

Jordanian compromises for Syrian brothers and sisters

The role of shared identity in the sustainability of Jordan's hospitality towards Syrian refugees



Jaber-Nassir border crossing between Syria and Jordan, re-opened in October 2018

Keywords: hospitality, the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordan, Amman, shared identity, Islam, Bedouin, tribalism, Arab, unconditional hospitality, limits of hospitality.

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Preface

In front of you lay's my Master thesis which marks my last assessment within the Master Conflicts, Territories and Identities. Even though I am excited to graduate and achieve my diploma, I will miss the Radboud University and everything this facility offered me. The Elinor Ostrom building has become nearly my second home, spending long days studying there with my fellow Human Geographers. The topics covered during the Master excited me, challenged me and made me change perspectives. From a young age, I have been intrigued by the Middle-East and Arab culture and this master allowed me to further discover this interest: I focused in particular on the Syrian civil war and the Israel-Palestine conflict. I was able to bring my knowledge into practice during an internship at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working at the MENA-department, specifically on the Mashreq region (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq). This internship offered me a broad view of the Syrian refugee crisis, Dutch and international (humanitarian) programs in the region and challenges of this problem ahead. Gratitude to Piter Pals (policy officer Jordan at the Ministry), I was entrusted with the all-embracing responsibility of working on Jordan. While operating on a refugee return bulletin, I noticed how Jordan was always positioned as the most hospitable and sophisticated host country for Syrian refugees and this made me want to learn more about it. How is this possible? What lessons can be learned from Jordan for other host countries (also in the future)? Together with Willemijn Verkoren, my supervisor of this thesis, we discussed this phenomenon. Willemijn helped me to bridge the learnings during the internship into a more theoretical question. Her readiness to assist my thinking process and her trust in my independence gave me the confidence to confirm my travel to Amman. Through the internship, stimulated by Piter Pals, I contacted the Dutch embassy in Amman and announced my visit. Their willingness to further help me once in Amman, with particular thanks to Amber de Been (policy officer migration), gave me a foundation to fall back on. How overwhelming it can be to travel solely to a foreign country did not outweigh how much I learned during my stay. I am grateful for my experiences, the people I met and that the Radboud and this thesis allowed me to conduct field research in a notably interesting environment. A special thanks to all the great people I met in Jordan who made my stay unforgettable and who have been unmissable for the outcomes of this research. A special thanks to Adham Sinan, who was an enormous help guiding me through the dynamics of Jordan and Amman, assisted me in my research design and always supported me to achieve my full potential. It has been an intensive, but the extremely fascinating process to write this thesis and I am gratified of the result. I would like to express my gratitudes to everyone who contributed to this and I hope you enjoy reading it!

Jannah Ravestein

Executive summary

This research analyzes the role of sharing identity characteristics between host- and refugee communities in the sustainability of hospitality of the host community. Jordan and the large number of Syrian refugees in Jordan since 2011, in particular in Amman (Sweileh), are used as a case study to explore this. Jordan is on the international stage perceived as the most sophisticated responder to the Syrian refugee crisis while the protracted stay of Syrian refugees has further challenged the existing economic hardship and resource competition. Jordanians feel the burdens of the Syrian refugee crisis but appear to remain hospitable. This research investigates this phenomenon by exploring its coherence with the shared identity characteristics, such as Arab ethnicity, Sunni Islam, and tribal relations, Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordan share. To answer the questions: *what is the role of shared identity in Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees and how sustainable is this role?* I conducted 3-months of field research in Amman, Sweileh. The findings of this research are based on interviews with Jordanians, NGOs, a local research institute, numerous informal conversations, and observations. The results of this research show that sharing identity characteristics, mainly language, ethnicity, geographical-historical similarities, and tribal relations, has played a significant role in how hospitable Jordanians have been towards Syrian refugees, especially at the beginning of the refugee crisis. A sense of shared identity has played in particular a facilitating role: Syrians were able to adapt to the established norms in Jordan relatively easily and Jordanians were relatively easily able to offer Syrians protection and further integration into Jordanian society. This hospitality initially derives from the Jordanian strong local identity, which emphasizes on the importance of hospitality towards others and especially people in need, deriving from Bedouin culture and Islamic standards. Both local identity and shared identity magnified Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian. However, when unfolding the similar identity characteristics to more specific comparisons between Jordanians and Syrians, there seems to be more friction in their shared identity and Jordanians then describe Syrians more as an out-group rather than an in-group. Especially in how Syrians differ in their interpretation of Islamic standards (morals) and ethnicity (nationalism of Syrians). Moreover, over time, hospitality towards Syrian refugees has changed: the perceived ever-growing competitive environment seems to transcend the shared identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrians and Jordanian sense of duty to remain hospitable. While the presence of Syrian refugees in Jordan continues indefinitely, Syrians have been integrating into Jordanian society, in which sharing identity characteristics seem to have played a significant facilitating role in the graduality and the almost seamless manner of this integration. Sharing identity characteristics evidently made the integration of Syrians relatively more gradual and easier than most other migrant groups in Jordan. However, the undeniable large number of Syrians in Jordan and their likely protracted stay is perceived as an ever-growing competition for Jordanians, affecting multiple aspects of their livelihoods: in the labor market, in the availability of

resources, in further urbanization, and in the attention of the international community. The challenges of continuing to host Syrian refugees are perceived as so pressing, that sharing identity characteristics don't necessarily stand ground in sustaining hospitable, nor ensure the future of Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees. This study emphasizes the potential bias in answers due to the ultimate power of the King and effectively the political passivity of Jordanians, the culture of keeping issues 'close to the chest', interwoven with the importance of preserving the culture of extreme hospitality. This research offers political recommendations for the international community working in Jordan. Furthermore, the conclusions of this research can be applied in studies that explore host- and refugee relations and the role of sharing identity characteristics. Especially for case-study with, just as Jordan, a large number of refugee presence.

Definitions

Abbreviations

- UNHCR: the high commission for refugees worldwide of the United Nations. UNHCR stands for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- UNRWA: the refugee organization of the United Nations focused on Palestinian refugees. UNRWA stands for United Nations Relief and Works agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East.
- JOD: JOD stands for Jordan Dinar, the monetary currency in Jordan.
- NGOs: Non-governmental organization.

Arabic terms

- Hadith: the hadith is a record of traditions and sayings of the prophet Muhammed with accounts of his daily practices as a guidance for Muslims. Hadiths are mentioned in the Quran and are part of the Islamic religion¹.
- Haram: Haram refers to practices that are forbidden or proscribed by Islamic law².
- Halal: Halal refers to practices that are lawful by Islamic law (opposite of Haram)³.
- Inshallah: Inshallah is translated from Arabic to 'if Allah wants it' or God's will, and is rooted in the Arabic language, the Quran and in the proverbs of Muslims⁴.
- Ahlan wa sahan: a frequently used sentence in Jordan to welcome people or say 'you are welcome'⁵.

¹ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hadith>

² [lexico.com/definition/haram](https://www.lexico.com/definition/haram)

³ <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/halal>

⁴ [lexico.com/definition/inshallah](https://www.lexico.com/definition/inshallah)

⁵ http://arabicwithoutwalls.ucdavis.edu/aww/alifbaa_unit1/ab1_phrases_vocab.html

*The broth is cooking, and now we have to act as one.*⁶
(Bedouin proverb)

⁶ <https://www.inspirationalstories.com/proverbs/t/bedouin/>

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"Ahlan wa sahlan, Welcome to Jordan! A safe haven in a region of conflict, Jordan has delighted visitors for centuries with its ancient hospitality".

The opening of Jordan's Lonely Planet prominently refers to Jordan's hospitality. Functioning as a 'safe haven' in a turbulent region. It also is reflected in Jordan's long history of sheltering refugees from the Middle-East region. More than half of Jordan's citizens have Palestinian roots, who sought refuge in Jordan either after 1948 (Arab-Israeli war) or 1967 (Six-day war). With Jordan's independence of the British Empire in 1946, the young state was already dealing with great refugee challenges. Nation-building efforts and strengthening the sense of Jordanian nationality - enforced by the late King Hussein of Jordan – have been tested since the existence of Jordan. Civil wars, political instability and economic desperation in neighboring countries have caused large influxes of refugees to Jordan. Even though these large influxes of refugees powerfully affected Jordan's economy, population, resources, political and socio-cultural dynamics. Despite these great challenges, Jordan and its citizens remained to cope (Hawkins, et. al., 2019). Unlike turbulence in neighboring countries, Jordan is not familiar with civil wars or long-lasting conflict. The resilience of Jordan has strengthened its stable position in the turbulent Middle East.

1.1 Problem statement

However, the 'newest' flow of refugees might be the largest challenge for Jordan as a refugee host country so far. Since the break-out of the brutal war in Syria from 2011 onwards, almost half of the Syrian population has been forced to flee. Especially to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Following the WANA Institute (2019, p. 1), around 671.000 Syrian refugees are now registered with UNHCR in Jordan. According to UNHCR (2019) Jordan is one of the countries most affected by the Syrian refugees crisis and counts as the second highest share of refugees per capita in the world (Lebanon first)⁷. Jordan's population now exists of 20 percent Syrians (WCCES, p. 33, 2018). In reality, the total number of Syrian refugees in Jordan is estimated to be even greater when taking unregistered refugees into account (Healy et. al, 2015).

The overwhelming number of Syrians seeking refuge in Jordan can be illustrated by the size of the Zaatari camp. Zaatari is located in the North of Jordan and it is regarded as the largest Syrian refugee camp in the world. Almost 80.000 Syrian refugees are sheltered in Zaatari. However, only 20 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan are settled in refugee camps. In fact, the majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan live in urban areas, mostly in Irbid, Mafraq and Amman. The population of Jordan's

⁷ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70665>

capital, Amman, now consists of 30 percent Syrians (WCCES, p. 33, 2018).

The arrival of yet another major refugee flow has put large pressure on Jordanian shoulders. While the pressure of previous refugee flows was already evident, the great number of Syrians has reinforced Jordan's challenges. The Syrian refugee crisis has adversely affected the Jordanian labor market, security sector, and the educational establishments. Jordan's double-shifted schools, hospital facilities, housing, and water resources are heavily stressed since the arrival of Syrians in 2011 (Luck, 2018). Besides, the socio-cultural standards, sovereignty and national identity are, yet again, have come under pressure. The large number of Syrian refugees in Jordan magnitudes the fear of potential outnumbering of Jordanians by its refugee groups. Debates on Jordan's national identity and sovereignty revive during refugee waves, as also detected after the large influxes of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees (Salameh and Hayajneh, 2019).

The pressure on Jordan of the Syrian refugee crisis, above the existing large number of refugee population, is evident in the more restrictive policies towards Syrian in the last years. For example, new regulations have limited labor opportunities and citizenship for Syrians in Jordan (ILO, p. 55, 2017). Also, within the Jordanians society, as the refugee crisis continues, there have been small demonstrations against the protracted stay of Syrians, for example, in the Northern parts of Jordan when the border reopened (Sanadiki, 2018). These protests, however, focused more on the missed economic chances of the border opening rather than demanding Syrians to return (Sanadiki, 2018). However, these restrictions and (minor) demonstrations have not led to a hostile image of Jordan and how they treat Syrian refugees. Moreover, the Jordanian environment for Syrian refugees remains publicly being perceived as hospitable. Following a report of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2015, Jordan's response plan to the refugee crisis is perceived as one of the most hospitable approaches for Syrians in exile⁸. The public opinion perceives Jordan's response to the Syrian refugee crisis as "handled properly" On the international stage as well as by Syrians and Jordanians. Following a survey of the NAMA institute in 2019, 75 percent of Jordanians and 70 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan assess Jordan's response to the refugee crisis as "very well"⁹. Entering the 9th year of hosting Syrian refugees in Jordan, the relationship between Jordanians and Syrian refugees can still be characterized by inclusiveness and tolerance (UNHCR, 2019). Especially regarding the changing dynamics towards Syrian refugees in the two other largest host countries for Syrian refugees: Turkey and Lebanon. In these countries, concerning reports about damaging the livelihoods of Syrian refugees, for example through demolishing tent camps and aggressive civilian protests, show a growing anti-refugee sentiment. Even detainment and deportation back to Syria have taken place¹⁰.

⁸ https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_364162.pdf

⁹ https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_364162.pdf

¹⁰ Hostility in Lebanon towards Syrian refugees reports: Amnesty International - Lebanon wave of hostility and claims of Syrian refugee returns are voluntary (2019); Refugees International - Lebanon at crossroads (2020);

These concerning findings are not detected in Jordan. In fact, Jordanian authorities (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation) have, closely cooperating with international partners, created a response plan that aims to provide short and long-term solutions for the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Jordan (JRPSC, 2019). The plan focuses on national improvement as well as offering perspective for Syrians. In this perspective, Jordan's hospitality remains remarkably positive. The plan, however, reaches only until 2022 and the integration of Syrian remains questionable. The 'Palestinian question' – referring to the protracted stay of Palestinians in Jordan – is still sensitive and Jordanians fear a similar situation with Syrians (Hawkins, et. al., 2019). The fear that Syrians will stay in Jordan indefinitely is not entirely misplaced; as Syria remains unsafe for refugees to return. Multiple reports describe how Syrian refugees who return are at high risk to be detained, forced into conscription, being kidnapped or even be murdered¹¹. In October 2019, the border between Jordan and Syria, the Jaber-Nassib border, was reopened after being closed for three years. However, following UNHCR's report on Jordan (2019), this reopening has not caused major border movements yet. Neither from the Jordanian, nor the Syrian side. The WANA Institute (2019) argues that, analyzing the ongoing insecure environment in Syria, a major voluntary refugee return of Syrians in the foreseeable future is not likely to occur. In a public speech this year, Syria's regime-leader Bashar Al Assad claimed that Syria has gained 'a healthier and more homogenous society' and that Syria is entering a 'post-war' phase. In reality, half the Syrian population lives in exile and is not likely to be part of Bashar's new social contract that ensures regime obstructers will not return according to UN's conditions - safe, dignified and voluntarily (Batrawi & Uzelac, 2018).

The realistic scenario of protracted stay of Syrian refugees and their further integration into Jordanian society raises questions on the sustainability of Jordan's seeming hospitality towards Syrian refugees. Jordan is not crossing 'red lines' in hosting Syrian refugees as seen in the more hostile environments for Syrians in Turkey and Lebanon. Even though the refugee crisis is extremely pressing on Jordanian shoulders, Jordanians remain resilient and continue to be relatively hospitable towards Syrian refugees. How can this be further explained?

Shared identity

Understanding the remarkable hospitality of Jordan towards Syrian refugees in context to other countries has gained more attention in political- and scientific debates (Hawkins et al., 2019). For example, the international community often positions Jordan as the 'best practice' of hosting Syrian

Forced return Syrian refugees in Lebanon: Human Rights Watch (2019) - Syrians Deported by Lebanon; New Humanitarian (2018) - unsafe in Syria, unwanted in Lebanon

¹¹ Examples of reports on insecurity in Syria: European Institute of Peace (2019) - Refugee Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, Human Rights Watch (2019) - Syria: Detention, Harassment in Retaken Areas.

refugees due to its effective cooperation with UNHCR, other humanitarian agencies and strong relationships with international allies (Hawkins et al., p. 23, 2019). However, there is no clear evidence, rather assumptions, on why the Jordanian government – and the Jordanian society – remains apparently hospitable. And, therefore, a knowledge gap in which aspects to focus on to ensure sustainable hospitality or promoting it elsewhere. An important gap, since the international community invests largely in offering resilience for hosting countries in the region – rather than transit of (Syrian) refugees to Europe (Achili, 2015). Current explanations for Jordan's remarkable hospitality towards Syrian refugees are merely explained through an economic lens; the economic incentives for Jordan to remain hospitable (Luck, 2018) or through political incentives; the importance for Jordan to assure Western ties and receive international aid (Parker-Magyar, 2019; Chatty, 2017). There is a great focus on the economic and political circumstances of the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan while analyzing reports of NGOs (UNHCR, 2019; Mercy Corps, 2019) and existing literature (Chatty, 2017; Lockhart, 2019; Luck, 2018). While these approaches offer great insights in Jordan and the Syrian refugee crisis, a further understanding of the socio-cultural approach of the crisis is especially interesting in the context of Jordan, in where Jordanians and Syrian refugees share significant similarities in identity characteristics (Simpson et. al., 2019; Mansour et. Al., 2018). Sharing identity characteristics potentially can provide a wider perspective on Jordan's hospitality towards Syrian refugees with whom they share significant socio-cultural similarities with. Especially in comparison with Turkey and Lebanon where Syrian identity characteristics are in theory more opposing to the established local identity than in Jordan¹². Existing literature that touches upon this point of view elaborates on the importance of sharing the same language (Arabic), religion (Sunni Islam), and tribal relations (Mansour, et. al, 2018; Harris, 2017; Simpson & Zayed, 2019; Phillips, 2012). For example, 84 percent of Syrians in Jordan originate from Syria's Southern province Deraa. Syrians from Deraa are tribally linked to Jordanians in the North (Simpson & Zayed, 2019; Roussel, 2014). In Irbid, for example, Syrian refugees now co-exist with Jordanian tribal relatives whose connections exist from before the 20th-century Sykes-Picot borders (Simpson & Zayed, 2019). Also, Syrians and Jordanians share the Arabic language and a similar sense of Arabism, which is – ever since 20th-century Pan-Arab movements – still reproduced and maintained daily by state media and governmental narratives (Phillips, 2012). Furthermore, Syrians in Jordan, as well as Jordanians, are predominantly Sunni Muslims. The available literature on this perspective, however, focusses rather on statements of the Jordanian government or the perspectives of Syrian refugees. Surprisingly, the Jordanians voices remain relatively underexposed, the ones who co-exist with Syrian refugees and their sentiment towards them is politically and scientifically claimed

¹² Lebanon and Turkey are more culturally fragmented than Jordan. For example, Lebanon knows a variety of religions, whereas Jordanians are predominantly Sunni Muslims. In Turkey, people speak a different language than Syrians; Turkish rather than Arabic. Turks are also no Arabs, while the majority of the Jordanians society, as well as the Syrian society, consists of people of Arab ethnicity (Içduygu & Nimer, 2020).

as hospitable. Despite the plausibility of the (positive) role of sharing identity characteristics in how hospitable Jordanians are towards Syrian refugees, this explanation seems to remain assumptive rather than scientifically confirmed. The question therefore remains: to what extent does sharing identity characteristics with Syrian refugees indeed play a role in how hospitable Jordanians have remained towards them? Moreover, taking the realistic scenario of protracted stay of Syrian refugees in Jordan into account: how important remains this 'shared identity' in the sustainability of Jordan's remarkable hospitality?

1.2 Relevance

1.2.1 Scientific relevance

Existing data on the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan approaches mainly the perceptions and needs of Syrian refugees (Hawkins, et. al., 2019; Alfadli, 2018; Drury, 2018), rather than that of the host community, or at least no in-depth analysis of this target group. Alfadli (2018) and Drury (2018), for example, investigated shared identity already, but among Syrians refugees rather than between Syrians and Jordanians. In theory, the similar identity characteristics, such as Arabism, Islamism, and tribalism, might play an important role in the sustainability of hosting Syrians, but - in reality - scientifically proved nor explained in the literature from a Jordanian perspective. Jordanian perceptions and needs are predominantly translated through governmental statements, rather than directly from Jordanians themselves (Alfahli, 2018; Drury, 2018) - the people who directly co-exist with/and affected by Syrian refugees - who lack presence in the debate concerning the refugee crisis. Furthermore, current research (specifically on Jordan's Syrian refugees) tends to equalize and/or in many cases generalize Jordan's situation with Turkey and Lebanon as the other two largest hosting countries for Syrian refugees (Chatty, 2017). Jordan, therefore, mostly comes out as the remarkable country out of the three largest host countries in terms of hospitality towards Syrians. In comparing Jordan's hospitality with Turkey and Lebanon - which allegedly has lower hospitality standards - Jordan remains to be the go-to hospitable host country in the region.

However, without analyzing the specifics of Jordan and its refugee crisis, hostility in Jordan can therefore be overlooked. Additionally, research on Jordan's refugee resilience prominently focuses on economic effects as a connector or divider of Jordanians and Syrian refugees, with only a minor reference to the role of identity. More specifically, this research uses concepts of identity to further explain the role of identity in hospitality towards refugees. This research contributes to existing debates on how similarities (and contrasts) between host- and refugee communities play a role in how the host community perceives refugees and how they intend to approach hospitality. By investigating the role of identity in hospitality towards refugees for Jordan in specific, this research gives interpretation to how identity can lead to acceptance or rejection of refugees and the relevancy of

identity characteristics (contrasting or similarities) in the long-run of refugee hosting. These debates are further discussed in Chapter 3. Insights on the case of Jordan can contribute to more abstract debates on the role of identity of refugee- and host community and/or can be applied to other specific cases where a host community receives (a large number of) refugees.

1.2.2 Societal relevance

Growing hostile sentiments in hosting countries can jeopardize the livelihoods of Syrian refugees. While Syrians cannot change the situation and return to Syria, it is therefore important to gain a deeper understanding of how Jordan remains remarkably hospitable toward Syrian refugees, and sustain Jordanian hospitality toward them. The outcomes of this research can potentially assist governmental practices, such as evaluating (international) programs in Jordan for refugee empowerment. To illustrate this, at the Brussels Conference in March 2019, 57 countries pledged for, in 2019 only, 6.2 billion euros of international aid to support Syrian refugee hosting in the region. Additionally, multi-year pledges raised around €2.1 billion for 2020 and beyond, of which a large percentage is assigned to Jordan¹³.

The issue remains urgent and worthwhile to further examine insights into how Jordanians perceive Syrians and how enduring their hospitality can develop a better understanding of effective planning in Jordan. Insights of this research can offer a better understanding of tensions, dividers and connectors between Syrians and Jordan, for the sake of improving social cohesion. Outcomes of this research offer an extensive perspective of an underexposed group in Jordan's society when it comes to the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordanians themselves. This research provides insights of perspectives of Jordanians. Perceptions that create their view on Syrian refugees, regardless of their accuracy (for example when numbers or regulations are mentioned that differ or are more nuanced in reality). Perceptions give a predictability of one's actions (WCCES, 2018), and can support a better understanding of how the refugee crisis is likely to evolve and how people might change hospitable behavior towards refugees. Since Syria remains unsafe for refugees to return, it remains of high importance to monitor the refugee-sentiments in hosting countries, since they can predict shifts in how Syrians are received and treated.

Current developments show a growing anti-refugee sentiment in other large hosting countries, such as Lebanon and Turkey; countries that also receive large amounts of international aid. Developments in the region contribute to a larger debate of Syrian refugee return and the continuation of international aid. How Syrians are treated in hosting countries, consequently affects international aid and the political support towards Jordan within the international community. It is,

¹³ Brussel III Conference by the Council of the European Union: consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2019/03/12-14/

therefore, essential to continue the on-the-ground analysis of refugee sentiments to indicate possible shifts, events and responses of Jordan's citizens.

This subject is timely but remains relevant for the coming years, if not decades. While just being in Jordan for 3 months, public protests in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Iran started, with dozens of civil casualties as a result, and new waves of refugees in the region. This indicates that 'safe' Jordan will remain a refugee-receiving country in the near future. It remains therefore important that Jordanian citizens drive for them to remain hospitable and resilient to their newcomers.

1.3 Geographical focus

To gain a deep understanding of the local context and to come up with valid results within a timeframe of 2,5 months only, I chose to demarcate my research area geographically. The geographical demarcation of this research can be deconstructed as follows: Jordan (country), Amman (city), Sweileh (neighborhood). This paragraph explains the considerations and choices made in defining the focus group of this research. Naturally, demarcating to Amman and specifically to Sweileh involves validity implications, which are further explained in the methodology (chapter 4). First of all, as explained in 1.1 and 1.2, this research focuses specifically on the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan, instead of other large host countries (such as: Turkey and Lebanon), due to Jordan's remarkable hospitable environment. Secondly, this research zooms in on Jordan's capital, Amman. The reason for zooming in on Amman is first of all, from a practical significance standpoint, since Amman serves as a knowledge hub for Syria-related matters. Refugee-related research in Amman remains relevant, following Hawkins (p. 5, 2019). Many NGOs, research institutes and international embassies that work on projects for refugee resilience are based in Amman. Secondly: Amman's liberal/semi-liberal character (compared to other parts of Jordan), it should facilitate a workable and safe research environment in which expats are welcomed (Hawkins, 2019). Thirdly, Amman's ethnic vibrancy, the capital remains a desirable place for refugees to seek safety due to the city's easy mobility and acceptance towards refugees and various nationalities compared to refugee camps or more community-based rural areas of Jordan (Hawkins et al., p. 5, 2019). Amman has gone through an unprecedented growth, especially in the last decade, and now has more than 4 million people inhabiting the capital (Nordregio, 2019). Jordan's capital now hosts approximately 30% of the Syrian refugees who live outside camps. Following the latest numbers of UNHCR, there are 193.399 Syrians living in Amman¹⁴. Thirdly, this research takes Sweileh, a neighborhood in Amman, as a case study for conducting interviews. In the first weeks of staying in Amman, I noticed that the Jordanian connections I made were merely people of higher social status, who did not have a clear opinion or attitude on how they perceived Syrian refugees in


¹⁴ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36>

Jordan. In that time, I stayed in the wealthier parts of Amman (Al-Weibdeh and Downtown), where I was surrounded by either expats or high-class Jordanians. There are not many Syrians living in these areas. The people I spoke with, therefore, did not coexist with Syrians and indicated that they were probably of no help for my research.

I shared this experience with SIREN, the first NGO I spoke with early in my stay in Amman. SIREN advised me to further zoom in on neighborhoods of Amman where Jordanians closely live together with Syrians, areas where the refugee crisis is visible and tangible, and people, therefore, can give a clearer view on their experiences and perceptions. Sweileh is a suburb in the North-West of Amman in which a relatively high number of Syrians are settled and live together with (mostly) vulnerable Jordanians. Following UNHCR's Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), vulnerable Jordanians are defined as Jordanians living below or with high risk to live below the poverty line. More specific: Jordanians whose expenditure per capita is less than the absolute poverty line of 68JD per person per month¹⁵. According to UNICEF's vulnerability analysis in February 2020, around 16 percent of Jordanians (around 1 million people) live below the poverty line. Alongside, almost 78 percent of the Syrian population in Jordan lives below the poverty line (UNICEF, 2020). Vulnerable Jordanians, as well as vulnerable Syrians, mostly inhabit East-Amman and neighborhoods outside West-Amman. One of these neighborhoods in Northwest Amman is Sweileh. Besides Sweileh, there are also other areas in Amman that contain a high density of Syrian refugees, such as the Eastern neighborhoods of Amman. I chose to focus on Sweileh rather than on Eastern parts of Amman for two reasons. First off, the area's socially-contrasting neighborhoods (as some areas closer the university of Jordan are of a high social-class, which infers a better environment for students like myself), which made it practical to focus on this area. Secondly, East-Amman is underdeveloped and not as mobile as western parts of the city and already overexposed when it comes to refugee studies. For example, UNRWA (Palestinian refugees) and UNHCR offices are established here. The first observations instantly indicated that the issue was more vivid than the more central parts and accessible parts of Amman, Jordanians I spoke with were vocal and upfront about their opinions on the Syrian refugee crisis. In addition, walking through Sweileh, Syrian shops were more prominent than at the center of Amman.

¹⁵ <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Summary%20English.pdf>

Image 1: Density Syrian population Amman



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1.4 Research question

Following the problem statement, scientific- and societal relevance and geographical demarcation, this research examine the following research question:

What is the role of shared identity in the hospitality of Jordanians in Amman (Sweileh) towards Syrian refugees and how do Jordanians in Amman perceive the limits of this hospitality?

1.5 Research aim

The final product of this research aims to give a more extensive understanding of dynamics in Jordan regarding the Syrian refugee crisis. This research aims to fill in knowledge gaps on how hospitality is perceived, executed, changed and, what the incentives are through underexposed Jordanian perspectives, aiming for these outcomes to serve as a small predictor on how hospitality towards Syrian refugees will develop in Jordan. Additionally, This research tests current theories on the role of shared identity in Jordan's relatively hospitable climate for Syrian refugees. Through this approach, this research aims to contribute to larger debates on where the Syrian refugee crisis in other (large) hosting countries is heading. This research does not aim to intensify differences in identities. Labels, dividers and connectors are only illustrated to analyze the role of identity characteristics in potential clashes, rather than to segregate different groups.

¹⁶ Map of the density of Syrians in Amman. The right red cluster is East-Amman, the far-left red cluster is Sweileh. Al-Tal, R. S., & Ghanem, H. H. A. (2019). Impact of the Syrian crisis on the socio-spatial transformation of Eastern Amman, Jordan. *Frontiers of Architectural Research*, 8(4), 591-603.


Chapter 2: Context

This chapter provides an outline of the historical, geographical, political, economic and demographic context of research questions. This chapter broadly describes the context of Jordan to further understanding the research context and the context in which the results can be indicated.

2.1 Historical context

In the book 'A Peace to End All Peace' (2009), historian Fromkin describes how the Sykes-Picot agreement was being achieved in 1916. The French and English diplomats, Picot and Sykes, agreed upon how to partition the collapsing Ottoman Empire and established mandates in the Arab nations, under French and English rule. The partition drew borders through the Middle-East, irrespective of the diverse populations. People of different ethnic, religious, and tribal backgrounds were assigned to co-exist and - especially after the independence of most Arab nations after WW2 - were obliged to build nation-states together. Repeatedly mentioned in the literature is that the effects of this particular agreement still influence contemporary conflicts and tensions in the Middle-East (Kumaraswamy, 2006; Fromkin, 2009).

Image 2: Sykes-Picot partition of the Middle-East (1916)



An illustration of this enduring influence is the so-called 'identity crisis' in the Middle-East (Kumaraswamy, 2006). The artificial borders of 1916 approached nation-building in the Middle-East


¹⁷ Source: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/photo/mpk1-426sykespicotagreementmapsigned8may1916jpg>

from a Westphalian imperialist view: whereas classical Western imperialism attached great value to borders and sovereignty, the Middle-Eastern population was more bounded to nomadism and living in (smaller) tribes and communities (Mellon, 2007). The British and French mandates forced a variety of tribes to co-exist and to build a nation-state. After the partition, the strain for the young Arab countries to unify its diverse population caused tensions and sometimes even more divisions. As a counter-reaction to the failing colonial divisions, Gamal Abdel Nasser, at the time President of Egypt, called for a pan-Arab unity in 1958; the cooperation of a supra-national movement that would form one Arab nation. His vision gained large popularity throughout the Arab World but lost its glance after the two Israeli-Arab wars (Mellon, 2002). Arab states in the Middle-East are relatively 'young states' that obtained sovereignty less than a century ago. The heterogeneity within Middle-Eastern countries caused sectarian targeting by oppressive regimes, such as seen in Iraq in the 90s and contemporary Syria. The result of multiple periods of political targeting caused large-scale migration flows in the region (Yahya, 2015). The largest number of displaced people in the world are Arabs - from different national, religious and sectarian backgrounds. UNESCO's report 'building bridges, not walls' (2019) explains how Arab states only count for 5% of the global population, yet 32% of the global population of refugees and 38% of globally internal displaced people derive from Arab countries.

