

‘HOPE HAS THE TASTE OF HELL’

The extent and the limits of the ‘State of exception’ in the migrant camps of Calais



Source: A.Mattei, 'Galloo squat', 13/03/15

Anaïs MATTEI
Student no. 4502744
July 2016

Supervisor:
DR. O.T. KRAMSCH

Second reader:
DR. J. SCHAPENDONK

ABSTRACT

This research examines the concept of 'State of exception', developed by the Italian theorist Agamben (1998), within the migrant camps in the border town of Calais. The migratory history of Calais began over ten years ago, and yet no sustainable solution has been found for a better management of the migratory situation and crystallization. This study provides an analysis regarding the extent of this 'State of exception' in the migrant camps, its presence over time and its limits. The role of different migratory actors crosses a reality driven by a desire for security and the increased creation of spatial, social and political borders. In Calais, the case of migrant camps also shows us that strategies of resistance can be created by the formation of spaces of autonomy. These spaces of autonomy, through communities and identity behaviors, then become the ultimate barrier to the consideration of the migrant, as a person devoid of political existence and rights.

Keywords: Calais- Migrant camps – State of exception – Resistance – Space of autonomy

TABLES OF CONTENTS

1.INTRODUCTION	9
1.1 FRAMEWORK	9
1.2 SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE	10
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND GOALS	12
1.4 OPERALIZATION	13
1.4.1 Refugee, migrant and exile	13
1.4.2 Camp and jungle	14
1.4.3 Autonomy, identity and community	15
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN	15
2.THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK	17
2.1 THE 'STATE OF EXCEPTION': CONCEPTUALISATION AND ANALYSIS	17
2.1.1 The concept of biopolitics	17
2.1.2 'Bare life' and its relation to political life	18
2.1.3 The 'Homo sacer'	18
2.1.4 Sovereignty and the exception	19
2.1.5 The exception through different powers	19
2.1.6 The 'State of exception' and the suspension of the law	20
2.1.7 Spaces of exception	21
2.1.8 The refugee, as a symbol of current biopolitics	21
2.2 THE CAMP, A SPATIALIZATION	22
2.2.1 The Spatialization of the political	22
2.2.2 The camp as a space of exception	23
2.2.3 The camp as part of geographies of power	24
2.2.4 The camp and the desire of securisation	24
2.2.5 Camps as space of life	25
2.3 THE CAMP, A LACK OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT?	26
2.3.1 The human dignity, a myth?	26
2.3.2 Illegal migration and Human trafficking	27
2.3.3 The securisation of migration	28
2.3.4 The role of the government in migratory measures	29
2.3.5 The place of racism in society	30
2.3.6 Does the political commitment to a better migratory management still exist?	31
3.METHODOLOGY	32
3.1 DATA COLLECTION	32
3.2 DATA ANALYSIS	35
4. FROM THE 'WILD' CAMPS TO THE 'TOLERATED' SPACE	37
4.1 THE DIFFERENT CAMPS OF CALAIS: SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS	37
4.1.1 The nine camps	37

4.1.2 <i>The proximity and the temporality</i>	38
4.1.3 <i>Spatial disparities and borders</i>	39
4.2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 'TOLERATED' SPACE AND THE JULES FERRY CENTRE	40
4.2.1 <i>Moving or not to the 'tolerated' space</i>	40
4.2.2 <i>The 'tolerated' space, the Jules Ferry centre and the 'State of exception'</i>	42
4.2.3 <i>The 'tolerated' space and borders</i>	43
4.3 THE DISMANTLING OF THE SQUATS, THE SATURATION OF THE JULES FERRY CENTRE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 'TOLERATED' SPACE	44
4.3.1 <i>Managing the migration</i>	44
4.3.2 <i>The evictions</i>	44
4.3.3 <i>Living conditions of migrants</i>	46
5. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MIGRATORY SITUATION	48
5.1 A DESIRE OF SECURISATION THAT ACCENTUATES THE 'STATE OF EXCEPTION'	48
5.1.1 <i>'Closed' or 'open' detention</i>	48
5.1.2 <i>Securing the border</i>	49
5.1.3 <i>The police</i>	50
5.2 THE DEHUMANIZATION OF MIGRANTS	51
5.2.1 <i>The lack of migrant rights</i>	51
5.2.2 <i>The stigmatizations towards migrants</i>	52
5.3 THE MULTICULTURALISM AND THE MIGRANTS	53
5.3.1 <i>The migrants and the local population</i>	53
5.3.2 <i>The migrant, a threat?</i>	55
5.3.3 <i>The influence of the mafia</i>	56
6. BUILDING SPACES OF AUTONOMY	57
6.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OR ORGANISATION OF COMMUNITIES	57
6.1.1 <i>The formation of communities</i>	57
6.1.2 <i>Communities and space</i>	58
6.2 PRESERVING OR BUILDING IDENTITIES	59
6.2.1 <i>Do migrants sometimes really lose their identity?</i>	59
6.2.2 <i>Preserving the identity</i>	60
6.2.3 <i>Building or renewing identity</i>	61
6.3 THE ROLE OF VOLUNTEERS	62
6.1.1 <i>The organization of volunteers</i>	62
6.1.2 <i>Volunteers and spaces of autonomy of migrants</i>	64
7. THE IDENTITY, A NECESSITY TO THE SURVIVAL OF MIGRANTS	65
7.1 SHAPING IDENTITIES TO ESCAPE THE STATE OF EXCEPTION	65
7.1.1 <i>The identity through freedom</i>	65
7.1.2 <i>Leaving the past behind or not? An important factor for shaping identity</i>	66
7.1.3 <i>Shaping identities through the living conditions</i>	67
7.2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY, A SUBJECT OF CHANGE	68
7.2.1 <i>An individual vision on the identity renewal</i>	68

7.2.2 The identity through changes	69
8.CONCLUSION	70
8.1 CONCLUSION	70
8.2 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	72
LITERATURE	74
APPENDICES	82
A. MAPS	82
A.1 The Pas-de-Calais Strait	82
A.2 The location of the migrant camps and centres in Calais	82
B. METHODS	83
B.1 Respondents	83
B.2 Diary	83
B.3 Interview Protocols	83
C. CATEGORIES AND CODES FOR DATA ANALYSIS	87
C.1 Categories for the coding of the diary	87
C.2 Categories for the coding of the testimonies from the local population and volunteers...	88
C.3 Categories for the coding of the testimonies of migrants (Written ones, interview and questionnaire)	88
D. FREQUENCIES, AS THE RESULT OF THE CODING	89
D.1 How are the communities formed?	89
D.2 Do migrants prefer to live near the city center or the crossing points?	89
D.3 Are the borders visible to the eye?	89
D.4 What do migrants and volunteers think of the location of the 'tolerated' space?	89
D.5 What does the government want?	89
D.6 Are the borders more social or physical between the camps and the other parts of the city?	90
D.7 Is England still the main goal of migrants?	90
D.8 The importance of the living conditions	90
D.9 What do people think about the living conditions of migrants?	90
D.10 The positive and negatives points of the Jules Ferry centre	90
D.11 Are the police and its action one of major point of the migratory situation?	91
D.12 Did you experienced police violence?	91
D.13 The image of the police	91
D.14 The human rights for migrants in Calais	91
D.15 The opinion of the majority population about migrants	91
D.16 The cohabitation of the majority population with migrants	92
D.17 The influence of the mafia	92
D.18 what happens to migrants' identities in the camps	92

LIST OF TABLES

3.1 Categories of respondents and methods	33
3.2 The respondents of the local population	34
3.3 The respondents of the volunteers category	34
3.4 Categories and words used for the coding	35

LIST OF FIGURES

4.1 'Tioxide', from one of the entrance of the site	38
4.2 The frequency of the threats regarding evictions	41
4.3 Sketch of the 'tolerated' space	41
4.4 Are the possible evictions legal or not?	45
4.5 The police during the eviction of the 'Galloo squat'	45
5.1 How is the desire of security characterized in the city of Calais?	48
5.2 Posters for the recognition of migrant rights on the doors of the 'Church'	51
5.3 The tensions between different groups	54
5.4 According to the majority population, what do migrants bring to the city?	55
6.1 Demonstration against racism	63
6.2 the main role of volunteers	64
7.1 Drawing of Louis, a Syrian migrant, about his living conditions in Calais	67

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 FRAMEWORK

Migration is a complex phenomenon, dynamic and constant (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2001). Understanding population movements, and processes related to it, leads to address many social, political and economic issues. These issues are accentuated when the migration is considered as 'illegal'. This is the case in the border town of Calais, where I conducted a fieldwork, in the association *SALAM*, from March to June 2015. Growing up next to this city, my interest for the subject has always been significant, but the deterioration of the humanitarian crisis of the past two years incites me to conduct this research. Conducting this research and doing a fieldwork, in an association helping the migrants, was a unique opportunity of learning more about the migrant camps, and more generally about the migratory situation of Calais. Indeed, this border town is a crystallization point of 'illegal' migration, one of the most important in Europe. Calais is separated from Dover by the *Pas-de-Calais* Strait, natural barrier between France and England (Liagre and Dumont, 2005: 97; See Appendix A- A.1). But the border between the two cities is also political as England is not part of the Schengen area, which establishes the free movement of people in a defined area (Weber, 2009: 165). Since the signing of the Schengen Convention in 1995, the border between Calais and Dover becomes more and more secure, making the crystallization of migration increasingly important. In Calais, this crystallization is characterized by the creation of migrant camps, whether 'wild' or established by the State. The establishment or the dismantling of these camps form the migratory history of Calais and feed the current migratory situation of the city.

One of the most important elements of the migratory history of Calais was the opening of the *Sangatte* camp for exiles in 1999, set up by the state but managed by the Red Cross (Bastie, 2015). This camp remains a paradoxical symbol: a symbol regarding the quest of migrants but also a symbol of the limits of French and European migratory policies (Carrère, 2003). Following the closure of the *Sangatte* camp in 2002, by the government, the securisation of the border increased, especially with the implementation of the agreements signed in *Le Touquet*. The *Touquet* agreements were implemented in 2003 and aimed to improve cross-border cooperation concerning security (Delève, 2015). But the agreements that followed the closure of the *Sangatte* camp are far from having improved the migratory situation of Calais. Following its closure, over the years, 'wild' camps were created, developed and were dismantled, depending to migratory flows (Rygiel, 2011).

'Illegal' migration appears in the collective imagination, but even more for the States, as a threat (Wihtol de Wenden, 2010: 25-27). In Calais, to counter this threat, the state seeks security, as it is the case for the migrants living in the camp. Yet, paradoxically, the desire of securisation of the State reflects a desire for protecting the society and the governmental system, and not protecting the recognition of migrant's rights (Laacher, 2003: 126-128). For years, this paradox especially is noticeable in the camps of Calais. It seems to show the limits and defects in migratory management. Being interested in the Calais migrant camps is a way to understand how the crystallization of 'illegal' migration is characterized in border areas. The migrant camps, as it was the case of the *Sangatte* camp, are means to control, to detain but are also symbols *"of resistance against this politics of mobility control"* (Rygiel, 2011: 1). Between migrants and the government, there is the establishment of a 'border game' (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen 2001: 127, 130). This 'border game' includes a lot of actors, such as the police. Moreover, it reflects the migratory situation in Calais, where the humanitarian crisis is more visible than ever. This humanitarian crisis is characteristic of a dehumanization of the foreigner (Harker, 2016).

So, in Calais, the migrants find themselves in a situation of survival. Yet, despite the terrible living conditions, the migrants continue to come to the border town. It partly is because of the English Eldorado, which is a concept still present in the imagination of migrants. This idea of the English paradise is conducted by the attraction linked to the ease of working on the parallel market (Carrère, 2002). However, the desire of securisation and national security, in France but especially in England, makes this Eldorado increasingly difficult to access for migrants.

Thus, through this research, I try to bring a contemporary vision of the crystallization of migration in Calais; in a context where safety takes precedence over the respect for human rights. The relationship between space, power and Men is, then, paramount to an understanding of static and dynamic migratory phenomena; as is the relationship between space, multiculturalism and Men. In the migrant camps of Calais, control and detention oppose the acquisition of autonomy and the establishment of identity behaviors. Nevertheless, migrants have managed to survive in camps for years. Survive, yes, but for how much longer?

1.2 SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE

The survival of migrants in the camps is one of the elements regarding the analysis between space, Men and power. I chose to extend this analysis through several scientific theories. These theories show the importance of the chosen case: the migratory situation in Calais. This case feeds

the scientific literature about - among others - the exception, the camp and the migrant. In my theoretical analysis, concepts around the exception are based on Agamben's theory of the 'State of exception'. According to him, the State of exception is "*an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law*" (Agamben, 2005: 39). This concept is introduced in some spaces, where the Man is considered by its 'bare life' and gets a political status only regarding its exclusion (Hanafi, 2010: 147, Minca, 2005: 409). So, these spaces are characteristic of a suspension of the law which seems to exist for years in the migrant camps of Calais. Indeed, the relationship between power, space and Men – in the assumption- has an important place in the establishment, the development but also the dismantling of camps. The analysis of migrant camps, both spatial and socio-political, fits in the scientific debate about the exception advanced by Agamben, his successors and his critics. This research brings concrete elements of the extent of the 'State of exception' in the camps. Those elements sustain the debates on migration; and the processes associated with it, such as the creation of confinement zones (Du Bois, 2015). With contemporary facts, it reflects the character both dynamic and temporarily static of the migratory situation and the crystallization of migration in Calais.

This research also provides matter for the debate linked to theories around the concept of camp, including those of Minca (2005). Minca considers the camps as 'spaces of exception', as spaces that mark the border between the facts and the law (Minca, 2005: 407; Giaccaria and Minca, 2011: 4), but also the border between the fact of being human or not (Minca, 2005: 406). In most theories, camps refer to the study of concentration camps or to the study of refugee camps run by the States. The fieldwork, which I conducted in Calais between March and June 2015, brings a perspective briefly discussed in the theories of the concept of camp. In fact the influence of the state, in the management of Calais migrant camps, is relative. Structurally, in the camps, the 'State of exception' is present but the government has no real influence over the structural and community organization of the migrant camps. In this sense, the Calais migrant camps provide elements to the scientific debate around the camps, and can put forward some limitations in the most discussed theories regarding the camp and the exception.

The relationship between space, power and the individual is then the main element, of which we need to understand the links and interdependencies. This relationship is also characterized by problems that feed both humanitarian, security, political and social debates. By analyzing the migrant camps of Calais, I was interested in the discourse on migratory security. The desire for security is increasingly present in European migration policies, particularly in border areas (Honoré, 2016). Yet, the migratory history of Calais shows that security did not reduce the flow of migrants.

This research tends to bring answers about the impact of security on crystallization and

migratory processes. It also fuels the discussions on migratory policies at different geographic scales, particularly showing the limits of these policies. Moreover, this research points out contextual elements and daily needs for migrants. The consideration of these elements appears to be essential in the implementation of a better management of the migration situation, and in improving the living conditions of migrants in Calais. The analysis and the understanding of needs and patterns of the migration in the camps can, then, bring a factual vision of the crystallization of migration in a border area of France. It can help to combine security and respect of human rights, in the future political measures that will be implemented at the local, regional and national level.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND GOALS

Over the years, the security desire forged borders that seem incompatible with the recognition of migrant rights. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable in the Calais migrant camps where human rights seem to be absent. Indeed, the camps of Calais, including the 'wild' ones, seem to respond to increasingly significant border controls (Rygiel, 2011: 1). This crystallization of migration at the door of England has also led to the development of a 'State of exception', a concept developed by the theorist Agamben (2005). This 'State of exception' brings back the migrant to its biological status of 'bare life', depriving its rights (Sundberg, 2015). The 'State of exception' is spatialized in the migrant camps of Calais, by the confinement of migrants, of people excluded from the political system (Rygiel, 2011: 2-3). Yet, acts of resistance and identity behaviors seem to be developed in camps, through per example the creation of communities (Sigona, 2015). Thus two main questions arise and lead my research:

To what extent do migrant camps reveal a 'State of exception' in the border town of Calais? And how do migrants find their own space of autonomy despite the 'State of Exception'?

There are a lot of borders regarding the migratory situation of Calais. These borders are political, spatial, social, cultural, economical and ideological (Millner, 2011: 325). While elaborating my research, I try to answer several questions and to achieve goals. The first goal leads us to the following questions: how are the borders regarding the migratory situation of Calais characterized? Within this research, I analyze the creation and development of these borders, visible or not, to understand their impact on the establishment and development of camps. This analysis also aims to point the complexity of social borders, social interactions between migrants themselves but also between the migrants and the different actors of migration.

Between March and June 2015, the migrant camps, their location and their characteristics have evolved. Does the 'State of exception' have followed this evolution? Does the presence of the 'State of exception' have been accentuated by the evolution of the camps? One of the main goals of this research will be to understand how the state of exception is characterized in migrant camps. Is the desire of securisation really accentuating the 'State of exception'?

Analyzing the migrant camps in Calais leads to try to understand how migrants manage to survive despite the 'State of exception'. How do they manage to create communities? How they develop identity behaviors? One of the challenges of this research is to analyze and understand the processes that lead to the creation of a space of autonomy for migrants, individually or collectively, in an assumption related to the formation of resistances to the 'State of exception'. Understanding the relationship between Men, power and space – especially in migrant camps - becomes the main goal of this research. Through the position of the migrant in the camp and the production of living spaces by migrants, we can wonder about the identity of migrants, its role in the formation of spaces of autonomy, and who is helping migrants in the establishment of their space of autonomy.

Other objectives of this research are to understand the relationship, sometimes the interdependence, between the various actors of the migratory situation in Calais. How does the government establish the 'State of exception' in the camps? What is the role of the police in maintaining this 'State of exception'? One goal of this research is to understand the extent of the involvement of government in the establishment of exclusion and in the development of camps. To understand the complex migratory situation of Calais, we must also wonder what the local population thinks of migrants. What is the role of the local population in maintaining the 'State of exception'? Do differences of opinion between the local population lead to the appearance of stigmatizations and racist attitudes? The aim, then, is to understand the migratory situation in Calais, the presence of the 'State of exception' and the establishment of spaces of autonomy, by analyzing the migrant camps and the role of the actors of the crystallization of migration, from March to June 2015 in the border town of Calais.

1.4 OPERALIZATION

1.4.1 REFUGEE, MIGRANT AND EXILE

The questions - posed in the previous section - refer to the use of terms, specific words, important for the understanding of the analysis. These words usually have multiple meanings regarding the context. Thus the choice of a word or another and the meaning of this word in the

context of my research is essential, for understanding the analysis. Migration is a complex phenomenon which refers to a lot of terms. One of them is the term 'refugee'. If we stick to the definition of the Geneva Convention (1951), the refugee is a person who leaves its country in substantive political threats, such as persecutions, massacres, etc. Yet, the refugee is often used in migratory debates, in particular by the media, in a larger form. The definition of refugee, in itself, is unclear and *"it no longer addresses the realities of refugees in the modern world"* (Koser, 2007: 71). For years, this term seems inappropriate to qualify the migrant populations of Calais, especially since the *Sangatte* camp (Liagre and Dumont, 2005). In fact, the majority of the migrants, living the camps of Calais, can be called refugees, particularly the Syrians who migrate because of the war in their country of origin.

Still, I decided – in my research- to use the term 'migrant', despite the term 'refugee'. Indeed, the term 'migrant' encompasses all the people living in the camps, whether political refugees, economic or cultural migrants (Duriez, 2015). The use of the term 'migrant' is also coupled with the use of the term 'exile' that also feature a larger part of the migrant population living in the camps of Calais. Indeed, the term also refers to a departure from the country of origin for economic or political reasons. The difference between the migrant and the exile lies in the fact that the migrant has the choice to leave while the exile must leave, because threats of various kinds are too strong (Duriez, 2015). In the case of Calais, the majority of people living in the camps are exiled. However, I chose mainly to use the term 'migrant', hardly knowing the path of the entire migrant population of the camps. The term 'exile' is less used and the term 'refugee' exceptionally.

1.4.2 CAMP AND JUNGLE

The name of the living spaces of migrants should also be discussed in order to understand the precise meaning that is given to it, regarding the migratory situation of Calais. Within this research, I choose to use the word camp to define the living spaces of migrants. This choice refers to the definition brought by Migreurop, in 2005. This definition indicates that while thinking of the camp, we think of a confinement space, spatially known for those excluded from society or unwanted (Rygiel, 2011: 5). The network uses the word camp to denounce the limits of European policies, including migratory ones. So, using the term camp, in my research, considering the definition of Migreurop, allows me to denounce the limits of the current management of migration in Calais, in France and in Europe.

