

Ceuta & the EU Customs Union

How to Europeanize Europe's margins?



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“Hay una técnica que te puede ser muy útil, intenta descubrir diferencias en donde el común de los hombres no ve sino semejanzas e intenta descubrir semejanzas donde los hombres no ven sino diferencias”

Leonardo de Matos Lima

(“There is a technique which can be very useful - try to discover the difference where people do not see but similarities and try to discover similarities where people do not see but difference”.)

Summary

This qualitative, explorative case-study aims to theorize recent transformation processes in the border-region of Ceuta and Northern Morocco. A recent decision in 2011 by Ceuta as consequence and cause of transformations has been to join the EU Customs Union in 2012. Further it seeks to understand how the decision-making process and debate have been influenced by “Europeanization” –processes and carry attributes of “European-ness”. Using post-colonial theories attributes of Europeanization are traced in transformations, arguments in the debate about joining the EU Customs Union and thinking of border-people from both sides of the border. Besides, potential attributes of Europeanization in potential socio-economic effects in the border region are put into scene. That way an answer is given to the research-question, in which way attributes of European-ness, otherness, Europeanization and resistance are reflected in transformations in the border-region, factors in the debate about joining the EU-Customs Union and thinking of border-people from both sides in Ceuta. This research has thus challenged and proved applicability of postcolonial theory to the special border phenomena of Ceuta, also highlighting one-sidedness of decision-making (Ceuta as site of decision) impacting also the other side of the border (the Moroccan part of the border-region).

During the research process some background information resulted essential to understand the subject of analysis, namely transformations concerning the joining of the Customs Union in Ceuta: first of all it is important to know that the Customs Union is an institution appointed to create a single European market and regulating same conditions for international importation into the EU member-states. Ceuta is still a free-zone not adhering to the fiscal regime of that institution. Fiscal conditions are therefore advantageous in the city. It was Ceuta’s decision in 1986 (when Spain became a member-state of the EU) not to join the Customs. Reasons were disadvantageous historical and economic singularities, which were to be compensated by maintaining a special fiscal regime. The latter has determined Ceuta’s economic structure relying on irregular trading to Northern Morocco (irregular - because the border to Morocco is until now not recognized by Morocco, claiming Moroccan-ness of the territory). Consequently interwoven relations with Northern Morocco find expression in every-day routine, while at the same time Spanish-ness and European-ness are being accentuated. The border-passage is the site, where the economic particularity of the system is especially visible, but the singularity is also reflected in the life and discourses of the Moroccan traders involved.

The economic model of Ceuta became subject to debate due to changing conditions since 1986. The decision-making about joining the Customs Union started at the decision *not* to join. Arguments have developed through time, finally leading to a positive decision in 2011. Before, worries about potentially negative effects such as the change in prices affecting consumption costs and importation were stronger. The consequent reduction of irregular trade would require re-orientation of the economy and cause unemployment. Besides more economic reasons, political tensions with Morocco were feared. In the official discourse, though, the loss of jobs and basis of survival for thousands of poor Moroccan border-traders is not mentioned. Arguments about positive effects such as improving Ceuta’s status in the European Community, affirming its European-ness also before Morocco

and the urgent need for reform were convincing in 2011, especially given the disarmament of customs tariffs between Morocco and the EU.

Postcolonial theories chosen for analysis are based on the concepts “Europeanization” and “European-ness” proposed by Kuus (2004). Her analysis of how Europe is configured in relation to the Oriental is fundamental, explaining the constitution of self-images. Conditionality in the way Europe builds up “good” relationships to its “outside” and Eastern inside is based on demanding conformity to European values in exchange. “Not-yet”-European areas, such as Morocco and places marked by otherness within the Union such as Ceuta seek to attribute more European-ness to themselves –corresponding European standards. Strategies of attaining this are especially grounded in discursive shifting of boundaries of European-ness away from the own place and even beyond Europe’s margins - which then Europeanize themselves discursively. Mignolo’s “postcolonial” thinking (2000) or “borderthinking” is about focusing on dichotomous concepts to decolonize dichotomous, modernist categorization. For the case of Ceuta’s border this refers especially to the line separating the European from the Other, the colonized Oriental world of Morocco and Africa. Researching on the border-region and border-people, who might have a perspective from the border much more than others, goes in hand with these ideas. It is then crucial to think from dichotomous concepts, taking into account the colonial difference. Theoretical contributions by Kramsch focus on the European Neighborhood policy implying a similar conditionality in Eurocentric policy as described by Kuus. Also diversity and potential of resistance are aspects of relevance of Kramsch’s article (2011) pointing to agency and power within the process of Europeanization. Economic aspects of the decision-making around the transformation around the border are significant, regarding development as part of the modernity and attribute of European-ness. Template thinking and the process of “neoliberalization” (Sparke, 2002) transmit principles related to the logic of European-ness according to Sparke. Neoliberalist ideas are thus indicative of the “European-value-package” (in Ceuta AND in Morocco). Rumford points to the particularity of borders emphasizing change and transformation through Europeanizing and borderwork realized by simple border-people contesting established borders and multiplying them (Rumford, 2008).

From these theories indicators have been operationalized in order to analyze attributes of *more static* European-ness, Otherness, and *more dynamic* processes of Europeanization and resistance. Qualitative methods have been applied to gather data in the field as well as literature study of different media since 1984 for the analysis. Respondents for the research included two distinct groups: Moroccan border-people daily crossing the border for work (having opportunities to think from the border) and experts on the economic decision-making about the Customs Union from Ceuta.

The exhaustive analysis brought along certain key-findings which are worth mentioning here: The aim of the study to theorize the transformations by the recent and current developments in Ceuta and understanding the decision-making process and debate about the Customs Union was attained. Indicators from post-colonial theories have helped to generate huge amounts of data and to create a differentiated image of Europeanization in the border-region.

Europeanization is reflected for transformations before the decision-making e.g. considering construction of the border fence, substitution of kinds of goods and origins (now originating mainly in Europe), the Tanger-Med-project or the gradual liberalization of Morocco. Europeanizing transformations of Morocco put Ceuta under pressure stimulating reaction – namely the debate about the Customs Union. Europeanization seems a self-perpetuating process then, relying on mutual stimulation and reaction on both sides of the border. Thereby borders to ‘other’ less European Europe’s and Orients, such as Ceuta and Morocco and more European Europes are multiplied discursively. Arguments justifying the decision about the Customs Union are driven by neoliberal template thinking with the aim of modernization – Europeanizing the city. For the thinking of border-people we have evidence for long-lasting, penetrating Europeanization without any clear beginning. Since the decision *not* to join the Customs Union Europeanization of thinking of border-people from both sides has been evident, though to less extent in Morocco. European values are internalized and used to evaluate the world around – also Moroccan border-people make use of the criteria to even admit “primitive”, none-European features of Morocco. Discursive behaviors of border-people partly corresponded with the official discourse and become (un-)intended instruments of Europeanization of Ceuta by practices of de- and re-bordering. Socio-economic effects estimated show a scenario of Ceuta and the region after integration into the Customs Union – reflecting Europeanization of Morocco and Ceuta. The border is more organized, people keep on evaluating by European criteria and many processes of transformation to Europeanize the region, even more, are starting off. Beyond this elitist process the shifting of European borders is also realized by individual border-people and groups, undermining Europeanized borders by none-European practices of bordering and multiplying Europes. The impacts of a (here identified as) Europeanizing measure taken in Ceuta have thus impacts far beyond the European border – stimulating elitist Europeanization of Morocco. The poorest of the poor, though, suffer from the impacts having lost their job in irregular trading and struggling for survival.

An unexplained finding question is e.g. why the discursive groups use different levels of reference - Moroccan border-people referring to the daily on the micro level and border-people from Ceuta (like the official discourse) focusing on a macro-perspective. Approaching the problem from a postcolonial perspective the focus on the total by experts from Ceuta indicates a sort of Europeanization of perspective, always seeking comparison with the global through a European-value system as filter. Moroccan-border-people instead orient on a local scale staying with their habitual practices. They are still less obsessed with global comparisons and competition, working for survival only.

In spite of various difficulties in various phases of the research process a reasonable critical framework has been established observing the decision-making and related transformations in Ceuta.

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1. Introduction

“Una parte de la ‘reactivación económica y la generación de empleo’ se base en la integración de Ceuta en la Unión Aduanera. [...] La ciudad ‘debe iniciar el camino para una serie de reformas para plantear un futuro estable y de prosperidad para todos’. [...] Por lo tanto, ‘la globalización requiere de una adaptación de la ciudad para no quedarse atrás’ y por ello, ‘es estrictamente necesario que una Ceuta del siglo XXI siempre mire hacia el sur’. Es decir, con el afianzamiento de las relaciones comerciales, el flujo de visitantes y la potenciación de una plataforma de servicios que aproveche la sinergia del ‘enorme potencial que supone el desarrollo de la zona del norte de Marruecos’” (Zumeta, 2011).

This is a quotation from the daily journal published in Ceuta “El Pueblo de Ceuta”, reporting on the debate about Ceuta joining the European Customs Union in 2012. What it illustrates is the debate on changes and transformations e.g. driven by globalization in the border-region of Ceuta to which the city will have to adapt. Moreover it expresses the crucial role of Ceuta being situated at the border with Morocco as an enclave on the African continent as well as the decisiveness of interrelation with the other side of the border region. There is an intention of building up partnerships – though it is neither clear what they might be like, nor which criteria and assumptions define this partnership given the permanent transformation of the dividing border itself by different forces. All this can be considered as a part of wider transformations which are subject to this research.

1.1 The aim of the research

The aim of this research is to theorize the transformations by the recent and current developments in Ceuta. More precisely the research aims to understand how the decision-making process and debate have been influenced by the transformation processes of “Europeanization” and how the steps, which will have an influence in future, carry attributes of “European-ness”. Postcolonial theory on borders is expected to help explaining the transformations and decisions at the contested part of the European external border. This research is thus a way to challenge and prove applicability of postcolonial theory to border phenomena. Theoretical aspects are interesting to focus on in this research, because so far the Spanish enclaves in Morocco have served as frequent examples to illustrate why diverse, different theories are more or less adequate to understand the EU-border. One must be aware of the consequences of supporting one or the other theoretical narrative about the external border of Europe, because they all carry on into real life. One should therefore be sure that there is rhyme and reason to the theories one applies. Critical views, here the postcolonial perspective, on the ENP cannot but help Europe to start to listen to the people “out there”, outside of its borders. The geographical, spatial range and implications of institutions such as the Customs Union in fact goes much beyond European borders.

The lack of knowledge to be filled in has to do with the “one-sidedness” of the decision-making in the region: Ceuta has chosen to join the Customs Union, but it is also the Moroccan side of the border, which is affected by transformation and it is part of the setting based on which the decision has been made. The choice though is made by Ceuta, not directly considering consequences for the areas and people on the other side. Many might be

worried and afraid of the future - especially the most vulnerable in the Moroccan border-region e.g. those trading across the border. At the same time there are those who cannot wait anymore because new opportunities might arise even on the Moroccan side (X. Ferrer-Gallardo, personal communication, March 12th, 2012). It is therefore worth thinking about what possibilities are inherent in the changes as well. In a more practical sense one should reveal possibilities and changes for the people in the region and implications for existing theories. This leads to the research question to be answered with the help of postcolonial theory here.

1.2 Research question

In which way are attributes of European-ness, Otherness, Europeanization and resistance reflected in transformations in the border-region, factors in the debate about joining the EU-Customs Union and thinking of border-people from both sides in Ceuta?

The following sub-questions emerge from the main research question:

- 1) *What is the EU-Customs Union and why has Ceuta so far not been part of it?*
- 2) *Which attributes of European-ness, Europeanization, otherness and resistance have emerged in forms of transformations in the border-region, as factors in the debate and thinking of border-people before the decision to join the Customs Union in Ceuta?*
- 3) *Which attributes of European-ness, Europeanization, otherness and resistance can be expected in transformation processes of the border and social-economic impacts on the region after Ceuta will have become a member of the Customs Union?*

1.3 How to answer the research question and structure of the research

To answer the research question a distinction between the two phases has been made: The phase when the debate was still ongoing and the phase after the decision and introduction of the new conditions to Ceuta.

Theories (Chapter 2) allow for some helpful instruments to frame the way of investigating the topic. It is first worth having a look at what features belong to the border between Ceuta and Morocco. Then it is also relevant to be aware of the recent and current changes linked to Ceuta joining the Customs Union in 2012, also placing it in a wider row of transformations. Finally pieces of postcolonial border-theory can help to give guidelines for conceptualization and operationalization of indicators in this research. Understanding the regional background (chapter 3) and placing it in a wider geographical context is a basis to this process. In the method section (chapter 4) then operationalization of theory is realized. This research can be generally called a case-study, for it is dealing with the case of Ceuta affronting wider transformations. Interviews, observations and informal talks in the field and profound analysis of discourse in literature were ways of gathering data. During a phase of qualitative content analysis the operationalized indicators were used to structure the data. That way the first step is to focus on understanding the Customs Union, as well as the motivations and impacts of Ceuta staying out of it at the Spanish adhesion to the EU in 1986 (chapter 5). Factors and transformations which have contributed to the

decision-making to become a member of the Customs Union in 2012 are analyzed in chapter 6. Moreover, it is the task here to identify attributes of European-ness, otherness, Europeanization and resistance. Attention has been paid to the nature of the transformations, thinking of people in the border region and in which the mentioned attributes way they have entered the arguments in the debate leading to the decision. The last part of the analysis (chapter 7) is more speculative and imagining scenarios of socio-economic effects of the decision and integration into the Customs Union – again tracing attributes of Europeanizing processes. The final chapter is a conclusion summarizing, bringing together observations and interpretations of and about the Europeanization of the border-region.

2. *Postcolonial theory on Ceuta's border*

This chapter is designed to establish a solid theoretical framework of postcolonial border-theory. This theory will then help to understand and explain processes empirically observed surrounding the incorporation into the Customs Union. First of all the concrete border between Ceuta and Morocco and the debate are being discussed from diverse theoretical perspectives to shed light on the particular characteristics of theorizing the particular border-region (§2.1). The second step is to find more critical, general post-colonial theories which can help to investigate later the particular decision to join the Customs Union and respective transformations and effects (§2.2). The last part (§2.3) presents the theoretical perspective fitting the case of Ceuta and chosen for operationalization of indicators helping to find answers to the main- and sub-questions of this research.

2.1 The border between Ceuta and Morocco

An important feature of the border-region is the vital function of the border for interaction between Ceuta, the areas and people on the Moroccan side, including also illegal activities such as smuggling. The border is much more permeable than its physical appearance (double fences, permanent surveillance and barbed wire) might suggest (Driessen, 2010, p. 174). The people who have an objective in passing are diverse: There are European tourists wanting to visit Morocco or wanting to visit Ceuta (Hernandez et al, n.d.), there are salesmen with Moroccan passports with a special permission to enter the Spanish enclave daily in order to buy goods at the special fiscal conditions of Ceuta and sell them in Morocco. And there are those who only watch the fence from distance – thousands of potential immigrants to Europe, the desired continent of their hope for a better living. Many of the latter desperately run into the fence, experience violence or even death (Valsecchi, 2009). The effects of drawing a line of separation in daily social realities can be considered a rather arbitrary division (Anderson et al in Kramsch, 2010, p. 1010) of people in an interrelated region: people with a “good” passport, people with a “wrong” one (Driessen, 2010, p. 169) - and people with special permissions due to proximity under the framework of Schengen-exceptions (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011, p. 30). Still there is normality and people cross the border to spend their leisure time, to buy goods or visit friends or family on the other side (X. Ferrer-Gallardo, personal communication, March 12th, 2012). Freedom of movement along one of the most protected, securitized

borders in the world, the border of Ceuta, is thus a question of citizenship and permissions. It has become an issue to ongoing, current local, national and supranational debate (Kramsch, 2011, p. 195). In spite of this, there is cultural exchange, interrelation and normality embedded in the everyday routine (Bechev et al, 2010, p. 1) at the border.

As every border, the border in Ceuta, between Spain and Morocco, is meant to separate legal systems, cultures, politics, mentalities, religions and people from each other (Bechev et al, 2010, pp. 1-2). Still it is permeable and the separating effect is not dominant alone though (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1006). Yet, the border has been established among others in order to guarantee sovereignty about territories and people to the two states (Walters, 2002, p. 577). But there is more to it. The border also helps to define identities in the sense that it is meant to make people subject to national and supranational discourses of belonging – separating Spanish and Moroccans, Europeans and Moroccans, Europeans and Africans. This overlap of identities (Balibar, 1998, pp. 223-225) brings along contestation especially on the local level of the border region: There are many aspects of discontinuity and separation (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011, p. 26), which have been institutionalized in various ways. But Ferrer-Gallardo also stresses continuity, interaction and permeability on the local level at the border which in part undermines the strict separation (ibid.) as one might expect from the physical appearance of the border. There is thus a certain resistance within the region to the institutionalized border discourse of separation. In which way two forms of transformations, continuities and discontinuities, are articulated is analyzed by Ferrer-Gallardo for cultural, economic and issues related to securitization. What is sure is that the discourses formerly dominated by Ceuta and the Spanish, are now under renegotiation in a different power- balance. Morocco is developing steadily to be the steering force in the region (X. Ferrer-Gallardo, personal communication, March 12th, 2012).

Processes through history must be thus analyzed having in mind the interwoven-ness of relationships of Europe and Morocco as a relationship of a former Spanish colony with its colonizer Spain (X. Ferrer- Gallardo, personal communication, March 12th, 2012). Processes of e.g. othering “between Christian ceuties and Muslim ceuties” (ibid., p. 28) go in hand with “daily patterns of social cross-border interaction” which leads to a “decrease of fears and prejudices” (ibid., p. 31). “Economic modernization process in Morocco”, “the ‘Schengenisation’” since 1991, borderless-ness of mass media (ibid., p. 31) and “cross-border dialogue” are factors to continuity which are undermined by the national “geopolitical dispute” between Spain and Morocco (ibid., p. 31). Sovereignty over Ceuta has not formally been recognized by Morocco and therefore the border either. The latter might be a reason why the newly designed European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) for the Mediterranean neighbours of the EU is not likely to be accepted by Morocco (ibid., p. 33). Commercial relations are not formalized and thus treated as “irregular”, “atypical”. Yet, they are acknowledged by Spain for the “profit” they bring along. Morocco tolerates them although the activities are categorized as “smuggling”. Often they are considered to be an “obstacle to formal economic development”. However, developments in Ceuta have had impacts on “northern Morocco’s economic structure” e.g. on “gradual commercial de-bordering between the EU and Morocco as well as investment and infrastructural transformations taking place in the north of Morocco” (ibid., p. 30). Yet, Morocco in general is less dependent on Ceuta by now bringing along a “decay” of economic relations (ibid., p. 30). Still there

is a “cross-border labour market” in different branches (ibid., p. 31) and thanks to the dynamics of smuggling “purchasing power” has risen on the Moroccan side (ibid., p. 31). “Economic modernization of Morocco” and “globalization” also foster increase in tourism and real estate investment across the border and the state seems to move away from “economic underdevelopment” (ibid., p. 31). A new role for Ceuta can be to play an “informal commodity supplier to Morocco”, a “logistic platform” and provider of “quality services” at the Moroccan side (ibid., p. 32). The “increasingly securitized border regime” (ibid., p. 29), “immigration pressure”, “strengthening of controls” and similar measures of security (ibid., p. 30) are transformations paralleling “Schengenisation” in favor of “thousands” of Moroccan border traders and more (ibid., p. 30) and stimulating co-operation of authorities on both sides for the “securization” of the border. The most recent debates and current decision-making process, yet, is about the joining the EU Customs Union or not and will be theoretically discussed in the following paragraph.

2.1.1 The debate about the Customs Union

Besides these seemingly contradictory transformations a debate lasting for years is expected to find an end in 2012: Ceuta is at the break-over point to join the European Customs Union this year. The above described transformations might have been factors to the way decision-making has occurred in Ceuta making decision-makers chose in favor of the EU (Saura, 2011).

That Ceuta as a Spanish autonomous city not yet being part of the Customs Union has to do with the status as a free harbor: In 1986 when Spain joined the European Union, Ceuta and Melilla decided to stay out of the Customs Union though. Being a member of the latter would have meant to give up a favorable economic model, making use of price differences across the border to Morocco, which was driven by the engine of Ceuta at that time (X. Ferrer-Gallardo, personal communication, March 12th, 2012). Thanks to the special fiscal conditions (no VAT on consumption and not being member of the Customs Union) Ceuta could have been regarded for years as a “fiscal paradises” also profiting from “generous subsidies by the European Union”. That way competitive goods had been flooding the Moroccan market from Ceuta and Melilla as well (Sebtamlilya.net, n.d.). But as described earlier (1.3.1) the situation has changed. Ferrer-Gallardo indicates that there has been a “growing number of claims to formalize cross border interaction” in order to adapt to “new economic circumstances” with Morocco becoming ever more dominant in the region. In this context the debate about an alternative “hypothetic integration within the EU customs territory” (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011, p. 32) has been reinforced again. An important factor to it might have been the debate about free-trade agreements between Morocco and the EU in general which come into action since March 1st, 2012 (Gongora et al, 2011). The transformations in the region on the Moroccan side and changes in structure of the interaction across the border have not only led to decrease of “economic disparities” but also changed the role of Ceuta, which has to respond to the re-“distribution” of “geoeconomic” powers (ibid., pp. 34-35). Some authors confirm that the “atypical” trade has become a critical obstacle in Northern Morocco to investment and development. There are even worries about the health of the Moroccan population which might have been intoxicated for years by alimentary goods from the European market, which

were far over their date of expiry. Moreover there has been criticism about sustaining corruption by the customs officials at the passage by maintaining the informal status of trade connections (Sebtamlilya.net). Additionally recent developments such as the economic crises in Europe and the Arab Spring movement in Morocco might have had important impacts on the border-region. Whereas the crisis had arrived much earlier to Spain peninsula, only now it seems to reach Ceuta. There has been also remigration by Moroccans in Spain to Ceuta due to lack of jobs on the peninsula, as some Moroccan workers in Ceuta have observed. The illusion of paradise Europe is starting to melt away. However, the Arab Spring in Morocco has led to changes in the Constitution which have to enter social reality in the upcoming periods. Moreover the set of minds of many people has been influenced, so that they position themselves partly more self-conscious towards Europe. This can be also felt in the region where people go into the streets to claim their rights in Morocco – actually dreaming of an economic progress similar to the European of some years ago. Ceuta must find a way to deal with wider changes and the decision of joining the Customs Union might be a way of coping.

Ceuta joining the Customs Union would mean that it belongs to the Customs Territory of the European Union which includes the territory of the waters, the sea and the airspace (Guezanya, 2012). Thus joining the Customs Union would not only mean responding to certain transformations but also creating them since it means giving up the “free port status”. Ferrer-Gallardo estimates that the step could have positive effects on generating a “formal cross-border economic space”, increasing “interconnection” in economic sense and “interdependence” of the “urban” form in the region (ibid., pp. 34-35). Formal trade can stimulate entrepreneurship on both sides of the border. What is crucial though is that the spatial range of the Customs Union goes beyond the border and reaches into Morocco and particularly into the border-region on the Moroccan side. Moreover the kind of transformation described here will have *winners AND losers* (O.T. Kramsch, personal communication, March 5th, 2012). Disadvantages of Ceuta joining the Customs Union are likely to be experienced especially by the clandestine traders who make their living by the informal transport of goods. Also people in Ceuta are dependent on the relationships, since for years the viability of their economy has been linked to the clandestine trade (There are speculations that about 90% of the revenues were gained from it (Sebtamlilya.net, n.d.). Without special fiscal conditions and with VAT the trade will break away – which is an intention behind joining the Customs Union (El Farah, 2008). What thus has to be noticed is that the annual traffic across the border amounts to about more than 34 millions of persons. The clandestine traders among them are estimated to be carrying billions of Euros on their backs, according to the American chamber of Commerce in Casablanca. The chamber also estimated that 45.000 are directly employed through the clandestine trade and about 400.000 indirectly (El Farah, 2008), one could think of e.g. taxi-drivers to the border and other related branches. The VAT which will be introduced in Ceuta then has disastrous direct (at least short-term) effects for many people making their living through the clandestine trade. Another negative effect will be probably created with regard to the anyway tensed relations with Morocco (El Farah, 2008; Guezanya, 2012). Rabat will be against a commercial frontier with Ceuta allowing for legal transition of goods products, because then the border will definitely be fixed at the border-passage to Ceuta (Guezanya, 2012). Yet, those in Ceuta arguing in favor of joining the Customs Union assure that the

establishment of a commercial frontier is a pure economic decision and by no means political. Morocco could go on claiming sovereignty about the territories (El Farah, 2008). Still one could also regard the decision made by Ceuta as a diplomatic strategy disguised as an economic reform to finally force Morocco to acknowledge the border officially and change discourse. However it is probable that if Morocco had to change discourse it would find a way to still claim sovereignty about the territories.

It would be thus interesting to understand which factors, perceptions; calculations and balancing of reasons have led to the decision of joining the Customs Union. Part of it is also to understand how it will transform the border and impact the region. This can be especially interesting to have a look at from a postcolonial perspective.

2.2 Postcolonial insights: theorizing Ceuta's decision within transformations

As with every topic the European border and borders in general have been looked at from a multitude of different perspectives and described by various metaphors. All of them produce knowledge and discourses which all of them are certainly legitimate, not only within their underlying worldviews and theories chosen. They thus highlight diverse aspects and attributes of borders, such as the geopolitical function of borders to guarantee peace or war, the nation-state perspective in which borders guarantee sovereignty or the control-function of bio-political borders (Walters, 2002, p. 562).

We are dealing here with the network of institutions, activities and people of the border region of Ceuta and the way European influence and transformation of the border are impacting the area and its people – of course, on the side of Ceuta, but also on the other side, the Moroccan region of Tetouan and Tanger. This also means that it is about a border between European modernity and “Oriental” “not-yet” modernity. Throughout a long history Morocco has internalized (and has been forced to internalize) values and norms of European modernity which have become roots of Moroccan society. The concept of coloniality as part of modernity indicates that the topic, we are treating here, is also a question of tracing much longer ongoing process (O.T. Kramsch, personal communication, March 5th, 2012). Since we are dealing here with this particular European border of Ceuta with Morocco and processes of transformation affecting the border-region in a former colony of France, Morocco, this research though is not only focused on the border but also seeks to think from it (Mignolo, 2000, p. 85).

In the following paragraphs different useful postcolonial theories will be elaborated. First borderthinking by Mignolo (§2.2.1) and European-ness and Europeanization by Kuus (§2.2.2) will be presented. Next European-ness and conditionality at the external border of Europe and the ENP (§2.2.3) by Kramsch and the economic dimension to European-ness in crossborder spaces by Sparke (§2.2.4) will be discussed. The last border-theories are by Rumford, dealing with borderwork are subject to explanation (§2.2.5).

2.2.1 Borderthinking

Mignolo presents the relevance of looking at borders from a different perspective, namely by not only having a critical view on modernity but also to take into account the perspective of coloniality or colonial difference. Modernity and colonial difference belong to each other and are not successive (ibid., p. 50). Mignolo argues that coloniality and modernity have their roots both in the discovery of America and are both “conditions to a global imaginary” (ibid., p. 51). This is obvious when “tracing local histories” of e.g. Latin America which have been managed by the modern colonial world system e.g. with regard to the production of knowledge, labour etc. (ibid., pp. 53-54). Hegemonic eurocentrism and global designs have been (and are so now!) important features carrying coloniality even during decolonization (ibid., p. 54). The “imitative traditions” were made visible already through the dependency theories promoted by Latin American authors (ibid., p. 55).

But colonialism also concerned other parts of the world in a later “oriental” phase, which is very much linked to the first “American” phase through the modern colonial distinction of the Occident and Orient. Mignolo goes on arguing that a dominant standard of knowledge was brought along by the second wave of colonizers (French, English and Dutch especially) (ibid., p. 56) and the important feature of Spanish/Portuguese colonization -the Occidental as constituting the Oriental - became forgotten. Before Arab knowledge had served as a yardstick to judging occidental epistemology and state of knowledge (ibid., p. 61). Throughout time the Oriental then became the incorporation of the “Other” from a modern perspective, regardless the colonial differences. The Occident instead became a “different sameness” as a European Western extension (ibid., p. 58), from where the planetary epistemological standards of knowledge emerged (ibid., p. 59). The Arab world as enemy with a same foundation of thought, namely the Greek tradition was equalized through the colonization of the transatlantic, the occidental, generating images of the Other, Oriental during the first wave of colonization. Mignolo argues that the Occidental as condition to the Oriental was forgotten when the Renaissance as such was erased by the second wave of colonizers, the second modern (ibid., p. 62). This meant “washing away” fundamental ideas to the nowadays imaginary of the global.

According to Mignolo the narrative of the modern world system in that sense has to be rethought from its “margins”, its borders, to tell what has been “forgotten” (ibid., p. 51). Mignolo encourages borderthinking from the “colonial difference” “at various sites” to tell a “diversity of local histories” and “all kinds of knowledge” (ibid., p. 63). This means “re-reading modern texts” from non-European perspectives to see how modern global designs have been forced upon (ibid.) and could be regarded as intellectual decolonization then (ibid., p. 64). As there is an expansion of the modern world system, a parallel construction from outside and inside to build the imaginary, Mignolo stresses potentials of “an other thinking” from the “borderlands” implying double critique (ibid., p. 52). The basis of thought is the idea of many colonial modernities, constituted by the coloniality of power inherent in the modern (ibid.). At the same time also critical postmodern authors have to be criticized and their writings to be decolonized for lacking perception of the colonial difference as pointed to by Mignolo (ibid., p. 66). He adapts the idea of Khatibi taking the conflict for centuries between Occident and Islam based on mutual misunderstanding as occasion to start a double critique towards Islamic fundamentalism AND the Occidental, Western modern – and

here Mignolo shows that being critical of both means thinking from both traditions and neither, *namely from the border of coloniality of power* (ibid., p. 67).

This way one gets away from “dichotomies” and limitations of metaphysics, occidental or oriental inspired by modern coloniality and colonial modernity (ibid., p. 68). Instead one can see the possibility and epistemological potential to overcome limitations of modern territorial thinking. It means to free subaltern knowledges “outside parameters of the modern conceptions of reason and rationality” to start “an other thinking” (ibid., p. 67) with ethical qualities (ibid., p. 68). Then also thinking diversity and plurality make important contributions to escape from dichotomies when thinking from the border e.g. seeing how languages and knowledges have been silenced through translation and universal knowledges of modernity with the consequence that an “Oriental” scholar cannot know from which perspective he is speaking. This also means to follow Glissant and note how epistemology has been globally “creolized”. When Mignolo, presenting Khatibis and Glissants ideas, he explains what is different about “an other thinking” from e.g. postmodern ideas he mentions the “*irreducible difference*”, which implies to recognize coloniality of power as being interlinked with modernity and to criticize from the border. The strength of what so many authors conceptualized in different ways but hint at the idea of “double critique”, they all “have in common” that they seek to stop organizing the world into dichotomous categories by border thinking, “thinking *from* dichotomous” concepts instead (ibid., p. 84).

What is important of these insights into Mignolos “postcolonial” thinking is that the general assumptions of this research start from here as a wider way of viewing the world, a lens chosen. I will try to investigate from the border, and more specifically from the one of Ceuta. This is of course an ambitious project for a Europeanized writer, but a challenge to be taken. The most relevant concepts of Mignolo are then the “borderthinking” from “dichotomous concepts” and “decolonizing”. This fits very much the idea of researching impacts on the border-region at the border between modernity and Occident, and the group of people, who might through the circumstances of their life and more than many other people have a perspective from the border: the Moroccan people who cross the border on a daily basis for work.

2.2.2 European-ness and Europeanization

Another author, Kuus, shares this basis of thought and has investigated the East-enlargement of the European Union from this perspective. This is not only interesting from a general postcolonial perspective but also since the issue of research is about a shift of the European external border. Kuus in that context brings along the concept of “European-ness” (Kuus, 2004, p. 474), which is meant to describe a criteria attributed to the West of Europe which is expected to incorporate and carried also by the new member states. The underlying idea has to do with a dichotomy, the contrast between European-ness and Eastern attributes (ibid., p. 472). In this sense one can speak of an “oriental discourse” as hinted at by Mignolo, ascribing difference by distance: The more distant from European Europe the more oriental attributes are ascribed to a site (ibid., p. 473). The fact that the discourse of difference persists in spite of the enlargement and idea of unifying Europe (ibid.) can be explained in light of postcolonial perspectives.

The main reason of persistence, according to Kuus, is a certain flexibility and fluidity of the discourse (ibid.). The orientalization and practices of othering make the concept Europe exist, since it is “necessary for the self-image” (ibid., p. 474) not as one single Europe but in plurality: From different perspectives of different people in different sites very different borders are drawn to define and mark where East and Europe start. What remains is that Eastern European countries are perceived to be in a “learning process”, “not fully Europe”, “learners” and “adopters” of European norms (ibid., p. 473). This effort is also a sort of conditionality to their accession and the enlargement (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197). “Not yet European” is interpreted by Kuus as pointing at a “patchwork Europe of a single vision”, consisting of “differing degrees of European-ness” in addition to an “identity of a generalized East” (Kuus, 2004, p. 475). This actually means that the more a site Europeanizes the more it is regarded European, though Kuus stresses that it is not a question of either or, but instead a continuum between East and European, between the Other, Oriental and modern European-ness. The result is a division between a core, not yet Europeans and excluded (ibid.).

The attribute of European-ness is e.g. linked in official speeches to “good behavior” (ibid.) and thus degrees of civilization, as making difference between “normality” and “otherness”. “Social change” then does not imply (only!) to develop the ‘underdeveloped’ but is linked to “European-ness” and “moving towards” it (ibid., p. 476). “Europeanization” then describes a “process of showing the willingness and ability to internalize European norms” (ibid., p. 477). There is a “banal obviousness” about which places are East and West and thus certain representations can be reinforced and are “channeled into gradations of European-ness”. Central criteria can be summarized as proximity, likeness and idealization (ibid., p. 484). The East can become a “bridge of civilization”, “a contact zone” where earlier there was division. It is about incorporating European values and cooperating regionally with permeable borders. If the latter is resisted there might be very negative labels about the East instead (ibid., p. 477). The East is also still imagined by the geopolitical term “bufferzone” to further East and in that light the Eastern states might seek the “stabilizing” influence of Europe (ibid.).

One could also speak of a process of “westernizing” and Kuus even comes to call the transition “experiments” of the West to transform “satellites”, which implies even higher ambitions of Europeanization (in terms of Mignolo colonizing or modernizing maybe) imagining the world from “simple binaries” (ibid., p. 474). Kuus’ critical insights go further and she describes the European Union as often considered as a “disciplining power”, controlling the struggle of the Eastern accession countries to adopt and conform. “Circulation” of the discourse by e.g. claims of intellectuals in European and Eastern Europe make the ideas ever more legitimate, which is all possible by the flexibility of the discourse, making it “effective”: Any place can be constructed as wished (ibid., p. 484). Here Kuus points out that any “agency” of the Eastern countries, “specific groups” and “existing institutional relationships” are denied by this view (ibid., pp. 477-478). Thus she also observes how norms are only selectively and strategically appropriated or even rejected, often unnoticed by “self-assured Westerners” who of course, prove to be most confident with a certain elite of partners representing European-ness (ibid., p. 478). That way Western aid is “channeled” through a small “insider group”, so that in fact one can speak of a “two-way power relation”. The representative European elite than has incorporated the discourse of otherness (ibid., p. 479). They seem to use

the discourse and define their own particular East: The “shades of otherness” as described earlier are “durable” because of the “flexibility of the discursive borders” of the East, which in any case can be always located “further east” by a particular country. Kuus calls this process “nesting orientalism” and stresses the flexible framing of Europe, non-Europe by pointing to the “various internal Europes” (ibid.). This is most clear having a look at the term “central Europe”, which has been used as a “redefinition” and thus a “multiplication of the internal East” in a sense like European Europe “Moréally superior” and “more civilized” (ibid., p. 480) – to which the East on which everyone agrees, namely Russia, is a condition (ibid., p. 481).

Kuus shows that there is a decisive difference between what is normally regarded as the Orient and the case of Eastern Europe: She observes a “double framing” since Eastern Europe is “not quite in Europe” but either non-Europe like the “traditional orient” (ibid., p. 482). Eastern Europe is not an “outside” because even within Europe there is a “repository of Eastness”. The East also resists comparisons to the third World – there is pride of achievements of Westernness and good relationships. There has never been a “formal colonization” (though some consider the Soviet Union as a “Russian imperial empire”) and in that sense either any “decolonization” (ibid.). The reason why still she keeps on using postcolonial theories in terms of the oriental has to do with the “discourse of otherness” which is the logic of the European-ness concept. The East has a “constituting role” for the European “self-image”. The transformation process indicates otherness as a basis. Postcolonial theory then can serve as e.g. a “critique of linear transitology”, but also “nationalism”, “identity” and can help to understand the “interaction of Europe and the East” (ibid.).

From this point of view Kuus starts speaking of “colonialities AND postcolonialities” in plural form and stresses that postcolonial theory then is not about “ranking the most truly postcolonial or oriental”, but just a means to help deconstructing colonial knowledges and practices. Even if Eastern Europe is not “truly oriental” otherness still is ascribed to it and it bears “similarities” (ibid., p. 483) with the “real” Oriental. Kuus encourages to “explore power-relationships” and to investigate “representational frameworks” of the Eastern and the Orient. According to her both do not operate with “clear-cut dichotomies” but instead “gradations of “NOT YET” and “NOT FULLY” (ibid.).

Like with Mignolo Kuus stresses that there is some sort of “*double conception*” of East and Central Europe, as “similar” with the discourse of orientalism. Dichotomy is highlighted and goes in hand with the enlargement process. Moreover Kuus adds that there are more peripheries to Europe than only the East, e.g. with regard to the South of Italy. Thus “different kinds” of “colonial and postcolonial experiences” might be observed as well as different “functioning” of “various strategies of othering” (ibid.). Kuus recommends research “not only from centers of power, but also from power margins”, since the latter might serve as a “useful mirror of exclusion and division as integral part of the EU” (ibid., p. 484).

The most crucial ideas for this research then gather around two terms used by Kuus European-ness and Europeanization. Since we are dealing with one of Europe’s margins, the border-region of Ceuta, it is relevant from this perspective to investigate how the ideas behind the concepts impact the area and its people. The border is of course meant to be a demarcation of where Europe ends, but if European-ness is an attribute of the side of

Ceuta in the border region is a question to be answered. One could speculate that due to cohesion across the border, impacts of attributes of European-ness can be found also on the Moroccan side of the border region then. It is also decisive, because the process under investigation, namely Ceuta joining the Customs Union might or might not be a process of Europeanization of Europe's margins (reaching far beyond the external border), which have to conform and adopt to be more "European". The process of Europeanization is possible to be traced due to the proximity, but also because Morocco itself has been colonized by the French, Spanish and Portuguese in all phases of colonization thus. Due to the flexibility of the "European-ness-discourse" as noticed by Kuus European-ness is not likely to stop at the institutional external border of Europe and even if there is no doubt about differences and consensus instead about the non-European-ness of the Moroccan side postcolonial theory proves how coloniality is always linked to modernity e.g. by the incorporation of modern ideas as being regarded as other or oriental. As Kuus shows there are shades of otherness, not clear-cut dichotomies and various colonial experiences and strategies which means that insights of Kuus can be applied also the border region with an own ongoing colonial experiences, also considering the colonial "enclave-like" situation of Ceuta. The border has served as a "re-demarcation of identity" also for Spain before and does so until nowadays, with the additional function constituting EU-identity now as well. It has thus been an 'otherness producer' to Morocco (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011, p. 26) as a "civilizational fault-line".

The theoretical perspective of Kuus also illustrates the way of responding the European-ness discourse for those who are meant to become more European: On the one hand there is agency and power which contribute to the adaptation of EU-values, on the other hand there is also agency and power to resist the discourse, presumably the more the greater the distance from the "European" core. Investigation of representational frameworks and power relationships about the region and the transformation of Ceuta joining the EU-Customs Union might highlight aspects of European-ness and Europeanization of the region.

2.2.3 European-ness and conditionality at the external border of Europe and the ENP

What is more is that "European-ness" and "conditionality" have been applied not only to the enlargement policy of the EU but also to its external border e.g. by Kramersch. It is about critically analyzing inputs of the ENP – European Neighborhood Policy (Kramersch, 2011, p. 193). What Kramersch does for the entire external borders of the EU, can be also done in a similar way then for a special border-region e.g. the one of Ceuta and the particular impacts by Ceuta joining the custom union:

Kramersch observes recent shifts in thinking by the "administration" of the European Union and its "intellectuals". He describes these by calling the new "differentiated 'ENP plus'" "reinvigorated". He also makes links between the policy towards the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East and the way enlargement policy with Eastern accession countries has been conducted previously. Within this policy he finds ambiguities of how the "ENP transition" is imagined e.g. by cartographic representations of the external border inheriting such contradictions (ibid.).

It is useful here to have a look what the ENP exactly is about. Kramersch gives a reasonable description: ENP officials formerly, before and in 2006, spoke of ENP as “commitment to common values” referring to e.g. “good governance”, “human rights” and “democracy” and similar terms (ibid., p.198). The role of the EU would be to “act as a facilitator of this process” individually approaching neighboring countries by having an eye on “regional needs and aspirations” (ibid.). Success then would depend on the “will of the respective neighboring country to fulfill the agreed commitments (ibid., pp. 198-199). Another objective was to foster the “regional and sub-regional” with their specific characteristics (ibid., p. 199). Still the ENP officials have been clear about that transition is a “goal in its own right”, without any further enlargement prospects (ibid., pp. 199-200). Still at the same time they have sought to “pursue our [their] geo-strategic interest in expanding the zone of prosperity, stability and security beyond our [the European] borders for our [theirs and the others] mutual benefit” (ibid., p. 199) – although this should not be understood as “a second best option to enlargement” (ibid., p. 200).

The shift Kramersch observes began in a later phase after 2006, which he called a moment of “Crisis of Eurovision” (ibid.). Improvement is tried to be achieved in order to show better “what the EU stands for and the values we [the EU] promote[s]”. Still the ENP countries are expected to show instead “commonality of values” to be linked to the member states, which in fact means that “accession countries [have] to adhere to these values”, namely the ones of the EU. The other way round the EU does not have to adhere to values of the other countries so that commonality actually refers to conformation and adaption of EU-norms (ibid.). Only that way “greater economic development, stability and better governance” can be fostered (ibid., p. 201). In this context Kramersch criticizes that the “distinction” between enlargement and ENP provokes ambiguity and is still not clear (ibid.). The shift observed has especially to do with the change from transition for transition to a “more self-centered” prevention of spill-over of “risks” and threat to the EU (ibid.). From Kramersch’s perspective this implies a come-back of a “certain frontier logic” (ibid., p. 202). However, the way to a more individual treatment of the neighboring countries is still the means of operating. Yet it is about achieving the same goals of more Human Rights, freedoms and other values mentioned before (ibid.) for each, namely following a European, modern model of development.

Kramersch (ibid.) thus traces the same conditionality in the ENP like for the logic of the Eastward enlargement as described by Kuus. In the more recent version of the ENP officials Kramersch shows, how officials represent the ENP as “two way”-relationship which “requires significant willingness to change on the part of our neighbors. Only as they fulfill *their* commitments on the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, market-oriented economic reforms, and on foreign policy objectives, can we offer an even deeper relationship” (ibid., pp. 200-201). These conditions indicate, that for good relationships with the EU its values have to be adopted. This means that not only accession countries but also neighbors are expected to Europeanize. Kramersch corrects the expression used by calling the policy as requiring actually a “one-way commitment” to “European values, values which EU member states are assumed to embody and which ENP candidate countries lack” (ibid., p. 202). What is clear then is the fact that enlargement and the ENP share the same characteristics of otherness and Europeanization in terms of Kuus, since good relationships are conditioned by transformation and transition to

more European-ness. There is thus a lot of ambiguity (ibid.) in the original idea behind the ENP to simply improve the “‘relations with all these countries’” (ibid., p. 203).

Of course the ideas are generally based on postcolonial theories as envisioned by Mignolo. Kramsch e.g. refers to the “exported [...] modular nation-state form (as well as its boundaries) to the rest of the globe, thus rendering the rest of the world literally in its own likeness”, which shows his support of Mignolo’s basic ideas. He also sees the “claim to an epistemological modernity” as monopoly of Europe as an important feature within his own ideas. – (ibid., p. 196). In this context the “inner/outer dialectic linking Europe’s inner and outer borderlands”, according to Kramsch, stresses the geopolitical dimension of the discourse (ibid.).

In some aspects though Kramsch’s argumentation goes slightly into a different direction than the one of Kuus, and maybe than the one of Mignolo: One aspect less emphasized by Kuus is the recognition of “diversity of political frontier spaces” and a certain potential there of resisting Europeanization of values, which is to say modernizing aspirations (ibid., p. 197). According to Kramsch then the borders which are meant to be overcome are actually reinforced through the conditionality implied in the ENP (ibid., p. 197). Unlike Kuus Kramsch also points to the in part economic dimension of development by speaking of “a spatio-temporal gradient which placed them [countries outside Europe] in the position of ‘catching up’ to a set of ‘European’ values” (ibid.). This quotation shows that the same, European model of development is supposed to be followed by other countries, maybe the world, in terms of modernity – the spatio-temporal positioning into a phase of Europe’s past implies that there is only one way to survive which means to progress, implicating the economic dimension. Spatially there is a factor of “geographical distance from this Western European core” which indicates the “degrees of underdevelopment”, “otherness” (and the latter again would be agreed on also by Kuus), “barbarism” as opposed to civilization (ibid., p. 196).

The modernist assumptions make the ENP policy-makers and Europe blind to particularity and the own local images of how a partnership with Europe could be also like, as illustrated by the example of ignoring Algeria criticizing the Euro-centrism of the ENP and proposing another sort of partnership (ibid., p. 205). There seems to be no place for “‘differentiation’” in the plans of the EU, taking into account neither “the challenge” of “transnational political Islam” as a characteristic of the Southern Mediterranean, nor “non-Western” “Islamic democratic governance”. This as in the case of Algeria can have negative consequences for the relationships with the neighbors (ibid.). Europe finds itself thus in a world of “threats” and particularity to which it has been blind: the epistemological monopoly will have to be given up for seeing the especially transboundary spaces, where “European aspirations often became entangled in complex ways with national and local needs and interests on either side of the political boundary line”(ibid., pp. 194-195). Internal border problems have thus been “projected” to the outer borders but not eliminated by the EU (ibid., p. 196). The external border spaces then “re-connect Europe with its own spatio-temporal ‘outside’” which has been also constitutive to Europe itself in all its diversity (ibid., p. 206). Kramsch thus considers it a necessity that Europe comes to recognize that the “control” over external borders has been lost as well as to acknowledge the diversity and power of its neighbors (ibid., p. 207).

For this research the theoretical contribution taken from Kramsch's critical description of the ENP has to do with the sharpened notion of conditionality in comparison to Kuus. The diversity and potential of resistance in the neighboring countries as emphasized by Kramsch can serve complementary to the notion of agency and power within the process of Europeanizing - values which is part of Kuus' ideas. Then the general description of the ENP is important, because the topic here is about an external border to one of the Southern neighbors of the EU, namely Morocco, which has also been a former colony. From Ferrer Gallardo (2011, p. 25) we even learn that there is indeed a longer history to it: "ENP's 'ring of friends' bears a certain resemblance to the Spanish geopolitical logic of expansion experienced during the years of the Protectorate" which means to offer "everything" but to maintain the institutional difference. I also appreciate the fact that Kramsch underpins the idea of development and underdevelopment, because one of the most important reasons for Ceuta to join the European Customs Union has to do with economic development: Economic development of Ceuta but also in relation to an ever more "developing" and in this sense Europeanizing Morocco.

2.2.4 Economic dimension to European-ness in crossborder spaces

As much as I appreciate the clear description of the way Europeanization works as realized by Kuus I am missing one important dimension in her view, which I would regard as important for this research. Yet I do not mean to contradict Kuus in any way, but I would like to make a bridge and integrate the dimension into the theoretical perspective of this research lead by Kuus theory.

Sparke (2002) describes how the discourse of the construction of cross-border integrate spaces actually serves the wider goal of "promotion of the neoliberal hegemony of entrepreneurial governance" (Sparke, 2002, p. 215). The real objective behind promotion of cross-border cooperation then is a purely "economic vision", a "strategic regionalism", "selling a region" in a globalizing world, according to Sparke (ibid., pp. 213-214). The economic benefits give power to a region similar to the geopolitical strategy of forming "critical masses" to survive in global competition (Sparke, 2002, p. 229). Sparke concludes from this, that geo-economics are taking over from geopolitics in the economic struggle about "positionality" in "global free trade" (ibid., p. 215) in order to achieve "regional dominance". "Public" and "private networks" are to be reinforced also across borders (ibid., p. 216). Along with this goes also the promotion of "decentered governance" (ibid., p. 218). What is striking here is, that Sparke proves, that the "discursive construct" does not necessarily correspond to a "real process" (ibid., p. 220). It seems to be sufficient to keep up a certain "metanarrative" to make entrepreneurial benefits possible (ibid.) by rebranding a region (ibid., p. 221). Supranational agreements help - in part they are meant in part they really realize to overcome borders (ibid., p. 223). The result is that in a region the "spirit of globalization" is embodied and neoliberal, less interventionist governance, fostered by distrust towards the big governments, favors entrepreneurial activities (ibid., pp. 223-224). This even proves to work out if there is no real "economic integration" (ibid., p. 226). That way though, increasing competition within the region might result as well, which

from an entrepreneurial point of view (yet not for all branches) is not an obstacle at all (ibid., pp. 231-232). What Sparke concludes from all his analysis is that the discourse about cross-border regional cooperation gives especially “legitimation” to “neoliberalism”, “rationalization” and “efficiency” (ibid., p. 234), which are all over strategies of reinforcing the model of modernity and European-ness. At the same time a shift towards more influence of the supranational and subnational level is underpinned by these trends (ibid., p. 235).

