


# EUROPEAN STRUCTURATION AND DIPLOMACY IN LIBYA:

A Descriptive Case Study on the EU Border Assistance  
Mission In Libya from a Dual Structuration and Post-Colonial  
perspective

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Bachelor Thesis

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-June 2018-

**Bachelor Thesis Geography, Planning and Environment**

For the completion of the Pre-Master Human Geography program

Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University

Cover front: Hanel Kunstgeschichtliches Zeminar der Universität Göttingen, 1993

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Words main text: 26569

6 July 2018



## Summary

In order to understand the present, an outlook on history can be highly relevant. This thesis traces back historical events and patterns that have led to, and influences the present-day cooperation between Libya and the European Union (EU). It zooms in on how the European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), as a cooperation mechanism actually influences the relation between the EU and Libya and gaining a clear insight and better understanding of the actual impact the mission has had up to now.

The central question that is asked in this thesis is if the borders are 'externalized', or offshored to Africa, as many scholars have suggested and where then the power in preserving this border lies. The research therefore zooms in on whether or not the EUBAM can be seen as a manifestation of externalization and has a certain agency in transforming the border construction between the EU and Libya. The idea of this is to contribute to the debate on political cooperation with Libya on migration control and to understand the current relation and border between the EU and Libya, where historical events and patterns have played an important role in reproducing structural thoughts and behaviour.

Theories that form the foundation of this research are that of the Duality of Structuration Theory by Anthony Giddens as a means to understand the ways in which the border between Libya and Europe has been constructed and reconstructed throughout time and space EU and that of Post-Colonial Theory as the study concerned with uneven, diverse and the contested impact of colonialism on cultures of colonized countries and colonized people, that shows how colonial behaviour and thoughts are reproduced throughout time.

The main argument that has been made in this thesis, building on the Duality of Structuration Theory and Post-Colonial Theory, is that Libya and Europe have never been truly separated, but were kept together by different actors and mechanism. Through describing interaction and the different roles and meanings of the border, it has been proved that the border is a non-fixed structure, capable of change. The reproduction of Orientalist thoughts have been brought to light by Post-Colonial Theory and used to explain the cause for a divided identity that has been reproduced and resulted in polarized identities based on fear, hate and racism. As the Duality of Structuration Theory claims, change is possible—by thinking differently, decolonizing our minds, we can change the structure and demonstrate that history can be changed. The thesis has shown that the land on which we live on has shaped us, made us for what we are today and how we perceive one another. It also showed that this does not always have to be so. Thoughts and behaviours are capable of change and by changing our thoughts; we can steer away and free our minds from hateful and stereotyped perceptions of one another.

## Acknowledgments

What led me to explore the relationship between the EU and Libya were the stories from my Libyan friends. These friendships—their stories and experiences, changed and defined my outlook on them and the world. They showed me a side you do not always get to read in the news or in academic articles. I learned more about the people of Libya through stories upon stories: stories of a pre-colonial society, based on a Bedouin sort of lifestyle, where nationalism played less of a role and people associate themselves with being ‘Arab’ or ‘Muslim’ and not with ‘from here or from there’.

‘You come from your mother and belong to nobody’, is what they told me. If anything this research has thought me, it is that demarcation of territory—whether it were by the colonizers, the authoritarian regime by Gaddafi, or European management—has divided us more than ever. Teaching me these lessons, by introducing me to their culture and the traditions of the ‘Land of Sand’, named and bounded as Libya, has been a wonderful gift.

To my academic supervisor I want to say thank you. Olivier, it was a pleasure to be supervised by you. Your insights and deep knowledge of the issue this thesis is inspired by, is something I greatly benefitted from.

Thanks for all, سلكدن

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Summary .....	1
Acknowledgments .....	2
List of figures .....	5
List of Acronyms .....	6
INTRODUCTION .....	7
Setting the scene .....	7
Research Goal .....	8
Research Relevance .....	10
Methodology .....	11
Research Limitations .....	12
Thesis Outline .....	12
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....	14
Introduction .....	14
The Duality of Structuration Theory .....	15
Rules and resources .....	17
Post-Colonial Theory .....	18
Orientalism .....	19
Present day Orientalism .....	20
Other thinking .....	21
Border Ontology .....	22
Conclusion .....	24
<b>Part I</b> .....	
<b>What kept us together .....</b>	<b>25</b>
The Border as Bridge and Resource - EURAFRICA - .....	27
1.1 The Gateway to Africa .....	28
1.2 Part of Africa .....	30
1.2.1 Eurafrica .....	33
1.3 The Post-Colonial Era .....	35
1.3.1 Political Interests: EU Norms .....	35
1.3.2 Economic Interests: Black gold .....	36
1.3.3 Joint Cooperation on Migration .....	37
1.4 Externalized borders .....	40
1.5 Conclusion .....	41

<b>Part II</b>	<b>What divided us .....</b>	<b>42</b>
The Border as a Symbol of Identity and Barrier - IN THE EYES OF THE OTHER - .....		44
2.1. The civilized and barbarian.....		45
2.1.1 Indigenous Politics.....		46
2.2 National Identity .....		47
2.3 The Muslims and non-Muslims.....		49
2.4 The Modern and Stagnated .....		51
2.4.1 The ‘Arab Spring’ narrative.....		52
2.5 Fort Europe .....		54
2.6 Migration control .....		56
2.6.1 Power Differences.....		57
2.7 Conclusion .....		58
<b>Part III</b>	<b>The EUBAM case.....</b>	<b>59</b>
The Implementations of the EUBAM - DARK WEB OF COLLUSION -.....		61
3.1 The EUBAM as a Bridge and Resource .....		62
3.1.1 Bringing back Eurafrika.....		64
3.2 The EUBAM as a Barrier and Symbol of Identity.....		65
3.2.1 Bringing back Orientalism .....		66
3.3 The EUBAM’s Agency.....		66
3.3.1 Saving lives .....		67
3.3.2 Human rights abuse.....		68
3.3.3 Europeanization .....		69
3.3 EUBAM in relation to Externalization .....		70
3.3.1 De-territorial collaboration.....		72
3.5 Conclusion .....		73
Bibliography .....		81

## List of Figures

<i>Figure 1.1: The Trans-Saharan Trade Route. Source: Austen: 2015. ....</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Figure 1.2: Italy setting foot in Libya. Source: Lombardi Historical Collection. Source: Lombardi: 1912.....</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Figure 1.4: Dividing of border responsibilities EU and Libya. Source: EPSC 2017 .....</i>	<i>39</i>
<i>Figure 2.1: Tony Blair, left, with Gaddafi at the start of their meeting. Source: Watson: 2004 .....</i>	<i>48</i>
<i>Figure 2.2: 'How the Media and experts determine how we see the rest of the World'. Source: Said, 1997... </i>	<i>50</i>
<i>Figure 3.1: Facebook message from EUBAM introducing its first meeting. Source: Facebook EUBAM.....</i>	<i>63</i>
<i>Figure 3.2: Practices through which the externalisation is conceptualized. Source: Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, &amp; Aragall, 2009. ....</i>	<i>71</i>

## List of Acronyms

CSDP	The Common Security and Defence Policy
EU	The European Union
EUBAM	The European Border Assistance Mission
EUNavFor	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU
GNA	Government of National Accord
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LNA	Libyan National Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOC	National Oil Corporation
NTC	National Transitional Council
SAR Zone	Search and Rescue Zone
SGI	Società Geografica Italiana
UN	United Nations
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya

# INTRODUCTION

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## *Setting the scene*

On the periphery of three worlds– the Arab, African and Mediterranean, surrounded by sea and desert, lies what is now called ‘Libya’– a nation that has been influenced and been under at least nominal foreign rule for most of its known history. Libya has been a colony, a state or province of empires ruled from Africa, Asia or Europe. Whether it were the Greek, Roman, Ottoman Turkish or the Fascist Italian powers that ruled the place, or international interventionism that shaped the place– it all made the country for what it is today (St. John, 2008).

The current state of Libya has been described in international media as a ‘state of emergency’ (Daily Mail, 2016), or even as a ‘failed state’ (Al Jazeera, 2018), for it is currently governed by multiple authorities and ruled by different militias and terrorist groups. The current state of Libya is relevant throughout this research since it influences the relation and cooperation on migration control that is currently going on between Libya and the EU.

Libya and Europe seem to be divided on cultural, political and social fronts, and a question to be raised therefore is if Libya has ever been united with Europe or instead has ever been truly separated from European influences at all.

As Libya became one of the largest migrant transit countries for migrants on their way to Europe, the EU looked for ways to cooperate with Libya in order to constrain these arriving migrants. This marked the beginning of an on-going cooperation; the most recent cooperation is that of the EUBAM, ‘The EU Border Assistance Mission’. This cooperation started in 2013 as a political framework developed with the objective to avoid deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and to bring prosperity, security, and stability to both the EU as well as to Libya, by advising and supporting Libyan authorities in managing migration control (EEAS, 2018).

The EUBAM provides the central context for this thesis and will be analysed through a Duality of Structuration and Post-Colonial lens, reflecting on historical events and power relationship between the EU and Libya. While some scholars argue that the EU is currently very much involved in Libya, this thesis challenges the idea that Libya and Europe have ever been apart. Starting from the sixteenth century, this thesis will outline what has defined and divided ‘us’, and trace back historical events to the current state of EU-Libyan cooperation that is now criticized and in this thesis aimed to be understood.

### *Research Goal*

By using the Duality of Structuration Theory, the idea is to prove that the border construction between Libya and the EU and therewith the divided identity, is that are capable of change. The border can be seen as a non-fixed structure, maintained by actors and mechanism capable of bringing certain agency. This non-fixed character is demonstrated in this thesis by showing the dynamic side of the border, where the border had different roles, meanings, and realities throughout history.

At the same time, the border will be perceived off as to remain a stagnated and fixed structure by actors acting in accordance to it and reproducing the same behaviours and thoughts over and over again. This will be shown by analysing historical patterns- patterns that are thought of as actions and thoughts that are being reproduced and established and herewith created similar identities and realities throughout time.

To show how borders have remained similar and stagnated, Post-Colonial Theory serves as a means to understand the influence of unequal power and its effect on the perceived identity caused by colonialism. This thesis proves that the border as a social structure has played an important role on influencing the perceived identity and relation between the EU and Libya. Post-Colonial Theory implies a certain historical pattern and homogeneous thought that suggests that the borders and the identity between Europe and Libya have not really changed and where the perceived identity of the 'other' remained the same.

The current conceptualization is relevant in order to understand the reproduction and fixation of the border between Libya and Europe. Therefore, this thesis zooms in on the current mechanism, accused of bringing structural change and thus capable of changing the border between Libya and the EU.

This thesis aims to prove that the EUBAM does not show much agency in changing the border constructions between Libya and the EU, while at the same time it will prove that the EUBAM shows certain agency in reproducing a stagnated oriental identity of Libya that can be explained by historical structural thinking.

Scholars have suggested that the border between the EU and Libya have been transformed and 'externalized' to Libyan shores, while this thesis argues that this conceptualization is elusive and incorrect and that the EUBAM cannot truly be conceptualized as an agency in bringing cultural change, but only repeats historical practices by showing similar colonial patterns where Libya is doing Europe's 'dirty work'- and where Europe structures the Libyan society to meet European standards.

The main guidance that is used to analyse the border conceptualization and transformation is the following:

*How did the Libyan and European border conceptualization transform throughout time and space and to what extent does the practice of conceptualizing the border as 'externalized', apply to the present day EUBAM and act as an agency in influencing border thinking and border construction?*

In order to formulate a comprehensive answer to this question, the following supporting sub-questions are created as guidance:

1. *In what way has the political border between Libya and Europe been perceived as a bridge, a resource, a symbolic meaning and a barrier for Europe?*

This question focuses on the conceptualization of the border throughout time by building on Liam O'Dowd's idea (2001) that argues that borders can best be described with the use of the four metaphors mentioned above. By focusing on these metaphors and tracing back historical constructions and events, the nature of the border is shown to be multi-dimensional and complex. The aim of this sub-question is to prove that a certain dynamic and transformation of the borders suggested by the Duality of Structuration Theory is possible.

2. *Can the on-going EUBAM cooperation with Libya be defined as an example of externalization? And if so, does externalisation increase the overall bargaining power of Libya or Italy?*

The EUBAM can be seen as the most recent cooperation between Libya and the EU on migration control and is therefore relevant to the political border between Europe and Libya. The conceptualization of the border as externalized implies that the EU is involved in Libya and herewith reproducing historical behaviour.

3. *Does the EUBAM correspond with EU's internal policy of fundamental rights of protection or has its implementations clashed with these interests?*

The current involvement of the EU in Libya has received criticism where the implementations of the EUBAM are clashed with EU's interest of offering protection and stability. The EU can be seen as reproducing colonial behaviour by acting in accordance to historical patterns, which contributes to a shared responsibility in the currently being violated human rights in Libya.

### *Research Relevance*

This thesis is highly relevant as it proves that the border and therewith the relationship between the EU and Libya is capable of change. Currently, the borders and the created identity for Libya and its citizen are being reproduced through Colonial behaviour and thoughts, which resulted in consequences for its the relationship and cooperation.

Hate and racism plays a role in Libya's current perceived identity, where the Arab world is often portrayed as 'less developed' and in need for Westernization. The idea is to prove that this identity has not changed throughout time by the cause of Duality of Structuration theory that argues that structures can produce acts and mechanism and reproduce similar behaviours. A change in perceived identity is necessary as it is important from an ideal perspective of a more peaceful world, one where relationships are built on well-read cultural understandings of one another. The idea is to make people conscious of their perceptions that are influenced by structures. If people are conscious of the structures they act and think in accordance to and influences their thoughts and behaviour, one is able to steer lose from them and make a change.

By analysing historical patterns and transformations throughout time, a better understanding of the current impact of the EUBAM is gained. The idea of this thesis is not to provide a total overview of EU foreign policy, but rather to examine one specific case in Libya within the context of the latest external policy concerning migration policy.

The situation in Libya is critique and the migrant route to Europe is still on-going with growing numbers of migrants arriving at the EU's external borders, who are hoping to find a safer future but are refused and send back. The 'shame' by international media is placed on Libya for mistreatment and bad management of migrants, while Europe is freed from the 'burden' of accepting migrants. The social relevance of this research is therefore to better understand this situation and prove that this situation can be changed.

By analysing the border construction and relation between the EU and Libya, the idea is to contribute to the debate on political EU cooperation with Libya and the implementation of migration control. The issue of 'externalization' and international diplomacy in Libya has been intensively researched, however, the debate is controversial with different opinions on responsibilities and power relations influencing the thoughts on externalization. The relevance of this thesis is therefore to clarify the term 'externalization' and compare different standpoints in order to shed a different light on externalization practices and reject the idea that the EUBAM is an act of externalization and capable of transforming the border construction while at the same time, the EUBAM acts as an agency in reproducing an unequal identity, one that is based on a colonial and hierarchal relation.

## *Methodology*

The focus of this research is on investigating and understanding the on-going cooperation on migration control between the EU and Libya and relating it to historical practices and the conceptualization of externalization. This is done by qualitative research and a descriptive case study, with the idea to focus on a specific case in order to compare and place it into a historical perspective.

The reason to focus on this sort of methodology is to prove how the two theoretical lenses, namely that of the Duality of Structuration Theory and that of Post-Colonial Theory, have influenced the relationship between Libya and the EU and how they can be used as a means to better understand their transformative or stagnating character.

The idea of a descriptive case study as a methodology is to focus on a small domain within a larger framework to generate intensive qualitative data. The reason for choosing this approach is the complexity of the research topic and the abundance of literature available.

Data is gathered through individual people (through the personal channel of the researcher), online media, online documents, and academic literature. By focusing on this form of data gathering and a specific case, it is possible to explore or describe the data in real-life environment, but also to explain the complexities of real-life situations (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010).

The case to focus on throughout this research is the EUBAM: The EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya. The reason to focus on the EUBAM is its on-going character and a currently dominant view in academic literature that argues that the EU-Libyan cooperation is seen as a practice of externalization to Libya and herewith implying a certain hierarchical different and Neo-Colonial attitude by the EU.

Besides data on the two theoretical lenses, extensive data is used in order to create a comprehensive image on the Libyan and European society. A scholar who wrote extensively about the history of Libya is John Wright. His work includes a wide range of historical data that covers Libya's complex and long history. Another scholar that wrote detailed work on historical, but also on present-day Libya, is John St. Bruce. An inside view through the eyes of the Libyan writer Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, whose parents and grandparents experienced Italian Colonialism at first hand, will provide an inward view on the Libyan society and culture. By using these writers to analyse Libya, a comprehensive overview and insight is provided, one that covers multiple layers of Libyan society and history and its international relations.

### *Research Limitations*

This research focuses on the Duality of Structuration Theory and Post-Colonial Theory. By zooming in on these theories and only focussing on secondary research, this thesis aims to prove the relevance of these theories in relation to the central concept. The limitation of this is that these theories are not empirically substantiated and the research only aims to prove the relevance of these theories. The research is mainly focused on analysing structural thoughts and actions and can be not be empirical proven.

