'The Troubles' with Brexit

The Impact of External Economic Aid on Civil Society Building NGOs in Northern Ireland

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Preface

Before you lies my Master's thesis, my final work for my studies in Human Geography. During the three months internship in Belfast I got a great chance of getting insights from close by on one of the major changes in European politics. It was very interesting to attend several events on Brexit, to hear so many people speak, think and consult on the issue, and to get to see how Brexit is been handled in Northern Ireland instead of just the European view I got in the Netherlands. Although the vibrant politics in the UK and Northern Ireland are very exciting to follow, this also made it hard to write my thesis with the political context changing so fast. Within the timeframe of writing this thesis the Northern Ireland Assembly fell, there were new elections and a long period with negotiations followed while in the UK after the Brexit referendum, new general elections were held and a deal with the conservative party of Prime Minister Theresa May was made with the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party. The first quote on this page shows exactly how I sometimes felt while writing this thesis while on the other hand it gave me motivation to shed some light on the situation in Northern Ireland. The second quote showed the hope some people had for the future which was very nice to hear for a change. Therefore that became my favourite question during the interviews, if the interviewees saw any positives with Brexit. Some people never really thought about that, but in the end most of them could at least see something positive for Northern Ireland. I am really fortunate to have been able to talk with all those interesting people, to hear their views and perceptions on Brexit but also to hear their personal stories from life in a (post-)conflict region. This helped me with understanding the whole situation much better and for that I want to thank all of my respondents for being so open with me.

I would like to thank everyone who made it possible for me to write this thesis. First of all I want to thank Martin van der Velde for helping me writing my thesis throughout the whole process. Secondly, I want to thank Timofey Agarin, my internship supervisor in Belfast who always found some time to read my work and who gave helpful insights on both the scientific as well as real life situation on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Also thanks to my fellow interns at Queens University Belfast who made live there more fun and with whom I could discuss all the peculiarities of the Northern Irish tongue, cultures and the divide in society. Many thanks go to my friends and family who all came to visit me in Belfast and with whom I had some awesome adventures. At last, I am very grateful to my boyfriend, Frank, who motivated me every time I got stuck, who read my work and supported whether he was visiting me in Belfast or back home in Utrecht.

Summary

In March 2017 Theresa May, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), started the process of Brexit by invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. This gives the UK two years to negotiate its withdrawal from the European Union (EU). One of the subjects of those negotiations is the case of Northern Ireland, a region of the UK that has a history of 30 years of violent conflict. This conflict between two communities officially ended with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998. Ever since, there is peace in Northern Ireland that is supported by efforts from all levels of society. At the top-level there is consociationalism, a power-sharing system which is supposed to create a stable democracy by making opponents work together and let them make decisions by consensus. While at the bottom level local peacebuilding is at work with a focus on civil society. This because civil society is supposed to be able to transform conflict by building trust, transparency and openness between communities, as well as it can provide a solid foundation to democratization. However, also external aid is part of peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. The EU contributes to the peace process not only by economic aid towards local NGOs but also indirectly by underscoring the consociationalist GFA. Thus, with the realisation of Brexit this contribution of the EU to peacebuilding in Northern Ireland might change. Therefore this research focuses on the impact of the EU on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland in light of Brexit. More specifically, this case is linked to the theory that external economic aid creates local development to become dependent on those funds. Dependency of NGOs can for example be visible by the need to organise short-term projects as well as the creation of bureaucratic work. The EU as an external actor funds among others the PEACE programmes with the focus on civil society. With Brexit, this funding will stop and makes an interesting case study to research dependency.

Overall, it is important to secure the current peace in Northern Ireland towards also a peaceful future after Brexit. Therefore, the societal relevance is to analyse the situation to be prepared for possible implications and it might provide insights on decisions that are to be taken with the Brexit negotiations. The goal of this explorative research is to get insights on the possible impact of Brexit on the peace process in Northern Ireland. With the focus on the influence of the EU as external economic actor on civil society building NGOs. This leads to the research question: *"what is the impact of external economic aid from the EU on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland with the focus on civil society building NGOs and how can Brexit influence that?"*

This research question is especially interesting when comparing the theory on peacebuilding with the current situation in Northern Ireland, because some tensions arise between the two. Theory outlines that to build sustainable peace all levels of society need to contribute as well as long-term commitment is needed. Though, Northern Ireland includes all levels of society within the peace process, it also receives external economic aid for, among others, civil society building NGOs. This could be in tension with the long-term commitment because as outlined before, external economic aid can create dependency which includes the need for NGOs to organize short-term projects. Furthermore, also Brexit itself puts an end to the long-term commitment of the EU towards peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and is therefore in tension with the theory.

To research how those tensions relate to each other, data is collected by three different research methods. First, literature research is used to outline views, insights and theories of academics focused on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland to get an overview of the situation in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, data is collected by conducting a survey, interviews and analysis of position papers. The survey is conducted with 26 NGOs working in Northern Ireland on civil society building. The survey is focused on their views on peacebuilding, the involvement of the EU in peacebuilding and Brexit. More

in depth insights are gained by conducting interviews with five NGOs, with the same focus as the survey. Besides, to get an overall view, one interview is held with Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA), an umbrella organisation of NGOs and one with the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB), who is responsible for the distribution and organisation of the PEACE funding in Northern Ireland. Further insights are gained at two Brexit events where concerns and possibilities were discussed on Brexit. In addition, analysis on three position papers from different perspectives is done to collect specific insights on Brexit. All this data is combined and analysed, to get a broad overview of the situation. This resulted in some concluding remarks that show that the impact of external economic aid from the EU, in the form of the PEACE programmes, on the society is positive. The research showed that many NGOs focus on short-term projects with availability of funding as main reason. Concretely, the implementation of the EU funding creates, first of all, more work and secondly creates the need for civil society building NGOs to focus on short-term projects. Civil society building NGOs in Northern Ireland are therefore seen as partially dependent on the EU. But, when only looking at funding, PEACE money is just a small portion of the whole budget of most NGOs. However, there is a feeling of dependency on the EU in general because of the current situation and concerns in Northern Ireland regarding Brexit and the lack of a working Northern Irish Assembly. Those concerns are much broader than peace alone, they range from the worries about economy, the border towards human rights. Because of those concerns and polarization, NGOs are even more needed for civic dialogue to let all voices be heard within this period of change and to take all aspects of concerns and possibilities in consideration. This need of a strong sector is in tension with; the concerns, the lack of funding and the trend of NGOs working on a week by week basis.

This research argues that external economic aid does create dependency, because even though EU funding is only a small portion, it already creates the need for short-term projects and the feeling of dependency. Because this research is a case study it is hard to make broader statements on the theory because it depends a lot on the context. In this case, it should be considered that first, the EU is not just an external economic actor, but a multilevel actor. Secondly, external economic aid here is studied by looking at the EU, however, there are more external economic donors in Northern Ireland. Besides, from all the contacted NGOs, 26 organisations responded to the survey which alone does not create a high validity for the research though because of the use of mixed methods an interesting research is done. Some of the NGOs send a standard e-mail that they are not existing anymore and during the interviews respondents also explained that many NGOs in their networks had already stopped due to funding problems. For further research it would be interesting to investigate the trend of all NGOs when they are set up and if they still exist throughout the years. This could be compared with the amount of external funding available at a certain period to research dependency and opportunity. Also for future research on the theory on external economic aid, it would be interesting to research this case study after Brexit occurred because then the effect of the dependency of the EU in Northern Ireland can be studied on both the elite level (Track I) and on the local level (Track II and III).

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

Tables

List of Abbreviations

DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EAW	European Arrest Warrant
EU	European Union
GFA	Good Friday Agreement
INTRAC	International NGO Training and Research Centre
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NICRA	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NICVA	Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
SEUPB	Special European Union Programmes Body
UK	United Kingdom
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party

1. Introduction

"*Brexit means Brexit*", said Theresa May, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), when the referendum determined that the UK would leave the European Union (EU). However, there is a lot of debate on what Brexit will actually mean. Theresa May started the process of leaving the EU at the end of March 2017 by invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. This gives the UK two years to negotiate its withdrawal. These negotiations will be a complicated task of unpicking 43 years of treaties and agreements which cover many different subjects (BBC, 2017a). One of these subjects will be the case of Northern Ireland, which is, although part of the UK, located in the Northern part of the Island of Ireland (CIA World Factbook, 2017). 56,8 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland voted to stay in the EU in the referendum in June 2016 (BBC, 2017a).

Northern Ireland should become a serious subject in the negotiations concerning Brexit because of its history. Between 1968 and 1998, the country was dominated by severe conflict between two communities. This thirty-year period of violence, which is often referred to as 'the Troubles', was ended by the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998 (BBC, 2017b). The history of Northern Ireland creates a context in which, according to Burke (2016), Brexit could cause a political, security and economic crisis in the Northern Ireland. Firstly, the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland will become an external border of the EU. Therefore, the movement of goods, services and individuals cannot remain the same, and thus Brexit will have an influence on the Northern Irish economy (Burke, 2016). Besides, it is argued that such a hard(er) border with border controls and military towers will bring back nightmares from the past (Moloney, 2016 as cited by CNBC, 2016) and threaten to undermine the two decades of peace (CNBC, 2016). Secondly, the GFA could be disrupted by Brexit. In this peace agreement, the UK and the Republic of Ireland are named as 'partners in the European Union' and as equal Council of Europe members. For this reason, many see the EU connection as an underscoring of the GFA. At last, even today the EU plays a stabilizing role because both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland receive several funds from the EU through the Interreg and the PEACE IV Programme (2014-2020) to maintain peace. PEACE IV covers the entire border region between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and it provides this region with some €270 million, of which 85 per cent comes from the EU, all to manage cross-border and cross-community issues (Mars et al., 2016). In total, 8.4 per cent of Northern Ireland's GDP was dependent on support from the EU in 2015. This includes the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Interreg and PEACE (Hayward, 2016).

1.1 Relevance

It is argued that Brexit may lead to a shift in the geopolitical environment in Europe and in the world, as well as have significant geopolitical implications (The Economist, 2015). Which according to an article of BMI Research (2016) might lead to the weakening of both the UK and the EU, as well as towards a more multi-polar system. Brexit will not only lead to an unknown shift in the western world, but also regionally it creates many uncertainties. As argued by Mars et al. (2016) working together in the EU drew the Republic of Ireland and the UK closer together, Brexit could do the opposite. They argue that over time the Republic of Ireland will become more integrated with Europe, while the UK will be moving further away. This leaves Northern Ireland in the middle towards an unknown direction (Mars et al., 2016).

Northern Ireland has been without a functioning devolved government since the coalition fell in January 2017. On the 2nd of March 2017, new elections again showed the division in Northern Ireland in which the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (a right-wing unionist party) and Sinn Féin (a left-wing Irish republican party) became the biggest parties. However, in the beginning of July they announced that negotiations to reach a power-sharing deal had failed, because among others, differences on how to deal with the legacy of the Troubles and the Irish language act (BBC, 2017e). This left Northern Ireland without a government throughout the summer recess and uncertainties on what will happen afterwards. According to BBC (2017f) the options for Northern Ireland are (1) new elections, (2) another deadline extension on negotiations, (3) direct rule from Westminster or (4) a halfway house between devolution and Westminster.

Furthermore, the Tory – DUP deal has created more tensions in Northern Ireland. Prime Minister May made a deal with the 10 DUP Members of Parliament (MP's) to support her minority conservative government after she lost 13 seats in the general elections on the 8th of June 2017. In return, Northern Ireland receives an extra 1 billion pounds over the next two years. Although the money has been largely welcomed, there are also concerns that the deal could undermine the peace process when the UK government is dependent on the support of the DUP while it is supposed to be neutral (BBC, 2017g). Besides, some other Northern Irish parties like Sinn Fein, SDLP and Alliance Party have said that the deal would also make power-sharing at Stormont Parliament more difficult (BBC, 2017h).

As argued above, a realization of Brexit has different consequences for Northern Ireland. Especially those consequences that might destabilize the country and threaten the peace in Northern Ireland could create tensions. Ever since the GFA in 1998 Northern Ireland has been at peace, but critics argue this has been quite fragile (Burke, 2016). First of all, there are still serious issues to be resolved that leave the whole peace process in doubt. Especially issues related to governance, sectarianism and community relations are problematic according to Mac Ginty et al. (2007) and have only destabilized during the period after the GFA. Besides, the GFA appears to have led to only more radicalized divisions and support for more extreme political parties (Samuels, 2005). This is visible in the current political environment in Northern Ireland, in which agreements are hard to reach (more info, see textbox 1.2). Finally, spatially, the conflict is also still visible in the segregated society of Northern Ireland through the walls and borders that continue to separate the nationalist and unionist neighbourhoods (Shirlow, 2006). This shows that the conflict still plays a role in everyday life. It is important to secure this (still 'fragile') peace towards an also peaceful future in Northern Ireland after Brexit. Therefore, the societal relevance is to analyse the situation of Northern Ireland in light of Brexit to be prepared for possible implications. This explorative research on the uncertain future of the peace process in Northern Ireland might provide insights on decisions that are to be taken with the Brexit negotiations.

On the other hand, it is argued that even though the transition from conflict towards this more peaceful, stable and positive future was not perfect, it is still one of the best examples of a successful peace process (Causeway Institute for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution, CIPCR, 2017) and reconciliation processes (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). The GFA is seen as model for peace (Tonge, 2016) and, according to Reynolds (2000), is the clearest example of consociationalism. Consociationalism is a political power-sharing structure where two or more ethno-national groups jointly rule and take decisions in consensus (Schneckener, 2002). Alongside this consociationalist peace agreement, local peacebuilding focusing on civil society has been at work in Northern Ireland to build grassroots participation (Byrne, 2001). The idea behind this civil society approach is to transform the conflict, by building trust, transparency and openness between both communities through, for example, integrated education, efforts to end employment discrimination and encourage economic investments (Byrne, 1995 in Byrne, 2001).

The EU has been one of the major external actors in this peace process with its multilevel type of intervention of

contributing at both top level as well as at the local level (Hayward & Murphy, 2012). Besides their indirect impact by underscoring the GFA at the top level, the EU had the desire to help build peace in Northern Ireland, though it only had limited capacity on enforcing any form of peace. Therefore the solution from the EU was focused on embedding civil society into governing processes (Bush & Houston, 2011), because civil society was seen as a crucial agent that can influence the political system and provide a more solid foundation to democratization, the rule of law and human rights (Belloni, 2001). This resulted in big investments from the EU in expanding the role of civil society by mostly focusing on civil society building through voluntary and community groups (Bush & Houston, 2011).

The biggest strength of the EU in this process has been their sustained commitment, because they see it as a long-term project just like the peace process itself (Hayward & Murphy, 2012). As Jeong (2005 in Hayward and Murphy, 2012) argues: *"[s]uccessful peacebuilding cases are characterized by a sufficient level of commitment of time and resources as well as political will both on part of external and internal actors"* (Jeong, 2005, p.34, in Hayward and Murphy, 2012, p. 442). According to Hayward and Murphy (2012) the EU, which funds, empowers and reforms, allows for that to happen and can lead the peace process to a success with its enduring commitment. However, Brexit might compromise this enduring commitment, which will (at least partially) stop and might lead to a less successful peace process. This research can therefore debate whether this argument of Jeong, that both internal and external actors with long-term commitment are important in successful peacebuilding is also applicable in the Northern Irish case.

Belloni (2001) argues that such external economic aid, like the EU contributions on civil society building, only creates dependency. According to Skarlato et al. (2015), it is unclear whether the EU's economic assistance has created more employment and helped with peacebuilding or that this aid has only created dependency and facilitated a competitive milieu in Northern Ireland. Some respondents in their research argue that the external economic funds have only impeded sustainable change. While others wondered, back in 2015 (before any mention of Brexit), how they would be able to carry out their peace work without continuous external funding (Skarlato et al., 2015). Therefore this research tests the theory of Belloni (2001) on whether external economic aid also creates dependency in the case of Northern Ireland and seeks to further explain it. The outcome can be helpful in assessing how Brexit might impact civil society building. Besides, Skarlato et al. (2015) argued that more research is also needed on this topic to be able to optimize current peacebuilding projects and to assist in future ones. Likewise, Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) saw the need for further research to determine which actors encourage sustainable civil society building to create insights that will help support future planning and implementation.

A new situation arises in Northern Ireland in which the long-term commitment of the EU on both top- and local-level peacebuilding will end, at least in its current form. Brexit creates a new and unknown challenge for peacebuilders because, for one, it is uncertain whether the EU will continue to fund local peacebuilding focusing on civil society. Moreover, the broader context of the partnership between Ireland and the UK in the EU will change. This development could show whether or not Northern Ireland is dependent on the external aid from the EU. Thus, it is interesting to investigate this case study and to analyse whether the 'successful' consociationalist peacebuilding project in combination with the civil society approach in Northern Ireland, both made possible by EU assistance, are sustainable enough to survive Brexit. This new situation due to Brexit not only creates an interesting case study to focus on the dependency theory of Belloni (2001). It also creates a new context for debates on the concepts and its function of consociationalism and civil society building in light of peacebuilding in Northern Ireland.

1.3 Research question

The EU is involved at several levels in the peace process in Northern Ireland, namely by contributing to both the consociationalist power-sharing agreement and civil society building. However, it is argued by Belloni (2001) that external economic aid, such as funding for civil society building, can create dependency on international presence. Therefore, this research focuses on external economic aid and whether it creates civil society building NGOs to become dependent. This is studied by means of the case study of Northern Ireland in light of Brexit, because Brexit will create an end, or at least a change to, the external economic aid from the EU. It is an explorative research on the uncertain future of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The goal is to analyse the concerns and consequences of the Brexit on the peace process. More specifically, it is focussed on dependency of civil society building NGOs that receive EU funding to contribute to peace and how those organizations can continue without such funding. This leads to the following research question:

"What is the impact of external economic aid from the EU on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland with the focus on civil society building NGOs and how can Brexit influence that?"

In order to answer this research question, insights on the current situation of the peace process are needed to be able to link that with the role of the EU in the process. As well as, to be able to place issues, views and findings on Brexit and dependency in the context of Northern Ireland. So, it is important to know which peacebuilding mechanism are at work in Northern Ireland and how those function. Therefore the first subquestion on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland is:

1   *How does current peacebuilding manifest itself in Northern Ireland?*

Secondly, the research question focuses on the influence of the EU on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Therefore the second subquestion is an extension of the first subquestion because it outlines the role of the EU on the current situation of peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. This role includes the EU influence on both consociationalism and civil society building in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, it gives insights in what Brexit might mean for that role of the EU in the peacebuilding process:

2   *What role does the EU have in Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and how can Brexit influence this role?*

Thirdly, the research question is focused on external economic aid. To research that, the following two subquestions arise. The impact of external economic aid is researched specifically by whether external economic aid from the EU leads to dependency among NGO's that receive such funding. The focus is on NGOs because the direct contributions of the EU on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland is the funding of civil society building NGOs.

3   *To what extent do civil society building NGOs depend on external economic aid from the EU and how did this dependency come about?*

The fourth subquestion also focuses on the impact of external economic aid from the EU but then more specifically its impact on the EU PEACE programmes. The subquestion is a twofold of both the influence of the PEACE funding on the civil society building NGOs as well as the impact of the PEACE programmes on civil society itself and thus on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland.

4   *What is the impact of external economic aid in the form of the EU PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland and why does that certain impact arise?*

After these four subquestions, that together outline the current situation of peacebuilding and the impact of external economic aid in Northern Ireland, the last two subquestions are focused on how

Brexit might impact that situation. Subquestion 5 answers how Brexit might influence the peace process. This is researched with the focus on the concerns of civil society building NGOs on Brexit.

5   *What are the concerns of civil society building NGOs regarding Brexit and why do those concerns arise?*

Lastly, subquestion 6 is used to outline the possibilities for NGO's when Brexit is applied with a focus on solutions for the research question. It is supposed to give insights on how civil society building NGOs can anticipate Brexit.

6   *How can civil society building NGOs anticipate to Brexit?*

The six subquestions give an overall view of the peace process in Northern Ireland and thus insights on the research question. Together they outline the current impact of the EU on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, the possible impact of Brexit on that process and the possibilities for the future, all with the focus on civil society building NGOs. Therefore they are sufficient to answer the research question. This is done by the following structure: first, the background chapter offers insight into Northern Ireland's history, the region's current situation and it gives more information on Brexit so far. This is followed by theory on peacebuilding at several levels of society, provides positive sides as well as some critiques of the theories. The chapter ends with a conceptual model outlining the suggested relations between the explained terms. The methodology chapter explains the qualitative and quantitative methods used in this research and elaborates on how data is analysed. Then, the results are outlined and discussed in two chapters. The first two subquestions are investigated by means of existing literature on this topic and are outlined in the 'Peace in Northern Ireland' chapter. The following chapter describes the results from the later four subquestions which are found by means of a survey, interviews and content analysis. Altogether, this leads to an analysis of the results which is placed within the context of conceptual model. This thesis ends with concluding remarks, the answer to the research question and a discussion on the research itself.