What I like about Sparke’s ideas is that a certain discourse, in Sparke analysis about cross-border cooperation, actually serves to promote economic principles which are closely linked to ideas of progress and modernity. Neoliberalism then is the most interesting concept as it is recognize to be a promoter or strategy itself of a competitive global system, importing an economic, capitalist model of development to the whole world. As emphasized by Kramsch development is one of the criteria of conditionality of European-ness, which determine the quality of relationships with neighboring countries of the EU. Since the topic treated here is about a shift in economic strategy of the border-region of Ceuta, it is also crucial to be aware in how far neoliberal arguments about progress and development as part of the “European-value-package” (in Ceuta AND in Morocco!) influence the decision of joining the customs Union and thus have impacts on the border region.

2.2.5 Borderwork

The “cosmopolitan” writer C. Rumford gives some more input in “bringing to Earth” all the above theories. He can help to start imagining what Europeanizing in the border-region of Ceuta might mean. Rumford introduces the term “Borderwork” which is an instrument to explain how borders are made. In his article from 2008 he studies borders and their “changing nature” which from his point of view can help understanding “European transformations” (Rumford, 2008, pp. 52-53). For me first of all the changing nature itself is important, so that I would like to inverse the idea: European transformations have an impact and transform the nature European borders as well.

He names a row of “key developments” in the EU which bring along transformation: the development of a “single market”, the development of “Schengenland” and the “East enlargements”. All of them I regard as decisive also for the analysis of the decision of Ceuta joining the Customs Union. What is more is that Rumford has observed e.g. “multiplication of borders,” substitution of borders” (ibid., p. 53). The processes around “changing borders” for him have to do with practices of “(de)bordering” (ibid.). In the same context he stresses the great variety of scopes and groups (ibid.), but also “permeability” which is uneasy with the metaphor of a mere “Fortress”- Europe (ibid., p. 56). To explain all this he starts having a look who is doing “borderwork” (ibid.), realizing the practices of (de)bordering. He comes to conclude that there is a “diverse range of actors” besides the EU, “especially” for the “definition of borders” (ibid., p. 57) and primary among them are “citizens”. Those might also “contest” the “legitimacy of borders” and undermine them from the local against the geopolitical (ibid., p. 59), which is also emphasized by another cosmopolitan writer, Balibar (1998, p. 220). This again gives way to the agency of border-people as earlier identified by Kuus and Kramsch, but here it is even clearer, that borders have to be made,

legitimized and can be contested and resisted by local actors. It becomes visible e.g. in the permeability mentioned here.

Also Rumford observes the phenomenon of “Europeanization”, though he links it to decreasing borders inside Europe (Rumford, 2008, p. 58), which would be complemented probably by Kramsch and Kuus, who argue that Europeanization means increase in othering to an other exterior. More than Kramsch Rumford emphasizes the particularity of borders, and shows that although borders are changed and transformed by the EU and Europeanizing margins, the borderwork has to be carried out. For myself this way I find it much easier to understand the whole concept of Europeanization, which in this sense works via all the ones “who are at the border” and can be called border-people. Also here there must be paid attention to differences and particularities among groups and individuals. The question which rises then for me is in how far the border-people in the region of Ceuta then do carry European-ness and Europeanize the region. It could be especially the ones who can make use of the selectively permeable border (and here we can think of the famous gated community metaphor – the one who contributes something to wealth and security may enter) who Europeanize. But it could be also crucial that border-people have the ability to think from the border and resist it Europeanization. These aspects are part of the issue under investigation in the context of the decision of Ceuta joining the Customs Union. It will be investigated with regard to its impacts partly through the views of a certain group of border-people.

2.3 The theoretical perspective of this research

The last part of this chapter summarizes the theoretical perspective of this research. As mentioned before this starts off from Mignolo’s “postcolonial” thinking from the border, and as far as possible from the piece of the European border located in Africa in the region of Ceuta. “Borderthinking” is about focusing on dichotomous concepts to decolonize dichotomous, modernist categorization. For the case of the border of Ceuta this is especially suiting since it is meant to be a line separating the European from the Other, the colonized Oriental world of Morocco and Africa. Researching on the border-region and border-people who might have a perspective from the border much more than others goes in hand with these ideas. Within that group of people focus will be given to those who cross the border on a daily basis for work and whose life might change very directly due to Ceuta joining the customs Union. Mignolo’s (2000, p. 63) “borderthinking” or “double-critique” by thinking from the border can help finding an adequate perspective. The main idea is then not to categorize into dichotomies but to think from dichotomous concepts, taking into account the colonial difference and coloniality as a part of what has been Eurocentric modernity for long (Mignolo, 2000, p 63).

Kuus adds to this colonial perspective a more concrete analysis of how Europe is configured in relation to the Oriental, constituting its self-image as well as images about the others (Kuus, 2004, p. 474; Kuus, 2004, p. 482). She observes conditionality (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) in the way Europe builds up “good” relationships to its “outside” and Eastern inside, by demanding conformity to European values in exchange. Within this logic “European-ness” and “Europeanization” (Kuus, 2004, p. 475; Kuus, 2004, p. 477) are crucial concepts to explain why certain behaviors are performed by the “not-yet”- European areas such as Morocco, but also the “others” within the

Union such as Ceuta– and why decisions are made in a certain way in relation to Europe”. It is certainly worth investigating impacts on the area and its people from these perspectives as well as analyzing how much the decision of Ceuta is in line with a process of Europeanization. Presumably European-ness is in a certain way an attribute of Ceuta but due to the permeability, interaction across the border and Morocco being an ex-colony and neighbor of Europe some sort of spill-over effects might be observable also in the rest of the border-region. How Ceuta and the region become more Europeanized by the changes assumed is a question to be investigated. Shades of otherness implied in the discourse of European-ness can be experienced individually and locally in very different ways and are certainly applicable also to the border region under discussion here. All that might be highlighted by the situation of the colonial “enclave-like” city and the fact that it is not officially recognized as a part of Spain and Europe by Morocco, which claims sovereignty about the territory of Ceuta. The way of responding the European-ness discourse from the margins which are meant to be Europeanized can make the link with how people and actors make use of agency and power contributing to Europeanization and resisting it - presumably the more the greater the distance from the “European” core.

Theoretical contributions by Kramsch focus on the ENP. He applies similar ideas like the ones of Kuus to e.g. the Southern neighbors adding a more explicit analysis of conditionality in Eurocentric policy. Also diversity and potential of resistance are aspects of relevance of Kramsch’s article pointing to agency and power within the process of Europeanization. What is really important is that Morocco is to be thought of as one of those neighbors as discussed by Kramsch and his insights might help to understand the transformations by Ceuta joining the Customs Union in 2012 impacting the region. Moreover Kramsch gives some thought to the idea of development and underdevelopment implied in European-ness. Economic aspects of the decision making around the transformation around the border are significant, because the debate on European Customs Union is primarily motivated economically and the Union is economic in nature. Still development then is regarded as part of the modernity and civilization attributed to European-ness but has to be regarded from two sides: possible advantages and disadvantages for the development of Ceuta and factors influencing the decision made in Ceuta which are linked to fast development in Morocco. But attention must be *also* paid to how “(under)-development” (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) and the process of “neoliberalization” (Sparke, 2002, p. 215) transmit principles related to the logic of European-ness and othering into the border-region (as well to the Moroccan side) and have influenced the debate and scenarios. It is a question also what Europeans and non-Europeans are doing to Europe, giving it new particular dimensions, maybe to some extent resisting the Europeanization described by Kuus and Kramsch (O.T. Kramsch, personal communication, March 5th, 2012).

Here Sparke analysis on cross-border cooperation shows how ideas of progress and modernity are promoted by in the strategies of neoliberalism which is e.g. behind the idea of cross-border cooperation. Neoliberalism exports an economic, capitalist model of development from Europe to the world and as a development strategy also part of the attributes taken as criteria of European-ness and its conditionality. The shift in Ceuta is an economically motivated step in a globalized world which is among others penetrated by neoliberalist thought from Europe. I

would regard the neoliberalist ideas as indicative part of the "European-value-package" (in Ceuta AND in Morocco!), which is meant to be adopted by Europe's neighbors and thus an element of Europeanization.

To Rumford "Europeanization" means decreasing borders inside Europe, which can be the case of Ceuta – joining the European customs Union there is one border less in Europe. Still the increase in othering to an other exterior might be a consequence and impact the region of Ceuta. Rumford points recurrently to the particularity of borders emphasizing change and transformation by the EU and Europeanizing margins. He comes up with the idea of borderwork which is among others carried out by all the ones "who are at the border" and can be called border-people re- and de-bordering (Rumford, 2008, pp. 56-59).

But here we still do not know how far the border-people in the region of Ceuta are European or Oriental or other and what they do to Europe. It is also not yet clarified how this is combinable with the idea that especially border-people might have a certain ability to think border and resist a discourse of European-ness. Finding out more about this can help understanding the transformation of Ceuta joining the Customs Union and consequent impacts as a form of Europeanization or not. Rumford here brings down the ideas of discourses to the ground again and makes the researcher observe the renegotiation of the discourses in the life of people and literature. It is important to not forget that, the decision by Ceuta to join the Customs Union is a free decision as well as it was in 1986 (Ferrer-Gallardo, personal communication, February 27th, 2012). Yet, inspired by the above mentioned theories I assume that, the underlying reasons can be understood as striving to come up to a certain ideal model of progress, wealth, development – attributes of modern Europe- to get a piece of cake as well. In that sense the choice to become a member of the Union is out of internalization of European values, a strategic decision in order to assimilate to "core"- Europe and achieve prosperity as always connoted with the European core.


3. *Regional background – Ceuta and the frontier region*

This chapter deals with information about the regional background concerning diverse relevant aspects for this paper. The intention is thus to place Ceuta into a context and make the reader familiar with particularities of the border-region. Historically, during colonial Morocco, the North has belonged to the Spanish protectorate zone (Pennell, 2009, p. 138). Unlike the French, the Spanish Protectorate did not establish different legal systems for different ethnic groups – although the group of Amazigh people, the Rifis, was much bigger in the North than the Arab ethnic group (Ibid, p. 142). Rule was instead established through existing structures of tribes and notables. But there were fights for many years about territorial dominance between groups of Moroccans, different tribes and the Spanish army – wherein the Spanish would often succeed by using local leaders for their own purposes when they were without chances by mere fight. However, the Moroccan groups caused them plenty of struggles, especially in the 1920s during the Rifwar (Ibid, pp. 142-147). The colonial rule was even less approved, when, during the Depression of the 1930s, the Spanish zone was the poorest among all regions in Morocco, due to the least economic stability (Ibid, p. 154). This period in combination with the Civil War in Spain gave opportunity to the rise of a national movement (Ibid, p. 155). Hunger and disease had increased throughout the war as well as

discontent (Ibid). Also in the French zone tolerance of colonial authority was “fading fast” (Ibid, p. 158). The protectorate came to an end by internal pressure – with the exception of the enclaves along the Mediterranean coast (Ceuta and Melilla) and the delicate issue of Spanish Sahara.

The era of independence had begun in Morocco but still the economic situation was not good in the North so that intensive outmigration in the 1960s was produced, but also rural –urban migration to smaller and major towns (Ibid, p. 170) e.g. Tetouan. At the same time Morocco as a state was engaged in winning the competition about Sahara (Ibid, p. 171) of which the annexation is widely criticized and is subject to conflict even nowadays (BBC News, 2002) .

The Spanish – Moroccan diplomatic relations thus have always been overloaded with tension and rivalry about territories (Sahara having been a colony of Spain and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla) and are still not friendly (Bechev et al, 2010, p. 35, 55), which is to be seen in acts of aggression such as the occupation of an island close to the Spanish enclave Ceuta being interpreted by the Spanish as some sort of pure provocation (BBC News, 2002). Another struggle is about fishing grounds in the Atlantic, leading to tension between Morocco, Spain and the EU (ICE Case studies, n.d.).



The border between the enclave Ceuta and Morocco (Figure 1) thus marks the separation of two states with very diverse political systems in Africa, with a tensed relationship. At the same time it forms the line of division between EUropeans and non- EUropeans. In that sense the border is even more contested since a lot of possible irregular migrants (Rueda, 2009, p. 2) seek to enter the “European paradise” but are mostly left without any chance (Rueda, 2009, p. 2): *“Considered for decades as a land of opportunity and asylum, Europe has adopted more and more severe measures with respect to immigration [...] notion of ‘illegals’ attempting to profit from a*

more favourable situation “ (Rea in Pickerill, 2009, p. 3). A highly sophisticated security system has been established (Lahlou in Pickerill, 2009, p. 3) and “over the past decade, Morocco has in its turn experienced increasing pressure from Europe to respond to migration flows and institute a legal framework with respect to those who pass through its territory” (Pickerill, 2009, p. 3). A confrontation between Spanish and migrants in 2005 led to death of many migrants and the deportation of even more of them (Ibid, p. 4). This shows how the impact of a small piece of border (certainly after Spain had joined the Schengen-states in 1991) (Driessen, 2010, p. 171) has impacted on global migration reaching far into Africa, creating suffering among so many people who are not allowed to cross the border legally. However, in the daily routine, the economy of the Spanish enclave, Ceuta, and the province of Tetouan are highly interwoven (Ibid., p. 174) as I could observe myself and learn from interviews. Interestingly there is a presence of strong Islamist forces in Tanger as well as Tetouan and even Ceuta. Especially in times of the Arab Spring it is impacting the region even into Ceuta. The following paragraphs first describe Ceuta in relation to the border-region (§3.1) and highlight recent transformations (§3.2), which are fundamental to understanding the decision about the Customs Union.

3.1 Ceuta and the border-region

Ceuta is a Spanish autonomous city (Illustration 2 and 3) and province of 82.376 inhabitants (Instituto nacional de estadística, 2011) which is economically dependent on the relation with the Moroccan areas in its direct neighborhood. There is a regular flow of workers from those areas, since Moroccans from Tetouan profit from a 24-hour visa-exemption granted by Spain (Hernandez et al., n.d.). Hernandez et al. (n.d.) describe the interrelation as “thriving from commercial relations with Morocco including narcotics and human trafficking” which means smuggling, to a huge extent. For the Moroccans the profit is higher since the introduction of the Euro to Spain and Ceuta, reinforcing the attractiveness of the Spanish city as a site for work. The economy is moreover rather dependent on the harbor, some industrial areas, commerce and benefits from special, generous fiscal conditions (Ceuta digital, n.d. b). The internal consumption is augmented essentially by the tourism sector and Moroccan citizens consuming in the city as well (ibid.).

Adapted from Welt.de, n.d.,
(http://www.welt.de/multimedia/archive/00772/ceuta_karte_DW_Poli_772794a.jpg)



Figure2: Ceuta and Melilla at the Northern Moroccan coastline

Adapted from wikimedia, n.d.
(<http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0f/Perejil-neutral.png/300px-Perejil-neutral.png>)



Figure 3: Ceuta Peninsula, the neutral zone as border and Morocco

An important characteristic is the coexistence of four different religious groups (ibid. c): Before the Arabs conquered the city, it was mostly Christian and became Christian again after the conquest of the Portuguese in 1415. From 1668 the city was in Spanish-hand and is since then claimed to have preserved its “Spanish-ness”, even during the period of the protectorate and after the independence of Morocco and it has been even ratified as part of the Spanish Constitution. Since 1986 when Spain joined the EU, there has been financial support by the latter. In 1995 Ceuta obtained the status of an autonomous city in Spain (ibid. a). The special geographical location invited many people of diverse religions to come to the city– Arab Islamic forces entered during periods of Arab domination and remained (ibid. c). The Arab community is even growing and diversifying nowadays, mostly by Moroccan immigrants (Hernandez et al, n.d) They are the second largest group, followed by a small number of Jewish who have been trading in Ceuta ever since and a Hindu-community, established due to trade relations in the 20th century (Ceuta digital, n.d. c)



The closest bigger city in the border region on the Moroccan side is Tetouan, a city surrounded by mountains and Sea: It has been a Roman City, Tamuda oppidum on a high plain, belonging to the mountain of Djebel Dersa, but was given up before the Arab conquerors built a city at the same place in the 11th century which was then mostly dominated by Amazigh until the Arab conquerors arrived again in 1307 to protect the city against conquerors from Ceuta. Tetouan had been a pirate place for a long time until it finally conquered by Spanish and burned out (Marokko.net, n.d.). However, when Jews and Muslims were fleeing from persecution in Spain the pirate city was reestablished again and went on expanding as a center of trade, together with Ceuta under the authority of Sultan Moulay Ismail (1672-1727). From the 19th and 20th century Tetouan was governed one more time by the Spanish and only after independence it became part of a Moroccan state (ibid., n.d.).

Nowadays Tetouan (figure 4) keeps on expanding; there is growing tourism along the coast, which is especially benefitting from proximity to Europe. It is a main trading center for Western Rif-area: Beside tourism, fishing, textile-, cigarette and electronic industries are dominant as well as the agricultural sector of especially olive production. By nowadays the city has 500.000 inhabitants (ibid., n.d.). An interesting place with regard to the border in the region is the village of Fnideq which has developed to be a center of trade for products which are

brought from the other side of the border, from Ceuta, to be sold in Morocco. Its beginnings trace back to 1934 when there were a few settlements located in the area (Trafalga.net, n.d.). During the protectorate it was an important place of the customs and military bases. The development was fostered by agricultural and industrial activity, e.g. a factory of ceramics, industry for tinned food and a mine for sinker. After independence in 1956 the town became a cross-border center of commerce: Sale of products from Ceuta made the town grow economically and in number of population very quickly. Both Moroccans and Ceutis were customers (Trafalga.net, n.d.) Recently it has developed to a new province of modernization: The construction of the new highway between Ceuta and Tetouan, the new avenue along the beach, new districts a new bus-station and an enormous mosque are testimonies. (Trafalga.net, n.d.) The role of trade is prevailing economically, though also the tourism sector is evolving quickly (Trafalga.net, n.d.). Ferrer-Gallardo (2011, p. 26) observes that it is an example of change in the region, illustrating a shift of “the center of border gravity in the Ceuta-Morocco region, induced by the shift in relational power between the two sides of the border”.

3.2 Transformation processes at the border

From Ferrer-Gallardo we can learn that European bordering in Ceuta has to be considered also in the context of structural Spanish-Moroccan re-bordering from 1986 to really understand the evolution of border practices. His ideas also show that “cross-border interaction” has its origins in “rising potentialities of economic and urban cross-border co-operation” in spite of “apparently disagreeing territorial trends”. He also highlights that the development has been related to “ongoing modification of relational power between Ceuta and Morocco” (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011, p. 24). Ferrer-Gallardo calls the region of Ceuta a “contact zone, as a territory of cultural hybridity” (ibid., p. 28). Still he observes transformation during the last almost three decades which have reinforced disconnection. What he wants to illustrate is the “permanent tension between practices of conflictual fortification and practices of co-operative interaction. As this tension develops, relational power between the two sides of the border mutates” (ibid., p. 34). In the same context he underlines that the cultural domination which was formerly “orchestrated from Ceuta” and “incontestable”, now has become an object of renegotiation within the ongoing transformations in the region.

To this end Ferrer-Gallardo depicts cultural, economic aspects and topics related to security showing how discontinuity and continuities at the border of Ceuta have been transformed since Spain’s adhesion to the EU. For cultural aspects Ferrer-Gallardo observes discontinuity in first instance: Although by now there have been settling ever more Moroccan Muslims and Muslims in general in Ceuta the separation made by the physical border between Europe and Morocco seems to be reproduced by processes of othering “between Christian ceuties and Muslim ceuties” of whom the former feel a certain fear (ibid., p. 28).

However, what Ferrer-Gallardo here takes for discontinuities has in part contributed to continuity as well: Through the relative increase of the Muslim population in Ceuta a transformation in the “daily patterns of social cross-border interaction” is going on. Continuity can be seen e.g. in linguistics and religiously. Earlier on “during

protectorate Ceuta” the interaction was largely determined by the Spanish side in the region, whereas now Ceutis doing shopping in Morocco show curiosity which stimulates interaction (ibid., p. 31). Ferrer –Gallardo also relates “decrease of fears and prejudices” by Spanish to the “economic modernization” process in Morocco. He also has observed Moroccans shopping in Ceuta “privileged by the ‘Schengenisation’” in the region since 1991. Another factor stimulating interaction is the borderlessness of mass media. However whereas formerly Spanish media prevailed (ibid., p. 31) now there is a shift to Arabic. “Cross-border dialogue” though is undermined by the higher scale “geopolitical dispute”. Yet it exists e.g. within the emergency health services. Nevertheless Ferrer – Gallardo regards it impossible a co-operation via an “EU cross-border co-operation initiative” would be accepted by Morocco .The same applies to European Neighbourhood Policy measures designed for the Mediterranean neighbours of the EU (ibid., p. 33) .

On an economic level discontinuities are obvious as well: Commercial relations between the two sides of the region are not formalized and thus “irregular”, but the interpretation of this is different for both sides. On the Spanish side trade across the borders is regarded to be “atypical” pointing to the “profit it” brings along. To “Moroccan authorities” the trade equals “smuggling” and is interpreted as “obstacle to formal economic development”. Ferrer-Gallardo sees a link here to the “non-recognition of Spain’s sovereignty over Ceuta ”by Morocco, since from his point of view it is the reason, why “Morocco does not allow legally normalized cross-border trade”. Yet they “tolerate” the irregular flows. Ferrer-Gallardo therefore speaks of a discrepancy between “official discourse and pragmatism” (ibid., p. 29). At the same time the key-role of Ceuta as an “economic engine” for the region has been lost, although “smuggling across the

Ceuta border” has had deep impacts on “northern Morocco’s economic structure”. Factors of transformation were the “gradual commercial debordering between the EU and Morocco; free-trade agreements signed by Morocco with the US and China; substantial investment and infrastructural transformations taking place in the north of Morocco” (ibid., p. 30) . The gradual liberalization of Morocco and alternative access of alternative goods have changed the role of Ceuta as accession point but also “the intensification of Spanish-Moroccan formal trade” thus caused “decay” of economic and social relations in part (ibid.). However the potential of interaction is constrained by the disputes on national scale, the “volatile Spanish-Moroccan bilateral relations” (ibid., p. 31)

Nevertheless economic interaction and integration are part of the transformations, too. Integration and continuity is indicated e.g. by the “cross-border labour market”. Moroccans working in “Ceuta are mostly employed in the so-called domestic sector (women) and in the building sector (men)”, as well as in the gastronomic branches (ibid.). At the same time though Ceuta belongs to the areas with the highest rates of joblessness in the EU comparable only to “overseas territories”. To Spanish “unacceptable work conditions” inherit possibilities for “cross-border workers” and are an “economic opportunity for Ceuta” and the “Moroccan border region” (ibid.) For years there have been “socioeconomic asymmetries (purchasing power, labour rights) between the two sides of the border”, where e.g. “purchasing power” has risen. Moreover profit from smuggling has contributed to “dynamics” and even “internal Moroccan migration towards the border region”. Urban expansion has been a

decisive consequence of these transformations and Ferrer-Gallardo links it to the “exceptional ‘Schengenisation’ of the border” (ibid.). Another development observed is a general “economic modernization of Morocco” or “take off” (e.g. achieved by “several free-trade agreements” and relaxation of “import taxes” in Morocco), as well as “globalization enhancing interaction” which has e.g. lead to increase of tourism and real estate investment across the border. From this perspective Morocco leaves a state of “economic underdevelopment” (ibid.). The transformation leads to Ceuta becoming an “informal commodity supplier to Morocco” as a sort of logistic platform” guaranteeing “quality services” at the Moroccan side. Ceuta is not rejecting this role (ibid., p. 32).

In the area of security discontinuity is dominant when analyzing the transformation of building an “ increasingly securitized border regime” (ibid., p. 29). It constitutes discontinuity in the transformation process as a response to increased “immigration pressure”, “strengthening of controls”, the construction and fortification of the “border fence and the increase of Spanish-Moroccan border patrols” (ibid., p. 30). Simultaneously continuity has been achieved by the “‘Schengenisation’ “ which allows for the cross-border trade activities, in which “thousands” of Moroccan border-people are involved (ibid.). On the other hand the reasons for the geopolitical arguments are closely linked to questions of security as well, constraining interaction across the border (ibid., p. 29). However in the same context there is co-operation: Moroccan and Spanish authorities work closely together for the “securisation” of the border.

All these transformations described by Ferrer-Gallardo are linked to the debate about the Ceuta joining the European Customs Union. The above described transformations have been directly or indirectly factors to the way decision-making has occurred recently.

4. Methodology

This part is dedicated to the methodological choices made for this research. First the selection of the research strategy is outlined, followed by a description of the methods of triangulation applied. Then the analysis of contents is explained also including a description of operationalization of indicators which served to structure fieldwork and the analysis of data. A presentation of the research environment and group follows in order to avoid misunderstandings in the part of analysis (§5,6,7) about interviewees and places. The last part deals with problems and obstacles encountered.

4.1 Choice of research - strategy

The research was meant to investigate on the border-region of Ceuta, transformations, the debate and arguments about joining the EU Customs Union and the thinking of border-people about that. It is thus a concrete case with which had to be dealt and the respective design chosen was an explorative, qualitative case-study (Korzilius, 2008, p. 121; Cresswell, 2000, p. 78). It was planned to pay attention to discourses and transformations on both side of the border – the side of Ceuta and Morocco. However, lack of time and access to Moroccan especially regional media made this aspect become an obstacle. Nonetheless, even after fieldwork the basic research

questions resulted useful and appropriate for investigation of the place, the transformations, debate and people so that the strategy has remained explorative and qualitative. Given the limits of time and access the problem mentioned resulted difficult to be solved. Some ethnographic features have been taken into the design, though since the especially for the investigation of the thinking of border-people I also had to do with a culture-sharing group, trying to understand the “native point of view” (Malinowski in Morris et al, 1999, p. 781; ehow, n.d.). Moreover, ethnographic descriptions (with a typical first-person-narrator–perspective and involvement of the researcher) seemed adequate as tool in the report to introduce the reader to Ceuta, at a place where he has maybe never been, and to create some tension and variety to the rather exhaustive analytic sections. Deepening of knowledge took place throughout the entire period of fieldwork (Vennix, 2009, p. 264): The leading postcolonial theories have resulted very useful to structure and guide the way of gathering data and analysis. Access to the research group and experts could be organized via personal contacts, yet, also reflecting the choice of respondents carefully (ibid., p. 264).

4.2 Methods applied

Use of triangulation – has worked out rather well augmenting the reliability of the process and results (ibid., p. 267). Operationalization of main- and sub-questions into interviews, observation, informal conversations and indicators for qualitative analysis of literature has been a theoretically guided, clear process.

During the first period of investigation, the phase of fieldwork, 10 in-depth interviews have been conducted with a variety of Moroccan border people, as well as 4 expert-interviews with different border-people from Ceuta. Before doing formal interviews I had to find methods to gain access. First informal talks to inhabitants of Tetouan proved to be useful and I have arranged several interviews by them. Later the informal conversations also served to verify information I had found during the interviews. Networking started from the first moment and I could also gain important ideas from the first informal talk e.g. about the situation at the border passage. Some contacts have been made thanks to the family I met on my first day. Other contacts have been arranged via Couch-surfing and friends of friends, others again through people working at a local language school. Even if people themselves do not have direct contact with the border, most of them know someone who works at the other side and do not hesitate to help me in contacting them. And all of them have something to tell about the border and the border-people working at the other side. For the groups of experts contacts with the researcher Ferrer-Gallardo, since he had been investigating in Ceuta before and made friendships there, so that mentioning his name several people showed themselves very helpful, answering questions and providing me with huge amounts of information. It turned out well also in Morocco to build up a contact with interviewees via another person, who informants regard as trustworthy, because it increased the willingness and openness of informants for telling me about their experiences. Concerning my interviewees I felt that they were mostly enjoying talking to me and they revealed to me their rejection of the border passage. However, some of the respondents especially women were intimidated and fearful about the border but maybe also because they feared to get problems by to me. Five interviews had to

be conducted with the help of interpreters for the Moroccan Arabic dialect, Darija. The others were conducted in Spanish or English.

More methods used to obtain data and background information to understand the whole situation, organizing and store it were observations, informal conversations, collecting written documents such as articles and brochures, writing transcriptions and observations reports in the field. Especially transcribing took many hours because I simultaneously had to translate them into English. Yet, based on the new ideas I got, I also checked interesting articles and literature about the border of Ceuta, supporting the impressions I had from informal talks, interviews and observation. From all that information I could picture the many different discourses of different border-people and experts.

In the second phase of investigation, being back to the Netherlands, I have been studying articles of local newspapers of Ceuta (*El Pueblo de Ceuta*, *El Faro de Ceuta*) and the national Spanish one (*El País*). Besides, daily checking of news I searched the archives on their websites since 1984 for interesting articles, giving insights into transformations, the debate and being representative for an official discourse about the city. All of this will be called “official” discourse in the part of analysis (§ 5, 6, 7), reflecting what I have been studying about discourses on, in and from Ceuta from the media and reports mentioned here.

4.3 Qualitative analysis of contents

The whole process of research has been of course iterative (*ibid.*, p. 253), which makes this research more reliable (*ibid.*, p. 268), especially interpretations and conclusions. Interpretation as the capacity of placing oneself into the emic point of view to understand people resulted a key-factor (*ibid.*, p. 262). Further on I tried to avoid “over”- interpretation –being aware of the differences between my own ideas, theoretical insights and the empirical observable (*ibid.*, p. 263). Since the research focuses primarily on representation and representational frameworks which emerged around the topic of Ceuta joining the Customs Union the analysis was sort of “genealogical” and about “historicized understanding” of the transformations at the border (Walters, 2002, p. 561). Coding was a useful device for handling the various “truths”. Based on the theoretical framework and the operationalization facts can be interpreted and key-terms were identified (*ibid.*, p. 265). The coding thus followed indicators operated beforehand as presented in the paragraph below. Yet, as always in research several indicators proved to be more useful than others and new codes have (though rarely) emerged from data making new contributions to theories possible. After fieldwork schemes for analysis have been developed for the structured analysis aiming to find answers for main- and sub-question of the research in a systematic manner. Overviews of information per interviewee (respectively articles from newspapers or official reports) and sub-question subdivided into the operationalized indicators were used to compare data and group them according to indicators (appendix). This way data was reduced, filtered (*ibid.*) and could be compared for discursive groups.

4.3.1 Operationalization and indicators for the final analysis

The operationalization had been directly derived from the sub-questions of this research and is based on the theoretical perspective chosen. We can differentiate by time for the period before and after the decision-making that Ceuta is to join the European Customs Union. Moreover finding indicators has focused on the terms of European-ness – as characteristic - or Europeanization – as a process of change. The attributes which could function as indicators here have to do with the transformation of the border region, the argumentation during the debate before the decision and thinking of border-people. Concretely, the indicators concentrate on criteria of European-ness and conformation to European values during the period of the debate. European-ness implies also to look for attributes of Otherness, as opposed characteristic. Resistance is a process undermining Europeanization and understood as counter-indicator for the analysis, tracing agency relativizing Europeanization in the border-region. The same way of operating can be applied to the second phase, which deals with the impacts on the border-region and the transformation as a consequence of Ceuta joining the Customs Union. This part though is more speculative and imagining scenarios as Ceuta at this moment is not yet a member of the Union. It will be presented in an ethnographic imaginative style – alluding to the nature of transformations concerning European-ness, Europeanization and otherness and resistance to these discursive forces. By understanding in which way attributes of the three concepts are involved in the decision-making process and impacts on the region the significance of the step for the region and the European border external border to Morocco, both will be much clearer.

In this section the search of indicators for the attributes of European-ness, Europeanization otherness and ways by which resistance to these discourses and developments is presented. It is based on the theoretical chapter in which the theorization by Kuus and Kramsch were the clearest about the concepts. In addition we learn from them that it is useful to “explore power-relationships” and to investigate “representational frameworks” (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) justifying the focus on discourse analysis. The final selection of indicators is summarized in Table 1, under paragraph 4.3.5.

4.3.1.1 European-ness

Kuus observes the “opposition of other and European in discourses” (ibid., p. 472) which is based in terms of coloniality on the “underlying oppositions in image” between modern and non-modern (ibid., p. 475). She also shows that modernity is often linked to standards such as “normality” of the West (ibid., p. 475) and “civilization” (ibid., p. 476). This goes in hand with the way postcolonial theory insists on the close relationship between modernity and coloniality, in which all the world is striving or has been forced to follow the model of European modernity. Kramsch gives the example of how the “modular nation-stateform” has been passed on “to rest of globe from Europe” based on the “claim of epistemological modernity” which is also a key-characteristic of Europe and its “urban centres” (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). For this study this means that finding reference in the debate around the customs and transformations in the region which are linked to striving for modernity and civilization already indicate degrees of European-ness.

There are more concrete attributes of the “modern” which are linked to European-ness. The main argument of Kuus centers on the “gradation of European-ness”. Thus spatial “proximity”, “likeness” to and idealization of European values are other discourses supporting the idea of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). With regard to “geographical distance” “increasing underdevelopment” (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) is connoted to places, situating them on some sort of “evolutionary timeline”. Kramsch emphasizes that a “spatiotemporal putting others into past of Europeans present” practice has established to treat this (ibid., p. 196). The more proximity there is between a place and what is defined as Europe, the more it is modern and similar, which hints at the second characteristic mentioned by Kuus. Likeness can be also understood as homogenization processes of spaces (O.T. Kramsch, personal communication, March 5th, 2012) – the “ability” and “willingness” to “internalize European values” (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) generally means to adapt some characteristics of European-ness and give up own particularities. The spaces become more alike to Europe (ibid., p. 484). Driving forces of the process are among others economic in kind such as neoliberalization and globalization so that “global designs” spread across the world (Mignolo, 2000, p. 54). This is rather interwoven with standardization and “imitative tradition” (ibid., p. 55) which is based on a globally recognized Europeanized “planetary epistemological standards of knowledge emerged (ibid., p. 59). This is where Kuus idea about “idealization” (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) might come from as well. Still the extent of European-ness in an area is also determined by power-relationships which e.g. might be visible in representational frameworks (ibid., p. 483).

“Common values” with Europe are the crucial factor to becoming homogenous, standardized and European. This set of values has been identified by Kramsch by critically reading European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) and the key-values then are:

- “the rule of law
- good governance
- respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
- democracy the principles
- a transparent social [liberal] market economy
- sustainable development”

(Kramsch, 2011, p. 198)

If European-ness is a driving force of transformations in the border-region and the decision to join the Customs Union these “common values” or goals then can be found as being “idealized” (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) in the border region. Kramsch also shows that it is part of the partnership-deals with the neighbors to make them seek to adapt their institutional structures to so-called European ‘values’: good governance, liberal markets, human rights, rule of law (Kramsch, 2011, p. 208). What we can add to these values is the criterion of “democracy” as dominant political system, but, of course, no “indigenous democracy”, but the European-style one as “imposed from the outside” (ibid., p. 205). What is interesting else in Kramsch’s analysis is that Islam seems to be regarded as an obstacle to achieve commonality in values (ibid., p. 205). Thus also religious values seem to

belong to European-ness, but as possible Christian or none. Thus we can add democracy and Christian or atheist values to the list above as indicating European-ness and likeness.

What is also typical of places which seek to consider themselves as European is that they do “not challenge the dichotomy” of European and other, but instead align with it (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) and use the same criteria to identify others who are less “European” to constitute their self-image as Europe does. This strategy has led both to “feeding Eurocentrism” and “xenophobia” in Eastern Europe (ibid.). In that sense shifting Europe’s borders as a discursive practice further away from the core indicates self-identification with European-ness. But also contribution to the discourse of Eurocentrism and reinforcement of xenophobia in this context can hint at the attribute.

4.3.1.2 Otherness

Indicators of otherness as opposed to European-ness have to do with lack of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 472). “Distance” as opposed to proximity then is an indicator of otherness: the more East or South, the more oriental you are (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). In that sense there is also a certain “generalized identity” of the East (ibid., p. 475), here respectively South, which is opposed to a nuanced gradation of European-ness. Kuus also emphasizes that especially Europe’s “power margins” can be a “useful mirror” of “exclusion” and “division”, since they are still European, but close to being other (ibid., p. 484). Therefore these indicators are worth being applied to the case of Ceuta. The opposite of “civilization” as attribute of European-ness can be categorized as “barbarism” (alluding to some primitivism of living standards) (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) – which interestingly already in times of the Roman Empire was used as a term to describe the Northern African native tribes, who nowadays still are frequently referred to as “Berbers”. With regard to likeness or homogeneity and common values which are indicators for European-ness here one can expect non-likeness or heterogeneity and opposed value systems as criteria of otherness. In fact Kramsch traces in his analysis interesting quotations which reveal characteristics of otherness. He quotes a statement by officials of the ENP from which the following indicators emerge:

- “poverty
- unemployment
- mixed economic performance
- corruption and weak governance
- citizens particularly the young are often faced with bleak personal prospects
- ‘Frozen conflicts’
- conditions for peaceful coexistence remain to be established” (Kramsch, 2011, p. 201)

Here again it is especially the dimension of underdevelopment which is stressed. But there are also values opposed to the democratic values and respect Human Rights which are attributed to European-ness. On their “way to modernity” they have not yet come as far as to be European.

The way Europe treats this other is first of all categorizing the other as possible threat to its own stability (ibid.). But in order to blame them for resisting European-ness on their ways, Europe accuses them of being e.g. “pro-Russia and anti EU institutional structures” (ibid., p. 205). Only internalizing the idea of European-ness in forms of European conditioned partnerships is a way of solving the problem. In that sense otherness is also used as a tool of blaming and distancing used by Europe to force partnerships in the European way. Discourses under this framework can also serve then to indicate otherness here.

4.2.1.3 Europeanization

What applies to Europeanization indicators have to be found which show characteristics of becoming European or being made “European”. First of all there has been Europeanization throughout history and for centuries in forms of local stories of historical colonization (Mignolo, 2000, p. 53). Another indicator refers to the “own discursive location” (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Depending on what one defines oneself there can be “Several Europes” and thus excluded others within Europe by shifting the border from individually in order to profit from the advantage of “European-ness” (ibid., p. 473). The attempt and desire to be able to do so indicate Europeanization at work. In the case of Ceuta and the border region this would mean to shift the borders of the attribute of European-ness further South out of the need of othering for the self-image (Kramsch, 2011, p. 474). This “trying to shift discursive borders further” Kuus would call “nesting orientalism” through “patterns of representation” (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Through this process of Europeanization “Morel superiority” and “more civilization” (ibid., p. 480) are meant to be achieved.

This implies also to determine the other e.g. as with Eastern Europe determining a “Russian other” to be a “tailor-made export product” to be sold in core Europe (ibid.). In this sense Europeanization implies “exclusion” of others which are at the same time their “condition” and “possibility” to Europeanize (ibid., p. 481). Thus self-definition by shifting European borders and exclusion can both serve as indicators of Europeanization for this research.

But there is more to Europeanization: Kuus also mentions that there is a “change of habitual ways” in places which are Europeanized (ibid., p. 474). This change has to do with “learning” from, “adopting norms” of (ibid., p. 473) and “needing advice” by Europe (ibid., p. 474). This process is determined for those who are “not yet fully” European (ibid.) since otherwise they would not be in need of the change. The transformation serves to achieve the wider goal to follow the European model (ibid., p. 475), “moving towards” European-ness (ibid., p. 476) by simply taking “over values” (ibid.). The process also helps to “show ability” and “willingness” to adapt to European norms (ibid., p. 477) by following “EU recommendations in policy making” (ibid., p. 478) given the conditionality of Europeanization. Indicators of Europeanization thus can be also found in giving up “habitual ways” and substituting them for more European ones.

As a consequence Europeanization can be also traced in some sort of “double framing” of “not quite in Europe” and “neither orient”, but something in between (ibid., p. 482). The respective places will also show pride of their Europeanization progress and achievements then (ibid.). As many “others” have been colonized, whether formally or not (ibid.), it is not important to rank searching for “most truly postcolonial” others, but to look at double conceptions and inferiority with comparison to Europe (ibid., p. 483). In the case of Ceuta and the border region then indicators can be applied on otherness, without considering whether Ceuta with a long colonial history and Morocco with a younger but maybe more intensive one are more or less oriental from this point of view. Kuus also gives an example of Southern indicate to indicate that “colonial and postcolonial experience” can function by “various strategies of othering” (ibid.).

By following the European, modern model of modernity, progress and development liberalization of trade often seems a means to move towards more development and leave underdevelopment which is regarded to be an attribute of otherness behind. Sparke’s ideas on the “glocalization narrative” to “promote hegemony of neoliberal entrepreneurial governance” can be identified also in the strategies of ENP. Attention is paid more and more to the local level. However the mere opening of economy and striving for an economic system similar to the one of Europe opens up the door for “geoeconomics mobilizing spaltialized forms of neoliberal strategy” (Sparke, 2002, p. 215) carrying loads of European-ness and helping to Europeanize regions. “Global interdependency” and “changes for entrepreneurial governance” (ibid., p. 220) implicitly carry the concept of European-ness into the world by Europeanizing. According to Sparke this is especially obvious in “local cross-border space[s] (ibid., p. 235). Thus what applies to the region of Ceuta and their economic decision-making, every step towards neoliberalization and following the European model of development works to Europeanize the region to a certain extent – as expected about the Customs Union. One could describe the idealization and ambition to come up to the model of Europe as some kind of “template thinking” (O.T. Kramsch, personal communication, March 5th). This contains to imagine the world from “simple binaries” (Kuus, 2004, p. 474) as well as to “deny agency” and “particularity” (ibid., pp. 477-478) and instead believing in “linear transitology” (ibid., p. 482). It is also here where on a “spatio-temporal gradient” countries outside Europe “are placed in the position of ‘catching up’ to a set of ‘European` values`” (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197).

The transition to European-ness, Europeanization is also encouraged by the ENP policy as Kramsch shows by seeking to help the neighbours to reach “stability, prosperity, security” by actually some sort of “one way commitment to European values” (ibid., p. 201). This help and the “dialogue on human rights” (ibid.) talking also about reforms shows the process of Europeanization as well. Those reforms represent the process also by their content and as Kramsch shows these are meant to lead towards adaptation of European values. The reforms are directed towards:

- “the electoral systems
- judicial reform
- the public-sector governance
- restrictions on press freedom

- intimidation of NGOs
- political prisoners
- ill-treatment in police custody
- extra-judicial killings" (Kramsch, 2011, p. 205)
-

These reforms are clearly meant to make the differences between the other and Europe smoother and less sharp. In that sense the dialog about it is itself an indicator of Europe trying to Europeanize actively but also of making European margins "bufferzone" to protect from outside threats (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

4.3.1.4 Resisting Europeanization

There is also a tendency of resisting wider discourses especially in borderlands (Anderson & O'dowd in Kramsch, 2010, p. 1010). But obsessed by the discourse linear transitology (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) Europe is not seeing what is happening beyond its external borders, the particularity and resistance (Kramsch, 2011, p. 205). Instead of fully subjecting to a discourse of European-ness one can expect people in Ceuta and the region to have a certain agency and to renegotiate the discourse in another way within daily routine and practices. So it is also relevant to find indicators for less subjection.

In general Kuus observes an adaptation to European values in a "selective", "strategic" way and even "rejection" (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). At the same time this might be missed by "Westerners" who trust in the persuasiveness of their discourse. This "two way- power relationship" might remain unnoticed by core Europe which is concentrating on building up good contacts to the small "westernized elites" of not yet fully Europe's (ibid., p. 479). This "seemingly western` group" though is actually representative for the "appropriation of the notion of otherness" and using it for their own purpose (ibid.). Again power-relationships are a key-factor, including also means of power, which can facilitate agency of people to resist.

Kramsch frames it a little different: He affirms that the "claims of universal legitimacy" of European-ness "reach beyond Europe" but the simultaneous neglect and blindness to "diversity and specificity is also characteristic of Europe dealing with the world (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). Instead the EU has identified generalized "challenges" of the other such as "non-Western orientated, Islamic and democratic governance" of movements going on in the Arab world (ibid., p. 205). In that sense, agency and particularity are only noticed whenever "threats to own values from the outside" turn up (ibid., p. 206).

As Kuus indicates "ethnic nationalism" (Kuus, 2004, p. 476) can be a "danger" as well as the development of "authoritarian regimes". It can appear simultaneous to Europeanization of areas since the shifting European borders to more oriental parts of the world also means to break with the other and exclude it. This can reinforce forms of nationalism then and lead in the end also to a resistance against a supranational European influence (ibid., p. 477).

4.3.1.5 Summary and selection of indicators

All the above mentioned criteria are summarized in the table (table 2) below. At some places there is doubling since an indicator can be hinting at both, the characteristic of European-ness or the process of becoming European or because of opposition which is self-explaining. Therefore a selection is made in a way that certain criteria are combined or selected for practical reasons of investigation for this research (e.g. proximity can be perceived differently but is then still based on some sort of felt likeliness or commonalities). All of them have resulted useful for the analysis – though, of course, some more than others.

	<i>Criteria per concept</i>	<i>Indicators of this research</i>
European-ness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Striving for modernity and civilization - power-relationships – pressure by Europe and European-ness - Proximity shows European-ness - Likeliness/Homogenization (European model as global design) - Standardization of European epistemology - A row of values in common with core Europe: The rule of law Good governance Respect for Human Rights and fundamental freedoms A social liberal market economy Aiming sustainable development Democracy Christianity or Atheism – political secularity - Shifting Europe's borders as a discursive practice (in this case further South?) - holding up Eurocentric discourses - developing xenophobia towards others 	<p>1) <i>Following the model of modernity and civilization (powerful)</i></p> <p>2) <i>Homogenization- European values in common</i></p> <p><i>(Democracy, good governance, human rights, freedom, liberal market economy, secularity)</i></p> <p>3) <i>Standardization: Idealizing European-ness as linked to privileges</i></p>
Otherness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not yet modernity - distance from core Europe - difference in values - barbarism/primitivism - poverty - Unemployment - mixed economic performance - corruption and weak governance - Citizens particularly the young are often faced with bleak personal prospects - 'Frozen conflicts' - conditions for peaceful coexistence remain to be established - being blamed for otherness by Europe 	<p>4) <i>value differences</i></p> <p>5) <i>Primitive standards of life/ simplicity: Underdevelopment, poverty, corruption, lack of stability</i></p> <p>6) <i>blames of otherness by Europe</i></p>

Europeanization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Shifting discursive borders - Excluding others - Selling a discourse of the other to the rest of Europe - Neoliberalization and striving for a European-like economic system - Template thinking - Substitution of habitual practice by more European ones (moving towards European-ness) - Double framing situation - Pride of achievements and progress (following European model) - Fostering stability, prosperity and security - Dialog about reforms with Europe - Using the area as bufferzone only 	<p>7) <i>Excluding the others/oriental</i></p> <p>8) <i>Template thinking: neoliberal ideals/European-like economic model followed, Pride of achievements of transition</i></p> <p>9) <i>substitution of habitual practices for European</i></p> <p>10) <i>Double framing</i></p> <p>11) <i>dialog about reforms</i></p> <p>12) <i>bufferzone function</i></p>
Resisting the discourse of European-ness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Keeping on own routines and practices - Developing anti-European ethnic nationalism - Only elites involved in Europeanization processes - Power-relationships: agency and means to resist Europeanization 	<p>13) <i>own practices given priority/agency</i></p> <p>14) <i>anti European ethnic nationalism</i></p> <p>15) <i>Elitist character of transformation processes</i></p>

Table 1: Indicators for fieldwork and analysis

4.4 Research group and environment

The environment of this research is as mentioned limited to the territorial unit of where the border-network-region is spread. On the one hand, I dedicated my attention to the interesting group having a permission to cross the border from the Moroccan side to Ceuta every day, representing the idea of permeability, which is involved in trading and having the border-experiences which is one of the objects under investigation: This group “benefits from a 24-hour visa-exemption granted by Spain” (Hernandez et al, n.d.) helping the economic commercial survival of the city, also in clandestine ways (ibid.). The official label of the border-region is “frontier zone”(Ferrer et al, n.d.) in order to give special rights for cross-border interaction, such as defined by the bilateral local border traffic agreement , which sustains Ceuta economically. This is applied by “special provisions for bilateral trade” (ibid.) with the neighboring Tetouan: citizens of this city regularly entering Ceuta “require only a passport for a maximum 24-hour stay” (Gold in). In that sense the cross-border flow consists of “desirable’ migrants (workers, consumers, smugglers) within the general scenario of border stoppage to non-EU citizens”. Yet, the reality is that people have to leave Ceuta before 9 pm, as I learned, which relativizes the 24 hours.

People crossing the border for work are very diverse: There are housekeepers (mostly women), men who work on the black market for service companies e.g. in construction, men selling goods at the market next to the border, men and women who carry goods to the other side and some high educated, who have maybe studied in

a European system and have the privilege of having found a good job with a contract and maybe even residence permission in Ceuta.

For my transcriptions and the analysis of results I gave labels to the informants which are congruent with what they do. Some labels are less clear than others, so it is worth explaining them here in brief: There are four people who worked as traders on the black market, trading and carrying goods across the border to Morocco. One of them has a shop and works alone for himself. He is labeled “the trader” here. Another works in organized trading as a responsible, thus in a higher position, to manage the smuggling across the border and is therefore labeled “the smuggler”. Two more of them work as most people do carrying goods on their backs through the border passage: They are called “contrabandor” and “second contrabandor”, which refers to the Spanish term people use in the region to describe the clandestine way of importing goods to Morocco. There is “the politician”, a man actually working in logistics, but in his free time he dedicates every minute possible to his association for democracy and Human Rights and is involved into activism of the Moroccan political party for Independence (Istiqlal). He crosses the border less regularly, but frequently for establishing cooperation with associations in Ceuta. “The housekeeper” is a woman working for a household in Ceuta, “the charwoman” is not working in Ceuta, but in Madrid. Still she shares the situation of a woman working in Spain, knowing the border well from monthly crossing during approximately 20 years for shopping. It was a compromise to adopt her into the research group, but it resulted difficult to access women working at the border due to their shyness, anxiety, social expectations, language barrier and lack of time. There is the “medicine” who crossed the border whenever there was a lack of workforce in the hospital of Ceuta as a help in cases of emergency. He has a contract and a permission of residence in Ceuta, still, he lives in Tetouan. The “painter” is working in construction without contract for a Spanish company in Ceuta, the IT-expert shares the destiny of not having a contract, but works for a Spanish company offering service for hard-and software in Ceuta.