This thesis thus makes assumptions that cannot be completely proven. Regardless of the on-going character of the EUBAM and the main focus on a theoretical framework without empirical substantiation, this thesis aims to defend the implementations of these theories and tries to focus on the importance of the theories described.

The EUBAM case on which the thesis zooms in is an on-going mission that has not yet been completed and therefore cannot be fully evaluated. However, since the mission already resulted in serious consequences as is claimed by international organizations, it can be relevant to already reflect on certain implementations caused by the on-going mission.

### *Thesis Outline*

The main foundation of this thesis outlined in the Theoretical Framework consists of two important theories. These theories are explained and applied to the border conceptualization and the relationship between the EU and Libya. Throughout the thesis, these theories are commonly referred to as means to understand and explain behaviours and actions. By analysing the implementations these theories have had on the situation in Libya, the theories can be reflected upon in order to understand if they have lived up to the expectations and implementations as described.

After discussing the Theoretical Framework, the thesis moves on to the core context, which is divided into 3 parts.

Part I, 'What kept us together' focuses on historical events and mechanism that caused Europe and Libya to cooperate or be part of one another in some way or another. This part includes the pre-colonial, colonial as well as the Post-Colonial era. Part I describes the two metaphors of 'bridge and resource', where the focus will be on what has caused for Europe and Libya to be part of each other's history.

Part II 'What divided us', zooms in on what caused Europe and Libya to be physically or mentally divided. Important here are the cultural aspects and the perceived identity of both the EU and Libya attach to their nationality. Part II zooms in on the metaphors of 'symbol of identity', the symbolic division, and 'barrier', the physical

cartographical division. Both the symbolic identity as well as the barrier can be seen as a dividing mechanism that has separated Libya and Europe and continues to do so.

Part III 'The case 'EUBAM'', focuses on the current operation on migration control and on the concept of externalization. This part focuses on the cooperation between Libya and the EU as well as on the implementations of the EUBAM.

The thesis will finish with an overall conclusion, summarizing the most important and relevant information in order to find an answer to the main research question mentioned earlier by referring to the two theories and evaluating their relevance and their role they have played in the research.

Throughout this research, the concept of 'migrant' describes the wide range of people on the move and stranded outside their country of origin, including refugees, asylum seekers, displaced people, illegalized migrants and legal migrants. Whereas the term migrant implies a larger network of related terms, the term Europe can be seen more as the opposite, where most times Europe should rather be referred to as Western European states such as Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, who have been more involved in Libya in compare to other European countries, but instead is referred to as the 'EU' or 'Europe' for pragmatic reasons.

A final note of this introduction is that what is present-day called 'Libya' is only recently (the last 60 years) been called so (St. John, 2017), for pragmatic reasons, the term will be used to refer to the geographical location of what is present-day bounded as 'Libya', throughout its entire history. The same applies when addressing the population of Libya. Throughout this thesis, the term used for the population living in Libya is that of 'Libyans', regardless of them being better described at certain times as Tripolitanians, Bedouins, Arabs or Muslims for example.

# THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

## **Introduction**

The Theoretical Framework includes two important theories that form the foundation of this research. Starting with the Duality of Structuration Theory by Anthony Giddens as a means to understand the ways in which the border between Libya and Europe has been constructed and reconstructed throughout time and space. Focusing on the Duality of Structuration will emphasize the altering character of the border between Europe and Libya and allows for a detailed understanding of how the border has been produced and reproduced through social action.

After describing the Duality of Structuration Theory, this framework continues with the border analysis through the theoretical lens of 'Post-Colonial Theory', as a way to describe the colonial and postcolonial influences on the border and on the relationship between Libya and the EU. Libya is a colonized country, colonized by different powers. This thesis focuses on the relationship between Libya and Europe and will therefore focus on the colonization of Libya by Italy and the Post-Colonial period of European diplomacy after independence.

The idea of using Post-Colonial Theory can be seen as a means of social and political representation of a postcolonial nation and to form a dialogue with the colonial past. It will also be used as a lens to analyse present-day EU diplomacy. With the use of a Post-Colonial lens, it is possible to strive for a new identity and a new way of thinking that does not completely banish the colonial past but involves the selective retrieval and appropriation of indigenous and colonial cultures to produce appropriate forms of the Post-Colonial present.

Besides two theoretical perspectives, this chapter will zoom in on the concept of border thinking and the ways in which we can conceptualize a border. Throughout history, the ontological character of the border had different meanings and functions. This is relevant when capturing where the political border between Libya and Europe is located (mentally or cartographically).

Important when conceptualizing the border, is the term 'externalization', as a means to refer to the external dimensions of border policymaking involved in managing border construction. Externalization in this light can be relevant as a means to conceptualize where the borders are, and what effect conceptualizing the border as 'externalized' might have on the border ontology and border thinking.

## **The Duality of Structuration Theory**

The Duality of Structuration Theory by Anthony Giddens (1984), is a theory that emphasizes how social actors have certain agency and design tools, social systems, physical entities and organizations within social processes and have the ability to create their own history, depending on the construction and influences of the existing social forces and relationships.

With the use of the 'Duality of Structuration Theory' as the lens to look at interactions, the border construction between Libya and the EU can be critically reflected upon as an abstract structure, structuring the agent's thoughts and behaviours, as well as a daily reality reconstructed repeatedly by agents acting according to them (Fuchs, 2003).

According to Giddens (1984), structures only exist as long as people act according to them and so reproduce these structures. With his theory, he tries to treat the production and reproduction of social life as an on-going process of structuration, where all human action in society is directed by actions that have specific meaning for social actors. One can identify reasons for their actions, have planned intentions and can choose between different alternative actions in situations. He argues that structures can be interpretative on one hand and 'structural' in some sort of sense. People have the possibility of choosing to think in and from structures and are able to engage in structural thinking, where structures are constantly constructed and reconstructed. The theory thus shows how structures are complex and non-fixed concepts and therefore capable of change.

The border between Libya and the EU can be perceived of as a social structure, where actors can identify their role and position towards their actions, reflect on the state of the world and interpret how it is changing. Borders are an 'absent' order of differences, 'present' only in the moments of social interaction through which it is itself reproduced or transformed or reconstructed (Giddens, 1984).

The relation between the EU and Libya will be of importance in order to see how interaction between the two transformed and reproduced the border structure. The focus of this thesis is therefore on how the Duality Structuration Theory may offer a way of looking at the role and influence of the border structure and recognize that human actions and thoughts are enabled and constrained by social structures, which at the same time are the result of previous human activity and thinking.

Tracing back historical events to see how they structured or have been influenced by structures can be done through the central concepts of actors, rules and resources, and power involved, which play a role in reproducing or transforming the border construction.

### *Agency and mechanism*

This thesis uses an actor-oriented approach as a means to understand social phenomena of which the border construction and conceptualization between Libya and the EU can be an example. The approach departs from the central point of view where social actors have agency and are steered, enabled by certain mechanism.

In the Duality Structuration Theory by Giddens (1984), the concept of agency is a mixture of the sense of freedom, where the actor is capable of making a change and structures do not determine everything, while at the same time, the agency exists within constraints but is free within those constraints. Actors thus, are not entirely passive or 'victims' of social change or interventions, but are 'actors' who are capable to shape and act upon interventions or structures in their day-to-day life.

In the light of the border structure between the EU and Libya, 'illegal' migrants passing through the Mediterranean, are actors constrained by the border construction. Migrants play a role in the reality of the border construction between Libya and the EU. Without migrants, the discourse of the political border would not be so severe. Migrants can therefore be seen as social forces, maintaining the reality of the border construction through acts of crossing the border.

Important are the changes in the relation for example during colonial times and during independence, where different agencies capable of bringing change, perceived the political border between Libya and the EU from different perspectives.

Recent agencies for example are The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) and the Libyan coastguards who are in charge of surveillance and border restrictions. These actors transform the border structure from an 'open' barrier to a 'closed' and exclusive barrier. FRONTEX and other coastguards can be perceived as agencies in keeping the 'reality' of the EU borders and the border with Libya 'alive' by acting according to the border structure. Without agencies like 'FRONTEX' or the Libyan coastguards, the border structure would have a different reality.

Historical events, like imperialism, brought structural change and transformed the border through interaction and social action. By acting according to- and believing in these structures, actors continuously produced and reproduced the border. Therefore, these agencies serve as an important part of everyday social life and a means to understand the relationship between Libya and the EU.

The question of whether or not the EUBAM can be seen as an actor that brings change will be analysed in part III, where the EUBAM will be investigated in order to decide if it can act as an agency that structures the border between the EU and Libya.

### *Rules and resources*

Anthony Giddens (1984) argues that social relations invent rules and resources to keep people in their place, and at the same time change, constrain and construct their actions. These rules and resources can be thought of as ways to make action possible, facilitate, and reproduce social interaction at the same time.

The concept of 'resources' is closely connected the concepts of actors and rules. There are different types of resources- in this thesis; the relevant resources that might have influenced or are influenced by the borders are financial resources, knowledge, land or power. Those who have control over their resources may influence outcomes more than those who do not have such control. Resources can be embedded in institutional structures and rules, where power depends on actors' capacities (Giddens, 1984).

In the case of EU-Libyan cooperation, the EUBAM can be seen as an agreement draw upon rules, and at the same time as a resource that allows for cooperation between Libya and the EU. Acting according to these rules is done through mechanisms as joint surveillance operations. Migrants are actors who are examples of actors who do not act in accordance to the rules drawn upon by agreements, by crossing the Mediterranean Sea.

These rules influence the border conceptualization and imagination while it causes for a closed and exclusive character for some actors. Cooperation between agencies is necessary in order for the border construction between Libya and the EU to exist and to be reproduced. Cooperation is a collective process that involves mutual actions and communications in such a way that the social system can create a new reality that represents a shared goal. Rules and resources are the medium and outcome of co-operation and by co-operating, actors mutually benefit from each other (Fuchs, 2003).

The concept of power as a resource, is the agent's capacity to 'make a difference' that is to exercise some sort of power. Through power, the border can be transformed and allow for a form of domination, legitimation, and influence. Important is the authority and property that comes with power and can be seen as something that will be relevant when analysing the power relation throughout colonial times, where the power relation between Libya and Europe was equally divided.

After independence, the power role changed and therewith the border construction. Emanuele Paoletti (2010) argues that Libya is a powerful actor in using power as a resource. The role of power as a resource is perceived differently by Luiza Bialasiewicz (2012), who argues that the border structure is held in place by unequal power relations and through authority and dominance over Libya.

## **Post-Colonial Theory**

Post-Colonialism can be seen as the study concerned with uneven, diverse and the contested impact of colonialism on cultures of colonized countries and colonized people. Post-Colonial theory can be a means to theorize the problems of colonization and de-colonization. By investigating the role that colonization has played through new visions, revisions, new histories and geographies throughout time, it theorizes not just colonial conditions, but also why those conditions are what they are, and how they can be undone and redone (Shome & Hegde, 2002).

Using Post-Colonial theory can be useful when analysing the cooperation and relation between Libya and the EU. Libya has been transformed into 'Italian Libya', by Italy in 1911, which lasted till February 1947, when Italy officially lost all the colonies of the former Italian Empire (St. John, 2008).

The colonial scramble by Europe simplified Libya by means of the colonial project. Under the claim of transforming knowable territory, governable in practical terms—European powers were involved in a process that can be defined as 'creative destruction', where Europe negated indigenous knowledge and socio-territorial organizations that destructed Libya. Europe represented Libya as vacant space and reconstructed its territory as a colonial domain within European epistemologies (Atkinson, 2005).

When analysing the relationship between Libya and the EU, colonialism plays a role in the re-creation of culture, how it reflects hegemony, and how ideologies and dominating norms and values are shaped by it. Post-Colonialism can help to move beyond the limitations of a European centric perspective in order to identify tensions and contradictions that lie behind different manifestations of 'Europe' in its former colonial periphery and present-day diplomacy.

A writer of the colonial history and present day Post-Colonial Libya is Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, a Libyan writer whose grandparents and parents experienced Italian colonization and who studied Libya's history and present-day society dominated by a colonial mind-set. He has been confronted with the impact of trade, colonial rule on local governments and rural communities and is able to provide an inward looking on the knowledge often ignored as a consequence of Orientalism. By focusing on the work of Ahmida, the idea is to steer loose from Western dominated literature and focused more on an inward looking at the Libyan society. A well-known scholar on Post-Colonial theory is Edward W. Said. He himself was born in the 'Arab' world, one that was completely experienced differently by him than from what he saw in the news, in literature or movies from the rest of the world.

## *Orientalism*

Said's work played an important role in Post-Colonial theory. With his book *Orientalism* (1978) he emphasizes how institutionalized knowledge is always subject to forces of colonialism, nation, geopolitics, and history (Shome & Hegde, 2002).

*Orientalism* is used to refer to the Western attitude towards other societies mainly in Asia and Africa of being more 'developed' and superior to these societies, creating a boundary between the Occident and the Orient (Said, 1978). The Orient became the idea of an exotic indigenous and interesting 'subject', where literature, films, and oral traditions played an important role in construction the identity of 'the Orient' and the identity of the 'Occident' as well (Ahmida, 2009).

Through Eurocentric studies, scholars came to view the Maghreb societies as unruly, segmentary, traditional and patrimonial, by typically focusing on the uniqueness of a region, especially the roles of Islam, tribalism, sects, and national character (Dimitrovova & Kramersch, 2017). Said (1978) explains how by Orientalism, Europe renders the Maghreb through its mobilization of orientalist 'imaginative geographies'. According to Said (1978), as cited by Dimitrovova and Kramersch (2017):

*Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient (Dimitrovova & Kramersch, 2017, p. 802).*

According to Ashcroft, Gareth and Tiffin (2000) colonialism could only exist by the fact that there existed a binary opposition into which the world was divided. These binary oppositions are important in shaping the identity and thoughts of Europeans and Libyans, as well as the relation between them.

Ashcroft, Gareth, and Tiffin (2000) explain how the establishment of an identity depends upon a stable hierarchical relationship in which the colonized exists as the other of the colonizing culture. The binary logic of imperialism here is the tendency of Western thought to see the world in terms of binary oppositions that establish a relation of dominance.

Central distinctions are that of centre/margin; colonizer/colonized; civilized/primitive, good/evil, Muslim/non-Muslim, developed/stagnated. These oppositions represent very efficiently the violent hierarchy on which imperialism and also Post-Colonialism is based. The oppositions are important in constructing ideological meanings in general and useful in imperial ideology (Ashcroft, Gareth, & Tiffin, 2000).

### *Present day Orientalism*

The concept of Orientalism and idea of the 'Orient' or the 'Arab' lingers on in present-day society and has played an important role in Post-Colonial Libya during riots of the Arab Spring. Today the image of 'the Arab' and the 'Arabic world' still speaks to many to their wild imagination where the Arabic people and Arab nations are perceived of as one civilization and one world, lacking the thought that these worlds are so unique, with 22 different cultures, histories and unique people (Ventura, 2017).

When talking about the Arab Spring, the 'West' often assumes that all Arab countries struggled with one thing: becoming like the West, going through the same historical phase, on their way to Western 'development'— while in reality, they all led their own revolution and made their own history (Ventura, 2017).

Ahmida (2009) stresses the importance of culture and the role colonialism has played and still plays in bringing cultural change and structuring the identity of the 'Orient'. He explains how Libyan citizen often experience a sort of struggle for identity. After independence and during the regime of Gaddafi, many Libyans travelled abroad and came in contact with 'the other', and the 'Western' culture.

He describes this experience through a Post-Colonial mind-set and through the eyes of the Libyan novelist Khalil, who experienced who travelled to Britain after decolonization and felt intellectually displaced from both the West and his own society— something shared by many individuals from Third World countries according to Ahmida (2009).

Khalil emphasizes the importance of the impact of Arabic myths on English literature, specifically that of sex and violence in the folktales such as those of the *Arabian Nights*. This influenced his view on his own identity and that of the West (Ahmida, 2009).

Ahmida (2009) describes that the reasons for the problems Libyans experience can be explained by the persisting autonomous kinship and Islamic social organizations, Libya's weak urban centres, and its reluctance to adopt the modern nation-state.

Ahmida (2009) goes on to say that many Third World societies experienced a sort of capitalist colonization by European states and find themselves struggling to figure out their identity, an identity that the West had created for them, namely that of 'the Arab' or 'the Muslim'.

Present-day Orientalism will be explained through Post-Colonial Theory where colonial thoughts and behaviours are reproduced by historical patterns and colonial thinking.

### *Other thinking*

The article by Dimitrova and Kramsch (2017), stresses that there is an increase in studies on the external perceptions of the EU and explain that these studies lack the vital significance of socio-spatial differences in international relations. They argue that the EU is reproducing Neo-Orientalism behaviour in its encounters with the Maghreb and argue for a different way of thinking. According to them, the Maghreb region is intellectually framed and should be restaged through a Post-Colonial lens (Dimitrova & Kramsch, 2017).