2. Background of Northern Ireland

As explained earlier, between 1968 and 1998 there was a violent conflict in Northern Ireland. To be able to understand the current situation in Northern Ireland, this background chapter gives a short overview of the Troubles, its consequences, the current situation in Northern Ireland and the priority issues for Brexit as outlined by the former Northern Ireland government.

2.1 The Troubles

Cairns and Darby (1998) argue that to understand the Troubles and the duality between the two ethnic groups in Northern Ireland, the history of the island of Ireland is important. Already in the 1170, King Henry II of England tried to incorporate the island of Ireland into his kingdom. Although, the Island of Ireland only got fully secured in 1609, after the last resisters in the northern province of Ulster were defeated and their lands were confiscated. This became the Ulster Plantation that attracted many English colonizers (Gidron, Katz & Hasenfeld, 2002). These foreigners spoke a different language (Scots) and they were mostly Protestants in contrast with the native Irish, who were Catholic. Around the 18th century these Protestants formed a majority in Ulster and occupied some 95 per cent of the land (Cairns & Darby, 1998). With this, the broad lines of the division between the population were established in which the two factions held mutually incompatible ambitions and deep suspicions about each other (Gidron et al., 2002). In 1919-1921 the War of Independence was fought and instead of the 'home rule' that Britain was trying to impose before (in which Dublin parliament would rule Ireland, though they would still be answerable to London), another solution was imposed: partition (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). In 1921 the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed to divide the island in two. The 26 mainly Catholic-Republican countries in the South become independent and later known as the Republic of Ireland with their government in Dublin. The six counties that were mostly Protestant-Loyalists in the North remained part of the UK, as visible in figure 2.1 (Cairns & Darby, 1998). The partition resulted in restricted opportunities for regional development in Northern Ireland, though it did not take into account the historical differences and the more recent struggles over independence in the divided society. Therefore it left freedom for working out the sectarian rivalries in Northern Ireland on a local level, which only created bigger religious divisions. Besides, the Protestant government introduced several laws that were discriminative towards Catholics which resulted in them opting out of public political life and it caused the emergence of exclusive Catholic voluntary organizations. The partition led to a relatively peaceful period (Gidron et al., 2002), however, violence and protests kept occurring in Northern Ireland mostly because the

Figure 2.1 Island of Ireland – Counties of the Republic of Ireland and of Northern Ireland

Source: Wikipedia, 2017

Catholic Republican population saw the partition as an attempt to maintain a protestant majority. Throughout the 1920s, 1940s and 1950s the Irish Republican Army (IRA) also campaigned to force a reunification with the Republic of Ireland. In the late 1960s civil rights campaigns were organised by the Catholic population against discrimination in areas like jobs, education, housing and local elections (Cairns & Darby, 1998). In 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was formed and used the civil rights movements in the United States as inspiration for non-violent methods of campaigning (BBC, 2017d). The NICRA had a whole list of demands for more rights, the strongest one was the demand for 'one man – one vote'. To end the unequal voting system in which subtenants, lodgers and anyone living at home with parents could not vote (McKittrick and McVea, 2002) while business owners had the right to multiple votes. The NICRA called for the right to vote for everyone over the age of 18 (BBC, 2017d). One of these campaigns resulted into violence in 1968 and it led to several Catholic marches and Protestant counter marches. More clashes occurred, and in 1969 British troops were deployed to reduce the violence. In 1972 Britain announced Direct Rule over Northern Ireland with the intention to be a short-term measure, however this lasted much longer, among other things because it gave the IRA a new and "legitimate" target: the British imperialists (Gidron et al., 2002). What followed was a period of 30 years of violence, bombings, riots and attacks that resulted in 3,703 deaths and approximately 40,000 people seriously injured (on a population of 1.5 million) (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). The conflict varied in intensity during the 30 years but it was mostly felt in Belfast, Derry/Londonderry and areas near the border with the Republic of Ireland. The violence and intimidation created even greater segregation in some areas. Economically the conflict resulted in high costs, from upscaling security to rebuilding many buildings destroyed by bombs. Indirectly, the conflict created even higher levels of unemployment, decline in inward investment and tourist income and it led to emigration of young and educated people (Cairns & Darby, 1998). However, during this period violence, some reforms were made, universal adult suffrage was introduced and later also acts on fair employment and housing were implemented (Conflict Archive on the Internet, 2016). The Troubles officially ended in 1998 with the GFA (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012).

2.1.1 Causes & Consequences
O'Leary and McGarry (2016) argue that historical causes to explain a conflict (as outlined above) are overrated because history is often used to explain a group's situation and justify their cause. According to them (2016) this is also the case in Northern Ireland, in which the republicans would start their narratives with the first invasions in 1169 towards the continuous brutality and oppression of the English. While the unionists would start with the Plantation of Ulster in 1609 and their tales of the survival during many barbaric sieges. O'Leary and McGarry (2016) see the key ideas of both nationalism and unionism as a modern polarisation of the communities as they argue that those ideas were not present in neither the 12th nor the 17th century (O'Leary & McGarry, 2016; Edwards & McGrattan, 2012).

The conflict was "*at its most basic[,] a struggle between those who wish to see Northern Ireland remain part of the United Kingdom and those who wish to see the reunification of the island of Ireland*" (Cairns & Darby, 1998). Though other generalizations are focused on the explanation as a conflict between the Protestants and the Catholics (Dixon, 2008). However, the use of the terms Protestants and Catholics is as much ethnic and political as it is religious. Protestants are often loyalist unionists who prefer to identify themselves as British, whereas Catholics prefer to label themselves as Irish and are nationalist republicans (Cairns & Darby, 1998). These two communities do not only have different ethnic heritages but also distinct national identities therefore neither of them want to be subsumed

within the other's nation-state. Just like the Scots or the Basques for example, although they show willingness to be integrated in autonomy deals with dual identities, to be both Scots and British. Though in Northern Ireland, identity is more complicated because there are several dual identities and those are opposing each other rather than compatible. Besides, the Northern Irish identity is not strong enough to weaken the polarized identities between the Irish and the British (McGarry & O'Leary, 2006). Independently of the debate on where the emphasis of identity should be placed, there is an overall agreement that the existence of two communities is central to the Northern Ireland case (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). However, according to them (2012), those primordial divisions do not explain why the conflict erupted, why at that moment and why it lingered on so long (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012).

Part of that explanation could be based on the extreme degree of segregation of the Northern Irish society. Already before the outbreak of the Troubles Catholics and Protestants have been residentially segregated. This also explains the other forms of segregation like different newspapers, football (sports) clubs and schools (Abrams et al., 2004). Surveys from 1968 to 1998 show that approximately 55 per cent of Protestants and 75 per cent of Catholics report that "all or most" of their friends are of the same religion as themselves (Cairns & Hewstone, 2002 in Abrams et al., 2004). Segregation only allows stereotypes to flourish (Whyte, 1990, in Abrams et al., 2004). Therefore Gallagher (1995, in Abrams et al., 2004) argues that this "*segregation sustains conflict by creating a social climate that fosters mutual ignorance and suspicion*" (Gallagher, 1995, in Abrams et al., 2004, p. 271).

A more Marxist explanation is that the conflict was a result of discrimination and inequality in which Britain was seen as the colonial power (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). Northern Ireland before the Troubles was one of the least prosperous areas within the European Community, with large families, high unemployment rates and poor housing and health standards. Because of the domination of the Protestants this led to inequality. There was for example higher unemployment for Catholics than for Protestants, but it was also visible in number of home owners and the number of children leaving school early (Cairns & Darby, 1998).

When looking beyond those ambiguities there are historical, religious, political, economic and psychological elements that altogether explain the violence during the Troubles (Cairns & Darby, 1998). Therefore Edwards and McGrattan (2012) describe it as follows:

"*The Northern Ireland conflict emerged and persisted due to historical choices. These choices were influenced by ideological or political preferences, coloured by perceived grievances and opportunities, and shaped by previous vents and received 'truths' about history – nevertheless, at each step alternatives existed".*   *Edwards & McGrattan, 2012, p.143.*

2.1.2 Northern Ireland Today

According to Mac Ginty et al. (2007) reaching a peace deal is not the same as reaching peace. Even though the GFA was agreed upon in 1998, Northern Ireland is facing difficulties in the transition towards peace. It is still engaged in low levels of violence and civil disturbances, political stubbornness and public discontent with the elite level peace accords (Mac Ginty et al., 2007). Furthermore, even today, Northern Ireland is still very divided (BBC, 2012a). Segregation is again seen as one of the reasons for the continuous mistrust between the two groups (The Economist, 2006). The peace walls (built during the Troubles to separate one community from the other) have only been extended or heightened and even nine more have been built. Also the intimidation of families who are living in the 'wrong' neighbourhood, disputes on the annual parades and the overall culture of rioting, are all

contributing to more segregation (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012), as well as separate education. The majority of children are taught in separate schools (Nolan, 2017). Although there are 45 integrated schools throughout Northern Ireland, this only contains 4 per cent of the school population (BBC, 2014). The divide is also still visible in preferred newspapers, political parties, cultural and sports organizations and the preferred version of history. One consequence to this segregation is that both groups fail to be able to understand or empathize with the position of the other (Mac Ginty et al., 2007).

Also the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) (2016) sees these issues and argues that there still remains a real need of support for the region on the overall peace process. This includes: *"more efforts to develop and deepen reconciliation between divided communities; increase tolerance and respect to reduce the levels of sectarianism and racism; promote increased community cohesion; and address the legacy of the past"* (SEUPB, 2016, p.1), which is encouraged in the PEACE IV programme that lasts until 2020.

2.2 Brexit in Northern Ireland

In the referendum on June 2016 the UK voted to leave with 51,9 per cent, however, 56,8 per cent of the Northern Ireland population voted to stay in the EU (BBC, 2017a). In the period leading up to the referendum Northern Ireland was rarely mentioned in the whole debate while Brexit might have a significant impact on the situation of the region (Burke, 2016). This possible impact of Brexit in Northern Ireland is based on four main issues, namely on the economy, politics, border and security, as outlined in the introduction. EU funding is part of those issues especially when realizing that there are just few European regions that have benefited as much from EU membership as Northern Ireland did (Hayward, 2016). All this funding needs to be replaced by funding from London, but when compared to the current distribution of funds (Mars et al, 2016) this will be hard to realize for the UK government. This while, Northern Ireland is already the UK region with the highest rates of economic inactivity, long-term and youth unemployment and child poverty (Hayward, 2016). These issues are acknowledged by the former Northern Irish government in a letter send to Theresa May on the 10th of August 2016.

The UK government stated that the negotiations with the EU should involve full engagement of the government of Northern Ireland to be able to protect the interests of all parts of the UK. Therefore the Northern Ireland's former First Minister and deputy First Minister have written a letter to the UK Prime Minister to highlight five priority issues among which is the border and EU funding. In their letter they stress that "[i]*t is equally important that the border does not create an incentive for those who would wish to undermine the peace process and / or the political settlement".* Besides they outline their worries on the uncertainty on a significant amount of future EU funding among several sectors (The Northern Ireland Assembly, 2016). Their worries on several issues are motivated in the research paper which was the motivation for the letter, parts of it are outlined below.

*"**The Peace Process and British-Irish Relations:** UK withdrawal from the EU will represent a significantly changed context for the work of the devolved institutions and the cross-border bodies established under the Agreement. These bodies might be subject to any stresses emerging in UK-Ireland relations, as a result of the UK's withdrawal from the EU.*

*"**The European Social Fund (ESF):** The ESF has played a major role in supporting employment and skills development in NI. Call 1 of the 2014-2020 programme is currently supporting 65 community and*

voluntary groups. These projects may be negatively impacted if Brexit occurs before the end of 2020 and without the ESF programme there may be a loss in the value of investment for future skills development.

The voluntary and community sector: *The impact on the sector will depend upon a number of factors including current and future access to EU funding and the impact of the economic climate on demand for third sector services. One particular concern to Northern Ireland and the border regions will be the impact of the UK's withdrawal on EU funding opportunities that promote community relations. An example of such a Programme is PEACE IV, a cross-border initiative financed through the EU European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).*

Community Relations: *Northern Ireland has benefited from EU funding for promoting reconciliation, particularly the PEACE Programme. The current (and most probably last) manifestation of this, PEACE IV, is operational until 2020. However, the EU also contributes to other funds, such as International Fund for Ireland, and the Belfast Agreement refers to the EU as a site of partnership and co-operation between the UK and Irish governments."*

Northern Ireland Assembly, 2016, pp.24-40.

These issues acknowledged by both parties (before their government collapsed) outline some of the uncertainties that arise in Northern Ireland with Brexit and show the dependency on the EU on the different levels of society and peacebuilding.

3. Theories on Peacebuilding

The letter from the First Minister and deputy First Minister outline several concerns on the peace process in Northern Ireland that impacts on different levels of the society. To understand the situation in Northern Ireland, this chapter outlines the theory on Peacebuilding. It describes what peacebuilding is, which levels of peacebuilding there are and it explains the influence of external actors on peacebuilding.

3.1 Peacebuilding

Ethnic conflicts can be described as *"the extreme political polarization of the contending parties, stereotyping of the outgroup and feelings of intense animosity and longstanding hostility between contending groups."* (Byrne & Irvin, 2002, as cited by Byrne et al., 2008). Those conflicting groups are often motivated by exclusion from politics and economic resources as well as threats to their identity which can motivate them to resort to violence. Therefore Byrne et al. (2008) argue that addressing those issues should be an important part of a peacebuilding process.

Peacebuilding is a broad term with many different interpretations, according to Schirch (2008) peacebuilding is often used as an 'umbrella-term' to encompass other terms such as conflict resolution, management, mitigation, prevention or transformation. Besides, peacebuilding itself is also defined and used in different ways. This can differ based on the timespan, when does peacebuilding begin and end? But there are also differences in types of peacebuilding, like political, structural or social peacebuilding (Schrich, 2008). Originally Galtung (1976, as cited by Fischer, 1993) describes it as *"a structure that removes the causes of war and provides alternatives to war".* This is in line with Harbottle (1980) who adds that peacebuilding needs to establish confidence and trust between the antagonists, improve communication and assist in development of a new social and economic relationship involving cooperation and peaceful coexistence. However Lederach (1997, as cited by International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (IAHPC), 2007) sees peacebuilding as an even broader term, something that:

> *"..is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct."*   – Lederach, 1997 in IAHPC, 2007.

Lederach (1997, as cited by Buchanan, 2008) sees three levels of peacebuilding in a society; a top (Track I), middle (Track II) and bottom (Track III) level. Where he argues that every level of society is required to be involved in peacebuilding. Track I is seen as the official actions by governmental and diplomatic actors. Track II focuses on unofficial actions of facilitation and consultation by non-governmental actors like religious leaders or academics. The last track, track III focuses on grassroots actors that provide training, capacity building, empowerments, human rights and development work. All levels together are needed to establish an infrastructure across all levels of a society for a long-term commitment towards peace (Lederach, 1997, as cited by Buchanan, 2008).

3.2 Consociationalism

At the top level of society (track I) there are several options towards peace with ethno-national groups, like partition (Sambanis, 2000) or power-sharing (Schneckner, 2002). The most prescribed solution

towards peace for divided societies is that of consociationalism (Reynolds, 2000). The key idea of this specific form of power-sharing is that two or more ethno-national groups have to jointly rule the common polity and take decisions in consensus. This concept of conflict regulation was shaped by the work of Lijphart in the '70s (Schneckener, 2002). Consociationalism holds four basic elements: "*First is executive power sharing among the representatives of all significant groups (grand coalition); second, a high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it (segmental autonomy); third, proportional representation and proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds (proportionality); and fourth, a minority veto on the most vital issues (mutual veto)*" (Lijphart, 1977, in Reynolds, 1999). These elements should guarantee that the government becomes an inclusive multi-ethnic coalition and it avoids a form of majoritarianism that can lead to permanent exclusion of one or more minority groups (Reynolds, 1999). The idea behind consociationalism is that it should provide a stable democracy through consensus among elites (Lijphart, 1984; 1996 in Byrne, 2001), with the ultimate goal that working together and making decisions by consensus will lead to turn opponents into partners (Schneckerner, 2002). However, there are also critiques on this Track I solution, among others, that consociationalism only reinforces the antagonistic identities that are supposed to be managed into less antagonistic forms. This because consociationalism avoids conflict between the different groups by reducing contact between them which only leads to a preference of more segregation (Dixon, 2011).

3.3 Civil Society

As Lederach explained, every level of society is needed to be involved in peacebuilding (1997, as cited by Buchanan, 2008). The interest in other levels in peacebuilding started with the 'local turn', in which the international community started focusing on local solutions after the many critiques they received on their (top-down) liberal peacebuilding. Liberal peacebuilding was supposed to build "*post-conflict societies through the export of liberal frameworks of 'good 'governance', democratic elections, human rights, the rule of law and market relations*" (Chandler, 2010a, pp 138). However, liberal peacebuilding had been disappointing, many critiques on liberal peacebuilding have been focused on the implementation problems, especially on its top-down approaches where universal values are seen as remedy for local problems but also that liberalization does not always lead to peace (Leeuwen et al, 2012). The international community became more aware of the legitimacy and sustainability advantages that could be gained by working together with local partners (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Local peacebuilding started with research of Lederach who argued that "*the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture*" (Lederach 1994, as cited by Leonardsson & Rud, 2015, p. 826). This idea is in line with research of Varshney (2001) who argues that interethnic networks within communities can work as agents of peace. Both formal and informal engagement between ethnic groups can build bridges, manage tensions and thus promote peace. Such a space, that makes those interconnections between individuals or families possible and which is independent of the state, is seen as civil society.

Civil society can therefore promote those interethnic networks through communication between members of different religious communities, civic networks or associations based on cultural, political, economic and social needs. Such interethnic community life is mostly experienced locally, therefore it is hard to build those networks through top-down approaches and should local peacebuilding be considered (Varshney, 2001). Furthermore civil society is seen as a crucial agent that can influence the political system and provide a more solid foundation to democratization, the rule of law and human rights. This because civil society can be a counter balance to the state through the

capacity of individuals to organize themselves collectively (Belloni, 2001). So, civil society can act as an agent for peace at the local level as well as influence the political system from the bottom-up. Therefore, building civil society is used as approach to transform conflict and to build trust, transparency and openness between communities. This can be done by for example, integrated education, efforts to end employment discrimination and encourage economic investments (Byrne, 1995 in Byrne, 2001). Civil society building can result in a more legitimate way of peacebuilding because it can focus on the local expectations (Mac Ginty, 2008). It can include several types of bodies, from trade unions, professional bodies and churches towards NGOs and social movements (Acheson & Milofsky, 2008). However, most peacebuilding funding meant to support civil society is spend on a narrow set of NGOs (Chandler, 2010). NGO stands for a non-governmental organization, which according to the World Bank (1995) are *"private organizations that pursue activities to relieve the suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development"* (World Bank, 1995, p.7). Also Pouligny (2005) saw this increasing focus of peace operations towards both local as well as international NGOs. These NGOs play a large role in post-conflict societies and it is seen as a part of the process of democratization (Pouligny, 2005). NGOs can be effective to bring grassroots (track III) and mid-range participants (track II) together and provide needed social services. Because NGOs work often in communities they are able to secure trust, create spaces for informal dialogue and therefore strengthen civil society (Racioppi & O'Sullivan See, 2007).

However, some issues arise with civil society building. Verkoren and Van Leeuwen (2013) argue that it often creates frictions, for example local legitimacy can be at odds with international legitimacy (and its global values). But frictions can also arise with donor preferences for specific local NGOs, certain partners or reluctance to support any political activities. They argue that in practice there is much uncertainty when a post-conflict country lacks institutional capacity and local actors take over. These local actors will provide for the basic needs and/or security but often only in their own groups interests (Verkoren & Van Leeuwen, 2013). Due to those frictions, Verkoren and Van Leeuwen (2013) argue that intervening organizations should be careful with local peacebuilding implementations because results are not always predictable and positive.