A long history of receiving refugees

This high number of displaced people in the Arab world is visible in the population of Jordan. Jordan has known a long history of receiving refugees. Before the state of Jordan was established in 1946, nomadism, migration and displacement was already into practice on the contemporary Jordanian territory. Parts of the Caucasus population - Circassians, Armenians, Chechen and Assyrians - already settled in Jordan before its independence. After 1946, Jordan's sovereignty and nation-building was already highly tested by the large influxes of Palestinians after 'Al-Nakba' in '48. Palestinians of the West Bank fled to the 'East Bank' in Jordan. Another large number of Palestinians sought refuge in Jordan after the Six-Day war in '67. The estimated population of Jordan in 1950 was around 500.000 inhabitants. After ten years, this number already doubled and it had tripled after twenty years. Jordanians with Palestinian roots (Palestinians who obtained Jordanian citizenship, and are no longer considered refugees), nowadays, make up for the majority of Jordanians (World Population Review, 2019). In recent decades only, large influxes of Iraqis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Yemenites and Lebanese have sought refuge in Jordan (UNRWA, 2019). Syrian refugees, who arrived in Jordan after 2011, are by far the highest number of refugees in Jordan.

Image 3: Refugee origin population registered with UNHCR in Jordan in 2019



2.2 Demographic context

Population

Jordan has an estimated population of over 10 million people. Following analyses of UNHCR in Jordan, this number is highly comprised of refugees of different nationalities: around 2.5 million people are Palestinian refugees (holding Jordanian citizenship but beneficiaries of UNRWA's aid) (UNRWA, 2013) . Furthermore, the official number of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan is around 664.000, but UNHCR and other refugee facilitators estimate the actual number of Syrians in Jordan (unregistered) to be higher: around 1.4 million (World Bank, 2019). Other registered refugees are predominantly Iraqis (around 67,000), Yemenis (around 15,000), Sudanese (around 6,000), and Somalis (around 800)¹⁹.

As the table below illustrates, in early stages of the existence of Jordan, in 1952, Jordan's population consisted of approximately 580.000 inhabitants. In twenty years only, by 1970, the population tripled. According to the latest population measurement of the Jordanian department of Statistics in 2018, Jordan's inhabitants count over 10 million people and exponential population growth is estimated to continue. Due to natural growth and the arrival of new large refugee movements, a doubling in Jordan's population occurred in just under a decade.

¹⁸ Source: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/69826.pdf>

¹⁹ <http://reporting.unhcr.org/jordan>

Table 1: Jordan population growth

	Total(000)
(1)1952	586.2
1970	1,508.2
1980	2,233.0
1990	3,468.0
2000	4,857.0
2010	6,698.0
2018	10,309.0

²⁰

The Jordanian society is relatively young. The median age of people is 24 years old²¹. Most Syrians who fled to Jordan are of a similar young age. Around 90% of Syrians in Jordan are younger than 60 years old²².

Religion

93 percent of Jordanians are Sunni Muslims. This makes Jordan one of the most predominant Sunni Islamic countries in the world (Pew Research Centre, 2012). The state religion is Sunni Islam, following semi-Sharia rule, but the Kingdom allows other religions to a certain extent. For example, 4 percent of Jordanians are Orthodox Christian who practice their religion in churches (Caputo, 2017).

Islamic extremism


Since the emergence of the Islamic State in neighboring countries Iraq and Syria, Jordanian authorities have increased security efforts and invested in monitoring Jihadi forces within Jordan. Since 2011, approximately 2000 Jordanians joined extremist Jihadi forces in or outside Syria (Abbadi, 2015). This makes Jordan the largest exporting country proportionate to its population for extremist fighters in Syria. Moreover, Syrian refugees in Jordan are prone to fit the 'terrorist' discourse; some perceive Syrian refugees as an extent of extremist violence and spillover effects of the Syrian war (Milton-Edwards, 2017).

²⁰ <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/population/population-2/>

²¹ <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/population/population-2/>

²² <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36>

Image 4: Foreign fighters in Syria



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Arabism


Furthermore, homogeneity of Jordan's society can also be seen in its inhabitants' ethnicity. Almost all inhabitants are of Arab ethnicity, with only 2% of Circassians and Armenians of origins. These similarities are shared with most Syrian refugees in Jordan. The majority of Syrians in Jordan are Sunni Muslims as well, and are of Arab ethnicity (Caputo, 2017). Around 98% of Jordan consists of citizens of Arab ethnicity, with respectively 1% consisting of Circassians and Armenians (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). The sense of being Arab continues, even after Pan-Arab movements, to play an important role for Jordanian and Syrian societies (further explained in chapter 3).

Bedouin

The vast majority of people in Jordan, descend from Bedouin tribes (Rosshandler, 2018). Bedouins are nomadic Arabs who historically inhabited desert regions in the Maghreb, in the Arab Peninsula and in the Levant (Weissleder, 2011). Bedouins are traditionally divided into tribes (or clans) and live in small communities that dwell in the desert. Even though most people in contemporary Jordan live in urbanized regions, there are still some Bedouin tribes found in more rural or desert areas of Jordan (North and South). The vast majority of (ancient) Bedouin tribes adhere to Sunni Islam. In the Quran, for example, in Arabic, Bedouins are literally referred to as 'Arabs'. The correlation between Arabs, Bedouins and tribes can be explained as follows: Arabs (traditionally) exist as Bedouins (nomads) or non-Bedouins (rural people, etc.). Arabs that are Bedouins, are grouped in different tribes. In general, and historically, these tribes are Sunni Muslims (Al Ramahi, 2008). The following table gives an overview of how Arabs, Bedouins, tribes and Islam are related (focusing on the Arab-Bedouin track):

²³ Source: Abbadi, S. (2015). Jordan in the Shadow of ISIS. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 7(2), 8-12.

Figure 1: Relation between Arabs, Bedouins and tribes



2.3 Geographical context

Jordan is nearly landlocked between neighboring countries Syria, Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt (Aqaba). Jordan is extremely vulnerable to lack of resources. There is no direct access to water, besides the ports of Aqaba. Drought and lack of water are major environmental challenges to Jordan, which have magnified alongside the rapid population growth. The exponential growth of population has caused a pressing imbalance between population and (water) resources (Haddadin, et. al., 2010).

Jordanian-Syrian border

The Jordanian-Syrian border measures 375 kilometers and crosses Israel and the Palestinian on the left, Syria in the North, Iraq in the North-East, Saudi-Arabia in the South and Egypt from the ports of Aqaba in the South-West. To enter Syria, the Jaber-Nassib border is the only crossing that connects Amman to Damascus. In April 2015, this border closed when the Free Syrian Army and the Al-Nusra Front battled over Southern parts of Syria. In July 2018, the border was recaptured by the Syrian regime. The border then was officially re-opened by Jordanian and Syrian authorities in October 2018 (Achili, 2015, p. 4). Kakish (2014) explains how before the war in Syria, the Jaber-Nassib border was one of the most important crossings in the Middle-East. The flourishing Syrian market exported greatly towards Jordan and from Jordan onwards to Saudi-Arabia. The closing of the border caused a great economic deficit for the Jordanian and Syrian border regions. After the reopening end of 2018, the border trade has not been re-flourished yet (Kakish, 2014).

2.4 Political context

While neighboring countries Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Syria have known long-lasting periods of conflict, Jordan established a secure environment. Jordanian authorities, especially the King of Jordan, have established strong ties with foreign governments and have served as a balancing act between

conflicting neighboring countries. For example, after the Arab-Israeli wars Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994, this treaty stabilized the region and diminished ongoing conflict over territory (Lefèvre, 2013).


Jordan's political, social and economic systems continue to be largely dependent on tribal-and kinship relations, especially in the more rural areas. King Abdullah II, part of the Hashemite tribe, is the successor of his father Hussein bin Talal, who ruled Jordan from '52 until his death in '99 (Caputo, 2017).

An illustration of the importance of tribalism in Jordan's political process is reflected in the Arabic word "wasta" (واسطة). It is translated as 'whom you know' or in more political terms: favoritism (El-Said & McDonald, 2001). Bedouin tribes are closely linked to the Monarch. The king is the ultimate tribal leader. In Jordan, more than in other countries in the region, the tribe to which one belongs depends is closely linked to their power status and opportunities in the country (Roberts, 2018). During the Arab spring in 2011, Jordanian protests called to reduce the power of the King and its allies, and required an improvement of civil rights and democratic systems. King Abdullah reduced the stir by changing the electoral system more democratically (Eran, 2019).

2.5 Economic context

To cope with a large number of refugees – with little natural resources and national production and therefore the high export-rate – the Jordanian government is highly dependent on grants and loans of the World Bank, donor countries and international institutions to address these internal challenges (Eran, 2019). With the arrival of Syrian refugees, the international community has helped Jordan with refugee resilience and bearing the consequences of the high number of refugees in the long term. Jordan has received over \$200 million of international aid in 2019 only of which the United States counts as the main donor.

Image 5: International funding UNHCR and required funding



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In reality, UNHCR remains pledging for more international aid to Jordan. In 2019, UNHCR estimated that 162 million extra dollars should be invested in Jordan to ensure the livelihoods for Syrian refugees

²⁴ Source: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/72611.pdf>

and to offer assistance to Jordanians. Even though the donations have helped Jordan with the financial burden of sheltering Syrian refugees, the challenges ahead remain to require grand financial resources (Eran, 2019).

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

Identity, hospitality, and host-refugees relations are complex subjects with a wide variety of scholars. A theoretical framework is required to further understand the current debates and to make abstract concepts applicable to this specific research. This chapter, therefore, analyzes the existing literature to develop a framework that offers a foundation in further understanding the research question. This chapter is divided into a literature review and operationalization paragraph and illustrates the theory from an abstract to a more case-specific level.

Literature review

The literature review elaborates first on the two central subjects of this research: identity and hospitality. Afterward, I provide an overview of how existing literature approaches the links between these two subjects. I start with explaining theory on the role of (shared) identity in hospitality in general terms (between social groups), and then specify social groups of host- and refugee groups. Simultaneously, I will apply the literature to the case of Jordan and Syrian refugees, by complementing with case-specific existing data.

Conceptual framework

Out of this theory review, I reflect on the most relevant and applicable theories for this research and translate this into a conceptual framework that gives an overview of how this research is constructed. The conceptual framework translates relevant concepts into an operationalization approach of how to measure the theory in practice in order to answer the research question.

Literature choices

The literature analyzed is chosen based upon the novelty and topicality of existing literature, and on the variety in nationalities of authors (not solely focusing on Western literature). Many sources in this research derive from authors from the Middle East to gain knowledge of information *from* the region rather than *of* the region. I tried to avoid outdated literature as much as possible unless this data offered an essential foundation in understanding the current debate.

3.1 Literature review

3.1.1 Deconstructing Identity

Before comparing Jordanian and Syrian identity and its role in Jordan's hospitality towards Syrian refugees, I first provide a general overview of how 'identity', and more specifically, shared identity is approached in the literature. The concept of 'identity' has been tried to explain in various study fields of sciences, such as political science, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Despite these extensive scholarly efforts, the concept 'identity' remains complicated and unclear, while identity continues to play a major role in how people's worldviews and everyday social interactions (Hogg, 2018). This research tries to understand and compare the similarities in-group identities (Jordanians and Syrian refugees). Hence, this theoretical framework specifies on literature that explains group-identity and intergroup identity - also referred to as 'social identity' (Hogg, 2016; Stets and Burke, 2000; Tajfel, 2010). Through a social comparison, persons who are similar ones 'self-categorization' are perceived to belong to one's in-group, whereas persons who differ from 'the self' are categorized as the outgroup (Stets and Burke, 2000, p. 225). A dominant theory on understanding group-identities is the Social Identity theory of Tajfel & Turner (1979). This theory explains how groups give people a sense of belonging to a social world, a membership to a specific group that shares identity characteristics. The group's standards and norms determine who is 'in' and who is 'out'. Social Identity theory is explained by three stages that classify the acceptance or rejection of 'out-groupers':

1. Categorization: people identify others by social categories, for example, categorized in religion, ethnicity, nationality, age, gender, income. For example: *Jordanians are predominantly Arabs, and can, therefore, categorize themselves to the Arab ethnic group.*
2. Social identification: people act upon the ascertained categorization by conforming to group norms and values. For example: *Jordanians who are members of the Arab ethnic can act upon the conformed norms of this specific group, which are, for example, hospitality towards strangers.*
3. Social comparison: members of the group adapt to the group standards and commence comparing with 'other' groups. For example: *Jordanians perceive people who are also of the Arab ethnicity, but are conformed to other norms, as different and therefore as the out-group.*

What are the identity characteristics?

Group identity can exist in a variety of identity characteristics. Besides the similar identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan mentioned in the previous chapter - ethnicity, religion, language, and historical-geographical background - other identity characteristics include, for example, gender, age, socio-economic status, education, family/parental status, sexual orientation, and so onwards (Fearon, 1999, p. 14). Because this research focuses on the identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan which are, in theory, known to be similar, the following literature

review focuses mainly on these characteristics as an onset to understanding their role in hospitality. However, other identity characteristics (similarities or contrasts) are taken into account when detected its prominence during the field research (moreover in the results chapter).

3.1.2 Deconstructing shared identity

More specifically, this research focuses on *shared* identity characteristics between groups. Shared identity can be *perceived* and be *factual*. For example, this research starts with the factually (or in theory) shared identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordan. For example, first is determined that, in theory, these groups share the Sunni Islamic religion, speak the same Arabic language, and derive from Arab ethnicity. However, to understand if these shared identity characteristics effectively play a role in Jordan's hospitality towards Syrian refugees, this research further investigated the *perceived* shared identity characteristics. In theory, Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan share identity characteristics, but is this also perceived in practice? To provide an answer to this question, I will first deconstruct the term *shared identity* and illustrate its presence in the scientific debate of identity.

There is not one prominent description of shared identity but rather an assorted approach with different linguistic indications of the concept in the literature. For practical matters, this research uses the term *shared identity* to refer to parallel identity characteristics of the identity of Jordanians and that of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Shared identity is in the literature also explained by intergroup relations - Brown and Tajfel (2010) refer to it as 'intergroup similarities', and as in-group relations - Swaab et al. (2007) define shared identity as a group identity that is closely bound with a group's perspective on reality. This research follows inter-group relations, and I will, therefore, further elaborate on Brown and Tajfel's (2010) deconstruction of how to measure the effects of intergroup similarity on intergroup attitudes and behavior (p. 603). They distinguish two forms of intergroup similarities: attitudinal similarities - which explains the resemblance between standards and ideologies between groups, and status similarities - which explains resemblance in values and status (p. 604). Following their argument, groups that share identity characteristics are more likely to be welcoming towards each other than to groups who differ more in identity (attitudinal). Intergroup status similarities, on the contrary, conclude that evidently similar groups tend to search more for ways to discriminate against each other: "groups which become too similar may make greater efforts to distinguish themselves from one another, with a resulting increase in discrimination and dislike (Brown and Abrams, 1985, p. 79)". These two approaches to measuring similarities between groups will be applied to the case of Jordan and Syrian refugees. As for the Social Identity framework of Tajfel and Turner (1979), this theory will be reviewed through the practices within the case of Jordan (moreover in 3.2 - operationalization).

3.1.3 The construction of (shared) identity between groups

As the previous paragraph explained general concepts of identity and shared identity, I now turn to how identity and shared identity is constructed following the literature in order to understand how Jordanians reason their identity characteristics in comparison with Syrian refugees.

Oberschall (2000) illustrates four approaches to ethnic violence between groups that offer perspectives on how the scientific debate approaches identity construction. These four approaches are the primordial view, the instrumental view, the constructionist view, and the view that centers state breakdown, anarchy and security dilemmas (p. 983). I focus on the first three approaches which further explain how identity is constructed rather than, as the fourth approach, how specifically ethnic violence can be seen in the context of state breakdown and security dilemmas (which is not applicable to the situation in Jordan).

Primordial thinkers assume that identities are natural and inevitable, in other words, an uncontrollable given. Edward Schils, for example, explained in 1957 how national identities are natural, inevitable and attributed to the ties of blood. He argues that modern society is held together by a primordial affinity and civil sense “which is low in many, high in some, and moderate in most persons in society (p. 131)”. Kinships, blood ties, language, and nationality are overpowering coerciveness and are strongly tied to emotional- rather than rational qualities (Oberschall, 2000, p. 982).

Applying a primordial view on the case of Jordan and Syrian refugees in Jordan, these two groups share primordial elements of identity with each other: kinships (Bedouin tribes), the Arab ethnicity and the Arabic language. Through this lens, Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan would share inevitable primordial affinities and these elements might hold a society in which both Jordanians and Syrians live together.

The instrumental view, however, argues that identity loyalties and ethnic sentiments are not primordial but are constructed and manipulated by political leaders and elites for political purposes (Rosens, 1989, cited in Oberschall, 2000, p. 983). Bennett Anderson (1983) was one of the theorists who explained with his concept of ‘imagined communities’ how rather social constructs have created borders, nations, communities, but are and remain artificial – therefore ‘imagined’. National identity was rather created just over the last two centuries. Imagined communities can - for example - exist in the form of the ‘contemporary nations’. Anderson also argued that one’s identity and their sense of nationality is perceived through and reinforced by elites and rulers.

Applying this to the case study, the Sykes-Picot borders can be analyzed as such ‘imagined communities’. National borders in the Middle-East were imposed upon inhabitants that previously perceived their community borders through geographical elements (mountains, rivers, etc.) and tribal- and kinship ties (Pintak, 2009). As a counter-reaction to the colonial divisions that disturbed the

existing dynamics of the region, former Egyptian president Gamal Nasser enforced a cross-border Pan-Arab movement that aimed to form one Arab nation. The sense of Arabism gained strong regional support but lost its glance after the two Israeli-Arab wars (Mellon, 2002). In Jordan and Syria, there is still a sense of Arabism. Phillips (2012) explains in his book 'Everyday Arab Identity' how Arabism is continuously being reproduced and nourished in Jordan and Syria. This is, for example, evident in Jordanian state media and educational books. Arab solidarity remains - even after pan-Arabic movements - an important factor for the Jordanian government, but made a gradual shift towards strengthening Jordanian national identity (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010). Phillips (2012) explains that the Syrian and Jordanian government – both the Hashemite family and the Al-Assad family have been in power for over 40 years – have used Arabism as an important pillar of both their national identities. Arabism is, therefore, reinforced and maintained by both governments, but both countries renounced supra-nation visions and focused more on nation-building since the 21st century (Oudat and Alshboul, 2010). This shift in political identities is evident in the statements of Kings of Jordan. Whereas Abdullah I of Jordan (Transjordan in 1921) emphasized the Arab identity, current King Abdullah II puts more emphasis on the nation of Jordan.

'I do not wish to see any among you identify themselves by geographical region. I wish to see everyone rather trace his descent to the Arabian Peninsula, from which we all originate. All the Arab countries are the country of every Arab.'

- Emir Abdullah, 1916.

(Salibi, 1993 in Oudat & Alshboul, 2010).

'Jordan is proud of its Islamic identity and Arab allegiance. It will indefatigably strive to protect the right of the Nation, raise Arab unity, construction and solidarity. Nobody should take the 'Jordan First' call as a bid for introversion, but rather as a deep conviction that Jordan's economic and political strength, as well as its social security, are prerequisites that need to be safeguarded in order to strengthen our Arab surrounding and support our Arab brethren (Abdullah II, 2002).' (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010)

Anderson (1983) argues that despite his assumption that (national) identity is imagined and socially constructed, this does not mean that these perceived identities are no less real. Members of a group, or a nation, perceive their 'imagined' identity. This nuance finds ground with the constructionist view.

The constructionist view offers a mixture of elements of the primordial and instrumental approaches. Kuper (1977) emphasizes the variety in identities in society and, independent of political identity reinforcements and the social facts, religion, and ethnicity, for example, are in ordinary times only one of many other identity characteristics. Furthermore, constructionists argue how identities remain amenable, even if they are politically constructed. Linz and Stepan (1996, cited in Oberschall, 2000) explain that these 'political identities are less primordial and fixed' (p.366). Politically constructed identity characteristics, such as enforcing a sense of nationalism, ethnic belonging a states' religion, is not fixed by political leaders or elites but does remain influenceable for political enforcement (Linz and Stepan, 1996, cited in Oberschall, 2000). Sen (2006) explains that one's identity is plural and not singular. Identity should rather be seen as a 'menu of choice'. Sen opposes the singularity in identity debates: "the difficulty with the thesis of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations²⁵ is that it begins with the presumption of the unique relevance of a singular classification (p. 6)". Whereas Kuper (1977) emphasizes on the relevance of additional identities rather than the politically constructed characteristics in "ordinary times", Sen (2006) elaborates that the context in which identity characteristics are prioritized are extremely important. When members of a group, for example, compete for attention with each other, a person or subgroup makes a choice about their divergent loyalties and identity priorities (p. 19). Despite possible enforced political identities, choices within one's plural identity become more prominent in competitive environments. In such a context, a person chooses which identity layers to prioritize to 'survive', irrespective of the possible identity similarities of competing groups or individuals (Sen, 2006, p. 29). It is not necessarily that one consequently denies one identity characteristic to give priority to another, but rather that a person with plural identities has to decide, in case of a conflict or competition, on the relative importance of different identity layers.

For Jordan, a Jordanian might decide to not only be part of the Jordanian society but also to be a member of the Arab ethnicity. Phillips (2012) describes possible contradictions in contemporary identities in Jordan and Syria as: 'today Arabs feel comfortable with their multi-layered identity – identifying themselves as citizens of separate nation-states while feeling proud of being Arab and Muslim' (p. 13). Jordanians, however, are competing on natural resources, the labor, and public space with the unprecedented large number of Syrian refugees in Jordan. In a competitive environment, following Sen's (2006) argument, Jordanians might use different reasoning in how their identity resembles the identities of Syrians in Jordan. How important remains, for example, sharing ethnicity and language in a competitive environment?

²⁵ The ground theory of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations (2000) argues how the fault lines of civilizations are the battle lines of the future and that great divisions, by religion, history, language, and tradition, are deep and increasing factors that will dominate international conflict (Huntington, 2000, p. 23).

As I provided a deeper understanding of the theory on (shared) identity, the following paragraphs links (shared) identity with hospitality between host- and refugee groups, and how this theory can be applied to the case-study. But before that, I elaborate on the second core subject of this research first: hospitality.

3.1.4 Deconstructing hospitality

Before I link hospitality with shared identity between host- and refugee groups, I provide a deeper understanding of the term hospitality. In the Cambridge English dictionary, hospitality is defined as: *the quality or disposition of receiving and treating guests and strangers in a warm, friendly, generous way*²⁶. One of the most prominent philosophers of the 21st, Jacques Derrida, problematized the presupposed 'quality' or 'disposition' of host by arguing that hospitality inherently creates a power imbalance between host and guest. This extent of hostility in hospitality he calls 'hostipitality'.

In his work *Of hospitality* (2000) Derrida argues how the dichotomy between host and guest provokes imposed conditions for the guests on how to behave. He divides hospitality into two distinctive orders:

1. Conditional hospitality (invitation): 'guests' are welcomed under certain conditions and hospitality is not necessarily unlimited. There is a reciprocity of right and duty in hospitality; hospitality remains a 'debt' to the guest and the hospitality is controlled and monitored by the host. As Derrida explains: *"please feel at home, act as if you were at home, but, remember, that is not true, this is not your home but mine, and you are expected to respect my property"* (Derrida, 2000, cited in Caputo, 2002, p. 111).
2. Unconditional hospitality (visitation): 'guests' are welcomed by the sense of the host. Hospitality is 'something they have to do', without expecting something in return. Even though the 'guest' arrives uninvited and unexpected, the host has an ethical duty to take the guest in, even if their presence threatens the hosts' daily life. This form is absolute and pure hospitality, without any reciprocity expected from the guests. (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000).

Correlation and paradox of hospitality

Conditional and unconditional hospitality can also be correlated with each other and/or shift from one another. The shift in the sort of hospitality is often correlated with the limitation or duration of hospitality (Kakoliris, 2015). Also, offering hospitality places the hosts in a power position, choosing and electing the 'guests'. Hospitality is then an embodiment of power and/or gives the host increased esteem towards himself or how others perceive him. Welcoming guests can place guests in an uncomfortable position while the host gains confidence in showing off how much he owns. It is then

²⁶ <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/hospitality>

not necessarily about the hospitality towards the 'guest' itself, but more the perceptions of being hospitable (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000).

"If I say 'Welcome', I am not renouncing my mastery, something that becomes transparent in people whose hospitality is a way of showing off how much they own or who make their guests uncomfortable and afraid to touch a thing (Derrida, 2000, as cited in Caputo, 2002, p. 111)".

Moreover, there is a deeply-rooted paradox in the idea of hospitality (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000). Absolute hospitality requires the host to be generous without limits. However, at the same time, the host places itself in self-limitation by requiring the guest to 'feel at home'. As long as the guest decides to stay, the host who hosts its guests unconditionally - but remains sacrificing - is taken hostage during the duration of the guests' stay (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000). The ethical relation of a host with an unconditional sense of hospitality and the guest who remains to stay makes that the freedom of the host is exceeded by the guest. As Derrida states: *"unconditional hospitality implies that you don't ask the other, the newcomer, the guest to give anything back, or even to identify himself or herself. Even if the other deprives you of your mastery or your home, you have to accept this. It is terrible to accept this, but that is the condition of unconditional hospitality: that you give up the mastery of your space, your home, your nation. It is unbearable. If, however, there is pure hospitality, it should be pushed to this extreme (Derrida, 1998, as cited in O'Gorman, 2007, p. 11)".*

Moreover, Derrida linked his concepts to migration: nations might consider themselves hospitable towards 'others' but are unlikely to completely open their doors for them (borders) without any conditions or limits of stay (Derrida, 1999, as cited in O'Gorman, 2007, p. 11). Applying this to the case of Jordan, it is interesting to further investigate in this research which forms of hospitality (unconditional-conditional) Jordanians perceive in their hospitality towards Syrian refugees, and also, to understand the limits for Jordanians and the durability of their hospitality. Derrida's theory offers a framework that later will be used to assess and categorize Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees. Another relevant framework on hospitality that can contextualize Jordanian hospitality and, more specifically, the motives of their hospitality towards Syrian refugees, is that of Telfer (1996). Telfer distinguishes hospitality for pleasure and hospitality out of a sense of duty. Telfer categorizes three types of guests that a host would offer hospitality (in no particular order):

1. Guests who are friends of the host (who can turn into a sense of family)
2. Guests who have are included in the social circle of the host (for example a neighbor or a colleague).
3. People in need (material needs)

This theory, however, focuses on domestic hospitality and rather hospitality towards people the host is already familiar with. Furthermore, this theory does not reflect on hospitality towards family but rather on friendships that can feel as family. Furthermore, the theory reflects people in need by people who, for example, feel "lonely or need to feel valued (p. 72)". This categorization does, however, offer an understanding of how Jordanians host their Syrian 'guests' and what the implications of a certain categorization of guests implies in practice.

3.1.5 (Shared) identity and hospitality in host-refugee relations

Now that both (shared) identity and hospitality have been deconstructed and analyzed within the literature, this paragraph illustrates the debate on how (shared) identity and hospitality are linked host-refugee relation studies.

I first reflect on the literature on how 1) contrasting- and 2) similar identity characteristics between host- and refugee groups affect hospitality of the host group. Secondly, I further elaborate on the role of 3) host-group's identity (local identity) in general, and how this can 3a) positively or 3b) negatively affect receiving refugees (with either contrasting or similar identity characteristics with the host group).

Identity contrasts between host- and refugee group

Remarkably, there is a strong emphasis in the literature on the contrasts of identity between host- and refugee groups and how this caused clashes in adaptation and integration. Moreover, there is an extensive literature coverage on the refugee crisis in Europe, from 2012 onwards, and the role of contrasting identities with host- and refugee groups (Xavier, 2018). Hynie (2018) elaborates that there prevails a specific negative attitude towards Muslims or Arabs. Negative attitudes of Europeans towards migration are also found towards Central Africans and South-East Asians, however, Hynie (2018) states that these groups are perceived less as a 'symbolic threat' than refugees and migrants of Arab origin or with adherence to Islam. This symbolic threat is often related with how a host-community perceives the extent of differences between them and the newcomer, and to what extent the new coming group is expected to reject or accept local beliefs and established norms (Hartley & Pedersen, 2015 in Hynie, 2018). Move over, to what extent the host community perceives a threat (symbolic or realistic threat) indicates attitudes towards refugees and migrants, how the local community responds to them, and influences policy responses (Hynie, 2018, p. 267). According to polls in 2018, around 60 percent of Europeans had a negative attitude on immigration of people outside EU-countries (Xavier, 2018, p. 3). This data also showed that these negative attitude merely derive from ethnic prejudices, such as the fear of terrorism, and from contrasting established European norms, such as the spread of Islam in Europe (p. 3). Xavier argues that there is a misconception of how refugees from Arab countries seeking refuge in Europe, for example Syrians and Iraqis (who are

entitled to humanitarian protection according to UN legislation), are linked to terrorism and the spread of Islam (p. 3). This misconception is politically being disclosed and further embedded in European societies by far-right movements (Greven, 2016, as cited in Xavier, 2008, p. 4). In multiple European countries negative attitudes towards refugees have led to hostile actions of the host community and stricter immigration policies (Hynie, 2018). In reality, the arrival of refugees in Europe in the last decade can rather be perceived as a symbolic threat - harming the established norms - than a realistic threat when contextualizing the number of refugees who sought refuge in Europe. Realistic threats, as originally formed within the *realistic conflict theory* of Campbell (1965), describe threats of the out-group (refugees or migrants) that pose danger to the wellbeing of the in-group (host community). These threats regard how the new group can, for example, hinder the existing labor market, increase violence and crime, change division of power, and harm the existence of the pre-existing group (Campbell, 1965).

The unprecedented number of Syrian refugees in Jordan can be analyzed as a realistic threat rather than symbolic threat for Jordanians. According to Salameh and Hayajneh (2019), the Jordanian indigenous people were already on the verge of being outnumbered by refugees and migrants, but with the arrival of Syrians from 2011 onwards this has become a fact (p. 6). Furthermore, behind symbolic threats, the Syrian refugee crisis has put large pressure on Jordanian economically, politically and socio-culturally. Due to ongoing insecurity at the Jordanian borders with Syria, possible spillovers effects and the high amount of Jordanian Jihadi foreign fighters, the militarization in Jordan has intensified. Also, Jordan deepened its dependence on international aid (the World Bank) and the economic situation has become more competitive. Additionally, the national identity of Jordan is being challenged due to the outnumbering of Jordanians (Salameh and Hayajneh, 2019). These developments cannot necessarily be pointed directly towards the arrival of Syrians in Jordan (some issues existed before 2011), but can be perceived as such by the hosting community (Salameh and Hayajneh, 2019). Furthermore, they argue that Syrians are not likely to return in the short-term and that this is also realized in Jordanian society, and existing problems are exacerbated (p. 6). Following these perceived threats, especially regarding the large number and the likelihood of prolonged stay of Syrian refugees in Jordan, can lead to hostility as the theory of Hynie (2018); incidents in Europe due to the symbolic threat of (Arab and Islamic) refugees showed hostility of the host community. There is little literature coverage on hostility in Jordan towards Syrian refugees but this, however, does naturally not indicate that there is no discrimination towards Syrians at all. In fact, recent local studies of Simpson et al. (2019) and Hawkins (2019) argue that there are tensions between Jordanians and non-Jordanian migrant- or refugee groups living in Jordan towards Syrian refugees in Jordan. Hawkins (2019) explains proposed by Jordanians are reasoned through religious, economic or cultural lines. Simpson et al (2019) illustrate that these tensions mostly happen in children's schools (bullying) and

on the Jordanian labor market (discrimination towards Syrians). There have been protests by Jordanians sporadically since 2014, but these protests required economic reforms rather than opposing the presence of Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, the competing labor market in Jordan cannot be observed by taking the pressing number of Syrians into account (Francis, 2015, p. 21). Frustrations among the host community of Jordan, however, has remained confined and does not cross 'red' lines or disturbance of the international community (Francis, 2015). Data on tensions between host- and Syrian refugees in Jordan remain especially confined in relative terms: in other large hosting countries Turkey and Lebanon there has been a significant increase in hostility towards Syrian refugees over the last two years (Al-Dbaes and Quorah, 2019). Concerning reports of non-governmental organizations in Lebanon, as well as in Turkey, alarm the international community about the deteriorating livelihoods of Syrian refugees in the countries and the growing anti-refugee rhetoric, both from civilians as from political leaders. According to reports of Human Rights Watch, since April 2018, the Lebanese government has taken extreme measures to increase pressure on Syrians to return to Syria: refugee camps have been demolished by the Lebanese army²⁷ and Syrians were evicted and expelled from municipalities and ended up homeless²⁸.

