 70 |
| Appendix F. Invitation to participate in this research in the PIV-survey ..... | 71 |
| Appendix G. Relevant results for the industry .....                            | 72 |

## List of abbreviations

|       |   |
|-------|---|
| Adfiz | Trade Organization for independent financial advisers (De Branchevereniging van onafhankelijk financieel adviseurs)             |
| ANWB  | Royal Dutch Touring Club ANWB (De Koninklijke Nederlandse Toeristenbond ANWB)   |
| ASP   | Association of Attorneys for Victims of Personal Injury (Vereniging van Advocaten voor Slachtoffers van Personenschade)         |
| DLR   | Personal Injury Council (De Letselschade Raad)  |
| GAV   | Dutch Association of Advisers in private insurance matters (Nederlandse Vereniging Adviseurs in particuliere verzekeringszaken) |
| IMN   | Dutch Foundation for Incident Management (Stichting Incident Management Nederland)  |
| KNGF  | Royal Dutch Association for Physiotherapy (Koninklijke Nederlandse Genootschap voor Fysiotherapie)                              |
| KNMG  | Royal Dutch Medical Association (Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst)                        |
| LHV   | National Association of General Practitioners (Landelijke Huisartsen Vereniging)  |
| LSA   | Association of Personal Injury Attorneys (Vereniging van Letselschade Advocaten)  |
| NIS   | Netherlands Institute of Loss Adjusters (Nederlands Instituut van Schaderegelaars)  |
| NIVRE | Dutch Institute of Loss Adjusters (Stichting Nederlands Instituut van Register Experts)   |
| NKL   | National Quality Mark Personal Injury (Nationaal Keurmerk Letselschade)   |
| NLE   | Trade association of Dutch Personal Injury Experts (Branchevereniging Nederlandse Letselschade experts)                         |
| NOvA  | Netherlands Bar Association (Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten)  |
| NPCF  | Federation of Patients and Consumer Organizations in the Netherlands (Nederlandse Patiënten Consumenten Federatie)              |
| NVvA  | Dutch Association of Occupational Consultants (Nederlandse Vereniging van Arbeidsdeskundigen)                                   |
| PIV   | Personal Injury Institute of Insurers (Personenschade Instituut van Verzekeraars)   |
| SHN   | Victim Support Netherlands (Slachtofferhulp Nederland)  |
| VNG   | Association of Netherlands Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten)  |
| VvV   | Dutch Association of Insurers (Verbond van Verzekeraars)  |





**CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION**

The Dutch personal injury industry is an unregulated market because anyone can call themselves a personal injury expert (DLR, 2020a; SP et al., 2019; De Vries, 2019). Consequently, there are insufficient measures for high-quality representatives of personal injury victims in this industry. Personal injury victims can subsequently fall victim to poor representation, known as secondary victimization (Stichting De Ombudsman, 2003). It is estimated that five to ten percent, respectively 3250 to 6500, of Dutch personal injury cases are not handled properly due to poor representation, resulting in secondary victimisation (SP et al., 2019). The Register Letselschade is a quality system that aims to improve the quality of personal injury claim settlement and to prevent secondary victimization (DLR, 2018a). It provides victims with a reliable tool to make an informed choice between representatives, as it functions as an online database that makes it easier to link high-quality representatives to victims. Representatives must meet quality requirements to be registered, enabling high-quality representatives to distinguish themselves. However, the Register Letselschade is currently not functioning optimally as it falls short in recognisability (both victims and representatives are struggling to find this quality system), enforceability and commercial value (DLR, 2020b). Hence, the problem of secondary victimization persists.

The Register Letselschade is a service of the network organization DLR and is based on collaborations between non-profit organizations (NPOs) from different sectors (DLR, 2020c). The Dutch personal injury industry can be seen as an alliance network, given that different stakeholders tend to align themselves to improve the quality of service in this industry, led by DLR (Child et al., 2005; DLR, 2020d). The Register Letselschade can be strengthened by strategic alliances to leverage complementary resources between NPOs (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Yang et al., 2014). A strategic alliance is defined as a formal agreement between organizations in which they agree to work cooperatively toward a strategically relevant objective, like delivering more value to customers in the form of better quality (Thompson et al., 2015). Organizations and their strategic alliances in networks co-evolve if they can provide strategic value to their partners and customers (Siripitakchai et al., 2015).

Despite the proliferation of strategic alliances, many underperform and therefore fail to deliver results in relation to potential or expectations (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Meier et al., 2016). Alliances are considered successful if expected results have been achieved and partners are satisfied with those outcomes (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020). Alliances often fail due to poor partner selection (Hitt et al., 2000) and poor alliance management (Ireland et al., 2002). Alliance networks bring benefits and a degree of managerial complexity that affect strategic alliances' success (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). The success of strategic alliances is also associated with partner characteristics that can be distinguished in resource interdependence and compatibility (Aulakh et al., 1996; Bleeke & Ernst, 1991; Harrigan, 1985; Parkhe, 1993; Sarkar et al., 2001). Partners need to have different resources, yet share similarities in their social institutions in order to create value through strategic alliances. Furthermore, relational capital between partners is key in realizing the potential value of strategic alliances through smooth cooperation (Cavusgil & Evirgen, 1997; Johnson et al., 1996; Madhok, 1995; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009).

There is a need for further development of the success factors of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020). Alliance networks, partner characteristics

and relational capital have been fragmentedly explored, but have not been considered in their entirety and not in the context of the Dutch personal injury industry. The aim of this research is to study how the success factors of strategic alliances can optimize cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry in order to strengthen the Register Letselschade and thus prevent secondary victimisation. The Register Letselschade was converted to the NKL in January 2021 (DLR, 2021). This research focuses on the Register Letselschade as the NKL was introduced recently and is fundamentally aligned with this register. Hence, the results of this research can be used in the development of the successor of the Register Letselschade, the NKL. Following from the above, the following research question has been formed: ‘How can success factors of strategic alliances optimize cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry in order to strengthen the Register Letselschade?’ This research question can be approached through the following sub-questions:

1. How can the success factors alliance networks, partner characteristics and relational capital optimize cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry?
2. What is the interaction between alliance networks, partner characteristics and relational capital and how do these success factors indirectly influence the success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry?
3. What other factors influence the success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry and how can these factors optimize these alliances?

The Dutch personal injury industry is described in chapter 2 to gain an adequate understanding of the context of this research. The literature on the success factors of strategic alliances is elaborated in chapter 3. Chapter 4 outlines the methodology of this study to ensure its verifiability. The results are analysed and placed within the theoretical background in chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains the main conclusions, the study’s theoretical and practical implications and limitations and recommendations for future research. Concluding remarks are made in chapter 7.

## **CHAPTER 2 – RESEARCH BACKGROUND**

It is important to understand the problematic phenomenon and its context in order to solve it (Bleijenbergh et al., 2011). Therefore, the problem of secondary victimisation and the Dutch personal injury industry are described (§2.1). Subsequently, the operation of the Register Letselschade is explained (§2.2) and the functioning of the network event where strategic alliances are formed, is clarified (§2.3).

### **2.1 The Dutch personal injury industry**

Victims can choose whether or not to use the service of a representative throughout the entire personal injury claim settlement (DLR, 2020e). A distinction can be made between two types of representatives: personal injury attorneys (attorneys or the Bar) and personal injury experts (experts). Experts can submit a personal injury case of claims for damages up to 25.000, - euro to the subdistrict court (DLR, 2020e). With a higher claim, a victim can only litigate with the intervention of an attorney. The professional title attorney is protected, while the professional titles representative and expert are not (LSA, 2020). Ten percent of personal injury cases are handled by attorneys, the rest is settled by experts (De Vries, 2019). Representatives are

usually hired because as specialists they have more information about the subject than victims. The representative is a contractor of the victim and has the authority to act on his behalf. The victim is, however, not fully able to control what the representative does as he does not perform the task himself and, therefore, does not have the same information. Although the representative owes obedience to the victim, he cannot adequately supervise the representative and is not able to deduce the quality of his service. As a result, an information imbalance arises in favour of the representative (Schieg, 2008). The information advantage of the representative gives him the opportunity to serve his self-interest. The claim settlement may be rushed, wrongly settled or even deliberately delayed as it can serve the representative's financial interest (SP et al., 2019; Stichting De Ombudsman, 2003; Radar, 2019a).

The personal injury claim settlement is often burdensome and obstructs recovery for victims, especially in the case of secondary victimisation (Radar, 2019b; SHN, 2020a; Stichting De Ombudsman, 2003). Since representatives have a major influence on the way victims experience the claim settlement process, their quality is important in several aspects (Elbers et al., 2012). Poor-quality representation also leads to higher socio-economic costs (Cotti et al., 2004; De Vries, 2019). Healthcare costs increase as secondary victimisation aggravates the trauma impact. Costs for legal counsel increase as less personal injury cases are qualitatively well settled within a reasonable timeframe. These costs are passed on to policyholders, including (future) victims (VvV, 2018). Another societal problem of poor-quality representatives is that confidence in high-quality representatives is undermined. Therefore, high-quality representatives need the opportunity to distinguish themselves (DLR, 2018a).

A quality system is a form of self-regulation and an instrument to address the societal problems caused by poor representation (Goudswaard, 2016; Schieg, 2008). A quality system is defined as a quality judgment based on quality aspects of a product, service, process system or person, tested by an independent third party that authorizes the use of a recognized logo (Goudswaard, 2016). A trustworthy quality system provides victims with a reliable tool to make an informed choice between representatives. There are currently six quality systems in the personal injury industry for representatives (ASP, 2020b; DLR, 2018a; LSA, 2020; NLE, 2020; NIS, 2020; NIVRE, 2020a). The characteristics of these quality systems are shown in figure 1. DLR aims to strengthen its quality system by converting the Register Letselschade to the NKL (DLR, 2020b). The NKL aims to replace all quality systems, resulting in the creation of one clear quality system. This simplification must lead to more transparency and consumer confidence (ACM, 2016).

**Figure 1.** *Quality systems for representatives in the Dutch personal injury industry*

| <b>Quality system</b>     | <b>Members/registrants</b>                          | <b>Registration level</b> | <b>Representing</b>  |
|---------------------------|---|---------------------------|----------------------|
| The Register Letselschade | Experts and attorneys (and other service providers) | Organizational            | Victims and insurers |
| ASP                       | Attorneys   | Personal                  | Victims              |
| LSA                       | Attorneys   | Personal                  | Victims and insurers |
| NIS                       | Experts   | Personal                  | Victims and insurers |
| NIVRE                     | Experts (and other service providers)               | Personal                  | Victims and insurers |
| NLE                       | Experts   | Organizational            | Victims              |


## 2.2 The Register Letselschade

Representatives who meet set requirements can be registered in the Register Letselschade, managed by DLR (DLR, 2018a). It is important that the quality system is, and set requirements are, developed in collaboration with stakeholders to ensure a broad level of support in the Dutch personal injury industry (Goudswaard, 2016). Too little involvement of stakeholders leads to a lack of support, while overinvolvement may lead to impracticable demands or unfeasible requirements. The Committee Register Letselschade is responsible for the development of quality requirements set for each profession (DLR, 2020g, 2019, 2017). Since all professions are represented in the committee and the platform consultation (more about this in §2.3), the quality requirements are developed in collaboration with stakeholders. The quality requirements specialised for attorneys are currently developed in consultation with the LSA, a professional organization for personal injury attorneys. DLR aims to involve the ASP, another professional organization for personal injury attorneys, as well (DLR, 2020b).

## 2.3 The network event

DLR is an independent network organization encouraging and directing collaborations between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry (DLR, 2020b, 2020d, 2017). The network event takes place in the platform consultation, an independent body of DLR. The platform consultation consists of NPOs from different sectors of the personal injury industry.<sup>1</sup> Representatives from NPOs that participate in the platform consultation are known as participants. Participants have a right to vote and the decision making takes place based on unanimity. The network event is reinforced by observers. Observers are NPOs that participate in the platform consultation, but have no voting rights. The LSA and the Ministry of Justice and Security are currently observers in the platform consultation. The ministry does not have an active role because the personal injury industry is self-regulated. DLR aims to actively involve the LSA in consultation, making the LSA a participant instead of an observer. The ASP chooses not to be involved in the network event (ASP, 2020a). All ASP-members are inherently members of the LSA. Therefore, it can be argued that ASP-members take part in the network event through the LSA. The most important network members for this research are visualized in figure 2. NPOs representing the interests of representatives are indicated with boxes. NIS, NIVRE and NLE represent the interests of experts and are indicated with grey boxes. ASP and LSA represent the interests of attorneys and are indicated with white boxes. SHN represents the interests of victims and is indicated with a black circle. VvV represents the interests of insurers and is indicated with a white circle. The mission, roles and function in the platform consultation of these network members are visualized in Appendix A.

**Figure 2.** *Visualisation of network members in the Dutch personal injury industry*



<sup>1</sup> It concludes: ANWB, GAV, LSA, Ministry of Justice and Security, NIVRE, NIS, NLE and NVvA SHN and VvV (DLR, 2020c).

### CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter elaborates on success factors that can optimize cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry. Relevant literature is discussed in different paragraphs covering alliance networks (§3.1), resource interdependence (§3.2), compatibility (§3.3) and relational capital (§3.4). Subsequently, relevant literature on the indirect effects of these factors on the success of cross-sector strategic alliances is elaborated (§3.5). Despite the fact that elements of the various factors overlap, as much distinction is made as possible to bring structure to the theory. The discussed theory is summarized in the conceptual model (§3.6).

#### 3.1 Alliance networks

Strategic alliances between organizations are often located within networks (Child et al., 2005). A network is an economic community that produces services and goods of value to customers (Moore, 1996). An alliance network refers to a network comprising different stakeholders who co-evolve their capabilities and roles (Siripitakchai et al., 2015). The stakeholders or network members tend to align themselves with the direction set by one or more leadership organizations. The Dutch personal injury industry can be seen as an alliance network as different stakeholders tend to align themselves to improve the quality of service in this industry, led by DLR (see §2.3). Network members represent conflicting interests as insurers and representatives face each other in personal injury cases. Besides, experts and attorneys are competitors, causing mistrust. Despite their differences, these parties seek harmony and solutions to improve the quality of service in this industry in order to prevent secondary victimisation. The platform consultation offers as network event opportunities for strategic alliances in the future, given that it encourages and directs strategic alliances between network members (Tjemkes et al., 2012). It ensures consultation between network members, enabling them to develop and intensify strategic alliances.

An alliance network comprises an organization's direct alliances and its indirect relationships connecting two parties through a third party (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Despite the lack of a formal partnership, all three parties may possess relevant expertise and knowledge that could benefit all. A holistic approach must be followed that includes understanding the effectiveness of an organization's position within an alliance network and the extent to which it can influence network processes and outcomes. Value may not be equally and equitably distributed, putting network members in a position of power. DLR functions as a broker between otherwise disconnected parties as it encourages and directs collaborations through the platform consultation (DLR, 2020b). Even though the disconnected groups are not necessarily unaware of one another, it is expected that resources and information are exchanged through DLR as intermediary in the network event. Sharing resources and information often leads to expectations and obligations as network members may expect receiving organizations to reciprocate their efforts. The alliance network creates interdependencies between network members, reducing their autonomy and constrain their decision making. Alliance networks bring thus a degree of managerial complexity and create risks and hazards (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).

Organizations and their strategic alliances in the network co-evolve if they can provide strategic value to their partners and customers (Siripitakchai et al., 2015). An alliance network requires a certain level of aligned goals among its members to create value (Child et al., 2005; Hinterhuber, 2002; Tjemkes et al., 2012).

Collective sense aligns the perceptions of network members and helps to develop a working structure for the network. Members may be willing to share a part of their autonomy to the network to operate like a quasi-organization if they believe a greater value can be achieved as network members. The orchestrator must set an agenda and initiatives to support joint value creation in an alliance network, creating mutual benefit. Besides, the orchestrator must create awareness about this agenda among key members. DLR, as orchestrator, has the responsibility to motivate network members to collaborate on the network priority. DLR has partly fulfilled this role, since it has aligned most network members to jointly strengthen the Register Letselschade (see §2.3). However, the Bar does not actively participate as the LSA is only an observer in the network event and the ASP does not participate at all. This is remarkable because the Bar is an important network member in the Dutch personal injury industry. There is thus an element of reciprocity in the relationship of DLR as orchestrator and network members. Orchestrators are only successful with their partners and likewise, since the success of partners comes with the success of the orchestrator (Hinterhuber, 2002). Following from the above, the following proposition has been formed:

**Proposition 1:** *Alliance networks influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success directly and positively.*

### 3.2 Resource interdependence

Strategic alliances create value through the unique combination of partner resources (Johnson et al., 1996; Mindruta et al., 2016; Stead & Stead, 2013). The objective of using strategic alliances is to augment strengths, whilst ameliorating any weaknesses by pooling or sharing explicit resources (Hamel & Doz, 1998; Hamel & Prahalad, 1989; Hoskisson & Busenitz, 2001; Varadarajan & Cuningham, 1995). This objective has an element of interdependency because alliances are used to share needed resources to create mutually beneficial outcomes (Bahinipati et al., 2009; Kunc & Morecroft, 2010; Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008). Resource interdependency means that parties have different, but complementary resource needs (D'Amour et al., 2005). The resource dependency theory emphasizes that value can be created through optimal resource boundaries by pooling and utilizing valuable resources (Das & Teng, 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resources can be distinguished in property based and knowledge based resources (Das & Teng, 2000; Miller & Shamsie, 1996). Property based resources refers to legal properties of organizations, such as human and physical resources. Knowledge based resources consists of social knowledge and technical skills of organizations. When needed resources are not sufficiently or immediately available, like knowledge based resources that take time to acquire and are difficult to imitate, it increases the reason to collaborate (Child et al., 2005). Resource scarcity encourages cooperation to obtain lacking resources through partners (Tjemkes et al., 2012).

Resource complementarity represents the degree to which each partner provides idiosyncratic resources the other lacks and thus satisfies the other's needs (Gao & Shi, 2011; Jap, 1999). Complementary resources allow organizations to combine acquired resources with their own resources, creating a resource set that provides unique value and that is difficult to imitate (Harrison et al., 2001). It refers to the extent to which the joint use of a distinctive set of resources yields a higher total return than the sum of returns earned if each set of resources was used independently (Chi, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Complementary resources stimulate joint coordination, increasing profitability and competitive advantage. Resource

complementarity may also stimulate interorganizational learning as organizations can gather up valuable new resources provided by their partners (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Strategic alliances offer learning opportunities, helping partners to better leverage their own resources by bringing together partners with different skills and knowledge bases (Inkpen, 1998). Since the Dutch personal injury industry aims to optimize the Register Letselschade, strategic alliances can be formed or intensified to leverage complementary resources between NPOs (Koza & Lewin, 1998; Yang et al., 2014).

Partners should participate in learning-processes to be able to exploit synergies and explore complementary resource strengths to achieve greater alliance performance (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Even if the alliance ends, mutual benefit will have been obtained since learning has already taken place. Knowledge, acquired through alliances, can be internalized and applied outside the alliance current activities (Inkpen, 2001; Khanna et al., 1998). Hence, alliances offer an attractive opportunity to gain access to skills that would not have been acquired if the alliance had never been formed. Alliances allow organizations to become close enough to even acquire tacit knowledge from partners that is critical to the development of a sustainable competitive advantage (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). However, it also increases the likelihood of transferring critical resources involuntary (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Skill substitution is less risky because only limited amount of learning will take place as one partner takes over an activity it can strongly perform (Child et al., 2005). In addition, proprietary information is less likely to be given away. Organizations must consider the extent to which a partner's anticipated resource contributions will be sufficient motive to forge a strategic alliance. The best strategic alliances are highly selective and focus on certain activities to obtain a specific competitive advantage (Thompson et al., 2015). Only partners' resources that are useful and can be aligned with a focal organization's resources, will significantly influence its performance (Das & Teng, 2000).

Resources can only lead to a substantive competitive advantage if it delivers value to customers (Santema & Van de Rijt, 2005). Organizations should estimate the value of resources by looking at the role these resources play from the perspective of the customer. Therefore, it is important to examine which resources are highly valued by victims. Due to an accident, victims end up in a strange new world (the personal injury industry). Since the Dutch personal injury industry is complex and unregulated, victims need clear information and a user friendly system from which to choose high-quality representatives (DLR, 2020i). There are currently six quality systems for representatives in this industry, making it (unnecessary) complex and confusing for victims (see §2.1). This could be solved by strengthening the Register Letselschade into an overarching quality system (more about this in §3.3). Another detrimental aspect of the Register Letselschade is that DLR's service activity falls short as DLR qualifies as business-to-business (B2B) instead of business-to-consumers (B2C; DLR, 2020i). Victims cannot easily ask for help or extra support when using the register as they can only contact DLR via a contact form that is not easy to find on its website (DLR, 2020k). This is striking, given that an easily accessible service activity is indispensable in this complex industry. DLR could intensify its strategic alliance with SHN that aims to guide and assist victims (SHN, 2020). For example, the Register Letselschade could refer victims to SHN for support. Skill substitution of DLR's lacking service activity by SHN involves less risks than DLR learning these skills from SHN (Harrison et al., 2001; Inkpen, 2001; Khanna et al., 1998; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Besides, economies of scale could be realized as SHN

already performs these activities (Harrison et al., 2001). Following from the above, the following proposition has been formed:

**Proposition 2:** *Resource interdependence influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success directly and positively.*

### 3.3 Compatibility

Compatibility refers to the extent to which partners share similar characteristics (Douma et al., 2000; Harri-gan, 1988). It determines the degree to which organizations can get along and realize anticipated synergies to achieve alliance success. Alliances are more successful if partners have similar cultures, venture experi-ence levels and asset sizes. Compatibility with partners increases the quality of the relationship and facilitates alliance processes (Saxton, 1997). It positively influences alliance effectiveness, reinforces collective strength and decreases the propensity for opportunistic behaviour. Compatibility thus enables partners to cooperate efficiently and effectively. Partners must develop mechanisms, skills, structures and processes for bridging organizational and interpersonal differences to achieve value from strategic alliances (Bretherton, 2006). A misfit jeopardizes alliances by obstructing inter-organizational collaboration (Tjemkes et al., 2012). The five indicators of compatibility are elaborated below and include the strategic, organizational, opera-tional, cultural and human fit (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Sarkar et al., 2001).

#### 3.3.1 Strategic fit

Strategic fit refers to the compatibility in partners' strategic view and orientation (Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Tjemkes et al., 2012). It refers to the motives for forming alliances and the selection of partners to achieve compatibility between their goals. A good strategic fit signals long-term commitment and implies that individual interests are carefully weighed against the potential benefits and hazards of the alliance. Partners with a strategic fit perceive added value for their organizations and recognize their important role in the alliance success. A strategic misfit is a threat, since it creates strategic conflicts that undermine joint business propositions as partners may be less committed and allocate resources to alternative more valuable arrangements. Moreover, organizations that pursue alliances with a poor strategic fit face greater demands on the alliance design and management (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Organizations must therefore carefully consider whether a limited stra-tegic fit can be strengthened. Encouraging top management dialogue about the strategic vision, realigning alliance strategies, reducing or expanding the alliance scope, emphasizing added value and communicating carefully with stakeholders about the value and importance of the alliance are ways to strengthen the strategic fit. If this is not possible, organizations should not collaborate. Varying perceptions of the importance of the alliance, the pursuit of potentially conflicting alliance goals, market rejection of the alliance and partners acting competitively in areas on which the alliance focuses indicates a strategic misfit.

Forming a strategic alliance is a voluntary and two sided decision implying that both partners must agree to ally with each other (Mindruta et al., 2016). The choice of a focal organization to form an alliance with a preferred partner is constrained by the potential partner's own preferences and opportunities for realizing higher value in different alliances. Organizations only enter into an alliance if they perceive higher utility



from that alliance than individually or from another alliance (Cabral & Pacheco de Almeida, 2014; Mindruta et al., 2016). Learning is a motive to cooperate in order to complement own deficient resources (see §3.2; Bretherton, 2006; Child et al., 2005). A political motive to cooperate is associated with successful forming of alliances, given that it enables partners to focus on cooperative action (Child et al., 2005). There is a political motive in the Dutch personal injury industry to strengthen the Register Letselschade in order to improve the quality of service in this industry, preventing secondary victimisation (DLR, 2019).

An economic motive to cooperate is, in comparison with a political motive, less associated with successful strategic alliances (Child et al., 2005). DLR is currently in consultation with referrers with the aim that they exclusively refer victims to registered representatives (DLR, 2020l).<sup>2</sup> SHN refers victims exclusively to the successor of the Register Letselschade, the NKL, since January 2021 (SHN, 2021). When referring to the register becomes common practise, the importance of registering for personal injury representatives increases (DLR, 2020b). A ‘pull-system’ is created where both the number of victims making use of the quality system and the incentive for representatives to get registered increases. Representatives will thus make greater efforts to comply with set quality requirements to obtain this qualification. According to DLR, this results in an increased quality of service reducing the risk of secondary victimization (DLR, 2020b). The Register Letselschade is, however, currently incomplete as a large number of attorneys are not registered because the ASP prohibits its members from being registered (DLR, 2020m). The ASP does not want to be associated with a quality system where its rivals (experts) are inducted. According to the ASP, if ASP-attorneys were registered in the Register Letselschade it would legitimize the quality of lesser representatives by being on the same list which is undesirable for the ASP. In addition, the ASP argues that the draft standards of the Register Letselschade for attorneys conflict with the freedom of ASP-attorneys to practice within the requirements set by the ASP. The ASP is convinced that adopting these standards will not enhance attorneys’ operational efficiency, but causes it to deteriorate. The inheritance theory emphasizes that indirect institutional benefits of enhanced access to resources or customers, status or legitimacy can require organizations to adopt practices that they do not believe will directly enhance their effectiveness, given that the organization erroneously perceives that it would be worse off without it (Vermeulen, 2018). Representatives, including ASP-attorneys, may feel obliged to adopt the standards of the Register Letselschade in order to get registered to secure customer acquisition, although they may not believe that it actually enhances their operational efficiency. Unknowingly, the possible long-term harmful consequences of implementing the standards of the Register Letselschade might outweigh the indirect institutional benefits. Organizations must therefore perceive some benefit of adopting these standards, in terms of direct benefits (like enhancing efficiency) or indirect benefits (like enhancing legitimacy). It may be necessary to adjust the standards of the Register Letselschade to ensure that adopting actually improves registered organizations’ operational efficiency.