The migrant camps of Calais are also sometimes called 'jungle', because of their nature to be spaces without rights (Rygiel, 2011). The word 'jungle' was picked up by the media, hence its common use. However it began to be used by Afghans, years ago. Some migrant camps were located

in wooded areas. In Persian the word 'forest' is pronounced 'Janghal', close to the pronunciation of the English word 'jungle' (Suys, 2016). Several camps have taken the name of 'jungle' over time. Some migrants particularly use this term, because it reflects their bad living conditions. Thus, the term 'jungle' will also be used in my analysis, even if the term camp will remain predominant.

1.4.3 AUTONOMY, IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY

The life of the migrant in the camp also refers to other terms. One of the main questions of my research points out the term 'autonomy'. The autonomy is seen in this research, as *“the individual's enculturation and socialization » and as « an essential part of the term person”* (Greve, Rothermund and Wentura, 2005: 323). The term 'autonomy' seems to be linked to the terms 'identity' and 'community'. The term 'identity' is very broad and brings together many factors. Nevertheless, the use of this term, in my research, is almost reduced to the understanding of social identity. As Tajfel (2010: 2) says it in his book, the social identity is then seen as a *“part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional attached to that membership”*. But the identity, in analyzing migrant camps, is also understood as a personal identity since autonomy can be gained by both membership and individual actions.

The membership is characterized, in particular, by the term 'community'. This term is defined by a social group that lives on the same space. But it is also seen - in my research - as having a role in the integration (Penninx, 2003). This can be a role in spatial, social and political integration; inside the camps, between the camps or between migrants and migratory actors.

1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN

This research is structured with eight chapters, the first being this one, used for the introduction of the thesis. In chapter 2, the theoretical framework is developed around three parts, for a deeper understanding of the case study 'migrant camps in Calais'. The first part concerns the 'State of exception' and the concepts linked to its implementation. In the second part, I realize a literature review of the main theories linked to the camp and its relation to the power, the space and the Men. The extent of the political and social commitment, through the scientific literature, regarding the migratory situation in Calais, is - then - analyzed in the last part of chapter 2. In chapter 3, the methodology and methods used to collect and analyze my data are discussed. The importance

of the phenomenology, the choice of the right methods and respondents is justified. Then, chapter 4 focuses on the evolution of the migrant camps from March to June 2015, with a particular interest in the establishment and maintain of the 'State of exception', and in the analysis of borders of various kinds. Subsequently, the fifth chapter provides a better understanding of the complexity of the migratory situation, by analyzing the securisation of the town, linked to a dehumanization of migrants and to the struggles implementing multiculturalism in the city. Chapter 6 focuses on the processes of resistance to the 'State of exception', which allows the creation of spaces of autonomy in migrant camps. Following the relation between identity and autonomy established in Chapter 6, chapter 7 analyses the importance of the identity of migrants – especially its shaping and its evolution through the changes - in the creation of resistance to the State of exception. Finally, chapter 8 is elaborated to give the conclusion of this research.

2. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 THE 'STATE OF EXCEPTION': CONCEPTUALISATION AND ANALYSIS

Working on the concept of 'State of exception' is complex, particularly in a dynamic contemporary context. This requires addressing the theories and concepts describing the relationship between power and life, but also those illustrating the position of Man in space. Studying the migrant camps of Calais refers to temporal and spatial markers that weaken - in some aspects – theories around the concept of exception advanced by precursors such as Agamben. However, to understand and analyze the current impact of these theories on migratory dynamics in the border town of Calais, it is essential to focus on the origins, but also on the interpretations of concepts related to the 'State of exception'.

2.1.1 THE CONCEPT OF BIOPOLITICS

The term 'biopolitics', developed by Foucault, introduces life - not space - in the heart of the political order (Lemke, 2005: 3). By this neologism, Foucault affirms the importance of the relationship between politics, power and life. However it includes distinctions, particularly between sovereign power and biopolitics. These distinctions reflect differences in interpretation between Foucault and his successors as Agamben. Indeed, for the latter, biopolitics are at the heart of the sovereign power. Yet, according to Foucault, power is not enough to analyze the modern biopolitics (Lemke, 2005: 4, 6). Thus Agamben has been criticized for his interpretation of modern biopolitics. He considers it starting with the 'French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen', ignoring the colonial and racial context in which that declaration was made (Sundberg , 2005: 212). However, Agamben has brought a new explanation of the term 'biopolitics'. According to him, modern policies are primarily modern biopolitics as the 'State of exception' is the political (Lemke, 2005: 6). The exception and especially the 'structures of exception' (Agamben, 1998: 7) - separating the 'bare life' of the political life - then becomes the main factor of implementation of biopolitics (Ajana, 2013: 578). Placing the exception in the heart of biopolitics, as does Agamben, refers to consider a threshold between a political community and those excluded from it (Lemke, 2005: 5). This threshold is vector of creating an area without legal and juridical protection where political life is the result of a 'ban' and where 'bare life' is trapped in the 'State of exception' (Ansaldi, 2010: 385).

2.1.2 'BARE LIFE' AND ITS RELATION TO POLITICAL LIFE

The 'bare life', abandoned in the exception, reflects the connection between "violence and the law" (Ek, 2006: 366) according to Benjamin, but also the fact of being ignored by the juridical order as Agamben says (Sundberg, 2015: 211; see Agamben 1998, 2005). Although the 'bare life' seems to be at the limit of policies, Agamben argues that everyone may one day acquire the status of 'bare life' (Lemke, 2005: 5, 7, 8), the latter being the object of sovereign violence (Ziarek, 2012). However he fails to take into account the complexity of relationships and social and political interaction, essential to measuring the impact of 'bare life' on human gender as Shewly says (2013: 4). Shewly, rejecting the thought about the 'State of exception' described by Agamben, highlights the complexity of the construction of 'bare life'. It is a concept he considers very variable especially in light of the dynamic nature of 'spaces of exception' (2013: 29). The fixed nature of Agamben's analysis earned him many critics. However, this Italian philosopher has developed key concepts about the relationship between natural life and political existence. He says there is a separation, a confrontation line between 'zoe' (bare life) and 'bios' (political life) (Lemke, 2005: 5). 'Zoe' is linked to our natural existence which corresponds to the one of our birth, as 'bios' refers to the political existence to which participation brings us. According to Agamben, the distinction between these two forms of existence reflects the exclusion of 'zoe' of what he called 'polis', the political space (Ajana, 2013: 577, 578). But he also says that the confrontation between the 'bare life' and the political existence cannot be reduced to a particular space. The dividing line between different individuals is also a subjective line in the sense that it is in the biological body of the individual (Lemke, 2005: 7). In this sense it seems difficult to find a solution regarding this dividing line and to understand what separates the inside from the outside. Several theorists, including Foucault and Agamben, believe that the major challenge of modern biopolitics is to redefine the threshold of exclusion (Sundberg, 2015: 212). So as a solution, Foucault speaks of a 'new right' (1997), through a legal process, that aims to remove the differences between natural existence and citizenship (Lemke, 2005: 11).

2.1.3 THE 'HOMO SACER'

In the contemporary world, and despite the desire to reduce the differences, some theorists lead to the hypothesis that the exclusion is causing the creation of political dimensions (Ansaldi, 2010: 283). The main author to have developed this notion is Agamben who reflects this exclusion with the figure of 'Homo sacer', a figure develops in his book *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (1998). The 'Homo sacer' lives a 'bare life' in the sense that he is not protected by law while being subject to it. He is then both included and excluded in the political system under an inferior and dangerous form for his life, especially as he is exposed to violence (Shewly, 2013: 26). The concept of 'Homo sacer' is also used to explain how biopolitics practices capture what Agamben calls

the 'sacred life', namely 'the excluded biological life' (Ajana, 2013: 579). The term 'sacred life' refers to the sacredness of the 'Homo sacer' which is made 'sacred' by the gods despite his political insignificance to the sovereign power (Hanafi, 2010: 147).

2.1.4 SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EXCEPTION

The power and especially the concept of sovereignty are essential when one is interested in the exception. Indeed the phenomena of exclusion, particularly in the contemporary world, are worn by the influence of power on space and life. The concept of sovereign power has been argued and interpreted by many theorists. To resume the work of Agamben on the subject, it is first essential to focus on the work of his predecessor, Carl Schmitt. The term 'sovereign' is described by Schmitt as being above the law in the sense that it decides on the existence of the 'State of exception' or not, and the answer to bring regarding this state (McConkey, 2013: 417). Sovereignty is what triggers the 'exception' according to Carl Schmitt (Minca, 2007: 85). This concept is taken up by Agamben who explains that the suspension of the law is decided in reality by the 'sovereign' *"because the sovereign is already the lawgiver, deciding the space in which the rule of law has validity"* (Owens, 2009: 571). Thus - according to him - the exception is the norm nowadays, especially because of the link between the 'State of exception' and the sovereign power (Leshem, 2015: 93, 94). The state of exception is then the 'State of Nature' in which bare life is paradoxically included and excluded from the law (Minca, 2007: 82-85). Agamben, therefore, indicates that the 'bare life' is created by the sovereign power. This idea is strongly criticized by Butler (2004), who argues Agamben forgets the complexity of creating the 'bare life' in political systems, by failing to explain the difference in vulnerability between groups – including ethnic ones - of our society (Shewly, 2013: 26). Critics on the work of Agamben then focus on the fact that he says life is at the center of the relationship between power and life (Huysmans, 2008: 166). In this direction, it deviates slightly from the work of Schmitt or Foucault. For example, Foucault emphasizes the management by the sovereign power of the people and especially the population, approaching more of Carl Schmitt's work on the unity of the state and societal issues than of Agamben's work on 'bare life' in itself (Huysmans, 2008: 166; Owens, 2009: 570).

2.1.5 THE EXCEPTION THROUGH DIFFERENT POWERS

The relationship between the exception and the law depends on the power to which it refers. According to Foucault, the genealogy of pastoral power - related to Christianity- is the origin of 'governmentality' (Leshem, 2015: 95), a concept he developed to explain the control on the population by the State and on the way the people must govern themselves (Lemke, 2002). The work

of Foucault and Schmitt split in the fact that the pastoral power and sovereign power engages a different relationship between law and authority. In the case of the pastoral system, « the exception is the continuation of the norm, while in Schmitt's account of political sovereignty, exception appears as its suspension.» (Leshem, 2015 : 110). This quote, though revealing differences, supports the fact that the exception is always present regardless of the power or political regimes. So the exception through the exclusion, often attributed to totalitarianism, is also present in our contemporary democracies. In this sense -as outlined by Arendt and then Agamben- points of convergence between democracies and totalitarian regimes exist and they are more visible when the 'State of exception' is put forward, and when every citizen may be reduced to 'bare life' (Ek, 2006 : 368 ; Ajana, 2013 : 579).

2.1.6 THE 'STATE OF EXCEPTION' AND THE SUSPENSION OF LAW

The 'State of exception', a term made popular by the Italian philosopher Agamben, has its roots in other theories, including - as seen above - in Schmitt's work related to sovereignty (Minca and Rowan, 2015: 269). Schmitt says that the 'State of exception' is the decision of the sovereign. Moreover, what he calls the 'structures of exception' are related to « the existence of an order based within a fundamental relation between the juridical-political domain and territory» (Minca, 2007: 83). However the interpretation of the exception by Schmitt and Agamben differs in the fact that Agamben sees exception as a kind of exclusion. Indeed, the exception according to Schmitt is related to the state of emergency within society, state of emergency destabilizing the state and for what the solution is the suspension of the order (Ek, 2006: 365) . In this way the state of emergency reflects a decision and not a specific and static norm, which makes its connection with the exception a paradox, especially because the exception cannot be planned (Minca, 2007 : 90, McConkey, 2013 : 420). For Agamben, because the exception is linked to exclusion (Passavant, 2007 : 154), the 'State of exception' then appears as a suspension of the law in the political order, where the inclusion of 'bare life' is observed coupled with the exclusion from political life (Hanafi, 2010 : 147, Minca, 2005 : 409). This paradox of inclusion and exclusion seems so characteristic for the figure of the migrant and particularly the refugee, deprived of political rights and protection but included in the political system in its most primary biological form (Ajana, 2013: 578). According to Agamben, the 'State of exception' is nevertheless in itself « neither external nor internal to the juridical order» (Giaccaria & Minca, 2011: 4). It is the vector of an indistinctive area between what is internal and external, but also between 'bios' and 'zoé', between law and life (see Agamben 1998). The contrast between the norm and its practical implementation then peaked in the 'State of exception', since a zone without distinction persists. This opposition is reflected in particular by the violence, which appears to be one of the main problems associated to the 'State of exception' (Minca, 2007: 90, 91). This violence is

transcribed in particular by social and political abuses, but also by a lack of human rights, by a suspension of the law in general as Agamben says (Shewly, 2013: 23; Minca, 2005: 410). The 'State of exception' seems sometimes permanent, especially in Western democracies where it is related to a bad economic situation and deprivation of rights (Ansaldi, 2010: 387).

2.1.7 SPACES OF EXCEPTION

This anomic violence is notable in what Agamben calls a 'space of exception' (Shewly, 2013: 23). Indeed, he says people excluded from the political-juridical system live in this space (Rygiel, 2011: 3). Talking about 'spaces of exception' refers to spatialize the indistinct zone between life and law, but also the opposition between the norm and its application. According to Minca (2007: 94, 95), these areas produce a new threshold - beyond all temporal and territorial indications - which corresponds to a no man's land where we can observe a dehumanization revealed by the power. Thus, the geographical area and the 'bare life' seem to be united in a conceptualization of the exception, driven by a securisation of States and their borders increasingly important (Minca, 2005: 408; Shewly, 2013: 26). Indeed nowadays the 'spaces of exception' seem to be a concept in the era of time, really accurate regarding the socio-political realities. Associated initially to Nazi concentration camps which appear as permanent 'spaces of exception' (Minca, 2007: 92), the term 'space of exception' is currently used for more and more space in the scientific literature. The Guantanamo camp, of military detention, then appears as one of the leading examples of a modern 'space of exception'. Geographically off-centre, it is the perfect archetype of the lack of distinction between life and law in these spaces (Minca, 2005: 406). Other places like borderlands - especially in the 'Western world' - are also seen by some authors as 'spaces of exception' (Sundberg, 2015: 223). These places are subjects to greater security in Europe and in particular in the borders of the European Union. So if we follow these theories, the border town of Calais - in itself-seems to be the heart of a 'space of exception' where people are exposed to 'bare life'. However this statement is too general and does not take into account the social, legal, juridical and economical status of each individual.

2.1.8 THE REFUGEE, AS A SYMBOL OF CURRENT BIOPOLITICS

As seen above, each individual according to the theories of Agamben can be forced to acquire the status of 'bare life'. However, for him, only one figure reflects the political and social reality of our societies: the refugee (Owens, 2009: 567). Agamben's work was then specifically used to explain the situation of migrants - including refugees - but also to criticize the European security policies (Ek, 2006: 370). The refugee seems to be rooted in contemporary history by drawing the

boundaries of political communities, destabilizing the foundations of the nation-state and opening the horizon to a new conceptual organization (Ansaldi, 2010: 389). It makes visible the political reality (Minca, 2015: 80), which seems to represent the danger for political systems. Yet, governing and controlling the refugee seems to be easy in the current biopolitics systems. According to Agamben, the refugee is the perfect subject to biopolitics since it can be controlled through a 'State of exception' standing in a permanent way in a 'space of exception' (Owens, 2009: 567, 568). The refugee then lives a 'bare life' in an exceptional space '(Hanafi, 2010: 147). Agamben has earned much criticism because of the reduction of refugee to its 'bare life' (Ek, 2006: 371). One of them comes from Arendt who was one of the inspirations of Agamben's work on the political theory. Arendt argues that the refugee is not necessarily subject to the exception, in this case it cannot be qualified by its 'bare life' (Owens, 2009: 569). Like Arendt, Owen (2009) and Gundogdu (2012) criticize the reduction of refugee in its 'bare life'. Gundogdu, in particular, insists that an individual can also be resisting to the exception, resisting to dehumanization (Ajana, 2013: 580).

2.2 THE CAMP, A SPATIALIZATION OF THE EXCEPTION

The relationship between space and the 'State of exception' is essential to understand the mechanisms, that influence life and include the concept of 'bare life'. So understanding the Spatialization of power –sovereign power- seems to be a key element in the introduction of the term camp. Conducting a research on the migrant camps of Calais brings the question of the definition of that term and how to interpret it. There are many theories around the concept of camp, and especially in our contemporary world. Indeed, policies - particularly European ones - are now focused on internal and external security of territories and borders, reflecting the production of camps. Then the camps become a reflection of policies of exception where the place of Man is underestimated. Sometimes, however, they also seem to be the heart of resistance to stereotypes, of multiculturalism and of an affirmation of identity.

2.2.1 THE SPATIALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL

The spatial order is considered as the starting point of all other order both legal, social and political (Minca and Rowan, 2015: 281). This spatial order is related to the concept of 'nomos', a concept related to the law in ancient Greek philosophy (*Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2016). This concept is also seen by Schmitt (2003: 42) as the unity including space and law. The 'nomos' seems to be the

basis for making the spatial order predominant to all other orders. But the 'nomos' is also the source of a fuzzy area that distorts 'physis', that means nature itself. Indeed, Agamben speaks of an area where nature and 'nomos' merge and where nature seems to be the concept of exception (Minca, 2007: 85; Agamben, 1995: 121, 1998: 109). Today some even see the sea as part of the global 'nomos' (Minca and Rowan, 2015: 282), involving the risk of proliferation of areas of exception. According to Agamben, 'spaces of exception' reflect the Spatialization of sovereign power. In this sense, the spatial power in our contemporary world is related to the relationship between life and the law, and the balance of power in the space leading to the production of biopolitical body (Minca, 2007: 79). Spatialization, according to Schmitt, is also the source of spatial differences - often inequalities - as *"the political is always spatialized along the lines of a 'concrete' division between inside and outside"* (Minca and Rowan, 2015: 273). The 'bare life', namely the people who are reduced to it through the 'State of exception', is then excluded from a geographic consideration to which the citizen can pretend (Minca, 2007: 88). These people live in a 'no man's land' (Minca, 2007: 89), a 'space of exception', a space where borders - visible or not - are everywhere. Some scholars then speak of immobility spaces created by the power and desire of security (Millner, 2013).

2.2.2 THE CAMP AS A SPACE OF EXCEPTION

The camp is the epitome of immobility spaces where life seems to be captured in space by law (Agamben 1995: 26; Sigona, 2015: 4, 5). According to Agamben, the camp is then the space where the 'State of exception' is sustainable and makes the law (Ansaldi, 2010: 385). Bülent and Laustsen (2006: 443) also say the camp is governed by three principles: discipline, transgression and biopolitics. Discipline refers to the difference between the inside and outside while the transgression refers to the vagueness of that difference. The principle of biopolitics refers to the fact that the individual in the camp is both included and excluded as it is included in the exclusion and excluded in the inclusion. These three principles lead to a lack of distinction between norm and exception, in the sense that the exception is the norm. This view, developed by the authors, is shared by many theorists included Walter Benjamin who argues that this lack of distinction is even more present in modern society (Bülent & Laustsen, 2006: 443). However they also argue that even if originally the camp was the 'space of exception', it is not today since the exception and the norm - being confused - both tend to disappear (Bülent & Laustsen, 2006: 451). This theory does not seem valid when speaking of migrant camps of Calais where the exception is indicative of inequality and of an established norm at both local and national levels. The term camp, again increasingly used by politicians, opens a new page of history where there is a democratization of fear of the other and spatial production of horror. Spatialization, by the figure of the camp, of the indistinct zone between

life and death enables a spatial materialization of violence (Minca, 2005: 407, 408).