The balance of women and men is not given as mentioned before due to problems of access – which is a pity since the most interesting group, the border traders are mostly women in fact. Here it has been only male traders who were interviewed. Also the age of the research group is generally accumulated between 20 and 50 (though this is more or less representative for the working population observed at the border). Nevertheless, there is variety in professions which resulted to be useful to get a diversified picture of experiences with the border.

The expert-interviews have been conducted with several people involved and familiar with the topic of the EU – Customs Union preferably from Ceuta. Íñigo Moré though is a Madrid-based economic consultant and researcher on economic questions concerning the Maghreb, Latin America, immigration and economic disparities at borders. Although he is from Madrid and there was limited time to do a full interview his insights have been useful. Jose Maria Campos Martínez, was born in Ceuta and studied law and social sciences in Granada. Besides working as lawyer he held diverse important positions in Ceuta within the administration and was the founder of the Chamber of commerce and entrepreneurial confederation in Ceuta. Another citizen from Ceuta is

Gonzalo Testa Méndez, a journalist who has worked for all the three different journals in Ceuta in different periods. The last expert from Ceuta is the historian and director of the local archive of Ceuta, José Luis Gómez Barceló with profound knowledge on history of the city.

4.5 Difficulties during fieldwork and analysis

The chosen design, the case-study bears some typical characteristics which can lead to complications in the research process. Among these there is e.g. the direct involvement of the researcher in the field interpreting, bringing along subjectivity. The latter is also included in selections and decisions on the basis of worldviews – the researcher is his own research instrument (ehow, n.d. b). The theory has luckily helped focusing and analyzing in a structured way. Nevertheless the kind of data, personal testimonies and observations, cannot lead to generalizing, universalizing conclusions (ibid.) as in quantitative research. The research process takes a long time, but this specific research had a rather restricted period of fieldwork, impacting results and binding them to the particular spatial, temporal context. Conclusions are thus unique and limited to the same criteria (ibid.). A general problem has been language because my, the researcher's mother tongue is not the same as the one of the interview partners so that communication is always less precise. Language was also a barrier to access to literature : I am less familiar with common media of communications in neither Spain nor Morocco (and for the latter the Arab writing is another obstacle for sure!), the institutional frameworks, economics, media and historic developments in both countries so that readers have to keep in mind the restricted perspective from which I am writing. Accessibility of the research group is another issue here: The topic of borders used to be a sensitive one especially in Morocco.

During fieldwork several problems emerged as well: For holding interviews I had to realize that timing was a problem. The majority of people, especially those who smuggle goods, are mostly relatively poor, they work hard, long hours and have to bear discrimination. They are often hardly educated which makes it necessary to bring interpreters for interviews with limited schedule as well. Making contacts with them at the border was impossible because that would endanger them and me before the police because of the sensitivity of the topic. I had to catch up people of this group after work on free days or go to where they sell goods. Also the housekeepers have a tough schedule for working, have families and showed little willingness to talk to me. Some of them, especially women are shy and worried about talking because anyways they always fear to lose the permission of crossing the border. Another dilemma about the language barrier was that I was dependent on the good will of friends and to help translating - I felt uncomfortable bothering them. Conducting interviews with an interpreter is less direct and takes more time. Steering becomes difficult, yet bits of Moroccan Arabic helped to understand general contexts and I could interpret gestures, facial expressions etc. Sometimes interpreters seemed to mix up own ideas with those of the interviewee. For observation I consider it a pity that there was no opportunity to observe more parts of the border, without car, friends with time or financial means to rent a private taxi.

Analysis of data has been intense and the biggest difficulty was selecting and keeping an overview. Moreover statements sometimes emerged to imply several different indications which lead to repetitions of the same statements but analyzing two different aspects of it. Nevertheless this also meant that there is a certain overlap of different indicators involved in the analysis. In the end I chose to allow for repetition since the structuring element of the indicators is fundamental for a logical consistent presentation of results. Yet, I would regard this as a clear weak spot of this research.

5. The EU Customs Union and the free zone Ceuta

This chapter is dedicated to explain the EU Customs Union, the reasons and impacts of Ceuta being a free zone. First (§5.1) we start off from a description of Ceuta, continue with observations about Moroccan border-people and the border–passage and the life of the Moroccans (§5.2.), so that the reader has some impression about the place and significant process in the region. In a second step the EU Customs Union as an institution (§ 5.3) will be explained, also as an instrument of Europeanization. Next the motivation of Ceuta for the decision not to join the Customs Union in 1986 will be looked at closer (§5.4) on a more abstract level (§5.5). At last there will be a summary of the most relevant information of this chapter.

5.1 Impact for daily life in Ceuta - an observation in December 2011

When you come to visit Ceuta to observe impacts of the relation with the border and reliance on irregular trade you would be first tempted to just forget about it for a moment: scenery and landscape of the peninsula in the North of Africa are worth enjoying. Looking from the very outer point of the island towards the mountains bordering with Morocco then, you could try to detect the famous border-fence separating the two sides. It is hard though to find it as a thin line sometimes disappearing among some valleys. Walking in Ceuta the sea and coastline of Europe across the Straits of Gibraltar seem to be omnipresent – you would see them turning your head towards North at every street-corner even in the city-center. You wonder, how close Europe is and if you could not just swim to the other side, like many “clandestine” immigrants. In Ceuta itself, a central feature is, of course, the harbor on the Northern side of the peninsula, and the many boats making their way from and to Spain mainland. Turning around, watching towards South you see the long coastline of Morocco, seeing clearly the nearest village called Fnideq and following the line until you can only recognize distant shadows in the shape of the Rif-mountains. Where the coastline runs South towards Fnideq the border-passage is the dominant element, standing out with all trees around it cut and guards standing on the mountains above (see figure 5).

Figure 5: Views in Ceuta. From left to right- The beach, the coast with Morocco and the village Fnideq, the city from the cap of the peninsula to the African continent and mountains of Morocco.



Having a walk through the streets of Ceuta you come across some ancient, beautiful houses, some of which are obviously victims of time and lack of investment. Some of these ancient beautiful houses along the boulevard next to the port are well maintained and seem to be telling the history of Ceuta. They tell about the influence of rich traders and the Portuguese Bastion is a symbol of former Portuguese domination of trade, some centuries ago. You can anticipate a bit of former colonial influence and richness of the city. There are many monuments imitating ancient Greek statues and monuments, one of them in the center which is several meters high representing a naked athlete. The athlete seems to push two pillars of a temple aside to pass in between. Later, I learn, that it is a monument about the *unity* of Europe and Africa, which I would not have expected from the separating movement presented. The athlete is Hercules, reference to Greek-Roman – and thus European history. Especially the nakedness of the athlete was strangely irritating to me having stayed in Morocco, a Muslim country for several months. In the streets you also find several small shops selling international and Spanish journals. Interestingly they do not sell any written in Arabic although walking you can actually hear so many people speaking Moroccan in the streets. There are cafés with only men, selling traditional Moroccan mint-tea. In the very center you feel a certain cleanliness and untidy houses are exceptional. You notice also that streets and shops are structured and organized, as well as the traffic. Outside the tourist office you would find a map indicating the most attractive touristic sites. Paintings on walls mirror Ceuta during the 16th century, when Spanish rule started. Similar paintings can be found on different walls all over Ceuta reminding of glorious colonial times. Not far from the harbor you come across a Casino. Expensive cars are located on the parking, which suggests that it is elite of people enjoying western luxury, the swimming pool in the garden with both genders bathing in the same place –impossible in Morocco. In “Calle real” (“Royal street”) I find a shop selling colonial furniture called “Kolonial home” which I find quite ironic in a contested city like Ceuta. Yet, you do not find traditional Muslim architecture or calligraphic paintings anywhere (see figure 6).



What is striking, is that you encounter many Spanish flags hanging from balconies. I wonder whether citizens of Ceuta are rather patriotic for Spain or use the reference of Spanish nationality as symbolic protection to keep up the discourse against dangerous Morocco inside and outside. On a street sign indicating directions, the destination "Morocco" is placed among many others (parks, the center of the small "enclave" etc.), so that one might think that Morocco is just another square or part of the city of Ceuta. I am not sure, if it is a way of subtly expressing depreciation for the neighboring country. More symbols I detect have to do with the statute of autonomy, emphasizing Ceuta's status, maybe showing that Ceuta is neither simply Spain nor Morocco.

Being in Ceuta you will be fascinated by the traces of different religions and cultures you find just walking around. It is not just the touristic brochure telling about it: in fact you encounter a variety of Minarets in some, different churches in other parts of the city. You find districts with "Moroccan-looking" houses where many satellite dishes are turned South towards Morocco. At the same time you can be standing under a lantern which has been decorated with Christmas symbols for the upcoming festivities. You can observe some slightly tanned Spanish-looking man jogging in shorts – A Moroccan would have had to cover at least his knees. In front of the autonomous government building - symbol of Spanish and European democratic values - a veiled Muslim woman pulls her vehicle like so many Moroccans shopping and transporting the acquisitions. Going by bus back to the border passage you could maybe even observe Muslim women without veil and Muslim couples publicly showing affection. Another group of people I observe are some Sub-Saharan migrants who seem to have become legal in Ceuta, but still cannot cross the Straits to Europe. They are free but imprisoned in the city of Ceuta, assisting at parking places helping cars to park and selling tickets in the central areas. I find it a very mixed reality, the traditional and the modern, the Muslim, the Christian, the International.



Traces of the presence of the border are all around the city. You can observe the transport of goods towards the border - typically packed bundles of goods on different smaller or bigger kinds of vehicles on the street driven to the Tarajal, the only border-passagage to Morocco by now. There, some men seem to be awaiting people arriving from Morocco to carry the bundles on their backs. There is also the immense market place at the passage containing huge warehouses, stores for goods and people selling in front of them. Sellers here are often Moroccans from Morocco themselves. At the harbor which in comparison with other harbors appears relatively small, bears indications of the border traffic: Some huge ships with containers unload in the main part. But there

are also some smaller buildings of wooden constructions which make me think of business like smuggling drugs to Europe. Interestingly I hardly see any fisherboats, neither in the harbor nor on the sea, only to the South at the Moroccan side of the border you can see some fisher-boats on the sea (see figure 7).

5.2 El Tarajal and the life of border-people on the Moroccan side

The decision by Ceuta to remain being a free zone has had very direct impacts on life on both sides of the border, meaning also in the very North of Morocco. It is crucial to understand the interwoven relations as theory by Ferrer Gallardo has shown and consequent effects of decisions on the side of Ceuta on Morocco. Results of fieldwork illustrate the impacts at the border-passage (§5.2.1) and for the life-style of many Moroccan traders (§5.2.2) or “contrabandores” (smugglers) as they are called in Ceuta.

5.2.1 Observing the border-passage

It is early in the morning on Thursday December 15th, 2011, 7 am and people on my collective taxi, which we share with seven persons, are talking about the border. At 7.15 am we and many more cars arrive at Fnideq and the border, a lot of people get off. All the trees in the area are cut, probably for guards to keep and overview about what happens. There are also many of them on top of the hills (see figure 8). There is so much activity around me, the only thing I cannot detect here is the famous border fence.

Figure 8: The entrance to the border-passage: On the left the bare mountains with all trees cut. On the right side the collective taxis and people hurrying towards the passage and Ceuta in the background. Below : border accessories.



Instead I can observe some men discussing with an officer, and I am reminded of what some interviewees told me: The beginning of passing is a decisive moment already to know if you can cross or not. The officer leaves. The men are waiting and when the official is finally back they start arguing again. More people arrive and the discussion goes on with the whole crowd. If you go two hours later it is less crowded, I know, but now at the


entrance to the border lots of cars are waiting to get through. First they stand in rows of four next to each other, closer to the passage in rows of two, when they arrive to the zone of control between the walls, then with only one. I observe people of both genders. Still there is the accumulation of white grand taxis in rows at the left side of the street, on that big square behind us. The slopes of the hills on the left, at the right side the sea: one seems to be quite naturally forced into the entrance of the border passage.

There one finds oneself in front of some white and blue buildings. Entrance into the passage between the buildings is regulated by pieces of portable metal fences of one meter of height and Moroccan police officers - when we, a Moroccan friend with Spanish permission of residence and me, arrive, a group of women discussing with a police agent is directed to the side and we, the ones with red, European passports may pass although the others have been standing and discussing with insisting gestures for much longer. Especially one elderly woman dressed in the traditional jellaba is pulled aside very harshly and she seems to be quite annoyed, which I interpret from her facial expression and loud protests. We have to fill in a paper for the "douana", the customs. People try to sell us, the privileged the papers. Another "border job" - I understand. Strangely, it takes long to control my foreign passport, in the end the officer makes some registrations into the computer and gives a stamp. First it seems that at the next checkpoint, to leave Morocco, we have to wait like the others - but in the end the European passports pass much faster again.

A man crosses the border while I am standing at the checkpoint where my stamp is being controlled: I am standing where the Europeans, cars, special permissions and bikers pass. So I can observe the place where everyone else, with Moroccan passport, is queuing. I see how a man seems to pass along the official pushing something into the hand of the police agent, trying to do it inconspicuously and quickly. Unless you observe, you do not even notice the tiny movement. I interpret that what people told me during interviews is true: Instead of queuing for a stamp you can pay five dirham to the officers controlling and they will let you pass.

The Moroccans who want to cross head quickly towards a crowd of people pushing towards the next section of the border passage, the Spanish, all of them trying to be there before the others, pushing and pulling, pulling and pushing. As a next step at the Spanish side everyone has to enter some sort of cages, a corridor-like construction, with grates on top and as "walls" with different rows inside, separated by again cage-like fences of grates. One row is not broader than half a meter, but at least 100 meter of length. There is no way out, you can only walk straightforward. The European passport holders are walking through the freest row, the others are regulated to pass at the exits with some revolving doors of metal and their corridors are crowded of people in all of the three neighboring "cages". There the movement is slow, sometimes people only stand, leaning to the sides of the cages, talking. Moreover I notice that there is one row for men only and there are two, for women only. Leaving the border passage construction we enter a square where many people seem to be just hanging around with a lot of bags. I get the impression that it is mostly Moroccan women, elderly, thin, wearing scarfs, talking with each other. There are also men, organizing some big packages, what gives me a proof about the stories about

organized trafficking. That we are in Europe now, can be noticed directly by the presence of a huge amount of giant-sized signs of advertisement: Lidl, Mc Donalds and other branches of Western companies welcome us (see figure 9), but also signs indicating the different traffic rules in Europe. I wonder if all those signs somehow are located here in order to symbolize, that here things are different - there is western luxury and quality, there are western values, western rules emphasizing that the border is a real separation of legal systems and cultures.



During the procedure of crossing I felt injustice, I am feeling ashamed for being treated so differently and at the same time I am feeling convenience. The border can be also confusing for passing from Morocco, because there are different checkpoints for different passports, but no signs or anything to indicate where one has to go. Maybe it is a good way to guarantee business for the people earning money by helping inexperienced tourists through the border. But I even got the impression that creating a feeling of un-sureness is imposed on purpose. On another occasion of crossing, I was also impressed by the very authoritative treatment and voice of a huge official in uniform, which made him even seem taller and more powerful. Of course, I had a stamp, but I got the impression, that I had to justify myself and that made me feel offended. What makes the place also pretty much a site of authorities are the different border accessories e.g. a tower for surveillance, spot lights and a lot of barbed

wire on top of the fences and roofs. There are also flags and signs marking where the sovereignty of the two countries starts.

Passing back to the Moroccan side at about 1pm works again with privilege for people who do not carry goods. Moroccans carrying materials on their backs walk into a room in a building and I understand that it is there, where the police checks their bags, can steal them and make use of the situation. Behind the passage many people arrive with small and huge bags. There are those curious-looking women, who dress up all the clothes which they want to carry, making them look like walking balls. I wonder if the women dress that way because when the police wants to check their things, the women could insist that they do not want to undress - just as a strategy to avoid to be stolen.

5.2.2 Life at the border of the traders carrying goods to Morocco

Many Moroccan border-people and also those who have been interviewed for this research depend on the border because they need to work for their survival. From interviews and from observation at the border-passage one can easily learn by mere watching that it is a mass of people crossing the border to work day by day: There are *"5000 a day, living on trafficking, doing it to survive"* the medicine told me. Yet, occupations at and across the border are diverse: there are housekeepers (mostly women), men who work on the black market for service companies e.g. in construction on the side of Ceuta, men selling goods at the market next to the border, some higher educated, who have e.g. studied in a European system and have the privilege of having found a good job with a contract and maybe even permission of residence in Ceuta and what is decisive here – there are men and women who carry goods to the other side. The indirect occupations linked to the irregular trading are e.g. taxi-driving or selling. For some like the medicine, the job in Ceuta is not a necessity for survival, but a useful addition to their jobs in Morocco. Thus the dependence and need does not exist as much for them. But most groups indeed, are dependent and vulnerable, especially the people involved in trading of goods: *"The people there are in a very difficult situation, ... it is the only work they can have. For the young from here, for the women, for the men here in Tetouan, because here we do not have a lot of work. There, there is work in houses, there are products they buy to sell them again in Tetouan, and they have to pass at the Moroccan police"* the housekeeper tells. The painter adds: *"The people from Morocco who work there are poor, women who do not have a husband, but they have 4 children, they have a house, they have four children in their heads. You see them working like dogs"*. Indicated in the statement of the painter there is some critique about the working conditions and general conditions Moroccans encounter at the border-passage. It is a crowded place - *"Ceuta, Tanger, Martil, Mdiq, a lot of people, maybe 10.000 people can enter, just in the morning. It takes a lot of time to go to Spain, you have to stand in that line, in the queue, to give your passport to the Spanish police. Before, you have to walk through the iron fence, like in Palestine"*. This is what several of the interviewees tell. Yet one can make distinctions between the different occupations at the border. The people trading have a particular situation and represent the largest group. Passing is not guaranteed though: The first contrabandor told: *"He has to deal with the police, the Moroccan police just when he gets out of the taxi. If he is known to this policeman he can easily go inside, and if*

not, he cannot. Also if you try they will not let you go. It depends on how people, maybe, psychologically react. You can only go if they let you go, they ask you the passport to put the stamp or not. But in order to not have to pay 5 dirhams, you give them and they can let you go. For the Spanish border it happens that everyone is there at the same time". The contrabandor adds that for crowded days the duration of waiting can be even 5 hours. But also at the Spanish side of the passage people encounter obstacles as the IT-expert explains: "I have to cross two barriers. First the one of Morocco, second the Spanish, you need a stamp for entering, at the Spanish everyday it is forbidden to enter. Between 8 o'clock in Spanish time until 11, it is really difficult". Some statements also imply that the police can be an important factor to the conditions at the passage. The smuggler confirms that "the chief official of the police uses to be present as well, they have to control more. They ask them to work well. This is the most dangerous moment. Later in the morning, at about 10 or 11, things get more relaxed". Further on there are also limitations with regard to time for when Moroccans from Tetouan cannot cross anymore, "the gates they stop at 7 or 8 o'clock". The politician explains "after 8 o'clock pm it is not allowed to enter because you are not a resident of Ceuta and you are neither a citizen of the European Union. So I cannot enter freely". This has consequences especially for the people transporting goods across the border. The second contrabandor tells that "he has to control time because of the schedules". A common metaphor used to describe conditions has been: "Like as if they are animals, there are so many people, so many rows every day". What is clear then is that different positions and occupations determine the role of the individual in power relations at the border. Among the traders "there are few who have the power and form like an important part of the border".

Positions can be improved by strategies of dealing with conditions, of course, and there are various for passing as quick as possible. The trader, as he lives in Fnideq, the last village in Morocco before the border, can reach the border quite easily: "I get up at four o'clock, take my breakfast, take a taxi, go, a lot of people want to go, so like 2-4 hours", which refers to the time he has to wait in the queue normally. "Around 1pm I am back to work in my shop in Fnideq, 20 days in a month, four times a week". Yet, since most traders do not have the means to work on their own, they participate in organized trafficking, as the second contrabandor describes: "In order to wait less, he hides himself away between the cars and gets through to the front of the queue, he gives some dirhams to the Moroccan police and enters. The one who is courageous, can enter. His boss, for whom he was transporting from there to Morocco, on his back, he and three more persons, wait for him. But if there is a moment with less control, there used to be more people working. Even six or seven, depending on the situation. But normally and fixed there are four. He goes one time carrying even 60kg to 65kg. With moments of less control he himself can order others, he stays, the others enter and go back. For them carrying the goods is not too long, the taxi-drivers take the things directly. They already know the addresses". This description gives a vivid impression how the organized business works. Behind the systems of trading there are some rich Moroccans hiring the people transporting goods, as one learns from the traders. "Women crossing used to work for other people. Especially women do not have enough money to work for themselves". The choice to work in groups or alone therefore depends on the individual economic status and presuppositions. There is also an important difference in gender, if we can trust the estimations above. It is usual to pay for crossing. The painter tells about his experience: "I pay five Dirhams a day to the Moroccan police, every day. I do it to work, everyone. If you want

to pass without going home again. I have a motorbike, you can pass easier. Not everyone has money to buy one. I leave my house at 7 o'clock, I work at 9, before I was living in Castillejos, only 3 kilometers from the border. Now I have the motorbike". From his insights we can also learn that choice for means of transportation can be a strategy, especially motorbikes and bikes are helpful.

"I feel like shit, I feel crazy! Because we have no permission of a right a man". That is one of the statements people made about feelings while crossing. It expresses the helplessness, powerlessness to change conditions and the arbitration which exists in the treatment by the police, which especially concerns the traders. The trader also told me *"It is like anarchy, no rules. I hate it"*. The contrabandor calls it *"a misery when he reaches the Spanish police"*. The dependence on arbitrariness is what makes them helpless actually - they have to work: *"He is lucky. He can go all the days. It is as if you are praying. If it is a lucky day you can go back with your goods. If not ... it is a big tragedy. So it is...he always has to run, he is afraid"*. If you live everyday with fear for your survival people might become depressed and shaped by their experiences. The smuggler illustrates: *"There is always the tension: Will they take away something? When he is at home and wants to sleep, bad dreams come up to him, they will take something away. So if it does not happen during the day, then it just happens during the night. He almost has no time for family and he is sorry, but he needs to sleep also"*. As the politician explains, it is *"your relationship with them [the police which] determines if you can pass"*. More people told me similar stories, which means that the vulnerability of many of the border-people is not only based on dependence on the border in general but also on the mercy of the police agents. Many of the border-people can tell scenes which they found meMoréble in a negative sense, e.g. the story by the second contrabandor: *"The treatment is aggressive. A person, let's say Islamist, with the beard, the police prohibited him to pass, they asked money from him. The guy told them that he would not give them any money. The boss overheard the conversation and called him to enter a room of the buildings there. And they beat him off a lot, all of them. The boss said 'we are not here so that you give money to me'. So that means that they are just too used to get money"*. The story also shows that treatment varies individually, depending on how your relationships with policemen are and what you give them back. In that sense certain criteria such as age serve to build up a hierarchy in privilege of treatment applying for both sides of the border passage.

Sharing the same destiny, yet, does not directly create friendship among the border-people. The trader described the others: *"Like friends, like my family"*. Others agree but interpret that the friendship is often bound to the border itself, whereas private meetings normally would not happen. As in every group of friends there also seem to be some interactional laws, which one should not break: *"The relationship is very good, a good person must not steel and betray others, stick to those rules. You will always have a good relationship, more work also, others know that you behave well and keep on rules"*. As long as you behave conform to the norms, you will be popular and have friends. The negative side of the relations has to do with needs and necessities, which everyone brings along: *"There is competition, one who is working, is always followed by someone who is not. Not everyone there works with a group. One goes there to the other side just waiting for someone to give him things to transport."*

Every day friendships increase, other people start trusting him, like other bosses, let's say. So there is always competition". Therefore, some of the border friendships are rather out of necessity and more or less functional. Friendship could also be defined as some sort of business relation on the basis of trust – that a person would work well. The competition is also noticed by others.

Figure 10: The market place Tarajal on the left. On the right the women dressing up like balls to transport the clothes to sell on the Moroccan side. Below back on the Moroccan passage, many people waiting for someone to pick the goods up after having done the carrier-job through the passage.



To sum up: There are certain factors which can make a huge difference in experience. Occupations determine which conditions one encounters and therefore choices of strategies for passing and working. Consequently feelings and the perception of different relationships among the border-people and with the police vary strongly. Individual characteristics e.g. years of experience at the border or the personal background in general have impacts. People make use of opportunities passing goods in a clandestine, but tolerated way from one side to the other contributing to stimulate economy on both sides. The stream of goods in quantities is large from more affluent Ceuta to the less affluent Tetouan (see figure 10) – which seems surprising, but the logical explanation is the special fiscal conditions in Ceuta.

5.3 The EU Customs Union as an institution

"The Customs Union is a foundation of the European Union and an essential element in the functioning of the single market. The single market can only function properly when there is a common application of common rules at its external borders. This implies that the 27 Customs administrations of the EU must act as though they were one" (European Commission, 2012a).

As the above quotation illustrates the EU Customs Union consists of 27 national customs administrations of the EU member-states, which “implement a community customs code” (European Commission, 2012a). This code is the same for all the member-states’ territories with only few exceptions and is meant to guarantee equal conditions of trade under the flag of a “single market” all over the EU-territory. This involves a population of 500 million people, “183 million customs declarations” (2007) - “5.5 every second”, “1,545 million tons of sea cargo and 11.7 million tons of air cargo checked each year” (European Commission, 2012a). These immense volumes of goods, people and declarations are dependent on the definition of “common tariffs”, a common “trade policy”, “preferential trade, health and environmental controls, the common agricultural and fisheries policies, the protection of economic interests by non-tariff instruments” and generally “external relations” of the EU and its member-states (European Commission, 2012a).

According to the general objectives of the EU, which has once officially been established for purposes of maintaining peace and then been converted into an especially economic association, the objectives of the Customs Union focus on market issues: The Customs Union is meant to “ensure the smooth flow of trade” by “applying necessary controls” and “guaranteeing” to protect “health” and “safety” of the citizens (ibid.). Nowadays the European Commission has added some and amplified the objectives of the Customs Union, which is now also meant to provide for “international trade” and “fight against fraud, terrorism and organized crime”.

Normative aspects of the objectives are related to a belief in liberal market economies, such as the idea to contribute to “fair and open trade”, while striving for external representation as a closed harmonic community, fighting “unfair and illegal trade while supporting legitimate business activity” (ibid.). At the same time the EU Customs legislation respects and incorporates the global “rules set out in the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement” (ibid.). The practical dimension of these objectives is fulfilling tasks such as “collecting customs duties” and “indirect taxes at import” of goods (ibid.). The legislation contains a precise definition of the application of required custom tariffs. One of these is the maybe most famous VAT (Value added tax), which is a “*taxable amount in respect of the importation of goods is the customs value*” (ibid.). Yet, there are more complex and complete regulations of which a detailed explanation goes beyond this research project.

One rule that will repeatedly be mentioned during the description of results has to do with the “concept of origin”: “Origin is the ‘economic’ nationality of goods in international trade”, of which the EU distinguishes between “non-preferential and preferential” (ibid., 2012b). The former implies determining a product’s economic nationality which serves to implement “commercial policy measures (such as anti-dumping measures, quantitative restrictions) or tariff quotas” (ibid.). Instead the latter implies better import conditions for “certain goods from certain countries” e.g. “reduced or zero rate of duty”. The origin of goods is thus an instrument of “tariff classification” and at the import of goods into the Customs Territory the binding origin information has to be applied. An exception is the movement of goods within the territory of the Customs Union (ibid.). Another special role applies to so called “free zones” (ibid., 2012c), where goods entering “are free of import duties, VAT and other import charges”. This is applicable to “non-community goods” in that sense that they are being regarded as

“not yet imported” into the Customs Union and applicable to “community goods” in the sense that they can be seen as “already exported” (ibid.). Yet in free zones there might be further special reliefs, forms of taxes or local duties which are diverse and locally individual (ibid.). One of these free zones is the city of Ceuta (see figure 11).




Figure 11: Map of the European Customs territory

The following paragraph is dedicated to justify briefly why the European Customs Union can be considered an instrument of Europeanization in general.

5.3.1 The Customs Union as driving force of Europeanization

According to the indicators operated in the methodological section (§ 4.3) the Customs Union can be regarded as one of the bearers and promoters of Europeanization. It was an ideal of progress, modernization and civilization which has been the main reason for the establishment of the institution of a Customs Union aiming to help to establish a powerful single European market. The same ideal can be traced also in the day by day business of the institution. Recently (2008) the institutional rules have undergone processes of modernization : a “modernized Customs Code was adopted in the form of a regulation” (European Commission, 2012d) implying transformations such as “rationalization of the legal framework” (fewer procedures), “greater standardization of customs rules and their implementation” (increased “communitization” of economic operators’ rights and obligations), “computerization” (declarations, data exchange), “interoperability” (national customs computer systems) and new facilities (self-assessment by operators) (ibid.). The change of rules and institutionally internal modernization also imply aspects of homogenization, spreading same values such as belief in free markets or democracy and standardize (the European way as predestined of privileges). Simultaneously the institution of the Customs Union sets boundaries of exclusion towards non-member-states, bears neoliberal template thinking and has brought along the substitution of individually varying custom habits in the different member-states by those of the Customs Union.

“European” values are also to be traced in the description by Florensa (2012) who published an article about the World Customs Organization in the local newspaper. The role of the institution is accordingly about helping its member states to cooperate about material customs, applying rules of consent. The organization offers assistance, advise for customs services, at the creation norms and instruments internationally, facilitating trans-border trade and promoting ethics, administrations of customs, harmonization and simplification. The slogan fitting the goals of the organization is: “borders divide, customs connect” (Florensa, 2012). The question here than would be which ethics are promoted and it is clear that again liberal market economy is an underlying value in what the institution promotes. Concretely the Customs Union thus seems to be an instrument of homogenization of values infiltrating Ceuta and many places else in the world. Interestingly the site of the organization is in Brussels, the European capital, which even more points at the European-ness of the organization.

In this sense the many attributes of what has been identified as characteristic of processes of Europeanization inhere in the Customs Union. This generally justifies the research project undertaken here on the case of Ceuta.

5.4 Why Ceuta has decided not to join the Customs Union in 1986

This section is written to explain which motivations decision-makers had for not letting join Ceuta the Customs Union in 1986. It will help understanding in later steps of the analysis, why in 2012 the decision has been taken in favor of integration – also illustrating the role of Europeanization.

Together with the second Spanish city on the African continent, Melilla, and the Faroer islands, Ceuta forms an exceptional category of territories being under a member-states’ sovereignty but simultaneously not being part of the territory of the European Customs Union. Instead there is Protocol 2 of the Act of Accession of Spain to the EC which declares that Ceuta and Melilla may “benefit from an autonomous preferential agreement with the EC allowing products originating in Ceuta and Melilla to benefiting from most of the cumulation systems signed by the EC with third countries” (European Commission, 2012e).

From some border-people from Ceuta, who are experts on the topic of the Customs Union, the border in Ceuta and the economic developments, I learned that it was the state government (1985-86) of Spains’ socialist party (the “PSOE” - Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol) with Felipe González as president, which elaborated these conditions. It was the central government deciding and designing, since it was only in 1995 that Ceuta obtained its institutional status of Autonomy. Before, Ceuta was subordinated to the autonomous provincial government of Cadiz. The ordinary citizen of Ceuta did not have any influence about the decision-making e.g. by referendum Testa Méndez tells, which implies that it were political and economic institutions and other organizations pushing the decision. Another expert and citizen of Ceuta, José Maria Campos Martínez, though is convinced that the opinion of the citizens fully coincided with the decision of the government, which then could be even regarded as an unanimity in favor of the choice. Morocco as a country, which has been impacted by the choice as it is sharing

its border with Ceuta, was not considered to influence. Moreover, Morocco and the border-region resulted to be a major criterion for making the decision as will be explained in the following paragraphs.

Three of the interviewed experts and border-people agree on that the main objective of not joining the Customs Union was to maintain the economic and fiscal singularity (including the special economic and fiscal regime e.g. applying an own taxation system different from the usual VAT). As Testa Méndez explains the driving argument was to sustain the conditions which allow for the irregular exportation of goods to Morocco, despite of a lack of a Commercial Customs Institution. The irregular trade has namely been a decisive economic force until the 1990s. Testa Méndez adds that this is a general official version of arguing and alludes to the fact that also political relations between Spain-EU-Morocco might have had a major impact. The archivist, José Luis Gómez Barceló adds that the defense of the traditional legal and economic status of Ceuta (having historical roots of five centuries), like the one of many other autonomous provinces in Spain, was another major criterion for the choice.

It is thus a certain inherent repeatedly mentioned “singularity”, which has been in various ways criterion to decide not to join the Customs Union. Singularity of Ceuta is argued to be topographically, geo-politically conditioned given its position as a city isolated from the national mainland, and the simultaneous proximity to a neighbor-state with which diplomatic relations are tensed. In this sense Ceuta’s singularity has historical and economic (what applies to the system of importation and strategy of economic survival) dimensions. Moreover particularities are visible in distinctive needs of Ceuta under fast changing circumstances. These aspects are analysed in the following paragraphs.

5.4.1 Historical singularity of Ceuta

“The Spanish have been in Tetouan for 50 years, also everyone can speak Spanish here” – this statement by a Moroccan medicine working in Ceuta shows, that being strongly interwoven with the hinterlands is one of the colonial facts which still mark the present of Ceuta. Ceuta on its own has a long history of singularity as well which has been often mentioned to explain the decision not to join the Customs Union in 1986. Ceuta had obtained a status of fiscal singularity already during the Castillian Empire. The legal equivalent to its later legal status has been the ‘Law of basics of the Economic and Financial regime of Ceuta’ of 1955 by which Ceuta has been declared a free trade zone implying also free entry, transit and reloading of goods. Moreover, already at this early stage established exceptions in the taxation system support the effect of singularity (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 351).

When Spain became a member of the EU the responsible authorities were obliged to modify the fiscal system of Ceuta according to the Union’s criteria (1986) but carrying on an autonomous regime. Additional fiscal singularity has been established in 1998 by introducing a 50% tax deduction for residents (ibid., p. 352) and somewhat later refunding for social security from which certain economic sectors should profit (e.g. gastronomy, commerce, tourism, industry) - entrepreneurs would receive up to 40% of refunding (ibid., p. 353). Generally Ceuta applies the so called “IPSI” (“impuesto produccion, servicios, importaciones”) which means “imposition on production,

services, importation'), which has been introduced already in 1944 and experienced major changes in 1991. The latter were fully introduced only in 1996 (ibid., p. 355). Ceuta's singularity is further marked by the characteristic non-existence of specific products for exportation -exportation is generally based on what has previously been imported. This form of re-exportation can be traced taking into account the balance between local consumption (private/companies), sale (tourism, visitors) and irregular commercial activity (trading to Morocco) (ibid., p. 170).

This leads to discuss a major difference with Melilla which is a city sharing much of Ceuta's destiny. Melilla though has a commercial customs institution since 1853 (X. Ferrer-Gallardo, personal communication, June 15th, 2012) which Ceuta does not. In 1853 both cities were made trade port and consequently led modifications of Custom rules with the objective of facilitating the commercial development of the - at that time - newly obtained Spanish colony Morocco (Cembrero, 2008). The modifications led to allowance for stopovers (dis-/charging) and intervention-free trade passing through the harbors without intense bureaucratic formalities in Northern Africa. In 1958 then rule "572" urged that the area of "Tarajal" will be the official border passage of Ceuta (which it is still today). The customs institution allows for temporal exportation of vehicles, passage of goods and travelers. A similar institution was urged for Melilla, but including more than one border-passage for the city – more passages for exclusively vehicles, travelers and alimentary non-commercial goods. A resolution in 2007 reaffirmed protocol number 2, but gave more competence to the autonomous cities. Again Melilla could maintain several transition points. The problem of Ceuta is thus the different practice regarding customs – whereas the institutions in Melilla are operative, they are not in Ceuta. A cause of the non-existence of Spanish norms about commercial customs is based on diplomatic relations with Morocco. The country has never recognized the passage of Tarajal, only Beni Enzar, the passage of Melilla. For Ceuta this means that as long as Morocco does not recognize the "Spanish-ness" of the cities (Ayala, 2010), a real commercial customs institution cannot be established (González, 2008). In spite this there is no lack of commerce in Ceuta as illustrated earlier on (§5.2.).

There are more factors causing a unique situation in the EU. What applies to water resources in 1989 Ceuta did not dispose of any system of transporting ships, different than e.g. Canary Islands. Its tourism was underdeveloped, the agrarian sector hardly existed with only the exception of fishing but even here there has not been any exploitation to its potential. The industrial sector has almost no weight. It is mostly small enterprises in Ceuta determining the economic development (El País, 1989). 92,15% of the GDP was constituted by services, as Armuna reports in 2010, bringing along a danger of structural imbalance. The real estate crisis caused additional obstacles, however, the commerce was undergoing a phase of restructuration – with clear orientation towards Morocco (Armuna, 2010). This relatively mixed picture reveals many of the distinctive characteristics of the city. Already in 1989 similar problems as now concerned housing and high rates of low level education which has been tried to solve by the creation of courses of formation (professional, entrepreneurial). Better use of resources (solar energy, fishing, industrial grounds, tourism) was a goal of wider planning projects (El País, 1989). A considerable proportion of the population of 81.181 inhabitants (2009) is unsurprisingly Moroccan (Armuna, 2010), which contributes to Ceuta's singularity. Studies show that the almost half of population with

Moroccan or Maghrebian roots struggles to be accepted as citizens with full rights due to their different identities. Still, the reassignment of the territory of Ceuta to Morocco is a critical topic (López García, 2006).

On the administrative level the particularities of Ceuta became subject to negotiation when there was a demand for broadening the autonomy of both cities (including Melilla), changing their statute to be more comparable with autonomous provinces. The initial demands also included legislative capacities in order to equalize the cities in ambiguous positions with the rest of Spain and reinforcing the protection against territorial claims from Morocco. Out of these initial ideas in 1994, the municipal government of Ceuta rejected a first draft of a new Statute of Autonomy designed by the state government (Aznar, 1994b). This was supported broadly by general public so that thousands of residents joint demonstrations (Aznar, 1994a). It has been only in 1996 that the Senate has approved the Statute of Autonomy for Ceuta and Melilla, which had been a pending assignment since 1978 (Aizpeolea, 1999). The result was a unique less powerful role for Ceuta than autonomous provinces but more than municipalities (Aizpeolea, 1995). Even currently the singularities of Ceuta will be defended: This time the Foreign Minister of Spain is going to defend the special treatment of Ceuta before the EU, also arguing in favor of special funds for prevention of illegal immigration (Cembrero 2012^a) which has become another special characteristic of Ceuta during the last decades.

5.4.2 Particular history of importation

“If there were no Moroccans in Ceuta, there would be no economic development” – this is a quotation by the interviewee who is called the “trader” in this research. It expresses again the economic interdependence of Ceuta and its hinterlands from a Moroccan perspective. The interdependence has been crucial to the decision-making of 1986.

Ceuta irregularly exports goods for a value of 500 million euros annually; according to the Moroccan Ministry of economy it might be even about 700 million euros (Cembrero, 2009b). Ceuta lives on the border- which is especially beneficial for the entrepreneurial branch (approximately about 100 companies) and half a million Moroccans in the region of Tetouan (Abad, 2003). Barbulo (2005) describes the cities’ trading centers as “The biggest bazar of the Maghreb”, where Ceuta generates 12% of its richness - not yet including the traffic of drugs. The first buying agents arrive by car, ask their orders and return to Morocco, the carriers carry the goods to Fnideq (the nearest village on the Moroccan side of the border) where they are waited for by their bosses – As described several times already the “Tarajal” is no Customs institution and neglects thousands of Moroccans from neighbouring cities living on the trading of obscure goods. Goods are thrown across the fence of 6 meter of heights. Five Dirham to pay the Moroccan police agents, five more to pay the Spanish, and five more to pay the soldier - throwing goods (formerly this practice was possible) is more expensive. At the bazar of Tarajal 80% of goods are imported from Spain via Ceuta to Morocco (Bárbulo, 2005). Irregular trading to Morocco especially of alimentary goods and tobacco has been triplicating legal exports of Ceuta (Cembrero 2001) during years. And it has been years that this system has been fostered.


In 1990 Spain enunciated flexible forms of visa to Moroccans who regularly work in or visit Ceuta (24-hours Schengen-exceptions for citizens of the region of Tetouan) and an agreement has been reached in Rabat. The exception described here is another reason, why Ceuta is particular. For years also at “Beliones” (at the northern part of the border between Ceuta and Morocco) there has been a tolerated passage for neighbors e.g. for reasons such as visits to family, or for other social and commercial purposes. That way an alternative to the Tarajal had been established which about 5000 Moroccans used for daily crossing (Abad, 2002). Yet, after incidents in May 2009 two of the women carrying goods from Ceuta through the passage of Buitz to Morocco died, revealing the necessity of improving the security of 8000 -10.000 women passing daily (at that time) (Cembrero 2009b). An actualization of the law about irregular trading (Ley de Contrabando) has been passed by a majority in the chamber of the government of Ceuta in 2011. The step is meant to avoid that the delict of trading irregularly would be considered a delict under the changing circumstances. It helps to protect the economic model of Ceuta impeding the application of fines as defined by law, but puts the obligation of informing about importation from non-Customs Union territory and to hand those informs in at Spanish Authorities before a boat can leave again (Aznar, 2011c). The irregular trade has thus been in the focus of attention for many political decisions trying to maintain its functioning.

In March 2012 the major decisive factor for changing conditions came into full being: the disarmament of Customs between the EU and Morocco has been completed (El Faro de Ceuta, 2012a). 16 years ago the EU settled the agreement on free trade during the Conference of Barcelona about a mutual disarmament of customs, gradually abolishing high customs putting obstacles to trade. The disarmament has produced a direct phenomenon, the importation of industrial goods from Morocco since the beginning of the liberation in 2000 (El Faro de Ceuta, 2012b) and has been also major factor in debates about the economic model of Ceuta.

The above measures and events have been all factors influencing the trade across the border and economic stability of Ceuta. In order to understand the importance of the cross-border trade to Ceuta understanding the its origination, its evolution, temporally, in volume and in value -using importation to Ceuta as only statistically available indicator- only what has been imported to Ceuta can be sold again. Importation to Ceuta is particular also because one can notice a significant concentration on few importing countries, of which four supply already more than half and two thirds of the total importation originate from only eight countries of the EU (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 184). These numbers are completed by an important volume of goods “imported” from Spain. There is a clear need of importation in Ceuta, as to be expected in a city with hardly any industry. However, some products result more relevant than expected. This fact then, can be explained because import is not only destined for internal consumption (ibid., p. 206). Calculation of private household spending in Ceuta can help to reveal the irregular exportation, without ignoring the major factor of Moroccans (and other visitors) shopping for private consumption in Ceuta as well.

Since 1980, but actually for much longer Ceuta had gained stability in importation, which by now is changing strongly (ibid., pp. 172-173). From 1980 onwards one could distinguish three phases of development in relation to

the GDP, indicating the different relevance of importation. Until 1985 the importation had grown ever more important and continued also during the 1990s though with more moderate and changing throughout years. Then from 2000 again importation had only moderate importance in relation to the GDP, yet, it started relatively increasing (ibid., p.174). After reaching a maximum value and volume in importation between 2001 and 2003 a period of decrease with about 40% loss of value year by year, reaching its minimal turning point in 2006 followed (ibid., p. 171) - as the journalist R. Abad observed in 2004, the only commercial lung of Ceuta generating about 600 million euros a year and providing for 70% of economic activity, has been reduced to its half since 2002 (Abad, 2004).



What is striking, is a gradual substitution of products and thus continents of origin to be traced. Already in 2006 the main source of products has been Europe, whereas Asia and Oceania had become the second important origin only. Products from America and Africa have always hardly been represented; - today the main importers are all from the former EU15 states (ibid., p. 177). What becomes clear observing the data is that Spain becoming an EU-member state had a negative impact on importation (ibid., p. 178). The fact that products from Asia have been more relevant and then became progressively substituted is crucial for tracing the evolution of the irregular

trade: After a quick decrease during the early 1980s, there was a rebound in 1986, followed by a systematic increase until 1995. The relative and absolute increase continued until 1999 but was more moderate (see figure 12). Since then amounts and values were decreasing until a minimum in 2006 (*ibid.*, p. 180) - always corresponding a relative increase of European importation (*ibid.*, p. 181). This tendency shows that also the irregular trading which mainly consisted of cheap goods from Asia (such as footwear or ready-to-wear clothing or even cheap electronic goods (*ibid.*, p. 311) generally lost in relevance, but at the same time the kind of products transported have become gradually substituted: Since Morocco has started a liberalization of markets, products from Asia can be imported directly at comparable tariffs to the trading via Ceuta. For importation via Ceuta European products especially alimentary goods are favored instead. This is also indicated by a loss of value in importation (Aranda Gallego, 2007; X. Ferrer-Gallardo, personal communication, February 29th, 2012).

In the economic analyses by Joaquin Aranda Gallego done by request by Ceuta, seeking to react to the disarmament of customs with Morocco, the selected economist tries to determine the kind of goods involved in both importation and irregular trade: Although it is not easy to determine the volume or the kind of goods, by observation and anticipation it is presumably low-value products, with low added value and mass-production of little differences in quality (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 467). Generally the quality might be low since importation come from mainly developing countries from Asia (especially Thailand and Vietnam) (*ibid.*, p. 469) mirroring globalization and specialization of countries. What is special though is the foreign demand in Ceuta from Morocco and by visitors and tourists. Since there are no statistics Aranda relies on general observations and speculations presuming that goods transit even into the very interior of Morocco, but admits that the sustainability of the trading is difficult to be estimated without reliable statistic data. Moreover, political factors might influence the trading which are little controllable from Ceuta (e.g. the development of Morocco, its currency etc.) (*ibid.*, p. 467).

The relevant condition for the working of the trade across the border and also basis to Ceuta's economic model has been the suppression of custom duties. Given the special conditions of Ceuta staying out of the Customs Union, entrepreneurs could make use of the rules of origin to import elaborated products from third countries without paying customs to EU territories. This mechanism can be used due to the definition of products of origin (*ibid.*, p. 341), but has been changing during the years. The EU Customs Institutions have started to set up new agreements with third countries which are conforming measures of liberation. In that sense commercial politics of Ceuta have been exceptional and involvement in the Customs Union in 1986 would have had consequences especially on agreements with third countries such as China. At that moment a restriction only by the applied protocol number was favorable (*ibid.*, p. 345; p. 362).

Other sources of income such as shopping tourism have broken away almost totally: The shopping tourism had its first down at opening of the border of Gibraltar in the middle of the 1980s. Since then it has become more convenient for customers from Spain mainland to obtain products at favorable conditions in Gibraltar. The second shock came when the obligatory military service in the middle of the 1990s was abolished in Spain, because the many young soldiers stationed in Ceuta and their families would not consume anymore in the city (X. Ferrer-

Gallardo, personal communication, June 15th, 2012). It is thus only the irregular trade as important economic pillar which has been left in Ceuta.

5.4.3 Unique but changing needs of Ceuta

It is one main principle that there are no barriers among EU member-states, as well as it is formally impossible to implement protectionist measures within the EU Customs Union. But during 20 years of Spanish EU membership the international and national circumstances have been changing considering e.g. the introduction of a single currency, EU-enlargements (also those foreseen in future) (ibid., 2007, p. 336) and new compromises with third countries have been made – which gradually made turn out the need of revision of the economic model in relation with EU (ibid., p. 170). There have been few changes of the economic structure since 1986 and the development of productivity has been comparatively moderate only. At the same time problems concerning the population have remained or worsened such as the capacity of employment generation and unemployment. A constant factor causing problems has been the lack of educational offer, generating a low rate of professionals (Aróstegui Ruiz, 2008).

A possible integration into the Customs Union is describe as an opportunity in this context to take seriously the need to take concrete action also against otherwise deteriorating economic effects. There is also a need of protection of some sectors at the incorporation, of course (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 489) given the impossibility of customary restriction on sensitive products from the EU. There would also be an obligation to impose customs, increasing costs of products from third countries which at the same time is necessary to avoid an increase of costs of living. There would thus be a need for measures for transition, and in order to provide for a linear development it would be a moment to adapt the IPSI (which is the taxation form, very different from and lower than, but equivalent to the VAT, which is not applied in the freezone Ceuta). Besides, Ceuta depends on being always guaranteed sufficient finance to avoid differentiating effects (ibid., p. 490). Living costs and certain economic activities are thus especially sensitive to the introduction of customs, so that measures to stimulate the local economy and generation of employment and investment might be needed (ibid., p. 491).

Generally a profound analysis of advantages and disadvantages of reforms and integration into the Customs Union is considered a basic need of the city (ibid., p. 487), since decisions go beyond imposing customs - considering development of prices and long-term consequences. Additional factors increasing the need for reforms mentioned in the public discourses and media have to do with the continued territorial claims about Ceuta's territory by Morocco. Morocco rejects to admit the competence of the bilateral agreement about Ceuta and Melilla. It is the member-states of the EU which determine the localization and competences of the different custom institutions in their territories (Ayala, 2010). A functioning of a commercial customs institution at the border would without doubt be the interest of Spain and the EU. But in the discourse about Ceuta one can notice preoccupation for the case of lacking support by the EU, always being conscious about the territorial claims from Morocco (Ayala, 2010).