3.4 External Support

Besides these three tracks of peacebuilding (from track I which focuses on the elite level up to track III at the grassroots level) also external economic aid is a necessary component of any successful intervention in ethno-political conflicts. This because external economic aid can address economic deprivation and structural inequality by providing communities with both human and material resources. This can be through several different projects focusing on for example humanitarian relief, cross-border conflicts, victims of terrorist attacks and famine, as well as projects focusing on reintegration of combatants or setting up a democratic framework for fair and free elections (Byrne et al., 2008). External economic aid can help reduce violence, encourage negotiations and peaceful settlements of disputes, because it is hoped that economic growth will spill over (Byrne et al., 2008) into the social and political arenas to decrease the intensity of the conflict (Byrne & Ayulo, 1998). Although, they argue that such external economic aid needs to create action thinking within local peacebuilding models to be able to transform conflict (Byrne and Ayulo, 1998). Therefore to build sustainable peace, external economic aid needs to be combined with other peacebuilding activities (Byrne et al., 2008). This is in line with the argument of Irvin and Byrne (2004) that economic aid alone will not be a solution to a political problem but part of it can be creating a growing economy. On the

other hand, as Byrne and Ayulo (1998) outline, this could also been seen as just a short-term strategy, because such an expanding economy can only be sustained with stable political and socio-economic conditions. International funding agencies need to understand the impacts their assistance can cause, like perceptions that the ethnic rival is receiving more of the available economic resources (Byrne & Ayulo, 1998). Therefore Byrne et al. (2008) stated that when not targeted correctly external economic aid can also reinforce divisions and increase existing violence. Funding agencies, NGOs and local communities together need to take a shared responsibility to assure socio-economic resources are correctly used for peacebuilding at all levels of society (Byrne & Ayulo, 1998).

3.5 Dependency of Civil Society Building NGOs

Since the local turn, external economic aid is among others spend on civil society building NGOs to encourage local peacebuilding. However, besides the critiques that civil society building has received on it local approach, there is also critique with focus on the funder of such peacebuilding: external economic aid. Namely, Belloni (2001) argues that external economic aid makes local development dependent on international presence, which he argues, only hinders the formation of an open and democratic civil society (Belloni, 2001). Also Skarlato et al. (2015) are critical on how funding can create a certain degree of dependency. First of all, because the external funding discourages local communities from finding internal resources. Secondly, such NGOs often serve certain interests (Varshney, 2001) because they are externally driven and dependent upon international resources (Belloni, 2001). Therefore they are based on donor-driven rules, schemas, language and logics (Creary & Byrne, 2014 in Skarlato et al., 2015). Thirdly, most of the projects are not sustainable (Skarlato et al., 2015), NGOs need to redirect their accountability to the donor due to top-down planning and top-down funding. This results that most NGOs adopt project based work because they are easier to monitor, assess (Antrobus, 1987) and can create fast results (Skarlato et al., 2015; Belloni 2010). While long-term programmes can create more security for both the organization as well as the participants (Antrobus, 1987) because they can be more effective and sustainable (Skarlato et al., 2015). According to Belloni and Hemmer (2009) these issues were visible in Bosnia where the availability of external economic aid created problems: (1) it resulted in that NGOs were focused on the preference of donors instead of the needs of the communities, (2) it discouraged cooperation and long-term programmes because of competition between local organisations and (3) it created NGOs not motivated by ideals but ones that saw an opportunity for jobs and took advantage of the available money. Though, when less money became available the new 'opportunistic' local NGOs disappeared, the ones surviving are seen as the ones more driven by ideals than money (Belloni and Hemmer, 2009).

Some of these critiques depend on whether it is a local or an international NGO, because according to Verkoren and Van Leeuwen (2013) local NGOs can reach on the ground better because they are deeply rooted in the communities and are seen as legitimate within those communities. While international NGOs might focus on Western norms and have international legitimacy, but support on the ground might be harder to reach (Verkoren & Van Leeuwen, 2013).

3.5.1 Solutions for Dependency

The International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) sees that funding is in most cases the major issue in the way towards sustainability (INTRAC, 2017). Therefore they advise donors how to fund organizations without encouraging dependency. Which can be done through among other things, by building trust and long-standing relationships as well as having a long-term vision (INTRAC, 2015). Besides, solutions to limit dependence for NGOs on external funds are argued by Antrobus (1987)

NGOs should focus on looking for a variety of funds to secure their future. To become less dependent on funding in general, NGOs could generate their own funding, through for example consultancies, training or the sale of material/publications. However both solutions are time-consuming, stressful and changes the focus of the NGOs towards funding instead of their goal. Besides, special/extra staff will probably be needed to arrange these solutions (Antrobus, 1987).

3.6 Conceptual Model

Altogether, there are many theories, solutions and critiques on peacebuilding. The conceptual model, visible in figure 3.6.1, incorporates the theory with the situation in Northern Ireland.

Note: The black arrows outline an existing relation which are going to be described while the dotted arrows outline relations that are suggested by theory but that is going to be investigated during this research.

The conceptual model (figure 3.6.1) shows in box 1 what is needed to build peace according to the theory as outlined in this chapter. Peacebuilding should at least include all levels of society, external support is argued as a necessary component to peace, as well as the need for a long-term commitment. The arrow from box 1 towards box 2 outlines the first subquestion: *"how does current peacebuilding manifest itself in Northern Ireland?"*. So, is the theory (box 1) applicable in Northern Ireland? As mentioned in the introduction, peacebuilding in Northern Ireland at least includes consociationalism, civil society and aid from the EU which is made visible in box 2. This second box represents part of subquestion two, to describe the relations within box 2: *"what role does the EU have in Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and how can Brexit influence this role?"*. How does the EU fit within the peace process in Northern Ireland? The other part of subquestion two arises when Brexit is included in the model (box 3). The arrow between Brexit (box 3) and peacebuilding in Northern Ireland (box 2) represents this part of subquestion two, to answer how can Brexit influence the overall role of the EU? Box 4 is the result of the EU aid combined with the idea that civil society can help build peace which creates civil society building NGOs. Because as outlined in the introduction, the EU set up the PEACE programmes to focus on civil society and grassroots peacebuilding. This arrow towards box 4, leads to the following subquestion: *"what is the impact of external economic aid in the form of the EU PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland and why does that certain impact arise?"*. So, what is the impact of the EU on those NGOs? Moreover, as outlined in the theoretical framework, external economic aid can lead to dependency among NGOs. To research whether this theory of Belloni (2001) is also applicable in the case of Northern Ireland and thus if there is a relation, the dotted arrow is drawn between the NGOs and dependency. This dotted arrow represents subquestion three: *"to what extent do civil society building NGOs in Northern Ireland depend on external economic aid from the EU and how did this dependency come about?"*.

The second part of this research arises with the addition of Brexit in the whole situation. What will Brexit have for impact on the peace process and how can be responded to Brexit? Therefore the double arrow between Brexit and civil society building NGOs is drawn, to not only investigate the relation between the impact of Brexit on the NGOs but also to relate it back to Brexit and how the organisations can react on Brexit. Subquestions five and six outline those relations: *"what are the concerns of civil society building NGOs regarding Brexit and why do those concerns arise?"* and *"how can civil society building NGOs anticipate to Brexit?"*.

To conclude it all, the two dotted arrows back to box 1 are drawn to apply the findings of the research back to the theory. So, how do the findings of this research influence peacebuilding? This outlines the final research question *"what is the impact of external economic aid from the EU on*

peacebuilding in Northern Ireland with the focus on civil society building NGOs and how can Brexit influence that?".

Figure 3.6.1 Conceptual Model

Source: Own interpretation of Theories

Note: The black arrows outline an existing relation which are is going to be described while the dotted arrows outline relations that are suggested by theory but that relation is going to be investigated during this research.

4. Methodology

This research uses different research methods, both qualitative and quantitative. The operationalization, the justification of several decisions and the analysis tools that are used are explained in this chapter.

As this research focuses on the influence of external economic aid on civil society building NGOs in Northern Ireland in light of Brexit, it can be described as a case study. According to Simons (2009, in Thomas 2011, p512) a "*case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system in a "real life" context".* Case studies are useful in an environment rich with contextual variables and is mostly used with research questions focusing on how and why (Shell, 1992). It gives the researcher a chance to closely examine data within a specific context (Zainal, 2007). With case study research, generalizing is difficult because the small group that is researched cannot represent all similar groups or situations (Barnes et al., 1994), so, the conclusions drawn in this research only apply on the participants of this research. Case studies are mostly known as a triangulated research strategy through either data, investigators, theories or methodologies, which all lead to validity of the research process (Tellis, 1997). Therefore, this research uses different methods to explore the case study and create more validity because when different methods lead to the same results its reliability increases (Boeije et al., 2009). Besides, as Skarlato et al. (2015) argues both qualitative and quantitative methods are needed for further research to optimize current peacebuilding projects and assist in future ones, as well as to be able to analyse both tangible and intangible results of those initiatives.

To be able to understand the specific situation of Northern Ireland in to the broader context of peacebuilding as outlined in the theoretical framework, literature research on the case of Northern Ireland is done. This also gives an overall picture in which the quantitative and qualitative research is conducted within. To get quantitative data, the internet survey is chosen as method because surveys can be useful to do descriptive research on a large scale (Boeije, 2009). Besides, internet surveys are easy to send, fast to process because all the data is directly available for analysis (Boeije, 2009) and it is cheap to carry out. However, the response rates for internet surveys is low (Fricker Jr. et al., 2002). To be able to get an overall view of the situation, this survey research is combined with qualitative research. Qualitative research is a good method to be able to understand and explain situations, especially interviews can be a useful method to be able to go in-depth on a subject with different actors involved (Boeije & Hox, 2009). For this reason, the method of in-depth interviews is chosen to get an understanding of the situation of the NGOs. This is combined with information gained from different Brexit events where civil society building NGOs and academics were gathered together to discuss Brexit as well as from position papers that outline views on Brexit from specific actors.

4.1 Operationalization
4.1.1 Research Group
For this research it is chosen to focus on NGOs that received EU PEACE funding, even though other EU-funds (like interreg and other regional/structural funds) might also contribute to peace. This because the PEACE programme is specifically designed to contribute to peace and more importantly to civil society building, while the other funds also have other objectives. However, the process for distribution of the PEACE IV money from the counties to the local organizations has not finished yet.

Thus, it is not possible to get an overview of all the organizations in Northern Ireland who will receive PEACE IV funding. That is why the organizations that received funding through PEACE III instead of PEACE IV are used in this research, because this programme is completed and all the funding has been granted. The following website http://www.seupb.eu/programmes2007-2013/beneficiaries.aspx is used to find the respondents, because it has an overview of the 1495 the successful applications for projects of PEACE III. A selection has been made to contact only the relevant parties. Organisations that only contributed with technical assistance were deleted, as well as all the city and county councils and organisations that were located outside Northern Ireland. Also if organisations appeared more than once on the list, because they applied for funding several times for different projects, the doubles were deleted. After the selection from this list only 536 organisations remained. The 536 were googled to find contact information. 284 e-mail addresses and 44 contact forms on a website were found which have all been contacted to fill in the survey, in the end 26 organisations responded to the survey (the list of contacted organisations is added in appendix 2). This system might be biased because of several reasons. First of all it excludes NGOs who do not have a website or any information online. Besides, because the list includes the organisations that were active around 2007-2013, some of them might not exist anymore. Lastly, the population only includes NGOs that have received (some) EU funding so they are therefore already more dependent than NGOs that did not receive any at all.

4.1.2 Survey

The survey is made with the subquestions as guidelines and can be found in appendix 4. The survey itself contained twenty questions and took around ten minutes to fill in. It is made with Google forms to have an easy and free tool to conduct the survey. The survey was send on the 17th of May and a week later a reminder was send to push organizations to fill it out. The response rate was very low, for this reason, all organisations with a Facebook page (81) also received two reminders through that medium, the rest received a third reminder by mail. The survey was closed at the 8th of June with 26 responses.

The questions were mostly multiple choice questions because these type of questions are easy to process. However, with multiple choice questions, respondents are required to choose an answer even though it might not totally reflect their own answers. Therefore most multiple choice questions in the survey had the option to choose -other…, and clarify the answer. Besides, surveys and especially multiple choice questions can push a respondent in a certain direction because of the premade answers and the selection of answers that are and are not included within the multiple choice options (based on guidelines of Boeije & Hox, 2009 on doing survey research). This is taken into account with the analysis of the survey.

4.1.3 Interviews

For the interviews a list of subjects was prepared to keep an overall consistency with the several interviews that were done. The topic list can be found in appendix 3 and it is based on the subquestions together with insights gained from the survey research. Though during the interviews it was taken into account to stay flexible and to be able to ask follow-up questions or change the order of the questions in case interesting views, ideas or stories arose (based on guidelines of Boeije & Hox, 2009).

Interviewees were selected from the respondents of the survey. In the survey, respondents were asked whether they would be open for an interview on the topic. This way of selecting interviewees, made it easier to approach them because they had already agreed on participating in it and a personal e-mail address was given. However, this group might already be biased because before the interview

they might have been pushed into a direction through the survey. At the start of the interviews, the interviewees were informed about the research and its goal, and asked whether the representative of the organisation would be okay with recording the interview. The respondents needed to agree on recording the interview so it was possible to write a transcript from which the analysis could be done and to be able to use citations (based on guidelines on doing interviews from Spradley, 1979). All the interviews (with consent of the respondent) were typed out and are available at request.

In the end five interviews were conducted with civil society building NGOs of which one by phone and one through email. These five organisations at least received PEACE III funding and focused in some way on peacebuilding although they were all very different. It included a community centre in a protestant neighbourhood in Belfast, a trade union organisation that helped with conflicts at the workplace, two network organisations that focused on people in rural areas and a community organisation promoting dialogue between the two groups just outside Belfast. Besides those five interviews with civil society building NGOs, two more interviews were conducted. One interview was with a representative of NICVA (a representative umbrella body for the voluntary and community sector in Northern Ireland, (NICVA, 2017)) and another interview by phone with a representative of the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) (who are among other things, responsible for the implementation of PEACE funding, (SEUPB, 2017a)). For those two interviews different topic lists were used, to be able to get an overall view of the perspective of the whole voluntary and community sector through the interview with NICVA and to gain insights on future plans before and after Brexit became a reality from the SEUPB (these topic lists can also be found in appendix 3).

4.1.4 Events and Position Papers
To be able to get a better understanding on the situation and the views of the civil society building NGOs specifically on Brexit, insights are gained at two events: a conference, 'Brexit: Charting a Way Forward, A Civil society Dialogue' and a focus group event organized by NICVA together with the Department for Communities: 'Brexit Series'. From both events summaries have been published on respectively the website of the Human Rights Consortium and NICVA, those are combined with personal notes and used in the analysis. Finally, three position papers on Brexit have been used to get a better understanding of positions from different perspectives: Human Rights Consortium, Rural Sector and the UK and Irish Voluntary and Community Sector. A clear list of all the analysed qualitative data and its sources can be found in appendix 1.

4.2 Subquestions
To be able to answer the research question, each subquestion needs to be answered first. The method used to answer each subquestion is described below.
1   *How does current peacebuilding manifest itself in Northern Ireland?*
This question is answered by means of literature research which gives an overview of the different processes at work in Northern Ireland that contribute to peace. Several views of academics are compared and outline the situation.

2   *What role does the EU have in Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and how can Brexit influence this role?*
This question in answered by means of literature research. Views of different academics on the influence of the EU in Northern Ireland are compared as well as articles that outline the concerns and

solutions on Brexit are researched. Together this gives an overview of the role of the EU in Northern Ireland and the possible impact of Brexit on the role of the EU.

3   *To what extent do civil society building NGOs depend on external economic aid from the EU and how did this dependency come about?*

To answer this subquestion dependency is researched by looking at the different factors of dependency. Those are the distribution of external and internal funding, the variety of its funding, whether a NGO generates its own funding, but dependency can also be seen in the influence donors have on the work of NGOs, the duration of projects and the aim/goals of the organisations. Therefore, the distribution and variety of funding is researched through the survey by asking to give an indication of the percentage of external funding compared with internal funding over their total resources and how dependent they are on several external economic donors. They are also asked what their top three main resources are (which can also include generating own funding). The influence of donors is investigated by comparing the respondents' views on the impact of donors in general with the views on the impact of the EU as donor through PEACE. Besides, the average duration of their projects is asked, together with the main reason for this duration to be able to check whether donors do influence such decisions in the first place.

4   *What is the impact of external economic aid in the form of the EU PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland and why does that certain impact arise?*

This subquestion is a combination of both the survey and the interview research, in the survey is asked if donors in general and the EU as donor through PEACE, influence the duration of their projects, the goal of their organisation and if they create more bureaucratic work. This is compared with the interviews where experiences on PEACE programmes are asked. The experiences are divided into the impact of the PEACE programmes on the peace process and the implementation of the programme itself.

5   *What are the concerns of civil society building NGOs regarding Brexit and why do those concerns arise?*

This subquestion is answered by asking respondents in the survey, if they think Brexit will have a positive or negative impact on the Northern Ireland society, the overall peace process and the civil society building NGOs. This is substantiated by the interviews with the question why they think that and what their concerns are regarding the Northern Ireland society, the peace process and the NGOs themselves. Besides, the insights gained at the Brexit events and collected from the position papers are used to get a broader overview of all the concerns and opportunities of Brexit.

6   *How can civil society building NGOs anticipate to Brexit?*

To answer this subquestion, first it is researched whether NGOs are already preparing for Brexit and how. This is followed by the question on how NGOs could prepare for Brexit, what they are doing already and what they think needs to be done. This is asked both at the level of the NGOs themselves as well as the view on the whole sector. The views heard at the Brexit events and position papers are also incorporated here to be able to give a broader view on the possibilities and needs for the community and voluntary sector for the future.

4.3 Analysis

The data of the survey is analysed through IBM SPSS Statistics 24 and it is used for descriptive statistics. The data describes the situation of NGOs, if and how EU funding impacts them and what their view is on Brexit in general. However, because 26 NGOs responded to the survey there are no regressions analyses and relations between groups done but only overall description of the data. These are outlined in graphs in the results chapter. The tables with results can be found in appendix 6.

The interviews are transcribed and uploaded in NVivo. NVivo 11 is a computer software, developed by QSR international, to help with systematically analysing qualitative data. With the subquestions, the survey and the literature research an analysis plan was set up to be able to systematically analyse all the collected qualitative data (the interviews, the position papers and the insights gained at the two events). The plan was flexible, so when new insights were found in the data the plan could be adapted. Then, data would be looked at again with this new way of analysing the data. The analysis plan is used as a guide through the process of coding all the data and to be able to look for specific answers. The coding is done to be able to evaluate and organize all the data and to identify and understand meanings behind it (as proposed by Clifford et al., 2016), with the goal to find explanations and insights that could help explain the data from the survey. For this research, the plan was divided between several topics: the situation in Northern Ireland in general, the impact of Brexit on different levels of society, funding, impact and implementation of PEACE funding and preparations of funding. Each subject was then split between positive and negative categories in which views and ideas are divided over. This way a clear division is made between arguments in favour or against certain topics, which makes that the analysis can be based on pros and cons with the corresponding arguments. Besides, this can be amplified with experiences told by the interviewees on each of the subquestions. The detailed analysis plan is added in appendix 5.

The interviews and the survey are combined to find the answers on the subquestions three, four, five and six. Each subquestion is answered by first outlining the results from the survey with graphs and the description of the data. The answer is then amplified and compared by citations, stories and insights gained from the qualitative data and describes both the positive and negative arguments of each subquestion. This is done because the use of several detailed quotations can strengthen the arguments made in the analysis and therefore can also improve the 'rigour' of the research. Together this outlines a description of the situation in Northern Ireland as viewed by the respondents. It explains how the respondents perceive peacebuilding in Northern Ireland especially with the focus on civil society building done by the EU. Not only practically explaining what the EU did for them and their organisation. But it also expands on how Brexit is perceived by the respondents on topics like the society in general, peacebuilding and their own organisations. In the end it concludes with the ideas of the respondents on the possibilities, concerns and solutions for the future. All those perceptions of respondents are analysed and interpreted on what they mean and why respondents perceive certain things.

5. Results: Peace in Northern Ireland

As Lederach explains, all levels of society are important to build peace. This chapter outlines how those levels of peacebuilding have been shaped in Northern Ireland and what the EU contributes to that solution. Together this answers subquestion one and two.

