The power of framing

Securitisation, criminalisation and externalisation in European Union's migration policy

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Abstract

This thesis investigates how the European Commission's framing of migration in key policy documents — the European Agenda on Migration and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum — contributes to the broader themes of populism, Fortress Europe, and the migration crisis narrative. Using Entman's framing theory, the research uses three predefined dominant frames: securitisation, criminalisation, and externalisation. Through a frame analysis of the official communications this study reveals how these frames are structured and in what way they reinforce populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative. By linking the frames to the broader societal issues, this thesis demonstrates that the European Commission's migration framing legitimises exclusionary and securitised policies, which contribute to the rise of populism and the fortification of Europe's borders and the migration crisis narrative.

Cover image: Newsletter for the European Union (2018)

Table of Contents

Table of figures

Terminology

To start with, this section provides definitions for terms that are often used in migration research and policy. Also, it gives an explanation for the terminology used in this thesis.

Refugee, Migrant, Asylum Seeker

The distinction between refugees, migrants and asylum seekers is central to international policy (Scalettaris, 2010). The overarching category is the term ‘people on the move’, emphasising the need for a basic standard protection for all (Geneva, 2023; Pijnenburg & Rijken, 2020). However, different reasons and motivations to move apply and this comes with different international legal obligations, which portray itself in terminology.

Refugee

The primary and universal definition of a refugee that applies to States is contained in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention, as amended by its 1967 Protocol, defining a refugee as someone who:

> Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
>
> In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national. (“OAU Convention,” 1974, p. 3)

Asylum seeker

Asylum seekers are those who are seeking international protection. Their request for a refugee status, or complementary protection status, has yet to be processed, or they may not yet have requested asylum but intend to do so. When someone crosses an international border seeking safety, they often need to apply to be legally recognized as a refugee. While they seek asylum and await the outcome of their application, they are referred to as asylum seekers and should be protected (The UN Refugee Agency, n.d.)

Migrant

There is an important difference between the term migrant and refugee. Refugees are defined and protected by a specific international framework (UNHCR Handbook, 2019). However, there are no legal definitions of a migrant. Most agencies or organisations define migrants as people staying outside of their country of origin, who are not asylum seekers or refugees. It is important to note that it is possible that many migrants don’t fit the description of refugee or asylum seeker but could nevertheless be in danger if they go back to their countries of origin (Amnesty International, 2023b).

The UNHCR defines migrant as the following:

> The term ‘migrant', on the other hand, is not defined under international law, and is sometimes used differently by different stakeholders. Traditionally, the word ‘migrant' has been used to designate people who move by choice rather than to escape conflict or persecution, usually across an international border (‘international migrants'), for instance to join family members already abroad, to search for a livelihood, or for a range of other purposes. The term is increasingly used as an umbrella term to refer to any person who moves away from their usual place of residence, whether internally or across a border, and regardless of whether the movement is ‘forced' or voluntary. UNHCR recommends that people who are likely to be asylum-seekers or refugees are referred to as such, and that the word ‘migrant' should not be used as a catchall term to refer to refugees or to people who are likely to need international protection. Doing so can risk undermining access to the specific legal protections that states are obliged to provide to refugees. (“Migrant Definition,” 2019, p.1)

Irregular migration
Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination. The term is generally used to identify persons moving outside regular migration channels. (*Key Migration Terms*, 2019)

Third country
Meaning 'a country that is not a member of the European Union as well as a country or territory whose citizens do not enjoy the European Union right to free movement' (*EMN Asylum and Migration Glossary*, 2024).

In accordance with these definitions, any individual intending to seek asylum in another country should be classified as an asylum seeker. Within the context of this thesis as well as the European Agenda of Migration (European Commission, 2015) and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (European Commission, 2020), both of which place significant emphasis on asylum related migration- it is important to use the term asylum seeker. Moreover, the term carries important humanitarian connotations, highlighting the fact that individuals flee their countries due to necessity (ŞiMşek & Anik, 2018). Additionally, the of asylum seekers contributes to framing migration as an issue of protection, rather than a threat (Ellis et al, 2016). Because of these reasons, I will use the term asylum seeker in this thesis.

Introduction

Migration has long been a familiar occurrence in Europe, due to the economic growth and an ageing population (Kourachanis, 2018). During the years, the people who migrate fluctuate from with highs and lows (de Haas, 2023), however the Syrian war marked a significant surge in the number of asylum seekers and refugees arriving in 2015 compared to previous decades, most of them arriving on Greek islands and on other parts of the European Union external border in Italy and Spain (Horii, 2018). Where the external border of the European Union is defined by the European Union as the borders of a Schengen Member States that are not common borders with another Schengen Member State (EMN Asylum and Migration Glossary, n.d.).

FIGURE 1 SHOWING THE EXTERNAL EU BORDERS. SOURCE: HTTP://DDC.ARTE.TV/UNSERE-KARTEN/EU-MIGRANTEN-UND-GRENZENN

In response to this situation and to aid Spain, Italy and Greece, the European Commission introduced 'A European Agenda on Migration' in 2015, hereafter the Agenda, a guide to handle this so-called 'migration-crisis'. Initially, the primary goal of this Agenda was to provide comprehensive and targeted operational support to Italy and Greece. This assistance aimed to help them fulfil their obligations under EU law by swiftly identifying, registering, and fingerprinting incoming migrants. Additionally, it aimed to channel asylum seekers into asylum procedures, implement relocation schemes, and conduct return operations (Asylum Information Database, 2023). This ensured the realisation of a different document some years later. When Ursula Von Ley, the president of the European Commission admitted that the current migration policy was not working, NGOs and human rights activists were optimistic for a new approach (IRC, 2024). Eight years after the Agenda on Migration, the New Pact of Migration and Asylum, hereafter the New Pact was proposed by the European Commission (EC) in 2023 (New pact on migration and asylum, 2023). Even though the European Union views this as a 'set of regulations and policies to create a fairer, efficient and more sustainable migration and asylum process for the European Union, there have been critiques. Mostly by NGOs warning that this Pact is made to make it harder for people to access safety, accompanied with human rights violations and detention (Amnesty International, 2023).

The documents and policies of the European Commission are important documents, not only do they influence domestic legislation on migration, but they also influence people's views and beliefs on the subject of migration by using different discourses and narratives. These policies are violating human rights (Van Schaik, 2023) and with asylum seekers being framed as victims in the best case and a

cultural or security threat at worst, it does not only create dehumanisation of asylum seekers but also legitimises actions taken against them (Sajjad, 2018).

Three ways of framing are significant within the Agenda and the New Pact, namely the securitisation of migration, the criminalisation of migration and the externalisation of migration (Häkli et al, 2024; Sajjad, 2022). Within the securitisation frame of migration, migration is framed as a security threat, where asylum seekers are portrayed as risks to internal security. This frame justifies strict border policies and exceptional measures to address the perceived threat. Next to that, within the criminalisation frame of migration asylum seekers are portrayed as criminals, with unauthorised actions being framed as illegal. This frame justifies harsh policies, including detention, deportation and strict border controls. Lastly, the externalisation frame of migration views migration as a problem that needs to be managed outside of the EU's borders. This frame leads to policies that outsource asylum processing to transit or origin countries, deterring asylum seekers from reaching the European Union. While framed as a solution to protect asylum seekers from dangerous journeys, this practice shifts responsibility for asylum away from the EU, often resulting in human rights violations.

However, the negative framing of the 'dangerous' asylum seeker creates a clear European 'Self' and a non-European 'Other' (Esses et al., 2013). Contributing to broader themes that have been rising in the last decades, namely populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative (Liebhart, 2020). Populism is characterised by a division between 'the people' and 'the elite' and often carries anti-immigrant and xenophobic undertones, particularly in xenophobic undertones (Rooduijn, 2013). Populist movements gained momentum after events like 9/11, which led to securitisation policies, and the 2008 financial crisis, which further fuelled anti-immigrant sentiments (Harris, 2018). The rise of populism is linked to stricter migration policies and a radicalisation of mainstream politics, creating tensions within and among European nations (Harris, 2018; Mudde, 2017).

Another rising theme is Fortress Europe, which critiques the EU's increasingly restrictive migration policies. The Member States have a near-obsession with migration control, spending billions of dollars each year in the hope of securing their borders. Their objective is not to prevent the entry of all outsiders. To the contrary, developed states compete to attract those whom they believe will likely contribute to their well-being through trade, tourism and the provision of labour. But the uninvited, including most unskilled and humanitarian asylum seekers, are not welcome (Hathaway & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2014). Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the metaphor of Fortress Europe has been used to describe the EU's focus on security (Burgdorff, 2023). It highlights strict border controls, militarisation and exclusionary policies that create barriers for asylum seekers. Fortress Europe contradicts the EU's human rights values by contributing to human rights violations and pushing asylum seekers towards irregular routes (Jünemann et al, 2019).

Additionally, the migration crisis narrative is something that is present in migration policies, especially since 2015 when the Syrian war broke out. The crisis rhetoric is often exaggerated to serve political agendas. Politicians and media frame migration as an overwhelming crisis legitimising restrictive policies. However, migration numbers have always fluctuated and always will but the portrayal of migration as a crisis distorts public perceptions and justifies harsh action against asylum seekers (de Haas, 2023).

In contemporary times, right-winged governments are winning the elections in Europe, leading to rising xenophobic sentiments and stricter migration policies (Winn, 2020). It is interesting to study how the migration policy of the EU relates to this. By analysing the Communications of the European Commission on the Agenda and the New Pact, this thesis will analyse the way the frames of migration employed are used by the European Commission and how they contribute to the broader themes, to see how the securitisation, criminalisation and externalisation frames of migration contribute to the three broader themes of populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative, This will be done by employing Entman's framing theory, this theory is based on the fact that a frame exists of four functions, namely the effects defined as problematic, the causes that are being identified, conveying a moral judgment and endorsing remedies or improvements (Mortensgaard, 2018). Next to that, it will discover how these functions connect, or contribute to ideologies of the broader themes.

Problem statement & research questions

The aim of this thesis is not to neglect problems that arise from migration, not to delight migration and not to plea that it is easy to design migration policy. But the aim of this thesis is to equip the reader with knowledge that will enable them to critically look at claims made by politicians, media and in this case the European Commission.

This will be done by shedding light on the framing of migration used by the European Commission and how this contributes to populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative. It will answer the main research question:

How do the securitisation, criminalisation and externalisation frames of migration in the communications of the European Commission of the Agenda of Migration and New Pact of Migration and Asylum contribute to the three themes of populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative?

To answer the main research question, this thesis will work with the following three sub questions:

1. How does the securitisation frame of migration in the Agenda of Migration and the New Pact of Asuylum and Migration contribute to the three main themes of populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative?
2. How does the criminalisation frame of migration in the Agenda of Migration and the New Pact of Asuylum and Migration contribute to the three main themes of populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative?
3. How does the externalisation frame of migration in the Agenda of Migration and the New Pact of Asuylum and Migration contribute to the three main themes of populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative?

Societal Relevance

The societal relevance of this thesis lies in its focus on the intersection of political framing and discourse and broader societal trends in Europe. The Agenda and the New Pact are both leading policies in migration management for member states and most base their national migration policy on these policies (*Areas of EU Action*, n.d.). By investigating the frames used by the communications of the EC will reveal the EC communication strategies on migration that play a critical role in shaping public perception and policy responses to migration.

At the EU level, addressing the migration crisis narrative has led to various actions. This includes military interventions without opposition, reinforcing borders, investing more in neighbouring countries to handle refugees outside of Europe, and engaging in prolonged debates about refugee governance within the EU. The focus has shifted from a humanitarian crisis to managing migration. Now, the primary concern is implementing screening and identification procedures to distinguish between refugees requiring protection and those perceived as security risks (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2016). By exploring how the frames of migration, used by the EC, contribute to the migration crisis narrative, this thesis will reveal whether such communications perpetuate a sense of emergency and threat to its audience.

Following Kourachanis (2018), the specific way of managing the refugee issue is intertwined with features of biopolitics. This term was used by Foucault to describe the techniques of managing and regulating the life and death of human populations through the modern exercise of power. This narrative often categorises asylum seekers as either desirable or undesirable based on factors like education, skills, origin, and cultural background. The portrayal of asylum seekers as potential terrorists, has reinforced this perception. Consequently, governments have implemented stricter border controls and admission policies to regulate the movement of people across borders (Jaskulowski, 2018).

It is important to reveal these frames of migration used by the European Commission since it influences people's perceptions and views, frames and discourses are powerful tools that are generated by the regimes and imposes a perception on its audience (Briscoe et al, 2009). Revealing

these frames helps in understanding and revealing the underlying intentions and objectives of the policies.

Hakli et al. (2024) state; “We believe that its framings legitimise certain approaches to asylum migration management and international human rights both in the Member States and in the EU” (p.2). That is why it is important to highlight the frames used by ‘regimes’ or ‘authorities’, in this case the EC, to make sure that the audience receiving this information is aware of frames and narratives.

Unfolding the narratives and framing is important because of their possible effects in the future. Winn (2020) found that (far-)right winged governments have lower asylum recognition rates than centre or left winged governments and with more governments of Member States becoming more right-winged. This means that the more right a government is, the less asylum seekers will be granted asylum in this country (Kim, 2022). This could lead to problems in the future if this trend becomes larger and less asylum seekers get admitted while the same amount arrive at the external borders of the EU.

In line with this is the populist movement that has gained traction across Europe in recent years, often using migration as a key issue to mobilise support (Harris, 2018). By analysing how the EC frames migration, this thesis can shed light on whether these communications reinforce populist narratives. Understanding the role of migration framing in the rise of populism can help policy makers and civil society actors develop strategies to foster inclusive migration framing, which is crucial for maintaining the EU’s democratic values and social cohesion. So that it can foster a multicultural society based on trust, social well-being and equality (Pinto et al., 2020).

Next to that, Fortress Europe refers to the critique that the EU prioritises the security of its borders over the rights and needs of asylum seekers. Examining how frames of migration are used in official communications can reveal the extent to which these policies contribute to a Fortress Europe, potentially undermining humanitarian obligations and Europe’s own image as a protector of human rights.

In conclusion, this thesis underscores the importance of examining how the EC frames migration in its communications on the Agenda and the New Pact. These frames influence public perceptions and policy responses, shaping narratives around the migration crisis, populism and the concept op Fortress Europe. Understanding these frames is critical to ensuring that migration policies are balanced, inclusive and aligned with democratic values. By revealing how securitisation, criminalisation and externalisation frames of migration contribute to these broader themes, this thesis will ensure that the public can form its own well-informed opinion and does not fall prey to the manipulative techniques of the regime.

Scientific Relevance

There has been plethora of literature concerning the framing of migration, most scholars arguing that the way asylum seekers are framed influences collective views (Clemens & Ogden, 2019; Lahav & Courtemanche, 2011; Wenzel & Żerkowska-Balas, 2018). The Agenda and the New Pact are no exception, the framing within both the documents can tell us a lot about the way the European Union portrays migration. This thesis adds to the body of literature on framing theory by exploring how different frames, securitisation, criminalisation and externalisation, are employed in official EU communications. By linking these frames to broader societal themes like populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative, the study contributes to the broader understanding of how framing shapes political discourse and enhances our knowledge of how institutional actors influence and engage with complex political issues.

Sajjad (2022) describes in her work the discourses that are used in the Agenda On Migration in 2015, she suggests that the measures implemented by the EU and its member states are driven by strategic considerations. She argues that every policy enacted aims to reduce the irregular entrants and that there is an intentional effort to justify policies that actually go against the idea of Europe being humane. In line with this, several scholars argue (Agyemang, 2016; Crawley & Blitz, 2017; Mitsilega, 2023; Nagy, 2017; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016; Scipioni, 2018; Stepper, 2016; Willermain, 2016) that its failure to foster solidarity among member states and its heavy focus on border control

measures are often at the expense of humanitarian considerations and the integration of asylum seekers, with the humanitarian narrative in the Agenda on Migration masking these shortcomings.

Despite the purported humane approach of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, Gazi (2021), Häkli et al. (2024) and Majcher (2020) argue that the humanitarian tone in the Pact is a way to cover up the inhumane policies being proposed in the New Pact and perpetuate a focus on restrictive border control measures, potentially normalising human rights abuses. Various scholars (De Bruyker, 2022; Gazi, 2021; Häkli et al., 2024; Mouzourakis, 2020) warn for the strategies proposed by the EC such as the 'crisis regulation' (Sunderland, 2023) and the solidarity principle where asylum seekers' human rights might be violated.

Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between populism and the European Union. Populist movements have used migration as a tool to advance their political agendas, challenging common EU policies and advocating for national sovereignty (Gedõ & Nagy, 2020). This thesis investigates how the framing of migration policies by the European Commission might inadvertently fuel populist narratives by securitising and criminalising migration and externalising migration control to third countries. It examines the role of EU institutions in shaping the political environment that populist exploit, thus this thesis adds to expanding the literature on the connection between populism and European governance (Gruszzynki & Friedery, 2021; Ingehart & Norris; Ongaro et al., 2022). This is scientifically relevant because it helps to unravel the mechanisms through which populism gains traction and how supranational policy decisions can contribute to their success.

To conclude, this thesis contributes to the literature on migration framing by examining how the European Commission employs the securitisation, criminalisation and externalisation frames in its migration policies. While previous research has shown that migration framing influences perceptions and policies (Clemens & Ogden, 2019; Lahav & Courtemanche, 2011), this thesis adds depth by connecting these frames to themes like populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative. Next to that, it also provides insights into how supranational decisions, like EU policy can contribute to populism.

Literature Review

During the past years some scholars have been writing about the hypocrisy of the European Union, (Barbulescu, 2016; Greenhill, 2016; Lo Coco, 2021) where on the one hand the European Union is a safe haven for human rights and tries its best to create a safe space for every individual and on the other hand, thousands of human rights are being neglected and purposely deprived for people trying to get into the European Union (Lavenex, 2018). Bast et al (2022) and Lavenex (2018) argue that the policies implemented by the European Commission legitimise the violations of human rights. In these policies words are being carefully chosen to make it seem that, on the surface, as if it is profitable for the refugee or asylum seeker while in the meantime, diving a little deeper into the material, there are few to no asylum seekers profiting from these policies (Cernadas, 2016). The next part will entail a summary of the policies and some of the biggest critiques on the two leading documents of European migration policy will be discussed in the following part of this thesis.