Moreover, Ceuta is under enormous pressure to react on the disarmament of customs between the EU and Morocco, which implies a progressive creation of free trade of industrial products and legal investment etc. (agreement from 1996) (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 3). This generates an even more urgent need in Ceuta to adapt to the changing tendencies of trading as described above. In February 2011 then a more concrete debate was initiated about studying possibility (advantages, inconveniences) of integration into the Customs Union as means to stimulate the local economy (Rober, 2011). The debate in Ceuta focuses especially on the positive example of the Canary Islands having integrated effectively into the Customs Union, proving that it is possible. The socio-economic council actually had already firmed an agreement on the analysis of conveniences and possibilities in terms of incorporation in 2000. Issues of interests have been also then the respective aspects of change for the rules of origin, other (dis-) advantages, the status of Ceuta in the EU and possible special regimes, privileges or exceptions as compensation for singularities and obstacles (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p.333)

In the end of 2011, on December 24th the support of the integration into the Customs Union has been announced unanimously (Aznar, 2011d). The president of Ceuta, Caballas, declared that Ceuta is *for* joining the Customs Union and establishing a commercial Customs Institution under the condition of recognition by the EU as an ultra-peripheral region to not endanger the fiscal singularities and conditions of trading activity as a free zone and port (Aznar, 2011b). By this Ceuta came to define its primary need in joining the Customs Union and simultaneously applies for funding pointing to its particularities. In the same context this also means that the city depends very much on the EU acknowledging these particularities and status as a commercial free zone with own fiscal and necessary advantages for its residents (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 9). A partial success can be observed already: The Mixed Commission of the EU had approved the report on the specificities of Ceuta and Melilla already in 2011. There is acknowledgement for the need to reach a balance for the standard of living. For Ceuta this means that they have now in hands a document to ask for special treatment with regard to structural funds, including the port. European interest in project of better accessibility, the establishment of a commercial customs institution, improvement of fiscal incentives and revision of the current taxation system the IPSI has been proved, so that Ceuta can go on fighting for own rights (El Faro de Ceuta, 2011). It is then task of the Spanish government to process the demand by Melilla and Ceuta for the integration into the Customs Union to the Commission of the EU which then will have to elaborate a proposal for the Council of Ministers, the member-states will then have to approve the request unanimously (Cembrero, 2008).

5.5 Summary about why Ceuta did not integrate into the Customs Union and consequences

Up to now we have learned that the Customs Union is set up to create a single European market, guaranteeing the same conditions for international trading to all 27 member states. The VAT (Value Added Tax) is the main Customs tariff for goods entering the EU territory. Rules of origin, though, can provide for preferential treatment of goods from certain regions. Moreover, we have seen that there are exceptions within the EU-territory, where different conditions are applied and which do not take part in the Customs Union, namely free-zones, one of which is Ceuta. Further it was analyzed that the Customs Union is another instrument of the EU to promoting European values, liberal market ideals as well as human rights, fair trade and in the end, of course, modernity

and progress (Mignolo, 2000, p. 68). It is also obvious that the Union is exclusionary in nature since non-EU member-states cannot join the Customs Union.

Ceuta's decision in 1986 not to join the Customs Union was realized by the central government, not involving any citizens or Morocco. Factors to the decision were the important historical and economic singularities which were to be maintained, also given the tensed political relations with Morocco. Due to the historically special fiscal regime the interwoven relations with Northern Morocco have been maintained in spite of the non-recognition of Ceuta as a Spanish city by Morocco. Ceuta's economic structure is thus still oriented to the irregular economy based on the comparative fiscal advantages of importing certain goods over Morocco. Changing conditions in the world and Ceuta (e.g. attaining autonomous status and change of main origin of products towards Europe instead of Asia and the agreement on disarmament of customs) in the course of time since 1986 have brought along a pressing need for reform of the economic model. In every-day routine Ceuta presents itself as a formerly colonial, rich city, where evidence of the connection with Morocco and the border, the crucial roles of port and trade is all around. Despite the multicultural character one encounters in the streets, one can also observe that officially the cities' character is tried to be maintained European, considering the flags and monuments all around the place. The border-passage, though, is a revealing site, where the whole dimensions of the decision of 1986 and discourses can be grasped: The tension at the passage, advertisement and traffic signs of Europe, the irregular system of trading, the crowding and bad conditions for Moroccan traders are observable here. The stories about the tough lives of people, needs and dependence on the border, tactics to overcome the obstacle, the every-day routine with border-jobs, the power of police agents and complicated relations among the Moroccan border-people - all of that reflects the consequences of the choice for singularity made on the other side of the border.

6. *Europeanization, argumentation and factors to the debate about integration*

This chapter is designated to highlight arguments during the debate in Ceuta about joining the European Customs Union before making the positive decision in 2011. The debate, which had started actually already in 1986 when Ceuta decided to stay out, has been long-lasting and exhaustive. Therefore it is first useful to understand the general lines of argumentation feeding the debate (§ 6.1). Secondly there will be a deeper analysis of what is the actual topic of this chapter – the analysis of attributes of European-ness, Europeanization, Otherness and borderthinking (§6.2). This might be more or less explicit in the argumentation and factors surrounding the decision-making process as well as in the thinking of border-people from both sides. Distinction is also made between the official discourse and meaning-making by the respondents, highlighting similarities and differences. At the end of the chapter a summary helps to have an overview over most important results (§6.3).

6.1 Arguments throughout the official debate about integration into the Customs Union

During the long-lasting debate about joining the European Customs Union (CU) different arguments have been used to reason in favor or against it. This paragraph therefore is dedicated to shedding light on the 'pros' and 'cons' to understand the set of problems behind the discussions.

<i>Disadvantages of incorporation in CU</i>	<i>Advantages of incorporation in CU</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rise in prices - Rise in living costs - Reduction of importation - Reduction of atypical/irregular trade - Need of reorientation of economy at reduction of irregular trade - At least short-term increase of unemployment (rate) - Losing advantages of exploitation of rules of origin - Possible deviation of capital investment - Losing advantages as stop-over point for container ships - New political tensions with Morocco - More investment also by the state is necessary, Ceuta is anyway expensive enough for Spain - (Loss of jobs and endangering survival of many of the poorest among the Moroccan border-traders, including their families) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Confirmation as Southern EU border - Improving status in the European Community Affirmation of European-ness and Spanish-ness before Rabat - Effect of introduction of EU custom tariffs on total importation very little - Disarmament of custom tariffs between Morocco and EU could cause major problems to the economy of Ceuta if the city stays out of the CU - Small enterprises involved in irregular trading are vulnerable to arbitrariness of Customs agents and diplomatic relations - Loss of revenue from legal exportation to Morocco - An official customs institution could be possible after joining the EU, more revenues from exportation, normalization of trading - Legal exportation and investment in Northern Morocco can compensate for loss of employment in irregular trading - Crisis and general structural conditions of Ceuta call for reform and new opportunities - There is a positive example of integration into the Customs Union which can be followed - Opportunity to finally overcome long-lasting structural problems - Opportunity to profit from additional funding and subsidies due to better relations with the EU

Table 2: Schematic summary of main arguments during the debate

We will start examining *disadvantages*: A major argument against joining the Customs Union has been the fact that Ceuta partly would have to give up advantages of its taxation-system or at least to reform it. So far, there have been advantages of importation of certain products in comparison to Spain mainland, the EU-territories - generally where the higher VAT is implemented - and Morocco e.g. for importation of goods from China, which has led to attraction of “shopping”- tourists and maintained the irregular trading to Morocco (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 469). Ceuta would have to adhere to the general European customs tariffs instead. Under these conditions, imposing EU - customs tariffs, there is first of all the risk, that the city loses its character as a free-zone and thus its attraction for tourists shopping. Shopping tourism might generally have decreased to only an additional component to attraction during the last years, but is not a proper pull-factor though (ibid., pp. 461-465). More decisive impacts would arise from the combination of the tariffs with the IPSI (the current taxation code of Ceuta - “imposition on production, services and importation”) probably causing crucial drop back of importation but also diminishing tax revenues – so that Ceuta is in urgent need of reforming its fiscal system. The above

factors might generally cause the economy to fall to a level inferior to the current one, implying even that an entirely new economic strategy is necessary (ibid.).

Higher custom tariffs and the VAT on importation will have to be compensated also for the sake of residents, who are especially sensitive to changes in prices of ordinary consumption goods, costs of living and the isolated position of the city in the EU. Costs of transportation e.g. would have to be funded more in order to protect the ordinary citizens from adverse effects (ibid., p. 469). Another problem is the fact that the effects on prices are all in all rather inestimable, also regarding contingent strategic products from Ceuta, considering the low level of protection at EU custom tariffs. Additionally the disappearance of the possibility to make use of the - for Ceuta - favorable rules of origin will affect the city negatively redirecting its markets towards the EU (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 31). A rise in prices also stimulates inflation likely to cause a significant shock in Ceuta. An increase of salaries will be a necessary measure to cope with the shock which consequently provokes more suspension of staff and unemployment (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 495). Implementing the European customs tariffs will approximately cause 400 employees to lose their occupation directly and thus also lead to an eight-percent point reduction of the GPD, notwithstanding indirect impacts. It is also reasonable to expect deviation of capital investment since former advantages with regard to exploiting rules of origin and refunding of tax might disappear or be transformed (ibid., pp. 461-462). With regard to the rules of origin the location and enterprises in Melilla would have an advantage over (those in) Ceuta if a new fiscal regime was established in Ceuta. Melilla's enterprises (for the case that Melilla does not decide for the incorporation in the CU) would have advantages in attaining their primary materials for free, whereas in Ceuta the customs tariffs will have a significant impact (ibid., p. 462). This comparative advantage for Melilla could also cause changes in capital investment - so that at integration into the Customs Union Ceuta cannot but think of additional measures of reform (ibid., pp. 461-462). This again would mean a strong dependence on the necessary recognition of singularities and specialties of Ceuta by the EU and respective application of politics and funding (ibid.).

As briefly mentioned in the above paragraphs the substantially negative impact on the foreign demand (Moroccan – atypical trade) are worse, and in case of a positive decision by Melilla presumably much worse there, due to the structure and extent of importation: For the case of an integration into the Customs Union without Melilla the estimated increase of prices without any additional measures might cause also a deviation of irregular trade towards Melilla, bringing to an end the importation of goods for Morocco via Ceuta. The mechanism is simple: the demand concentrates on where it is more cost-efficient to do trading. If both cities though join the Customs Union, effects are worse for Melilla, because of Moroccan politics acknowledging the commercial customs institution of Melilla (ibid.), which would mean paying additional fees at the entrance of goods to Morocco (El Faro de Ceuta, 2012a).

For certain sorts of product it is foreseeable that the regions of origin of products will be substituted. For example the demand for pajamas will reorient to products from Italy or Turkey, because given the EU-customs tariffs the conditions of importation for these countries will be better than the ones for China being the principal origin of the pajamas right now. As it is products from Asia which have been mainly traded to Morocco irregularly the just

pictured substitution will strongly reduce the irregular business with Morocco and cause a contraction of the demand – the atypical, irregular trade is very vulnerable to changes in prices (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 478). What applies to pajamas then also refers to textile, ready-to-wear clothing, footwear (all especially from Asia) and it is to be expected that importation relatively diminishes (Vivancos, 2010). Other products vulnerable to the changes might be cars and fish (statistically showing significant effects). Mineral and crude oil would be also touched by the customs tariffs, but since their origin is mostly from within the Union the tariffs are not very relevant (ibid., p. 481). However, the reduction of the irregular trading (contrabando) might endanger a lot of (economic) viability of Ceuta which is based on these activities. Disappearance or moderation are the most likely under conditions of the Customs Union according to the estimations by Professor Joaquín Aranda Gallego (Cembrero, 2008).

As mentioned earlier (§ 5.3) due to the current lack of a commercial customs institution at the border passage transport of goods across the border is considered irregular and only private persons and cars can pass. Trading is not recorded and the export volume can be estimated only by importation registered to Ceuta and considering the value, an amount up to 15000 million euros, the 45000 people working (75% women) and 450.000 indirectly involved. 53% of importation to Ceuta is approximately actually addressed to Moroccan demand (Martínez Navarro, 2003, p. 27). A break-down of this economic system through the incorporation into the Customs Union then has a lot of impact and reinforces calls for a reorientation of the economy of Ceuta (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 495). However, this effect will impact much more the Moroccan side of the border immediately: An official customs institution at the border will not serve the poorest of the poor – impacting their families, education of their children etc. It will be a large group of people being affected at the same time directly or indirectly in the Northern Region across the border (ibid., p. 495). Finding alternative occupation on the short-term will be rare.

The commercialization of the border also implies to force Morocco to accept the border – since it will be the official external border of the EU. In that context there will be supposedly negative effects on the political and diplomatic relationship with Morocco - the political component of Ceuta in relation to Morocco makes acceptance of an official customs institution not an easy exercise (ibid.). The city has been always matter to tensions and, in fact, does cost Spain and Europe a lot (Vivas Lara, 2010). Neglecting the tensions would be difficult (Cembrero, 2008a) also because the trading across the border endangers the viability of the irregular economy of the region of Tetouan, which is another reason why Rabat is likely to neglect the qualification as official commercial border persistently (Cembrero, 2008a). Tensions can also further stretch the current delay in the implementation of procedures which are designated to facilitate the expedition of instantaneous visa for Moroccans coming as tourists or having purposes of shopping. The advantageous alternative incentives to the economy of Ceuta would fail to appear. Instead such a prolonged delay causes impairment to the local economy (Armuna, 2010).

Recently in 2011 moreover, there has been an advanced declaration by the European Customs Union which could create benefits for the harbor of Ceuta, but cause struggles for other Spanish harbors. From that moment it is definitely preferable and more convenient for ships to stop over at Ceuta than at harbors belonging to the

territory of the Customs Union (Solana Bermejo, 2011). This measure could push the local economy of Ceuta, but the advantage would be lost at the moment in which Ceuta joins the Customs Union.

A possible scenario of Ceuta not joining the Customs Union then could be imagined as follows: As no customs tariffs were introduced, there would be also no effect on prices and consequently no effects on foreign trade or commercial politics with third countries. The economic and fiscal regime would remain as well as subsidies for transportation. Funds generated through structural politics by the EU would remain but would not increase (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 29). Global change and thus changing circumstances around Ceuta would have to be expected (ibid., p. 7). Anyway, the part of the GDP generated by importation for further selling to Morocco would continue to diminish (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 464) and the intensity and sustainability of trade to Morocco remain questionable for the vulnerability of this sort of trade. Politics, little control from the Ceuta itself (dependence on bilateral relations and relations with the EU), the development of the currency of Morocco on the markets and restrictions or liberation of importation to Morocco in general (referring to third countries) are factors which cannot be foreseen at the moment of decision-making (ibid., p. 467).

Advantages of joining the Customs Union are mostly related to the pressing circumstances and needs of Ceuta: Given the complicated diplomatic relations Ceuta asking for integration into the Customs Union would be a way to affirm itself before Rabat. Consequently the city would be also confirmed as EU Southern border and thus elevate its status in the European community. According to Ignacio Cembrero, journalist of the major Spanish newspaper El País, the step would therefore create more confidence for the future since, although forced, the affirmation would guarantee less uncertainty about the relationship to Morocco (Cembrero, 2008). This idea has been agreed on in various ways by various people, such as the president of Ceuta who commented: "With Europe we are stronger" (ibid.).

The implementation of customs tariffs will cause little relative change for Ceuta according to economic estimations (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 475) despite a consequent redirection of import-streams from different geographical commercial zones (from South- East Asia to EU). The only sector showing major changes would be the irregular trading business (ibid., p. 473). This activity is as mentioned sensitive to fluctuation of prices and thus to the implementation of customs tariffs, since the products traded to Morocco are a small group of products being affected most by the introduction of tariffs. In fact, actually the tariffs would not create high monetary values in total. As estimated by Aranda Gallego, customs tariffs would only lead to payments of in total 3 million of 7.3 of general customs (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 492), so that the total effect of diminution of importation is estimated to only amount up to 0,94% (ibid., p. 481). This means that effects in general are rather small – except for irregular trading.

As explained earlier (§5.4) there is no commercial customs institution at the border passage, yet 53% of importation into Ceuta is actually directed towards Morocco which is a clear weakness of the local economy. Success of business thus e.g. depends on the arbitrariness of the police agents working at the border letting pass the irregular trading (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 27). Moreover the calculated loss of tax revenue for exportations

in comparison with a border being official is high: according to an article by R. Abad from 2003, at that time, it was about 1.500 million Euros escaping taxation. Some people also supported the theory that one place of employment in irregular activity in the end impedes 10 legal employments per job and the development of Northern Morocco (Abad, 2003).

At the same time there could be an official customs institution with Morocco for goods if Ceuta joined the Customs Union (Aranda Gallego, 2007). In that case the border will be a commercial one with the Customs Union so that exportation is real. Importation of e.g. materials for construction which are less expensive in Morocco but still of sufficient quality could be also beneficial (Cembrero, 2008b). Independently of joining the Customs Union in 2006 there have already been requests by politicians and enterprises from Ceuta to the Spanish government to start negotiations in Rabat about a commercial border between Ceuta and Morocco to export legally (Cembrero, 2006). Worries have been expressed earlier on also because especially small enterprises involved in the irregular market activities are vulnerable to Rabat's arbitrariness (Barbulo, 2005), always referring to the example of the incidents of Perejil in 2002. As consequence of the incidents 90% of goods were blocked by the Moroccan customs agents. This caused an emergency in Ceuta due to the deterioration of sells to Morocco. At that time there have been even fiscal proposals to give incentives to small enterprises involved in trading to balance effects by the crisis (Abad, 2002). It is thus necessary to reduce vulnerabilities and dependence of small enterprises in Ceuta.

Besides, Ceuta is forced to act in one or the other way: Importation via Ceuta to Morocco will lose attraction when the tariff reduction between Morocco and the EU will have been completed in 2012. From that moment prices reduce significantly for direct import to Morocco (whereas so far it has been still more cost-efficient to import irregularly via Ceuta) (Cembrero, 2008a). The basis to the reduction is the Euro-Mediterranean agreement on free trade, regulating the gradual reduction of custom tariffs with Morocco (Suarez, 2012). Already in 2001 it was clear that 10 years of custom reductions with Morocco could cause major problems to Ceuta: The free trade zone between the EU and Morocco would endanger the prosperity of Ceuta and Melilla because it endangers the irregular trading of European and Spanish goods into Morocco. That way the first source of richness covering almost 85% of commercial activity in Ceuta will be affected. It seems thus more adequate to reorient the economy on time into the direction of (legal business with) Northern Africa (Cembrero, 2001). On the one hand this clearly implies a loss of competitiveness for Ceuta, creating more dependence on the compensation by funds by the state (Aznar, 2012b). If Ceuta was not to join the Customs Union anyway a reduction of taxes would be necessary because import from other territories of the EU can pass without paying customs to Morocco, so that importations of products from there have already doubled (ibid.).

In 2006 preoccupation began about the competition with the Tánger-Med project (construction of a new, modern port for containers in the North of Morocco) given also the disarmament of customs tariffs with Morocco. Worries centered around the potential substitution of functions of the harbor of Ceuta by the new port in Tanger at least from 2012, which would be tremendous. If the economic engine of the irregular trading is already disappearing – the creation of a commercial border will help at least in part to solve that problem (Cembrero, 2006).

Given the argumentation above Ceuta has been argued to be in need of an alternative (Cembrero, 2008). In 2012 the GDP rate has been lower than anywhere else in Spain, also considering physical presuppositions such as the scarcity of physical resources (ground, water, energy). These factors conditioning the economic development also implied that an additional physical separation (leaving the border as it is) would be a limitation to entrepreneurial projects, everyday life of inhabitants, cause expensive transportation, worsening the generally low professional qualification, little access to labor markets, school drop-outs and anyway high unemployment rate. The border situation partly causes the singularity of Ceuta – being even a border of the EU. Separating two worlds of sharp differences of standards of living strictly, would restrain the entrepreneurial development. In addition the structural crisis (touching Ceuta even more than the rest of Spain) calls for measures to overcome the negative structural conditioning (Aznar, 2012a). Since the crisis in 2008 400.000 companies all over Spain have been closed creating high costs. Credits are not given anymore and consumption has decreased. Therefore it is argued that it is now even more an adequate moment to create employment, reduce entrepreneurial costs and fighting the low employment rate which does not allow for any growth (Chavez, 2011). More aspects mentioned are necessary reductions of transportation costs and continuation of social, economic, educational and labor politics to prevent the population from emigrating (Armuna, 2010). New opportunities for business have to be generated, also for the long-term development (Cembrero, 2008b) and for long there has been a demand to normalize the situation (Abad, 2004) – abolishing the irregular trading activities.

The presumed negative effects of the introduction of Customs tariffs could be compensated by a reform similar to the one realized by the Canary Islands when joining the customs Union, ensuring the city of Ceuta sufficient resources. The positive example shows that advantages of being member of the Customs Union can be fully achieved without causing huge negative effects: The Islands have been in a similar situation and invented a new fiscal and economic regime to adapt and compensate. An analysis about how similar measures would work for Ceuta has been realized for a new version of the current imposition on production, services and importation (IPSI) in combination with public dues similar to the ones on Canary Islands (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 479). Accordingly it could be possible to secure many of the fiscal advantages and obtain subsidy (Cembrero, 2008). Conditions of success have to do with consent of socio-economic agents, avoiding any economic or fiscal harm also maintaining the activities related to the advantages as free zone (Reyes, 2011). This means that the main task has to be to find a gap in financial perspectives of the EU between 2013-2020 – using the geographic specificity and the fact of being the only land-border of Europe and Africa in order to obtain necessary financial support which then is also condition to joining the Customs Union (Cembrero, 2012). Solutions could be e.g. to reform the economic and fiscal regime, the IPSI and to abolish the tax on associations and heritage –thus guaranteeing major advantages of the IPSI (El faro, 2012b). If goods continued to enter at a tariff comparable to the IPSI, prices in Ceuta could remain nearly the same (being still lower than Moroccan prices) (Suarez, 2012). Besides, plans of investment and similar measures would be necessary to be financed by the application of special criteria to Ceuta and Melilla at the upcoming assignment of European funding (Reyes, 2011). These structural funds, like for other ultra-peripheral regions, would be addressed to maritime transport, subsidies comparable to Canary Islands used to stimulate entrepreneurial competition (Aznar, 2012c), supply of primary

needs and essential goods of consumption (El Faro, 2011). To guarantee for the necessary funding Melilla created a proposal in 2011 for an intermediate category of regions which have to overcome obstacles in their development. This would especially consider the role of urban zones with special, particular geographic characteristics in process of development as well as permanently naturally or demographically disadvantaged regions (including trans-border zones). That way certain regions in need of support could be denominated ultra-peripheral (Aznar, 2011).

The scenario of Ceuta joining the Customs Union under the condition of additional measures shows, that subsidy on transportation can be maintained, an increase of structural funds by EU could be achieved and the contribution payments to the EU would remain the same (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 31). Possibly the IPSI and respective direct local benefits with destination of local institutions can remain without any need to adopt the VAT. However a new fiscal and economic regime has to be established. It would have to be differentiated considering the lack of tariff advantages and following the liberation of the global economy. Emphasis has to be given to fiscal advantages for residents and productive activities (ibid., p. 31). Further on the potential for fishing has to be exploited more. What applies to shopping-tourism, by now it has already lost its attraction to visitors from Spain mainland where prices are almost the same so that rising prices will not matter. With regard to commercial effects they are estimated to be minimal, only replacing and constituting what has already been emerging. Apart from the crisis there should not be any negative impacts on employment, since by the time more legal exportation will be possible. Whatever might be the effects of loss of free importation there will be a better relation to the EU, increase in funding and subsidies for the reforms (ibid., p. 31).

What is crucial is that the discussion of disadvantages and advantages has finally led to a positive decision in 2011 to integrate into the Customs Union in 2012. For many disadvantages alternative solutions have been invented and especially the disarmament of custom tariffs with Morocco simply forced Ceuta to react.

6.2 European-ness, otherness, Europeanization and resistance

In this part of the chapter features of European-ness and Europeanization of transformations in Ceuta, discussions about whether to join the Customs Union and ideas of border-people will be examined. Examining, I follow the insights of the theoretical framework chosen for this research - more precisely and especially Kuus', Kramsch's and Mignolo's postcolonial approaches. To less extent ideas of Sparke and Rumford will be used as well. The analysis will be done with the help of previously operated indicators based on the mentioned theoretical perspectives. Thereby emphasis is given to compare official arguments with ideas of border-people. In paragraph 6.2.1 follows a description of the analysis of European-ness of Ceuta, paragraph 6.2.2 deals with Otherness, paragraph 6.2.3 with Europeanization of Ceuta and, finally, paragraph 6.2.4 focuses on border-thinking.

6.2.1 European-ness of Ceuta

Within the sections of methods (§ 4.3) of this research report the operationalization of indicators has been presented. For the term European-ness (understood as a characteristic of the state of being) three different indicators have been operationalized from the literature: Following the model of modernity and civilization

(powerful) (§6.2.1.1); homogenization - as sharing European values (such as democracy, good governance, human rights, freedom, liberal market economy, and secularity)(§6.2.1.2) and standardization in the sense of idealizing the European way and European-ness being connoted with certain privileges (§6.2.1.3). During fieldwork and the exhaustive literature review these indicators have helped to trace European-ness in Ceuta, the factors influencing the debate and the way of thinking of (border-) people (on the topic).

6.2.1.1 Following the model of modernity and powerful civilization

With regard to 'following the model of modernity and powerful civilization' many statements reveal that Ceuta is already being considered a place of modernity and civilization. In an article of the local newspaper "El Faro de Ceuta" we can learn that the Spanish king, visiting Ceuta, showed his approval of recognizing modernity in Ceuta, which as a city has known how to grow and gather prosperity within a pluralistic democratic framework, characteristic of Spain (Bárbulo, 2007). Another self-glorifying statement found in the national Spanish newspaper even refers to the period of Franco's regime saying that in spite of all the limitations of Franco's Spain, the leader generated some kind of modernity in Northern Morocco (including Ceuta at that time) - especially in the field of sanitary institutions and campaigns of vaccination and fought against illnesses typical of underdevelopment (Cembrero, 2006). In 2005 we find a critical voice commenting on Zapatero celebrating at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona the proposal about dialogue on civilizations and convergence of North and South (Rius Sant, 2005). All these examples are indicative for a belief in modernity and modernity itself, which has manifested in Ceuta. The official discourse therefore indeed reflects what Mignolo's (2000, p. 68) and Kramsch's theory (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) especially seek to explain.

The border-people of Ceuta have more concrete comments revealing that European-ness of the city and of their own thinking, which reminds of explanations from Mignolo's theory about borderthinking (Mignolo, 2000, p. 85): From expert-interviews with citizens of Ceuta one can deduce the observation, here by Testa Méndez, that at the border between Ceuta and Morocco there is a huge gap of welfare, superior to the one between the United States and Mexico. Gómez Barceló gives a description of in how far he can observe European-ness of residents of Ceuta, explaining that a European is a person of European cultural origin, of Christian-Jewish culture, bearing the secularity and belief in the values of the French Revolution, which as an explanation fits well this interviewee's expertise on history. Moré instead, like many Moroccan border-people, stresses the cleanliness and organization of the city emblemizing progress and modernity. The Charwoman, the housekeeper, the smuggler, all of them agree with that cleanliness and the organizational structure of (public) transportation are admirable. The painter instead stresses the huge differences in standard of living again (like Testa Méndez did) between the two sides of the border, admitting that some Moroccans, "some of them have made to be rich and buy a lot", profiting from the progress and modernity of Ceuta. The trader comments on Ceuta: "Beautiful, clean, just a little bit more ordered and clean than in Morocco. Good job, the good life, paradise". All these ideas in one or the other way implicitly reveal that the border-people in fact locate modernity and civilization in Ceuta, showing how even ways of thinking of people living at a former colonial border, which has officially been decolonized, are still being colonized (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 54-56).

The trader describes more aspects of civilization, which he connotes with Ceuta "Like education, like health, like transportation. First of all there is the right man in the right place". Yet he adds "Like in world Arabic now. Like the right man in the right place", showing that he considers his home becoming equal. Civilization and control seem to be closely related even in the minds of some border-people as the comment by the painter proves "In Ceuta there is a good police", whereas the second contrabandor emphasizes the superior standard of knowledge and the bounteousness and generosity to share it, supporting those in need: "In European countries there is no racism at all, go to study, they help you". The smuggler confirms: "The treatment by the Spanish is good, they organize, they are good people. He has Spanish friends who greet him every day 'Buenos dias, como estas?'" (smuggler). The superiority and standardization of European epistemology indicated here, very much corresponds basic ideas of Mignolo's theoretical insights (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 54-56). What is striking here is that the border-people especially those from Morocco specify the modernity and civilization they observe, showing admiration for every-day details. The official discourse is much more distant and less euphemistic about the details, focusing much more on the total picture. Probably the king of Spain has used different measures to evaluate modernity, than the functioning of the cleaning service of the city which the border-people in their everyday routine appreciate a lot.

Besides the observation of modernity, we can repeatedly find the motivation to strive for modernization in the discourses: In the analysis of advantages and inconveniences of joining the Customs Union by the university professor of Economy, Joaquin Aranda Gallego, striving for modernization plays a major role. To give an example we can have a look at his description of the strategic principles of Canary Islands, which "can help Ceuta to achieve a flexible system with the objective to attract attention without inhibiting the modernization of business" (like the islands in 1991), to stimulate industrialization, diversification and to speed up growth (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 348). Also the local newspaper reports on the objective of social and economic development for Ceuta (El Faro de Ceuta, 2012b) and about perfection of local peculiarities and major stability for the future (El Faro de Ceuta, 2001c). Implicit in these formulations, there are strong ideals of civilization and modernity. More modest desires of modernization are expressed e.g. by R. Abad, who sees the need to normalize the situation (Abad, 2004) of irregular trading. But normalizing in this context means to modernize and cut with everything that would inhibit progress and civilization. An article of El País (Sampietro, 1999) tells about the Speech of the new president of Ceuta presenting his objective to project an image on citizens of a battered city, sharing the legitimate illusion of progress by appealing to their sense of community, recognized intellectual capacities, signs of identity and the accentuated feeling of Spanish-ness. This speech then sounds very much like propaganda of modernization which is repeatedly mentioned in the context of economic reforms also in other articles. For the sake of neoliberal market economy and profit it is that political leaders try to convince the citizens of believing in modernization - on the one hand we see the agency of different places making use of the discourse of European-ness as the pieces of theory by Kuus (2004, pp. 477-478, 484) indicate, on the other hand it is a very much neo-liberally driven thinking (§ 6.2.3.2) which lurks behind the propaganda affirming the relevance theoretical insights

by Sparke (2002, pp. 221, 234-235) to understand the transformations in Ceuta. An article by Armuna (2010) demands modernization, attaining a standard model of quality, creation of networks of economic actors, quality of living, cleanliness and security for the city. Testa Méndez one of the experts from Ceuta admits instead much less enthusiastic: "I do not think there is an alternative. Ceuta would be even more an island and the dreams of fiscal paradises do not come true". In the same context he adds that the city lacks industrial activity, but special economic and fiscal conditions can help to attract modern sectors and companies which do not need vast surfaces of land e.g. new technologies. In this statement we can find that the interviewee is not satisfied with the level of modernity, he observes in Ceuta, instead he strives for progressive development e.g. by attracting modern technologies.

Moroccan border-people instead mainly do not observe any need for modernization of Ceuta, but instead dream of modernization of their own lives in Morocco or in future in Europe: "Europe: I have always wanted to go to live there, already from when I was small. But now, right now things have changed, they are different. When I was young, everyone told Europe here and there....I saw people coming back with good cars". Also the IT-experts wishes to modernize the Moroccan side of the border stating: "we are different, because the people who control politics in Morocco... is bad people. The ministers, the parliament also". All these examples show that Ceuta and the discourse –reflected in the opinions of the border-people from both sides have internalized the ideal or even aspects of modernity (Mignolo, 2000, p. 68) in their thinking and system of evaluation, for which especially Mignolo's theory provides explanation (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 54-56). However there are decisive differences between an official ambitious discourse and the modest wish of very individual, regional modernization and civilization. Moroccan border-people in a way dream of European modernity, but cannot really achieve it since Morocco is still the "other" less European necessary to reaffirm Europe's identity (Kuus, 2004, pp. 472-474), Kramsch, 2011, pp. 196, 199-200) (§6.2.2).

2.2.1.2 Homogenization and sharing European values

What applies to the indicator of homogenization, the indicators to be observed in the debate were supposed to be European values which Ceuta and maybe also the other side of the border might have in common with a "core Europe". Some of those values have also emerged from the literature on postcolonial theory: Democracy, good governance, human rights, freedom, liberal market economy and secularity. During the debate and the official discourse these values proved to play a major role.

In the analysis of advantages and inconveniences of joining the Customs Union by Joaquin Aranda Gallego, which has been the basis to many arguments used in political debate and reports by the Spanish media, these values are fundamental. A general example is the definition of the three pillars of the EU, which are defined as political dialogue, economic cooperation and economic and commercial relations (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 347). The Customs Union then has been referred to also as "one of the main pillars of the EU" by the journalist Ignacio Cembrero, being an area of free trade unifying trading politics and establishing a common foreign customs tariff (Cembrero, 2008a). Underlying European values here are the belief in progress and development, liberal market

economy, secularity, good governance and democracy as basis for political dialogue. For Ceuta a commercial Customs institution would mean to be more powerful, making use of a real, legal liberal market (Cembrero, 2008a). Moreover within the argumentation it is clear, that joining the Customs Union is bound up with the hope to reactivate the economy (Aznar, 2011d). Concretely there is a hope to support the commerce and facilitate the arrival of Moroccan clients. The discourse also centers on the development of tourism, improvement of relations with Morocco and better standards of life (e.g. concerning infrastructure) (Armuna, 2010). Again Sparke's theory (2002, pp. 213-215) describing the significance of economic motivation for transformations in border regions and cooperation across the border turns out to be very useful-fitting values of free markets. At the same time the fact that economic growth and progress is adapted to as a major value also confirms explanations by Kuus (2004, pp. 474, 477), showing that the degree of *European-ness is defined by the intensity by which European values have been internalized*. This is also the striking feature about following examples: Besides the objective of economic development, becoming a member of the Customs Union is also to reinforce the international orientation of Ceuta, reaching a development more according to international tendencies within the generally visible economic, social, national, European context and its respective near surroundings (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 5). These ideas reveal that Ceuta is trying to adapt more and more to the European values, a clear sign of homogenization. "Liberation of trade, globalization, enlargements introduction of a single currency, preferential agreements with the Maghreb region" - all these factors of homogenization and spread of European values have consequences in Ceuta coming from Europe (ibid., p. 26) and have to be adapted to. The agreement mentioned here moreover inherits a typical feature of neoliberal governance, since the plan is to overcome borders for the sake of neoliberal entrepreneurial goals (Sparke, 2002, p. 223).

Therefore main arguments in the debate emphasize the aspect of liberal markets and development. In analysis and articles in journals from different years one comes repeatedly across descriptions of the economically motivated debate. Terms such as development (El Faro, 2012c), effectiveness and efficiency of economy (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 347) point at the relevance of economic European ideals and values in the thinking of decision-makers and the general discourse. The goal of a "single European market" is even lurking behind another European objective (thinking of theory about rebranding and overcoming borders for the sake of entrepreneurial benefits, inventing meta-narratives and shifting power to a supranational level (Sparke, 2002, pp. 213-216, 235)) namely political stability of the Mediterranean region. The stability could be considered a pure condition to economic integration for the sake of liberal markets and development. The economist Aranda Gallego even admits that different treatment of developing countries many times actually is not based on real reciprocity (ibid., p. 346).

Sustainable development as a European value, which seems to become an ever more popular and important pillar, is another favored term also in the discourse about the Customs Union in Ceuta. It is used as a "container-term" for many European values which are meant to be imported into developing countries such as with the agreement on disarmament of custom tariffs with Morocco- reminding of Sparke's critical view on the promotion of neoliberal goals through these supranational contracts (Sparke, 2002, p. 218). For Morocco the agreement is

conditioned by commitment to new regimes stimulating sustainable development and good governance, implementation of ratified Human Rights, labor rights and at least seven of the environmental duties of the agreement by the UN (*ibid.*, p. 349). The implementation of the mentioned rights means a homogenization of values in Morocco, strongly corresponding European values. However, the main goal, of course, behind the disarmament and introduction of homogenizing values is to stabilize the liberal market economy and augment profits. The conditional nature of the agreement nicely illustrates the value of Kramsch's theory (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 198, 200-201) especially as part of European Neighborhood Policies (*ibid.*, pp. 200-201). Lately one observes liberalization, privatization of sectors, agency of promotion of investment, the moralization of public life, integration of women in development, remittances by emigrants and tourism pushing economic development (*ibid.*, p. 4). In the same context the values of democracy appears in the debate about Ceuta. As we can learn from an article from 2010 by Luis Manuel Aznar "the status of autonomy has provided political stability experienced during the last years, bringing along more confidence for investment and institutional presence. It can help the transformation of urban physiognomy, environmental and social protection, better quality of services and development of the GDP and generates social security (Aznar, 2010b). A Moroccan University professor of History of Islam (teaching at the Autonomous University of Madrid) generally considers Ceuta and Melilla as key factors to the neighbor-ship, poles of development of the region taking a fundamental role in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). He also argues in favor of evaluating positively the will to implement Human Rights of Morocco, which he regards as proof at the level of neighborhood (López García, 2006). Other voices about Ceuta regard Morocco as big market with commercial potential, yet in need to correct misbalances, attain stability and acceleration of economic opening. The country could possess a structure of a developed country, open to foreign companies and growth (Martínez Navarro, 2003, p. 3).

From all these observations one can conclude that homogenization of values is a key driving force of transformations in Ceuta, a European geographically peripheral region (Kuus, 2004, p. 477). But also in a Moroccan, in a non-European context, European values are becoming ever more decisive (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 54-56; p. 68; Kramsch, 2011, pp. 198, 200-201) and that neoliberal thinking and project planning does cross borders (Sparke, 2002, pp. 215, 234 ; Kramsch, 2011, p. 197). This again has major impacts on conditions of development for the city of Ceuta.

In order to analyze whether homogenization and European values also play a role in the thinking of border-people it is worth having a closer look at their images of Ceuta and Europe. With regard to attitudes and ideas of experts on the Customs Union from Ceuta quite a lot of correspondence with the official discourse can be encountered. Values of liberal markets and economic development are rather dominant listening and reading Testa Méndez, Campos Martínez and Moré. The latter adds that the debate has existed for decades and always focused on the economic peculiarities of Ceuta. Testa Méndez, however, assures that there has been generally a lot of consent among the population to take the decision to join the Customs Union although this assertion is not based on any official studies. From how these experts imagine an ideal Ceuta and what is European to them we learn that European values are very deeply rooted in their way of thinking: They praise the rule of the law, free markets,

social cohesion, respect for Human Rights and access to labor and education (Testa Méndez), as well as Christian-occidental values and juridical security which is so much more developed than in the neighboring country. The comparison produced here reminds of the theoretical input by Kuus about double framing, nesting-Orientalism and invention of degrees of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, pp. 480-482; pp. 477-478). The historian, Gómez Barceló, repeats that he regards the values of the French revolution as essential. Campos Martínez additionally emphasizes democracy and liberty. More precisely the experts imagine an ideal Ceuta being based on a normalized trade with the EU, implying homogenization of the economic system corresponding standards of the EU, local industrial development, a central of services oriented towards Morocco supplying this big market and developing the touristic branch (Campos Martínez). The influence of 'core' European values, the wish for even more homogenization and incorporation of European values in their thinking is obvious.

Concerning the Moroccan border-people images of Europe and Ceuta reveal a lot of admiration and consent about values as well, supporting the official discourse. The second contrabandor tells about Europe: "You can be an important person, right to be one more of them" and the trader confirms that "first of all there is the right man in the right place". This can be interpreted as admiration for the chances Europe and its liberal markets, the efficiency and organization bring along. The medicine instead stresses the values of "liberty, freedom" as most characteristic. The smuggler admires the rule of law and respect of individuals subtly hinting at his maybe partial approval for Human Rights: "They give you rights. Spain is rights! If you get your passport, you go to some administration, and there they treat you well. They respect you more, for the rights. A contrast to here!". What is very clear from the admiration expressed by the different Moroccans here is that they feel a lack of what they admire in their own surroundings. However, they might be also influenced by official discourses or what they learn from media glorifying European values, transmitting them into the minds of people around the world (Mignolo, 2000, p. 56). In fact they measure and evaluate their own side of the border implicitly making use of criteria close to European values which confirms homogenization of values in relation to a European monopoly on setting epistemological standards as described by Mignolo (2000, pp. 54-56).

The interviewees also had impressions and opinions to tell about Europeans: "Europeans? I like them, they are very honest. If you are foreigner or not. It is not important. Europeans, they are good people. They are very direct. A word and it is a word", explains the charwoman. The housekeeper adds: "Spain is Europe and Europe means that people are more cultivated and educated, people are better. They stick to rules, are more cultivated, and respect things ". Both statements (they are affirmed by statements by other Moroccan interviewees as well) show that the interviewees had have rather positive experiences so far and that they regard Europeans as civilized, honest and direct. This observation again subtly implies (and the use of the comparative degree proves this) a less positive image of their own fellow-citizens. However, here it is less clear that it is European values which are incorporated in the thinking of the border-people. Actually the experience at the border and the chance to meet border-people brings along an opportunity for comparison of mentalities and characteristic, which is unique of border-regions. Permeability of the border is obvious (Rumford, 2008, p. 56). Yet, the generalizing admiration and appreciation might be created through connotation of higher standards of living, economic conditions and

economic success in Ceuta with mentalities or characteristics of behavior (Sparke, 2002, p. 221). Moreover appreciation of civilization and civilized modes of behavior show that the Moroccan border-people share the understanding that these attributes are valuable confirming at least partial homogenization of values.

This becomes much more explicit when speaking about Morocco. It is mostly hope for a better future, more similar to Europe's present which they express in this context and reminds us of Kramsch describing template thinking (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197). Some of them also observe Morocco becoming more European especially after the spread of the Arab Spring Movement which seems a mere contradiction. People admit that they are "living a change" (medicine) and that "people [themselves] are changed" (politician). The trader tells: "After Arab Spring a lot has changed in Morocco, the first time, some persons want to go to elections. They want to, who talk to me. There are a lot of people who want change. People in Morocco have changed the idea of the political game" and the second contrabandor adds: "People are more conscious, they know that the rights are in the hands of other people. More conscious after the 20th February movement, more people know what they have and need, where it is and how they can get it. We are more democratic and free". What these comments express is most of all a description of a process of becoming more politically conscious and reinforcement of democratic orientation. The achievements of and way of thinking about "Arab" and therefore "oriental revolution" seem to carry many attributes of homogenization and confirmation of European values, such as democracy. This seemingly contradictory development illustrates nicely how values are taken over, under the flag of European epistemological sophistication (Mignolo, 2000, p. 56). Yet, some observe the change described but do not attribute it to the Arab Spring, as the comment by the charwoman illustrates: "Everything is more democratic and Mohamed VI does a lot, almost everything. Everything is more democratic". Also the contrabandor sees another event as causal to an accelerated democratization: "There is going to be a good change with the new Constitution, what happens in the other countries, last elections". However, the observation of 'more democracy' then remains, underpinning the shared recognition of democracy as one of the important *European* values.

Some of the Moroccans interviewees can even tell about active involvement into the desired democratization: "I fight for them. Most of all I fight for them, Moroccans need to be citizens, they need a democracy...", the politician says. The trader, the smuggler, the medicine and the painter declare that they clearly support the demands of the movement, and although they might or might not have participated actively in demonstrations they are sure that "those who do it are right, in doing so, they have all the rights to make their requests and demands". Again we find a strong underlying wish for a better future, which is associated with democracy and other European values: "I want to change for the better. I like my country. It is not only me. I want that everyone has a good life. I like Europe, Africa, I like Spain...I like the whole world. I do not want to kill anyone; I want that you have children. I want, that the whole world can live well", the painter tells.

More democracy has already often been experienced positively in daily life, perceiving more freedom and liberty, implying agreement on two more typical European values: "Before they were afraid about powers and powerful here, taboos. Before you could not say that...but now you can. People did not have the courage to say what they felt. People can demonstrate, protest and go out into the street and take out their papers with comments... Before

it was not possible, because there was also the police. Legality and equality, no abuse of power. No such liberty and freedom” as the medicine describes. There are more interviewees sharing this perception.

European values such as liberal markets and development also come to surface in transformations observed in the border-region and what the Moroccan border-people desire. The housekeeper has noticed development of “a lot of tourism” and the politician and the charwoman share the opinion that “Tetouan is a city which has developed a lot. That is what I can say. If you had been here like for five or ten years, then you would not see the same Tetouan. It has changed a lot”. Homogenization of values and adaptation or favoring of European values is thus also part of the way of thinking of some Moroccan border-people (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 54-56). However, they have a different perspective – more focusing on individual, local life- than the border-people from Ceuta and the presentation in the official discourse.

6.2.1.3 Standardization, idealizing European-ness, privileges

Coming to the next indicator of European-ness, ‘standardization’, as idealizing European-ness which is connoted to privileges (of general and economic status), a lot of evidence in the official discourse but also in the thinking of border-people could be found.

In fact, in the official discourse European-ness and European standards are associated with a certain status within the EU. The more European a place is and the more it complies with the European standards, the more privileged the status of that place within the EU. In the discourse about Ceuta then, the step of joining the Customs Union means to standardize and improve the position of Ceuta, reflecting international tendencies and hoping to achieve a protagonist role with regard to relations to Morocco (and the Maghreb in general). Ceuta would be a more *acknowledged* part of the EU (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 495). Repeatedly one can find indications in media and official discourse especially in the context of Moroccan claims over the territory of Ceuta, that the city, the law and its inhabitants defend the “Spanish-ness” of the African city (Vivas Lara, 2010). This means simultaneously to confirm the belonging to Europe and its European-ness, as Kuus’ (2004, p. 474) theory explains.

In an article of the daily journal *El Faro de Ceuta* Armuna (2011) reports on the speech held by the director representing the European Commission in Spain. The director affirms that he can notice that “Ceuta believes in Europe, which is a question of status. The citizens of Ceuta believe in Europe”. He also describes that he observed “affection of citizens of Ceuta for every European sign, being the only land-border on African soil”. He showed appreciation also for signs of successful EU investment, improvement of infrastructure and standard of living of citizens. He generally called Ceuta a “privileged observation point, having a European view to Arab countries in its proximity, transmitting the school of good European practices, controlling flows of immigration. He also reminded of financial scenarios and confirmed that the fundamental report about specialties has been approved since solidarity was one of the major European objectives (Armuna, 2011). The message behind the speech is twofold: On the one hand he shows approval for the ‘job’ Ceuta is doing for itself and praises the European standards which have been achieved. On the other hand the speech reminds Ceuta of its ‘job’ as only

land border in Africa and the fact that it is European funding which has helped Ceuta to develop a lot. In this sense he not only affirms the status of Ceuta within the EU but he also touches another topic which is dependent on the status in the community, namely funding.

Privileges of European-ness, related to European standards are often considered to be of economic nature. As quoted earlier the president of Ceuta believes that with Europe Ceuta is more powerful, but he also connects this thought with the argument that a commercial border after joining the Customs Union brings along economic advantages (Cembrero, 2008a). An important part of the debate about integration into the EU Customs Union focuses on the condition to be able to maintain or increase the financial support for Ceuta by the EU.

Continuation of support would be possible in the case of succeeding to convince the European Commission of the necessity of a special treatment - due to the special circumstances and natural disadvantages inherent in Ceuta's island position. "The objective of a singular treatment as the only land border in Africa has implications on migratory pressure, standards of living, services, employment and economic development, which is a reason to ask for assignment of structural funds and for cohesion for Ceuta" (Aznar, 2012a). The strategy of convincing the EU to reassign funds to Ceuta is based on the argumentation that Ceuta like the Canary Islands deserves a treatment as an ultra-peripheral region and could profit from a generally similar regime like the one on Canary Islands (Vivancos, 2010). Already in 2005 Ceuta rejected the European Constitution which would not have recognized sufficiently the special conditions of ultra-peripheral regions and especially Ceuta and Melilla, also reminding the EU of principles of solidarity and the fact that the EU possesses the first global maritime territory (concerning its surface) thanks to the ultra-peripheral regions. The maritime territory is an important economic zone which is especially crucial in the 21st century of trade and resource-bias. For Ceuta it could have been detrimental losing the funds due to losing the necessary compliance with the new criteria (Chaves, 2011). It is also for economic reasons that Ceuta and Melilla were about to open a shared office in Brussels (Rober, 2011), serving to define their representation before European institutions in order to ask fiscal advantages (Aznar, 2011e) for the period after the configuration in 2013. For this purpose Melilla has drafted a proposal about transitional funds, creating a new intermediary category for regions in development to compensate for the East-enlargements, using relative indicators to assign funds (El Faro de Ceuta, 2011b). All these activities and contexts have to do with obtaining the desired financial privileges by being and representing oneself as European. In the imagination about Ceuta fostering employment, urgent social politics, educational and social reforms cannot only create more security of citizens of which a majority of Muslims has to struggle with marginalization, becomes committed to crime and fostering anti-cohabitation. It would also mean fostering prosperity (Bárbulo, 2003) achieving European standards. This improvement of status would convert many citizens of second class in first class citizens and *normalize* the city (Bárbulo, 2003). In this sense standardization has to do with a compliance of certain norms and is directly connoted with privileged treatment and prosperity. Again it is a rather economic motivation which is driving Ceuta to prove its European-ness which stresses the explanatory force of the combination of Kuus' (Kuus, 2004, pp. 477-478, 484) and Sparke' (Sparke, 2002, pp. 221, 234-235) insights about meta-narratives legitimizing promotion of neoliberal goals.

Across the border “the Rif tries to overcome the cleft which has been separating it for decades from the rest of Morocco. Yet, it has always kept an eye on the new fascinating prosperity of Spain, Ceuta and Melilla, being the authentic economic capitals of the North” (Cembrero, 2006). This observation by the journalist of *El País*, Ignacio Cembrero, clearly illustrates that the consciousness about the link between European standards and privileged forms of treatment and life has for long infiltrated the North of Morocco, which Kuus (2004, p. 477), Mignolo (2000, p. 56) and Kramsch (2011, pp. 200-201) illustrate in their theories. The agreement of association between the EU and Morocco bringing along an increase of trade by gradual liberation had as goals the political dialogue, to strengthen relationships as well as exchange and generating balanced economic-social relationships. Moreover the development of prosperity of Morocco and Moroccans through cooperation on various levels was another major objective (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 4). This again reflects the fact that within the official discourse a favorable status within the EU or as apparent in the latter example, even a conditioned friendly relationship with the EU (also implying an incorporation of European standards, (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 200-201, 197), is often linked to economic advantages and privileges.