To jump back to the role of identity in how Syrian refugees have been treated in Lebanon and Turkey, there are significant general lines that can be drawn in how Jordan differs from these countries in homogeneity. As this research focus: Jordanians and Syrians share significant identity characteristics, such as ethnicity, language, religion, cultural heritage and tribal ties. These identity characteristics are in larger contrast to the established local identities in Lebanon and Turkey than in Jordan. The spillover effects of the Syrian war have had myriad effects on, in particular, the sectarian ratios in an already fragile sectarian environment. The arrival of approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees (of which the majority is Sunni Muslim) has caused a resurgence of pre-existing religious contrasts in Lebanon (Assi, 2018). Reports of humanitarian organizations illustrate a warning hostile environment and excessive discrimination by the host community towards Syrians in all aspects of life, for example: in the labor market, educational systems, in the media, and so on²⁹. Lebanese authorities signed an agreement with the Syrian regime in 2018 stating that it is safe for Syrians to return to 'safe areas' in Syria, while Syrians remain extremely prone to violence of the regime in all regions of Syria (Habbal, 2019). These returns have been reported as forced deportations rather than voluntary return³⁰. Deportations of Syrians and anti-Syrian sentiments have been evident in Turkey as well, especially in recent months.

²⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/05/lebanon-syrian-refugee-shelters-demolished>

²⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/20/lebanon-mass-evictions-syrian-refugees>

²⁹ Hostility in Lebanon towards Syrian refugees reports: Amnesty International - Lebanon wave of hostility and claims of Syrian refugee returns are voluntary (2019); Refugees International - Lebanon at crossroads (2020);

³⁰ Forced return Syrian refugees in Lebanon: Human Rights Watch (2019) - Syrians Deported by Lebanon; New Humanitarian (2018) - unsafe in Syria, unwanted in Lebanon

Turkish president Erdogan received Syrians in 2011 as 'fellow Muslims' and positioned himself as a guardian of Islamic brotherhood with his hospitality (Carpi and Senoguz, p. 8; Mackreath, 2019). More recently, Erdogan's hospitality towards Syrians has reached its limits. Turkey is situated in a chokehold between an ongoing humanitarian crisis at the border with Syria with thousands of Syrians in awaiting to seek refuge in Turkey effectively - while the internal situation was predominantly already pressing on Turkish shoulders³¹. The sustainability of the EU-Turkey deal has been contested with Turkey opening the borders with Greece for Syrian refugees to seek refuge in Europe. This caused a new humanitarian crisis: thousands of Syrians are stuck between the Turkish and Greek border and being denied on both sides³². Orhan and Gündoğar (2015) explain how the largest challenges of Syrian refugees in Turkey have been social factors; the difference in cultural norms, language (Arabic versus Turkish), and habits. While Turks are predominantly adherents of Sunni Islam, as most Syrian refugees in Turkey, the Syrian interpretation of Islam is considered to be more conservative and a threat to the established local values (p. 17). Furthermore, especially in border towns of Turkey, there prevails a fear of Turks becoming the ethnic minority with the integration of large numbers of Arab Syrians (Orhan and Gündoğar, 2015, p. 17; Makovsky, 2019). Effectively, as seen in Lebanon as well, different reports show strong anti-Syrian attitude of the Turkish host community towards Syrian refugees³³.

It should be noted that the above described analysis of the other two large hosting countries of Syrian refugees, Lebanon and Turkey, are described from a very general 'helicopter view', and that the situation in both countries, as well as in Jordan, is much more nuanced. For example, the economic factors are not even included in these analyses. However, this research focuses on the role of (shared) identity within hospitality towards Syrian refugees, and this factor is effectively more emphasized on. Also should be noted that there is extensive literature and media coverage on the (hostile) situation for Syrians in Turkey and Lebanon, unlike for hostilities in Jordan, which makes it possible that Jordan seems to come across extremely hospitality and as the most sophisticated host country in the region - especially in relative terms. This possible contrast in theory and practice is taken into account and further elaborated on in the research results. As for existing literature, Jordan remains remarkably hospitable towards Syrian refugees - which Jordanians share, among others, religion, language, and ethnicity. Identity characteristics that are contrasting in Lebanon and Turkey for large parts, and where remarkably prevails a more hostile environment for Syrian refugees. Moreover, the debate on Syrian

³¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50886120>

³² <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51678462>; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/06/refugees-europe-closed-tensions-greece-turkey-border>;

³³ Mackreath (2019); Human Rights Watch - Syrians being deported (2019); UNHCR - Response to the influx of Syrian Refugees into Turkey (2015)

return is the least discussed in Jordan, and the Jordanian government states to remain complied with international non-refoulement³⁴ agreements (İçduygu and Nimer, 2019, p. 19).

What does the literature explain about the acceptance of the refugee community by the host community if they share identity characteristics? And what research has already been done on the role of shared identity in how Jordanians perceive Syrian refugees?

Shared identity and hospitality

According to extensive research of UNHCR (2007), it is more likely that refugees are supported peacefully by hosting communities when both parties share the same culture, religion, and language. Besides resemblances in identity between Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordan, other case studies illustrate how refugees have been accepted by host communities in where sharing identity played an important role. Porter et al. (2008) argue that integration of refugees in the host community is effective in contexts where there is a low labor shortage, where host- and refugee belong to the same ethnic- and linguistic group, and where there has been previous migrations between the host country and the country of origin of the refugees. Young Liberian refugees in Ghana who spoke Ghanaian language overcame a language barrier which helped them integrate in the Ghanaian labor market and expand their social Ghanaian circles (Porter et al., (2008). After Zambia's independence in 1964, thousands of Angolans who shared the same Balovale ethnicity with a majority of Zambia were received in the Eastern parts of Zambia (Backwell, 2002, as cited in Porter et al., 2008). Moreover, over the last centuries almost 3 million Afghans fled to Iran and were acknowledged by public Iranian opinion to be received out of a duty to help fellow Muslims (Tober, 2007, p. 283). Even though ethnic divides between Iranians and Afghans and tensions between Shia and Sunni adherents, Tober (2007, p. 284) explains that Iranians emphasized on the need to help fellow Muslims rather than deeper ethnic- and religious divisions. Moreover, throughout severe migration influxes of refugees in the region, Olszewska (2015) explains how the Iranian government and society has always relied on religious solidarity. Ayatollah Khomeini famously commented after the Iranian revolution: '*Islam has no borders*'. (p. 8).

It should be noted that in all these cases there have been economic and geographical tensions, as well as tensions over demographics; ethnicity, language barriers, different cultural norms, and different interpretations of Islam. These examples, however, provide an image of how identity evidently plays a role in how the host community receives refugees, but more important, how the refugees are likely to

³⁴ Non-refoulement is the United Nations Article 33 of the 1951 Convention explained: "No contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of the territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (UNHCR, 2008, p. 13).

integrate effectively. In the case of Jordan, in theory, Syrian refugees and Jordanians share evident identity characteristics that possibly has played a role in how Jordanians (positively) perceived Syrians. In a research of Athamneh et al. (2014), professors of the Yarmouk University in Irbid, 1600 Jordanians were surveyed about their perceptions towards Syrian refugees in Jordan. Almost all participants considered Syrian refugees as their fellow 'Arab', 'Muslim' and 'brother' (Athamneh et al., 2014, as cited in İçduygo & Nimer, 2019, p.7). Luck (2019) stresses the importance of historical ties between Jordanians and Syrians in contemporary perceptions. Just over a century ago, before the Sykes-Picot borders, Jordanian and Syrians were living in the same region and without any borders for centuries. It should be noted that both Jordan and Syria are (compared to, for example European nations) extremely young nations. It was relatively a short time ago in history that Jordanians and Syrians were considered as the same people (Arabs - Bedouins) living under the same ruler (Ottomans) in the same region (the Levant) (Luck, 2019).

Shared identity and hostility

Even though Jordan appears resilient to a large number of Syrian refugees, following Harris and Alshoubaki (2018), the continuation of the refugee pressure on Jordanian shoulders can dismantle internal balances with the (unexpected) protracted settlement of Syrians in Jordan (Harris & Alshoubaki, 2018). In fact, Rügger (2018) argues it is precisely the strong identity similarities between host- and refugee communities which can harm social cohesion rather than facilitate it in protracted stay of refugee groups. He explains this as follows: naturalization and integration are relatively easier for refugees who are speaking the same language, share the same norms - and can therefore easily adapt, and understand the culture of the host community. Rügger emphasizes in specific on how the same ethnicity (co-ethnicity) between host- and refugee groups rather triggers internal conflict than neutralizes it. Because ethnic-demographics are not drastically changed and the integrate process of the refugees in relatively easy and gradual, the refugees can gain political power easier, can threaten the internal security (fanatic ideologies and spillover effects can easier being transferred from refugee to host through mutual linguistic and cultural understanding), and are precisely because their resemblances to the host population more direct (labor and resource) competitors (Rügger, 2018, p. 46).

3.1.6 Local identity and hospitality towards refugees

After discussing the role of shared identity characteristics between host- and refugee community on how refugees are received (and how they integrate), I now turn to the literature that provides an understanding of the role of the identity of the host community (in-group), and how this reflects in how they perceive people outside their community (out-group) - such as refugees. I first discuss how

the identity of the host community positively affects refugee reception, followed by how it can negatively affect it.

Local identity and hospitality

In the literature is also explained how a strong local identity, or in-group identity, can encourage between-group acceptance and adaptation. Robert Putnam's (2000) contributions to theories of *social capital*³⁵ explain how a group with a strong sense of shared identity; shared values and norms for example, beneficial cooperation between other groups. Following Putnam's bridging-bonding theory, social capital can exist between heterogeneous groups (bridging) and between homogeneous groups of people (bonding) (Davis, 2014, p. 4). Bonds describe the links between people which are based on a sense of shared identity, for example, family ties, cultural ties and/or ethnic ties. Bridges rather describe the bonds with people with a further distance than a shared sense of identity, such as indirect friends and colleagues (Putnam, 2000). Moreover, more specific to the acceptance of migrants and refugees, Nee and Sanders (2001, as cited in Bucholtz, 2019) argue that social capital based on shared ethnicity is prominently of higher relevance than human- and financial capital in the adaptation of migrants and refugees.

Driel & Verkuyten (2019) demonstrate how a strong group identity within a host community actually contributes to positive absorption of refugees. A community with a strong identity often requires specific behavior of its members. The established standards and values then provide a direction for members of the group on how to behave (f.e. towards 'others'). Their research occurred in a small village in Italy, where a strong sense of community-based behavior was observed. The inhabitants would always take care of each other, and this behavior reflected in how the community received refugees and migrants. Naturally, it depends on the substance of the established community norms. If the norm, for example, is to be hospitable, members of the group tend to behave upon these norms, also towards people from outside the group (Driel & Verkuyten, 2019).

Following these arguments, Jordan's hospitality towards Syrian refugees may not derive necessarily from shared identity between Jordanians and Syrians, but the strong local identity of Jordanians in general. Rosshandler (2019) shows in his research how Jordanians fall back on the Quran while speaking about hospitality as if it is a duty, required by the standards of God. Luck (2019) points out that Jordanian hospitality is more likely to be derived out of 'habits', ever since Jordan was established, and even before that, Jordanians have been sheltering people from outside Jordan. Regardless of the shared identity aspects of the 'guests'. This long history of receiving people from outside Jordan is now deeply-rooted in Jordanian identity and, therefore, explains hospitality. Chatty

³⁵ Putnam (2000, p. 19) defines social capital as follows: "connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them".

(2017) explains how the cultural ethics of tribes contribute to this. The tribal nature of receiving guests and always being hospitable has created a culture in which tribal members tend to hold grudges or frustrations closer to their chests'.

Local identity and hostility

Schildkraut (2014) and Wagner et al. (2010) emphasize on how a strong local, national or group identity often goes hand-in-hand with the social exclusion of newcomers. Especially if the identity layers of these newcomers are in contrast with the host community's identity. Moreover, Portes (1998) and Bucholtz (2019) argue that groups who are densely connected through ethnicity, race and kinships are rather likely to exclude themselves from other groups. Putnam's theory (2000) describes how, besides bonding and bridging between groups can facilitate inter-group cohesion, bonds can also hinder people belonging to a strong in-group identity (such as ethnic ties) to socially bridge with other groups; there is no strong incentive in bridging because the in-group is providing satisfactory social capital already.

3.1.7 Other incentives for Jordan's hospitality

To understand the role of (shared) identity in Jordan's hospitality towards Syrian refugees I briefly close this chapter by providing perspectives that exclude the role of identity and focuses on other incentives for Jordan to be hospitable towards Syrians. The following perspectives give a macro-overview (since this is not the focus of the research) which help placing the role of (shared) identity better into context in proportion to other incentives.

Economic and political drivers

Francis (2015) explains Jordan's response to the Syrian refugee crisis from a more political and economic standing point. He argues that the Jordanian government has always handled refugee crises opportunistically by leveraging international support for sophisticated refugee absorption. Jordan's extraordinary responses to the refugee crisis show how aware the Jordanian government is about the relationship between hosting refugees and receiving international aid (Francis, 2015). In comparing research on Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, Içduygo & Nimer (2019) argue that the King of Jordan has strategically positioned Jordan as the most sophisticated partner in the region for Syrian refugee absorption.

Following a statement of the Jordanian Ministry of Media Affairs and Communications; 'Jordan is proud of its track record regarding hosting and helping refugees'. While the economic- and political incentives merely derive from officials' statements, there is a gap in the literature on explaining Jordanian voices about their perceptions of hospitality towards Syrian refugees. Hawkins (2019) and Salameh & Hayajneh (2019) do offer a stage for Jordanian voices in their research, but this specific data remains confined (and specified to economic topics) and misses in-depth questioning.

Transcending of previous mentioned explanations for Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees should be the size and magnitude of the presence of Syrian refugees in Jordan taken into account. Harris and Alshoubaki (2018) argue that a great number of refugees in proportion to the local population is more likely to cause economic, socio-cultural and political tensions. This is undeniably the case for Jordan, in which estimated 1.4 million Syrian refugees live – registered and unregistered with UNHCR (World Bank, 2019) - on a total population of circa 10 million people. Moreover, Brown (1996) states that, despite the similarities between locals and refugees, the sudden influx of a large number of refugees is highly likely to complicate domestic balances. Following these arguments, the large number of Syrian refugees potentially cause negative sentiments towards Syrian refugees, because the burden of their presence in high numbers is transcended by other incentives to remain hospitable and keep up an positive attitude. This matter will be taken into account in potential bias of this research.

Conclusion

The aforementioned theoretical debates are to some extent already applied to the case of Jordan and Syrian refugees, but need further examination in order to accept or reject the existing theoretical assumption for this specific case. The existing theory shows opposing scientific evidence of the role of identity in hospitality of the host community towards the refugee community. There are remaining questions deriving from this literature review, such as *does either contrast or similarities in host-refugee identities cause hospitality or hostility for the case of Jordan? And: is either the role of shared identity or a strong local identity causing hospitality or hostility for the case of Jordan?* An overarching question while analyzing the existing literature remained: *to what extent are Syrian refugees actually considered as an 'in-group' to Jordanian hosts? And what are the reasons for this inclusion (or exclusion)?* Finally, in correspondence with the research question, *if shared identity places a large role in hospitality of the host community, will it remain important in hospitality in protracted stay of refugees (duration of stay)? Or are other factors, such as economic or political factors, becoming more important over time?*

3.2 Operationalization

The following operationalization shows the process of how this research is constructed and how remaining questions, relevant theories, and relevant concepts are defined into measurable factors. The operationalization is illustrated by a step-by-step framework that deconstructs the research question and specifies on which theory is relevant for measuring the different steps. The following roadmap serves as a framework in operationalizing the research question: *how do Jordanians (in Sweileh) perceive the role of shared identity in their hospitality towards Syrian refugees and how sustainable is this hospitality?* First, I provide a graphical overview of the five steps for operationalizing this research, and then elaborate on each in specific. The order of steps is based on understanding key concepts in

the research environment first in order to make linkages between theories and empirical findings. The choices of theories complying to the different steps are based on to what extent the existing theory can be examined (accepted or rejected) for the case-study, and which concepts offered a framework to interpret empirical findings. The theory which is primary for a specific step should, however, not be considered only applicable to this research step since the theory overlaps and builds on findings from, for example, previous steps.

Table 2: Roadmap operationalization

Roadmap ³⁶	Relevant theories
Step 1: Measuring Jordanian hospitality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conditional/unconditional hospitality (Derrida, 2000) ● Types of guests (Teffler, 1996)
Step 2: Measuring Jordanian identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Bridging-bonding theory (Putnam, 2000) ● Local identity and hospitality (Driel & Verkuyten, 2019) ● Local identity and hostility (Schildkraut, 2014; Wagner et al., 2010; Putnam, 2000)
Step 3: Measuring perceived Jordanian and Syrian shared identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) ● Identity menu of choice (Sen, 2006) ● Attitudinal similarities and status similarities (Brown and Tajfel, 2010) ● Shared identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrians: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Arab ethnicity and Arabism (Phillips, 2012; Mellon, 2002; Oudat & Alshboul, 2010) ○ Bedouin culture (Luck, 2019; İçduygu & Nimer, 2019; Chatty, 2017), ○ Islam (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010) ● Identity construction approaches (Oberschall, 2000; Anderson, 1983; Kuper, 1977; Sen, 2006)
Step 4: Measuring the perceived role of Jordanian and Syrians shared identity in the hospitality of Jordanians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Shared identity and hospitality (Porter et al, 2008; İçduygu & Nimer, 2019) ● Shared identity and hostility (Harris & Alshoubaki, 2018; Rügger, 2018) ● Identity construction approaches (Oberschall, 2000; Anderson, 1983; Kuper, 1977; Sen, 2006)
Step 5: Measuring the perceived role of Jordanian and Syrians shared identity in the sustainability of hospitality of Jordanians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Realistic and symbolic threat (Hynie, 2018) ● Protracted stay (Harris & Alshoubaki, 2018) ● Political- and economic factors for hospitality (Francis, 2015; İçduygu & Nimer, 2019) ● Conditional/unconditional hospitality (Derrida, 2000)

³⁶ Attachment 5 further elaborates the steps more detailed.

3.3 Sub questions

The roadmap for operationalization is processed in the sub questions of the research. The following research questions are guiding principles in how the results are constructed, and aim to answer the research question. There are five general sub questions which answer the main research questions. These sub questions are further analyzed by more detailed sub-questions.

Main research question:

How do Jordanians (in Sweileh) perceive the role of shared identity in their hospitality towards Syrian refugees and how sustainable is this hospitality?

Sub questions:

Jordanian hospitality

1. How do Jordanians perceive their hospitality?

- How do Jordanians perceive their hospitality in general?
- How do Jordanians perceive their hospitality towards Syrian refugees?
- How do Jordanians perceive their hospitality towards different types of 'guests'?

Jordanian identity

2. How do Jordanians perceive their Jordanian identity?

- How do Jordanians describe their local identity?
- What is the role of this local identity in the acceptance or rejection of outsiders?

Shared identity Jordanians and Syrian refugees

3. To what extent do Jordanians perceive a shared social identity between Jordanians and Syrian refugees?

The role of shared identity in hospitality

4. How do Jordanians perceive the role of shared identity in their hospitality towards Syrian refugees?

The role of shared identity in sustainability of hospitality

5. How do Jordanians perceive the sustainability of their hospitality and what is the role of shared identity in this?

- How has Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees changed (since 2011)³⁷?
- How do Jordanians perceive the role of shared identity in the protracted stay of Syrian refugees, and eventually their integration into Jordanian society?

³⁷ Since 2011 Syrian refugees have sought refuge in Jordan from the Syrian Civil War (UNHR, 2019).

Chapter 4: Methodology

To answer the research question, I collected qualitative in-depth data in Jordan by means of an ethnographic approach. This chapter elaborates on how the research was conducted: the research strategy, the desk- and field research, the research validity and potential bias, the ethical considerations, and the limits of this research.

Research strategy

To gather data effectively in the specific research context of Jordan, I made several strategic considerations:

First of all, I chose an iterative process in which I was able to first identify the research context in order to further develop the research design (Bassett, 2010). This form allowed me to discover the research limits and further detect relevant aspects in order to answer the research question.

Secondly, I conducted research through an ethnographic approach and placed myself in Amman for three months. From October until December 2019 I stayed in Amman, observing the environment, connecting with Jordanians, placing myself in the local community and followed developments through local (English) media. This ethnographic approach has given me the space to approach the research as 'a local'. By experiencing daily lives of Jordanians, I gained a 'portrait of the people' (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015). I have chosen to add quotes, personal experiences and individual stories to this research, to provide a realistic and expressive portrait of the opinions of people in Amman (Sweileh).

Furthermore, I focused on connecting theory with practice by translating theoretical perspective on the role of shared identity in hospitality (in host-refugee studies) into the research questions, the interpretation of the results, and the conclusion. Following Verschuren and Doorewaard (2019), the two general approaches in research can be distinguished in theory-oriented and practice-oriented. This research does not aim to involve interventions within the case-study (which is applicable to practice-oriented), but rather seeks to examine theory with practices on the ground. Theory-oriented research can be approached through theory-testing and theory-building. This research combines theory with practices and tests if these theories are applicable to the case specific. Theory-testing is therefore more applicable to this research, but findings of this research can, besides accepting or rejecting existing theory on the case-specific, contribute to further build on host-refugee studies; either case-specific or for general use. According to Colquitt and Phelan (2007, p. 3), established theories can become intuitive while being extensively adapted. These are, however, not necessarily well-supported by empirical findings. This research establishes new empirical findings and can contribute to supporting or denying established or intuitive assumptions within the current debate

on refugee-host studies and the links between identity and hospitality in this. The theory described in Chapter 3 will, therefore, reoccur throughout the research interpretations and is eventually being evaluated on how applicable they are in the case of Jordan and Syrian refugees.

Eventually, I chose to gather data on a macro, meso, and micro level, relying on both desk- and field research. The offset of this research gathered information out of open resources (meso). Then, the research was further developed through discussion with NGOs and a local research institutes (meso), and further zoomed-in and completed by interviews with local people (micro). This is further described below.

Sub questions

The data for the sub questions is, besides desk-research, gathered through the discussions with NGOs, the interviews with Jordanians, and my personal visual footage and notes during the observations³⁸.

4.1 Desk research

The starting point of this research has been structurally monitoring open resources during a half-year internship at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working at the political department for the MENA-region, in particular on Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan, equipped me with reports occasionally (for example reports of the UN/UNHCR, humanitarian institutions, local Jordanian institutions and overviews of political statements regarding the Syrian refugee crisis in the region). Throughout this internship I further developed knowledge on international politics, the MENA-region, and the Syrian refugee crisis in the region. Working with different political actors, such as policy officers and NGOs, offered me insights on what the Netherlands, the European Union, and the international community in general focused on and considered as relevant developments to monitor. One of them was the shifting rhetoric and policies on hosting Syrian refugees in the region (more hostility in host countries) and the politics of Syrian refugee return - as also described in Chapter 3. One of the recurring phenomena in these debates were the remarkable continuity of Jordan's hospitality compared to other host countries. This finding raised my curiosity and, therefore, formed the base to conduct this research. The more 'outside' perspective gained throughout my internship in The Hague will be taken into account while being situated in a more 'inside' perspective in Amman. The 'outside' perspective was established before, hence could have impacted how I perceived the 'inside' perspective. This potential bias in observing the research context and focus of the research is, if applicable, processed in the research results. Moreover, gaps between the outside- and the inside perspective are taken into. These gaps can prevail how there is a gap in knowledge between the general assumptions of the international

³⁸ Attachment 9 further explains how data is gathered per sub question.

community and the actual perspectives on the ground.

4.2 Field research

Through a 'snowball method', I linked with multiple relevant contacts who were able to offer me a deeper understanding of the Syrian refugee crisis in the context of Jordan. As commencing points of the field research, I spoke with the Dutch policy officer on Jordan, who helped me further design the research and provided me with contacts in Jordan. In this way, I connected with policy officers (working on migration) at the Dutch embassy in Amman. The embassy redirected me to NGOs and local institutions that worked on Jordanian and Syrian social cohesion and/or host community and Syrian refugee resilience.

I moved to Amman (Sweileh) for three months from September 2019 until December 2019. The first connections in Amman were made through the accommodation I resided in. I deliberately chose to stay at an Airbnb, hosted by a local. From here, I made new contacts and approached the first weeks merely as 'going with the flow'. Since the research process was not fixed yet, I embraced where people in Amman led me to, making new contacts and having conversations with as many people as possible. With an open attitude, and avoiding orientalist perspectives as much as possible, I managed to establish friendships and strong connections within the first weeks of my stay. I did not necessarily mention I was in Amman for research purposes, at least not in the first encounters, but rather to learn Arabic and for tourism purposes – which was not a lie either. I choose this strategy because of the possible 'research fatigue' people in Amman feel. I was aware of the fact that the research field in Amman can be observed as "saturated" due to its central position as a relatively safe haven in the Middle East (Hawkins, 2019). Locals, therefore, might feel exhausted or 'research fatigue' by, yet another, researcher that is not directly able to offer solutions (Way, 2013). The data of this research is, besides using existing literature and examining this with practices for the case study, being gathered through conducting discussions with two NGOs, one research institute, ten interviews with Jordanians in Sweileh, and observations. The empirical findings are supported by pictures I took in the field, complementing literature and personal notes during observations.

4.2.1 Discussions Ngo's and the research institute

Through the snowball-effect approach, I secured an appointment with the Dutch embassy in Amman before arrival, which served as the offset for my field research. I visited the embassy in the second week of my stay. Besides only following the embassy's recommended contacts, I also informed on contact details of NGOs or research institutes of which I already found interesting studies on. I contacted ten different institutions - opening with: 'I obtained your contacts through the Dutch

embassy - used to work for the Foreign Affairs -', of which three were able to make an appointment within the research timeframe. Two NGOs, SIREN and Finish Church Aid, and the well-established local research institute, WANA, agreed upon a meeting. After 2-3 weeks of orientation and acclimatization, based on the institution availability, I discussed the research topic with SIREN, after 1 month with Finish Church Aid (FCA) and the WANA Institute. I spoke with Kareem Rosshandler, a research of the WANA institute, Jehan Zaben, a policy officer working on the Syrian refugee crisis within the FCA, and collaboratively with the team (ten employees) of SIREN about my research.

These fruitful discussions provided a strong base for the further research. In the context of iterative research. Attachment 1.3 further describes the discussions and their contributions to this research. The discussions with these institutions have not been recorded, but extensive notes were made throughout the conversations. Taking notes was more into place, because it felt more appropriate and appreciated by participants. I discussed sensitive subjects with these institutions and only in secrecy they were more likely to offer the complete picture, even if this picture was not necessarily the institutions' vision.

Validity of discussions

Furthermore, reflecting on the validity of the three discussions with the institutions; it is critical to realize that institutions are not entirely independent but rather rely on financial support of governments, for example. SIREN and FCA likewise, both rely on Irish and Finnish financial support and their national agendas on specific topics. To give a more nuanced explanation, FCA and SIREN have been established in Jordan as one of the first NGOs since 2011. Implementations of their work deeply rely collaborations with local stakeholders. SIREN - for example - works closely together with Jordanian police and FCA with Jordanian entrepreneurs. The WANA Institute, in fact, is an independent institution and merely managed by Jordanians or people from the region.

4.2.2 Interviews with Jordanians in Sweileh

After a deeper understanding of the research context, I started to conduct semi-structured interviews with Jordanians in Sweileh. Participants were selected through random sampling on the streets of Sweileh. After speaking to the first Jordanians in Sweileh, I applied the 'snowball-method' in which participants 'tipped' others for possible new interviews (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015). On average, Jordanians in Sweileh are not sufficient in English or speak English limitedly. Since my Arabic does not reach an eligible level, I have been supported by an Arabic translator. All interviews are recorded with the consent of participants and textually typed out by an Arabic translator to English. On the afternoons of October 26, November 1, November 28 and December 5, together with my translator we approached dozens of Jordanians. Our tactic was approaching people in the center of Sweileh, close to

the central market, in the central street which was appointed by my translator. This area offers markets, eateries, and communal meeting points. This research searches for a general perception of Jordanians (in Sweileh), and the selection criteria used was therefore that we approached Jordanians. My translator was for most of the approaches able to distinguish Jordanians from Syrians. However, we included the possibility of approaching a Syrian in Sweileh, and anticipated this ethically by providing an alternative (short) questionnaire (moreover in paragraph 4.3). In search of participants, we approached people who seemed to have a break - or at least they were not occupied by getting groceries for example. The list of participants is displayed in attachment 5.

The majority of people on the streets of Sweileh were men. To establish more balance in gender, we searched for women in shops along the streets, for example in florist shops, clothing shops, and at the local female gym. Furthermore, we did not search for a specific age, since this research seeks for a general view of Jordanians (in Sweileh). However, we chose to approach adults (18+) because I considered them to be more aware of how Syrians changed the context of Sweileh, and were more knowledgeable and reasoning for their attitudes towards Syrians. Eventually, ten people agreed to cooperate in total. These interviews were extensive and in-depth, on average taking 30 minutes.

Validity interviews with Jordanians in Sweileh

The initial proposal required a higher number of interviews with Jordanians. In reality, gathering participants appeared to be more difficult than imagined.

First off, the language barrier appeared larger than expected. The majority of people I spoke with, did not speak eligible English, at least not 'sufficient enough' for them to fully express their opinion. The most challenging barrier to this research, therefore, has been the language barrier. The official spoken language in Jordan is Arabic, and although English is widely promoted in Jordan, as well as in educational institutes as at homes, it only reaches a fragment of Jordanian society (Saidat, 2010). To limit bias and come up with valid results, an Arabic translator therefore indispensable. Since I operated as an independent researcher, not financially supported by third parties, there was little to no budget to hire a professional translator. Luckily, a Jordanian contact I made in the first few weeks of my stay was willing to help me with translations. He helped me extensively by joining field trips in Sweileh, conducting the interviews and eventually translating the interview from Arabic to English. Because of the voluntary nature of this service, and the time-consuming process of finding participants, a higher number of interviews was unrealistic within the research timeframe.