The European Agenda on Migration

In 2015, over one million refugees and asylum seekers arrived and tried to arrive in Europe by sea (Ineli- Fargues, 2016; Ciger, 2016; Southgate, 2018). States at the EU's external borders were not properly prepared and had difficulty to manage (Matusz et al., 2020). In response to this so-called 'refugee crisis', the European Agenda on Migration was introduced by the European Commission in May 2015 (Managing Migration Better in All Aspects: A European Agenda on Migration, 2015), aimed to address these challenges. The Agenda included various measures to address migration, such as an emergency relocation response mechanism, increased funding for Frontex, currently called the European Border and Coast Guard Agency[1], and an action plan to combat smuggling (European Commission, 2015). While it sought to establish a comprehensive approach to migration management, it has faced significant critiques (Crawley & Blitz, 2017; Mitsilegas, 2023; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016; Scipioni, 2018; Selanec, 2015; Willermain, 2016).

Following the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015), some of the key measures for immediate response are Implementing mechanisms to relocate asylum seekers from frontline member states (such as Italy and Greece) to other EU countries, providing increased financial and material support to countries hosting large numbers of refugees, both within and outside the EU and enhancing operations in the Mediterranean including increased funding and resources for Frontex .

Other immediate measures, still following the European Agenda on Migration, entail four main pillars. The first one is to reduce the incentives for irregular migration. By means of development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and enhanced efforts to combat smuggling and trafficking networks the EC aims to reach this. The second pillar focuses on strengthening the management of external borders through the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard, which should improve coordination and resources for border control. Next to that, implementing a new 'smart borders' initiative to better monitor and manage border crossings. The third pillar involves reforming the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to ensure asylum rules are applied consistently and fairly across the EU. The fourth pillar promotes legal migration pathways to the EU, including proposals for a revised Blue Card scheme to attract highly skilled workers, and enhancing integration policies to support the inclusion of asylum seekers and refugees into European societies (European Commission, 2015).

A Sustainable Migration Framework is one of the long-term reforms of the European Agenda of Migration, where the European Union should develop partnerships with countries of origin and transit to manage migration flows and address the underlying causes of migration, such as poverty, conflict

[1] Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard was established in 2004 to enhance cooperation between national border authorities and manage the EU's external borders. Frontex underwent reforms, facing operational limitations during the so-called 'migration crisis' in 2015, to expand its mandate and transform into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency while retaining its original name (Wawrzusiszyn, 2022).

and lack of opportunities. The other long-term reform is the proposing of changes to the Dublin Regulation, which determines the member state responsible for processing asylum claims, to ensure a more equitable sharing of responsibilities among EU countries.

Critique

One of the primary criticisms of the Agenda is the failure to achieve solidarity among EU member states in sharing the burden of refugee resettlement and migration management (Scipioni, 2018; Willermain, 2016). Despite efforts to implement a quota system for refugee distribution, several Eastern European countries have vehemently opposed accepting refugees, leading to a lack of burden-sharing and exacerbating the crisis (Nagy, 2017; Stepper, 2016). In line with this, is the fragmentation and ad-hoc approach to migration governance, characterised by inconsistent and temporary policies and a lack of coordination among EU institutions and member states (Dimitriadi, 2015). Next to that, Selanec (2015) argues that the lack of a functioning legal framework forces Member States to act individually, and thus to act in a way to prevail their own political interest. He stresses the fact that this is not in line with the aim of the European Agenda to function as a unifying document.

Other scholars (Crawley & Blitz, 2017; Mitsilegas, 2023; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016) argue that the European Agenda on Migration has focused excessively on border control and deterrence measures, often at the expense of humanitarian considerations. Selanec (2015) has highlighted the paradoxical relation between the emphasis on the report's aim to save lives at sea by strengthening the external border of the European Union.

Next to that, the European Agenda neglects the integration of asylum seekers and refugees into European societies. The emphasis on securing external borders and outsourcing migration control to third countries has led to violations of asylum seekers' rights and humanitarian principles, including reports of abuse and neglect in detention centres.

Davitti & La Chimia (2017) argue the EU policies use policies that are aimed at externalising the management of migration by using aid funding in return for cooperation on migration control. There are two problems with this fact, the first is that there is not a clear definition given of what this aid funding is and that absence over how aid should be allocated enables its misuse for migration control. The second problem is that allocating the ‘root causes of migration’ and seeing poverty as the main reason for migration is based on the wrong information (Crawly and Blitz, 2018). As well as Europe's attempts to control irregular migration while cooperating with countries that violate human rights could make things worse by causing more political instability, which might lead to more people leaving the region (Crawly and Blitz, 2018; Davitti & La Chimia, 2017).

Lastly, different scholars (Ineli-Ciger, 2015, 2016; Gluns & Wessels, 2017) argue that the absence of the Temporary Protection Directive should have been a part of the European Agenda on Migration. The Temporary Protection Directive, which was adopted and entered into force in 2001, has introduced a practical and efficient framework to deal with mass influx situations (Türközü, 2019). Since the European Agenda discusses such a situation, like a mass influx situation, this Directive is missing and could provide important benefits to both persons seeking refuge in Europe and the Member States themselves. If the Temporary Protection Directive is activated, individuals recognized as beneficiaries of temporary protection would not require individual status determination. This approach would save money, workforce and time (Ineli-Ciger, 2016).

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum

After some years, it became clear that the European Agenda on Migration failed in managing migration and this resulted in another document called the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (Goldner Lang, 2022; Kużelewska & Piekutowska, 2021). This is a framework proposed in September 2020 by the European Commission to address the complexities and challenges of migration and asylum within its member states. Following the European Commission, the New Pact entails 'a set of regulations and policies to create a fairer, efficient, and more sustainable migration and asylum process for the European Union' (European Commission, 2023). The pact focusses on solidarity and responsibility-sharing among EU countries. Key features of the pact include faster asylum procedures, enhanced cooperation with non-EU countries to manage migration flows, and a flexible mechanism for distributing asylum seekers among member states. Additionally, the pact seeks to strengthen external border controls while ensuring respect for human rights and international obligations.

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum (New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 2023) builds on the previous reform proposals of migration. The four pillars consist of securing the external borders, fast and efficient procedures, effective system of solidarity and responsibility and embedding migration in international partnerships. To strengthen the external borders the New Pact focusses on robust screenings, the Eurodact asylum and migration database will be expanded and will ensure clear identification of everyone who enters the EU, this means people registered as an asylum seeker as well as people not registered as asylum seekers. A mandatory border procedure will apply for asylum applicants who are unlikely to receive asylum, efficient returns will apply for them. Also, the Crisis Regulation provides quick crisis protocols for emergency situations.

The second pillar, fast and efficient procedures must be accomplished by clear asylum rules, where there will be determined which EU Member State shall be responsible for handling an application for asylum. Also, the Reception Conditions Directive should establish standards across the EU, ensuring adequate living conditions for asylum seekers and the Asylum Procedure Regulation sets out clear obligations of cooperation for asylum seekers, providing for consequences in case of non-compliance (New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 2023).

The effective system of solidarity and responsibility should be accomplished by the new permanent solidarity framework, this new framework should ensure that countries will receive the solidarity that they need. This will also be accomplished by operational and financial support and clearer rules on responsibility for asylum applications. Another important part of this third pillar is the prevention of secondary movements, this entails that asylum seekers must apply for international protection in the EU country where they first enter the EU and remain there until the country responsible for their application is determined (New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 2023).

The last pillar, embedding migration in international partnerships, the New Pact wants to strengthen capacities of border management authorities in third country partners to prevent irregular departures. The Anti-Smuggling Operational Partnership with partner countries should tackle migrant smuggling. Lastly, the New Pact will promote legal pathways to the EU, by means of a EU Talent Pool, where international recruitment will be facilitated and non-EU citizens can apply to work, study and train in the EU (New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 2023).

Critique

Although the New Pact is portrayed as more humane and friendly, Häkli et al. (2024) discuss that the framing used in the New Pact contributes to the legitimisation of certain approaches in asylum migration management that violate human rights, while it initially seems to approach asylum seekers in a fair and humane way. International non-governmental organisations such as Save the Children, Amnesty International and the International Rescue Committee, argue that the New Pact's focus on border control and external cooperation with third countries may prioritise restrictive measures. The NGOs argue that the New Pact and these restrictive measures will normalise human rights violations, such as violent push backs and long detention at the external borders of the European Union

(Amnesty International, 2023; IRC, 2024; Sanderson, 2023; Save the Children International, 2023; Sunderland, 2023). Various scholars have also expressed their concerns and critiques (De Bruyker, 2022; Gazi, 2021; Häkli et al., 2024; Mouzourakis, 2020). They highlight that the New Pact will use strategies to justify human rights violations. NGOs warn for the 'crisis regulation', this will allow EU countries that face a loosely defined 'mass influx' or a 'situation of instrumentalization of asylum seekers by a third country or non-state actor' to give a black eye from human rights obligations, resulting to legalising the denial of the right to asylum (IRC,2024; Sunderland, 2023). Next to that, they warn the European Commission that the 'solidarity principle' of the New Pact does not support the states where people first arrive, like Greece, Italy and Spain. Other Member States will be able to pay to strengthen the external borders, or even fund countries outside of the EU to prevent people from reaching Europe, also leading to more risks of human rights violations (Amnesty International 2023; Sunderland, 2023; Bouvier, 2023).

Regarding this, de Bruyker (2022), argues for a system where states can be obliged to improve reception conditions or supporting asylum procedures in other member states under pressure, instead of offering the opportunity to simply pay for extra border management. Gazi (2021) contends that even though the current asylum policy must be adjusted, the New Pact will hinder vulnerable groups' access to a fair asylum process. De Bruyker (2022) also stresses the fact that it is not a long-term document, highlighting one of the organisational disadvantages of the New Pact and contributing to migration and asylum management based on temporary policies, not able to provide a long-term and sustainable solution approach.

Populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative

In the next section the three broader themes will be explained that the frames of migration will be linked to. Firstly, populism will be clarified, secondly, Fortress Europe will be explained and lastly the migration crisis narrative will be described.

Populism

During the last two decades, populistic movements have risen and populistic parties have taken place in governments in Europe (Liebhart, 2020; Mudde, 2017; Oudenampsen, 2013; Schain, 2018). Figure 2 shows the rise of people voting on a populist party in the last two decades in Europe. Populism is a much contested concept, and in politics, a contemporary buzzword (Mudde, 2017). One common characteristic essential for populism includes some kind of appeal to 'the people' and a denunciation of 'the elite', and so, it involves a critique of the establishment and a flattery of the common people (Zaslove, 2008) . Mudde (2017) defines populism as 'a thin centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, the 'pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people' (Mudde, 2017; p.6).



% vote share of populist parties, 2008-2018

	2008	2018	Growth/decline
Italy	8.30%	50.03%	41.73%
Greece	17.00%	54.60%	37.60%
Czech Republic	12.81%	49.60%	36.79%
Slovakia	11.70%	34.34%	22.64%
Hungary	43.70%	65.09%	21.39%
Poland	32.10%	51.18%	19.08%
Spain	3.77%	21.15%	17.38%
France	13.82%	27.09%	13.27%
Finland	12.90%	24.78%	11.88%
Germany	10.30%	21.98%	11.68%
Sweden	8.78%	18.58%	9.80%
Ireland	8.03%	17.70%	9.67%
Denmark	13.90%	21.10%	7.20%
Romania	3.15%	9.98%	6.83%
Estonia	26.10%	32.90%	6.80%
Bulgaria	26.00%	32.65%	6.65%
Croatia	1.80%	6.49%	4.69%
Cyprus	31.10%	35.38%	4.28%
Lithuania	29.04%	32.83%	3.79%
Luxembourg	1.90%	4.94%	3.04%
Slovenia	5.40%	8.20%	2.80%
Portugal	8.34%	9.38%	1.04%
Latvia	7.00%	6.85%	-0.15%
Netherlands	22.49%	22.20%	-0.29%
United Kingdom	2.20%	1.80%	-0.40%
Austria	28.24%	26.00%	-2.24%
Belgium	16.02%	4.09%	-11.93%

FIGURE 2 TABLE POPULISM IN EUROPE SINCE 2008 [INFOGRAM], (N.D)

Even though there are different area-based conceptualisations of the term populism, Rooduijn (2013) has found four main characteristics of populism. 1. They emphasize the central position of the people;

2. they critice the elite; 3. they perceive people as a homogeneous entity; and 4. they proclaim a serious crisis.

Wodak, a populist expert, marks the beginning of the populist wave in Europe with the 9/11 attacks. She explains that the security crackdown legitimised certain policies that left room to violate human rights and helped extremist parties tough on issues like law and order. After this securitisation phenomenon, the financial crisis hit and even though the south of Europe was most affected, northern countries like Austria, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries shifted more to populism out of fear for the potential effects of the crisis such as unemployment and poverty. To protect their own country, their own benefits and their welfare, anti-immigrant policies arose (Harris, 2018). In the eastern countries, the rise of populist parties started a little earlier, in 1989, when asylum seekers from the former eastern communist countries started to cross the borders (Loch, 2017). The refugee movements triggered the rise of right winged populist and extreme parties, mostly in Hungary and Poland. First, it was against asylum seekers from the former communist countries and now, by pointing at the Islam and refugees as scapegoats, they legitimize their policies that challenge democracy (Harris, 2018).

As Wodak (Harris, 2018) states in her interview, it is difficult to make predictions about the effects of growing populism in Europe. She does describe possible consequences as more tensions, the undermining of democracies and polarisation, within countries but also within the European Union. In line with this is what Piere Rosanvallon calls 'perverse inversion' of democratic ideals (Weymans, 2018). Populist leaders often challenge the legitimacy of the judiciary, the media and other democratic institutions, framing them as enemies of the people whereby democracy can be endangered (Mudde, 2017). Populism thrives on the 'us' vs 'them' narrative, which often leads to greater societal polarisation. For example, citizens vs. asylum seekers, nationalists vs. globalists. Wodak also warns us for the normalisation of populist strategies. Currently, with people like Trump in the USA or Wilders in the Netherlands, it seems accepted to discriminate against certain groups. This normalises discrimination and xenophobia. Finally, populist programmatic proposals will exist even though the parties itself might not win (Harris, 2018).

In Europe, there is one thing most populist movements or parties have in common, they have strict anti-migration ideologies, especially from asylum seekers from non-EU countries, and a more nationalist take on governing (Mudde, 2017). Populist rhetoric often paints asylum seekers and refugees as threats to national security, cultural identity and the welfare system. Right-wing populist movements have shown a tendency towards authoritarianism, using fear (especially of immigrants and refugees) to justify tightening control over law enforcement, restricting civil liberties and cutting back on human rights (Levinger, 2017). Consequently, for this thesis this means that growing populism goes hand in hand with stricter migration policies and probably that less asylum seekers, refugees or asylum seekers will be granted asylum.

All in all, the rise of populism has led to a radicalisation of mainstream politics and the normalisation of extreme views. The long-term implications of this shift are still unfolding but if left unchecked, populism could undermine the foundations of democracy in Europe, exacerbate social tensions, legitimise violations of human rights and threaten the future of the European Union, which is especially undesirable for migration policies and asylum seekers and refugees themselves.

Fortress Europe

Fortress Europe refers to the strengthening of external border controls and increased internal surveillance, contrasting with the removal of internal barriers within the EU (Kofman & Sales, 1998). Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992[2], the term 'Fortress Europe' has been used to describe or criticise EU's migration policies. The term was once used by the Nazis to indicate the Nazi controlled areas fortified against Allied invasion during World War II. Later, it reappeared in the Cold War, where it symbolized the Western Europe's defense against the Soviet bloc. After this, the term was used more as a metaphor, first, in the 1980s it was used to criticise the European Economic Community's protectionist policies. Finally, with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Fortress Europe became a metaphor for Europe's increasingly tightening migration policies, intensifying of border controls and efforts to prevent refugees and asylum seekers from entering while maintaining internal freedom of movement for EU citizens (Burgdorff, 2023).

The contemporary term of Fortress Europe is often used to describe and to critique European Unions' migration policies where it symbolises Europe as a heavily guarded, restrictive, exclusionary zone under the guise of security (Burgdorff, 2023). It criticizes Europe's restrictive migration policies and the militarisation of its borders, next to that it criticises the EU for prioritising security over humanitarianism (Burgdorff, 2023). Migration is often framed as a threat, legitimising increased securitisation, policing and surveillance at European borders (Engelbert et al, 2019). This manifests itself in strict border control and militarisation, which entails physical barriers, high-tech surveillance systems, and patrols by naval operations, like Frontex, but likewise, it focusses on legislative measures and externalisation of border management to prevent unauthorised entry.

Additionally, the use of legal frameworks and legislation measures fortifies Europe. By making legal entry for some people impossible enforcing selective admission where there is preference for certain migrants based on nationality, economic status or perceived threat (Jünemann et al., 2017). Research shows that the restrictive EU migration policies have fuelled irregular migration and smuggling networks. As legal entry becomes more difficult, people are forced to seek dangerous irregular routes, often relying on routes (Achilli, 2016; Chatelard, 2005). These smuggling networks have become the only option for many people fleeing danger or seeking better prospects (Mateus, 2012).

However, following Burgdorff (2023) and Engelbert et al. (2019) Fortress Europe is in itself a contradiction, where on the one hand, there is internal freedom of movement within the EU, but for people outside of the EU that do not have the right categorisations, there is no freedom of movement at all. Where Europe likes to present itself as the promoter of human rights, Fortress Europe reflects a paradox where Europe promotes itself as a space of openness and human rights while simultaneously constructing barriers to prevent external migration (Engelbert et al., 2019).

Furthermore, Fortress Europe is created and sustained by European Union institutions but next to the EU, it is also sustained by media and public discourse (Engelbert et al, 2019). Everyday actions, such as political rhetoric, media representations and mobilisations of emotions by frames help reinforce the boundaries of Fortress Europe. These practices shape public attitudes towards asylum seekers and contribute to the maintenance of exclusionary policies and cultural barriers (Pastore & Ponzo, 2016).