By referring to the Moroccan sociologist, novelist and poet Abdelkebir Khatibi, Dimitrova and Kramsch (2017) introduce an interesting inward perspective on the Libyan identity. Khatibi portrays a view where he struggled with his identity— his polyphonic or multilingual identity— one that was framed by colonial conditions and hegemonic traditions. Khatibi explains how identity is always interwoven with differences, and how he keeps searching for the discursive modes that can best enable productive dialogue among differently situated voices. In his essay on the role of the intellectual in the era of globalization, he states that:

*I belong to a magnificent country, a marginal one [...] To it, I owe my birth, my name, my first identity, my history, but not the story of my freedom of thought, the freedom to invent a space and a dialogical relation with any being that approaches me. I am changed as a result of my contact with beneficent strangers [...] As a believer in globalization, alternative globalization, I journey with an active constellation of researchers, thinkers, and artists with whom I share affinities (As cited in Lionnet, 2011, p.391)*

Khatibi argues that the Maghreb as a geo-philosophical site is capable of taking part in global affairs on its own terms. A sort of ‘other thinking’, ‘double critique’ that should offer a theoretical critique of the colonial condition and the hegemonic traditions.

By opposing the Western episteme to its own untheorized outside, the idea here is to radicalize its margins not just by means of Arabic thought, but by thinking otherwise, by engaging in thought that is heterophonic and heteroglossic, that listens to any speech or voice (Lionnet, 2011).

Dimitrova and Kramsch (2017) explain that through such a double critique— Khatibi restages the Maghreb as a horizon for new thoughts. His thoughts on ‘desert thinking’ as described by Dimitrova and Kramsch (2017), explains that our thoughts on the Maghreb can be updated and adjusted to the current geopolitical and geo-economic setting, to provide a fresh set of coordinates for the Euro-Maghreb relation, to grasp the changed geohistorical circumstances and to listen to the Maghreb in its plurality.

## Border Ontology

The border between Libya and the EU is relevant as it influences the current relationship and cooperation. The three main borders that are there between the EU and Libya is that of the natural border the Mediterranean Sea, the political negotiated border and the symbolic border that relies on the difference in identity.

The natural barrier of the Mediterranean Sea—is there since forever, however, the negotiated ‘borderline’, has changed throughout time and maintained through agreements, surveillance mechanism and regulations. The symbolic border is structured by social actors and also thought of as ever-changing, however has been divided on polarized values throughout most of its history.

Taken in mind that the political border and the symbolic border between Libya and Europe are seen as a social and non-fixed construction, it had different ‘realities’, meanings and functions over time. A question raised here then is how can we conceptualize this border?

*Borders are not simply found on maps, in walls, or in bilateral policing initiatives. Borders are also found in people as “lingering” subjectivities. Border “ends up being inhabited by people who cross it” the border itself becomes internalized as part of one’s subjectivity” (Maher, 2017).*

Drawing on the words by Maher (2017) and the two theoretical lenses described earlier, the border construction between Libya and the EU can be interpreted as a social structure, produced and reproduced throughout time by social actors and influenced by colonial acts and a colonial mind-set.

The question of the reality of borders, borderers and the bordered is still debatable and uncritically identifiable and explainable. Actors and agencies impose the meaning of the collective imaginary that is necessary to be in a position to manage the discourse by which an entity succeeds in making believe that it exists.

Just like Mignolo, Henk van Houtum (2011) questions the ontology of borders. He argues that a border itself is nothing less than a tautology, a fabricated truth; it is not the fixation of borders and identities that is the constant factor in geopolitical history, but the changing of these, where its reality is created by the meaning attached to it. Borders can be seen as a result of desire and at the same time the result of the reverse of desire, namely of fear. It communicates a ‘truth’, actively constructs knowledge, it silences the unrepresented, it exercises power and can be a powerful means of promoting social change. What is seen as ‘the truth’ in one domain can be seen as a lie in the eyes of another (Van Houtum, 2011).

If borders are merely tautology and nothing less than an imaginative structure, how then do we give meaning to a border? Anthony Cooper (2015) argues that:

*If bordering is everywhere, and the lived experiences of bordering are particularly important, then a third important aspect to consider is the meaning attributed to and from borders, wherever they are, whatever forms they take, whatever their function, whoever is bordering and whoever is being bordered. Borders are both 'meaning-making' and 'meaning-carrying entities' (Cooper, 2015, p.451).*

Cooper (2015) acknowledges a certain subjective and imaginative character of a border, he also questions this imaginative character by the sheer violence that can occur when people are excluded and disciplined by this 'imagined' border. He argues that the border imaginary on offer can be an oversimplification reinforcing a particular naturalized vision of ordered space, territory and geography.

By challenging the imaginative character of borders—the border can be captured as a multiple and localized border practice, involving non-state actors in non-traditional places. These lenses enable to theorize a bit more about the border subjectivities, seeing that borders—and the places, actors, and lives surrounding them do not exist discretely outside of time, but are in fact constructed and contested over time and transformed in their spatial location (Cooper, 2015).

O'Dowd (2001) describes four metaphors for understanding borders, namely as bridge, resource, symbol of identity and as a barrier. These metaphors are used as guidance to understand how the border between the EU and Libya has evolved and had different functions and meanings over time. He applies his metaphors to the borders within the EU since the 1980s and herewith indicates how they have changed and had different roles. By drawing on O'Dowd's argument, this thesis takes on his idea to examine borders by these four metaphors by relating his metaphors to the political border between Libya and the EU as of the beginning of Europe being involved in Libya.

Throughout time, the borders have undergone these different metaphors and kept on changing to the current state, where according to some scholars, the European borders have become more fused with the Libyan borders and where Libya is used as a barrier to constrain migrants from entering the European borders. Some argue that by shifting of European border defence mechanism, the borders become 'externalized' to Northern Africa. By using O'Dowd's metaphors as a way of conceptualizing the border, the idea is to adopt a genealogical viewpoint of the ever-evolving character of the border—one that is part imaginative, part real, ever-changing and existing of different functions and meanings.

## Conclusion

This Theoretical Framework discussed two theories, namely that of the Duality of Structuration Theory by Anthony Giddens, and that of Post-Colonial Theory.

The Duality of Structuration Theory offers an outlook on the imperial structuration acts by Europe and its aftermath on the Libyan society. The theory emphasizes how through interactions and actions, the border construction between Libya and the EU can be critically reflected upon as an abstract structure, structuring the agent's thoughts and behaviours, as well as a daily reality reconstructed repeatedly by agents acting according to them. The borders are produced by agencies; capable of making a change while at the same time the borders constrain certain agencies' behaviour and actions by their existence.

The theoretical lens of Post-Colonialism offers a historical and present-day understanding of how the colonization of Libya by Italy structured and changed the border between Europe and Libya. It can also be used as a means to understand the present-day relation— one where Oriental thought lingers on in the perception of the 'Arab' or the 'Muslim' and where both the Arab and Muslim are thought of as having only one definition. In this light, the identity of Libya and that of Europe has been produced and reproduced through colonial thoughts and actions by actors acting in accordance to their structures.

The two central theories result in the political border between Libya and the EU being thought of as a social structure, produced and reproduced by actors throughout time. The border between Libya and the EU is ever-changing and has been produced and reproduced throughout space and time by agents and by engaging in border thinking, where colonial thoughts have played an important role in constructing the present-day unequal power relation between Libya and the EU and has caused for the reproduction of colonial thoughts and acts in present-day society.

In order to conceptualize the border, the reality, 'ontology' of the border can thus be summarized as a fabricated truth— an imaginative construction, one that includes a sense of 'realness' by the sheer violence that can occur when people are excluded and disciplined by the border. Viewing the border construction through the two theoretical lenses, and analysing the ontology of the border through metaphors in order to conceptualize the border, the thesis surface underlying structuration acts, influential agencies and consequences of historical and present-day border (re)construction that have made the relation and border cooperation for what it is today.

Part I  
What kept us together



## The Border as Bridge and Resource - EURAFRICA -

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*“The principle must always rule that ideas are not born of other ideas, philosophies of other philosophies; they are a continually renewed expression of real historical development. The unity of history (what the idealists call unity of the spirit) is not a presupposition, but a continuously developing process” — Antonio Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971, p. 437).*

This chapter covers the role of the border between Europe and Libya where it was, and still is, perceived as a ‘bridge’ and a ‘resource’ in some way or another. A bridging character, according to O’Dowd (2001), implies a ‘gateway’ dimension, a cross-cooperation or a sort of buffer zone, whereas the role as a resource can be seen as a means to seek benefits from a bridging character. The border as bridge or resource influences the way Libya and the EU interact and cooperate and implies a certain ‘togetherness’.

The chapter will start off with a focus on the Trans-Saharan trade route by zooming in on Libya’s bridging role as ‘gateway’ for trade with Africa for Europe, and as a gateway for North Africa to trade with Europe. Libya here can be seen as a facilitator to Europe for obtain valuable resources from Africa.

During colonial times, the border remained to be perceived as a ‘Gateway’ to Africa, bridging European powers to their ‘extended’ territory. Italians believed Libya was part of their history, seen as an extension of their land, a resource for raw materials and a possibility of exploitation of labour ‘offered’ to the Europeans. Europeans relied on their shared geographical imagination, to create a *Eurafrican* ideological ‘reality’.

After Libya’s independence, the role of Libya as bridge and resource for European powers remained in some way or another, as Europe became a resource for Libya as trading partner as well as a resource for Europe in alliance politics, where Libya served as a means to keep the Arab world out of Soviet hands during the Cold War. For Libya, the West became a financial resource as largest export partners in oil.

This chapter will end by presenting the present-day function of the border as bridge and resource, namely as bridging between the EU and Libya on migration control, where Libya uses the EU as a resource for obtaining financial gains and for the EU to use Libya as a resource for constraining migrants and promote European values.

## 1.1 The Gateway to Africa

This chapter is based on the work of John Wright (1982) who wrote extensively on the Trans-Saharan Trade route. According to him, the Trans-Saharan Trade route can be seen as Europe's first real encounters with Africa. The route was a route of trade, where commodities and enslaved Africans from Black Africa were traded with North Africa, West Africa, Asia, America and Europe. From the sixteenth until the early nineteenth century, exploitation of natural and human resources characterized this route, where North African places, like those of the transit ports of Tripoli, were seen as facilitators.

According to Wright (1982), North Africans had been pre-occupied with 'Black Africa' and its trade. In North Africa, it was clear that to become rich, one had to travel south and bring back enslaved people and commodities, such as ivory, feathers, and gold to North Africa.

Libya's geographical location, bordering the Mediterranean and therefore Southern Europe, made Libya attractive for European powers to take control of Trans-Saharan trade routes and therewith access to natural resources that were not available on the European continent. The exchange of goods between what Europeans called the 'Negroland' and the Maghreb enriched the nomad Saharan peoples and North African and European Mediterranean ports. European powers tried to gain control over the Trans-Saharan Trade Route for centuries, which was difficult with their disadvantage of being Christians in lands of strongly Muslim faith. To engage in trade with Northern Africa, Europeans had to travel by boats through the Mediterranean Sea and the African Mediterranean coastal area (then the 'Barbary Coast') (Wright, 1982).

Trade was characterized as dangerous, with merchants often being robbed or enslaved by 'pirates', and shipped to their territories. European historians called the attacks of European shipping by Barbary corsairs 'piracy', while in North Africa this was seen as acts of undeclared war. Wright (1982) describes how Europeans were worried about their coastal towns where citizens feared the risk of being enslaved by pirates or robbed of their possessions. Coastal cities became more and more empty and therefore the Europeans started paying Ottoman authorities to stop pirates from molesting their merchant vassals and enslaving their people living around the coast and passing through the Mediterranean.

While European powers accused the Ottomans of being barbaric, the same could be said about them. For centuries, the Christians complained about the evil of Muslim piracy, of the Christian pirates was little known and written. By piracy, rioting, and robberies, the Muslims came to dislike and mistrust all Christians.

In order for Europeans to engage in Trans-Saharan trade, they established formal friendly relationship treaties, including the provision of consular gifts for the rulers of Algiers, Morocco, Libya, and Tunis. These relationship treaties can be seen as ‘bridging’ cooperation between the Ottoman ‘Libyan’ rulers and Europeans, where European states bought their free passage to travel on the Barbary Coast.

Besides Europe, the United States engaged in the Trans-Saharan trade by the immunities from Barbary corsairs that the British bought by tribute payments. However, the paying of money for protection was not enough to stop the troubles in the Mediterranean Sea, therefore, by the nineteenth century, The United States intervened by bombing various pirate cities including present-day Benghazi in Libya.

The United States demanded fair passage and an end to piracy in the Barbary Coast. This marked the First Barbary War and later the Second Barbary war that ended in 1796, where the United States concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Regency of Tripoli, promising protection and free passage for the naval vessels of both the United States and European states, herewith ending periodical tributes and giving Europe and the United States immunity in the Barbary Coasts. This final immunity and safe passage became an opportunity for European powers to take over and start concurring Northern Africa (St. John, 2008).




Figure 1.1: The Trans-Saharan Trade Route. Source: Austen, 2015.

The map above illustrates Libya as a transit port, connecting several routes of Trans-Saharan travel to Libyan shores. Libya here is seen as a means—bridging between ‘Black Africa’ and Europe, protecting against piracy and providing and assuring safe travel in the Mediterranean Sea.

## 1.2 Part of Africa

When negotiating over the division of Africa into 'spheres of interests', France and Italy came to an agreement in 1902, recognizing the 'special interest' of France in Morocco and Italy in Libya. For Italy, Libya seemed to be the obvious choice to become a sphere of interest for Italy, seeing its location just below Italy (St. John, 2008).

Besides the geographical location of Libya that played an essential role in constituting, legitimating, and sustaining colonialism— the single most powerful image in the discourse of Italian colonization was the idea that Libya was part of Italy's history. Libya had been ruled by the Roman Empire centuries beforehand and was therefore seen to belong to Italy. Some of the architecture in Libya was described as more impressive than that of Rome and therefore *had* to belong to Italian territory.

In 1911, Italy defeated the Ottoman rule and herewith the history of 'Italian Libya' began. After a year, a peace treaty was signed between the Ottoman and Italian rulers and most Ottoman authorities left Libya. The colonization of Libya allowed for the imaginary construction of colonial territory as lands previously 'unknown', transformed into legible, knowable places with their dimensions, topographies, and characteristics (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2005).

Besides the 'opening up' of underdeveloped areas and taking what was 'theirs', colonialism was legitimized with the idea of slave elimination. Europeans saw it as their task and 'burden', to 'civilize' Africans and pacify in their inter-tribal disputes and wars. Ben-Ghiat and Fuller (2005) describe how Italy believed that Libya had to be saved from the 'barbaric' Ottoman Turks who had occupied Libya and needed to be enlightened with the European norms and values. Africa was regarded in patronizing, racialist terms, as a 'dark continent' that needed European know-how and culture to emerge from poverty (Gilbert, 2016).

Italy started a 'cleansing' of all internal buildings of traces hinting at the five-century-long Ottoman occupation of the land, and at the same time 'restored' the streets of the walled city to the modern conception of their medieval 'European' appearances. Through the bridging character of the political border, Libya's society was drastically changed. Libya's agricultural capacity was limited, its industry virtually non-existing and most of its territory was empty desert. The remaining land was limited and exploited to the utmost for European benefits (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2005).

While Italy believed to be part of Africa, Libyan citizen and the Ottoman rulers thought differently. According to Wright (1982), the Libyan population felt more attached to the Ottoman, sharing the same religion. This became clear when in some Libyan cities, people remained loyal to their Ottoman rulers and remained to be ruled by them. The painting below marks the Ottoman defeat, where the Ottoman Turks handed over their power to the Italian rulers, with in the right corner below, submissive Bedouins, bowing to their former rulers.



Figure 1.2: Italy setting foot in Libya. Source: Lombardi Historical Collection. Source: Lombardi, 1912

For the duration of the First World War, Italy only managed to control little more than a few cities including Tripoli, while other cities formed armed resistance supported by remaining Ottoman authorities. The loyalty of local tribal leaders to Ottoman authorities and Italian authorities fluctuated throughout the years between collaboration and resistance in an effort to gain power and to shift the political landscape. While overall, most Libyans resisted, other indigenous Libyans emigrated, or collaborated with Italian forces.

The resistance through violent protests continued until 1933, when Omar al-Mukhtar, the most effective guerrilla leader and fighter for independence, was captured and hanged. He can be thought of as a leader who led the resistance to Italian colonialism by fighting for independence and therewith challenging the reality of the border construction and relation with Italy (Ahmida, 2009). Libyan citizen were forced to witness the execution of al-Mukhtar and the act was marked by the Italian ruler Marshal Badoglio as the official ending of the war that had started in 1911 (St. John, 2008).

Step-by-step Libya became more 'Italianized', and the border between Europe and Libya became blurry and fused with each other in the imagination of the Europeans. By the end of the 1930s, Libya became mostly a settlement colony for Italians and was run for their benefits. According to Italian strategic control, Italian colonialists were necessary to make it an Italian country. Libya became an integral part of Italy and was defined and delineated in legalistic European terms (Wright, 1982).