Besides, my translator experienced after six interviews a saturation in answers. The seventh interview also had significant similarities in answers. Eventually, three out of the ten interviews were conducted in English (by me) and 6 out of 10 in Arabic. If participants were eligible for conducting the interviews in English and felt secure enough in expressing their opinion in English, then this language

was the preference. Despite possible errors in the process of translation, which possibly caused a decrease of validity, the choice for people to express themselves in their language, Arabic, remained the priority. To increase the validity within translating, I discussed every interview with my translator after every conduction. If there were clear emotions visible, I asked for a summary during the conversation. Interviewing English-speaking Jordanians only would have caused great bias; only a small percentage of people in Amman speak eligible English. These people are mostly high-educated young people.

Even if there would have been more budget and if saturation did not occur after ten interviews, it appeared more difficult than expected to gather participants who were willing to conduct an interview. The reason for this reluctance is further explained in the results chapter.

The validity of the target group

As explained in paragraph 1.3, this research initially focused on 'people in Amman', aiming to gain a general view on their perspective. In reality, and on the ground, Amman is extremely fragmented and to generalize relevant results on this demarcation would not have been accurate. Instead, I further demarcated to Sweileh, where Jordanians who are relatively vulnerable, as well as co-existing with Syrians. As this group appeared to be less exposed and more relevant for research outcomes - based on discussion with and observations in higher segments of Amman in the first weeks - the target group of this research shifted to increase the validity of the interview outcomes. There are (only) ten people in Sweileh eventually interviewed, but this gives already a view on the more general perspectives, combining the in-depth interviews with observations and daily informal conversations with people in Sweileh for 2,5 months. The demarcation to this specific group merely enables this research to provide the opinions of vulnerable Jordanians - people who are the direct competitors of Syrians on the labor market, housing, etc. To reflect on this, this group might be more likely to have a negative sentiment towards Syrians than people of higher segments who do not compete or/and interact first-hand with Syrians. Opposing this, the group of 'vulnerable' Jordanians is significantly higher than affluent Jordanians throughout the total of Amman (and Jordan). Vulnerable Jordanians are not only found in Sweileh but in the overwhelming parts of Amman. Investigating this target group remains therefore relevant and is more valid to provide generalized answers than investigating the wealthier (English-speaking) parts of Amman.

Interview interpretation

After conducting the interviews, I examined the interview answers by using open coding techniques in Atlas.ti. This application provides the ability to code texts by linking words, expressions and sentences to concepts and sentiments. Open coding offered flexibility and helped to fragment and to come to

the core of the issue, rather than predetermined coding (Lyons & Coyle (2016). Throughout the analysis, I considered questions, such as: *which words frequently are mentioned? What are the frequently used words linked to? What is the sentiment during the interview? On what do the participants get into, rather than other topics?* Attachment 4 further displays the codes used.

Results representation

The display of results is mostly textual but underlined with pie charts, organic trees and images I made during my stay. In the results chapter, I test theories with practices on the ground. The answers of interviews and discussion, and the observations, are linked to the theory if appropriate. This research focuses for the most part on perceptions, rather than on technically-exact numbers and figures. Claims within perceptions of people I spoke with are not at all times necessarily accurate or the reality, but one's perception of a situation is one's reality as well. Claims that were mentioned in the interviews, for example that Syrians have higher wages, were checked in fact and where possible complemented with figures or existing literature.

Furthermore, perceptions can also explain individual actions, or actions likely to occur. To illustrate the voices of the people I spoke with, I chose to use quotes to underline findings. Most of these quotes are translated from Arabic to English and are therefore not precisely mentioned similar to this, but rather translated as one-on-one as possible.

Because of the ethnographic nature of this research, I combine empirical findings with personal experiences. Experiences that I considered as relevant and underlining to the data gathered, I included in this research.

Saturation

According to Saunders, et. al. (2018), the saturation point is reached when data collection is 'saturated' and participants' answers remain steadily the same. It should be noted that the expected number of interviews has been lower in reality. Eventually only ten Jordanian participants were interviewed whereas I aimed for at least twenty. It was, however, more challenging than expected to gather participants. It is, therefore, plausible that more variety in answers would have occurred if there was a higher number of participants. I was, however, able to collect an extensive view on perceptions, dynamics and attitudes in Amman, especially in Sweileh, because I lived here for almost three months and connected with a great number of Jordanians (informally). Additionally, besides the interviews and the daily contacts, the discussions with NGOs and with policy officers of the Dutch embassy in Amman allowed me to further understand the context of Jordan and Syrian refugees.

4.3 Internal and external validity

Despite well-considered choices in the method, the potential threats to validity of this research should be considered in understanding to what extent is actually measured what this research claims to have measured (Kelly and McGrath, 1988). Campbell and Stanley (1966) provide guidance in how to measure validity by explaining factors that can affect internal- and external validity. Internal validity describes treatments within the research itself, and how these treatments have 'made a difference in this specific experimental instance, the basic minimum without which any experiment is uninterpretable' (Campbell and Stanley, 1966, p. 5). External validity refers to the extent of generalization of the research and how extendable the outcomes are for (other) populations, variables or settings (Campbell and Stanley, 1966, p. 5). For both internal and external validity of researches there are several factors examining possible threats; 8 internal validity threats and 3 validity external threats. Not all factors, however, are applicable to this specific research due to the research nature of testing one group and only one moment of testing per participant (not comparing multiple): Jordanians in Sweileh. The following overview elaborates on the internal and external threats of this research that potentially have caused bias.

Table 3: Threats to internal and external validity

Threats to internal validity³⁹	Case specific
Sample size	Ten Jordanians agreed to participate in in-depth interviews, which has given extensive information on their views and resembled in their answers. It should, however, be considered that a larger sample size could have shown more variety in answer, and that findings are more based on chances. To reduce the threat of the small sample size to the internal validity, besides interviews there have also observations and discussions with institutions taken place. Furthermore, informal conversations on a daily basis for 3-months have also contributed to a deeper understanding of the research question and have complemented the interviews.

³⁹Campbell and Stanley (1996, p. 5-16); Kelly and McGrath (1988, p. 16-19)

<p>Instrument change: <i>The change of (human) instruments throughout the research (f.e. motivation, fatigue, interviewers, questioning).</i></p>	<p>The questionnaire was exacerbated after the first interview after noticing the interviewee did not understand all the questions initially. The questionnaire was minorly changed tailored more into the daily lives of people rather than abstract discussions (such as refugee return). Furthermore, after three interviews we gained more confidence in approaching participants, and also the interviews ran more smoothly over time (repetition). This potentially reflected in the confidence of participants as well, and potentially have influenced their answers (more embedded than the first interviews). Finally, my company changed throughout different research measures: during observations I have been in contact with a range of people, from Jordanians to expats, and from refugee to policy officers. This can be analyzed as a research strength, but specific companies at a specific time could also have biased my perception during observations. The results chapter therefore, if applicable, takes company during observations into account.</p>
<p>History: <i>Potential effects on participants attitudes from events happening during the time-course of the research</i></p>	<p>The region was exposed to sequences of unrest during my stay: civil protests in Lebanon and Iraq, Turkish invasion into North-East Syria, and the Jordanian-Israeli peace-deal coming to an end. These external events widely covered in local media and main topics in daily conversations. The Syrian refugee crisis might have been relatively less important perceived at that time than other development, and therefore, possibly influenced how (in)extensive answers on this particular subject were described.</p>

<p>Threats to external validity</p>	<p>Research specific</p>
<p>Participants characteristics: <i>The extent of the selected participants representing a larger population</i></p>	<p>Correlated with the relatively small sample size, the interview outcomes should be considered as perceptions of individuals in Sweileh, but are not sufficient enough to generalize all inhabitants of the neighborhood of Sweileh nor the people of Amman. Random sampling, as implemented in this research, however increases the validity. Even though this research method selected on age (18+) and searched for female participants since the gender divisions was unbalanced, these general characteristics are included in random sampling. A different gender balance (for example more women), however, possibly would have caused different outcomes. Finally, the participants of the interviews were eventually the ones willing to cooperate while many others denied. It should be considered that only these volunteers gave different answers than, for example, the people who denied. Participants who are eager to participate can have (personal) purposes, for example are politically engaged. But also more banal: are perhaps less shy or less scared of consequences of participation than people who denied.</p>
<p>Situational factors: <i>The research situation time, location, researcher characteristics</i></p>	<p>My role as a researcher should be considered to have caused potential bias. As a European and Dutch woman, answered might have differed when, for example, a Jordanian man asked the questions. In the interviews, however, I was assisted by a Jordanian translator. Also for the interviews in English.</p>

<p>Timing: <i>Potential difference in answers in future research or when the research was conducted in a longer/shorter period</i></p>	<p>It should be considered that the outcomes of this research potentially differed if it was conducted in earlier stages of the Syrian refugees crisis. Syrian refugees are almost 9 years in Jordan, in which the attitudes and challenges are likely to have changed over time. The same counts for if the research happened one year ahead from now, if the security situation in Syria will shift, for example, and affects how hospitable Jordanians remain.</p>
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4.4 Conditions and boundaries

Terminology

The term 'integration' can be observed as taboo in Jordanian society since it implies the protracted stay of refugees. Humanitarian and development circles rather use the term 'refugee inclusion' or 'social cohesion' (Simpson, 2019). During my interviews and observations, I have, therefore, been careful with using the term integration.

Jordanian-Jordanians and Jordanian-Palestinians

Jordan's population consist merely of people from Palestinian background. Palestinians are deeply adapted in Jordanian society and their identity cannot be seen separately from Jordanian identity. To further determine the target group, this research applies Jordanians as people with a Jordanian passport and citizenship. Regardless of their or their elder generations' heritage.

4.5 Ethics

The Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan is highly sensitive and, therefore, requires ethical considerations while approaching field-research (Simpson, 2019). Following Limb's (2001) advice on conducting research ethically, I reassured that the participants of the interviews were aware of the research topic and that they remained anonymous (Limb, 2001). Furthermore, research in Jordan contains gender-based barriers, since it is a masculine-oriented country and female voices are less represented (Alfadhli, 2018). It is uncommon for a woman alone to conduct field research in a male-dominated neighborhood, such as Sweileh, and therefore my (male) translator always accompanied (Alfadhli, 2018). Likewise, proper (covered) way of dressing was required to be considered gravely and to dispense respect to Jordanian norms.

Moreover, while approaching participants for interviews in Sweileh, it was relevant to approach Jordanians rather than Syrians since Jordanian voices are central to this research. From an outside perspective, it is difficult to identify Jordanians from Syrians. To avoid awkwardness or potential offenses concerning ethnicity, I established a questionnaire if the people approached happened to be Syrian (see attachment 2).

Chapter 5: Research results

This chapter explains the results of the data collected which answers the sub questions. The chapter is constructed in five paragraphs, which are in line with the five main sub questions. At the end of every paragraph, I give a brief conclusion of the results. The results are further interpreted and critically reflected in the conclusion (Chapter 6).

5.1 How do Jordanians perceive their hospitality?

This paragraph answers the first main sub question: how *do Jordanians perceive their hospitality?* by examining the three sub- questions: *How do Jordanians perceive their hospitality towards Syrian refugees?* and *how do Jordanians perceive their hospitality towards different types of 'guests'?*

5.1.1 How do Jordanians perceive their hospitality in general?

Generally, Jordanians are positioned as extremely hospitable people. As well as in the literature as in non-literature (tourism promotion material for example) In the literature, Jordanians are characterized as generous and hospitable people, which is derived from ancient Bedouin culture (Shryock, 2008).

Everyone who has visited an Arab country before is familiar with the extreme hospitable environment in which guests are invited to eat, sleep and stay as long as they want. This sense of hospitality was also tangible the minute I arrived in Amman; every Jordanian seemed to be waiting in the wings to offer me help. As Sobh, et. al. (2013) explains, Arab hospitality is interwoven with Bedouin culture, derived from ancient decades of surviving in harsh desert environments nomads lived in. Nomads helped each other by opening up their (temporarily) houses and to sustain the nomadic lifestyle.

In a conversation with a young Jordanian man⁴⁰, a captivating example of ancient Arab Bedouin culture was covered. A famous ancient Arabic poet was the generous Hatim Al-Tai, who is also mentioned in the hadiths of the Prophet Mohammed (Rahman, 2003). The extreme generosity of Hatim is well known in Arabic folklore. This is, for example, evident in the proverbial phrase: *more generous than Hatim*. The legends of Hatim prevail the importance of honoring and being generous towards guests. These are two examples of his legacy (Radhman, 2003):

⁴⁰ Jordanian man, personal communication, October 18, 2019.

*'One day, when Hatim was sent to take the family's camels to graze, Hatim returned empty-handed, but with a face that was beaming with pride, as he told his stunned father that he'd given away every one of his camels, no doubt sure of the honor it would bestow on the family name.'*⁴¹

*'One night, Hatim was greeted by a group of riders, among whom were three poets, who were off seeking their fortune in exchange for their wordplay. Generous as he was, Hatim offered them his village to set up camp for the night, and then proceeded to slaughter three of his best camels to prepare a feast for his guests, much to the amusement of these poets.'*⁴²

The ongoing legacy of Hatim's generosity is an expressive illustration of the importance of hospitality in contemporary Arab culture. Since Hatim's hospitality is praised in Islam, Jordanians as well feel honorable to protect their guests and offer them as much hospitality as possible.

Contemporary Jordanian hospitality

Contemporary Jordanian hospitality is also perceived positively by Jordanians themselves.

In the interviews, for example, the majority fully agreed that Jordanians are extremely hospitable towards people from outside Jordan. These answers are mostly motivated by the inherence of hospitality in ancient Bedouin culture. The majority of the participants consider Jordanians as people with good morals, based upon the standards in Bedouin culture and in Islam. Besides, also because Jordanians 'are used to doing it'. In the interviews, participants underlined that Jordanians have always been taking care of neighboring countries, migrants and visitors. Additionally, in the interviews, Jordanian hospitality is described as 'something they have to do'. It is not an option to not take care of guests. Following Derrida's (2000) theory of forms of hospitality, hospitality rooted in Jordanian culture is in line with the concept of 'unconditional hospitality'. Jordanians perceive hosting guests as something they have to do, without necessarily expecting anything in return. It is, as in Derrida's theory explained, an ethical duty, derived from Bedouin culture and underlined in Islam.

*"It doesn't matter who or where you come from. Everyone is welcome. This is visible in Amman nowadays. It has become a multi-ethnic city."*⁴³

⁴¹ Heroes of Arabia - Viswanathan (2017): <https://timesofoman.com/article/111368>

⁴² Heroes of Arabia - Viswanathan (2017): <https://timesofoman.com/article/111368>

⁴³ Participant 10, personal communication, December 5, 2019

"It is an honor to host people. In ancient times, as visible in Arab folklore, Arabs would always fight for guests and it still happens today."⁴⁴

One interviewee⁴⁵ describes that, regardless of the difficult circumstances a large part of the Jordanian society lives, Jordanians as well as other migrant- or refugee groups, no one is dying of hunger. "We would always take care of each other". He elaborates on this with an Arabic saying: *"if you have one dinar you can share it with your neighbor"*. Even though Jordanians are suffering – which I accurately experienced during my stay in Jordan – Jordanians tend to remain moral and helpful towards others. One of the interviewees quotes:

"Even though we are suffering, we remain moral and humane. Syrian or not Syrian. Iraqi or not Iraqi. It is inherent in Jordanian culture. Or maybe Arab culture. For example, the street worker who is working in front of my office visits me every day and asks for water. I give him 1 JD every day. He is suffering and what is 1 JD for me? Most Jordanians think like that. Even if you have less money."⁴⁶

Hospitable towards everyone?

Whereas most interviewees perceive Jordanian hospitality as 'something they have to do' towards any guests, two participants⁴⁷ explain Jordanian hospitality as more 'selective'. They both explain how there is greater hospitality towards non-Arabs. Specifically towards Europeans (tourists) and expats. Following their arguments, Europeans are treated with a 'special treatment'. Both participants, who work together or meet up with Europeans occasionally, experience different attitudes of Jordanians when they are surrounded by Europeans in Jordan. I experienced this 'special treatment' myself as well. On several occasions, I was favored over locals because of my Dutch nationality. This happened mostly in security contexts, for example in lines (at the police office), at the border crossing with Israel (VIP entrance). Furthermore, I have experienced conversations to be different alone or with other Europeans, more positive and approachable, than when surrounded by Jordanian or Palestinian companions. Also, at tourist attractions throughout Jordan, the Jordanian government has made sure that tourists are not experiencing any inconveniences.

⁴⁴ Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

⁴⁵ Participant 8, personal communication, December 5, 2019

⁴⁶ Participant 8, personal communication, December 5, 2019

⁴⁷ Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019; Participant 9, personal communication, December 12, 2019

Image 6: Information for tourists at Petra, the most touristic attraction of Jordan



On the one hand, Jordanians perceive their hospitality inherent to their culture, deriving from Bedouin habits. On the other hand, their hospitality is not necessarily directed to fellow Jordanians, or Arabs, but rather from people outside Jordan, in my experience particularly Europeans. How can Jordanian hospitality be placed in the context of the Syrian refugees that sought refuge in Jordan since 2011?


5.1.2 How do Jordanians perceive their hospitality towards Syrian refugees?

According to the literature, Jordan has had the most sophisticated regional response to the Syrian refugee crisis compared to other large hosting countries (Chatty, 2010; Dbas & Quorah, 2011). During my internship at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jordan was also often mentioned as the 'best practice' of offering resilience for Syrian refugees and being a strong ally in the region. This sophisticated approach is also perceived by Jordanians themselves. Following the interviews, all participants agreed upon the remarkable approach and resilience of Jordan's refugee crisis. In daily conversations I had, Jordanians came across as almost proud of their hospitality towards Syrian, occasionally summing up all the efforts they achieved to offer Syrians a safety.

However, three interviewees portray how Jordanians are not necessarily hospitable towards Syrian refugees, but because Jordan is often compared to other host countries, they are relatively hospitable. The question then remains: would Jordan also be observed as hospitable without the recurrent comparison to other host countries? The interviewees illustrate Jordanian hostility towards Syrians refugees by hostile events they experienced over time. For example, they experienced how Syrian children were bullied in schools, how Jordanian authorities have been abusive towards Syrians, how cruel circumstances of the refugee camps are, and the discreet racist sentiments discussed among Jordanians. One of the participants explains that these racist attitudes towards Syrians were discussed daily in taxi rides (which are common form of transportation in Amman) and the inevitable discussion

on how the Syrians worsened the traffic in Amman⁴⁸. The following figure illustrate the division of positive, negative and neutral sentiments on how Jordanians perceive their hospitality towards Syrian refugees, deriving from the opinions given in interviews with Jordanians:

Figure 2: Sentiment Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees



Despite several negative sentiments on how hospitable Jordanians have been towards Syrians, the vast majority of Jordanians I spoke with emphasized on the hospitable environment of Jordan. Following the interviews, the community of Sweileh has been extremely hospitable towards Syrian refugees. Especially in the beginning, when they arrived in 2011 and 2012. Asking people in Sweileh about their hospitality towards Syrians seemed almost a rhetorical question. Of course, they have been hospitable.

"Jordanians have welcomed Syrians more than whoever did. More than what Europe did, more than Lebanon. We have remained hospitable. That is in our nature, we are used to doing that. Syrians are our neighbors who went through a horrible war and I think they would do the same for us."⁴⁹

While asking about hospitable actions of people in Sweileh, interviewees explained how they have opened up their houses for Syrians, how property owners lowered rents to make it more affordable for Syrians, how they offered Syrians jobs, and how they volunteered, for example, by building educational spaces for Syrians.

"Jordanians were extremely welcoming to Syrians, they gave them jobs and prioritized them in that regard, as a kindergarten teacher, most of my co-workers were Syrians. I haven't seen inhospitable actions from Jordanians. Moreover, half of the participants emphasize on how the people in Sweileh

⁴⁸ Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

⁴⁹ Participant 5, personal communication, November 1, 2019

placed the wellbeing of Syrians on that of their own. They opened their houses for Syrians while living in poor circumstances themselves.” (Participant 3, personal communication, November 11, 2019)

“Syrians changed this neighborhood. They opened shops, found jobs and made friendships. We welcomed them as brothers and treated them as such.” (Participant 1, personal communication, October 26, 2019)

However, the hospitable actions towards Syrian refugees were not necessarily perceived as positive by everyone. One of the interviewees experienced how his neighborhood offered extensive help to Syrians. He was extremely frustrated by this since many vulnerable Jordanians are living in Sweileh and they should be helped first. He, quite vocally, explained how he *“cannot stand the help towards Syrians”*⁵⁰. On a more concerning note, another interviewee experienced how fellow Jordanians in Sweileh have exploited the arrival of Syrians and their vulnerability. He experienced in close circles how Syrians were sexually and financially being exploited.

Finally, another participant described how vocal Jordanians were about Syrians in the beginning, but that this was shared among Jordanians only, rather than expressed towards Syrians. He elaborates on this by experiences in taxi rides (which are common in Amman). In taxis, the presence of Syrians in Jordan is often the topic and where accompanied negative stereotypes are being discussed. He continues: *“The sentiment towards Syrians has not always been necessarily negative, but definitely not as positive as sometimes seems. Not even in the beginning”*⁵¹.

Discussions with institutions

‘Why are we surprised by how hospitable Jordan is responding to the Syrian refugee crisis?’. This question was raised during the discussion I had with SIREN (personal communication, October 15, 2019). With ‘we’, the policy officer referred to Western organizations and governments. She elaborated that Western organizations and governments approach Jordan’s response plan towards the Syrian refugee crisis as if we are “waiting for it to go wrong”. Why don’t we perceive hospitality as the standard and hostility as the deviation?

This is especially interesting following the answers of Jordanian participants and the way they see hospitality as an inherent driver, a natural response. Karim Rosshandler, a researcher of the WANA institute working on research of host- and refugee communities in Jordan, explained how this natural hospitality is rooted in historical constructions, and not necessarily questioned or widely debated as seen in, for example, Europe (personal communication, October 25, 2019).

Rosshandler continues: “Jordan has always been a transit country. Petra, for example, was

⁵⁰ Participant 10, personal communication, December 5, 2019

⁵¹ Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

always the trading route to mecca. Jordanian ancestors took care of travelers in harsh desert environments. The population situation in Jordan has never been permanent [referring to the fluidity and the rapid growth]. This fluidity of immigration and emigration also affects how Jordanians perceive migrants and refugees; people are used to it. The continuous changes in the population of Jordan, the inherent Bedouin hospitality and the historical migrations in- and out Jordan is deeply embedded within Jordanian identity (personal communication, October 25, 2019)."

Jehan Zaben, policy officer of the FCA working on the Syrian refugee crisis and establishing projects that support social cohesion between Jordanians and Syrians, is Jordanian herself. She explains Jordanian generosity not by 'doing Syrians a favor', but as something Jordanians 'have to do'. Jordanians do not necessarily expect compensation of Syrians, but they expect Syrians to be moral in their actions and adapt to Jordanian standards. She explains the roots of hospitality are detectable in the Arabic language and in phrases of the Islam (personal communication, October 28, 2019).

Once I was aware of this, alongside with learning the Arabic language and adapting more to the Jordanian culture, I noticed indeed the traces of hospitality in even the most subtle forms of Jordanian daily life.

A few examples:

*Traces in Arabic (colloquial Jordanian) language*⁵²

- 'Mgaddam' - It is already yours (you do not have to ask for it).
- Ta'ali kul youm - Come every day.
- El beit beita - The house (my house) is yours.
- Tfaddal gabli - Enter before I do.

Traces in Islam

- Various verses in the Quran and the Hadith refer to generosity towards 'strangers', 'outsiders', and 'guests' (Sobh, et. al. 2013). Verse 78 in Hadith specifically refers to the protection of guests from outside aggressors. If the host fails to offer protection to their guest, it would be a shame on the host (Sobh, et. al., 2013): *He who believes in Allah and the Last Day should honor his guest. Provisions for the road are what will serve for a day and night; hospitality extends for three days; what goes beyond that is Sadqa [voluntary charity]; it is not allowable that a guest should stay till he makes himself encumbrance.*

⁵² Azban, A. (2011). The unprecedented spoken Jordanian-Palestinian dialect. Diwan Baladna. (Confirmed by Arabic translator, Adham Sinan)

Moreover, the importance and the value Jordanians attach to Islam and its manifestations should not be underestimated. Jordanians strive to live up to the *sunnah* – the way Prophet Mohammed lived – and the teachings and instructions of the Quran. Because hospitality is inherent in Islam as well, it is also a form of showing-off, gaining pride in charity, or at least emphasizing how good of a Muslim one is by approaching foreigners with extreme generosity (Zulfiqar, 2011, p. 193). My name, Jannah, for example, means *paradise or heaven* in Arabic and refers to the Paradise promised to the righteous in the Quran. This is the highest goal to reach as a Muslim which can be reached by acting morally and accordingly to Islam (Tazi, 2015, p. 1). I noticed how taxi drivers, for example, would always respond to my name with numerous blessings. In summary, hospitality and generosity cannot be observed inextricably of the Islamic identity and importance of religion within the Jordanian society.

5.1.3 How do Jordanians perceive their hospitality towards different types of ‘guests’?

To better understand Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees it is useful to place hospitality of Jordanians in general (also towards other migrant- or refugee groups) into context. The theory of Teffler (1996) and the ‘types of guests’ is examined in this paragraph. This theory distinguishes hospitality for pleasure and hospitality out of a sense of duty, and can therefore conceptually explain more about the conditions for being hospitable towards different types of guests. Migrant- and refugee groups should, however, not necessarily be considered as ‘guests’, since many of them were urged to come to Jordan and start over, rather than out of ‘pleasure’ purposes such as tourism. To examine the theory of different guests and hospitality (which in theory is considered as host-guest relations), however, for practical purposes I refer to guests as non-Jordanians; refugees, migrants, tourists, etc. Teffler (1996) categorizes three types of guests in 1) guests who are friends of the host, 2) who are included in the social circle of the host or 3) guests who are people in need.

Syrians and Palestinians

During the discussion with SIREN⁵³ the differences between the arrival of Syrian refugees and Palestinian refugees in Jordan was brought up. The most distinctive difference, following several members of the SIREN team, was that during the Palestinian refugees influxes Jordan was challenged with nation-building efforts and territorial claims. Additionally, the right to return for Palestinians seemed far away and Jordanians realized their stay would be irreversible. The Syrian refugees in Jordan, however, have cultivated a different perspective on the duration of stay: Jordanians expect Syrians to return one day. Rosshandler of the WANA Institute (personal communication, October 25, 2019) attests this general perception, but argues that Jordanians perceive the moment of return for

⁵³ Personal communication, October 15, 2019

Syrians will occur as long as Bashar al-Assad is in power in Syria. He elaborates that both Palestinians and Syrians have been received with hospitality because of the urgency of helping these vulnerable groups. Palestinian refugees, and to some extent Syrian refugees as well, were either direct family (tribal relations) or were at least perceived as family in how Jordanians opened their houses for them. This way of being hospitable is consistent with receiving guests because they are 1) perceived as family - or are actually related, in combination with 2) these 'guests' being in need.

Different migrant- and refugee groups in

Furthermore, in my discussion with Rosshandler, he provides a 'sequence' of how the most prominent migrant- and refugee groups in Jordan are perceived from positively to more negatively by Jordanians (premises that Palestinians are part an embedded part of Jordanian society). This sequences is as follows⁵⁴: Iraqis, Syrians, Yemenis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Somalis, and at last South-East Asians. During my observations, I found several examples that confirmed the order of this sequence, which are explained next to Rosshandler grounds, supported by complementing literature. It should be considered, however, that this is a rather generalized picture of how migrant- and refugee groups are perceived by Jordanians. It can, however, indicate a general sense of how different groups in Jordan are perceived and the reasons for this positive or negative perception.

First of all, Iraqis and Jordanians know a long history of political and economic collaboration (oil trade, labor- and education exchanges). Iraq and Jordanian governments joint forces during the Saddam Hussein administration and the reign of King Faisal aiming to warrant Sunni Islam in the region⁵⁵. In the literature, Fagen (2009), for example, also explains how wealthy Iraqis migrated to Jordan and invested their funds in properties as 'a hedge against instability and repression' in their own country (p. 6). As I noticed during my observations, many Jordanians have a predilection for Iraq and for Saddam Hussein. This was, for example, noticeable in how Jordanian taxi drivers extensively praised the prosperity Iraqis brought to Jordan. Additionally, symbols of Iraq are frequently symbolled in the street view. The face of Saddam Hussein, for example, occasionally appears as a sticker on cars or as ornaments in taxis. Also, during the start of protests in Iraq from October 2019 onwards, I experienced how people went on the streets with Iraqi flags to show solidarity with protesters.

⁵⁴ Rosshandler - WANA Institute, personal communication, October 25, 2019. His rationale was based on doing years of research on refugees in Jordan and the attitudes of host communities. These are the largest migrant- and refugee groups in Jordan and do not take 'guests' for pleasure (such as tourists) in consideration.

⁵⁵ Rosshandler, personal communication, October 25, 2019

Image 7: Saddam Hussein decals adhered to cars in Jordan



Secondly, following Rosshandler's sequence, Syrians are then most positively perceived by Jordanians due to the tribal ties between Jordanians and Syrians, especially in the North of Jordan. Helping relatives is amplified by the awareness most Jordanians have about the horrors Syrians went through which has developed a sense of duty to offer Syrians protection (Rosshandler, personal communication, October 25, 2019). During my observations I also noticed how horrified Jordanians spoke about the war in Syria, and how afraid they have been themselves as well. Especially in the first years of the conflict (moreover in paragraph 5.2.2). The relations between Jordan and Syria, however, have caused tensions before and possibly continue to play a role in contemporary relations. Syrians historically tended to support radical Palestinian movement, for example, the support of Palestinian Liberation Organization in the catastrophic 'Black September' in 1970, who fought the Jordanian Armed forces harmed Jordanian national security (Cooley, 2015, p. 131).

Rosshandler (personal communication, October 25, 2019) argues that Yemenis are then relatively well-perceived by Jordanians because they are conflict-driven refugees and in high need of a secured environment. He argues that Yemenis can easily adapt in Jordan, because they speak Arabic (with a distinctive accent). During my observations, I noticed how Yemeni shops are highly represented in the street view of Amman, selling typical Yemeni food, honey and traditional dressing. Egyptians also share the Arabic language with Jordanians, but Rosshandler argues that they are perceived less positively because they are merely economic rather than conflict-driven migrants. Furthermore, despite most Sudanese and Somalis in Jordan are Arabs, their ethnicity remains tied to their African roots. Davis et al. (2016) argue how these groups in Jordan are prejudiced on civilization underdevelopment and inferiority compared to Middle-Eastern Arabs (p. 3). Sudanese and Somalis in Jordan also have a distinctive culture that differs from Jordanian culture. They speak Arabic, but their accent is more difficult to understand. According to the discussion I had with SIREN's team, domestic workers from South-East Asia, merely with a Philippine or Myanmar nationality, this group is being seen as the

'other' and therefore also discriminated against. One of SIREN's field researchers concerns the fragile livelihoods of Southeast Asians in Jordan, how there are many suspicions of domestic violence from their Jordanians employers, and the extreme low wages they earn. SIREN's team explained how this group is neglected by the international community. Evidently, there is also little research done on the livelihoods of these groups in Jordan.