In short, most concerns about Fortress Europe are about the focus on security over humanitarianism, leading to the human rights violations, the death of asylum seekers because of the lack of enough legal routes, and the reinforcement of xenophobic and nationalist sentiments. It creates barriers that perpetuate fear and undermine the EU's values of freedom and inclusivity, next to that it fosters

[2] The Maastricht Treaty founded the European Union, it amended existing treaties and established a three pillar structure: the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home affairs (Verdrag van Maastricht, n.d)

illegal smuggling networks(Akkerman, 2018; Burgdorff, 2023; Engelbert et al., 2018; Jünemann et al, 2019).

Migration Crisis Narrative

In his recent work, Hein de Haas (2023) states 'contemporary levels of refugee migration are anything but unprecendented' (De Haas, 2023, p.47). Despite this assertion, politicians, experts and media often claim that there is a global 'refugee crisis'. This framing is particularly salient in Europe, where migration is a big theme on contemporary political agendas. Currently, Germany is starting to control their borders, because of the 'dramatic rise' in amount of refugees coming to Germany (Redactie Duitslandweb, 2023). Similarly, in the Netherlands the Minister of Asylum, Marjolein Faber, has declared an asylum crisis, asserting that the system is 'simply overwhelmed' (NOS, 2024). This rhetoric is further reinforced by international organisation such as the UNHCR and IOM, which often highlight record-high refugee numbers to draw attention and secure funding (De Haas, 2023).

The notion of a crisis is rooted in the perception that escalating conflicts and oppressive regimes worldwide are driving increasing numbers to flee their home countries (Crawley, 2016). In response, politicians often cite these rising figures to justify restrictive asylum policies and border controls, claiming that their systems cannot accommodate the influx (Odutayo, 2016).

Under the guise of a migration crisis, there is a growing narrative that many asylum seekers are not 'genuine' asylum seekers, with the term 'economic migrant' frequently used to describe those perceived as 'inauthentic'. This distinction allows policymakers to implement measures aimed at distinguishing between 'real' and 'fake' asylum seekers, often with the intent to deport the latter (Gatrell, 2022).

However, an examination of the numbers reveals that there is a fluctuating increase and decrease in asylum migration numbers (De Haas, 2023). Asylum seeker numbers in European countries only spike when there is conflict relatively close by, such as the Yugoslavian wars, the Syrian civil war and the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Historically, conflicts have prompted large numbers of people to seek refuge in other countries. However, most refugees tend to remain in neighbouring countries, challenging the need to declare a global crisis (De Haas, 2023). By calling out crises it has contributed to the securitisation of migration, elevating it as a priority on the EU's policy agenda (Gifra, 2024).

Menjuvar et al (2019) argues that the term 'crisis' is overused in contemporary society leading to a diffusion of its meaning. In their view, crises are increasingly becoming normalised. This migration crisis rhetoric is problematic because it serves political agendas by legitimising stringent border controls and restrictive asylum policies that often violate human rights. It also distorts public perceptions in the receiving countries, exaggerating the scale of migration, making it appear unprecedented, scaring people for the possibility that the systems is on the brink of collapse (Wodak, 2017)

In many instances, the phrase 'refugee crisis' or 'asylum crisis' positions refugees and asylum seekers as the source of the crisis, rather than critically examining the broader factors driving displacement (Crawley & Skeplaris, 2018). Sahin-Mencutek et al. (2022) state that 'a crisis is commonly identified as an extraordinary event leading to increased but temporal instability and uncertainty in the pre-existing status quo or perceived 'normality' (p. 2). Crises are often used in a discursive sense to shape public perceptions and justify particular political actions. Crises are not simply objective occurrences but are socially constructed to signal a breakdown in stability and legitimise governmental interventions (Nabers, 2019).

In conclusion, the migration crisis narrative is misleading and politically driven. While asylum numbers fluctuate with regional conflicts, they are not historically extraordinary. The 'refugee crisis' rhetoric, promoted by politicians, media and organisations, justifies restrictive asylum policies and increased border controls, distorting public perception and fuelling fear of systemic collapse. Next to

that, crises are socially constructed to advance political agendas. By focusing on restricting migration governments expand their authority and normalise extreme border management without offering sustainable solutions to displacement.

Theoretical framework

Framing theory

The basis of framing theory is that the sender of a message focuses on certain events and then places them within a field of meaning. Framing is an important topic since it can have a big influence on the audience receiving the message. In essence, framing theory suggests that how something is presented to the audience, called the frame, influences the choices people make about how to process that information (Wicks, 2005).

Ervin Goffman (1974) is seen as the founder in framing theory, he introduced the concept of 'frames' as mental structures that shape the way people perceive and interpret experiences. Goffman viewed framing as essential to understand how people organise and give meaning to events and actions in everyday life. Gamson (1992) analysed how social movements and interest groups use framing to mobilise support for their causes and influence political discourse. Other big scholars like Snow and Benford (2000) introduced the concept of 'collective action frames' which help movement construct meaning, mobilise participants and garner public support. Lakoff (2014) applied framing theory to political communication. He explored how political discourse is shaped by deeply embedded cognitive frames. Lakoff's book 'Don't Think of an Elephant' (2014) promoted the idea that political success is not just about policy but about creating narrative through effective framing.

Chiefly, framing theory is seen as valuable for helping us understand how issues are conceptualized and how they affect people's opinions on the specific issues. Furthermore, Silva et al (2016) argue that frames in policy making are mostly reflective of the prevalent values of the policy making group (Benford and Snow, 2000; Goffman, 1974; Dewulf et al., 2009).

In the context of this research I will use Entmans' work to conceptualise framing theory. Entman defines framing as 'selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and / or solution.' Entman states that frames perform two or more functions of the following:

1. Defining effects or conditions as problematic; framing identifies what an issue is and why it is important. By defining problems, frames help audiences determine the severity of an issue and what aspects of it are most relevant.

2. Identifying causes; frames assign blame or responsibility for the problems they define.
This is crucial in shaping public opinion, as the frame directs the audience toward specific causes or agents.

3. Conveying a moral judgement; frames evaluate the moral implications of the problem and its causes, often suggesting whether something is good or bad, just or unjust. This moral dimension helps shape how audiences feel about the issue and those involved.

4. Endorsing remedies or improvements. Frames suggest solutions or courses of action to address the problem. These recommendations can influence public policy and decision-making, as they align with the problem's defined causes and moral evaluations. Entman classifies 'problem definition' and 'remedy' as most important parts of a frame (Mortensgaard, 2018). This thesis will focus mostly on these two functions.

Next to that, Entman argued that framing involves two core processes; the process of selection and the process of salience. With the process of selection he means the act of choosing certain aspects of a perceived reality to emphasize, while ignoring or downplaying others. The process of salience entails making selected information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences. When something is made salient, it becomes more likely to influence how people think about the issue.

The following chapter will explain predefined frames on the basis of the theory of Entman. It will specify the characteristics of the frames using the two or more of the four different functions of a frame.

Securitisation frame of migration

The securitisation frame that is recognisable in the documents of the European Commission can be analysed following the framing theory of Entman. The securitisation frame defines the threat to internal security as problematic (1). The securitisation frame assigns blame the people that want to claim asylum within the European Union (2). The securitisation theory of Balzacq (2011) confirms this technique; according to Balzacq (2011), security is defined as the anticipated state of being unharmed in the future. However, while security is oriented towards the future, its effects in terms of mobilising governmental practices and implementing exceptional measures are in the present (De Graaf & Zwierlein, 2013). The process of securitisation can be paradoxical: the relative increase of objective security often results in a subjective sense of insecurity (Daase, 2016). For example, when Osama Bin Laden was killed it did not result in a new sense of security for Americans, rather, a sense of insecurity grew, because a new perception of international risks emerged. To conclude, we need to consider that "being secure" is not a status that can be reached but that it is a perception of danger which can change.

Balzacq (2011) wrote the article 'a theory of securitisation: origins, core assumptions, and variants'. There he argues that every securitisation is an historical process that occurs between a set of events and their impacts on interactions, so securitisation is a product of a complex repertoire of causes. In the case of the securitisation of migration, it arised in a context marked by geopolitical changes following the end of the Cold War and broader social and political shifts associated with globalisation. Consequently, contemporary debates on migration and security reflect changes in both the nature of migration and how it is perceived (Aradau et al., 2010). Securitisation theory examines how a securitizing actor, through an act of speech, tries to convince an audience of the critical vulnerability of a referent object with such a threatening complex that extraordinary measures must be taken immediately, a process known as discursive politics (Balzacq, 2011). Security threats are a process of social construction (De Graaf & Zwierlein, 2013). In line with that, Esses et al (2013) argue that securitisation mainly focuses on framing asylum seekers as a risk and transforming traditional notions of security to portray them as "enemies at the gate," demanding urgent action to contain their movement. The media often contributes to this crisis mentality by portraying immigrants and refugees as invaders threatening Western nations. Next to that, political leaders, media outlets, and governments often depict immigration as a threat to national security, economic stability, and cultural identity. Bello (2020) argues that this perception of human mobility as a threat and crisis is socially constructed by both state and non-state actors.

By creating this threat, the moral judgement (3) in the securitisation frame legitimises the harsch and drastic remedies and improvements, such as securitising the borders (4). The securitisation frame can be very effective to do this, as Balzacq (2011) claims, if the audience is convinced by the claims made by the one using the securitisation frame they have the 'ability to enable the securitising actor to adopt measures in order to tackle the threat'. According to Williams (2015), the result of a securitising move is conditioned 'by the different capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats.'

Figure 3 shows a simplistic display of the theoretical framework for the securitisation frame of migration, this figure is completed within the discussion.



FIGURE 3 A SIMPLISTIC DISPLAY OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITIZATION FRAME OF MIGRATION

In conclusion, the securitisation frame of migration has become a dominant lens through which migration is viewed by the European Union. In line with Entmans' framing theory, the securitisation frame defines threats to the internal security as the problem (1) framing asylum seekers as possible risks to stability. Consequently, leading to stricter border policies as being the solution (4). The social construction of asylum seekers as enemies at the gate has contributed to a sense of fear and urgency, justifying immediate action.

Criminalisation frame of migration

The criminalisation frame of migration has played a key role in justifying migration policies centred on border control, detention, and shaping public discourse (Taylor, 2018). This trend has been particularly pronounced in Europe, where it has been driven by the reinforcement of border controls, tightening of entry conditions, and the increasing use of criminal penalties for migration-related offenses (Parkin, 2013). The process of criminalisation involves the application of criminal law, traditional law enforcement methods and a focus on prevention and pre-emption (Mitsilegas, 2015). Apart from that, this approach often excludes asylum seekers from legal protections and prioritises their removal, which raises significant concern for human rights (Mitsilegas, 2015).
Identical to the securitisation frame, the criminalisation frame also fits Entmans' framing theory. The criminalisation frame defines criminality and illegality (1) as an issue. Criminalisation refers to the process by which certain behaviours and actions are transformed into crimes through legislative enactment, reflecting the norms and values of society (McNamara et al., 2019). This process involves creating laws that define specific activities as illegal and often stipulate penalties or sanctions for those who engage in these behaviours. Various factors influence the decision to criminalise certain conduct, including public opinion, political agendas, and cultural beliefs. While the goal of criminalisation is to maintain public order and safety, it also raises ethical and practical concerns, such

as the potential for overreach, the impact on marginalised communities, and the effectiveness of criminal sanctions in deterring undesirable behaviour (Fassnidge, 2024).



FIGURE 4 A SIMPLISTIC DISPLAY OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CRIMINALISATION FRAME OF MIGRATION

Following Entman's theory this frame identifies the cause of the problem (2) as the people who perform illegal actions, unauthorised movements, overstaying visa's, hereby conveying the moral judgement (3) that these people are criminals and thus 'bad'. By portraying them as 'criminals', the audience perceives them as unjust or bad, influencing the moral judgement of the audience. Also, legitimising the remedies or improvements (4) that are being implemented, such as detention centers or forced returns for asylum seekers.

Pallida (2011) explains criminalisation as enveloping all the discourses, facts, and practices by police, judicial authorities, local governments, media, and parts of the population that hold immigrants responsible for a large share of criminal offences. In the context of migration, this is evident in the increasing use of detention centres, deportation proceedings, and stringent border control measures (Sandven & Scherz, 2022). Asylum seekers are often depicted as threats to national security and social cohesion (Ben-Arieh & Heins, 2020; Kubal, 2014; Sajjad, 2018), leading to policies and practices that criminalise them, where their main 'crime' is the lack of proper documentation (Sajjad, 2022), rather than recognizing them as individuals in need of assistance.

International law requires that refugees seeking international protection must be physically present within or at the border of a receiving state. To circumvent this obligation, states are increasingly resorting to establishing strict border regimes, such as constructing physical barriers like walls and fences on land, engaging in aggressive interception of asylum seekers at sea, and employing illegal practices of direct or indirect refoulement (Ben-Arieh & Heins, 2020). For example, in 2004, Member States agreed to abolish the issuing of visas for asylum reasons at their embassies, creating a crucial obstable to reach EU territory safely (Strik, 2022).

Additionally, framing migration as a criminal act can lead to discriminatory treatment, xenophobia, and violations of human rights, while legitimising actions or policies against refugees and asylum seekers (Mentasti, 2022; Sandven & Scherz, 2022).

In line with this is Jakobs (1985), he suggests that the possibility of someone becoming a threat increases their chances of being rejected and controlled more strictly through security measures. In response, some states and the European Union have introduced tougher measures and grown more intolerant towards irregularities, often confusing victims with perpetrators. This has led to a general

atmosphere of suspicion, harsher policies, and greater intolerance towards non-national offenders (Guia, 2012).

Figure 4 shows a simplistic display of the theoretical framework for the securitisation frame of migration this figure is completed within the discussion.

To conclude the criminalisation frame fits Entmans' theory where the problem is mostly defined to be the criminality and illegality (1) and in response stricter policies and harsher migration law as the solution (4). The criminalisation frame frames asylum seekers as criminals, by creating this security threat, states justify stringent border controls, detention and deportation measures. While intended to maintain public order, the criminalisation of migration risks to target marginalised groups and fostering an atmosphere of suspicion and intolerance. Consequently, the focus on criminality neglects the obligations of states to protect vulnerable populations, while it legitimises harsh and strict responses to asylum seekers.

Externalisation frame of migration

As Alison Mountz (2020, p. describes in her latest book (*The death of asylum)*; 'border deaths are increasing at alarming rates. While many mourn this loss of life, another death goes unnoticed: the death of asylum itself' (Mountz, 2020, p.2). At the south eastern EU borders, studies show that the right to seek asylum has been severely restricted. Externalisation leads to human rights violations, is costly and hard to measure for success (Bousiou, 2022).

Following Entmans' framing theory the externalisation frame mostly defines migration to the European Union as the problem (1), causes for this are a lack of opportunities in countries of origin or unstable countries of origin (2). By framing these externalisation practices as being better for the asylum seekers themselves, think of ' shelter in the region', the moral judgement will tell the audience that externalisation is something positive (3). This makes the logic solution, externalisation (4). Externalisation is the process where migration control and asylum processing move from destination countries to transit or origin countries. Pijnenburg (2024) states that this mostly, but not only, happens on the line of the Global North and the Global South, with the North trying to contain asylum seekers in the South. Externalisation agreements mainly function to deter asylum seekers from arriving (Hathaway & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2015).

Since 1997, asylum seekers' rights in the EU have become detailed and protective, including the right to an asylum procedure, legal aid, appeal, and social rights for those granted protection. However, these rights only apply once asylum seekers reach EU territory. Through externalisation agreements the EU has created more obstacles for asylum seekers to reach EU territory and to make use of these rights (Strik, 2022).

The concept of externalisation became common in the 2000s to describe migration control measures affecting refugees taken outside a country's territory. Although the term is relatively new, such practices date back to the early twentieth century, with some like carrier sanctions existing since the eighteenth century. Major developments in externalisation included the shift to immigration controls and visa requirements (Pijnenburg, 2024).

Visa regimes are classic examples but are now joined by other strategies (Strik & Robbesom, 2024). Other examples of externalisation include visa regimes, carrier sanctions to prevent boarding without visas, 'border preclearance' at airports outside national territory, and high seas interdictions to prevent further international travel by persons who have already started their journeys (Nicolosi, 2024).

EU Member State manage migration and enforce immigration policies outside their borders, collaborating with other countries or non-state actors. This can involve outsourcing border control, forming agreements to intercept asylum seekers and providing incentives for other countries to reduce migration. These practices shift migration management away from the receiving state to others,

assuming human rights obligations only apply within their own and in this way, no harm is done by the EU (Nicolosi, 2024).

Over time, reliance on third states has increased, states now heavily rely on third-country cooperation to keep unwanted asylum seekers away, effectively externalising their borders (Poméon, 2023). The EU has eighteen readmission agreements obliging countries to readmit their national and third-country nationals, and cooperates on border control and fighting smuggling and trafficking, and more are coming (Strik, 2022). Criticism of these externalisation strategies mostly relate to the potential human rights violations by third-country authorities (Strik & Robbesom, 2024).

Using marginal island territories, states can avoid international protection obligations, creating spaces where rights are suspended. Providing asylum in another state's territory under an emergency or state of exception breaches that state's sovereignty (Bousiou, 2022). In the EU, Triandafyllidou (2014) explains that the Canary Islands, Lampedusa and Linosa and the Aegean Islands act as 'gatekeepers' for the rest of the European Union, forming the external border of the European Union.



FIGURE 5 A SIMPLISTIC DISPLAY OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITIZATION FRAME OF MIGRATION

Figure 5 shows a simplistic display of the theoretical framework for the securitisation frame of migration, this figure is completed within the discussion.

In conclusion, the externalisation frame follows Entmans' framing theory and sees migration to the EU as the problem and logically sees externalisation as the solution for this problem. Consequences of this frame are concerns about the violations of human rights. While externalisation is often framed as a solution for asylum seekers itself by preventing dangerous journeys and providing 'regional protection', it fundamentally shifts the responsibility for asylum away from the European Union and to the origin and countries in the region, often at the expense of human rights. By creating barriers to access and relying on third-country cooperation, the EU distances itself from its international protection obligations.

Methodology

The aim of this research is to equip the reader with knowledge that will enable them to critically investigate claims made by politicians, experts, and interest groups and see how the framing being used reforms the perceiving of information they tell. This thesis employs a deductive qualitative analysis, starting with pre-existing theoretical frameworks and concepts derived from framing theory to guide the data analysis.