### 3.3.2 *Organizational fit*

Organizational fit refers to the compatibility in partners’ organizational structure and routines (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001). A good organizational fit reduces uncertainty

---

<sup>2</sup> It concerns the following organisations: Adfiz, Ambulancezorg Nederland, IMN, KNMG, LHV, NPCF, VNG, unspecified legal expense insurers and unspecified healthcare insurers (DLR, 2020b).

about partners' intentions, interests or competences and increases the likeliness that they create and enjoy synergies (Douma et al., 2000; Saxton, 1997). An organizational misfit is a threat because it undermines collective sensemaking and increases risk of decision making conflicts. In practice, a good organizational fit rarely takes place as partners almost always differ. Therefore, the objective is to obtain a profound understanding of the differences and initiate corrective measures to achieve a sufficient organizational fit. A limited organizational fit can be managed by anticipating it during the alliance design and management stages (Tjemkes et al., 2012). The misfit can also be managed by emphasizing the need for flexibility and adaptation. The manageability of alliances increases with relatively simple alliance designs that are characterized by few alliance partners, a limited alliance scope, clear tasks divisions and contracts with contingency clauses.

ASP, LSA, NLE, NIS and VvV are associations, meaning that all members are allowed to participate in the discussion and decision making about the pursued and future policy (ASP, 2021; LSA, 2021; NLE, 2020; NIS, 2021; VvV, 2021; Rensen, 2012). DLR, NIVRE and SHN are foundations, enabling the board to take faster decisions because there are no members to consider (DLR, 2020i; NIVRE, 2020b; SHN, 2020b). Hence, these NPOs have different decision making structures, causing a limited organizational fit (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001). These NPOs should be aware of this difference, since the inertia in decision making could create misunderstandings and conflicts. Furthermore, the differences in organizational attributes cause an organizational misfit. DLR and NLE are qualified as B2B, while the other NPOs are qualified as B2C (see §2.1). The limited fit can be managed by emphasizing constructive partner interactions and building relational capital (see §3.5.3; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This limited fit can also be managed by NPOs being aware of their differences and by emphasizing it in the alliance design. These differences can be used to augment strengths while ameliorating weaknesses by introducing a cascading quality system based on collaborations of these NPOs, ensuring the quality of representatives at organizational and personal level (more in §3.3.3).

### 3.3.3 *Operational fit*

Operational fit refers to the compatibility in partners' operational systems (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). A good operational fit enables partners to integrate alliance activities. It indicates that partners can collaborate effectively at the operational level, giving the alliance a higher chance of success as the links between partners' operations are transparent. If partners can work together efficiently, it reduces coordination costs, resolves emerging operational issues quickly and discovers potential areas for improvements. A good operational fit is thus critical for partners to realize the potential benefits of strategic alliances. An operational misfit jeopardizes value creation as it creates a risk that processes will stall or produce inadequate output by obstructing the execution of day-to-day alliance operations. It creates ambiguity about the roles and skills of each partner, impeding decision making and undermining alliance leadership and performance management. It can also lead to poor communication among operational staff, impeding quick conflict resolution. A limited operational fit can be strengthened by incorporating partner differences in the alliance design and management. Joint education and training, co-development of operational systems and employee transfer between partners can prevent emerging hazards caused by an organizational misfit. The quality systems of ASP, LSA, NIS and NIVRE have substantively

different quality requirements in comparison with the Register Letselschade and NLE as they are aimed at guaranteeing the quality of representatives at a personal level (see §2.1). It jeopardizes as an operational misfit value creation. Merging different quality systems require that set quality requirements are comparable. This operational misfit could be managed by jointly developing quality requirements and performing audits to assess whether these requirements are being met. An example is the PIV-audit which qualifies insurers (VvV, 2020b). Insurers with a positive PIV-Audit can enter the Register Letselschade, avoiding double audits (DLR, 2020b).

#### *3.3.4 Cultural fit*

Cultural fit refers to the compatibility in partners' organizational cultures, such as ideologies, values and practices (Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Park & Ungson, 1997; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). The organizational culture of partners manifest in the commitment to the alliance, the willingness to collaborate, the distribution of power and control and openness of the organization. A good cultural fit stimulates joint sensemaking. It suggests that partners have sufficient awareness and flexibility to work and learn from their cultural differences to achieve strength. A cultural misfit undermines the quality of the working relationship at different levels in the alliance and can cause conflicts and mistrust between partners (more about this in §3.5.3). If alliance employees resist understanding the culture of partners, the alliance is likely to fail. A limited cultural fit can be strengthened by initiating activities that stimulate cultural awareness, like employee transfer, cultural training and joint sessions (Tjemkes et al., 2012). If the cultural misfit is well managed, it might even improve alliance performance and positive cultural changes in the partnering organizations.

Ideologies, values and practices of NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry differ as they are from different sectors (see §2.3). For example, attorneys must comply with the rules of conduct of the Bar (NOvA, 2018). Attorneys' practices may differ from case to case, as they are only allowed to act in the interest of their clients. It can thus be beneficial to rely on an issued guideline in one case, but not in another. The equivalence principle applies to insurers, meaning that equal cases must be treated equally (Rijksoverheid, 2020). Insurers cannot deviate from case to case. Therefore, insurers benefit from standardization of personal injury loss items in DLR-guidelines, speeding up the personal injury claim settlement (VvV, 2020c). These differences create a cultural misfit that may be managed by creating mutual cultural awareness.

#### *3.3.5 Human fit*

Human fit refers to the compatibility in partners' employee backgrounds, experiences and personalities (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). A good human fit is critical as it stimulates inter-organizational learning and the employees' behaviour influences important outcomes directly such as customer satisfaction and profitability. A human misfit inhibits alliance process because it fosters interpersonal conflicts and impedes communication (more about this in §3.5.3). A limited human fit can be strengthened by motivating key employees to help other employees adjust to the new alliance environments and interact with partners' employees. It can also be strengthened by undertaking human resource management activities (like formal policies and practices focused on training and

monitoring) and rewarding employees by offering alliance team-based incentives which are tied to overall performance (Tjemkes et al., 2012). The behaviour of the different professional groups in the Dutch personal injury industry differ and jeopardizes as a human misfit strategic alliances' success. Attorneys are known to not shy away from conflicts and litigation (DLR, 2018b). This bias is strengthened by the direct and little nuanced attitude and statements of ASP-members (DLR, 2020m). Experts are known to be more willing to compromise or even avoid conflicts. These biases can cause misunderstandings if partners are unaware of them, making it challenging to manage this human misfit. However, solutions are sought within both professions and DLR stimulates parties to keep communicating (DLR, 2018b). Following from the above, the following proposition has been formed:

**Proposition 3:** *Compatibility influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success directly and positively.*

### 3.4 Relationship capital

Relational capital is defined as the psychological aspects of a collaboration that find expression in relational factors (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Kwok et al., 2019; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Relational capital allows partners to work harmoniously and synergistically, improving partner processes and enhancing strategic alliance performance. Trust, information sharing and commitment are three indicators of relationship capital.

#### 3.4.1 Trust

Trust is defined as the willingness of a partner to dedicate all necessary resources to the alliance and to depend on another partner's actions that involve opportunism (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Fadol & Sandhu, 2013; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Studies found trust as a key component for successful strategic alliances because it allows partners to develop shared goals and it helps them to overcome antagonisms (Chaturvedi & Gaur, 2008; Emden et al., 2006; Fadol & Sandhu, 2013; Den Hond et al., 2015; Meier et al., 2016; Rivera-Santos & Rufin, 2010; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009; Zaheer & Harris, 2006). Building trust among partners improves their overall satisfaction with the alliance (Fadol & Sandhu, 2013; Schreiner et al., 2009). In addition, the presence of trust decreases the likeliness that partners have perceptions of vulnerability and risk in the relationship (Glasbergen, 2011). Trust facilitates dispute resolution (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), reduces the extent of formal contracts (Kale & Singh, 2009; Larson, 1992) and ensures full cooperation and transfer of resources between partners (Ireland et al., 2002; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2009). It also helps partners to exchange resources faster, to devote more funds to the alliance, to avoid bureaucratic obstructions and to improve the decision making process (Fadol & Sandhu, 2013). A lack of trust has a significant impact on the successfulness of strategic alliances and is even viewed as a reason for alliance failure (Larson, 1992; Sherman, 1994).

Mutual trust is a necessary precursor to develop reciprocal commitment in strategic alliance relationships (Dyer, 1996; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Siguaw et al., 1998). Both trust and commitment encourage managers to consider potentially high-risk actions of partners as prudent, since they believe that partners will not act opportunistically. This is fundamental, given that opportunistic behaviour will likely destroy a friendly collaborative relationship and lead to the termination of cooperation (Narayandas & Rangan, 2004). Trust develops over time through learning and continued interaction between partners (Child et al., 2005). A high level of mutual trust is making partners, and its individual members, more willing to share information and

ideas (Fadol & Sandhu, 2013). Once a strategic alliance is implemented, the growing amount of shared information and mutual knowledge enhances trust between partners as their ability to understand each other increased. The greater the level of trust between partners, the more they can rely on informal social control. Therefore, the costs of monitoring and controlling the alliance will be lower which in turn likely fosters the development of mutual trust, enhancing alliance performance (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Fadol & Sandhu, 2013; Robson et al., 2008). Thus, mutual trust can relieve the dilemma of control as it likely facilitates agreement on common control and information systems, and it will break down barriers to integration.

#### *3.4.2 Information sharing*

Information sharing is defined as timely exchanging knowledge between partners to coordinate their tasks, to reduce risk caused by incomplete and asymmetric information and to solve problems (Su et al., 2020). In addition, information sharing includes the security that a partner achieves regarding the integrity and response of its partner (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020). Information sharing enhances strategic alliance performance by creating transparency in the relationship (Mohr et al., 1996). Besides, it decreases coordination costs and increases the realization of mutual benefits by reducing misunderstandings, conflicts and uncertainty (Dwyer et al., 1987; Mohr & Nevin, 1990; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Information sharing and learning are essential to leverage partners' complementarity resources and take place through mutual interdependence (Inkpen, 1995). Alliances increase the likelihood of transferring critical resources involuntary, requiring sufficient mutual trust among partners (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Both trust and commitment are essential for partners to be willing to share key information (Heide & John, 1992; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2009; Whipple & Frankel, 1998). Interaction between partners can be improved by information sharing as long as the exchanged information is valuable to both partners (Austin & Seitanidi, 2014). Information sharing helps to develop trust and commitment gradually as the relationship between partners continues to evolve (Kwok et al., 2019). In strategic alliances there is a need for effective informal information exchange, instead of formal reporting channels, to both promote bonding and trust among partners (Emden et al., 2006; Child et al., 2005).

#### *3.4.3 Commitment*

Commitment is defined as a partners' willingness to make short-term sacrifices to maintain the relationship and a confidence in the stability of this relationship (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020). It creates affective and emotional bonds between partners (Sanzo et al., 2015). Commitment improves interaction between partners and consequently the successfulness of the strategic alliance (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Child et al., 2005; Cullen et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Graf & Rothlauf, 2012; Hunt et al., 2002; Jamali et al., 2011; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Sanzo et al., 2015; Seitanidi, 2010; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Commitment allows partners to build stable long-term relationships through aligning incentive structures, thereby increasing trust in partners (Williamson, 1985). Strategic alliances are more likely to be long-lasting when both parties conclude that continued collaboration is in their mutual interest, a trusting relationship has been established and partners do not compete directly (Thompson et al., 2015).

Both trust and information sharing are important antecedents of commitment (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020). Neither partner would accept the risk of committing themselves to the relationship without trust (Goo

& Huang, 2008; Graça & Barry, 2019; Ha, 2010; Lancaster & Lages, 2006; Sanzo et al., 2015; Wittmann et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2012). Mutual trust ensures partners' willingness to keep their promises and the alliance agreement, and that they will not exploit the alliance opportunistically for their own gain or at the expense of their partner (Atouba & Shumate, 2020). Information sharing helps partners to build commitment by providing them with a mechanism for aligning expectations and perceptions, and resolving conflicts (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). In addition, information sharing reduces uncertainty and confusion, thereby enhancing problem solving and coordination (Atouba & Shumate, 2020). Following from the above, the following proposition has been formed:

**Proposition 4:** *Relational capital influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success directly and positively.*

### 3.5 Indirect effects

The success factors of strategic alliances discussed in the paragraphs above also indirectly influence strategic alliances' success. The indirect influences of alliance networks through partner characteristics (§3.5.1) and relational capital (§3.5.2) on strategic alliances' success are discussed first. Subsequently, the indirect influence of partner characteristics through relational capital on strategic alliances' success is elaborated (§3.5.3).

#### 3.5.1 The influence of alliance networks through partner characteristics

Access to key resources can be achieved through utilising established networks leading to sustainable competitive advantage (Anderson & Narus, 1991; Biem & Caswell, 2008; Egan, 2001; Gulati, 1998; Hamel et al., 1989; Varadarjan & Cunningham, 1995). An alliance network can enhance organizations' competitive advantage because the set of direct relationships provides access to a pool of resources that might not otherwise be easily available. Competitive advantages of organizations are therefore often embedded within the relationships among partners (Siripitakchai et al., 2015). Organizations can use their access to resources and information to compete more effectively, to create innovative services, to lower their reliance on others and to obtain legitimization (Tjemkes et al., 2012). DLR, as orchestrator, is expected to create awareness among key members within the alliance network, enabling them to recognize the complementarity of their needs. Access to interorganizational networks is a form of social capital that increases in value with subsequent use (Coleman, 1988). The greater the member diversity in an alliance network, the better the access an organization generates to more sources of critical resources (Yli-Renko & Autio, 1998). Considering that the network members' functional orientation in the Dutch personal injury network is diverse as they come from different sectors (see §2.3), NPOs within this network have access to a high degree of critical resources.

Collective sense aligns the perceptions of network members and functions as a political motive to cooperate (Child et al., 2005; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Collective sense is associated with successful forming of alliances, given that it enables partners to focus on cooperative action. It is likely that network members receive information about each other's organizational differences, established working routines, operational routines and practices, organizational cultures, employee backgrounds, experiences and personalities (see also: Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This information enables network members to have a profound understanding of their strategic, organizational, operational, cultural and

human fit (see also: Khanna et al., 1998; Li et al., 2008). This awareness enables network members to learn from their differences to manage potential misfits, increasing strategic alliances' success (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Following from the above, the following proposition has been formed:

**Proposition 5:** *Alliance networks influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success through partner characteristics indirectly and positively.*

### 3.5.2 The influence of alliance networks through relationship capital

Alliance networks can increase the survival chances of strategic alliances and their successful evolution through relationship capital (Child et al., 2005; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Tjemkes et al., 2012). An alliance network enriches an organization's repertoire of strategic actions as it provides managers with greater access to information than they would generate operating autonomously. Organizations that are not part of the core of an alliance network have an information disadvantage, as they may not receive new information (in time) even though access to this information can be critical. DLR, as broker, has the opportunity to control exchanges between network members and provide them with informational advantages (Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995; Tjemkes et al., 2012). The network learns as a whole and shares the necessary information for processes to run effectively, reducing the risk that partners engage in opportunistic behaviour (Siebert, 2003). Network members are more committed and may even be willing to share a part of their autonomy to the network to operate like a quasi-organization if they believe that a greater value can be achieved (Child et al., 2005; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This implies that network members must have sufficient trust in each other to relinquish a part of their autonomy. Furthermore, collective sense among network members helps to develop an informal working structure for the network based on trust. The presence of clearly defined collaborative objectives fosters the development of mutual trust (Inkpen & Curral, 2004). It is expected that the development of mutual trust is fostered among network members in the Dutch personal injury industry as they have defined a clear collaborative objective (see also §3.3.3).

Three types of partners can be distinguished in relation to network distance (Kang & Zaheer, 2018). Existing partners refer to the situation that a focal organization forms a new alliance with an existing partner. New close partners refer to the situation in which a focal organization forms a new alliance with a new partner connected through a mutual partner. New distant partners refer to the situation in which a focal organization forms a new alliance with a new not connected partner. A majority of literature reveals that organizations prefer existing partners to reduce uncertainty in their exchanges by engaging past partners in repeated ties (Gulati, 1995; Kogut, 1988; Podolny, 1994; Powell et al., 1995; Walker et al., 1997) or forming new alliances with new close partners (Baum et al., 2005; Uzzi, 1996). Prior successful experiences with partners may increase a partner's trustworthiness, which is disseminated through referrals in the alliance network (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Organizations tend to form new alliances with existing partners, as they have already established prior working relationships and are aware of their mutual skills and needs. Organizations that become partners are often reassured about the risks entailed to an alliance if there are already strong social bonds between them, governing their attitudes and behaviour (Gulati, 1998). Due to the presence of relational capital, existing partners imply lower risk compared to new close partners and the latter imply lower risk compared to distant partners (Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Li & Rowley, 2002). Prior ties reassure partners that they can

maintain their alliances with more flexible organizational arrangements and a less costly managerial structure (Child et al., 2005; Gulati, 1995; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Repeated partners have trust-based routines and strong bonds, lubricating the process of knowledge transfer and joint knowledge creation (Adner, 2013; Huang et al., 2020; Zollo et al., 2002). Altogether, existing partners increase the potential for value creation as jointly specialized assets enhance the prospects of value creation (Argyres & Zenger, 2012; Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Kaul, 2013). New alliances with existing partners are the safest and least costly option, as the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour is low due to established relational mechanisms (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995). Hence, new or intensifying alliances with repeated partners (such as ANWB, LSA, NIS, NIVRE, NLE and SHN) have a high potential for value creation to strengthen the Register Letselschade.

Risk involved in distant ties derives from concerns about competition, vulnerability, relationship imbalance, complexity and costs of monitoring (Das & Teng, 1998; Katila et al., 2008; Park & Ungson, 2001). Kang and Zaheer (2018) argue that the lack of relational mechanisms in relationships with distant partners may increase the risk of relational failure, since it is harder to evaluate and control distant partners than close partners. Besides, distant ties are more uncertain and riskier as the possibility of gaining information about and experiences with potential partners' capabilities, reliability and conduct is limited. However, a minority of literature reveals that organizations sometimes prefer distant partners that cut across clusters, due to novel knowledge that they bring despite the lack of trust and commonality in routines (Baum et al., 2003; Kogut & Walker, 2001; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Powell et al., 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). Connections with distant partners generate structural holes for the focal organization in the network because the distant partner and the focal organization do not share a mutual partner by definition. Distant ties are better able to access novel resources and information from remote parts of the network as well as obtain arbitrage and control benefits across disconnected partners (Burt, 1992). Alliances with distant partners allow the focal organization to hear about potential opportunities and threats more quickly than embedded organizations (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994). Furthermore, distant ties can enrich the knowledge pool of the focal organization by providing a sufficient set of choices to solve problems and helping organizations to avoid core rigidities and competency traps (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Levitt & March, 1988; March 1991). Various referrers (except ANWB and SHN) are distant partners and enable DLR to gain novel knowledge because they can inform DLR about how the findability of the Register Letselschade for victims can be increased. Besides, DLR obtains arbitrage and control benefits across disconnected partners if referrers agree to exclusively refer victims to registered representatives. Consequently, a 'pull-system' can be created where both the number of victims making use of the quality system and the incentive for representatives to get registered increase.

An alliance network provides its members through indirect relationships with information about the availability and reliability of potential partners and the predictability of their behaviour. Alliancing with new close partners thus lowers risk through a greater information access via shared third parties, reducing the costs for searching and screening potential partners (Kang & Zaheer, 2018). In addition, risks are being limited to only redundant knowledge if alliances are being formed with new close partners (Burt, 1992). Furthermore, forming an alliance with a new close partner offers significant savings in both time and resources that are needed to build a new relationship (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1994). It reduces vulnerability



because a mini-society is created, including a web of potential sanctions, among the group of interconnected partners that discourage opportunistic behaviour (Coleman, 1988; Macneil, 1980). The mutual connection among close ties creates a safeguard countering the relational risk (Kang & Zaheer, 2018). However, new close partners may not benefit the focal organization as much as existing partners or new distant partners. New close partners, such as the ASP, offer neither the benefits of novel knowledge from distant partners nor the advantages of trust and lubricated knowledge transfer routines from existing partners. Kang and Zaheer argue: “Firms thus trade-off between higher trust in local ties and greater access to novelty in nonlocal ties; or alternatively, between unintended knowledge transfer in repeated ties and impacted knowledge that remains less accessible with distant ties because of the lack of social mechanisms” (2018, p. 2746). Following from the above, the following proposition has been formed:

**Proposition 6:** *Alliance networks influence cross-sector strategic alliances’ success through relational capital indirectly and positively.*

### 3.5.3 The influence of partner characteristics through relational capital

Partner characteristics (resource interdependence and compatibility) can indirectly affect the success of strategic alliances through relationship capital (also known as the Synthetic School; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Heide 1994; Sarkar et al., 2001; Smith & Barclay 1999; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Reciprocal needs exist if partners perceive resource interdependence, reducing incentives for opportunistic behaviour when both partners perceive value in the relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Oliver, 1990; Stump & Heide, 1996). Hence, resource interdependence decreases the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour of partners as they are more likely to be interested in creating relational capital to decrease their vulnerability to each other (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020). Resource interdependence increases the likelihood that partners trust and commit to each other (Akrouit & Diallo, 2017; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Buchanan, 1992; Robson et al., 2019). Reciprocal needs promotes the formation and development of cooperative norms in order to create relational capital (Madhok, 1995; Sarkar et al., 2001). Partners create relational capital by engaging in trustworthy behaviour (Robson et al., 2019) and maintaining open and participative lines of communication or information sharing (Sarkar et al., 2001; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Partners are more willing to share information if their relationship is good and they perceive reciprocal needs due to resource interdependence (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). An overlap in knowledge resources improves the ability of partners to absorb knowledge and their in-depth understanding of potential value and deployment of resources (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Emden et al., 2006; Reuer & Lahiri, 2014). It allows partners to interact and share knowledge more effectively and easily. However, at the same time alliance partners desire a certain control over the alliance’s behaviour and performance due to resource dependency (Child et al., 2005). Hence, the challenge is to find a balance between commitment, trust and a required degree of control in organizing strategic alliances.

Compatibility with partners decreases the propensity for opportunistic behaviour (Emden et al., 2006; Saxton, 1997; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Relationships between compatible partners are more likely based on mutual support rather than on domination (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Similarity in cultures is fundamental for social relationships, since it is the basis for social interaction processes as it

facilitates congeniality and a sense of unity (Evans, 1963; Hitt et al., 2001; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Studies show that cultural fit is a major antecedent explaining trust (Austin & Seitanidi, 2014, 2012; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Jayari & Chaheer, 2019). Partners are unable to create a climate of mutual trust in any alliance they attempt to undertake if they are from different sectors which do not share values (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001). Organizations thus must share similar values and beliefs with potential partners for strategic alliances to succeed. A cultural misfit can hinder partners to develop a harmonious relationship, leaving partners unable to work together seamlessly (Sarkar et al., 1997; Wilkof et al., 1995). A negative relationship, characterized by suspicion and conflict, is likely to develop that hinders the development of mutual trust and information sharing (Fadol & Sandhu, 2013; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). A cultural partner fit cultivates relationship capital-building behaviours (Sarkar et al., 2001). Partners with a friendly relationship are more likely to exchange formal and informal information. A cultural fit increases the credibility of shared information and help to see the behaviour of a partner in a positive light (Douma et al., 2000; Ganesan, 1994; Saxton, 1997). An information flow is essential to achieve cultural fit and learning within the alliance (Child et al., 2005; Emden et al., 2006). Besides, it increases the level of trust (Akrouit & Diallo, 2017; Fadol & Sandhu, 2013; MacMillan et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2012) and commitment to the alliance (Tjemkes et al., 2012). If an organization perceives that its partner is acting in accordance with its values, they are willing to share more information (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). A cultural fit can also create stability in the strategic alliance relationship and greater levels of tolerance by acting as a social glue that helps partners to endure temporary periods of disequilibrium (Madhok, 1995). If partners' cultures are compatible, coordination costs will reduce and it serves as a means of behavioural control and expectations management (Chung et al., 2000; Das & Teng 1998).


A good strategic fit increases the long-term value creation potential of alliances by signalling that partners have long-term commitment and are not likely engaging in opportunistic behaviour (Emden et al., 2006; Saxton, 1997; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Tjemkes et al., 2012). A strategic misfit creates strategic conflicts that undermine joint business proposition because partners may be less committed and allocate resources to alternative more valuable arrangements. An organizational misfit undermines collective sensemaking and increases risk of decision making conflicts. Established relational capital and emphasized constructive partner interactions can overcome these hazards associated with an organizational misfit (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Operational misfits creates ambiguity about partners' roles and skills and can lead to poor communication among operational staff, impeding quick conflict resolution and putting the relationship under pressure. Established relational capital may restrict opportunistic behaviour and create mutual understanding, limiting negative effects of the operational misfit on strategic alliances' success through relational capital. A good human fit stimulates information sharing and trust building, increasing relational capital and enhancing strategic alliances' success (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Following from the above, the following proposition has been formed:

**Proposition 7:** *Partner characteristics influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success through relational capital indirectly and positively.*

### 3.6 Conceptual model

The theoretical aspects discussed above can be summarized in the conceptual model, visualized in figure 3. Influences and relationships between the components are indicated by arrows in the model. Relational capital and compatibility are implied by eight indicators. Alliance network, resource interdependence, compatibility and relational capital are expected main factors that positively and directly influence the success of cross-sector strategic alliances (indicated with P1, P2, P3 and P4). It is expected that alliance networks influence the success of cross-sector strategic alliances via partner characteristics positively and indirectly (indicated with P5). Furthermore, alliance networks and partner characteristics are expected to influence the success of cross-sector strategic alliances through relational capital positively and indirectly (indicated with P6 and P7).

**Figure 3.** *The conceptual model of cross-sector strategic alliances' success*



## CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY

This chapter contains the methodological choices and measures that have been made to ensure the quality and verifiability of this research. It outlines the research design (§4.1), data collection methods (§4.2), data sample (§4.3), data analysis (§4.4) and research ethics (§4.5).