The border-people from Ceuta, the experts on the topic seem to have internalized almost all the arguments generated in the official discourse. Like Campos Martínez, Testa Méndez tells that all agents basically agree that joining the Customs Union is a step to achieve a commercial border and thus economic advantages as well as to reinforce the European character before the territorial claims from Morocco by achieving more political support by the European institutions. He thus affirms that there is actually no debate but consent about the step. The only debate arises at the decision about compensation for vulnerable branches. What Testa Méndez says reflects the ideas about the official discourse with regard to standardization – standardization helps to improve the status within the EU and is closely connected to economic advantages as well. Moré and Testa Méndez are sure that the standardization of Ceuta has led to Moroccans from the other side enjoying privileges as well: The Moroccan surroundings have the opportunity to trade, access to sanitary assistance, find employment (so far often irregularly), juridical security and can make use of diverse free time activities, all of which is less available on their side of the border – also thanks to a certain permeability of the border (Rumford, 2008, p. 56). Campos Martínez adds that Ceuta continues being a pole of development for Morocco; thousands of families live on what they buy and trade to Morocco although this might be subject to change when Ceuta joins the Customs Union. Moré also stresses that for both sides the irregular trade is losing its importance given increasing significance of better integration into Europe. He adds that, there is no problem about territoriality; no one would want to be Moroccan, all having in mind the funding by the EU. Gómez Barceló speculates that also Morocco is trying to make use of political support by Europe to economically develop the country. These observations of cross-border impacts are clear signs of belief in European-ness and corresponding standards being a basis for enjoying privileged political and economic treatment. European template thinking (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197) is thus rather dominant in the experts’ argumentations. Yet, some experts show preoccupation because joining the Customs Union might cause problems with Rabat as well, as Testa Méndez admits and Gómez Barceló weakens the argument about improving the status of Ceuta within the EU by joining the Customs Union saying, that actually the EU had been

treating Ceuta as a privileged place for long already. However, the arguments do not lessen the evident belief in standards of European-ness which bring along diverse privileges.

European standards which are related to privileges are observed by Moroccan border-people in a different way. Again they do not focus on the total economic development or political relations, but instead emphasize the individual dimension of a privileged form of life. This observation, of course, is in many ways related to the comparison made with their own life in the North of Morocco. Some of the border-people simply talk about a "better life", "better work" or a "better present" (second contrabandor, the IT-expert, the trader, the housekeeper). The second contrabandor goes even further calling the other side the "dream of improvement" and the medicine regards Europe to be "hope and everything". The housekeeper talks about the feeling, one has being there, the trader mentions decency as a decisive aspect of living in Europe and the charwoman tells that the first thing she thinks of is "money, el oro". "Liberty, freedom" is a privilege one is expected to experience living in Europe as well as respect and acknowledgement of rights, according to some border-people. It is the smuggler who more explicitly touches the topic of privileges related to European-ness, referring to Moroccan migrants and their children in Ceuta who by now enjoy different advantages of their European citizenship: "You know that there are Moroccan Muslims who are born there. These Moroccans feel privileged having the Spanish passport, even though they live in a bad situation, if they are poor, but in comparison with the people who enter, they believe, that they are superior, due to having that passport. They treat you badly, believe that they are superior to the others - in contrast to the Spanish, they are bad". This statement is rather revealing since it shows that proving European identity and thus European-ness (e.g. by possessing a passport) is a sign of status also for an individual citizen. Privileges are the chance to travel freely as well as of economic nature. *The privileges connoted with European-ness as well as the attribute are thus generally looked at on the micro-level.*

To some degree the images might be projections of the official discourse on the micro-scale which Moroccan border-people might desire: Due to different experiences in their own lives they do not go as far as to dream of privileges and European-ness of their country – unlike the Spanish border-people. They also seem to be much more involved into their daily routine, which for some of them is a real struggle for survival. The theories by Kuus (2004, p. 474) and Sparke (2002, pp. 213-214) are confirmed in a way but on a different level than before. What applies to the infiltration of a European way of thinking (Kuus, 2004, p. 477), one could agree on that indeed they believe in privileges of European-ness and thus their thinking has been partly standardized.

What they know and connote with privileges of European-ness is also nurtured by the fact that many of them have relatives, friends or acquaintances who report them about experiences of life in Europe, and who of course, feel under pressure to justify their decision to migrate and therefore are tempted to emphasize the positive aspects of their stay in Europe. The second contrabandor tells that "He has friends who can enter, who can travel, who live in Spain". The painter adds that "they really talk positively about these countries" referring to Europe. The charwoman, who before has been a border-person like all the others but now has found a job in Spain mainland talks about her own experience: "Fine there. The people also. They are really nice. So far I have only met really

good people. I have a good boss, all those people with whom I am, are really good people. I like them, they are very honest. With foreigners. If you are foreigner, or not. It is not important, it does not matter”.

Despite these affirmations there are also voices pointing at the European-ness, they notice in Morocco. The painter tells about his dream of Europe, which by now is not the same anymore, referring to the crisis and explaining that at least Spain is not really well off now either. The contrabandor agrees with what the painter says, estimating that, if he compares it to Spain, Spain is small hope, then Europe for him maybe is big hope. The politician instead stresses that the relationships between Morocco and Europe are mutual and that they are crucial for both of them: “Europe: Good relationships, Europe and Spain have to respect Morocco, the way that Morocco respects also Europe and Spain. Europe is a union, a union, which can support and help Morocco. A separate image of only Europe is impossible”. The only indication that it is European-ness, which is connoted with privileges, can be discovered in the idea that it is Europe, “which can support and help Morocco”.

Some aspects of standardization and ways of idealization are based on own observation. Since the interviewees cross the border to Ceuta regularly they have their very own ideas of standards of European-ness and respective privileges. The charwoman affirms that “it is really beautiful; I like it a lot”. The contrabandor goes even further, stating that “Europe and Spain are like paradise, the good thing about the border is when he goes with his wife and his family just to walk around the city”. Also the second contrabandor has this habit and acknowledges: “Ceuta is a European country, it is Spain”. The first contrabandor also appreciates the economic opportunity, one of the privileges linked to European-ness which he can enjoy coming to Ceuta: “The other side, Ceuta, it is like fuel, like bread, he has to bring money, it is the source of his money. “I go to work” it is like “to bring my bread”. The housekeeper simply states that she is “preferring the other side, feeling calmer quieter, better” there. In this sense the Moroccan border-people in fact experience privileges which they automatically ascribe to the European-ness of Ceuta. In this sense, they prove to apply the idealization of European-ness unintendedly for their evaluation proving to have internalized the connotation of “European-ness” and “privileges” in their thinking, which corresponds to the theoretical perspective of (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 54-56; p. 68).

6.2.2 Otherness

This dimension is meant to mirror the characteristic of European-ness - being its negative. Many times it happens that the otherness of certain features actually confirms European-ness of opposed features. From the operationalization of indicators in the methods section (§4.3) again three different indicators have been chosen to measure Otherness: Differences of values (§6.2.2.1); Primitive standards of life and simplicity mentioning underdevelopment, poverty, corruption, lack of stability etc. (§6.2.2.2) and blaming otherness (§6.2.2.3). During fieldwork and the exhaustive literature review these indicators have helped to trace Otherness and its identification in Ceuta and Morocco. Analysis has also concentrated on the factors influencing the debate about the Customs Union and the way of thinking of (border-) people (on the topic).

6.2.2.1 Differences in values

The first indicator has helped to find many indications of defining Otherness as opposed to European-ness as well in the official as in the border-people's discourses. Some differences in values have to do with economic topics and values. Joaquin Aranda Gallego tries to illustrate in his analysis about joining the Customs Union that a new model of economy could help to replace the irregular economy (and the adjective 'irregular' already implies that something is not completely European and conform with standards) (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 488). The irregular economy is not usual or normal and thus carries attributes of otherness. Aranda Gallego's description of a future treatment of developing countries shows that there is difference of values between the developed and not yet developed world, such as Morocco. The professor describes that the creation of new regimes stimulating sustainable development and good governance as well as simplification and transition to flexible rules of origin in combination with the development of new products could help these countries [developing countries including Morocco] and could be supported from Europe. Moreover, it is often argued that a condition of this support has to be the application of ratified Human Rights, labor rights and at least seven environmental ones (ibid., p. 349). This description of ways of supporting developing countries implicitly contains the information that the values which have to be introduced in these countries are "not yet" part of structures and thinking there. The conditioning behind the support reminds of Kramsch's argumentation (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 200-201) and the formulation of 'not yet' is what Kuus refers to when explaining template thinking and double framing (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

Major value differences mentioned in the official discourse also have to do with religious norms and values: Some comments in the discourse about Ceuta are very general, stressing differences in values between Muslims and other religions e.g. finding expression in male polygamy and increased fertility (El País, 1999). The article describes the election campaign of the government of the GIL party at that time, also using mechanisms to create fear among the Christian population (El País, 1999) e.g. forecasting a dangerous domination of mosques and Muslim culture. Otherness here is clearly connoted with Islam and respective traditions which are unknown to the habitually mainly Christian population of the city which reminds of descriptions of the "Oriental" by Mignolo (2000, pp. 59-61). Popular propaganda helps to make use of the stigmatization to gather votes for the elections, of course. On the other hand the propaganda also contains the information that there *is* a major Muslim population in Ceuta. If Islamic values and religion are considered to be aspects of otherness also Ceuta as a place is partly characterized by this otherness it contains. Newspapers report on the Ramadán festivities which a major part of the population of Ceuta celebrates and follows. However this cultural event is regarded as having negative impacts on economy (Reyes, 2011) opposite to the celebration of Islamic Eastern. The latter festivity reinforces entrance of Moroccan citizens realizing shopping, but decelerates controls at the Moroccan border-passage (Echarri, 2011). So even if Ceuta does not directly become categorized as "other", it is still touched and impacted by otherness across the border and within its own boundaries.

In 1991 the Muslim population of Ceuta positioned themselves against the formulation of the demand for the autonomous status, which they did not consider representative for all the population of Ceuta. Different Moroccan

associations (political and social) but also the Human rights association of Spain claimed the marginalization of Muslims in the project of the Statute accusing its authors to ignore the existence of Moroccan population and culture. They argued that without their participation products are generated such as the Foreigners law and total neglect of the Berber language which should be co-official in a future autonomous community. Their protest was also symbolic, exemplifying their marginalization by asking money to go by bus to demonstrate in Madrid which the movement for the Statute had been granted (Sánchez Mellado & Nogueira, 1991). The claim for incorporation, acceptance and participation here implies a subtle request to shift the boundaries of otherness and attributing European-ness to the Moroccans living in Ceuta. At the same time the article also shows that at the time being in 1991 this has clearly not been realized and the Muslims were seen as some 'other' (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 59-61) within Ceuta, Spain and Europe due to different religious value systems.

In 2009 the topic was still present, this time the report focused on "a war of religions between the radicals and moderates" among the Muslims which had been carried into the municipal government arguing with an important Islamic leader in Spain and representatives of the Union of Islamic communities in Ceuta (UCIDCE). Some of the Muslims seek to establish an independent Islam in the city whereas others who would like to be guided by Morocco (Cembrero, 2009c). The debate here thus concentrates on orientation of the religion towards European-ness or otherness in Ceuta – yet, the religion anyway carries attributes of otherness as mentioned above.

This topic of otherness and struggles of Ceuta to deal with it or even suppress it have turned up during the last twenty years of official discourse at different occasions: In 1986 an article in *El País* sheds light on the depreciation towards the population of Moroccan origin although they might have grown up in the cultural context of Ceuta, identifying with democratic principles and values of Spain. Agreements on the topic have been made to favor the full integration of Muslims into Spanish society and supporting their ingraining. This step though created more obstacles to obtain the historical, legal and moral rights of Spanish citizenship. The institutional discrimination and building of obstacles can be understood as a way of protecting and reassuring European-ness of Ceuta and Europe in general. Although the other is always necessary to redefine European-ness of a place (Kuus' many over-defined Europes affronting one undefined other (2004, p. 475) and Kramsch's transitional ENP without integration into EU (2011, pp. 199-200)), it is not desired to be located within the own boundaries of Europe and its territory.

Perceptions and ways of thinking of border-people from Ceuta result to be rather critical about features of otherness which they observe in Ceuta. Testa Méndez strongly argues in favor of adapting to European-ness instead of emphasizing the singularity of Ceuta, which has created a certain degree of otherness during the last decades. Maintaining this feature of otherness would not be recommendable especially given the disarmament of Custom tariffs with Morocco and little probability to generate a successful fiscal paradise in Ceuta. His advice is to reinforce the European character of Ceuta instead also to establish the status of the city against the territorial claims by Morocco, eradicating attributes of otherness and thus shifting the boundary of European-ness further South (Kuus, 2004, p. 475). Testa Méndez's advises can be consequently understood as an invitation to totally

adapt to European values, leaving all others behind - a substitution of values by European ones (§ 6.2.3.3) (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 59-62). However it is striking that unlike the official debate Testa Méndez does not at all refer to religious values but exclusively economic ones, showing again the relevance of Sparke' (Sparke, 2002, pp. 221, 213-215) theoretical contributions for this research.

Otherness and differences of values of Morocco are a topic mentioned by many border-people from both sides. Testa Méndez again comes up with a rather economic argument describing the major economic gap separating Ceuta from Morocco, locating otherness clearly South to Ceuta. Campos Martínez goes on arguing in an economic way and rather colonialist allusions, presenting Morocco as an opportune market for Ceuta. Besides these economic value differences, Gómez Barceló expresses some rather exclusive ideas which deny every slightest attribute of European-ness to Moroccans, saying that European-ness is based on European culture built on Jewish and Christian belief. All these arguments imply that there is an economic and cultural, different system of values which helps to clearly draw a line of distinction between Morocco and Ceuta, between otherness and European-ness (See Kramsch - prevention of spill-over of risks and reinforcement of borders through conditionality of adaptation of European values (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 201, 197)).

More as the only Spanish border-person and many of the Moroccan border-people (the charwoman, the housekeeper, the smuggler, the trader, the IT-expert and the painter) agree that Ceuta is much more ordered and organized than the Moroccan side of the border. A difference in values in this comment is rather implicit, hidden within differences of mentalities or modernization. However, it is worth noting that the manifestation of different degrees of organization does not impede the Moroccans to appreciate the organization of the side of Ceuta. Therefore here we deal with a rather ambiguous criterion of value differences. Otherness then can be found in the underlying value system which determines daily processes on both sides of the border. The fact that also Moroccans appreciate organization of cleaning, transport, police and administration in Ceuta, could then mean, that the value of organization and tidiness is part of the Moroccans' value system, but maybe less dominant and of a lower degree of importance. In this case thus we would have to speak of degrees of otherness and European-ness which manifest in realization of a common European value. This notion of degrees is similar to what Kuus describes in more general terms in her theory (Kuus, 2004, p. 472-475).

Several Moroccan border-people stress, that Europeans treat them well, are helpful are not racist and friendly. However, by using the negation-form "not" in connection with racist and generally regarding the observation that people are friendly as important, somehow expresses, that it is something unexpected for them. It seems as if they want to assure that all the negative discourses about Europeans, which they knew before have not been confirmed when interacting with them. These social capacities and communication from equal position thus seems to have some value for the border-people, but is not associated to be European, but according to the discourse it is rather untypical for Europeans. From this perspective then otherness as opposed to European-ness bears attributes of sociability, helpfulness and friendliness. At the same time it implies that European-ness bears attributes of individuality, self-centeredness and competition –which pretty much reflect aspects of

modernity and striving for economic success and progress on an individual level. It is interesting is, that, again, the Moroccan border-people refer to the daily and individual, micro-level and details when expressing their thoughts, whereas border-people from Ceuta and the official discourse focus on totalities and a macro-perspective neglecting the personal, individual. These insights are not implied in the theories chosen to operate indicators from. It is thus an observation which emerges from data and is worth spending more thoughts on in the final conclusion of this report.

6.2.2.2 Primitivism and simplicity

A very fruitful indicator helping to find a lot of indications of otherness has been 'primitive standards of life and simplicity' (expressed as underdevelopment, poverty, corruption, lack of stability etc.). 'Primitivism' of Ceuta is expressed as well in the official as in the discourse of border-people.

What is often mentioned in the former are issues related to the economy and unemployment. In the analysis by Aranda Gallego an extensive description of the "historically and economically not favorable trading profile" (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 357) has been realized. In the same context the special characteristics of Ceuta are repeatedly mentioned, e.g. considering the possibility of acknowledgement by the EU under for ultra-peripheral criteria (ibid., p. 495). On the one hand the discussion demonstrates some agency of policy-makers of Ceuta who try to find gaps in the funding system of the EU, which after the enlargement has shifted financial aid especially East-wards (El Faro de Ceuta, 2011b). On the other hand the potential to be acknowledged as ultra-peripheral region implies to admit that Ceuta struggles with natural, geographical and socio-economic circumstances which are "more primitive" than in many parts of Spain and the EU. However, in this case then, Ceuta makes use of being less European than other areas of Europe, in order to upgrade and improve the degree of its European-ness (more modernity, economic development and progress) with the help of European funding. Goals to be achieved are among others to reduce disparities of the GDP per capita within Ceuta and in comparison to Europe, by achieving, more development, competitiveness, innovation, better education, more employment, better infrastructure and paying more attention to the coordination of regional development. The economic dimension of primitivism is thus closely interlinked with social dimensions of primitivism, which are meant to be treated as well.

With regard to social issues lack of stability and poverty are frequently being mentioned throughout the official discourse. In 1989 already a report on the socio-economic situation of Ceuta revealed serious problems because of high housing rates and a generally low educational level of the population. Measures such as the creation of courses of professional and entrepreneurial formation as well as generally better use of resources (such as fish and Eolic energy), creation of industrial grounds, stimulation of tourism, better social endowments, and urban planning became subject to debate (Oppenheimer, 1989). A major drop-back was also constituted by the status of Moroccan inhabitants before Spanish law, of whom many after transformations in 1990 became illegal. At the same time the fight against drug-traffic was increased (El País, 1990), both expressing how Ceuta at that time tried to get rid of attributes of primitiveness and otherness, attributing to itself more European-ness. In 1999 the

“battered city”-image was to be projected on the citizens, saying a lot about the estimation of primitiveness of the city at that time. Social struggles and sensitivity of people from Ceuta was mainly concentrated among the huge proportion of Moroccan population which had been marginalized by political forces and media for long. Yet, the objective was to make all citizens then share an legitimate illusion of progress, appealing to the sense of community and the recognized intellectual capacities (Sampietro, 1999). More measures such as fostering employment, normalizing the city, converting many citizens of second class into first class citizens and introduction of urgent social politics etc. aiming to improve the educational offer, social security, integration, prosperity and to reduce crime and migration pressure (Bárbulo, 2003) are quite revealing about the problems of “primitivism” which were to be solved: Unemployment, un-normality, treatment of citizens as only second class, social conflict, bad educational standards, social insecurity, segregation and marginalization, poverty, crime and migration pressure can be deduced from the measures of improvement to have been major problems of Ceuta at that time. Ignacio Cembrero reported in 2009 (2009c) about Ceuta going through a war of religions between those who want an independent Islam in the city and those who want it to be guided by Morocco, which adds another problem to the ones listed above –religious conflicts. All these strongly remind of the indicators operated from literature e.g. by Kramsch (2011, pp. 196-198) describing features of otherness as opposed to European-ness.

The border-people as well observe certain primitive features in Ceuta. Some of the expert’s observations in fact correspond a lot with the official discourse pointing at economic underdevelopment and specialties: The fact that Ceuta has been characterized by economic and fiscal singularity for long, also involving the irregular exportation to Morocco, is a feature several of them mention. Yet, Testa Méndez also tells about the relative progressiveness of Ceuta given that many Moroccans from the surrounding region find jobs, trade, sanitary assistance, etc. in Ceuta which they would not find in the Moroccan territories. On the other hand he admits that the conditions they make use are many times irregular. This again proves that some primitive features have been for long been part of the character of Ceuta. The experts (Testa Méndez, Gómez Barceló and Campos Martínez) also explain that a change of all these special and irregular conditions is necessary, e.g. in the form of substitution by a commercial Customs institution at the border with Morocco (which is ever more pressing under changing global and regional circumstances). Campos Martínez states that liberalization of international trade, normalization of trade within the framework of the EU, development of the local industry and development of tourism and a competitive harbor are key-factors to improvement. Testa Méndez affirms that this is also an attitude which the population of Ceuta generally shares. If this estimation was true, one could even say, that the citizens of Ceuta generally seem to have internalized the official discourse and wish to overcome the features of primitivism and otherness which they observe.

The only social issue touched by a statement by Testa Méndez showing otherness is the fact that among the working population the majority is clearly of the Christian-occidental group. In this sense it is again the marginalization of the Muslim population which comes to surface - indicating the presence of population with different value-systems as feature of otherness *and* that marginalization processes occur in Ceuta - which

undermines efforts for progress being typical of European-ness, revealing otherness. What applies to otherness as perceived through the lens of primitive standards in Ceuta, we can confirm that the official discourse and the way of thinking of the border-people from Ceuta carry European-ness, since they clearly distinguish between European and the Other making use of very European criteria, also proving Kramersch (2011, pp. 196-197) and Mignolo (2000, pp. 59-62).

Interestingly the group of Moroccan border-people does not observe any primitiveness about Ceuta. From their point of view, they do not locate features of otherness in the city so that they affirm Ceuta as European. But we will see that they are critical about otherness of Morocco applying European criteria of European-ness and otherness for their criticism. Also in the official discourse primitiveness of Morocco is a frequent topic: One of the attributes mentioned in various sources is under-development of Morocco, which is of course a relative term – comparing the stage of development like on a linear spatio-temporal scale (Kramersch, 2011, p.197) with a “developed occident” and Europe – also considering distance from the European core. Cembrero in 2006 described how the Northern part of Morocco, the Rif has tried to overcome the cleft which has been separating it for decades from the rest of Morocco. This firstly indicates that within Morocco there are huge regional disparities of welfare; secondly it indicates the struggle of these areas to progress. Martínez Navarro (2003, p. 3) instead analyzes the dependence of Morocco on the first sector and agriculture, which implies a strong economic vulnerability to meteorological conditions and stocks of resources, as well as the fluctuation of markets. This weakness clearly expresses primitiveness according European criteria of otherness and is affirmed by reports on the measures to be taken to help Morocco developing: European assistance for development of prosperity of Morocco and Moroccans and integration of the Maghreb through co-operation on various levels even before the general agreement on customs tariffs and trade of 1994 (*ibid.*, p. 4) have been part of the relationship with the EU for long. In this respect a primitive status of welfare, trading and involvement into international economy are part of otherness ascribed to Morocco. Morocco is treated by Europe like only one of many developing countries else: “Efforts to include developing countries and eradication of poverty” are made especially by Eurocentric measures such as the stimulation of trade as “one of the most effective ways” to stimulate exportation, industrialization, diversification and to speed up growth. Practical and beneficial for Europe the classical instrument used to attain these goals is the introduction of preferential customs tariffs, eventually making the countries more competitive on international markets and attract investors taking the opportunity (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 348). The responsibility the prosperous European EU takes here is as mentioned rather Eurocentric since it is also the European economy profiting from the measures. However, the fact remains that economic standards in the developing countries such as Morocco are often regarded as primitive, ‘other’ than European ones. Even in the debate about the Customs Union in Ceuta arguments have been mentioned about avoiding “punishing” effects on countries depending on one concrete sector (e.g. Vietnam on footwear) which Ceuta is a major purchaser of (*ibid.*, p. 350).

On a social level these economic features of primitivism are often connoted in official discourse with actions “against” society and law. López García writes about the Moroccan youth without hope and becoming without

reason terrorists. The image about committing crimes goes further and is regarded to be institutional even: In the surroundings of Ceuta and Melilla money is generated to vast extents by drug-traffic which nurtures Moroccan banks. Deposits in Nador accordingly result to be comparable to those in Casablanca a city of 5 million inhabitants. Moroccan authorities are suspected to support the narcotic traffic, irregular trade and even clandestine immigration (Cembrero, 2006). Corruption is very usual also at the border, where Moroccan customs agents are accused even officially of asking money from Moroccans passing whether it is legal or not (El País, 2001), and as observation has shown, the discourse about corruption is observable in real life. All this as well as the clandestine trading as kind of activity are considered to inhibit the development of the North of Morocco (Abad, 2003). They are clear signs of primitiveness following a European perspective and thus show that Morocco still - and here again we refer to linear development models (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197) - inherits many features of otherness.

Generally then it can be concluded that the official discourse attributes primitivism to Morocco which shows that otherness is typical of Morocco within the discourse about Ceuta.

The border-people from both sides would agree with parts of this discourse, though adding their own discursive pieces. The experts from Ceuta make a clear distinction between primitivism in Ceuta and in Morocco. In comparison, the city of Ceuta still possesses many advantages with regard to juridical security and infrastructure, e.g. providing work for many Moroccans, as Testa Méndez comments. Gómez Barceló confirms that Morocco for his understanding carries the image of a developing country which is in a phase of economic growth. Moré and Campos Martínez do not comment anything which would hint at the topic. In this case we can conclude that the border-people from Ceuta who have been interviewed especially regard Morocco to be more primitive than Ceuta (always making the comparison with their own city and not with Europe in general) in an economic sense.

The Moroccan border-people mostly do not express that they regard Morocco as primitive in one way or the other. Instead they show the admiration for certain characteristics of Ceuta, Europe or the inhabitants mentioned before, which implies that they might miss or desire similar characteristics for themselves in their country. The trader admires efficiency, the charwoman likes honesty and directness, the housekeeper appreciates the compliance of rules and laws, the organization and cleanliness. The second contrabandor adores the idea of career opportunities, the medicine desires freedom and liberty and the smuggler appreciates the rule of law. The desires and admiration exemplified do not directly have to lead to the conclusion that all the opposite of these characteristics mostly connoted to European-ness are the primitive standards in Morocco. We just cannot tell from these indications to which extent the respondents experience a lack of the features of European-ness and thus features of otherness, as some sort of binary thinking. However, it is clear, though that they would admit that many of the mentioned aspects are less part of their own environment and lives in Morocco, so that maybe again we have to speak of shades of otherness and European-ness here. Moreover the Moroccans show that they observe a transformation and upgrading on the scale of European-ness of their country, e.g. with regard to freedom of opinion and speech, described before. The medicine tells: "There are fewer taboos and people can demonstrate, before there was no such freedom". Only two of the interviewees freely tell that non-European and

therefore more primitive standards are part of the state of being of their country – the politician tells about the urgency by which “Moroccans need to be citizens, they need a democracy” and the smuggler says that the most striking feature which comes to his mind thinking about his side of the border is that “You have cheap vegetables”. The politician thus stresses more primitive standards of a corrupt not sufficiently democratic political system, while the smuggler points at the most developed agricultural sector which is -unlike European industrialized agricultural structures- especially based self-sufficient households.

The discourse of the Moroccan border-people shows evidence of European-ness in the sense that the binary oppositions of European-ness and otherness (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 59-61) or shades of moving between the two extremes (Kuus, 2004, pp. 472-475) are applied in their considerations. Again, they refer more to their daily routines and surroundings to express their opinions. Unlike the official discourse and discourses of border-people from Ceuta they do not exclusively refer to economic aspects of primitivism, but focus more on political and social standards. Officially and from Ceuta’s border-people we learn that the economic dimension of primitiveness of Morocco is decisive, underpinning the importance of the theory of Sparke (2002, pp. 213-214).

6.2.2.3 Blames of otherness

Blaming non-European-ness and otherness has been the last indicator to analyze borderthinking, the debate and transformations in Ceuta with regard to otherness. In the official discourse Ceuta has been blamed for inheriting otherness e.g. in 2010 when the Foreign Ministry of Morocco published a report about maltreatment of Moroccan citizens (beating, racism) by Spanish security forces. Moroccan protesters and Sub-Saharanans gathered in front of the Spanish embassy in Rabat and the consulados in Nador and Tetouan to demonstrate and denounce the racist practices of Spanish authorities towards Sub-Saharan immigrants; The agents were accused of “menacing, torturing and insulting”. Simultaneously officially the participants expressed thankfulness for Moroccan authorities (Cembrero, 2010). The blaming although coming from Morocco, which according to the official discourse and the one of the border-people is less European than Ceuta, touches very European values, which are oriented to political dialogue, free trade and of which Human Rights are often regarded to be a basis. The behavior by the agents in Ceuta though is different from respecting these Human Rights and thus implies conflicts in Ceuta, which under ideal European conditions are not meant to happen at all. Another blame of Ceuta was addressed to the municipal government, accusing the administrative institution to have neglected the task of population census among the Moroccans and other foreigners who live in the city for which even the central government did not show any objection for (Cembrero, 2010c). Supposing that the municipal administration has in fact not realized any census anymore the underlying strategy could be to avoid to give official status to a steadily growing proportion of foreigners and otherness in the city. However this strategy itself carries some attributes of a try to cheat the population and official discourse, which is a sign of corrupt and in that sense not European behavior.

The border-people blame Ceuta for “the concentration of school drop-outs and unemployment among the Arab-Muslim population” to quote Testa Méndez who is the only among the experts from Ceuta blaming its own city for features of otherness which he wishes to overcome. On the other hand, though, one could regard his blame as

meant to address the mentioned group of people, who are anyway different and less European. It could be Testa Méndez's tactic to project on them the entire complexity of problems which make Ceuta struggle with otherness.

Less ambiguous blames can be noticed by Moroccan border-people accusing the citizens of Ceuta to show racist behavior (except for a few number of people) and lack of readiness to help as the IT-expert, the contrabandor and the second contrabandor tell. Preferences of groups of the population of Ceuta are divergent – the smuggler prefers the population of Moroccan origin whereas the painter has more positive experiences with the Spanish-Christian population. Racism, of course, is not combinable with many of the European values of equality and freedom, so that its presence indicates otherness as feature of the population of Ceuta. Yet, racism and xenophobia, of course, are just another strategy of othering, typical of not-yet European places (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

With regard to Morocco blames in official discourses have not been too many, despite the important amount of non-European primitive standards. Cembrero in his article about the development of the Rif-region from 2006 accuses Morocco to have taken over the task of improving infrastructures which had been initiated during the colonial period under Franco *only recently* when king Mohamed VI came into office – which he regards to be rather late. In the same article Cembrero also blames the Moroccan authorities for supporting narcotic traffic, irregular trade and clandestine immigration. This critical voice is the only one in the official discourse about Ceuta, which I could trace. Probably blaming Morocco is not the proper European way of treating primitive standards of otherness in a developing country which instead deserves to profit from European superior epistemology, economic support and standards of knowledge (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 54-56).

Yet, border-people from Ceuta are more critical blaming Morocco mostly in relation with the continuous claims about the cities' territory and inhibiting improvement of relationships with Spain and Europe that way. This discourse though carries on the one hand strategic aims of Ceuta but also contains some of the positive conditionality as outlined by Kramsch (2011, pp. 198, 200-201) and Kuus (2004, p. 473), forcing neighboring countries to accept whatever conditions for good relationships with the EU. In the case of Ceuta it could be, and in fact the expert Testa Méndez exactly follows this strategic discourse, to remind Morocco of the many thousand Moroccans finding employment and other infrastructural advantages in Ceuta.

The other border-people, neither from Ceuta nor from Morocco are not ready to formulate observations of otherness as blames. The only critical remark addressing otherness is a criticism by the medicine from Tetouan, who blames the Spanish in general for disrespectfulness and racism towards his own country and people, which he does not regard as a European manner of entering political dialogue: "The Spanish has a fear of the Moroccan, and always had that fear. They deprecatorily call us "Moros", which refers to Mauritania. They look down upon the Moroccans in general: They are absolutely anti- Moroccans, I am complaining a lot about them. They would ask me: 'You are a medicine, you? How did you manage that?' The Spanish they depreciate the Moroccan". The statement implicitly reveals how Spanish and people from Ceuta might stigmatize Moroccans even by racist claims in order to set boundaries, making distinctions towards South, shifting European-ness and

applying tactics (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) of othering, Nesting-orientalism about the other to affirm the own European identity as the insights of Kuus have shown (Kuus, 2004, pp. 472-475, 477-478, 480-482).

6.2.3 Europeanization

Europeanization has to be distinguished from “static” characteristic of European-ness first of all by its active, “dynamic” nature as a process of change. For this unity of analysis six different indicators have been determined, which each to a different extent have helped to trace the process of Europeanization in Ceuta (before the decision to join the Customs Union). These operationalized indicators based on the theoretical chapter (§ 2) and the methods (§ 4.3) are: excluding the ‘other’ (§ 6.2.3.1), template thinking (internalization of neoliberal thinking and belief in linear development) (§ 6.2.3.2), substitution of habitual practices for European ones (§ 6.2.3.3), nesting-orientalism and double framing (§ 6.2.3.4), dialogue about reforms (§ 6.2.3.5) and taking a buffer-zone function (§ 6.2.3.6). Again these indicators have been applied to the official discourse (politics and media) as well as to the thinking of individual border-people. Attention has been especially paid to transformations and arguments throughout the long-lasting debate.

6.2.3.1 Excluding the ‘other’

With the help of the indicator “excluding the other” different dimensions of drawing boundaries have been found in the different discourses. To start from the official discourse, the first dimension found had to do with economic features of exclusion. Aranda Gallego (2007, p. 5) presents the EU and the Customs Union as institutions which are designed to spread prosperity and stability within the generally visible economic, social, national and European context and its respective near surroundings. This description is exclusionary in the sense that everything beyond the “economic, social, national, European context and its respective near surroundings” is not expected to profit from the institutions and the welfare they spread. However, the definition of the included remains vague since ‘European’ and ‘near surroundings’ remain an open category. The economic dimension to the exclusionary description lies in the “spread of prosperity and stability”. Also the article by López García (2006) contains a similar economic dimension of exclusion and bordering, because the commercial agreement which the EU is about to establish in 2012 was supposed to facilitate the development of the border in the North of Morocco (López García, 2006). Although here there might be also diplomatic complexities behind the connection between the agreement and the exclusion, this report again supports Sparke’s theory emphasizing the prevailing role of neoliberal thinking determining practices of bordering (Sparke, 2002, pp. 215, 221, 234). Financial aspects also play a role in the demand for compensation for the border-work - and we are reminded of Rumford here, describing different actors realizing borderwork (Rumford, 2008, pp. 56-57) - which Ceuta has to realize being one of two land borders of Europe on African soil (Cembrero, 2011). In this context it becomes clear that exclusion and practices of (de-)bordering (Rumford, 2008, p. 53) themselves have an economic dimension when it comes to maintaining contested borders. All these economic exclusionary practices, help to promote and foster the process of Ceuta becoming European, called Europeanization.

In Ceuta Spanish-ness has for long been an issue related to the cities' identity. "The city, the law and the inhabitants defend the "Spanish-ness" of the African city" (Vivas Lara, 2010). The question of identity then becomes a driving force of the exclusionary process of Europeanization: Spanish-ness also implies to be European and therefore the clear self-exclusion of Ceuta from the African continent means to Europeanize itself, reassuring its European belonging and identity.

Excluding the African could be taken here also literally: In 2005 Zapatero was celebrating at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona the proposal about dialogue on civilizations and convergence of North and South. Simultaneously Spain has not been accepting enough immigrants necessary to guarantee growth and welfare. This step has been undertaken under the flag of a danger of invasion from Africa - danger because "there is no place" for people from the South, there is only place for dialogue (Rius Sant, 2005). The exclusionary practice here is not territorial in kind, however, it is a "non-European", 'other' group which is meant to be kept out, implying that measures of prevention have to assure that Europe stays European enough also within its territories. Thus in this case Europe and Spain are Europeanizing themselves excluding others (which is on a territorial level exactly what Kuus (2004, pp. 472-475) in her theoretical insights tries to transmit).

In a similar way exclusion also works within Ceuta: Despite of the ideal of 4 cultures and many making efforts for it, a part of the society does not want to attain the scenario actually: The society is Spanish, but it is criticized that within this Spanish society with multicultural characteristics the Spanish governments have never defended the interests of the Muslim citizens being symbolic and indicative for their marginalization. Another example is the dominance of 90% Christian employees in the public sector and military where power is exercised (Barbulo, 2005). Claims of marginalization have existed for long: Muslims positioned themselves already against the claim for an autonomous status, which would not have been representative for their part of the population. Together with different kinds of organization they demonstrated against marginalization from power and asking for more participation (Sánchez Mellado & Nogueira, 1991). Additionally the introduction of the Foreigner Law in 1990 making Moroccan inhabitants illegal (El País, 1990) and an article of 1986 in El País illustrate that Ceuta has been struggling for long with a tunnel of prejudices, and discrimination directed against the population of Islamic religion. Implications have been also juridical and had to do with rights and freedom of foreigners in Spain. Depreciation towards citizens of Moroccan origin could occur many times even if the citizens had grown up in the same surroundings identifying with democratic principles and values of Spain.. All these factors show that institutional exclusion of otherness has become an established practice throughout years to Europeanize the Self (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 196-198), in this case the European Self of Ceuta.

At the same time Ceuta has officially always been seeking to keep on being considered special and particular, emphasizing the island position and other natural disadvantageous characteristics. At moments such as the debate about a new European Constitution in 2005, Ceuta insisted on rejecting the draft, since otherwise the consideration of Ceuta as in need of funding under criterion number one would have been lost (Chaves, 2011), meaning a partial loss of financial support by the EU for the city. The emphasis of particularities and otherness

then can be understood as some sort of strategic self-exclusion in order to profit from financial aid, with the long-term objective to develop until achieving more Europeanization and thus to Europeanize.

To sum up, the Europeanization via exclusion of others and the other is a very popular strategy to improve the status within the EU and/or economic advantages also for Ceuta, at least analyzing the official discourse.

With regard to opinions and discursive insights of border-people different kinds of exclusion emerged, some of which are similar to the official discourse. One similar kind of exclusion of the other is exclusion taking place *within* Ceuta. As the expert Testa Méndez reminds that one should not forget distrust, racism and categorization into classes which the Christian-occidental population demonstrates towards the Arab-Muslim population, cultivating a feeling of exclusion towards the other. He critically remarks that this behavior carries risks of leading to a social break which could have been avoided and continues explaining that Ceuta has been living with the back to the neighboring country and those who obtained Spanish nationality in Ceuta during the entire 1980s. Some Moroccan interviewees agree: The second contrabandor finds a big difference between Spanish and Moroccan citizens and their mentalities: Whereas Moroccan inhabitants of Ceuta treat them with respect and help them a lot, the Spanish would never even think about supporting the traders in their struggles at the border. The IT-expert has observed that some Spanish have racist attitudes towards the Moroccans, but others do not and treat them with respect. The painter observes huge differences between people living in different districts of Ceuta, of which one is “like Colombia”, where people “kill” and trade with drugs a lot. All these observations by border-people from both sides who regularly spend time in Ceuta make visible excluding practices within Ceuta have a racist and spatial dimension, go in hand with class-division in which the Spanish, Christian-Occidental feel and behave superior to the Moroccans. Stigmatization might also carry some truth as the comment of the painter confirms, however, the border-people themselves keep the division up by contributing own discursive pieces to the stigmatizing discourse. What remains is that exclusion of the ‘other’ is again related to superiority of European-ness and Europeanization of Ceuta and the residents, helping to reassure their European-ness.

What is interesting though, is that also the population of Moroccan origin partly tries to take part in the process stigmatizing the ‘other’, namely the other across the border. The smuggler tells how Moroccans, living in Ceuta, “feel privileged, having the Spanish passport, even though they might live under bad circumstances and are poor. They believe and present themselves superior and treat other Moroccans bad, worse than the Spanish”. These multi-actor tactics of defining and multiplying borders (Rumford, 2008, pp. 53, 56) and exclusion clearly show that presumably especially the Moroccan population of Ceuta feels a need to Europeanize themselves and set themselves apart from the other, the Moroccan.

Exclusion and bordering against the outside (ibid., pp. 56) and affirming European-ness has generally been observed in many statements of different border-people: Testa Méndez follows very much the official discourse explaining that Ceuta has been seeking support from Europe and tried to reaffirm its European character by excluding the other, namely the Moroccan claims about the territory of Ceuta. On the one hand the argumentation for asking support Europe, according to Testa Méndez has been, that Ceuta is the only European land border in

Africa, on the other hand the support by Europe is influential and can help to prevent bilateral tension between Spain and Morocco. The Europeanization of the debate helps to exclude the 'other' but at the same time the final objective of the exclusion is to completely Europeanize Ceuta. For Campos Martínez Morocco could be a good market for Ceuta, arguing from a rather Eurocentric utilitarian perspective which at the same time reassures the distinction between the European Ceuta and the markets for Ceuta in the world, one of which could be Morocco. Although the commercial relations might be an instrument of Europeanizing Morocco, the statement subtly supports the discourse of excluding the other and Europeanizing Ceuta. Testa Méndez in the same context regards it as a European strategy to attract Morocco by making favorable agreements, since Europe does not wish any dangerous radical Islamism close to its borders, depending on how Arab Spring evolves. On the one hand this argumentation that it might be preferable to Europeanize Morocco on time before other forces come to dominate there, on the other hand the clear identification of radical Islamism and the movement of the Arab Spring show that very different features are prevailing in the development of the country, which are in a crucial way distinctive of Ceuta and Europe. Again we find a subtle discursive exclusion of the other which has to be fought by means of and for the sake of Europeanization. The expert Moré is convinced that actually all the contracts and agreements firmed throughout years with Morocco implicitly stand for a political recognition of the Spanish-ness of Ceuta. This statement is just another way of putting it and Europeanizing Ceuta's political and cultural identity.

Some of the Moroccan border-people simply confirm the distinctiveness and exclusionary practices inherent in the discourse: The housekeeper says that in Ceuta she encounters "another world" and the second contrabandor explains that "Ceuta is also a space for going for a walk, it is a European country, it is Spain". In this sense the Moroccan border-people carry on the discourse of excluding the other, themselves, admitting the differences and thus discursively Europeanizing Ceuta. Yet, some border-people revealed surprising ideas - since they assure that "Europeans? I do not know any", illustrating that for their geographic imagination Ceuta is not part of Europe. The second contrabandor who has been cited earlier talking about racism in Ceuta is convinced that "in European countries there is no racism at all", which implies that he makes a distinction between Ceuta and Europe. The medicine makes a more explicit distinction explaining that "the mentality of the Spanish is different from the mentality of the Spanish, who lives in Ceuta". All these comments indicate that some Moroccan border-people do not agree with or have not been reached by the discourse of European-ness of Ceuta. They would instead exclude Ceuta from Europe which is a sharp contradiction with what has been analyzed earlier on. It is worth to keep the observation made here in mind and come back to the point in the paragraph about borderthinking (Mignolo, 2000, p. 85) and resisting Europeanization (§ 6.2.4).

Exclusionary discourse by border-people mostly deals with the exclusion of Morocco: The country is developing and has been doing for the last years, which is especially visible in the North. But in economic terms it is impossible to equalize it with Ceuta or the rest of Europe. The level of democratic qualities and Human Rights is much improvable. This opinion by Testa Méndez is confirmed by the historian Gómez Barceló who considers Morocco to be in disadvantages with regard to liberty and socio-economic aspects. What is explained by the

Spanish experts in macro-level terms is explained similarly on the micro-level by some Moroccan border-people: "Spain? Firstly I think of, money, el oro", says the charwoman and the contrabandor metaphorically describes that "the other side, Ceuta, it is like fuel, like bread, he has to bring money, it is the source of his money". Similar ideas are expressed by the second contrabandor and by the painter, who even adds that Ceuta "is a place where everyone works, where people come from Sahara, all places, from Rabat. So there are so many people, also Spanish, now that there is the crisis". All these comments imply that although Morocco might be Europeanizing as well, in the sense that it is developing economically, Ceuta and Europe are definitely superior in economic terms. The discursive acknowledgement and reassurance of Ceuta's higher level of European-ness and economic power serve as means of Europeanization of the city, simultaneously degrading and excluding Morocco.

A last aspect of excluding the other and therefore Europeanizing Ceuta has to do with the consequences of the exclusionary practices and landmarks. The most imposing and clearest sign of exclusion is, of course, the border decorated with a high fence and many other border accessories. The trader reacts quite emotional describing his relation with the exclusionary border, saying that he hates it. The border-passage is comparable with "anarchy", lack of rules for him. He connotes it with all the problems people encounter trying to pass trading goods and wares. The contrabandor tells that "the word border, when he hears it, is like the word hell" and it makes him very nervous. The exclusionary line of distinction drawn into the landscape between Ceuta and Morocco thus has clear exclusionary impacts also on the people, even those who make their living with it. Although people are satisfied about the work they find due to the border – the second contrabandor says that "Good for him is, that there is work" - they also suffer from the conditions and practices at the border - physical institutionalization of the exclusion and steady instrument of Europeanization of Ceuta. The politician also admits that border-people "are at the same border, but no-one knows anything about the other. So we have to come to communicate". The Europeanization of Ceuta by excluding what is in the South therefore has implications also on the flow of information and knowledge of the other side. However, the lack of knowledge about the other, might help Ceuta to keep on its own cultural heritage and protect all features of European-ness in order to Europeanize itself ever more –avoiding otherness.

The indicator of excluding the other thus has helped to find many indications of Europeanization in all three of the discourses, the debate about Ceuta and transformations in the region. Both the border-people from Ceuta and Morocco mostly agree with the official discourse and add or complete the discourse from their own perspectives based on experiences. Yet, some contradictory insights came to surface as well which is a useful input for further thinking and paragraphs which follow.

6.2.3.2 Template thinking and neoliberal ideals

The next indicator of Europeanization is the presence and dominance of template thinking which implies that neoliberal ideals and a European-like economic model is followed, by locating economic achievements of a place on a scale of core-Europe's economic past to assess the place's status of development. Indicative of that neoliberal template system is also a certain pride of economic achievements of transition. In Ceuta the official

discourse deals among others with many general measures to stimulate linear development. One of the huge number of frequently mentioned similar ideas is the “promotion of local activity” (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 361), more specifically the topic of impulse to economic activity is often raised, as well as necessary fiscal differentiability, generation of employment, stimulation of entrepreneurial initiatives and attraction of private investment (ibid., p. 488). The general objective behind these measures is mostly described as “development towards a new sustainable economic model without dependence on irregular economy”. More proposals concentrate on the configuration of the taxation system, the reform of public fiscal advantages, fiscal and economic incentives to generate favorable investment decisions, the dynamic localization of activity zones and simultaneously the adaptation of principles of density (ibid.). Developing branches which could help Ceuta to progress might be the fishing production, tele-communication in combination with further R+D projects on endogenous potential (ibid., p. 347). All of these ideas bear attributes of neoliberal template thinking, since all of them are meant to help Ceuta to advance on the linear scale of European development. Purely economic measures are expected to bring along welfare and well-being. As expected this dimension of Europeanization can be easily explained making use of theories by Kramsch (2011, p. 197) and Sparke (2002, pp. 221, 234), who respectively stress (from diverging philosophical perspectives which for this aspect seem to be easily combinable) the Europeanizing and economic nature of belief in progress of border-regions.

More specific measures playing a role in the discourse and which take into account particularities of certain places in Europe (which Ceuta might imitate to advance) or Ceuta itself bear attributes of template thinking as well. In 1989 Oppenheimer wrote an article for *El País*, evaluating the state of development and problems to be overcome of Ceuta. Some of them were the high rates of housing problems, the low level of education, the need to create courses of professional and entrepreneurial formation, better use of resources, industrial grounds etc. From these paragraphs we can conclude that Ceuta was clearly located in the past of core Europe on the linear scale of development. Since then again and again the fiscal regime of Ceuta as a result of the consideration of the special situation has been subject to debate, which is related to fostering economy, investment and generation of employment (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 7). In 1999 it was the in Ceuta governing party GIL making the proposal to follow the model of the former British colony of Hongkong for purposes of development of Ceuta and a transformation of the geopolitical strategy – making Ceuta become an international business center. Necessary measures would have been the mentioned change of fiscal status to something similar to an autonomous province disposing of financial and fiscal authority. It would have meant to renounce on national support and transform the city into a fiscal paradise, applying strategies of clean and safe municipal management (*El País*, 1999). This proposal has remained a suggestion. Since 2000 calls for joining the EU Customs Union and the necessity of a commercial customs institution when looking South (having an eye on commercial relations, visitor flows, service platforms, development of Northern Morocco) became more frequent. Integration into the Customs Union then seemed only a question of finding the fitting moment for putting the plan into action (Vivancos, 2007).

Soon the strategic principles of the Canary Islands when joining the Customs Union became more important for Ceuta (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 488). The fiscal code of the islands, the IGIC, works in a similar way like the VAT. Taking the example as a model Ceuta could try to find an ideal system for its own particularities, in which is guaranteed also for public compensation for lost tax venues (Armuna, 2011b). The incentive of taking the islands as a model is based on the *effective, efficient working of the Canary economy*. The only important change would have to be incorporation of the frontier-character of Ceuta also given planned expansions of the EU (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 333): For compensation by the EU Ceuta has been trying to receive funding for being one of the only European land-borders in Africa where they are working for the entire Union (Cembrero, 2011). The assignment of funding has become a decisive argument in the debate especially considering funds of cohesion which will be reconfigured in 2013 and prioritize the new member-states of the Union - but not Ceuta. Therefore the topic of introducing an intermediary category for regions of slower development mentioned earlier was proposed by Melilla (El Faro de Ceuta, 2011b). All the chain of argumentation about how to achieve the best development possible underpins the desire to economically develop and achieve growth in Ceuta. We can conclude that neoliberal template thinking is a driving force of the debates and transformations in Ceuta, also contributing to convergence with core-European standards, a process of Europeanization.