Research design

This thesis employs a frame analysis, following Entman's framing theory, which identified four key functions of frames: problem definitions, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation. These functions are used to code and categorise the EC official communications.

Frame analysis is a methodology used to identify and understand how content is organized and interpreted by receivers of the frame (Giorgi, 2017; Koenig, 2006; Lingström & Marais, 2012). In this thesis, a framing analysis is employed, grounded in Entman's framing theory. According to Entman (1993) framing involves the selection and salience of certain aspects of a perceived reality to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/ or treatment recommendation. This thesis employs a deductive approach, meaning that it begins with predefined frames based on Entman's framing theory and existing literature on migration framing. These frames are treated as hypotheses, and the analysis seeks to confirm whether and how they are present in the. By using a deductive approach, this thesis tests the predetermined frames on the EC Communications, allowing for a focused and structured analysis.

This thesis employs manual coding to identify instances of the three dominant frames: securitisation, criminalisation and externalisation. The documents have been analysed and marked instances where the discourse or sentence matched one of the frames. The securitisation frame has been coded for instances where migration is presented as a threat, instances where security and protection measures are emphasised and instances where an enemy is created. The criminalisation frame has been coded for instances where migration is portrayed as a criminal activity and the externalisation frame has been identified where responsibilities for migration management are shifted to third countries or where border control is outsourced. Table 1 shows a schematic display of the way the frames have been coded.

Frame	**What?**	**Codes**
Securitisation	Phrases and words to emphasise threat, security measures and protection, to create an enemy	surveillance technology, biometric data collection, border securitisation, migration restrictions/ management, visa regulations, return, threat
Criminalisation	Phrases and words that associates migration with illegal activities and criminal behaviour	Undocumented migration, unauthorised movements, human smuggling, overstaying visas, irregular migration, illegal stay, legality, 'good migration'
Externalisation	Phrases and words that outsource responsibility, cooperation with third countries and border control outside of the EU.	Border externalisation, third-country agreements, cooperation with transit countries, development cooperation, legal pathways, origin countries politics, root causes

After the text has been segmented and the policy documents have been divided into smaller text units where these frames might appear, the data was broken down into the specific functions of Entman's framing theory (see appendix).

Once the coding was completed the data underwent the analysis, this thesis has used an interpretive analysis. A deeper qualitative analysis explores how these frames are constructed and linked to the three themes of populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative. Hereby the four functions of the frames are separated. This will focus on understanding the political and social implications of the identified frames.

Documents

The data for this analysis is drawn from the official Communications of the EC on the European Agenda on Migration (2015) and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (2023). The primary data sources are the official communications from the EC on the European Agenda on Migration (2015) and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (2020). Since the EC is the executive agency of the European Union, it is responsible for the development, implementation and managing of EU policy, law and funding programs (European Commission, n.d.). This entails that the documents of the EC contain the implementation and management of the EU policies.

Volunteering at Offene Arme e.V.

For this research, I have also conducted some general background information in the field. I have volunteered for a month on the island of Chios at Offene Arme e.V.. In this month I have broadened my background knowledge of migration policies on the external border of the European Union. I did not conduct specific data but got a taste of how migration policies get transformed into real life.

Offene Arme e.V. provides a free shop where asylum seekers that just arrive on the island can come to shop for clothes and other non-food items. It is the only non-food distributer on the island and plays a significant role in providing the residents of the camp with clothes, baby baskets, transportation to the hospital and providing doctor visits for ultra sounds

During my time there, I was working in the warehouse, to organise all the clothes, as well as being active in the shop where I supported people with their shopping. During my time on Chios, we performed ‘Summer Distributions’ at Vial Camp, the refugee camp on the island. The summer distributions entailed that we went to the camp and set up a pop-up shop, close to the camp, for different age categories. Unfortunately, due to regulations we could not enter the camp to do the distributions, so we set up the pop-up shop on a street close to the camp. We started with children from the age of 0 to 3 years old, then continued with the children of the age of 4 to 7, consequently the children for the age of 8 to 12, and lastly the children from the age of 13 to 17. After the children’s distributions we then continued with the distributions for women older than the age of 18, and finished with the biggest distribution of the men above the age of 18. Next to these, summer clothing distribution, we also did a sanitary pad and diaper distribution. During these distributions, my role was mostly to answer questions about how the distributions take place and give out numbers to make a fair line. These moments were perfect to have interactions with the asylum seekers, in these moments I did not ask questions but while talking to people, some would share some information that was interesting for this research. Next to that, seeing the camp and its surroundings, speaking with my colleagues and with the asylum seekers from the camp gave a general impression of the real life implications of migration policies in the European Union.

Discussion

In this discussion, we will critically assess in what way the frames employed by the EC contribute to the themes of populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative.

Securitisation of migration frame

The securitisation frame of migration in the Agenda of migration and the New Pact of Migration and Asylum contributes in several ways to the three big themes of populism, crisis management and Fortress Europe. This section explains the ways the frame is structured in these documents following Entman's four characteristics of framing and how they connect to one or more of the themes. The first characteristic regarding Entman's framing theory, that is the problem defined by the European Commission, is explained using phrases and quotations of the Agenda of Migration and the New Pact of Migration and Asylum. After, the second characteristic, namely the ones that get the blame for the problem, is clarified, also supported by phrases and quotes. Thirdly, the moral judgment placed on the receiver of the frame is, supported by quotations and phrases, highlighted. At last, the remedies proposed by the EU are featured. In addition, these characteristics are linked to one of the themes of populism, Fortress Europe and crisis management, to explain the way they link and how the frames contribute to these themes. Figure 6 shows a visualization of this section, using the theoretical model and shows what characteristics of Entman's framing theory are linked to the three main themes.



FIGURE 6 SIMPLISTIC VISUALISATION OF THE COMPLETED VERSION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITISATION FRAME OF MIGRATION

Firstly, the problem in Entman's framing theory is defined in the securitisation frame as irregular migration being a threat to internal security, the following quote shows the attitude towards asylum and migration of the documents, as if it is a threat to security and overwhelming the current systems. "The EU should not wait until the pressure is intolerable to act: the volumes of arrivals mean that the capacity of local reception and processing facilities is already stretched thin" (Agenda, p.10). This quotation implies migration as a threat by emphasizing that 'the EU should not wait until the pressure is intolerable to act', implying that systems will be overthrown if nothing is done, creating a sense of

urgency. It adds more urgency to it by stating that the capacities are ‘already stretched thin’ and creates a feeling of fear, urgency and threat. Basically, scaring the audience and contributing to the migration crisis narrative, wherein a crisis is always lurking.

Next to the threat of irregular migration, that in the documents is the main problem, more problems come to the eye, when dissecting this main problem. Such as lack of sufficient border control, non-functioning migration policy, big numbers of people who are still going to come to the EU, overpopulated detention centres and unauthorized movements. The following quotation displays these problems perfectly and by the use of ‘continue to face’ and ‘still’ the emphasis is being put on the duration of the perceived troubles of migration. “While some Member States continue to face the challenge of external border management, others must cope with large-scale arrivals by land or sea, or overpopulated reception centres, and others still face high numbers of unauthorized movements of migrants” (New Pact, p.2).

In conclusion, the problem of the securitisation frame in the documents is that irregular migration is a threat to internal security, creating a sense of urgency and fear. The documents highlight the risk of overwhelmed systems and reinforce the idea of a ‘migration crisis’ to justify strict measures.

Secondly, the Agenda and the New Pact blame abusers of the systems for the threat of irregular migration. Abusers are seen as asylum seekers themselves, especially the ones coming via irregular routes, but also rejected asylum seekers who do not return, and lastly, smugglers who provide ways to enter the European Union. Asylum seekers in the documents are often indicated with phrases like ‘flows of arrivals’, ‘migrant arrivals’, ‘mixed flows of refugees and migrants’, ‘visa overstayers’, ‘unsuccessful asylum claimants’.

By describing asylum seekers with these phrases, the documents dehumanize the asylum seekers and create a sense that we are not speaking about humans but about numbers. This makes it easier to think about them as threat and adds to a populist ideas where asylum seekers need to stay outside the EU borders. The following quote uses active language to blame the asylum seekers for ‘eroding citizens' trust in the whole system’. “Currently about a third of people ordered to return from Member States actually leave. This erodes citizens trust in the whole system of asylum and migration management and acts as an incentive for irregular migration*”* (New Pact, p.8).

Next to that, smugglers are also blamed in the documents. There is a lot of emphasis on ‘tackling’ and ‘targeting’ human smugglers and smuggling networks. By portraying smugglers as abusers of the system, it is easy to forget that in most cases smugglers are providing routes to the EU that otherwise are not possible. Currently, legal pathways include, humanitarian admission, community sponsorship, labor mobility, student scholarships, family admissions, and humanitarian visas (van Selm, 2020). For most of these pathways a passport and visa is required. Asylum seekers are not always in possession of a passport, or a passport that will be approved for visas and thus is irregular migration the only option to reach Europe. The fact to target smugglers is adding to Fortress Europe by not providing any legal routes for asylum seekers but blaming the smugglers for finding ‘gaps’ in the border.

Concluding, both the Agenda and the New Pact shift the blame for irregular migration onto asylum seekers and smugglers while dehumanizing and framing them as threats. Smugglers are blamed for exploiting gaps in the system ignoring the reality that they often provide the only available routes for asylum seekers. This focus on smugglers adds to Fortress Europe, neglecting the lack of legal routes to the EU for asylum seekers.

Thirdly, it is difficult to isolate the moral judgment because it is also embedded within other characteristics of Entman’s framing theory. However, the moral judgment that is conveyed within the securitisation frame of migration is in line with the distinction that is being made in the ideology of Fortress Europe, that wants to frantically regulate who comes in and who stays out. This is done by

the distinction made between the desired migrant and undesired asylum seeker. With words like ‘no right to stay’, ‘those not in need of protection’, ‘bona fide refugees’ and ‘the most vulnerable refugees’ the distinction between desired and undesired is being made. It creates a feeling where the asylum seekers calls it upon itself whether or not he or she is granted asylum and in this way legitimizes what happens with rejected asylum seekers. Feeding into this sense of distinction is the need for coastguards that is being emphasized in the documents for both ‘saving lives and securitising maritime borders’. This adds to the contradiction and fastidiousness of the EU where some asylum seekers are welcome but others are neglected and undesirable.

To add to this, there is another way in which the moral judgment is conveyed which adds to the populist idea of migration being a threat. The following quotation shows the threat the securitisation frame of migration poses, it emphasizes the duration of migration and by using words like ‘major’ and ‘global’ it emphasizes the scale of migration, creating the feeling that it is way bigger than we can ever handle. This contributes to a populist ideology where we have to act now, and where the focus is fully on the downsides, disregarding the possibility for positive sides of migration. “….. all suggest that migration will remain a major phenomenon and global challenge for the years to come. Migration policies that work well are in the interest of partner countries, the EU, and refugees and migrants themselves” (New Pact, p. 29).

In conclusion, the moral judgment conveyed within the securitisation frame of migration, as outlined in Entman’s framing theory, shapes the perception of migration by distinguishing between desired and undesired asylum seekers through specific language and contributes to Fortress Europe. This legitimises the exclusion and treatment of rejected asylum seekers. Additionally, the portrayal of migration as a large-scale, enduring threat aligns with populist narratives, reinforcing urgency and fear, that focus on negative aspects of migration.

Lastly, the final characteristic in Entman’s framing theory are the remedies the securitisation frame of migration proposes. Within the securitisation of migration frame the overall remedy proposed is the enlarged securitisation of the external borders of the EU. This is proposed to be done by creating ‘Smart Borders’, pre-entry and faster screening, a bigger role and budget for Frontex, the ‘Hotspot Approach’, and returning people before they enter EU territory. Next to that, both the Agenda and the New Pact are focused on a stronger external EU border with a bigger role and budget for Frontex. In the New Pact, the focus for a stronger border policy is legitimized by emphasizing the internal freedom within the Schengen area. Legitimizing these new and stricter measures is done by imposing measures that will tackle the created enforcer of the framed problem, in this case the asylum seekers and smugglers that facilitate and act in irregular migration towards the EU. Techniques used to achieve this are to create a feeling of threat, urgency, the sense that some asylum seekers bring it upon themselves to be treated this way and especially in the New Pact the feeling to be ready for possible future crises.

The following quotation shows the way the EU legitimises its own policies. The use of ‘bona fide third country travellers’ implies that there are other third country travellers that are not ‘bona fide’ or trustworthy. This adds to the ideology of Fortress Europe where there is a distinction between the people that the European Union should help, and those abusing the system.

> A new phase of would come with the ‘Smart Borders’ initiative to increase the efficiency of border crossings, facilitating crossings for the large majority of ‘bona fide’ third country travellers, whilst at the same time strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionally. (Agenda, p.11)

The next sentence adds to this, the ‘fight’ against irregular migration is being highlighted creating a sense that irregular migration is a threat that needs to be fought against no matter what. This reinforces the sense that the EU needs to be protected from the ‘other’, adding to xenophobic and

populist ideologies. This perceived threat was also visible on Chios where Vial camp is eight kilometers away from Chios town and there were no busses that drove from the camp to the town. This reinforces the idea of asylum seekers being a threat to society and thus need to be distanced.

The documents also create a sense of a lurking crisis, adding to the migration crisis narrative. In the following quotation it is visible to see that the European Commission legitimizes its own policies by creating a sense of a lurking crisis.

> The rules of engagement agreed for Triton operations should be seen as the model for future action on the whole of the external land and sea border. Every crisis will be different but the EU needs to heed the lesson and be prepared to act in anticipation of a crisis, not just in reaction. (Agenda, p.11)

The fact that the European Commission takes Triton[3] as a model for future action for border control is problematic since it was run by Frontex, which has a border control mandate and as a main priority. By appointing a 'crisis' in the next sentence, it legitimizes this fact, neglecting the fact that less lives are being saved in the sea because of Frontex. This contributes to the migration crisis narrative where extreme and short-run measures are being approved under the guise of crisis. The connotation that it is necessary to be prepared to act in anticipation implies that a crisis can happen anytime and is always lurking. In the New Pact, the focus on crisis is even more evident and with phrases like 'the EU will always need to be ready for the unexpected', 'the EU must be ready to address situations of crisis and force majeure with resilience and flexibility', 'it will set out the array of measures that can be used to address crises related to a large number of irregular migrants'. All in all, the remedies proposed by the European Commission are justified by portraying irregular migration as a threat and creating a distinction, reinforced by a crisis narrative that legitimizes stricter controls. The framing contributes to Fortress Europe distinguishing between trustworthy and untrustworthy asylum seekers perpetuating xenophobic and populist ideologies. The focus on crisis preparedness further legitimises extreme border policies under the constant anticipation of future migration challenges.

In conclusion, the securitisation frame of migration frame, contributes to the three overarching themes; populism, the migration crisis narrative and Fortress Europe. Firstly, the documents define irregular migration as a threat to the EU's internal security, emphasizing strained capacities and a sense of urgency, contributing to the migration crisis narrative. The problem that is constructed in the documents is the fear that systems will be overwhelmed, reinforcing a populist sense of urgency and fear. Secondly, the documents place blame on asylum seekers and smugglers, portraying them as abusers of the system. Asylum seekers are dehumanised turning individuals into numbers. Smugglers are framed as facilitators of irregular migration, yet their role in providing the only routes for asylum seekers is overlooked. This supports the populist narrative by casting asylum seekers as threats, while further justifying Fortress Europe by targeting those who attempt to breach its borders irregularly. Thirdly, a clear moral judgment is made within the documents mostly based on the distinguishing between 'real' asylum seekers and those undeserving of asylum. This division aligns with populist ideologies that see asylum seekers as a threat to cultural identity. The moral judgment legitimises policies that exclude certain groups from the EU, reinforcing Fortress Europe. Lastly, the overall remedy proposed is the securitisation of borders. The documents highlight the emphasis on security measures, portraying irregular migration as something to be fought against, contributing to populist ideologies. Moreover, the focus on crisis readiness reinforces the migration crisis narrative and legitimises extreme border policies.

[3] Operation Triton was a mission by Frontex and it aimed to monitor and control the external borders of the EU (*Joint Operation Triton,* 206)

Criminalisation frame of migration

The criminalisation frame of migration in the Agenda of migration and the New Pact of Migration and Asylum contributes in several ways to the three big themes of populism, crisis management and Fortress Europe. This section analyses how this frame is structured in these documents, using Entman's four characteristics of framing, and demonstrates their connection to one or more of these themes. First, the analysis explores how the European Commission defines the problem drawing on specific phrases and quotations of the Agenda on Migration and the New Pact. Furthermore, the second characteristic, identifying who is to blame for the problem, is examined, again using quotations for support. Third, the moral judgment implied by the framing gets highlighted, with relevant examples from the documents. Finally, the proposed solutions or remedies put forward by the EU is discussed. Throughout this analysis, these four framing characteristics are linked to the themes of populism, migration crisis narrative, and Fortress Europe, illustrating how the framing contributes to each theme. Figure 7 shows a simplified visualisation of the characteristics of Entman's framing theory and which one of them connects to one or more of the three main themes.



FIGURE 7 A SIMPLISTIC VISUALISATION OF THE COMPLETED VERSION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CRIMINALISATION FRAME OF MIGRATION

To start with, the documents define the first characteristic of Entman's framing theory, namely the problem, within the criminalisation of migration frame as irregular migration being a crime. This problem consists of illegality, unauthorized movements, illegal border crossings, but also the lack of effective returns causing people to stay and live their lives in illegality. In the documents irregular migration is framed as a problem and stated to be a crime, just as everyone operating outside the current migration and asylum system but smuggling is also framed as something negative and criminal. In the next quotation it is clear to see that 'a robust fight' against irregular migration is needed, implying that irregular migration is a big problem.