According to Ben-Ghiat and Fuller (2005), European imperialism relied upon collective geographical imaginations to naturalize colonial order. Only around 45,000 Italians had settled in one of the colonies of Italy (Eritrea, Somalia, and Libya) out of a population of 30 million Italians, but was experienced differently. The colonization of Libya became normalized, where children in schools were taught that North Africa was part of Europe and were to believe in Italian colonies as part of Italian territory.

Italy had established six concentration camps throughout Libya, which resulted in around 20,000 Bedouins having to be located in northern Cyrenaica. Bedouins were forced to march across the desert while their land was given to the arriving Italian settlers. Starvation and other poor conditions in the camps were reported and internees were used for forced labour, ultimately leading to many deaths. Over 80,000 Cyrenaicans died during the Pacification in the concentration camps that operated in the Cyrenaica region of Libya between 1930 and 1933. The camps were mandated by Mussolini and implemented by nameless Italian soldiers and civilians. Unregulated and sadistic violence, behaviours, and practices were the norm that structured colonial power (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2005).

This violent behaviour resulted in the halving of the Libyan population by the mid-1930s and ironically marks the failure of Italy's intention of promoting peace and freedom by 'saving' them from the 'barbaric' Ottoman rulers. Italy had proved them to be barbaric too and showed Libya they were not rational thinkers, enlightened with ideas of freedom and equality for all.

An agency that played a role in the creation of the geographical imaginary of Italian Libya was Italy's geography society, the Società Geografica Italiana (*SGI*). The SGI became central in the colonial lobby and its expansion. The society sponsored scientific expeditions, made maps and surveys, undertook scientific research and reported their findings back to Italy. The SGI herewith transformed an unknown space, into a more legible territory with resources, topographies and populations (Atkinson, 2005).

The SGI played an important agency in fascist expansionism since they ignored indigenous knowledge in favour of reconstructing colonies intellectually in languages intelligible to 'modern' Europeans.

### 1.2.1 Eurafrica

The idea of European and African connectedness was not merely an Italian thought and imagination; it became the ideology of *Eurafrica* that European powers perceived as the complete integration of the two continents—or the absorption of Africa by Europe.

After the First World War, intellectuals and politicians across Western Europe argued that Africa was, in geopolitical terms, Europe's heartland and principal resource. Imperial Europe became defined as the 'centre' in geography. Everything outside the centre of Europe was by definition at the margin or the periphery of culture, power, and civilization. The colonial mission, to bring the margin into the sphere of influence of the enlightened centre, became the justification for economic and political exploitation of colonialism for European powers (Ashcroft, Gareth, & Tiffin, 2000).

Africa became the perfect resource for obtaining raw materials, labour and land, while it was believed that Africa needed the capital, technology, and know-how of Europe. This way, Africa helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion as Western Europe helped to underdevelop Africa (Bachmann, 2018).

Veit Bachmann (2018) explains that *Eurafrica* suggested a homogeneity that was never there. The imperial role for Libya was constructed in the form of a collective exploitation of resources and was a natural or necessary part of Italy's geopolitical sphere.




Figure 1.3: The Idea of Eurafrica. Source: Bachmann, 2018

The whole idea of 'Eurafrica' was never a reality, according to Bachmann (2018):

*"There is no such one thing as "Africa," neither is there one "Europe." As such, there is also clearly not one such thing as "Eurafrica." Any engagement with the "African-European relationship" is thus always flawed with generalizations that brutally brush over and conceal the richness of interactions between people of the two continents"* (Bachmann, 2018).

Towards independence, Eurafrica became to be perceived as a sovereign remedy that would strengthen Europe's position in the world and at the same time allow colonies a transition more securely towards independence. Eurafrica became more defined as a broad Euro-African community based upon common economic, cultural and strategic interests.

Regardless the conceptualization as Eurafrica or as a Euro-African community, Bachmann (2018) argues that the entire history of the official discourse of the cooperation can be seen as a false rhetoric that is subsumed by the realities and power relations of the international political economy. This idea of Eurafrica was a 'partnership' based on a 'strong' and a 'weak' partner and can therefore not be seen as cooperation. There was no equal exchange of resources and the border between Europe and Libya can thus not be seen as totally fused from a Libyan perspective.

Marshal Bodolgio, in charge of ruling Italian Libya during both World Wars, played a role in the idea of preserving Eurafrica and believed in an 'Italian Libyan' shared identity, an ideology based on dominance and destruction. As Ashcroft, Gareth, and Tiffin (2000) describe:

*[m]aps and mapping are dominant practices of colonial and post-colonial cultures. Colonization itself is often consequent on a voyage of 'discovery', a bringing into being of 'undiscovered' lands. The process of discovery is reinforced by the construction of maps, whose existence is a means of textualizing the spatial reality of the other, naming or, in almost all cases, renaming spaces in a symbolic and literal act of mastery and control (Ashcroft, Gareth, & Tiffin, 2000, p. 28).*

European mapmakers ignored indigenous boundaries, cultures, and disputes, and drew the African borderlines. The lands of colonized places are literally reinscribed, written over, as well as the names and languages of the indigenes being replaced by new names, or are corrupted into new and Europeanized forms by cartographers and explorers. The blank spaces of early maps signify an open and inviting space into which the European imagination can project itself and into which the European explorer must penetrate. These fabricated maps became important mechanism of Euro-centrism, defining European in the world hierarchy, and embodying it as geographical facts (Ashcroft, Gareth, & Tiffin, 2000).

### **1.3 The Post-Colonial Era**

Italy's colonial rule came to an end with semi-independence for Libya in 1943, where Europe still remained to play a role in bringing cultural, economic and political changes in Libya. Independence for Libya did not mean complete independence and a separation between Italy and Europe and Libya, as both remained to rely on each other in some way or another.

Most times, both Europe, as well as Libya, had their stakes and benefits in a bridging character of the border. This chapter on the colonial aftermath will focus on the main resources both the EU and Libya gained from a bridging character of the border.

#### *1.3.1 Political Interests: EU Norms*

After Italian defeat, Libya became under the relative freedom of four European allies, creating Libya into a sort of buffer zone, for promoting democracy out of Western fear for the Soviet, where Libya was used to establish a Western Base, to keep the Arab world out of Soviet hands (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2005).

In 1951, England and the United States created an independent Libyan state in exchange for a political alliance with military bases. This idea of using Libya as a resource in establishing democracy and capitalism was legitimized with the limited autonomous rule of a settled 'United Kingdom of Libya' where Europe handed over its 'responsibilities' to King Idras al-Sanusi (Ahmida, 2009).

The semi-partnership between the new United Kingdom of Libya and the European allies ended with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi leading a military coup to overthrow the monarchy on 1 September 1969. Colonel Gaddafi, 'the Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution of Libya', as he was called, came to stand for anti-imperialism and all that the West tried to promote, such as democracy and capitalism. European powers came to portray Gaddafi as 'the enemy', a danger to its people and to the 'wider' world (Brambilla, 2014).

In mid-February 2011, demonstrators with the support of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) demanded the fall of Gaddafi's regime, which for Western leaders was an opportunity to intervene and reshape Libya and structure Libya more to their interests. The NATO mission, providing financial, military and media support and sending hundreds of special forces personnel to Libya, started under the idea of the 'Responsibility to Protect' framework, which quickly turned into a mission for regime change. Europe had both economic and geopolitical goals, the attempt to secure control of Libyan resources and get rid of a relatively progressive Gaddafi at the same time. Getting rid of Gaddafi would

mean control of Libyan natural and financial wealth, a cut back of Libya's influence in Africa and the limiting of China's access to long-term oil imports (Pradella & Rad, 2017).

### *1.3.2 Economic Interests: Black gold*

The discovery and exportation of oil in 1961 changed Libya and its relation to Europe completely. Oil played an important role in structuring the Libyan society and turned it from one of the poorest countries, into one of the richest countries of the Middle East and Africa. By access of oil, Libya was able to steer loose from Western dependency and was able to trade with international markets. However, these markets remained mostly European markets benefitting from Libya's geographical proximity (Burke, 2009).

Italy played a big role in managing Libyan Oil, where the Italian energy company Eni became a dominant power. This company that has been operating in Libya since 1959 and became widely perceived as the second pillar of Italy's Libyan foreign policy after NATO. In 1972, Eni entered a joint venture agreement with the National Oil Cooperation (NOC), a Libyan state-owned company, cooperating together till around 2014 (Pradella & Rad, 2017).

Oil was also used as a bargaining tool to sabotage Libya's main source of income. Since most of the Libyan oil exports had been directed towards European countries, Europe could use trade embargoes to structure Libya by European standards and to force Libya to remain on friendly terms with the West. In return, Libya could attract necessary financial income and the technicians and technology under the umbrella of Western oil companies.

From the 1990s, the trade embargoes that were placed on Libyan oil, progressively shifted by the lifting of sanctions. This led to competition between Western oil companies for the control of Libyan oil. By 2007, most sanctions were lifted and more than 40 foreign oil companies had returned to Libya. In 2011, the year Gaddafi was downsized, Libya was still highly dependent on oil exports, as oil constituted almost 65 per cent of Libya's gross domestic product, 96 per cent of its exports and 98 per cent of its government revenues. The fall of Gaddafi marked what the New York Times called a 'scramble for access of Libya's oil' and was seen as an opportunity to gain control over Libyan oil (Pradella & Rad, 2017).

As of September 2016, the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, captured major oil facilities in the Gulf of Sirte. The EU and the US, who had normally support the Government of National Accord (GNA)— now hoped for a chance to bridge and resume to recognize Haftar's military strength and conduct military missions in his support. Europe formed alliances with the Tobruk government and lent military support to Haftar in return for a share in Libya's oil (Pradella & Rad, 2017).

Between 2012 and 2016, EU imports from Libya decreased by 85 per cent and Libya continues to be a fundamental energy exporter to the EU. The EU is still the first trading partner of Libya, where 53,8 per cent of the country's global trade in 2015 still accounts for the EU (EC, 2018).

### 1.3.3 Joint Cooperation on Migration

Right after Gaddafi's coup in 1967, he declared institutional representation of Libya as an open frontier—welcoming African people through a widespread of powerful billboards, distributed all around the country. His idea was to promote African Unity, supporting this on historical sociocultural values deeply related to the desert, the Islamic religion, and traditional trade routes in and around the Sahara. These values have played a role in encouraging the migration flow from African countries to Libya (Brambilla, 2014).

From the late 1990s, Libya became a threat for Europe, in particular for Italy, since many migrants invited by Gaddafi, became to see Libya not merely as their destination, but as a transit port and 'a gateway' to Europe. For Gaddafi this fear became a way to express the role of power towards the West by claiming that he could 'turn Europe black' at any time. Fear of migration was now leverage for Gaddafi to bargain and declare that Libya would become Italy's bridge to Africa and that Italy would be the door to Europe for Libya.

On 28 November 1999, the then Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema went to Tripoli and presented for the first time Italy's apology for mischief during Italy's colonial actions. The apology and attempt to improve the relationship between Libya, came with the underlying interest to manage the 'flow' of people and the goal to cooperate between Libya on this matter (Brambilla, 2014).

A year later in Rome, December 2000, the 'Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation', was signed, which can be seen as the first official contribution to a bridging cooperation between Italy and Libya. The treaty was intended to right the wrongs of colonialism where Libya and Italy pledged to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, organized crime and 'illegal' migration, herewith putting an end to the dispute between the two countries and Libya's claims relating to Italian colonialism. According to this Treaty, Italy would have been obliged to invest 5 billion dollars in compensation for abuses committed during Italy's rule in Libya and should be invested in Libya to different infrastructure projects over a 20 years period (Pradella & Rad, 2017).

After the killing of Gaddafi in 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC) the *de facto* government of Libya for a period during and after the Libyan Civil War) and Italy reactivated the Friendship Treaty article regarding the fight against 'illegal' migration, until it was reinforced again in 2013. The EU made a commitment to support Libyan authorities

in developing their capacity for enhancing border security. During this time, Libya with a population of 6.5 million citizens existed of at least 2.5 million immigrants in Libya. Immigration fuelled labour market competition in the low-wage sector of the economy where black Africans performed the least-paid jobs compared to Arabic-speaking immigrants or those who could enter legally.


This way, migrants became to be perceived of as a threat to Libya too. One thing Europe and Libya now had in common was that both the EU as well as Libya did not want to take in migrants, as both Libya and Italy perceived migration to form a treat in preserving economic benefits and domestic security. A shared goal became thus to stop migrants from Africa arriving at the Libyan borders.

As of 2004, the EU started to lift trade sanctions against Libya in order for Libya to cooperate with Italy on migration control. This was believed required in order to 'lift the burden' on Italy who struggled with the arrival of migrants. During that time, the EU created the single border-monitoring agency FRONTEX, with the aim to coordinate border cooperation among EU member states (Zaiotti, 2016).

In December 2007, with the idea to prevent deaths, Italy and Libya signed a series of bilateral agreements creating joint patrols on the Libyan coasts, which made it possible for Italian coast guard vessels to operate in Libyan waters. Italy provided 'the necessary resources', including technology, to control migrant flows through the southern borders of Libya. The migrants around Africa and the Middle East, traveling through the Saharan desert, passing Libyan shores in order to reach Mediterranean waters, now had to avoid the EU-funded border patrols or Italian-supplied surveillance drones, in order to reach European territory.

Today the cooperation on migration is still on-going and mostly focuses on support and advice from EU officials to Libyan authorities governing migration control. Bialasiewicz and Minca (2009) argue that this cross-border cooperation on migration control has become the narratives of the border that they call *confine ponte*: a bridge-border (Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2009). Walters (2004) describes that the need for the barrier either through direct military occupation or through alliances came as a means for political control beyond the administrative boundary. The idea behind these forms of alliances and 'partnerships' with police forces and border authorities is to draw these countries into a 'wider zone of stability and prosperity', thus seeking to stabilize the frontier through various programs of regional assistance and development (Walters, 2004).

The need for migration control became managed and maintained through bilateral agreements and EU laws and regulations, like that of the visa policy, a set of measures and



forms of cooperation in order to put in place a structured policy to prevent and combat illegal immigration (EUR-Lex, 2005).

Figure 1.4: Dividing of border responsibilities EU and Libya. Source: EPSC 2017

In the map above these dynamic operations are shown through different rescue and search activities. The European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNavFor Sophia) an Italian operation that operates as of 2015 with the Libyan Search and Rescue (SAR) zone, emphasizes the ever-tighter and complex cooperation between Libya and Italy (EPSC, 2017).

Today when migrants enter the Mediterranean Sea, they are intercepted by Italian, European or Libyan coast guards and brought back to Libyan soil. This way, the agreements

and the mechanism to defend them, are the structures and agencies that created and maintain the barrier that is there between the EU and Libya.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operate the closest to Libyan shores. The idea behind that is to save lives by intercepting migrant boats as soon as possible. Lives of people trapped on boats that are overloaded and in danger of capsizing. By diplomatic procedures, the location of the boats decides where the migrants should be brought back.

However, the attempts made by some NGOs and civil society initiatives to fill the gap whether to save people's lives or to comply with states' procedures causes for tension and challenges their adherence to the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality (Refei, 2016).

#### **1.4 Externalized borders**

From rescuing actions to institutionalized surveillance operations, European actors began to operate more closely towards African shores, pushing migrants back to Libyan territory. Immigration control began by moving up to the intergovernmental level, then closer to supranational governance and is now gradually moving out towards the realm of EU foreign relations. This idea of the barrier constructed more towards African shores in need of migration control support is often described as 'burden shifting' or 'burden sharing'.

According to Ruben Zaiotti (2016), practices of externalisation involve a transfer of governance having an internal effect in the third country. Instead of burden shifting, practices of externalisation can imply burden sharing, where there has to be an element of imposition, in which the transfer of governance occurs in one direction (Zaiotti, 2016).

Another view comes from Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, Aragall, (2009) who explain that externalization can be understood as elements of the domestic system that have international implications, such as the creation of camps for different types of migrants, outside and inside borders.

Externalization includes the increased emphasis on external borders and on the fight against illegal immigration, such as border control measures, the construction of fences, patrols, and so on. Besides that, externalization includes the measures for the repatriation of the illegalized migrants, re-admission agreements, and means of transport to third countries. This would mean the processing of asylum claims outside EU territory (Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, Aragall, 2009).

Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, Aragall (2009) describe that there are three different strategies for the externalisation of migration policies; the first is *Remote Control*, that

involves the shifting of control further afield from the common territory. Visa policies and the mobilisation of third countries in the control of migration flows are mechanism used for a remote control strategy. Remote control implies shifting migrants at the border through state agents (visas), private actors (carrier sanctions).

The second strategy is that of *Remote Protection* that emphasis on the extra-territorial dimension of migrant protection, and the third strategy is that of a *Capacity Building* strategy, which only includes the transfer of know-how, surveillance technologies, facilities, and institutions.