 1 *How does current peacebuilding manifest itself in Northern Ireland?*
 2 *What role does the EU have in Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and how can Brexit influence this role?*

The EU got involved as an external actor in the conflict in the 1990s. The EU could support the process towards peace, but it did not have means to impose any form of peace (Hayward, 2007). The conflict in Northern Ireland distressed the economy and its infrastructure. Poverty, inequality, social and economic deprivation, educational disadvantage and social exclusion had impacted daily life of people in Northern Ireland (Buchanan, 2014 in Skarlato et al., 2015). This situation led to the idea that external economic aid was needed to address economic grievances, structural inequality and sectarian relationships by assisting in social and economic development (Skarlato et al., 2015). As a result, the EU's greatest value in conflict resolution is the economic input towards development. The logic of the EU underscoring the GFA, is the EU's assumption that interests on both sides should be met through co-operation, which can increase mutual understanding. Thus, development, co-operation and peace are tight together in their view, which is also visible in the two major EU programmes PEACE and INTERREG (Hayward, 2007). Therefore, the EU intervention in Northern Ireland is not just a general case of external economic aid; Hayward and Murphy (2012) see it as a multilevel intervention that would not have been possible without the membership of the UK and the Republic of Ireland in the EU. The EU intervention works from several levels, from heads of government, local officials to grass-roots activists (Hayward & Murphy, 2012), it touches all levels of peacebuilding as seen as essential by Lederach. The workings of each of the levels of peacebuilding in Northern Ireland are explained below and then described within the context of the EU.

5.1 Consociationalism in Northern Ireland

During the conflict in Northern Ireland several efforts to reach consent on power-sharing governments were made, like the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973. With influence of the United States (US) as primary mediator, with its resources, capabilities and the promise of economic aid in case of peace, multi-party talks were facilitated. All the political representatives of paramilitary organizations and mainstream political parties were involved in this negotiation process, which led to the consociationalist GFA in 1998 (Byrne, 2001). This time the power-sharing negotiations succeeded which was possible because the context had changed, due to the reforms made on equality like the introduction of the universal adult suffrage (Conflict Archive on the Internet, 2016). This agreement established a single-chamber Assembly and Executive with full legislative power and executive competence on economic development, education, health and social services, agriculture, environment and finance. Only issues like defence, taxation, immigration and the monarchy are still decided upon in London (Zuhair, 2002). The Assembly is inclusive in its membership and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the Community (McGovern & Murphy, 2010). This 108-seated Assembly (since 2017 90-seated Assembly (Belfast Telegraph, 2017)) of Northern Ireland is being elected by proportional representation (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). The

GFA also called for human rights reforms, the establishment of a commission on police reform, the release of paramilitary prisoners and it required that all parties should use their influence to encourage paramilitary decommissioning (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012).

5.1.1 The EU and the Good Friday Agreement

The EU plays an important role within consociationalism in Northern Ireland. Namely, the context of the EU membership for both the UK and the Republic of Ireland is seen as part of the foundation of the peace process because it enabled a positive British-Irish relationship through the European integration process (Hayward, 2007). Therefore in the GFA the UK and the Republic of Ireland are named as 'partners in the EU' (Mars et al., 2016). After the agreement working together in the EU on common interests is seen as an important aspect of peacebuilding at the elite level (Track I). This indirect impact of the EU on peace in Northern Ireland is explained by Hayward (2007) through three main dimensions. First, policy development, in which the EU provides foundations for policy builders to have a framework from where to build on (Hayward 2007), around 60 to 80 per cent of the Northern Ireland Assembly's legislation have originated in Brussels (McGovern & Murphy, 2010). Secondly, the EU is seen as an inspiration for local politicians because the EU is a model of conflict resolution (Hayward, 2007). The EU started as the European Coal and Steel Community to unite Europe economically and politically to be able to secure peace after the Second World War (Europa.eu, 2017). John Hume (Member of European Parliament (MEP)) even draws parallels between the EU model and the GFA because both based on similar structures (In Hayward, 2007). The third dimension is based on the EU being a reference point in cross-border co-operation and the peace process. The EU has served to create functional cross-border co-operation and extended collaboration through a variety of EU programmes and networks (Hayward, 2007).

5.1.2 Peacebuilding for the Elite

Although the GFA and the indirect EU involvement established peace in Northern Ireland, the consociationalist power-sharing system, as outlined in the GFA, has not stopped the escalating sectarianism and divisions in everyday life (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). According to them, the power-sharing institutions only created incentives for political parties to radicalise rather than becoming more moderate. This is visible with the growth of both Sinn Fein and DUP with respect to their more centrist counterparts SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) and UUP (Ulster Unionist Party). In the elections in 2017 DUP became the biggest party with 28 seats in parliament followed by Sinn Fein with 27 seats (BBC, 2017c). Sinn Fein is still focused on a way towards unity with Ireland, while DUP for example announced to want a majoritarian voluntary coalition in parliament (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). The trend of growing radicalized political parties is in line with the more general critique on consociationalism as outlined by Dixon (2011) in the theoretical framework.

Besides, the GFA did not automatically settle the conflict and neither did it lead to a permanent stop of violence and intimidation between the two communities. While politicians were shaking hands, the riots in Belfast in 2001 for example, showed the depth of division between the communities (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). Those security concerns soon showed the fragility of this elite (Track I) peacemaking which led to the realization of the need for long-term changes. Both governments (Irish and British) adopted besides the power-sharing approaches also civil society approaches to build a grass-roots participation and they *"recognized the need to create an economic infrastructure to distribute resources equally to empower both communities" (Byrne, 2001, p. 341).* This realization led

beyond the high politics of parties and paramilitaries towards equally important efforts of 'on the ground' peacebuilding (Racioppi & O'Sullivan See, 2007).

5.2 Civil Society in Northern Ireland

The realisation of the need for this 'on the ground' (Track II and III) peacebuilding, created a shift in focus towards the voluntary and community sector. According to the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) there are approximately 6127 voluntary and community sector organisations in Northern Ireland (2017) (NICVA, 2017a). This high number of voluntary and community organizations is among other things due to the rise of them during the Troubles. Because of the so called 'democratic deficit' in which local government had little power and responsibility, and so the voluntary sector stepped in (Cochrane & Dunn, 2002). Until today the sector is extremely large, in total these organizations absorb some £574 million annually over a population of only 1.5 million (in 2017). The sector is an important employer, around 45 000 people work within the sector which is 5.3 per cent of the total Northern Ireland workforce with 60 per cent of them having a paid full time function (in 2014) (NICVA, 2017a). Part of this sector are the organizations focused on peace and conflict resolution, which, according to Cochrane and Dunn (2002) is a highly diverse group in areas as community development, mediation, reconciliation, intergroup contact and human rights activism. This diversity is mostly because the sector is unregulated and unstructured, but also the funding from the EU, US and the British government have contributed to the growth and diversifications in the NGO sector. According to Cochrane and Dunn (2002) the organizations focused on peace and conflict resolution do not all have coherent political objectives in Northern Ireland, on the one hand organizations are focused to erode or transform traditional identities, while other organisations focus on accommodating these identities by establishing political and social structures that would help for peaceful coexistence. Moreover, there are different types of organizations namely: cross-community groups, who work with both identities in joint activities. Inter-community groups who do work with both groups but separately from each other and then there are single-identity groups that focus on only one community (Cochrane & Dunn, 2002).

5.2.1 Civil Society and the EU

Part of this growth of the voluntary and community sector is because of the focus of the EU towards civil society as solution towards peace. Which as explained in the theoretical framework is in practice mostly done through NGOs. The funding programmes from the EU were designed as a conflict transformation tool and they have supported civil society initiatives and local and regional partnership arrangements (Hayward & Murphy, 2012) which contributes to track II and III levels of peacebuilding. In total, the EU supported civil society building NGOs by funding the INTERREG and the PEACE programmes paid by the European Regional Development Funds and the Structural Funds. *Peace I (1995-1999), Peace II (2000-2006), Peace III (2007-13) and Peace IV (2014-2020) represent a sophisticated and sustained example of 'peace-building from below' to complement rapprochement at the political elite level" (as cited by Phinnemore & McGowan, 2016).* Together the four PEACE programmes received already 1.5 billion euros from the EU (SEUPB, 2017). According to Phinnemore and McGowan (2016) these funds have been essential for the cross-border and cross-community projects. The projects have made significant contribution to peacebuilding in the past two decades. According to them these projects led to many positive experiences like the engagement in discussions on British/Irish histories, participation in storytelling for children and cross-border and cross-community events (Phinnemore & McGowan, 2016). Also Byrne et al. (2008) conclude their research

on a positive note on the impact of PEACE II. They argue that *"[t]he participation of grassroots NGOs, funding agency development officers and civil servants, and economic and political elites in a web of interdependent and collaborative relations had transformed local social-economic structures in a process of direct participatory democracy."* (Byrne et al., 2008). At last it is argued by Byrne and Ayulo (1998) that external economic aid in Northern Ireland has contributed to build up local socioeconomic and political indigenous infrastructures.

However, according to Buchanan (2008) the PEACE programmes have never had a comprehensive evaluation on their performance in their entirety, nor any detailed academic analysis from perspectives of conflict studies. Besides, some of the general critiques on local peacebuilding through NGOs are also heard on the EU PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland. For example the method of implementation and distribution of the money was highly complex, there were many bodies involved which not only made it complicated and inefficient, it was also very expensive (Buchanan, 2004). As well as, participation of cross-community activities was hard to achieve, especially in the socioeconomic deprived areas (Racioppi & O'Sullivan See, 2007). Lastly, Hayward (2007) argues that the perceptions in Northern Ireland on the EU's force on peacebuilding is seen at best as facilitating. Mostly because the EU is rarely associated with peacebuilding or cross border relations in the first place. There is a poor level of public knowledge in Northern Ireland about the EU and what it does. In her research an interviewee stated that the connective impact of the EU was only felt by NGOs, just because they are the only ones aware of the role of the EU at track III level (Hayward, 2007).

5.2.2 Dependency of Civil Society Building NGOs in Northern Ireland
Next to the implementation critiques of the PEACE programmes as outlined before, there is also a more general critique heard on the funding of the PEACE programmes. Byrne et al. (2008) argued that there was a big increase in the number of community groups focusing on conflict related issues since the 1990s. Many of them have been supported by external economic aid from the EU PEACE I and II programmes. This large peace industry that arose does have a financial interest in securing further funding from PEACE. Byrne et al. (2008) argue that the accessibility of such funding may have changed the attention of NGOs from development efforts towards money and keeping their funding (and their jobs). This sounds similar as the situation in Bosnia as explained by Belloni and Hemmer (2009) in the theoretical framework. One of the respondents in the research of Skarlato et al. (2015) on external economic aid in Northern Ireland, underscores this view that external economic aid leads to dependency. He saw serious progress in his community on the already achieved peacebuilding, though he noticed that funding did had to continue to ensure the continuation of that progress (Skarlato et al., 2015). This dependency issue is also visible in the argument of Racioppi and O'Sullivan See (2007) that it is not clear how many of those community-based initiatives can be sustained without external funds. Long-term engagement of such grassroots groups is not clear (Racioppi & O'Sullivan See, 2007). In that same research of Skarlato et al. (2015) half of their respondents wondered how their peace work in Northern Ireland would carry on without continuous international funding. At the moment of writing of the research of Skarlato et al. (2015), the PEACE funding started to decline already which showed that sustainability of projects was already becoming more pressing in Northern Ireland. Therefore they concluded that it is important that NGOs started looking for new funds (Skarlato et al., 2015).

5.2.3 Funding

The EU is not the only donor for NGOs in Northern Ireland, NGOs also receive money from its local government, the governments of the UK and Ireland (Hayward, 2007), the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) (IFI, 2017) or from trusts and foundations (Cochrane & Dunn, 2002). Besides, some NGOs receive money from connected organizations in their network or their international partner organisations (Hayward, 2007). According to research of NICVA on the State of the Sector throughout the years the distribution of funding sources changed. It shows that in the period 2003-2004 European funding represented 9.4 per cent of total funding of the sector while this reduced to 1.9 per cent in 2006-2007. This was due to cessation of PEACE II, which they argued decreased the level of dependency on European funding and created that in 2006-2007 only 2.1 per cent of the organisations was reliant on European funding for more than 75 per cent of their total funding. Although 92.8 per cent of the sector was dependent on the EU with less than 25 per cent of their total funding (NICVA, 2009). This trend continued with the later projects where research of NICVA shows that in 2013-2014 European funding is around 2 per cent of the total funding sources of the sector and was ranked number 5 of most important sources. With 1) non-departmental public bodies, 2) Central Government, 3) Grant Making Trusts and 4) General Public as more important, though the EU was the most important external economic funder (NICVA, 2017a)

6. Results: Dependency and Brexit

The results found in both the survey through descriptive statistics and the qualitative data through content analysis are outlined per subquestion in this chapter.

Note: Referring to the interviews is done by placing the letter of the specific interview (see appendix 1) in brackets after a sentence or citation. The percentages and graphs outlined in the results are based on 26 respondents (or otherwise indicated).

The survey has been completed by 26 NGOs. The majority of the NGOs is located in County Down (4) and Country Antrim (13) in which the Belfast is divided over. 2 NGOs indicated to be working in the whole of Northern Ireland. The rest of the NGOs are divided over County Armagh (1), Londonderry (2) and Tyrone (4) (appendix 6, table 1.1). Most of the organisations (18) indicated to already been set up before 1995, 5 of them between 1995-1999 and only 3 organisations indicated to exist less than 17 years (see figure 6.0.1). 23 of the respondents are registered as a charity, 2 as a non-profit organisation and 1 as a membership based association (appendix 6, table 1.3).

Figure 6.0.1: Number of NGOs set-up per time period of each of the PEACE programmes(N=26)

Source: Own data collection

The focus of the 26 NGOs is very diverse, the main areas of work of most NGOs are 1) promoting intergroup contact, 2) education and training and 3) promoting cultural development (figure 6.0.2). Their target group is mostly 1) young people (<25), 2) old people (>65) and 3) women. However, three NGOs also indicate not to work with one specific group but with all people (appendix 6, table 1.5). Moreover, the majority (23) of the NGOs indicated to work with both communities (appendix 6, table 1.4).

Figure 6.0.2: Main focus of work of the NGOs (N=26)

Source: Own data collection
(Percentage is calculated with 26 respondents, multiple answers possible (70 answers) and therefore the total percentage is higher than 100%)

6.1 External Economic Aid

To what extent do civil society building NGOs depend on external economic aid from the EU and how did this dependency come about?

6.1.1 Dependency and Funding

In the survey only 5 NGOs indicated that on average their projects run on a long-term basis (> 4 years), 14 between 1-4 years and 7 of the NGOs run short-term projects (figure 6.1.1.1). The most important reason for the specific duration of the projects is the availability of funding, following that the specific duration for their projects was chosen because it is most effective to reach their goal (appendix 6, table 2.2). In figure 6.1.1.2 this information is combined, which shows that funding is the main reason for NGOs to organise short-term programmes. For middle- and long-term programmes funding becomes less important while the effectiveness of the programmes is a more indicated reason for the longer duration of programmes.

Figure 6.1.1.1: Duration of the average project of the NGOs (N=26)

Source: Own data collection

Figure 6.1.1.2: Average duration of projects compared with the reasons behind the certain duration

Source: Own data collection
(N is respectively: 7, 17 and 6 (based on the number of answers instead of number of respondents, because multiple choices were possible))

NGOs in Northern Ireland receive external economic aid from several sources. 7 of the respondents of the survey indicate to only receive internal funding at the moment. 15 of the respondents received around 20-60 per cent of their funding from external sources. None of the NGOs indicated to receive 80 per cent or more international funding (figure 6.1.1.3). Part of these external sources is the EU who contributes to NGOs with several funds. According to the survey, 10 of the NGOs feel 'dependent' or 'very dependent' on EU funding, while only 4 NGOs feel dependent on the International Fund of Ireland and 6 on other international funds (figure 6.1.1.4). The feeling of dependency on the EU is also compared with the distribution of international funding versus other funding (figure 6.1.1.5). This indicates that NGOs with a higher ratio of international funding are more dependent on the EU as donor than NGOs of which international funding is just a small portion of their funding.

In figure 6.1.1.6 the level of dependency on the EU as external economic donor is split in NGOs set up before 1995 and ones set up after 1995. This shows that in proportion NGOs set up after 1995 indicate to be more dependent on the EU as ones who were set up earlier. This same effect can be seen in figures 6.1.1.7A and 6.1.1.7B. The impact of the EU as donor through peace, shows that almost 60 per cent of the NGOs set up after 1995 are influenced by the EU while only 23 per cent of NGOs set up before that period are influenced by the EU. This difference is not clear when looking at the impact of donors in general compared with the NGOs set up before and after 1995. Together this indicates that NGOs set up before 1995 are less dependent on the EU as well as less influenced by them compared with NGOs set up after that period.

Figure 6.1.1.3: Distribution of international versus other funding of the NGOs (N=26)

Source: Own data collection

Figure 6.1.1.4: Level of dependency on external economic donors, respectively EU, IFI and other international organisations (N=26)

Source: Own data collection

Figure 6.1.1.5: Number of organisations that feel dependent on the EU as donor in comparison with the distribution of international funding versus other funding (N=22)

Source: Own data collection
(The categories 'very dependent' & 'dependent' and 'very independent' & 'independent' are merged to 'dependent' and 'independent')

Figure 6.1.1.6: Level of dependency on the EU as external economic donors of both NGOs set up before (N=18) and after 1995 (N=8)

Source: Own data collection

Figure 6.1.1.7A: Influence of donors in general on decisions/work of NGOs set up before and after 1995(N=25)

Figure 6.1.1.7B: Influence of EU as donor through PEACE funding on decisions/work of NGOs set up before and after 1995 (N=20)

Source: Own data collection

Source: Own data collection

PEACE funding is part of the external economic aid from the EU. The survey shows that PEACE funding is the most important external donor for the NGOs. However, when looking at both internal and external funding, PEACE funding is the sixth most important source of funding. Local government is the main funder for the NGOs, followed by the Community Foundations Council and trusts or foundations. Generating own funding is the fourth most important resource (table 6.1.1.1). Furthermore, the representative of SEUPB argued in the interview that the voluntary and community sector are not dependent on EU funding because the funding is minimal now. Though they thought, perhaps it could have been an argument some ten years ago when there was a much higher level of external economic aid but since 2006-2007 there is been a gradual and slow decline in funding from the EU. So according to the representative the funding does not create a dependency culture, but "*it is very important for the work we do" (L).* Moreover, the representative of SEUPB stated that even before Brexit became a reality there was no plan for any future PEACE programmes yet, because it was too early to start formulating any detailed plan for post 2020, without identifying the needs of that time. Though, they would always been open to talk about possibilities on future PEACE programmes (L). Finally, the representative of SEUPB argues that those needs are important to identify, because not all needs and issues can be effectively addressed by external type of funding. There are things the EU cannot buy in a long-term peace process(L).

Table 6.1.1.1: Ranking of main donors of the NGOs

Ranking	Main sources of funding	Points
1	**Local Government**	38
2	**Community Relations Council**	21
3	**Trusts or Foundations**	16
4	**Generating own funding through research/consultations/training**	14
5	**National Lottery (fund)**	13
6	**EU PEACE funding**	9
7	**Partner Organisations**	7
8	**Other EU funding (Interreg, Regional funds etc.)**	4
9	Department of Foreign Affairs	4
10	Arts Council NI	3
11	Education Authority (EA)	3

12	Membership fees	3
13	Private Donors and Honesty Box contributions	3
14	**International fund of Ireland**	2
15	**Charities**	2
16	Trade Unions	2
17	Central government	2
18	we have a cocktail of funders depending on the type of programme	2

Source: Own data collection

(Created from tables 6.4A, 6.4B, 6.4C (see appendix) by point system, when ranked most important donor accounts for three points, second most important for two points, third most important for one point. Bold were available options on the multiple choice question, not bold were filled in answers at the option 'other..'.)

6.2 PEACE Programmes

What is the impact of external economic aid in the form of the EU PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland and why does that certain impact arise?

6.2.1 PEACE Funding Impact

"From the community perspective, Northern Ireland in the last 30 years has benefited from being part of greater Europe because of the funding and the grants that have been given for the peace process"(B).