However Europeanization by template thinking and striving for convergence with core-Europe is not being confined to the European Union: Developing countries, such as Morocco are meant to Europeanize as well and advance on the scale of linear development. This is where the earlier mentioned Eurocentric support of these countries, e.g. by improving custom tariffs comes into play (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 348).

With regard to Morocco as one of these developing countries template thinking in official discourse is rather obvious. Ceuta and Melilla are supposed to become the poles of development of the Northern region and take a fundamental role in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Morocco itself is a “big market with a lot of commercial potential”, which would just need to orient itself to correcting misbalances, to achieve stability, economic opening and acceleration of opening up for foreign companies (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 3). The new labor law, liberalization and privatization of sectors, promotion of investment and remittances by emigrants (ibid., 2003, p. 4) give reasons to be optimistic, from a template-thinking-perspective. Morocco is becoming Europeanized even after the end of the colonial period. However, many obstacles remain to be overcome, e.g. the cultivation of cannabis, which is easy money, but does not fit core-European template thinking and model. Nevertheless Morocco is moving: e.g. initiatives of Interreg-program by the EU have been started to promote “prosper neighborhood” (López García, 2006) – and we think of theoretical insights about transitional ENP (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 199-200). But although template thinking and Europeanization might be infiltrating Morocco, the status of being on the scale of linear development is estimated much lower, than the ones of Spain and Ceuta (Moré, 2005). In the discourse of Ceuta this information can mean that Ceuta is being regarded as more European, which is another instrument of Europeanizing Ceuta.

With regard to special measures for Ceuta only two among the border-people take up arguments from the official discourse. It is Testa Méndez who explains in how far the former economic model of Ceuta including the very

special economic and fiscal regime has dominated for long until new economic strategies have been discussed, e.g. becoming part of the Customs Union and the adaptation of the fiscal system. He and Campos Martínez also do show awareness for certain potentials for a linear development such as the tourism sector which could be made use of to progress.

Measures for Morocco are mentioned by more border-people, but only those from Ceuta argue following the general discourse. Testa Méndez is convinced that the disarmament of customs tariffs with the EU has been a decisive step to achieve development and will finish the irregular trade across the border. In theory the measure would contribute to major competitiveness, innovation and real economic development even of the North of Morocco, whereby also Ceuta with the help of the EU could be a protagonist (as far as fiscal advantages are maintained). Gómez Barceló acknowledges that Morocco is the most occidental among the countries of the Maghreb-regions trying to achieve liberty and an economic status of the first world. These estimations and evaluations of the status and possible future of Morocco are based on European neoliberal criteria, trying to place Morocco on the core-European scale of development. Like Campos Martínez though the experts agree that time is necessary to reach a reasonable level of prosperity to be considered European. What all of them observe is, anyway, some clear signs of Europeanization of the country, which they evaluate from a higher position in rank – which again can be regarded as a strategy of Europeanization as proposed by Kuus (2004, p. 484), who describes that the comparison with less European others is always a way to establish the own status and European-ness. Moré explains that in Ceuta, no-one would like the city to be Moroccan, since funding of the EU is generous if it is assigned to the city and the status in international competition is much better as being part of the European context. Also here template thinking is the basis to thoughts expressed –economic development is much easier being more European than less.

The Moroccan border-people mention in their discourses neoliberal ideals much more in a general context than specifically addressed to measures of improvement. It is much more general neoliberal ideals which they reveal in their considerations: The painter for example tells about how he was told stories of Europe and richness and how he then started dreaming of it. He, the charwoman and the medicine all agree that since the new king has come into office development of Morocco is taking the right direction: “Morocco can go up with the king, it has a good character. It can go up to the sky, like an airplane, the king is good, things go well.” As we can see with the example of the metaphor “going up” the image of linearity has been deeply internalized. All of them seem to agree that the right thing is happening since Mohamed VI has taken over the tasks of his father and the “right thing” is connoted for all of them to economic development. This template thinking which has become internalized is a clear sign of Europeanization of the thinking even beyond the European border. People already observe some progress into that “right direction”, e.g. the politician describes that “Tetouan is a city which has developed a lot. That is what I can say. If you had been here like five or ten years before, then you would not see the same Tetouan. It has changed a lot”.

Nevertheless some other people are more ambitious and want more progress along the linear line: The IT-expert, the housekeeper and the contrabandor are sure, that “Moroccans still have to learn a lot if you compare it to the

other side” and that Morocco is “a country which has work to do for changing the economic situation . The people do not control life, because of the political and the economic life”. Whereas other border-people thus show themselves already satisfied and have observed how Morocco has been making steps following an European economic model, these respondents want more. It thus seems that they locate Morocco on a low level of the developmental line and want to reach a higher place. This ambitious thinking can be called template thinking and has been internalized even by the border-people from Morocco, which implies that their way of thinking has been Europeanized (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 54-56). With regard to the content of their statements one can deduce that according to their perception Morocco is Europeanizing.

What is striking about the border-people’s thoughts is that they project neoliberal ideals very clearly on their own lives and life of individuals in other places. This is once more a clear difference to the application of template thinking by the experts interviewed. Many of the Moroccan respondents, especially the traders, are among the least educated in the North of Morocco and thus depend on the manual jobs the border offers for their survival. Their thinking is therefore dominated by thoughts about business and fiscal conditions in Ceuta which allow for low taxation of entering goods etc. This thinking is very much prevailed by individual striving for economic prosperity, though on a very low level. Work and economic activity are at the center of their thinking, dreams and worries. When they think of Europe, they think of the life and opportunities there, calling it like the second contrabandor “the dream of improvement” or commenting like the trader that “if you have good education, you have the good job”. But also speaking of their surroundings they tell agree that work is the key to improvement. All these ideas reveal adaptation to an economy which forces them to fight individually, getting a job and doing their best. It seems as if they locate themselves on a line of linear development starting from unemployment and reaching up to high level educational standards, having a well-paid job and money. This behavior fits very well European template thinking and reflects the Europeanization of the thinking of these border-people.

Another interesting aspect of this thinking is competition: When the housekeeper has to speak about other people working in Ceuta like her she is rather clear: “You cannot speak about friendship among the people. One is much more with oneself, and you even do not help each other with coins if one has not enough left for the bus. Very clearly competition! The women pay attention to conversations, to work somewhere else or taking over a job”. This description of interaction (which has been very similar for all the border-people) with other border-people shows that needs and pressure to survive generate a very competitive sphere, as it is usual in European neoliberal contexts (a difference is, of course, the wide-spread system of social security in European states, which can rescue the weak from dying from hunger). All of these comments seem indications of the way the life of border-people on the Moroccan side is slowly being Europeanized. The fact that experts from Ceuta do not project the template thinking as much on the individual could have to do with the fact that they would generally be located at the top of the linear scale which the Moroccans strive for to reach. It would thus mean that being on the very top, the experts from Ceuta have become indifferent to the individual, local dimension of template thinking as driving force and *are* already Europeanized and only orient within a global competing world already.

Generally the indicator of template thinking has resulted fruitful to find aspects of Europeanization in the transformations, thinking and discourse in the border-region. The most interesting is the confirmation of Kramsch's, Kuus's and Sparke's theories here as well as the discovery of the focus on different scales of template thinking on the two sides of the border.

6.2.3.3 Substitution of habitual practices

The simplest way of observing Europeanization could be to concentrate on in how far habitual practices have become substituted by European ones. Although the indicator was expected to be especially rich for both the official and the discourse of the border-people, there was little to be gathered what has not already been described for other indicators of Europeanization before.

One of the most explicit indications could be found in the analysis by Aranda Gallego (2007, p. 249) telling about steps to improvement which are to be undertaken in developing countries with the help of the EU as seen before: Focus is given to the creation of new regimes stimulating sustainable development and good governance, simplification rules of the European rules of origin to help the countries to rely on more and new products on the condition that the respective countries apply and ratify the Human Rights, labor rights and at least seven of the environmental rights. All these promoted measures are meant to help improving, modernizing and progressing and simultaneously *replacing* stagnation and primitive attributes of the developing countries. The replacement of habitual practices is thus realized in order to Europeanize and progress on the scale of linear development. Again though, we find indications of good relations with the EU on a conditional basis as Kramsch explains in his theoretical insights (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 200-201). In the argumentation about joining the Customs Union some voices warned about the shift of origin of products for importation after the introduction of customs tariffs, which would have e.g. especially negative impacts on importation of footwear from Vietnam. The argument then was that it would not be responsible to punish the poorest countries by making the decision to join the EU Customs Union (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 350). The substitution of habitual importation practice in Ceuta would mean Europeanizing the importation (since products at the introduction of custom tariffs in Ceuta would be even more imported from European countries), but would also have adverse impacts on e.g. Vietnam. Here again compensation for the adverse effects would be necessary, e.g. by European support in order to lessen the vulnerability of importation on one product and thus helping the economic development of the country, which again gives way to Europeanization.

In Ceuta habitual practices such as the irregular trade across the border are meant to be replaced for more European regular ones, as argumentation about the decision about the Customs Union proves. Abad (2004) reports that a delegation of the government of Ceuta has started the fight against the irregular trading, which has been for long a cause of accidents and aggressions towards the "Guardia Civil", the police agents. The fight which started at that time and will find (more or less) an end when Ceuta joins the Customs Union means eroding habitual practices such as throwing bundles of goods across the fence (popular expression: volleyball) to Morocco. The "normalization" of the situation which is the goal (Abad, 2004) adds up also to adapt the trading

system to European standards instead, a clear sign of Europeanization. Moreover Ceuta's plans have to be examined within a context of international trends such as modernization (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 25) liberation of trade, globalization, enlargement of the EU, implementation of a single currency, preferential agreements with Maghreb which all have consequences for Ceuta (ibid., p. 26). These consequences force Ceuta to adapt to the internationalization which itself takes place within a European framework and is driven by European values and ideals. In this sense the international context is forcing Ceuta to Europeanize and substitute local traditional and habitual practices to fit its surroundings- a perpetuation Europeanizing process. One example is the joining of the Customs Union which some of the experts from Ceuta also do identify as substitution of habitual practices: Testa Méndez describes the fiscal and economic particularity which especially for economic motives of adaptation to the international context have to be given up. Campos Martínez and Moré are sure that it will be beneficial to make this step to substitute the current economic model. On the other hand Moroccan border-people such as the painter stress that "Ceuta: is a place where everyone works, where people come from Sahara, all places, from Rabat. So there are so many people, also Spanish, now that there is the crisis. In Ceuta the crisis has had only as small effect so far so that there are so many working there ". The adaptation to the European way replacing the irregular trading would thus impact the Moroccan border-people a lot who would be deprived of their strategy for survival. Ironically, they could be regarded as Europeanized as well then, since they would not work irregularly anymore but would be in a "regular" way unemployed – a more European way, because it is legal.

However, Morocco is being Europeanized according to the official discourse through the replacement of habitual practices, too. As mentioned earlier the Northern part of Morocco which was part of the Spanish protectorate had achieved some European-ness during the era of Franco, who institutionalized European practices e.g. with regard to sanitary services in that time, replacing certain habitual practices (Cembrero, 2006). Since that time the Spanish language has been maintained thanks to television penetrating generations of young and helping to replace other uses of languages and habits. Both measures reflect the way European habits have been transported into Morocco and substituting other activities and habits. Today many projects and initiatives of the trans-border –Interreg-program by the EU have been established in the region for the promotion of prosper neighborship (López García, 2006). These projects, of course, substitute other practices and have been designed from a European point of view, thus they are Europeanizing the region to a certain degree. A good example for the very practical substitution of habits has been given by the Moroccan medicine saying, that "when you were old, you knew that you would stay and live together with your family. Now the same development like in Europe starts. Before we would really live together very much with our families, in the same house. There was cohesion, unity." Here it becomes clear that what has been usual in former times in the region has become replaced by some attitudes and habits which are rather similar to European ones.

As mentioned earlier the indicator has helped less than expected to find indications of Europeanization. But although there is not much data described the message is clear: as well in the official discourse as in the thinking and observations of border-people substitution of practices takes place and leads to Europeanization.

6.2.3.4 Double framing, nesting-otherness and shifting borders discursively

The next indicator instead has helped to find a huge amount of data. It is based on theoretical insights by Kuus (2004, pp. 472-475, 480), who describes how borders and boundaries of European-ness are shifted ever further to the margin of Europe and beyond by agents from certain places to make the own place appear more European. Proving that another place is much less European helps to prove the own European-ness and Europeanizes the place.

In the official discourse several strategies of nesting-orientalism and double framing appear. One consists of introducing hidden arguments stating that other countries and places are less European. In the analysis by Aranda Gallego (2007, p. 333) the message is e.g. implicit in the observation that after the East-ward enlargement the new members of the EU are less well-off than Ceuta and might therefore be favored for receiving funding. In this case thus, it is estimated that Ceuta would be regarded as more European than other places further East. The boundary of degrees of European-ness is thus shifted to the East from Ceuta, so that Ceuta is discursively Europeanized. For Ceuta, seemingly always under pressure to reaffirm the border to Morocco and its distinctiveness, it is thus also important to prove the difference in degree of European-ness with this country to Europeanize itself. For official discourses about Ceuta this has been e.g. done by Martinez Navarro (2003, p. 28) describing the need to reduce dependence on Morocco, which is characterized by political and social instability despite of liberation of trade and improvement of bilateral relations, taking into account the issues related to a fast growing population. Besides the shifting strategy in the official discourse many times simply affirming indications of European-ness of Ceuta appear. In an article by Vivas Lara (2010) the author reports that the city, the law and its inhabitants defend the "Spanish-ness" of the African city and many times the position as "land –borders" of Europe is emphasized, implicitly reminding that financial compensation is adequate for Ceuta working for the entire EU (Cembrero, 2011). Both articles thus prove that Ceuta is a part of the EU, and even an important one. This has also been affirmed by the visit of the Spanish kings after 80 years of not coming to the city. The king showed his respect and made clear, that he was observing all the typical features, characteristic of Spain (Bárbulo, 2007). All these discursive pieces Europeanize Ceuta and appoint Europe's border definitely further to the South than Ceuta.

Yet, some discursive pieces mentioned above also imply that Ceuta could become even more European e.g. reducing the dependence on Morocco which carries so much less characteristics of European-ness (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 28). This ambiguous message seems rather concise, describing practices of double framing and Europeanization in Ceuta. Similarly, the report on Zapatero celebrating at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona the proposal about dialogue on civilizations and convergence of North and South (Rius Sant, 2005) carries the same ambiguity, since Europeanization of the South is possible by the measures taken, but still Spain is not prepared to lose anything of its own European-ness through immigration of less Europeanized.

Nevertheless the official discourse also inherits voices who explain doubts about the European-ness of Ceuta: Reports on demonstrations from the Moroccan side against claims of Spanish-ness by Ceuta (Bárbulo, 2007) and the discourse of rivalry between Spain and Morocco are regularly fed and throw a shadow on the purely European identity of the city. Reports about problems of co-habitation of Christians and Muslims and the marginalization of this group (Barbulo, 2005) also cause doubt about the European-ness of the city. Ceuta has even often been regarded as "bridge to Morocco" (Armuna, 2011b), which refers to the geographical proximity but also to cultural-economic ties. With regard to double framing and Europeanization then, one has to deduce that Ceuta is officially regarded as a part of Europe, but not as very European which is a less desirable, yet, other way of doubly framing the role and situation of Ceuta.

Although Morocco is not part of the EU there are also pieces of discourse which deal with European-ness of Morocco. For instance, the agreement of association of the EU and Morocco to increase trade and attaining the creation of a free trade zone through gradual liberation in maximum 12 years is regarded as a way to strengthen relationships, to reinforce balanced economic-social relationships and development of prosperity of Morocco and Moroccans (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 4). This discourse about integration of the Maghreb and co-operation on various levels implies some sort of Europeanization and double framing about Morocco as well.

The official discourse thus is contradictory, but the indicator of nesting-orientalism and double framing though, has helped to encounter many aspects of Europeanization in the debate about the Customs Union, the ongoing transformations and ways of thinking.

The discourse of the border-people on the same topic resulted to be more diverse. It is Testa Méndez who in line with official discourses, describes double framing as useful to gain support by the EU in order to be confirmed as an important part of the EU in need of support. Some of these arguments concentrate on the Customs Union which could be an instrument to Europeanize the city by confirming its European-ness before the territorial claims from Morocco. This confirmation helps to officially confirm the border of Europe South to the territory of Ceuta and thus the European character of Ceuta. However, the integration into the Customs territory also carries some attributes of agency of the city, making use of the marginalized position: Due to the singularities of Ceuta and the border-position, Ceuta tries to claim a need for continued confirmation of its European-ness by European institutions and funding. The acknowledgement of its European-ness and singularity at the same time, the construction of double-framing to attribute European-ness to the Self *and* stressing 'not-yet' European-ness, can be considered a strategy to profit from financial aids. At this point we have to be strongly reminded of the theory by Kuus (2004, pp. 484, 482) who explains that this agency and initiatives of making use of nesting-orientalism and double framing are typical also of other 'not-yet' European places in the Union. What is proved here additionally, is the permeability of also of discursive borders which can be framed by various actors in various ways and be crossed by others designing their very own discursive borders (Rumford, 2008, p. 56).

Many of the border-people from both sides apply an evaluation of economic standards as criterion of European-ness shifting the border of Europe to the South of Ceuta. Although Testa Méndez can observe a positive

economic development of Morocco, which according to him is especially visible in the Northern parts, he is sure that the economic standards are impossible to compare with the standards of Ceuta and the rest of Europe. Gómez Barceló agrees that Morocco is clearly disadvantaged in economic terms and Campos Martínez stresses that Ceuta keeps on being an important pole of development for Morocco. Thousands of families have for long been living on working with and in Ceuta. He admits that Morocco is improving fast, but relativizes this idea, saying, that it is a long time to go still. The charwoman says that what she connotes with Spain is first of all money (implying that she does not do so for her own country) and the contrabandor affirms what Campos Martínez had been telling about. The IT-expert puts stress on another dimension and uses less pathetic words talking about Europe and Ceuta: "A normal, decent life. Ceuta is a beautiful city and I have a different relationship. Work in Ceuta is better, a better present. A political administration which we do not have here, it is working a lot for the public, for people. People in Europe they search for a better life for the people". The implicit use of comparative degrees such as "more" and "better", points at the comparison to his home indicating a relatively higher level of civilization attributed to Ceuta. It is mostly by comparison in many statements that modernity is located in the city of Ceuta – affirming Kuus' idea about double framing, shifting with borders of degrees of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, pp. 482, 475) – even if Ceuta is not yet fully European, but more than Morocco. Moreover, the idea based on Rumford that transformation change the nature of borders and borders change the nature of transformations, here Europeanization, provides for additional explanation (Rumford, 2008, pp. 52-53). These ideas also demonstrate that there is some difference in economic standards between the two sides of the border, which justifies locating the border of Europe in the South of Ceuta.

More arguments in favor of shifting the border of Europe to the South of Ceuta have to do with cultural aspects. The evolution of Radical Islam and the Arab Spring are cultural features of Morocco which are supposedly distinct from cultural features of Ceuta and are part of the images Testa Méndez presents. He is also critical about the democratic qualities of Morocco and the treatment of Human Rights in the country. From his point of view these aspect are much less developed in comparison with Europe. Gómez Barceló agrees that despite the economic development which in comparison with other countries of the Maghreb region has reached a rather advanced standard and the occidental character of the country, at the level of liberty and its Islamic values cannot be considered a first world country. Especially social problems and liberty are key factors here. The medicine agrees showing appreciation for liberties and freedom of opinion and speech which he finds evolving slowly as well in Morocco though. Other Moroccan border-people agree on differences in culture but manifest them in different criteria. The housekeeper e.g. talks about differences in education and respect of rules and law. Many of the other Moroccan interviewees see differences also in mentalities with regard to organization.

At the same time the European-ness and discursive Europeanization practiced above is reinforced by the idea that also places in the North have lost in standards and European-ness. The painter tells that Spain as well now is in crisis. "People cry because they are without work. The people come to Ceuta, there is not yet as much crisis, there is little. It is a small one, not a big one". The second contrabandor is of the same opinion: "Now the Spanish

have the life of the Moroccans". The relative European-ness of Ceuta is thus reaffirmed also looking towards North, which is another device to help to Europeanize Ceuta discursively.

The last discursive instrument of Europeanization affirming the high degree of European-ness of Ceuta is the belief in European-ness of the city. Testa Méndez and Campos Martínez both highlight that they are convinced that in different proportions Ceuta disposes of all characteristics of European-ness.

The contradictory part of the double framing, the part weakening the above argumentation about pure European-ness, comes from the South. Moroccan border-people often implicitly neglect European-ness of Ceuta shifting the border of Europe discursively much further Shift to the North. When the trader is talking and admiring the "good education in Europe" he mentions several countries of which he is convinced that educational systems are of high quality. Among these are "France, the Netherlands, Britain and Germany". He also tells about some preferences of certain European which are based on what he heard about these countries: "Europeans are different. In all people you have difference. Every country. I mean British people are not the Dutch. I do not like Spain, not Belgium. Because for me, I like English people". From these insights it is already clear that Spain and thus Ceuta are less connoted with aspects this Moroccan admires in Europe. What is even more striking is that three of the border-people do not consider Spain as a part of Europe at all – the second contrabandor is convinced that "Europe? There it is better than in other countries, such as Spain" and the charwoman and the painter (both working in Ceuta and Spain mainland) acknowledge that they do not know many or any Europeans. The contrabandor is thankful for the work he finds in Ceuta, which is a place for him to bring his bread, his source of money. However he is sure that "if he compares Europe to Spain, Spain is small hope. Europe for him maybe is big hope ". All these comments illustrate that mostly as part as their geographic imagination and discourses which these border-people came to listen to the interviewees would not consider Ceuta and Spain as European. In comparison with places further North the European-ness of these places is so much less, according to them. The medicine does not go so far but he makes a clear distinction though between Spain and Ceuta: "The mentality of the Spanish is different from the mentality of the Spanish who lives in Ceuta". The respondent is convinced that actually Morocco is also already close to what he appreciates about some European values: "Morocco is right now the only intimate friend of the European Community. It has so many advantages in comparison to other countries in the Arab world". In these observations we can find subtle comparisons with an undefined other in the Arab world (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 59-61), which is considered less European, showing that theories of (de-) bordering (Rumford, 2008, p. 53), nesting-otherness and double framing (Kuus, 2004, pp. 472-474, 480-482) have become even implemented outside Europe, yet using European-ness as criteria of differentiation.

All these opposed images and discursive pieces show that Ceuta is not framed in one way, but at least double and this in many ways. Having a closer look nesting-orientalism and double framing are even applied to the interior of Ceuta, concerning different groups: The IT-expert finds that "people of Ceuta are divided. One is the Moroccan people who have a Spanish passport and the other is the Spanish part". Moreover the people of Ceuta form a rather closed community which is not part of anything bigger but enclosed and focused on itself. "They are normal, different from other people, because it is a much smaller city. The small city controls the thoughts and the

Morality of the people, it is more limited, difficult to enter in this social ". A similar analysis is done by the smuggler. From these observations then, we can learn that borders of European-ness are shifted even within Ceuta and nesting-orientalism and double framing become very complicated here. However, practices of bordering and borderwork by institutional actors, diverse groups and citizens can be clearly observed, confirming the theory of Rumford (2008, pp. 56-59). Kuus approach is enriching as well pointing to pluralities of Europe (2004, p. 475) which can be created for so many different places, but the indications which arise from the analyses of data show that complexity is bigger here than "only double". Here we even have to deal with several discursive Europes in one place, promoted and used by diverse groups and individuals.

6.2.3.5 Dialogue about reforms

The fifth indicator of Europeanization in the debate, transformations in the region and thinking within both the discourses is 'dialogue about reforms'. Generally, of course, the entire debate about joining the Customs Union including the debate about accompanying reforms *is a dialogue about reforms* with orientation to Europe and therefore suspiciously indicative of Europeanization.

In the official discourse we find more general indicative arguments, e.g. the earlier mentioned measures to be introduced in developing countries with the help of Europe and consideration of effects on vulnerable economies in developing countries by imposing customs tariffs in Ceuta (Aranda Gallego, 2007, pp. 349-350). More often mentioned example are the projects under the flag of INTERREG programs by the EU (López García, 2006) and the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona about dialogue on civilizations and convergence of North and South (Rius Sant, 2005). More concrete indications of moments of dialogue about reform with Morocco – based on ideas of transition but never integration, of course, (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 199-200) - are frequent as well, especially the agreement on disarmament of custom tariffs with Morocco (Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 4). Europeanization of Morocco is likely to happen as consequence of all these dialogues and in fact, the agreement on disarmament is an actual manifestation of approaching Europe, its ideals and standards.

In the discourses of the experts among the border –people the dialogue about reforms in Ceuta is central. Testa Méndez exemplifies that many important economic actors as well as parties and institutions have been involved in the decision process about the Customs Union. However, he is also convinced that there has been little debate at all about joining, instead everyone seemed to agree. Yet, the reforms are still subject to confirmation by the European Commission and actors in Ceuta are not satisfied about the commitment of the EU with Morocco. According to Campos Martínez it is necessary to normalize – and here he could also use the term 'Europeanize' - the relations between Ceuta and Morocco, giving up territorial claims from the side of Morocco. Both comments are rather indicative for processes and wishes for Europeanization. What is interesting here is that more data has not been found for this indicator. None of the Moroccan respondents had respective remarks. In spite of this, the indicator helped to generate very clear results, attesting Europeanization in debate and transformations in the region. Since the dialogue often carries positive conditionality from the European side, Kramsch's insights are useful for understanding these processes at work here (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 200-201).

6.2.3.6 Buffer-zone function of Ceuta

The last indicator of Europeanization is the 'buffer-zone function' Ceuta as a border-city could take. In the official discourse (transmitted through media) it is e.g. an article by Cembrero (2011) which stresses the border function of Melilla and Ceuta, which deserve financial compensation, working to protect Union's borders. Protecting against growing migratory pressure from Africa for which both Morocco and Spain are pushed to make efforts to control. Yet, with regard to Ceuta, Martínez de Rituerto (2005) recommended that the EU would have to reassess its political, diplomatic and financial support for the long-term, also increasing its cooperation and assistance of Morocco. At that time 40 millions of euros were promised (Martínez de Rituerto, 2005). From this article we can deduce that the buffer-zone is not only extending in Ceuta but also far into Morocco, which like Ceuta is Europeanized, working for Europe and profiting from it. Already during the 1990s it became obvious that the Schengen paradise inheriting free circulation within Europe would need Ceuta and Melilla serving as walls to Africa – protecting and filtering migrants from Schengen-paradise from transition of immigrants. In exchange economic re-compensation of 100 million pesos were being granted in 1996 (Casqueiro, 1996).

In this context we learn that Ceuta was needed. Maybe this is another reason why speeches of political decision-makers of the EU coming to Ceuta include propagandistic features like the following: "Ceuta believes in Europe, it is a question of status - the citizens of Ceuta believe in Europe. From the only land-border on African continent Ceuta has a privileged observation point, a European view and proximity to Arab countries. It benefits from the school of good practices of the EU and controls flows of immigration". More topics mentioned in the speeches are financial scenarios and solidarity as European objective (Armuna, 2011). Maybe it is also for the work which Ceuta does that in 2011 the Mixed European Commission approved the report defending the specificity of Ceuta and Melilla (El Faro de Ceuta, 2011). All this implies that Ceuta in a way is used as a buffer-zone by the EU (Kramsch, 2011, p. 201), but also receives certain support in return. This mutual commitment can easily be recognized as Europeanizing Ceuta.

Another function Ceuta and Melilla take is the one of poles of development being authentic economic capitals of the North of Morocco, where the irregular trade generates low employment for about 400.000 but might discourage investment. Spanish language has been maintained thanks to media and 86% of cooperation projects in the Northern region are managed by Spanish. Cembrero in his article criticizes this way of preserving the colonial potential being spread from the occupied cities (Cembrero, 2006). Cembrero hints at the fact that the function of Ceuta described, could also be to bridge between the "outside" of Europe and the "inside", maintaining colonial mechanisms in the Northern part of Morocco and generating dependence. That way the region can be sufficiently Europeanized, creating loyalty also for the protection of Europe's borders. From this point of view the function as "poles of development" then is also just another version of the above described "buffer-zone" function.

In the discourse of the border-people this function of Ceuta is mentioned in a similar way as just described. Testa Méndez elucidates the role of Ceuta with regard to tourism and trade, of which the former is meant to especially appeal to the North and the latter to the South. He also mentions the advantages which Ceuta has above the

neighboring country and which through Ceuta might gradually filter into the North of Africa. These ideas show that in his thinking Ceuta is a key to Europeanization of Africa, stressing the role as transmitter and buffer-zone.

Another dimension which emerges from the data is the fact that Ceuta, the inhabitants and one of the Moroccan border-people perceive Ceuta as a buffer, always being confronted with dangers lurking in the South – corresponding with the theory by Kramsch describing the European self-centered prevention of spill-over of risks (Kramsch, 2011, p. 201). Often it is Europe which is considered “a medicine” helping to soften the tensions created in the relationship between Spain and Morocco. Europa in the eyes of Testa Méndez has to take responsibility for its land-borders and joining the Customs Union might be a decision causing new conflicts between Spain and Morocco. Gómez Barceló though, tries to explain the exceptional role of Ceuta in these relations slightly differently. Ceuta according to him tries to be loyal towards Morocco in its development without affecting negatively Spanish interests. This characterization of Ceuta then expresses very much the balancing role and bridging function of the city between two worlds, being Europeanized and Europeanizing. Campos Martínez and Moré both want Morocco to recognize the Spanish-ness of the city, but differ on the perception of compliance with this: Campos Martínez thinks that Morocco still would have to be forced to do so, whereas Moré is convinced that Morocco has already or long been accepting it, but keeps on the discourse of territorial claim for the sake of binding its people together and furthering nationalism. The painter as only Moroccan, touching the topic comes back to the spatiality of Ceuta, the division into parts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’: “In the center there are good people, but a small part of the city, a district with the name Sibite is like Colombia. People kill a lot the police, many of them have drugs...directly behind the border “. In his imagination thus the closer one gets to the border the “worse” conditions and people are. This idea somehow seems to imply that even within Ceuta some spatial transition is observable, which might be symbolic for the transitional function of Ceuta between Spain and Morocco. Curiously the definitions of good and bad are connoted to a similar understanding of “good and bad” in a European value system, revealing a certain effect of Europeanization in his way of thinking. Furthermore the description gives a good picture of the role of Ceuta as buffer for Europe and the degree to which the city has been accordingly “not yet” Europeanized and has to learn. Here, of course, we think of Kuus’ theory (2004, p. 473) and the ‘not yet’ European margins of the Union.

Generally Europeanization has thus been revealed with the help of all the indicators operated beforehand. The theories describing different aspects of Europeanization resulted to be useful for explaining certain processes, arguments invented during the debate about the Customs Union and the way of thinking of the border-people. What applies to differences of the official discourse and especially discursive ideas of the Moroccan border-people some curious differences could be found and might help to lead to new theoretical insights.

6.2.4 Resistance to the discourses of European-ness and borderthinking

This part of the analysis of the debate, transformations in the region and ways of thinking is different. It is not about tracing Europeanization, but just the opposite –tracing conscious and unconscious resistance. It is different from otherness though, because it is understood as a process, not a more “static” characteristic and can therefore

be understood as counter-part of Europeanization. The section deals with resistance to the discourses promoting Europeanization and examines the given units of analysis and thinking which differs from the indications in data found so far. Like for the other sections, indicators have been deduced from the literature on theories: Presence of (giving priority to) own habitual practices (over European) (§ 6.2.4.1), anti-European ethnic nationalism (§ 6.2.4.2) and an elitist character (§ 6.2.4.3) of the debate and transformations of Europeanization are chosen to help observing resistance and borderthinking. This will be as usual differentiated also for the official discourse and the border-people's discourse.

6.2.4.1 Agency and prioritizing own practices

For the first indicator a huge amount of qualitative data has been gathered which cannot be fully presented here. It has been necessary to make a representative selection of results of analysis. However, this also means that there is a lot of agency which has not been Europeanized yet in the region – and undermines the process of Europeanization.

For the official discourse the following results were the most significant. Territorial claims from Morocco are one of the very circumstances which make practices and meaning-making in Ceuta particular. A good example is the agency of some Moroccans changing traffic signs in a way that the territorial claim and accusation of occupation would be read together with the indication (Cembrero, 2010b), which makes the claim of Moroccan-ness physically noticeable for everyone passing: They added a line calling Ceuta the occupied city and writing it by its Moroccan-Arabic name "sebtá". The second and maybe most important topic is the economic particularity of the city. Often it is referred to as historical or geographic singularity causing a need for a fitting, special economic model and treatment within the EU (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 357). The respective particular economic practices in Ceuta, as we by now know being Europeanized by joining the Customs Union, seem endangered to be substituted (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 495). Yet, there is a lot of engagement by Ceuta to simultaneously maintain the special conditions and treatment e.g. making use of the discourse about favorable treatment of ultra-peripheral and trans-border regions (Chaves, 2011) in order to maintain an economically favorable status in the EU (Aznar, 2012a). Ceuta's way of dealing with the singularity is thus ambiguous carrying both features of Europeanization, standardization etc., but also of agency and emphasis of very own practices. Both have in this ambiguous form also been approved lately by the Mixed European Commission (El Faro de Ceuta, 2011). All the measures taken for joining the Customs Union and the debate generally focus on the particularity and the question of combinability with the step to join the Customs Union (Rober, 2011, Aznar, 2011d, Armuna, 2011b, El Faro de Ceuta, 2011c).

Before making the decision to join the Customs Union the particular economic model was especially characterized by the irregular practice of trading across the border with Morocco. For long this feature of agency and distinctiveness has been dominant, contested (Cembrero, 2009d; El País, 2001) and crucial for Ceuta and many thousands of border-people from both sides, even more on the Moroccan side. Much of Ceuta's prosperity has been based on the trading (Barbulo, 2005). This, of course, would not be seen as good European practice

and sticking to the system of trading, from the perspective of the indicator dealt with here, thus has been a long-lasting tactic of resistance to European-ness and Europeanization of Ceuta.

Agency and prioritization of own practices within Ceuta has been a predominant feature of the Moroccan population of Ceuta claiming discriminatory and marginalizing treatment by the Spanish and municipal government (Cembrero, 2010c), resisting e.g. also the claim for an autonomous status of Ceuta. The argument for this choice has been that Moroccans and their interests did not seem to be taken into account and not being represented by the government – which are reasons for Moroccans feeling highly marginalized (Sánchez Mellado & Nogueira, 1991). Besides, different occasions of protests and resistance the different practices come to surface also whenever there is an Islamic festivity such as Islamic Eastern (Echarri, 2011) or the month of Ramadán (Reyes, 2011).

The curious feature of the official discourse indicating agency and prioritization of own practices is a critical view on Ceuta, Spain, Europe and European colonial practices. In 1986 e.g. Albuquerque wrote an article criticizing that the Spanish state lacks initiatives to democratically deal with decolonization hiding away the unrepresentative imperialist past of Spanish capitalism. Especially among the residents and government of Ceuta the author observes a colonial maybe even racist attitude and political decision of colonial style closing eyes in front of history. A way to justify the sending of more troops is to remind of possible dangers lurking in Africa. The explicit racist tone during Franco's domination towards Moroccans "los moros", seem to justify the nowadays repression of the Barrionuevo in Ceuta. At the same time the critic reminds the inhabitants of Ceuta of the "Arab-other" in them which in spite of the official history is part of their own culture, their being, feeling. He asks for more solidarity with those who are nowadays termed foreigners in places where they have been. This critique can clearly be understood as a call for resistance against eradicating habitual practices for Europeanization, resisting the tempting economic tendencies etc.

However, the situation does not seem to be as grievous as Albuquerque describes when writing about colonialist racist attitudes if we have a closer look to border-people telling their discourses. Multicultural practices of European and non-European nature are appreciated also by Testa Méndez, who shows respect for the way four cultures cohabit though sometimes more harmonic than on other events. Testa Méndez even shows consciousness, maybe even pride of Ceuta's singularity when he explains why Ceuta has to and needs to differentiate itself from other parts of Europe. Given all the singularities (cultural, economic, historical, geographical) Ceuta within or without Customs Union will remain different and particular. In any case also the economic regime would be different from the general European one. Campos Martínez agrees that this difference is to be evaluated positively, reinforcing the discourse about alternatives even within the Customs Union comparable with Canary Islands and Madeira. Like in the official discourse Moré also tells about the functioning of the irregular trading. The ideas of the expert-interviewees from Ceuta in sum, seem to correspond accurately with the official discourse for so far. One of them even confirms the critical discourse towards the EU and extends it.

It is Moré expressing his disapproval for the border- and developmental politics of the EU: According to Moré the only solution the EU has found so far for solving the discrepancies at the most unequal border in the world has been the installation of the FRONTEX border protection. Really necessary measures of cooperation helping Northern Morocco to fight poverty have not been taken. It is not Ceuta being in a problematic situation but the surroundings, where very different socio-economic. This is also a main cause of problems in Ceuta. In general Moré accuses the EU of lacking elaborate neighborhood programs and policies, since it is not Europe's business what happens beyond its boundaries it seems also mentioning examples of Moldavia and Romania, Albania and more. This is where Europe's politics fail and it is especially in Ceuta, the free zone, where Europe can prove if it continues failing or not. Instead though the EU keeps on worrying about utopic collaboration on development in far zones in Asia and Africa while forgetting about its neighbors right beyond its exterior boundaries. Moré concludes his criticism saying that Europe does not seem to take the responsibility which would be so essential to help, e.g. having a look at the European exportation to all over the world which is not possible with its Southern neighbor right across the border. The IT-expert agrees with Moré's argument on a more specific level regarding Ceuta. He tells how everyday he asks himself why he cannot get a permission of residence to work in Ceuta legally. He accuses Europe making instead a game of politicians in the world to change the Middle East; a big idea for another world, reminding that they forget to ask the question where this world was before. Both the discourses of the two critics demonstrate critical thinking from the border, resisting the glorifying Europeanization and proving agency in thinking.

Moroccan border-people further especially praise their own habits, such as hospitality and sociability: According to the medicine Morocco is "a very lovely, hospitable country. People are good and nice. Also in comparison with the rest of the world we are very generous. I only know such people. They are very much their own people, excellent people, they can adopt, hospitality. They welcome every one, they love family, there is a lot of cohesion among the family. When you are old, you know that you will stay, live together with your family. Now the same development like in Europe starts, before we would really live together very much with our families, in the same house". The contrabandor also mentions cohesion, generosity, hospitality and social skills when thinking of typical Moroccan features. Other characteristics mentioned are helpfulness, forgiveness, feeling of belonging together "like brothers" and "hard-working". As the comment of the medicine illustrates there is also some subtle criticism, considering these characteristics to be less typical of Europe and Ceuta. He also shows a will to resist Europeanization with regard to these aspects. However, we should add, that Ceuta has a huge proportion of Moroccan population as well, which might have internalized the qualities described, so that Ceuta itself in the end has inherited some of the Moroccan, non-European practices as well.

As denoted in the above paragraph the people of both sides of the border also seem to share a regional fate across the border, and they tell about it. "Ceuta is like Andorra, almost half of it is Moroccan population. But it is a Spanish city. They feel Morocco like no one else. Spanish and Moroccans have always been living together. Also the Spanish have been in Tetouan for 50 years, everyone can speak Spanish here", tells the medicine. The painter and the politician mention the opportunities of exchange the border offers, allowing for trading and buying

goods on both sides, making use of opportune business and chances for employment. The politician even generalizes his ideas explaining that it is like with “all the borders, that they use it”. These images prove the borderthinking of some of the Moroccan border-people, confirming e.g. theories of Mignolo (2000, p. 85) and Kramsch stressing opportunities inherent in borders (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 197, 205). The same thinking is applied to more general diplomatic aspects of cooperation, of mutual dependence, needs and support, since “a separate image of only Europe is impossible. Because Europe without Morocco would have a hard time and go through a series of problems”. Moreover ties across the border are felt concerning sharing a moment of economic crisis (which is touching Spain harshly), passion for Spanish soccer and friendships or relatives living in Spain as the charwoman, trader, first and second contrabandor and the medicine explain. This sharing of fate does not fit the idea of a Europeanized Ceuta and Spain which are clearly separated by the European border from Morocco. Instead borders are shifted very flexibly through media and experiences, confirming prioritization of own habits and very special kinds of border-work (Rumford, 2008, p. 59) – which do not carry European attributes and help to contest the legitimacy of the border.

Poverty and (inter-) dependence in the region are more topics emerging from the discourse of the border-people. The Moroccans tell about the conditions and unemployment they and their friends would probably be confronted with not working in Ceuta. Their practices at the border are therefore very much a result of circumstances in their part of the region forcing them to do jobs for and in Ceuta or trading across the border as the trader, the painter, the smuggler, the contrabandor, the charwoman and politician, all of them, tell. Yet, as we know it is also Ceuta profiting from their services and trading activities so that dependence is mutual. One could speak of an economic cross-border interdependence, which brings along agency and un-European practices. Some of the activities, e.g. services, such as working in construction or households would even probably remain in Ceuta after the city joins the Customs Union.

From the description of practices at the border we can learn that the situation is problematic there: Almost all the Moroccan border-people agree on that the border is a problem and causes (them) problems. It is perceived as an obstacle they have to overcome to reach their place of work and to guarantee their survivals including their families’. Many of them also tell about corruption, bad treatment by police-agents on both sides of the passage, about their worries and fears to be not allowed to cross. Some of them, e.g. the housekeeper or the smuggler who has been working there for long have bad dreams and cannot relax at all, since the tension is so present at the place they have to pass for work. Given these circumstances the competition among the groups of different occupations is high and even worsens the everyday routine and experiences. The medicine from his privileged position of having a permission of residence for Ceuta regards the “crowding” of people queuing and trying to push and skip the others as worst – which as the official discourse confirms has even had deathly consequences sometimes. The dominant discourse in the life of border-people from Morocco about the border-passage is indicative for very own practices which are not conform with European norms, also given the unofficial character of the Customs and border-passage which Morocco (like Ceuta being Spanish) does not recognize. It is a lot of

agency of individuals who have developed diverse tactics to overcome the border-obstacle which characterizes this part of Ceuta, impacting so many Moroccan border-people.

Borderthinking as a very special perspective which might be typical of border-people (Mignolo, 2000, p. 85) could be evident in some rather differentiated ideas of Moroccan border-people on the other side, which appear in their discourse. It is rather indicative that the charwoman, the painter, the contrabandor, the trader and the smuggler. all of them, do not want to give a totalizing judgment about what they think of Spanish or people from Ceuta. They strive for avoiding generalization, all of them saying that as everywhere there are good and bad people. This differentiation and avoidance of a single categorization is indicative of the uniqueness of life of border-people who have the chance to daily experience the other side. I can confirm that the more you know a place the more difficult it becomes to generalize and categorize. Views tend to become more differentiated through intense long-lasting experience with the unknown. Some of the Moroccans go further stating that Moroccans and Spanish basically are the same, there are very diverse people on both sides. What is also remarkable is the fact that they do not tend to glorify people from Ceuta and many times they do not for Spanish neither. It is their experiences proving that they are also just people. The contrabandor says: "Spanish? Everywhere in the world where you go there is good people and bad people". The trader adds: "Europeans: You are different. In all people you have difference". The medicine and the painter though show some preferences: The medicine has had more positive encounters with Spanish from the mainland, than with those from Ceuta, the painter instead prefers the older generation to the young. Before it came to surface already that some of the border-people such as the IT-expert and the painter make a distinction between Moroccan residents in Ceuta or the part of the city a person comes from. What this implies though is that the Moroccan interviewees are not exercising borderwork (Rumford, 2008, pp. 53, 56-57) between Ceuta and Morocco directly but search for other criteria to differentiate, multiplying and substituting established borders. Some paragraphs before the discovery was made that for some Moroccan interviewees Spanish are not Europeans, for they claim not to know any, but still glorify. This is another indication actually that the less one knows people and places from experiences the more one tends to generalize, while having a much more precise picture about what is known, in this case Ceuta and Spain. This characteristic of the thinking of border-people cannot be assessed neither exactly as agency or giving priority to own practices over European. However, this differentiated way of thinking is based on the unique opportunity to know both sides of the border rather well due to proximity and thus I would say, can be called "borderthinking" (Mignolo, 2000, p. 85).

There is thus a lot of agency present in the border-region under mining Europeanization which originates partly from less-European features in Ceuta and Morocco in form of daily practices but is also derived from a rather different value-system and perception of Ceuta, the region and the world.

6.2.4.2 Anti-European Ethnic nationalism

Anti- European Ethnic nationalism is the second indicator of borderthinking and resistance. For the official discourse many comments have been made about authorities and the Moroccan party called Istiqlal promoting anti-European and anti-Spanish-Ceuta nationalism. Going back to 1988 it was when the Istiqlal (party of

independence) used the opportunity of the Fourth International Socialist African Congress (ISA) to gather support for a resolution about the decolonization of Ceuta and Melilla which would be addressed to the Spanish government. In the Spanish discourse this try was evaluated as just another initiative by the party to find a forum for expression (EFE, 1988). Two years later several Moroccan parties expressed themselves unanimously against conspirations against the Moroccan-ness of Ceuta by the Spanish government. Especially Istiqlal made efforts to achieve negotiations working against the Spanish socialist government fostering colonial projects. The party regarded the developments as a dangerous phase of hispanization, acting arrogantly against a peaceful international climate, endangering centuries of common history of Spain and Morocco (Interino, 1990). With regard to other authorities Ceuta and Melilla have been contested issues in Morocco as well: It was in 1995 that Morocco had repeated its request concerning the claim about the territories of Ceuta and Melilla to the United Nations, although vaguer than the times before (Cembrero, 1995). Ten years later there was still rivalry between Spain and Morocco, yet, the journalist Barbulo saw Ceuta making use of the contested situation continuously asking privileged treatment on national and European level (Barbulo, 2005). The first visit of the Spanish king to Ceuta after 80 years of not visiting the city meant a provocation for Morocco, so that the Moroccan king withdrew the ambassador from Madrid immediately (Bárbulo, 2007). Two years ago accusations became quite concrete: the Foreign Ministry of Morocco published a report on maltreatment of Moroccan citizens (beating, racism) by Spanish security forces. The report also included comments on the thankfulness expressed for Moroccan authorities by the traders working at the border (Cembrero, 2010a). The official discourse in Ceuta thus has kept on observing behavior of important Moroccan institutions, demanding back Ceuta. Ceuta is a nationalist issue in Morocco and authorities want to prevent Europeanization of the city.

However, it is not only authorities supporting the claims: there is a general national consent for the requests and there are many examples of moments when this found its expression: It starts with indications that Ceuta is an occupied city on traffic signs at the border to Ceuta (Cembrero, 2010b) mentioned earlier, Moroccans and Sub-Saharanans protesting in front of the Spanish embassy in Rabat and the consulados in Nador and Tetouan. The objective is to denounce the racist practices of Spanish authorities (Cembrero, 2010a), which was also documented by the government in 2010 and sent to Madrid. But there are also intellectuals, different parties etc. pressuring the king about the national issues of Sahara and the occupied cities pointing also to the dangerous steps of disarming custom tariffs with Europe (López García, 2006). At the visit of the Spanish king to Ceuta thousands of Moroccans gathered at the other side of the border to demonstrate against the visit, mainly men and young, carrying Moroccan flags also announcing further demonstrations (Bárbulo, 2007). It is thus a whole people resisting, dreaming to stop the Europeanization of Ceuta and supporting the claims, according to the official discourse represented from a Spanish perspective and Ceuta.

In the discourse of the experts from Ceuta it is acknowledged with regard to the nationalism that the relations between Spain, the EU and Morocco have a very political dimension. Testa Méndez observes that Morocco might be uneasy about the decision of Ceuta to join the Customs Union. He is aware that every benefit the city receives from the EU and concerns Morocco, would not be recognized by Morocco like the Spanish-ness of Ceuta making

illegal newly obtained rights of citizens of Ceuta. Gómez Barceló in fact worries if the improvement of economic relations since the full right-conforming effect has been adopted in 2012 reinforced Morocco's influence about Ceuta. Campos Martínez for similar reasons considers it a necessity that Morocco normalizes, maybe Europeanizes, the relationship with Ceuta. From the politician we learn about the Moroccan perception of the relations: "Moroccans have a good relationship, but we cannot forget the cruelty of the past with Spain, and the opinions of the Spanish about Morocco. Spain is occupying Ceuta, Melilla and the islands, a lot of studies within Spain show, the greatest danger is Morocco. Since November 25th, 2011, when elections in Morocco took place, actually more. The relationship between Morocco and Spain is at a difficult stage. I am worried about the relationships. Spanish are wrong about the history. Spanish media lies to them. They lie to their people about Morocco. Europeans also lack information". These opinions then do not represent resistance or ethnic nationalism, but show that in Ceuta people notice the resistance from Morocco, which makes the Spanish border-people desire more Europeanization as protections from the Moroccan claims.

Claims from Morocco are discussed by Testa Méndez and several Moroccans: Whereas Testa Méndez is especially curious about developments after the elections, the way of dealing with Ceuta under the new Islamist government and the new requests to the UN, the medicine, the IT-expert, the politician and the smuggler simply confirm the claims. They absolutely agree on the fact that Ceuta is an occupied city, which the IT-expert phrases as: "Spain is a country that occupies Morocco". The smuggler simply states: "Ceuta is Moroccan". The medicine even explains what this consequently means for Ceuta and the inhabitants: "one who lives in Ceuta is suspicious of us, because Ceuta actually was ours and half of it is Moroccan now. They feel Morocco like no one else. It is an enclave, military enclave, they have a lot of struggles about their sovereignty". All these ideas illustrate again that the nationalism created about the issue is shared by many Moroccans, all prepared to help resist further Europeanization of Ceuta.

Quite often these reclamations go along with blames of Spain and Spanish. The painter in the context of claims about Ceuta tells that "Spain has some really bad people". The trader fully agrees. The medicine explains the way in which Spanish look down upon the Moroccans and treat them as if they were superior. The politician remains vague when he is asked about the citizens of Ceuta, preferring to better not giving "any opinion about those people", and a rather deprecatory tone is swaying in this sentence. These behaviors show how the border-people from Morocco project their nationalist ideals and diplomatic tensions with Spain also on the relation with and characteristics of Spanish citizens. It might be a tactic of demonstrating that they are right indeed, affirming them in their accusations about the occupation.