2.2.3 THE CAMP AS PART OF GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER

Violence is an integral part of social and political processes that characterize the camp and struggles accompanying the emergence of a new form of authority that responds only to itself (Millner, 2013). The camp then reflects the spatiality of power, especially of capitalism which is an integral part of European democracies, or more generally the 'West' (Minca, 2015: 80). As the power completes its mission within spaces (Sigona, 2015: 4), the camp is controlled by the government. It therefore becomes «an integrative part of the micro and macro geographies of power» (Minca, 2015: 81). The example of the case of sovereign power is particularly interesting in the 'State of exception'. Indeed in this case, as stated by Minca (2005: 407), the sovereign power needs the space provided by the camp. Thus, leaning on the theory of power developed by Agamben, Minca states: "how the spatialisation of biopolitics finds in the camp the ideal site for the definition of endless caesurae in the body of the nation, and for the definition of population as a merely spatial concept" (Minca, 2007: 78). He also states that the sovereign power brings death and life as "political devices" in the camp (Minca, 2007: 92). The law of sovereign power seems to be locked and then contained within invisible boundaries that form the camp (Bauman 2003; Ek, 2006: 369). Yet the camp's presence is felt increasingly in the landscape nowadays, where the exception has become common in particular transcribed in space (Minca, 2015: 81). Knowledge of political regimes and current government practices are essential to the analysis and interpretation of camps and the practices around it. Agamben, following the theoretical concepts of Schmitt, is also criticized for its lack of consideration of government practices, in particular concerning the laws regarding human rights (Huysmans , 2008: 172, 180, Bigo: 2007).

2.2.4 THE CAMP AND THE DESIRE OF SECURISATION

It is true that governmental practices should always be taken into account in the study of camps, particularly regarding human rights, since they allow showing resistance phenomena that exist there. Nevertheless some authors note that the camp tends to distort processes of resistance, making human rights access difficult or impossible for example. The role of boundaries in that distortion is big and those are at the basis of containment process in the camps (Meiches, 2015: 486). The camp through its boundaries becomes a real 'space of exception' where the containment allows the government to push aside the people living there, especially in the case of refugees (Ramadan, 2012: 69). The migrants - refugees in general- have indeed become in recent years one of the main groups within the camps. This trend refers to the ever-increasing desire of security in a world of

social transition. Considering the control practices that currently exist therefore seems important when studying camps, practices that Agamben does not take into account in his work. Other authors like Deleuze with his 'assemblage theory' (Smith, 2012), have strongly criticized the Italian philosopher for its static and inaccurate view to the new control policies (Meiches, 2015: 481). The camp can be seen as a product area for the establishment of a control technology (Minca, 2015: 80). Some authors - as Raulff (2004) - lead the origin of this growing desire to secure to the period post-September 11 when the Bush administration urged the new geographies of modern exception, in particular with the opening of Guantanamo (Giaccaria & Minca, 2011: 3). The security architecture therefore includes camps (Meiches, 2015: 488), which can take different forms: closed by visible boundaries or not, by physical, legal or social boundaries. The camps may be waiting areas but also more institutionalized centers, all relating to confinement (Valluy, 2005: 3). In the case of Calais mass migration has committed to the rapid formation of those camps which then become dynamic, since they are modular zones on several parameters such as the number of people or different ethnic groups. The camp is then the 'nomos' of modern space as Agamben says (1998; Bülent & Laustsen, 2006: 451). In this respect, it appears a space for political action and change (Ramadan, 2012b: 148). But it can also be seen as a space of exile that became permanent in its wait (Ramadan, 2012: 72, 73). The 'exile' provided by the camp refers to the concept of 'internal colonialism' developed by Foucault (Ek, 2006: 369), concept reflecting the 'State of exception' and sociopolitical inequalities in a postcolonial world where the rising nationalism and a growing number of exclusion processes can be noticed (Ek, 2006). The rise of inequality tends to increase for the marginalized populations including migrants - especially refugees - who may try to survive in camps where living conditions are terrible. These migrant camps are nevertheless flexible in the sense that they evolve more quickly in time, unlike a prison for example (Meiches 2015: 478; Overly, 2011). Some scholars are looking at the relationship between these camps and concentration camps, such as Bülent & Laustsen (2006: 451), however ensuring that no confusion should be made between migrant camps and concentration camps, the genocide bringing no similarities between the two cases (Valluy, 2005: 3). Minca says, yet, that the camps are an integral part of the current geographies of terror (Minca, 2005: 411).

2.2.5 CAMPS AS SPACES OF LIFE

Despite the fact that camps are 'spaces of exception', those spaces are also living areas where there is a network of social interaction, solidarity (Sigona, 2015: 12) and resistance to the 'State of exception'. The interpretation of camps by Agamben therefore seems too static, as discussed above. Indeed, this interpretation obscures the dynamic part of the migratory movements

and interactions; especially important when analyzing the migrant camp in Calais that is often renewed (Rigby & Schlembach, 2013). This renewal is characteristic of the vision of Diken and Laustsen (2005; Sigona, 2015: 5) who sees the camp as a space with boundaries but also openings. Thus as Ramadan (2012: 70) says, « the camp is much more than a void of law and political life; it is who and what is in the camp, how they interrelate and interact”. Agamben is also criticized by Ramadan for its simplification of sovereign regimes related to migrant camps (2012); and Levy (2010) estimated that Agamben fails to mention the real lives of migrant and resistance that the refugee develops (Sigona, 2015: 5). Indeed, the camp can also be the starting point for the creation of new identities, a space of resistance certainly outside the normal political order but where the political and socioeconomic hopes grow.

2.3 THE CAMP, A LACK OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT?

Understanding and interpreting migrant camps is complex. Indeed, many elements interact both inside and outside these areas. Looking at the space and its relation to life - in the current European migratory situation – reflects the population flows context, but also exchanges and processes inside the camps. Thus the question of a more secure Europe has led many authors to study concepts like threat to national security, illegal immigration or segregation. The decisions taken by governments - both at the local and national levels - have played a huge role in the development of camps, including ‘wild’ ones in the case of Calais. Between the issue of human rights and living conditions, the camps then become a reflection of the limits of European migratory systems particularly regarding asylum.

2.3.1 THE HUMAN DIGNITY, A MYTH?

The camps have become, over the accentuation of population flows, a response – certainly not officially - to managing migration crisis (Davies & Isakjee, 2015: 93). So many scholars have studied the camps and the interactions that take place there. One of them, Sigona (2015), developed the term 'campzenship' which reflects the concept of 'membership' that exists in the camps (Sigona, 2015: 6; Davies & Isakjee, 2015: 94). This term also refers to the role of the State in the formation of relationships between people, living in camps that are qualified as spaces of politics (Sigona, 2015: 1, Isin & Rygiel, 2007). In Calais, the term 'campzenship' reflects the complexity of creating unity among different ethnic groups, cultures and religions. However, this term seems accurate because all

migrants have at least a common goal, which is to be under protection and see the respect of human rights. Yet, the access to human rights seems to be one of the major struggles of migrants - refugees especially – nowadays. Arendt's theory on the subject and on the recognition of the existence of Man says that life does not have a great value for the political (Owens, 2009: 579). She says it is difficult to have a political existence that could change something to the access to human dignity. But according to her, human dignity – given among others by human rights - should be valid for any human being even excluded from society (Owens, 2009: 576). In the camps of Calais, the access to basic needs such as water or food, has long been problematic and remains precarious, causing a violation of human dignity (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014: 27). This violation also extends into the basic principles of protection of the Man and freedom of movement. The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) nevertheless provides such freedom of movement, for example people can leave their country and choose their residence in another one regarding Article 13. Other international documents also exist for the promotion of human rights as the *International Covenant on Civils and Political rights* (1966) which, in Article 13, guarantees the right to security and freedom. Human rights are universal and apply to every human being. However, certain groups - like the migrants - experience a lack of recognition and a difficult way of recognition to their rights (Appleyard, 2000: 3). In some countries experiencing significant emigration flows, due to political or economic problems, illegal emigration is a crime (Lévêque, 2013: 16). But the human rights for non-citizens are well below international standards most of the time. Refugees are a category particularly affected by this problem. In lack of protection, they are often subject to violence, racism and abuse (Appleyard, 2000: 7, 8; Bendel, 2005: 26). Yet granting more rights to migrants could help to reduce crime, mafia networks and health risks (Appleyard, 2000: 24). But the question of a clear definition of the one who needs to be protected - the refugee - plays an important role in the complexity of access to human rights. The *UN Convention on the Status of Refugees*, dated from 1951, seems out of line with global political and economic realities and the conflicts related to it. The refugee must be protected, but what about the migrants who move because, for example, the rise of water or a civil disorder (Appleyard, 2000: 13). The absence of a modern and accurate definition of the refugee in the international law has intensified the categorization of certain people as 'illegal migrants'. This designation, in its very construction, is a vector of the lack of legal status, access to rights and protection (Appleyard, 2000: 23).

2.3.2 ILLEGAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The 'illegal migrants', a qualification generally given by politicians, reflect the emergence of a literature - according Millner (2013) - which sees the “*irregular migration as a polemic space of disagreement, through a focus on migration and demonstration as ‘acts of citizenship’*”. In this

respect, one may ask how that space of disagreement is created. Is it the promotion of security, including national one, which leads to the increase of illegal migration? According to Salt (2000: 49, 50), it is important to ask ourselves how far the desire of security decreased the protection and security of the individual, as well as the integration into the society of the host country. The 'illegal immigration' then reflects the limits of a control system, system related to governmental decisions or sovereignty; but also linked to a much more informal form of actors such as mafia networks and human trafficking (Mbembe: 2003; Shewly, 2013: 26). These networks are installed on the migratory paths to Europe, increasing the possibility of 'control' over individuals who then become victims of trafficking (Hernandez & Rudolph, 2015: 134). The vulnerability of migrants, linked to their lack of legal consideration in particular, actually favors the development of traffic (Hernandez & Rudolph, 2015: 119, 122). When migrants become illegal, criminal organizations seem to be their only solution to achieve their goal, which to those present in Calais is most of the time to reach England. The development of illegal networks may be linked to the closure of borders. Some scholars claim that the closure of borders seems to enhance the development of mafia networks. Since the closure is turning migrants into 'illegal' more easily, they are turning to the mafia with 'ease' regarding their situation (Gathmaan, 2008; Mahmoud & Trebesh, 2010).

2.3.3 THE SECURISATION OF MIGRATION

Closing borders has yet emerged as a key measure in the fight against human trafficking. The closure seems in some cases to go hand in hand with the creation of fences, expanding the concept of a 'fortress Europe', as currently the walls seem to be extended beyond the boundaries (Bendel, 2005: 30). But migration to Europe remains largely under the internal mobility related to conflicts, especially in Africa (Lévêque, 2013: 13). So we could imagine that the issue of migration will be developed in other ways than security aspects that tend to dominate the debate in Europe for several years (Gabrielli, 2007: 150,169). The problem nowadays is the fact that we protect a part of the population by increasing insecurity on the other part, via what Balibar called the 'insecurity security apparatus' – "*l'appareil de sécurité insécuritaire*" (Bietlot, 2005: 13). So when we talk about migration or refugee, the states and Europe in general, seem to emphasize human security at the expense of human dignity and human rights (Ibrahim, 2005: 168). However, the concerns of States have not always been centered on the security concept; it was not until after the Cold War with the development of capitalism in the global market that the security appeared as a central point. Security strategies developed by governments complicate the integration of migrants in host societies (Huysmans, 2000: 753), while reflecting some power relations (Ibrahim, 2005: 164). According to Huysmans, these relationships seem to be primarily the connection between internal security and

the most universal political issues "*of cultural and racial identity*"(2000: 761). Security strategies have therefore developed in terms of internal security as well as external security. External security may refer to the "agreements" that have been made with the neighboring countries of Europe but also with countries of origin of migrants. This idea was developed by Claire Rodier, who was interviewed by Liberation magazine in October 2012, who speaks of a transfer of obligations that led to many abuses such as mass deportations (Lévêque, 2013: 13). These agreements with countries of origin of migrants focus on security (Bendel, 2005: 26), omitting the differences in the application of human rights very different from Europe. This desire of security does not seem to be at the service of the Man. According to Bietlot (2005: 12), it establishes a global instability - as a '*guerre civile mondiale*' (civil world war) - not resolving any problems since it is focusing on an imaginary threat. This virtual threat is controlled by an agency called Frontex (Lévêque, 2013: 12, 14). Frontex, established in 2004, is directly related to the European border management that it develops and promotes (Frontex, 2016). This agency is in particular linked to the member countries of the organization sending their border guards at the agency's posts. Between national governments and Frontex, the issue of liability in case of litigation is very blurred, especially in the case of disrespect of human rights (Lévêque, 2013: 18). Human rights are also not the heart of Frontex, which - according to Lévêque (2013: 16) - seems to be one of the factors accentuating the danger of migration and the risks related to it. Frontex' development as a police organization refers to governance of the people in the 'State of exception' in which the role of the camp is central (Meiches, 2015: 476).

2.3.4 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN MIGRATORY MEASURES

Increasing measures to secure the borders of Europe refers to the fact of a fear of harm to the European cultural homogeneity, particularly national; European countries are countries of immigration despite the denial of most politicians (Huysmans , 2000: 762). This fear has long been characteristic of the extreme right movements throughout Europe, only now it is a reflection of policies brought especially by national governments and the European Union. From the eighties, an Europeanization of migration policies has brought more cooperation in various scales with coordination such as police systems (Huysmans , 2000: 755,758). Thereafter, the strengthening of cooperation and border controls in the European Union, but also regarding the Schengen zone was passed in 2011 to the European Commission following proposals on migration policy (COM, 2011). This has particularly affected the border area between Calais and Dover, one of most secure internal borders of European Union. The development of security measures to counter the influx of migrants yet seems in opposition to just being able to apply for asylum. But access to Europe is difficult, leaving people waiting for protection at its doors. But this difficulty of access to asylum is also very complex when migrants have reached Europe, particularly because of the complexities of the Dublin

Convention (Huysmans , 2000: 756). But the Dublin Convention is only one aspect that tends to reduce the number of asylum applications. Indeed, the words of Jacques Rancière, influenced by the work of Arendt and Agamben, indicate there is a 'ethicalisation' of asylum - that means some ethnic groups have more chance to get asylum than others - that directly refers to illegal immigration and policies associated with it (Millner, 2013). How is the integration of migrants and asylum seekers possible in the context of increasing security? What is the role of governments in this integration? In integration policies, multiculturalism and its approach are key points. The progress towards multiculturalism is then, according to Huysmans (2000: 756), by accessing to political rights of migrants. However, as seen above, the legal existence of the migrant -especially the refugee - is far from automatic in the current context. So the integration seems to be slowed down by political decisions themselves, particularly regarding citizenship and belonging to a community (Millner, 2013). One of its policy measures, the 'crime of solidarity' –*délit de solidarité*, Article L622-1 of the French penal code - refers to the fact that assistance to refugees who arrive illegally in the territory is illegal (Rigby & Schlembach, 2013). Yet it must be noted that most people wishing to seek asylum in Europe arrive illegally. Although this article first relates to the fight against traffic around migration, it also directly affects the people who help migrants to survive their terrible living conditions (Rigby & Schlembach, 2013).

2.3.5 THE PLACE OF RACISM IN SOCIETY

The living conditions in camps of Calais are very bad. After closing the center run by the Red Cross and situated in Sangatte in 2002, 'wild camps', also called 'jungles', have increased (Rigby & Schlembach, 2013). The issue of hygiene is then central, because most of the migrants are living in tents outside. Yet, a lack of hygiene can cause a real risk in terms of spreading diseases (Davies & Isakjee, 2015: 93). The threat of a health disaster adds to the idea of the threat of migrants, including refugees, in itself. The major international migration is a point of vulnerability and a risk to the safety of Man (Ibrahim, 2005: 168, 169). However refugees are people who risk their lives and who are the firsts threatened of persecution. But the people of Europe fail to recognize the danger that individuals face if they are not directly exposed. The categorization of refugees by certain individuals or groups is especially important if the population flow continues to increase. This categorization can go back to the period of colonization where Western countries have fostered stigma through the population what Foucault considers as racism (Ek, 2006: 369). Foucault also says that racism, by differences between races, fragments society (Lemke, 2005: 8). This fragmentation is also spread by the securitization of migration which accentuates the differences between cultures (Ibrahim, 2005: 164, 165). Racism is also carried by the stigma that exists towards migrants, who are often linked -

wrongly- to crime (Appleyard, 2000: 4).

2.3.6 DOES THE POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO A BETTER MIGRATORY MANAGEMENT STILL EXIST?

This racism is even more important in the camps which appear as a symbol of the decline of international rights and values (Intrand and Perrouty, 2005: 11). The term camp itself is characteristic of maintaining control policies and a certain lack of political commitment (Bietlot, 2005: 4; Migreurop, 2004). The camps currently can be seen as ways to manage migration that nobody wants. The idea of 'immigration gateways', put forward by Tony Blair in 2003, is at the heart of political debate on migration (Intrand and Perrouty, 2005: 10). And delegating to the borders of Europe seems to be, for politicians, the best way to handle the influx of migrants. Migration policy does not yet offer a coherent European vision. The recent establishment of European quotas for asylum applications is far from being implemented everywhere, especially in Calais which experiences improvement of the situation. Calais seems to crystallize mafia networks, the violence is common and the relations with the police very conflicting (Millner, 2013). Under these conditions, the question is how human rights can be respected? How does the 'State of emergency' appear as an obstacle to integration and social cohesion? Is the migrant camp of Calais, which reflects the containment and European security policies, really a source of resistance and hope?

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 DATA COLLECTION

For answering the two main questions and sub-questions, qualitative research methods were used. I choose to study a phenomenological case study: the case of the migrant camps of Calais. According to Hegel, phenomenology, based on facts and subjective points of view, is a scientific method related to consciousness (Jarczyk, 2007: 131). Phenomenology allows analysis based on individual experiences and direct facts, providing a broader view about social, spatial and political issues. Phenomenology is based on different methods. To develop my research, I decided to use several phenomenological methods. The first of these is the participant observation, which is considered by Eric Laurier (2013: 116) as *“a method based on participating and observing in which field-notes, sketches, photographs or video recordings are used as a method of data collection”*. The collected data, through the participant observation, led to the creation of a diary. Indeed, the participant observation - in itself – constitutes an observation, which does not include interactions or personal conversations (Laurier, 2013). Writing a diary is then the best way to complete the data of the participant observation, including interactions. In the case of Calais, this can be, per example, an informal conversation with a migrant. The choice of the diary, as the main method of data collection, also allows having data of perceptions and facts, on a few months period. The diary, then, shows the evolution - over time- of the migration situation in Calais. It is very important because the crystallization of migration refers to temporarily static but especially dynamic phenomena. In addition to the diary, two interviews, a questionnaire and ten written testimonies were used to collect the data of my research. The interviews, as the questionnaire, provide a structured view of what people think of the migratory situation, regarding different predefined themes. Written testimonies are, in turn, much less structured and provide a point of view in a more objective context, as they are not guided by a lot of predefined questions or themes.

The various testimonies, questionnaire and interviews were conducted following several categories: migrant, local population and volunteers. Before the beginning of my fieldwork in March 2015, I only wanted to conduct interviews, around twenty. Yet, over time, I had to adapt my methods of data collection in regards of the migratory situation in Calais. The evolutions of camps, the bad living conditions and the tensions have led me to first consider the fears and apprehensions of the respondents, including migrants. Shortly after my arrival, I conducted my first interview with a

Sudanese migrant. This interview was stressful and challenging for him, and it was difficult for him to immediately put words on his situation in the camps. Following this interview, I decided to leave the choice to the people of different categories, to be interviewed or to write a testimony. Of the thirteen respondents, only two have wished to be interviewed, one decided to answer a written questionnaire and ten wrote testimonies.

Table 3.1: Categories of respondents and methods

Interviews	1 migrant
	1 volunteer
Questionnaire	1 migrant
Written testimonies	3 migrants
	2 volunteers
	5 individuals from the local population

Source: A.Mattei, 2016

The interviews were semi-conducted, following two different interview protocol, one for migrants, one for volunteers (see Appendix B- B.3). Depending on the interviewee, I took the flexibility to insist or not on certain aspects of the migratory situation in Calais. The interviews were recorded on an audio system, before being transcribed. On the specific request of the respondent, the questionnaire was elaborated with the same questions used for the interview protocol. Written testimonies were made from three subjects. The volunteers needed to write their testimony about the following subject: ‘the migratory situation in Calais, my perception and my experiences with migrants’. For people from the local population, the subject was ‘the migration situation in Calais: social, economical and humanitarian impacts’. Finally for migrants, the testimonies had to be about “their living conditions and the migration context in Calais”. The testimonies and the questionnaire were written and not recorded on an audio system. The direct writing of testimonies has – sometimes- been done via virtual social networks like Facebook. Most of the time, it was written from a mobile phone (for migrants) or a personal computer. Virtual communication is indeed the preferred way of communication in contemporary society, especially for migrants. The power of the internet and the use of new technologies led me to an unusual data collection. Via internet, migrants but also volunteers and people from the local population sent me their testimonies. The testimonies of local people and volunteers have been translated from French to English.