## 1.5 Conclusion

This chapter described the role of the political border between Libya and the EU with the use of the metaphor 'bridge' and 'resource' as a way to capture how Europa and Libya have been involved with each other and in a way been 'part' of each other throughout time.

Starting with the Trans-Saharan Trade Route, which Europe tried to gain access to in order to benefit from African resources. Libya here was used as a transit port and trading partner—a bridge, 'a gateway'—facilitating, taxing and partly organizing trade as a sort of 'middle men' from the south, along the Trans-Saharan trade route up to Mediterranean markets. By gaining access to the Trans Saharan route, Europe was able to engage in slave trade and obtain materials such as ivory, feathers, and gold.

During Italian colonization, the continent of Africa as a whole became fussed with the idea of a 'Eurfrican' reality. European powers refused the idea of a barrier between Europe and Africa and saw Africa more as their extension of land, a resource for them to obtain new land, raw materials, and labour.

European geographers served as agencies that contributed to the social structural change, demographic conditions and changing settlement patterns inflected through the change of frameworks of European racial science. Europe creating their own border construction and therewith their imaginary border characterized as a bridge.

After independence, the bridging character changed off and on, where on different fronts, both partners used each other as a bridge or resource. The most important examples mentioned in this chapter were that of political interests, oil trade, and migration control. Europe used Libya as a resource for political support and alliance in exchange for financial aid and military support.

Where Italy had 'freed' the Libyans from their barbaric Ottoman Turkish rulers and make them more 'civilized', Europe again tried to do the same by downsizing the regime of

Gaddafi in order to 'free' the Libyan society of their authorial dictator, bringing them 'freedom' and 'stability'.

The present-day bridging character of the border between Libya and the EU is for the EU to protect its European citizen from the 'mass' migration from Northern Africa where Libya is used as a bridging facilitator and a resource, as a 'backyard' of Europe.

## Part II

### What divided us



# The Border as a Symbol of Identity and Barrier

## - IN THE EYES OF THE OTHER -

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*Borders: a need, a fever, a curse. Without them is neither identity nor form, there is no existence; they create existence and arm it with all-pervading talons. Claudio Magris, Microcosms (as cited in Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2009)*

This chapter will focus on the barriers that divided Libya and Europe—the barrier that is there to constrain, to be crossed or there to protect. The three barriers discussed in this chapter are that of the Mediterranean Sea—the one that is there since forever, the negotiated ‘borderline’— the barrier that is thought of as ever-changing and capable of movement and maintained through agreements, surveillance mechanism and regulations and third that of the mental barrier—, the border that was, and is there, not per se in physical walls or wired fences, but in symbolic or invisible ways, creating a sense of ‘we’ on one side, and ‘they’ on the other side. It will seek to answer what divided ‘us’ and what continues to do so by analysing the ways in which the border between Libya and the EU became a ‘barrier’ and has been used and perceived as a ‘symbol of identity’.

The natural border of the Mediterranean Sea separates three continents and is used since ancient ages as the trade route to connect different cultures across continents. The Mediterranean Sea has always separated Libya and Europe and kept its force through the creation of political bordering practices, where negotiated agreements decided on rules where to locate the border exactly. This political border can be seen as vague, arbitrary and has often changed throughout time.

The chapter is based on the idea that identity has been shaped, both internally by nationalism as well as by external forces such as European colonization, Post-Colonialism, and Western-dominated globalization. It will answer the question of how both the EU as well as Libya have perceived and still perceive one another, and how the border between them served as a means to give themselves and each other their symbolic meaning and identity. The perceived polarized identities played a role in the narrative of the Arab Spring and the cooperation on migration control.

Present-day ‘we’ are still divided, even though Libya is not under Gaddafi’s rule anymore, the aftermath of the colonial era and the different identities shaped by it are still there.

### **2.1. The civilized and barbarian**

The symbolic meaning of the border has been produced and reproduced by European powers and often changed the representation of Libyans in Western narratives. This includes being part of a new 'Roman Empire' in Mussolini's geopolitics, and part of a Eurafrikan identity, turning Africa into an extension of Europe and 'Libyans' into 'Italian Libyans'. Starting off with the colonial era where the border was perceived by European powers as a symbol to distinguish the 'civilized' from the 'uncivilized' (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2005).

The image of colonialism was widely persuasive in its time, not only to the great majority of Europeans but also to many colonial subjects, to believe that Europe was the source of all agencies.

For European powers, imperialism gave them a sense of superiority, a feeling of being more civilized, while for the colonized people imperialism reduced their social identity and individual collective action and closed off possibilities that might otherwise have flourished.

Europeans saw themselves as more rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, without natural suspicion and distrust, while 'Orientals' were none of these things. This powerful and illusive self-image allowed them to rename, re-define, and thereby control 'Oriental' peoples, places, and things, into the imperial domain (Ventura, 2017).

The identity they created for its other was an exotic barbaric character, associated with a certain backwardness and lack of development, where they saw the indigenous population of Northern Africa as less intelligent, less civilized and therefore in need of European 'civilization'. Europe saw it as their 'burden' to 'civilize' these 'uncivilized' 'barbaric' people (Ahmida, 2009).

Besides the urge to 'civilize' Libya, the Italian colonizers saw it as required to 'free' the Libyans from their aggressive Ottoman Rulers. They believed the barbarous governing of Ottoman rule, where slavery was acceptable and where the society was governed by Islamic traditions and beliefs oppressed the Libyans. Wright (1982) explains that the Libyans saw this 'barbaric' character of their Ottoman rulers differently. They shared the same Islamic belief and had accepted slavery as a respected form of hierarchy in their society, whereas the Italians and their Catholic belief were viewed as completely different and distant from their beliefs and values.

### 2.1.1 Indigenous Politics

The term 'Indigenous Politics' arose during Italian Balbo's Governorship, which began in January 1934. The idea behind this was to modernize Libya and at the same time preserve its indigenous culture. By Indigenous Politics, Italy legitimized its colonial actions by presenting themselves as trying to please both Italians and the indigenous population (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2005).

Indigenous politics became a mechanism for Europeans to create the identity of the 'Orient'. The idea of the invention of the Orient, as described by Said (1978), was that the 'Orient' was something obscure, something eternal, and incapable of development, which gave the West the impression of being the only measure of 'modernity'. Libyans therefore *had* to remain its indigenous culture and 'backwardness' for the creation of the superior European identity.

Brian McLaren (2005) explains that Italy created a 'Mediterranean' identity through the ideas of the Italian architect Florestano Di Fausto, who was in charge to create architectural designs for Italy's Mediterranean colony. According to him, architecture had to be based upon a careful reading of the local architecture.

The vision by Di Fausto's was the culmination of a theoretical trajectory to legitimized the appropriation of local architecture by architects working in Italian Libya. The maintenance of the indigenous culture was directly connected to its tourist business development. The touristic sites in Libya were reinforced by a campaign to restore historical sites and implement civic improvements.

The program included Muslim religious buildings, like the Qaramanli mosque in Tripoli, and the Roman and Greek archaeological sites at Leptis Magna, Sabratha, Cyrene, and Apollonia. A perfect touristic destination was created for the Europeans, where tourists could experience the most exotic forms of Libyan culture.

Another structural act of Indigenous Politics was that of education. Italy aimed to eliminate illiteracy and to 'civilize' and 'enlighten' the Libyan citizen, while at the same time they tried to keep them as ignorant as possible.

The process where Italy allowed them a basic education and at the same time restricted their ability to acquire advanced education has been defined as 'creative destruction'. A process focussed on maintenance of traditional cultural practices of the local populations while at the same redefining them according to the demands of a metropolitan society (McLaren, 2005).

## 2.2 National Identity

In the attempt to give meaning to a national identity, nations define themselves in comparison with their neighbours and people from abroad. The symbolism and semiotics of a nation give the individual a feeling of togetherness, of solidarity, or a feeling of common community. The creation of a national border symbolizes demarcation of an appropriated space, an imagined truth that carries its own name and is being reproduced symbolically, semiotically, formally every day in time and space. It creates a distance where 'the other' is constructed and constitutive for its own identity (Van Houtum, 2011).

Europe's idea of the nation-state was forced upon countries like Libya after their independence. Libya, an invented country, out of multiple tribes, with people who to some degree shared a history, ethnicity, culture, a language, and a geographical location, but varied on many different levels, were expected to function as one single nation-state and to express a sense of common community. This resulted in neighbour disputes and a struggle for personal identity (Ahmida, 2009).

After the revolution in 1969, the new Libyan regime by Gaddafi began to evolve its own vision of the nation Libya and policies it wished to develop. Gaddafi was left with the borderlines drawn by European powers, where his idea was to create an African united front, with an Arab nationalist regime rooted in Africa. Libya increasingly adopted an anti-imperialist rhetoric derived from its political interpretation of Islam and adopted a radical socialist economic model, one that Gaddafi described as 'The Third Way'— a combination of communism and capitalism based on Islamic values and beliefs. The idea behind the African unity and the Third Way Theory was to become truly independent and to break loose from ties with former European powers (Joffé, 2001).

The principles of the Third Way were opposed to the capitalistic West. Gaddafi was not fond of democracy and formed his nation on different terms. According to Talal Asad (2009), Islam is opposed to democracy. Not only because it is the rule of the majority, which may exercise tyranny over the minority, but also because it is the rule of the people and not God.

There was a clear recognition of what Ahmida (2009) called the 'winds of change' blowing through Africa, where several African countries met in Casablanca and established the 'Casablanca Group' in 1961. The aim of this meeting was to create a joint military command and an African common market that could be regarded as radical to advocate a socialist path of development for Africa (Ahmida, 2009).

Migrants formed an important role in the creation of the Libyan national identity. Libya's significant black population connected with the ancient history of black African

slavery in Libya had brought a significant number of black people to Libya to work principally in the gardens, construction sites, and in garages. Black migrants were described, at the same time, as an important component of Libya's oases identity, which Gaddafi took as a mainstay of the Libyan national identity (Ahmida, 2009).

The created national identity became a symbol to reflect anti-imperialism, particularly as the Jamahiriya, a term used by Gaddafi to refer to the state of the masses, Libya's normative self-image (Ahmida, 2009). Gaddafi came to symbolize these values and traditions. He was seen as a leader, proud of his traditional Islamic way of life, differentiating himself from the West. When, for example, he held meetings with Western powers such as Blair, he insisted on meeting in a traditional tent, associated with his heritage of being raised in a Bedouin family that lived in traditional Bedouin tents (Watson, 2004).



Figure 2.1: Tony Blair, left, with Gaddafi at the start of their meeting. Source: Watson, 2004

In the West, Gaddafi was portrayed as a brutal dictator, often accused of investments in terrorist activities and human rights abuse. Throughout his time of ruling, he became to stand for everything the West was opposed of, someone that could dilute what some perceived to be 'European Culture'. The rejection of democracy and the urge of Gaddafi on unification on Arab and African fronts became a means for Libya to express itself as opposed to its colonial past and the continued Post-Colonial interests of the West. This marked a division between the 'new' Islamic and 'Third Universal ideological' Libya and the democratic capitalistic 'West' (Joffé, 2001).

### 2.3 The Muslims and non-Muslims

The links with the Arab world were seen as a priority for Gaddafi, recognizing its Islamic faith, culture, and traditions. The identity created by Gaddafi's regime was based on historical socio-cultural values, deeply related to the desert and the Islamic religion and traditional trade routes in and around the Sahara.

The rise of militant Islam in the Maghreb during the early part of the 1990s was increasingly seen in Europe to pose a distinct and powerful threat to European security and identity. Europe in a way, found itself threatened with the Islamic beliefs of Gaddafi's revolutionary disdain and made Libya a subject of fear. The Islamist discourse on the colonial past intended to erase it and promised to reconstruct a future that reaches back to a mythical primordial era, by reconstituting the present on anticolonial principles (Asad, 2000).

Asad (2000) raises the question 'Can Europe represent Islam? And goes on to explain that for both liberals and the extreme right, the representation of European culture takes the form of a narrative, one of whose effects is to exclude Islam. It is precisely because Muslims are external to the essence of Europe that 'coexistence' can be envisaged between 'us' and 'them'.

According to Lorella Ventura (2017), the main basis of the Western narration of the 'Arab' is the idea of 'modernity', where Islam does not fit with it. Religion appears to be a strong unifying factor for the West, where the Islamic movement is considered to be 'cohesive' because they provide a simplistic ideology that appeals to a certain level of education or class (Ventura, 2017).

Interesting to bring back here are the thoughts of Edward Said. Said— being an Arab himself— saw how the West portrayed the Arab and the Islamic world as 'barbaric' and interpreted it as if there was just one version of it— one 'Arab' and one 'Islam'. In his work *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine how We See the Rest of the World* (1997), he describes how the West became to associate Islam with 'terror' and fear.

Said (1997) describes how for example in movies, the West often portrays 'the bad guy' or the terrorist as an 'Arab-looking' figure, speaking aggressively in Arabic and herewith speaking to the Western imagination and interpretation. From the Iranian hostage crisis to the Gulf War and the events of 9/11, the American and Western news media have portrayed Islam as a monolithic entity, synonymous with terrorism and religious hysteria (Said, 1997).

The front cover of Said's book says a lot about its content. On the front, one can see a 'terrorist' Muslim, dressed in the clothes one would associate with an Arab or a devoted Muslim. The man is holding a gun and stares through a visor, while next to him a well-dressed Western journalist is pointing his camera on the terrorist (Said, 1997). These two men—the portrayed terrorist on one side and the 'sane' journalist on the other side—give a clear impression of how the West has often interpreted the Islamic 'other'.



Figure 2.2: Cover of 'How the Media and experts determine how we see the rest of the World'. Source: Said, 1997.

Said's book *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine how We See the Rest of the World* (1997), can be seen as a follow up on his ideas on Orientalism, where the West is again accused of generalizing and stereotyping the Arab and the Islamic World as it has done during the indigenous politic strategies.

The creation of an identity of the Arab or Muslim— associated with terrorism and fear— is done by exposing the misperceptions of Islam by the media coverage that usually finds what it wants rather than what is there (Said, 1997).

## 2.4 The Modern and Stagnated

Lorella Ventura (2017) explains how the West remains to perceive Libya as a nation less developed and often stereotyped as problematic by the West. Just as the West had created the identity of the 'Orient', the West created an image of the 'Arab', one that includes a general image of a civilization suppressed by their regime, in a movement towards democratization and 'development' like the West. She makes an interesting opposition here of two worlds as perceived by the West: the 'Modernized' and the 'Stagnated'.

The Orientalist viewpoint here is that Western democracy is supposed to be the 'goal of history' and the supreme value for the whole world, and that those who structure their lives on the ideals of the Islam do not 'get to' experience the 'freedom' of democracy and are perceived of as stagnated (Ventura, 2017).

Burke (2009) confirms this neo-colonial perspective of Libya by the West, where according to European colonial narratives, the dynamism of Europe alone can bring life to the non-West. He explains that colonial historians saw colonialism as a progressive force and therefore one endowed with legitimacy. Colonialism claimed to bring progress to non-Western societies and colonial powers and historians saw themselves as participating in a great progressive enterprise, namely, the introduction of the world's peoples into history (Burke, 2009).

This colonial ideological mission thus lingers on in present-day society. Becoming like the West is still seen as 'progress', where the Arab world and its Islamic traditions are perceived as a stagnated civilization. Said (1997) explains that it is precisely the differentiation between the more 'modern' and the less 'modern', that is important for the identity of the West and is therefore intended to remain to perceive this image. In order for the symbolic differentiation between the modern and the stagnated, the 'other' was not to become like the West, but perceived of as always lacking behind.

The idea that the 'other' could be as 'modern' as them was according to Said the most threatening idea. In an older video published on YouTube in October 2012, Said explains how the first time the West experienced this frightened sense of competition in 'modernity', was during the events of the Israel-Egypt war in 1967, when the West expected an obvious victory on the Israeli (Western) front, when suddenly the Egyptians made an impressive move by crossing the Suez canal and therewith showing the world to be a strong competitor on military front (Said, 2012, October 28).

#### *2.4.1 The 'Arab Spring' narrative*

The presence of Orientalist thoughts features in the Western-dominated interpretation of the uprisings in the Arabic World, later known as the 'Arab Spring', that took place in several Middle Eastern and North African countries around the year 2011. The way the 'West' documented the Arab Spring emphasizes the perceived image of the 'stagnated' and a homogeneous 'other'.

Despite the fact the revolts occurred in a short period of time, one after another, and that their protagonists used the same slogans (freedom and fall of the 'regime') and spread of social media outings—to consider them as one revolution an 'Arab Spring' implies an abstract viewpoint one that reduces and neutralizes the real differences between the various Arab countries. In the media, protesters were seen as angry Arabs, waving their black flags and shouting Arabic lines, which could speak to the imagination of the Western mind (Falk, 2013).

When Libyan militias with the support of Western forces killed Gaddafi in October 2011, the event became to symbolize a radical change. While Western powers attempted to establish control over the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) leadership, the NTC announced its intention to review Libyan investments in the Middle East, Africa and around the world with help of the World Bank.