### 4.1 Research design

The aim of this research is to study how the success factors of strategic alliances can optimize cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry in order to strengthen the Register Letselschade and thus prevent secondary victimisation (see chapter 1). Hence, a qualitative approach is suitable for answering this ‘how’-question (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). This research is practice oriented as it aims to solve a practical problem (Bleijenbergh et al., 2011). Since the factors of success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs have not been explored in their entirety and not in the context of the Dutch personal injury industry, this research is exploratory. The organizations DLR, SHN and Q-Consult Insurance have pledged to cooperate in this research. There is no agreement with these organisations, guaranteeing the independence of the researcher.

#### 4.2 Methods of data collection

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect data, allowing respondents to formulate their experiences themselves and provide insights into their perception and shared values within NPOs (Bleijenbergh, 2013). It is important that a trustworthy environment was created to ensure that respondents could speak freely during the interviews, especially in the politically sensitive Dutch personal injury industry. The internal validity of this study is improved by the development of an early familiarity with the culture of participating NPOs before the first data collection dialogues took place (Shenton, 2004). The researcher preliminarily visited various NPOs and spoke to several respondents to gain an adequate understanding of their cultures and to build a relationship of trust necessary for conducting interviews. The possible undesirable side effects that can influence the researcher's professional judgements by becoming so immersed in the culture being studied, are limited by increasing reflexive awareness through memos in which assumptions, thoughts and feelings were written down. Furthermore, the social interaction between the interviewer and respondent helped create a trustworthy environment and motivated respondents to say things they might not have said otherwise. The researcher's independent status was emphasized to limit respondents' giving socially desirable answers.

Semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to steer which information is discussed during interviews, without pinning respondents down to specific wording (Bleijenbergh, 2013). Pre-structured questions ensure that all respondents are presented with the same questions, increasing the reliability of the data collection. It directs the conversation in a certain direction, whereby unexpected matters can be addressed to some extent but the space to explore them is more limited than in unstructured interviews. This can negatively affect the internal validity of the data collection. An inductive approach is used to study the field as openly as possible and to avoid influencing respondents. Existing theory is used to formulate broad, general concepts that give some direction to the perception (the sensitizing concepts). The observation is then open enough to distinguish matters that are not yet known from previous research, but also sufficiently focused to be able to steer the observation somewhat. The internal validity of this study is improved by asking respondents to read transcripts of dialogues in which they have participated, emphasizing that respondents consider that their words correspond to what they actually intended (Shenton, 2004). Due to COVID-19, the government has advised to avoid social contacts as much as possible (RIVM, 2020). Interviews were conducted digitally in line with this regulation and to encourage a greater response. Video calling was the preferred used method as it includes non-verbal communication (Bleijenbergh, 2013). However, five respondents only wanted to be interviewed by phone. Furthermore, six respondents only agreed to participate in this study via a double interview. These respondents could have influenced each other, for example by providing socially desirable answers. The contribution of each interview to the larger objective of this research was clarified before questions were formulated to avoid obtaining information that may be interesting but is of little relevance.

The internal validity of this study is improved by triangulation (Shenton, 2004). The researcher has used various data (reports, brochures, websites and annual plans) created by the NPOs under scrutiny themselves and externally produced data related to those NPOs. This secondary data was used to analyse the context of this research (see chapter 2) and to further shape the theoretical framework (see chapter 3). Moreover, this supporting data provided a background to help explain the attitudes and behaviour of respondents. It verified particular details that respondents had supplied as they referred to several documents during the interviews.

### 4.3 Data sample

The data is collected through twenty semi-structured interviews with two main types of respondents, namely four victims and sixteen (former) board or committee members, employees, members or registered representatives of NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry (affiliates of NPOs). A number of respondents from each discussed NPO were selected to provide diversity. This enabled the researcher to obtain a variety of perspectives in order to get a better and more stable view of ‘reality’ that is based on a wide spectrum of observations (Dervin, 1983). Appendix B includes an overview of the characteristics of respondents. Ten respondents are female and ten are male. Since the Dutch personal injury industry is small and respondents know each other, they fear that links can be made between each other and their statements. In addition, respondents indicated that the topic under study is very politically sensitive and they do not want to damage established relationships. Some respondents even feared that participating in this study could damage their careers. The legal background, qualifications and experience of the researcher appeared to be important for several respondents to participate in this study as it improved her credibility. Several respondents only agreed to be interviewed if the results would be extensively anonymized, so that statements cannot be traced back to them. Hence, anonymity has been further implemented to avoid recognition. The characteristics of respondents are therefore kept limited, and respondents are referred to by a random letter. However, respondents are identified by a number corresponding with Appendix B if their occupation is relevant. Respondents were selected based on the researcher’s judgement of which characteristics of respondents are important in terms of obtaining necessary data to achieve the research objective (Saunders, 2012). Victims were selected ad-random and affiliates of NPOs were selected by judgment sample (more about this in §4.5).

An interview protocol based on the theoretical framework was developed to guide the interviews and is included in Appendix C. To improve the objectivity of this study, per question is explained how it is used in this study (Shenton, 2004). There are six general interview questions. During interviews, more specific questions were asked based on the direction of the interview and background information. Respondents were asked to introduce themselves briefly to put them at ease and to better understand their background. They were asked to describe the value of the Register Letselschade and how this register could be improved in order to obtain information about valuable (lacking) resources. Subsequently, respondents were asked what organizations could help to strengthen the Register Letselschade in order to improve the quality of service in this industry and prevent secondary victimisation and why. This question was asked to obtain information about relevant factors for successful strategic alliances in this industry. The question has been deliberately formulated as openly and neutrally as possible to not influence respondents. To obtain information about referrers, respondents were asked at what time in the personal injury claim trajectory and by what party is it best to inform victims about the Register Letselschade. Concluding, respondents were asked whether they would have anything they would like to add to the interview and whether they would like to receive a transcript of the conducted interview. The interviews lasted on average 45 minutes and were conducted in Dutch as all respondents are Dutch. A translation of the interview questions to English is included in Appendix C. The interviews took place in May and June 2020. Respondents were asked to contact the researcher about new developments to ensure they are included in this study. Since the topic being studied is very actual, the researcher monitored the NPOs under scrutiny to ensure that new developments were considered.

#### 4.4 Data analysis

The interviews were audio-recorded and fully transcribed. All empirical observations that were made were written out to improve the objectivity of this study (Bleijenbergh, 2013; Shenton, 2004). The empirical phenomenon is approached as openly as possible through inductive coding. The concepts that respondents use themselves to express their experiences with the investigated social phenomenon form the basis of the codes. Open descriptive codes were derived from interview transcripts to stay close to what respondents have said and reflect the events from their point of view (Shenton, 2004; Wester & Peters, 2004). The concepts were abstracted in steps, until they were general enough that they match the level of the goal of the research question. Each fragment is labelled with a term that is the most characteristic of that content. By comparing fragments with equivalent themes (the axial codes), patterns were recognized in the social phenomenon. These patterns were viewed by selective codes or pattern codes. Since all interviews were held in Dutch all quotes of respondents that are used to confirm the analysis of data in chapter 5 are translated from Dutch to English. Appendix D contains these translations to improve the reliability of the data analysis.

#### 4.5 Research ethics

The General Data Protection Regulation requires that personal data be protected. In accordance with this regulation, victims were invited to take part in this research via a post on social media (via Facebook and LinkedIn; included in Appendix E) and via the PIV-satisfaction survey. This survey was carried out among victims, whereby the personal injury claim had been recently settled by a third-party insurer. The PIV-satisfaction survey was conducted by the independent organization Q-Consult Insurance to determine the extent to which the requirements of the insurance sector are complied with (PIV, 2018). In consultation with Q-Consult Insurance and third-party insurers that participate in the PIV-satisfaction survey (A.s.r., De Goudse, Nationale Nederlanden, Nh1816, Unigarant, Univé, and ZLM Verzekeringen), an introduction and an invitation to participate in this research had been added to this survey (included in Appendix F).<sup>3</sup> Considering the different sizes of these third-party insurers in the market and victims do not choose the offender or liability insurer, the sample is ad-random. Only victims in a third-party liability situation have been approached through the PIV-satisfaction survey, meaning that victims are by definition not the insurers' own customers as the insurance of the liable party has been invoked. Since victims were only invited digitally, a part of the population is not reached. Affiliates of NPOs were invited directly and via a post on social media (via Facebook and LinkedIn; included in Appendix E).

The five principles for research ethics formulated by APA have been followed (Smith, 2003). Reflexivity is an important element in this research, since an interpretive approach is chosen to conduct interviews (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004; Haynes, 2012). Assumptions, thoughts and feelings were written down in memos to increase reflexive awareness. These memos, interview recordings and transcripts were used to analyse how the researcher might have affected the interview process. The research process is evaluated and discussed in paragraph 6.3. At the start of each interview, the researcher introduced herself and the research to create an open and trustworthy environment within the interview. The reason for the interview and why the respondent

---

<sup>3</sup> These third-party insurers are not the only organizations participating the PIV-satisfaction survey, but were the only ones who volunteered to participate in this research.

was chosen, were discussed. Respondents were asked for permission to record and transcribe the interviews. Hereby, the anonymity of respondents is guaranteed (anonymity has been further implemented to avoid recognition, see §4.3). Respondents were informed that they have the right to decline to participate and to withdraw from the research at any time. Besides, respondents were informed that the results of this research will be published and were asked whether they appreciate to receive a summary of the results personally via e-mail. Concluding the introduction of each interview, respondents were asked if they had any questions. Clarity about the preconditions of the interview is necessary to put respondents at ease in such a way that they give honest and comprehensive answers to the interview questions (Bleijenbergh, 2013).

This research uses insights from the theory to improve the malfunctioning practice and to make recommendations. The results of this research may be applied by the discussed NPOs (ASP, DLR, LSA, NIS, NIVRE, NLE, SHN and VvV) and other parties in the Dutch personal injury industry, such as referrers. The results can be applied in the development of the successor of the Register Letselschade, the NKL. NPOs can apply the results to optimize cross-sector strategic alliances in this industry in order to strengthen the overarching quality system and improve the quality of service in this industry, preventing secondary victimisation. Since the aim of this practice oriented research is that the target NPOs adapt their behaviour to the research recommendations, they should understand and accept the results of this research and the way they were produced (Bleijenbergh et al., 2011). Hence, managers of these NPOs should recognize the results, emotionally support them and consider them legitimate in order to be committed to implement them. The results of this research were presented to three professionals with knowledge of the industry. This helps ensure that the results considered all relevant aspects of the social phenomenon, the results are understandable to those wishing to use them, and the researcher's interpretations are correct (Bleijenbergh, 2013). The relevance of this study is shown by the fact that discussed NPOs and many representatives, insurers and other professionals have indicated to look forward to the results of this study, hoping that it will contribute to the solution to counter secondary victimisation.

## **CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS**

This chapter contains the results of the data analysis. The results are placed within the theoretical background and are outlined in different paragraphs covering the alliance network (§5.1), resource interdependence (§5.2), compatibility (§5.3), relational capital (§5.4), the indirect effects (§5.5) and new success factors of cross-sector strategic alliances (§5.6). Results that are not relevant to this study, but are relevant to the Dutch personal industry are included in Appendix G.

### **5.1 The alliance network**

An alliance network refers to a network comprising different stakeholders who tend to align themselves with the direction set by one or more leadership organizations (Siripitakchai et al., 2015; Tjemkes et al., 2012). It is confirmed that the Dutch personal injury industry can be seen as an alliance network, as affiliates of NPOs unanimously indicated to be motivated to work on the network priority to create value despite opposite interests (in line with: Siripitakchai et al., 2015; Tjemkes et al., 2012). However, a minority of affiliates [2/16]

indicated to have concerns about DLR as leadership organization.<sup>4</sup> Affiliates of NPOs unanimously indicated the alliance network as an important factor for the success of cross-sector strategic alliances, comparable to regular strategic alliances (in line with: Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Siripitakchai et al., 2015; Tjemkes et al., 2012).<sup>5</sup> A majority [12/20] considered the network event, the platform consultation, essential to foster necessary collaboration and harmony in order to achieve the aligned goal.<sup>6</sup> *“The platform consultation is in fact the driving force, where project groups arise from signals from the industry.”* (O). Hence, the theory that the network event encourages and directs strategic alliances between network members is confirmed (in line with: Child et al., 2005). Attorneys indicated that their autonomy and decision making are limited due to the expectations of network members. They fear that if the Bar actively participates and commits to the Register Letselschade, network members will assume that registered attorneys must act in accordance with issued guidelines even if these are not in the best interest of their clients. According to these attorneys, this violates the rules of conduct of the Bar. Hence, a minority [4/20] confirmed the theory that the alliance network itself creates interdependencies between network members, reducing their autonomy and constrain their decision making (in line with: Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).

The roles of network members in the network event appeared to be important in the complex and polarized Dutch personal injury industry (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012). DLR’s orchestrator’s role is confirmed as it is described by a majority of affiliates of NPOs [9/16] as an important medium that functions as a bridge between naturally opposed parties and motivates stakeholders to collaborate on the network priority (in line with: Child et al., 2005; Hinterhuber, 2002; Siripitakchai et al., 2015).<sup>7</sup> *“DLR facilitates and coordinates that parties continue to discuss topics that they themselves consider important.”* (O). DLR’s broker role was not mentioned by respondents (not in line with: Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995; Tjemkes et al., 2012). The observer-position of the LSA is viewed as a compromise and is largely discussed. A minority [2/20] indicated that LSA’s role of observer in the platform consultation is sufficient.<sup>8</sup> *“The LSA takes its role very seriously and wholeheartedly talks with it. There are also many attorneys who take part in different workgroups in a private capacity to provide that input, precisely to improve the personal injury settlement. But the question is whether you need to expect more from the Bar.”* (R). A minority [2/20] argued that the LSA is in practice an influencer by acting like a participant but not committing to anything, causing inequality between parties and jeopardizing cooperation.<sup>9</sup> *“It cannot be the case that, on one hand you say that you do not want to commit to the rules of DLR, but on the other hand you will attend all meetings and interfere with everything.”* (K); *“There are simply no decisions taken [in the platform consultation] because the LSA, as an observer, disagrees. I find this unworkable.”* (N). Other respondents [3/20] argued that the Bar and especially the ASP should participate in the network event.<sup>10</sup> *“It is of course true that there are strong links between insurers and DLR, but how important is it that the Bar has a voice in the platform consultation. In any case as observer.”* (L). There is discussion about the role of the government in the network event. A

---

<sup>4</sup> R and T.

<sup>5</sup> E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, N, O, R, S and T.

<sup>6</sup> F, G, H, K, L, M, O, P, R and T.

<sup>7</sup> H, I, K, L, O, Q, R, S and T.

<sup>8</sup> R and T.

<sup>9</sup> K and N.

<sup>10</sup> I, L and O.



minority [3/20] stated that the industry has a societal duty to self-regulate in the interests of victims.<sup>11</sup> They indicated to prefer the government keeping its current role as observer. Others argued that the government should bear its responsibility as an important party in this industry by supporting the Register Letselschade [5/20]<sup>12</sup> or even by regulating this industry as it is not sufficiently self-regulating [5/20].<sup>13</sup> The judiciary, who does not take part in the network event, is mentioned by a minority [2/20] as an important party as well because it creates clarity.<sup>14</sup> *“The moment you involve the judiciary, they are not confronted with something that comes out of the blue, but something in which they are involved as a professional group.”* (S).

Regarding proposition 1, the results show that the alliance network and more specifically the network event is considered important for cross-sector strategic alliances’ success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry. The alliance network influences cross-sector strategic alliances’ success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry directly and positively. Hence, proposition 1 can be accepted.

## 5.2 Resource interdependence

Resource interdependence emphasizes that parties have different but complementary resource needs (D’Amour et al., 2005; Das & Teng, 2000; Gao & Shi, 2011; Jap, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When needed resources are not sufficiently and immediately available, it increases the reason to collaborate (Child et al., 2005). This is confirmed by a majority [13/20] who indicated that the Register Letselschade should be strengthened by strategic alliances because parties depend on each other’s resources.<sup>15</sup> The resource dependency theory is confirmed as this majority recognized the importance of collaboration due to perceived interdependence (in line with: D’Amour et al., 2005; Das & Teng, 2000; Miller & Shamsie, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Respondents did not indicate that required knowledge based resources increases the reason to collaborate (not in line with: Child et al., 2005; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Resources can only lead to a substantive competitive advantage if it delivers value to customers (Santema & Van de Rijt, 2005). This is confirmed as respondents unanimously stated that the Register Letselschade must be strengthened to deliver value to customers, which ultimately also delivers value to partners. A majority [12/20] argued that the Register Letselschade is not user friendly and even for educated employees difficult to use.<sup>16</sup> A majority [12/20] pointed out that DLR has become an organization for organizations and is not aimed at victims.<sup>17</sup> *“DLR was once created in the desire to create a one-stop shop for victims where they could find everything and neutral non-commercial information. (...) Due to the desire to become an organization for organizations, the entire victim portal has moved deeper into DLR on the website and is no longer as prominently visible.”* (O). A majority [12/20] argued that the Register Letselschade must be adapted to the target group victims in order to be able to provide them with sufficient information and services.<sup>18</sup> Respondent G pointed out that the industry is polarized, making it difficult to adapt the Register Letselschade: *“Ideally there would of course*

---

<sup>11</sup> I, K and O.

<sup>12</sup> G, L, M, N, and R.

<sup>13</sup> J, M, N, R and S.

<sup>14</sup> Q and S.

<sup>15</sup> E, F, G, J, I, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and S.

<sup>16</sup> A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, M, O, P and Q.

<sup>17</sup> F, G, I, K, L, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T.

<sup>18</sup> A, B, C, D, E, G, F, I, M, O, P and Q.

*be some sort of electoral guide, a comparison page such as Independer, where you can simply enter your data. (...) It is an IT-project in my opinion, while the industry often sees it as a kind of political project.”*

Resource complementarity is present as strategic alliances between DLR, SHN, the government and referrers were mentioned to fulfil reciprocal needs (in line with: Gao & Shi, 2011; Jap, 1999). The resources of these partners are complementarity, providing a resource set that provides unique value that stimulates joint coordination (in line with: Harrison et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). The service activity [8/20] was mentioned as most important lacking activity of DLR related to the Register Letselschade.<sup>19</sup> A customer service was valued from whom victims can request additional support, including assistance in choosing a representative and to whom they can turn to for specific help. A minority [3/20] argued that SHN is specialized in assisting victims (at a personal level) in different needs and thus already has developed the service resources that DLR lacks.<sup>20</sup> This minority mentioned to value a strategic alliance between DLR and SHN in which DLR refers victims clearly on its website for (extra) support to SHN, given that SHN has already developed a well-functioning customer support aimed at this target group. Hence, the minority indicated skill substitution of DLR's lacking service activity by SHN as SHN already performs these activities and economies of scale could therefore be realized (in line with: Harrison et al., 2001). Respondents did, however, not indicate to prefer skill substitution due to less risks compared with involuntary transferring resources through learning (not in line with: Harrison et al., 2001; Inkpen, 2001; Khanna et al., 1998; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Furthermore, respondents did not indicate that the scarcity of service resources encourages cooperation (not in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012). The minority stated that both DLR and SHN benefit from this alliance as the target group of the Register Letselschade is better informed and able to use the register, preventing secondary victimisation. This strategic alliance thus augments strengths, while ameliorating weaknesses by sharing explicit resources to create mutually beneficial outcomes (in line with: Bahinipati et al., 2009; Hamel & Doz, 1998; Hamel & Prahalad, 1989; Hoskisson & Busenitz, 2001; Kunc & Morecroft, 2010; Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008; Varadarajan & Cuningham, 1995). In addition, a minority [2/20] mentioned that SHN is able to provide DLR with knowledge about how the Register Letselschade could be improved from the victim's perspective.<sup>21</sup> This alliance opens therefore learning opportunities that help partners better leverage their own resources (in line with: Inkpen, 1998).

The results show that a minority [6/20], including all victims, were unaware of the Register Letselschade and its value.<sup>22</sup> Respondents unanimously indicated that the recognizability and familiarity of the Register Letselschade must be enhanced in order to strengthen its value. *“A quality mark is only of added value if it is a recognizable quality mark. Whether representatives have a quality mark should be a convincing argument for people who ultimately make decisions.”* (G). Actively informing victims [20/20], higher online findability [8/20],<sup>23</sup> Postbus 51 advertising in which the government shows its support [7/20],<sup>24</sup> converting the registers' name to NKL [5/20]<sup>25</sup> and actively participating in television programs to promote the Register

<sup>19</sup> A, B, C, D, E, F, M and P.

<sup>20</sup> F, I and P.

<sup>21</sup> F and P.

<sup>22</sup> A, B, C, D, E and J.

<sup>23</sup> G, H, J, K, M, Q, R and S.

<sup>24</sup> G, J, L, M, N, R and S.

<sup>25</sup> G, I, M, N and O.

Letselschade [4/20]<sup>26</sup> were mentioned to enhance the registers' recognizability and familiarity. Respondents [7/20] argued that the government has an enormous scope to reliably draw attention to the Register Letselschade and that its support strengthens the registers' power and value.<sup>27</sup>

Respondents unanimously stated that victims must be as early as possible actively informed by an independent and trustworthy organization in one clear way to be able to find the Register Letselschade and understand its value. Respondents unanimously indicated that victims' knowledge is limited and that it is difficult to reach them. The information available in the industry is currently too fragmented for victims and referrers to see the wood for the trees. *"The moment you become a victim, that [personal injury] world only starts to become relevant."* (N); *"Victims come in unknowingly and also a bit traumatized."* (P). A minority [3/20] criticized that there are too many professions registered in the Register Letselschade, causing only more confusion for victims and referrers in the already complex industry.<sup>28</sup> *"It seems to set up so large to support DLR financially. Yes, I would rather have seen that differently. Maybe DLR itself too."* (R). Strategic alliances with referrers were seen by a majority [12/20] as the main way to enhance the findability of the register among victims.<sup>29</sup> Health care providers [13/20],<sup>30</sup> insurers [12/20],<sup>31</sup> SHN [10/20],<sup>32</sup> DLR [4/20],<sup>33</sup> first care providers [3/20],<sup>34</sup> ANWB [3/20],<sup>35</sup> the government [3/20],<sup>36</sup> insurance intermediaries [M], the Legal Services Counter [J], employers [M], the trade union [B], accountants [A] and salvage companies [K] were mentioned as important referrers through which victims could be reached. Referrers are seen as crucial partners to get access to victims as target group, since they are the first to come in contact with the hard-to-reach victims and thus have a dominant position. A majority [12/20] argued that the Register Letselschade can be strengthened by strategic alliances between DLR and referrers in which they actively inform victims and exclusively refer victims to registered representatives.<sup>37</sup> A minority [3/20] argued that DLR must strive for alliances with umbrella or professional care organizations such as the KNMG, the KNGF and the LHV.<sup>38</sup> Respondents did not mention that referrers can offer DLR access to their network and understanding of victims in order to increase the registers' findability and recognizability (not in line with: Faulkner, 1995).

Respondent E pointed out that referrers may lack relevant knowledge to provide sufficient guidance to victims in the personal injury trajectory. Referrers, especially health care providers, should be able to easily inform and refer victims as they are not legal specialists and do not have enough time to assist victims in the legal process. *"It would be helpful if there was a leaflet that you could hand over right away. (...) The leaflets could be distributed integrally by the KNGF at affiliated practices."* (E). A strategic alliance between referrers and SHN in which referrers refer victims to SHN for broad support, was indicated by a minority [3/20]

---

<sup>26</sup> H, K, M and Q.

<sup>27</sup> G, J, L, M, N, R and S.

<sup>28</sup> J, R and T.

<sup>29</sup> F, G, J, I, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and S.

<sup>30</sup> A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, M, P, Q and S.

<sup>31</sup> B, C, D, F, G, J, K, M, O, P, Q and T.

<sup>32</sup> F, G, I, K, M, O, P, Q, S and T.

<sup>33</sup> M, O, Q and S.

<sup>34</sup> F, J and P.

<sup>35</sup> G, M and S.

<sup>36</sup> Q, R and S.

<sup>37</sup> F, G, J, I, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and S.

<sup>38</sup> G, K and N.

as a solution.<sup>39</sup> SHN can assist victims or subsequently refer victims to needed specialized support as SHN already performs these tasks and thus already developed these lacking resources. This alliance lowers the threshold for referrers to actively inform victims, enabling both referrers and SHN to better help victims. *“It would be valuable if insurers refer to SHN for objective advice on what kind of help victims need. But that is much to ask of commercial parties.”* (F). Respondents seemed unaware of the importance of participating in learning-processes to be able to exploit synergies and explore complementary resource strengths to achieve greater alliance performance (not in line with: Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Tjemkes et al., 2012).

Regarding proposition 2, the results show that resource interdependence was present and considered important for cross-sector strategic alliances’ success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry. Resource interdependence helps partners to achieve and sustain successful cross-sector strategic alliances. Hence, resource interdependence influences cross-sector strategic alliances’ success directly and positively. In conclusion, proposition 2 can be accepted.

### 5.3 Compatibility

The results are analysed per indicator of compatibility in different paragraphs covering the strategic, organizational, operational, cultural and human fit.

#### 5.3.1 Strategic fit

A strategic fit is an indicator of compatibility and is expected to be important to the success of cross-sector strategic alliances (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Sarkar et al., 2001). This is confirmed by a majority [14/20] who stated that the Register Letselschade must be strengthened to provide value, otherwise parties have no incentive to cooperate.<sup>40</sup> Respondents unanimously acknowledged the political motive to separate the wheat from the chaff in order to prevent secondary victimization. This perceived political motive enables partners to focus on cooperative action (in line with: Child et al., 2005). A majority [11/20] mentioned the common interests that all high-quality representatives should register to give a strong signal to both the internal market (the personal injury industry itself) and the external market (victims and referrers) in order to strengthen the Register Letselschade.<sup>41</sup> *“The way to do that, also to separate the wheat from the chaff and to protect victims, is to bring all parties together and create such a national quality system.”* (I); *“To put it bluntly, the quality mark loses value by the political hassle around it. Not all parties that should be included are included.”* (G). Showing quality and acquiring customers were mentioned by half of the affiliates of NPOs [8/16] as economic motives for representatives to collaborate with DLR and to register.<sup>42</sup> The political motive to cooperate is, in comparison with an economic motive, thus more associated with cross-sector strategic alliances’ success (in line with: Child et al., 2005). Respondents [7/20] mentioned higher reimbursement for registered representatives to motivate representatives to register.<sup>43</sup> They stated that registered representatives should automatically qualify for higher reimbursement, given that a minimum quality is guaranteed

<sup>39</sup> F, I and P.