Teffler (1996)'s theory stretches on the one side hospitality 'for pleasure' and on the other side 'out of a sense of duty'. This tension field is not all-encompassing for the different groups in Jordan, but gives a sense where conditions for Jordanian hospitality are based on. Applying the findings to Teffler's categorization of hospitality towards different types of guests, the nature of migration towards Jordan and the cultural similarities seem to play an important role in how Jordanians perceive different migrant- and refugee groups. Syrians and Yemenis, for example, are conflict-driven refugees, people in need, which can be a reason for Jordanians to be hospitable towards them. But Syrians in particular can also be perceived as friends or family, due to the tribal relations with Jordanians. Groups who differ culturally more from Jordanians, such as Somalis and Sudanese seem to receive less hospitality. Even though their nature of migration derives from conflict, in particular for Somalis and Sudanese in Jordan (Davis et al., 2016). Iraqis, furthermore, brought prosperity to Jordan and have been 'good neighbors' of Jordan historically (Fagen, 2009).

Moreover, in the discussion with the team of SIREN, they explained that Syrians receive disproportionate attention from the internal community compared to other groups in Jordan. The overwhelming attention of the international community on Syrian refugees has enlarged frustrations among many Jordanians⁵⁶. This matter became more prominent during the interviews with Jordanians in Sweileh. While many Jordanians in Sweileh are a vulnerable group, they witness their Syrian neighbors receiving financial support that is sometimes even more than the average Jordanian in Sweileh. In addition, the sole focus of the international community on Syrians in Jordan neglects not only vulnerable Jordanians, but also other migrant or refugee groups that have become more vulnerable after 2011. In Chapter 2, this matter is further highlighted.

Conclusion

To conclude this first results paragraph, Jordanians perceive being hospitable as an intrinsic drive in Jordanian society, deriving from Arab Bedouin culture and also detected in the Arabic language and phrases of the Quran. Jordanians are selective, however, in their hospitality towards different types of guests. As a European researcher, coming for 'pleasure' purposes rather than being 'in need', I was

⁵⁶ SIREN team, personal communication, October 15, 2019

treated almost disproportionately hospitable. This might have affected how Jordanians shared their perceptions on their hospitality in general, but also towards Syrian refugees with me. Whereas Jordanians are perceived on the international stage as the most sophisticated responding country towards Syrian refugees, it should be considered that this image at all costs is being maintained towards 'outsiders' (like me) while the situation differs more negatively in practice. The different groups of migrants- and refugees in Jordan seem to be perceived differently, based on their nature of migration (conflict or labor) and the extent of cultural similarities with Jordanians. In proportion to other groups in Jordan, Syrians seem to be received relatively positively. Syrians are conflict-driven refugees and Jordanians seem to feel a sense of duty to protect them, and for some Jordanians, to protect them as family. There seem to be more similarities in identity characteristics between Syrians and Jordanians, than, for example, between Jordanians and Sudanese or Somalis. This paragraph analyzed Jordanian hospitality towards different groups in Jordan, whereas the next paragraphs elaborate specifically on hospitality towards Syrian refugees and the similar identity characteristics in this.

5.2 Shared identity between Jordanians and Syrian refugees

Before comparing Jordanian identity characteristics with those of Syrian refugees in Jordan to understand the perceived shared identity, I first reflect on how Jordanians perceive their identity in general. This paragraph covers the second sub question: *how do Jordanians perceive their Jordanian identity?* This is analyzed by further zooming in on the local identity and the role of this local identity in the acceptance or rejection of Syrian refugees.

5.2.1 How do Jordanians perceive Jordanian identity?

As described in the previous chapter, there is a clear sense of the importance of hospitality in Jordanian identity. This hospitality appears to derive from Islamic and Bedouin culture. One of the interviewees explained: "*Jordanians are moral. They have good standards. They use Islamic standards in how they perceive Syrians.*"⁵⁷ Jordanians describe Jordanian identity also as 'resilient', mostly referring to how Jordan remains peaceful in a turbulent region. One of the participants elaborates: "*Most of the Jordanians are struggling, but we keep on going and we leave no one [regardless of one's nationality] behind*"⁵⁸. Manifestations of Jordanian local identity, such as flags, traditional dresses, local music, artworks, street names, shop names, etc., are highly visible while walking through Amman. During my observations, I noticed that people are aware of their nationality, heritage and culture. In daily

⁵⁷ Participant 8, personal communication, December 5, 2019

⁵⁸ Participant 1, personal communication, October 26, 2019

conversations I had with taxi drivers in Amman, for instance, explanations about the drivers' identity would always come across the conversation. "I am Jordanian but originating from Palestine". "I am Jordanian-Jordanian." "My family is from Irbid". While there is a strong sense of a variety of identities, especially the variety of nationalities, living in Jordan, this does not necessarily divide inhabitants. Most Jordanians I spoke with are not significantly nationalistic towards Jordan or, in case of migrant or refugee groups, towards their motherlands. As I have explained, carrying out identity explicitly (mentioning one's nationality, family, origin, etc.) is a form of explaining one's status and possibilities in Jordan. The diversity in citizenships in Jordan exhibits the different implications for, for example, property rights, legal protection, taxes and the duration of stay. For instance, a Palestinian refugee from '48 can have different legal rights than a Palestinian refugee from '67 living in Jordan. And a Jordanian from a specific family or tribe can have different protection than Jordanians from other families. These differences in citizenship have, naturally, implications on the daily lives of different people.

Image 8: Large wall painting of the Jordanian flag in Downtown Amman.



More physically, in the streets of Amman, there are various expressions of identity. Mostly predilections of Palestine and Jordan. For example through the appearance of Palestinian flags, street shops named after Palestinian cities and in how people are dressing in Palestinian traditional clothes.

Image 9: Wall art of shrinking Palestinian territory, Pejac Al-Hussein, Amman.



The emergence of Jordanians nationalism

Besides Palestinian identity manifestations, the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom symbols have become more popular in the last years. Whereas Jordanians are not necessarily bounded to nationalistic movements, an emergence of patriotic or non-politicized nationalist movements grew (Bakri & Al-Quran, 2012). This emergence can be traced back to the late King Hussein's reign but took unprecedented exponential popularity after the Arab Spring. Moreover, Naseem (2015) explains how the emergence of patriotism in the last years should be observed in the context of fears of the impact of uprisings and the possible spillover effects of the Arab Spring suppression in neighboring countries on Jordan. Suppressive regimes and the brutal consequences of the Arab Spring in other Arab countries, has frightened Jordanians. Therefore, a growing population has expressed more loyalty towards the ruling family than previously. The emergence of patriotism is illustrated by the sheer amount of patriotic songs, which glorify and praise the loyalty towards the ruling Hashemite family and the Jordanian artillery (Bakri & Al-Quran, 2012). Furthermore, many Jordanians in Amman's street view, mostly men, are wearing jackets, sweaters and T-shirts with the Hashemite symbol on it. This merchandise is broadly being marketed in clothing stores. The unprecedented importance of identifying with the Hashemite Kingdom is present through the great number of pictures of the King and his family. King Abdullah II, his father the late King Hussein and Abdullah's son the Crown Prince Hussein are imaged in almost every store or service institute.

⁵⁹ Source: <https://streetartnews.net/2016/04/pejac-in-amman-jordan.html>

Image 10: Merchandise of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, broadly worn by male Jordanians.



Image 11: Folklore Jordanian and Palestinian female dresses, Downtown, Amman.



Image 12: Shop selling Jordanians tribal scarves for men which are broadly worn by Jordanians, Downtown, Amman.



The role of strong local identity in hospitality towards Syrian refugees

According to Driel and Verkuyten (2019) and Putnam (2000) a strong local identity can stimulate inclusion of out-groups, such as refugee groups. A community with a strong identity often requires specific behavior of its members. The established standards and values then provide a direction for members of the group on how to behave (f.e. towards 'others'). Being hospitable seems to be conformed in Jordanian identity, and following the theory members of the group are then more tended to behave upon these norms, also towards people from outside the group (Driel & Verkuyten, 2019).

On the contrary, the literature also offers empirical evidence of how a strong local identity excludes out-group people. This exclusion is likely to happen when the outgroup rejects the local identity and changes the established norms (Hynie, 2018). The unprecedented manifestations of Jordanian identity in the street view of Amman indicate a strong local identity, at least, more present than what I am used to in the Netherlands. To me, it seemed that Jordanians broadly conform to their local identity and have a sense of Jordanian nationalism, yet attach great value to identity characteristics that are nation-transcending, such as their Arab heritage and Sunni Islamism. Besides, the variety of nationalities living in Jordan has created an interesting balance between a strong local identity and diverse nation. The fluidity of Jordan's population and the national diversity should also be considered as an inextricable part of Jordan's identity as well, and might be precisely the reason for Jordan's accessible characters towards others. Jordan's strong local identity, which is among other things described as hospitable, can contribute to how Jordanians receive Syrian refugees. A strong local identity, however, can endanger hospitality towards out-groupers if the out-group contrasts with the established local identity. To better understand the role of the (strong) local Jordanian identity in how Syrian refugees are received, the similarities and contrasts between Jordanians and Syrians should be further analyzed. The next paragraph elaborates on to what extent there is a shared identity perceived by Jordanians between Jordanians and Syrian refugees.

5.2.2 What is the role of shared identity between Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordanian hospitality?





The previous paragraph provided a deeper understanding of characteristics that describe Jordanian identity. This paragraph links this identity with the identity characteristics of Syrians, and how they are perceived to be similar to Jordanian identity: the shared identity. This paragraph combines sub question 3 and 4, by first elaborating on the perceived shared identity between Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordan, and examines this with how this shared identity fits into Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees in Jordan. The questions answered in this paragraph, therefore, are 1) *to what*

extent do Jordanians perceive a shared identity between Jordanians and Syrian refugees? and 2) what is the role of this perceived shared identity in Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees?

5.2.2.1 To what extent do Jordanians perceive a shared identity between Jordanians and Syrian refugees?

Following the interviews, the observations and the discussions with institutes, it should be stated that the majority of Jordanians does perceive strong identity similarities with Syrian refugees. Interestingly, all interviewees recognized that Jordanians *share* more identity characteristics with Syrians than *differ* from Syrians. But how is this perceived shared identity between Jordanians and Syrians characterized and explained? The following figure illustrates the identity characteristics mentioned most frequently in the interviews with Jordanians⁶⁰. Following Sen's (2006) theory, this overview provides the identity layers of the shared identity of Jordanians and Syrians, or the 'identity menu of choice'. By labeling and counting words in the answers of the interviewees four overarching identity characteristics have been observed as most prominent in how Jordanians perceive a shared identity with Syrians: ethnicity, geography, language and religion (further described in attachment 10).

Legend:

-  First layer: abstract categories of shared identity characteristics
-  Second layer: prominent shared identity characteristic
-  Third layer: description of the shared identity characteristic
-  Fourth layer: details of the shared identity characteristics

⁶⁰ The interviews in Atlas.ti are labelled and counted based on the most frequently mentioned identity characteristics (see for further details attachment 10). In order to provide an abstract overview of how Jordanians describe their shared identity with Syrians, and which identity characteristics they mention, I chose to illustrate abstract levels to a more detailed level. For example, being 'Arab' is frequently mentioned in the interviews, which I extended to the more abstract level of 'ethnicity'. From there, I layered down to more detailed aspects of the identity characteristics mentioned.




Figure 3: Overview 'menu of choice' identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrians

These four categories, described more detailed below, however, should be considered to be intertwined rather than incoherent with each other. For example: the Arab ethnicity cannot be considered incoherent of the Arabic language, and the perceived shared geographical background is strongly connected with the shared history and tribal relations.

1. Ethnicity

The most frequently mentioned identity characteristic in the interviews with Jordanians that describes Jordanian and Syrian shared identity is ethnicity. More specifically, Arab ethnicity. Following the literature, (pan-)Arabism is still into place in most Arab countries. A pan-Arab approach was widely adopted on state- and society levels in Jordan as well as in Syria through elites and state media after the decrease of Pan-Arab ideologies in the 60's until now (Salameh, 2019; Mellon, 2002; Phillips, 2012). Moreover, following Salameh's argument, the reinforcement of Arabism has positively influenced the absorption of (Arab) refugees in Arab countries. The still existing sense of Arab solidarity may reflect in the willingness of Jordan to absorb fellow Arabs. During my observations, I noticed that a sense of Arab solidarity is still detectable in Jordan. The sense of 'sameness' between Jordanians and Syrians, but also Jordanians and Arabs in general, was advocating in the interviews and in informal conversations.

Tribal

Inextricably from the Arab ethnicity is the tribal or Bedouin ties between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan. The word 'Arab' in Arabic literally means - not a coincidence - 'nomad'. Nomadism is inherent in most Arab Bedouin tribes, with a long history of continuous moving families in the desert. All the interviewees emphasized on the importance of tribal relations in Jordan in general. But also within the context of receiving Syrian refugees. Over time, many Syrian tribes that settled in Jordan have merged with Jordanian tribes, mainly in the Northern parts of Jordan⁶¹. The WANA institute further elaborates that the adoption of tribes is not a new phenomenon in the Arab history. Dukhan (2014) supports this by explaining how Arabs, especially nomadic Arabs (Bedouins), have known a fluidity of migration for centuries. For tribes to stand stronger against external dangers, tribes emerged or weaker tribes were protected and adopted by stronger tribes. The protection of fellow (nomadic) Arabs is inherent to even contemporary Arab societies, as seen in Jordan. One of the interviewees⁶² explains: *"When the war in Syria started, Syrian tribal leaders moved to Jordan and arranged that Jordanian tribes adopted their Syrian tribes in Jordan. Before the war, these tribes already emerged, but then there was, for example, one tribe leader in Jordan and one in Syria."*⁶³

History

Following the theory of Luck (2019) and Gerges (2013), understanding identities in the Middle-East need to be considered in the context of historical events in the Arab world. Most interviewees mentioned how Jordanians and Syrians are 'the same people'. From a historical perspective, in relatively recent world history, Jordanians and Syrians were indeed people from the same empire. In specific, 'Greater Syria' covered the contemporary territory of Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. For centuries, inhabitants of Greater Syria co-existed and shared identity characteristics to a great extent.

Another interviewee explains how she cannot distinguish Syrians from Jordanians as a Jordanian herself, perhaps only *"in the way they dress or when I hear them speaking in Syrian dialect. But mostly we are similar. Literally the same people"*⁶⁴. This sense of 'sameness' makes sense analyzing historical events in the region and the fact that Jordan and Syria fall under the same ruler in relatively recent history. In specific, 'Greater Syria' covered the contemporary territory of Israel and the Palestinian

⁶¹ Rosshandler (WANA), personal communication, October 25, 2019


⁶² Participant 10, personal communication, December 5, 2019

⁶³ Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

⁶⁴ Participant 6, personal communication, November 28, 2019

Territories, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Until the 20th century, inhabitants of Greater Syria co-existed and shared identity characteristics to a great extent.

Image 13: Greater Syria under Ottoman rule, the year 1851



Jehan Zaben of the FCA⁶⁵ brings up more recent historical events to describe shared identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrians. The Jordanian-Syrian relations were initially established shortly before the creation of both nations in 1916 as Jordan and Syria used to be part of 'Greater Syria'. The movement between Jordanian and Syrian territory has therefore is therefore not a new phenomenon (Saunders & Faulkner, 2010, p. 523). It should be noted Syria and Jordan are in relative terms extremely 'young' states, compared to the emergence of nations in Europe for example, and it has been relatively recently in history that Jordanians and Syrians lived under the same rule.

2. Geography

Borders

Ever since Jordan's independence, Jordan and Syrians have been closely tied neighbors. In the interviews, Jordanians explain emotional attachment to Syrian land, especially to South Syria and Deraa.

⁶⁵ Personal communication, October 28, 2019

"People used to hop in their cars on the weekend and drive to Damascus or Deraa. Syrians would come to Jordan, Jordanians would come to Syria. Visiting family or shopping"⁶⁶.

"Jordanians from the Northern parts of Jordan still have a special bond with Syria, because visiting Syria used to be an important part of our lives"⁶⁷.

The border between Jordan and Syria was closed in 2015 and reopened in 2018. Jordanians used to visit Damascus or Deraa occasionally and vice versa would Syrians visit Amman or family in the North of Jordan. From Amman, it is only 100 kilometers to the Syrian borders, and from Irbid only 30 kilometers. During my stay, I visited the border region of Jordan and Syria multiple times. For me, this was a surreal experience, being so close to the Syrian border, a country I only knew from the civil war. In reality, the Southern region of Syria is not in war (although there remain security risks) and the border region on the Syrian side appears not to be a completely different world than on the Jordanian side. While Syria has seemed far away to me, being close to the border made me realize how close the civil war in Syria has always been to Jordanians. Following Abbadi (2015) the threat of ISIS and the spillover effects of the Syrian war were extremely close for Jordanians during 2015-2017. ISIS, Al-Nusra and other extremist groups controlled large parts of the Southern region of Syria during that time. The fear of possible spillover effects, in combination with the large group of Jordanian Jihadi choosing to fight in Syria, caused great stress on Jordanians as well (Abbadi, 2015). The team of SIREN⁶⁸ elaborates on the border fluidity between Jordan and Syria by explaining how easy it used to be to cross the Jaber-Nassib border from both sides. Consequently, the Jordanian-Syrian trade used to be flourishing around the border regions. According to Rosshandler of the WANA institute, the closure of the Jaber-Nassib border has caused great economic deficits and frustrations among Jordanians and Syrians in the border region. The closing of the border increased illegal trade and smuggling towards and from Syria to Jordan. When the border crossing reopened in October 2018, the Jordanian government hoped for a re-flourishment of border trade but up until now new trading mechanisms have been minimal (Mencutek, 2019). In informal conversation I asked Jordanians about the reopening of the border crossing. It seemed not to make a great impression on them, and they seemed to not be optimistic about the border trade to flourish in the short-term. Even though Jordanians miss their visits to Syria, many Jordanians consider the road to Damascus not worth the potential security risks.

⁶⁶ Participant 7, personal communication, November 28, 2019

⁶⁷ Participant 3, personal communication, November 19, 2019

⁶⁸ Personal communication, October 15, 2019

"I used to go every Friday with my wife. Damascus is a beautiful city and it is way cheaper than Amman or Irbid. I would love to go there and so does my wife, but it is not safe now. It is not the same anymore"⁶⁹.

Image 14: Close to the border of Jordan and Syria, Damascus Highway, Mafraq Jordan.



Furthermore, two interviewees describe how it was relatively easy for Jordanians to help Syrians settle in their neighborhoods because these neighborhoods were similar to neighborhoods in Syria. Jehan Zaben of the FCA explains that most Syrians in urban areas, especially in Amman, are more likely to be from higher social classes and are used to live in urbanized areas - rather than the agricultural Syrian in the more northern parts of Jordan⁷⁰. One interviewee perceives this as follows: *"For some Syrians. integration wasn't so challenging. Especially not for urban dwellers coming to Amman. It was more difficult for rural dwellers. It was a bit of cultural, or lifestyle shock"*⁷¹. Another interviewee describes: *"Those who lived in the urban areas [in Syria] would come and settle in urban areas [in Jordan] which made it relatively easy for Syrians to settle in this neighborhood [Sweileh]"*⁷².

Not just a neighbor

The term 'neighbors' is often mentioned in the interviews. While this is geographically accurate, I noticed that Jordanians considered their Syrians neighbors as more than 'just being geographical neighbors'. Even with the contemporary borders, Jordanians tend to transcend the classical border thinking and think more in tribal, historical and cultural relations. In theory, this practice is in line with *imagined communities* (Anderson, 1938).

3. Religion

⁶⁹ Participant 7, personal communication, November 28, 2019

⁷⁰ Personal communication, October 28, 2019

⁷¹ Participant 1, personal communication, October 26, 2019

⁷² Participant 5, personal communication, November 11, 2019

As stated before, religion plays an overwhelming role in all aspects of Jordanian lives. The fact that most Syrians in Jordan share the same religion, Sunni Islam, is not surprisingly another significant pillar in how Jordanians perceive their shared identity with Syrians. Jordanians are relatively conservative Muslims, whose daily activities, morals and social relations can most likely be derived from Islamic standards (Schwedler, 2019). Interestingly, this was evident in the interview with Jordanians, detecting how many challenges in Jordan - also the Syrian refugee crisis - were placed in context with Islamic standards. The will of Allah to give people strength in their challenges is prominent in many Jordanian mindsets, evidently in the frequent use of *inshallah* - if God wants it - in conversations.

Image 15: Mosque in the old city of Amman



4. Language

Another significant characteristic in how Jordanians describe a shared identity with Syrians in the interviews is sharing the Arabic language. In specific, the Arabic Levantine dialect. The Arabic language is spoken over 25 countries and knows a variety of dialects. Whereas Jordanians, for example, have difficulties understanding Arabs from the Maghreb, Jordanians and Syrians can understand each other easily (Kaye, 2009).

5.2.2.2 How do Jordanians perceive the role of shared identity in their hospitality towards Syrian refugees?

As described above, Jordanians perceive a strong shared identity with Syrians (in Jordan) of which the most prominent connectors are sharing the Arab ethnicity, a geographical (and historical) background, the Sunni Islamic religion, and the Arabic language with the Levantine dialect. But how do Jordanians

perceive these shared identity characteristics in how hospitable they have been towards Syrian refugees since 2011?

First off, in all ten interviews with Jordanians it was mentioned that sharing identity characteristics with Syrian refugees has played a significant role in how Jordanians positively received Syrian refugees.

Protecting brothers and sisters

In all interviews the importance of sharing Arab ethnicity and the Arabic language, especially the specific Levantine dialect, have been emphasized to describe the hospitality of Jordanians towards Syrian refugees. The sense of 'sameness' and the urgent need for protection of Syrian 'brothers and sisters' seemed to have strongly appealed to the sense of duty and hospitality of Jordanians.

"Of course it is practical that Syrians here are Muslims, but it is more important that they are Arabs. We share the same history and heritage. We are the same people."⁷³

This is not only derived from *shared* identity, but also from Jordanian identity in general, in which hospitality towards 'guests' and people in need is deeply-rooted. But also the role of Bedouin culture (which is inherent to Jordanian culture) should not be underestimated in how Jordanians perceived Syrians. Especially at the beginning of the refugee crisis, the first people to open their houses for Syrians were mostly related to the same Arab tribe. Rosshandler of the WANA institute elaborates on this by explaining how, after the first arrivals of Syrians, many Syrians sought help at Jordanian tribal relatives "as if they were visiting family"⁷⁴. During the observations and the interviews, I've noticed that Jordanians tend to categorize beyond nation-thinking: the sense of being Arab' plays a large role in Jordanian identity as well as their perceived shared identity with Syrians. As described in paragraph 5.2 there has been an emergence of Jordanian patriotism, but in questioning Jordanians about their reasons for their hospitality towards Syrian refugees, nation-thinking seems to be surpassed by sharing Arab identity and the duty of helping brothers and sisters, deriving from Islamic standards. Offering hospitality seems to appear as something Jordanians 'have to do', regardless of their wishes to do so.

"We are Arabs. We are neighbors. Syrians are our brothers and sisters. It is our duty to help our neighbors."⁷⁵

"We treat Syrians like guests and brethren. We cannot be inhospitable towards them; this is our duty as brothers. We put ourselves in the shoes of Syrians. It could be us who escaped our home countries, and I don't think there is any attribute that plays a larger role in our hospitality than that and that there are

⁷³ Participant 8, personal communication, December 5, 2019

⁷⁴ Rosshandler, K. (WANA), personal communication, October 25, 2019

⁷⁵ Participant 4, personal communication, November 1, 2019

our neighbors and we have to be welcoming."⁷⁶

Identity characteristics as facilitators

Besides offering hospitality towards Syrians solely because they share prominent identity characteristics with Jordanians, it should be considered that these shared identity characteristics have played a major *facilitating* role. And perhaps, therefore, Jordanians have also been able to be more hospitable than, for example, refugees or guests with contrasting identity characteristics. Sharing the Arab language, for example, facilitated the integration of Syrians in Jordanian neighborhood and contributed to how Jordanians were able to help Syrians. One of the interviewees explains how it created mutual understanding between Jordanians and the new coming Syrians⁷⁷. In informal conversation with Jordanians, condolences towards horrors Syrians went through and what is left of Syria were expressed occasionally. Because Jordanians speak the same language as Syrians, Jordanians have watched a lot of Syrian television; news and soaps. One interviewee described how the TV shows helped her better understand the challenges of Syrians, in Syria, but also Syrians in exile⁷⁸. This helping of Syrian brothers and sisters seems to be amplified by the awareness Jordanians have about the horrors Syrians went through and the urgent need for help, especially at the start of the refugee crisis. The fear of possible spillover effects, in combination with the large group of Jordanian Jihadi choosing to fight in Syria, caused great stress on Jordanians as well (Abbadi, 2015). One of the interviewees links this fear with how she received Syrian refugees in Sweileh: *"We saw the horrors of the Syrian war and we were terrified as well. I think Syrians would have done the same and more if this happened to us [Jordanians]"*⁷⁹. But also sharing Islamic standards, for example, is perceived as a major pillar for how Jordanians have been able to be hospitable towards Syrian refugees. All interviewees pointed out the extreme importance of sharing the same religion with Syrian refugees in their hospitality towards them. But more specifically: the importance of sharing religion in how it helped Syrians and Jordanians to co-exist. One of the interviewees clarifies that without sharing Islamic features with Syrians, there would have been a higher potential of tensions⁸⁰.

Frictions in identity characteristics

It should be stated that in all interviews there prevailed a more negative image of how Jordanians perceived Syrians (and how they shared identity characteristics) when unfolding identity concepts and getting more into detail. Naturally, some interviewees were more vocal than others. The above-

⁷⁶ Participant 6, personal communication, November 28, 2019

⁷⁷ Participant 1, personal communication, October 26, 2019

⁷⁸ Participant 5, personal communication, November 28, 2019

⁷⁹ Participant 1, personal communication, October 26, 201

⁸⁰ Participant 9, personal communication, December 5, 2019

mentioned shared identity characteristics, categorized in ethnicity, geographical background, religion and language, have come forward as the most relevant characteristics for Jordanians in sharing identity characteristics with Syrians. These elements are not just relevant in Jordanian-Syrian shared identity but are also prominent elements of Jordanian society in general (as explained in paragraph 5.1). Furthermore, sharing these important identity characteristics is perceived as an important factor for Jordanian hospitality towards Syrians. Especially at the beginning of the conflict, Syrians could relatively easily adapt to the Jordanian society. As stated by Hynie (2018), a new coming group who accepts local beliefs and is not perceived as a (symbolic) threat to change established norms, has a higher chance of being included by the host community. This is in line with this specific case-study. It has been relatively easy for Jordanians to offer Syrians help, since they speak the same language, based their standards on the same religion and are in some cases even family or tribally related. Discussing the shared identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrians with Jordanians generally seem to be of a positive note.

However, when unfolding these abstract identity characteristics to more specific comparisons between Jordanians and Syrians, there seems to be more friction in their shared identity. Applying this to the Social Identity Theory of Tajfel & Turner (1979), Jordanians seem to perceive Syrians as 'in-group' on abstract terms: sharing ethnicity, language, geographical-historical background and religion. This is the first step of the Social Identity theory - categorization. The second step - social identification - describes how the categorized groups act upon their identities and conform to which norms are attached to a specific group. Whereas Jordanians seem to perceive Syrians as in-group in the first step, in the second step it becomes clearer how Jordanians expect members of the group to behave to be perceived as 'in-group'. For some identity characteristics perceived as shared with Syrians, when socially identifying how to act Jordanians seem to be more negative than appeared at first. Unfolding identity shared characteristics, therefore, show more negative social comparisons between Jordanians and Syrians perceived by Jordanians. The following table explains how answers within the interviews with Jordanians can be applied to the Social Identity Theory and how they show more 'out-group' thinking towards Syrian in more detailed characteristics of perceived identity characteristics. Analyzing these more negative attitudes show how these are roughly closely linked to ethnicity and religion, which I will further discuss below:

Table 4: Social Identity Theory Jordanian-Syrian shared identity

	Categorization	Social identification	Social comparison⁸¹
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⁸¹ These outcomes are based on general assumptions, the general image Jordanians I spoke with provided me with, derived from analyzing and counting the interview answers, and my observations.

<i>Ethnicity</i>	We are Arabs	Thinking beyond borders, Arab solidarity	Syrians are more nationalistic than Jordanians
<i>Religion</i>	We are Muslims	Act morally and according to Islamic standards	Syrians are less moral than Jordanians

Ethnicity

While there is evidence of a growing national Jordanian sense, overall speaking, Jordanians tend to think more in non-national perspectives. In the interviews, one of the frustrations of Jordanians towards Syrians, therefore, was the sense of Syrian nationalism among Syrians. 4 out of 10 of the interviewees brought this up by themselves while comparing Jordanians with Syrians. It seemed that they perceive Syrians as more fanatic over their country, rather than thinking beyond borders ('Arab', 'Muslim', tribes)⁸². Two interviewees underpin this by explaining how Syrians have continued their craftsmanship in Jordan and would still mark their products with a 'made in Syria' sign [while using Jordanian resources]⁸³.

*"There are not many differences between Jordanians and Syrians, but I think Jordanians are more conservative and less nationalistic. Syrians are proud people. They love Syria."*⁸⁴

Religion

Furthermore, frictions within shared identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrians are brought to the fore in the interviews by unfolding comparisons within practices of religion. 6 out 10 interviewees perceive that Syrians interpret Islamic standards differently than most Jordanians. It should be noted that how the interviewees describe religious differences between them and Syrians can also be observed as cultural differences rather than attached to religion. For example, being 'moral' or having 'manners' can be understood in socio-cultural differences, but are in the interviews inextricably explained through Islamic standards.

Morals

During my observations I noticed how most practices in daily life are explained through Islamic standards and conforms how Jordanians base their judgements on 'good' and 'bad' behavior. Jordanians have a conformed sense on how to behave accordingly to Islam - in the streets, towards other and at home. For example: Jordanians remain collected in tensed situation (overly crowded traffic, arguments, etc.) and they help without asking anything in return in a selfless way ('Afwan' - you're welcome or literally:

⁸² Participant 3 (personal communication, November 11, 2019)

⁸³ Participant 1 and 2 (personal communication, October 26, 2019)

⁸⁴ Participant 8 (personal communication, December 12, 2019)

don't mention it, it's my duty⁸⁵). A recurring explanation of differences between Jordanians and Syrian in the interviews is how Syrians are perceived as less moral and accordingly to Islamic behaviors. This difference in morality is explained through the perception of Syrians having a different understanding of what is *halal* and what is *haram*. Varying from behavior in the streets and the labor to domestic behavior.

Two of the interviewees judge differences in the morality of Syrians on how they approach doing business with Jordanians:

"I think Syrians have some moral problems. Maybe it is because of the war, I don't know. They don't see a clear difference between what is halal or haram. They think everything is halal, but this can be caused because of the scarcity of money, I don't know. Most of the Syrians I've met; they are not business-minded and don't think long-term. They want fast money and are greedy or, let's call it, opportunistic. In Islam you share, you can't be selfish in this situation."⁸⁶

"Syrians do not use the same standards for what we call haram or what we call halal. Syrians can be opportunistic and greedy; you see it happening in labor forces. Those are not Jordanians moral standards. You take care of everyone, not just for yourself."⁸⁷

Furthermore, Syrians in Jordan can live with multiple families together in one house, a phenomenon some Jordanians look down upon and is in contrast with Jordanian standards⁸⁸. On average, Syrians are more used to this form of living, due to the typical *courtyard houses* in Syria (houses with a common outside gathering area yet offering private space for multiple households underneath one roof)⁸⁹. In the interviews it is mentioned how this way of living goes against Islamic standards: unmarried and unrelated men and women are not allowed to be exposed to each other. This is considered *haram*, based on one of the Hadiths⁹⁰. Since many Syrians in Jordan share the rent with other households through these shared arrangements, Syrians can better afford accommodations, especially compared to more vulnerable Jordanians. These dynamics are perceived, next to immoral behavior, also to cause inflation in the rental sector in Jordan as well as mentioned in the interviews: Syrians are able to pay more rent which causes new financial standards for renting houses⁹¹.