The civil regime resistance and the intervention by the NATO to 'protect' the civilian population led to a violent war with over 72 civilian deaths, including women and children. According to the report by Human Rights Watch, NATO had flown 26.000 sorties against almost 6.000 targets during its campaign in Libya.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) team that arrived in Libya in April 2012 recommended further economic liberalization and privatization. A NATO intervention with the United Nation's (UN) sponsorship had produced regime-change in Libya, but Post-Qaddafi Libya achieved neither stability nor democracy. The social changes, those relating to demography, unemployment, and the new media created strong pressure for change and instability for Libya.

The idea of dictatorships in present-day society is deeply rooted in the cultural predisposition of Arabs or Muslims and not explained by the true historical and geopolitical contingencies, is simply the late versions of Orientalism, where the Arabs/Muslims are perceived by the West as culturally incapable of democracy and human rights (Roberts, Willis, McCarthy, & Ash, 2016).

The West documented the Arab revolutions as one— with as main actors the bloggers, young students, and women— the types of ‘modern heroes’ who in the eyes of the West were not that different from themselves. With smartphones and social media, this ‘modern’ view of the youth implied an image of these people to appear as ‘modern’, anti-traditionalist and even pacifist. It reinforces the idea of these revolts as being based on the opposition between tradition and modernity and that the ‘suppressed’ people had chosen to become ‘modern’ like the West (Ventura, 2017).

Ventura (2017) explains that the association of technology linked with modernization is misleading and can be understood with the example of technology use by al-Qaeda and ISIS, which are clearly not interpreted by the West as ‘modern’, but do in fact clearly show that the use of visual technologies and new means of communication can coexist with very ‘traditional’ and even anti-modern behaviour and perceptions. The thought that after the Arab Spring, the immobility of the past was finally left behind, becomes clear in a remark made by Hillary Clinton at the gala dinner celebrating the US-Islamic World Forum, where she posed the following statement:

*“whether the people of the region [will] make the most of this historic moment or fall back into stagnation”). embracing the “spirit of reform” and their capability to answer to “the region’s most pressing challenges – to diversify their economies, open their political systems, crackdown on corruption, [and] respect the rights of all of their citizens, including women and minorities”. The United States “will be there as a partner, working for progress” (As cited in Ventura, 2017, p. 290).*

Interesting when evaluating the events of the Arab Spring and the downsizing of Gaddafi is the article by Dimitrovova & Kramsch (2017), who describe that this attitude finds expression in an evolving process of modernization (or ‘Europeanization’), which lies at the heart of EU foreign policymaking, the failure of EU development policies that according to Dimitrovova & Kramsch (2017) is attributed by the EU and the wider international community, to corruption, bad governance, clientelism and/or the lack of social capital of Arab Muslims. Dimitrovova and Kramsch (2017) claim that the EU in its discursive practice takes on the role as an external observer, claiming that it shunt aside its own responsibilities when things go wrong (Dimitrovova & Kramsch, 2017). They argue that currently the manifestations towards socioeconomic development in the Maghreb are divided into those who would question the good intentions and sincerity of the EU, those who would react in defensive ways by stressing independence, integrity and domestic resources; and those mimicking Western norms (Dimitrovova & Kramsch, 2017).

## 2.5 Fort Europe

The idea of a frontier, a boundary or a limiting zone to distinguish one space or people from another, is much older and used more widely than in colonial and Post-Colonial times. The idea to mark of a property is to enclose, to define, to illustrate, and to perceive a settling or place. It is the figure of that enclosure that marks the frontier between the ones on one side, and those on the other side (Ashcroft, Gareth, & Tiffin, 2000).

After the fall of the Berlin wall, for a moment there seem to be no borders in Europe. Europe was to become one united entity, 'united' for its citizen. By closing of the external borders of the EU member states, the idea was to protect the Europeans against all that was not European, which became known as 'Fort Europe'.

The border between the EU and Libya transformed into what Walters (2004) calls a *Networked Border*. A border under the terms of the Schengen agreement where states removed border control along their common frontiers and replaced it with new forms of regulations (Walter, 2004).

The exclusive external borders around EU zones became managed by authorities who used strict rules and resources deciding on who may enter, become EU citizen and who are to be excluded. The edges of the EU became characterized as frontier zones rather than lines, as the barrier that marks the EU territory are not precisely visible in the sense that there are lines and walls everywhere, but are still there in some ways, to make it difficult to cross the border (Walters, 2004).

'Fort Europe' transformed the Mediterranean in a divided territory, where those who were not allowed to enter through legal ways, came to perceive the Mediterranean as an option to reach EU territory. This journey turned the Mediterranean Sea in a deathly barrier, where over the past years over 10.000 deaths have been documented along the EU's maritime frontiers (Bialasiewicz, 2012).

The EU website on visa regulations states that the EU's overall visa approach is the best working method to combat illegal immigration, stop trafficking in human beings, prevent economic exploitation of migrants, and on cooperation with the countries of origin and transit in carrier liability and readmission and return policy (EUR-Lex, 2005). All EU Member States should be presented or represented for visa purposes in all third countries whose nationals are subject to visa requirements (EUR-Lex, 2009).

According to Walters (2004) by the demarcation of EU's territory, a colonial barrier arose, whereas, in the past, the Mediterranean was the centre of the civilized world—*mare*

*nostrum* —for the Romans, The Mediterranean came to divide the ‘North’ and ‘South’, between the ‘highly organized’ and ‘those who are outside’.

Walters (2004) argues that over the years, Fort Europe became to look more like a traditional empire. With the distribution between centre and periphery becoming almost as important as the distinction between members and non-members’. EU’s borders became more and more fortified, a dynamic space, less fixed and therefore capable of movement (Walter, 2004).

The reason for the transformation towards more securitization was mainly because of migration. Migration became more immediately connected with a series of highly charged socio-political issues such as drugs smuggling, terrorism, people trafficking, arms dealing and asylum seeking. It is not the invasion by hostile armies that the EU fears, but the criminal networks, and above all the entrance of clandestine migrants (Walters, 2004).

In 2004 the Council of the EU established FRONTEX to form a new external borders agency for the EU, with as main purpose to coordinate intelligence driven operational co-operation at EU level and to strengthen security at the external borders. This became a two-sided operation of surveillance for fighting ‘illegal’ immigration and monitoring for saving lives (Tazzioli, 2015).

In 2009, by the Berlusconi government, migrants could no longer travel along the Mediterranean Sea. Those trying to cross the Mediterranean border were to be fined with a fine up to 10.000 euro and detention. Italy also tried to ‘push back’ the migrants who were already on European ‘territory’. The idea behind this was to ‘discourage’ migrants from making the trip across the Mediterranean (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2016).

## 2.6 Migration control

Libya and the EU remain to be divided by values, beliefs, and Europe's idea that the Arabic world does not fit within the European frame. This is expressed through the agreements and cooperation on migration control. As described in part 1 '*What kept us together*' the EU and Libya had a common goal of limiting migration towards Libya and Europe. Both Italy as well as Libya perceives migration a form of a treat to preserving economic benefits and domestic security. The difference is that the EU is 'protected' from migrants by the Mediterranean and by agreements that intercept migrants and bring them back to Libya.

Libya's border control policies expose the critical tie linking migration with Libya's domestic and foreign policies agenda. Libyan authorities believe that all migrants are 'economic migrants' and that the question of asylum policy is a 'European obsession' and not their responsibility. Besides that, the Libyan government is thought of as vulnerable, and thus incapable of managing migrants (Bialasiewicz, 2012).

According to Paoletti (2010), the arrival of migrants is seen as a threat to security because of its alleged links with terrorism that may infiltrate the country through migrant flows. Migration is also considered to be a threat to Libya's identity, Libya attracts migrants that form not only economic threats, but also for its cultural and ethnic homogeneity. Paoletti (2010) peaks of 'Africanisation', where Africans outnumber the Libyans and form a threat to the National identity of Libya.

New diseases like pneumonia, lice, and HIV that did not previously exist in Libya are spread from migrant detention centres. Paoletti (2010) argues that the responsibility placed on Libya is legitimized with financial support and training support and the idea of protection. Libyan coastguards are trained by EU standards and norms and migrants are placed in detention camps that are sponsored by the EU.

The fact the EU and Libya have not come to clear agreements and migration control still remains a controversial topic; migration can still be seen as a factor dividing the two and influence the relationship between them.

### 2.6.1 Power Differences

An important factor dividing the EU and Libya is that of power. Boswell (2003) stresses that cooperation on migration is considered a central aspect of EU migration policy and is binding its neighbours into partnerships by a strategy of reducing migratory pressures through development aid, intended to take account of a range of concerns on their part. The idea of putting pressure and unequal benefits for Libya is also emphasized by Claire Rodier saying:

*Countries of northern Africa are persuaded, under pressure from the EU, to introduce control measures at their own borders to prevent nationals from their neighbours in Black Africa entering, despite the fact that they could enter freely before that. As a consequence, it is worrying today to see the Union structuring its relations with third countries in line with a logic whose, often devastating, effects can be measured (As cited in Paoletti, 2010, p. 5).*

A different view on the power relation between Libya and the EU comes from or from Paoletti (2010) who argues that Libya still remains a powerful actor in managing border policy practices and that the EU borders cannot be seen as 'externalized' due to the power relation at play. Libya possesses a fair share of power in using migration as a means to manipulate the EU and therefore has a role in preserving and reproducing the border construction (Paoletti, 2010). That Libya sees itself as a powerful nation became clear during Libya's Interior Minister Salah Mazek's a speech, addressing the world saying:

*With regards to illegal immigration, I am warning the world, and the European Union in particular, that if they do not shoulder the responsibility with us, the state of Libya will take a position on this matter that could facilitate the quick passage of this flood of people through Libya since God has made us a transit point for this flood (Al Jazeera, 2014).*

Not only does Italy perceive migration as a threat, for Libya it causes major societal threats as well. As described by Paoletti (2010), Libya has articulated a foreign policy based on a view that is more racist than that of Italy. It has amplified an anti-foreign sentiment that resembles Europe's far-right security paradigms. This has led to for example the mistreatment of migrants by Libyan coastguards as will be discussed later on.

It is clear that both Italy as well as Libya are not open to the acceptance of migrants. As Paoletti (2010) explains, migration is moulded in the behaviour of one actor towards his counterpart and his capacity to influence outcomes to form any particular diplomatic exchange.

## 2.7 Conclusion

This chapter focused on what divided 'us' and what continues to do so. Ever since there can be spoken of a border between Europe and Libya, this border carried a form of symbolism in it where Libya and Europe came to be divided by the symbolic meaning and difference of their own identity.

The chapter started with a focus on the first clear difference between Libya and Europe, a 'border' perceived by Europeans divided on grounds of the 'civilized' Europeans and the 'uncivilized' indigenous Libyans. The border for Europeans became a means for Europeans to differentiate themselves as superior and as a way to legitimize their imperialistic acts. After independence Libya struggled to create its own new national identity, based on Islamic and traditional values. Gaddafi played an important actor in the creation of this national identity. He declared his nation an Arab state, ruled by Islamic rules, welcome for all those who fitted in.

Through the eyes of European powers, Libya became an Islamic nation, build on traditional culture and values, still 'less developed' as the European nation states. The regime by Gaddafi remained to be associated with a sort of backwardness where European powers maintained a colonial attitude of trying to 'develop' Libya. Due to constant pressure for liberalization and reform from outside powers like the EU, Gaddafi's regime was downsized. The fall of Gaddafi symbolized the neo-colonial attitude where Europe again tried to free the Arab world from its suppressive 'tyrannical' leader and to clear the path for democracy and modernization.

When deciding on the conceptualization of EU's external dimension, the relation between the EU and Libya is important. Paoletti (2010) argues that Libya possesses a fair share of power in using migration as a means to manipulate the EU and therefore has a role in preserving and reproducing the border construction. The power is more equal than other scholars such as Bialasiewicz (2012) who argues that the power relation is unequal and the EU is placing pressure on migrant destination countries like Libya.

Till today, the EU and Libya create their identity on its opposite 'other'. The EU, as expressed through international diplomacy and media outings, remains to perceive themselves as superior, bearers of 'the right' knowledge, where the West is still the more developed, 'democratic' society, more 'modern' than that of the 'stagnated' Islamic Arabic world and where Libya as a Muslim nation is opposed to the values of the West.

Part III  
The EUBAM case



# The Implementations of the EUBAM

## - DARK WEB OF COLLUSION -

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*The many human bones that litter the sandy surface of the desert and the piles of clothes on the shores of the Mediterranean washed ashore by the waves attest to the misfortune and destruction that await the modern day adventurous immigrant (Jaiyeola, 2013, p.3)*

The quote above is from the Nigerian migrant Saeun Jaiyeola, who travelled across the Sahara from Nigeria to Libya. As he arrived in Libya he experienced many difficulties. He was not able to travel to Europe easily as he was constrained by different forces. Eventually, he made it to Europe through the illegalized route: that of the Mediterranean Sea. Going to Europe had been his dream, being stuck in Libya was something he had not prepared for and scared him for life. Among Jaiyeola many migrants experienced the same.

Libya is currently described as a society with high unemployment, rising criminality, linkages with terrorism, threats to national identity, the spread of new diseases, and low education standards. Due to unrest and violence in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi, many people tried to flee Libya. Since 2011, more than one million people left Libya, of which most of them fled to neighbouring countries and a relatively minor percentage fled to Europe.

In May 2013, the EUBAM Libya was initially launched as an integrated border management mission in Libya as part of EU's migration policy. The metaphors of O'Dowd's (2004) bridge and resource, will be used to describe the purpose of the EUBAM as keeping the EU and Libya closer together, while the metaphor of symbol of identity and barrier are used to explain an ever more separating character of the EU and Libya.

Starting off with introducing the case of the EUBAM, before analysing whether the borders can be thought of as 'externalized', or offshored to Africa, as many border scholars suggest. The EUBAM can be seen as bringing the EU and Libya closer together, while at the same time, forming a barrier that divides the EU and Libya. The implementations of the EUBAM are critically analysed in order to evaluate if the EUBAM can be seen as an influential agency, capable of bringing structural change and herewith proving that the EUBAM acts according to structural patterns, reproducing colonial behaviour and oriental thoughts.

### **3.1 The EUBAM as a Bridge and Resource**

The EUBAM is meant as assistance in crisis management in the field of security sector and reform. The mission is focussed on police, criminal justice, border security, and migration. The EUBAM is also launched to educate, prevent deaths, and build on a better relationship between Libya and the EU at the request of and in full ownership of the Libyan authorities.

By planning support activities in border management, law-enforcement and criminal justice, the EUBAM assists the Libyan state, capacities and needs of the Libyan institutional actors. Besides that, the EUBAM aims to contribute to the development of the Libyan security planning and advice on their institutional coordination (EEAS, 2018).

A bridging character includes a 'Gateway' or cooperation aspect, which in the case of the EUBAM, a bridge can be that of a better relationship between the EU and Libya. According to O'Dowd (2001), cross-border interaction may contribute to a 'we-feeling' or a sense of common identity (O'Dowd, 2001). To unpack this interaction, the shared interests are relevant to distinguish, however the idea here is that active and increasingly European policies, shared by continental partners, could be negotiated without this being ultimately synonymous with a true dialogue of shared interests.

Both Libya and the EU have shared interests, but also different costs and benefits resulting in cooperating with one another. Both Libya, as well as the EU aim to restrict clandestine migration towards Libya and Europe, as it is perceived of as a threat to both their societies. For the EU the costs are financial resources that they invest in Libya with limited return. The benefits for the EU are formal support of Libya to collaborate on migration—while for Libya, the benefits are financial and material resources, and the inclination to 'talk at any cost' and therewith a privileged position in the discussion on migration.

For Libya, the EUBAM can be seen as a bribing mechanism, as explained by Paoletti (2010). She argues that the geographical location of Libya, so near to Europe, offers Libya strong leverage on constraining migrants. The EUBAM can be seen as a resource for Libya, for gaining financial support and capacities to support institutional actors and is therefore relevant for Libya to maintain (Paoletti, 2010).

While the EUBAM aims to fight against smuggling and trafficking of human beings, customs, and their interrelation with the wider criminal justice chain (EEAS, 2018), Libya's interest in cooperating with Italy is to selectively support smuggling practices. For Libya, the support of smuggling practices would result in income benefits and therefore keeps the cooperation with the EU on-going.

By more smuggling practices, more 'illegal' boats will leave the shores and therewith thus more boats to be constrained by the same Libyan coastguards. By comparing the interests, costs, and benefits of both the EU and Libya, the cooperation can be conceptualized more as 'burden sharing' instead of 'burden shifting', where both partners have a shared interest in a bridging character of the border (Paoletti, 2010).



Figure 3.1: Facebook message from EUBAM introducing its first meeting. Source: Facebook EUBAM, 2014

The Facebook message by EUBAM on August 4<sup>th</sup> 2014, states that they wish to establish a 'long-term and mutually beneficial relation'. The EUBAM in this light can be thought of as building on closer ties with Libya by the EU where the EU is literally involved in Libya and presents their own interest and values as well as looking after those of Libya.