<sup>40</sup> F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T.

<sup>41</sup> F, G, H, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and S.

<sup>42</sup> F, I, L, M, N, O, R and T.

<sup>43</sup> G, J, L, M, N, Q and S.

through registration. *“You have to create commercial preconditions to interest representatives to register. (...) Insurers are willing to pay more once you have an efficient and professional handling of the [personal injury] claim.”* (S). Respondent M went a step further: *“I personally think that insurers in the Netherlands should state that they do not work with or reimburse unregistered representatives.”* Respondents [3/20] pointed out that this must be widely accepted in the industry, including the judiciary, in order to succeed and to prevent victims to be adversely affected by this discussion.<sup>44</sup>

Attorneys did not perceive higher utility from an alliance with DLR than another alliance or individually, causing a strategic misfit (in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). A majority of attorneys [3/4] indicated that the Bar’s own interests outweighed the political motive as attorneys considered to not benefit from an alliance with DLR and even suffer if the Bar takes part in the Register Letselschade by legitimizing lesser quality representatives. They are afraid of losing their distinctive character because they cannot distinguish themselves sufficiently in the Register Letselschade. *“What the LSA fears very much, and I think it is right, is that they help put their competitors who are less skilled and under less supervision than attorneys into the saddle.”* (18); *“The Bar is not waiting for a referral register that you are obliged to participate in, and it also suggest that all participants have the same standards.”* (17). Attorneys unanimously stated that economic motives are insufficient as well for the Bar to form or intensify alliances with DLR to strengthen the Register Letselschade. They indicated that attorneys already receive higher reimbursements. All attorneys and one other respondent [5/20] stated that showing quality is not a motive for LSA- and ASP-members to register as they already have to meet stricter quality requirements. Thus, there are varying perceptions on the importance of the alliance and partners (attorneys and experts) act competitively in the area on which the alliances focus, creating a strategic misfit (in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Nonetheless, attorneys pointed out to be realistic. *“Only a list of attorneys is not a viable option in the current area. If you explain the difference between an attorney and an expert well, people can choose for themselves.”* (8). Due to the strategic misfit, respondents [5/20] considered allocating resources to alternative more valuable arrangements, such as a referral list of LSA- and ASP-members and NIVRE-experts to ensure the quality of representatives at a personal level (in line with: Cabral & Pacheco de Almeida, 2014; Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Mindruta et al., 2016; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Hence, the choice of DLR to form alliances with the LSA and ASP to include the Bar in the Register Letselschade is constrained by their own preferences and opportunities for realizing higher value in different alliances (in line with: Mindruta et al., 2016).

A majority [12/20] argued that the Register Letselschade can be strengthened by strategic alliances between DLR and referrers in which they actively inform victims and exclusively refer victims to registered representatives.<sup>45</sup> *“If referrers only refer to the register, then I think that representatives will register because they have an interest in it.”* (P); *“If you can do that, some representatives run the risk of losing perhaps fifty percent of their business if they are not registered.”* (G). Respondents [3/20] argued that actively informing

---

<sup>44</sup> G, Q and S.

<sup>45</sup> F, G, J, I, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and S.

and referring victims to high-quality representatives has value to referrers as well as a smooth personal injury trajectory reduces stress and is therefore beneficial to the victim's recovery (in line with: Elbers et al., 2012; Stichting De Ombudsman, 2003). A majority [13/20] argued that the Register Letselschade cannot function as an overarching quality system to which referrers could exclusively refer as long as the Bar does not take part in it.<sup>46</sup> *"I will find it very strange if they already agree to refer exclusively to registered representatives, while ninety percent of the Bar is absent. Then you actually deprive people... (...) As long as the Bar does not participate fully in the register, you cannot speak of a good register."* (R). Strategic alliances between DLR and referrers, whereby referrers refer victims exclusively to the Register Letselschade, hinders customer acquisition by attorneys. While both political and economic motives were considered insufficient to collaborate, a majority of attorneys [3/4] indicated that they feel compelled to collaborate with DLR to ensure customer acquisition. Attorneys feel in this case obliged to adopt the register's standards to register in order to secure customer acquisition. The inheritance theory is confirmed as these attorneys feel obliged to adopt these standards, while not believing that it actually enhances their operational efficiency (in line with: Vermeulen, 2018). In addition, these attorneys did not indicate that they were aware that the short-term benefits may not outweigh the potential long-term harmful consequences of implementing these standards.

### 5.3.2 Organizational fit

An organizational fit is an indicator of compatibility and is expected to be important to the success of cross-sector strategic alliances (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar, et al., 2001). This is confirmed by a majority [12/20] who mentioned that different operational attributes cause an organizational misfit, jeopardizing the success of cross-sector strategic alliances in the Dutch personal injury industry.<sup>47</sup> This majority indicated the difference between organizational and customer processes as the main difference in the organizational structure and routines of partners. DLR and NLE were described as B2B, while other NPOs were described as B2C. This creates a difference in the scope of quality systems and victim support, undermining collective sensemaking and increasing risk of decision making conflicts (in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Saxton, 1997). A strategic alliance between DLR and SHN, in which support activities are outsourced to SHN, was mentioned [3/20] in order to better assist victims (as mentioned in §5.2).<sup>48</sup> A minority [2/20] proposed to manage this organizational misfit by anticipating the misfit during the alliance design (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012).<sup>49</sup> They introduced a combined quality system that ensures the quality of representatives at both organizational and personal level (more about this in §5.3.3).

Respondent 17 argued that the decision-method in the LSA as an association differs from other entities, creating misunderstanding and decision making conflicts. In addition, most members of the LSA are ASP-members as well, complicating collective sensemaking. *"The LSA-committee has to submit it to its members, since the LSA is an association. (...) The ASP has taken a clear stance that they do not participate in the register. They have arguments for that. Hence, that is an important signal that has been given within the LSA."* (17). Respondents did not mention an organizational misfit between other associations (NIS and NLE)

<sup>46</sup> F, G, H, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T.

<sup>47</sup> F, G, I, K, L, N, O, P, Q, R, S and T.

<sup>48</sup> F, I and P.

<sup>49</sup> G and K.

and foundations (DLR, NIVRE, and SHN) due to different decision-making structures. Hence, the expectation that different decision making structures jeopardize cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry is not confirmed (not in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012).

### 5.3.3 Operational fit

An operational fit is an indicator of compatibility and is expected to be important to the success of cross-sector strategic alliances (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar, et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This is confirmed by a majority [15/20] who indicated that the tangle of quality systems with different quality requirements in the Dutch personal injury industry jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances' success.<sup>50</sup> Respondent Q argued that within the Register Letselschade there are even undesirable substantively different quality requirements that apply to different professional groups: *"That is a challenge, but you have to ensure that every profession is tested equally and where possible in the same way."* The difference in operational systems of each partner, namely focussing on quality of representatives at an organizational level (DLR and NLE) or personal level (ASP, LSA, NIS and NIVRE), creates an operational misfit. There is a drawn-out discussion whether the quality of representatives can be guaranteed by focusing on quality at an organizational or personal level. It creates ambiguity about the roles and skills of each partner as there is widespread disagreement as to whether a partners' quality system could sufficiently guarantee the quality of representatives (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012). Furthermore, the operational misfit undermines alliance leadership and performance management as the output of every organization's quality system is questioned (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012). More specific, there is a debate whether the Register Letselschade [4/20]<sup>51</sup> and the LSA [3/20]<sup>52</sup> can sufficiently ensure quality of representatives at all. *"There are minimum standards set by the register, but the question is whether that is sufficient. For example, the NIVRE- and Grotius-courses are not obligatory. (...) You should not offer a false sense of security that representatives who are registered would therefore be good."* (R); *"They [the quality requirements set by the LSA] are initially high before you are admitted, but that is a knowledge exam. (...) It does not help that the LSA only conducts an internal audit once every ten years."* (O). A minority [2/20] indicated that the operational misfit jeopardizes value creation as high-quality law firms may not be able to register and guarantee their quality at an organizational level.<sup>53</sup> Law firms with both LSA- and ASP-members are less likely to meet expert requirements, since ASP-attorneys are forbidden to register and therefore cannot be considered. The operational misfit thus creates risks that processes will produce inadequate output (in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012).

As a solution to manage the operational misfit, respondents [10/20] proposed to register representatives in the Register Letselschade at a personal level instead of organizational level to sufficiently guarantee the quality of representatives.<sup>54</sup> *"I think that [registration at an organizational level] is dangerous. (...) You can*

<sup>50</sup> A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, M, N, P, Q and R.

<sup>51</sup> L, N, R and T.

<sup>52</sup> J, O and P.

<sup>53</sup> L and S.

<sup>54</sup> C, D, F, G, L P, Q, R, S and T.

*prevent that by already indicating which individual representative you choose.” (P). A combined quality system was mentioned by a majority of affiliates of NPOs [9/16] as another solution to strengthen the limited operational fit by incorporating partner differences in the alliance design and management (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012).<sup>55</sup> A strategic alliance between DLR, ASP, LSA and NIVRE was mentioned as a solution. ASP- and LSA-membership and NIVRE-registration should be sufficient to determine the quality at a personal level and could be considered in the audit for the Register Letselschade to determine the quality at an organizational level, preventing double audits. ASP- and LSA-membership and registration as NIVRE-expert guarantees quality at a personal level, and the Register Letselschade guarantees the quality of the organization itself. “I believe that a collaboration could arise between the Register Letselschade and NIVRE, whereby you will get one register that has guidelines for organizations and one that has guidelines for individuals. You create one disciplinary law for a personal and organizational level. (...) Basically, the ideal solution should be that you actually only have one counter.” (K).*

#### 5.3.4 Cultural fit

A cultural fit is an indicator of compatibility and is expected to be important to the success of cross-sector strategic alliances (Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Park & Ungson, 1997; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar, et al., 2001). This is confirmed by a majority [11/20] who mentioned that conflicting practices of insurers and attorneys jeopardize cross-sector strategic alliances in the Dutch personal injury industry.<sup>56</sup> Insurers must treat similar matters equally and attorneys sometimes must even use different methods per case as they may only represent the interest of their clients according to the rules of conduct of the Bar. Attorneys unanimously considered it a matter of concern that DLR does not distinguish the Register Letselschade and other products such as issued guidelines. They are concerned about the expectation that if the Bar actively participates and commits to the Register Letselschade, registered attorneys must act in accordance with issued guidelines even if these are not in the best interest of their clients. They stated that if attorneys commit themselves in advance, it violates the rules of conduct of the Bar. Attorneys did not feel that this obstacle was understood. *Once the LSA becomes a participant, LSA-members are expected to commit to all kind of things [products of DLR] that an attorney cannot commit to in advance. (...) Make sure you listen to our objections.” (8).*

A minority [6/20] did indeed mention that they do not understand how the rules of conduct of the Bar prevent attorneys from participating in the Register Letselschade, as representatives can deviate from issued guidelines if necessary.<sup>57</sup> Thus, there is a great misunderstanding in the industry as to whether the rules of conduct of the Bar prevent attorneys from participating in the Register Letselschade, leading to a cultural misfit that causes conflicts (in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Park & Ungson, 1997; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). A minority [4/20] even mentioned that it appears that attorneys do not want to register, causing incomprehension and mistrust (more about this in §5.5.3).<sup>58</sup> *“I do not see the problem myself. I think it can be done easily. I think they especially*

<sup>55</sup> F, G, K, L, M, O, P, R and T.

<sup>56</sup> H, I, J, K, L, N, O, P, Q, R and T.

<sup>57</sup> H, I, K, N, O and Q.

<sup>58</sup> H, I, K and N.



want to distinguish themselves from representatives who are not attorneys.” (K); “I do not understand that discussion and I think that the industry must deal firmly with the Bar: take it or leave it.” (N). Hence, there seems to be resistance to understanding the culture of partners (the rules of conduct of the Bar), jeopardizing cross-sector strategic alliances and reducing the willingness to collaborate (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012). Respondent L mentioned role play to create mutual cultural awareness in order to strengthen the limited cultural fit: “I think a nationally organized role play day has value. (...) When we took on a different role, we noticed that we started to behave very differently and treat each other differently.” Although role-play is not explicitly mentioned in the literature, role play fits within the mentioned examples, such as cultural training and joint sessions, to create mutual cultural awareness (Tjemkes et al., 2012).

### 5.3.5 Human fit

A human fit is an indicator of compatibility and is expected to be important to the success of cross-sector strategic alliances (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar, et al., 2001). This is only confirmed by a minority [6/20] who indicated that attorneys’ behaviour jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances’ success.<sup>59</sup> The minority perceived the behaviour of attorneys, especially ASP-members, towards insurers and experts as negative, fostering interpersonal conflict and creating mistrust. “Attorneys like to position themselves above experts.” (G); “At the moment, attorneys are pretty condescending about experts.” (N); “The ASP is a very critical and difficult group. Those are the little macho’s, who think that only they can do the job well.” (M). In addition, a minority [4/20] stated that attorneys do not shy away from confrontations.<sup>60</sup> “Attorneys have always been difficult. Attorneys are stubborn people.” (K); “The ASP is always looking for conflict, so I think that it is fine that they are not there [at the platform consultation].” (N). It must be mentioned that in the context of all interviews with affiliates of NPOs, there was a tense atmosphere between attorneys and the rest of the industry.

Regarding proposition 3, four out of five indicators representing compatibility (strategic, organizational, operational and cultural fit) were present and considered important for cross-sector strategic alliances’ success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry. Only a minor effect of human fit on cross-sector strategic alliances’ success is found. The results show that the misfits jeopardize cross-sector strategic alliances’ success. This means that compatibility directly and positively influences the success of cross-sector strategic alliances in the Dutch personal injury industry. In conclusion, proposition 3 can be accepted.

## 5.4 Relational capital

Established relational capital between partners is expected to be essential in realizing the potential value of cross-sector strategic alliances through smooth cooperation (Cavusgil & Evrigen, 1997; Johnson et al., 1996; Madhok, 1995; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Relational capital allows partners to work harmoniously and synergistically, improving partner processes and enhancing strategic alliance performance (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Kwok et al., 2019). A majority [12/20] mentioned harmony as the most important factor for successful

<sup>59</sup> G, K, L, M, N and P.

<sup>60</sup> K, L, N and P.

cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry.<sup>61</sup> This majority did, however, not specifically confirm that relational capital allows partners to work together harmoniously. Commitment, trust and information sharing are important indicators of relationship capital (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Commitment improves interaction between partners and consequently strategic alliances' success (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Child et al., 2005; Cullen et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Graf & Rothlauf, 2012; Hunt et al., 2002; Jamali et al., 2011; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Sanzo et al., 2015; Seitanidi, 2010; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). A majority [19/20] indicated that a lack of commitment jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances.<sup>62</sup> A majority [11/20] argued that all parties in the Dutch personal injury industry should commit to and support the Register Letselschade to create the needed overarching quality system to prevent secondary victimization.<sup>63</sup> A majority [12/20] argued that attorneys' full commitment is necessary to strengthen the Register Letselschade.<sup>64</sup> *"We can only achieve this when we work together. If the ASP and the LSA continue to be obstructive, we will not achieve that."* (G); *"It is essential that the quality system is supported by the industry, otherwise I am afraid that organizations will slip away."* (K).

Trust allows partners to develop shared goals and helps to overcome antagonisms (Chaturvedi & Gaur, 2008; Child et al., 2005; Emden et al., 2006; Fadol & Sandhu, 2013; Den Hond et al., 2015; Meier et al., 2016; Rivera-Santos & Rufin, 2010; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009; Zaheer & Harris, 2006). Trust was only confirmed by a minority of affiliates of NPOs [7/16] as an indicator that directly influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success.<sup>65</sup> The presence of trust decreases the likeliness that partners have perceptions of vulnerability and risk of the relationship (Glasbergen, 2011). This is confirmed by all attorneys who unanimously indicated that they feel vulnerable due to a lack of trust. The theory that trust is an important antecedent of commitment is confirmed by a majority of attorneys [3/4] who indicated that they were not willing to accept the risks of committing themselves to relationships with non-attorney parties due to a lack of trust (in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Dyer, 1996; Goo & Huang, 2008; Graça & Barry, 2019; Ha, 2010; Lancaster & Lages, 2006; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Sanzo et al., 2015; Siguaw et al., 1998; Wittmann et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2012). Trust and commitment encourage managers to consider potentially high-risk actions of partners as prudent because they believe that partners will not act opportunistically (Narayandas & Rangan, 2004; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). This is supported by respondents [7/20] who viewed attorneys' behaviour as opportunistic because they distrust attorneys and believe that attorneys are only committed to what suits them best. Respondents did not mention any direct effects of information sharing on cross-sector strategic alliances' success. Thus, the expectation that information sharing is essential for cross-sector strategic alliances' success is not confirmed (not in line with: Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Mohr et al., 1996; Mohr & Nevin, 1990; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009).

Regarding proposition 4, the results show that commitment by a majority and trust by a minority is considered important for cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry, but neither were present. No direct effects of information sharing on cross-sector strategic alliances'

<sup>61</sup> F, G, H, I, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R and T.

<sup>62</sup> A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, S and R.

<sup>63</sup> F, H, I, K, L, O, N, P, Q, R and S.

<sup>64</sup> A, B, C, D, E, F, G, J, L, P, R and T.

<sup>65</sup> H, I, K, L, Q, R and S.

success in this industry is found. Hence, it cannot be confirmed that relationship capital influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry directly and positively. In conclusion, proposition 4 cannot be fully accepted.

## 5.5 Indirect effects

### 5.5.1 Influence of the alliance network through partner characteristics

Access to key resources can be achieved by utilising established networks leading to sustainable competitive advantage (Anderson & Narus, 1991; Biem & Caswell, 2008; Egan, 2001; Hamel et al., 1989; Varadarjan & Cunningham, 1995). Respondents mentioned insurers [12/20],<sup>66</sup> SHN [10/20],<sup>67</sup> ANWB [3/20]<sup>68</sup> and the government [3/20]<sup>69</sup> as important parties to get access to key resources (see §5.2 as well). The umbrella organization for insurers, the VvV, SHN, ANWB and the government participate in the network event. Respondents did, however, not mention that the established relationships with these network members provide access to key resources. Hence, this theory cannot be confirmed. Respondents did not indicate that DLR as orchestrator creates awareness among network members, allowing them to recognize the complementarity of their needs (not in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012).

Collective sense aligns the perceptions of network members and functions as a political motive to co-operate (Child et al., 2005; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This is confirmed as respondents unanimously acknowledged the political motive to separate the wheat from the chaff in order to prevent secondary victimization. Nonetheless, this political motive was perceived by a majority of attorneys [3/4] as insufficient to collaborate because they do not perceive that a greater value can be achieved as network members (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012). Although a majority [12/20] indicated that network members have a profound understanding of their differences, it is not confirmed that it leads to a better strategic, organizational, operational, cultural or human fit (not in line with: Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Khanna et al., 1998; Li et al., 2008; Tjemkes et al., 2012).<sup>70</sup>

Regarding proposition 5, the influence of the alliance network through partner characteristics on cross-sector strategic alliances' success was not sufficiently present or seen as important. Hence, it cannot be confirmed that the alliance network influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success through partner characteristics in the Dutch personal injury industry indirectly and positively. Proposition 5 can thus not be accepted.

### 5.5.2 Influence of the alliance network through relational capital

It is expected that alliance networks increases the survival of cross-sector strategic alliances and their successful evolution through relationship capital, comparable to regular strategic alliances. Established strong social bonds between network members governs their attitude and behaviour, increasing trust (Child et al., 2005; Gulati, 1998, 1995; Kang & Zaheer, 2018). This expectation is not confirmed as respondents did not mention the presence or benefits of established strong social bonds (not in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Li & Rowley,

<sup>66</sup> B, C, D, F, G, J, K, M, O, P, Q and T.

<sup>67</sup> F, G, I, K, M, O, P, Q, S and T.

<sup>68</sup> G, M and S.

<sup>69</sup> Q, R and S.

<sup>70</sup> F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P and T.

2002; Tjemkes et al., 2012; Walker et al., 1997). A majority of affiliates of NPOs [9/16] even argued that the alliance network jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances due to a lack of trust among network members, indicating that a lack of trust is a reason for alliance failure (in line with: Larson, 1992; Sherman, 1994).<sup>71</sup> Respondents [5/20] mentioned that DLR has as orchestrator the responsibility to properly organize the governance of the network event in order to build trust (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012).<sup>72</sup> A minority [2/20] pointed out that the LSA acts like a participant in the platform consultation without committing to anything, causing inequality and mistrust among network members (see §5.1 as well).<sup>73</sup>

Respondents [6/20] indicated that there is a lack of trust in DLR, hindering DLR to fulfil its role because orchestrators are only successful together with their partners and likewise (in line with: Hinterhuber, 2002).<sup>74</sup> A majority of attorneys [3/4] indicated that they do not believe that a greater value can be achieved as network members. They are even concerned if the LSA becomes a participant in the network event. *“As soon as the LSA becomes a participant, you are expected to commit to all kind of things that an attorney cannot determine in advance. (...) So as far as I am concerned, if an overarching quality system has a chance of success, it should be separated from DLR.”* (8). Furthermore, they indicated that the relationship with DLR will be worsened by forcing attorneys to register for fear of losing customer acquisition, creating mistrust (see also §5.3.1). They also stated that they are not committed and not willing to share a part of their autonomy to the network to operate like a quasi-organization due to a lack of trust (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012). Attorneys unanimously argued that the industry’s collaborative objective of preventing secondary victimisation is insufficient to overcome antagonisms caused by the misunderstanding of the rules of conduct and a lack of trust (see also §5.3.4). Hence, it is not confirmed that the presence of a clearly defined collaborative objective fosters the development of mutual trust (not in line with: Inkpen & Curral, 2004). The managerial complexity, risks and hazards that the alliance network bring outweigh the benefits for attorneys to actively participate in the alliance network (in line with: Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).

The expectation that the alliance network influences cross-sector strategic alliances’ success through commitment is only confirmed by a minority [6/20] (not in line with: Child et al., 2005; Tjemkes et al., 2012).<sup>75</sup> This minority argued that the needed commitment from the industry could only be established by involving all important parties in the governance structure of DLR and being transparent about the funding of DLR to build trust. The platform consultation and each workgroup of DLR should be an accurate reflection of the industry in order to create trust and widely supported decisions. They also argued that DLR’s governance structure must be spot on in order to create support among parties, given that they give up a piece of autonomy. Furthermore, respondents [5/20] argued that the trias politica must be implemented to ensure quality, reliability and independence of the Register Letselschade in order to build trust and commitment.<sup>76</sup> It is thus confirmed that trust is an important antecedent of commitment in this context as well (in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020). Respondent K stated that network members should demonstrate a strong

---

<sup>71</sup> G, H, J, K, N, Q, R, S and T.

<sup>72</sup> G, K, Q, R and S

<sup>73</sup> K and N.

<sup>74</sup> H, K, Q, R, S and T.

<sup>75</sup> G, H, K, Q, R and S.

<sup>76</sup> G, Q, R, S and K.

commitment to DLR by informing their members about what has been decided and ensuring that they pursue this internally. Respondent N went further: *“I am in favour of that obligation [that all network members must oblige their members to register]. That you all show, this is quality.”*

Organizations that are not part of the core of an alliance network have an information disadvantage, as they may not receive new information in time even though access to this information can be critical (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This theory is confirmed by a minority [6/20] who mentioned that information is shared among network members in the network event, the platform consultation.<sup>77</sup> *“The LSA is observer at the platform consultation, because it believes that it is important to contribute their knowledge and to know what is happening elsewhere in the industry.”* (R). A minority [2/20] stated that it is important to be actively involved in the network event to get information faster and be able to have influence.<sup>78</sup> A majority [12/20] preferred strategic alliances with referrers, who are distant partners, due to novel resources that they bring (see §5.2 as well; in line with: Baum et al., 2003; Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Kogut & Walker, 2001; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Powell et al., 2005; Zollo et al., 2002).<sup>79</sup> Respondents did not mention information advantage of distant ties, allowing organizations to hear about potential opportunities and threats more quickly than embedded organizations (not in line with: Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994). Nor did respondents mention the lack of relational capital between distant ties that can increase the risk of alliance failure (not in line with: Kang & Zaheer, 2018). Respondents did not indicate to prefer repeated or new close partners (not in line with: Adner, 2013; Huang et al., 2020; Zollo et al., 2002). The expectation that a strategic alliance with the repeated partner LSA offers more benefits and less risks in comparison with the new close partner ASP is therefore not confirmed. Respondents [6/20] indicated that the ASP is not a favourable partner due to a human misfit instead of the lack of established relational capital (see §5.3.5 as well; not in line with: Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Li et al., 2008).<sup>80</sup>

Regarding proposition 6, the results show that a majority considered that the alliance network influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success through trust. Only a minority considered that the alliance network influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success through commitment and information sharing. Hence, it cannot be confirmed that the alliance network influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs through relational capital in the Dutch personal injury industry network indirectly and positively. In conclusion, proposition 6 cannot be accepted.

### 5.5.3 Influence of partner characteristics through relational capital

Resource interdependence decreases the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour of partners as they are more likely to be interested in creating relational capital to reduce their vulnerability to each other (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Madhok, 1995; Oliver, 1990; Sarkar et al., 2001). This theory cannot be confirmed as respondents did not indicate that they were interested in creating relationship capital due to resource interdependence. Despite the cultural misfit and lack of trust, one expert [1/20] indicated in particular to be still willing to partner with attorneys due to perceived reciprocal needs. The expert did, however, not mention to

<sup>77</sup> F, H, I, O, P and R.

<sup>78</sup> H and R.

<sup>79</sup> F, G, J, I, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and S.

<sup>80</sup> G, K, L, M, N and P.

be interested in building relational capital with attorneys. Although attorneys unanimously indicated that they feel vulnerable due to a lack of trust (see §5.4), they did not indicate that they were interested in creating relational capital to reduce their vulnerability.