The choice of the respondents has been done in different ways, depending on the category. The five individuals from the local population were selected according to their ages, 20-30 years old, 30-45 years old and 45-60 years old, and their professions, in order to have the broadest possible vision of the opinion of the local population regarding the migratory situation of Calais. Growing up near Calais, most of my respondents are close or distant acquaintances, selected via the two previous

criteria. In the case of Nathalie, I had to do a long search for the purpose of finding people who really are against the migration. The anti-migrant groups did not reply to my requests for interviews. Consequently, I did a research on virtual social networks to find people who express a negative opinion about the migration to Calais. Following this search, I sent a few virtual messages. Only Nathalie agreed to write me a testimony.

Table 3.2: The respondents of the local population

20-30 years old	Lise	Law student
	Thomas	Police student
30-45 years old	Nathalie	housewife
45-60 years old	Jean-Luc	teacher
	Charlotte(2)	Working in an Administrative Retention center

Source: A.Mattei, 2016

The migrants, meanwhile, were chosen by nationalities: one Sudanese, one Eritrean, one Afghan and two Syrians. The choice of using nationality allows a wider range of crops that can play on the perceptions and opinions, even if the panel of migrants does not include all the nationalities of migrants living in the camps. For volunteers, the choice was made by the nature and frequency of their commitment.

Table 3.3: The respondents of the volunteers category

Tim	Activist, militant for the opening of borders
Charlotte	Occasional volunteer
Eminé	Regular volunteer

Source: A.Mattei, 2016

All respondents agreed to be part of this research as individual, for a personal research, not linked to the *SALAM* association where I did my fieldwork. The names of migrants have been changed to protect their anonymity. For other respondents, only their first name is used in order to respect their privacy, the migration situation in Calais being a tense and highly politicized subject. This research appears, by using methods such as a diary or written testimonies, to provide answers to the extent of the 'State of exception' in the camps and the establishment of spaces of autonomy despite this exception. However, it should be noted that the data provided by interviews, testimonies, the questionnaire and the diary provide only partial answers. Indeed, respondents represent only a small panel. The actors from the municipality and the government could also have been questioned, but the difficulty of contacts to request interviews with these actors has removed this perspective. The absence of women, in the panel of migrants, also shows the limits of this research, which does not take into account the sex and gender. It is true that qualitative methods can be seen limited by the

small sample, here thirteen respondents, taken into account to make assumptions (Mahé, 2002). Nevertheless, it allows me to advance some spatial, social and political assumptions regarding the migrant camps of Calais, hence its use for my research.

3.2 DATA ANALYSIS

Through qualitative methods, data - provided by the panel questioned and the diary - were analyzed by codifying, in stages. The codifying is transcribed by a coding of my data that I realized with software, called QDA Miner. The codifying corresponds to the fact *“to arrange things in a systematic order, to make something part of a system or classification, to categorize”* (Saldana, 2008: 8). First, I made a codifying by categories of words with data from the diary and written testimonies.

Table 3.4: Categories and words used for the coding

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>CODED WORDS</u>
The name of the living spaces of migrants	‘Tolerated’ space, camp, camps, jungle, squat
The police	Police, gas, cops/CRS
The asylum	Asylum, asylum seeker, Dublin, fingerprints
The living conditions	Living conditions, bad conditions, conditions, bad situation
The influence of the mafia	Mafia/mafias, smugglers/smuggler, traffic/trafficking
The desire of securisation	Fence/fences, wall/walls, securisation/security, control
The negative image about migrants	Racism/racists, fear of the unknown/the other/threat, stigma/stigmatization, negative image
The virtual communication	Text/message, mail/mailbox, phone, whatsapp/Facebook
The helpers	Association/associations, volunteers/independents, friends/family, help
The English Eldorado	Britain/Great Britain, England, eldorado
Migrant communities	Community/communities, group/groups, representatives/representative
The main emotions people feel regarding the migratory situation	Scared/afraid/fear, disappointed, tired, tears/sad, smile/Laugh/Happy/Joy, angry, tense, hope
Human rights	Dehumanization/ exclusion, human rights, lawlessness, illegal

Source: A.Mattei, 2016

This coding, very general, allowed me to know whether the categories of topics chosen were much discussed in the data, or not. Following this first classification, where I got the frequency of each code, I could identify certain of the topics that seemed to dominate the data collection (in blue on the figure). Following these results, I realized a second codifying, allowing me to go deeper in

some topics such as the police, the living conditions of migrants or the desire to securisation. The topics initially chosen, and those added, try to answer and highlight the different aspects of the main questions of this research. For example, by coding different parameters of the concept of securisation, we can know what is the impact of the security desire in maintaining the 'State of exception'. This codifying has been developed from my qualitative methods. The data from the diary - excluded interviews, written testimonies and questionnaire - were coded as categories of topics, to identify the frequency of responses to defined questions (See Appendix C- C.1). For example, we try to know whether - in the data of the diary - the frequency of segments indicates a lack of human rights or the recognition of migrant rights.

On the same pattern, I coded the interviews, testimonies and questionnaire. I made a combined codification of the data of the written testimonies from the local people and volunteers (See Appendix C- C.2). I also used the coding, to a small extent, for the analysis of the written testimonies of migrants, and the comparison between the interview and the questionnaire of the two migrants (See Appendix C- C.3). The establishment of categories and frequency allowed me to have some quantitative results for my analysis, albeit restricted due to the panel of respondents, but that help support my argument. In this analysis, these frequencies are supported by quotations and a conceptual and factual analysis of the various topics discussed, such as the presence of the mafia and the role of volunteers.

4. FROM THE 'WILD' CAMPS TO THE 'TOLERATED' SPACE

In Calais there are migrant camps for years, more or less developed, that have shaped the image of the town as *“une ville au fil des migrants”* (Statius, 2015), a city of migrants. During my internship from March to June 2015, I could see the spatial evolution of the camps and the issues related to it. From the 'wild camps' to the opening of the 'Jules Ferry centre' and the establishment of the 'tolerated' space, the State of exception is stated in the living spaces of migrants. Even today, deprivation of rights and security still shape the various borders – mainly social, political and physical - surrounding the camp.

4.1 THE DIFFERENT CAMPS OF CALAIS: SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS

4.1.1 THE NINE CAMPS

When I arrived in Calais in March 2015, there were nine migrant camps – including two squats. To the west of the city there is the 'camp of Leader Price', which took its name from the store located next to the edge of the highway leading to the Channel Tunnel. Bringing together mainly Sudanese people, the camp is made of waste material and consolidated tents. The living conditions are terrible over there, especially due to the moist soil. This 'wild camp' is located outside the city center of Calais, but still within close distance of public services. This site was chosen by migrants because of its proximity to one of the crossing points to reach England.

In the city center, in the West, the 'Galloo squat' lies in *“an abandoned metal processing plant”* (Chrisafis, 2015) between a high school and Le Channel, a national art and culture scene. 'Galloo' is considered a squat because migrants have 'illegally' claimed this private property. Activists and migrants have committed to this place as their stronghold of resistance. Over 16 communities are living there, which is not the case in the 'Egyptian squat'. As its name suggests, it is inhabited mostly by migrants of Egyptian origin. To the east of the city center, this squat is located in an unoccupied house (D.E., 2014). In the city center, there are also three other camps: the 'BCMO', the 'Church' and the 'Dock'. The 'BCMO' is a 'wild camp' in front of the *Bureau Central de la Main d'Oeuvre* (Central Bureau of labor). It is mostly populated by migrants of African origin. The 'Church' and 'The Dock' are separated by a street. Not far from the 'BCMO' and close to the port of Calais, the two camps mainly bring together Syrians. Some are living on the porch of the church while others

sleep on the dock of a warehouse. These three camps are valued by migrants because of their locations among the local population.

Far from the city center, at the highway leading to the port, there are the two largest migrant camps: 'Tioxide' and the 'Bois Dubrulle'. 'Tioxide' is located on a land owned by a titanium company.

Figure 4.1: 'Tioxide', from one of the entrance to the site



Source: A. Mattei, 04/03/15, Calais

The 'Bois Dubrulle' is –as its name says –located in a wooded area a few hundred meters from 'Tioxide'. In both camps live hundreds of migrants who appear to be organized mostly in ethnic communities or communities formed by social affinities (see Appendix D- D.1). The city center is far from these sites, but migrants wanted to settle there because of the proximity to the highway leading to the port. Access to the highway is indeed very easy because the proximity to a mound to the North of 'Tioxide'. The ninth camp is located in the village of Marck, a few hundred meters from the eastern border of the city of Calais. The camp of Marck includes a wooded area and a sandy part, and is inhabited primarily by Pakistani and Afghans. The migrants settled here because of its proximity to 'Transmarck', an area for road transport *“where there are many services for trucks that go to England”* (Mattei, 2015). This is a privileged point for migrants who want to reach England by hiding in trucks.

4.1.2 THE PROXIMITY AND THE TEMPORALITY

The geographical characteristics of these nine camps refer to two realities: the proximity of the crossing points and the proximity to the city center, which seems to be likely important (see Appendix D- D.2). The spatiality of the camps has changed at the whim of evictions and dismantling, noticeable for over ten years. The migrant camps have often been located near the harbor, but the government restrictions against 'illegal' immigration forced migrants to find other sites which mostly

are outside the city center. This is particularly the case with the creation of the camps in the east of Calais: 'Tioxide', the 'Bois Dubrulle' and the camp of Marck. The camps are in fact often considered as the crystallization of 'illegal' migration. In this sense, they appear as spaces on the margins of society (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2001). Paradoxically, for the government, the nine camps of Calais have also become a way to control migration and prevent settlement (Rygiel, 2011: 5).

The precariousness of these camps makes their location 'temporary'. These camps can be dismantled at any time, making the settlement of migrants and their survival difficult. The living conditions in the camps are clearly linked to the notion of temporary, which weakens the position of the migrant in the camp. The position of the migrant regarding the society and the political system is also linked to the temporary migration, they decided to be part of. The term 'temporary migrant' indicates that the migrant, at a point, wishes to return to its country of origin (EMN, 2011: 12). What can the government win of this temporary situation? What seems to be clear, in the case of Calais, is that the temporary location of the camps leads to the consideration of the migrant by its 'bare life'; in the sense that migrants do not have time to adapt, built and create their own spaces. The migrants have no rights and are considered only by their exclusion. The government at the local and national level extends its power in the lack of consideration of human rights (Sigona, 2015: 4-5), which is characterized in Calais by the living conditions in migrant camps. Indeed, the living conditions in the camps are terrible. Most of the time, the soil is muggy and polluted. The shelters are made of old plastic and recovery equipment. Hygiene conditions are well below international standards. The migrants of Calais really live in 'spaces of exception', spaces that deprive them of their human character. So as Robert - a Sudanese immigrant – says, the camps are *"for animals not for humans"* (Robert, 2015). The way of life of migrants contrasts with the way of life of the European society, as we understand it today. These differences create social and physical borders. So one may ask how the space plays a role in creating these borders.

4.1.3 SPATIAL DISPARITIES AND BORDERS

In the nine camps of Calais, there are spatial disparities. These differences relate to the social and physical borders of various kinds. These borders are difficult to identify because, regarding the data collected through the diary, 46% of it are visible to the eye. The other 54% cannot be seen visually but still are significant in the way it affects the daily lives of migrants (see Appendix D- D.3). 'Tioxide', the 'Bois Dubrulle' and the camp of Marck, located well outside the city center of Calais, are characteristic of a physical border. Indeed, the location of these camps points out in itself a spatial exclusion. This physical border is formed since the dismantling of the camps near the harbor in 2014, which forced migrants to the creation of new camps far away from the city. Gradually, the physical border has also become social. The spatial distance regarding the public services initiates a social

exclusion, concerning the local population in particular and the municipality. In the case of the 'Leader Price camp', the physical border is not really significant, except regarding the living conditions of migrants. Yet, the social border is there. It is leading to discriminatory phenomena, such as the prohibition to go inside some shops nearby the camp (Goudeseune, 2014).

This social border is also noticeable in all the camps and the squats of the city center. The living conditions and the way of life of migrants are themselves linked to the establishment of these borders. However, in the city center, especially in the 'BCMO', the social border is thinner because the contact with the people is more significant. It also happens that the physical and social borders are implemented by migrants. This is particularly the case for the 'Galloo squat' which, by its spatial configuration (closed space with a single guarded entrance), develops a physical and social border. The establishment of borders is not only social and physical in Calais. Borders are also ideological and political (Millner, 2011: 325). The space then is a tool where the borders are developed, and which refers to the extent and the establishment of the State of exception.

4.2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 'TOLERATED' SPACE AND THE JULES FERRY CENTRE


4.2.1 MOVING OR NOT TO THE 'TOLERATED' SPACE

The space plays an important role in the migratory situation of Calais. It is vector of the influence of power, political pressure, dehumanization but also resistance, new identities and communities. The relationship between migration and space is unique in Calais since the camps are waiting zones where migratory flows are 'temporarily stopped'. The nine camps of Calais appear politicized but also dissocialized, marginalized. In March 2015, the State has taken a decision that changes the evolution of the migratory situation in Calais. As it was previously the case, the government wants to dismantle the nine camps of Calais. The government wants to bring together all migrants to a 'tolerated' space (Seba, 2015). This space is located at the eastern border of Calais on a wasteland, several kilometers away from the city center. Migrants do not want to move on the 'tolerated' space that they consider too far from the city center, a point of view also shared by many of the volunteers (see Appendix D- D.4). The physical border, that the 'tolerated' space builds, is much more present than the border noticeable in the nine camps. This space, the 'new camp', reflects the desire to distance, to hide the migrants (Rygiel, 2011: 5).

In late March, the majority of migrants settle on the 'tolerated' space. Many left because of

the increased police pressure they experienced throughout the month of March. 'Tioxide', the 'Bois Dubrulle' and the camp of Marck are quickly empty of any human presence. On the sites, only some rubbish and tents have been left over by the migrants. The migrants of the 'Leader Price camp' also move gradually towards the 'tolerated' space. Only the camps and squats of the city center seem to resist the government pressure. The announcement of evictions is getting common, especially in these camps.


Figure 4.2: The frequency of the threat regarding evictions



Source: A.Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner and Excel, 2016

But migrants do not want to move. The spaces they occupy bring them a lot of social interaction. The 'tolerated' space is indeed far from creating contacts with the local population. Along a road leading to the port, the 'tolerated' space is inhospitable, with many thorns, a large sandy part and a small wooded area. Over time, migrants were able to develop it without any help from the state.

Figure 4.3: Sketch of the 'tolerated' space



Source: A.Mattei, 29/03/15

4.2.2 THE 'TOLERATED' SPACE, THE JULES FERRY CENTRE AND THE 'STATE OF EXCEPTION'

The 'new camp' has taken on different names, not without remembering us the history of migration in Calais. It is called the 'new jungle' in reference to the bad living condition (Suys, 2016), but also the 'roofless Sangatte'.

"This reference comes from the 'Sangatte centre' opened from 1999 to 2002, which was a shelter and humanitarian emergency response to the migrant crisis in Calais. [...] The living conditions back then were also bad. The designation of the 'roofless Sangatte' for the 'new camp' is not really positive and is linked to years of misery, which has worsened since the closure of the 'Sangatte centre' for migrants. "(Mattei, 2015).

The term 'roofless Sangatte' also refers to the fact that, next to this 'tolerated' space, migrants are supported by a day-care center: the 'Jules Ferry centre'. This centre opened completely in April 2015. It offers migrants a meal per day, showers, toilets, information on asylum, a medical service and electricity (Tissot, 2015). The center also serves as accommodation for women and children, who before mostly lived in the 'Victor Hugo centre'. The 'Victor Hugo centre' was a centre where they were sheltered, fed and monitored, thanks to the *Solid'R* association.

The establishment of the 'Jules Ferry centre' and the 'tolerated' space refers to the desire to increasingly secure the city. The 'Jules Ferry centre', in fact, is a step forward for better living conditions of migrants. But its location reinforces the exclusion of migrants regarding the local society. So the government's desire to create a 'new camp', where the majority of migrants live, refers to exclusion. It is characteristic of a 'State of exception' (Agamben, 1998). Controlling the migrants is also related to the creation of the 'tolerated' space. If migrants are brought together in an area of defined spatial borders, it is easier to control. The government has understood this. By the confinement in a relative small space, it tends to make invisible or to suppress the rights of migrants (see Appendix D- D.5). The 'tolerated' space, next to the 'Jules Ferry centre', is also an area that appears as a space for the development of 'bare life'. In itself, the area firstly does consider the 'bare life' of migrants, but it is characterized by resistances to this strict consideration. Indeed creating communities can be seen as a development of the 'bare life' through a social consideration.

4.2.3 THE 'TOLERATED' SPACE AND BORDERS

The social and physical borders seem to spatially surround the 'new camp', following its geographical limits. The geographical limits of the camp, in general, reflect even more the social than the physical borders (see Appendix D- D.6). But these borders seem to change of nature inside the 'new camp'. There are of course physical borders, since many migrants live in different communities or ethnic groups. These physical borders are characterized by the different locations that migrants have chosen in the 'tolerated' space. But these physical borders are not often taken into consideration, since social borders are too few to be linked to the physical ones. Generally only the language and culture can create a pretty strong social border to divide. But solidarity and the common goal shared by migrants bring cohesion within the camp, and in more specific situations outside the camp as during demonstrations.

In the case of the 'Jules Ferry centre', the border is clearly political and physical. This structure is controlled by the government through the association *La Vie Active* (Tissot, 2015). The contrast between the 'Jules Ferry centre' and the 'tolerated' space is important. In the 'Jules Ferry centre', the area is secured by the presence of the police. There is an access to first necessities and some other public services. Outside the centre, the situation is far from safe especially with the presence of the Mafia. Moreover, migrants have neither water nor electricity. In this sense, between the 'Jules Ferry shelter' for women and children and space 'tolerated', there is also a physical border. This border is also political since the 'Jules Ferry centre' gives a minimum of human dignity to the migrant that the 'tolerated' space does not. The term 'tolerated' returns - itself - to a consideration of migrants but not to the respect or understanding of them (Weil-Dubuc, 2016). It refers to a temporary state, undefined and vague legally speaking. The political border is formed between the 'Jules Ferry centre' and the 'new camp', between the term 'legal' and 'tolerated'. The physical border between these two places is characterized by fences and walls that surround the 'Jules Ferry centre'. But paradoxically, the most marked border is invisible in the sense that it is not characterized by walls or fences. This border is the one of the 'new camp' where the spatial and geographical border is also a social and political border with the rest of the city. It is a border that marks the concentration of migrants in an area of open detention, which characterizes a part of the *"governmental system of detention in Europe"* (Rygiel, 2011: 5).

4.3 THE DISMANTLING OF THE SQUATS, THE SATURATION OF THE JULES FERRY CENTRE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 'TOLERATED' SPACE

4.3.1 MANAGING THE MIGRATION

The creation of the 'tolerated' space, under government orders, brings a lot of pressure on the camps and the squats of the city center. In early April the threats of evictions are already launched, in particular in the case of the 'Galloo squat' (Kwiczor, 2014). The government wants to dismantle this squat for a long time. Indeed, they cannot find out what is going on inside the squat, which is closed and hidden from the view of both the local population and the municipality. This lack of visibility is also noticeable for the 'Egyptian squat', of which only the courtyard is visible from the street. The dismantling refers to the fact of a desire to control more and more, but also ranks as one of the main ways to manage the 'illegal' immigration. This management is difficult for the government because of the complexity of the migratory situation. Migrants are in waiting zones, where they have not chosen to stay. Indeed, the border prevents them from reaching their ultimate goal: England (see Raoul, 2015). According to my data, all migrants are wishing to reach England when they arrive in Calais. 24% of them change their goal of reaching England, out of spite. The remaining 76% wish to reach the English 'Eldorado', despite the difficulty of the crossings and the bad living conditions (see Appendix D- D.7).


The camps then become for them waiting areas, living areas or should we say survival areas. The migrants of the camps located in the city center do not want to go to the 'tolerated' space, as it is the case for a little group of migrants still living in the 'Leader Price camp'. Yet, the police pressure leads an increasing number of migrants to move to the 'new camp'. Mid April, in less than a month, the population of the 'Galloo squat' has largely decreased. The 'Egyptians squat' and the 'BCMO' also notice a decrease of their population from the end of March (Mattei, 2015). On the 8th of April 2015, following an act of vandalism initiated according to the rumors by the municipality, the last migrants living in the 'Egyptian squat' leave (Passeurs d'hospitalités, 2015-2). They join the 'new jungle'.