PEACE funding is, as shown in the results of the survey, seen as the most important external economic donor, also by the interviewees its impact is argued as positive. The interviewees see benefits of the funding and grants in the creation of jobs (C) the rise in the actual physical infrastructures such as the peace bridge (F), the opportunities to organize cross border and cross community projects (F) and the possibility to do projects a bit different and/or bigger (D). A representative of Trademark said *"I think it [PEACE programmes] did have a massive impact. I know that myself, with talking with people and hearing the way people talk about this place and their identity, is changed massively now, as it was 20 years ago"*(C)*.* However, the expectations some people had of the PEACE funds might have influenced their views on the impact of PEACE. "[PEACE funds] *have contributed*" did a representative of the Rural Community Network say, but "*maybe not to the extent everyone had wished*" (F). This is visible in the response of a representative of the Lagan Youth and Community Centre, located in an overall protestant neighbourhood in Belfast, who argued that *"30 years of EU funding hasn't really impacted greatly at the grassroots level within the unionist communities."*(B)

> *"…we knew that the peace and reconciliation money, that come into Ireland, two billion, people ask the question, where is it? I mean where is it? Because I still live in the same terraced house, I still live in the same street, I still live in the same area of deprivation, I still have people around me with low education. I see high unemployment, I see high dependency on prescription drugs, so what has the EU funding done for us? In reality that is the question, they may have built bridges, and the may have built roads, and the may have built high raised office blocks. So they may have built the waterfront centre, but for an ordinary Joe, for an ordinary person, what has EU funding done for us."*(B)

While others had less big expectations of the PEACE funding. A representative of the Community Relations Forum said:

"How do you move a mountain? If I give you a shuffle, can you move that mountain? I says yes, but I have to do it bit by bit. And that is what PEACE money was very good at, was moving things bit by bit. It was never going to come in and, in my personal view, it was never going to come in and be able to make massive changes in a short period of time, because it wasn't." (D)

6.2.2 PEACE Funding Implementation

Less positive views on the PEACE programmes are not so much on the impact of the programmes but on the implementation. In the survey, 7 of the respondents indicated that the PEACE funding influenced their decisions/work (Appendix 6, table 7.1). The main influence indicated, was on the duration of their projects and the creation of bureaucratic work. Less influential is the aim/goal of the organisation (figure 6.2.2.1).

Figure 6.2.2.1 Ways of influencing the work of NGOs by the EU as donor through PEACE (N=7)

Source: Own data collection

Also during the interviews issues varying on bureaucracy, duration, distribution of funding and difficulties for smaller NGOs were outlined. The influence that PEACE as donor has on the duration of the projects was a big issue, a representative of the Rural Community Network highlighted the problem with the project based funding, they argued that: *"it left many groups hanging high and dry for a long time afterwards. Also by the time such programmes really started to impact, the funding ended."*(F). But interviewees mostly emphasized that the application process for PEACE funding was very difficult (C,D,E) very bureaucratic and a very long process (C). This is explained by a representative of Trademark:

"As each of the peace money came in, accessing the money was becoming more and more of a challenge for smaller NGOs and it is really designed for larger NGOs or big institutions to access. Even in terms of amount of work we need to do to fill in an application for funding. It is nearly a full time job. It takes somebody two or three or four months to do it properly, to do it justice. It is a massive amount of work. We sort of saw it coming. Each peace funding became more and more difficult to access."

…"We did it, we did the bureaucracy, because we are good at it and we have a team who is experienced, but it took up so much time. Far more time that the actual work nearly, it was ridiculous, that was the main reason, bureaucracy." (C)

This is underscored by a representative of Community Relations Forum, who argued that the bureaucracy that comes with the PEACE funding causes that bigger companies can come in who can do a really good application, deliver on the ground for a certain period of time and then clear of. This representative reasoned that peacebuilding needs to be a long-term commitment and that small local NGOs should be involved because they are there all the time (therefore can actually reach people on the ground), they will stay and they can continue the legacy (D). Instead, application for the PEACE funding is very hard for small NGOs, besides they receive only ten per cent of advanced payment before their projects, which creates even more difficulties for small groups (D).

Now with PEACE IV coming in, smaller NGOs are even more disadvantaged. PEACE IV is seen as a big disappointment (C). According to a representative of Trademark: *"Peace IV is designed really not to benefit smaller organisations, but larger organisations, whether businesses, local government or universities, academia, most of that money didn't triple its way down to community groups. There are hundreds of groups that disappeared in the last two years. Including some well-known community groups and well-known NGOs all being wiped of, closed down because of lack of funding."*(C). Also the representative of Community Relation Forum said not to be able to get PEACE IV because their local peace partnership does not give out very small grants (D). The survey shows this trend too, only 7 NGOs applied for PEACE IV (app. table 5.2) and at the time of conducting the survey, none of those applications got confirmed (app. table 5.3). 5 from those 7 NGOs indicated that they might not be able to continue with their planned projects without PEACE IV. Because of this, a representative of Trademark explained that PEACE IV was not created to assist peacebuilding on the ground but had a more economic focus. They think that therefore PEACE IV money will only go into bureaucracy, management fees and consultancies, and only a part of it will go to actual economic development (C).

A last heard issue with the PEACE funding is the unequal distribution of funding. *"There have been people that have benefited greatly, made themselves very wealthy from the EU funding. Especially the ones who sat in the chief executive and the big money... who have been giving great sums of money every year to deliver peace and reconciliation programmes."*(B). A representative of the Rural Community Network said that this continued on the council levels: *"when councils got their hands on the PEACE III money; they tended to use them for their own pet programmes; it was very hard to avail of it and they wrote their own peace plans to spend the money without much consultation on actual need."* (F).

6.3 Concerns on Brexit

What are the concerns of civil society building NGOs regarding Brexit and why do those concerns arise?

6.3.1 General Situation in Northern Ireland

Overall the interviewees all outline the general situation in Northern Ireland as quite negative. There are still a lot of problems. The biggest issue mentioned is the need for a government and the uncertainties the lack of one creates (A). But also at the society level, there are big economic problems, anti-social behaviour, drug problems and inequalities (B). Furthermore, Northern Ireland is still divided and peoples mind-sets need to be changed (D) because according to a representative from Lagan Youth

and Community Centre Northern Ireland is still: *"in a peaceful conflict. There is peace but there is also conflict. And it happens on sporadic bases, but it is still there, and it is never gonna go away, it could set of at any time. It can ignite at any time"* (B). Besides, discrimination and racism are still big problems, not only between the two communities but also with people from other backgrounds. In 2009 and 2010 Northern Ireland was called the race hate capital of Europe, with many racist attacks and it is still quite a serious issue (C). The representative of the Lagan Youth and Community group explained the reason of voting in favour of Brexit, was the influx of ethnic people into the community (B). This representative argued that bringing in other people from different backgrounds is just too hard for some people to grasp or to understand in the current situation (B). A representative of Community Relation Council said *"we spend so many time talking about not putting people into boxes. But we spend all the time putting them into boxes. Because we are asking them, what is your religion? What school did you go to?"* (D). Therefore, according to a representative of Trademark, Brexit is a pity: *"because there is still a lot of work to be done on the ground. In terms of peacebuilding, relationship building, all those walls, (93 they are still there)"* (C).

6.3.2 Concerns on Northern Ireland Society in General

Results from the survey show that the overall view on the impact of Brexit on the Northern Ireland society in general is not very positive. 24 of the respondents thought the impact would be either 'negative' or 'very negative' (see figure 6.3.2.1). This in a context in which, 18 of the respondents think it is 'not at all likely' that NI will stay within the EU through any kind of political arrangement (appendix 6, table 3.1).

Figure 6.3.2.1: Views on the impact of Brexit on: Northern Ireland society, the peace process and on NGOs (N=26)

Source: Own data collection

The qualitative research results outline that there are many concerns on the impact of Brexit on the society; ranging from the border, the economy, funding, human rights and legal framework, politics and uncertainties. First of all, there are concerns on the (political) uncertainty (A,C,D,E,G), nothing is in place (E) and Britain does not have a negotiation strategy (C). At a conference organized by the Human Rights Consortium, a representative of the EU Commission Belfast made it clear that the EU only negotiates with the UK government, not with the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies (G). Therefore (at that same conference) it was argued that Northern Ireland needs to find a political

consensus with all its parties (G). But with the Assembly not in place Brexit just adds another layer of uncertainty on an already uncertain political situation (A). This uncertainty on a lot of sectors and issues and the information gap towards people, leads to fear (G). A representative of the South Armagh Rural Community Network said: "*to be honest we are no more wiser than we were last June on what is going to happen. So a lot of worry would be the lack of knowledge on what does happen and what does not happen.*" (E). Secondly, there is a lot of concern regarding human rights and legislation (A,G,I,J,K) because "*[b]ringing the UK out of the EU involves a high degree of risk to the current set of rights and protections that we currently enjoy through EU membership.*" (J). "*So if we pull out of the EU, at the moment, the intention is that there is a great repeal that they will just transfer all European legislation into domestic legislation. That is an easy thing to say but in practice it is not as simple as that, a lot can be lost in the transfer process. There is a lot of concern about what will happen next, when European legislation starts to go back into domestic legislation will it start to be undermined*" (A). For NGOs this concerns issues like disability rights, gender equality, social rights etcetera (A). Third, the border is a big concern (C,E,F,I) mostly with the focus on trade, regulations, immigration (F) and cross border co-operation (I). "*It will have massive impact on the economy, it will have massive impact on our everyday lives*", said a representative of the South Armagh Rural Woman's Network. This is already visible in businesses, where according to a representative of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) the uncertainty of Brexit causes delays in making big investment decisions (G). According to a representative of Trademark, Northern Ireland is already an unsustainable place (C).

> "*Obviously, it [Brexit] will damage the economy, we have a very fragile economy anyway, very high levels of unemployment, high levels of youth unemployment, we have some of the most disadvantaged areas in the whole of this islands here in Belfast and in Derry. If the economy is damaged further and that is also enforced by cuts from austerity from the conservative government, we lost a billion a year in cuts. So NI gets about 10 billion a year from Westminster to run this place, and NI can't survive without it. NI is not sustainable economic, cultural or political place, it falls nearly. And that 10 billion comes in every year, that is now 9 billion, so that is a billion pounds of cuts at the same time as Brexit going to hit, it is a double hit. So I have no doubt that is going to impact the economy and communities.*"(C)
>
> (Interview held before the DUP-Tory deal)

The biggest economic impact will be on the farmers who receive funding from the EU, but also with losing the regional development funding, PEACE money (C), funds for Cross borders cooperation and regeneration economic funding, there is a direct financial loss, which is a concern according to the representative of NICVA. They argue that those funds are important because without the EU it would not have been funded at all because there is not domestic funding for it (A). "*Some people are sort of hoping that the UK government will just replace all of that but we have seen indications of people saying, at best it might be 50 per cent of what we had before*" (A). However, at least "*[t]he treasury in the UK has said that any project funded by the structure fund, peace programme any peace programme that are properly approved prior to the UK exit from the EU that would be in March 2019, will be funded from the UK*" (L).

Even though most responses to Brexit are negative, there are some interviewees who also see some positives. These are mostly focused on a changing narrative (C,Ga) in which they see it as an opportunity to create a social dialogue (Ga) on for example the EU, or the Union of Northern Ireland with Britain (C).

"So if you are looking for positives, those positives are in those contradictions. But that doesn't help people in these communities, in the short term. In the long term who knows, but in the short term it doesn't. So I suppose it is a political positive. Debate about things we never debated before. People are debating what is the EU, what is it for, who does it benefit and there is the soft propaganda of all one big Happy family or is it really a liberal club for Ireland." (C)

Another positive view is the possibility for local change with an EU approach (A,Ga,I) *"in theory [Brexit] gives more freedoms to do things differently, locally. If you are not required to follow EU approaches. But finding examples for that is hard, I really have not come across very many positive opportunities"*. (A). The Rural Sector does see such opportunities in the potential to target policies more towards local circumstances (I) and the Human Rights Consortium called for the opportunity of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (Ga). At last, the idea that change can be good is argued by the representative of the Lagan Youth and Community Centre located in a protestant neighbourhood in Belfast. With Brexit they see hope, because *"now it can't get any worse, the life that they are living in now. I mean the deprivation, the dependency on social welfare benefits, I mean, the dependency on prescription drugs, the dependency on alcohol or illegal drugs. I mean, there is no future for their kids, there is no future for them."* … *"That is one of the big things about why Brexit was popular. It gave people the opportunity to vote for change. And it could happen."* (B)

6.3.3 Concerns on the Overall Peace Process

21 respondents indicated in the survey that they think the impact of Brexit on the overall peace process will be 'negative' or even 'very negative'. None of the respondents thought it will be positive, 5 respondents indicated that Brexit will not have an impact on the peace process (figure 6.2.2.1). These results are mostly explained by the interviewees because of the impact on the border, the Peace Agreement and the possible increase in polarization, which together leads to the fear for reoccurrence of violence. As the representative of NICVA explained, Brexit will undermine a lot of the efforts of the peace process, which was enshrined in the GFA and underscored by both countries (UK and Ireland) being members of the EU. Practically this means;

"direct potential impact on peace and stability because, first of all the EU has actually put direct money into in peacebuilding and programmes and actually, and I think the design of those programmes have been just as important as the amount money in these successive peace and reconciliation programmes from the EU, so they put in place a lot of structures, partnerships that supported the peacebuilding process, so that very direct support is obviously threatened" (A).

Besides, indirectly, *"[Brexit] has really sort of exposed big divisions in the UK society, between different parts in the UK even. The implications are very broad"* (A). More respondents argued that Brexit has only further polarized communities in Northern Ireland (G,K). Brexit only creates more debates on border polls, referendums on a united Ireland that will only lead to starker choices for people (A).

"The other threat, I suppose, is actually if there is going to be a hard border, there are still distant republicans, there are still people willing to kill cops, kill people in the army, and planned bombs. And providing them with more targets is not a clever idea, it is a very stupid idea" (C).

Also others see the physical border not only as an economic negative but also as a threat for the peace process (E,F,G). The loss of peace money and programmes, the border, polarization, all together threatens the peace process (G) and creates the possibility of resurgence of (small scale) violence (B,C).

6.3.4 Concerns on Civil Society Building NGOs

The impact of Brexit on civil society building NGOs in general is thought to be either 'negative' or 'very negative' by 24 of the respondents of the survey, only 2 of the respondents thought it would not have an impact on organizations (figure 6.3.2.1). Also the impact on their own NGO is thought to be 'negative' or 'very negative' by 23 of the respondents, only 3 of them indicated that it would not impact their own NGO (figure 6.3.4.1). The survey shows that most of the NGOs are concerned for the impact of Brexit on their own organisation, with 12 of them being 'extremely concerned'. 3 of NGOsstated to be neutral (app. table 4.3). However, 15 respondents indicated that their organisation took a neutral position in the Brexit referendum, the rest positioned their organisation as either (very)against Brexit (8) and (very)pro Brexit (3) (appendix 6, table 4.2). This difference in concerns and position might be because often organisations need to extend a certain neutrality while people themselves can have clearer viewpoints.

Figure 6.3.4.1: Views of NGOs on the influence of Brexit on their own organisation (N=26)

Source: Own data collection

The concerns that are heard in the interviews from NGOs for their own sector are mostly based on insecurities (C,D,K) funding (A,C,D,K) and as an effect of that, less jobs (B,C). A representative of Trademark argued with all the concerns and issues mentioned before on the impact on the society in general and the peace process, there would of course also be a 'knock-on effect' on NGOs (C). Because, as argued by a representative of NICVA, voluntary and community organisations are very often "*picking up the pieces of economic problems and civil problems, which are only made worse if our peace and stability is threatened, and if our economy is threatened*". So the whole situation with Brexit is argued to have effects on NGOs. However, more fundamentally, funding is one of the main issues causing concerns for NGOs. This is mostly because of the current situation in Northern Ireland where there is no Assembly, which means no budget for Northern Ireland specifically (A). "*Lots of organizations have disappeared already or people are put on half time or lay people of (C)*"... "*And that is happening in more and more places. People are getting laid off, or getting as we call it in English, protective notice which is a legal idea that you are employed here, but in a month, if the money doesn't come, you are gone*" (C). Organisations are already working on a week by week bases (Ka), this because without the Assembly only part of the Northern Ireland budgets can be spend and only in terms of three months (A). Therefore NGOs that receive funding from the government have this only secured until 31 of July (A). So, according to representatives of a local NGO and Trademark, Brexit will only make it worse

(Ka,C), for the whole sector (C). Especially because of the insecurity during the transitional phases, NGOs do not know if the EU (PEACE) funding will be replaced and more importantly when they know more. Because what will happen in the meantime between now and the 'real' exit from the EU? (Ka). One of the attendees at the Brexit Series event said that there is a need for support for a way to temper the tensions that occur within the communities because of the uncertainties and a need for recognition for those tensions. NGOs need to be empowered especially in the transitional times of insecurity, instead of work from a week by week bases without the possibility of future planning (K,Ka).

6.4 Preparing for Brexit

How can civil society building NGOs anticipate to Brexit?

6.4.1 Preparations of NGOs

The survey shows that 8 of the NGOs are preparing for Brexit against 12 who are not (6 stated not applicable) (figure 6.4.1.1). This is compared with the proportion of their funding from international donors in figure 6.4.1.2. This shows that NGOs that do not receive international funding at that moment are not preparing for Brexit, as the proportion of international funding increases the proportion of NGOs that are preparing for Brexit also increases. This trend could be logical when argued that the NGOs that have more funding from international donors probably receive funding from the EU and as a consequence, they are more dependent on the EU. Preparations are then more needed to adjust to a new situation after Brexit. From the 8 NGOs who stated to be preparing for Brexit, most of them are 'adjusting future plans' (6), 'searching for new/other funding' (5) or 'searching for a new strategy' (5). 4 NGOs stated to be consulting with stakeholders and 1 NGO indicated to be facilitating conversations (appendix 6, table 4.5).

Figure 6.4.1.1: Number of NGOs preparing for Brexit (N=26)

Source: Own data collection

Figure 6.4.1.2: NGOs preparing for Brexit compared with the level of international funding N=16

Source: Own data collection

Representatives of organisations that are not preparing for Brexit argued in the interviews that it is hard to prepare for something that you do not know how it will look like (C,E). After the referendum talks and discussions were held on what the impact is going to be, but nobody knows (C). *"We might well have had my three kids and your granny sitting next, no one had a crystal ball, no one knows the future, no one could read it, so at all levels people have not a clue what is going to happen"* (C). Also a representative of South Armagh Rural Women's Network gives that as a main reason for not getting started on preparations because *"I don't think we are any the wiser now then we were this time last year when we had the referendum."* (E). On the other hand, several NGOs argued to prepare in some way (A,D), or at least get informed, debate and outline the needs for their sector (Ga,H,I) and call to use the opportunities that Northern Ireland has with its special status (A,Ka,G,Ga,J). A representative of Community Relations Forum argued that they started looking for money and other funders to make their organization more sustainable or even searching for partnerships with other/bigger organizations (D). NICVA helps these kind of organisations who run out of money by giving them advice and show them their options. The representative of NICVA argued that legally:

> *"We have to advise organisations that if they don't know they got funding coming they are legally obliged under charity law and under company law to act responsible, so if they think they are going in to debt by continuing to employ people they actually have no funding for. Then they would be acting irresponsibly. So our formal advice if people don't think they are going to have enough funds, then they have to let people know that they might be made redundant and might lose their job"* (A).

More practically, NICVA outlines the different possibilities for NGOs to financially sustain themselves with the lack of government money and/or EU funding, which can be through contracts to deliver services, through other grants, fundraising activities, but also through volunteers or a combination of the above. But they also advise for a longer term development process for organisations to diversify their income and to become more resilient for the future by offering training and a whole range of services. However, in light of Brexit the representative argued that they see their work today as crisis

management by *"trying to reflect the interest of the sector to the government and to ensure people can keep their lights on through the crisis"* (A).

6.4.2 Position of Community and Voluntary sector

More broadly organizations have argued that a coordinated approach is missing (Ga) even though the special status of Northern Ireland could be an opportunity (A). The main parties involved in the Brexit negotiations (J) like the European government and the European commission have made indications of the need to look at Northern Ireland as a special case, because the region is different, with a land border and all of the political issues (A). Besides, they see Northern Ireland as one of the main issues that first needs to be resolved during the negotiations (J).

> *"This puts Northern Ireland in a unique position to be able to influence these negotiations. That influence would be exponentially increased if local parties and/or the NI executive were able to present a common position on how to proceed that had clearly faced up to the major points of divergence politically, agreed a set of common priorities that moved beyond the top-line position of retaining the status quo to detailed proposals that ensured all interests and standards of protection, including human rights, and equality, were protected to the highest possible standards"* (J).

Several other see this too as an opportunity for Northern Ireland in general (A,G,Ga,J,Ka) especially when adding that the democratic legitimacy for a hard Brexit was never strong but after the general election it is further undermined (G). Therefore the rapporteur of the Conference 'Brexit: Charting a Way Forward' concluded with:

> "*It is necessary for civil society to find its voice in Brexit and to formulate its demands and events like this are essential for doing that. There are no easy solutions, but it is possible to be creative and find things that can work for Northern Ireland*" … "*we are special and we need to use it to our advantage to get the best deal for Northern Ireland"* (G).

Besides the letter (discussed in the background chapter) from the then First and Deputy First Minister on 10 of August 2016 to the Prime Minister (which is the only indication of a potential joint approach) (J), there is no clear statement of what Northern Ireland needs or wants. That is way it is argued by some interviewees that Northern Ireland needs to move away from all the argued uncertainties and needs to look for solutions (Ga). It "*needs to agree a position on Brexit that is proactive, not reactive. If no political agreement reached in NI then we must use civic society to fill in the gaps."* (K). Civic society is argued to be needed to develop local policies and legislation (G).