It is expected that compatibility between partners decreases the propensity for opportunistic behaviour, helping them to achieve and sustain successful cross-sector strategic alliances, comparable to regular strategic alliances (Emden et al., 2006; Saxton, 1997; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Similarity in cultures is fundamental for social relationships, since it is the basis for social interaction processes as it facilitates congeniality and a sense of unity (Evans, 1963; Hitt et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009; Sarkar et al., 2001). Cultural fit is a major antecedent explaining trust (Austin & Seitanidi, 2014, 2012; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Glasbergen, 2011; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Jayari & Chaher, 2019; Park & Ungson, 1997; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This is confirmed by a majority [11/20] who indicated that the cultural misfit between the Bar and other parties in the Dutch personal injury industry creates mistrust, jeopardizing cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs.<sup>81</sup> All attorneys indicated that they fear there is no understanding for their rules of conduct, creating mistrust in the rest of the industry. Attorneys thereby indicated that they feel vulnerable and perceive relationships with non-attorneys as risky due to a lack of trust, increased by a lack of understanding of their rules of conduct (in line with: Glasbergen, 2011). A majority [11/20] indicated that the cultural misfit reduces willingness to collaborate and commitment to the alliance (in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012).<sup>82</sup> The limited cultural fit fails to create the needed greater tolerance levels by acting as a social glue that helps partners to endure temporary periods of disequilibrium (in line with: Madhok, 1995). This majority indicated that the cultural misfit hinders the development of a harmonious relationship between attorneys with the rest of the industry, leaving them unable to work together seamlessly (in line with: Sarkar et al., 1997; Wilkof et al., 1995). A negative relationship characterized by suspicion and conflict is therefore likely to form, obstructing the development of mutual trust (Fadol & Sandhu, 2013; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). This is confirmed by a minority [7/20] who argued that it appears that attorneys do not want to register and only commit themselves to what suits them best. Respondent K indicated that actions of some attorneys are seen as opportunistically due to differences in practices, creating conflicts and mistrust (in line with: Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Atouba & Shumate, 2020; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Narayandas & Rangan, 2004; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Respondent K argued that the governance of DLR must be spot on to manage the limited cultural fit in order to prevent conflicts and mistrust: *“The governance of DLR is insufficiently tightly organized, causing conflicts [miscommunication and mistrust]. The result is that parties do no longer act together, but that parties reject it.”* A majority [11/20] indicated that NPOs from different sectors which do not share important values (such as the rules of conduct of the Bar) seemed unable to create a climate of trust due to a cultural misfit (in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001).<sup>83</sup>

---

<sup>81</sup> H, I, J, K, L, N, O, P, Q, R and T.

<sup>82</sup> H, I, J, K, L, N, O, P, Q, R and T.

<sup>83</sup> H, I, J, K, L, N, O, P, Q, R and T.

A good human fit stimulates information sharing and trust building (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001). This is confirmed by a minority [6/20] who stated that the experienced negative behaviour of attorneys causes a human misfit, creating mistrust and jeopardizing cross-sector strategic alliances.<sup>84</sup> In addition, a minority [5/20]<sup>85</sup> argued that attorneys are not able to communicate well due to their litigation-personality, while good communication is seen [5/20] as necessary to cooperate.<sup>86</sup> *“Attorneys do not know how to deal with people, since they are often focused on litigation.”* (P); *“You need a good relationship and must speak in an understandable language. It is important to use language that one wishes to accept. A good relationship is essential.”* (H). A good strategic fit signals long-term commitment and implies that individual interests are carefully weighed against potential benefits and hazards of the alliance (Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This is confirmed by a minority [5/20] who indicated that they are less committed and consider allocating resources to alternative more valuable arrangements due to a strategic misfit (see §5.3.1 as well). Other respondents did not indicate that a good strategic fit signals long-term commitment. The theory that differences in decision method structures create as an organizational misfit misunderstanding and mistrust, cannot be confirmed as this is only mentioned by respondent 17 (see §5.3.2; not in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Sarkar et al., 2001; Parkhe, 1991; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Respondents did not indicate any effect of operational fit through relational capital on cross-sector strategic alliances’ success. The theory that an operational misfit leads to poor communication among operational staff, impeding quick conflict resolution and putting the relationship under pressure can thus not be confirmed (not in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012).

Regarding proposition 7, the influence of resource interdependence through relational capital on cross-sector strategic alliances’ success was not present or considered important. Only one out of five indicators representing compatibility (the cultural fit) were present and considered important. Only a minor effect of the strategic and human misfit through relational capital were found. Hence, it cannot be confirmed that partner characteristics influence cross-sector strategic alliances’ success through relational capital in the Dutch personal injury industry indirectly and positively. In conclusion, proposition 7 cannot be accepted.

## 5.6 New success factors of cross-sector strategic alliances

The results do not indicate any new factors of successful cross-sector strategic alliances. All aspects mentioned by respondents fall under the known success factors and are discussed in the above paragraphs.

## CHAPTER 6 – DISCUSSION

This chapter explains what the results, discussed in chapter 5, mean. The aim of this research is to study how the success factors of strategic alliances can optimize cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry in order to strengthen the Register Letselschade and thus prevent secondary victimisation. The findings of this study, as discussed in chapter 5, show that the known success factors of

---

<sup>84</sup> G, K, L, M, N and P.

<sup>85</sup> G, J, K, L and P.

<sup>86</sup> G, H, K, L and Q.

strategic alliances, alliance networks (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Siripitakchai et al., 2015; Tjemkes et al., 2012), resource interdependence (Child et al., 2005; D'Amour et al., 2005; Das & Teng, 2000; Gao & Shi, 2011; Jap, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tjemkes et al., 2012) and compatibility (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012) also influence the success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry directly and positively. The expectation that relational capital as a known success factor of strategic alliances also directly and positively influences the success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry has not been confirmed (not in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Kwok et al., 2019; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). In addition, the expectation of an interaction effect between the known success factors of strategic alliances (alliance networks, resource interdependence, compatibility and relational capital) has not been confirmed by the results (not in line with: Anderson & Narus, 1991; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Biem & Caswell, 2008; Child et al., 2005; Emden et al., 2006; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Khanna et al., 1998; Li et al., 2008; Saxton, 1997; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Tjemkes et al., 2012). In this study, no new factors were found for cross-sector strategic alliances' success compared to existing theory. These findings have implications for theory (§6.1) and practice (§6.2). Finally, the limitations and recommendations for further research are discussed (§6.3).

### 6.1 Theoretical implications

Some of the results deviate from existing theory. These deviations can be explained, so that theoretical implications based on this study are limited. One explanation is that respondents may have focused on other topics during interviews, since the interview questions were deliberately formulated as openly as possible (more about this in §6.3). This is discussed per subject.

*Alliance networks.* Alliance networks, and specifically the network event, influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry by facilitating dialogue between network members with conflicting interests and enabling them to develop and intensify strategic alliances. Alliance networks therefore appear to have a similar effect on the success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry comparable to regular strategic alliances (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Siripitakchai et al., 2015; Tjemkes et al., 2012). The orchestrator proves essential in cross-sector strategic alliances in the Dutch personal injury industry to achieve the network priority as it functions as a bridge between naturally opposed parties and motivates them to collaborate (Child et al., 2005; Hinterhuber, 2002; Siripitakchai et al., 2015). The expectation that the broker influences the success of cross-sector strategic alliances in the Dutch personal injury industry, comparable to regular strategic alliances, has not been confirmed (not in line with: Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This can be explained by the fact that the Dutch personal injury industry is small and every knows each other. Parties in this industry may not depend on a broker to create interactions as they can establish contact with other parties themselves. Furthermore, the expectation that the alliance network itself creates interdependencies between network members in the Dutch personal injury industry, reducing their autonomy and constrain their decision making, has not been confirmed by the results (not in line with: Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). This can be explained by the fact that the results show that only attorneys perceived that their autonomy has been reduced and their



decision making constrained due to expectations of network members if the Bar actively participates in the Register Letselschade. The results do not show that non-attorneys were faced with similar dilemmas and therefore may not perceive that the alliance network creates interdependencies between alliance members.

*Resource interdependence.* Resource interdependence influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry by helping parties recognize the importance of collaboration due to perceived reciprocal needs. Resource interdependence therefore appears to have a similar effect on the success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry comparable to regular strategic alliances (D'Amour et al., 2005; Das & Teng, 2000; Miller & Shamsie, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resources of NPOs were considered complementarity, providing unique value that stimulates joint coordination (Harrison et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Interestingly, the results do not confirm the expectation that required knowledge based resources increase the reason to collaborate (not in line with: Child et al., 2005; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This can be explained by respondents not being aware of the difficulties of obtaining this type of resources. Remarkably, respondents did not appear to be aware that strategic alliances open learning opportunities that help partners better leverage their own resources (not in line with: Inkpen, 1998). The results even show that respondents seemed unaware of the importance of participating in learning-processes, despite that it is necessary to be able to exploit synergies and explore complementary resource strengths to achieve greater alliance performance (not in line with: Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Only a minority indicated that an alliance between DLR and SHN open learning opportunities. Other referrers were not mentioned, while they could also provide DLR with knowledge of how the Register Letselschade can be improved from the victim's perspective. Referrers can also offer access to their network and understanding of victims in order to increase the registers' findability and recognizability (Faulkner, 1995). However, this was not reflected in the results. This can be explained by the fact that such an alliance has yet to be entered into. Partners may therefore not be aware of the learning opportunities that alliances with referrers provide. The results show no indications that skill substitution was preferred due to fewer risks compared to the risks of involuntary transferring resources through learning (not in line with: Harrison et al., 2001; Inkpen, 2001; Khanna et al., 1998; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This can be explained by respondents not being aware of the differences in risks between learning and skill substitution.

*Compatibility.* Compatibility influences the success of cross-sector strategic alliances in the Dutch personal injury industry by increasing the quality of relationships between NPOs, facilitating alliance processes and helping partners to realize anticipated synergies. Compatibility therefore appears to have a similar effect on the success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry comparable to regular strategic alliances (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). The results show strategic, organizational, operational and cultural misfit jeopardize cross-sector strategic alliances' success. Respondents focused on what they lacked and perceived as threat. This is understandable due to the context of the polarized Dutch personal injury industry, where political relations are on edge due to conflicting interests. This may also explain why respondents hardly went into solutions that can strengthen the limited fits (not in line with: Child et al., 2005; Emden et al., 2006; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Respondents may have been too focused or frustrated with the limited fits to discuss

solutions. Another explanation is that respondents had no idea how these fits could be strengthened or were not willing to adapt to manage these misfits. The results do not reflect that a cultural misfit jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances' success with experts, while their practises are similar to those of attorneys and differ from insurers (not in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Park & Ungson, 1997; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar, et al., 2001). This can be explained by the fact that the results show that experts do not feel threatened in their practises compared to attorneys, given that interviewed experts mentioned that representatives could deviate from issued guidelines if necessary. The expectation that a human misfit jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry, comparable to regular strategic alliances, has not been confirmed (not in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001). The results revealed a tense atmosphere between attorneys and the rest of the industry in all held interviews with affiliates of NPOs. Despite additional safeguards for anonymity, respondents may not have wanted to respond negatively to partners in interviews to protect their relationship. Respondents may also have been too focused on other misfits during interviews, making the human misfit less apparent. Hence, the human misfit may play a greater role than the results show. The expectation that an organizational misfit due to different decision making structures jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry, comparable to regular strategic alliances, has not been confirmed (not in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). The organizational misfit between associations other than the LSA and foundations as a result of different decision making structures did not emerge from the results. This can be understood from the context that the policy of expert-associations regarding participation in the network event and support of the Register Letselschade has already been established. The general meeting of members of these associations therefore no longer needs to be consulted about the policy to be pursued. However, it is a topic of discussion among attorneys whether the Bar should actively participate in the network event and support the Register Letselschade. The ASP prohibits its members from registering and the LSA leaves the choice to register to its members (DLR, 2020m). Therefore, the general meeting of members of these attorney-associations must be consulted on the policy to be pursued, creating inertia in decision making. Interestingly, the results do not show that the different decision making structures cause an organizational misfit between the ASP and other NPOs. This can be explained by the fact that the results show that ASP is not considered a favourable partner, indicating that there are no intensive cross-sector strategic alliances between these NPOs. This indicates that the ASP does not have to make decisions that require consultation of the general meeting of members to determine policy. Respondents may not have been aware of the differences in decision making structures because they were not confronted with or aware of them. Hence, the difference in decision making structures may play a greater role than the results show.

*Relational capital.* The expectation that relational capital influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry, comparable to regular strategic alliances, has not been confirmed (not in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Kwok et al., 2019; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). The results show that a lack of commitment jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury, comparable to regular strategic alliances (Barosso-Méndez et al.,

2020; Sanzo et al., 2015; Graf & Rothlauf, 2012; Jamali et al., 2011; Seitanidi, 2010; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009; Emden et al., 2006; Child et al., 2005; Hunt et al., 2002; Cullen et al., 2000; Mohr & Spekman, 1994). It is not sufficiently supported by the results that trust directly influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success, comparable to regular strategic alliances (not in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Chaturvedi & Gaur, 2008; Child et al., 2005; Emden et al., 2006; Den Hond et al., 2015; Fadol & Sandhu, 2013; Meier et al., 2016; Rivera-Santos & Rufin, 2010; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009; Zaheer & Harris, 2006). It must be mentioned that the results reveal a tense atmosphere between attorneys and other affiliates of NPOs. Despite additional safeguards for anonymity, respondents may not have wanted to respond negatively to partners in interviews to protect their relationship. Any direct effect of information sharing on cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry did not emerge from the results (not in line with: Dwyer et al., 1987; Mohr et al., 1996; Mohr & Nevin, 1990; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). This can be explained by the fact that the results show that affiliates of NPOs perceived a lack of trust and commitment. Trust and commitment are essential for partners to be willing to share key information (Heide & John, 1992; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2009; Whipple & Frankel, 1998). However, this is not reflected in the results. Respondents may have been too focussed on the lack of commitment and trust during the interviews, causing them to be unaware of the benefits and necessity of sharing information. The results show that harmony is considered essential to achieve cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry. While relational capital allows partners to work harmoniously, only one (commitment) out of three indicators of relational capital were considered important (not in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Respondents may not have been aware of the fact that harmony can be achieved through relational capital. Moreover, the results do now show that respondents were aware of other benefits of established relational capital, such as reducing costs of monitoring and controlling the strategic alliance (not in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Child et al., 2005; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). Respondents may thus not have been aware of the benefits of relational capital at all. Moreover, relational capital can be a hygiene factor for cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry (Herzberg et al., 1959). This means that cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs may not succeed without relational capital, while it may not necessarily contribute to success. Hence, relational capital may play a greater role than that the results show.

*The influence of alliance networks through partner characteristics.* The expectation that alliance networks influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry through partner characteristics, comparable to regular strategic alliances, has not been confirmed. The theory that access to key resources can be achieved by utilising established networks is not confirmed by the results (not in line with: Anderson & Narus, 1991; Biem & Caswell, 2008; Egan, 2001; Hamel et al., 1989; Varadarjan & Cunningham, 1995). Although network members were considered essential partners to get access to key resources, the fact that these NPOs are network members did not emerge as an important motive from the results. The results do also not confirm the expectation that DLR as orchestrator creates awareness among network members that allows them to recognize the complementarity of their needs (not in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012). This can be explained by the fact that the Dutch personal injury industry is so small and intimate

that network members are aware of their interdependence. Nonetheless, respondents may not have been aware that established relationships provide access to scarce resources. The alliance network may thus play a bigger role on cross-sector strategic alliances' success through resource interdependence than the results show. While the results indicate that network members have a profound understanding of their organizational differences, it is not confirmed that it leads to a better strategic, organizational, operational, cultural or human fit (not in line with: Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Khanna et al., 1998; Li et al., 2008; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Despite that collective sense aligns the perceptions of network members, the results do not confirm that it functions as a sufficiently political motive to collaborate (not in line with: Child et al., 2005; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This can be understood from the context of the polarized Dutch personal injury industry. Relationships between network members are tense due to conflicting interests, making it understandable that respondents are focused on differences that create risks rather than solutions to manage those differences.

*The influence of alliance networks through relational capital.* The expectation that alliance networks influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry through relational capital, comparable to regular strategic alliances, has not been confirmed. The expectation that the alliance network jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances' success due to a lack of trust among network members has been confirmed (Larson, 1992; Sherman, 1994). The expectation that a clear collaborative objective fosters mutual trust between partners is not confirmed by the results (not in line with: Inkpen & Curral, 2004). Distrust between parties in the politically sensitive and tense Dutch personal injury industry seems too deeply rooted to overcome by a collaborative objective. The results show that the needed commitment from the industry could only be established by building trust. Hence, the expectation that trust is an important antecedent of commitment has been confirmed (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020 & Tjemkes et al., 2012). The expectation that taking part in the core of an alliance network is important to exchange new information in time and to be able to have influence is not sufficiently confirmed by the results (not in line with: Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Tjemkes et al., 2012). One explanation is that respondents may already participate in the network event and are therefore not confronted with restrictions associated with not participating. Hence, respondents may not consciously consider the importance of taking part in the core of the alliance network. In addition, it did not emerge from the results that the information disadvantage and limited influence increases the motivation of the non-network member ASP to participate. This can be explained by the fact that the results show that ASP-members are often LSA-member as well, reducing the need of ASP to participate in the network event. It is striking that the results show network members sharing information through the network event, despite the lack of trust and the cultural and human misfit (not in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). This can be explained by network members willing to share necessary information, as exchanged information improves interaction and enables partners to achieve the collaborative goal (Austin & Seitanidi, 2014). Although network members are willing to share information through the network event, results do not confirm that it helps to develop trust and commitment (not in line with: Kwok et al., 2019). Network members may therefore only share non-privileged information as trust is expected essential for partners to be willing to share key information (Heide & John, 1992; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2009; Whipple &

Frankel, 1998). This is, however, not confirmed by the results. The results show that respondents prefer distant ties due to the novel resources that they bring (in line with: Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Powell et al., 2005; Baum et al., 2003; Zollo et al., 2002; Kogut & Walker, 2001; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991). The lack of relational capital between distant ties that can increase the risk of alliance failure was, however, not mentioned (not in line with: Kang & Zaheer, 2018). The information advantage of distant ties, allowing organizations to hear about potential opportunities and threats more quickly than embedded organizations did neither emerge from the results (not in line with: Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994). This can be understood from the context that referrers are considered necessary partners, creating a tunnel vision for respondents and risks are accepted in order to achieve the goal. Another explanation is that respondents were unaware of the risks of a lack of relational capital and the information advantage of distant ties. Furthermore, the results do not show a preference for either repeated or new close partners (not in line with: Adner, 2013; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Huang et al., 2020; Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Li & Rowley, 2002; Tjemkes et al., 2012; Walker et al., 1997; Zollo et al., 2002). The distrust between attorneys and other parties may be too deeply ingrained to overcome, even with the repeated partner the LSA. While the results show that the network event is considered essential to foster necessary harmony between NPOs with conflicting interests to collaborate in order to achieve the network priority, respondents did not indicate to invest in building relational capital to foster necessary harmony between network members (not in line with: Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009). This can be explained by the fact that the results show that respondents seemed unaware that harmony can be achieved through established relational capital. The indirect effect of alliance networks on cross-sector strategic alliances' success through relational capital may thus play a greater role than the results show.

*The influence of partner characteristics through relational capital.* The expectation that resource interdependence helps partners to achieve and sustain successful cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry through relational capital, comparable to regular strategic alliances, has not been confirmed (not in line with: Akrouit & Diallo, 2017; Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Buchanan, 1992; Oliver, 1990; Robson et al., 2019). The results do not show that respondents who perceived reciprocal needs were motivated or interested to create relational capital. Partners create relational capital by engaging in trustworthy behaviour, among other things (Robson et al., 2019). The results show that respondents were focused on a lack of trust. Hence, respondents may have been too focused on the lack of trust and vulnerability that this causes, ignoring the benefits of established relational capital. Interestingly, the results do not indicate untrustworthy or opportunistic behaviour between affiliates of the network members DLR and SHN. DLR and SHN may have unconsciously created relational capital to reduce their vulnerability to each other due to resource interdependence (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020). This is, however, not confirmed by the results. The expectation that compatibility helps partners to achieve and sustain successful cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs through relational capital, comparable to regular strategic alliances, has not been confirmed (not in line with: Emden et al., 2006; Saxton, 1997; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Only an effect of the cultural misfit on cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs through relational capital was found (in line with: Evans, 1963; Hitt et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009;

Sarkar et al., 2001). It is not confirmed that a human fit influences cross-sector strategic alliances' success by stimulating trust building (not in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001). Only a minority [6/20] indicated that the human misfit between attorneys and other parties in the Dutch personal injury industry creates mistrust, jeopardizing cross-sector strategic alliances. Despite additional safeguards for anonymity, respondents may not have wanted to respond negatively about partners in interviews to protect their relationship. It must be mentioned that the context of all held interviews with affiliates of NPOs revealed a tense atmosphere between attorneys and the rest of the industry. As a result, the human misfit may play a greater role on cross-sector strategic alliances' success through relational capital than the results show. Interestingly, only a minority [5/20] confirmed the expectation that a strategic fit signals long-term commitment (not in line with: Douma et al., 2000; Emden et al., 2006; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001; Tjemkes et al., 2012). This can be understood from the context that respondents focused on the strategic misfit between the Bar and other parties in the Dutch personal injury industry. Respondents may have been too focused on the misfit to link the strategic misfit to a lack of commitment that jeopardizes cross-sector strategic alliances' success. In addition, respondents focused on what they lacked and perceived as threat. Therefore, respondents may not have mentioned that a strategic fit between DLR and non-attorney parties signals long-term commitment as it does not pose a threat. As a result, the strategic fit may play a greater role on cross-sector strategic alliances' success through relational capital than the results show. It is striking that the results do not show that the organizational and operational fit affect cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs through relational capital (not in line with: Tjemkes et al., 2012). This can be explained by parties having yet to enter into far-reaching strategic alliances, so that respondents have not yet encountered relational problems caused by an organizational or operational misfit. In addition, respondents did not seem to value established relational capital as the results do not show that they were aware of its benefits.

*New success factors of cross-sector strategic alliances.* No new factors have been found that influence the success of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry compared to known success factors of regular strategic alliances. Since the interview questions have been formulated as openly as possible to identify new success factors, it appears that no new success factors can be distinguished on the basis of this research.

## 6.2 Practical implications

Findings of this study are highly relevant to managers of NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry who want to optimize cross-sector strategic alliances in order to strengthen the Register Letselschade, preventing secondary victimisation. The alliance network, resource interdependence and compatibility are found factors that influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success in this industry. If managers wish to improve strategic alliances, they should critically assess the collaborative fit between their organization and its (potential) partners. Managers should focus on designing alliances proactively in seeking suitable partners. Current strategic alliances can be strengthened or new ones can be formed. Practical implications are given for each topic.

*The alliance network.* The Dutch personal injury industry is complex and political relations are on edge due to conflicting interests. The results show polarization between attorneys and other parties in this industry.

The results reveal that the network event is considered essential to foster necessary harmony and collaboration between network members with opposite interests. The platform consultation ensures consultation between network members, enabling them to develop and intensify strategic alliances. DLR's orchestrators role proves necessary to achieve the network priority as it functions as a bridge between naturally opposed parties. The results show that DLR should build trust among network members to fulfil its orchestrator role in order to align and motivate network members to collaborate. Managers of NPOs within the alliance network should assess whether greater value can be achieved as network members. If network members believe that greater value can be achieved by the alliance network operating like a quasi-organization, they should align their goals and be willing to share a part of their autonomy. The results reveal that the government and the Bar should participate actively in the network event and support the Register Letselschade in order to create a powerful overarching quality system. The government, currently a dormant network member, should at least publicly express support for the Register Letselschade as the results indicate that self-regulation does not have the desired effect. Although law firms are able to register on their own initiative (with the exception of ASP-attorneys), the results show that the Register Letselschade is incomplete as long as the Bar is absent. This deficit must be resolved before an effective pull-system can be created, since referrers cannot exclusively refer victims to the Register Letselschade without ruling out a large group of high-quality representatives and damaging the relationship with the Bar. The Bar should be actively involved in the development of the Register Letselschade in order to realize one strong overarching quality system for the Dutch personal injury industry. The results show that the Register Letselschade should be adjusted in order to provide sufficient value to victims and therefore partners, enabling strategic alliances in the network to co-evolve.

*Resource interdependence.* Managers of NPOs should be aware of their resource dependence. They should recognize the complementarity of their needs and the need to collaborate to augment strengths while ameliorating weaknesses. The government, SHN and other referrers depend on the proper functioning of the Register Letselschade to prevent the social problem of secondary victimisation. DLR depends on these parties to strengthen the accessibility, familiarity, recognizability, reliability and usability of the Register Letselschade. The managers of these NPOs should engage in a dialogue to consider whether strategic alliances between each other provide sufficient value for their organizations. The government has an enormous scope to reliably draw attention to the Register Letselschade and its support strengthens the registers' power and value. The results show that the Register Letselschade must be adapted to victims in order to provide them with information and services. The results reveal that DLR's lacking service activity can be outsourced to SHN as SHN specializes in and has already developed a well-functioning victim support, realizing economies of scale. In addition, the results show that DLR depends on referrers to reach victims. Referrers should actively inform and refer victims as early as possible to enable them to find the Register Letselschade and understand its value. The results show, however, that the Register Letselschade cannot function as an overarching quality system to which referrers can exclusively refer as long as the Bar does not take part in it. Care providers, insurers and SHN were considered important referrers. Managers of DLR, umbrella care provider organizations (such as KNGF, KNMG and LHV) and the VvV should engage in a dialogue whether strategic alliances in which referrers actively inform victims about the Register Letselschade provide sufficient value.

The results reveal that the threshold for referrers to actively inform and refer victims should be lowered, as not all referrers are specialized in personal injury. DLR could provide referrers with necessary information, for example by providing leaflets that referrers can distribute to victims. In addition, referrers could refer victims to SHN for support. Furthermore, referrers can provide DLR with knowledge of how the Register Letselschade can be improved from the victim's perspective. They can offer access to their network and understanding of victims to increase the user-friendly, findability and recognizability of the Register Letselschade.