### 3.1.1 *Bringing back Eurafrika*

The authors Paulo Gaibazzi, Stephan Dünwald and Alice Bellagamba (2017) elaborate on the idea of EU involvement as maintaining a bridging character by bringing back the term 'Eurafrika'. In their book *EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management* they explain that the term Eurafrika is highly relevant in present-day society in order to recall the legacy of asymmetric relationships and imaginations that inform in complex ways the current border and migration management strategies in the Euro-African space.

The EU has facilitated the rise of Libya as a host state for pre-emptive European control of migrant smuggling practices. The book expresses that Africa is again, part of Europe through migration management through agreements and 'friendship' treaties and bilateral agreements. The authors argue that Europe has offshored border work in order to locate migrants upstream along the route to Europe. They perceive the involvement in migration control not as the territorial limit of the (supra-) state, but as the management practices directed at where the migrants are (Gaibazzi, Dünwald & Bellagamba, 2017).

At the same time, African states like Libya have their strategic interests in this and can therefore be seen as part of Europe as well, cooperating on a shared goal. While Europe states seek to develop repressive tasks to their African partners, they gain direct control over migratory flows and therefore induce the partial autonomy of making or unmaking of border regimes (Gaibazzi, 2017).

Not only through migratory flows control does the EUBAM strikes to express a bridging character, through the EUBAM the EU is physically present in Libya by financing border control and training Libyan authorities. According to the report by Amnesty International (2017), up to 20.000 migrants have been held in arbitrarily overcrowded, unsanitary detention centres—exposed to torture, forced labour, extortion and unlawful killings at the hands of Libyan authorities and militias who were put in charge of the centres. The report mentions that the EU member states have provided assistance, particularly Italy, to the Libyan Coast Guard Units and migrant detention centres that made them complicit in the abuses that took place (Amnesty International, 2017).

The idea by Bachmann (2018) presented in Part I, that a partnership cannot be based on a weak and a strong power, relates to present-day migration control, where Libya is perceived of as the weaker partner; one that is in 'need' of European know-how. Just as during colonial times there was no Eurafrika reality and neither is there a 'Eurafrika' today. However, recalling Eurafrika is relevant as it shows how the EUBAM has reproduced colonial thoughts and behaviour where the EU believes to be 'part of' and 'in charge of' Libya.

### **3.2 The EUBAM as a Barrier and Symbol of Identity**

The EUBAM aims to train Libyan coastguards to intercept migrants on sea and bring them back to Libya, herewith the EUBAM creates a stronger barrier between the EU and Libya—one that is more actively act upon and thus more difficult to be crossed.

Research by Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, and Pickles (2014) describe that through migration policies like the EUBAM, the EU is re-articulating Europe's relations with African countries and herewith producing new bordering processes, creating new geographies of integration and border management, and redefining the practices of territory, sovereignty, and extra-territoriality (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias & Pickles, 2014)

According to Bialasiewicz (2012), EU's cooperation with Libya can be seen as a further manifestation of the deepening barrier on inequalities between the migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, where the migrant-sending countries are passive agents forced to adjust to the rules set by the supposedly stronger countries.

Bialasiewicz (2012) argues that the relationship between Libya and the EU has shifted from collaboration and 'friendly' exchange to an explicitly security-led agenda, rendered in the phraseology of 'preventative' security. Identity and power here are seen as mechanism that separated the EU from Libya in a way that the EU has a hegemonic character and thus 'stronger' than its more vulnerable 'partner' Libya (Bialasiewicz, 2012).

Van Houtum and Boedeltje (2011) explain that this way of putting pressure by the EU on its partners is known as 'shaming' and 'name-and-shame' strategies. The EU herewith creates an international and domestic climate of opinions critical of national human rights violations and polarized values.

The shame on Libya became very well expressed through media outings in November 2017 when the mismanagement of migrants in Libya was reported to the world. Images and videos of migrants kept in cages and being sold on markets were spread around the international media that marked the 'Dark Web of Collusion' (Amnesty International, 2017), where Libya's international reputation has become associated with horrific human right scandals like slavery and torture.

The idea of Libya being educated by the EU can be seen as the reproduction of colonial thoughts and behaviour, where the EU creates a polarized identity between Libya and the EU and where the EUBAM can be perceived of as a symbol of identity that causes for the identity of the EU and Libya to be shifted more apart.

### *3.2.1 Bringing back Orientalism*

When evaluating the implementations of the EUBAM, it can be argued that the EU perceives the Libyan society through an Oriental perspective. Where Oriental thoughts on Libya are being reproduced. By taking the idea of Dual Structuration Theory, it can be argued that these thoughts and behaviours are caused by the little agency involved. People are stuck in their structure, incapable of thinking differently and therefore reproducing thoughts and behaviours as presented in the past.

In the past, Europeans saw themselves as more superior over its 'exotic Oriental other' and herewith shaped an identity that lingers on in present-day society where the 'Arab world' is seen as less 'developed' and less 'modern' as theirs and in need of change.

The EUBAM here is a mechanism that is used as a means to educate the Libyans, where the EUBAM portrays Libya as the 'human right abuser', the 'failed state', and the EU as the 'bearers of Human rights' and carriers of the right 'know-how' to handle migrants. While the EU is 'relieved' from the entering migrants, the EU is teaching Libya how to treat migrants and thus portrays Libya as incapable of self-management and in need of EU support and education. The EUBAM in this light is brought to the 'rescue' to civilize the Libyan coastguards, and prevent Libyans from acting in inhumane ways.

In the light of symbolic identity as a way to define the purpose of the EUBAM, it can be argued that it serves as a way to emphasize the difference in power and a reproduction of Oriental thoughts where the symbolical difference attached to the EUBAM can be thought of as dividing the EU and Libya instead of bringing them closer together.

This nuanced neo-Orientalizing terminology was constructed out of what Dimitrovova and Kramsch (2017) call 'empty signifiers', denoting ideal type values, terms, which the EU arrogates unto itself with the force of a monopoly (democracy, good governance, human rights, rule of law, liberal market).

Through the notion of normative power, they argue that the EU shapes the discursive strategies of domestic actors and their perceptions of what is permissible and acceptable to the West.

Just like during colonial times, the EU considers itself best equipped to provide 'free' advice because of its self-representation as a rational and neutral actor. The EU is equipped with a capacity to efficiently rationalize, standardize and produce quick technical fixes (Dimitrovova & Kramsch, 2017).

### 3.3 The EUBAM's Agency

As stated previously, the EUBAM can be seen as a further manifestation where the EUBAM reproduces colonial thoughts and behaviour. The EUBAM has been accused of other implementations that imply a certain agency by the EUBAM on the Libyan society and the relationship between the EU and Libya. It can thus be questioned if the EUBAM actually serves its purpose and if it can be seen as an agency in bringing structural change to Libya.

A Western neo-liberal agenda is supposed to be spread through the Libyan civil-society through education, NGO's, cultural exchange, media, school, and perception (Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2011). Questioned can be if the civil society that is involved is actually willing to adopt these values, stated by the EU and EUBAM and if their values, norms and politics thus fits into the plan of further 'Europeanization'.

Critique aimed at the cooperation between the EU and Libya has often come from NGO's such as Human Right Watch and Amnesty International who have argued that by cooperating with Libya, the EU is guilty of violating human rights, violating the non-refoulement regulation and damaging the Libyan identity by shaming them for these malfunctions. The degree of influence from the EUBAM in the implementations mentioned are difficult to distinguish from external effects such as NGO's or the number of arriving migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean.

#### 3.3.1 *Saving lives*

The EUBAM can be seen as a mechanism to 'push-back' migrants on boats on sea at risk of dehydration or drowning. By intercepting these boats, the idea is to prevent deaths in the Mediterranean Sea. The EUBAM does this by teaching Libyan coastguards how to intercept boats and people from drowning (by rescue missions at sea). Because of this, coastguards are better equipped with know-how on how to rescue human lives (EEAS, 2018).

Proof that the number of deaths and arrivals in Italy has dropped becomes clear in the report from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Migration Agency. The IOM states that 22,439 migrants entered Europe by sea in the first 122 days of 2018, which is much lower in comparison with 45,540 arrivals across the region in the same period last year and 184,793 at this time in 2016. The total of deaths reported in the Mediterranean were 379 in 2018 and 1,029 in 2017, which shows a decrease. The reason for fewer arrivals and fewer deaths can be argued to be explained by the actions by the Libyan Coast Guards Units with the support of the EUBAM, who intercepted 1,485 migrant men, women and children in 2018, bringing the total number of irregular migrants returned to Libya after debarking from Libya to 4,964 (IOM, 2018).

### 3.3.2 Human Rights Abuses

In November 2017, the report by Amnesty International (2017) '*Libya's Dark web of Collusion*' stated how migrants are subjected to widespread and systematic abuse across Libya. The report explains how migrants are inflicted with total impunity, where they are constantly at risk of being unlawfully killed, tortured, otherwise ill-treated, and exploited, and cannot avail themselves of the protection of the law or seek international protection (Amnesty International, 2017).

The EUBAM aims to improve the borders of Libya where there is no asylum system. In this way, migrants (including refugees who would be accepted to the EU) are sent back to Libya with the support of the EUBAM and therewith risking the inhumane circumstances of Libyan detention camps. Migrants are detained in these centres, which are managed by the Libyan Ministry of Interior and run by militias and criminal gangs.

Dimitrova and Kramsch (2017) emphasize that the EU is one of the main protagonists of neoliberal reforms in the Maghreb as external observer and judge. This is problematic because it shunts aside its own responsibility when things go wrong. This becomes clear by the fact that Amnesty International (2017) receives most of the information on human rights abuses by a leaked report by the EUBAM, dated 25 January 2017, which confirmed that:

*"[t]here are reports about these DCs [detention centres] which describe gross human rights violations and extreme abuse and mishandling of detainees, including sexual abuse, slavery, forced prostitution, torture and maltreatment (Amnesty International, 2017, p.59)*

EUBAM thus reports on human rights abuses while at the same time is there to prevent this from happening. Italy and other EU governments have regardless of this information, chosen to cooperate and provide assistance to Libyan authorities.

By providing funds, training, equipment and other forms of assistance to enhance the capacity of Libyan security agencies to intercept and detain refugees and migrants, the EUBAM proactively contributes to violations and abuses.

The EUBAM states that they prevent human rights violations, but does not act as an agency in bringing a change by having tolerated violations and abuses by measures aimed at interceptions at sea.

### 3.3.3 Europeanization

By being present in Libya, Bialasiewicz (2012) argues that Libya becomes more 'Europeanized', and the Libyan coastguards are becoming Europe's policemen. This would imply that they have European values and feel a certain degree of 'togetherness' with Europe. She argues too that border-work foregrounds needs to consider the EU's bordering activities as part of a broader attempt to 'translate' EU space by re-making the world beyond it. She quotes William Walters, who states that attempts to 'translate' EU spaces through the diffusion of specific norms, values, regulations, the EU is seen as an 'Empire', a new form of state-making.

*Squarely within the realm of geopolitics', embedded within the 'combat' against illegal immigration is a political imagination in which Europe is cast as a bounded, self-contained region distinct from and confronted by an external world of similarly bounded but far less well-governed political entities. Illegal immigration is at once a major symptom of this asymmetry in governance capacity, and a source of justification for Europe to involve itself in attempts to remake the world beyond it in the image of the well-governed, territorial state [...]. It is nothing less than state making in a new form (as cited in Bialasiewicz, 2012, p. 847)*

How much then is Libya turning into a European state? And are the Libyan coastguards really becoming more 'Europeanized'. The report by Amnesty International (2017) argues that the coastguards are accused of smuggling practices and human rights abuses, which would imply that the EUBAM has not fully managed to be of certain agency in bringing peace and prosperity in Libya and teaching Libyan authorities EU norms and values.

The EU's support to Libya on migration focuses on programmes that facilitate access to basic services, support to host communities and therefore the degree of protection and 'Europeanization' brought by the EUBAM is not really clear. Van Houtum and Boedeltje (2011) argue that the EU's neighbouring policies may not have such influence on its neighbours as is being stated. They argue that EU's strategies are based on soft power strategies, which according to them works well for its candidate states, but not for its Southern neighbours. The reason why their neighbours do not become 'fully European' will always be subjected to shifting policies of which they have no democratic influence.

The willingness of neighbouring states plays a role in this too where they are part of a buffer zone and container politics of the EU and therefore not self-evident. The EU pushes its neighbours more on democratisation and on-going integration of the southern Mediterranean while both camps strongly differ on financial sources and other funding resources (van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2012).

### 3.3 EUBAM in relation to Externalization

As the previous chapter questioned the degree of agency by the EUBAM in Libya it is important what the impact will be on the agency of the EUBAM in relation to externalization. Questions to be answered will be to what extent and in which way EU borders have become part of Libya or are seen as actually ‘externalized’ to Libya or not, and what it would mean if the borders or border control mechanism are in fact ‘externalized’.

To reflect if the EUBAM serves as an act of externalization, the relation between the EU and Libya as discussed in Part II and the different stages as described by Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, Aragall (2009) in Part 1, will be used here.

*Remote control* strategies involve a shifting the locus of control further afield from the common territory (Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero & Aragall, 2009). Since the EUBAM does not have an executive mandate and works primarily on strategic planning and assistance to institutions in charge to manage Libya’s borders, they cannot be seen as really being in control. The mission does not include measures that aim to restrict migration flows, aim to address the causes for migrants to leave their country of origin, or to manage migrant flows according to the needs of labour market. To a certain level however, the EUBAM can be seen as being in control, as they are in charge of supporting Libyan authorities in border management and migration control. The form of control can therefore be better describes as ‘indirect remote control’, as it partly controls the degree of control by the Libyan authorities.

A *Remote Protection strategy* implies an extra-territorial dimension of migrant protection, which involves a priority regarding the protection of migrants in Libya (Zaiotti, 2016). As Amnesty International (2017) reported, the degree of protection is low. The idea behind the EUBAM is to prevent abuse or to relieve the burden on countries disproportionately affected by migration. There are numbers of abuse reports (still in 2017) that proves that human rights are violated while the EUBAM has been present in Libya since 2013. The EU’s support to Libya on migration protection thus has failed in offering real protection for migrants.

A *Capacity Building Strategy* includes the transfer of know-how, surveillance technologies, facilities and institutions, which can be seen as tools used by the EUBAM. On 17 July 2017, the Council extended the mandate of EUBAM Libya until 31 December 2018 to plan for a possible non-executive Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission providing advice and capacity building in the fields of border management, law enforcement and criminal justice for Libyan coastguards. EUBAM Libya also cooperates closely with, and contributes to, the efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

(UNSMIL), liaising with Libyan authorities and other relevant security interlocutors. Taken in mind that the EUBAM's main goal is to educate, prevent deaths and build on a better relationship. However, as stated earlier, the EUBAM strikes as a dividing mechanism where the identity of the 'weaker' partner is being expressed.

The on-going mission in Libya by indirect remote control, offering remote protection and capacity building, has failed and therefore the EUBAM does not strikes as a manifestation of externalisation. The mission has no direct control and does not offer much direct protection as proved by the reports on human rights abuses. The EUBAM only serves an advisory and supporting function- therefore there is no direct transfer of migration policies, no signing of a readmission agreement, or the building of a detention centre, that 'shift the locus of control further from the common territory'.

EUBAM's actions can be conceptualized as diplomatic practices. As stated in the figure below, actions involved in diplomatic practices are that of bilateral meetings, multilateral meetings that the EUBAM engages in and in re-admission agreements which the EUBAM can be an example of. The EUBAM cannot be seen as an external institution or building external institutions, providing camps, immigration offices and border control, however, does serves as a supporting actor for external institutions as well as supporting policies regarding visa, return and repatriation policies (Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero & Aragall, 2009)

Diplomatic practices	External institutions	Policies
Bilateral meetings; Multilateral meetings; Re-admission agreements.	Camps and processing centres; Immigration offices; Border control.	Visa; Return; Repatriation policies.

Figure 3.2: Practices through which the externalisation policies is conceptualized. Source: Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, & Aragall, 2009.

By evaluation the strategies described by Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, and Aragall (2009) and the different practices concerning the conceptualization of externalization as 'diplomatic practices' and supporting external institutions and policies, the EUBAM aimed to implement these externalization strategies as it aims to control, protect and bond with Libya, but have failed in implementing these strategies. As the EUBAM has proven to not be of great agency in preventing human rights abuses, Europeanization, and transforming the border, conceptualizing the EUBAM as a manifestation of externalisation seems not appropriate.

### 3.3.1 De-territorial collaboration

The term externalization can be elusive and implies a shared identity and blurriness of the border, which the EUBAM cannot be seen as to be causing.