Most practically argued solutions found in this research are the calls for a reinforcement of some sort for PEACE programmes like PEACE I and II, because tensions will rise from Brexit (Ga). Though, the representative of SEUPB argues that when planning any kind of future PEACE programme, public consultations, looking at policies and the political environment are all needed to identify the needs of that moment. Although according to them, it is too early to really identify those needs now for 2020 or later (L). An attendee of the Brexit series argued that not only support is needed for community cohesion but it is also important to monitor those tensions (K). Other recommendations are a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (G,I) and a full assessment of what EU funding will be lost and the impact of this. At last, it is called for openness in the process, there should be a proper information provision about the negotiations but also on the process around changing EU legislation (K).

A first step has been made after this call for a joint statement. NICVA, NCVO, SCVO, WCVA and The Wheel together represent over 15,200 member voluntary and community organisations published

on the 16th of June 2017 a position paper which outlined their view on issues that should be addressed like social, economic and environmental needs, among which:

- *"Brexit should not lead to important human rights safeguards or consumer and environmental protections being weakened"*

- *"the process should be as transparent as possible and seek to involve civil society organisations"*

- *"it is vitally important to ensure that, despite Brexit, collaboration between people and organisations in the UK and other countries in Europe for public benefit (for example joint medical research, co-operation on security, protection of vulnerable groups, educational exchanges) is allowed and encouraged to continue through suitable mechanisms"*

- *"the full implications of different forms of Brexit for citizen's rights must be fully considered and (often unintended) negative social and economic impacts avoided"*

- *"…Additionally, the avoidance of a hard trade border between Northern Ireland/Ireland is crucial to maintaining peace and social cohesion" (H)*

However, this is just the first step on very broad issues. As argued during the conference 'Brexit: Charting a Way Forward' concrete solutions are needed in which Northern Ireland and its civil society needs to take a proactive position towards new solutions. These addressed needs, in the position paper of NICVA, NCVO, SCVO, WCVA and The Wheel, can act as a guideline in the process.

7. Analysis

The goal of this research is to get an insight on the possible impact of Brexit on the peace process in Northern Ireland. This chapter outlines the analysis, it combines the results with the theory and looks for connections between the results. The conceptual model is used to show the possible relations, while each of the six subquestions are the starting point of the analysis.

1   *How does current peacebuilding manifest itself in Northern Ireland?*

As explained in the theoretical chapter peacebuilding should include all levels of society and should involve a long-term commitment. This is the case in Northern Ireland today, where several peacebuilding mechanisms are at work. Peace in Northern Ireland officially started in 1998 with the signing of the GFA which is a consociationalist power-sharing agreement that focuses on track I level of peacebuilding. Consociationalism in theory is seen as one of the better options for peace in divided societies, with the argument that when two or more ethno-national groups have to jointly rule and take decisions in consensus it will lead opponents to turn into partners. However, in practice this is not really the case in Northern Ireland where the power-sharing system only created more incentives for political parties to radicalise rather than to moderate, hence Sinn Fein and DUP. Because the GFA did not create a strong peace in Northern Ireland, the track I actors realised the need for long-term changes and local involvement. Therefore the focus in Northern Ireland shifted towards civil society and thus track II and III level of peacebuilding. The voluntary and community sector is enormous in Northern Ireland. Part of this sector are the organizations focused on peace and conflict resolution, which is a highly diverse group in areas as community development, mediation, reconciliation, intergroup contact and human rights activism. The organizations focused on peace and conflict resolution do not all have coherent political objectives in Northern Ireland. On the one hand organizations are focused to erode or transform traditional identities, while other organisations focus on accommodating these identities by establishing political and social structures that would help peaceful coexistence. Besides, there are different types of organizations namely: cross-community groups, who work with both identities in joint activities, inter-community groups who do work with both groups but separately from each other and then there are single-identity groups that focus on only one community. So peacebuilding in Northern Ireland is a twofold of both consociationalism and a broad civil society. This combination of involvement of different levels of society links practice with the theory of peacebuilding..

2   *What role does the EU have in Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and how can Brexit influence this role?*

The EU intervention in Northern Ireland is not just a general case of external economic aid, but a multilevel intervention because the EU is connected with the peacebuilding process at all levels. First of all, the context of the EU membership for both the UK and the Republic of Ireland is seen as part of the foundation of the peace process because it enabled a positive British-Irish relationship through the European integration process. Therefore, in the GFA the UK and the Republic of Ireland are named as 'partners in the EU'. After the agreement, working together in the EU on common interests is seen as an important aspect of the peacebuilding process on the track I level. So, although in practice consociationalism in Northern Ireland did not work exactly according to theory, combined with the EU influence the GFA did have a joining impact. Indirectly the EU has impacted peace at track I level in Northern Ireland by policy development, as inspiration for politicians and by the possibilities of cross-

border co-operation through EU programmes and networks. Besides, the EU has contributed more practically with their approach of building a strong civil society, because this can act as an agent for peace locally as well as an agent for the political system. Their contributions are based on their view that development, co-operation and peace are tight together. They contributed by setting up structures and help with funding with for example the PEACE programmes. Therefore the EU also contributes at track II and III level of society. Lastly, some see the EU involvement as important just because they are involved in the process for the long term.

It is not clear how Brexit will change Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, however it will at least change the whole situation. It might not only directly impact the involvement of the EU with the stop of funding towards PEACE programmes and with that also the structures of those programmes. It can also impact the indirect involvement of the EU in the process. When the UK and Ireland are no longer partners in the EU there is no further need of working together while this is one of the arguments in favour of the current peace. All positive impacts of the EU as mentioned above will be in danger with the realisation of Brexit.

3   *To what extent do civil society building NGOs depend on external economic aid from the EU and how did this dependency come about?*

The results show that funding is the main reason for NGOs to organise short-term programmes, while the organisations that run long-term projects give the reason that it is more effective. This confirms two theories; first of all that long-term projects are more sustainable as argued by Skarlato et al. (2015) and Antrobus (1987). Secondly, it confirms that funding can create a level of dependency because dependency creates difficulties by making long-or medium-term plans as stated by Skarlato et al. (2015). Therefore it creates a need for project based work as also Belloni (2001) outlined.

When looking at funding, PEACE funding is seen as the most important external resource of the NGOs. Though when looking at both internal and external funding, PEACE funding is the sixth most important source. The survey shows that the respondents do have a variety of other (internal) resources. The fourth most important source of funding is 'generating own funding'. This suggests at least a certain level of sustainability of the NGOs, as outlined in the theoretical framework by Antrobus (1987). Also the representative of SEUPB stated that the level of EU funding is so small it cannot create a dependency culture now (but may have done some 10 years ago, which is in line with the numbers NICVA outlined in their research as shown in the theoretical framework). When looking at the financial side of dependency, NGOs are not really dependent on EU funding. However, most NGOs indicated that they do feel dependent on the EU as external economic donor, especially NGOs that receive a higher portion of international funding feel more dependent on the EU than organisations that just receive a small proportion of their funding from the EU. So the higher the amount of funding, the more dependent NGOs are.

Even though external funding is just a small portion, it can create a feeling dependency. This can be explained within the context of Brexit and the idea that the EU is not just a donor but also set up many structures, relations and institutions on which these organisations might feel dependent on, as one of the interviewees explained. There is a difference between NGOs set up before 1995 and NGOs set up after that period, namely the first feel less dependent on the EU as well as less influenced by them compared with the latter group. It can be explained by the theory of Belloni and Hemmer (2009) and Byrne et al. (2008) as outlined in the theoretical framework. They argue that there is a difference in NGOs that are set up because funding is available (like PEACE) who use it for example as an opportunity for jobs and as a result, also their focus is not so much on development, but more

towards money. While there are also NGOs that were set up without that availability of funding which are more driven by ideals. Therefore NGOs set up after 1995 might be seen as more opportunistic organisations. Besides, this feeling of dependency can also be caused by personal insecurities of the respondent due to the impact on their own economic status and job.

In short, when only looking at amounts of funding, civil society building NGOs are not really dependent on EU funding because it is just a small portion of all the funding they receive, even though it is the most important external donor. However, when looking from a broader perspective, the NGOs do feel dependent on the EU (though this feeling might only be strengthened because of Brexit). As well as the results show that the EU as donor influenced the duration of the projects and created more bureaucracy, both indicators of dependency.

4   *What is the impact of external economic aid in the form of the EU PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland and why does that certain impact arise?*

"Yes well somethings really worked here, some problems are still going" (D), that is actually in short the PEACE programmes today. The impact of the PEACE programmes are seen as quite positive and it is argued that it did contribute to the peace process so far. It did help create jobs, built infrastructures and gave opportunities to organize cross border and cross community projects. However, the implementation of the programmes received complaints. Especially the amount of work that is needed for the NGO to receive the funding is substantial. But also because the difficulty of the application and evaluation process, the short-term nature of the funding and the ten per cent advancement payment caused issues. These implementation issues together create that for smaller organisations it is harder to benefit from the PEACE funding. While, as argued in the theoretical framework, local NGOs can contribute better on local peacebuilding because they are deeply rooted in the communities and they are seen as legitimate on the ground (Verkoren & Van Leeuwen, 2013). This is especially strange when the objective of the PEACE programmes is 'peacebuilding from below'. Furthermore, long-term commitment of all tracks is needed to secure peace, this includes track III that focuses on grassroots actors (Lederach, 1997 as cited by Buchanan, 2008). Therefore long-term commitment of the PEACE programmes with grants that are easy to excess for smaller NGOs too, might have contributed to more sustainable peacebuilding. Especially because the results show that already during the PEACE programmes NGOs were dependent on that funding and some needed to close down. There were also complaints regarding unequal distribution and loss of money due to bureaucracy, consultations and management fees. Lastly, not only practically there were issues with PEACE, but there is also a mismatch visible between the expectations of people and organisations and the delivery of the programme.

So the impact of external economic aid in the form of EU PEACE programmes is a twofold between the results and the implementation. Although expectations of people and organisations are not always in line with the idea of the programme, overall the impact of PEACE is seen as quite positive. However, the results show that the implementation could have been better and easier, which could have created a lower level of dependency as well a higher level of sustainable peacebuilding and therefore have more positive results.

5   *What are the concerns of civil society building NGOs regarding Brexit and why do those concerns arise?*

Even though all efforts of peacebuilding, the situation in Northern Ireland in general is not seen as very positive. With still a lot of social and economic problems and without the Assembly in place, it is argued

that Brexit will only make the situation worse. Especially the impact of Brexit on the border, the economy and human rights are broad concerns, which is comparable with the outlined concerns in the introduction. More directly is already the impact of Brexit on the increase in polarisation and the rise of uncertainties with the fear of a possibility of reoccurrence of violence. These issues all together make that NGOs are concerned. Brexit and the Assembly not in place create that funding is hard to come by. This results that NGOs do not have the means to address issues and focus on long-term projects, but they need to work on a week by week basis, which is not the most sustainable way of working and less effective according to Skarlato et al (2015) and Antrobus (1987). While NGOs, especially in this period of change and uncertainty, are needed because they are often the ones picking up the pieces of economic and civil problems.

In the theoretical framework only possible negative impacts of Brexit were found, though in this research also some positives on Brexit are heard. These were mostly focused on the possibility of changing narratives on debates like the Union with Britain, the EU and even on debates on a United Ireland. Also chances for a more regional approach and local legislation on certain issues are seen as an opportunity. But then again, some structures need to be in place to be able to have such a civic dialogue. So in this time of uncertainty, NGOs are more needed to improve the situation. However, they will already have a hard time to cope with Brexit and without government support.

6   *How can civil society building NGOs anticipate to Brexit?*

Subquestion five can be seen as the motivation for this last subquestion, because what are the solutions and possibilities for the current situation with all its concerns outlined by subquestion five. First of all, in the results it is argued that Northern Ireland should use its special status to be able to move towards a peaceful future after Brexit. Plans and ideas are needed for that, therefore the voluntary and community sector calls to move away from all the concerns that are mentioned in the results and start a civic dialogue to find solutions and let those be heard. The position paper from the sector was a start for that, although these are just broad principles and it does not show concrete solutions at the local level. Thus, the local NGOs should be involved in this process to create civic dialogue and discuss possible solutions. Some of their ideas mentioned were the possibility for a bill of rights, the need for some sort of reinforcement of PEACE programmes, the need for an open process on the negotiations and the need to monitor tensions that arise within communities. However, when combining this call for civic dialogue through NGOs with the concerns that arise surrounding Brexit as outlined at subquestion 5, there is a problem. Because NGOs have to deal with their own crisis management due to funding issues and their work on a week by week bases makes it hard to focus on good solutions and opportunities. Legally, NGOs are then obliged to let their staff know that they might be made redundant and might lose their job when there is no more funding available. To overcome those funding problems, NGOs can look for contracts to deliver services, other grants, partnerships, organise fundraising activities and/or work with (more) volunteers.

7.1 Conceptual Model Analysis

When looking at the conceptual model as outlined in the theoretical chapter (figure 3.6.1) some overall relations can be found with use of the analysis of the subquestions. These relations are made visible in figure 7.1 by the different arrows. First of all, peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, as it happens today, can be related to the theory of peacebuilding. More specifically, the need for peacebuilding to include all levels of society (box 1) can be applied on consociationalism (Track I) and civil society (Track II and III) in box 2. Also, theory implied peacebuilding should include external economic aid and a long-term

commitment, both can be found with the involvement of the EU as external actor (box 3). Then, the EU as external actor contributes to both consociationalism and civil society. Therefore, the model is connected with all three boxes and shows that peacebuilding in Northern Ireland today, is working as theory prescribed.

However, the combination of civil society and the direct influence of the EU through external economic aid leads to box four; civil society building NGOs. These NGOs have altogether impacted society positively, although issues arose with the implementation and the funding. When only focusing on money, NGOs cannot really be seen as dependent on EU funding. While taking a broader view on dependency, the EU funding did create the need for short-term projects and created lots of bureaucracy, both stand in the way of sustainable peacebuilding. Besides, NGOs did feel a level of dependency on the EU. Therefore, the arrows lead from the external economic aid from the EU combined with civil society, to dependency, which mostly creates short-term projects and bureaucracy. When linking this (box 4) back to peacebuilding in theory, it does create tensions (which is visualized by the double, red arrow). Firstly, it creates tension between short-term projects and the need for long-term commitment. Besides, dependency is also in tension with Track II and III because it is argued in the theoretical framework that dependency only hinders the formation of an open and democratic civil society. In conclusion, the theory of peacebuilding can be applied on the case of Northern Ireland and is working positively on the peace process. Even though, the contributions of the EU are useful and have helped in many cases, their financial contributions do add a layer of dependency on the whole process. This should be kept in mind when placing the whole model (7.1) in the context of Brexit.

Realisation of Brexit will change peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. It is uncertain what exactly will happen, but the contributions of the EU will at least change. This puts the current model of peacebuilding at risk because relations might change, these relations that might be impacted by Brexit are visualized by the dotted arrows in figure 7.1. First of all, the long-term commitment of the EU will be lost at all levels. Secondly, at track I, the backbone of the consociationalist agreement will be lost when the EU does not indirectly contribute to it anymore and when the UK and the Republic of Ireland are no longer partners in the EU. Thirdly, the direct external economic aid from the EU will be lost which will probably mean an end to PEACE programmes including its set structures and institutions (thus, the civil society NGOs will receive less money). Because most NGOs only receive a small portion of their total funding from the EU, these NGOs will probably be able to continue their work. However, due to Brexit and thus the increase in polarisation and uncertainties, the work of the NGOs will increase. Besides, NGOs are called for to find solutions and opportunities on Brexit for Northern Ireland through civic dialogue. So the need of functioning NGOs will became more stressing due to this polarisation and the call for them to help find solutions, while the support (funding, structures and institutions) for NGOs from the EU will decline. Also from a political view civil society is seen as part of the solution namely to find joint views. This because the elite level (Track I) cannot find such joint views since there is still no new government in the Stormont Parliament.

On the other hand, when external economic aid from the EU for civil society building NGOs stops, this might end the dependency of NGOs on this external funding. This can in the short run create problems for NGOs to survive, but it might in the long run lead to a more sustainable sector. So, peacebuilding more or less worked in Northern Ireland, but with Brexit added in the situation, many important actors (box 3) and relations that hold peacebuilding together (dotted arrows) will change.

Figure 7.1: Conceptual Model Analysis of current Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland

Note: All arrows together visualize the found relations in this research, with the red arrows suggesting a tension between the boxes. The dotted arrows outline relations that are uncertain when Brexit becomes reality.

8. Conclusion

The goal of this research was to get an insight on the possible impact of Brexit on the peace process in Northern Ireland. This because Northern Ireland is a special case within Brexit negotiations due to its historical and geographical circumstances. More specifically the focus was on the influence of the EU as external economic actor on civil society building NGOs. In theory external economic aid is argued to create dependency on NGOs therefore the case of Northern Ireland in light of Brexit is relevant to investigate if there is a relation between external economic aid from the EU and dependency of civil society NGOs. The research question was *"what is the impact of external economic aid from the EU on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland with the focus on civil society building NGOs and how can Brexit influence that?".* This is answered by means of six subquestions which are outlined first. To start with the first two subquestions:

1 *How does current peacebuilding manifest itself in Northern Ireland?*
2 *What role does the EU have in Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and how can Brexit influence this role?*

Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland consists of several levels. One is the elite level of political power-sharing through consociationalism. At this track I level, the EU does mostly indirectly contribute to the peace process by encouraging cooperation through the membership of both the Republic of Ireland and the UK in the EU. Second is the 'on the ground' peacebuilding through cross-border and cross-community initiatives. This track II and III level of peacebuilding is among many others, also set up and funded by the EU through the PEACE programmes. The EU programmes focus on civil society building and contributed to the big and diverse community and voluntary sector including its structures and institutions. Besides, the EU is also seen as important actor due to its long-term involvement. Altogether, the EU's contribution is not just simple external economic aid but can be seen as a multilevel intervention. However, with Brexit these contributions of the EU will stop or at least change, at all levels. Because theory outlined that external economic aid could lead to dependency on international presence, the following two subquestions were investigated to see if that is the case in Northern Ireland.

3 *To what extent do civil society building NGOs depend on external economic aid from the EU and how did this dependency come about?*
4 *What is the impact of external economic aid in the form of the EU PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland and why does that certain impact arise?*

On the ground, the PEACE programmes have had positive impact and contributed to peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. The implementation of the programmes on the other hand, has been seen as less positive. This was mostly caused by the amount of work to apply for PEACE funding, the bureaucracy surrounding it and the need created to organise short-term projects. This led to short-term projects attracted by mostly bigger NGOs and caused a difficult situation for smaller NGOs. Short-term projects is one of the indicators for dependency. However, when looking at PEACE funding specifically, it is just a small amount of money compared to the total funding NGO's receive, thus it cannot create a strong dependency on EU funding. But when looking at the broader context, the NGOs did feel dependent on the EU in general. This feeling of dependency might be explained by the multilevel intervention of the EU (as explained by subquestions one and two) because their intervention does not only fund the

NGOs, it also set up certain structures and institutions. With dependency of NGOs on the EU, concerns could arise when adding Brexit in the debate, therefore subquestions five and six outline the concerns of the sector as well as the proposed possibilities in light of Brexit.

5   *What are the concerns of civil society building NGOs regarding Brexit and why do those concerns arise?*
6   *How can civil society building NGOs anticipate to Brexit?*

In general there are the broad concerns on the border, human rights, the economy and political uncertainties but more concretely, the civil society building NGOs are concerned on the more direct impact of Brexit which has already led to the increase in polarisation and the fear of reoccurrence of violence. At a lower level concerns arise around funding, although on the long run some organisations are worried about the PEACE funding, at the short term, concerns are mostly because of the uncertainties of government funding due to the lack of a functioning government in Northern Ireland. As a result NGOs already work on a week by week basis and try to keep on working. While Brexit creates a situation of uncertainty and polarisation in which civil society building NGOs are even more needed to monitor and help communities.

Possibilities for civil society building NGOs to survive this funding concern and to overcome some feeling of dependency are first of all to become (more) sustainable. They can look for contracts to deliver services, other grants, partnerships, organise fundraising activities and/or work with (more) volunteers. Secondly, to anticipate to Brexit and its broader concerns, it is argued that Northern Ireland should embrace its special status within the negotiations and should use it to create the best deal possible for the region. It should focus on finding solutions instead of worrying about all the concerns. This is also where the role of the civil society building NGOs lies, they should start civic dialogue, involve the communities and let those voices be heard. Especially without a functioning government civil society should take responsibility for their own future, (this is in theory what civil society could do). Such civic dialogue is not only seen as part of a solution, but also seen by some respondents as one of the opportunities Brexit creates for Northern Ireland. Debates on issues like the EU, or the Union with Britain, chances for a more regional approach and local legislation might lead to a better situation in Northern Ireland. The NGOs should look for joint approaches and concrete solutions in a time of uncertainty and polarisation.