> As outlined by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines, a robust fight against irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing Europe's external borders must be paired with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration. (Agenda, p.6)

Consequently, the largest blame for irregular migration is given to smugglers. Within the second characteristic of Entman's framing model, smugglers are kept fully responsible for irregular migration towards the EU within the criminalisation frame of migration. Neglecting the lack of legal pathways for asylum seekers and their own agency and shifting responsibility from the European Union to smugglers. Smugglers are framed as criminals that don't care about people or human lives. This is clearly visible in the next quotation where smuggling is explained to be a crime with 'scant respect for human life in the pursuit of profit'. It states that the criminal activity of smuggling damages the humanitarian and migration management objectives of the EU. De Haas (2023) however, argues that the lack of legal pathways for asylum seekers creates an opportunity and business model for smugglers. In this logic, it means that smugglers don't want to be known for how many people have died on their journeys since this leads to less customers, which refutes the way smuggling is presented within the documents. Adding to this is the fact that legal pathways are most of the times not accessible for asylum seekers due to a unfavorable passport or simply the absence of a passport, stimulating smuggling towards the European Union (de Haas, 2023). The portrayal of smugglers in the documents contribute to Fortress Europe in a way where there are not enough legal ways to enter the European Union if you're from particular places on the globe. "smuggling involves the organized exploitation of migrants, showing scant respect for human life in the pursuit of profit. This criminal activity therefore damages both the humanitarian and the migration management objectives of the EU" (New Pact, p.16).

Aside from smugglers, the documents also blame other people for irregular migration, namely the asylum seekers that get rejected or are likely to get rejected. Indicated in the documents with 'applicants misleading the authorities', 'people who do not comply', 'those not in need of protection', 'irregular migrants', 'visa overstayers', 'failed asylum claimants who do not return'. All these terms emphasize the fact that they don't deserve to receive asylum or protection and contribute to the distinction between the desired and undesirable asylum seekers as made in Fortress Europe. The next quotation portrays the way the documents frame people who are rejected and don't return as a problem. The quotation actively blames them for 'corroding confidence in the system' and blames them for the fact that 'accepted asylum seekers' have a hard time integrating.

> Unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity constitute a serious problem. This corrodes confidence in the system. It offers strong arguments for those looking to criticise or stigmatise migration. It makes it harder to integrate those migrants staying in the EU as of right. (Agenda, p.7)

The blame that is given to 'unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity' adds to a populist ideology where asylum seekers are framed to actively destroy the solidarity within the EU.

Another example of how the 'false' asylum seekers are being blamed is visible in the next quotation. "Asylum claims with low chances of being accepted should be examined rapidly without requiring legal entry to the Member State's territory"(New Pact, p.5). This frames the 'asylum claims with low chances of being accepted', so asylum seekers trying to request asylum, as dangerous by stating that they should not enter Member State's territory, implying that they will cause trouble. Examining the application of specific groups of people outside the EU contributes to Fortress Europe and to populist ideologies where we need to be protected from a certain group of people.

In conclusion, the blame is given primarily to smugglers and undesirable asylum seekers. This narrative reinforces a populist ideology, portraying smugglers as profit-driven criminals and rejected asylum seekers as threat to societal solidarity. However, as de Haas (2023) argues, these restrictive policies contribute to the smuggling business by limiting legal avenues for asylum, ultimately strengthening Fortress Europe and exacerbating the very challenges they claim to address.

Thirdly, the moral judgment that is being hinted at is that irregular migration is criminal and thus dreadful. This is being done by creating the feeling that asylum seekers misuse the system, the emphasis on legal migration and the need to destroy smugglers.

So to start with, the feeling is being created that some asylum seekers trick the system, the following quotation displays this moral judgment very well. “This has a direct impact on asylum seekers who seek to "asylum shop", but also on EU public opinion: it encourages a sense that the current system is fundamentally unfair” (Agenda, p.12). The term ‘asylum shop’ carries a negative connotation, suggesting that asylum seekers are opportunistically selecting countries rather than genuinely needing protection. This portrayal can undermine the legitimacy of their claims and paint them as abusers of the system. The fact that ‘asylum shop’ is placed in quotation marks, suggests a dismissive attitude. It is implying that seeking asylum in multiple countries is akin to shopping, minimizing the serious situation of the asylum seeker itself. By linking asylum seekers’ actions to disbelief in the system, as is being portrayed in the phrase: ‘it encourages a sense that the current system is fundamentally unfair’, it implies that asylum seekers are the ones responsible for undermining trust in the asylum system. This is in line with populist ideologies where asylum seekers are deliberately trying to ruin the EU system.

Next to that, the moral judgment is being reinforced by the focus on ‘legal’ migration and the emphasis on the need for ‘legal’ migrants. In both the documents there are chapters about how to reinforce legal migration and developing legal pathways to Europe, stimulating legal migration and making the European Union an attractive destination for migrants. This creates the sense that people don’t need to migrate irregularly because there are enough options. This neglects the truth that most people don’t have a choice and are not able to come to the European Union via these legal routes, contributing to Fortress Europe where the European Union makes it easy for some people to come but tries to make it impossible for others. Also, the documents praise legal migrants and emphasize the need for them to integrate and not be discriminated against. Contributing to the sense that irregular migration is a lousy form of migration, this on its turn contributes to a populist ideology where irregular migrants are seeking to abuse the system.

Another way the documents convey a moral judgment is to describe the way the smugglers should be treated as: ‘tackling smugglers’, ‘targeting smugglers’, ‘dismantling smugglers’, ‘to crack down smugglers and traffickers’. This contributes to Fortress Europe in a way where the European Union wants to regulate who comes in and who doesn’t. In the following quote the moral judgment about smugglers is displayed very clearly, where ‘profit is put before human life’. Stating that it ends in ‘deep disappointment’ implies that irregular migration does not have a lot of benefits for the asylum seekers themselves. “There are many different motivations behind irregular migration. But often, it ends in deep disappointment. The journey is often far more dangerous than expected, often at the mercy of criminal networks who put profit before human life” (Agenda, p.7).

In conclusion, the moral judgment within the criminalisation frame of migration is that irregular migration is criminal and harmful, reinforcing a negative view on asylum seekers. Using terms that imply that asylum seekers abuse the system, fostering distrust in asylum processes. The emphasis on legal migration further bolsters the notion that irregular migration is unnecessary and undesirable. Completely ignoring the limited access to legal pathways for many, leading to populist views where asylum seekers are framed to be ruining the systems. Additionally, the portrayal of smugglers as exploitative criminals reinforces the strict regulation of migration, contributing to Fortress Europe where only certain individuals are qualified as worthy of entry.

Lastly, the remedies that are being proposed to tackle irregular migration are mostly focused on legislative measures to criminalize those who participate in or facilitate irregular migration. Different measures are planned to increase the hunt on smugglers, imply an effective return system and use IT technology to track irregular migration.

To start with, especially in the New Pact the return system is emphasized. In the next quotation, where the New Pact discusses the return system of the EU, the way the EU legitimizes its own policies is to create the feeling that some asylum seekers are dangerous and criminals. By using the phrase 'to use detention for public order and security concerns' it creates the feeling that the asylum seekers are criminals and need to be locked up. Backed up by the terms 'absconding' and 'unauthorised movements' that have strong negative connotations. Where absconding implies a deliberate attempt to evade authorities and 'unauthorised movements' suggests illegality and disorder. "It [the Return Directive] would help and prevent and reduce absconding and unauthorised movements, with common criteria to assess each case and the possibility to use detention for public order and security concerns." (New Pact, p.9).

Next to that, the proposed remedies for smugglers are to step up legislative measures. To intensify systems to detect, prosecute and execute them. In both the Agenda and the New Pact the fight against smuggling is a big theme, accelerating in the New Pact. The next quotation shows a good example of how it is legitimised to install these harscher measures. "Existing rules to clamp down on migrant smuggling have proven an effective legal framework to combat those who facilitate unauthorised entry, transit and residence" (New Pact, p. 17). Describing rules as 'effective' validates and legitimizes the stringent rules and actions taken against smuggling, since the idea is given that unauthorized entry and smuggling are significant problems that need to be addressed through strict legal measures. With the phrase 'clamp down on migrant smuggling' a forceful aggressive tone is transferred to the reader. This choice of words conveys a sense of urgency and severity, which frames migrant smuggling as a serious criminal activity that requires harsh measures. Next to that, it contributes to a migration crisis narrative where migrant smuggling needs to be tackled before it gets out of line. Furthermore, the word 'combat' introduces a militaristic and confrontational tone, emphasizing the need to fight against those who help asylum seekers, enter, transit or reside. It criminalizes their actions but also indirectly those of asylum seekers themselves by focusing on the illegality of their movement. Adding to Fortress Europe, in a way where it is illegal to enter without having permission of the EU itself.

All in all, the proposed remedies within the criminalisation frame of migration heavily focus on legislative measures to criminalize both smugglers and asylum seekers. By emphasizing an effective return system and the use of detention for public order it is being legitimised. Next to that, smugglers are portrayed as criminals, legitimising harscher measures such as detention. This contributes to Fortress Europe, where migration is tightly controlled and unauthorised entry is increasingly criminalised.

Finally to conclude, the criminalisation frame of migration is tied to the themes of populism, migration crisis narrative and Fortress Europe. First of all, irregular migration is framed as a criminal issue being equated to illegal activities. This aligns with populist ideologies, which emphasize the need to protect 'the people' from external threats. Secondly, the blame is largely placed on smugglers, who are portrayed as profit-driven criminals exploiting asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers and those overstaying their visas and are depicted as purposely undermining public trust in the system. This interpretation feeds into a populist ideology of the 'other' deliberately trying to destabilize the EU and shifts responsibility away from structural issues like the lack of legal migration pathways for many asylum seekers. Thirdly, the moral judgment within these documents frames irregular migration as inherently criminal. Asylum seekers are often painted as individuals seeking to abuse the system, furthering the narrative that they are responsible for the erosion of trust in the EU policies. Smugglers, described as valuing profit over human life, reinforce the idea that irregular migration is a dangerous and exploitative process. This evaluation strengthens the populist stance asylum seekers ruining the system. Lastly, the proposed remedies focus on tightening legislative measures, enhancing border controls, and expanding the return system. These measures are presented as necessary to maintain public order, and contribute to the solidifying of Fortress Europe. The measures create a highly regulated and exclusionary migration system that reflects the populist desires to maintain cultural and political purity while addressing the perceived crisis of migration. So, the criminalisation frame in the

Agenda and the New Pact is reinforcing populist fears and strengthening Fortress Europe, which seeks to limit migration while emphasizing control, security and exclusion.

Externalisation of migration frame

The externalisation frame of migration in the Agenda and the New Pact contributes in different ways to the themes of populism, migration crisis narrative and Fortress Europe. This section explains how these documents construct this framing by applying Entman's four framing elements, highlighting their connection to these overarching themes. First, the analysis focusses on how the European Union defines the problem, using quotations from the two documents. Secondly, this section considers who is identified as responsible for this issue, once again supported by relevant quotations. Third, the moral judgment embedded within this framing is analysed, with examples drawn from the documents. Finally, the solutions proposed by the EU are discussed. Throughout this analysis, the four framing elements are linked to the themes of populism, the migration crisis narrative and Fortress Europe, showing how the externalisation frame of migration reinforces these concepts. Figure 7 shows a simplistic visualisation of the characteristics of Entman's framing theory and which of them connects to one or more of the three main themes.



FIGURE 8 SIMPLISTIC VISUALISATION OF THE COMPLETED VERSION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EXTERNALISATION FRAME OF MIGRATION

First of all, the problem of the externalisation frame of migration is defined as irregular migration. Within this frame irregular migration is not seen as a European internal issue but as stemming from what is seen as 'root causes' beyond Europe's borders. The documents define the root causes as poverty, insecurity, civil war, prosecution, climate change, inequality and unemployment in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe and identified as central issues driving irregular migration and forced migration. This aligns with the populist ideas where the European Union is a victim of external factors that cause migration, rather than a co-operator to it. Reinforcing the sense that migration is out of control and that action is needed. In the next quotation it is clear to see that the European Union sees irregular migration as the problem, where this statement frames migration as a consequence of enduring, complex global problems. The quotation implies that migration is not only for the European Union to solve but more widespread. "Many of the root causes of migration lie deep in global issues which the EU has been trying to address for many years"(Agenda, p.5).

Secondly, within the externalisation frame, the line between the problem defined and the blame that is being given is narrow. Within the documents, blame is placed also mostly on the root causes of migration but also to the countries of origin and the lack of cooperation between the EU and third

countries, but always in combination with the emphasis on the root causes of migration. Nevertheless, this suggests that poverty, insecurity, instability, climate change, lack of opportunities and poor governance in those regions cause migration flows. The blame that is given to the root causes suggests that the solution lies in improving conditions outside the EU, this externalises the responsibility for migration management on external factors and regions, suggesting that the countries of origin need to be fixed to prevent migration towards the EU. Next to that, it contributes to the Fortress Europe mentality, where the European Union stands as one strong unity against the 'other', controlling who comes in and who cannot, implying that it is easier to address these issues before they lead to migration is more effective than dealing with asylum seekers after arriving in the EU. The following quotation shows the focus on externalisation: "Regional labour mobility schemes encouraging South-South mobility can bring an important contribution to local development" (Agenda, p.16). It demonstrates the way the EU uses development cooperation as one measure to prevent people from trying to reach the EU. Especially the 'South- South mobility' shows this, the EU is trying to prevent 'South- North mobility'. Contributing to the Fortress Europe mentality by focusing on South South mobility, the possibility of South-North migration is being implicitly neglected.

Furthermore, the following quotation portrays the belief that solving the root causes of migration is easier than dealing with asylum seekers "economic opportunity, particularly for young people, is often the best way to reduce the pressure for irregular migration" (New Pact, p.19). Striking to see that, as plausible as this may sound, it is not as easy as it seems. People migrate to find better opportunities, but investing in the 'root causes' of migration does not minimize migration towards the European Union. As de Haas (2023) states, the more developed a country becomes, the more its people start to migrate. More money generally means more possibilities and opportunities to look beyond their village or country (De Haas, 2023).

In conclusion, the externalisation of the migration frame defines the problem as well as places the blame on the root causes of migration. The documents frame this approach as a solution to prevent migration flows and at the same time externalises responsibility, shifting the focus away from internal EU policies. The reliance on development cooperation contributes to Fortress Europe, where efforts are made to manage migration before it reaches the external borders of the European Union. However, research suggests that addressing root causes does not necessarily reduce migration, as economic development may increase mobility by providing people with more resources to migrate.

Thirdly, the externalisation frame of migration conveys a moral judgment where the European Union is a humanitarian, heroic actor and where collaboration with third countries is necessary to be able to deal with migration. The EU frames its actions as morally necessary to address the root causes of migration. This humanitarian commitment is shown by the provision of 'over 1 billion in humanitarian aid' and its role as the 'world's largest development donor'. The EU's approach, described as being guided by 'principles of humanity, impartially, neutrality, and independence' suggests that the European Union has an ethical obligation to assist displaced people and prevent human suffering caused by irregular migration. This narrative positions the EU as an altruistic actor addressing global inequalities and offering protection to those in need while promoting the benefits of migration for both origin and destination countries. The following quotation displays the way the moral judgment is conveyed: "The EU's work to address emergency and humanitarian needs is based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence" (New Pact, p.20).

Next to that, the emphasis on the need to collaborate with other countries reinforces the idea of the migration crisis narrative by implying migration is too big to handle alone with the European Union.

Lastly, the solutions within the externalisation frame of migration offered by the documents are mostly focused on fostering development in countries of origin, promoting legal migration pathways and engaging in agreements with transit countries to prevent irregular migration. These solutions shift responsibility to nations outside of the EU to manage migration towards the European Union.

First, the EU emphasizes addressing migration at its source by tackling the root causes in countries of origin. By investing in development projects, promoting economic opportunities and supporting stability, the EU seeks to create conditions that reduce the need for irregular migration. The next quotation shows the importance the documents give to fixing the root causes of migration. “Civil war, persecution, poverty and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance for the migration debate” (Agenda p.7). The link between the root causes and migration is being emphasizes and explains the focus of the documents on the root causes. Not necessarily to help other countries with development but to be able to manage migration.

Second, the EU advocates for the expansion of legal migration pathways as a way to reduce irregular migration. By creating ‘safe and legal channels’ for migration, the EU wants to provide alternatives to the risky routes. Initially, this creates the impression that this might be easy or beneficial for asylum seekers themselves. However, this is not the case, the legal migration routes are not accessible to everyone. The European Union is very selective on who can use these legal migration options. Contributing to the Fortress Europe where the European Union divides the desirable from the undesirable asylum seekers and only grants permission or asylum to the desirable asylum seekers. Initiatives such as the Talent Partnerships aim to facilitate mutually beneficial international mobility. The following quotation reflects this strategy of promoting legal migration as a way to reduce irregular migration while highlighting its selective approach, matching migration to specific labour market needs.

> the EU also works with its partner countries on legal pathways to Europe as part of migration partnerships, opening the way for cooperation on schemes to match people’s skills and labour market needs through legal migration. At the same time developing legal pathways should contribute to the reduction of irregular migration which often leads to undeclared work and labor exploitation in the EU. (New Pact, p.24)

Thirdly, the last solutions include forging agreements with transit countries to prevent irregular migration. The EU wants more cooperation with third countries to manage migration before it reaches Europe. The documents name the deal between the European Union and Turkey, in this deal, irregular migrants would be send back from Greece to Turkey in exchange for financial compensation. Another agreement was that for every irregular migrant that was taken back by Turkey from Greece, the European Union would take up one ‘real’ asylum seeker. The deal did not take place as it should and asylum seekers were used as political toys being pushed back and forth between Greece and Turkey, where a lot of them ended on the Greek islands in camps like Moria (*7 jaar Turkijedeal*, 2024) . The fact that the New Pact speaks about new deals with other third countries and reinforces the idea that this deal was a success adds to populist ideas where it does not matter how or where the asylum seekers go to, as long as it is not in the European Union. In the following quotation it is visible that the European Union will invest in more deals with other countries. “Europol will strengthen cooperation with the Western Balkans and the Commission and Europol will work towards similar agreements with Turkey and others in the neighbourhood. The Commission will also include this in its cooperation with the African Union (AU)” (New Pact, p.17).

In conclusion, within the externalisation frame of migration the EU presents itself as humanitarian effort contributing to addressing the root causes of migration, promoting legal pathways and collaborating with third countries. This narrative positions the EU as a moral actor, focusing on development, security and the reduction of irregular migration. However, this narrative legitimises the shift of responsibility to countries outside of the EU and the selective migration policies that are part of Fortress Europe. While framed as ethical and necessary, the emphasis on external agreements and selective legal pathways illustrates the strategic interest in controlling migration rather than solely prioritising humanitarian aid.