*Compatibility.* NPOs should develop mechanisms, skills, structures and processes to bridge organizational and interpersonal differences to achieve value from cross-sector strategic alliances. The strategic and cultural misfit jeopardize strategic alliances between attorneys and non-attorney parties. There are varying perceptions on the importance of the alliance and parties (attorneys and experts) act competitively in the area on which the alliances focus, creating a strategic misfit. All partners should perceive added value from the strategic alliance in order for it to succeed. The top management of the NPOs should engage in a dialogue on the strategic vision to realign alliance strategies, emphasising added value and communicating carefully about the value and importance of the alliance. The strategic misfit between DLR and the Bar should be managed by adjusting the standards of the Register Letselschade, so that attorneys perceive that adopting these standards improve their operational efficiency. The different practices of parties and in particular the misunderstanding whether the rules of conduct of the Bar prevent attorneys to register, create a cultural misfit. For strategic alliances to succeed, this cultural misfit must be managed by stimulating cultural awareness among parties. This can be accomplished through role-play, cultural training, joint sessions and employee transfers. The organizational and operational misfit jeopardize strategic alliances between all parties. The different operational attributes cause an organizational misfit and undermine collective sensemaking. This organizational misfit must be managed for cross-sector strategic alliances to succeed by anticipating this misfit during the alliance design. NPOs described as B2B (DLR and NLE) and B2C (ASP, LSA, NIS, NIVRE and SHN) should be aware of their differences and deploy this to augment strengths while ameliorating weaknesses. SHN is for example specialized in victim support, while DLR lacks the necessary attributes. Managers of these NPOs should obtain a profound understanding of (potential) partners' organizational differences to initiate corrective measures, such as partner interactions and building relational capital. The limited operational fit should be strengthened as well for strategic alliances to succeed by incorporating partner differences in the alliance design and management. The results show that a quality system is not accepted as an overarching quality system of the industry as long as it is only aimed at guaranteeing the quality of representatives at organizational level, such as the Register Letselschade. NPOs should collaborate to realize an overarching quality system in which the quality of representatives at both personal and organizational level can be guaranteed. The results indicated a combined quality system as a solution that prevents double audits. ASP- and LSA-membership and NIVRE-registration can determine the quality at a personal level and can be included in the audit for the Register Letselschade to determine the quality at organizational level. In addition, managers of NPOs should invest in joint education and training, co-development of operational systems and employee transfer across partners to avoid hazards associated with an operational misfit. Furthermore, the



manageability of alliances increases with relatively simple alliance designs that are characterized by few alliance partners, a limited alliance scope, clear tasks divisions and contracts with contingency clauses. Due to the inability to confirm the influence of human fit on strategic alliances' success in this industry, no practical implications on this subject can be given on the basis of this research.

*Relational capital and indirect effects.* The results do not confirm relational capital as success factor of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry. Nor do the results show that cross-sector strategic alliances' success in this industry is affected by alliance networks or partner characteristics through relational capital. The results also do not confirm that cross-sector strategic alliances' success in this industry is affected by alliance networks through partner characteristics. Due to the inability to confirm these relationships, no practical implications for these topics can be given based on this research.

### **6.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research**

This research focuses on cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry. The generalizability of the results is therefore limited and does not go beyond the actually analysed context (Bleijenbergh, 2013; Symon & Cassell, 2012). Since this practice oriented research focuses on solving a practical problem in a particular context and not on generalizing results to other contexts, the external validity of this research is, however, less important (Bleijenbergh et al., 2011). Nonetheless, further studies might confirm the found results in cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in other industries and other countries. An important limitation of this research is its validity. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, general and open questions were asked in the interviews (see chapter 4). As a result, the reliability of this research is high, but this has negatively affected the construct validity of the data collection (Bleijenbergh, 2013). This research do not test whether alliance networks, resource interdependence, compatibility and relational capital are hygiene factors instead of success factors for strategic alliances (Herzberg et al., 1959). Cross-sector strategic alliances may not succeed without these factors, while these may not necessarily contribute to success. Further research can be conducted to test this model.

Another limitation of this research is sample size. Different types of respondents were selected to provide diversity, resulting in a small number of different types of respondents. Due to this small sample size per type of respondent, the generalizability of the results based on their statements is limited (Bleijenbergh, 2013). In addition, victims speak from their experience that they have had in their personal injury claim trajectory. Hence, victims did not have an overview of the entire playing field of personal injury. Victims may thus not be aware of the success factors of cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry as this is not relevant to them. The results could therefore give a distorted picture. This has been limited as much as possible by making a distinction between the type of respondents (affiliates of NPOs and victims) in the analysis of results, where this is considered relevant by the researcher. In further research, the type of respondents could be weighed differently in the analysis of results (Bethlehem, 2018). Another limitation of this research is that not all network members were interviewed as this study focuses on the prevention of secondary victimisation due to poor representation. Hence, the results cannot be generalized to other contexts (Symon & Cassell, 2012). The Dutch personal injury industry consists of more network members than discussed and interviewed (see §2.3). It would be interesting if other studies could validate the

proposed model using data from the perceptions of other network members involved in this industry. Although the native language of all respondents and the researcher is Dutch, all quotes have been translated into English to integrate them into this study. Even though these quotes were translated by the researcher with knowledge of the subject and industry, misunderstandings may have arisen as translations do not always accurately reflect the intended content (Baumgartner & Weijters, 2017). Since the aim of this practice oriented research is that the target NPOs adapt their behaviour corresponding to the research recommendations, they should understand and accept the results of this research and the way they were produced (Bleijenbergh et al., 2011). Hence, managers of these NPOs should recognize the results, emotionally support them and consider them legitimate in order to be committed to implement them. This can be achieved by the target population agreeing with the selection of respondents. Since anonymity has been further implemented, the characteristics of respondents are being kept limited (see §4.3). This may therefore limit the acceptance of the results.

The results show that a human fit and relational capital might influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry. This would be in line with the theory that a human fit (Douma et al., 2000; Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001) and relational capital (Barosso-Méndez et al., 2020; Kwok et al., 2019; Tser-Yieth et al., 2009) influence strategic alliances' success. In addition, the results reveal that alliance networks and compatibility might influence cross-sector strategic alliances' success between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry through relational capital. This would be in line with theory that alliance networks (Child et al., 2005; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Kang & Zaheer, 2018; Tjemkes et al., 2012) and compatibility (Emden et al., 2006; Saxton, 1997; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Tjemkes et al., 2012) influence strategic alliances' success through relational capital. Further research can be conducted on these relationships as not enough results were collected to fully confirm these relationships in this study.

## **CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION**

The findings of this study show that the Register Letselschade must be strengthened by optimizing cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in the Dutch personal injury industry to prevent secondary victimization. Cross-sector strategic alliances between NPOs in this industry should be optimized by further developing the success factors alliance networks, resource interdependence and compatibility. The NPOs, especially DLR as orchestrator, should focus on and invest in these found success factors to achieve their goal of preventing secondary victimization. Hopefully, this research will encourage the managers of the NPOs to go a step further and it will contribute to the solution to counter secondary victimisation.

## References

- ACM. (2016). *ACM over keurmerken*. Retrieved from <https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/15163/ACM-over-keurmerken>
- Akrout, H., & Diallo, M.F. (2017). Fundamental transformations of trust and its drivers: a multi-stage approach of business-to-business relationships. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 66, 159-171.
- Amit, R.H., & Schoemaker, P.J. (1993). Strategic assets and organizational rent. *Strategic Management Journal*, 14(1), 33-46.
- Anderson, E., & Weitz, B. (1992). The use of pledges to build and sustain commitment in distribution channels. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 29(2), 18-34.
- Anderson, J.C., & Narus, J.A. (1991). Partnering as a focused market strategy. *California Management Review*, spring, 95-113.
- Argyres, N.S., & Zenger, T.R. (2012). Capabilities, transaction costs, and firm boundaries. *Organizational Science*, 23(6), 1643-1657.
- ASP (2020). *ASP-letselschadeadvocaten zetten zich in voor de belangen van slachtoffers*. Retrieved from <https://www.asp-advocaten.nl/asp-letselschadeadvocaten-zetten-zich-in-voor-de-belangen-van-slachtoffers>
- ASP (2020). *Lid worden van de vereniging ASP*. Retrieved from <https://www.asp-advocaten.nl/bezoekers/lid-worden-van-de-vereniging-asp>
- ASP (2021). *Statutenwijziging*. Retrieved from <https://www.asp-advocaten.nl/sites/default/files/bibliotheek/Statuten%20ASP%202019.pdf>
- Atouba, Y.C., & Shumate, M.D. (2020). Meeting the challenge of effectiveness in nonprofit partnerships: examining the roles of partner selection, trust, and communication. *International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 31, 301-315.
- Aulakh, P.S., Kotabe, M., & Sahay, A. (1996). Trust and performance in cross border marketing partnerships: A behavioral approach. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 27, 1005-1032.
- Austin, J.E., & Seitanidi, M.M. (2012). Collaborative value creation. A review of partnering between 695 nonprofits and business. Part 2: partnership processes and outcomes. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 41(6), 929-968.
- Austin, J.E., & Seitanidi, M.M. (2014). *Creating Value in Nonprofit-Business Collaborations: New Thinking and Practice*. John Wiley & Sons, San Francisco, CA, USA.
- Bahinipati, B.K., Kanda, A., & Desmukh, S. G. (2009). Horizontal collaboration in semiconductor manufacturing sector supply networks. *International Journal of Management and Enterprise Development*, 12(2), 132-157.
- Barosso-Méndez, M.J., Galera-Casquet, C., Velero-Amaro, V., & Nevado-Gil, M.T. (2020). Influence of Partner Characteristics and Relational Capital on the Success of Business/Nonprofit Organization Partnerships. *Complexity*.
- Baum, J.A.C., Calabrese, T., & Silverman, B.S. (2000). Don't go it alone: Alliance network composition and startups' performance in Canadian biotechnology. *Strategic Management Journal*, 21, 267-294.
- Baum, J.A., Shipilov, A.V., & Rowley, T.J. (2003). Where do small worlds come from? *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 12(4), 697-725.
- Baum, J.A., Rowley, T.J., Shipilov, A.V., & Chuang, Y.T. (2005). Dancing with strangers: Aspiration performance and the search for underwriting syndicate partners. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 50(4), 536-575.
- Baumgartner, H., & Weijters, B. (2017). Methodological Issues in Cross-Cultural Research, in: H. van Herk, & C.J. Torelli (2017). *Cross Cultural Issues in Consumer Science and Consumer Psychology: Current Perspective and Future Directions*. Springer.
- Bethlehem, J.G. (2018). *Understanding public opinion polls*. CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Biem, A., & Caswell, N. (2008). *A value network model for strategic analysis*. Proceedings of the 41<sup>st</sup> Hawaii International Conference on System Science (HICSS), Waikoloa, Hawaii.

- Bleeke, J., & Ernst, D. (1991). The way to win in cross-border alliances. *Harvard Business Review*, 69(6), 127-135.
- Bleijenbergh, I. (2013). *Kwalitatief onderzoek in organisaties*. Boom uitgevers, Den Haag.
- Bleijenbergh, I., Kortizlius, H., & Verschuren, P. (2011). Methodological criteria for the internal validity and utility of practice oriented research. *Qual Quant*(45), 145-156.
- Bretherton, P. (2006). Use of strategic alliances along the wine sector value chain, in: J. Kennedy, & L.D. Milia (2006). *Proceedings of the 20<sup>th</sup> ANZAM Conference on 'Management: Pragmatism, Philosophy, Priorities'*. Lindsfield, NSW: Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management.
- Buchanan, L. (1992). Vertical trade relationships: The role of dependence and symmetry in attaining organizational goals. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 24(2), 65-75.
- Burt, R.S. (1992). *Structural holes. The social structure of competition*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Cabral, L., & Pacheco de Almeida, G. (2014). *The distributional properties of interorganizational value*. Working paper, HEC, Paris, France.
- Cavusgil, S.T., & Evrigen, C. (1997). Use of expert systems in international marketing: An application for co-operative venture partner selection. *European Journal of Marketing*, 31(1), 73-83.
- Chaturvedi, S., & Gaur, A.S. (2008). A dynamic model of trust and commitment development in strategic alliances. *IIMB Management Review*, 3, 22.
- Chi, T. (1994). Trading in strategic resources – necessary conditions, transaction cost problems, and choice of exchange structure. *Strategic Management Journal*, 15, 271-290.
- Child, J., Faulkner, D., & Tallman, S. (2005). *Cooperative Strategy* (Second ed.). New York, United States: Oxford University Press Inc.
- Chung, S., Singh, H., & Lee, K. (2000). Complementarity, status similarity and social capital as drivers of alliance formation. *Strategic Management Journal*, 21(1), 1-22.
- Coleman, J.S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 95-120.
- Cotti, A., Magalhaes, T., Pinto da Costa, D., & Matos, E. (2004) Road traffic accidents and secondary victimisation: the role of law professions. *Medical Law*, 23, 259-268.
- Cullen, J.B., Johnson, J.L., & Sakano, T. (2000). Success through commitment and trust: the soft side of strategic alliance management. *Journal of World Business*, 35(3), 223-240.
- D'Amour, D., Ferrada-Videla, M., San Martin-Rodriguez, L., & Beaulieu, M.D. (2005). The conceptual basis for interprofessional collaboration: core concepts and theoretical frameworks, *Journal of interprofessional care*, 19(1), 116-131.
- Das, T.K., & Teng, B.S. (1998). Between trust and control developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances. *Academy of Management Journal*, 23(3), 491-512.
- Das, T.K., & Teng, B.S. (2000). A resource-based theory of strategic alliances. *Journal of Management*, 26, 31-61.
- Dervin, B. (1983). *An overview of sense-making: concepts, methods, and results to date*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communications Association, Dallax, TX.
- Diestre, L., & Rajagopalan, N. (2012). Are all “sharks” dangerous? New biotechnology ventures and partner selection in R&D alliances. *Strategic Management Journal*, 33(10), 1115-1134.
- DLR (2017). *Statuten*. Retrieved from <https://www.kvk.nl/orderstraat/product-kiezen/?kvknummer=30148088>
- DLR (2018a). *Annual report 2017*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/over-ons/jaarverslagen/>
- DLR (2018b). *De Letselschade Raadsdag*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/wp-content/uploads/Verslag-De-Letselschade-Raadsdag-2018.pdf>
- DLR (2019). *Nationaal Keurmerk Letselschade NKL*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/register/nkl/>
- DLR (2020a). *Melding signaal, vraag of klacht?* Retrieved from

- <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/slachtoffers/bemiddelingsloket-2/>
- DLR (2020b). *Nationaal Keurmerk Letselschade. Projectplan concept*. Den Haag: DLR.
- DLR (2020c). *Leden Platformoverleg*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/over-ons/leden-platformoverleg/>
- DLR (2020d). *Over ons*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/over-ons/>
- DLR (2020e). *Uw letselschade verhalen*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/slachtoffers/schade-verhalen/>
- DLR (2020f). *Register Letselschade*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/register/>
- DLR (2020g). *Reglementen Register Letselschade*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/register/reglementen-register-letselschade/>
- DLR (2020h). *ASP uit Register Letselschade*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/actueel/asp-uit-register-letselschade/>
- DLR (2020i). *De Letselschade Raad*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/>
- DLR (2020j). *Slachtoffers contact. Signalen en meldingen*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/slachtoffers/contact/>
- DLR (2020k). *Slachtoffers*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/slachtoffers/>
- DLR (2020l). *Voortgang Nationaal Keurmerk Letselschade*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/actueel/voortgang-nationaal-keurmerk-letselschade/>
- DLR (2020m). *ASP uit Register Letselschade*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/actueel/asp-uit-register-letselschade/>
- DLR (2020n). *Leidraad Audit Register Letselschade*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/register/reglementen-register-letselschade/>
- DLR (2021). *Algemene informatie NKL*. Retrieved from <https://deletselschaderaad.nl/nkl/nkl/>
- Douma, M.U., Bilderbeek, J., Idenburg, P.J., & Looise, J.K. (2000). Strategic alliances – Managing the dynamics of fit. *Long Range Planning*, 33, 579-598.
- Dwyer, F.R., Schurr, P.H., & Oh, S. (1987). Developing buyer-seller relationships. *Journal of Marketing*, 51(4), 11-17.
- Dyer, J.H. (1996). Specialized supplier networks as a source of competitive advantage: Evidence from the auto industry. *Strategic Management Journal*, 17(4), 271-291.
- Dyer, J.H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view. Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage. *Academy of Management Review*, 23, 660-679.
- Egan, J. (2001). *Relationship Marketing*, Prentice Hall, Harlow, Essex.
- Elbers, N.A., Van Wees, K.A.P.C., & Akkermans, A.J. (2012). 'Hij schreef dat hij contact op zou nemen zodat hij de tegenpartij had gesproken': letselschadeslachtoffers over hun belangenbehartiger. *Tijdschrift voor Vergoeding Personenschade*, 3, 102-113
- Emden, Z., Calantone, R.J., & Droge, C. (2006). Collaborating for New Product Development: Selecting the Partner with Maximum Potential to Create Value. *The Journal of Product Innovation Management*, 23, 330-341.
- Evans, D.H. (1963). Modular design: A special case in nonlinear programming. *Operations Research*, 11(4), 637-647.
- Fadol, Y.Y., & Sandhu, M.A. (2013). The role of trust on the performance of strategic alliances in cross-cultural context. *Benchmarking: An International Journal*.
- Faulkner, D. (1995). *International Strategic Alliances: Co-operating to Compete*. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill.
- Ganesan, S. (1994). Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships. *Journal of Marketing*, 58(4), 1-19.
- Gao, T., & Shi, L.H. (2011). How do multinational suppliers formulate mechanisms of global account coordination? An integrative framework and empirical study. *Journal of International Marketing*, 19(4), 61-87.
- Glasbergen, P. (2011). Understanding partnerships for sustainable development analytically: the ladder

- of partnership activity as a methodological tool. *Environmental Policy and Governance*, 21(1), 1-13.
- Goo, J., & Huang, C.D. (2008). Facilitating relational governance through service level agreements in IT outsourcing: an application of the commitment-trust theory. *Decision Support Systems*, 46(1), 216-232.
- Goudswaard, M. (2016). *De Trias Politica van een succesvol keurmerk*. Retrieved from <https://www.consultancy.nl/nieuws/11795/de-trias-politica-van-een-succesvol-keurmerk>
- Graça, S.S., & Barry, J.M. (2019). A global examination of cognitive trust in business-to-business relationships. *New Insights on Trust in Business-to-Business Relationships*, 26(7), 7-36.
- Graf, N., & Rothlauf, F. (2012). Firm-NGO collaborations: a resource-based perspective. *Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft*, 82(6), 103-125.
- Grant, R.M. (1991). The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: Implications for strategy formulation. *California Management Review*, 33(3), 114-135.
- Guillemin, M., & Gillam, L. (2004). Ethics, Reflexivity and “Ethically important moments” in Research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 10(2), 261-280.
- Gulati, R. (1995). Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38, 85-112.
- Gulati, R. (1998). Alliances and Networks. *Strategic Management Journal*, 19, 293-318.
- Gulati, R., & Gargiulo, M. (1999). Where do interorganizational networks come from? *American Journal of Sociology*, 104 (1), 439-493.
- Ha, H.Y. (2010). Alternative explanations of business-to-business relationships: the relational case between web-based companies and traditional channel partners in South Korea. *Asian Business & management*, 9(1), 149-171.
- Hamel, G., & Doz, Y.L. (1998). *Alliance Advantage – The art of creating value through partnering*. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
- Hamel, G., Doz, Y.L., & Prahalad, C.K. (1989). Collaborate with your competitors – and win. *Harvard Business Review*, January-February, 133-139.
- Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C.K. (1989). Strategic intent. *Harvard Business Review*, 67(3), 63-76.
- Harrigan, K.R. (1985). Strategies for intrafirm transfers and outside sourcing. *Academy of Management Journal*, 28(4), 914-925.
- Harrigan, K.R. (1988). Strategic Alliances and Partner Asymmetries. In: F.J. Contractor and P. Lorange (eds.), *Cooperative Strategies in International Business*. New York: Lexington Books, 205-226.
- Harrison, J.S., Hitt, M.A., Hoskisson, R.E., & Ireland, R.D. (2001). Resource complementarity in business combinations: Extending the logic to organizational alliances. *Journal of Management*, 27, 679-690.
- Haynes, K. (2012). Reflexivity in Qualitative Research. In: G. Symon, & C. Cassell (Eds.), *Qualitative Organizational Research: Core methods and current challenges*. London, UK: Sage Publications, 72-89.
- Heide, J.B., & John, G. (1992). Do norms matter in marketing relationships. *Journal of Marketing*, 56(2), 32-44.
- Hennart, J.F., & Zeng, M. (2005). Structural determinants of joint venture performance. *European Management Review*, 2, 105.
- Herzberg, F., Mausner, B., Snyderman, B. (1959). *The motivation to work*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Hinterhuber, A. (2002). Value chain orchestration in action and the case of the global agrochemical sector. *Long Range Planning*, 35, 615-635.
- Hitt, M.A., Dacin, M.T., Levitas, E., Arregle, J., & Borza, A. (2000). Partner selection in emerging and developed market contexts: Resource-based and organizational learning perspectives. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43, 449-467.



- Hitt, M.A., Harrison, J.R., & Ireland, R.D. (2001). *Mergers and acquisitions: A guide to creating value for shareholders*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Den Hond, F., De Bakker, F.G.A., & Doh, J. (2015). What prompts companies to collaboration with NGOs? Recent evidence from The Netherlands. *Business & Society*, 54(2), 187-228.
- Hoskisson, R.E., & Busenitz, L.W. (2001). Market uncertainty and learning distance in corporate entrepreneurship entry mode choice. In: M.A. Hitt, R.D. Ireland, S.M. Camp & D.L. Sexton (Eds.), *Strategic entrepreneurship: Creating a new integrated mindset*. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell Publishers, in press.
- Inkpen, A. (1998). Learning, Knowledge Acquisition, and Strategic Alliances. *European management Journal*, 16(2), 223-229.
- Inkpen, A. (2001). Strategic alliances. In: M.A. Hitt, R.E. Freeman, & J.S. Harrison (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of strategic management*, Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell Publishers, in press.
- Ireland, R.D., Hitt, M.A., & Vaidyanath, D. (2002). Managing strategic alliances to achieve a competitive advantage. *Journal of Management*, in press.
- Jamali, D., Yianni, M., & Abdallah, H. (2011). Strategic partnerships, social capital and innovation: accounting for social alliance innovation. *Business Ethics: A European Review*, 20(4), 375-391.
- Jap, S.D. (1999). Pie-expansion efforts: collaboration processes in buyer-supplier relationships. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 36(4), 461-475.
- Jayari, I., & Chaher, M. (2019). Institutional framework's moderation of the effects of cultures fit on allies' trust: Case of international alliances. *New Trends and Issues Proceedings on Humanities and Social Sciences*, 6(3), 85-94.
- Johnson, J.L., Cullen, J.B., Sakano, T., & Takenouchi, H. (1996). Setting the stage for trust and strategic integration in Japanese-U.S. cooperative alliances. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 27(5), 981-1004.
- Kale, P., & Singh, H. (2009). Managing strategic alliances: what do we know now, and where do we go from here? *Academy of Management Perspectives*, 8, 45-62.
- Katila, R., Rosenberger, J.D., & Eisenhardt, K.M. (2008). Swimming with sharks: Technology ventures, defence mechanisms and corporate relationships. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53, 295-332.
- Kaul, A. (2013). Entrepreneurial action, unique assets, and appropriation risk: Firms as a means of appropriating profit from capability creation. *Organizational Science*, 24(6), 1765-1781.
- Khanna, T., Gulati, R., & Nohria, N. (1998). The dynamics of learning alliances: Competition, cooperation, and relative scope. *Strategic Management Journal*, 19, 193-210.
- Kogut, B. (1988). Joint Ventures: theoretical and empirical perspectives. *Strategic Management Journal*, 9, 319-332.
- Kogut, B., & Walker, G. (2001). The small world of Germany and the durability of national networks. *American Sociological Review*, 66, 317-335.
- Koza, M.P., & Lewin, A.Y. (1998). The Co-evolution of strategic alliances. *Organizational Science*, 9, 255-264.
- Kunc, M.H., & Morecroft, J.D.W. (2010). Managerial decision making and firm performance under a resource-based paradigm. *Strategic Management Journal*, 31(11), 1164-1182.
- Kwok, F., Sharma, P., Gaur, S. S., & Ueno, A. (2019). Interactive effects of information exchange, relationship capital and environmental uncertainty on international joint venture (IJV) performance: An emerging markets perspective. *International Business Review*, 28(5).
- Lancastre, A., & Lages, L.F. (2006). The relationship between buyer and a B2B e-marketplace: cooperation determinants in an electronic market context. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 35(6), 774-789.
- Lane, P.J., & Lubatkin, M. (1998). Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning. *Strategic Management Journal*, 19, 461-478.
- Larson, A. (1992). Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: a study of the governance of exchange