Altogether, *"What is the impact of external economic aid from the EU on civil society building NGOs in Northern Ireland and how can those NGOs anticipate to Brexit?"*

The combination of consociationalism and civil society building in Northern Ireland has worked to build peace. The EU contributed directly and indirectly in that process through multilevel intervention. This led to partial dependency of civil society building NGOs, even though PEACE funding is only a small portion, it already created the need for short-term projects and overall there is a feeling of dependency. With Brexit many important relations and actors in the peacebuilding process will change or disappear, this idea already created many concerns. Especially on how to keep peace in Northern Ireland while current peacebuilding structures will change and the need for such structures only intensifies with Brexit. Polarization, economic and political uncertainties caused by Brexit create the need for a strong civil society, however, those NGOs already have a hard time because without a functioning government and a stop of the PEACE programmes, funding is hard to come by. The civil society building NGOs should focus on becoming more sustainable. But more importantly, Northern Ireland should embrace its special status within the negotiations and should use it to create the best

deal possible for the region. This deal should consist of solutions found through civic dialogue, by involving the communities and using the opportunities to find one joint view.

8.1 Discussion

The concluding remarks are focused on the situation in Northern Ireland. When looking at the broader picture of the theory used in this research that external economic aid can create dependency, this case study would suggests that it does create dependency. Concretely, the research showed that many NGOs focus on short-term projects with availability of funding as main reason, while the ones with long-term projects state to do that because it is more effective. Besides, the level of dependency of NGOs on the EU as donor was higher with NGOs that started when PEACE funding became available, than NGOs that already existed before 1995. So the EU as external donor did create a certain level of dependency, however when looking at the distribution of total funding NGOs receive, EU PEACE funding is just a small portion of that. Therefore, this research would argue that external economic aid does create dependency, although in Northern Ireland this is partially compensated by a big portion of internal funding. Because this research is a case study, it is hard to make broader statements on the theory because it depends a lot on the context. In this case, it should be considered that first of all, the external economic aid researched is not just external economic aid. The EU as external actor is not just giving funding, it has created structures and partnerships as well as it combines this with indirect help (at Track I). Besides, in this research external economic aid is studied by looking at the EU. However, there are more external economic donors in Northern Ireland that are not included here, so this research does not outline the whole picture.

Secondly, it should be considered that the respondents all have received at least funding once from PEACE, which creates a biased group. As well as personal interests might have influenced the answers of the respondents because Brexit and/or loss of funding can also impact the individual. Furthermore, of all the contacted NGOs, 26 of them responded to the survey which does not create a high validity for the research. Some of the them send a standard e-mail that they are not existing anymore while during the interviews respondents also explained that many NGOs in their networks had already stopped due to funding problems. For further research it would be interesting to investigate the trend of all NGOs when they are set up and if they still exist throughout the years. To start from before PEACE funding became available until now and later on. Not only to see if opportunity are reasons for a rise in NGOs, but also to show the trend on what will happen after the realisation of Brexit. Comparing this data of trends of NGOs, with the amount of funding it received from PEACE, would give a good overview of the impact of PEACE funding on NGOs in Northern Ireland. For future research on the theory on external economic aid it would be interesting to research this case study after Brexit occurred because then the effect of the dependency of the EU in Northern Ireland can be studied on both the elite level (I) and on the ground (level II and III).

Another factor that should be considered when looking at these results is that PEACE funding might be more important for NGOs than as indicated in the research, because two responses on the e-mail with the survey were with the question if the certain NGOs really did receive PEACE III funding because they did not know that. This could be because there is little awareness of the impact of the EU at the community level.

Fourth, the context of this research is important to realize. The politics in Northern Ireland and the UK have been changing very much, even within the timeframe of this research. This resulted that some interviews have been held before the general elections and the DUP-Conservative deal while the last few interviews were held after that. This is quite an important event which might have changed

views from the interviewees. Besides, it should be realised that it is a political and sensitive topic which is still for some people hard to talk about or outline strong feelings.

Finally, the impact of the researcher should be taken into account. It is tried to stay as objective as possible, by outlining the perceptions of the respondents and only later on interpret those perceptions. However, the background of the researcher might have impacted the research. As being an outsider to the conflict, could be positive to be seen as someone with an objective view. On the other hand, this might have also created some sort of trust and understanding barrier while conducting the interviews.

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Figure 2.1

Island of Ireland – counties of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Wikipedia (2017) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counties_of_Ireland, consulted on 02-02-2017.

Appendix 1 - *List of used qualitative data*

Numbers match with the number in the text, used as references.

A. **NICVA – *Interview***
NICVA is *"a membership and representative umbrella body for the voluntary and community sector in Northern Ireland. With around a thousand members - that range from household name charities to grass roots community groups - we lobby and campaign to advance the interests of the people and communities that our members support"*.
http://www.nicva.org/about-us

B. **Lagan Youth and Community Centre – *Interview***
Lagan Youth and Community Centre is a community Centre in the overwhelmingly protestant East-Belfast, which *"aims to engage and provide educational support for young people, adults, and members"* of the community.
https://www.facebook.com/laganvillage15/

C. **Trademark – *Interview***
Trademark is the anti-sectarian unit of the Irish congress of trade unions. So we are the union set up to deal with intimidation in the workplace and also in the community. It also offers several education and training courses.
http://www.trademarkbelfast.com/

D. **Community Relations Forum – *Interview***
The Community Relations Forum is a "*Community and Voluntary organisation focused on promoting good community relations across Newtownabbey, by encouraging honest and open dialogue, enabling people to have a better understanding of and respect for each other's views and opinions".*
Newtownabbey has a majority of Protestants though the organisation focuses on both sides of the community (survey).
https://www.facebook.com/Community-Relations-Forum-239162832917511/

E. **South Armagh Rural Woman's Network – *Interview by phone***
"South Armagh Rural Women's Network is a voluntary organization established in 1999 to articulate the voice of rural women and to support community based women's groups and individual women to achieve their goals, by providing advice, information, guidance, training and educational opportunities in local venues. SARWN offers one to one Befriending to people who have been bereaved or traumatised as a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland, regardless of their religious, cultural or political beliefs."
http://www.sarwn.co.uk/

F. **Rural Community Network – *Interview by e-mail***
"Rural Community Network is a regional voluntary organisation established by community groups from rural areas in 1991 to articulate the voice of rural communities on issues relating to poverty, disadvantage and equality."
http://www.ruralcommunitynetwork.org/

G. **Conference: 'Brexit: Charting a Way Forward, A Civil Society Dialogue' – *Published summary by the Human Rights Watch.***
Overview – 'Brexit: Charting a Way Forward' conference.
Source: http://www.humanrightsconsortium.org/brief-overview-brexit-charting-way-forward/
    a. **Conference: 'Brexit: Charting a Way Forward, A Civil Society Dialogue' – *Notes Author***

H. **UK and Irish Voluntary and Community Sector – *Position Paper (NICVA, National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO), Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO), the Wales Council for Voluntary Action (WCVA) and The Wheel (Ireland))***
UK and Irish Voluntary and Community Sector Position Statement on Brexit Negotiations.

Source: http://www.nicva.org/article/uk-and-irish-voluntary-and-community-sector-position-statement-on-brexit-negotiations

I. **Rural Sector - *All Island Civic Dialogue on Brexit Position paper (Rural Development Council, Rural Community Network, NIRWN)***
Rural Sector (RDC RCN and NIRWN) submission to the All-island Civic Dialogue on Brexit.
Source: http://www.ruralcommunitynetwork.org/publications/publicationdocument.aspx?doc=10622

J. **Human Rights Consortium – *Manifesto***
A Rights Based Northern Ireland- HRC General Election Manifesto 2017.
Source: http://www.humanrightsconsortium.org/rights-based-northern-ireland-election-2017/

K. **Brexit Series, Department of Communities event – *published summary by NICVA***
Sector discusses Brexit negotiations and priorities with the Department of Communities
Source: http://www.nicva.org/article/sector-discusses-brexit-negotiations-and-priorities-with-the-department-of-communities.

    a. **Brexit Series, Department for Communities – *Notes Author***

L. **Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) – *Interview by phone***
The SEUPB *"is responsible for the implementation of the EU's PEACE IV (€283m) and INTERREG VA (€270m) Programmes".* With their aim to *"help facilitate the positive impact that European Regional Development Funding will have on the lives of people living across Northern Ireland, the Border Region of Ireland and Western Scotland."*
https://www.seupb.eu/aboutus/SEUPB

Appendix 2 - *List contacted organisations for survey*

Organisation
Age Concern Irvinestown
Aibhlín McCrann/Communique international
all set cross-cultural project
Altnaveigh House
An Gaeláras
An Grianan Theatre
An Teach Bán: Centre for peacebuilding
Ards Citizens Advice bureau
Ards Development Bureau
Arts Council of Northern Ireland
Arts for All
ArtsEkta
Ashton Community Trust
Association for The development of Pettigo and Tullyhommon
ADoPT
ATLAS Womens Centre
Ballintrillick Environmental group
Ballybeen Women's Centre
Ballybofey And Stranorlar intergrated community company
Ballymacarrett Arts and cultural society
Ballynafeigh Community development association
Beam Creative Network
Bee Park Resource centre
BELB
Belfast Health Trust
Belfast Interface project
Belfast Jewish Community
Belfast South Commurity Resources
Belfast Unemployement resource centre
Belturbet Community Development Association
Blayney Blades Womans Group
Blu Zebra
Blueprint Development consultancy unlimited
Bluestacks Special needs foundation
Border Arts and Catlederg youth forum
Borderline Players
Breakthough Consulting
Breffni Integrated LTD
Breffni Youth Café
Brendan Smith Consulting
Business in the Community
C.A.L.M.S
Cairde Festival
CAKE (Crossroads * Killygorden enterprise)
Caledon Regeneration partnership
Calipo

Carrickfergus Enterprise
Carrickfergus YMCA
Carrick-on-Shannon Herritage Group Ltd.
Castleblayney Art and community dev. Co. ltd.
Castleblayney Community enterprise
Castlefin Partnership intitiative
Catalyst Consulting
Cathedral Youth Club
Cavan Community and voluntary forum
Cavan County Museum
Cavan Family Resource centre
Cavan Federation ICA
Cavan Girl Guides
Cavan Information and Technology centre
Cavan VEC
Cavehill Antrim Road Regeneration
Charter for NI
Chinese Welfare Asociation
Churchtown Community Association
Claire Galligan, Development and social research agency
Clanrye Group
Clones Community forum Ltd
Clones Regeneration partnership ltd.
Clonmany Youth & Community research centre
Co Donegal VEC
Co Monaghan Community network
Co Monaghan VEC Community education
Co. Donegal VEC Music education partnership
Coiste
Colin Neighbourhood partnership
Comhaltas Cavan
Common Purpose
Community Change
Community Dialogue
Community Foundation for Northern Ireland
Community Integration at avalon centre CIAC
Community Relations forum
Community Restorative justice
Community Workers Co-operative
Community Youth Projects Cavan
Confederation of community groups
Conflict trauma Resource centre
Connect FRC (Family Resource Centre)

Consensus Mediation
Cookstown and Western shores area network
Co-operation Ireland
Copius Consulting
County Cavan Rugby football club
CRAIC Theatre and arts centre
Craigavon Intercultural programme
Craigavon Travellers support committee
Creggan Neighbourhood partnership
Cross Border Orchestra of Northern Ireland
Crossfire Trust
Culture Connect
Cumann Gaelach Chnoc na ros diore
Cumann Gaelach Leath chat hill
Cunamh
Curriculum Development unit
Desertmartin Community group
Diversity Challenges
Donegal Education Centre
Donegal Sports Partnership
Donegal Travellers project
Donegal Youth Service
Doneyloop Youth Club ltd
Dove House Community trust
Down County Museum
Dreamscheme NI
Drumgor Detached youth work project
Dundalk FM100
Dundalk Youth Centre
DUNGANNON YOUTH RESEARCH CENTRE
Earagail Arts Festival management co ltd.
East Belfast Mission
East Down Rural Community network
Education Matters
EPIC Northern Ireland
Expac ltd
Failte Abhaile
Falls Community Council
Falls Women's Centre
Farney Community Resource and information centre
Féile an Phobail
Fermanagh Concert band
Fermanagh Women's network
Festival of Fools ltd
FGS McClureWatters
Football In the Community (teenage kickz)
FOROIGE

Forthspring Inter community group
Gaelscoil Cois Feabhail
Galliagh Womens Group
Gaslight Media Trust
Gasyard Trust
Gleann Fhinne Teorant
Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland
Greater Village Regeneration trust
Greenhat
Groundwork NI
GROW
Habitat for Humanity Northern Ireland
Harmony Community Trust
Headliners
Healing Through Remembering
Hillhall Regeneration group
Holy Trinity Centre
Holywell Consultancy
Holywell Trust
Hugh Trayer Design management
Humanising Conflict
HURT
Inishowen Development partnership
Institute for Conflict research
Integrating Ireland
Interaction Belfast
Interaction Institutue for social change in Northern Ireland
Intercomm Ireland ltd
Irish Congress of trade unions
Irish Country Womens association
Irish Immigration centre
Irish Traveller Movement
Junior Achievement Ireland
Juniper Consultinting
Justice for Innocent victims of terrorism
Kilcooley Community forum
Kilcooley Womens centre
Killeeshil & Clonaneese historical society
Killeshandra Community council
kingscourt youthreach
Knockalla Consulting
Knockatallon Development company
KW Research & Associates ltd
Latton Social Service anddevelopment ltd.
Leitrim County Child care community
Leitrim Development company
Leitrim Sports Partnership
Lestas Consulting ltd
Liberty Consortium
LINC Resource Centre
Londonderry YMCA
Love Hockey Ireland
Lower North Belfast community council

Lower Ormeau Residents action group
Macaulay Association association ltd
Maghera Parish Caring association
Maiden City Festival
Making Music Workshop
Manor Street/Cliftonvill community group
MCR Community Centre limited
Mediation Northern Ireland
Mid Ulster Women's Network
Monaghan Community forum
Monaghan Education centre
Monreagh Ulster ScotsHeritage and Education Association
Morrow Communications
Mount Vernon Comminty Development forum
New Life Counselling
New Meadows Community Partnership
Newry & Mourne Co-operative and enterprise agency
Newry & Mourne Womans group
North Down & Ards Woman Forum
North Down Alternatives
North Down Community Network
North Down YMCA
North Leitrim Women's centre
North West Play Resource Centre
Northern Ireland Children's enterprise
Northern Ireland Community of Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Northern Ireland Housing Executive
Northern Ireland Phoenix Organisation
Northern Ireland Rural Development Council
Northern Ireland Trade Union Education and Social Centre
Northern Ireland Youth Forum
Northern Visions
Omagh Forum for Rural Association
Omagh Support and Self Help Group
Omagh Volunteer Centre
Otium Leisure Consultancy
Parrish of Carrickfergus Youth centre
Partisan Productions
Pat Finucane Centre
Patrician Youth Centre
Peace and Reconciliation Group
Peace Players International
PLACE
Playboard NI
Polish Supplementary school Newry

Polska Szkoła Dundalk
Pomeroy Preschool playgroup and afterschool
Portaferry Community collective
Presbyterian Church in Ireland
Public Achievement
QE5 LTD
R.A,F.T. - Restorative action following the troubles
Randalstown Arches
Raphoe Family Research centre
Rathgill Community association
Redburn Loughview community forum
Redhead Conference and exhibition limited
Regional Cultural centre
Relatives for Justice
Rossinver Youth and community project ltd.
Rural Area Partnership in Derry
Rural Community Network
Saint Patrick Visitor Centre
Scoutlink
Seaview Enterprises ltd
Second Chance Education for women
SELBSEELB
Seymour Hill and Conway Community network
Shortstrand Community Forum
Sliabh Beagh Partnership
Small Steps Adult education group
South Armagh Rural women network
South Belfast Partnership
South East Fermanagh foundation
South Eastern Education and library Board
Speedwell Trust
Springboard Opportunities limited
St Columbs Park House
St John's Heritage group
St Josephs Brass Band
St Mary's Grammar school
St Marys Silver Band
St Patrick's Day parade community
STEP
Stephenstown Pond Trust ltd.
Stepping Stones
Survivors of Trauma
TARA CENTRE
taughmonagh community forum
Teach na Doaine
Teach Oscail
The Armagh Rhymers educational and cultural organization
The Beat Initiative
The Bytes Project
The Corrymeela Community
The Dock
THe Ely Centre

The Fellowship of Messines association
The Goal Line You Trust
The Hubb - From Prison to peace
The Integration Centre
The Leitrim Design house
The Link Family and community centre
The Mummers Foundation
The Scoutlink Trust
The Venturei Network
The Whistle Project
The White House Preservation trust
Towards Understanding and healing
Trademark

Training for Women network
Trinity Presbyterian church
Truagh Development association ltd.
Tyrone Derry & Donegal action
Tyrone Donegal Partnership
Ulster Peoples College
Ulster-Scots Community network
Verbal Arts Centre
Victims and Survivors Trust
Virginia Pumpkin Festival Limited
Wah Hep Chinese Community association
Waterside Area Partnership
WAVE Trauma Centre
WELB Youth Service
West Tyrone Voice

Westville Family Resource Centre
Women in Agriculture
Women's Resource and development agency
Womens Tec
Workers' Educational Association
Workforce Training
Y.M.C.A (Lisburn) ltd.
YCNI
YMCA
Young at Art
Youth Action NI
Youth Initiatives
Youth Link: NI
Youth Work Ireland-Monaghan

Appendix 3 – *Topic lists*

Interview NGOs

Introduction into the NGO (what does your organisation do?)
EU in general
1. Has the EU been <u>important for the peace</u> in Northern Ireland? (How?)
2. Will Brexit influence <u>NI society</u>? (How?)
3. Will Brexit influence the overall <u>peacebuilding process</u>? (How?) And the NGO sector?
4. What is the impact for you on the fall of the Assembly?

EU for your organisation
5. Is the <u>EU important</u> for your organization? In what way?
6. Is the <u>EU holding your organization back</u> in certain ways?
7. How important is the <u>PEACE funding</u> for your organization?
8. Did your organization apply for PEACE IV funding? What will happen when you won't receive this? > what are you planning with it?
Besides funding:
9. Will Brexit influence your organization?
10. Are there any positive sides to it? Negatives?

Future
11. Does your organization <u>anticipated</u> in any way to Brexit?
12. How does your organization see the <u>future</u> after Brexit? As well as NGO sector
13. Without Brexit, what were the plans and goals of your organization for the future? Has this changed or will this change with upcoming Brexit?

Interview NICVA

Assembly (survey on funding situation after Assembly fell):
How dependent is the sector on the Assembly?
How does Brexit come in this situation?

Brexit:
What is the impact on the Voluntary and Community sector?
Politically and economically?
What does NICVA do with Brexit coming?
How can the sector prepare for Brexit?

Impact funding cuts in general:
What kind of advice does NICVA give?
What options do organisations have to overcome funding cuts in general?

Interview SEUPB

Before Brexit:
      Where there any plans or ideas how to continue after PEACE IV in 2020?
      Ideas for <u>PEACE V?</u>
      What was the view then from the EU on the <u>progress of the Peace process</u>?

Brexit:
      What will happen with the EU initiated peace process after Brexit? Are there any <u>plans</u> already?
      Will the EU keep contributing in some way to peace in Northern Ireland?
      Will <u>PEACE IV be finalized</u> as planned in 2020?

Peace process:
      Do you think the peace process is <u>sustainable</u> enough that it could continue after Brexit?
      Some scholars argue that external economic aid (such as PEACE funding) create <u>dependency</u> in a region. Do you think that Northern Ireland and then especially the voluntary and community sector is dependent on the EU (through the PEACE funding it received
      Are there a lot of organizations contacting you with questions on PEACE funding and the future?
      What does Northern Ireland need to keep peace?

Appendix 4 - *Survey*

The impact of Brexit on NGO's

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey on the impact of Brexit on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. This survey will take around 10 minutes to complete. Be assured that all answers you provide will be analysed with strict confidentiality.

*Required

Part 1: General Information

1. **In which county is your organisation located?** *
   Multiple answers possible
   Tick all that apply.

   ☐ Antrim
   ☐ Armagh
   ☐ Down
   ☐ Fermanagh
   ☐ Londonderry
   ☐ Tyrone

2. **When was your organisation set up? (Select period)** *
   Mark only one oval.