To conclude, the externalisation frame of migration is closely linked to the themes of populism, the migration crisis narrative and Fortress Europe. First of all, the frame defines the problem as irregular

migration, which is framed as stemming from 'root causes' in regions beyond its borders. By presenting migration as an external issue, it aligns with populist narratives, where Europe is depicted as a victim of global instability rather than a contributor. This reinforces the notion that migration is a threat to Europe, which must be controlled through external action, reflecting the populist fear of migration spiralling out of control. Secondly, the blame for irregular migration is largely placed on the root causes of migration, such as poverty, insecurity and political instability. As well as on countries of origin and lack of cooperation between the EU and third countries. By attributing blame to these external root causes, it reinforces the idea that it is the responsibility of other regions to address their internal problems to prevent migration. This externalisation supports the idea of Fortress Europe, as it implies that solutions to migration lie in containing and addressing it outside the EU's borders, thereby reducing the need for internal management. It also aligns with the populist rhetoric of shielding Europe from external threats. Thirdly, the moral judgment that is being conveyed is that the European Union acts like a humanitarian actor, driven by ethical obligations to address poverty, instability and insecurity. This moral positioning as a saviour reinforces its legitimacy in intervening in external regions to manage migration, linking to the migration crisis narrative, where the EU creates the sense that it cannot manage migration without cooperation from other countries outside the EU. Lastly, the proposed solutions focus on external development, legal migration pathways and agreements with third countries. By emphasising the development cooperation to address the root causes of migration, the EU shifts responsibility for migration management to countries outside its borders. Another solution offered is the creation of legal pathways, reflecting a controlled and exclusionary approach to migration. This reflects the core of Fortress Europe, where migration is being controlled beyond EU territory, reinforcing selective migration policies between desirable and undesirable asylum seekers. Cooperation with other third countries is another solution proposed to decrease irregular migration. Even the New Pact advocates for deals similar to the EU-Turkey deal, despite its shortcomings and risks it has caused for asylum seekers. This reinforces populist ideas of keeping asylum seekers outside the EU at all costs.

Conclusion

This thesis sets out the answer for the research question: How do the securitisation, criminalisation and externalisation frames of migration in the European Commission's communications of the European Agenda on Migration and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum contribute to the broader themes of populism, Fortress Europe and the migration crisis narrative? Through a detailed frame analysis of these key policy documents, it has become evident that these frames do not only shape policy but are also central to shaping both public perception regarding migration in the EU, legitimising exclusionary and reactionary responses to migration within Europe.

Firstly, the securitisation frame portrays migration as a fundamental threat to the internal security of the European Union. Through language that highlights the pressure on border and institutions, the EC emphasises the potential for societal collapse if migration is not controlled. By framing migration in terms of security risks, the EC legitimises restrictive border control measures and military responses. Which resonates strongly with populist narrative that depict asylum seekers as dangers to national identity and cultural homogeneity. The framing of asylum seekers as potential threats fuels fear, which is exploited by populist movements to justify nationalist policies, creating an 'us vs. them' mentality. Populism thrives on creating a division between 'the people' and 'the other', in this case, the securitisation frame of migration constructs asylum seekers as that other, reinforcing the populist agenda. Furthermore, the EC frames migration as a crisis by cultivating a sense of urgency and fear. By doing so, the EC strengthens the migration crisis narrative, making migration appear as a problem of overwhelming proportions that requires urgent and exceptional measures. This framing does not only normalise the expansion of border control and surveillance but also prioritises security over humanitarian responses, undermining the EU's humanitarian principles.

Moreover, the criminalisation of migration frame works hand-in-hand with securitisation by framing irregular migration as illegal and associating migration with criminal activities such as human smuggling and unlawful border crossings. By criminalising asylum seekers and smugglers, the policies legitimise disciplinary measures, like detention and deportation. This narrative dehumanises asylum seekers and are seen mainly as lawbreakers, rather than individuals fleeing persecution or seeking a better life. The criminalisation frame supports populist ideologies, that portray asylum seekers as dangerous and undeserving, thus mobilising public opinion in favour of stricter immigration controls. Within populist ideology, asylum seekers are not only a burden but also a threat to safety and homogeneous culture. Framing asylum seekers as criminals, the EC contributes to and validates this rhetoric. Often advocating for extreme anti-migration measures. Moreover, the criminalisation frame reinforces the idea that asylum seekers violate EU laws and social norms, justifying the exclusion of asylum seekers from EU territory. This reinforces Fortress Europe, where the EU positions itself as a protected zone that only the 'right' kind of asylum seekers should be allowed to enter, further reinforcing exclusionary practices.

Lastly, the externalisation frame reflects the EU's efforts to manage migration outside its borders by outsourcing responsibilities to third countries. The externalisation frame positions externalisation as a solution to migration. The main objective is to prevent asylum seekers from reaching Europe in the first place. With externalisation strategies, such as agreements with third countries, deportations and investing in the root causes, defined by the EC as poverty, insecurity and prosecution, the EU shifts its responsibility of managing asylum seekers onto other regions. By presenting externalisation as beneficial both for the EU and asylum seekers, these policies are frames as humanitarian solutions, when in reality, they often lead to human rights abuses and prevent asylum seekers from accessing international protection. This shift in responsibility is a core component of Fortress Europe, where Europe increasingly walls itself off from external pressures while maintaining the appearance of humanitarianism. The externalisation frame reinforces the image of the EU as a space that must be shielded from external influences, contributing to the legitimisation of the militarisation of borders and further alienating asylum seekers from EU territory. Furthermore, the externalisation frame reinforces the migration crisis narrative, as it suggests that EU's resources and capacities are

insufficient to handle migration internally, by that justifying the need to manage migration from a distance. By framing externalisation as a necessary response to the migration crisis, the EC perpetuates the idea that migration is unmanageable unless it is addressed at its source.

In conclusion, the EC's use of the securitisation, criminalisation and externalisation frames in its communications on the Agenda and the New Pact deeply influence the broader societal and political context in Europe. These frames do not only justify increasingly restrictive migration policies but also contribute to the rise of populist movements, the fortification of EU's external border and the perpetuation of the migration crisis narrative. Suppose the EU is to foster a more inclusive approach to migration. In that case, it will need to rethink its framing strategies. Moving away from narratives that create fear and dehumanise asylum seekers and towards narratives that promote solidarity, inclusion and human rights aligned with the EU's values.

Appendix A: Coded securitisation frame of migration

<u>defining problem</u>	- Managing our borders more efficiently also implies making better use of the opportunities offered by IT systems and technologies. The EU today has three large-scale IT systems, dealing with the administration of asylum (Eurodac), visa applications (the Visa Information System), and the sharing of information about persons or objects for which an alert has been created by the competent authorities (Schengen Information System). (Agenda p. 11) - Unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity constitute a serious problem. (Agenda, p.7) - While the EU has common rules on return, it lacks effective operational cooperation. (Agenda, p.10) - Member States' asylum systems today face unprecedented pressure and, with the summer arriving, the flow of people to frontline Member States will continue in the months to come. (Agenda, p. 4) - the EU should not wait until the pressure is intolerable to act: the volumes of arrivals mean that the capacity of local reception and processing facilities is already stretched thin. (Agenda, p. 4) - Upholding our international commitments and values while securing our borders and at the same time creating the right conditions for Europe's economic prosperity and societal cohesion is a difficult balancing act that requires coordinated action at the European level. (p.2) - - -
<u>problem new pact</u>	- - Return is more effective when carried out voluntarily and accompanied with strong reintegration measures. (New Pact, p. 9) - The Schengen area is one of the major achievements of European integration. But it has been put under strain by difficulties in responding to changing situations at the Union's border, by gaps and loopholes, and by diverging national asylum, reception and return systems. These elements increase unauthorised movements, both of asylum seekers and of migrants who should be returned. (New Pact, p. 15) - While some Member States continue to face the challenge of external border management, others must cope with large-scale arrivals by land or sea, or overpopulated reception centres, and others still face high numbers of unauthorised movements of migrants. (New Pact, p.2) - In situations of crisis that are of such a magnitude that they risk to overwhelm Member States' asylum and migration systems, the practical difficulties faced by Member States would be recognised through some limited margin to temporarily derogate from the normal procedures and timelines, while ensuring respect for fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement (New Pact, p.12) - Concerns about existing shortcomings have contributed to the triggering of temporary internal border controls. The longer these controls continue, the more questions are raised about their

	temporary nature, and their proportionality. Temporary controls may only be used in exceptional circumstances to provide a response to situations seriously affecting public policy or internal security. (p.15) - Demographic and economic trends, political instability and conflict, as well as climate change, all suggest that migration will remain a major phenomenon and global challenge for the years to come. Migration policies that work well are in the interest of partner countries, the EU, and refugees and migrants themselves. (p. 18)
<u>blame</u>	- - More will be done to pool and better use information to identify and target smugglers. (Agenda, p.3) - Such centres in countries of origin or transit will help to provide a realistic picture of the likely success of migrants' journeys, and offer assisted voluntary return options for irregular migrants. (Agenda, p.5) - One of the incentives for irregular migrants is the knowledge that the EU's return system – meant to return irregular migrants or those whose asylum applications are refused – works imperfectly. (Agenda, p.9) - The goal must be to transform smuggling networks from 'low risk, high return' operations for criminals into 'high risk, low return' ones. An action plan will be brought forward by the Commission by the end of May. (Agenda, p. 8) - Swift identification and return of persons who do not abide by such agreement is already possible under the EU law. (Agenda, p.20) - Under return sponsorship, Member States would provide all necessary support to the Member State under pressure to swiftly return those who have no right to stay, with the supporting Member State taking full responsibility if return is not carried out within a set period. (Agenda, p. 6) - Strengthening the Common European Asylum System also means a more effective approach to abuses. Too many requests are unfounded: in 2014, 55% of the asylum requests resulted in a negative decision and for some nationalities almost all asylum requests were rejected, hampering the capacity of Member States to provide swift protection to those in need. (p.12) - More will be done to help deal with the immediate challenge faced by Member States in the frontline of migrant arrivals. (p.6) - One of the incentives for irregular migrants is the knowledge that the EU's return system – meant to return irregular migrants or those whose asylum applications are refused – works imperfectly. (p.9) - -
<u>blame New pact</u>	- Strong external borders also require up-to-date and interoperable IT systems to keep track of arrivals and asylum applicants. Once operational, different systems will form an integrated IT border management platform checking and keeping track of the right to stay of all third country nationals, whether visa-free or visa holders, arriving in a legal manner on EU territory, helping the work of identifying cases of overstaying21 . (New Pact, p.13)

	- As part of the comprehensive approach to migration and mobility, visa measures can act as a positive incentive in the engagement with third countries (New Pact, p.24) - Currently, only about a third of people ordered to return from Member States actually leave. This erodes citizens' trust in the whole system of asylum and migration management and acts as an incentive for irregular migration. (New Pact, p.8) - Nevertheless, for those with no right to stay, an effective system of returns needs to be in place. Some of them may take up voluntary return options, and this should be proactively supported. Currently, one of the key gaps in European migration management is the difficulty to effectively return those who do not take up this option. (New Pact, p. 22) - Mixed flows of refugees and migrants have meant increased complexity and an intensified need for coordination and solidarity mechanisms. (New Pact, p.4) - To ensure that the same checks are conducted for all irregular arrivals before legal entry to the territory of a Member State, Member States will also need to carry out the screening if a person eludes border controls but is later identified within the territory of a Member State. (p.5) - Smuggling involves the organised exploitation of migrants, showing scant respect for human life in the pursuit of profit. This criminal activity therefore damages both the humanitarian and the migration management objectives of the EU. (p.16) - The new 2021-2025 EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling will focus on combatting criminal networks, and in line with the EU's Security Union Strategy, it will boost cooperation and support the work of law enforcement to tackle migrant smuggling, often also linked to trafficking in human beings. (p,16) - The first step should be a pre-entry screening2 applicable to all third-country nationals who cross the external border without authorisation. (p.5) - The management of EU external borders is a shared responsibility of all Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, and of the EU and its agencies. This also means that where there are shortcomings, the impact is twofold, both an extra challenge for the Member State in question, and consequences such as unauthorised movements which affect the credibility (p.12)
<u>moral judgement</u>	- In parallel, Member States have to apply the Return Directive. The Commission will give priority to monitoring implementation of the Directive, with a more swift return system going hand-in-hand with the respect of the procedures and standards that allow Europe to ensure a humane and dignified treatment of returnees and a proportionate use of coercive measures, in line with fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement (Agenda, p.10) - Strengthening the Common European Asylum System also means a more effective approach to abuses. Too many requests are unfounded: in 2014, 55% of the asylum requests resulted in a negative decision and for some nationalities almost all asylum requests were rejected, hampering the capacity of Member States

	to provide swift protection to those in need. (Agenda, p.12) - this is why, even if the case for legal migration will always be difficult at a time of high unemployment and social change, it is important to have in place a clear and rigorous common system, which reflects the EU interest, including by maintaining Europe as an attractive destination for migrants (Agenda, p.14) - - Those who fail the test of asylum face the prospect of return. (Agenda, p.7) - For those not in need of protection, (p.6) - - The inflows it was facing were of a different nature and scale. (Agenda, p.13) - All asylum applications must be processed and protection granted to those who qualify p. 12 - Coastguards have a crucial role both for saving lives and securing maritime borders. (p.11) - It aims to reduce unsafe and irregular routes and promote sustainable and safe legal pathways for those in need of protection. (p.3) - - -
<u>moral judgement new pact</u>	- Following an assessment, the Commission can propose to apply restrictive visa measures, or in case of good cooperation, propose favourable visa measure (New Pact, p.22) - Return is more effective when carried out voluntarily and accompanied with strong reintegration measures. (New Pact, p. 9) - With a well-managed system, migration can contribute to growth, innovation and social dynamism (p.2) - Asylum claims with low chances of being accepted should be examined rapidly without requiring legal entry to the Member State's territory. (p.5) - Whilst asylum applications made at the EU's external borders must be assessed as part of EU asylum procedures, they do not constitute an automatic right to enter the EU. (p.5) - Unaccompanied children and children under twelve years of age together with their families should be exempt from the border procedure unless there are security concerns. (p.8) - Resettlement is a tried and tested way to provide protection to the most vulnerable refugees. (p.23) - The EU has a strong track record in labour mobility schemes. Legal migration pilot projects53 have shown that by providing targeted support, the EU can help Member States implement schemes that meet the needs of employers. The EU has also opened Erasmus+ and vocational training to third country nationals and offered support grants for the mobilisation of the diaspora. However, the scope and ambition of existing schemes remains limited. (p.24) - The international mobility of students and researchers can increase the pool of expertise available to European universities and research institutions, boosting our efforts to manage the transition towards a green and digital economy. Full implementation of the recently revised Directive on Students and Researchers64 is essential to make it easier and more attractive

	to come to the EU, and to promote the circulation of knowledge by moving between Member States. Talent Partnerships may also directly support schemes facilitating the mobility of students and researchers. (p.26) - -
legitimising remedies agenda	- Frontex and Europol will also develop profiles of vessels which could be used by smugglers, following patterns to identify potential vessels and monitor their movements. (Agenda p. 4) - The full use of these systems can bring benefits to border management, as well as to enhance Europe's capacity to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants. A new phase would come with the "Smart Borders" initiative to increase the efficiency of border crossings, facilitating crossings for the large majority of 'bona fide' third country travellers, whilst at the same time strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionality. (Agenda, p. 11) - Europol will immediately strengthen its recently established joint maritime information operation (JOT MARE) – and its focal point on migrant smuggling (Agenda, p.3) - First, the Commission will set up a new 'Hotspot' approach, where the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol will work on the ground with frontline Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. (Agenda p.6) - - It is in the interests of all to address the root causes which cause people to seek a life elsewhere, to crack down on smugglers and traffickers, and to provide clarity and predictability in return policies. (Agenda, p.7) - For those not in need of protection, Frontex will help Member States by coordinating the return of irregular migrants. Europol and Eurojust will assist the host Member State with investigations to dismantle the smuggling and trafficking networks. (Agenda, p. 6) - Currently, Frontex can only coordinate return missions but not initiate its own. On the basis of the ongoing evaluation to be concluded this year, the Commission will propose to amend the Frontex legal basis to strengthen its role on return. (Agenda, p.10) - Member States must also implement fully the rules on taking migrants' fingerprints34 at the borders. Member States under particular pressure will benefit from the Hotspot system for providing operational support on the ground (see above). The Commission will provide, by the end of May, guidance to facilitate systematic fingerprinting, in full respect of fundamental rights, backed up by practical cooperation and exchange of best practices. The Commission will also explore how more biometric identifiers can be used through the Eurodac system (such as using facial recognition techniques through digital photos). (Agenda, p.13) - More will be done to help deal with the immediate challenge faced by Member States in the frontline of migrant arrivals. (Agenda, p. 6) - This Agenda brings together the different steps the European