⁸⁵ Asban, A (2011). The unprecedented spoken Arabic - Jordanian and Palestinian dialect. Diwan Baladna

⁸⁶ Participant 8 (personal communication, December 5, 2019)

⁸⁷ Participant 3 (personal communication, November 11, 2019)

⁸⁸ Participant 1, 8 and 10 (personal communication, October 26, November 28, December 5, 2019)

⁸⁹ <https://muslimheritage.com/the-courtyard-houses-of-syria/>

⁹⁰ <https://seekersguidance.org/answers/hanafi-fiqh/a-wifes-right-to-housing-seperate-from-her-in-laws/>

⁹¹ Participant 2, 7 and 8 (personal communication, October 26, November 28, December 5, 2019)

Moreover, less linked to religion per se but explained through a religious moral lens: some interviewees argue how Syrians can behave immoral by being loud in the streets [‘honking in traffic’⁹²] and in their domestic environment [‘disturbing neighbors’⁹³]. While discussing the crowdedness in Amman, often the presence of Syrians was considered as the explanation. According to daily conversations I had with taxi drivers, the traffic of Amman did not used to be as crowded.

These frustrations are now linked to Islamic standards and Jordanian morality, but it should be considered that religion can serve as a justification to be frustrated at Syrians. Especially taken the importance of hospitality in Jordanians society (and also in Islam) taken into account.

Two others argued that sharing identity unquestionably played a facilitating role, but that Jordanian hospitality transcends help to solely Syrian because of their shared identity.

“We would do the same for non-Arabs and non-Muslims. It is about being moral, independent of nationality.” (Participant 5, personal communication, November 1, 2019)

Competing environment

Sen’s theory of an ‘identity menu of choice’ prevails that choices of one’s identity and determining group-identity become more apparent in competing environments between different groups. As I observed, Jordanians have perceived a growing competing environment (moreover in paragraph 5.3). The (protracted) duration of stay of Syrian in Jordan seems to play an important role in Jordanian frustration towards the presence of Syrian refugees in Jordan. This is also visible in how sharing prominent identity characteristics with Syrians initially seemed the most important role in how Jordanians received Syrians, over time the presence of Syrians in Jordan has also affected the livelihoods of Jordanians, and frictions within an initial perceived shared identity also have seem to gradually become more transparent. In line with scholars on intergroup similarities (Brown and Tajfel's, 2010; Brown and Abrams, 1986), Jordanians perceive to a large extend attitudinal similarities with Syrian refugees – resemblances, for example, religious and cultural standards - but in a perceived growing competing environment within these same similarities Jordanians tend to search for ways to distinguish themselves from Syrians with dislike as a result for some (status similarities). Following the interviews, sharing identity remains an important factor in Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian, but it should be considered that this possibly served more as a facilitator in how relatively integration of Syrians rather than remains a strong incentive to remain hospitable. Especially in perceived growing

⁹² Participant 2, 3 and 4 (personal communication, October 26, November 11, 2019)

⁹³ Participant 3 and 4 (personal communication, November 11, 2019)

competition (moreover in paragraph 5.3). Jordanians tend to be hospitable in nature, in theory, but this is difficult to maintain once they perceive their livelihoods being damaged because of this hospitality.

As one of SIREN's policy officers explained: *"Jordan's 'honeymoon phase' of hospitality towards Syrian refugees is over. The competition between vulnerable Jordanians and Syrian refugees is becoming more tensed, and Jordanians are tired of it"*⁹⁴.

Sharing identity characteristics, no matter how powerful they initially appeared, effectively are also ever-diminishing in preserving a hospitable image in competing circumstances. One interviewee explains that there are indeed identity differences between Jordanians and Syrians, but these are minor and less significant in how hospitality has changed than, for example, economic dividers.

*We are divided by economic dividers. We share a lot of culture with Syrians and we do have our differences, but they don't divide us*⁹⁵.

Conclusion

As analyzed in this paragraph there prevails a strong sense of shared identity between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan, mainly derived from shared ethnic, religious, geographical and language backgrounds. These sharing identity characteristics, interestingly, seem to have played a significant role in how Jordanians felt a duty to offer protection for their fellow Arabs, Muslims, and neighbors, derived from Islamic moral standards and the inherence of hospitality in Jordanian local identity. Besides the sense of duty to offer hospitality to Syrians, the shared identity characteristics also served as a facilitator for Jordanians to be able to offer help (language, Islamic values, etc.) and for Syrians to adapt to the established identity in Jordan. However, in unfolding these shared identity characteristics more detailed, more frictions in how Jordanians perceive Syrians appear - and the more they are perceived as an 'outgroup'. First of all, these frictions in shared identity seem to have appeared over the years - while the livelihoods in Jordan have become more competitive.

5.3 Sustainability of hospitality and the role of shared identity

This paragraph answers the last sub-question *how do Jordanians perceive the sustainability of their hospitality and what is the role of shared identity in this?* by analyzing how hospitality changed, what the reasons are for this and how important the role of shared identity in Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees remains in the protracted stay and further integration of Syrians.

⁹⁴ SIREN, personal communication, October 15, 2019

⁹⁵ Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

5.3.1 How has Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees changed since?

During my observations, I noticed a strong sense of frustration. In Sweileh, and in Amman in general. In almost every conversation I had with people in Amman (economic) hardship was brought up. The changes in welfare are not assigned to Syrian refugees directly, but more indirectly as people tend to describe their livelihoods with 'before' and 'after' 2011. In the interviews with Jordanians, a clear change in sentiment towards Syrian refugees can be noticed. Whereas Jordanians have received Syrians initially as 'brothers and sisters', the burdens of the refugee crisis are taking its toll. There is not an obvious event pointed at causing this change, but a more gradual accumulation of developments: a perceived growing disproportional attention of the international community towards Syrians only, a competitive environment for resources and labor alongside, and a perceived safer Syria.

Figure 4: The perceived sustainability of hospitality




Figure 4 shows that the majority of interviewees had negative sentiments on how sustainable their hospitality to Syrians remains, whereas 4 out of 10 interviews remain positive and 1 neutral.

"During the first years, we welcomed Syrians, but we did not expect them to stay this long in Jordan"⁹⁶.

Competitive environment

Following the interviews, the discussions with NGOs, and my personal observations, the largest stress factor for Jordanians regarding the presence of Syrian refugees is how Syrian are economically structurally benefitting at the expense of the needs of (vulnerable) Jordanians. Often mentioned in the interviews, for example, is how Syrians pay less rent than Jordanians and are financially supported by

⁹⁶ Participant 7, personal communication, December 5, 2019

UNHCR monthly, which makes that Syrians are able to take jobs for lower wage - jobs that used to 'belong'⁹⁷ to (vulnerable) Jordanians.

Labor market

Syrians are perceived as craftsmen, and creative- and efficient workers with little resources⁹⁸. Moreover, Jehan Zaben of the FCA explains how the Syrian market, before 2011, was designed to export more than import products. The Syrian market has always been independent and self-sufficient, while Jordan, on the contrary, has always been extremely dependent on export⁹⁹.

A policy officer of SIREN, a young Jordanian woman, explained how she experienced how Jordanians are jealous of the great trade mentality of Syrians. "Jordanians could actually benefit of Syrian trade by learning from them. However, there always is this thing here called pride". She elaborates that pride and status play an important role in Jordanian society. "Jordanians are 'ashamed' to take lower waged jobs [than before 2011] and reject to work for less"¹⁰⁰.

Zaben, who works on Syrian-Jordanian entrepreneurial projects, elaborates that collaborations between Syrians and Jordanians can offer essential benefits to the Jordanian market. However, a lack of trust between Jordanians and Syrians, aggravated by governmental policies, hinder these opportunities. As an example she uses: in the Jordanian law 51% of a new business opening in Jordan requires a Jordanian owner. In contracts, therefore, Syrian collaborators are not necessarily mentioned. There then needs to be great trust between the two parties, for Syrians to benefit shared entrepreneurship. Therefore, many Syrian-Jordanian trade contracts fail during the process. The collaboration can be of great value, a win-win situation, but occurs rarely¹⁰¹. FCA, and many other local NGOs, advocate for changes in the entrepreneurial legislation of Jordan. However, they experience a blockade of the Jordanian government. "The government considers our recommendations but seems not to be open for actual change"¹⁰².

SIREN's team further explains difficulties within the competitive labor market by analyzing the current workforce demographics in Jordan. The majority of Syrian refugees are soon reaching the labor force age, similarly with a growing Jordanian labor force population¹⁰³. A significant group of Jordanians will now or soon enter the labor market (UNHCR, 2019). The Jordanian Department of Statistics prevails that, while the participation of Syrians in the Jordanian labor market may have driven down wages in the informal sector, the wages of Jordanian workers in the formal sector were hardly

⁹⁷ Participant 2, personal communication, November 11, 2019

⁹⁸ Participant 1 and 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

⁹⁹ Jehan Zaben of FCA, personal communication, October 18, 2019

¹⁰⁰ Policy officer of SIREN, personal communication, October 15, 2019

¹⁰¹ Jehan Zaben of FCA, personal communication, October 28, 2019

¹⁰² Jehan Zaben of FCA, personal communication, October 28, 2019

¹⁰³ SIREN, personal communication, October 15, 2019

affected. However, the Jordanian labor market is characterized by high rates of informality, a sector in which most vulnerable Jordanians occur (UNHCR, 2019).

As I noticed during my observations and numerous informal conversations with Jordanians, it is extremely difficult to meet ends in Jordan. This counts for most Jordanians and non-Jordanians living in Jordan, even if they are employed. On average, Jordanians earn a higher salary than Syrians, contriving a mere average of 377,40 JOD per month (around 450 euros)¹⁰⁴. This monthly income does not fit the needs of most Jordanians living in Amman. As I noticed myself, Amman is an extremely expensive city to live in. The costs of living are high: food is expensive to buy in the supermarkets and accommodation is scarce and expensive. Besides, to move around the city, even for small distances, you are dependent on taxi services - which Jordanians without private cars are forced to use daily to get to work or elsewhere. Taking this into consideration, rising numbers of almost one-fifth of Jordanians in the workforce participation being unemployed are concerning¹⁰⁵.

Image 16: Unemployment rate of people in Jordan



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¹⁰⁴ <https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/unemployment-rate>

¹⁰⁵ <https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/unemployment-rate>

¹⁰⁶ <https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/unemployment-rate>

Table 5: Average monthly wages of Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan

Table 5: Average Monthly Wages of Jordanians and Syrian, 2016³³ (JOD)			
Economic Activity	Jordanians	Syrian Refugees	Relative Advantage of Jordanians
Agriculture	298.85	97.93	205.2%
Manufacturing	344.45	231.14	49.0%
Construction	328.70	179.84	82.8%
Wholesale/Retail Trade, Repair of Vehicles	337.75	184.07	83.5%
Accommodation, Food Services	337.60	204.31	65.2%
Professional, Scientific, Technical Activities	457.80	328.94	39.2%
Other Service Activities	317.70	116.15	173.5%
Household Employment Activities	261.90	100.75	159.9%
Activity-Weighted Overall Monthly Average Wage	377.50	147.10	156.6%

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The international community

As mentioned above, another economic frustration that grew over the years and affected how Jordanians remained hospitable towards Syrian refugees is the strategy of the international community, which is perceived as solely focusing on Syrians rather than other (vulnerable) groups in Jordan. While these other groups are perceived to carry the burdens of the refugee crisis. Two examples of this are repeated throughout my field research: the UNHCR coupons and the working permits for Syrians. First of all, Syrian families in Jordan receive monthly coupons of averagely 300 dollars per individual per family¹⁰⁸. Compared to the average monthly income of Jordanians as illustrated in image 16, 300 dollars per individual is extremely high in the Jordanian context. Moreover, migrant workers who have been in Jordan for decades, such as Egyptians and Yemenis, are obliged to pay 500 JOD per year to obtain a working permit. The international community and the Jordanian government promote Syrian labor in Jordan for Syrian integration, and Syrians, therefore, only pay 10 JOD¹⁰⁹. Syrian refugees are eligible for legal work permits in specific sectors of Jordan's economy such as service work, agriculture, and construction. Refugees from other countries are not eligible for work permits (Hawkins, et. al, 2019). The neglect of other vulnerable groups, Jordanian or non-Jordanian and the sole focus on Syrians by the international community, is perceived as the biggest divider between Jordanians and Syrians. Abovementioned examples of economic frustration were brought by interviewees themselves, which indicates their awareness of international policies on the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan.

¹⁰⁷ https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/3_SyrianRefugeeCrisisImpactJordanianLabourMarket.pdf

¹⁰⁸ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65143> (p. 7)

¹⁰⁹ https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_559151.pdf (p. 45)

"We see how Syrians live wealthier than some Jordanians. We don't understand how the international community only supports Syrians, while some Jordanians live in worse circumstances. And that counts for a large group in Jordan, many people are vulnerable"¹¹⁰.

"It is extremely frustrating for Jordanians to see how we are neglected. It makes the division deeper and changes sentiments towards Syrians negatively. We are the same people, but we are divided by economic factors. Of course, there are minor cultural differences, but those are not affecting our hospitality towards Syrians. The economic division is."¹¹¹

Giving these findings back to the NGOs I spoke with, SIREN, as well as Rosshandler (WANA) and Zaben (FCA), indicated the awareness within their field on how gaps have been created between Jordanians and Syrian refugees by the efforts of the international community. FCA, as well as policy officers at the Dutch embassy, explained there is a growing advocacy for a 'one-refugee' approach within the diplomatic field that should harmonize financial attention for all vulnerable groups in a hosting country. Jaben, however, explains that it takes a long road for the international governments to fully embed this approach in their policies on the Syrian refugee crisis. She, herself, strongly advocates for this approach and argues that it's the international community's responsibility to offer realistic and equal resilience in largely affected host countries of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Despite economic hardship and perceived unequal benefits for Syrians solely, the majority of people in Jordan, regardless of one's nationality, seem to remain taking care of each other. As one of the interviewees quoted: *"We make sure that no one in Jordan will sleep on an empty stomach"*¹¹². For Jordanians then to see how the international community is selective towards a specific group in Jordan, Syrian refugees, is new to Jordanians¹¹³. Especially if this selective approach has different economic outcomes. The impact of economic international intervention is, therefore, debatable and might deepen the gap between Jordanians and Syrians more than initially existed. To illustrate this, Rosshandler of the WANA Institute explains the 'Tafileh incident'. In September 2014, a Syrian man clashed with a Jordanian man from the Sawalqah tribe in Tafileh and resulted in the killing of the Jordanian. The aftermath caused the expulsion of 700 Syrian refugees from the town in just a short period of time. This massive expulsion was only possible because the Ngo Save The Children made a clear Syrian-Jordanian in the town: Syrian houses were indicated with an 'S' (for aid purposes). This made it easy for resentful Jordanians to find and expel this high number of Syrians. SIREN further

¹¹⁰ Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

¹¹¹ Participant 7, personal communication, December 5, 2019

¹¹² Participant 7, personal communication, December 5, 2019

¹¹³ Rosshandler, K., personal communication, October 26, 2019

explained how they have seen the gap between Jordanians and Syrians growing, specifically referring to the situation in poorer Northern governorates in Jordan. Working closely with police services in Syrian refugee camps (Zaatari and Zarqa), SIREN's employees have received many close by analyses since the refugee crisis. One concerning example is how SIREN and the Jordanian police unmasked a small number of highly vulnerable Jordanians deliberately who have chosen to live in Syrian refugee camps rather than outside camps. They pretended to be Syrians during the UNHCR checks to approve their shelter. Living in the camp, provided with aid tools, has by some Jordanians perceived as better living circumstances than their life outside the camps¹¹⁴.

Aid does contribute to resilience

Jordanians have a long history of receiving refugees and are familiar with UN efforts, such as UNRWA for Palestinian refugees and UNHCR now for Syrians. Most Jordanians I spoke with agreed that international aid previously offered respective resilience for multiple refugee flows. Appreciation mostly goes out to international projects that help to build schools and hospitals, which can also benefit Jordanians. It should be noted that Jordanians do seem to appreciate foreign aid, but that the frustrations are more directed towards the selectiveness of the aid and neglect of the needs of the host community. Besides, Jordanians perceive their government as corrupt (moreover in the next chapter). The immense amounts that Jordan receives from the international community to offer resilience for the refugee crisis in Jordan is not necessarily perceived as actually ending up with Jordanians nor with Syrians. There is a huge mistrust in the government, but people are careful to speak up about this.

*"It is important that Syrians are supported. They went through brutalities and are forced to live in exile. But it is not fair that they receive these high UNHCR coupons. They can buy living utilities, but they do not have to pay taxes. It is unfair competition with Jordanians who struggle with their monthly income. All of us struggle. They compete with us in every sector, except for the governmental sector."*¹¹⁵

Perceptions of safety in Syria

Following the interviews, 4 out of 10 interviewees considered their hospitality has reached its limits and where quite vocal about Syrian return:

¹¹⁴ SIREN, personal communication, October 15, 2019

¹¹⁵ Participant 8, personal communication, December 5, 2019

"I think Syrians like it here, but they should start over and build a culture or rebuild their country. Jordanians are struggling to find jobs because of Syrians and that's disastrous. It is time for Syrians to go back and leave us alone."¹¹⁶

"I think Syria is safe for them to return, and I hope they do soon. Considering that the border is open, that says it is safe for them to return to their countries. I hope this does not sound too hostile, but I think Syrians should go back to rebuild their country, just like other countries after WWII. I think Syrians like it here, but it is up to the Syrians outside Syria now to return and rebuild their country. It is not fair because they did not choose this, but the strain on Jordanian is also not fair."¹¹⁷

The resting participants were more considerate of the dangers for Syrian returnees:

"The border is open, but it is not safe to go to Syria. My first wife is from Irbid, which is close to Deraa and only two hours away from Damascus. We used to go to Damascus every Friday. Groceries are cheaper in Syria and they have better products. Sometimes we went on Saturday, to the grand market on the bazaar in Damascus. My first wife loved going to Syria, but there are still too many safety risks."¹¹⁸

"Syria remains unstable. Syrians who will return now will have political and economic problems. The regime is not welcoming them back. People who left Syria, are considered as 'pro-revolution' or traitors. They might be sued or jailed."¹¹⁹

"Syrians will not return before Assad is gone. If they can, they will go back. Syrians love Syria."

Syria remains super dangerous. Our neighbor got killed when he went back to Syria with his brother. As soon as they got back, they got killed by the regime. It is nowhere from safe to go back to Syria right now. I don't know, maybe not even in my lifetime [around 40 years old]."¹²⁰

On the one hand, Jordanians are aware of the brutality of the Syrian war and the effect on Syrian people. They feel an ethical duty to protect Syrians from these horrors. On the other hand, they perceive the current situation in Jordan also as unsustainable. What is often mentioned is that Syrians will not return as long as Assad is in power. Some Jordanians think it is time for Syrians to go back home, however, they don't have high expectations of this happening in the foreseeable future. It

¹¹⁶ Participant 5, personal communication, November 11, 2019

¹¹⁷ Participant 6, personal communication, November 28, 2019

¹¹⁸ Participant 7, personal communication, November 28, 2019

¹¹⁹ Participant 8, personal communication, December 5, 2019

¹²⁰ Participant 1, personal communication, October 26, 2019

seems that Jordanians didn't expect Syrians to stay this long, but now the war has continued for so long, also do not expect them to leave any time soon.

"We thought it would be different than the situation with the Palestinian refugees in Jordan. Their right to return seems far away, but Syrians can return once Syria is stable. That also seems far away now. Syrians will not return as long as Assad rules in Syria."¹²¹

Population pressure

It should be considered that Jordanian frustration towards Syrian refugees cannot be analyzed inextricably from the large numbers of Syrians present in Jordan, and that frustrations might not necessarily arise from this large group being Syrian per se. On the contrary, this large number of refugees being Syrian, with sharing identity characteristics with the host community that motivated and facilitated Jordanian hospitality, is more likely to have sustained hospitality. Analyzing the population boom, as shown in paragraph 2.4, however, shows an extreme growth in population. The lack of resources, a challenge already before 2011, and the almost doubling of the population in a relatively short period prevails more of the context in where Jordanians express frustrations. Harris & Alshoubaki (2018) and Brown (1996) argue that a host community is able to remain hospitable as long as the number of refugees is not outreaching the population pressure and division of resources, which is not the case now for Jordan (or is at least perceived by Jordanians).

"We are now at 10 million. Amman is overcrowded. The streets are full and there are not enough resources for everyone. We are twice as much as less than a decade ago, but with the same scarcity of resources."¹²²

"We are trying, but it is hard to cope with the rapid growth of people."¹²³

5.3.2 How do Jordanians perceive the role of shared identity in the protracted stay of Syrian refugees, and eventually their integration into Jordanian society?

Following the interviews and my observations, it seems that whereas the role of shared identity has been significant in Jordanian hospitality in the first few years of the refugee crisis, this factor does not seem to maintain its strengths now that Jordanians perceive a more competitive environment. Economic hardship and political processes (international community, refugee return, etc.) seem to

¹²¹ Participant 5, personal communication, November 11, 2019

¹²² Participant 8, personal communication, December 5, 2019

¹²³ Participant 5, personal communication, November 11, 2019

transcend in how Jordanians perceive Syrians now. Before coming to Jordan, while analyzing existing data and research in Jordan, multiple researchers mentioned the sensitivity of the word 'integration', especially in regards to Syrian refugees. On the contrary, Jordanians I spoke with were not distancing themselves from this topic. Additionally, they considered Syrians as already being integrated. While Syrian integration in Jordan was not necessarily their preference, it was something they had no control over and has already – gradually – happened. Interestingly, however, as also described in the previous chapter, the shared identity characteristics does seem to have played an important role in the graduality of Syrian integration. Perhaps more less on the surface than Jordanians are aware of. The shared identity seemed to have made Syrian integration into Jordanian society quite natural and people relatively easily adapted to each other. Sharing identity characteristics were facilitating Jordanians hospitality towards Syrian refugees at the outset of the refugee crisis, but are perhaps even more relevant in protracted stay of Syrians and further integration into Jordanian society. This factor in explaining sustainable hospitality is, however, less explained by Jordanians themselves. It should be considered that 'sharing identity' in an environment that is perceived as growing more competitive over time might have forced Jordanians to think in more in- and outgroup terms, and in ways to distinguish themselves from Syrians in Jordan.

As one of the interviewee mentions: "in the streets, you don't notice who is Jordanian or who is Syrian. The presence of Syrians is only felt in the labor market"¹²⁴.

Another interviewee follows: "sharing identity absolutely helped in how Syrian have integrated. Especially the language has made co-existence easy"¹²⁵.

Whereas Jordanians have been remarkably hospitable towards Syrian refugees in the first years of the refugee crisis, opened up their houses and sometimes even prioritized Syrian welfare above their own welfare, this unconditional hospitality changed to a more conditional hospitality over time. As time progressed Jordanians experienced a more competitive environment. Especially vulnerable Jordanians such as Sweileh who are the direct competitors of Syrians in the labor force. Additionally, Jordanian expectations of Syrians staying only temporarily ('We thought they would only stay for six months or a year at longest') were not matched with the reality. The form of hospitality, therefore, shifted more towards a conditional environment, in where Jordanians expect Syrians to, for example, adapt more to Jordanian standards, take more economic compromises and even consider Syrians to return. This finding is in line with the theory of Derrida and Dufourmantelle, who explain that there can be a

¹²⁴ Participant 7, personal communication, November 28, 2019

¹²⁵ Participant 5, personal communication, November 11, 2019

correlation between conditional and unconditional hospitality. This correlation explains how hospitality can shift to requiring more conditions of the 'guest' over time and if the duration of stay is longer than expected.

5.3.3 What are the limits of Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees?

What comes after hospitality? What if the incentives to remain hospitable aren't as valuable anymore as they used to be, and what if incentives for hostility grow? Whereas Jordanians have been remarkably hospitable towards Syrian refugees in the first years of the refugee crisis, opened up their houses and sometimes even prioritized Syrian welfare above their own welfare, this unconditional hospitality changed to more conditional hospitality over time. As time progressed Jordanians experienced a more competitive environment. Especially vulnerable Jordanians - such as those in Sweileh - who are the direct competitors of Syrians in the labor market. Additionally, Jordanian expectations of Syrians staying only temporarily: 'We thought they would only stay for six months or a year at longest', were not matched with the reality. The form of hospitality, consequently, either shifted more towards a "conditional environment", where Jordanians expect from Syrians - for example - to adapt to Jordanian standards, share the economic compromises, or suggest Syrians' return. This finding goes hand in hand with the theory of Derrida and Dufourmantelle, who explains that: there can be a correlation between conditional and unconditional hospitality. This correlation could explain how hospitality is likely to shift to a more conditional environment towards the 'guest' over time. And, therefore, if the duration of stay is longer than expected, Despite it is arguable that the limits for Jordanians hospitality have already been reached through Jordanians eyes (as mentioned above), the Jordanians environment for Syrian refugees is still not detected as hostile as in the other two large-host-countries for Syrian refugees (Turkey and Lebanon). Therefore, As analyzed accordingly, this can be attributed to numerous factors, of which, a shared identity characteristic plays a major role. However, Jordanians' frustrations are increasingly visible. Thus, to understand the sustainability of their hospitality, I asked Jordanians the question: what are the limits of your hospitality towards Syrian refugees?

While observing the environment in Jordan for 3-months, and having countless informal discussions with Jordanians, I perceived that the limits for Jordanian hospitality have already reached their limits in case of the ever-growing perceived burdens of the Syrian refugee crisis on Jordanians and the realization of protracted stay and integration of Syrian refugees in Jordanian society. As one of the

interviewees quotes: *"We have to move on from the Syrian refugee crisis. We are waiting and waiting. The current situation is not sustainable for Jordanians¹²⁶".*

However, the actual 'limits' in which hospitality transitions to hostility and Syrians were - for example - to be extremely discriminated against, potentially leading to their deportation back to Syria aren't in the cards yet in Jordan. While asking Jordanians about their absolute limits in their hospitality towards Syrian refugees, most of them explain how only the government can 'end' hospitality. As one of the interviewees quotes: *"the strains of the refugee crisis have overtaken the sense of taking care of Syrian brothers and sisters but our hospitality will sustain as long as the King insists¹²⁷".*

As I deduced after speaking to Jordanians (informally); there is a large frustration on how the King protects Syrian refugees to benefit from international aid. These assumptions comply with Francis' (2015) theory which states that the Jordanian government is aware of the financial benefits of hosting refugees, as Jordan has been doing for decades.

The Jordanian King receives a broad acknowledgment of Western allies for his response to the refugee crisis. On the surface, the King pledges for more help for the burdens on Jordanians. In an interview with CBS (2016) the King was asked: *what is the boiling point for Jordan?* On which he answered: *"the boiling point was reached two years ago. Jordanians have had it up until here, we just can't take it anymore"*. In EU-conferences, he continues to pledge for more financial aid and accuses Europe of not responding adequately to the burdens of Jordan¹²⁸. The King rejects the policies of Erdogan and the Lebanese government, that threatens Europe to send refugees to Europe. The King remains, by doing this, one of the strongest allies for Europe to deal with and understand the correlation of properly hosting refugees and financial aid¹²⁹. Europe continues to provide Jordan from financial aid as long as Jordan remains to offer Syrian refugees resilience. On the ground, however, Jordanians consider the King and the government as corrupt. All interviewees refer to the Jordanian government as a regime, one that is acting out of international pressure and aid, opportunism, favoritism, and corruption, rather than is representing Jordanian voices.

"If the [Jordanian] regime was surged by the international community to send Syrians back to Syrians; they will of course. They will make the return of Syrians easier and systematic. They can help to invest in housing and property rights in South-Syria for example. I think that Jordan's response will be parallel

¹²⁶ Participant 8, personal communication, December 5, 2019

¹²⁷ Participant 9, personal communication, December 5, 2019

¹²⁸ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/14/brussels-iii-conference-on-supporting-the-future-of-syria-and-the-region-co-chairs-declaration/>

¹²⁹ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6150

with the policy of the international community. As long as the Jordan government receives international money, they won't send them back. At least not before its internationally agreed upon that Syria is safe to return.¹³⁰

"Their [Syrian] stay is obligatory for the most part, no-one asked, counseled, or informed us of anything. It is the same with the Iraqi and Palestinian refugee-crisis. As long as the government receives money, in spite of our willingness to receive, and if so, how much, the same as the Iraq crisis and any other crisis in the region¹³¹".

What I also noticed in (informal) conversations with Jordanians was the emergence of frustrations towards the international community that keeps building up pressure on the Jordanian government to remain hospitable and resilient towards the Syrian refugees in Jordan. Meanwhile, the strains for Jordanians are ever-growing. Besides frustrations on the selectiveness of international aid solely directed towards Syrians (as described in the previous paragraph), most of the people I spoke with also do not necessarily see what happens with extensive amounts of international aid-funded and suspect it to be embezzled by the government. And Jordanians are not likely to step up against the King's supreme policies, due to the authoritarian rule, idle political engagement, hence, fear (moreover in the reflection - bias of answers). As one of the interviewees elaborates:

"Negative sentiments towards Syrians are not stimulated by the government, which is good, I guess. But it also shows that the Jordanian authorities do not necessarily represent the people on the street. It does not matter how vocal or how negative they perceive Syrians and how Syrian influence their lives negatively because if the authorities proceed with their support towards Syrians, that is what the people [Jordanians] also have to do then.¹³²"

Finally, following the interviews, Jordanians argue that the international community should be more realistic about a political resolution in Syria. To illustrate this argument - which is widely supported in informal conversations I had with Jordanians: *"It needs an international agreement with the Syrian regime. There should be the pressure of Western countries and Arab countries, everyone who is involved has to put pressure on the regime to move on the current situation is unbearable for both Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan"¹³³.*

¹³⁰ Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

¹³¹ Participant 5, personal communication, November 11, 2019

¹³² Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

¹³³ Participant 8, personal communication, December 5, 2019

Chapter 6: Conclusions and reflection

This concluding chapter answers the research question by discussing the main findings of this research: *what is the role of shared identity in the hospitality of Jordanians (in Amman, Sweileh) towards Syrian refugees and how do they perceive the limits of this hospitality?* Furthermore, I reflect on the scientific- and societal contributions of this research, and on potential bias within the outcomes.

Most important findings

This research discovered the relation between sharing identity characteristics between host- and refugee groups, and its effect on (sustainable) hospitality by analyzing the case-study of Jordan and Syrian refugees. During my field research for three months in Amman (Sweileh), I connected and lived along with extremely resilient people, who have been welcoming me throughout my whole stay. Despite the economic hardship, there is an undeniable sense of looking after each other that appears to transcend nationality. The empirical evidence gathered in this field research shows that shared identity between Jordanians and Syrian refugees have played an important role throughout the timeline of Jordanians hosting Syrian refugees from 2011 until currently. First off, especially at the beginning of the refugee crisis, sharing identity characteristics - especially sharing the same religion, language, geographical background and ethnicity – has been a prominent driving force for Jordanians to be hospitable towards Syrian refugees. This has been accompanied by the inherence of hospitality in general in Jordanian society: Bedouin- and Arab culture, and Jordanian interpretations of Islamic standards. Vice versa, the inheritance of hospitality in Jordanian society is magnified by the resemblances between Jordanians and Syrians and the sense of duty to help fellow Arabs, especially the ones in need.