- relationships. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 37, 76-104.
- Leonard-Barton, D. (1995). *Wellsprings of knowledge: Building and sustaining the sources of innovation*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Levitt, B., & March, J.G. (1988). Organizational learning. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 14, 319-340.
- Li, S.X., & Rowley, T.J. (2002). Inertia and evaluation mechanisms in the organizational partner selection indicate formation among U.S. investment banks. *Academy of Management Journal*, 45(6), 1104-1119.
- Li, D., Eden, L., Hitt, M.A., & Ireland, R.D. (2008). Friends, acquaintances, or strangers? Partner selection in R&D alliances *Academy of Management Journal*, 51, 315-334.
- Lorenzoni, G., & Baden-Fuller, C. (1995). Creating a strategic centre to manage a web of partners. *California Management Review*, 37(1), 146-163.
- LSA (2020). *Kwaliteitseisen en kwaliteitswaarborgen*. Retrieved from <https://www.lsa.nl/node/31>
- LSA (2021). *Statutenwijziging*. Retrieved from <https://www.lsa.nl/lsa-lid-woorden>
- MacMillan, K., Money, K., Money, A., and Downing, S. (2005). Relationship marketing in the not-for-profit sector: an extension and application of the commitment-trust theory. *Journal of Business Research*, 58(6), 806-818.
- Macneil, I.R. (1980). *The new social contract, an inquiry into modern contractual relations*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Madhok, A., & Tallman, S.B. (1998). Resources, transactions and rents: Managing value through interfirm collaborative relationships. *Organization Science*, 9(3), 326-339.
- Madhok, A. (1995). Revisiting multinational firm's tolerance for joint ventures: A trust based approach. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 26(1), 117-137.
- Meier, M., Lütkevitte, M., Mellewigt, T., & Decker, C. (2016). How managers can build trust in strategic alliances: a meta-analysis on the central trust-building mechanisms. *Journal of Business Economics*, 86(3), 229-257.
- Mesquita, L.F., & Lazzarini, S.G. (2008). Horizontal and vertical relationships in developing economies: Implications for SMEs' access to global markets. *Academy of Management Journal*, 51(2), 359-380.
- Miles, M.B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition). Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Miller, D., & Shamsie, J. (1996). The resource-based view of the firm in two environments: The Hollywood film studios from 1936 to 1965. *Academy of management journal*, 39(3), 519-543.
- Mindruta, D., Moeen, M., & Agarwal, R. (2016). A two-sided matching approach for partner selection and assessing complementarities in partners' attributes in inter-firm alliances. *Strategic Management Journal*, 37, 206-231.
- Mohr, J.J., Fisher, R.J., & Nevin, J.R. (1996). Collaborative communication in interfirm relationships: Moderating effects of integration. *Journal of Marketing*, 60(3), 103-115.
- Mohr, H., & Nevin, J.R. (1990). Communication strategies in marketing channels: A theoretical perspective. *Journal of Marketing*, 54(10), 36-51.
- Mohr, J., & Spekman, R., (1994). Characteristics of partnership success: partnership attributes, communication behavior, and conflict resolution techniques. *Strategic Management Journal*, 15(2), 135-152.
- Morgan, R.M., & Hunt, S.D. (1994). The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 58(3), 20-38.
- Moore, J.F. (1996). *The death of competition: leadership and strategy in the age of business ecosystems*, New York: Harper Business.
- Narayandas, D., & Rangan, V.K. (2004). Building and sustaining buyer-seller relationships in mature industrial markets, *Journal of Marketing*, 68(3), 63-77.
- Nielsen, B.B., & Nielsen, S. (2009). Learning and innovation in international strategic alliances: an



- empirical test of the role of trust and tacitness. *Journal of Management Studies*, 46(6), 1031-1056.
- NIS (2020). *Over ons*. Retrieved from <https://nis-letsel.nl/over-nis/>
- NIS (2021). *Statuten*. Retrieved from <https://nis-letsel.nl/statuten/>
- NIVRE (2020a). *Missie en Visie*. Retrieved from <https://www.nivre.nl/over-het-nivre/missie-en-visie/>
- NIVRE (2020b). *Over het NIVRE*. Retrieved from <https://www.nivre.nl/over-het-nivre>
- NIVRE (2020c). *Aansprakelijkheid/Technische Varia*. Retrieved from [www.nivre.nl/branches/aansprakelijkheidtechnische-varia/](http://www.nivre.nl/branches/aansprakelijkheidtechnische-varia/)
- NLE (2020). *Over ons*. Retrieved from <https://www.nle-letsel.nl/over-de-nle/>
- Nohria, N., & Garcia-Pont, C. (1991). Global strategic linkages and sector structure. *Strategic Management Journal* (Summer Special Issue), 12, 105-124.
- NOvA (2018). *Gedragsregels advocatuur*. Retrieved from <https://regelgeving.advocatenorde.nl/content/gedragsregels-advocatuur>
- Park, S.H., & Ungson, G.R. (1997) The effect of national culture, organizational and economic motivation on joint venture dissolution. *Academy of Management Journal*, 40, 279-307.
- Park, S.H., & Ungson, G. (2001). Interfirm rivalry and managerial complexity: A conceptual framework of alliance failure. *Organizational Science*, 12(1), 37-53.
- Parkhe, A. (1993). Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost examination of inter-firm cooperation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 36(4), 794-829.
- Parkhe, A. (1991). Interfirm diversity, organizational learning, and longevity in strategic alliance. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 22, 579-601.
- Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G.R. (1978). *The external control of organizations: a resource dependence perspective*. New York: Harper & Row.
- PIV (2018). *Handleiding voor uitvoering van de PIV audit*. Stichting Personenschade Instituut van Verzekeraars: Den Haag.
- Podolny, J.M. (1994). Market uncertainty and the social character of economic exchange. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 39, 458-483.
- Powell, W.W., & Smith-Doerr, L. (1994). Networks and economic life. In: N.J. Smelser & R. Swedberg (Eds.), *The handbook of economic sociology*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Powell, W.W., White, D.R., Koput K.W., & Owen-Smith, J. (2005). Network dynamics and field evolution: The growth of interorganizational collaboration in the life sciences. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110(4), 1132-1205.
- Powell, W.W., Koput, K.W., & Smith-Doerr, L. (1996). Interorganizational collaboration and the locus of innovation: networks of learning in biotechnology. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 41, 116-145.
- Radar (2019a). *Gedragscode Behandeling Letselschade*. Retrieved from [https://radar.avrotros.nl/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Gedragscode\\_in\\_de\\_praktijk.pdf](https://radar.avrotros.nl/fileadmin/user_upload/Gedragscode_in_de_praktijk.pdf)
- Radar (2019b). *Sancties en tuchtrecht nodig in langlopende letselschadezaken*. Retrieved from <https://radar.avrotros.nl/uitzendingen/gemist/item/sancties-en-tuchtrecht-nodig-in-langlopende-letselschadezaken/>
- Rensen, G.J.C. (2012). *Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht. 2. Rechtspersonenrecht. Deel III. Overige rechtspersonen. Vereniging, coöperatie, onderlinge waarborgmaatschappij, stichting, kerkgenootschap en Europese rechtsvormen*, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.
- Reuer, J.J., & Lahiri, N. (2014). Searching for alliance partners: Effects of geographic distance on the formation of R&D collaborations. *Organizational Science*, 25(1), 283-298.
- Rijksoverheid (2020). *Wettelijk verbod op discriminatie*. Retrieved from <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/discriminatie/verbod-op-discriminatie>
- Ring, P.S., & Van de Ven, A.H. (1994). Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations. *Strategic Management Journal*, 13(7), 483-498.
- RIVM (2020). *Vragen & antwoorden nieuw coronavirus (COVID-19)*. Retrieved from

- <https://www.rivm.nl/coronavirus-covid-19/vragen-antwoorden>
- Robson, M.J., Katsikeas, C.S., & Bello, D.C. (2008). Drivers and performance outcomes of trust in international strategic alliances: the role of organizational complexity. *Organization Science*, 19(4), 647-665.
- Robson, M.J., Katsikeas, C.S., Schlegelmilch, B.B., & Pramböck, B. (2019). Alliance capabilities, interpartner attributes, and performance outcomes in international strategic alliances. *Journal of World Business*, 54(2), 137-153.
- Rothaermel, F.T., & Boeker, W. (2008). Old technology meets new technology: Complementarities, similarities, and alliance formation. *Strategic Management Journal*, 29(1), 47-77.
- Sanzo, M.J., Alvarez, L.I., Rey, M., & Garcia, N. (2015). Business-nonprofit partnerships: do their effects extend beyond the charitable donor-recipient model? *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 44(2), 379-400.
- Santema, S., & Van de Rijt, J. (2005). The valuation of resources: looking through the eyes of the customer. In: R. Sanches & A. Heene (Ed.), *Competence perspectives on resources, stakeholders and renewal*. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley.
- Sarkar, M.B., Cavusgil, S.T., & Evirgen, C. (1997). 'A commitment-trust mediated framework of international collaborative venture performance', in Cooperative strategies: North American Perspectives, P.W. Beamish and J.P. Killing. San Francisco: New Lexington Press, 255-285.
- Sarkar, M.B., Echambadi, R., Cavusgil, S.T., & Aulakh, P.S., (2001). The influence of complementarity, compatibility, and relational capital on alliance performance. *Journal of Academy of Marketing Science*, 29(4), 358-373.
- Saunders, M.N.K. (2012). Choosing research respondents. In: G. Symon, & C. Cassell (Eds.), *Qualitative Organizational Research: Core methods and current challenges*. London, UK: Sage Publications, 35-52.
- Saxton, T. (1997). The effects of partner and relationship characteristics on alliance outcomes. *Academy of Management Journal*, 40, 443-461.
- Schieg, M. (2008). Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management. *Journal of Business Economics and Management* 9(1), 47-51.
- Schreiner, M., Kale, P., & Corsten, D. (2009). What really is alliance management capability and how does it impact alliance outcomes and success? *Strategic Management Journal*, 30(13), 1395-1419.
- Seitanidi, M.M. (2010). *The politics of partnerships. a critical examinations of nonprofit-business partnerships*. Springer, London, UK.
- Shenton, A.K. (2004). Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects, *Education for information*, 22(2), 63-75.
- Sherman, S. (1994). Are strategic alliances working? *Fortune*, 21, 77-78.
- SHN (2019). *Ons verhaal*. Retrieved from <https://www.slachtofferhulp.nl/over-ons/ons-verhaal/>
- SHN (2020a). *Slachtoffers moeten te lang wachten op letselschadevergoeding*. Retrieved from <https://www.slachtofferhulp.nl/nieuws/2020/slachtoffers-moeten-te-lang-wachten-op-letselschadevergoeding/>
- SHN (2020b). *Over Slachtofferhulp Nederland*. Retrieved from <https://www.slachtofferhulp.nl/over-ons/>
- SHN (2021). *Rechtshulpverlener kiezen bij letselschade*. Retrieved from <https://www.slachtofferhulp.nl/gebeurtenissen/verkeersongeval/schadevergoeding/rechtshulpverlener-kiezen-bij-letselschade/>
- Siguaw, J.A., Simpson, P.M., & Baker, T.L. (1998). Effects of supplier market orientation on distributor market orientation and the channel relationship: The distributor perspective. *Journal of Marketing*, 62(3), 99-111.
- Siripitakchai, N., Miyazaki, K., & Ho, J.C. (2015). Partnership ecosystem of IC design service companies: The case of Taiwan. *Technology in Society*, 43, 199-208.
- Smith, D. (2003). Five principles for research ethics. *American Psychological Association*, 34, 1.

- Smith, B., & Barclay, D.W. (1997). The effects of organizational differences and trust on the effectiveness of selling partner relationships. *Journal of Marketing*, 61(1), 3-21.
- SP, CDA & PvdA (2019). *Letselschade: Slachtoffers van verzekeraars*. Retrieved from <https://www.sp.nl/sites/default/files/lletselschade.pdf>
- Stead, J.G., & Stead, W.E. (2013). *Sustainable strategic management*. New York: Sharpe, Armonk.
- Stichting De Ombudsman (2003). *Letselschaderegeling: onderhandelen met het mes op tafel, of een zoektocht naar de redelijkheid*. Hilversum: Stichting De Ombudsman.
- Stump, R.L., & Heide, J.B. (1996). Controlling supplier opportunism in industrial relationships, *Journal of Marketing Research*, 33(4), 341-441.
- Symon, G., & Cassell, C. (2012). *Qualitative Organizational Research: Core Methods and Current Challenges*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Su, X., Zhang, H., & Guo, S. (2020). A model and complexity analysis of the relationship based on organizational justice and embeddedness theories. *Complexity*.
- Thompson, A.A., Peteraf, M.A., Gamble, J.E., & Strickland, A.J. (2015). *Crafting and executing strategy. the quest for competitive advantage*. New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2 Penn Plaza.
- Tjemkes, B. Vos, P., & Burgers, K. (2012). *Strategic alliance management*. New York: Taylor & Francis Group.
- Tser-Yieth, C., Hsiang-His, L., & Wei-Lan, H. (2009). The influence of partner characteristics and relationship capital on the performance of international strategic alliances. *Journal of Relationship Marketing*, 8(3), 234-252.
- Uzzi, B. (1996). The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic performance of organizations. The network effect. *American Sociological Review*, 61, 674-698.
- Varadarajan, P.R., & Cunningham, M.H. (1995). Strategic alliances – A synthesis of conceptual foundations. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 23(4), 282-296.
- VvV (2018). *Financieel jaarverslag verzekeringsbranche*. Retrieved from <https://www.verzekeraars.nl/branche/cijfers-statistieken/openbaar-financieel-jaarverslag>
- VvV (2020a). *Lid worden*. Retrieved from <https://www.verzekeraars.nl/het-verbond/lid-worden>
- VvV (2020b). *Wat doet het Verbond?* Retrieved from <https://www.verzekeraars.nl/het-verbond/wat-doet-het-verbond>
- VvV (2020c). *Verzekeraars: fundamentele hervorming systeem letselschade noodzakelijk*. Retrieved from [Verzekeraars: fundamentele hervorming systeem letselschade noodzakelijk](https://www.verzekeraars.nl/over-het-verbond/organisatie)
- VvV (2021). *Organisatie*. Retrieved from <https://www.verzekeraars.nl/over-het-verbond/organisatie>
- Vermeulen, F. (2018). A basic theory of inheritance: How bad practice prevails. *Strategic Management Journal*, 39, 1603-1629.
- Villa, A. (2011). *Managing cooperation in supply network structures and small or medium-sized enterprises*. London: Springer-Verlag.
- De Vries, M. (2019). *Wildwest in de letselschadepraktijk*. Retrieved from <https://www.advocatenblad.nl/2019/06/19/wildwest-in-de-lletselschadepraktijk/>
- Walker, G., Kogut, B., & Shan, W. (1997). Social capital, structural holes and the formation of a sector network. *Organizational Science*, 8, 109-126.
- Wester, F., & Peters, V. (2004). *Kwalitatieve analyse: uitgangspunten en procedures*. Bussum, The Netherlands: Uitgeverij Coutinho.
- Whipple, J.M., & Frankel, R. (1998). The alliance formation process. *International Food and Agribusiness Management Review*, 1(3), 335-357.
- Wilkof, M.V., Brown, D.W., & Selsky, J.W. (1995). When stories are different: The influence of corporate culture mismatches in interorganizational relations. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 30, 372-388.
- Williamson, O.E. (1985). *The economic institutions of capitalism*, New York: The Free Press.
- Wittmann, C.M., Hunt, S.D., & Arnett, D.B. (2009). Explaining alliance success: competences,

- resources, relational factors, and resource-advantage theory. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 38(7), 743-756.
- Wu, M.Y., Weng, Y.C., & Huang, I.C. (2012). A study of supply chain partnerships based on the commitment-trust theory. *Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics*, 24(4), 690-707.
- Yang, H., Zheng, Y., & Zhao, X. (2014). Exploration or exploitation? Small firms' alliance strategies with large firms. *Strategic Management Journal*, 35, 77-91.
- Yin, R.K. (1994). *Case study research: design and methods* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition). Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Yli-Renko, H., & Autio, E. (1998). The network embeddedness of new, technology-based firms: Developing a systemic evolution model. *Small Business Economics*, 11, 253-267.
- Zaheer, A., & Harris, J. (2006). Interorganizational trust. In: O, Shenkar & J.J. Reuer (eds), *Handbook of strategic alliances*. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 169-197.
- Zollo, M., Reuer, J., & Singh, H. (2002). Interorganizational routines and performance in strategic alliances. *Organizational Science*, 13(6), 701-713.

## Appendices

### Appendix A. Network members

| <b>Network member</b> | <b>Mission</b>  | <b>Role</b>  | <b>Platform consultation function</b> |
|-----------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>DLR</b>            | Aims to increase harmony, transparency and clarity in the handling of personal injury cases, by promoting a high-quality process of claim settlement (DLR, 2020d) | Orchestrator   | Orchestrator                          |
| <b>SHN</b>            | Aims to help victims find recovery and justice (SHN, 2020b)   | Represents the interests of victims                              | Participant                           |
| <b>NIVRE</b>          | Aims to monitor and promote the quality of NIVRE-registered experts and promotes both the professional group and the NIVRE-institute (NIVRE, 2020a)               | Represents the interests of experts                              | Participant                           |
| <b>NIS</b>            | Aims to optimize the functioning of experts by enabling members to share their knowledge and increases it through meetings (NIS, 2020)                            | Represents the interests of experts                              | Participant                           |
| <b>NLE</b>            | Aims to promote the quality of personal injury treatment (NLE, 2020)  | Represents the interests of experts who only represents victims  | Participant                           |
| <b>VvV</b>            | Aims to promote the quality of insurers and to strengthen the confidence of stakeholders (VvV, 2020a)   | Represents the interests of insurers                             | Participant                           |
| <b>LSA</b>            | Aims to promote both the quality of attorneys and this professional group (LSA, 2020)   | Represents the interests of attorneys                            | Observer                              |
| <b>ASP</b>            | Aims to promote both the quality of attorneys who only represent victims and this professional group (ASP, 2020a)   | Represents the interests of attorneys who only represent victims | -                                     |

**Appendix B. Overview of characteristics of respondents**

| <b>Respondent</b> | <b>Type</b>   |
|-------------------|---|
| #1                | Victim  |
| #2                | Victim  |
| #3                | Victim  |
| #4                | Victim  |
| #5                | Physiotherapist   |
| #6                | Board member of/ Employee of/ Registered representatives at DLR       |
| #7                | Board member of/ Employee of/ Registered representatives at DLR       |
| #8                | Committee member/ Employee/ Member of the ASP                         |
| #9                | Representative (attorney) who is not affiliated with a quality system |
| #10               | Board member/ Employee of SHN   |
| #11               | Board member/ Employee of SHN   |
| #12               | Expert of the personal injury industry                                |
| #13               | Committee member/ Employee/ Member of the VvV                         |
| #14               | Committee member/ Employee/ Member of the NLE                         |
| #15               | Committee member/ Employee/ Member of the VvV                         |
| #16               | Committee member/ Employee/ Member of the VvV                         |
| #17               | Committee member/ Employee/ Member of the LSA                         |
| #18               | Committee member/ Employee/ Member of the LSA                         |
| #19               | Committee member/ Employee/ Member of the NIS                         |
| #20               | Board member of/ Employee of/ Registered representatives at NIVRE     |

### **Appendix C. Interview protocol**

This interview protocol is based on the theoretical background that was developed to guide the interviews. The interviews are conducted in Dutch, because all interviewed respondents are Dutch. The English translation is included.

#### **Introductie/Introduction**

Allereerst wil ik u bedanken voor uw tijd en de mogelijkheid om een interview bij uw af te nemen. Ik zal mezelf kort voorstellen. Mijn naam is Leonie Bach Kolling, 26 jaar en ik woon samen met mijn verloofde en twee katten in Arnhem. Ik heb de master Nederlands recht dit jaar afgerond. Op dit moment ben ik bezig met mijn masterthesis van Strategisch Management aan de Radboud Universiteit. Mijn thesis gaat over het verbeteren van het kwaliteitssysteem het Register Letselschade. Meer specifiek wil ik onderzoeken op welke manier samenwerkingen tussen organisaties dit kwaliteitssysteem kunnen verbeteren. Uw input is hierbij van groot belang: door het delen van uw ervaringen en inzichten kunnen toekomstige letselschadeslachtoffers beter worden geholpen. Het interview duurt ongeveer 45 minuten duren en bestaat uit zes vragen. Als een vraag onduidelijk is, geef dit alstublieft aan dan zal ik dit proberen te verduidelijken. U kunt op ieder moment aangeven dat u wilt stoppen met het interview. De resultaten van dit interview worden geanonimiseerd gebruikt in mijn onderzoek. Wenst u een samenvatting van de resultaten van het onderzoek te ontvangen per mail? Heeft u nog vragen? Voordat ik begin met het inhoudelijke deel, wil ik u vragen of u toestemming geeft dat ik het interview opneem zodat ik dit interview kan uitschrijven?/

First, I would like to thank you for your time and the opportunity to conduct an interview with you. I will introduce myself briefly. My name is Leonie Bach Kolling, 26 years old and I live with my fiancée and two cats in Arnhem. I completed the master Dutch law this year. At this moment, I am working on my master thesis of Strategic Management at the Radboud University. My thesis is about improving the quality system, het Register Letselschade, of De Letselschade Raad. More specific: I want to investigate how collaborations between organizations can improve this quality system. Your input is important, since sharing your experiences and insights can help future victims better. The interview will last approximately 45 minutes and will consists of six questions. Please indicate if a question is unclear and I will try to clarify it. You can indicate at any time that you want to withdraw. The results of this interview are used anonymously in my research. Would you like to receive a summary of the results of the research by email? Do you have any questions? Before I start with the substantive questions, I would like to ask you whether you give me permission to record and transcribe the interview.

#### **Algemene informatie/ General information**

1. Kunt u zichzelf kort voorstellen?/ Can you introduce yourself briefly?

#### **Waarnemen van de waarde en het gebrek aan middelen/ Discerning the value and lack of resources**

2. Hoe beschrijft u (de waarde van) het Register Letselschade?/ How would you like to describe (the value of) the quality system the Register Letselschade?

3. Wat zijn verbeterpunten voor het Register Letselschade?/ What are the areas for improvement for the Register Letselschade?

**Strategische allianties die het Register Letselschade versterken/ Strategic alliances that strengthen the Register Letselschade**

4. Welke organisaties kunnen helpen om het Register Letselschade te verbeteren en waarom?/ Which organizations could help to improve the Register Letselschade and why?
5. Op welk moment en door welke partij kunnen letselschadeslachtoffers het beste worden geïnformeerd over het Register Letselschade?/ At what time and by which party is it best to inform victims about the Register Letselschade?

**Afronding/ End**

6. Heeft u nog iets dat u wilt toevoegen aan het interview?/ Do you have anything you want to add to the interview?

Als u verder geen vragen meer heeft, waren dit voor zover de vragen. Wilt u een transcript van dit interview ontvangen? Hartelijk dank voor uw tijd en uw participatie aan dit interview./

I will conclude this interview if you have no further questions. Would you like to receive a transcript of this interview? Thank you very much for your time and your participation in this interview.



**Appendix D. Translation quotes**

This appendix contains the translation from Dutch to English of quotes that are used in chapter 5 to ensure the reliability.

| Re-spond-ent | English   | Dutch   |
|--------------|---|---|
| O            | “The platform consultation is in fact the driving force, where project groups arise from signals from the industry.”  | “Het platformoverleg is in feite de motor, daar ontstaan de projectgroepen vanuit signalen uit de markt.”   |
| O            | “DLR facilitates and coordinates that parties continue to discuss topics that they themselves consider important.”  | “DLR faciliteert en coördineert dat partijen die van nature tegen over elkaar staan over onderwerpen in gesprek blijven die zij zelf van belang vinden.”  |
| T            | “The low-hanging fruit has simple been picked. Why do we keep talking about things that we cannot work out together? (...) If we cannot figure it out together, I will take it to court.”   | “Het laaghangend fruit is gewoon geplukt. Waarom in die polder eindeloos blijven praten, waarin we niet uitkomen? (...) Wat in die polder niet lukt, dan ga ik dat bij de rechter halen.”   |
| R            | “The LSA takes its role very seriously and wholeheartedly talks with it. There are also many attorneys who take part in different workgroups in a private capacity to provide that input, precisely to improve the personal injury settlement. But the question is whether you need to expect more from the Bar.”                   | “De LSA neemt haar rol uiterst serieus en praten volmondig mee. Er zijn ook veel advocaten die in verschillende werkgroepen zitten op persoonlijke titel om die input te geven, juist ter verbetering van die letselschaderegeling. Maar de vraag is of het nodig is dat je meer van de advocatuur verwacht.”   |
| L            | “It is of course true that there are strong links between insurers and DLR, but how important is it that the Bar has a voice in the platform consultation. In any case as observer.”  | “Het is natuurlijk wel zo dat er grote banden zijn tussen verzekeraars en DLR, maar hoe belangrijk is het juist om dan je stem te laten horen in het platformoverleg. In ieder geval als toehoorder.”   |
| K            | “It cannot be the case that one hand you say that you do not want to commit to the rules of DLR, but on the other hand you will attend all meetings and interfere with everything.”   | “Het kan niet zo zijn dat je enerzijds zegt dat je je niet wenst te committeren aan de regels van DLR, maar dat je anderzijds wel komt bij alle vergaderingen en je overal tegenaan gaat bemoeien.”   |
| N            | “There are simply no decisions taken [in the platform consultation] because the LSA, as an observer, disagrees. I find this unworkable.”  | “Er worden gewoon geen besluiten genomen [in het platformoverleg], omdat de LSA als toehoorder het er niet mee eens is. Ik vind dit onwerkbaar.”  |
| S            | “The moment you involve the judiciary, they are not confronted with something that comes out of the blue, but something in which they are involved as a professional group.”  | “Op het moment dat je de rechterlijke macht erbij betreft, worden ze niet geconfronteerd met iets dat uit de lucht komt vallen voor hen, maar iets waarbij ze betrokken zijn als beroepsgroep.”   |
| O            | “DLR was once created in the desire to create a one-stop shop for victims where they could find everything and neutral non-commercial information. (...) Due to the desire to become an organization for organizations, the entire victim portal has moved deeper into DLR on the website and is no longer as prominently visible.” | “DLR is ooit in het leven geroepen als in de wens om één loket voor slachtoffers te maken waar zij alles kunnen vinden en neutrale niet-commerciële informatie. (...) Dat is ooit hetgeen geweest waar DLR mee is gestart. Door de wens om een organisatie voor organisaties te worden, is het hele slachtofferportaal dieper bij DLR op de website gekomen en niet meer zo prominent zichtbaar.” |