	Union should take now, and in the coming years, to build up a coherent and comprehensive approach to reap the benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration. (Agenda, p.2) - A clear and well implemented framework for legal pathways to entrance in the EU (both through an efficient asylum and visa system) will reduce push factors towards irregular stay and entry, contributing to enhance security of European borders as well as safety of migratory flows. (Agenda, p. 6 - On the basis of the ongoing evaluation to be concluded this year, the Commission will propose to amend the Frontex legal basis to strengthen its role on return. (Agenda, p.10) - Frontex can fulfil its dual role of coordinating operational border support to Member States under pressure, and helping to save the lives of migrants at sea. (p.3) - First, the EU should step up its support to the countries bearing the brunt of displaced refugees. (p.5) - When implemented, they will provide the EU with a migration policy which respects the right to seek asylum, responds to the humanitarian challenge, provides a clear European framework for a common migration policy, and stands the test of time (p.7) - Frontex is currently offering considerable support to Member States, but its mandate must be reinforced to increase its capacity to provide comprehensive operational assistance. (p.10) - The rules of engagement agreed for Triton operations should be seen as the model for future action on the whole of the external land and sea border. Every crisis will be different, but the EU needs to heed the lesson and be prepared to act in anticipation of a crisis, not just in reaction. (p.11) - The development of high standards inside the EU will also make it easier for Europe to support third countries developing their own solutions to better manage their borders. (p. `11) -
<u>legitimising remedies new pact</u>	- It creates faster, seamless migration processes and stronger governance of migration and borders policies, supported by modern IT systems and more effective agencies. (New Pact, p.3) - - The Commission is proposing to establish a seamless procedure at the border applicable to all non-EU citizens crossing without authorisation, comprising pre-entry screening, an asylum procedure and where applicable a swift return procedure – thereby integrating processes which are currently separate (New Pact, p.5) - This screening will include identification, health and security checks, fingerprinting and registration in the Eurodac database. (Pact, p.5) - A seamless migration and asylum process needs proper management of the necessary information. For this purpose, Eurodac should be further developed to support the common framework14. The 2016 Commission proposal, on which a provisional political agreement was reached by the European Parliament and the Council, would already enlarge the scope of Eurodac. An upgraded Eurodac would help to track unauthorised movements, tackle irregular migration and improve return. The data stored would be extended to address specific needs, with the necessary safeguards: for example, the European Parliament and the Council had already agreed to extend its scope to resettled

	persons. (Pact, p.10) - The Commission will also table the necessary amendments in the proposed revision of the Eurodac Regulation to integrate it into this approach, so that Eurodac also plays a full part in controlling irregular migration and detecting unauthorised movements within the EU. (Pact, p.14) - For those whose claims have been rejected in the asylum border procedure, an EU return border procedure would apply immediately. (New Pact, p. 5) - The new solidarity mechanism will primarily focus on relocation or return sponsorship. Under return sponsorship, Member States would provide all necessary support to the Member State under pressure to swiftly return those who have no right to stay, with the supporting Member State taking full responsibility if return is not carried out within a set period. (New Pact, p. 6) - A common EU system for returns is needed which combines stronger structures inside the EU with more effective cooperation with third countries on return and readmission. (New Pact, p. 9) - It would boost assisted voluntary return programmes, as the most efficient and sustainable way to enhance return (New Pact, p. 9) - Frontex must play a leading role in the common EU system for returns, making returns work well in practice. (New Pact, p.9) - Return is more effective when carried out voluntarily and accompanied with strong reintegration measures. (New Pact, p. 9) - This reform is urgent and a political agreement on the core principles should be reached by the end of 2020. (New Pact, p. 6) - The main building block to achieve an effective EU return system is the 2018 proposal to recast the Return Directive. This would bring key improvements in the management of return policy. It would help prevent and reduce absconding and unauthorised movements, with common criteria to assess each case and the possibility to use detention for public order and security concerns. (Pact, p.9) - The New Pact's goal of putting in place a comprehensive and robust migration and asylum policy is the best protection against the risk of crisis situations. The EU is already better prepared today than it was in 2015, and the common framework for asylum and migration management will already put the EU on a stronger footing, reinforcing preparedness and making solidarity a permanent feature. Yet the EU will always need to be ready for the unexpected. (New Pact, p.11) - The EU must be ready to address situations of crisis and force majeure with resilience and flexibility – in the knowledge that different types of crises require varied responses. The effectiveness of response can be improved through preparation and foresight. This needs an evidence-based approach, to increase anticipation and help to prepare EU responses to key trends15. A new Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint16 will be issued to help move from a reactive mode to one based on readiness and anticipation. It will bring together all existing crisis management tools and set out the key institutional, operational and financial measures and protocols which must be in place to ensure preparedness both at EU and national level. (New Pact, p.11) - The Blueprint will be immediately effective, but will also act as important operational support to the EU's ability to respond

	under the future arrangements. It will set out the array of measures that can be used to address crises related to a large number of irregular arrivals. (New Pact, p.11) - Integrated border management is an indispensable policy instrument for the EU to protect the EU external borders and safeguard the integrity and functioning of a Schengen area without internal border controls. (new Pact, p.12) - Effective management of EU external borders is a key element for a Schengen area without internal border controls. (p.13) - It creates faster, seamless migration processes and stronger governance of migration and borders policies, supported by modern IT systems and more effective agencies.(p.3) - Robust and fair management of external borders, including identity, health and security checks; (p.3) - The Commission is proposing to establish a seamless procedure at the border applicable to all non-EU citizens crossing without authorisation, comprising pre-entry screening, an asylum procedure and where applicable a swift return procedure – thereby integrating processes which are currently separate (p.5) - Special attention to the needs of the most vulnerable would include a general exemption from the border procedures where the necessary guarantees cannot be secured. - The new procedures will allow asylum and migration authorities to more efficiently assess well-founded claims, deliver faster decisions and thereby contribute to a better and more credible functioning of asylum and return policies. This will be of benefit both to Member States, and to the EU as a whole: the work should be supported by resources and expertise from EU agencies as well as EU funds. (p.6) - The Asylum Procedures Regulation would also establish an accessible, effective and timely decision-making process, based on simpler, clearer and shorter procedures, adequate procedural safeguards for asylum seekers, and tools to prevent restrictions being circumvented. (p.6) - This new common framework will set out the principles and structures needed for an integrated approach for migration and asylum policy, which ensures a fair sharing of responsibility and addresses effectively mixed arrivals of persons in need of international protection and those who are not (p.6) - The new mandate would respond to Member States' growing need for operational support and guidance on the implementation of the common rules on asylum, as well as bringing greater convergence. It would boost mutual trust through new monitoring of Member States' asylum and reception systems and through the ability for the Commission to issue recommendations with assistance measures. This legislation should be adopted still this year to allow this practical support to be quickly available, while acknowledging that new structures such as the monitoring may need some time to be put in place. (p.7-8) - These changes should now be complemented to allow an upgraded database to count individual applicants (rather than applications), to help apply new provisions on shifting responsibility within the EU, to facilitate relocation, and to ensure better monitoring of returnees. The new system would help create the necessary link between asylum and return procedures and provide additional support to national authorities dealing with asylum applicants whose application has already been rejected in another Member State. (P.10)

	- Protection, equivalent to subsidiary protection, could also be immediately granted to a predefined group of people, notably to people who face an exceptionally high risk of indiscriminate violence due to armed conflict in their country of origin. Given the development of the concepts and rules of qualification for international protection, and in view of the fact that the new legislation would lay down rules for granting immediate protection status in crisis situations, the Temporary Protection Directive would be repealed (p.12) - Strands of work such as creating economic opportunity, increasing stability or tackling migrant smuggling can reduce the number of irregular arrivals to the EU and the numbers of those in the EU with no right to stay. (p.22) - Such a system can only function if it has the tools needed to deliver. This means a strong legal framework able to give the clarity and focus needed for mutual confidence, with robust and fair rules for those in need of international protection and those who do not have the right to stay (p.29) - The external border is where the EU needs to close the gaps between external border controls and asylum and return procedures. This process should be swift, with clear and fair rules for authorisation to enter and access to the appropriate procedure. (p.5) - - Border procedures allow for the fast-tracking of the treatment of an application, much like acceleration grounds such as the concepts of safe countries of origin or safe third countries. - Frontex will also support the introduction of a return case management system at EU and national level, covering all steps of the procedure from the detection of an irregular stay to readmission and reintegration in third countries. In this way the Agency can realise its full potential to support return, linking up operational cooperation with Member States and effective readmission cooperation with third countries. (p.9) - A seamless migration and asylum process needs proper management of the necessary information. For this purpose, Eurodac should be further developed to support the common framework14. The 2016 Commission proposal, on which a provisional political agreement was reached by the European Parliament and the Council, would already enlarge the scope of Eurodac. An upgraded Eurodac would help to track unauthorised movements, tackle irregular migration and improve return. The data stored would be extended to address specific needs, with the necessary safeguards: for example, the European Parliament and the Council had already agreed to extend its scope to resettled persons. The new Eurodac would be fully interoperable with the border management databases, as part of an all-encompassing and integrated migration and border management system. (p.10) - Interoperability will connect all European systems for borders, migration, security and justice, and will ensure that all these systems ‘talk’ to each other, that no check gets missed because of disconnected information, and that national authorities have the complete, reliable and accurate information needed. It will bring a major boost to the fight against identity fraud. Each system will keep its established safeguards. (p.13) - Building on experience from the multiple crises of the last five years, the Commission will present a Strategy on the future of Schengen, which will include initiatives for a stronger and more complete Schengen. (p.15)

	- Combatting smuggling is a common challenge requiring international cooperation and coordination as well as effective border management. (p.17) - Supporting the EU's partners in developing effective migration governance and management capacity will be a key element in the mutually beneficial partnerships the EU seeks to develop.(p.21) - Frontex can also now provide practical support to develop partners' border management capacity and to cooperate with partners to optimise voluntary return. (p.22) -

Appendix B: Coded criminalisation frame of migration

defining problem agenda	- A clear and well implemented framework for legal pathways to entrance in the EU (both through an efficient asylum and visa system) will reduce push factors towards irregular stay and entry, contributing to enhance security of European borders as well as safety of migratory flows (p.6) - Another problem arises with asylum applications from third country nationals who do not require a visa to come to the EU. (p.4) - Migrants smuggling and trafficking are two diverse yet interlinked criminal activities perpetrated by criminal networks. (p.8) - As outlined by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines, a robust fight against irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing Europe's external borders must be paired with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration. (p. 6) - Those who live a clandestine life inside Europe have a precarious existence and can easily fall prey to exploitation. (p.7) - There must be safe and legal ways for them to reach the EU. (p.4) - Unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity constitute a serious problem. This corrodes confidence in the system. It offers strong arguments for those looking to criticise or stigmatise migration. It makes it harder to integrate those migrants staying in the EU as of right. (p.7) -
problem new pact	- It also exposes those staying illegally to precarious conditions and exploitation by criminal networks. (p.8) - It would help prevent and reduce absconding and unauthorised movements, with common criteria to assess each case and the possibility to use detention for public order and security concerns. (p. 9) - 1.82 million illegal border crossings were recorded at the EU external border at the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015. By 2019 this had decreased to 142 000. (p.2) - The Schengen area is one of the major achievements of European integration. But it has been put under strain by difficulties in responding to changing situations at the Union's border, by gaps and loopholes, and by diverging national asylum, reception and return systems. These elements increase unauthorised movements, both of asylum seekers and of migrants who should be returned. (p.15) - Frontex will also support the introduction of a return case management system at EU and national level, covering all steps of the procedure from the detection of an irregular stay to readmission and reintegration in third countries. (New Pact, p.9)
blame agenda	- Unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity constitute a serious problem. This corrodes confidence in the system. It offers strong arguments for those

	looking to criticise or stigmatise migration. It makes it harder to integrate those migrants staying in the EU as of right. (p.7) - Finally, Europol will identify illegal internet content used by smugglers to attract migrants and refugees, and request its removal. (p.4) - Such vulnerable people cannot be left to resort to the criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers. There must be safe and legal ways for them to reach the EU. (p.4) - The difference between the two is that in the former, migrants willingly engage in the irregular migration process by paying for the services of a smuggler in order to cross an international border, while in the latter they are the victims, coerced into severe exploitation which may or may not be linked to the crossing of a border. In reality, the two phenomena are not easy to disentangle as persons who start their journeys in a voluntary manner are also vulnerable to networks of labour or sexual exploitation. (p.8) - targeting criminal smuggling networks (p. 3) - Action to fight criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers is first and foremost a way to prevent the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks.15 It would also act as a disincentive to irregular migration. (p.8) - . Most of the smugglers are not based in Europe, and those who are arrested on the boats in the Mediterranean are normally the last link in the chain. (p.8) - Migrants who have been legally admitted by Member States should not be faced with reluctance and obstruction – they should be given every assistance to integrate in their new communities. But by the same token, the EU needs to draw the consequences when migrants do not meet the criteria to stay (p. 7) - For those not in need of protection, Frontex will help Member States by coordinating the return of irregular migrants (p.6) - Finally, Europol will identify illegal internet content used by smugglers to attract migrants and refugees, and request its removal. (Agenda, p. 4) -
blame new pact	- This would apply to claims presented by applicants misleading the authorities, originating from countries with low recognition rates likely not to be in need of protection, or posing a threat to national security (p. 5) - Existing rules to clamp down on migrant smuggling29 have proven an effective legal framework to combat those who facilitate unauthorised entry, transit and residence. (p.17) - The first step should be a pre-entry screening2 applicable to all third-country nationals who cross the external border without authorisation. (p.5) - To ensure that the same checks are conducted for all irregular arrivals before legal entry to the territory of a Member State, Member States will also need to carry out the screening if a person eludes border controls but is later identified within the territory of a Member State. (p.5) - Current rules on the shift of responsibility for examining an application for international protection between Member States can act as an incentive for unauthorised movement, in particular when the shift of responsibility results from the behaviour of the applicant (for example, when an applicant absconds). (p.7) - Trafficking networks abuse asylum procedures, and use

	reception centres to identify potential victims9 . The early identification of potential non-EU victims will be a specific theme of the Commission's forthcoming approach towards the eradication of trafficking in human beings, as set out in the recent Security Union Strategy10 . (p.8) - This would apply to claims presented by applicants misleading the authorities, originating from countries with low recognition rates likely not to be in need of protection, or posing a threat to national security (p.5) - There should also be clear obligations for the applicant, and defined consequences if they do not comply (p.7) - Finding employment in the EU without the required legal status is one of the drivers for smuggling to the EU. (p.17) - Currently, only about a third of people ordered to return from Member States actually leave. This erodes citizens' trust in the whole system of asylum and migration management and acts as an incentive for irregular migration. (p.8) -
moral judgement agenda	- This has a direct impact on asylum seekers who seek to "asylum shop", but also on EU public opinion: it encourages a sense that the current system is fundamentally unfair. (p. 12) - There are many different motivations behind irregular migration. But often, it ends in deep disappointment. The journey is often far more dangerous than expected, often at the mercy of criminal networks who put profit before human life. (p.7) - Smuggling networks often play on the fact that relatively few return decisions are enforced – only 39.2% of return decisions issued in 2013 were effectively enforced. (p.9) - The EU is also facing a series of long-term economic and demographic challenges. Its population is ageing, while its economy is increasingly dependent on highly-skilled jobs. Furthermore, without migration the EU's working age population will decline by 17.5 million in the next decade. Migration will increasingly be an important way to enhance the sustainability of our welfare system and to ensure sustainable growth of the EU economy. (p. 14) - The Commission will also make available at least EUR 30 million to support partners with capacity building on effective management of labour migration, focusing on empowering migrant workers and tackling exploitation. (p. 16) - -
moral judgement new pact	- The Commission will bring clarity to the issue of criminalisation for private actors through guidance on the implementation of the counter-smuggling rules, and make clear that carrying out the legal obligation to rescue people in distress at sea cannot be criminalised. (p.17) - Smuggling involves the organised exploitation of migrants, showing scant respect for human life in the pursuit of profit. This criminal activity therefore damages both the humanitarian and the migration management objectives of the EU.(16) - Combatting smuggling is a common challenge requiring international cooperation and coordination as well as effective border management. (p.17)

	- 20.9 million non-EU nationals were legally resident in EU Member States in 2019, some 4.7% of the EU total population. (p.2) - Part of a healthy and fair system of migration management is to ensure that everyone who is legally in the EU can participate in and contribute to the well-being, prosperity and cohesion of European societies. (p.27) - Assisting those in distress at sea is a moral duty and an obligation under international law. - While national authorities remain ultimately responsible for implementing the relevant rules under international law, search and rescue is also a key element of the European integrated border management, implemented as a shared responsibility by Frontex22 and national authorities, making the boosting of Frontex's access to naval and aerial capacity essential. (p.14) - The EU's neighbours are a particular priority. Economic opportunity, particularly for young people, is often the best way to reduce the pressure for irregular migration. (p.19) -
legitimising remedies agenda	- In parallel, Member States have to apply the Return Directive.The Commission will give priority to monitoring implementation of the Directive, with a more swift return system going hand-in-hand with the respect of the procedures and standards that allow Europe to ensure a humane and dignified treatment of returnees and a proportionate use of coercive measures, in line with fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement (p.10). - legislation includes specific provisions to fight against abuses, for example by allowing swift processing of unfounded asylum applications. (p.13) - The High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) has already presented options for possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations to systematically identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers. (p.3) - Europol and Eurojust will assist the host Member State with investigations to dismantle the smuggling and trafficking networks. (p.6) - It is in the interests of all to address the root causes which cause people to seek a life elsewhere, to crack down on smugglers and traffickers, and to provide clarity and predictability in return policies. (p.7) - EU Agencies can also assist Member States' authorities in intensifying their action against criminal networks of smugglers. Agencies help identify smugglers, investigate them, prosecute them, freeze and confiscate their assets. Action will build on immediate efforts to identify, capture and destroy vessels before they are used by criminal networks (see above). (p.9) - A clear and well implemented framework for legal pathways to entrance in the EU (both through an efficient asylum and visa system) will reduce push factors towards irregular stay and entry, contributing to enhance security of European borders as well as safety of migratory flows (p.6) - Those who fail the test of asylum face the prospect of return. (p.7) - the Commission will step up action against illegal employment of third country nationals, inter alia through better enforcement

	and application of the Employers Sanctions Directive18 , which prohibits the employment of third-country nationals who have no right to stay in the EU. (p.9) - The full use of these systems can bring benefits to border management, as well as to enhance Europe's capacity to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants. A new phase would come with the "Smart Borders" initiative to increase the efficiency of border crossings, facilitating crossings for the large majority of 'bona fide' third country travellers, whilst at the same time strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionality. (p.11) - -
legit remedies new pact	- EU migration rules can be credible only if those who do not have the right to stay in the EU are effectively returned. (p.8) - Once operational, different systems will form an integrated IT border management platform checking and keeping track of the right to stay of all third country nationals, whether visa-free or visa holders, arriving in a legal manner on EU territory, helping the work of identifying cases of overstaying. (p.13) - While the current criteria for determining responsibility will continue to apply, the rules on responsibility for examining an application for international protection should be refined to make the system more efficient, discourage abuses and prevent unauthorised movements. (p.7) - While the current criteria for determining responsibility will continue to apply, the rules on responsibility for examining an application for international protection should be refined to make the system more efficient, discourage abuses and prevent unauthorised movements. (p.9) - . An upgraded Eurodac would help to track unauthorised movements, tackle irregular migration and improve return (p.10) . - The Commission is also providing Guidance on the effective implementation of EU rules on definition and prevention of the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence24, and how to prevent the criminalisation of humanitarian actors25 . (p.15) - The new 2021-2025 EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling will focus on combatting criminal networks, and in line with the EU's Security Union Strategy, it will boost cooperation and support the work of law enforcement to tackle migrant smuggling, often also linked to trafficking in human beings. (p.16) - Immigration Liaison Officers provide a valuable connection in the fight against irregular migration and migrant smuggling. The full implementation of the Regulation on the European network of immigration liaison officers32 will further consolidate this network and enhance the fight against smuggling. (p.17) - The Blueprint will be immediately effective, but will also act as important operational support to the EU's ability to respond under the future arrangements. It will set out the array of measures that can be used to address crises related to a large number of irregular arrivals. (p.14) - The Commission will also table the necessary amendments in the

	proposed revision of the Eurodac Regulation to integrate it into this approach, so that Eurodac also plays a full part in controlling irregular migration and detecting unauthorised movements within the EU. (p.14) - The Commission is also providing Guidance on the effective implementation of EU rules on definition and prevention of the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence24, and how to prevent the criminalisation of humanitarian actors (p.15) - Common Security and Defence Policy operations and missions will continue making an important contribution, where the fight against irregular migration or migrant smuggling is part of their mandates (p.17) -