Secondly, while the presence of Syrian refugees in Jordan continues indefinitely, Syrians have been integrating into Jordanian society, in which sharing identity characteristics seem to have played a significant facilitating role in the graduality and the almost seamless manner of this integration. Sharing identity characteristics evidently made the integration of Syrians relatively more gradual and easier than most other migrant groups in Jordan. The horrors of the Syrian war came also closer to Jordanians, and additionally, the similarities between Jordanians and Syrians made it easier for Jordanians to replace themselves into Syrians' traumas and needs. on the other hand, Syrians were

able to adapt to the established norms in Jordan relatively easily and Jordanians were relatively easily able to offer Syrians protection and further integration into Jordanian society.

Asking Jordanians about their initial incentive for hospitality towards Syrian refugees prevails a positive attitude about Jordanian hospitality deriving from the sense of sameness between Jordanians and Syrians and the sense of duty to protect fellow Arabs and Muslims in need. However, unfolding details of identity aspects within Jordanian hospitality and focusing on the sustainability of it more, surfaces a more negative sentiment, in which Syrians are portrayed more as a burden and threat to the livelihoods of Jordanians, rather than being 'brethren'. The social capital and bonds that were once perceived, seemed to have weakened over time. As Putnam (2000) argues, social capital can exist between hetero- (bridging) and homogenous groups (bonding). Jordanians and Syrian refugees share social capital through bonds (family, cultural and ethnic ties), which is following Nee & Sanders (2001) prominently of higher relevance than financial capital in the adaptation of migrants and refugees. However, the undeniable large number of Syrians in Jordan and their likely protracted stay is perceived as an ever-growing competition for Jordanians, affecting multiple aspects of their livelihoods: in the labor market, in the availability of resources, in further urbanization, and in the attention of the international community. The perceived ever-growing competitive environment seems to transcend the shared identity characteristics between Jordanians and Syrians and Jordanian sense of duty to remain hospitable. The challenges of continuing to host Syrian refugees are perceived as so pressing, that sharing identity characteristics don't necessarily stand ground in sustaining hospitable, nor ensure the future of Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees. The sole focus of the international community on Syrians in exile creates a concern for the emergence of frustrations, so does the slow process of a political solution in Syria (ultimately for Syrians to return). The border between Jordan and Syria has re-opened and the security situation in Syria is more and more perceived as safe for return by many Jordanians. The nature of migration for Syrians, who came to Jordan as conflict refugees, therefore also shifts. Whereas on the one hand social capital between Jordanians and Syrians initially effectively supported the interaction between both groups, the financial resources and the competitive environment have transcended the once perceived sense of shared identity and unconditional hospitality.

These findings can reveal that the limits of Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees have been reached, However, there is no distinctive hostile environment detected yet. Even though Jordanians seem to be frustrated with ever-growing strains and burdens of the protracted stay of Syrians, Jordanians remain to cope with Syrians and there aren't distinctive red lines crossed nor did I detect a hostile environment. Even though Jordanians were sometimes vocal about their negative sentiments towards the burdens of Syrians in Jordan, they seem not to be vocal about this towards

Syrians. I noticed how Jordanians tend to keep their opinions relatively discrete, and that they have perched to the situation rather than speaking up against Syrians or authorities.

The limits of Jordanian hospitality can only be further analyzed while keeping three aspects in mind, detected during the field research, and caused potential bias in answers of Jordanians:

1. The culture of keeping issues 'close to the chest'
2. The culture of extreme hospitality
3. The political passivity due to the ultimate power of the Jordanian King

Close to the chest

First of all, I have experienced how the theory of Chatty (2017), which explains how *Jordanians are used to keep issues 'close to the chest' and are therefore probably less vocal towards Syrians* - came into play.

While gathering participants for the interviews and during the interviews, people were reticent in talking to me and my translator. Even after showing my student card, with an explanation of my research, many people requested to look further. It did not seem related to lack of time or interest, but more a lack of trust and fear for what I would do with the results. Even though I mentioned the anonymity of participation, some even asked if we worked for the government. These three examples during the process of conducting interviews in Sweileh underline Jordanian reluctance on speaking about Syrian refugees:

- One of the participants held an extremely positive sentiment towards the presence of Syrians in Jordan and their integration into Jordanian society. This was surprising because it distinctively deviated from other participants, which emphasized more on the challenges of the protracted stay of Syrians rather than the positive attributes to it. The interviewee of this particular interview is a shop owner whom we interviewed next to his colleague, a young boy behind the cashier. Later, we found that the co-worker was Syrian. This should be considered to have played a role in the interviewee's remarkable positive attitude.
- One of the participants was willing to speak to us but insisted on holding the interview a bit further, in his dental office. His sentiment towards Syrian refugees was mere of a negative nature. We addressed him in a relatively quiet environment with not many other people around.

- In almost every interview, or even before the start of the interview, the participants would ask us if we were Syrians ourselves. In a few interviews, the sentiment towards Syrian refugees started as merely positive but changed more negatively and more vocal after we confirmed not to be of Syrian origin.

Extreme hospitality

Interconnected to this is the inherence of extreme hospitality in Jordanian culture, deriving from Bedouin- and Arab culture and Jordanian interpretation of Islamic standards. The combination of being close to the chest and being required to be hospitable towards others can naturally form that Jordanians are not likely to be hostile towards their guests, despite possible frustrations they experience. This finding is in line with Derrida's paradox of hospitality: Jordanians remain hospitable as long as the guests are staying, even if their stay is a burden for them. Even though the limits for sheltering Syrians were reached years ago, Jordanians are not likely to express these limits towards their Syrian 'guests'. The paradoxicality of this lies in how Jordanians are not perceived to place their guest's well-being above their own well-being (affected livelihoods due to Syrians being direct competitors in all aspects of Jordanian life). To elaborate on this, Jordanian hospitality has caused large burdens on Jordanians themselves. They perceive that their hospitality towards Syrian refugees have placed Syrian wellbeing above their wellbeing, as something they require themselves and each other to do. This unconditional hospitable environment - that is deeply-rooted in Jordanian culture - has taken them 'hostage'. This research shows the practice of the paradox of hospitality of Derrida. Absolute hospitality requires the host to give without limits, but at the same time, there should be limits because the host will otherwise be taken 'hostage' by their guests, and therefore, will not be the host anymore - a role required to offer unconditional hospitality. This theory conforms with Jordanian history of sheltering large numbers of refugees, but definitely also regarding the Syrian refugee crisis. Even though their limits of hosting Syrians have been reached, their unconditional hospitality forces them to continue to be hospitable, despite being taken hostage because of their hospitality.

Political passivity and the ultimate power of the King

This unconditional hospitable environment and the reluctance of Jordanians to act upon their perceived limits of hospitality can, additionally, be explained through the political passivity of Jordanians due to the ultimate power of the King and the fear of the government. Dr. Blakely and Dr. Rizkallah (2015) explain how space for young people to give their opinions on society is shrinking because they perceive it as 'It has no point' and 'there will be no change'. In theory, the political Jordanian system is positioned as a 'democratic monarchy'. In practice, people experience a regime, the ultimate power of the King and his direct authorities. The passivity in providing opinions was also

visible during the fieldwork. prior to conducting the interviews, almost all the participants gave a disclaimer of probably 'not being useful' or 'not sure if they had the right opinion'. Especially the female participants were initially insecure, while they eventually have been extremely helpful in providing an image of the Jordanian perceptions of Syrian refugees. Sweis (2019), a Jordanian who strives for more transparency on Jordan's social diversity, argues that "Jordanians are often taught to think monolithically, anything from the outside or different perspective is perceived as deviant (p. 6)". It makes more sense why the voices of Jordanians are underexposed, the reasons why I started this research in the first place.

Moreover, besides the perceived pointlessness of opinions, there also prevails a certain fear of stepping up and being vocal about governmental policies. Besides the physical presence of the King's power (street names, news coverage, portraits in shops, etc.¹³⁴), his grounded power is also a presence in the minds of Jordanians. I noticed how Jordanians have experienced a growing security sector which is, on the one hand, appreciated - Jordan remains a safe haven among conflict countries - but is also experienced as suppressing. In three months only I have been in multiple situations in which my Jordanian companies suspected to be surrounded by intelligence services. Questionable figures would, for example, ask odd questions or follow us. There prevails an undeniable sense of 'being watched'. Even though Jordan is portrayed as a relatively liberal Middle-Eastern country, people do feel they have to pay attention to their words on certain topics, especially if it involves the Jordanian government and the King. There is a certain amount of freedom of speech. One of the interviewees illustrated this by the peaceful protests held in Amman regularly, advocating mostly for economic reforms. There is a but with a capital B though, which states that criticizing the King of the Hashemite family is the red line. While discussing this, the interviewee was careful in his wording, especially whilst Bedouin tribes (related to the Hashemite tribe) were sitting close to us in the café. He was able to speak more freely when they left. He quoted that (and this is widely supported within other conversations¹³⁵) "*the king is the red line*"¹³⁶. He elaborates: "*If the king wants to open the borders, we stand behind that. There is no choice. Political push back works counterproductive (imprisonment) or has no effect at all*"¹³⁷

¹³⁴ The power of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is visible in various senses of daily Jordanian life: the Royal Family is imaged at every service; restaurants, hospitals, police offices, barbershops, and so on. Moreover, most street names in Amman are named after the royal family: one of the most important streets in Amman is renamed to Queen Rania Street, while it used to be called University Street (University of Jordan is positioned here). Jordanians, however, would still call the street 'Sharaa Jamaa' (university) rather than referring to Queen Rania. Additionally, the leading newspaper The Jordan Times, which I analyzed weekly gives high importance to activities of the King and portrays positive sentiments on the King only.

¹³⁵ Participant 2, 4 and 5, personal communication (October 26, November 11, 2019); Jehan Zaben (FCA), personal communication, October 18, 2019.

¹³⁶ Participant 9, personal communication, December 5, 2019

¹³⁷ Participant 9, personal communication, December 5, 2019

It should be considered, taken the ongoing positioning of the Jordanian government as a resilient country within the Syrian refugees and continuing to pledge for more international aid, is not necessarily the opinion of the Jordanians. The actual Jordanian opinion will, however, following above mentioned condition for exposing Jordanian opinions, not being exposed nor acted upon by Jordanians themselves. Another interviewee explains: *"the voice of the people does not influence the authorities' agenda. People have no other choice than to submit to the regime. That is why Jordanians have become more passive about politics. They stopped being vocal. They are afraid of the systems. That is why you would not necessarily hear Jordanians being racist towards Syrians. The government invests in the safety of Syrians because the government's priority is to profile as a safe country and partner in the region. Negative sentiment towards Syrians might affect international funding and partnerships."*¹³⁸

The political passivity, the fear of potential risks attached to certain opinions, and the inheritance of being hospitable and close to the chest despite frustrations towards guests, should be considered while reflecting on potential bias in the results of this research. The actual attitude of Jordanians towards their hospitality of Syrian refugees potentially embodies a more negative sentiment than reflected in this research, and in the existing literature on Jordanian perspectives in general.

Scientific contribution

Other studies

The abovementioned conclusions should be taken into account when considering refugee resilience for hosting communities and host-refugee relations. The role of shared identity - as shown in this research - can contribute to a more hospitable environment (especially at the start of receiving refugees). Moreover, the competition in host- and refugees (resources, labor) should be taken into account when analyzing host- and refugee relations and especially the role of sharing identity characteristics. This research has found that protracted stay - alongside a perceived growing competitive environment - can ultimately change how the host community perceives refugees, and the role of sharing identity becomes less relevant. This finding can be applied to other studies that analyze the protracted stay of refugees, especially in similar environments where refugees and hosts share significant similarities.

Following Putnam's bridging-bonding theory, social capital can exist between heterogeneous groups (bridging) and between homogeneous groups of people (bonding) (Davis, 2014, p. 4). Bonds describe the links between people which are based on a sense of shared identity, for example, family ties, cultural ties and/or ethnic ties. Bridges rather describe the bonds with people with a further distance

¹³⁸ Participant 2, personal communication, October 26, 2019

than a shared sense of identity, such as indirect friends and colleagues (Putnam, 2000). Moreover, more specific to the acceptance of migrants and refugees, Nee and Sanders (2001, as cited in Bucholtz, 2019) argue that social capital based on shared ethnicity is prominently of higher relevance than human- and financial capital in the adaptation of migrants and refugees.

Furthermore, since the role of local identity and its inherence of hospitality - deriving from Bedouin Arab culture and Islamic standards - has also played a significant role in Jordanian hospitality; this finding can support other studies taken place in Arab countries or Islamic communities.

This research has explored host- refugee relations and the importance of sharing identity characteristics within the hospitality and the sustainability of this hospitality. This research has been built on existing elaborations of Jordanian hospitality towards Syrian refugees, furthermore, discovering the role of shared identity in this regard. In accordance with this hypothesis and with the theories of Gerges (2013), İçduygo & Nimer (2019) and Luck (2019), this research confirms that a shared identity has played a significant role in the hospitality of Jordanians towards Syrian refugees. The results show that Jordanians tend to transcend the classical border- and nation-thinking and think more in tribal, historical and cultural relations, bringing the *imagined communities* of Anderson (1938) into practice. This research also turned the Social Identity Theory of Tajfel & Turner (1979) more into practice by filling this in for how Jordanians perceive their shared identity with Syrians and how they conform to in- and outgroup forming. The interpretation of this theory on the case-study showed how Jordanians seem to perceive Syrians as 'in-group' on abstract terms: sharing ethnicity, language, geographical-historical background, and religion. However, in the second and third steps of the framework 'social identification' and 'social comparison' more negative attitudes from Jordanians towards Syrians tend to prevail, and more 'out-group' thinking is applied. These frictions within perceived shared identity should, however, be seen in the light of the competition Jordanians experience. The general assumption is that: they want to be hospitable, but this is hard to maintain when their livelihoods are being heavily affected by this hospitality. These findings are based upon the theory of Sen (2006): arguing that choices of one's identity and determining group-identity become more apparent in competing environments between different groups. Additionally, in accordance with scholars on intergroup similarities (Brown and Tajfel's, 2010; Brown and Abrams, 1986), Jordanians perceive - to a large extent- attitudinal similarities with Syrian refugees, which resemblances in, for example, religious and cultural standards - but in a similar - perceived-growing competitive environment, Jordanians tend to search for ways to distinguish themselves from Syrians with dislike as a result for some (status similarities). These findings also build upon - as explained above - the concept of Derrida and hospitality, especially on the theory of the paradoxicality of hospitality, which is applicable to this case study.

Local identity

This research also highlights the important role of not only shared identity but also local identity; considering how outsiders have been received in Jordan. This research agrees with the theory of Hynie (2018) who argues that a new coming group who accepts local beliefs and is not perceived as a (symbolic) threat to change established norms, has a higher chance of being included by the host community. This case study shows how it has been relatively easy for Jordanians to offer Syrians help and for Syrian to integrate since they speak the same language, based their standards on the same religion and are in some cases even family or tribally related. The results do not match the theory of Wagner et. al, (2010) and Schildkraut (2014), who argue that a strong local identity is likely to cause social exclusion for out-groups, such as refugees and migrant groups. However, this strongly depends on what the local identity consists of. More applicable to this specific case-study is the theory of Driel & Verkuyten (2019) which explains the approval of outsiders because of a strong local identity. This appeared especially to be the case in Jordan, in which hospitality is one of the most important pillars of their local identity. However, the results of the research lack reliable data of the same hospitality being directed towards other refugee groups, as large as the number of Syrians in Jordan, with the fewer similarities in identity.

Societal contribution

Underexposed voices

While previous research has focused more on the perceptions of Syrians in Jordan and more on the governmental narratives on the refugee crisis, this research provides insights on more underexposed voices within this research topic: those of the Jordanians. Furthermore, previous research on Syrians in Amman has focused on vulnerable suburbs such as in East-Amman, rather than on Sweileh. This research, therefore, portrays new voices (from a Jordanian perspective) and a new geographical area (Amman - Sweileh) which can contribute to existing data on the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan.

Political recommendations

Because this research has explained more perceptions of the hosting community, these results should also be taken into account when considering the 'one-refugee approach', an approach seeking to create awareness for all refugees in hosting countries in the region, not solely Syrians. In addition, governments, and donor countries - who invest largely in financial aid in Jordan - should beside a 'one-refugee' approach, also focalize non-refugees. The results show the hardship of Jordanians and other non-refugee groups, who do experience a growing economic and livelihood pressure due to the burdens of the refugee crisis. Moreover, since the primary data - the interviews - of this research is conducted with relatively vulnerable Jordanians, it should be considered that results are likely to be different when conducted with wealthier Jordanians. First off, I noticed this - a more positive yet also

ignorant sentiment - living in a wealthier area of Amman in the first weeks. Secondly, vulnerable Jordanians are direct competitors of Syrian refugees, which makes their sentiments (generally) more negative towards Syrian more plausible. It should be considered that Jordanians who feel threatened by Syrian presence can be less reasonable about the security situation in Syria than reality reveals; because it is a massive relief for them if Syrians would repatriate.

Also, growing negative sentiments towards Syrian refugees on the ground are not necessarily impacted by the (political) situation. The 'people on the street' do not feel their opinion impacting the decisions of the government. Since this research considered their opinion as an indicator of sustainability in hospitality, it, therefore, raises questions on how important their voices actually are in future decisions on the refugee crisis. Additionally, even if sentiments become more hostile, this research found how Jordanians do not necessarily act upon their sentiments, derived from their 'close to the chest' culture. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the actual democracy of Jordan, but this can be interesting in further research on how Jordanian voices contribute to policy manifestations.

Limitations and further research

The generalizability of the results is limited due to the small number of interviews conducted (ten), which cannot generalize the opinions of Jordanians throughout Sweileh, nor the whole of Amman. However, in line with the degree of saturation, increasing the number of interviews does not necessarily predict completely different outcomes. It can, however, induce the reliability of generalizing answers. Further research is needed to establish the sequences of factors of hospitality towards refugees and migrants, which now seem to overlap more during the time. While analyzing the results, I consider several further research questions to be relevant, which are either beyond the scope of this research or can further develop this research:

- As Harris & Alshoubaki (2018) and Brown (1996) argued, a large number of refugees in proportion to the local population is more likely to cause economic, socio-cultural and political tensions, as is for the case of Jordan and Syrian refugees on top of other refugee groups in Jordan. Shared identity has had a positive effect on Jordanian hospitality, but are over time transcending by more negative sounds due to the ever-growing competition perceived. The large presence of Syrian refugees eclipses the benefits sharing identity between host- and refugee groups might have had in hospitality and integration processes. It should be considered that the role of shared identity might have played an ever larger (positive) role in hospitality if the refugee group was smaller and less pressing on the hosts' shoulders. The same research question, therefore, should be analyzed on a similar case, but with a smaller refugee group that shares identity characteristics with its host community. The question

therefore remain: if there was a smaller presence of Syrian refugees in Jordan, would the sentiment have been more positive?

- How is a 'hospitable' environment defined (by the international community)? What are the exact boundaries or red lines? This is also correlated with the willingness of the international community to determine international aid (to offer resilience for the refugee crisis). A follow-up question, therefore, is: *what makes Jordan more eligible for international aid?*
- From a more Western perspective: why is it even remarkable that Jordan is - to this extent - hospitable towards Syrian refugees, and refugees in general? Should hospitality not be the standard, rather than the deviation? What does that reveal about the perspectives of Western governments towards receiving refugees and/or migrant groups?
- As explained in the results, sharing identity characteristics has played a major role in how gradually Syrians have integrated in Jordan. But also, because Jordanians had no other choice than letting Syrians integrate. The Jordanian government invested in a hospitable environment for Syrian refugees. As explained in the results, this governmental hospitality is correlated with international aid. Interesting to further understand the limits of hospitality, therefore, it is to analyze policy changes if international aid will go down and donor fatigue increases. A follow-up question then is also, how will Jordan proceed its policies towards Syrian refugees if the international communities' narratives shift to 'a safer Syria' and post-war Syria – while this might not be the case in reality? While Jordanians seem to remain hospitable, partly due to their shared identity with the Syrians - it is uncertain how the government will act.
- How sustainable is the living situation in Jordan for all people in Jordan in general? Cities are overcrowded, the population remains to grow exponentially, the economy is in a poor state and there is still large support for implementing more conservative forms of Islam. While experiencing the desperation of the youth in Amman, I wonder, how long can Jordan remain a 'safe haven' in the region, while there is a fertile ground for conflict? People want to escape, to Europe, or to Gulf countries. They do not see Amman as a place they want to end up. And Amman is - above all other places in Jordan - one of the most livable places with all facilities at reach. Jordan is often used as one of the examples of good governance and stability in the region, which makes sense, but poor circumstances and despair of Jordanians should not be undermined while analyzing the future of Jordan.

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Appendix

Attachment 1: Interview questions

1.1 Interview questions Jordanians in Sweileh

Hospitality towards Syrian refugees in general

- *How did the arrival of Syrian refugees change this neighborhood?*
- *How did Syrian refugees change your daily life in a positive way?*
- *How did Syrian refugees change your life in a negative way?*
- *How do you consider your hospitality towards Syrian refugees? Can you give examples?*
- *How do you consider the hospitality of the neighborhood towards Syrian refugees?*
 - *Can you give examples of hospitable actions?*
 - *Can you give examples of inhospitable actions?*
- *Has your opinion about Syrian refugees changed in the last few years?*
 - *If so, when did it change and why?*

Incentives for hospitality: shared identity?

- *What are reasons for Jordanians to be hospitable towards Syrian refugees?*
- *What is the most important reason?*
- *How important is it that Syrians speak the same language?*
- *How important is it that Syrians share the same religion?*
- *How important are the (tribal) family ties between Jordanians and Syrians?*
- *What are other similarities between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan?*
- *What are the most important differences between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan?*
- *Would you say there are more differences or more similarities between Jordanians and Syrians?*
- *How important is it for you to share similarities with Syrians to live in the same country?*

Sustainability of hospitality

- *How do you perceive the safety of Syria at this moment?*
- *How do you perceive the safety of Syrians in Jordan who return to Syria?*
- *How long do you think Syrians will stay in Jordan?*
- *What are the challenges if Syrians stay in Jordan?*
- *What are the benefits if Syrians stay in Jordan?*
- *How important is sharing similarities with Syrians if Syrians stay living in Jordan?*
- *Is this more important than other incentives for hospitality (f.e. economic, political or other socio-cultural motives)?*

Attachment 2: Interview questions for Syrians

- How long have you been in Sweileh for?
- How close are you to Jordanians neighbors?
- How do you perceive their hospitality?
- Have you seen hospitality changing?

Attachment 3: Discussions with Ngo's and knowledge institute

Discussion with the team of Siren Associates (October 15, 2019)

Siren is a (originally Irish) Ngo in Amman that seeks to develop safe and secure societies between host communities and refugees in Jordan. Siren works through civil policing to transform the public sector and to become more responsive to the needs of local communities. Siren is for example well-established in refugees camps Zaatari and Azraq. On 15 October 2019, after contacting Siren's director, after contacting the Executive Director, I had a 2-hour discussions with 10 members of Siren's team, who I explained the research question and they responded extensively with their experiences and pointed out relevancy (and irrelevancy) of the research question. The most important takeaways from this discussion were the vulnerable positions of Jordanians in lower economic classes and the lack of attention to this group - rather than on the continuous emphasized attention to Syrian refugees by the international community.

Notes/summary:

Jordan remains relatively hospitable towards Syrian refugees:

- *International aid (governmental narrative/needs → aid does not reach Jordanians; governmental prominently focuses on - if not frame - hospitality towards Syrian refugees). Is it a hoax?*

- *"Passive" nature of Syrians → not activistic, on the background; effects on how host-communities respond to them?*

Jordan's "honeymoon phase" of hospitality towards Syrian refugees transitions in a more critical phase; the competition among vulnerable Jordanians versus Syrian refugees is becoming more tensed.

"Jordanians are tired".

Competing on:

1. Resources

2. Labour and income

- *Syrians are willing to take lower waged jobs, Jordanians more 'ashamed' of low labour.*
- *Syrians are generally creative entrepreneurs, effective with little money*
- *Workforce demographics: majority Syrian refugees is reaching the age to enter Jordanian labour force.*

3. Housing

- *Highly vulnerable Jordanians consciously choose to live in Syrian refugees camps, such as Mafraq and Azraq, due to better living standards than their what they are used to.*

4. Attention of international community

- *UNHCR funds for Syrians higher income than that of vulnerable Jordanians; Syrians do not have to work for funds.*
- *International focus on Syrian refugees rather than on (vulnerable) Jordanians. Also; Iraqi and Palestinian refugees in Jordan are neglected.*
- *The focus of the international community solely on Syrian refugee rather than (vulnerable) Jordanians also created a gap between the two groups.*

5. Marriage

- *Syrian women (attractive appearance) are marrying Jordanian men. Jordanian women become more neglected.*
- *Syrian law enforcement dates back from French regulations, Jordanian from British. Syrian law child marriage < 18 possible.*

Shared identity characteristics

- From 2011; Syrians perceived as 'brothers and sisters' through kinship ties with Jordanians.
- Degree of hospitality more based on social class than on nationality?
- Migrant workers (from Phillipines, Myanmar, f.e.) are perceived more as 'the other' than Syrian refugees → domestic abusiveness, neglected, poor living conditions.

Palestinian < > Syrian:

- What were Jordanian perceptions after Palestinian influx?
 - Different context: less focus on nation-building and borders, statelessness.

Focus of international community

- Rhetoric/semantics of Jordan's hospitality: why are we surprised that Jordan is (relatively) hospitable towards Syrian refugees?
- What is international aid shifts, decreases, take new narrative?
- Jordan will always be strategic partner of EU and US as last "safe haven" in the Middle-East. But will this amount of aid endures, or will donor fatigue rise? Correlates with post-war/peace-building situation or even frames/rhetoric in Syria.

Security in Syria:

- Border opening; re-flourish the North-Jordan and South-Syrian trade
- Re-strengthen ties with Syrian regime by international community

Drivers for migration:

- Conflict driven (as perceived in 2011) → still the case? Or are Syrian refugees now more

Main questions:

- What are the connectors < > what are the dividers for social cohesion?
 - Role of shared identity?
- In order to know: what to emphasize on (international community programs; what is neglected) and on what not (overemphasized)?

Discussion with researcher of the WANA Institute (October 25, 2019)

WANA is a knowledge institute providing 'knowledge from the region, for the region', based in the knowledge center of Amman - next to the University of Jordan. WANA researchers provide in-depth

analysis of issues in Jordan. WANA's reports are extremely valuable for informing the government working on Jordan, visible during my time in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 25 October, I had an 1-hour discussion with one of WANA's researchers who had published reports on social cohesion between host communities and Syrian refugees and the impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian economy. Both reports had provided me with extremely relevant information while understanding the challenges and translating them to a research proposal. The most important takeaways from this discussion was that I had to rephrase my interview questions to more 'simple' questions that were more relatable for daily lives of Jordanians.

Notes/summary:

Previous waves of Syrians in Jordan (how valid are the current numbers being mentioned, framed?):

- Jordanian-Syrian relations go back to before 1920, after the Arab revolt in 1916. King Faisal established the Hashemite Kingdom, with territory over parts of Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Jordan: the Greater Arab Kingdom. Held on for 4 months and caused one of the first waves of Syrians to Jordan.
- In- and out travels of people on the (now) Jordanian and Syrian territory were fluid before '48 (Nakbah). After the Palestinian influx into Jordanian territory, borders became more fixed.
- The second wave of Syrians into Jordan was after the political exile when Hafez al-Assad came into power - after the Hama slaughtering.

The people in Mafraq were the first to face the current wave of Syrian refugees. It took them 48 months to actually give them shelter. Before this, Syrians would take on their journey into Jordan more down South from Mafraq.

How are the Syrian refugees so different than other refugees in Jordan?

- International attention
- High amount (population)
- Social class: many Syrian are from Deraa, in where people worked in the agricultural sector (lower class than f.e. wealthy Iraqis that fled to Jordan).

Vulnerable Jordanians <> Syrian refugees:

- UNHCR coupons paid upfront (6 months) higher expenditure than some Jordanians (f.e. Mafraq).

- Tafileh incident: Syrian killed Jordanian, 400 Syrians were expelled. Indirect fault of STC who put 'S' on Syrian houses and made it clearly distinguishable who was Syrian and who was Jordanian.

In general, refugees attitudes are perceived in following (positive) order:

1. Iraqis (historical political collaboration, oil export, education/labour exchanges, wealthy Iraqis came to Jordan)
2. Syrian (shared tribal ties, but complicated historical political ties: Syria's tendency to support radical/social Palestinian movements, f.e. backed PLO fight against Jordan in 'Black September' in '70-'71; lower social class came to Jordan).
3. Jemeni (same language, distinct accent)
4. Sudan (different culture)
5. Somalia (do not speak the language)
6. What about SE Asians? Europeans? Expats?

Generosity will transcend boundaries. *Is this true if it comes to hospitality of Jordanians towards Syrians? Why is this so relevant? More relevant than economic factors? Living circumstances? Future prosperities? Why is this so important?*

Freedom of speech:

- Jordan relatively free, protest of 2019, they can criticise anything but the king. The king is the red line.

For the focus groups:

- People talk about what they know. Rephrasing the questions. F.e.: how did the coming of Syrians change things in Sweileh? In shops, in the streets? Is this because of Syrians? Etc. Not focus too much on long-term, they talk about what they know, daily experiences.

Jordan has always been a transit country. Example: Petra. It has been a trading route to Mecca. The situation in Jordan is never permanent. This is how perceptions on population (refugees) is also received. No situation is permanent.

Different than with the Palestinians. Right to return seems far away. Syrians will return once Syria is stable. Syrian perception: no return with Bashar Assad in power.

Discussion with policy officer of the Finn Church Aid (October 28, 2019)

Notes/summary:

- JOR and SYR share - not as much as Palestinians and Jordanians - similar language, religion, family, history, same last names, geographical positioning, attached to geographical ground → but were once separated by borders (random) → especially in the North of Jordan.
- Jordanian hospitality is derived from bedouin culture and values from the Islam (examples). Generosity towards Syrian 'neighbors' is not doing a favour, it is something we have to do. Syrian pay back in return by being grateful and moral in their actions. Is it the same for non-Arabs, non-Muslims, non-tribal relatives? It is about being moral, independent of nationality.
- iNGO's problem: solely support to Syrian refugees. Advocacy for one-refugee approach, but not embedded (or visible in governmental actions) in international community. Takes time, takes something to happen for change. There is more awareness (integration), donors and int. gov. take it more into account.
- Lack of trust between SYR and JOR: opening business. By JOR law: 51% of opening new business has to be Jordanian owner. A Syrian collaborator is not being mentioned. It would be a great collaboration, JOR and SYR can learn lots from each other, but lack of trust in contract. Government should enable/be more flexible in JOR-SYR collaborations. Especially because SYR have great trade mentality. It would be a win-win situation
 - Advocacy/recommendations towards the government: not quite open for change.
- Syrians are already integrating. They are part of Jordanian cities. Problems in Jordan can not be all derived from the Syrian refugees. The lack of resources and economic challenges are used as an excuse. The government is corrupt and duzzles money.
- As long as the regime (Assad) is in power, Syrians are not going back. Also, they have nothing to return to (HLP, family fled). If they had the chance, they would. Syrians in Jordan miss the connection to their land (agricultural heritage from Deraa) Jordanians perceive the security situation in Syria also as unsafe for return. They will not send them back.
- The king is the red line. If the king wants to open the borders, we stand behind that. There is no choice. Political/governmental push back works counterproductive (imprisonment) or has no effect (political passivity).