4.3.2 THE EVICTIONS

Only the 'Galloo squat', the 'Church' and the 'Dock' seems somehow to resist the pressures of possible evictions. Yet, eviction threats, announced in late March 2015, run into a problem. Indeed, *"There are three steps to follow before an eviction: the delivery of the judgment, the command to leave and the passage of a bailiff with the police."* (Mattei, 2015). But the bailiff never came,

especially to the 'Church' and the 'Dock'. The idea appears that some possible evictions of migrant camps, during the period from March to June 2015, could to be done without legal procedures.

Figure 4.4: Are the possible evictions legal or not?



Source: A.Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner & Excel, 2016

The illegality of possible evictions reinforces the fact that the State of exception is present in the migrant camps of Calais. The transgression of the law by the government can reinforce the consideration of the migrant as a person without political or legal existence. The pressure related to possible evictions in Calais is also the vector of this relationship between the migrant, the power and the state. This pressure creates a climate of fear. Repeated threats show us that there is a deprivation of the rights of migrants, characteristic of the 'State of exception' (Ansaldi, 2010: 387), in the sense that the migrant cannot defend itself against such acts.

This lack regarding human rights and individual rights has been noted more than once in Calais, in particular during the evictions of the 'Galloo squat' and the 'Leader Price camp' of the 2nd of June 2015. The police evacuated migrants living in the squat and the camp.

Figure 4.5: The police during the eviction at the 'Galloo squat'



Source: A.Mattei, 02/06/15, Calais

They blocked the passage to the city center forcing migrants to bypass the city to join the 'new jungle', which is a totally illegal practice accentuating the discriminatory behavior. The municipality uses the space to assert its opinions towards the migratory situation. The city center of Calais, densely populated area, can then be seen as a 'privileged' area, where only citizens would have access. This Spatialization of local politics is a vector of areas that can be called 'exclusive' and 'inclusive'. The establishment of inclusive spaces can be seen as “a spatial dimension of social sustainability” (Juwet, 2013: 1). But in Calais, the municipality does not seem to include the migrants in this sustainability. In the particular case of the eviction of the Galloo squat, the center of Calais is an ‘exclusive’ area for the majority population, while the rest of Calais is an ‘inclusive’ area where migrants are also allowed. But with the establishment of the 'tolerated' space, the government tends to limit areas where migrants are allowed. Even more, the government seems to want the 'new jungle' to be the only ‘inclusive’ area for migrants.

4.3.3 LIVING CONDITIONS OF MIGRANTS

The fact of wanting to reduce migrant spaces leads to the creation of a ‘space of exception’. This ‘space of exception’, if it is considered as an ‘inclusive’ area, can also lose its characteristics by the establishment of identities and membership (Sigona, 2015: 5). However, the exclusionary nature of the 'new camp' also brings many problems that characterize the significant humanitarian crisis noticeable in Calais. The development of the 'tolerated' space is far from having improved the living conditions of migrants. Thus, according to the notes of my diary, the living conditions are a much discussed topic while speaking of the migratory situation of Calais (see Appendix D- D.8). Between March and June 2015, 76% of people, including myself and the people I talk about in the diary, indicate that the living conditions are bad. 24% believe that the conditions are getting better, especially since the opening of 'Jules Ferry centre' (see Appendix D- D.9). The 'Jules Ferry centre' is therefore a step towards the improvement of the living conditions.

However, at the end of April 2015, the capacities of the centre are below the needs of migrants. The number of migrants has increased from around 1100 to over 2000 (Mattei, 2015). Despite of the fact that the number of migrants stays approximate, the ‘Jules Ferry centre’ has reached its saturation during the process of the relocation of migrants in the ‘tolerated’ space. Thus the 1,500 daily meals are inadequate regarding the number of migrants. Although the center's capacities were increased in late April (Goudeseune, 2015), this still is not enough compared to the humanitarian crisis. The data - collected via my diary – indicate that the ‘Jules Ferry centre’ has more negative than positive points, 55% of negative points against 45% of positive points (see Annex D- D.10). The distance from the city center and the capacities of the centre, below the needs, reflect a

wrong evaluation from the government about the scale of the humanitarian crisis linked to the migratory situation of Calais.


The spatial characteristics of the camps have evolved from March to June 2015. But despite this development, little has changed for migrants. The lack of rights and the dehumanization built the camps as 'spaces of exception', which is particularly the case for the 'new camp'. The nine 'old camps' have been abandoned or removed gradually. Only the three small camps, near the harbor, seem to resist the pressure of the municipality. Resisting yes, but for how long? Indeed, the desire of security is more and more important in the city of Calais, where the frequency of control measures is increasing and where migrants are confronted with many obstacles on their way to England.

5. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MIGRATORY SITUATION

5.1 A DESIRE OF SECURISATION THAT ACCENTUATES THE STATE OF EXCEPTION

The securisation is a paradoxical phenomenon. Indeed as Laacher (2003) says, the actors of the securisation – the State and the migrants - both seek access to safety. The paradox comes when we understand that the actions leading to this security are seen in a totally different way by both actors. In Calais, the desire for security seems to be linked to three things: the detention, the controls and the establishment of fences and walls.

Figure 5.1: How is the desire of security characterized in the city of Calais?



Source: A.Mattei, *Diary*, via QDA Miner & Excel, 2016

5.1.1 'CLOSED' OR 'OPEN' DETENTION

The detention can be seen in different ways. We speak of detention that can be described as 'open' or 'closed'. In the city, a lot of migrants face 'closed' detention. It means generally detention in police custody or in a *CRA*, Administrative Retention Centre. The *CRA* (*Centre de rétention administrative*) is located in Coquelles, next to Calais. The migrants staying there are mainly particular cases related to mafia, or they already have obtained the refugee status in another European country. Maxime, a migrant from Afghanistan, had this experience several times. After being granted a refugee status in Italy, he decided to reach England to improve his living conditions. Yet, in the waiting zones of Calais, he may at any time be held at the *CRA* and faces the risk of being sent back to Italy (Mattei, 2015). The 'closed' detention refers to legal processes, to the French law and its application, which can make us think that the State of exception does not exist in this place. However, it is discriminatory phenomena that tend to feed places of 'closed' detention: controls regarding the skin color, 'hunting' of migrants, among other practices. These phenomena are

characteristic of a lack of rights for migrants, categorizing them only by their 'bare life'. The 'closed' detentions also are a perfect way for the government to regulate the migratory flows (Akoka and Clochard). It then reflects the power of the sovereign over the life of migrants.

While speaking of detention, we first think about confinement and physical borders. But the detention may also be characterized by invisible borders. According to Tim (2015), the 'new camp' of Calais can be considered "*a detention center without walls*". In this sense, the camps of Calais - and particularly the 'new camp' - can be considered as 'open' detentions. 'Open' detentions bring the same issues as 'closed' detentions. Even if there are no walls or fences, the 'open' detentions - in Calais the camps - are characteristic of deviant political behavior and a strong desire of security. These places then become the stronghold of the humanitarian crisis linked to the migratory situation of Calais, the stronghold of exclusion where migrants are outside the political norms of society (Rygiel, 2011: 1).

5.1.2 SECURING THE BORDER

This humanitarian crisis is visible by the presence of walls and fences. The walls and fences participate in the formation of the image of the European security policy. These barriers, both real and symbolic, are an obstacle to the crossings of migrants who want to reach England. The fences and walls also stand as a representation of the nationalist political decisions taken by the British government. Indeed in 2014, "*England had announced that it would fund up to 15 million to securing the border. The fences around the port have been strengthened and all along the highway some fences are built*" (Mattei, 2015). In fact, the landscape of Calais changed slowly. It is especially the case around the port and the Channel tunnel, the two crossing points, according to Charlotte-2 (2015). The transformation of the landscape of Calais reflects a fear of others, getting more and more important.

According to the government, the other, and especially its culture, appears as a threat to national security (Phillips, 2010: 209; Van Leeuwen, 2008: 152; among others). The fear of the other leads to the measures taken in regard to the security of the city. This fear of the other tends to make invisible migrants by building a wall between them and the local population. The security and the financial resources, used to implement it, are prior to improving the living conditions in the camps for example. So even if within the migrant camps of Calais, there are solidarity and cohesion; outside "*reigns the fear of the other*", according to a volunteer (Eminé, 2015). The threat brought by the migrant, by the foreigner, pushes the French government but also the municipality of Calais to do more and more controls.

5.1.3 THE POLICE

These controls are managed by the state that uses the police to secure the city. Police appears as one of the most important points when it comes to the migratory situation (see Appendix D- D.11). For the exiles in Calais, the police appears as the archetype of the domination of power over the 'bare life'. In this sense, according to Ansaldi (2010: 386-387), the State of exception is the only place where the police action - including repression - can take place. For years in Calais, a cat and mouse game takes place between migrants and the police. The police is really visible throughout the city, contrasting with the desire of the government to making migrants invisible (see Appendix D- D.5). The controls at the port and the Channel tunnel have also increased between March and June 2015. These checks are primarily characterized by repression, repression that appears to control the continuity of 'bare life' (Ansaldi, 2010: 387).

This repression is linked to the problems of police violence, that each of the migrants - I talked to - experienced (see Appendix D- D.11, D.12). Over time, most of the migrants develop a fear of the police. This fear of the police is especially significant in times of evictions where police pressure is intense.

"This pressure tends to intimidate migrants who generally develop hate and fear towards the police. This pressure and the psychological aspect of it can be characterized in different ways. Some tell me that they have nightmares but most of them are angry, rebellious." (Mattei, 2015).

The pressures and repression, exercised by the police, increase the tensions in the city. As a Syrian migrant says *"we have been beaten sprayed by gas... and they wonder why people hate"* (Hugues, 2015). The cases of police violence are really common according to the migrants. René (2015), among others, says that police use physical violence against migrant with tools such as gas spray and stick. According to my diary, 81% of people have a negative image of the police (see Appendix D- D.13). This bad image of the police refers to a way to accessing the security, which the majority of people - including migrants - are not satisfied of. Indeed, in Calais, the increasing presence of the police does not seem to bring a better management of the migration situation. Police can reassure but also scare and have deviant behavior. The desire of securisation is linked to the fight against 'illegal' immigration. Yet, as I say in my diary (Mattei, 2015): *"The fight against illegal immigration, by securing and building fences, seems to be directly linked to the failure regarding the protection of people in need"*.

5.2 THE DEHUMANIZATION OF MIGRANTS

5.2.1 THE LACK OF MIGRANT RIGHTS

The 'illegal' immigration refers to several 'illegal' phenomena. The 'illegality' characterizes the arrival of migrants in Calais, their crossings to England and their creation of camps. But more generally, the migrant itself is considered as 'illegal'. This 'illegality' brings controversy. I explain this controversy in my diary under the following terms:

"people fleeing their countries because of persecution or other reasons, inevitably arrive illegally in Europe. It is because the borders are closed and their home governments do not give them visas. Letting people, especially refugees in need of protection, at the borders of Europe is inhuman and illegal according to international law. [...] Thus the term 'illegal' in itself and the fight against the 'illegal' lead to a paradox: the refugees enter Europe illegally, but are they really illegal in the eyes of the international justice?" (Mattei, 2015).

The illegality of migrants is subjective in the sense that it seems to be defined by local, French and European regulations. These regulations do not seem to take into account international law, especially not the Human rights (see the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

Figure 5.2: Posters for the recognition of migrant rights on the doors of the 'Church'



Source: A.Mattei, 18/04/15, Calais

The living spaces of migrants - the camps- reflect a management of the Anglo-French border, which led to the creation of 'no-go' zones (Carrère, 2002). These zones of lawlessness allow controlling aspects, while trying to prevent migrants to settle in France or England (Rygiel, 2011).

This temporality situation plays a huge role in the absence of human rights in the camps of Calais. The experiences - told in my dairy - indicate that only 26% of the time we speak of 'recognition of rights', against 74% that point out the 'lack of rights' (see Appendix D- D.14). Moreover, it should be noted that the recognition of rights is only noticeable for asylum seekers who can finally live in a *CADA* or obtain a refugee status (Mattei, 2015). Before that, the future asylum seekers receive no protection from the government and live in camps with the migrants. The situation of asylum seekers particularly reflects the State of exception, which is established in the camps. The government is sometimes above the law, law which normally should take in charge people who need protection. The French asylum system seems saturated (François, 2014), obliging asylum seekers to be reduced to their 'bare life' by living in the terrible conditions of the camps.

5.2.2 THE STIGMATISATIONS TOWARDS MIGRANTS

Migrants are categorized by the government, as living in spaces without rights (Mattei, 2015). Automatically in this case, as we saw in Chapter 4, the physical borders are becoming social ones. These borders can sometimes lead to stigmatization and the emergence of discriminatory behavior. Migrants are considered outside the norm, a norm which for example corresponds to specific cultural behaviors of the nation (Favell, 2008: 136). The association between migrant and crime is also involved in strengthening the racism and discrimination. According to Van Leeuwen (2008: 165), some people can consider ethnic minorities as criminal. In Calais, the media's role in the relationship between migrants and crime is high. In fact, media coverage of the city of Calais often reports a negative image of migrants, often associating them wrongly with all kinds of crimes (Appleyard, 2000: 4).

But even if the media feed this link, they are not solely responsible for the rise of racism since the arrival of migrants in Calais. A part of the local population is clearly against migrants and it also associate them with various crimes. This is the case of Nathalie that makes the link between migrants and rape and robbery, among other crimes (Nathalie, 2015). Racism also pushes some people to attack the migrants. The attacks against migrants have become more and more violent and physical, over the years (Human rights watch, 2015). This violence again leads to a State of exception, where even some people from the local population seem to be in a position of domination towards migrants and their 'bare life'. For the migrants of Calais, not belonging to the local society excludes them and leads to a dehumanization.

This dehumanization is also fed by the racist behavior of extremist groups. In Calais, extremist groups, from the right, gathered under the name of a collective called *Sauvons Calais*. This group has organized demonstrations against the migration over time, demonstrations mostly banned in 2015. These prohibitions have occurred as a result of hate speeches and the reference to Nazi signs (RTL, 2014). This group does not hesitate to use violence to enforce its opinions. It is clearly linked to an extreme right political party called *Le Parti de la France*, a nationalist and anti-migration party (De Boisseau, 2016). Another group was also created in April 2015, following the establishment of the 'new camp' and the 'Jules Ferry centre'. This group is called *Les calaisiens en colère* and brings together mostly inhabitants of Calais and its surroundings. Its purpose is, however, somewhat different from the *Sauvons Calais* group. The group *Les calaisiens en colère* also is against 'illegal' migration, but what it claims is a better management of migration. It wants the consideration of the inhabitants of Calais in the management and a better securisation of the city.

But the management of the migratory situation in Calais is complex and reflects number of issues at both the local, national and European levels. These issues have not been resolved by racism, or by the dehumanization of migrants. Yet, the establishment of the State of exception in the camps, by the exclusion of migrants and the lack of rights, is characteristic of a migratory management focused on the fear of others. According to Agamben, by this exclusion, the migrant has a political existence somehow (Rygiel, 2011: 2). In Calais, the lack of political consideration led to the creation of many borders, including social ones. So one may wonder to what extent are these social borders visible in the relationship between local people and migrants? And what is the context around social borders in and outside the camps?

5.3 THE MULTICULTURALISM AND THE MIGRANTS


5.3.1 THE MIGRANTS AND THE LOCAL POPULATION

In Calais, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, there are groups composed by a part of the local population, but not affiliated with political actors. This is the case of *Les calaisiens en colère*. However, most of the local population does not belong to any group. Over the years, people living in Calais and its surroundings have learned to live with the migratory situation. The presence of migrants, for over 10 years, has built the image of the city. People know the migratory history of Calais and generally follow the evolution of it, without being in direct contact with migrants. Between March and June 2015, the visibility of migrants in the city has increased. This may seem paradoxical,

since the government has designated the 'tolerated' space in order to distance migrants from the city center (see Appendix D- D.5). Yet, as Jean-Luc says as a part of the local population: *“lately, the massive influx of migrants has worsened an already complex situation”* (Jean-Luc, 2015). The increase of the number of migrants, in a few months, changes or reinforces the opinions of the local population towards migrants. The presence of migrants in the city has led almost the entire local population, including pro and anti migration groups, to have an opinion on the subject. According to the testimonies of local people, pro and anti migrants included, 70% of people have a positive image of migrants (see Appendix D- D.15).

Despite this positive image of migrants, 50% believes that the cohabitation with migrants is going well, while the other 50% feels insecurity (see Appendix D- D.16). One does not exclude the other. The feeling of insecurity can be seen as legitimate. Since the population of the camps of the city increases, tensions rise in the city. This was particularly the case among residents living next to the 'new camp' and migrants. The lack of consultation of the municipality, regarding the local population of Calais, for the development of the 'tolerated' space, really heightened tensions both between migrants and the local population, and between the local population and the municipality.

Figure 5.3: The tensions between different groups



Source: A.Mattei, diary, via QDA Miner & Excel, 2016


Some people, including Nathalie (2015), feel overwhelmed by the presence of migrants, presence they want to see disappearing. But some of the locals have a good cohabitation with migrants, as Lise says (2015): *“migrants do not disturb me in my neighborhood, I even find that cohabitation is going pretty well every day”*. The social interactions –whether negative or positive – exist between migrants and locals, even after the government's desire to make the migrants less visible.

5.3.2 THE MIGRANT, A THREAT?

These social interactions increase the phenomena of diversity and multiculturalism. Policies

around these two terms exclude the migrant population. However, they should take into account migrants since, as stated Van Leeuwen (2008: 148), multiculturalism is an everyday phenomenon that refers to living with diversity. Including exiles in the multiculturalism policies of the city would help migrants and the local population to live better together. Yet, the State of exception -introduced by the government -automatically excludes migrants from a political consideration. In this sense, migrants are considered as excluded from the society; they seem to have nothing to lose. As René – the Eritrean migrant – says, it can lead to *“violate the city laws and regulations for their targets or for the matter of survival”* (René, 2015). The association between crimes and migrants is not the first association that the local population think of, while seeing the migratory situation in Calais. Indeed, migrants are primarily associated with bad economic situation of the city.

Figure 5.4: According to the majority population, what do migrants bring to the city?



Source: A. Mattei, local population and volunteers, via QDA Miner & Excel, 2016

The economic situation in Calais is indeed not very good, especially following the decrease in the number of tourists. Thomas, from the local population, believes that *“the port, which is the first port of passengers, saw its traffic declined by more than 30%”* (Thomas, 2015). The decreasing economic situation tends to reinforce stigma against migrants. In this unstable economic environment and the rise of the feeling of insecurity, groups outside the society - here the migrants- may be perceived as an economic threat (Valentine, 2008: 328). This threat tends to accentuate conflicts between migrants and the local population but also between pro and anti migrants. Yet, as a resident of Calais says, *“migrants, as well as the local population of Calais, should be united against their common enemy, namely the political power that ignores the facts”* (Lise, 2015).

5.3.3 THE INFLUENCE OF THE MAFIA

The political power, and how to enforce it, seems to be one of the main enemies of good

management of the migratory situation in Calais. Indeed the State of exception is established by this political power, leading the securisation and the dehumanization to be almost the only facets of migratory management. But the political power is not the only enemy of good management of migration. There is an actor difficult to control, fuzzy and which impedes the introduced migratory measures: the Mafia. According to rumors, the Mafia has always existed in Calais. Its primary business is the smuggling, allowing migrants to reach England against a financial compensation. But, between March and June 2015, according once again to some rumors, the involvement of the mafia has been extended to other traffic: human trafficking, prostitution, etc. The mafia is present both outside and inside the camps. In the camps, apparently, it controls the majority of shops and the trade but most of all it has a control over the communities (see Appendix D- D.17). This is particularly the case in the 'new camp' where the distance from the city center favors the actions of the mafia (Tim, 2015). The mafia is difficult to control and to identify, also for the government.

The feeling of insecurity in the city, often associated to the presence of migrants, is actually often linked to the presence of the mafia and its actions. The mafia merges into the exile population for the invisibility, provided by the state of exception, it seeks to achieve. The conflicts between the two main mafias, Afghan and Albanian, are violent and extremely dangerous for people really seeking protection. The use of guns and intimidation leads to the inferiority of migrants, especially characterized in the 'illegal actions' introduced by the Mafia. The fear, that some of the locals may feel towards migrants, is often fed by the actions of the Mafia. Everyone knows that the mafia is present in Calais. Yet, racism and stigmatization continue to exist. Migrants continue to fight for the recognition of their rights and better living conditions. They try in camps to create and preserve spaces of autonomy, despite a State of exception that has worsened since the formation of the 'new camp'.