Paoletti (2011) argues that the term externalization is often misused when referring to EU's external dimensions and should be re-conceptualized to 'de-territorial collaboration'. She rejects the view that the process of EU external migration control involves the transfer of responsibilities to third countries and that the idea of 'burden sharing' leaves the migrant-sending countries powerless. Tazzioli (2015) supports her idea by saying that:

*The image of a Europe "at a distance" captures the effects of the Neighbourhood Policies that proliferated in the last decade. However, Europe 'at a distance' can be a misleading image if confused with a territorial dislocation or the enlargement of Europe: actually, the purpose and the effect of Neighbourhood Policies is not to integrate the third countries involved within the European Union but to make some administrative measures (Tazziolio, 2015, p. 7).*

Tazziolio (2015) stresses that external government agreements are necessary transnational 'two-sided operation: surveillance for fighting 'illegal' immigration and monitoring for saving lives are considered two inseparable governmental actions. He rejects the assumption that the EU is trying to expand its sphere of governance and shifts its responsibilities to vulnerable migrant-sending countries.

The focus on the cooperation between Libya and the EU is thus more seen as a mechanism of bordering that is solely for the EU to exercise control over the Libyan territory to push and force Libya to control and block the migrant route.

Another scholar that challenges the idea of externalization is Sandra Lavenex (2004), who demonstrates that external migration control requires adaptation on the part of the EU to the needs and expectations of its neighbouring countries that could result in a wider Europe not so much in terms of common institutions but more in terms of a 'security community' where the EU and Libya remain to be divided and thus not completely cooperating with one another.

It is easy to forget that besides the EU, neighbouring countries have their own agenda as well, more than just economic and political interests as defined by European actors, Libya has its economic interests, fighting against unemployment and limiting political unrest, or even international relations with countries in the region (Paoletti, 2010).

### **3.5 Conclusion**

‘Good Neighbours Make Good Fences’ – a proverb that currently applies to the border between the EU and Libya where Libya is thought of as Europe’s barrier to constrain migrants from entering Mediterranean waters and the EUBAM is working on closer ties with its ‘friendly neighbour’ to work on a shared goal.

This chapter focused on the purpose of the EUBAM, its implementations, and its final conceptualization as externalization or not. The idea was to analyse whether the EUBAM has brought the EU and Libya closer together, or drifted them more apart. The shared goal of constraining migrants and the bridging character of EU’s involvement suggests that the EU and Libya are becoming closer together. While at the same time, the EU and Libya can be seen as more divided by the EUBAM, as their identity is still perceived of as opposed to one another and therefore perceived as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ power.

The chapter showed the controversial character of the EUBAM by focussing on its purpose with its different implementations. While the EUBAM focuses on saving lives, by training coast guards to intercept boats, the number of deaths has dropped while there are still many cases of human rights abuses being reported in Libya. This suggests that the EUBAM has not managed to bring a change and manage to structure Libya to their hands but only to reproduce an unequal cooperation that cannot be seen as a partnership.

To analyse the concept of externalization, three different strategies are analysed and applied to the EUBAM case. By analysing these different strategies of externalization, it can be concluded that the on-going mission in Libya aims to gain control, offering remote protection and capacity building, has failed and therefore the EUBAM does not strike as a manifestation of externalisation. The mission has no direct control and does not offer much direct protection as proved by the reports on human rights abuses. Due to the power relation involved and its final agency that does not seem to be very influential, the EUBAM does not strike as a manifestation of externalization, therefore a different term has been proposed in the last chapter, namely that of ‘de-territorial collaboration’.

By emphasizing the degree of power involved on both sides, and conceptualizing EU’s external dimension as ‘de-Territorial Collaboration’, both partners are seen to have their own interests where the EU barrier in this light remains on EU territory and the cooperation practices of the EUBAM is merely seen as supporting actor, not able to bring actual changes, but thought of as reproducing colonial behaviour and oriental thoughts.

# Conclusion

## - IN DIALOGUE WITH THE PAST-

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*“Ideas and opinions are not spontaneously "born" in each individual brain: they have had a centre of formation, or irradiation, of dissemination, of persuasion – a group of men, or a single individual even, which has developed them and presented them in the political form of current reality.” — Antonio Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971, p. 423-424).*

This thesis proved that the border between Libya and Europe is a non-fixed structure, capable of change, by showing its different roles and meanings throughout time. It showed that it is not the fixation of borders that is constant, but the changing of these. It has shown the effects of the Duality of Structuration by demonstrating that several actors and mechanism have influenced the border construction and perception between Libya and the EU, while at the same time were constrained or enabled by it.

As Gramsci (1971) explains in the quote above ‘Ideas and opinions are not spontaneously "born" in each individual brain’, this thesis has argued that ideas and opinions are seen to be constrained by structural thoughts, reproduced by actors acting according to these structures.

The border and the relationship between the EU and Libya remained similar on many levels through the reproduction of colonial behaviour and Orientalist thoughts. Through a Post-Colonial lens, the thesis has argued that the present-day identity of the Arab is shaped by Oriental thoughts– thoughts and behaviours that have affected the present-day relation and cooperation between Libya and the EU. This resulted in neo-colonial behaviour, hateful, racist and stereotyping behaviour and therefore in need of change.

This thesis zoomed in on pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times where Europe and Libya were seen as part of one another and at the same time divided on different fronts. By analysing these different time phrases, many interesting comparative behaviour are demonstrated. This thesis has argued that throughout history the border between Libya and the EU has been perceived as a bridge, a resource, a symbolic meaning, and a barrier. These different metaphors make clear that the barrier and its function, is complex and ever-changing, prove to be capable of change, while at the same time it has shown repeating patterns that have been constantly reproduced and kept in place through influences in power difference and colonial thoughts.

### **What kept us together?**

This thesis started with the Trans-Saharan Trade Route, where the border between Europe and Africa seemed to serve as a bridge and resource, providing Europe a Gateway dimension to Africa. Trade kept Europe and Libya together by Libya's bridging role in facilitating and organizing trade in order for Europe to benefit from obtaining raw materials, labour, and new land. Till today, trade plays an important role in bringing the EU and Libya together as both rely on each other for import and export.

During colonization, Europe and Libya were kept together through imperial acts and thoughts, which had severe consequences for the Libyan society. The border here was perceived by Europe as being fused with Libya with no internal borders between Libya and Italy. By seeing Libya as an extension of Europe, Europe made itself, created their own border construction and therewith their imaginary border as a bridge.

After independence, Libya and the EU were kept together by a mutual beneficial cooperation on oil export, alliance strategies, and migration control.

Because of the increase of irregular flows by sea of people who are seeking a better life, there became a growing need for agreement between the southern Mediterranean countries to constrain these arriving migrants. European nations established closer ties with other European neighbours with the idea of peace and unity, preventing war and promoting economic cooperation.

Today imperial actions still play a role in the border conception as it is argued that the EU promotes its own interests and tries to influence and change Libya by promoting the 'right knowledge' as it has done during colonial times. During colonial times, Europe implied a certain 'shared identity' by educating Libyans, and its own people in believing in the reality of 'Italian-Libya'.

Present-day programs like the EUBAM suggest a certain 'togetherness' or 'we-feeling', where the EU believes to be part of Africa again. Here the EU is thought of as promoting a certain 'Europeanization' and where Libyans are expected to behave like Europeans and become closer together.

### **What divided us?**

From trade embargoes, to the protection against terroristic attacks, as well as to protect against the arrival of migrants, the border has divided Libya and Europe on many levels.

The most relevant dividing mechanism described in this thesis is that of the symbolic identity and power. The border between Europe and Libya became symbolically divided and showed little agency in change throughout the years. Starting with the polarized identity of the 'European superiors', 'bearers of science and knowledge' and the creation of its 'indigenous other' that shaped the identity of Libya by marginalizing it as an exotic subject and the European identity by presenting it as more superior.

Colonialism resulted in the creation of nation-states whose boundaries ignored traditional cultural division, where through Indigenous Politics this perceived identity was aimed to remain the same. Europe here reduced the non-Western world into a homogeneous cultural entity, where powers presented themselves to colonial people as the bearers of science, rationality, and progress, while the Europeans saw themselves as living by traditional values and beliefs, as a sort of 'backwardness' and lack of development.

After colonization, Gaddafi created a national identity based on anti-imperialism, the Islam, traditional values and a different political system, opposed of the 'West'. This identity became a fear for the West, through reproduced stereotyping where the Islam became portrayed as a monolithic entity, synonymous with terrorism and religious hysteria and where the Islam as the 'enemy' was used as a means to create an identity for the West, portraying themselves as the 'sane', the more rational and free of religion and terror.

The polarized identity of a 'less-developed' and 'less-modern' other, became to be expressed during the Arab Spring revolts. Through a Post-Colonial lens, the thesis has argued that present-day the identity of the Arab is shaped by Oriental thoughts- thoughts and behaviours that have been reproduced by acting in accordance of historical structural patterns and affected the present-day relation and cooperation between Libya and the EU, where the EU is active in Libya with the legitimization of promoting 'the right knowledge' and educating Libyan authorities to act according to EU standards and where the Arabic world does not fit within this EU frame.

The plan on how to handle migration control is still a fierce debate and expresses the difference in identity and values between the EU and Libya, where the EUBAM can be seen as expressing EU's superiority over its 'weaker' partner that is in need of 'Europeanization' and in need of cultural and social change.

## Evaluating the EUBAM

A question raised in the beginning was if the EUBAM can be defined as an example of externalization and if so, does this increase the overall bargaining power of Libya. This thesis has argued that the EUBAM aims to promote EU interests by teaching EU-standards and values and pursuing human rights, which can be seen as a historical pattern of colonial behaviour and thought. At the same time, the EUBAM cannot be thought of as bringing certain agency in the border transformation and therefore the term 'externalization' has been rejected.

The EUBAM mission has caused for a division in identity, something that has not really changed throughout time. Building on the existing Post- and De-Colonial critique to identify tools and strategies for decentring the study of the EU's external policies, it can be argued that the EUBAM can be seen as a mechanism that reproduces colonial behaviour. It implies a hierarchical relationship going back to colonial times where Europe tried to teach its colonial other. This means a hegemonic relation where Europe perceives Libya as less powerful and in need of change and where the migrant crisis can be seen as a chance to 'taking over' control and structure Libya to their own hand.

The interference by the EUBAM is legitimized with the ideal to promote peace and prosperity, while in fact contributes to violence and human rights abuses. Hate fear and racism still remain factors that divide Libya and Europe. The idea that human rights are being persuaded involves a nuanced neo-Orientalizing terminology to denote an ideal type of values, terms of which the EU arrogates on itself with the force of a monopoly, like democracy, good governance, human rights, rule of law and a liberal market.

Whereas during colonial times, Libya became not truly European as was planned, Libya now does not strike European and as fused with the EU as well. This would imply that the EUBAM did not bring structural change as it aimed to do.

The degree of agency has proven to be low and therefore the EUBAM cannot be fully thought of as bringing structural change and Libya not as becoming more 'Europeanized'.

Libyan coastguards are assumed to be 'Europeanized' while at the same time they are perceived to be required education and to meet EU norms and values. These smuggling practices and human rights violations do not correspond with the mission's intention of bringing protection and defending human rights.

An important resource that plays a role in the conceptualization of the EUBAM as externalized or not, is that of power. Some scholars see the involvement in Libya as burden

shifting, Libya in the light is assigned Europe's 'dirty job', taking over tasks the EU does not want to deal with it and Libya is not perceived as an equal partner, while this thesis has argued that both the EU as well as Libya, benefit in a bridging character of the border.

Even though both partners have their benefits in cooperating with one another, the EUBAM cannot be seen as a 'partnership'. Just like during colonial times, the cooperation is built on a 'strong' and a 'weak' partner and can therefore not be seen as a partnership. Libya's current situation is not stable, as it has endured war and civil resistance and is current government by different authorities.

There is no change of control as the EUBAM only serves an educating and supporting role. Conceptualizing the borders as being externalized by the EUBAM implementations therefore would not be the right term. Externalization implies a certain control and partnership that is not there. There is no equal exchange of resources and the border cannot be conceived of as fused with the Libyan borders. A more appropriate term to describe the EUBAM therefore is that of 'de-territorial collaboration' that implies a more equal cooperation where there is no transformation or 'shifting' of the barrier.

The journey from migrants making their way to Europe starts in Libya and therefore to prevent people from drowning, boats are intercepted in Mediterranean waters. The agreement is currently that boats are brought back to Libya. Herewith, the EU violates the non-refoulement agreement that states that migrants cannot be brought back to countries where they fear to be at risk.

The refusal by the EU and the 'push-back' strategy has caused for many human rights violations. However, the total number of deaths has been dropped over the last few years. This could imply that the EUBAM with their aim of bringing prosperity, the EUBAM has actually prevented people from drowning and thus capable of a certain agency in preventing deaths, as more boats are intercepted who were at risk of capsizing and were brought back to Libya.

Since the EUBAM supports Libyan coast guards in this process, the actions of migrants refused at the border in Libya can be debated to be less humane than having migrants on the Mediterranean and therewith risking their lives.

### **Have things changed?**

A final conclusion here is to refer back to the question raised in the beginning: Have Europe and Libya ever been truly apart or has Libya ever been separated from European influences? The idea here is to see if the theories explained, have been relevant when analysing the border and relation between the EU and Libya and can thus be used as a means to understand and explain transformation and conceptualization of the borders and relation between Libya and the EU. Starting with the Duality of Structuration theory that claims that people are constrained by their structures, but are capable of bringing certain limited agency. This can be confirmed when looking at historical patterns where people have acted according to their structures in similar ways and reproduced similar thoughts and behaviour.

The borders are produced by agencies; capable of making a change while at the same time the borders constrain certain agencies' behaviours and actions by their existence. The barriers have proven to be changed throughout history, for example by the increased securitization that changed the barrier from a more open frontier, to a more securitized barrier.

People have reproduced behaviours and thoughts, which can be explained by the fact that the structure has constrained them from thinking differently. This reproduced behaviour has been proved when analysing the involvement in trade and interventionism by Europe. The phenomenon of human smuggling in and from Libya, crossing Mediterranean waters towards Europe, has been widely reported on, however, it can be argued that this is nothing new. Since the sixteenth century Europe has been involved in trade, have not acted differently and therefore maintained this relationship ever since. Europe traded in slaves and commodities from 'Black Africa', where Libyan coastal cities provided the role of middleman. Today, migrants travel Trans-Saharan routes again and are sold by smugglers or human traffickers. The coastal areas that were once facilitating Trans-Saharan slave trade now reproduce this function as transit ports, where Libyan coastguards facilitate smuggling and human trafficking. The economic demand by Europe has played a role in this bridging character and has not shown real agency for change. This shows the strength of the structure of being capable of reproducing similar thoughts and behaviours.

The discovery and exportation of oil in 1961 played an important factor in the relation between Libya and Europe by keeping them closer together. The same goes for the cooperation on migration control as of the 1990s, where Libya and Europe became more involved with each other by cooperating on issues regarding migration control.

It can be concluded and explained that through Post-Colonialism, Europeans and Libyans have reproduced behaviours and thoughts that have resulted in a stagnated and fixed perceived identity of one another; that of the 'Orient' and the 'Occident'. Identity thus has always caused for a certain reproduced division between Europe and Libya, which assumes that they were never truly together. A cultural division between the 'Orient' /'Occident', the 'developed/'stagnated', the Muslim/non-Muslim that has never been truly changed.

Explaining the downsizing of Gaddafi's regime by the NATO intervention has emphasized this repeated pattern. Just as the Italians had legitimized their colonial 'take over' from the Ottomans for a sense of 'equal' benefits, the NATO mission to kill Gaddafi was legitimized on the same grounds: to 'free' the Libyans from their oppressive ruler. Neither did the colonial acts by Italy as well as that of the NATO interventionism bring peace or stability to Libya.

In line with the questions outlined in this thesis, the overall argument in this thesis is that things have not changed very much. However, by showing the different roles and meanings of the border, like that of barrier, symbol of identity, resource and bridge, the borders have shown that change is possible. By the reproduction of colonial behaviour and Orientalist thoughts, the divided identity has been reproduced and caused for hate and racism and stereotyped identities. This is problematic as it has caused for serious consequences and will continue to do so without change. The problems have been explained by the experiences described by those of Khalil, who emphasized the importance of the impact of Orientalism on his own identity and that of the West. The reasons for the problems Libyans experience are a sort of capitalist colonization by European states where they find themselves struggling to figure out their identity, an identity that the West had created for them, namely that of 'the Arab' or 'the Muslim'.

As is claimed by the Duality of Structuration theory, people are capable of bringing a change. Regardless of the little change that has been shown throughout history, it cannot be ignored that certain change is possible. Explained and confirmed by Post-Colonial Theory is that certain colonial actions and thoughts are reproduced. People act according to their structures and think and behave according to them. This can be explained by the fact that these structures have been influenced by colonial thinking and therefore in need for change. By thinking differently, decolonizing our minds, we can change the structure and demonstrate that the future border conceptualization and the relation between the EU and Libya—one that is built on structural thoughts of racism, Orientalism, hate, miss-trust and power differences—can be changed.

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