|    |  |  |
|----|--|--|
| G  | “Ideally there would of course be some sort of electoral guide, a comparison page such as Independer, where you can simply enter your data. (...) It is an IT-project in my opinion, while the industry often sees it as a kind of political project.” | “Idealiter zou er natuurlijk een soort kieswijzer zijn, een vergelijkingspagina zoals Independer, waarin je gewoon je gegevens kan invoeren. (...) Het is een IT-project in mijn ogen, terwijl de markt het vaak ziet als een soort politiek project.” |
| G  | “A quality mark is only of added value if it is a recognizable quality mark. Whether representatives have a quality mark should be a convincing argument for people who ultimately make decisions.”  | “Een keurmerk is pas echt van toegevoegde waarde als het een herkenbaar keurmerk is. Dat de mensen die uiteindelijk besluiten nemen op basis van het al dan niet hebben van een keurmerk dat die dit als een overtuigend argument beschouwen.”         |
| N  | “The moment you become a victim, that [personal injury] world only starts to become relevant.”   | “Op het moment dat je slachtoffer wordt, begint die [letselschade] wereld pas relevant te worden.”   |
| P  | “Victims come in unknowingly and also a bit traumatized.”  | “Slachtoffers komen onwetend binnen en bovendien ook een beetje getraumatiseerd.”  |
| R  | “It seems to set up so large to support DLR financially. Yes, I would rather have seen that differently. Maybe DLR itself too.”  | “Het lijkt wel deels zo groot opgezet om DLR financieel te ondersteunen. Ja, dat had ik liever ook anders gezien. Misschien DLR zelf ook wel.”   |
| E  | “It would be helpful if there was a leaflet that you could hand over right away. (...) The leaflets could be distributed integrally by the KNGF at affiliated practices.”  | “Het zou wel handig zijn als er een folder zou zijn die je direct kan overhandigen. (...) De folders zouden vanuit de KNGF integraal kunnen worden gedistribueerd bij alle aangesloten praktijken.”  |
| F  | “It would be valuable if insurers refer to SHN for objective advice on what kind of help victims need. But that is much to ask of commercial parties.”   | “Het zou waarde hebben als verzekeraars verwijzen naar SHN voor objectief advies voor welke hulp slachtoffers nodig hebben. Maar dat is veel gevraagd van commerciële partijen.”   |
| I  | “The way to do that, also to separate the wheat from the chaff and to protect victims, is to bring all parties together and create such a national quality system.”  | “De manier om dat te doen, ook om het kaf van het koren te scheiden en om het slachtoffer te beschermen is om alle partijen bijeen te brengen en ook zo’n nationaal keurmerk in het leven te roepen.”  |
| G  | “To put it bluntly, the quality mark loses value by the political hassle around it. Not all parties that should be included are included.”   | “Door het politieke geneuzel daaromheen even plat gezegd, verliest het keurmerk aan waarde. Niet alle partijen die erin horen te staan, zitten erin.”  |
| S  | “You have to create commercial preconditions to interest representatives to register. (...) Insurers are willing to pay more once you have an efficient and professional handling of the [personal injury] claim.”                                     | “Je moet commerciële randvoorwaarden creëren voor belangenbehartigers om mee te mogen doen. (...) Verzekeraars zullen bereid zijn meer te betalen op het moment dat je een efficiënte en vakkundige behandeling van het [letselschade] dossier hebt.”  |
| M  | “I personally think that insurers in the Netherlands should state that they do not work with or reimburse unregistered representatives.”   | “Ik vind zelf dat verzekeraars in Nederland moeten zeggen dat belangenbehartigers die niet in het register staan niet mee wordt gewerkt of worden betaald.”  |
| 18 | “What the LSA fears very much, and I think it is right, is that they help put their competitors who are less skilled and under less supervision than attorneys into the saddle.”   | “Waar de LSA heel erg bang voor is, en dat vind ik ook terecht, is dat zij helpen om hun concurrenten die minder goed geschoold zijn en onder minder zwaar toezicht staan dan letselschadeadvocaten in het zadel te helpen.”                           |

|    |  |   |
|----|--|---|
| 17 | “The Bar is not waiting for a referral register that you are obliged to participate in, and it also suggest that all participants have the same standards.”  | “De advocatuur zit niet te wachten op een verwijzingsregister waar je verplicht aan moet meedoen, waarbij de suggestie bovendien wordt gewekt dat alle deelnemers dezelfde normen hebben.”  |
| 8  | “Only a list of attorneys is not a viable option in the current area. If you explain the difference between an attorney and an expert well, people can choose for themselves.”   | “Alleen een lijst met letselschadeadvocaten is denk ik in het huidige tijdsgewricht geen haalbare kaart. Als je goed uitlegt wat het verschil is tussen een advocaat en een expert kunnen mensen zelf kiezen.”  |
| P  | “If referrers only refer to the register, then I think that representatives will register because they have an interest in it.”  | “Als verwijzers alleen naar het register verwijzen, dan denk ik dat belangenbehartigers zich zullen registreren omdat ze daar ook wel een belang bij hebben.”   |
| G  | “If you can do that, some representatives run the risk of losing perhaps fifty percent of their business if they are not registered.”  | “Als je dat voor elkaar krijgt, lopen sommige belangenbehartiger het risico dat ze misschien wel 50 procent van hun handel kwijtraken als ze niet in het register staan.”   |
| R  | “I will find it very strange if they already agree to refer exclusively to registered representatives, while ninety percent of the Bar is absent. Then you actually deprive people... (...) As long as the Bar does not participate fully in the register, you cannot speak of a good register.” | “Ik zou het heel raar vinden als ze het nu al afspreken om exclusief te verwijzen naar geregistreerde belangenbehartigers, terwijl 90 procent van de advocatuur afwezig is. Dan ontnemen je mensen dus eigenlijk... (...) Zolang de advocatuur niet volmondig aan het register meedoet, kun je niet spreken van een goed register.” |
| 17 | “The LSA-committee has to submit it to its members, since the LSA is an association. (...) The ASP has taken a clear stance that they do not participate in the register. They have arguments for that. Hence, that is an important signal that has been given within the LSA.”                  | “Het LSA-bestuur moet het ook nog voorleggen aan haar leden, want de LSA is natuurlijk een vereniging. (...) De ASP heeft duidelijk stelling genomen dat ze niet deelnemen aan het register. Daar hebben ze argumenten bij. Dus dat is een belangrijk signaal dat binnen de LSA gegeven is.”  |
| Q  | “That is a challenge, but you have to ensure that every profession is tested equally and where possible in the same way.”  | “Dat is wel een uitdaging denk ik, maar je moet zorgen dat elke beroepsgroep gelijkwaardig wordt getoetst en waar mogelijk op dezelfde manier.”   |
| R  | “There are minimum standards set by the register, but the question is whether that is sufficient. For example, the NIVRE- and Grotius-courses are not obligatory. (...) You should not offer a false sense of security that representatives who are registered would therefore be good.”         | “Er zijn minimumnormen die het register stelt, maar de vraag is of dat voldoende is. De NIVRE- en Grotius-opleiding en zijn niet verplicht om maar wat te noemen. (...) Je moet niet een schijnzekerheid bieden dat belangenbehartigers zijn ingeschreven en daarom goed zouden zijn.”  |
| O  | “They [the quality requirements set by the LSA] are initially high before you are admitted, but that is a knowledge exam. (...) It does not help that the LSA only conducts an internal audit once every ten years.”   | “Ze [de kwaliteitseisen van de LSA] zijn in eerste instantie hoog voordat je toegelaten wordt, maar dat is een kennisexamen. (...) Het helpt niet dat de LSA tot op heden maar één keer in de tien jaar een audit uitvoeren intern.”  |
| P  | “I think that [registration at an organizational level] is dangerous. (...) You can prevent that by already indicating which individual representative you choose.”  | “Ik vind dat [kantoorregistratie] gevaarlijk. (...) Dat kan je voorkomen door in je keuze al aan te geven voor welke belangenbehartiger je kiest.”  |

|   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| K | “I believe that a collaboration could arise between the Register Letselschade and NIVRE, whereby you will get one register that has guidelines for organizations and one that has guidelines for individuals. You create one disciplinary law for a personal and organizational level. (...) Basically, the ideal solution should be that you actually only have one counter.” | “Ik geloof dat tussen het Register Letselschade en het NIVRE een samenwerking zou kunnen ontstaan, waarbij je één register gaat krijgen dat richtlijnen voor organisaties heeft en richtlijnen voor personen. Dat je één tuchtrecht maakt voor persoonlijk- en organisatieniveau. (...) In basis zou de ideale oplossing moeten zijn dat je eigenlijk maar één loket hebt.” |
| 8 | “Once the LSA becomes a participant, LSA-members are expected to commit to all kind of things [products of DLR] that an attorney cannot commit to in advance. (...) Make sure you listen to our objections.”   | “Zodra de LSA deelnemer gaat worden, wordt verwacht dat LSA-leden zich committeren aan allerlei dingen dat een advocaat niet op voorhand kan vastleggen. (...) Zorg dat je naar onze bezwaren luistert.”  |
| K | “I do not see the problem myself. I think it can be done easily. I think they especially want to distinguish themselves from representatives who are not attorneys.”   | “Ik zie zelf het probleem niet. Volgens mij moet dat makkelijk kunnen. Ik denk dat ze zich vooral willen onderscheiden van belangenbehartigers die geen advocaat zijn.”   |
| N | “I do not understand that discussion and I think that the industry must deal firmly with the Bar: take it or leave it.”  | “Ik begrijp die discussie niet en ik vind dat er veel harder moet worden opgetreden [tegen de advocatuur]: take it or leave it.”  |
| L | “I think a nationally organized role play day has value. (...) When we took on a different role, we noticed that we started to behave very differently and treat each other differently.”  | “Ik denk dat een landelijk georganiseerde rollenspel-dag waarde heeft. (...) Toen wij een andere rol aannamen, merkten wij dat wij ons heel anders gingen gedragen en elkaar anders gingen behandelen.”   |
| G | “Attorneys like to position themselves above experts.”   | “Advocaten positioneren zichzelf graag boven experts.”  |
| N | “At the moment, attorneys are pretty condescending about experts.”   | “Op dit moment doen advocaten best laatdunkend over letselschade-experts.”  |
| M | “The ASP is a very critical and difficult group. Those are the little macho’s, who think that only they can do the job well.”  | “De ASP is een hele kritische lastige groep. Dat zijn toch een beetje de haantjes noem ik het maar, die vinden dat alleen zij het werk goed kunnen doen.”   |
| K | “Attorneys have always been difficult. attorneys are stubborn people.”   | “De letselschadeadvocatuur is altijd lastig geweest. Advocaten zijn eigenwijze mensen.”   |
| N | “The ASP is always looking for conflict, so I think that it is fine that they are not there [at the platform consultation].”   | “De ASP zoekt per definitie het conflict op, dus ik vind het eigenlijk wel prima dat ze er [bij het platformoverleg] niet bij zijn.”  |
| G | “We can only achieve this when we work together. If the ASP and the LSA continue to be obstructive, we will not achieve that.”   | “We kunnen dit alleen bereiken als we samenwerken. Als de ASP en de LSA blijven dwarsliggen, gaan we dat niet bereiken.”  |
| K | “It is essential that the quality system is supported by the industry, otherwise I am afraid that organizations will slip away.”   | “Het is essentieel dat het kwaliteitssysteem draagkracht heeft in de markt, anders ben ik bang dat organisaties wegslijpen.”  |
| 8 | “As soon as the LSA becomes a participant, you are expected to commit to all kind of things that an attorney cannot determine in advance. (...) So as far as I am concerned, if an overarching quality system has a chance of success, it should be separated from DLR.”   | “Zodra de LSA deelnemer wordt, wordt verwacht dat je je committeert aan allerlei dingen dat een advocaat niet op voorhand kan vastleggen. (...) Dus wat mij betreft zou, als het verwijzingssysteem een kans van slagen krijgt, dit los moeten staan van DLR.”  |
| R | “The LSA is observer at the platform consultation, because it believes that it is important  | “De LSA is toehoorder bij het platformoverleg, omdat het belangrijk is om kennis in te brengen  |

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
|   | to contribute their knowledge and to know what is happening elsewhere in the industry.  | en te weten wat er elders binnen de branche gebeurt.”   |
| N | “I am in favour of that obligation [that all network members must oblige their members to register]. That you all show, this is quality.”   | “Ik ben een voorstander van die verplichting [dat alle netwerkleiden hun achterban moeten verplichten om zich te registreren]. Dat je met zijn allen laat zien, dit is kwaliteit.”  |
| K | “The governance of DLR is insufficiently tightly organized, causing conflicts [miscommunication and mistrust]. The result is that parties do no longer act together, but that parties reject it.” | “De governance van DLR is onvoldoende strak georganiseerd waardoor dit soort [miscommunicatie, wantrouwen] ontstaan. Het gevolg is dat partijen niet meer gemeenschappelijk optrekken, maar dat partijen zich ervan gaan afzetten.” |
| P | “Attorneys do not know how to deal with people, since they are often focused on litigation.”  | “Als jurist weet je niet goed hoe je met mensen omgaat, omdat ze toch vaak zijn gefocust op procederen.”  |
| H | “You need a good relationship and must speak in an understandable language. It is important to use language that one wishes to accept. A good relationship is essential.”                         | “Je hebt een goede verstandhouding nodig, maar je moet ook spreken in begrijpelijke taal. Taal die men wenst te accepteren, dat is heel erg belangrijk. Een goede relatie is eigenlijk essentieel.”                                 |

## Appendix E. Invitation to participate in this research on social media

**Radboud Universiteit**



### Uitnodiging voor deelname aan onderzoek over het Register Letselschade

Verschillende dienstverleners kunnen een letselschadeslachtoffer bijstaan, zoals: letselschadeadvocaten, -juristen, -specialisten en -experts. De term belangenbehartiger is echter geen beschermde titel, waardoor letselschadeslachtoffers niet van tevoren weten of zij met een deskundige en betrouwbare belangenbehartiger te maken hebben.<sup>1</sup> Hierdoor kunnen letselschadeslachtoffers opnieuw slachtoffer worden van een kwalitatief minder goede belangenbehartiger, omdat zij minder goed of zelfs bewust slecht worden geholpen. Het kwaliteitssysteem van De Letselschade Raad, het Register Letselschade, heeft onder andere tot doel om ervoor te zorgen dat kwalitatief goede belangenbehartigers makkelijker vindbaar worden. Belangenbehartigers moeten aan kwaliteitseisen voldoen om te worden ingeschreven in dit register.

Ter afronding van de master Business Administration aan de Radboud Universiteit, verricht ik onderzoek naar de optimalisatie van het Register Letselschade met betrekking tot belangenbehartigers. Dit onderzoek verricht ik met medewerking van De Letselschade Raad, Slachtofferhulp Nederland en Q-Consult Insurance, waarbij deze resultaten worden gebruikt om het kwaliteitssysteem te verbeteren. Het Register Letselschade wordt omgevormd naar het Nationaal Keurmerk Letselschade. Het is belangrijk dat het kwaliteitssysteem wordt verbeterd, zodat toekomstige slachtoffers dit beter kunnen vinden en gebruiken. Uw input is hierbij van groot belang: door het delen van uw ervaringen kunnen toekomstige letselschadeslachtoffers beter worden geholpen, doordat zij kwalitatief goede belangenbehartigers beter kunnen vinden. Voor dit onderzoek ben ik op zoek naar verschillende respondenten:

- Letselschadeslachtoffers die te maken hebben (gehad) met een letselschade zaak;
- Organisaties of personen die slachtoffers verwijzen naar belangenbehartigers;
- Belangenbehartigers die bewust niet zijn ingeschreven in het Register Letselschade; en/of
- Belangenbehartiger-organisaties die bewust niet zijn aangesloten bij het Register Letselschade.

Herkent u zich in deze omschrijving, of kent u iemand anders waarvoor dat geldt? Dan kom ik graag met u in contact. Ook in het geval dat u van mening bent dat u een belangrijke bijdrage kan leveren aan dit onderzoek, kom ik graag met u in contact. Het interview zal gemiddeld *45 minuten* duren en vindt plaats via beeldbellen of telefoon. Uw antwoorden worden anoniem in het onderzoek verwerkt. De resultaten van het onderzoek worden – indien u dat op prijs stelt – met u gedeeld. Het interview draait om drie onderwerpen:

1. De vindbaarheid van het Register Letselschade door slachtoffers;
2. De communicatie naar en de service voor slachtoffers door het Register Letselschade; en
3. De dekingsgraad van het Register Letselschade.

Voor vragen of opmerkingen kunt u contact met mij opnemen via: \*\*\* of \*\*\*.

Met vriendelijke groeten,  
Leonie Bach Kolling

<sup>1</sup> De term LSA Letselschade Advocaat is wel een beschermde titel. ASP-advocaten zijn tevens lid van de LSA.

**Appendix F. Invitation to participate in this research in the PIV-survey**

**Radboud Universiteit**



**Uitnodiging onderzoek over het Register Letselschade**

U heeft in dit tevredenheidsonderzoek aangegeven dat u bij de behandeling bent bijgestaan door een belangenbehartiger. Organisaties kunnen zich laten toetsen door De Letselschade Raad. Deze toets heeft als doelstelling om deze organisaties te blijven ontwikkelen en samen te brengen in een overzichtelijk Register. Ter afronding van de master Business Administration aan de Radboud Universiteit, verricht ik onderzoek naar hoe het Register Letselschade zo goed mogelijk kan worden ontwikkeld. De Letselschade Raad, Slachtofferhulp Nederland en Q-Consult Insurance dragen bij aan dit onderzoek. De resultaten van het onderzoek worden gebruikt om het Register Letselschade verder te ontwikkelen, waarbij dit register wordt omgevormd naar het Nationaal Keurmerk Letselschade.

Uw input is hierbij van groot belang: door het delen van uw ervaringen kunnen toekomstige letselschadeslachtoffers beter worden geholpen. Wij zijn daarom erg geïnteresseerd in uw ervaringen met uw keuze voor een belangenbehartiger. Hoe bent u tot deze keuze gekomen? Bent u wellicht geïnformeerd over het Register Letselschade? Of heeft u ernaar gezocht?

Het interview zal gemiddeld *45 minuten* duren en vindt plaats via beeldbellen of telefoon. Uw antwoorden worden anoniem in het onderzoek verwerkt. De resultaten van het onderzoek worden – indien u dat op prijs stelt – met u gedeeld. Voor nu wens ik u het beste toe. Voor vragen of opmerkingen kunt u contact met mij opnemen via: \*\*\* of \*\*\*.

Met vriendelijke groeten,  
Leonie Bach Kolling

## Appendix G. Relevant results for the industry

Results that are not relevant to this study, but are relevant to the Dutch personal industry are included in this Appendix. The translations of the quotes used in this appendix are included below to ensure the reliability.

A minority [4/20] argued that the Register Letselschade does not guarantee that registered representatives actually provide high-quality services.<sup>1</sup> *“I think it does not depend on whether someone has a quality mark, since then you can also be treated badly.”* (A); *“If I call myself a physiotherapist, I am BIG-registered and have my diploma, but that does not mean that I am a good physiotherapist. That qualification is selective. But you have to start somewhere.”* (E); *“That chance [that representatives with a quality mark still deliver poor quality] is smaller if you simply audit once every three years and especially at file level. Moreover, you have to see this in combination with which quality requirements are imposed on parties. The industry should continuously raise those quality requirements.”* (G). Reliable reviews or customer satisfaction were mentioned [13/20] as an extra tool to select high-quality registered representatives and enable victims to select representatives that fit their specific needs.<sup>2</sup> However, it was pointed [5/20] out that client satisfaction is difficult to measure.<sup>3</sup> *“One of the things that you could do from the register, is that at some point you say that everyone is going to measure customer satisfaction in the same way and we just benchmark that.”* (G). In addition, a minority [4/20] mentioned a reporting centre to report (possible) violations of quality requirements of registered representatives as lacking activity of DLR related to the Register Letselschade.<sup>4</sup> A minority [3/20] argued that reports of possible violations of quality requirements of registered representatives could be incorporated in audits of representatives to improve the quality of service in the personal injury industry.<sup>5</sup> *“I also think that it is useful to look at complaints in the context of audits. But then you have to make sure that the quality of your sample is guaranteed during the audit.”* (H). However, it was pointed out [2/20] that each professional group has its own complaints procedure (and disciplinary law), but that it is often unclear which complaints procedure should be used.<sup>6</sup> *“I want to advise DLR to not set up a new complaints institute again, we have had enough of that. DLR could offer a kind of decision making structure, whereby victims can see where they can go with which complaint.”* (K).

A customer service was valued from whom victims can request additional support, including assistance in choosing a representative and to whom they can turn to for specific help. However, respondents [8/20] pointed out that referring specifically to one representative rather than generally referring to the Register Letselschade bears the risk of non-objective referring and trade in suffering.<sup>7</sup> A lot of referrers get paid by not necessarily high-quality representatives to refer victims to them. Respondent G indicated a dilemma: *“The big dilemma behind prohibiting payment for referrers is if you prohibit members for paying you for the work that an insurance intermediary offers, you are actually forcing him to do business with parties that do not carry the quality mark. Then you send the victims to parties that may not deliver high quality.”*

---

<sup>1</sup> A, E, G and J.

<sup>2</sup> C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, M, O, P, R and T.

<sup>3</sup> G, H, J, O and R.

<sup>4</sup> E, G, H and O.

<sup>5</sup> G, H and O.

<sup>6</sup> K and O.

<sup>7</sup> G, K, L, M, P, Q, R and S.



Nonetheless, respondents [8/20] pointed out that victims have a considerable need for support in choosing a representative and are not helped by getting referred in general to the Register Letselschade.<sup>8</sup>

A signpost was proposed [5/20] that serves as a guide for whom victims could contact to request specific help (legal, medical, psychological and financial assistance were mentioned).<sup>9</sup> A minority [2/20] mentioned that victims could be provided with a victim-kit that informs them about the personal injury trajectory and where to find what information.<sup>10</sup> Knowledge is for informed victims after all an important tool to protect themselves against secondary victimisation. Furthermore, leaflets were mentioned [8/20] as the most important tool for informing victims.<sup>11</sup> One respondent pointed out that care providers must be willing to provide leaflets to victims. *“DLR used to send many leaflets to various organizations and had a lot of contact with general practitioners and physiotherapists, but they no longer want the leaflet.”* (O). Respondents missed important selection criteria in the Register Letselschade: whether the representative is an attorney or expert [8/20],<sup>12</sup> experience [4/20],<sup>13</sup> cultural background [3/20],<sup>14</sup> specialisation [3/20],<sup>15</sup> a descriptive of the representative [3/20],<sup>16</sup> way of contact [3/20],<sup>17</sup> the possibility of an online file [3/20],<sup>18</sup> gender [2/20]<sup>19</sup> and the actual expert standard of the organization (G).

| Re-spond-ents | English  | Dutch   |
|---------------|--|---|
| A             | “I think it does not depend on whether someone has a quality mark, since then you can also be treated badly.”  | “Ik denk dat het niet afhangt of iemand een keurmerk heeft, want dan kan je ook slecht behandeld worden.”   |
| E             | “If I call myself a physiotherapist, I am BIG-registered and have my diploma, but that does not mean that I am a good physiotherapist. That qualification is selective. But you have to start somewhere.”  | “Als ik mijzelf fysiotherapeut noem, ben ik BIG geregistreerd en heb ik mijn diploma, maar wil dat niet zeggen dat ik een goede fysiotherapeut ben. Dus ook die kwalificatie is selectief. Maar je moet ergens beginnen.”   |
| G             | “That chance [that representatives with a quality mark still deliver poor quality] is smaller if you simply audit once every three years and especially at file level. Moreover, you have to see this in combination with which quality requirements are imposed on parties. The industry should continuously raise those quality requirements.” | “Alleen die kans [dat belangenbehartigers met een keurmerk toch slechte kwaliteit leveren] wordt wel kleiner als je gewoon eens in de drie jaar toetst en met name ook op dossierniveau. Bovendien moet je dat in combinatie zien met welke kwaliteitseisen partijen wordt opgelegd. Wat er zou moeten gebeuren, is dat je die kwaliteitseisen als markt continu een beetje hoger gaat leggen.” |
| G             | “One of the things that you could do from the register, is that at some point you say that   | “Een van de dingen die je vanuit het register zou kunnen doen, is dat je op een gegeven moment  |

<sup>8</sup> A, B, C, D, E, F, M and P.

<sup>9</sup> A, B, C, D and E.

<sup>10</sup> F and P.

<sup>11</sup> B, C, D, E, H, L, O and P.

<sup>12</sup> F, G, H, J, L, P, R and T.

<sup>13</sup> F, J, M and P.

<sup>14</sup> C, L and P.

<sup>15</sup> F, M and P.

<sup>16</sup> C, D and G.

<sup>17</sup> C, D and G.

<sup>18</sup> C, D and G.

<sup>19</sup> C and P.

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
|   | everyone is going to measure customer satisfaction in the same way and we just benchmark that.”   | zegt dat iedereen op dezelfde manier klanttevredenheid gaat meten en dat benchmarken we gewoon.”  |
| H | “I also think that it is useful to look at complaints in the context of audits. But then you have to make sure that the quality of your sample is guaranteed during the audit.”   | “Ik denk ook dat het nuttig is om naar klachten te kijken in het kader van audits. Maar dan moet je er wel voor zorgen dat de kwaliteit van je steekproef bij de audit gewaarborgd blijft.”   |
| K | “I want to advise DLR to not set up a new complaints institute again, we have had enough of that. DLR could offer a kind of decision-making structure, whereby victims can see where they can go with which complaint.”   | “Ik wil DLR adviseren om niet weer een nieuw klachteninstituut op te zetten, daar hebben we genoeg van. Maar wel dat DLR een soort beslissstructuur aanbiedt, waarbij slachtoffers kunnen kijken waar ze met welke klacht terecht kunnen.”  |
| G | “The big dilemma behind prohibiting payment for referrers is if you prohibit members for paying you for the work that an insurance intermediary offers, you are actually forcing him to do business with parties that do not carry the quality mark. Then you send the victims to parties that may not deliver high quality.” | “Het grote dilemma wat achter het verbieden van betalen voor doorverwijzen van zaken schuilgaat is als jij keurmerk leden verbiedt om te betalen voor bijvoorbeeld de werkzaamheden die een assurantietussenpersoon aanbiedt, dwing je hem" eigenlijk om zaken te doen met partijen die het keurmerk niet hebben. En dan stuur je de slachtoffers weer naar partijen die misschien geen goede kwaliteit leveren.” |
| O | “DLR used to send many leaflets to various organizations and had a lot of contact with general practitioners and physiotherapists, but they no longer want the leaflet.”  | “DLR heeft vroeger veel folders gestuurd naar verschillende organisaties en veel contact gehad met huisartsen en fysiotherapeuten, maar die willen de folder dan niet meer hebben.”   |