Generally nationalism in Morocco is not necessarily directed against Europe or Ceuta. Many descriptions of Morocco and Moroccans by the interviewees demonstrate pride of being Moroccan and seem to serve as self-assuring tactics in front of criticism from outside. The politician has been observing "that the people and the people of the 20th February movement are now more nationalist than before, because they are worried about their country". The trader, the charwoman, the second contrabandor, the housekeeper, the IT-expert, the politician, the smuggler, all of them, picture their special relationship with their country often simply saying "It is my country" or it

is “my home country”. The second contrabandor is feeling very enthusiastic: “There is nothing like his country. Everything is fine”, the IT-expert calls the relationship with Morocco “beautiful” and the politician admits: “It is my love. I love my country and I love Morocco. I love all Morocco and all the Moroccan cities are my origin”. The smuggler also refers to the faith in the king, “the king Mohammed VI, king of the people and the poor”. However, no one is arguing as convinced as the politician who sympathizes with the Istiqlal party: “Moroccans are very popular in the world. You should not forget that. Many important leaders in the world have had so positive words about them. San Jose said that in every Moroccan who dies in a bloody conflict you can see a hero dying. Adolf Hitler said about the Moroccans ‘I need only one Moroccan with German weapons and I can dominate all over Europe’; a famous French, said that the French were crazy to occupy Morocco, because the Moroccans are very good people”. We can learn from these testimonies of being proud of the Moroccan nationality and nation, that affection for Morocco is wide-spread. But we also see that there are different degrees of affection which somehow seem to depend on the general political interest and engagement of a person. What is also logical, is that this pride and belief in the country might not easily be substituted, although, as we have seen earlier, also the Moroccan people dream of certain features of European-ness. Europeanization is thus resisted through partly anti-European nationalism (Kramsch, 2011, p. 205; Kuus, 2004, p. 477), proving ideas about resistance by Kramsch and growing nationalism at Europe’s margins directing itself against Europeanization by Kuus.

6.2.4.3 Elitist character of Europeanization

The last indicator to analyze resistance and borderthinking is the potential elitist character, which the whole debate about the Customs Union, transformations in the region and ways of thinking might have. However, it is not elitist processes which indicate borderthinking or resistance, but rather the identification of it as well moments of protest against the lack of involvement, consideration and participation of the normal citizen.

In the official discourse on Ceuta there are indications, that in fact it was a certain elite involved in decision-making processes. The agreement of both cities, Ceuta and Melilla was seen as a priority, but not without “giving voice to participation of economic and social actors” (Aznar, 2011d). These have been consulted early in the process, according to an article about the Council of Economy and Social (CES) consisting of important socio-economic actors (Armuna, 2010). Groups appealed to by reforms and measures also seem rather elitist, since some of the major goals are e.g. to support commerce and facilitate the arrival of Moroccan clients, developing tourism and improvement of relations with Morocco, whereby mostly it is not the Moroccan average individual, of course, of whom the target group consists but instead the affluent and economic actors (Armuna, 2010). Support from the ordinary citizen is stimulated by “propaganda” with the objective to project the image of a battered city on the citizen, in which everyone is sharing the legitimate illusion of progress. The article of *El País* illustrates, how the political decision-makers try to appeal to the sense of community, recognized intellectual capacities and the ordinary citizen marginalized by political forces. Moreover the sensitivity of people from Ceuta to discourses about belonging has for long been used to make signs of identity memorable and reinforce the feeling of Spanish-ness (Sampietro, 1999). We can conclude that a top-down strategy of decision-making is implemented, considering

only opinions from crucial socio-economic actors. The ordinary citizen of Ceuta is mostly comforted to make him accept the strategies chosen from above.

Ways of dealing with vulnerable groups such as the Moroccan citizens of the Northern region of Morocco who might be strongly impacted is not mentioned at all with regard in the debate. It becomes clear, that this group is not able to contribute opinions or proposals at all – Moroccan border-people have to accept what is decided about their lives on the other side of the border. What is worse, an article by Cembrero (2010a) pictures the accusation by the Foreign Ministry of Morocco about maltreatment of Moroccan citizens (beating, racism) by Spanish security forces at the border. Also Moroccan citizens within Ceuta are highly being ignored since the authorities have not realized a population census among the foreigners living in Ceuta (Cembrero, 2010c). On the other hand few voices hold that it is planned to make everybody benefit, to share richness with Morocco, proposing a reasonable plan of development for Moroccan citizens and not only elites (Moré, 2005).

In spite of this citizens of Ceuta have several times proved to claim their rights, when they felt neglected. In the early 1990s thousands of residents participated in demonstrations to claim historical equality of Ceuta with the rest of Spain which would be ascertained in the constitution of Ceuta as an autonomous city (Aznar, 1994a) – which by the way is another instrument of promotion of neoliberal regimes since power is shifted to a more decentered, subnational level (Sparke, 2002, pp. 218, 235). Garcia observed in 1992 a 95% support of protests and a majority closure of working-centers to mobilize against reforms which made the citizens disagree and worry (Garcia, 1992). Also the Muslim population has several times organized protests for more participation aiming to end marginalization in politics and decision-making (Sánchez Mellado & Nogueira, 1991). For now, for the decision-making about joining the Customs Union, no reports or articles about rejection by the citizens have been found searching the official discourse in Spanish media.

The expert Testa Méndez is convinced that there is total consent among the population for the decision, but also in political and economic institutions, the trading branch and more responsible. But he also explains that the final decision has to be transmitted and presented to the EU Commission by the central Spanish government. It will be the EU Commission then, the very top of institutions, which will have the final decisive power about the request. Besides, he has observed the president, the economic advisor, the spokesmen, the Chamber of commerce, the confederation of companies, political parties of opposition and government working on the proposal to be made. He would generally consider the debate political and economic in kind, but not social. The enumeration, however, is rather indicative for an effective elitist process and Campos Martínez and Gómez Barceló confirm the estimation of Testa Méndez: Political parties, entrepreneurial organizations and the government of Ceuta are responsible for the proposal. They also agree that the decision now as in 1986 was consensual by unanimity. The role of the citizen, they admit was small, although Testa Méndez is sure that they were all agreeing with the decision to join. Nevertheless, Moré counters, that anyway citizens are informed and have a clear image of the EU. Gómez Barceló reminds that, of course, the citizen has expressed his or her voice during the last democratic elections if he wanted so that by now he is anyway represented in the political process.

With regard to rights to participate for the ones who will be impacted on the other side of the border, there is little chance. The politician among the Moroccan respondents admits that generally people from Ceuta and the Northern region “are at the same border, but no one knows anything about the other. So we have to come to a communication”.

To sum up, the application of the indicator of elitist character of the processes on official discourse and ideas of border-people has not distinctly proved resistance (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 197, 205) and borderthinking (Mignolo, 2000, p. 85). Yet, there are subtle hints, that participation has been low and thus one cannot really know, whether consent for transformations in the city and the region and decision-making would have been achieved.

6.3 Summary of arguments and analysis

Summing up, the main arguments of the debate on negative effects have to do with a potential rise in prices, rise in living costs and reduction of importation – and consequently reduction of irregular trade. This would cause a need of a re-orientation of the economy and at least a short-term increase of unemployment. Joining the Customs Union would also mean to lose advantages of exploiting European rules of origin, causing deviation of capital investment and losing advantages as stop-over point for container ships. New political tensions with Morocco can be expected and more investment also by the Spanish state would be necessary, making Ceuta even more expensive for Spain. A disadvantageous effect which does not touch Ceuta, and therefore is almost not mentioned in the debate, is the loss of jobs endangering the survival of many of the poorest among the Moroccan border-traders, including their families.

Main arguments in favor of joining focus on the confirmation as Southern EU border, improving Ceuta's status in the European Community and affirming its European-ness and Spanish-ness before Rabat. In the end, the effect by additional EU customs tariffs on total importation would be small, but staying out of the Customs Union the disarmament of customs tariffs between Morocco and the EU would cause major problems to the economy of Ceuta. Being member of the Customs Union the vulnerability of small enterprises to arbitrariness of Customs agents and diplomatic relations can be reduced and revenues from legal exportation to Morocco would be gained – provided that an agreement on an official customs institution was reached with Morocco. In that case, legal exportation and investment in Northern Morocco could compensate for loss of employment in irregular trading. Generally, the Spanish economic crisis and general structural conditions of Ceuta call for reform and new opportunities, which is encouraged by the positive example of integration into the Customs Union of the Canary Islands, which can be followed overcoming finally long-lasting structural problems. Additional funding and subsidies due to better relations with the EU might be guaranteed as well. All in all thus, the debate revolves around rather economic and political arguments, both in favor of and against becoming member of the Customs Union.

The analysis of the debate, transformations and borderthinking has confirmed theoretical insights also for the time before the decision about joining the Customs Union had been made: From the analysis of European-ness we have learned that Ceuta is already being considered a place of modernity and civilization and that there is belief

in modernity. Its manifestation is visible in organization, cleanliness and control, which all is closely related to civilization. Striving for modernization is expressed through terms such as development, effectiveness and efficiency of economy. It has become obvious as well, that Europe itself and the Customs Union are instruments to homogenize values, which Ceuta is trying to adapt to. European values are part of the discourse on “liberation of trade, globalization, enlargements, the introduction of a single currency, preferential agreements with the Maghreb region and the container-term sustainability – including also Human Rights, labor rights and environmental duties. Homogenized values also resulted to be present in Morocco e.g. regarding development of the economic system corresponding standards of the EU. Even the spread of the Arab Spring Movement contributes to spread of European values, since it carries a lot of hope for a better future, democracy and other European values. The combination of promoted goals such as religious values becoming more important in politics and democracy strongly resembles party programs of conservative European parties, which fight for similar ideals – except that it is Christian values they promote. Democracy, liberty and development and more values incorporated as standards in Ceuta would correspond European standards and a higher status in the EU. For Ceuta then the step of joining the Customs Union means to standardize and improve its position, reflecting international tendencies and hoping to achieve a protagonist role with regard to relations to Morocco. Praising the European standards achieved is indicative for strategic incorporation of values. The other way round the funding received for the maintenance of the European land-border in Africa indicates acknowledgment by the EU of Ceuta’s status.

Simultaneously otherness has been noted in Ceuta, too. The city is living significantly on irregular economy (contradicting liberal market principles) and Islamic values and religion are part of Ceuta, characterizing otherness in the city. Traits of primitivism of economic standards in Ceuta are high unemployment and all struggles related to the singularity (natural, geographical). The social dimension of primitiveness concerns housing rates, a low educational level of the population, social and religious conflict, problems of social insecurity, segregation and marginalization, poverty, crime and migration pressure. Otherness in form of marginalization processes are part of an image which Ceuta is seeking to get rid of in order to attribute more European-ness to the image of the Self. Otherness across the border impacts Ceuta, leaving traces within the boundaries of the city. Yet, it leads to depreciation of population of Moroccan origin which has a negative effect on the image of European-ness–racism and disrespect of Human Rights is what Ceuta and the autonomous government have been accused of, all for the sake of strategies of othering Europeanizing the city (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). In spite of gradual appearance of European values in Morocco they are ‘not yet’ “sufficiently” part of structures and thinking there. Dependence of Morocco on the agricultural sector, economic vulnerability to meteorological conditions, to stocks of resources and fluctuation of markets represent weakness and otherness. Those are measured by European criteria, resulting in an image of primitivism for Morocco, affirmed by the European assistance for development of prosperity. Primitiveness is even considered institutional in a corrupt not sufficiently democratic political system.

Europeanization of Ceuta works through excluding e.g. using economic and social criteria classifying territories beyond the criteria as excluded e.g. Africa and Morocco. The Moroccan Muslim 'other' is also excluded via marginalization and stigmatization. These are strategies of Europeanizing Ceuta discursively inside and to the outside. Moreover, the EU helping to solve bilateral tensions between Spain and Morocco is subtly Europeanizing Ceuta, but degrading and excluding Morocco from the city. At the same time the Muslim country becomes Europeanized approaching Europe through political dialogue. Physical exclusion is being guaranteed by the border-fence, institutionalizing the separation. Europeanizing in Ceuta also is achieved by the goal to reactivate the local economy, taking respective measures conform neoliberal template thinking. Ceuta thus advances on the linear scale of European development. The entire debate on singularities is driven by neoliberal ideas, aiming to finally gain convergence with core-European standards. Substitution of habitual practices in Ceuta such as the irregular trade across the border is part of the process. The argumentation about the decision about the Customs Union proves that Ceuta strives for adaption to internationalization driven by European values and ideals. In Morocco, where the EU offers help and cooperation, values are simultaneously transferred and the country becomes Europeanized. The replacement of languages in the North for Spanish language and the change of family structure are more examples. Europeanization through nesting-orientalism and double framing works by setting boundaries based on degrees of European-ness. These are shifted to discursively Europeanize Ceuta e.g. to where Morocco begins, underlining its distinctiveness. Yet, doubts about European-ness of Ceuta through claims of Moroccan-ness and stressing economic and cultural ties have also emerged. Europeanization of Morocco is recognized given the economic development and association with the EU. Economic and political dialogue can be observed both in Ceuta and Morocco, and in both cases, approaching Europe. The buffer-zone-function Ceuta might take is confirmed: Ceuta is often considered the only European land-border in Africa, receiving compensation for the borderwork against the dangerous South and transmission of European values.

Resistance and borderthinking have been encountered in the analysis as own practices and opinions about Ceuta. Agency in dealing with the singularity has resulted ambiguous carrying both features of Europeanization, and of agency. The irregular trading could be considered resistance, which on both sides of the border has been practiced by Moroccans repainting traffic signs to show Ceuta is Moroccan and protesting against marginalization. Clear criticism of the EU and Ceuta and multicultural practices of Ceuta also have proved resistance to Europeanization. In Morocco Anti-European nationalism is promoted by diverse public bodies maintaining a discourse against the Spanish occupation of Ceuta - being a national issue. Protests have been supported also by intellectuals and common folk. The decision-making process about joining the Customs Union could be identified as elitist, in the sense that only few political, economic and social actors were involved in the top-down decision. Although participation has not been possible, there is evidence that the ordinary citizens agreed with the decision. The indicator did not help to generate clear-cut evidence though, only hints.

Summarizing about the discursive behavior of the two groups, the experts from Ceuta and the Moroccan border-people, means highlighting difference and similarities also regarding the official discourse. Moroccan border-specify the modernity and civilization they observe, showing admiration for every-day details. The official

discourse instead is distant and less euphemistic about the details, focusing much more on the total picture. Moroccan border-people do not regard Ceuta to be in need of modernization dreaming of modernization of their own lives in Morocco or in future. For their comments they mostly use concrete examples, showing consent with European values. Homogenization and European values play a role in the thinking of the experts from Ceuta who seem to agree a lot with the official discourse can be encountered. All border-people in fact do attribute modernity and civilization to Ceuta. As European-ness of thinking supposes people emphasize a superior standard of knowledge and the bounteousness and generosity of Europeans to share it. "Primitiveness of Ceuta" expressed in the discourse of border-people corresponds with the official discourse underlining economic underdevelopment and specialties. In perceptions and ways of thinking of interviewees from Ceuta features of otherness are looked at critically. Total adaptation to European values, leaving other values behind has priority in their ideas, also revealing partly rather colonialist allusions with regard to Ceuta's role in Morocco. They present exclusive ideas, denying attributes of European-ness to Moroccans, making also a distinction between primitiveness in Ceuta and Morocco – which especially economically is more primitive. The experts of Ceuta here confirm the official discourse, also referring to the social dimension. Blaming "school drop-outs and unemployment among the Arab-Muslim population might be also a tactic to indirectly blame the group at the margin for the entire complexity of problems in Ceuta related to otherness.

Moroccan border-people implicitly identify otherness in differences of mentalities or degree of modernity – differences of underlying value systems show up in daily processes on the two sides of the border. Yet, from their perspective otherness as opposed to European-ness is characterized by sociability, helpfulness and friendliness. European-ness is connoted with individuality, self-centeredness and competition. They blame citizens of Ceuta for behaving racist (except for a few number of people) and lack of readiness to help. Moroccan border-people observe otherness and primitiveness only for their country affirming Ceuta being European. They make use of European criteria to evaluate, but mostly would not call Morocco primitive. It is admiration for characteristics of Ceuta, Europe or the inhabitants, which implies that they desire the more of this for themselves in Morocco. In general the Moroccans do not clearly distinguish European-ness and otherness for the two side of the border. Instead they use shades of otherness and European-ness to characterize different attributes e.g. also explaining recent upgrading on the scale of European-ness of Morocco.

In border-people's discursive insights about Ceuta different kinds of exclusion emerged, some of which are similar to the official discourse, e.g. marginalization of Moroccan districts, superior behaving Christians, Stigmatization. Yet, the border-people themselves seem to reproduce the stigmatization. The marginalized Moroccan population of Ceuta e.g. takes part in stigmatization of the other across the border to Europeanize themselves. Some Moroccan interviewees simply confirm exclusionary practices as described by the official discourse, others do not agree with it or have not been reached by the discourse of European-ness of Ceuta. They would instead exclude Ceuta from Europe which is a sharp contradiction to what has been analyzed for the official discourse and the experts. Europeanization through linear development is mentioned by experts following arguments from the official discourse discussing new economic strategies, how to finish irregular trading etc. The

discourse on double-framing by border-people resulted diverse. For Ceuta many border-people from both sides use economic and cultural standards as criterion to shift the boundary of European-ness to the South. Interestingly Ceuta's European-ness and discursive Europeanization are reinforced because both groups of border-people regard places in the North to be losing attributes of European-ness. Both groups so far help to Europeanize Ceuta discursively. Some Moroccan border-people implicitly though contradict and neglect European-ness of Ceuta shifting the border of Europe discursively far to the North. Ceuta is thus framed in several ways and even in its interior through division into groups. Dialogue about reforms are only a topic to the experts from Ceuta, who also see the buffer-zone as characteristic of Ceuta facing a dangerous South (Kramsch, 2011, p. 201) unconsciously describing in how far Ceuta is accordingly "not yet" Europeanized (Kuus, 2004, pp. 480-482, 477).

Concerning Morocco the interviewees from Ceuta show that superiority of European-ness is an instrument to exclude and finally to reassure their European-ness. Agreements with Morocco on economics are regarded to imply political recognition of the Spanish-ness of Ceuta. The interviewees identify radical Islamism as worth excluding but admit that Morocco has been developing for the last years. Template thinking thus also penetrates the experts' evaluation similar to the official discourse. Ceuta and Morocco are regarded to be protagonists as most occidental in the Maghreb-region, by the experts. Their thinking is dominated by speculations on business and fiscal condition. The Moroccan border-people are more general in their neoliberal discourses: some are ambitious and want to progress along the linear line with Morocco. Yet, they project neoliberal ideals on their lives and life of individuals in other places. This thinking reveals individual striving for economic prosperity, on the micro-level. Work is the economic activity at the center of their lives and thinking on a local scale which is very distinctive from the application of template thinking by the experts. These, of course, do not struggle as much for survival. They would generally be located at the top of the linear scale of individual local development which the Moroccans strive for to reach - but being on the top already, the experts present themselves indifferent to the individual dimension. What applies to substitution of habits, nesting-orientalism and double framing, dialogues about reforms and buffer-zone function in Morocco there is almost no distinct discourse worth mentioning. However, what is there indicates images of less Europeanization of Morocco than of Ceuta.

For resistance both discourses differ partly from the official discourse. Observing what border-people from Ceuta comment, colonialist, racist attitudes are not as bad as the official discourse might suggest. They present themselves partly proud of the distinctiveness of Ceuta, and there is even criticism of border- and developmental politics of the EU. They note the claims by Morocco and Moroccans, but try to ignore them longing for official acknowledgement of their border. The elitist character of the decision-making about the Customs Union is, though unwillingly, confirmed. The consent is regarded as wide-spread, but they even doubt whether the ordinary citizen understands the decision and the Customs Union. Resistance in their discourse is small and there are only few moments of borderthinking emerging from it. Moroccan border-people praise their own habits, hospitality and sociability. They feel as if sharing a regional fate across the border. In their discourse poverty and (inter-) dependence and the border as a problem emerge as topics. Among them they share the idea that Ceuta is a

national issue, claim the occupied territory back and some even blame Spanish to behave racist and look down upon them. They all show belief in their nation. The Moroccans thus prove agency and resist the European discourse, although the nationalism as resisting European-ness might as well be a confirmation of the European conception of the nation-state.

With regard to theory then e.g. the standardization of European epistemology, the relevance of European-values or criticism about otherness of Morocco in evaluation and thinking observed can be explained by insights of Mignolo (2000, pp. 59-61). Border-people from both sides have internalized modernity in their thinking and European values are becoming ever more decisive. For the experts from Ceuta belief modernity seemed unchallengeable (ibid., p. 68) confirming steadily the official discourses and clearly distinguishing European and the Other by applying criteria of European- and other-ness. Also Moroccans proved to evaluate using criteria corresponding closely with European values, expressing homogenization. Positive images and values might be also reinforced by media transmitting criteria of evaluation and the European epistemology (ibid., pp. 54-56). A lot of evidence is also implicated in the achievements of the "Arab revolution", which bears attributes of homogenization and confirm European values e.g. as democracy. Although the revolution at first glance might imply opposite ideas (ibid., p. 59), it actually pictures how values are taken over always driven by European sophistication (ibid., pp. 54-56). They even apply European binary criteria of European-ness and otherness to criticize Morocco. European behavior has infiltrated the lives in Northern Morocco (ibid.) as well. However, the experience at the border and knowing the other side inherits opportunities for comparison of mentalities and characteristics (ibid., p. 85; pp. 64-67) so that Moroccan border-people in fact experience privileges which they ascribe to European-ness of Ceuta. Idealization of European-ness is then a simple consequence of connoting "European-ness" and "privileges" (ibid., p. 56; p. 68).

More, useful theoretical contributions were derived from Sparke (2002, pp. 213-216) stressing the economic dimension of transformations and actors in the border-region. Economic European ideals and values in the thinking of decision-makers and the general discourse proved to be relevant at several points of the analysis (ibid., pp. 213-214). Neo-liberally driven thinking seemed to be lurking behind many arguments of the debate about the Customs Union. The dimension of Europeanization of which template thinking (ibid., p. 215) has been one indicator is certainly very economic in kind and confirms that Sparke's insights are decisive in this paper - template thinking was a rather rich indicator appearing frequently in the official as well as in the discourse of border-people. Neo-liberal thinking (ibid., pp. 215, 234-235) generally resulted to be very determining of practices of bordering e.g. justifying to locate the border of Europe in the South of Ceuta. In combination with theoretical pieces of Kuus (2004, p. 477) we could explain many times the relation between rather economic motivations of Ceuta to prove its European-ness (ibid., p. 221). Another dimension observable in the transformation process in the region is the shift of power to sub- and supra-national organization and decentered governance which is indicative of neoliberal thinking as driving force as well (Sparke, 2002, pp. 218, 234-235). Euro-centrism (Mignolo, 2000, p. 54) finds expression in economic measures introduced to substitute otherness for European-ness, also generating profits for Europe. In combination with Mignolo Sparke (ibid., pp. 213-216) provides for explanation

also of admiration of higher standards of living in Europe and Ceuta, becoming connoted with characteristics of European civilized behavior and the European monopoly on epistemological standards e.g. also identifying the important economic dimension of primitivism of Morocco.

Moroccan border-people tended to identify modernity in Ceuta mostly by comparison with their own background, which is indicative for Kuus' idea about shifting borders of degrees of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 472-475). Significance of economic motivations for transformations seem to be a major value showing that values in general are the key-factor of analyzing European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 477). Arguing about Spanish-ness of Ceuta is strategic self-exclusion of Ceuta from the African continent -Europeanizing by exclusionary practice (ibid., pp. 472-475). Homogenization of Ceuta, a European geographically peripheral region, has been also identified as a piece of agency of the place making use of the discourse of European-ness to achieve political and economic privileged treatment (ibid., pp. 477-478) - or ambiguously as a wider goal even to achieve upgrade and improve the degree of its European-ness. Spanish from Ceuta stigmatizing Moroccans in order to set boundaries, making distinctions towards South, shifting European-ness and applying strategies of nesting-orientalism and double framing about the other to affirm their European identity, institutional discrimination and building obstacles (ibid., pp. 484, 480-482) can be all understood as tactics to protect and reassure European-ness of Ceuta. Hereby otherness elsewhere is always necessary to define European-ness of a place but is not desired to be located within own boundaries or those of Europe (ibid., pp. 472-475). The formulation of 'not yet' European, which has been observed several times is what Kuus refers to when explaining template thinking, nesting-orientalism and double framing (Kuus, 2004, pp. 473-475, 482). This nesting-orientalism, double framing and invention of degrees of European-ness (ibid., pp. 480-482, 473, 478) in comparison with different geographic directions have emerged from the discourses, being irreplaceable as tactic of Ceuta (ibid., 478). The same has been observed to less extent for Northern Morocco in the discourses of the interviewees. The implementation of the same tactics is e.g. proved by the discourses about achievements of the Arab revolution, whereby European-ness of Morocco has become a criterion of differentiation. Use of binary oppositions of European-ness and otherness serve as two extremes of a scale of shades of both attributes (ibid., pp. 472-474) being applied also in considerations made by Moroccans. What Kuus is already touching by talking of degrees, also arises from the analyses of data: Complexity, tactics and agency of framing go beyond "only double" and even beyond pluralities of Europes for different places. In response for Europeanization positive conditionality from the side of the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 473; Kramsch, 2011, pp. 200-201) has been encountered as well for Ceuta as for Morocco.

The fact that Moroccan border-people dream of European modernity, without having a chance to achieve it because of their "other" less European attributes and values actually helps to reaffirm Europe's identity (Kuus, 2004, pp. 472-474; Kramsch, 2011, pp. 196-198). The institutional discrimination, exclusion and building of obstacles reassures European-ness to Ceuta, which simultaneously needs the otherness of Morocco to define its European-ness drawing a line of distinction (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 196, 200-201). Especially template thinking (ibid., p. 197) can be useful to determine otherness. All this has proved to have been practiced in Ceuta for years as a way to Europeanize the place, setting oneself apart from the other. Generally features of otherness

described by Kramsch (ibid., pp. 195, 198, 205) thus help explaining tactical moves of Ceuta. The relation between Europe and Morocco is actually marked by a conditional nature which e.g. the agreement of disarming customs tariff shows. This mechanism has been identified e.g. in Kramsch's insights about European Neighbourhood Policies (ibid., pp. 198-201). The European values observed in the way of thinking of some Moroccan border-people and admiration for European standards and life, thus, does not "know" a border and reaches beyond the border-fence of Ceuta, proving what Kramsch (ibid., pp. 196-198) illustrates on the basis of Mignolo (2000, pp. 54-56; p. 68) about European template thinking having spread and spreading all around – contributing to Europeanize the thinking of Moroccan border-people. Another important explanation by Kramsch (2011, p. 197) can be applied to the borderthinking of some of the Moroccan border-people, showing up ways of resistance opportunities inherent in borders for agency.

Rumford's practices of bordering (Rumford, 2008, p. 53) are very obvious -observing tactics of bordering such as exclusionary practices towards outside and inside of Ceuta helping to Europeanize the city. Borders of European-ness are shifted a lot so that nesting-orientalism and double framing become very complicated here – all the bearers of discourses about Ceuta contribute to complex, sometimes contradictory border-work (ibid., pp. 56-59), which Rumford describes in his cosmopolitan theories, which allow for individual agency and making use of bordering (ibid., 59). Borders are multiplied, substituted and their legitimacy is being contested (ibid., pp. 53, 59). But none-the-less certain powerful border-workers are identified in combination with Sparke's theory, for it is neo-liberal thinking and European values determining and transforming many practices of bordering (ibid., pp. 52-53). For example exclusionary practices have resulted to be often economic in kind in both the official discourse and the discourse of ordinary border-people. Besides in the case of Ceuta borders also are shifted very flexibly through media and experiences, confirming prioritization of own habits and very special kinds of border-work (ibid., p. 59) –which do not carry European attributes.

What has been surprising and is not provided with theory in this research so far is the level of reference which has been chosen in the different discourses. Moroccan border-people referred almost exclusively to the daily and individual, using the micro level and details when expressing their thoughts. The border-people from Ceuta and the official discourse contrarily focus on totalities and a macro-perspective, neglecting the personal, individual and placing Ceuta in a more global picture. These insights are not implied in the theories chosen to operate indicators from. It is thus an observation which emerges from data and is worth spending more thoughts on in the final conclusion of this report.

7. *Europeanization and potential socio-economic effects in the border-region in 2013*

This paragraph deals with the potential socio-economic scenario of Ceuta and the border-region after the city has been integrated in the Customs Union in 2012 and attributes of Europeanization and othering to be expected. Focus is given to transformation processes and social economic impacts on the region after being incorporation of Ceuta in the Customs Union. The elaboration of the scenario is written in an ethnographic way based on speculation on potential impacts from literature and discourses by different border-people.

7.1 Imaginative ethnographic day-trip from Tetouan to Ceuta center

Spring 2013, I am back to the border-region on the side of Northern Morocco. It is as usual early in the morning when I take an over-crowded collective taxi in Tetouan to the border-passage of Ceuta. There are some women with me and since we are with seven in the taxi, I cannot but listen to their talks. Although my Moroccan Arabic is still not worth mentioning I understand that they talk about their jobs in Ceuta and I conclude that they are some of the housekeepers working on the other side. The housekeeper, my interviewee had already told me that business is becoming more and more competitive. Already before Ceuta joined the Customs Union, she told me that she has never been friends with the other women, who also just focus on themselves. She was very carefully telling about her job, since she knew that the others would try to boot her out and take over her job. Now, she told me there is even more competition – a lot of women carrying formerly goods across the border had to give up that occupation. Now, that also trucks can pass at the official Customs institution only the fittest survive. If you do not have capital to invest or any drivers-license you cannot work any-more in trading at the border. Anyway, the trade has become less, there is less profit from the business across the border now. So that is why especially (elderly) women without capital and driving license were forced to give up their jobs. Instead they joined the huge competing group of housekeepers, fighting for the jobs in Ceuta. But also jobs in Ceuta have decreased in number, since the Spanish crisis and the reforms have led (at least for the moment) to an even bigger lack of employment. Also measures to create more efficiency in administration in 2012 caused suspension of staff, so that by now many households cannot afford housekeepers or only those who work for little money under tough conditions.

After a while I give up to try to listen to the women around me in the taxi and start looking through the window. The huge hotels and tourist ‘palaces’ seem to spread like mushrooms at every single piece of the coast which has not yet been touched. It is true then, I conclude – investment in the Northern part is continuing. However, I am not sure, whether it is the modernizing, Europeanizing economy of Morocco and the support by the politically strategic king Mohamed VI (who tries to recompense for political failure and neglect of the Northern Region by his father to assure himself the support by the people in the region) or whether it is Spanish or European investors infiltrating the country, Europeanizing it from the outside and Ceuta.

We arrive at the border-passage and get off. As usually the place is busy, but I can observe some change. The group of people queuing to pass, now mostly consists of women. I interpret, that in fact, the majority heads to work in households in Ceuta. On the other side of the street through the passage the amount of cars has increased (Cembrero, 2009b) a lot. Now it is not only passenger cars queuing, by now there many typical, minor and major 20-years old Moroccan pickups and trucks, generally driven by Moroccan men. Probably controls have shifted to the inspection of vehicles now and it is there, where corrupt border-officials get their extra piece of the cake. Indeed you can smell the shift of means of transportation for the trading in the air: the passage, much more crowded by vehicles is a major place of pollution. However, I generally have the feeling that there are less people, especially in the cage-like corridors on the Spanish-side, the flow is accelerated and things seem more organized and civilized – maybe forced through the use of vehicles, which requires a higher degree of discipline from the

border-people and agents. The passage has been civilized and modernized, I think suddenly. Welcome European-ness.

Leaving the passage at the other side I meet some old acquaintances: The trader, the IT-expert and the two contrabandores among my interviewees stand together talking. They greet me with surprise and ask me what I was doing here. I tell them about my curiosity to see the border, Ceuta and the region after the introduction of the official Customs institution, which Morocco had been forced to acknowledge after Ceuta joined the Customs Union and the border of Ceuta was made an official exterior border of Europe (Cembrero, 2008b). Telling, I come to ask myself silently whether the conformation as Southern EU-border has actually really helped to improve Ceuta's general status within the Union e.g. through the elimination of uncertainties in relation to Morocco creating confidence into the future creating new opportunities (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 333). Enthusiastically the border-people tell me about what has happened to them since our last meeting. Basically all of them were lucky enough to find employment or stay with what they did before. The trader has changed the concept of his shop selling jewelry, which by now has become almost equal in prices in Morocco and in Ceuta. Now it is some alimentary goods subsidized by the EU for consumption in Ceuta, which he sells in his shop. He had enough money to buy a small pickup, so that now there are two men working for him getting the goods from the port in Ceuta, which he sells in Fnideq. However, he is not sure how long he might be able to sustain his shop, as usual he expresses his hopes by pulling up his shoulders and saying: "inshallah"!

The IT-expert continues working in black in Ceuta, selling hard- and software. His employer has received some financial support, like many of the small and middle enterprises helping them to reorient on the market. However, the situation in Ceuta is not stable yet and he cannot afford to employ the IT-expert permanently and with legal papers in situation of crisis in Spain and restructuring of Ceuta. For the IT-expert the daily struggle with the agents at the border remains and he hopes every day that they would let him pass. However, he is relieved about the fact that now there are significantly less people crossing as pedestrians, which makes conditions much more endurable. The two contrabandores have managed, due to the connections and experience they have, to become employed by some of the organized business for trading goods from Ceuta, belonging to rich Moroccans. The strategy is changed and the trafficking is officially more or less recognized. As transporting the goods is mostly realized by trucks, less people are needed and the process is more convenient and faster. Yet, the contrabandores have to calculate a lot of time still for passing, since their vehicles have to pass controls at the Customs institution and the queue of vehicles has grown. They also tell that they have been lucky, having a driving license and connections, since many of them lost their jobs. Especially women and poor men, not having capital to invest, lost their job as carriers and traders (Flores, 2010). Goods have become almost equally expensive in Ceuta and Melilla, so that there is no work anymore for them. Some of them found alternative jobs in construction, went to other cities or once in a while help out at the border. But many of them became unemployed (Cembrero, 2001). As a consequence competition on the market of construction in Ceuta and Morocco has increased, and as I would learn later, that the painter has lost his job. For his family, his wife and the two children that will mean a hard time depending on the support by parents, who are old and without work as well.

I am puzzled about the stories I heard and I leave the group of Moroccans who have to return to get their work done or hurry to their workplace, resisting the discourse of Europeanizing Ceuta of establishing a clear boundary of European-ness with Morocco. They just keep on trading half irregularly and crossing the border, demonstrating the border's permeability and their silent resistance. I feel sorry for the ones who lost perspectives, and I recognize that the economic, Europeanizing measures in Ceuta are elitist: It is at least for the short-term, especially elites and people in Ceuta benefitting (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 333; Cembrero, 2008b). But on the other side and among the most vulnerable the choice creates huge problems and endangers survival. I also remember a walk through the center of Tetouan, where I had the impression that the number of begging elderly has increased. Maybe it is because their families cannot support them anymore financially, so that they chose to leave them and give their lives to the capricious moods of the street. While thinking about all this I find myself already walking along the street from Tarajal, always along the coast towards the center of Ceuta.

I am curious if I can observe some traits of modernization or more European-ness – a lot of measure were planned to accompany the step of joining the Customs Union, so probably some indications must be found somewhere. Walking further then I discover that the amount of trucks and pickups coming from the port and loaded with goods driving into the direction of the border clearly has increased. I wonder which kind of goods they are transporting: Spanish chocolate? Baby-bell and Gouda cheese? I also try to guess, if goods indeed are, as expected, mostly from Europe not Asia anymore and especially alimentary in kind. However, what is clear is that the relationship with the neighboring province has not broken off – there are still a lot of connections, which now are even legalized. The Northern part seems to become Europeanized from and in relation with Ceuta in spite of remaining “primitive” features in Ceuta as cyclical tensions with Morocco and migratory pressure from the South. For the direct geographic surroundings basic products are still being provided for, as well as for essential services. Moroccans even still find employment in Ceuta, although maybe for the moment there is less (Aznar, 2011g).

Throwing a glance to the port I discover construction works. Maybe they received funding for the enlargement of the harbor by the European Union as planned, and yes, there are even some signs signifying that it is European support which makes the project possible - as hoped in Ceuta (Flores, 2011). I find my assumption confirmed that also physical transformations in the city are driven by Europeanization. Privileges have been admitted to Ceuta such as compensation for the exceptional obstacles (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 333) e.g. cheapening maritime transport by EU funding (El Faro de Ceuta, 2011), as I observe on an advertisement decorated by European stars for the local shipping agency for passenger's transportation to Spain mainland.

Arriving to the center I encounter more features, revealing change, investment, subsidies and Europeanization: The center seems to be modernizing which I see admiring some reconstruction for residential projects, bearing the EU-stars on posters outside the buildings. I remember also that renovation of the sector of production, generation of more benefits for investment, stimulation of industrialization and touristic projects were part of the agenda of modernization (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p.333). Maybe that was, what the construction-works to the

West of the port were about – stimulating production in Ceuta, using new fiscal conditions (Aznar, 2011g) and competitiveness of the site (El Faro de Ceuta, 2011). For tourism I do not think that I have noticed something concretely indicating reinforcement of the branch. The entire redefinition of the economic strategy reminds me of the process of standardization which goes along with the Europeanization. Speculations about Ceuta becoming known for occidental quality of service also in Morocco (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 494) were made a lot – presenting the privilege of European-ness of Ceuta.

Walking along the main shopping street, the Royal street, Ceuta presents itself as usual. As well European-looking customers as veiled Moroccan women pass. When I reach the local, municipal government I find a huge poster of advertisement stuck to the ancient, plastering balcony praising the good relationship of the particular, unique city Ceuta with the rest of the EU and role as bridge to Morocco (Aznar, 2011f). Reading the lines I remember the many times, I read before that Ceuta might be able to improve its position in the EU by joining the Customs Union. In fact, I observe investment and thus privileges which the decision has generated for Ceuta, but does that actually mean that Ceuta's position in the Union is improved? And what about tourism? Do tourists, like me, really prefer the city now that European-ness might have been reaffirmed? Has some sort of cultural, natural primitivism or exoticism inhibited tourism before (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 333)? I really cannot judge about that. Thinking more of what Ceuta's features of "primitivism" were before, I also wonder if the so pressing social problems of unemployment, despair of young, school dropouts etc. (Flores, 2010) actually might be solved now. If there is maybe some investment in these sectors or whether priority is still given to develop economically – as template thinking would promote? Solving economic problems will help solving all the other problems of the city, progressing in development. Maybe in fact revenues have increased since the introduction of a reformed fiscal system and the taxation of exportation to Morocco, so that the additional revenues were spent on other sectors (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 333). Finally the city has been regularized – no irregular or totally irregular trade anymore (Cembrero, 2008), habitual practice has been substituted and modernized – the city has managed to seem approaching European standards - but is not yet European enough.

Looking around on the main square thus, in front of the buildings of the government I recognize everything is as I remember it from 2011. The buildings, the multicultural crowd moving through the center-I cannot observe that otherness has lessened by now or been excluded. The relation across the border exists. At the same time the idea comes to my mind that joining the Customs Union would confirm the border in Ceuta as EU- Southern border, separating European Ceuta from not European Morocco (Cembrero, 2008) - a strategy of nesting orientalism. But actually the multicultural sphere and Moroccans still daily coming to work or for shopping show again, that Ceuta is not yet as purely European, as other values and habits are part of the day by day – maybe it is not nesting otherness, but often double framing what I am observing. Morocco and Ceuta - a complicated relationship. Anyway I cannot notice indications of tensed relationships with Morocco as might have been expected after Europe and Spain forced the country to recognize the border-passage at Tarajal as regular Customs institution (Cembrero, 2008). Moroccan nationalism about the border seems to have become more silent, implicitly involved in everyday practices, but seldom loud in official disputes or by closing the border-

passage. Maybe there is some truth in what I read in a report about the World Customs Organizations: "Borders divide, Customs connect". Although of course, as we have seen for long, the border in Ceuta is much too permeable to be dividing and the joining of the Customs Union too disadvantageous for the poorest among the border traders to be connecting. Still, of course, many have been speculating and hoping for compensation of loss of economic power through economic growth of Morocco -helping Ceuta out of isolation (Gallego, 2010). To me it seems though, as if this was a question of time first of all.

I am tired of walking and watching, I would like to have a good coffee and throw a glance into the local newspapers of which I know, that Spanish cafés provide them for their clients. That is, why I choose to sit in a "Spanish" – named bar, instead of walking into one of the still many Moroccan places, where you can get Moroccan specialties. I find a table and take one of the journals I desired. But suddenly my attention is attracted by a group of Spanish men discussing at a neighboring table. I hear that their debate is about the measures and steps undertaken in Ceuta, evaluating the socio-economic effects of Ceuta joining the Customs Union. Now I realize that it is the group of experts, I have been interviewing, Testa Méndez, Campos Martínez, Gómez Barceló and Moré whom I am listening to. I am tensed and very curious about what they find of the current situation in comparison with the time before the decision.


I hear Gómez Barceló asking: "What alternatives had we had? We would have been always more dependent on financial support by the state...", and he pulls his shoulders to his ears and lets them sink again. Campos Martínez agrees: "Now we are progressing fast" and Moré adds: "Indeed, it is much more organized now in Ceuta and the port is modern". While listening, I observe their gestures and wonder whether there has really been no alternative than to strive for progress, modernity and reassuring the European-ness of Ceuta. Testa Méndez tries to stress that it was especially important for Ceuta "to find its place in economic relations. Actually the whole debate before was economic, but in the end we have reaffirmed the European character of the city also before Morocco. Europe has helped us. Now we have a commercial border, which facilitates the commerce within and beyond the borders ... Have you seen lately how many agreements were firmed about investment in Fnideq and Mdiq? We have won so much, if you ask me." But Gómez Barceló is more doubtful, interrupting the enthusiastically gesturing Testa Méndez. "I am not sure in how far we can really profit from the investments there. It does not really help us. But for us, for us here anyway, you are right, it will be the right decision." I am not surprised to hear in their discourses a lot of will and to recognize an advanced state of homogenization of values corresponding core- European ones. They talk of economy, liberal markets almost exclusively. "I am not sure about that topic, but what I know, is that we normalize our trade with the EU and we are about to develop our own local industry, all due to having an official customs institution with Morocco", Campos Martínez tries to balance the discussion. And Moré follows his example: "I mean you have to consider how unequal this border has been, and now things are improving and obtain structure. With the effective port of Ceuta, the city is still superior even to the Tanger Med harbor". I feel like back to analyzing all the interviews, I feel as if I am just listening to how they tell me, that they seek to standardize their city, to make it be conform with European norms glancing at the

privileges linked to the standardization. They really seem to believe their city to be much more European, just after the short period of having a Customs Union and introducing measures of reform.

Their talk is interesting, but for a moment I am distracted while the waiter asks me to order something. I want a coffee and notice that I have totally forgotten the newspaper I wanted to read, but the conversation simply attracts my attention again. Campos is just stating, that according to him, “the decision has been beneficial for almost everyone. But it is true, importation has become so much less from Southern and Eastern Asia, the extreme Orient there.” I am fascinated, to hear the assumption being confirmed that importation has broken away from Asia through joining the Customs Union, but even more to hear him use the term “Orient”, by which he expresses that he locates attributes of otherness in these countries. He thus implies that Ceuta now as before has always been part of the Occident for him. The others are nodding. Moré starts talking about Morocco: “I mean, having a look across the border, Morocco is gradually integrating somehow into the EU’s economic networks. Of course, it is out of question that this country could never join the EU, but still Morocco is already living on trade with the EU and it is developing fast. I think, Ceuta was right in deciding this way”. I am impressed again, that he can be describing simultaneously how Morocco is economically evolving, modernizing and Europeanizing, but also draw that clear line, “excluding” Morocco – probably thinking of cultural differences. Testa Mendéz reacts pragmatically and distanced: “Well, I am satisfied that Morocco tolerates the commercial border ... that is the only thing, I wanted from that country”. Gómez Barceló shows a skeptic reaction arguing that “it would be utopic to believe that the land-and sea borders of Ceuta were ever recognized by Morocco”. No one dares to contradict. I feel that what they were telling, shows the actual difficulty Ceuta finds to set the border to a less European, “other” Morocco, which is always trying to resist and contest the border e.g. by nationalist discourses. Maybe it is therefore, that they return to economic arguments now, which seem to be more clearly defined make discursive exclusion of Morocco easier. “Well, it is actually of course strict economic arguments which reaffirmed our status in the European Union now and the European character of our city – and that is what might be a good means to force Morocco – with the help of Brussels – to give up the territorial claims. At least for our commercial border this strategy has obviously worked out well, I would say”, Gómez Barceló tries to break through the silence. Moré starts repeating what he stressed earlier on: “Yes, it is still a very unequal border. However we must be glad. Melilla is not doing well. There, I know that, the disadvantage of the customs tariffs is causing more problems right now. The increase of prices for importation especially for cars and products from Asia has led to much more significant reductions of importation – 10% of the trade of Melilla before was based on relations with third countries. That is different from Ceuta, of course”. I wonder whether Moré discursively tries to set apart Ceuta even from Melilla, showing that Ceuta has anyway been much more Europeanized – nesting-orientalism in Melilla. Testa Mendéz relativizes this positive evaluation: “For my information though also here some have lost: All the city profits in general - but the smaller branches, or those trading with cars and all branches related to those products originating formerly from third, Asian countries and to the contrabando have been losing- yet, already for one decade, of course”. “Anyway, we are on the good way I would say”, Campos Martínez explains, “we are normalizing the economy and developing industry – the majority of branches experiences beneficial impacts”. Directly I start thinking about template thinking again, when I listen to them discussing about economic

advantageous and progress. Isn't it just again the line of core-Europe's development which Ceuta seeks to imitate, being not yet European enough? Didn't they say earlier on that it was the only alternative to follow this line, otherwise there would be only ever more dependence on public support? Isn't it just neoliberal ideas dominating their thinking and the development in Ceuta right now? Still pondering I hear Testa Mendéz saying that "Ceuta just had to find its economic pace, a niche for development. The irregular trade was just not the right one anymore, also seen the development of Morocco and disarmament of Customs. I have heard from friends having their own shops, that they are doing well and the subsidies they received for preventing adverse effects have helped them. Others, more involved in the contrabando, had a chance to reorient on the regular market thanks to the subsidies – I regard all the reforms as an opportunity to progress. And yes, we had to give up the old IPSI, but not our singularities, like the Canary Islands we made it to get our special conditions recognized". Gómez Barceló agrees: "And the new fiscal imposition is still a little lower than the VAT". Testa Mendéz reaffirms: "I mean, we are not anymore a free zone, but that will become (as it is already now) steadily less important". It is thus even practices and habits, the experts think of mainly in economic terms. They really seem to have been reaffirmed by positive developments in their belief in neoliberal template thinking. Barceló sighs and says: "The only thing, I would still wish, was an official recognition of the Spanish-ness of Ceuta by Morocco. Actually of course, we have everything Europe has and we are European - if there was just the official recognition". What a typical statement of the historian, I smile to myself. But it is also indicative of the problem of double-framing of that "not yet" – in this case officially recognized – European-ness has remained even after the integration into the Customs Union. There is an official Customs institution, but no official border according to Morocco. The experts actually seem to observe Morocco to be Europeanizing, but they know that it will take some time still, more than for Ceuta. Again the experts are nesting-orientalism behind the border. They still do try to reaffirm their border discursively, even after joining the Customs Union. And as Moré mentioned before, they also seem aware that the Customs Union reaching into Ceuta helps structuring, but also makes Ceuta even more an official buffer-zone which has to protect Europe's borders and stimulate development in the neighboring country.

Figure 13: Multicultural Ceuta: a mosque, a veiled Muslim-woman walking in front of the building of the government in Ceuta and a Christmas-tree, two Suh-saharan Africans caught in Ceuta and assisting cars for parking.



I continue listening to their conversation. Again and again they reaffirm that they are content about the step to join and that they observe a positive reaction among the population and entrepreneurs as well. They do not mention the Moroccan border-people, the traders though who lost their jobs. Maybe for the experts it is satisfying to know that the irregular characteristic of their economic structure has been stripped off mostly. However, me, personally and as researcher having tried to create a picture of the region through a post-colonialist lens, I find this way of thinking disinterested: they still depend on Morocco and live together with Moroccan people in one border-region. The experts appreciate the regularization and traffic by trucks, which makes exportation legal and documented. Nevertheless, they also almost neglect the imposing character of the measures taken for small business which from their description does not find it any effort to readapt – which remains an open question here, whether the small entrepreneurs have difficulties in adaptation or not. The positive socio-economic impacts have consequently had a rather elitist character. The experts though show themselves glad also about the fiscal special treatment and support Ceuta receives for the particular, singular Island position and observe the satisfaction among the citizens who can travel for low prices to Spain now. They are aware that Ceuta will remain a multicultural city and try to shed positive light on it. Their only worry seems to be the relationship with Morocco in diplomatic sense and doubt whether there is enough expertise and sensitivity to the situation of Ceuta in the European and Spanish administration to foster a good end for Ceuta. I conclude from listening then, that they are conscious about particularities of Ceuta and that they wish to use the position and relations to the EU for improving – on a template scale - the situation of the city. Morocco, habitual practices, traditions and people on the other side resisting the discourse of European-ness through their claims and silent agency are mostly ignored, even in 2013 –they do not take any responsibility for the socio-economic effects on the other side created by joining the Customs Union in 2012.

I step out of the café and leave the experts to their discussion, breathing deeply the newly re- Europeanized and steadily Europeanizing air of Ceuta which I share with so many Moroccan border-people from across and within the border. They walk on the main square, busy hurrying “to get their bread” (Moroccan expression “for doing their jobs”). Observing this I find the air smell much more multicultural and multi-European again, than inside the café (see figure 13).