   ◯ ... - 1995
   ◯ 1995 – 1999
   ◯ 2000 – 2006
   ◯ 2007 – 2013
   ◯ 2014 - ...

3. **Is your organisation registered as a:** *
   Mark only one oval.

   ◯ Charity
   ◯ Voluntary group
   ◯ Trust
   ◯ Non-profit organization
   ◯ Other: _____

4. **What is the main area of work for your organisation?** *

Multiple answers possible
Tick all that apply.

- [ ] Promote economic development
- [ ] Promote cultural development
- [ ] Promote intergroup contact
- [ ] Human rights awareness
- [ ] Trauma counselling
- [ ] Mediation
- [ ] Education and training
- [ ] Advice/consultancy
- [ ] Research
- [ ] Other…:

5. **Who is the focus of your organisation's work?** *

Multiple answers possible
Tick all that apply.

- [ ] Both communities
- [ ] Both communities but we work separately with each
- [ ] Focus on only one community
- [ ] Not applicable

6. **What is your main target group?** *

Multiple answers possible
Tick all that apply.

- [ ] Young people (<25 years)
- [ ] Older people (>65 years)
- [ ] Women
- [ ] Men
- [ ] Unemployed
- [ ] Community specific
- [ ] Ethnic minority
- [ ] Not applicable
- [ ] Other: _____

Part 2: Projects

7. **How long do your activities/programmes/projects run on average?** *

If you organize several activities think of the most recent one
Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Short term (<1 year)
- ( ) Middle term (1-4 years)
- ( ) Long term (>4 years)

8. What is the main reason for this certain duration of the activities/programmes/projects? *

This period is used because:
Tick all that apply.

- [ ] It is most effective to reach our goal
- [ ] It is dictated by the availability of funding
- [ ] Donors would like to see results after that period of time
- [ ] New activities are lined up for after this period
- [ ] Other: _____

Part 3: Brexit in general

9. What do you think is the likelihood of Northern Ireland staying within the EU (through any kind of political arrangement)? *

Mark only one oval per row.

	Not at all likely	Moderately likely	Hard to say	Very likely	Completely likely
Northern Ireland staying in the EU is:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

10. How do you think Brexit will influence Northern Ireland on the following issues: *

Mark only one oval per row.

	Very positive	Positive	No impact	Negative	Very negative
The impact on Northern Ireland society will be:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
The impact on the overall peaceprocess will be:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
The impact on peacebuilding NGO's will be:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Part 4: Brexit and your organization
Your organisation has been receiving funding from PEACE and these will fall away with the Brexit, please tell me

11. How will Brexit influence your organisation? *

Mark only one oval per row.

	Very positive	Positive	No impact	Negative	Very negative
The impact on my organisation will be:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

12. What position did your organisation take in the Brexit debate, before the referendum? *

Mark only one oval per row.

	Very pro Brexit	Pro Brexit	Neutral	Against Brexit	Very against Brexit
Our organisation was:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

13. Is your organisation concerned for the impact of Brexit on your organisation? *

Mark only one oval per row.

	Not at all concerned	Slightly concerned	Neutral	Very concerned	Extremely concerned
Our organisation is:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

14. Is your organisation preparing for a Brexit *

Mark only one oval.

◯ Yes   *Skip to question 15.*

◯ No   *Skip to question 16.*

◯ Not applicable   *Skip to question 16.*

Part 4.1: Brexit and your organisation

15. How is your organization preparing for a Brexit? *

Multiple answers possible
Tick all that apply.

☐ Searching for new/other funding

☐ Searching for a new strategy

☐ Consulting with stakeholders

☐ Adjusting future plans

☐ Other: _____

Part 5: Funding

16. How dependent is your organisation on international funding from the following actors? *

Mark only one oval per row.

	Very dependent	Dependent	Neutral	Independent	Very independent
From the EU:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
From the international fund of Ireland:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
From other international organizations:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

17. Did your organization apply for EU PEACE IV (2014-2020) funding? *

PEACE funding requests can be through for example one of the PEACE action plans of your county or directly through SEUBP (Special EU Programmes Body))
Mark only one oval.

◯ Yes   *Skip to question 18.*

◯ No   *Skip to question 20.*

◯ Not applicable   *Skip to question 20.*

Part 5.1: Funding

18. Has your application for the EU PEACE IV funding been endorsed? *

Mark only one oval.

◯ Yes

◯ Not yet

◯ Our request is denied

19. If your organisation would not receive EU PEACE IV funding, is your organisation still able to continue your planned activities/projects/programmes? *

Mark only one oval.

◯ Yes

◯ No

◯ Maybe

Part 6: Donors

20. How is your organisation funded? Roughly, what percentage of funds are from international sources and what percentage are from other sources? *

International sources are for example EU, IFI, international partner NGO's. Other, are all funds, donors and sources from within the UK.
Mark only one oval.

◯ 100% International

◯ 80% International - 20 % other

◯ 60% International - 40% other

◯ 40% International - 60% other

◯ 20% International - 80% other

◯ 100% Internal

◯ I don't know

21. What is the main fund/donor of your organisation? *

The main fund/donor is the one who funds the highest amount of money
Mark only one oval.

◯ EU PEACE funding

◯ Other EU funding (Interreg, Regional funds etc)

◯ International fund of Ireland

◯ Local government

◯ Community Relations Council

◯ Partner organisations

◯ Charities

◯ Trusts or foundations

◯ National Lottery (fund)

◯ Generating own funding through research/consultations/training

◯ Not applicable

◯ Other: _____

22. **What is the second most important fund/donor of your organisation?** *

The main fund/donor is the one who funds the second highest amount of money
Mark only one oval.

- ◯ EU PEACE funding
- ◯ Other EU funding (Interreg, Regional funds etc)
- ◯ International fund of Ireland
- ◯ Local government
- ◯ Community Relations Council
- ◯ Partner organisations
- ◯ Charities
- ◯ Trusts or foundations
- ◯ National Lottery (fund)
- ◯ Generating own funding through research/consultations/training
- ◯ Not applicable
- ◯ Other: _____

23. **What is the third most important fund/donor of your organisation?** *

The main fund/donor is the one who funds the third highest amount of money
Mark only one oval.

- ◯ EU PEACE funding
- ◯ Other EU funding (Interreg, Regional funds etc)
- ◯ International fund of Ireland
- ◯ Local government
- ◯ Community Relations Council
- ◯ Partner organisations
- ◯ Charities
- ◯ Trusts or foundations
- ◯ National Lottery (fund)
- ◯ Generating own funding through research/consultations/training
- ◯ Not applicable
- ◯ Other: _____

24. **Do donors in general influence your decisions/work on the activities you organise?** *

Donors in general are all donors/funds that contribute to your organization
Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Yes   *Skip to question 25.*
- ◯ No   *Skip to question 26.*
- ◯ Not applicable   *Skip to question 26.*

Part 6.1: Donors

25. **How do donors in general influence your work?** *

Do donors in general:
Mark only one oval per row.

	Yes	No	Not applicable
Influence the duration of your projects:	◯	◯	◯
Influence the aim/goal of your organisation:	◯	◯	◯
Create more bureaucratic work for your organisation:	◯	◯	◯

Part 7: The EU as a donor

26. **Does the EU as a donor through PEACE funding influence your decisions/work?** *

Mark only one oval.

◯ Yes   *Skip to question 27.*

◯ No   *Skip to question 28.*

◯ Not applicable   *Skip to question 28.*

Part 7.1: The EU as donor

27. **How does the EU as donor through PEACE funding influence your work?** *

Does the EU as donor:
Mark only one oval per row.

	Yes	No	Not applicable
Influence the duration of your projects:	◯	◯	◯
Influence the aim/goal of your organisation:	◯	◯	◯
Create more bureaucratic work for your organisation:	◯	◯	◯

Part 8: Finalizing

28. **That is almost it, thank you for your time. As a follow up on this survey I would like to contact selected organisations and conduct interviews to find out more about NGOs work resulting from PEACE funding. Could I contact your organisation in early June to discuss this in person and collect further insights? Than please leave your contact information:**

    Name of organisation:

    _____

29. E-mail address:

    _____

30. **Would you like to receive information about the findings of my research project when it is completed?**

    Than please leave the e-mail address here on which you want to receive the findings of this research:

    _____

31. **If you have any comments, please outline here:**

    _____

    _____

    _____

    _____

Appendix 5 - *Analysis plan*

Used as nodes in NVivo

Situation in NI in General:	Positive	x	
	Negative	Political instability Drugs Sectarianism Unsustainable – Economy Social problems	
Brexit impact on:	Northern Ireland Society:	Positive	Changing narrative Local freedoms (No EU approaches) Better chances
		Negative	Border Economy Funding Legal framework/human Rights Politics Uncertainties
	Peace Process:	Positive	x
		Negative	Border issues PEACE en EU Political unrest
	NGOs	Positive	x
		Negative	Loss of (executive) Funding Disappearing NGOs Uncertainties
Funding:	Dependent on EU		
	Independent on EU		
Impact of PEACE funding:	Positive	Funding Creating jobs Peace and reconciliation- Projects Infrastructure Bringing people together	
	Negative	Inequality No visible progress at - grassroots level	
Implementation of PEACE funding:	Positive	Useful projects Rise of number of NGOs Jobs	
	Negative	Lot of bureaucratic work Difficult Long duration of Application No evaluation Need to focus on existing NGOs Need for long-term Insufficient payment in advance	
	PEACE IV	Positive	Still able to apply
		Negative	Not for small NGOs Different focus
Preparing for Brexit:	No		
	Yes:	Solutions Preparations Advice Need to speak up the needs of NI	Looking for funding Looking for clarity Call for Bill of Rights

Appendix 6 – *Survey outcomes :Tables*

All tables which are referred to in the thesis. Numbers correspond with each part of the survey.

1.1   Location of the NGOs

Counties	Number of NGOs	Percentage
Antrim	13	50%
Armagh	1	3,8%
Down	4	15,4%
Londonderry	2	7,7%
Tyrone	4	15,4%
All counties	2	7,7%
Total	*26*	*100%*

1.2   Period when the NGOs were set-up

Period	Number of NGOs	Percentage
… - 1995	18	69,2%
1995 – 1999	5	19,2%
2000 – 2006	1	3,8%
2007 – 2013	2	7,7%
Total	*26*	*100%*

1.3 Type of NGOs

Type	Number of NGOs	Percentage
Charity	23	88,5%
Non-profit organization	2	7,7%
Membership based Associaiton	1	3,8%
Total	*26*	*100%*

1.4 Main focus of the NGOs

Focus	Number of answers	Percentage
Both communities	23	88,46%
Both communities but we work separately with each	1	3,84%
Focus on only one community	3	11,54%
Total	*27*	*103,8%*

Percentage is calculated with 26 respondents, multiple answers possible, therefore the total percentage is higher than 100%.

1.5 Main target group of the NGOs

Target group	Number of answers	Percentage
Young people <25	15	57,7%
Old people >65	12	46,2%
Women	12	46,2%
Men	11	42,3%
Unemployed	7	26,9%
Ethnic minority	7	26,9%
Community specific	6	23,1%
We work with all	3	11,4%
Not applicable	5	19,2%
Total	*78*	*299,9%*

Percentage is calculated with 26 respondents, multiple answers possible, therefore the total percentage is higher than 100%.

1.6 Main area of work for the NGOs

Main area	Number of Answers	Percentage
Promote intergroup contact	13	50%
Education and training	12	46,2%

	10	38,5%
Promote cultural development	10	38,5%
Human rights awareness	6	23,1%
Advice/consultancy	5	19,2%
Mediation	4	15,4%
Promote economic development	4	15,4%
Research	4	15,4%
Traumacounselling	2	7,7%
Other	10	38,5%
Total	*70*	*269,4%*

Percentage is calculated with 26 respondents, multiple answers possible, therefore the total percentage is higher than 100%.

2.1 Average duration of the projects of NGOs

Duration	Number	Percentage
Middle term (1-4 years)	14	53,8%
Short term (<1 year)	7	26,9%
Long term (>4 years)	5	19,2%
Total	*26*	*100%*

2.2 Main reason for this certain duration of the projects

Reason	Number	Percentage
It is most effective to reach our goal	9	34,62%
It is dictated by the availability of funding	18	69,23%
Donors would like to see results after that period of time	1	3,84%
New activities are lined up after that period	1	3,84%
Other:	1	3,84%
Total	*30*	*115,37%*

Percentage is calculated with 26 respondents, multiple answers possible, therefore the total percentage is higher than 100%.

3.1 Northern Ireland staying in the EU is according to the NGOs:

	Number of NGOs	Percentage
Not at all likely	18	69,20%
Moderately likely	1	3,80%
Hard to say	7	26,90%
Very likely	0	0
Completely likely	0	0
Total	*26*	*100*

3.2, 3.3, 3.4 The influence of Brexit on the following issues:

	The impact on Northern Ireland society will be:		The impact on the overall peace process will be:		The impact on community building NGOs will be:	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Very positive	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Positive	2	7,70%	0	0%	0	0%
No impact		0%	5	19,20%	2	7,70%
Negative	14	53,80%	13	50%	13	50%
Very negative	10	38,50%	8	30,80%	11	42,30%
Total	26	100%	26	100%	26	100%

4.1 Influence of Brexit on NGOs organisations

	Number	Percentage
Very Positive	0	0%
Positive	0	0%
No impact	3	11,50%
Negative	19	73,10%
Very negative	4	15,40%

Total	*26*	*100%*

4.2 Position the NGOs took on Brexit, before the referendum

	Number	Percentage
Very against Brexit	5	19,20%
Against Brexit	3	11,50%
Neutral	15	57,70%
Pro Brexit	1	3,80%
Very pro Brexit	2	7,70%
Total	*26*	*100%*

4.3 Level of concerns of the NGOs on the impact of Brexit regarding their own organisations

	Number	Percentage
Not at all concerned	0	0%
Slightly concerned	11	42,30%
Neutral	3	11,50%
Very concerned	5	19,20%
Extremely concerned	7	26,90%
Total	*26*	*100%*

4.4 Number of NGOs preparing for Brexit

	Frequency	Percentage
No	12	46,20%
Yes	8	30,80%
Not applicable	6	23,10%
Total	*26*	*100%*

4.5 Ways of preparing for Brexit

Ways	Number	Percentage
Adjusting future plans	6	75%
Searching for new/other funding	5	62,50%
Searching for a new strategy	5	62,50%
Consulting with stakeholders	4	50%
Other: facilitating conversations	1	12,50%
Total	21	263%

Percentage is calculated with 8 respondents, multiple answers possible, therefore the total percentage is higher than 100%.

5.1 Level of dependency on several external economic donors

	EU		IFI		Other International Organizations	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Very dependent	1	4%	1	4%	2	8%
Dependent	9	35%	3	12%	4	15%
Neutral	9	35%	12	46%	12	46%
Independent	5	19%	6	23%	6	23%
Very independent	2	8%	4	15%	2	8%
Total	*26*	*100%*	*26*	*100%*	*26*	*100%*

5.2 Number of the NGO´s that applied for PEACE IV

	Number	Percentage
No	17	65,40%
Yes	7	26,90%
Not applicable	2	7,70%
Total	*26*	*100%*

5.3 Number of the NGO´s for whom PEACE IV is endorsed

	Number	Percentage
Not yet	7	100%
Total	7	100%

5.4 Number of NGO´s that are still able to continue their projects even without PEACE IV

	Number	Percentage
No	3	42,86%
Yes	2	28,57%
Maybe	2	28,57%
Total	*7*	*100%*

6.1 Number of NGO´s of which donors in general influence their work

	Number	Percentage
Yes	14	56,00%
No	11	44,00%
Total	*25*	*100%*

6.2 Ways how donors influence the work of NGOs in general

Donors:	Yes		No		Not applicable		Total	
Influence the duration of your projects	13	92,86%	1	7,14%	0	0%	*14*	*100%*
Influence the aim/goal of your organisation	4	28,57%	10	71,42%	0	0%	*14*	*100%*
Create more bureaucratic work for your organisation	9	64,28%	4	28,57%	1	7,14%	*14*	*100%*

Percentage is calculated with 14 respondents.

6.3 Distribution of internal and external funding at the NGOs

Distribution	Number	Percentage
100% Internal	7	26,90%
20% International - 80% other	8	30,80%
40% International - 60% other	5	19,20%
60% International - 40% other	2	7,70%
I don't know	4	15,40%
Total	*26*	*100%*

6.4A Main donor of NGOs

Donor	Number	Percentage
Arts Council NI	1	3,8
Community Relations Council	5	19,2
Education Authority / DE	1	3,8
EU PEACE funding	1	3,8
Generating own funding through research/consultations/training	1	3,8
Local government	8	30,8
Membership Fees	1	3,8
National Lottery (fund)	3	11,5
Not applicable	1	3,8
Other EU funding (Interreg, Regional funds etc)	1	3,8
Private Donors and Honesty Box contributions	1	3,8
Trusts or foundations	2	7,7
Total	*26*	*100*

6.4B Second main donor of NGOs

Donor	Number	Percentage

Charities	1	3,8
Community Relations Council	3	11,5
Dept of Foreign Affairs	1	3,8
EU PEACE funding	1	3,8
Generating own funding through research/consultations/training	3	11,5
International fund of Ireland	1	3,8
Irish Dept of Foreign Affairs	1	3,8
Local government	4	15,4
National Lottery (fund)	2	7,7
Not applicable	2	7,7
Partner organisations	3	11,5
Trade unions	1	3,8
Trusts or foundations	3	11,5
Total	*26*	*100*

6.4C Third main donor of NGOs

Donor	Number	Percentage
Central govt	1	3,8
EU PEACE funding	4	15,4
Generating own funding through research/consultations/training	5	19,2
Local government	6	23,1
Not applicable	3	11,5
Other EU funding (Interreg, Regional funds etc)	1	3,8
Partner organisations	1	3,8
Trusts or foundations	4	15,4
We have a cocktail of funders depending on the type of programme	1	3,8
Total	*26*	*100*

7.1 Number of NGO´s of which the EU as donor influences their work

	Number	Percentage
Yes	7	35%
No	13	65%
Total	*20*	*100%*

7.2 Ways how the EU as donor influences the work of NGOs

	Yes		No		Not applicable		Total	
Influence the duration of your projects	6	85,71%	0	0%	1	14,28%	*7*	*100%*
Influence the aim/goal of your organisation	3	42,85%	4	57,14%	0	0%	*7*	*100%*
Create more bureaucratic work for your organisation	5	71,43%	1	14,28%	1	14,28%	*7*	*100%*

Tables numbered with 8 are cross tables and are created from combining tables 1-7 with each other
8.1 Division of the feeling of dependency on the EU as donor by organisations set up before and after 1995 (combination of table 1.2 & 5.2)

	Very independent		Independent		Neutral		Dependent		Very dependent	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Before 1995	2	11,10%	3	16,60%	7	38,80%	5	27,70%	1	5,50%
After 1995	0	0	2	25%	2	25%	4	50%	0	0%

8.2A Comparison with organization set up before and after 1995 on whether the EU as donor through PEACE funding influences decisions/work of the NGO (combination of table 1.2 & 7.1)

	No		Yes	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*
Before 1995	10	77%	3	23%
After 1995	3	43%	4	57%

N=20

8.2.B Comparison with organization set up before and after 1995 on whether donors in general influences decisions/work of the NGO (combination of table 1.2 & 6.1)

	No		Yes	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*
Before 1995	8	44,40%	9	50%
After 1995	3	37,50%	5	62,50%

N=25

8.3 Comparison with average duration of projects and the reasons behind the certain duration (combination of table 2.1 & 2.2)

	Dictated by the availability of funding		Most effective to reach our goal		New activities are lined up after this period		Donors would like to see results after that period of time		Other..		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	*N*	*%*
Short term (<1 year)	6	86%	0	0%	0	0%	1	14%	0	0%	*7*	*100%*
Middle term (1-4 years)	10	59%	7	41%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	*17*	*100%*
Long term (>4 years)	2	33%	2	33%	1	17%	0	0%	1	17%	*6*	

N is respectively: 7, 17 and 6 (based on number of answers instead of respondents, because multiple choices possible).

8.4 Number of organisations that feel dependent on the EU as donor in comparison with the level of international funding (combination of tables 5.1 and 6.3) N=22

	Dependent	Neutral	Independent
100% Other	1	1	5
20% International - 80% Other	1	7	0
40% International - 60% Other	4	0	1
60% International - 40% Other	2	0	0

8.5 NGOs preparing for Brexit compared with the level of international funding (combination of table 4.4 & 6.3) N=16

	Organisations preparing for Brexit:	
	No	Yes
100% Internal	4	0
20% International - 80% other	4	3
40% International - 60% other	2	2
60% International - 40% other	0	1