- Syrians are integrating and it goes relatively well (seeing LBN and TUR). The longer they stay, the more relevant shared identity is.
- Jordan is resilient, was that before the Syrians. Unlike Lebanon (unstable) and Turkey (not the same language/religion → Turks less Islamic).
- Syrians in urban areas, especially Amman, are more likely to be from higher social classes. They used to be businessmen, rather than agricultural Syrians in camps or in the Northern part of Jordan.
- Integration of Iraqis went more smoothly: 1) wealthy Iraqis came to Jordan, 2) they had the possibility to return (flexibility, fluidity, not fixed situation like Syrians).
- Hopefully Syrians will get a fair chance in integration, Palestinians in f.e. LBN never got that opportunity.
- Syrians accept lower jobs than Jordanians. They can, because their salary is complemented by UNHCR coupons. Frustration of Jordanian youth.

The iceberg/castle of the king:

- 1) King
- 2) Army (convenient position, privileged, large percentage of JOR working labour)
- 3) Ministries
- 4) Mass

“Through the lens of few leaders - the King”.

Attachment 4: Codes used in Atlas.ti

Word density/most frequently used words interviews¹³⁹

	Words	Word density (all 10 interviews)	Mentioned in different interviews
1	Arabic	18	10
2	Arab	16	9
3	family (ties)	15	8
4	Neighbors	11	8

¹³⁹ Retrieved from <https://www.wordclouds.com/>

5	Muslim	9	6
6	traditions	6	4
7	war	6	4
8	tribes	6	6
9	love	4	3
10	moral	4	4
11	norms	4	4
12	suffering	4	2
13	support	4	3
14	love	4	2
15	understand	4	4
16	border	3	2
17	brothers and sisters	5	4

Codes Atlas.ti

Code	Frequency in coding	Mentioned in different interviews
Negative sentiment towards Syrians	12	7
Positive sentiment towards Syrians	5	3
Positive changes hospitality	4	2
Shared identity (connectors)	23	10
Shared identity (dividers)	12	6

Shared identity in hospitality	18	8
Shared identity integration	14	8
Limits hospitality	8	9
Conditional hospitality	10	7
Local identity	13	10
Unconditional hospitality	6	4
Other reasons hospitality	22	9
Hostility	10	4
Negative changes hospitality	6	8
Syria safe for return	10	6
Syria unsafe for return	7	4

The frequency in coding displays how often the code is attached to a quotation throughout all interview results. The 'mentioned in different interviews' displays how often this code is used in different interviews. The codes used are based on the research sub questions, reflecting on Jordanian hospitality, Jordanian identity, shared identity, shared identity and hospitality, shared identity and the sustainability of hospitality. I used overarching concepts and research topics that portray sentiments and attached these to quotations of participants that give interpretation to these concepts and research topics.

An example of the coding procedure for the code 'change in hospitality':

📄 Interviews English

People become more hostile over the years. You hear it when you talk, fe to taxi drivers.

changes

📄 Interviews English

Syrians changed the market. The sentiment towards Syrian started positive, but was already quite divided.

Limits

changes

Attachment 5: Interviews in text

Participant 1 (Arabic) - male, supermarket owner, 45 years, October 26, 2019:

How did the arrival of Syrian refugees change this neighborhood?

There was a significant change in lifestyle, their norms and traditions were a bit different although not too significant. For some Syrians. integration wasn't so challenging. Especially not for urban dwellers coming to Amman. It was more difficult for rural dwellers. It was a bit of cultural, or lifestyle shock. Some embraced it and some not so much. And their reaction to that changed and their attempts to assimilate was the factor of change in the neighborhood (especially since this neighborhood received large numbers; up to 70k Syrian refugees).

How did Syrian refugees change your daily life in a positive way?

The change can be summed up in the craftsmanship department (as its well-known that Syrians are on a high level of craftsmanship that Jordanians lack in general).

How did Syrian refugees change your life in a negative way?

As mentioned the reaction and counter-reaction of them embracing a new environment was the factor of change in general, their norms weren't and habits were different than the rest of their neighborhood.

How do you consider your hospitality towards Syrian refugees?

Jordan in general among the neighboring countries was the most welcoming and the most hospital in

many regards people open their houses and lowered the rents in some cases and me as a person I used to volunteer in some commissionaires that helps Syrians settle in.

How do you consider the hospitality of the neighborhood towards Syrian refugees?

This neighborhood received many Syrians and it changed by Syrians they settled here and some moved here from other places in Jordan or Amman, they opened shops, found jobs and made friendships. So I can say this neighborhood received them in open arms.

Can you give examples of inhospitable actions?

For some Jordanians (especially at the beginning of the crisis) used it as an opportunity to use refugees sexually and financially.

Has your opinion about Syrian refugees changed in the last few years?

Not at all. It remained the same.

What are reasons for Jordanians to be hospitable towards Syrian refugees?

I think it's that we're one people (referring to the Greater Syria).

How important is it that Syrians speak the same language?

It was important indeed, to communicate and to get along.

How important is it that Syrians share the same religion?

It wasn't all that important. At least, it was not the most important factor.

How important are the (tribal) family ties between Jordanians and Syrians?

This played a large role especially in the tribal area, such as Ramtha and Mafraq where the same families are stretched along the two borders. It would say maybe one of the most important factors.

What are other similarities between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan?

I think that the aforementioned reasons display that they aren't all that different to start looking for similarities.

What are the most important difference between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan?

Possibly some slight differences in socio-cultural interplay and traditions. But these are minor. Syrians look a lot like Jordanians in their daily lives.

Would you say there are more differences or more similarities between Jordanians and Syrians?

Definitely more similarities.

How important is it for you to share similarities with Syrians to live in the same country?

It is vital for the longevity. It will be too difficult for Syrian to integrate if they are not even speaking the language or completely have to adapt to new circumstances.

How do you perceive the safety of Syria at this moment?

It is super dangerous. Our neighbor got killed. He went back to Syria with his brother. The soon as they got back, they got killed by the regime. It is nowhere from safe to go back to Syria right now. I don't know, maybe not in my lifetime.

How long do you think Syrians will stay in Jordan?

If Syrians got citizenships, Jordan is the winner. They contribute a lot to Jordanian economy and society.

What are the challenges if Syrians stay in Jordan?

It will be difficult for them to get legal papers.

Interview 2 (English) - male, student, 24 years, October 26, 2019:

How did the arrival of Syrian refugees change this neighborhood?

I am not sure if I am helpful, but I will try. Syrians changed the market. The sentiment towards Syrian started positive, but was already quite divided. Some people hated Syrians for coming to Jordan, they had strong stereotypes towards them. It was not necessarily a positive sentiment. Also not negative, but definitely not positive.

Were people vocal about Syrians?

I have never been. I don't have an opinion on migration etc. Other people were definitely. People become more hostile over the years. You hear it when you talk, fe to taxi drivers. The economy of Jordan is not in a great shape. Syrians are better workers than Jordanians. They take the market share of employment. Some examples of things I heard; in taxis for example. When you talk about Syrians, it is always of negative sentiments. They perceive them as immoral and less unethical than Jordanians in many ways of living. For example the noise on the street, the honking of taxi drivers, it was not like that before the Syrians came. They are less honest, less helpful.

How hospitable do you perceive Jordan?

I have experienced this from a governmental view. They try to assist Syrians in every way possible. The

people have no hand in it. They can be vocal about Syrians, but they will never be vocal about it in front of Syrians. Negative sentiments towards Syrians are not stimulated by the government, which is good I guess. But it also shows that the Jordanian authorities not necessarily represent the people on the street. It does not matter how vocal or how negative they perceive Syrians and how Syrian influence their lives negatively, because if the authorities proceed their support towards Syrians, that is what the people [Jordanians] also have to do then. The voice of the people does not influence the authorities agenda. People have no other choice than submitting to the regime.

Shared identity

Jordanians are moral. They have good standards. They use Islamic standards in how they perceive Syrians. They help Syrians as their Muslim brother and Arab companion. "We are the same people", we share the same values and ethnic heritage. Heritage: before there were borders. People used to go to Syria. The mobility between Jordan and Syria was fluid and frequent. People hopped in their cars in the weekend and went to Syria for shopping. It was easy before 2011. People [Jordanians] still have an emotional bond with Syria, because visiting the country was an important part of their lives.

But Jordanians can also be racist towards its refugees. Towards Syrians, Iraqis, Egyptians, Yemenis. They cannot be too racist against Palestinians, because Palestine and Palestinians are a large part of Jordanian society. You cannot deny that. But this racism is against their refugees, who they sometimes perceive of lesser value. This is for example not the case towards Europeans. They love Europeans and they treat them in a special way.

Tribal links are still there. Tribes are shared. They have tribe leaders here in Jordan and one in Syria for example. When the war started, Syrians moved to Jordan and head of Syrian tribes were adopted by Jordanians. They merged and became Jordanian tribes. Happened a lot in history of Arab tribes.

One of the most important pillars is how Jordanians and Syrians adapt to each other. They share the same language and same cultural heritage and ethnic background. They have always been interwoven with each other geographically. It is not the same towards Egyptians or Iraqis necessarily, because most of them are economic migrants. The war in Syria affected Jordanians as well, people were shocked about the impact and the brutality. ISIS was even close to the Jordanian border, for example. So Jordanians understand why Syrians are here. So why they fled and the similarities are important.

Other incentives for hospitality

Relationship between Jordan and Syria was good and flexible. They share a large border. They shared a flourishing economy. Even now, large Syrian companies resettled here in Jordan. Jordanians appreciate that, because it contributes to Jordanian economy.

What divides Jordanians and Syrians?

The biggest divider between Jordanians and Syrians is financial inequality. Syrians are widely supported through institutions such as UNHCR. They receive 300 dollars for every individual in the family. They can buy things for cheaper prices, not even speaking about (free) housing. Jordanians see this and do not understand how the international community supports Syrians to this extent while some Jordanians live in even worse circumstances. Syrians live a better lifestyle sometimes than Jordanians. And that counts for a large group in Jordan, many people are vulnerable. It is frustrating for Jordanians. It makes the division deeper and changes sentiments negatively. They are only divided by economic dividers. There are minor cultural differences, but they are not prominent for remaining hospitable.

Integration of Syrians

Integration of Syrians happened already before the war. Syrians that lived here in the '60s and '70s were integrated very well and now are Jordanian citizens. It is not an issue of integration, they can integrate easily in Jordan. More easily than for example in Lebanon, the US or Europe. I don't think the situation will change on a short notice. Of course Syrians want to go back, they love Syria. They are proud people. No one likes to stay in Jordan, not even Jordanians. But they will not return until Assad and the regime are gone. It has to be super safe before they return. Jordanians who feel the negative impact of Syrians in Jordan, become less reasonable about the safety in Syria. They consider that it is safe to go back and believe (right-wing) media expressions. They see people going back to Syria, even Jordanians sometimes, so why would Syrian still be here?

The spectrum of hospitality changes. It shifts to a more hostile environment. I think there would always be a hostile sentiment towards Syrians. Even in 10-20 years. Jordanians do not think necessarily very strategically. They don't think of the future of integration of Syrians.

The reason why Jordan seems relatively hospitable is because the Jordanian regime invests in security. The government does not care about its people, it is not a democratic country as some presume. Any decision from the government cannot be opposed. That is why Jordanians have become more passive about politics. They stopped being vocal. They are afraid of the systems. That is why you would not necessarily hear Jordanians being racist towards Syrians. The government invests in the safety of Syrians, because the government's priority is to profile as the safe country and partner in the region. A negative sentiment towards Syrians, might affect international funding and partnerships.

Syria is self-sufficient, unlike Jordan who imports most of its products. Syrians for example produce their own cars. Jordanians can learn from that, but it is new; they are not used to producing their own products. Many artifacts made in Jordan by Syrians, still have the "made in Syria" label. Syrians remain

proud people. Until Jordanians understand and accept the way of Syrian labour more, they might cooperate better and the sentiment towards them can change positively.

Future of Syrians in Jordan

There has to be a governmental response towards Syrians or any economic improvements, limitations for Syrians and for Jordanians to see (there are but not perceived).

If the King was urged by the international community to send Syrians back to Syria; they will of course. They will make the return of Syrians easier and systematic. They can help investing in housing and property rights in South-Syria for example. I think that Jordan's response will be parallel with the policy of international community. They won't send them back before its internationally agreed upon that Syria is safe to return.

I do not think Jordan would respond towards refugees if it was not an Islamic country and Arab neighbor. They would not this amount of people who are not Muslim or neighbors. Not to the same extent of Yemenis for examples.

Participant 3 (Arabic) - female, teacher, 30 years, November 11, 2019

What was the impact of the arrival of Syrians in this neighborhood?

The impact of Syrians is prominent, and it's mostly negative (the groups who lives in Jordan at least). First off, their behavior isn't kind to their neighbors as they are inconsiderate, loud, and their actions can be disturbing for the local community. And their impact can also be felt on employment as owners would employ them instead of Jordanians, as they would ask for low wages and they accept any amount of money for their services. Additionally, begging as well.

How hospitable have Jordanians been towards Syrian refugees since their arrival?

Jordanians received Syrians just as good as they received Iraqis, Yemenis. For the vast majority of residents they were hospital towards them, I wasn't. Speaking for myself, I don't really like them, I cannot stand them.

Has your view on Syrian refugees change over the years?

My views about Syrians changed comparing before the crisis and during, as I used to consider them polite and civil, I don't think that anymore(and obviously I don't generalize, at least for the people I have encountered here).

What is the role of sharing identity characteristics with Syrians in how hospitable Jordanians are?

Yes, it played a role towards Jordanians hospitality, considering they are Arabs and Sunnis. But, mainly because they're Arabs. But I'd say mainly they're especially welcomed by the market, as they provide skillful and competent workers for a fraction of what Jordanians would ask in return for their effort.

What are similarities between Jordanians and Syrians? And differences?

They share the majority of our traditions, and norms and that has played a major role. I'd say similarities are more prominent than differences, and it is vital for both people to live together.

How do you consider the safety of Syria?

I think Syria is safe for them to return, and I hope they do soon. Considering that the border is open, that says it is safe for them to return to their countries. I think they like it here, they're not going back any time soon, in my opinion.

What are the challenges if Syrians stay in Jordan?

Jordanians are struggling to find jobs because of Syrians, and that's disastrous, so let them go and rebuild their country and leave us alone. These jobs belong to Jordanians. I don't think there's any major benefits of them being here. Even that we're similar, it doesn't matter in the sense of livability, and economic safety of Jordanians.

Other motives of receiving Syrians have been politically motivated.

Participant 4 (Arabic) - male, student, working at the gym, 25 years, November 11, 2019

What was the impact of the arrival of Syrians in this neighborhood?

The impact can be felt in the job market, they would as they took most of job opportunities. And their impact is majorly is on traffic, as they all use public transport. It is more crowded on the streets. It wasn't like this before 2011. You can find the good and the bad (inconclusive).

The neighborhood's hospitality is dependent on the Jordanian neighbors who had previous encounters with Syrians, either positive or negative. The Jordanians welcomed Syrians warmly. Either through the government or through the people.

How are Syrians similar to Jordanians?

Syrians themselves are different from traditions and norms standpoint so they would like it somewhere where it's most similar to their previous environment.

How do you describe Jordanian hospitality?

Jordanians are a welcoming people, it doesn't matter who or where you came from, as you can see in Amman it multi-ethnic city nowadays.

Considering the impact of Syrian TV and drama, it made it a bit easier for Jordanians to understand and live with them, and the Sham region is extremely similar in a lot of respects. The similarities can be traced as the shared history and family ties between the two people. The similarities between both of them were the purposes and making a living, and the difference in traditions is subtle.

How do you perceive Syria's safety at this moment?

I think Syrians should go back to rebuild their country not in a hostile way, just like other countries after WW2. I think Syrians like it here, but they should start over and build a culture or rebuilding their country.

What will be the challenges if Syrians stay? How important remains similarities between Jordanians and Syrians?

The challenges are prominent in extreme pressure on resources and infrastructure, back in the early 2000s Jordan's population was 5 million dollars, and now it is 3 times the population. That plays a large role on the pressure on resources. And increase of prices (including rents) so it only capitalizes the pre-existing issues in Jordan. I think that is the most important factor to keep in mind. If we want to continue coexisting.

Participant 5 (Arabic) - female, pharmacist, 27 years, November 11, 2019

What was the impact of the arrival of Syrians in this neighborhood?

It adversely affected traffic as approximately 1 million Syrians moved to Amman and this neighborhood is affected especially as more than 100.000 people moved here, and it also affected the job opportunities for Jordanians, for the worse, and they started a lot of businesses.

Negative impact?

My neighbors are Syrians, and they are always loud and noisy, and a lot of domestic violence happening there all the time.a

Jordanian hospitality

Jordanians were extremely welcoming to Syrians, they gave them jobs and prioritize them in that regard, as a kindergarten teacher, most of my co-workers were Syrians. I haven't seen inhospitable actions from Jordanians.

Did your view on Syrians change over the years?

My views about Syrians didn't change, but I got to know them better after the crisis and I noticed that they want to live and move forward, they love life. I used to think that they were problematic people, that wasn't completely true, but still you can say they are extremely nationalistic and fanatic for everything that's Syrian, and everyone says that they are annoying neighbors.

What are reasons for you, or for Jordanians, to remain hospitable to Syrian refugees?

Possibly it was an emotional response and for business owners it was a positive move. However for the most part I think it was obligated by the government and the people have no say in this. The same language played a major role to community.

What is the role of sharing identity characteristics in hospitality?

Sharing a Sunni religion facilitated all of this, considering that otherwise it might have potentially caused some tensions. The similarities between them are exclusive to the traditions, other than that they're not all that similar. Syrians are opportunistic and greedy, unlike Jordanians. The differences are more prominent than similarities. The similarities played a role in the safe coexistence of both parties.

How do you perceive the safety of Syria?

Syria isn't safe for their return, and I don't think they are going back anytime soon. We thought it would be different than the situation with the Palestinian refugees in Jordan. Their right to return seems far away, but Syrians can return once Syria is stable. That also seems far away now. Syrians will not return as long as Assad rules in Syria.

What will be the challenges if Syrians stay in Jordan?

The challenges that face Jordanians are far more obvious and major than Syrians because they receive aid from plenty of organizations, unlike Jordanians. The only thing I would say that's positive about their stay here is for businesses.

Will sharing identity remain important if Syrians stay in Jordan?

The Jordanians aren't all that fanatic about religions or at least they wouldn't talk about it, so sharing the same religion isn't major at this point in time.

Their stay is obligatory for the most part, they didn't ask us if we want to receive and if so how much the same as the Iraq crisis and any other crisis in the region.

Participant 6 (Arabic) - female, florist, 50 years, November 28, 2019:

What was the impact of the arrival of Syrians in this neighborhood?

The Jordanians cannot afford to rent here, because landlords raise the rents for Syrians as 2 or more families can live in the same small apartment and Jordanians aren't used to that. The impact of Syrians was mainly their positive attitude and vibe.

What similarities do Jordanians share with Syrians?

Syrians and Jordanians share a good relationships, courtesy and respect.

Jordanian hospitality

We have Syrians who couldn't afford to pay the rent so we lowered it to help them settle in. We're brothers and we always prioritize them above ourselves.

Since they came here we treat them like guests and brethren. We cannot be inhospitable towards them, this is our duty as brothers. We put ourselves in the Syrians shoes it could be us who escaped their home countries, and I don't think there is any attribute that plays a larger role than that and that there are our neighbors we have to be welcoming.

Differences

The differences between the Syrians plays the larger role, as those who lived in the urban areas would come and settle in similar areas.

Safety Syria

I think Syria as safe for their return, but who likes it here are going to stay here. The challenges for Syrian to integrate in Jordan are purely economic. The similarities between the two people helped them to communicate and integrate Jordan helped Syrian kids who were late 2 years, they dedicated buildings for them to study and get back to studying and to their school age.

Participant 7 (English) - taxi driver, 35 years, November 11, 2019

How did the arrival of Syrian refugees change this neighborhood?

Everything in Jordan has changed since 2011. I used to have a high salary, I worked for an American institute here in Jordan. I was making around 1500 JDs per month. Now, I only earn 350 JDs per month. I have to feed my children and I have two wives to take care of.

How did Syrian refugees change your daily life in a positive way?

My second wife is Syrian. I am happy with her. She is a bit younger, but I am really happy with her. She is a great cook. She gave me another child.

How did Syrian refugees change your life in a negative way?

A lot has changed since Syrians came to Jordan. Jordan was already crowded, but it is worse now. The

city is unlivable [referring to the density]. Because we have to take care of more people now [refugees], products have become more scarce. That, and a growing inflation of the Dinar, makes it barely livable here in Amman. How should I take care of my family with 350 JDs a month? My rent is already 250 JDs. I do not see it getting better soon, especially if more refugees are coming to Jordan. It is extremely frustrating for Jordanians to see how we are neglected. It makes the division deeper and changes sentiments towards Syrians negatively. We are the same people, but we are divided by economic factors. Of course, there are minor cultural differences, but those are not affecting our hospitality towards Syrians. The economic division is.

How do you consider your hospitality towards Syrian refugees? Can you give examples?

Jordanians have welcomed Syrians more than whoever did. More than what Europe did, more than Lebanon. We have remained to be hospitable. That is in our nature, we are used to do that. Syrians are our neighbors and I think they would do the same for us [Jordanians].

How important is it that Syrians speak the same language?

Syrians speak the same language as Jordanians, Arabic, but they speak a bit more subtle. Their accent is more cute. In general, Syrian and Jordanians are very similar. We used to live together, everyone of us. I cannot distinguish Syrians from Jordanians. Perhaps only in the way they dress, or when I hear them speaking. In my family, since I married my Syrian wife, things changed. You notice that my Syrian wife approaches the household and raising children different than my Jordanian wife. Everything is different: the small details in the house. The Syrian food is more delicious and when she does the laundry it smells more like flowers. She dresses different and she plays more with the children.

How do you perceive the safety of Syria at this moment?

It is not safe to go to Syria. My first wife is from Irbid, which is close to Deraa and only two hours away from Damascus. We used to go to Damascus every Friday. Groceries are cheaper in Syria and they have better products. Sometimes we went on Saturday, to the grand market on the bazaar in Damascus. My first wife loved going to Syria, but now we cannot go anymore, because there are still too many safety risks.

How do you perceive the safety of Syrians in Jordan who return to Syria?

My Syrian wife would love to go back to Syria. She appreciates Jordan, but misses Syria, especially her city Homs. For now it is not safe for her to return. She does not have family there anymore. Most of her family is in Jordan or in Europe. In the future, if Syria becomes more safer for her to return, I want to move with her to Syria. Syria is beautiful. The cities, the people, less crowded and way cheaper than Jordan. Inshallah in 5 years we can live in Syria [Homs].

Participant 8 (English) - male, landlord, 60 years, December 5, 2019:

How did the arrival of Syrian refugees change this neighborhood?

Syrians are Arabs. We have so many things in common. Language, Muslim, geographical. It is a good neighbor. After the war, last few years, we have more than 20% of Jordanians population is now Syrian. They are competing with Jordanian labour market. Which is economically not good. Jordanians pay taxes, but Syrians don't. It is frustrating for Jordanians. It is not fair. During the first years, we welcomed Syrians, but we did not expect them to stay this long in Jordan. Jordanians thought Syrians might stay 6 months or 1 year, but now it's almost 8 years. Syrian receive coupons of the international community [UNHCR] to buy living utilities, but they do not have to pay taxes. It is an unfair competition with Jordanians who struggle with their monthly income. They compete with Jordanians in every sector, except for the governmental sector.

Scarcity

The international community supported Jordan to cope with the problems. Aid went down, but we still have the same problems. For example scarcity of water, these problems were there before the Syrians, but now we have to take care of more people with even less resources. The total population of Jordan doubled. We are now with 10 million people, with the same resources.

Hospitable actions

Jordanians in the North share family ties with people in Syria. When the first Syrians came in, they emerged with the Jordanians in the North. Basically like they were visiting family. But as time went by, Syrians started to complain more about what they lack in Jordan.

We remain hospitable. If you compare it with Lebanon for example, they have many security problems. We have a strong security sector, which is controlled by the Jordanian regime. That is their priority. In Lebanon the social ethnic layers are also in play. They have Christians, Druze, Shia, Sunni, etc. and all these different groups have different views against the Syrians. In Jordan we don't have this problem. We are more homogeneous. Jordanians are from two backgrounds: 1) tribes, which count for 40% and 2) Jordanians from Palestinian background.

Similarities

Jordanians and Syrians are similar. We are Arabs. We share the same language. In majority they are Muslims. It definitely contribute to how we received Syrians and how we welcomed them.

Differences

Not many differences. Jordanians are more conservative. Religiously. Also, Jordanians are more homogeneous. We know how to cope with one another, we are the same. For Syrians it's a bit different. They are more diverse. Their country is more diverse [sectarianism]. And, to be honest,

Syrians have some moral problems. Maybe it is because of the war, I don't know. They don't see a clear difference between what is halal or haram. They think everything is halal, but this can be caused because of scarcity of money, I don't know. Most of the Syrians I've met, they are not business-minded and don't think long-term. They want fast money and are greedy or, let's call it, opportunistic.

Safety of Syria

With the intervention of other countries, Syria remains unstable. It will never be the same country. Everything is destroyed. The ethnic/sectarian problems are still in play. I think there is a lack of trust among the Syrians. I have seen it with the Lebanese after their civil war, it was never the same. There is no trust among Lebanese. Syrians who will return now will have political and economic problems. The regime is not welcoming them back. People who left Syria, are considered as 'pro-revolution' or traitors. They might be sued or jailed.

It needs an international agreement with the Syrian regime. There should be pressure of Western countries and Arab countries, everyone who is involved. They have to put pressure on the regime and forgive them. We have to move on. We are now waiting. We have to move on from the Syrian refugee crisis. We are waiting and waiting. The current situation is not sustainable for Jordanians.

The international community thinks from moral perspective [not talking to Assad], but it is not a sustainable solution. We are waiting.

Sort of refugees

We have many refugees, not all conflict driven, also economic migrants. Most are here illegal, but they are contributing to Jordanian economy. Syrians, not all of them, but most of them, are different. For example: an Egyptian or Yemeni migrant worker has to pay 500 JD for a working permit per year. For Syrians it is only 10 JD. It is easy for them. And still economically they are not contributing as much as other migrants.

Incentives government to support Syrians

The regime is pressured by the international community to pay attention to the Syrians. That is how they receive international support. The aid helps the Jordanian society, because international projects are building schools and hospitals for examples. But they neglect others. Everything is about the Syrians. It used to be about Palestinians, but Palestinians are now so mixed with Jordanians that we don't see differences anymore. We became one. Even the queen is Palestinian. But it's different with Syrians.

Incentives to remain hospitable

We are Arabs. We are neighbors. To some extent our hospitality can be explained by the similarities between us and Syrians. Our economic situation is not solely affected by the arrival of Syrians.

Everyone is suffering, at least a majority of Jordanian population. Syrians, Jordanians, Palestinians, Egyptians, everyone is suffering economically. Everyone tries, but we are in a economic crisis. We have this saying: if you have one [loef] you can share it with your neighbor. Social ties between people plays a significant role. No one is dying of hunger here, because we take care of each other. No one is starving. Even though we are suffering, we remain moral, humane and keep our social relevance in mind. Syrian or not Syrian. It is inherent is Jordanian culture. Or Arab culture. For example: the street worker who is working in front of my office every day visits me every day and asks for water. I give him 1 JD every day. Why? Because he is suffering and what is 1 JD for me? If that helps him to take care of his family (he now lives of 300 JD per month). Most of the Jordanians think like that. Even if you have lesser money.

Participant 9 (English) - male, sales, 26 years, December 5, 2019:

Notes:

Dynamics in Jordan are changing. People become more expressive against the king (f.e. on social media). Where they once were afraid (secret service), people now feel they have nothing to lose (no labor, no income, what else to lose?). Even if the king would drastically change his rhetoric on refugees now, people would not one-on-one change their thoughts. No longer, especially the young generation who becomes more cultured. As long as there is enough water and resources for everyone, things will be fine. Syrians are here to stay, they are not going back. Even if people who say that on the street, they have no idea about the actual situation in Syria and the security issues (for refugees).

Hospitality is interwoven in Jordanian culture. As long as we live we have been receiving people from outside. We have to receive people.

Not on the surface: there is a lot of criticism on Queen Rania (everything is called Rania now → for example Queen Rania street). People are done with the ultimate power of the king. People who support him do this for 'incentives' to get a better position in the government for example (which is likely to never happen).

Supporting the king (through visibility of his face and sons in shops f.e.) is also a sign of nationalism (sometimes used against Palestinians). People used to be more nationalistic (elder generation). Parents and family gatherings always talk about politics. New generation more passive, do not care about political correctness anymore (nothing to lose). The strains of the refugee crisis have overtaken the sense of taking care of Syrian brothers and sisters but our hospitality will sustain as long as the King insists.

I think there is more generosity to non-Arabs. Especially people from Europe are treated here very well. Black people are still called 'slaves' in Arabic

Kareem was careful with speaking negatively of the king. There were sitting Bedouins behind us (tribal relations to the king). He spoke more freely when they left.

Participant 10 (Arabic) - male, dentist, 30 years, December 5, 2019:

What was the impact of the arrival of Syrians in this neighborhood?

Sweileh, but also Amman and Jordan in general have changed a lot in the last ten years. After 2011, since a large number of Syrians integrated in this neighborhood, the street view changed. Like you see now, there are many Syrian shops. They are our new neighbors now.

What similarities do Jordanians share with Syrians?

Of course you notice that there are more people in the street. And the market is more competitive. But Syrians and Jordanians are really similar. I think Syrians dress a bit differently, the women for example. But mostly I can't differentiate Jordanians from Syrians if we don't have a conversation. I think it helped in how we were able to help Syrians. And how they were able to integrate in Jordan relatively easily. My father is from Egypt, for example, he had a more difficult time integrating in Jordan. His had a different accent and there was a lot of discrimination. Now it's different, but I think there is not so much discrimination against Syrians. Not from Jordanians at least, but it is annoying sometimes that Syrians get more attention and money from the government than other groups in Jordan.

But we are the same people. I think if they weren't Arabs and Islamic brethren the integration would have been different. I think there are more differences sometimes between Syrians themselves, for example the ones living in the south and north of Syria, than with Syrians from the south and Jordanians.

Safety Syria

I think Syria as safe for their return, but I would also stay here if I was afraid. And I think Syrians like it here. They get money and Jordanians take care of them. Even though they are becoming a burden more. It is obvious that most Jordanians are done with the current situation. I don't necessarily blame Syrians, but I think it's better if they go back.

It needs an international agreement with the Syrian regime. There should be pressure of Western countries and Arab countries, everyone who is involved. They have to put pressure on the regime and forgive them. We have to move on. We are now waiting. We have to move on from the Syrian refugee crisis. We are waiting and waiting. The current situation is not sustainable for Jordanians.

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