6. BUILDING SPACES OF AUTONOMY

6.1 THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ORGANISATION OF COMMUNITIES

6.1.1 THE FORMATION OF COMMUNITIES

Through the State of exception, over the years, the migrant camps of Calais have always managed to create communities. More generally, the community of migrants has - in itself - many other communities. Early and mid-March 2015, when migrants were living in the nine camps, communities were a lot of time formed by ethnic groups (see Appendix D- D.1). This was the case in 'Tioxide' where different communities lived: Eritrean, Sudanese, Afghan, Pakistani and others. In the case of 'tolerated' space, little has changed. The communities mostly remain ethnic, but we have a tendency to have a bigger mix of nationalities, with the formation via social affinities (see Appendix D- D.1). Chadian migrants live for example with Sudanese and Ethiopians with the Eritrean communities. In general, communities are formed by nationality or cultural affinity. But it happens that some migrants choose a community by necessity of protection. Thus Egyptian or Ethiopian migrants may seek to integrate respectively Syrian or Eritrean communities. Having the Syrian nationality for example, especially between March and June 2015, may in fact be beneficial. The Syrian are the most protected ones by the French system and can more easily access asylum and the status of refugees (Pouchard and Breteau, 2015). The desire of safety and protection is one of the factors regarding the choice of a community or another.

Despite the political, geographical and social obstacles, the migrant camps have become the stronghold of the communities. Migrant communities generally grow naturally. When he arrives in Calais, a migrant joins the community speaking the same language as him, or being of the same nationality. This behavior is common, in the sense that the majority of people emigrating will first approach the people from the same country of origin (Douzet and Robine, 2012). It was only after some time that social affinities come into play, as it was the case for Antoine, an Egyptian refugee. On his arrival in Calais, he lived with an Egyptian community, which he later left to live with a Syrian community with whom he had more affinity (Mattei, 2015). Besides, if we take the example of the Syrian communities, they are more than one, since they are formed according to affinities between migrants. But the diversity in communities is also due to other parameters such as the location of the living spaces or the goal that migrants want to reach. For example, a community of (future) asylum seekers was developed before the dismantling of the 'Leader Price camp' (Mattei, 2015). These asylum seekers had chosen to live in the same space together, allowing them to share a common

goal and the actions related to this goal: go to the sub-prefecture, to the *OFII*, etc. With the formation of the 'tolerated' space, some communities were also formed because of their location on the land. While most communities have moved from the 'old camps' to 'new camp' together, some communities have been created gradually or even enlarged over time. This is the case of one of the first communities that has settled on the 'tolerated' space. This community has been created, and later expanded, because of its very close proximity to the 'Jules Ferry centre'.

6.1.2 COMMUNITIES AND SPACE

Therefore, by the culture, the nationality or the social affinities, migrant communities seem to get developed naturally in space. But beyond the communities, organizing them enables migrants to acquire a space of autonomy, critical to their survival in the camps. The camps thus reflect the capacity that migrants have to overcome the State of exception, creating *"'homes' despite the obstacles"* (Rygiel, 2011: 10). The organization of communities in camps is primarily characterized spatially. When I arrived in Calais in March 2015, the camps were spread from the East to the West of the city and migrant communities have chosen their camp according to the proximity to the city center or the crossing points to reach England (see Appendix D- D.2).

But with the 'forced' move of most of the camps, the spatialization of communities becomes micro-geographic. Inside the camp, migrant communities chose a place, where they feel they can best develop their space of autonomy. But as I say in my diary (Mattei, 2015):

"It is difficult to understand the choice of communities or groups to settle in one location or another on the land. Some have chosen to put their tents and huts on the edge of the highway to be first in case of road traffic, improving their chance of crossing. Others have preferred to settle near the 'Jules Ferry centre'".

In all cases, the location of the camp and of the living spaces of migrants is very important in the access to autonomy. The development of communities goes through these living spaces. Thus, each migrant community has a common space of life and personal living spaces. This is the case for example in the camp of Robert, a Sudanese migrant, where migrants share a kitchen and a common living room, but also have a personal tent.

The autonomy also requires the establishment of 'healthy zones', 'toilets' or 'showers'. The government does not help with the installation of these structures in the camps. Migrants arrive with pieces of wood, water and other cans, to build areas where they can have their own space (Mechaï,

2015; Sabéran, 2015). Creating a space of autonomy goes through the creation of individual habits and everyday actions, like taking a shower or shaving. This space of autonomy is also developed by creating communities. Indeed communities help to promote social links, the preservation and sharing of cultures and the cohesion. In the camps, communities create a society outside of the local society of Calais. The presence of this organized society - with its stores, these 'homes' and communities - points out the camps as spaces of autonomy (Mechaï, 2015). These spaces of autonomy seem to exist despite the State of exception. They seem to appear as resistance process to the maintenance of 'bare life'. In fact, the establishment of communities - leading to the creation of a space of autonomy - seems to form a barrier to the development of the Man as 'Homo Sacer'. As Agamben says (1998), the 'Homo Sacer' is included in the political system by its exclusion. Consequently, strategies of resistance to the State of exception - by the creation of communities - can lead to the disappearance of the 'Homo sacer'. The communities grow through the identities of migrants and the way it manages to keep or rebuild these identities. Does the creation of identities also lead to the creation of strategies of resistance to the State of exception?

6.2 PRESERVING OR BUILDING IDENTITIES

6.2.1 DO MIGRANTS SOMETIMES REALLY LOSE THEIR IDENTITY?

The identities of migrants are challenged in the camps. Indeed, it is hard to keep its identity when you are considered as 'illegal', when you have no rights and when you live in terrible conditions (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014). In my fieldwork conducted between March and June 2015, in 16% of cases, migrants feel lost or feel they have lost their identity in the migrant camps (see Appendix D- D.18). This loss of identity often comes with disillusionment experienced on the migratory route through Europe. For example, according to Julian, a Kurdish migrant from Iraq, the lack of rights, freedoms and humanism makes him feel lost (Mattei, 2015). This impression of losing hope and losing its identity impede the creation of spaces of autonomy within the camps.

Identities are subject to many social and political pressures, which usually contrast with life that migrants had in their country of origin. The camps also generate as much as it contest the identities of migrants. In this contestation, dignity and hope, which have an important place in the preservation of identities, are challenged through various situations. These situations can be related, for example, to the confrontations with the police or the way of life in the camps. For a Syrian migrant, Raoul, it is a confrontation with the police and the infection of his eye because of the gas

spray, which made him lose confidence and hope (Mattei, 2015). For the migrant losing its identity is a complex process. It is characterized by the loss of the 'old identity', to build a 'new' one. Identities are in fact dynamic and tend to change with migration. According to Van Houtum and Van Naerssen (2001: 132), *"Identities must be understood as a social processes of continuous 're-writing' of the self and of social collectives"*.

6.2.2 PRESERVING THE IDENTITY

But in the camps of Calais, migrants also manage to maintain their identity, thanks to the communities and other factors. It is true that communities allow migrants to live in a familiar cultural environment. Language, for example, plays a big role in the preservation of the identity. As René, a Eritrean migrant, says, language differences create the formation of social barriers (René, 2015). For many migrants, conserving its identity goes through religion. It is the case of Maxime (2015) who asks his family to pray for him in his testimony. So in the camps, whether the new or old ones, religious buildings have always existed and are characteristic of manners that help some migrants to keep their dignity. The space of autonomy, created by the migrant, often includes the presence of a church, a mosque or other religious buildings. For example, in the 'new camp', some communities, mainly Eritrean, living in the west of the land, have built a large church (Watch the borders, 2015). This church is a way for Christian migrants of the camp to preserve their identity despite the State of exception and the lack of rights.

However, religion is often not the primary factor that allows migrants to conserve their identities. Indeed, in general, it is the relation between the migrant and its social capital, which allows it to preserve its identity. The social capital of migrants is understood, in this research, as a part of their social network, a responsive part. More specifically, as Bähr and Abraham (2016: 46) say, *"contrary to human capital, social capital is invested in ties to other individuals rather than in the actor herself and is therefore conditional on the willingness of other individuals to support the actor when she needs assistance"*. The social capital of the migrants of Calais seems to build their desire to reach England (Mattei, 2015). Indeed, the migrants have generally social links or a social network, mainly friends and family, over there. The importance of psychological support provided by family and friends, including those who still are in the country of origin, helps making the connection between the life of the migrant in Calais and his life before its arrival. This link is necessary for the preservation of its identity, through the contact with anything that holds this identity: love, friendships, etc. So for migrants, staying in contact with the family and friends is very important. When this link is broken, it can lead to the creation of a new identity or rather the reconstruction of an identity. The case of Raoul, a Syrian immigrant, attests of this reconstruction. In fact, on the 6th of

April 2015, Raoul received a call informing him of the death of his parents, because of a bomb dropped on their village. A few days later, it was his birthday. Yet he said that *“he feels that this date relates to its 'previous life' and he must now be built himself around something else”* (Mattei, 2015). This event shows that the loss of social links may lead to the renewal of the identity.

Keeping its identity appears to be a difficult process for the migrant, particularly regarding their background and the difficult migratory paths they had to take to reach Calais. In the camps, 29% of the experiences outlined in my diary, regarding the identities, indicate that migrants manage to preserve their identity (see Appendix D- D.18). One of the tools in this conservation of identities is the phone and the virtual social networks. Their importance is crucial, since they allow the link between migrants and their social network. This virtual link allows migrants to be autonomous in their interactions.

“calls, messages and communication via social networks and instant messaging allow the link between migrants who are in England and the one stuck in Calais. This virtual link is significant for migrants, it gives them a global view of the difficulties once they arrive in England and also continues to bring them hope. But it also allows them to stay connected with their friends met in Calais and with their friends and family in their country of origin.” (Mattei, 2015)

The phone is a tool for accessing to a space of autonomy. This tool appears to be outside of the State of exception, since it brings freedom of expression and action. Indeed, migrants can - for example - put messages on the virtual social networks, without experiencing pressure from the government. Also, as previously stated, the phone is the link between migrants and the friends they have in Calais or England.

6.2.3 BUILDING OR RENEWING IDENTITY

In Calais, identities are sometimes lost, but can also be preserved or renewed. The renewal of identities involves many actors, such as community organization that brings migrants to create new social connections. The reconstruction of identity can be initiated by changes of goal, by experiences that lead to another view of things but also by all kinds of social interactions. These interactions are a reflection of the solidarity and the cohesion that can be visible at multiple levels. Inside the camps, communities can help each other to build a common living space, a religious building or other constructions. Each community is also showing solidarity with each of its members by helping them building their personal tents and huts, as René used to do when he welcomed newcomers (René, 2015). But migrant communities sometimes become one big community, as during demonstrations for the recognition of migrant rights or against racism (Passeurs d'hospitalités, 2015). New identity

phenomena are created in the camps, allowing the migrants to escape the exclusion.

These identity behaviors are not exclusively between migrants, although this is generally the case. A sense of belonging can be formed among migrants, independents and volunteers. This was the case between March and June 2015, with the formation of the 'Church family'. The name 'Church family' comes from the fact that migrants of this group lived under the porch of the 'Church'. Over time, this group of migrants, independents and volunteers developed special bonds, an identity behavior. *"Under this porch, migrants and volunteers belong to a group without religion, without nationality, without prejudice"* (Mattei, 2015). By these social interactions, migrants manage to reconstruct an identity. Thus, in Calais - between March and June 2015 - 55% of the experiences outlined in my diary, regarding the identities, indicate the renewal of the identity, by building new identity behavior and creating communities (see Appendix D- D.18). The renewal of identity behaviors appears to create a resistance to the State of exception. In fact, the political exclusion seems to decline by the formation of communities and new identities which get revealed through spaces of autonomy. These spaces of autonomy are linked to the development of movement for migrant rights and the desire of participation to the debate with the government. The autonomy seems to give more power to the migrant and its way of thinking of action, in the fact that he seems to have built its own rules in a defined space.

6.3 THE ROLE OF VOLUNTEERS

6.3.1 THE ORGANIZATION OF VOLUNTEERS

In this quest for the preservation or the reconstruction of identity, the volunteers play an important role. Since the beginning of the crystallization of migration, solidarity networks have been developed to help the migrants of Calais, especially with the creation of associations as *SALAM* or *L'Auberge des migrants*. Between March and June 2015, the number of volunteers – individuals, activists or associative groups – have increased. However, the real cooperation for the improvement of living conditions is made between a small group of volunteers, which is almost daily in the camps. This group of volunteers organizes its cooperation in different ways. A part of this group meets, almost every week, to discuss the developments in the camps, during inter-association meetings. The inter-association meetings are led by the *Plateforme de Service aux Migrants* (see the PSM website). At these meetings, the substantial cooperation is discussed, among other subjects. The volunteers organize also, for example, demonstrations or discuss the writing of press releases. Consequently, the volunteers are also involved in the fight for the recognition of migrant rights.

Figure 6.1: Demonstration against racism




Source: A.Mattei, 21/03/05, Calais

This fight is characterized by a complex relationship between the volunteers and the government. Indeed, most of the governmental decisions never include volunteers, even if they are really familiar with the migratory situation of Calais. This was particularly the case for the choice of the 'tolerated' space by the government, where the remarks of volunteers were not taken into account. Between March and June 2015, some meetings between the government – in Calais, the sub-prefecture - and few associations were held (Mattei, 2015). Some have been held with the presence of representatives of migrant communities. Most of the time, these meetings bring a lot of promises, as it was the case during the establishment of the 'new camp'. However, after several weeks, the 'new camp' still did not have water and electricity points, promised in March 2015 by the government (Sabéran, 2015). The helpers do - generally - not trust governments, whose actions are often hidden to some of the volunteers. This was particularly the case during an operation of the *OFPRA*, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons. During this operation, some Eritreans were granted the refugee status in a few days, while other nationalities were ignored (Laurent, 2015). This operation has been followed by a demonstration regarding Human rights and many tensions between the migrants, which were handle by volunteers. Indeed, the government often acts in the same way: it creates migratory regulations in the city or in the camps, but is uninvolved in the subsequent consequences to its decision. Each time, the volunteers have to manage tensions in close cooperation with the migrants, strengthening their social interactions in the camps.

6.3.2 VOLUNTEERS AND SPACES OF AUTONOMY OF MIGRANTS

So, volunteers contribute to the creation of spaces of autonomy for migrants, especially on a psychological perspective. Indeed, even if the material support stays the most important role of volunteers, the moral support plays also an important role in the daily life of migrants, according to my data.

Figure 6.2: The main role of volunteers



Source: A.Mattei, *Diary*, via QDA Miner & Excel, 2016

Thus, as explained by Eminé - a volunteer - in her testimony, migrants entrust the volunteers about their lives or their feeling regarding certain situations (Eminé, 2015). Moreover, volunteers help the migrants to build their living spaces by giving them equipment; so that they can create their personal and common spaces, so they can build their 'homes'. But, some challenges still exist. For example, between March and June 2015, the resources of associations declined sharply due to the increasing number of migrants. This kind of situation has aggravated the humanitarian crisis, which proves that the role of associations is crucial to improve the living conditions and to create spaces of autonomy.

The volunteers also play an important role in the development of resistance. This was the case in the 'Galloo squat' that became, over time, the stronghold of resistance against evictions following the establishment of the 'new camp' (Watch the borders, 2015). This interaction between volunteers and migrants allows the renewal of identities. Volunteers, like Charlotte says (2015), are often overwhelmed by the interactions and friendships that they create with migrants. Strong relationships exist between volunteers and migrants. This is the case in a group called the 'Church family', between Syrians and French volunteers. *"Some friendships are created and extended beyond the borders between the French and the Syrians."* (Mattei, 2015). This is a proof that volunteers become more than a substantial support for migrants, since they create social interactions that are not desired by the government (Rygiel, 2011: 5). They are also actors participating in the creation of spaces of autonomy, showing the limits of the State of exception in the camps of Calais. Although the influence of volunteers in creating a space of autonomy is important, it should be noted that identity behaviours and the access to autonomy is shaped by migrants. The volunteers bring, above all, a support for the development of the identity of the migrant.

7. THE IDENTITY, A NECESSITY TO THE SURVIVAL OF MIGRANTS

7.1 SHAPING IDENTITIES TO ESCAPE THE STATE OF EXCEPTION

The renewal or reconstruction of identity seems to be a necessity for the survival of the migrant in the camps of Calais. The identity appears as the final barrier to the State of exception, in the way that it is shaped by the migrant. The identity of the migrant - whether lost, preserved or rebuilt - seems to be modulated by factors that interact and form an escape to the State of exception.

7.1.1 THE IDENTITY THROUGH FREEDOM

The migrants, living in the camps of Calais, hoping to go to England or seeking asylum in France, have one thing in common: they seek access to a better life. The concept of better life, as Robert (2015) says, is related to the concept of freedom. Freedom is a wide term that migrants seem to view from several angles: some speak of peace, others about economic freedom or political and social freedom. Their perception of freedom is one of the elements that led them to migrate. Thus, identity and freedom are linked in the fact that the identity of the migrant is built or preserved around this freedom. If the migrant is able to find a political freedom, he can then escape the State of exception.

It is interesting to look at several examples. In Calais, the protests against racism and evictions, between April and June 2015, show the desire of political freedom (Mattei, 2015). These events become the means for the migrant to display its political identity through the desire for freedom, and to push the limits of the State of exception. The fact of being opposed to governmental decisions, here evictions of the camps of the city center, through a demonstration, places the migrant as an opponent to the policy in place. It then becomes a matter for the sovereignty, because it expresses its political opinion publicly. Considering the migrant by its bare life is then no longer possible, since the inclusion in a public event gives the migrant a political status of opponent to a state decision, even if this status is temporary.

This idea of inclusion is also active in the development of social freedom by migrants, shaping their identities and showing the limits of the State of exception. Indeed, inclusion and social freedom are linked in the organisation of communities in the migrant camps of Calais. Communities organise themselves spatially and socially (see Chapter 6). This organisation allows the development of

identities through social inclusion. This inclusion, in a community or group, is developed following a desire for social freedom. By the organisation and development of communities, migrants gain social freedom, specifically the personal choice of being part of a group or another. The state has no control over this choice, which allows the migrant to develop an inclusive space and a space of autonomy, outside the containment brought by the State of exception. But the acquisition of freedoms in the migrant camps of Calais is complex. It can become an obstacle to the renewal of identities, when freedoms are violated.

“As a refugee fleeing the war and leaving my country I was expecting to find a peaceful life and forgotten about all the suffering and the bad memories I've never been more wrong in my life”
(Hugues, 2015)

Not having access to these freedoms can cause the blurring of identity, proof that they are essential to set the limits of the State of exception.

7.1.2 LEAVING THE PAST BEHIND OR NOT? AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR SHAPING IDENTITY

The limits and especially the resistance to the State of exception can also be characterized in the way that migrants use their background to shape their identities. Most migrants, mainly refugees, have very heavy backgrounds. Some migrants, like Louis with his paralyzed hand (Mattei, 2015), keep physical traumas from the war; others, like Raoul with the loss of his parents, keep psychological traumas. We could think that the heavy past of most migrants encourage the State of exception, in the sense that the physical and psychological marks seem to accentuate the despair and sadness and to decrease the resilience to 'bare life'. Yet, the background of migrants leads to the renewal of identities. According to my data, gathered during my fieldwork from March to June 2015, some migrants choose to leave their past behind them. After the loss of his parents, Raoul - a Syrian refugee - has decided not to celebrate his birthday. He believes that this date corresponds to his old life. Consequently, to go further with his life, he must get rid of things related to his background (Mattei, 2015). Leaving the past behind is a way for Raoul to rebuild an identity by creating new social networks and links, which can be - according to the individual - essential to the preservation of hope.


Other migrants choose to use their background to shape their identities and keep hope, to resist the State of exception. This is the case of Noah, an Afghan migrant, who lost several family members in attacks but whose identity behaviour is largely influenced by its past. In the new jungle,

he says that he feels lost sometimes; yet, the fact of preserving elements of its painful past helps him to rebuild an identity. The heaviness of this background reminds him why he fights each day, that past helps him to formulate goals for the future, for example bringing his mother to Europe (Mattei, 2015). The past of migrants may lead them to reproduce identity behaviour of political resistance, which they have already developed in their country of origin. Past experiences of migrants can strengthen their resistance to bare life and dehumanization. Many migrants have experienced persecution or war, their past is now a way to affirm or renew wishes of freedoms and claims, particularly political ones, which shape their identities.