Appendix C: Coded externalisation frame of migration

defining problem agenda	- All actors: Member States, EU institutions, International Organisations, civil society, local authorities and third countries need to work together to make a common European migration policy a reality (p.2) - Working in partnership with third countries to tackle migration upstream (p.5) - To increase the enforcement rate, we first need to ensure that third countries fulfil their international obligation to take back their own nationals residing irregularly in Europe. (p.9) - Civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance for the migration debate. (p.7) - Many of the root causes of migration lie deep in global issues which the EU has been trying to address for many years. (p.7) - Addressing the root causes of irregular and forced displacement in third countries (p.7) - It is in the interests of all to address the root causes which cause people to seek a life elsewhere, to crack down on smugglers and traffickers, and to provide clarity and predictability in return policies. (p.7) - A dedicated summit will be organised in Malta in the autumn with key partners, including the African Union, to develop a common approach with the region addressing the causes of irregular migration and the protection of people in need, as well as smuggling and trafficking of people. (p.5) - To try to halt the human misery created by those who exploit migrants, we need to use the EU's global role and wide range of tools to address the root causes of migration (p.2) - -
problem new pact	- Different policies such as development cooperation, security, visa, trade, agriculture, investment and employment, energy, environment and climate change, and education, should not be dealt with in isolation. They are best handled as part of a tailor-made approach, at the core of a real mutually beneficial partnership. It is also important to bear in mind that migration issues such as border management or more effective implementation of return and readmission can be politically sensitive for partners. (p.18) - Safe channels to offer protection to those in need remove the incentive to embark on dangerous journeys to reach Europe, as well as demonstrating solidarity with third countries hosting refugees. (p.23) - The EU also works with its partner countries on legal pathways to Europe as part of migration partnerships, opening the way for cooperation on schemes to match people, skills and labour market needs through legal migration. At the same time, developing legal pathways should contribute to the reduction of irregular migration, which often leads to undeclared work and labour exploitation in the EU. The Commission will reinforce support to Member States to scale up legal migration together with partner countries as a positive incentive and in line with the EU's skills and labour market needs, while fully respecting

	Member States' competencies. (p.24) - The root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, as well as the immediate factors leading people to migrate, are complex43 (p.20) - It is important to address the complex challenges of migration and its root causes to the benefit of the EU and its citizens, partner countries, migrants and refugees themselves. - By working together, the EU and its partners can improve migration governance, deepen the common efforts to address shared challenges and benefit from opportunities. (p.18) - Addressing the root causes of irregular migration, combatting migrant smuggling, helping refugees residing in third countries and supporting well-managed legal migration are valuable objectives for both the EU and our partners to pursue through comprehensive, balanced and tailor-made partnerships (p.3) - To deliver on the goal set out by the European Council50 to mobilise relevant policies and tools, joint efforts need to be taken a step further. This is why the proposed Asylum and Migration Management Regulation includes the possibility that the Commission, when reporting to the Council on the state of play of the cooperation on readmission, could identify further effective measures to incentivise and improve cooperation to facilitate return and readmission, including in other policy areas of interest to the third countries51, while taking into account the Union's overall interests and relations with the third country. (p.23) - The Commission will continue encouraging agreements with its neighbours47 . As for asylum, the possibilities today to work with third countries are limited, but well-functioning migration management on key routes is essential both to protection and to asylum and return procedures. (p.22) - EU level engagement alone is not sufficient: effective coordination between the EU level and Member States is essential at all levels: bilateral, regional and multilateral. Consistent messaging between the EU and Member States on migration and joint outreach to partners have proven to be critical to showing the EU's common commitment. The EU should in particular draw on the experience and privileged relationships of some Member States with key partners – experience has shown that the full involvement of Member States in the EU migration partnerships, including through the pooling of funds and expertise via the various EU Trust Funds, is key to success. (p.19) - It is important to address the complex challenges of migration and its root causes to the benefit of the EU and its citizens, partner countries, migrants and refugees themselves.By working together, the EU and its partners can improve migration governance, deepen the common efforts to address shared challenges and benefit from opportunities. (p.18) - The EU needs a fresh look at its priorities, first in terms of the place of migration in its external relations and other policies, and then in terms of what this means for our overall relations with specific partners. In comprehensive partnerships, migration should be built in as a core issue, based on an assessment of the interests of the EU and partner countries (p.18) - A common EU system for returns is needed which combines stronger structures inside the EU with more effective cooperation with third countries on return and readmission. (p.9)

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blame agenda	- With a budget allocation of EUR 96.8 billion for the 2014-2020 period, EU external cooperation assistance, and in particular development cooperation, plays an important role in tackling global issues like poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment which are among the main root causes of irregular and forced migration. This includes support in regions of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe where most of the migrants reaching Europe originate from. (p.8) - Such centres in countries of origin or transit will help to provide a realistic picture of the likely success of migrants' journeys, and offer assisted voluntary return options for irregular migrants. (p.5) - Persistent efforts to address the crisis in Syria have been accompanied by €3.6 billion in humanitarian, stabilisation and development assistance inside Syria and to help Syrian refugees in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq. These are only some of the most obvious of political crises which will have a profound impact on migration to the EU in the months to come. (p.5) - The development of high standards inside the EU will also make it easier for Europe to support third countries developing their own solutions to better manage their borders. (p. 11) - as by EU funding and related initiatives in the context of EU neighbourhood and development policies. The goal should be to encourage more secure borders, but also to strengthen the capacity of countries in North Africa to intervene and save lives of migrants in distress.(p.12) -
blame new pact	- The EU is the world's largest provider of development assistance. This will continue to be a key feature in EU engagement with countries, including on migration issues. Work to build stable and cohesive societies, to reduce poverty and inequality and promote human development, jobs and economic opportunity, to promote democracy, good governance, (p.20) -
moral judgement agenda	- One way in which the EU can help to ensure that countries of origin benefit from migration is through facilitating cheaper, faster and safer remittance transfers. (p.17) - First, the EU should step up its support to the countries bearing the brunt of displaced refugees. (p.5) - Partnership with countries of origin and transit is crucial and there are a series of established bilateral and regional cooperation frameworks on migration in place13. These will be enriched by stepping up the role on migration of EU Delegations in key countries. Delegations will in particular report on major

	migratory related developments in the host countries, contribute to mainstream migration issues into development cooperation and reach out to host countries to ensure coordinated action. (p.8) - This needs a sustained effort: more than 70% of the world's refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are trapped in situations of displacement for five years or more. The EU is a leading international donor for refugees with EUR 200 million in ongoing projects from development assistance and over EUR 1 billion of humanitarian assistance dedicated to refugees and IDPs since the beginning of 2014. (p.8) - The EU's legal migration policy should also support the development of countries of origin46 .The United Nations will shortly adopt the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and migration-related targets should be included, alongside targets in areas such as promoting decent work, youth employment, wage and social protection policies which can help countries of origin to create better economic opportunities at home. The EU will continue to actively support migration-related targets as part of the final overall framework, and to emphasise the importance of harnessing the positive effects of migration as a horizontal means of implementation for the post-2015 development agenda. This would complement the work of the EU's Mobility Partnerships47 and our efforts to mainstream migration issues into key development sectors. (p.16) -
moral judgement new pact	- The EU's work to address emergency and humanitarian needs is based on principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Over 70 million people, men, women and children are estimated to have been forcibly displaced worldwide, with almost 30 million refugees and asylum seekers41. The vast majority of these are hosted in developing countries and the EU will maintain its commitment to help (p.20) - Strands of work such as creating economic opportunity, increasing stability or tackling migrant smuggling can reduce the number of irregular arrivals to the EU and the numbers of those in the EU with no right to stay. (p.22) - This common response needs to include the EU's relationships with third countries, as the internal and external dimensions of migration are inextricably linked: working closely with partners has a direct impact on the effectiveness of policies inside the EU. (p.3) - mutually beneficial partnerships with key third countries of origin and transit; (p.3) - The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement reflected a deeper engagement and dialogue with Turkey, including helping its efforts to host around 4 million refugees36 . The Facility for Refugees in Turkey continues to respond to essential needs of millions of refugees, and continued and sustained EU funding in some form will be essential37 . (p.19) - The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement reflected a deeper engagement and dialogue with Turkey, including helping its efforts to host around 4 million refugees36 . The Facility for Refugees in Turkey continues to respond to essential needs of millions of refugees, and continued and sustained EU funding in some form will be essential37 . (p.19) - And at the same time, the proper functioning of migration and

	asylum policy inside the EU also needs reinforced cooperation on migration with partners outside the EU. (p.4) - It requires migration to be at the heart of mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries to effectively improve migration management.(p,29) -
legitimising remedies agenda	- The EU must continue engaging beyond its borders and strengthen cooperation with its global partners, address root causes, and promote modalities of legal migration that foster circular growth and development in the countries of origin and destination. (p.7) - Regional labour mobility schemes encouraging South-South mobility can bring an important contribution to local development. The Commission will also promote ethical recruitment in sectors suffering from a lack of qualified workers in countries of origin by supporting international initiatives in this field. (p.16) - The EU can also take immediate action to intervene upstream in regions of origin and of transit. (p.5) - The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) will work together with partner countries to put in place concrete measures to prevent hazardous journeys. (p.5) - A good example of where there is much to be gained from stepping up cooperation is Turkey. - Since the beginning of 2014, Turkey has received EUR 79 million to contribute to its efforts to deal with the pressure on its refugee management system and to help prevent hazardous journeys in the Eastern Mediterranean. Deploying a dedicated Frontex liaison officer in Turkey will take cooperation one step further (p.8) - as by EU funding and related initiatives in the context of EU neighbourhood and development policies. The goal should be to encourage more secure borders, but also to strengthen the capacity of countries in North Africa to intervene and save lives of migrants in distress. (p. 12) - Second, a pilot multi-purpose centre will be set up in Niger by the end of the year.Working with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR and the Niger authorities, the centre will combine the provision of information, local protection and resettlement opportunities for those in need. Such centres in countries of origin or transit will help to provide a realistic picture of the likely success of migrants' journeys, and offer assisted voluntary return options for irregular migrants. (p.5) - This work will be closely connected to broader political initiatives to promote stability. (p.5) - The EU must continue engaging beyond its borders and strengthen cooperation with its global partners, address root causes, and promote modalities of legal migration that foster circular growth and development in the countries of origin and destination. (p.7) - The EU will help third countries to meet their obligations by offering support such as capacity building for the management of returns, information and awareness campaigns, and support for reintegration measures. (p.10)

	- III.1 Reducing the incentives for irregular migration (p.7) - The EU must continue engaging beyond its borders and strengthen cooperation with its global partners, address root causes, and promote modalities of legal migration that foster circular growth and development in the countries of origin and destination. (p.7) -
legit remedies new pact	- The EU will strengthen cooperation with countries of origin and transit to prevent dangerous journeys and irregular crossings, including through tailor-made Counter Migrant Smuggling Partnerships with third countries26 . (p.15) - The new EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling will stimulate cooperation between the EU and third countries, through targeted counter migrant smuggling partnerships, as part of broader partnerships with key third countries. This will include support to countries of origin and transit in capacity-building both in terms of law enforcement frameworks and operational capacity, encouraging effective action by police and judicial authorities. (p.17) - Europol will strengthen cooperation with the Western Balkans and the Commission and Europol will work towards similar agreements with Turkey and others in the neighbourhood. The Commission will also include this in its cooperation with the African Union (AU). (p.17) - Working with partners also helps the EU to fulfil its obligations to provide protection to those in need, and to carry out its role as the world's major development donor. Under the New Pact, engagement with partner countries will be stepped up across all areas of cooperation. The Commission and the High Representative will immediately start work, together with Member States, to put this approach into practice through dialogue and cooperation with our partners. (p.18) - It is important to address the complex challenges of migration and its root causes to the benefit of the EU and its citizens, partner countries, migrants and refugees themselves.By working together, the EU and its partners can improve migration governance, deepen the common efforts to address shared challenges and benefit from opportunities. (p.18) - Action taken by Member States48 in the field of returns needs to go hand in hand with a new drive to improve cooperation on readmission with third countries, complemented by cooperation on reintegration, to ensure the sustainability of returns. (p.22) - Short-term mobility could complement other legal pathways to improve upstream cooperation with third countries (for example, in stemming irregular migratory flows). (p.25) - Addressing the root causes of irregular migration, combatting migrant smuggling, helping refugees residing in third countries and supporting well-managed legal migration are valuable objectives for both the EU and our partners to pursue through comprehensive, balanced and tailor-made partnerships. (p.3) - Frontex will also support the introduction of a return case management system at EU and national level, covering all steps of the procedure from the detection of an irregular stay to readmission and reintegration in third countries. In this way the Agency can realise its full potential to support return, linking up operational cooperation with Member States and effective readmission cooperation with third countries. (p.9)

	- Increase support for economic opportunity and addressing the root causes of irregular migration (p.25) - Support may also be targeted at maximising the positive impact of migration and reducing the negative consequences for partner countries, for example by reducing the transfer costs of remittances, reducing "brain drain", or facilitating circular migration. (p.21) - Conflict prevention and resolution, as well as peace, security and governance, are often the cornerstone of these efforts. Trade and investment policies already contribute to addressing root causes by creating jobs and perspectives for millions of workers and farmers worldwide. Boosting investment through vehicles such as the External Investment Plan can make a significant contribution to economic development, growth and employment. Better exploiting the potential of remittances can also help economic development. Cooperation in education, skills and research, as well as in policies such as digital, energy or transport, also helps to deepen economic development. (p.21) - peace and security, and to address the challenges of climate change can all help people feel that their future lies at home (p.21) - The EU's neighbours are a particular priority. Economic opportunity, particularly for young people, is often the best way to reduce the pressure for irregular migration. (p.19) - An important component of the future Voluntary Return and Reintegration Strategy will consist in setting out new approaches in third countries and include better linkages with other development initiatives and national strategies, to build third countries' capacity and ownership. The effective implementation of the Strategy will require close cooperation with Frontex under its reinforced mandate on return and as part of the common EU system for returns. (p.23) - Working with third countries on legal pathways is fully in line with the EU's interests. Europe has an ageing and shrinking population56. The structural pressure this is expected to create on the labour market is complemented by specific skills shortages in different localities and sectors such as health, medical care, and agriculture. The contribution of legally staying migrants to reducing skills gaps and increasing the dynamism of the EU labour market was recognised in the recently updated Skills Agenda for Europe57 (p.25) - As part of the comprehensive approach to migration and mobility, visa measures can act as a positive incentive in the engagement with third countries (p.24) - A reinforced and more comprehensive approach54, would offer cooperation with partner countries and help boost mutually-beneficial international mobility. The Commission will therefore launch Talent Partnerships in the form of an enhanced commitment to support legal migration and mobility with key partners. They should be launched first in the EU's Neighbourhood, the Western Balkans, and in Africa, with a view to expanding to other regions. These will provide a comprehensive EU policy framework as well as funding support for cooperation with third countries, to better match labour and skills needs in the EU, as well as being part of the EU's toolbox for engaging partner countries strategically on migration. Strong engagement of Member States will be essential, as will involvement of the private sector and the social partners, and ownership from partner countries. The Commission will organise

	a high-level conference with Member States and key EU stakeholders to launch the Talent Partnerships. (p.24) - The EU has a strong track record in labour mobility schemes. Legal migration pilot projects53 have shown that by providing targeted support, the EU can help Member States implement schemes that meet the needs of employers. The EU has also opened Erasmus+ and vocational training to third country nationals and offered support grants for the mobilisation of the diaspora. However, the scope and ambition of existing schemes remains limited. (p.24) - Following an assessment, the Commission can propose to apply restrictive visa measures, or in case of good cooperation, propose favourable visa measure (p.22) - Action taken by Member States48 in the field of returns needs to go hand in hand with a new drive to improve cooperation on readmission with third countries, complemented by cooperation on reintegration, to ensure the sustainability of returns. (p.22) - Frontex can also now provide practical support to develop partners' border management capacity and to cooperate with partners to optimise voluntary return. (p.22) - In addition, depending on the contexts and situations, the EU can assist partner countries in strengthening capacities for border management, including by reinforcing their search and rescue capacities at sea or on land, through well-functioning asylum and reception systems, or by facilitating voluntary returns to third countries or the integration of migrants. (p.21) - The EU can support capacity building in line with partners' needs. This will help partner countries manage irregular migration, forced displacement and combat migrant smuggling networks45 . Tools such as strategic communication will be further deployed, providing information on legal migration opportunities and explaining the risks of irregular migration, as well as countering disinformation. (p.21) - Migration is an integral part of the approach under the Joint Communication towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa to deepen economic and political ties in a mature and wide-ranging relationship38 and give practical support. The reality of multiple migration routes also underlines the need to work with partner countries in Asia39 and Latin America. (p.19) - the EU should build on the important progress made at the regional level, through dedicated dialogues and frameworks34 and through partnerships with organisations such as the African Union. (p.19) - Working with partners also helps the EU to fulfil its obligations to provide protection to those in need, and to carry out its role as the world's major development donor. Under the New Pact, engagement with partner countries will be stepped up across all areas of cooperation. The Commission and the High Representative will immediately start work, together with Member States, to put this approach into practice through dialogue and cooperation with our partners. (p.18)

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