7.1.3 SHAPING IDENTITIES THROUGH THE LIVING CONDITIONS

In Calais migrant camps, understanding the shaping of identities cannot be complete without understanding the role of the living conditions in this shaping. The living conditions of migrants seem essential to the renewal or preservation of identities. Robert (2015) and René (2015), respectively Soudanese and Eritrean, indicates that good living conditions are the main element in the preservation of their integrity. Therefore, good living conditions pose limitations to the consideration of the migrant by its bare life and resistance to the State of exception. Through good living conditions, creating spaces of autonomy is facilitated, since the migrant can comfortably evolve in the space. However, if the conditions are bad, the reverse process occurs. In the migrant camps of Calais, the living conditions seem to be a burden for the renewal of identities, and the main reason for maintaining the State of exception. Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapters, the living conditions are really bad in the camps.

Figure 7.1: Drawing of Louis, a Syrian migrant, about his living conditions in Calais



Source: Louis, May 2015

The bad living conditions accentuate the dehumanization of migrants who - between dreams of freedoms and heavy backgrounds - manage to shape their identities, in an attempt to set limits or to escape the State of exception.

7.2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY, A SUBJECT OF CHANGE

The preservation and renewal of identity seems to be based on several factors, such as the desire for freedom or the influence of living conditions. Yet, these factors do not establish identity patterns for the migrants. In the migrant camps of Calais, the identity is a dynamic concept, which changes regarding different spatial, social or political elements. The identity is also a concept related to the individual and its perceptions.

7.2.1 AN INDIVIDUAL VISION ON THE IDENTITY RENEWAL

The vision on identity differs for each individual, so for each migrant. This idea is clear when we look at the organisation of communities in the camps. As seen in the previous chapter, the migrant chooses his community due to ethnic or religious factors, or social affinities as it was the case for Raoul. He says *"When I arrived at Calais, preferred to stay near the church because my friend was in the same place"* (Raoul, 2015). His vision of identity is focused on a social network, already formed, while some prefer to integrate a community with migrants from the same religion. These variations of relation to the identity leads to differences, including spatial ones; per example a particular location for each community in the camps. The communities, formed around the Catholic religion, are for example gathered around the church in the new camp (Mattei, 2015). This vision on identity can be also be racial, in some cases. Maxime (2015), an Afghan migrant, thinks that the help of the government goes only to the *"black people"*. This kind of vision of identity leads to the creation of stigma within camps and also affects social relationships from where identity behaviours are coming. These behaviours may be related to the desire for collective and individual protection regarding political decisions, an ethnic group, etc. The differences of view regarding the identity make it difficult to establish predefined identity patterns, characterizing the migrants in Calais.

7.2.2 THE IDENTITY THROUGH CHANGES

The identity patterns are particularly difficult to establish. Indeed, the migratory situation in Calais is both spatially dynamic, with changes of camps' location over time, and politically dynamic with for example the evictions. Through these changes, the identity of migrant evolves individually and identity behaviours are shaped. It is interesting to look at several examples in order to understand how identities can evolve regarding a change. The Jules Ferry day care centre has been, even before its opening in April 2015, a controversial subject. Some migrants, like Robert (2015), believes that the capacities of the centre are below the real needs of migrants; while others, like René (2015), rather see the centre as a step forward. This difference of opinion modifies the behaviour identity. Not using the centre's facilities refer to a sort of resistance against the migratory policy in place.

The resistances are, generally, modified or created during situations of change. This was the case with the threats of eviction of the camps of the city centre, in April and May 2015, where some migrants chose to stay and resist the government decision and where another part preferred to move on the 'tolerated space' (Mattei, 2015). The resistances, developed by some migrants, have changed their identity behaviour. These behaviours appear as the desire for better living conditions and for spatial and social freedom, as a barrier to maintaining the State of exception.

The evolution of identity behaviours can also be linked to the change of the migrant's political status. Thus, when migrants seeking to become or become asylum seekers but continue to live in camps, their vision of their own identity seems to change in the same time that their political existence. The political status change can eliminate the State of exception since the migrant is not considered by its 'bare life', is no longer considered 'illegal'. The political change is related to a renewal of identity, which sets the limits of the State of exception in the camps. Robert (2015) indicates that, since he decided to seek asylum in France, time is what characterizes his life while the majority of migrants - according to him - can be characterized by sadness. The changes, whether political or spatial, shape identities and are important elements in creating resistances to the State of exception.

8. CONCLUSION

8.1 CONCLUSION

This research was set out to analyze and understand the extent and the limits of the 'State of exception' in the migrant camps of Calais. During my fieldwork from March to June 2015, the 'State of exception' persisted at the will of the establishment or destruction of the camps. This State of exception is revealed in several ways for migrants: lack of political existence, dehumanization and exclusion, which appear to be key elements in its development. Within this research, the role of the government in the establishment of the State of exception is lead by the importance of the desire of securisation prevailing on the respect for human rights. In Calais, migrant camps thus became over time zones of control, of 'open' containment. This is particularly the case since the formation of the 'new camp', where social, political and spatial borders ensure the presence of the State of exception. These borders appear to have been intended by the government at the local and national level, in order to make migrants invisible. The aim of this invisibility is to avoid cohabitation between locals and migrants, and to exercise political control and regulation, in an attempt to improve the management of the migratory situation in Calais. Certainly, the securisation of the city and its crossing points has been developed with the appearance of walls and the increased police presence. But the management of the migratory situation seems always guided by the fear of the other and a desire for national security.

The government has tried, under international pressures regarding the lack of rights for migrants, to improve the living conditions in camps. The opening of the Jules Ferry centre is a milestone in the migratory history of Calais. However, the capacities of the center were valued well below the real needs and the living conditions still are terrible. The centre has not changed the migrant's political status; the migrant is only considered by its 'bare life'. The new camp quickly became a space of exception. Due to its location, the influence of the mafia is getting stronger. The many incidents, related to confinement and a cat-and-mouse game with the police, have reinforced the stigma towards migrants. The majority of the local population raises concerns over the economic situation of the city and calls for a better management of the migratory situation.

Nevertheless, over time, resistances to the State of exception have been developed. These resistances have taken different forms. During the development of the 'tolerated' space by the government, the camps of the city center resisted to spatial segregation, countering the many

threats of expulsion and the police pressure. We have seen that the development of resistances to the State of exception is primarily through the establishment of spaces of autonomy. These spaces of autonomy are fed by personal and collective social development of migrants in the space. By the creation of communities - ethnic, religious or by social affinities - the migrant manage to create a space, where resistance strategies to the State of exception are settled. This is particularly the case with the creation of unique living space to each community, with its own rules. The communities are formed based on the identity of migrants, which is preserved or rebuilt. Using the social interactions inside and outside the camps, migrants manage to renew identities. Thus the spaces of autonomy, fed by identity behaviors, become strategies creating a barrier to the consideration of migrant as a 'Homo Sacer'. The identity behaviors become essential for the survival of migrants. By shaping their identities, through freedom or the living conditions, migrants manage to show the limits to the State of exception.

But the State of exception still exists in the camps, which can be characterized as lawless areas. Furthermore, trying to find a global solution for the disappearance of this State is complex, especially because there are no real patterns of the migrant's identity. The identity appears as a personal notion, subject to all kind of changes. However, the presence of the State of exception is weakened by the resistances that are formed inside and outside the camps. These are characterized in space, beyond the power of the sovereign. It then restores the biological and political life of the migrant via the claim of human rights, legally justified in the international law.

The studied theoretical cases around the camp and the State of exception - especially from Agamben (1998) and Minca (2005) - show that spaces of exception are areas, where the migrant is only included politically by its exclusion. This research tends to confirm that camps are the ultimate spatial form of the State of exception. However, it also raises the limits of these theories by addressing the characterization of dynamic processes regarding the life of migrants in the camp. Indeed, reducing the migrant to its 'bare life' is not always accurate in the migrant camps, especially due to strategies of resistance that are established through spaces of autonomy. Agamben's theories then appear as too static, as say Diksen and Lautsen (2005; Sigona, 2015). This research feeds, in this sense, the debates regarding dynamic processes related to the establishment and maintenance of camps, including the lives of migrants in camps and the resistance that it creates (Sigona, 2015).

The analysis of data, obtained between March and June 2015, also allows highlighting the limits of French and European asylum systems. Indeed some asylum seekers are living in camps, due to the complexities of asylum procedures and the saturation of the reception capacities. Furthermore, this research emphasizes the problems regarding the management of the migratory situation in Calais, reflecting a growing European policy concerning securisation.

Yet, the analysis also shows that solutions to a better management of migration to Calais are right in front of us. The improvement of living conditions and the inclusion of migrants' rights must be a priority. A balance must be found between national security and safety of migrants in order to avoid tensions between the different actors of migration in Calais. The relationship between migrants and the local population must also be put forward to increase social interactions, and thus acceptance — even temporarily — of migrants into society.

8.2 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The debates, fed by the results of this research, suggest the dynamic nature of migration, yet temporarily crystallized in the border town of Calais. Many factors have, however, not been considered in this study. Indeed, it would have been interesting to look further on the migratory actions and policies from the perspective of the municipality or the national government. Yet reaching the authorities was one of the main obstacles during my fieldwork. None of them has agreed to be interviewed or meet me, arguing that the migratory situation in Calais is a particularly complicated subject.

This research also raises other limitations in the fact that women are not represented in migrant interviewees. The women were in fact very difficult to approach. When they do not live in the shelter Jules Ferry, they live among men in the jungle. They put themselves in an invisible position and want to avoid problems with the male population or the Mafia. It then was a choice in my research, not to push my analysis towards the female population of the camps, mainly for lack of time. However, for future studies, it seems essential to understand how women manage to create resistance to the state of exception and spaces of autonomy, to understand how they survive in the camps. This would visualize the differences and similarities between women and men in migrant camps of Calais.

The study, conducted between March and June 2015, also poses a time limitation to the contents of the analysis. Indeed, migration is a dynamic process that changes in regards of the time and events related to it. Thus, the results of this research are valid only for the period of fieldwork. This constraint related to time can be avoided by a long-term study to understand how the migratory situation of Calais can evolve in the light of political changes, government or political parties both at the local, national or European scale.

The key is to remember that immigration and its crystallization are complex phenomena to be analyzed. It requires a deep understanding of various stakeholders, that the methodology used for

this research allows only partially. So, researching the migrant camps of Calais over a longer timeframe and doing a more in-depth study — for example by the inclusion of female migrant population - can be important for conducting a future research and getting wider and more accurate results.

LITERATURE

- Agamben, G. (1995), *Homo sacer*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Agamben, G. (1998), *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Agamben, G. (2005), *State of Exception*. Translated by Kevin Attell, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Originally published in 2003 as *Stato di eccezione*. Bollati Boringhieri, Torino.
- Ajana, B. (2013), *Asylum, Identity Management and Biometric Control*. Journal of Refugee Studies Vol 26, n°4, p576-595.
- Akoka, K. and O. Clochard (2015), Régime de confinement et gestion des migrations sur l'île de Chypre. Retrieved from www.espacepolitique.revues.org/3381#quotation, L'espace politique, 25, 2015-1.
- Ansaldi, S. (2010), *Biopolitique, état d'exception, puissance : notes sur une politique à venir (Autour de Giorgio Agamben)*. Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, Tome 135, p381-394.
- Appleyard, R. (2000), *The Human Rights of Migrants*. International Organization of Migration, UN, International Migration, Vol 38(6), Issue 2, p1-148.
- Bastié, E. (2015), *L'afflux des migrants à Calais : retour sur 15 ans d'impuissance publique*. Retrieved from www.lefigaro.fr, Société.
- Bauman, Z. (2003), *Utopia with no topos*. History of the Human Sciences, 16(1), p11-25.
- Bendel, P. (2005), *Immigration Policy in the European Union: Still bringing up the walls for fortress Europe?*. Migration Letters, Vol 2, n°1, p21-32.
- Bietlot, M. (2005), *Le camp, révélateur d'une politique inquiétante de l'étranger*. Cultures & Conflits, 57, p1-19.
- Bigo, D. (2007), *Le Ban et l'Exception*. Autour de l'Etat d'Exception, Erytheis 2: November.
- Bülent, D. and C.B. Laustsen (2006), *The camp*. Geogr. Ann., 88 B(4), p443-452.
- Butler, J. (2004), *Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence*. London: Verso.
- Carrère, V. (2002) *Sangatte et les nasses aux frontières de l'Europe*. Revue projet 272, 88-96.
- Carrère, V. (2003), *Sangatte, un symbole d'impuissance*. Plein droit, 58, p4-8.

- Chrisafis, A. (2015), *At night it's like a horror movie – inside Calais's official shantytown*. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com, World, Europe.
- COM, (2011), *Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the council, the economic and social committee and the committee of the regions*. Communication on migration, European commission, Brussels, 4.5.2011, 248 final.
- Davies, T. and A. Isakjee (2015), *Geography, migration and abandonment in the Calais refugee camp*. Political Geography, Vol 49, p93-95.
- De Boisseau, L. (2016), *Le Parti de la France (PDF)*. Retrieved from www.france-politique.fr.
- D.E. (2014), *Squat Avenue Blériot, à Calais: un arrêté d'expulsion déposé ce vendredi*. Retrieved from www.lavoixdunord.fr, Calais et ses environs, Calais.
- Delève, E. (2015), *Expliquez-nous... les accords du Touquet*. Retrieved from www.franceinfo.fr, Expliquez-nous : Été 2015.
- Diken, B. and C.B Laustsen (2005), *The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp*. London: Routledge.
- Douzet, F. and J. Robine (2012), *Les enjeux de la concentration spatiale des immigrés et de leurs descendants*. Infos migrations, mars 2012, 40, 1-6.
- Du Bois, G. (2015), *L'Europe des camps*. Retrieved from www.nouvelle-europe.eu.
- Duriez, J. (2015), «Migrants », « réfugiés », « exilés », *les mots de la crise migratoire*. Retrieved from www.services.la-croix.com, SStory/EJ Fox, Les mots de la crise migratoire.
- Ek, R. (2006), *Giorgio Agamben and the spatialities of the camp: an introduction*. Geogr. Ann., 88 B (4), p363-386.
- EMN, European Migration Network (2011), *Temporary and circular migration: empirical evidence, current policy practice and future options in EU Member States*. Luxembourg: publications office of the European Union, October 2011, p1-66.
- *Encyclopædia Britannica*, (2016), *Nomos*. Retrieved from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/nomos-Greek-philosophy>.
- Favell, A. (2008), *Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Preface (p. viii-xvi); Chapter 9: Integration (1) (pp. 136-149); Chapter 10: Integration (2) (pp. 153-168); Chapter 12: Old Amsterdam (pp. 186-202).
- Foucault, M. (1997), *Il faut défendre la société*. Cours au Collège de France 1976, Paris: Gallimard/Seuil.
- François, J-B. (2014), *Un rapport dénonce la saturation du système d'asile*. Lacroix, 06/11/2014.

- Frontex (2016), *Mission and Tasks*. Retrieved from <http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/>, About Frontex.
- Gabrielli, L. (2007), *Les enjeux de la sécurisation de la question migratoire dans les relations de l'Union européenne avec l'Afrique. Un essai d'analyse*. Politique européenne, n° 22, p149-173.
- Gathmann, C. (2008), *Effects of enforcement on illegal markets: evidence from migrant smuggling along the south-western border*. J Public Econ, 92, p1926–1941.
- Giaccaria, P. and C. Minca (2011), *Topographies/Topologies of the camp: Auschwitz as a spatial threshold*. Political Geography, 30, 3-12.
- Goudeseune, M. (2014), *Calais : les migrants indésirables à Leader Price ?*. Retrieved from www.lavoixdunord.fr, Calais et ses environs, Calais.
- Goudeseune, M. (2015), *Migrants : le récit de la visite de Bernard Cazeneuve à Calais*. Retrieved from www.lavoixdunord.fr, Calais et ses environs, Calais.
- Greve, W., Rothermund, K. and D. Wentura (2005), *The Adaptative Self: Personal Continuity and Intentional Self-Development*. Chapter 17: Autonomy, narrative identity and their critics, p323-345.
- Gundogdu, A. (2012), *Potentialities of Human Rights: Agamben and the Narrative of Fated Necessity*. Contemporary Political Theory, vol 11, 1, p2-22.
- Hanafi, S. (2010), *Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of Exception in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon*. Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol 23, N° 2, p134-159.
- Harker, J. (2016), *Cessons d'appeler le camp de réfugiés de Calais la « jungle »*. Retrieved from www.etatdexception.net, Opinion et Analyses.
- Hernandez, D. and A. Rudolph (2015), *Modern day slavery: What drives human trafficking in Europe?*. European Journal of Political Economy, 38, p118-139.
- Honoré, R. (2016), *L'Europe se prépare au retour généralisé des contrôles aux frontières*. Retrieved from www.lesechos.fr, Europe.
- Human rights watch (2015), *France : les migrants et les demandeurs d'asile victimes de violence et démunis*. Retrieved from www.hrw.org.
- Huysmans, J. (2000), *The European Union and the Securization of Migration*. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 38, n°5, p751-777.
- Huysmans, J. (2008), *The Jargon of Exception—On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of Political Society*. International Political Sociology, 2, p165-183.
- Ibrahim, M. (2005), *The securization of migration: a racial discourse*. International Migration, Vol 43 (5), p163-187, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

- Intrand, C. and P-A. Perrouty (2005), *La diversité des camps d'étrangers en Europe: presentation de la carte des camps de Migreurop*. Cultures et conflits, 51, p71-90.
- Isin, E. and K. Rygiel (2007), *Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps*. In Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror, edited by E. Dauphinee and C. Masters, p181-203, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Jarczyk, G. (2007) *Logique derrière la conscience*. Revue internationale de philosophie, 240, p121-137.
- Juwet, G. (2013), *Inclusive Public Space: conditions for a strategic spatial planning process*. Handbook strategic spatial planning for sustainable development. p1-8.
- Koser, K. (2007), *International Migration: a very short introduction*. OUP Oxford, p58-73.
- Kwiczor, D. (2014), *Squat vandamme : faire sauter la trêve hivernal ou attendre avril ?*. Retrieved from www.nordlittoral.fr.
- Laacher, S. (2003) *L'Etat, la frontière et l'étranger indélicat*. Revue internationale et stratégique 50, 123-130.
- Laurent, A. (2015), *120 migrants obtiennent l'asile dans une opération éclair*. Retrieved from www.lexpress.fr, Société.
- Laurier, E. (2013), *Chapter 9: Participant observation*. Key methods in Geography, London: Sage, pp. 116-130.
- Lemke, T. (2002), *Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique*. Rethinking Marxism: a journal of economics, culture and society, vol 14, 3, p49-64.
- Lemke, T. (2005), "A Zone of Indistinction" – A critic of Giorgio Agamben's concept of *biopolitics*. Outlines, n°1, 3-13.
- Leshem, D. (2015), *Embedding Agamben's Critique of Foucault: The Theological and Pastoral Origins of Governmentality*. Theory, Culture & Society, Vol 32(3), p93-113.
- Lévêque, F. (2013), *Frontex le bras armé de l'Europe Forteresse*. Demain le Monde, n° 18, p1-28.
- Levy, C. (2010), *Refugees, Europe, Camps/State of Exception: 'Into the Zone', the European Union and Extraterritorial Processing of Migrants, Refugees and Asylum-Seekers (Theories and Practice)*. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29(1), p92–119.
- Liagre, R. and F. Dumont (2005), *Sangatte vie et mort d'un centre de réfugiés*. Armand Colin, Ann Géo, 641, p93-112.
- Mahé, A. (2002), *Les méthodes qualitatives : intérêts et limites*. Retrieved from www.revues.enssib.fr, Usages.
- Mahmoud, T. and C. Trebesch (2010), *The economic drivers of human trafficking: micro-evidence from five eastern European countries*. J Comp Econ 38, p173–188.

- Mbembe, A. (2003), *Necropolitics*. Public Culture, 15, p11-40.
- McConkey, M. (2013), *Anarchy, Sovereignty, and The State of Exception*. The Independent Review, Vol 17, n°3, p415-428.
- Mechaï, H. (2015), *Une journée dans la new jungle de Calais*. Retrieved from www.middleeasteye.net.
- Meiches, B. (2015), *A political ecology of the camp*. Security Dialogue, Vol 46(5), p476-492.
- Migreurop, Observatoire des frontières (2004), *Derrière le mot camp*. Le blog de Migreurop, Mediapart, communiqué du 16 novembre 2014.
- Millner, N. (2011), *From “refugee” to “migrant” in Calais solidarity activism: Re-staging undocumented migration for a future politics of asylum*. Political Geography, 30, 320-328.
- Millner, N. (2013), *Routing the camp: experiential authority in a politics of irregular migration*. Journal of political power, Vol 6, Issue 1, p87-105.
- Minca, C. (2005), *The return of the camp*. Progress in Human Geography, 29, 4, 405-412.
- Minca, C. (2007), *Agamben’s geographies of modernity*. Political Geography, 26, p78-97.
- Minca, C. (2015), *Geographies of the camp*. Political Geography, Vol49, p74–83.
- Minca, C. and R. Rowan (2015), *The question of space in Carl Schmitt*. Progress in Human Geography, Vol 39(3), p268-289.
- Overy, R. (2011), *The concentration camp: An international perspective*. Mittelweg ,36(4).
- Owens, P. (2009), *Reclaiming ‘Bare Life’?: Against Agamben on Refugees*. International Relations, Vol 23(4), p567-582.
- Passavant, P.A. (2007), *The Contradictory State of Giorgio Agamben*. Political Theory, Vol 35, n°2, p147-174.
- Passeurs d’hospitalités (2015), *21 mars à Calais: rassemblement contre le racisme et les expulsions*. Retrieved from passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com.
- Passeurs d’hospitalités (2015-2), *Vandalisme municipal*. Retrieved from passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com.
- Penninx, R. (2003), *Integration, the role of communities, institutions and the State*. Retrieved from www.migrationpolicy.org, Migration information Source.
- Phillips, D. (2010), *Minority ethnic segregation, integration and citizenship: a European perspective*. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36 (2): 209-225.
- Pouchard, A. and Breteau, P. (2015), *Le nombre de migrants et de réfugiés a explosé au XXIème siècle*. Retrieved from www.lemonde.fr, les décodeurs.

- PSM, Retrieved from www.psmigrants.org.
- Ramadan, A. (2012), *Spatialising the refugee camp*. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers), 38, p65-77.
- Ramadan, A. (2012b), *From Tahrir to the world: The camp as a political public space*. European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol 20(1), p145-149.
- Raulff, U. (2004), *An interview with Giorgio Agamben*. German Law Journal, 5(5), p609-614.
- Rigby, J. and R. Schlembach (2013), *Impossible protest: noborders in Calais*. Citizenship studies, Vol 17, 2, p157-172.
- RTL, Rédaction numérique de RTL (2014), *Calais : dérapages nazis lors d'un rassemblement anti-migrants*. Avec AFP, 07/09/2014, 20:39. Retrieved from www.rtl.fr.
- Rygiel, K. (2011) *Bordering solidarities : migrant activism and the politics of movement and camps at Calais*. Citizenship Studies, 15, 1, 1-19.
- Sabéran, H. (2015), *A Calais, une jungle d'Etat pour les migrants*. [www.liberation.fr], 02/04/15.
- Saldana, J. (2008), *An introduction to code and coding*. The coding manual for qualitative researchers, Sage publications, chapter 1, p1-15.
- Salt, J. (2000), *Trafficking and Human smuggling: a European perspective*. International migration, Special issue, p31-56, Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Schmitt, C. (2003), *The Nomos of the Earth*. New York: Telos Press.
- Seba, A. (2015), *Migrants de Calais : un 'camp toléré' voit le jour autour du centre Jules Ferry ?*. Retrieved from www.lavoixdunord.fr, Calais et ses environs, Calais.
- Shewly, H.J. (2013), *Abandoned spaces and bare life in the enclaves of the India-Bangladesh border*. Political Geography, 32, p23-31.
- Sigona, N. (2015), *Campzenship: reimagining the camp as a social and political space*. Citizenship Studies, Vol 19(1), p1-15.
- Smith, D. (2012), *Assemblage theory*. Retrieved from <http://understandingsociety.blogspot.nl/2012/11/assemblage-theory.html>, Understanding society, November 15.
- Staius, T. (2015), *Calais, une ville au fil des migrants*. Retrieved from www.amnesty.fr, Amnesty international, Réfugiés et migrants, dossiers.
- Sundberg, J. (2015), *The state of exception and the imperial way of life in the United States-Mexico borderlands*. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol 33, p209-228.

- Suys, A. (2016), *D'où vient le nom « jungle de Calais » ?*. Retrieved from www.lalibre.be, International.
- Tajfel, H. (2010), *Social Identity and Intergroup relations*. Cambridge University press, p1-36.
- Tissot, P. (2015), *Calais, ville d'accueil de migrants (1) : « Notre centre, une première en Europe »*. Retrieved from www.lepoint.fr, Société.
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948) *Article 1, Article 3*. Paris.
- UN General Assembly (1951), *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*. United Nations, Genève.
- Valentine, G. (2008), *Living with difference: reflections on geographies of encounter*. Progress in Human Geography, 32 (3): 323–337.
- Valluy, J. (2005), *Introduction : L'Europe des camps. La mise à l'écart des étrangers*. Cultures & Conflits, 57, p1-6.
- Van Houtum, H. and T. Van Naerssen (2001) *Bordering, Ordering and Othering*. Nijmegen Center for Borders Research, Human Geography, Nijmegen School of Management.
- Van Leeuwen, B. (2008), *On the affective ambivalence of living with cultural diversity*. Ethnicities, 8 (2): 147-176.
- Watch the borders (2015), *Resistance at Fort Galloo and by the Syrians – a New 'village' by Jules Ferry*. Retrieved from www.watchtheborders.wordpress.com.
- Weber, S. (2009), *D'un rideau de fer à l'autre : Schengen et la discrimination dans l'accès à la mobilité migratoire*. Géocarrefour, 84(3), p162-171. Retrieved from <https://geocarrefour.revues.org/7405>.
- Weil-Dubuc, P.L. (2016), *La tolérance suffit-elle ?*. Retrieved from <http://www.espace-ethique.org/ressources/editorial/la-tol%C3%A9rance-suffit-elle>, Texte de l'intervention de Weil-Dubuc lors du Forum Valeurs de la République, du soin et de l'accompagnement du 16 mars 2016.
- Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2010), *Vers une externalisation de l'asile*. Revue projet HS 01, 25-30.
- Ziarek, E.P. (2012), *Bare Life*. Impasses of the Post-Global: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, vol 2, Open Humanities Press.


UNPUBLISHED

- Charlotte (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.

- Charlotte-2 (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.
- Eminé (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.
- François (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.
- Jean-Luc (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.
- Lise (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.
- Mattei, A. (2015), *Diary*. Unpublished.
- Maxime (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.
- Nathalie (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.
- Raoul (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.
- René (2015), *Questionnaire*. Unpublished.
- Robert (2015), *Interview*. Unpublished.
- Thomas (2015), *Written testimony*. Unpublished.
- Tim (2015), *Interview*. Unpublished.

APPENDIX A : MAPS

A.1 THE PAS-DE-CALAIS STRAIT



Source : [<http://www.sindeu.net/detroits-2/>]

A.2 THE LOCATION OF THE MIGRANT CAMPS AND CENTRES IN CALAIS



Source: A.Mattei via Google earth, 2016

- | | | | | | |
|---|--------------|---|-------------------|----|-------------------------------|
| 1 | Church | 5 | Egyptian squat | 9 | camp of Marck |
| 2 | Dock | 6 | Leader Price camp | 10 | Victor Hugo centre |
| 3 | BCMO | 7 | Tioxide | 11 | Jules Ferry centre |
| 4 | Galloo squat | 8 | Bois Dubrulle | 12 | 'tolerated' space/ 'new camp' |

APPENDIX B: METHODS

B.1 RESPONDENTS

- Migrants

Robert, Interview, 20/03/15

Maxime, Written testimony, 28/04/15

Raoul, Written testimony, 13/05/15

François, Written testimony, 29/05/15

René, Questionnaire, 30/05/15

-Volunteers

Tim, Interview, 21/03/15

Charlotte, Written testimony, 23/04/15

Eminé, Written testimony, 09/05/15

-Local population

Jean-Luc, Written testimony, 07/05/15

Nathalie, Written testimony, 10/05/15

Thomas, Written testimony, 12/05/15

Lise, Written testimony, 26/05/15

Charlotte-2, Written testimony, 27/05/15

B.2 DIARY

Anaïs Mattei, Diary, from the 2nd of March 2015 to the 3rd of June 2015

B. 3 INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS

Interview protocol (version for migrants) Anaïs Mattei

Be sure that the respondent agrees to be recorded (via audio recorder) and that he understand this interview is part of a personal research, not linked to the SALAM association

Introduction :

Hello, my name is Anaïs Mattei. I am currently doing my master degree in Human Geography at the Radboud University Nijmegen. I am doing research on the migrant camps in the border town of Calais. My aim with this research is to understand the situation of migrants that live in and around Calais. If you have any questions or remarks please let me know. The interview

*is made up from 13 questions, but it might be possible that I ask more on certain themes.
Okay, if you are ready, we start the first question...*

- Can you please tell me since how long are you in Calais and in which country do you come from?

Camps and Humans :

- When did you arrive to Calais, what was your first perception of the site you still live in?
- How, despite the difficult living conditions, did you create a space of autonomy? And How is this site organized every day?
- Many people, especially in associations, denounced the fact that the camps were seen as areas without rights for migrants. What do you think of this remark? Do you think that a real dehumanization of human exists in these places? If so, in what form, characterized by whom / what?

Migrants and Outsiders:

- They seem to be many social barriers between migrants and a certain part of the population. How are these barriers characterized between your community and population?
- Many people now associate crime / violence and migrants in the city of Calais. In your opinion, can we now speak of segregation of migrants? To what extent?
- I'm going to ask you an "open" question about the relationship between the police and migrants. Many people and migrants report a significant number of police violence. What do you think of this? *You can tell me about your own experiences.*

Jules Ferry:

Jules Ferry is the center where we actually have the food distribution of a hot meal once a day. It is a daily center where you have electricity, toilets and some social and health assistance. The government indicates that next to this center there will be a site where migrants can sleep. We just know they will be a point of water, but not structural accommodations/toilets or anything materials will be providing for the moment.

- Does the solution proposed by the government, regarding the site outside the Jules Ferry center, seem to be a good alternative? Why?
- The site plans to bring together all ethnic communities in one place. Do you think this can promote the outbreak of conflict between migrants? Why?

Conclusion / future:

- Now, what are your demands to the French government (and the British government)?
- What is the element that is most important to you in conserving your integrity as men?
- How would you describe your living here in one word?
- What is the adjective / the word that characterizes you the best as migrants in the city of Calais?

Interview protocol (version for volunteers) Anaïs Mattei

Be sure that the respondent agrees to be recorded (via audio recorder) and that he understand this interview is part of a personal research, not linked to the SALAM association

Introduction :

Hello, my name is Anaïs Mattei. I am currently doing my master degree in Human Geography at the Radboud University Nijmegen. I am doing research on the migrant camps in the border town of Calais. My aim with this research is to understand the situation of migrants that live in and around Calais. If you have any questions or remarks please let me know. The interview is made up from 13 questions, but it might be possible that I ask more on certain themes. Okay, if you are ready, we start the first question...

- Can you introduce yourself?
- How do you help migrants every day?
- Why is this aid necessary?

Camps and Humans:

- What was your first perception of the migrant camps when you arrive in Calais?
- How, despite the difficult living conditions, did you the migrant create a space of autonomy?
 - o (And) how do you help them to organize the site every day?
- Many people, especially in the migrant associations, denounced the fact that the camps are seen as areas without rights for migrants. What do you think of this remark?
 - o Do you think that a real dehumanization of human exists in these places?
 - o If so, in what form, characterized by whom / what?

Migrants and Outsiders:

- There seem to be many social barriers between migrants and a certain part of the local population of Calais. How do you see and interpret these social barriers?
- Many people in Calais now associate crime/violence with migrants in the city of Calais. In your opinion, does this stigma lead to more segregation and exclusion of migrants?
 - o To what extent?
- The following question is about the relationship between the police and the migrants in Calais. Many people (from associations or independent volunteers)

and migrants report significant numbers of police violence against migrants.
What do you think of this?

- o *Personal experiences ?*

Jules Ferry :

Jules Ferry is the center where we actually have the food distribution of a hot meal once a day. It is a daily center where you have electricity, toilets and some social and health assistance. The government indicates that next to this center there will be a site where migrants can sleep. We just know they will be a point of water, but not structural accommodations/toilets or anything materials will be providing for the moment.

- Does the solution proposed by the government seem to be a good alternative?
Why?
- The government plans to bring together all ethnic communities in one place. Do you think this can lead to the outbreak of conflict between different migrants groups?
 - o Why?

Conclusion / future:

- Now, what are your demands to the French government (and the British government) for migrants?
- How would you describe migrants living here in one word?
- How do you see the future for migrants in the border town of Calais?

APPENDIX C: CATEGORIES AND CODES FOR DATA ANALYSIS

C.1 CATEGORIES FOR THE CODING OF THE DIARY

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SUB-CATEGORY</u>	<u>CODES</u>
Police		Positive image
		Negative image
Living conditions		Bad
		Getting better
Government	Securisation	Control/security
		Walls/fences
		Detention
	The government wants	Making migrants invisibles
		Increasing the social interactions
Migrants	Image of migrants	Positive
		Negative
	The migrant is seen as	Threat to the norm
		Criminal
		Economic threat
England		Main goal for migrants
		Change of goal for migrants
Identities and communities	Identities of migrants	Keeping their identities
		Building identities/communities
		Lost hope/lost their identity
	Are the communities	ethnic
		religious
		Formed by social affinities
The role of volunteers		Moral support
		Material support
Human rights of migrants		Lack of human rights
		Recognition of human rights
Influence of the mafia		Over the trade
		Over the communities
Jules Ferry centre		Positive points
		Negative points
The borders inside and outside the camps	Are the borders	Physical
		Social
	Are the borders	Visible to the eye
		Invisible to the eye
Tensions regarding the migratory situation	Threat of evictions	Egyptian Squat
		Galloo
		Church/Dock
		BCMO
		Leader Price
	Possible evictions	By legal procedures
		By transgression of the law
	Tensions between	Local population and migrants
		Local population and government
		Migrants and government

Location of camps	Choice of the location of the camps regarding the proximity to the	City center
		Crossing points
	'tolerated' space	Good location
		Too far from the city center

Source: A.Mattei, 2016

C. 2 CATEGORIES FOR THE CODING OF THE TESTIMONIES FROM THE LOCAL POPULATION AND VOLUNTEERS

CATEGORY	CODES
Living conditions of migrants	Good conditions
	Bad conditions
Opinion about migrants	positive
	negative
Cohabitation with migrants	good
	Feeling of insecurity
What do migrants bring to the city?	Bad economic situation
	Openness to new cultures

Source: A.Mattei, 2016

C. 3 CATEGORIES FOR THE CODING OF THE TESTIMONIES OF MIGRANTS (WRITTEN ONES, INTERVIEW, QUESTIONNAIRE)

CATEGORY	ANALYSED DOCUMENTS	CODES
Did you experience police violence?	Interview Robert+ questionnaire René	yes
		no
Living conditions	Interview Robert+ questionnaire René	Really difficult situation
		Dealing with the situation
The image of Europe	Written testimonies: Hugues, Maxime, Raoul	England, the Eldorado
		Bad image
Human rights	Interview Robert+ questionnaire René	Lack of rights
		Recognition of rights
Is the Jules Ferry centre a good solution	Interview Robert+ questionnaire René	Yes
		No

Source: A.Mattei, 2016

APPENDIX D: FREQUENCIES, AS THE RESULTS OF THE CODING

Count: number of times the code has been used

Cases: number of documents in which the code is identified

D.1: How are the communities formed?

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
communities	ethnic	5,10%	8	1	100,00%
communities	religious	0,60%	1	1	100,00%
communities	social affinities	5,10%	8	1	100,00%

Source: A. Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner

D.2: Do migrants prefer to live near the city center or the crossing points ?

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
proximity	city center	3,20%	5	1	100,00%
proximity	crossing points	3,20%	5	1	100,00%

Source: A. Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner

D.3: Are the borders visible to the eye?

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
Are the borders visible to the eye?	yes	5,10%	8	1	100,00%
Are the borders visible to the eye?	no	6,40%	10	1	100,00%

Source: A. Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner

D.4: What do volunteers and migrants think of the location of the 'tolerated' space?

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
'tolerated space'	good location				
'tolerated space'	too far from the city center	2,50%	4	1	100,00%

Source: A. Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner

D.5: What does the government want?

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
what does the government want?	making migrants invisibles	5,10%	8	1	100,00%
what does the government want?	increasing the social interactions in the city	1,90%	3	1	100,00%

Source: A. Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner

D.6: Are the borders more social or physical between the camp and the other parts of the city?

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
borders	social	7,00%	11	1	100,00%
borders	physical	5,10%	8	1	100,00%

Source: A. Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner

D.7: Is England still the main goal of migrants?

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
England	main goal	9,40%	25	1	100,00%
England	change of goal	3,00%	8	1	100,00%

Source: A. Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner

D.8: the importance of the living conditions

By whom the word is used?		How many times is the word used?			
Categories	Codes	Living conditions	Bad conditions	conditions	Bad situation
Diary	Diary	45	3	55	1
Charlotte	Volunteers				
Eminé		2		2	1
Charlotte 2	Local population	1		1	
Jean-Luc		1		1	
Lise					
Nathalie					
Thomas		1		2	1
Hugues	Migrants				
Maxime					1
Raoul					

Source: A. Mattei, Diary and Written testimonies, via QDA Miner

D.9: What do people think about the living conditions of migrants?

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
Living conditions	Bad	12,10%	32	1	100,00%
Living conditions	Getting better	3,80%	10	1	100,00%

Source: A. Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner

D.10: The positive and negative points of the Jules Ferry centre

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
Jules Ferry	positive points	4,90%	13	1	100,00%
Jules Ferry	negative points	6,00%	16	1	100,00%

Source: A. Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner

D.11 Are the police and its actions one of the major point of the migratory situation?

By whom the word is used?		How many times is the word used?		
Categories	Codes	police	gas	Cops/CRS
Diary	Diary	48	7	3
Charlotte	Volunteers	1		1
Eminé		1		
Charlotte 2	Local population			
Jean-Luc				1
Lise				
Nathalie		1		2
Thomas	Migrants	1		
Hugues			1	
Maxime		3		
Raoul		2		

Source: A.Mattei, Diary and written testimonies, via QDA Miner

D.12: Did you experienced police violence?

Category	Code	Description	Count	% Codes	Cases	% Cases
Did you experienced police violence?	yes		2	16,70%	2	100,00%
Did you experienced police violence?	no					

Source: A.Mattei, interview Robert and questionnaire René, via QDA miner, 2016

D.13: The image of the police

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
Police	positive image	0,80%	2	1	100,00%
Police	negative image	3,40%	9	1	100,00%

Source : A.Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner, 2016

D.14 The human rights for migrants in Calais

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
Human rights	lack of rights	5,30%	14	1	100,00%
Human rights	recognition of rights	1,90%	5	1	100,00%

Source : A.Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner, 2016

D.15: The opinion of the majority population about migrants

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
Opinion about migrants	positive	22,60%	7	6	85,70%
Opinion about migrants	negative	9,70%	3	3	42,90%

Source : A.Mattei, Written testimonies (Local population+ volunteers), via QDA Miner, 2016

D.16: The cohabitation of the majority population with the migrants

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
Cohabitation with migrants	good	12,90%	4	4	57,10%
Cohabitation with migrants	feeling of insecurity	12,90%	4	4	57,10%

Source : A.Mattei, Written testimonies (Local population+ volunteers), via QDA Miner, 2016

D.17: The influence of the mafia

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
influence of the mafia over	the trade/stores	1,30%	2	1	100,00%
influence of the mafia over	the communities	2,50%	4	1	100,00%

Source: A.Mattei, diary, via QDA Miner, 2016

D.18: What happens to migrants' identities in the camps ?

Category	Code	% Codes	Count	Cases	% Cases
Identities	keeping their identity	5,30%	14	1	100,00%
Identities	build communities/identity	10,20%	27	1	100,00%
Identities	lost hope/ lost their identity	3,00%	8	1	100,00%

Source : A.Mattei, Diary, via QDA Miner