7.2 Summary about potential socio-economic effects in the border-region

The major socio-economic impacts in the border-region are based on the introduction of Custom tariffs on importation, causing substitution of importation from Asia by European products mainly. Moreover an official Customs Institution at the border would have to be forced by Morocco, making exportation legal – allowing for documented trading by freight traffic. For the border- passage this implies that irregular trading vanishes to a huge extent and is substituted. However, also the traders will lose their jobs and are urged to find alternative jobs, which is most difficult for the weakest, poorest and women. Consequently competition in other branches in the region will grow, but many families will slide into unemployment and poverty on the Moroccan side. In Ceuta small

business related to irregular traffic before will have to reorient. Additional measures of reform about the fiscal system and recognition of Ceuta as ultra-peripheral region by the EU though might guarantee compensations and help to invest in different projects. To a certain degree then we find the city and the region “normalized” and more European – also creating a basis for infiltration of investment into Northern Morocco and Europeanizing that region. Nonetheless, Ceuta will maintain characteristics of otherness, which are discursively being fought in the expert’s discourses. Moroccan border-people especially, less oriented towards the global competition than the experts stay with arranging their local lives and silent agency contesting the re-established borderline.

Many theoretical insights, such as resistance and borderthinking (Kramsch, 2011; Mignolo, 2000) in form of agency contesting the border (Rumford, 2008; Kuus, 2004) have been useful to understand the potential socio-economic impacts. Template thinking and neoliberal forces promoting the developments seem to continue penetrating the region and thinking (Kramsch, 2011; Sparke, 2002). All in all, Europeanization of Morocco, causing Europeanizing measures in Ceuta (Kuus, 2004) stimulates spill-over of Europeanization into Northern Morocco (Kramsch, 2011) and simultaneously always confirms a culturally conditioned (anchored in differences of values) border between Morocco, the Orient, and European Europe (Kuus, 2004). We might come to speak of a self-perpetuating process of Europeanization in the region, steadily being undermined by none-European practices of bordering and multiplying Europes at the same time (Rumford, 2008; Kuus, 2004).

8. Conclusion

It is now at the time to answer in which way attributes of European-ness, Otherness, Europeanization and resistance are reflected in transformations in the border-region, factors in the debate about joining the EU-Customs Union and thinking of border-people from both sides in Ceuta by drawing conclusions from the exhaustive analyses realized.

First of all we have learned that the Customs Union is an institution appointed to create a single European market by guaranteeing the same conditions for international trading to the EU member-states. Ceuta as a free-zone does not adhere to the fiscal regime of that institution, which allows for favorable fiscal, advantageous conditions. Reasons for Ceuta’s decision in 1986 (when Spain became a member-state of the EU) not to join the Customs are connected with historical and economic singularities. Maintaining the effectual special fiscal regime Ceuta’s economic structure could continue evolving relying on irregular trading to Northern Morocco. In every-day routine Ceuta’s interdependence with Northern Morocco finds expression while at the same time Spanish-ness and European-ness are being accentuated. The border-passage is the site where the economic particularity of the system is especially visible, but the singularity is also reflected in the life and discourses of the Moroccan traders involved.

Changing conditions since 1986 have urged reform of the economic model of Ceuta, but actually the debate about joining started at the decision not to join. It is the arguments which have developed through time, finally leading to a positive decision in 2011. Before worries about potentially negative effects such as the change in prices affecting consumption costs and importation seemed stronger. The consequent reduction of irregular trade

would require re-orientation of the economy and cause unemployment. Besides, more economic reasons, political tensions with Morocco were feared. In the official discourse, though, the loss of jobs and basis of survival for thousands of poor Moroccan border-traders is not mentioned. Arguments about positive effects such as improving Ceuta's status in the European Community, affirming its European-ness also before Morocco and the urgent need for reform were convincing, especially given the disarmament of custom tariffs between Morocco and the EU. More revenues from legal exportation to Morocco, creation of employment and stimulation of the economy are the long-term goals to be achieved. The encouraging example of Canary Islands gave input how to obtain additional funding thanks to a better position in the EU.

From these background information the analysis started off, tracing attributes of European-ness, respective otherness, Europeanization and resistance. By understanding in which way attributes are involved in the decision-making process will be much clearer. Although the decision has been a rather pragmatic decision at first glance, the underlying subtle processes Europeanization could be discovered in all the three subtle in the transforming conditions, the debate and thinking of border-people before the decision in 2011.

According to the analysis of the official discourse in media, European-ness manifested before the decision as Ceuta is considered a place of modernity and civilization and belief in modernity is shared by its inhabitants. Homogenization of values has resulted to be a part of discourses and European standards are understood to guarantee status within the EU and are connoted to economically preferable treatment, so that Ceuta has been making efforts to improve its status, e.g. by joining the Customs Union and even for Morocco seeks good relationships with the EU. Otherness of Ceuta is another feature of the official discourse e.g. features of primitiveness which Ceuta is seeking to strip off, attributing more European-ness to the Self. Morocco is not yet sufficient European, showing weaknesses of economic structure, corruption and primitiveness. Europeanization of Ceuta is a means to improving the negative image. Excluding the other, following neoliberal template thinking, substituting traditional habits, shifting discursive boundaries (double framing and nesting-orientalism), enter in dialogue about reforms and taking a roles as a buffer-zone are strategies of Europeanizing Ceuta discursively. The border-fence of Ceuta, marginalization of Moroccans, neglecting ties with Morocco, joining the Customs Union, stepping away from irregular trade and doing border-work for the EU were practically observable consequences until the decision. In spite of all that also resistance and border-thinking have been revealed - agency in dealing with the singularities of Ceuta and Morocco and Moroccans protesting are crucial signifiers as well as criticism of the EU and Ceuta, multicultural practices, anti-European nationalism promoted in Morocco illustrated this. The elitist top-down decision-making process to join the Customs Union reveals lack of participation of citizens, which implies that it is not necessarily the border-people who desire Europeanization of the place.

Paying attention to differences and similarities of the discourse of the experts from Ceuta and the Moroccan border-people and in comparison to the official discourse curious findings were made. Moroccan border-people manifest attributes of modernity and civilization admiring every-day details whereas the official discourse and the

experts keep distance concentrating on the total picture. Using many concrete examples they reveal adaptation to a European value- system, showing respect for a supposedly European superior standard of knowledge.

Otherness becomes connoted with differences of mentalities or degrees of modernity in daily processes, so that surprisingly for their own, 'other' community they mention sociability, helpfulness and friendliness. European-ness would imply individuality, self-centeredness and competition, also blaming racism in Ceuta. In comparison to Morocco they consider Ceuta European, using European criteria to evaluate primitivism in Morocco. Interestingly concrete descriptions often contain shades of otherness and European-ness instead of binary distinctions to characterize different attributes. Some Moroccans argue like in the official discourse. Others imply that Ceuta is not Europe, contradicting also the experts. That way they shift the border of Europe discursively in Northern direction. The experts mostly follow the official discourse, using European values in their thinking and locate modernity in Ceuta. They also do so with regard to the topics of primitiveness (under-development and specialties of Ceuta), longing to achieve European standards, but making a distinction of levels of primitiveness for Morocco. Discursive pieces of border-people from Ceuta imply tactics of exclusion some paralleling the official discourse e.g. their ideas about Europeanization, template thinking and Ceuta as buffer-zone.

For double-framing and nesting orientalism respondents from both sides used economic and cultural standards shifting the boundary of European-ness to the South and regard places in the North to be losing attributes of European-ness, which consequently discursively Europeanizes Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, pp. 473-475). Nevertheless not all Moroccans regard Ceuta to be European, so that here discourses diverge again. More decisive differences emerged: the domination of thoughts by perspectives focusing only on business and fiscal condition of experts is striking. The Moroccan border-people apply the neoliberal discourses instead as projections on their lives and life of individuals in other places, putting stress on the micro-level. This distinctive application is supposedly related to different standards and struggles of living characterizing the groups – the experts on the top, becoming indifferent to the individual dimension, which the hard-working often poor traders perceive much more. In spite of that in both discourses border-people arrive at the conclusion that Europeanization for Morocco is less than for Ceuta. For the dimension of resistance both discourses differ from the official discourse again. Border-people from Ceuta relativize existence of colonialist, racist attitudes in Ceuta, but prove little resistance. However, they seem proud of the distinctiveness of Ceuta. Only unwillingly acknowledge elitist features of the decision to join the Customs Union. Those ideas could be considered moments of border-thinking in the discourse of the experts. Moroccan border-people praise practices in Morocco but also feel as if sharing a regional fate across the border. Ceuta is a national issue to them and they support Moroccan claims about the territory of the city. Blames of racism in Ceuta and belief in the own nation come forth from also stimulating agency and resistance. Yet, nationalism as resisting European-ness is not purely a confirmation of resistance and agency, since the underlying value of nationhood and nation-states are part of a European value-system as well.

In the second part of analysis about evidence of Europeanization in socio-economic effects after the joining the Customs Union we learned that Europeanization is likely to manifest in physical, social transformations and lives of people. Importation of Asian products is likely to be by European products mainly and the installation of an

official Customs Institution is probable. This implies that exportation becomes legal into Morocco, bringing along revenues for Ceuta and freight traffic. Irregular trading would almost disappear, traders will lose their jobs and have to search for alternatives. The weakest, poorest and women will be impacted mostly by unemployment including their families. Small business related to irregular traffic in Ceuta is vulnerable as well, and forced to reorient. In spite of that reform of the fiscal system Ceuta being recognized as ultra-peripheral region by the EU fosters investments in modernizing projects. Generally the developments “normalize” the region and are hoped to stimulate economic development – clearly carrying attributes of Europeanization e.g. template thinking and modernization. It is especially the experts from Ceuta who stand behind the official discourse about potential socio-economic effects – the Moroccan border-people will have to make use of their agency to adapt – which for different individuals means reproducing the official discourse and adapting to it, for others it means making use of non-European practices to survive. Despite the Europeanization attributes of otherness are expected to remain even given the socio-economic impacts e.g. multiculturalism and presence of Muslims and their values – the experts will have to continue Europeanizing the city discursively.

Important theoretical explanations of the results presented have been deduced from all authors and theories outlined in the theoretical chapter (§ 2). Generally the most basic input for this paper, its framework and inspiration are derived from Kuus’ theories on the term “Europeanization”, being completed by other theories by different authors. All of them, have evidently contributed to generate a huge amount of interesting results.

Mignolo’s insights explain the standardization of European epistemology, the relevance of European-values (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 54-56; p. 68) as well as the use of binary criteria of European-ness and otherness by border-people (ibid., pp. 59-61) from both sides of the border. Moroccan border-people’s images show, achievements of and underlying hopes for the “Arab revolution” do bear attributes of homogenization and European values such as democracy, liberty and development. Indirectly this is also a confirmation of the belief in European epistemological superiority (ibid., pp. 54-56). Mignolo together with Sparke’s template thinking (ibid., pp. 213-214, 221) combined explains admiration of higher European standards. This is what happens to Moroccans in the border-region connoting the high standard of living in Ceuta and perceived inferiority of themselves with superiority of European epistemological standards.

Sparke stresses the economic dimension of transformations and thinking of actors border-regions as well as the driving force of neoliberal template ideals (Sparke, 2002, pp. 213-216, 221). Shift of power to supra- and subnational level, decentered governance and supranational agreements are indicative of this (ibid., pp. 218, 223, 234-235). In the border-region of Ceuta we encountered European ideals and values in the thinking of decision-makers and official discourse behind many arguments about the Customs Union. Ceuta becoming autonomous and the supranational agreements between the EU and Morocco are explained by Sparke as well, also explaining motivation for (mostly official) practices of bordering in the region.

Sparke and Kuus together explain economic motivations seemingly incorporated in values-systems to prove homogenization with European values (Kuus, 2004, p. 478) and thus European-ness (Sparke, 2002, pp.

213-214, 221). Ceuta at various occasions has tried to prove European-ness to profit from economic support by the EU. According to Kuus theories European-ness and otherness are necessary counter-elements of a binary system (Kuus, 2004, pp. 472-474). The boundaries between the opposites can be shifted along degrees discursively (ibid., p. 475) and is basis to strategies of attributing preferable European-ness to the image of the Self of places. These strategies of Europeanization are applied by Ceuta e.g. tactically excluding itself the African continent claiming Spanish-ness. Agency of places using these strategies can have various forms such as nesting-orientalism and double framing (ibid., pp. 473-475, 480-482, 484) and are especially popular for 'not yet'-European-places in relation with template thinking (ibid., pp. 473, 480- 484) . Ceuta as European peripheral region which Europeanizes its values, seeks to achieve political and economic privileged treatment in the EU on the one hand nesting-orientalism in Morocco. On the other hand double framing, stressing also not-yet European features such as unemployment and singularities in the discourse helps to profit from financial support, which can then be used to develop more according to European ideals. Thanks to the proper, inherent flexibility of the explained discursive strategies (Kuus., p. 484) the explanations have proved their value also for understanding Ceuta, a European margin bordering with Morocco.

The experts of Ceuta made use of the same strategies to Europeanize Ceuta, claiming both – development superior to Morocco, but inferior to other places also considering the cities singularities. Moroccan border-people were less strategic in framing and contested these discourses locating European boundaries e.g. also North of Spain and within Ceuta between groups. Pluralities of Europes emerged from several groups and individuals in the same place, so that Rumford's multiple, contesting border-working (Rumford, 2008, pp. 53, 59) adds explanation here.

Both, Kuus and Kramsch (2004, pp. 473-475; 2011, p. 196) illustrate dreams of dreaming of European modernity, by bearers of attributes of the "other" reaffirm European identity of a place and generally otherness conditioning European-ness serves to draw lines of distinction (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 196, 201). This is exactly what Moroccan border-people and attributes of the 'other' (e.g. values) in Morocco do for Ceuta. Kramsch though has elaborated ideas about template thinking (ibid, p. 197) as means to identify otherness (ibid., pp. 196-198). Conditionality in relations with the EU concerning transitional European Neighborhood Policies (ibid., pp. 199-201), entanglement between the particular place with all its needs with aspirations of the ENP and the EU blind to the particularity are illustrated by Kramsch (ibid., pp. 194-195), too. For Morocco we have seen that several agreements have been firm, e.g. the disarming of customs tariffs in exchange for homogenizing values such as the implementation of Human Rights. Ceuta as a buffer-zone has to prevent negative spill-over from the South in exchange for additional funding. European way of thinking, template thinking and admiration for European standards are supposed to be part of mind sets almost everywhere, combining Mignolo with Kramsch (ibid., 196-198). But both stress distinctive resisting borderthinking and double critique as inherent of border-regions with opportunities to compare both sides and making use of agency (ibid., pp. 194-195, 197, 205; Mignolo, 2000, p. 85; pp. 64-67). An example of some Moroccan border-people telling about their hopes for future improvement proved that indeed template thinking reaches beyond the border-fence of Ceuta, where experts have incorporated these ideals as


well talking of modernization and necessary economic development. At the same time border-people from Morocco discursively shift the border, differentiate when talking about Ceuta, keep on practices of trading irregularly and claim Moroccan-ness of Ceuta.

Finally, Rumford's description of practices of bordering (Rumford, 2008, p. 53) makes us understand tactics, e.g. exclusionary practices, shifting borders of European-ness. The theory helps to deal with complexity emerging from diverse bearers of discourses contributing to sometimes contradictory border-work (ibid., pp. 53, 56-59): it is multiple and contested (/ing) (ibid., pp. 52-53; 56-59). The theory leaves space for agency using bordering (ibid., p. 59) and helps to grasp own habits and special kinds of border-work (ibid.) –which do not carry European attributes contesting the legitimacy of the official border, demonstrating its permeability. Border-work in Ceuta has diverse workers - from Europeanizing transforming powers such as the decision to join the Customs Union to the individual (none-) EU-citizens telling what they think is European and where Europe starts. Especially the Moroccan border-people some living, some working in Ceuta contest the border and prove its permeability daily outside and inside of Ceuta. It is thus Rumford's theory which best outlines the particularities, diversity of the border, the different groups and individuals (re)producing borders in the particular region.

The aim of this research to theorize the transformations by the recent and current developments in Ceuta and understanding the decision-making process and debate about the Customs Union under potential influence of "Europeanization" (also in future) has been attained. The post-colonial theories have been challenged, but proved applicability also in the South of Europe and beyond its border in Morocco, generating a differentiated image of Europeanization working in the region. Theoretical explanation, though, has not been complete. An open question is e.g. why the discursive groups use different levels of reference - Moroccan border-people referring to the daily on the micro level and border-people from Ceuta (like the official discourse) focusing on a macro-perspective. These insights do not emerge directly from the indicators, but they have been frequently encountered in relation with results. Difference in educational level and status in society would be rather pragmatic explanations. On an abstract level, the focus on the total by experts indicates a sort of Europeanization of perspective, leaving the local behind always seeking comparison with the global. Comparisons, of course, are made through a European-value system as filter and the macro-perspective cannot but be Europeanized. The Moroccan-border-people instead seem less obsessed with global comparison or competition for European-ness. They orient on a local scale staying with their habitual practices.

To sum up, Europeanization has been observed for transformations in the region of Ceuta before the decision-making e.g. considering construction of the border fence, substitution of kinds of goods and origins (now originating mainly in Europe), the Tanger-Med project or the gradual liberalization of Morocco. It was thus especially progressing Europeanizing transformations of Morocco pressuring Ceuta to react stimulating the debate about the Customs Union and Europeanizing further. Europeanization could be even seen as a self-perpetuating process, driven by the need to multiply borders to 'other' less European Europe's and Orients, such as Ceuta and Morocco. For the arguments used to justify the decision about the Customs Union neoliberal template thinking (Sparke, 2002; Mignolo, 2000; Kramsch, 2011) aiming to modernize – which also means to

Europeanize - the city is a major motivation. For the thinking of border-people we have evidence for long penetrating Europeanization (Mignolo, 2000; Kramsch, 2011) and it is difficult to say when the process started. Since the decision *not* to join the Customs Union Europeanization has appeared in the thinking of border-people from both sides, though to less extent in Morocco. Partly their discursive behaviors resulted together with the official discourse instruments of Europeanization as well, helping to exercise border-work, de- and re-bordering (Kuus, 2004; Rumford 2008; Kramsch, 2011).



For the socio-economic effects we can imagine that estimations might confirm. Having a closer look on an eventual scenario of Ceuta and the region after integration into the Customs Union an interesting finding emerged. Europeanization of Morocco and Ceuta seem somehow mutually stimulating, so that Europeanization in the region reminds of a self-perpetuating process. However, beyond this especially elitist process the shifting of European borders is also matter to agency by individual border people and groups likely to undermine Europeanized borders by none-European practices of bordering and multiplying Europes (Rumford, 2008; Kuus, 2004) (see figure 14). The impacts of a Europeanizing measures as presented here, introduced in Ceuta have thus impacts far beyond the European border – stimulating elitist Europeanization of Morocco (see figure 15).



As final critical remarks to this research I would like to say, that sometimes the critical post-colonial theory seemed almost too applicable for being critical. It might be a typical characteristic of this type of theoretical frameworks, that smart insights from other perspectives are excluded from the view, while criticizing them. Stepping back then and trying to relativize one's own thoughts helps sharpening the critique, which I did not find easy. Another aspect to criticize is that this research has been designed for answering two different research questions and split into two different periods of fieldwork. By now I am convinced that it would have been worth to consult more border-people from Ceuta, maybe with less expertise on the topic. While analyzing and writing results doubling of information has occurred several times: pieces of information implied crucial indications for several dimensions of the topic. Yet, I finally decided to allow for doubling since the structure of the paper following the indicators, this way, remains clear and distinct. Thinking from the border resulted difficult for the official discourse because of lack of access to Moroccan media given the language barrier and lack of time to search better for French or Spanish Moroccan reports. And now let us see how things are going to turn out keeping an eye on Europeanization in the border-region of Ceuta.

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Appendix

1. Example of interview-transcription with Moroccan-borderpeople

14-12-2011

Tetouan

Interview with contrabandor 2

Name	Isem
Age	25
Origen	Tetouan
Place of residence	Tetouan
Occupation/profession	Trading at the border, contrabandor
Way of meeting the researcher	Through ahmed, a very close friend, future husband of Jamila, who helped me to translate several times
Relationship to the border: which way linked?	Working at the border, receiving goods there from other person to carry across the border, sometimes staying at the Spanish side to assist his boss and only crossing one time then. Sometimes also doing it for himself, if he has money.
Description of the interview setting	At Tetouan, meeting in Jamilas office at 4 pm. A quiet place, we are only with ahmed and jamila. Both help to translate, there is little background noise, sometimes by moving the voice recorder. I cannot really hear the interviewee on the tape because he sits at distance, so I have to rely in my transcription on Ahmeds translation. He feels at ease because he is a good friend of Ahmed, so he just tells everything, also ahmed can steer him because he knows more about him and stimulates him to reflect.
(First) impressions of the interviewee	A little bit shy, but a real man. He wears good clothes, which emphasize that he is young and male. He looks older than he is, maybe like 30, maybe due to the physical work he does, or because of his –in comparison to many Moroccan men muscular appearance. He seems to be critical about things and has an own opinion. Still he sees politics etc. very much from his own point of view and seems not to be able to place himself very much in other people. Still he is polite and seems to be a humorous person.
Difficulties in interviewing	<p>Language: He can speak only little Spanish, so Ahmed and Jamila translate. They are helping me a lot, are patient and they stimulate him to tell details and help to get an answer to every small question. He trusts his friends so he just tells and has no problem with me taping. Unfortunately again thanking and communicating with him directly is not easy for me.</p> <p>Again better combining before and after per group of topic/questions</p> <p>Good tape.</p> <p>Sometimes I could ask further to get even deeper insights, and we discovered interesting details about how the border actually works.</p> <p>Good interviewee because of he again represents the maybe biggest and most famous group of border people.</p>

Transcription/report:

K=Contrabandor 2 (Ahmed and Jamila translation!)

J= Janna

J: So, could you tell me again your name?

K: Isem.

J: How old are you?

K: I am 25.

J: Where are you from?

K: I am from Tetouan.

J: And is your family also from here?

K: Yes.

J: And what do you work at?

K: I work at the border.

J: You work at the border...interesting, are you a state official?

K: No.

J: So that means he works at the border, trading, contrabando?

K: Yes, like Azziz last time.

J: Okay, I thought you wanted to tell me that you are a police official.

(laughing all)

So what is your relationship with the border? Do you cross it everyday?

K: Yes he goes everyday.

J: So maybe we could start with the questions... oh sorry, has he maybe studied something or worked in another job?

K: He worked in a warehouse of tailors.

J: What is that? Could you repeat the last word?

K: Tailors...like sewing etc.

J: Okay I see, I will look up the word later in a dictionary. But why does he not work in it anymore?

K: Because of the bad treatment. He says because of the bad treatment towards him there.

J: Okay... So maybe now we can start talking about the Arab Spring, I would like to hear a definition of his for the Arab Spring...What is it for him?

(translating and asking for more details)

K: He says that for him it is a very good change, especially for future generations, because for us, we can already say, that it will not benefit us very much. But for the next generations it is good.

J: Okay, but could he also explain what it is for him? Like the 20th February movement?

(translating, asking for details)

K: He says that those who do it are right, in doing so, they have all the rights to make their requests and demands.

J: And what is it what they want?

K: He says that they ask for change, a change and they ask for work, and they ask a good treatment of everyone. Especially for those...how to say that, the muslims with beard, what is the right term??

J: You mean islamists?

K: Yes, islamists, they ask also for a good treatment, they are no terrorists, nothing.

J: Does he agree with the movement?

K (Ahmed): Yes he is.

J: Could you maybe ask him anyways?

K: Yes he agrees with it. Absolutely

K (Ahmed): sometimes he even goes outside with them...

J: Really? Has he been taking part in the movement?

K: Yes.

J: Many times?

K (Ahmed): Not many.

(translating)

He went out the first time, that they went on the streets for protests...

J: On the 20th of February?

K: He was with them.

J: And what impression does he have then about the demonstrations and protests?

(translating, if I understood correctly how they spoke darija he also asked if he like the demonstrations)

K: He says, that now he does not. Now they have not convinced him, because now he also does not go out with them anymore. Before, the first times that he went out with them, there were no problems. I do not know if you know about it... because they went to a company called mandis, providing electricity and gas, they broke all the glass, they entered a supermarket, he says that...

J: It sounds violent...

K: Yes, violent,... and all this because there were people who are not informed, who do not have the knowledge, they only go out to be violent...

J: Okay... only for demonstrating, but not for the cause. I see. Does that mean then, that he has changed his ideas about the movement? Yes...probably.... So, now does he now agree less with the ideas?

(discussing, translating)

K: he says that the 20th of February was the first time, right? Now everyone wants to make use of it, all the parties, which do not agree with the government, right? They make use of it and want to be part of the movement, to reach some changes, even if it is not beneficial for everyone in that sense. Anyway they just go out with them. They are really abusing, making use of it.

J: Okay I see... but is there any group which makes more use of it than others do?

K: He says that there is not one particular group, so that means, there is nothing official, everyone makes a little bit use of it.

J: So, does he think that something has already been changed in Morocco then?

(translating and talking with the three of them)

K: He says that at this moment there is no change. But there will be a better hour. We will not see the change now... We have to wait some years to see the result. They are on the way for change.

J: So that means that he in his life, personally, does not see any changes either?

K: No.

J: Really? Nothing?

K: He says that there is no change. Only at some occasions, like when there are elections. They go out with them to do publicity. That means, something temporarily, it depends on the situation.

J: Is it like the group of Tetuan?

K: No it is not the group of Tetuan, he says that he has taken part in....

(telling more)

He says that for him the important thing about it is work, so today he is with this party, tomorrow he can change to another. Depending on who pays more.

J: So that means he is paid for it?

K (Ahmed): No. I refer to the period of the elections...

J: Okay...but at that time he was paid then.

K (Ahmed): They paid him during 3 or 5 days to go out to do the publicity.

J: And who is paying them? I mean...you do not have to say it....

K: The representatives of the party, it is like a guy from the part of the city where we live.

J: Which party?

K: It is an Amazigh name...like, you know the Rif, right? It is a word from there...it is another language. So it is the language that the people in the mountains speak usually. The name is Amazigh....

J: But then it is not one of the big parties...

K(Ahmed): It is a party but not a big one.

J: Okay.... Then just come to the topic of the border, although this is interesting as well, but it leads us away... so in the process of crossing the border, what happens? Before, during, after crossing? How does it work to cross?

K (Ahmed): So what happens at crossing?

J: Yes, what happens, what happens when he arrives, when he is in the passage....

K (Ahmed) You mean how he enters Ceuta?

J: Yes..... but also how he leaves Ceuta afterwards. What happens at crossing the border, when he has to go from one side to the other?

(talking and translating for a long time)

K: He says that he gets up at 5 o'clock in the morning, he takes a taxi and like at around 5.45 he can arrive in Ceuta. There he is always confronted with a very long queue. The queue, right? Where there is a lot of people. In order to wait less, he hides himself away behind the cars and gets through. If he was the last in the queue, it would take him a long time. He gives as well as Azziz last time did, he gives some dirhams to the Moroccan police and enters.

J: And what about the Spanish police?

K: The steps that I told you before is only about the Moroccan part. But at the side, at the part of Ceuta, he has to join the queue, like everyone else. Because he would not give 5 dirhams to the Spanish police. They do not accept it. So that is why there is the queue.

J: but...

K: But in case you have some problem, documented in your passport or something, sometimes, very few times they also ask money from you.

J: The Spanish?

K: The Spanish, yes. Only few times, like if you have something really bad, so, so that they can make you a favour, they ask for money or cigarettes.

J: What is it for example that can be so bad in a passport?

(translating and talking for quite a long time)

K: He says that.... He says that problems could be caused by the past, like through stealing in Ceuta, some beating, if you try to go to Spain and they catch you up before, if you try to go by boat....So they would ask you your passport, and they make a note about it, an observation, and they kick you out, you cannot come back anymore. Sometimes it is not as bad, just a small thing, therefore they can let you enter. It depends on what you have done, if it is stealing...

J: And does he have this kind of problems?

K (Ahmed): No, of course not. So... as he is my friend I know it.

J: But how can he actually hide behind the cars...there is so many people...how can he avoid that they would see him?

K: He says, that they are normally more focused on the money they earn...

J: And the others in the queue, when they see him, do not they also try to do the same?

K: Some who are brave, they can do it, others cannot...So that means, the one who is courageous, can enter.

J: So what does he think or feel when he crosses the border?

(translating and talking for some time)

K: He says that there are no feelings when he enters. There are only aims to be achieved. He goes in there to work. He also has to control the time, look at his watch, because there is a time, a schedule, when they close the exit from Ceuta. At 9 o'clock, for the Moroccan time. 10 or 11 for the Spanish -it depends from the Spanish time actually. So his objective is to enter and turn back as early as possible, to be able to do his job. There is another person who is waiting for them inside, like his boss, we could say.

J: Like Azziz, right?

K: Yes like Azziz...

J: So that means he works for another person who buys and then he is the one who carries everything on his back?

(translating and talking)

K: He says that before he was working for a guy, who bought things like food for birds and other animals, and he was transporting this from there to Morocco.

J: But ...

K: Yes on his back.

J: So that means that there are many people who work for one person...

(talking and translating for a long time)

K: He says that normally for this person there are 4 people working, he and 3 more persons. But if there is a moment with less control, there use to be more people working. Even 6 or 7, depending on the situation. But normally and fixed there are 4.

J: So that means...do they only pass the border once? Or do they pass even several times?

K (Ahmed): He goes once, he goes to the other side, he remains....

J: Only once...he takes things to carry?

K: He normally uses to do one time, which can be even 60kg to 65kg. And if there is a lot of work he remains at the other side, waiting, for others. So we could say that if there is little control he can work as an assistant of his boss. Controlling and ordering others. Then he stays and the others enter and go back.

J: And where do they bring the things afterwards?

(Talking and translating, I hear him say Tetouan and Fnideq)

K: Like for them carrying the goods for them is not too long, because from there the taxi-drivers take the things directly, they bring the things to them and the taxi-drivers already know the directions and everything.

J: But are there actually people then, who work individually for themselves? People who do not depend on groups... selling their own goods and stuff?

K: He also works like that, in this way. For himself, if he has, let's say an important amount of money, he can go to buy his own goods and then he sells them to other people outside.

J: But how can I imagine the proportion of people in comparison – like how many work individually? How many do work in groups?

(translating and talking a lot)

K: He says that the majority works for themselves. Like almost 80% of the people work for themselves. There are few people who have power and form like ...like an important part of the border. Maybe they can even reach like 10 persons.

J: But are those working in groups more women or more men?

K: He says, that yes, there are women, but the majority does not go in person to the border passage. They would stay in Fnideq. There it is where you can meet them.

J: But... I have seen a lot of women walking there, dressed like "balls", so... do those women work for themselves or for someone else?

K: They work for other people. Especially women do not have enough money to work for themselves, on their own. So that is why they work with other people.

J: Really interesting... But... what does it actually mean then for the rest of his day, that he crosses the border? At what time does he leave, at what time is he back home usually, is there time for having a family?

K: He says, that there is time. There is time, since he is not married. Because of that he has time left for freetime. He uses to get up around 4 o'clock, have breakfast and leave the house at about 5 o'clock. So he arrives in Ceuta at 6. At 1 pm he uses to finish his work and so he can be home at about 2pm. He eats and everything, he can sleep some hours and then he can get up like at 5 o'clock pm again, which means that he is off all the afternoon and night, right? Like until 10 o'clock and he has to sleep again. So... and as he is not married yet, he is with his mother, he comes home and...

J: Okay I see. For which occasions does he cross the border? Only for working? Or maybe also for freetime, for shopping....?

K: He says that for Ceuta... there is always a day to go there. 2 or 3 times a month, to do shopping, to go for a walk...As he is working from Monday until Friday, he uses to go on Saturdays...just for a walk.

J: Okay...For how many years has he been working there at the border?

K: For 7 years.

J: And what is the contact like with other people who cross the border? Or with the people with whom he works? What is their relationship like?

K: He says that the relationship is very good, because there at the passage, to be a good person, you must not steal, and you should not betray others....If you stick to those rules, you will always have a good relationship, you will also have more work usually, because the other people know that you behave well and keep the rules.

J: But then,... what about the situation when he passes along the cars and the other people stand in the queue waiting?

K: He tells you... that this actually is very much liked by the Moroccan police, right? Because, I will explain to you... because they see him hurrying and that is good for them, because in the end he will give them 5 drh. So if he wants to enter, they will remind him of the fact that he came in hiding between the cars, so they ask him to give them the money. So that is why they like it.

J: So okay, the police appreciates it, but what about the others? Because...like, I can imagine that when I stand there queuing and I see someone passing between the cars, I can become easily frustrated...So... isn't there also some competition or envy?

(translating and talking)

K: He says that it is not important for the people in the queue. Actually they tend to comment on the police...because the police already has a relationship with him, they know him and see him day by day, so they

know that he will give them 5drh. So the people start to tease the police. That is interesting right? So it does not really matter to the others in the queue, because whenever they see an option, they will do the same.

J: Okay... so he also knows a lot of people who go to cross...and he has friends among them?

K: Yes he says that yes, he has a lot of friends, especially because Tetouan is a small city. So everyone knows each other.

J: So... but what does he think about the competition, other interviewees told me that they felt competition also...Does he also notice something like that?

K: He says that, of course, there is competition. There is competition because one who is working is always followed by someone who is not working. Because not everyone there works with a group. One goes there to the other side just waiting for someone to give him things to transport to the other side. And every day you get to know other people and so you go increasing/extending friendships, other people start trusting him, like other bosses, let's say. So there is always competition.

J: So did he notice any changes at the border after the 20th February movement, the Arab Spring in Morocco?

K: With the police?

J: No.... generally, the border, with the border in general, in his own experiences with the border?

K: He says that the mentality of the border is unique. So when you go to the border you have to get used to a different treatment. All that what happens in politics in Morocco it starts from the border and behind it. So that means when you are at the border everything is different. It is another way of thinking, another philosophy. And.. these days there is a change in the treatment by the police, because those days there ...like since 3 weeks ago there is another boss of the police, from another section. He came to the passage very suddenly without announcement and... nothing. And the people of the police was there like... a little bit lost let's say, And in the end they even fired 3 police officers.

J: But we are talking about the Moroccan part?

(talking and translating)

K: Yes we still talk about the Moroccan part. Because when the other boss came, they informed him that there are police officers who accept money from the people, that some of them even let you pass if you have some illegal goods such as drugs...So that is why those officers are now out of work.

J: But so... does that mean that he actually does not see any change through the Arab spring in his own experiences with the border?

K: He says that there is no change, absolutely no.

J: So I see. Let's change the topic a little bit, let's talk about images, So I will say some words, and I would like to know what his first thoughts are like, his emotions, when he hears this word...

(translating)

J: So let us start with the border...

K: The border for him is a nightmare.

J: And what about the other side of the border?

K: It is a dream.

J: Okay... (everyone laughing)

K: The dream of improvement...

J: So his first idea is this... but what does he think then about his own side of the border?

K: 5 drh.

J: okay.... (again laughing)... and is there another idea that he has about it? Like other images...since he has been living here for all his life...?

K: He says that there is nothing like his own country. Everything is fine, except the police.

J: The police at the border or in general?

K: He says that this feeling is caused by the treatment by the police officers who are at the border. Therefore he has that image. He also tells you, that a police officer can start working at the border and later work at different places... and climb in the hierarchy.

J: I see. But... does that implicate then, that the police is treating him bad at the border?

K: Always.

J: What do they do to him?

K: He says that the treatment is aggressive. He has also illustrated it by giving an example. There was a person...let's say Islamist, with the beard and everything. He wanted to enter Ceuta, but the police prohibited him to pass. They asked money from him.

J: But you are talking still about the Moroccan side?

K: Yes...still. So they asked money from him. The guy told them that he would not give them any money. And the boss of the police officers who were with the guy heard their conversation. So he called the guy to enter a room of the buildings there. And he beat him off a lot, all of them. Because their boss said we are not here so that you give money to me, you yourself. So that means that they are just too used to get money.

They beat him off and in the end they did not let him pass, because he rejected to give money to them.

J: Okay... so now we should return to speak about the images. Let's talk about Morocco, what is his first thought, his first idea when I say Morocco?

K: He says that the... how should I put it? The richness of the country are abused, made use of by other people.

J: Which other people?

(translating and talking)

K: It is the high positioned people who do it, such as the government, the president...The people who are rich, who have money.

J: Okay... and what does he think first of his city of origin? What images does he have about it?

K: The best city in Morocco.

J: But... because what is it what other cities do not have then?

K: Tetouan for him is his place of birth and the situation here is better than in Morocco, because here the people are more open-minded. They have got alternatives, and one of them is the border...So no one has to be without money.

J: And...what about the Moroccans?

K: The cohesion, the generosity...they always welcome you...It is...they are social.

J: Okay. All that, what we have been talking about so far... the border, both sides, Morocco, the Moroccans... his image of all this, has it changed due to or after the Arab Spring? Can he see a change or has he changed his opinion?

K: Now people are more conscious, they now that the rights are in the hands of other people, and they claim their rights for themselves, that means... it is not like leaving the country and then for example going to Europe. The rights are here, life is here in his country, it is only necessary to reorganize it...and ask for one's own rights. So that means that people are more conscious after the 20th February movement. There is more knowledge, which means, that more people know what they have and need, where it is and how they can get obtain it. (adding his own point of view Ahmed?)

J: okay, good. So what about his image of the city, has it changed because of the Arab Spring?

K: He says that with regard to Tetouan there are changes. The king was here recently, right? He has inaugurated an hospital, they are going to construct a new bridge...So different things. So that means that there is a change.

J: Okay... then we can go on: If I say Spain...what...

K: He says that Spain for him now is not like it was before – His idea has changed. Now for him Spain is the "liga", the soccer, So by now people have changed their ideas. Now people want to stay in their country. So that means... because of the crisis and everything, the movement which is going on right now in Morocco. People by now have more hope in their country.

J: And what about Europe?

K: In Europe... leaving aside Spain for a moment, Europe in general is well off, especially England, Switzerland, Germany, ...so the big countries, the people there live better than in other countries such as Spain for example.

J: And Ceuta? What is his first thought about it? His images?

K: It is his workplace.

J: But...before he said like, he also goes to do shopping... and...

K: Okay. First the most important thing is his job, his work. Then, it is also a space for going for a walk, it is a European country, it is Spain, ... It is a different world for him.

J: And the Spanish? How are the Spanish?

K: Now the Spanish have the life of the Moroccans, because whenever they enter into competition with them, the Moroccans would always win... in projects, in everything. From his point of view the Spanish are envious.

J: And the Europeans? How are they? What is typical of them?

K: In European countries -except Spain- there is no racism at all, if you go to study, they help you. If you have gained a ... you can be an important person, which means that you have the right to be one more of them, of the Europeans!

J: And what about the people from Ceuta?

K: Which ones? The Spanish citizens or the Moroccan citizens? Or both?

J: If he makes that distinction he has to explain me why....

K: He says with regard to the Moroccan citizens of Ceuta, they help a lot the Moroccans who cross the border every day. If there are problems with the police they even come into the passage and help to translate...they help them to solve problems if they have problems...in contrast to the Spanish citizens of Ceuta. They do not help you at all. Nothing. They leave you there and do not follow your requests. So that means he has a good relationship with the Moroccan citizens, better than with the Spanish citizens.

J: So has his image of Europe, Spain, Ceuta and its people changed due to the Arab Spring?

K: He says that in general the people have changed their image ... by now they know that you have to give their rights to the Moroccans. Otherwise they will get it anyway... in one or the other way, either they will do by protesting, or by means of...let's say, dialogue. Either by aggressive or by friendly means, without problems. They already have a different idea about it... They already know that they know their rights and how to get it. So that is how and why the image of Europeans about Moroccans has changed in general.

J: Okay, sure. But...what about his ideas about *them*?

K: He says that now he has changed the philosophy and the ideas of Europeans in general, Spain and so on. Because now they can already see the benefits in the Arab world. Therefore they have started wars, like in Libya, to rebuild it from the beginning. You can make use of this situation and start projects there. So that is why they have a different image now.

J: And what about the people who also cross the border, who are not only contrabandores, but also of different professions in general, what kind of relationship does he have with them and what does he think of them? And has there been a change in his thoughts after the Arab Spring?

K: He says that he has not noticed any change. There is no change in his ideas. The people who travel, travel, the people who work, work. So it is still the same.

J: And what kind of relationship does he have with them?

K: He says yes, there is a relationship, not with everyone of course, he has friends who can enter, who can travel, who live in Spain. There are people who work in Ceuta,...friends. So that means there is some kind of relationship. Friendship.

J: So now the last questions: What is good and what is bad about the border?

K: The good for him is, that there is work. The bad is that they beat him. So that means, the bad treatment by the police.

J: And...in his evaluation about what is good and what is bad...has there been a change after the Arab Spring?

K: You mean at the level of life?

J: I mean, his evaluation about what is good, what is bad, just now...has he changed that after the Arab Spring? Like the advantages and disadvantages?

(translating and talking)

K: He say that there is no big change. But there is a change concerning the people who by now already know their rights. The majority there does not know their rights. That it is their right to enter Ceuta. That it is legal and that they do not need to give money for that.

J: Thank you a lot for your help...

2. Example of written interview with an expert from Ceuta

April, 2012;

Respondent. Testa Mendéz

Estimados Senores, Estimadas Senoras,

Las investigaciones de las que trata este cuestionario son creados para entender mejor la decisión de Ceuta de formar parte de la Unión Aduanera de la UE a partir del 2012. La meta es también de entender el papel que tenían diferentes actores, la Unión Europea, un ideal europeo, Marruecos y España. Al final las consecuencias sociales y económicas todavía solo se pueden estimar, pero seguramente los imanes de futuros escenarios eran un factor importante durante el debate sobre Ceuta y la Unión Aduanera.

La pregunta qué estoy intentando a contestar con mis investigaciones es:

De qué modo la decisión de Ceuta de hacerse miembro de la Unión Aduanera de la UE y los presuntos efectos sociales y económicos llevan características de procesos de "Europeización" y "distinción"?

La intención es de comprender las ideas de la población de la region de Ceuta y el Norte de Marruecos desde una perspectiva postcolonialista.

Me ayudará mucho de consultar su opinión tal cómo experto y ciudadano de Ceuta. Muchas Gracias por su apoyo!

1) Cuando España se hizo parte de la Union Europea en 1986 Ceuta decidió (igual a las Islas Canarias y Melilla de mantener un estado específico y no hacerse miembro de la Unión Aduanera.

a) Por qué?Qué eran los argumentos principales?

Como el archipiélago canario, que cambió de opinión en 1991, Ceuta y Melilla optaron en 1986 por quedarse fuera de la Unión Aduanera para mantener su singularidad económica y fiscal, que básicamente pasa por el Régimen Económico y Fiscal (REF) de las dos ciudades autónomas y su singular imposición fiscal (no se aplica el IVA sino el IPSI) y sostener así las condiciones que permitían sobrevivir al comercio de bazar y a la exportación irregular de productos a Marruecos pese a carecer de aduana comercial. Esto en el ámbito económico, la que podríamos llamar 'versión oficial'. No me atrevería a decir hasta qué punto pesaron también en la decisión argumentos de índole político relacionados con las relaciones Marruecos-España-UE.

b) Quién estuvo involucrado en la decisión? (actores, instituciones?)

En 1985-86 gobernaba España el PSOE con Felipe González como presidente. En esa época (hasta que, en 1995, se aprobó el Estatuto de Autonomía de Ceuta) la ciudad no tenía ese rango institucional, sino el de Ayuntamiento ligado a la provincia de Cádiz. En esa fecha el alcalde era Aurelio Puya (PSPC, partido localista), que ya ha dejado la política en activo. Te recomiendo contactar para profundizar en este punto con Juan Luis Aróstegui (actual diputado en la Asamblea de la coalición Caballas), cuyos datos te facilito al final del documento.

c) Qué beneficios se suponían obtener por no formar parte de la Unión Aduanera?

Beneficios de índole económico en forma de REF y régimen impositivo singular para sostener el sector comercial de bazar, muy importante hasta los años noventa, cuando entró en decadencia, y las exportaciones irregulares (contrabando para Marruecos que aquí se denomina 'comercio atípico').

d) Cuánta influencia tenía el ciudadano simple ceutí sobre la decisión?

El ciudadano de a pie, ninguna influencia, sospecho. No hubo ningún tipo de votación popular al respecto. No obstante, no tengas demasiado en cuenta mi opinión en este punto porque no vivía aquí y no he investigado nunca este aspecto del tema.

e) Cuánto consenso había en la población?

Deberías consultar a alguna de las fuentes que te recomiendo al final del documento.

2) Recientemente el grupo de responsables en Ceuta para tomar la decisión se Ceuta formará parte de la Unión Aduanera en futuro ha cumplido su misión. Hay una decisión: Ceuta (según el gobierno de Ceuta) va a entrar.

a) ¿Por qué? ¿Cuáles eran los argumentos principales?

Fundamentalmente, la entrada en la Unión Europea se plantea como una opción estratégica para una ciudad que hasta ahora ha aprovechado sus singularidades económicas y fiscales para exportar de forma irregular a Marruecos. El desarme arancelario entre la UE y el país vecino, previsto inicialmente para este año, conllevaría, en principio, el final de esa modalidad de negocio. Se supone, o al menos eso defienden quienes apuesta por esta alternativa, que la incorporación a la Unión Aduanera sería una forma de lograr más apoyo político en las instituciones comunitarias para obligar a Marruecos a habilitar una aduana comercial en la frontera de Ceuta ("una negociación entre las autoridades comunitarias y las marroquíes sobre la frontera de Ceuta sería menos tensa que si la plantean las autoridades españolas", opina el CES).

b) ¿Quién estuvo involucrado en la decisión? (actores, instituciones)

A nivel local, podríamos citar como agentes involucrados al Gobierno de la Ciudad (sobre todo, a su presidente, Juan Vivas; a su consejero de Hacienda, Francisco Márquez; y a su portavoz, Guillermo Martínez); a la Cámara de Comercio y a la Confederación de Empresarios. Los sindicatos mayoritarios (CCOO y UGT) están a favor de la entrada en la Unión Aduanera, como el primer grupo de la oposición (Caballas) y el PSOE. Te apporto datos de contacto de todos ellos al final del documento.

c) Qué beneficios se supone obtener por hacerse miembro de la Unión Aduanera ahora?

Ceuta necesita buscar su sitio en términos económicos. Actualmente se ha creado un grupo de trabajo que defina los sectores donde puede encontrar sus mayores nichos de desarrollo. Dicha

reflexión, como la modificación del REF y la revisión del IPSI, deben ir en paralelo con la entrada en la Unión Aduanera. Sin el bazar (testimonial actualmente) y el 'comercio atípico', cuya desaparición casi total se augura tras el desarme arancelario UE-Marruecos, no tiene ningún beneficio seguir fuera. Los que haya dentro deben definirse, buscarse y encontrarse ya que ha habido instrumentos como las Reglas de Origen que también se creía que iban a dar beneficios y al final se han quedado en nada.

d) Quién gana algo? Quién pierde algo?

Debe ganar toda la ciudad salvo pequeños sectores ligados a la importación de países extracomunitarios (asiáticos fundamentalmente) para la exportación irregular a Marruecos y el bazar, residual desde más de una década.

e) Qué consecuencias tendrá la decisión para la región?

Están por definir, aunque los políticos no dejan de mencionar, al margen de los argumentos estrictamente económicos, el reafirmar nuestro carácter europeo frente a la reivindicación marroquí y la posibilidad de 'forzar' con la ayuda de Bruselas a Rabat a habilitar una aduana comercial como objetivos a conseguir.

f) Qué alternativas habría si los responsables no habían querido la formar parte de la Unión Aduanera?

No creo que haya ninguna alternativa. Ceuta sería una isla una vez concretado el desarme arancelario entre España y Marruecos y la perspectiva de convertirnos en una especie de paraíso fiscal, al estilo de Gibraltar, por citar el caso más cercano, no se contempla en términos realistas a pesar de que el proyecto de mejora del REF reclama aumentar al 75% las bonificaciones y deducciones fiscales locales (ahora están en el 50%).

g) Qué pierde Ceuta perdiendo una parte de su estato especial en la Unión Europea?

La entrada en la Unión Aduanera sólo se plantea manteniendo la mayor parte de las singularidades locales, haciendo posible el mantenimiento del REF con la incorporación y estableciendo regímenes transitorios para suavizar la entrada. El modelo que se cita constantemente es el de las Islas Canarias y su POSEICAN.

h) Cuánto quedará a Ceuta de su especialidad?

Si cualquier empresa, negocio, iniciativa económica, busca en primer lugar diferenciarse, Ceuta ya tiene ese carácter ganado, tanto por razones geográficas como sociales, culturales... Ello es indiferente de estar dentro o fuera de la Unión Aduanera, donde se prevé seguir contando con las especificidades y ventajas fiscales e impositivas actuales. El reto es lidiar con la reivindicación marroquí y las complicaciones políticas que entraña y conseguir atraer a empresas (ligadas a las Nuevas Tecnologías –o de otro sector que no necesite mucho territorio para desarrollar su actividad- o al Turismo, por citar los dos ejemplos más señalados) a las que no haga inviable su implantación el –alto- coste del transporte marítimo.

i) Cuánta influencia tenía el ciudadano simple Ceutí sobre la decisión?

Este es un debate político y económico, no social. De hecho, ni siquiera hay debate. Existe un consenso prácticamente absoluto sobre la necesidad de entrar en la Unión Aduanera. La única nota de discrepancia puede estar en la celeridad con la que se haga y en cómo compensar a los sectores que puedan verse perjudicados.

j) Cuánto consenso había en la población?

Muy elevado, prácticamente total, aunque es una opinión muy personal. No hay estudios demoscópicos al respecto.

3) Europa y Ceuta

a) Qué es típico europeo y características típicas de Europa según Usted?

Imperio de la Ley, libre mercado, protección y cohesión social, respeto de los Derechos Humanos...
Formación y educación para el acceso al empleo

b) Cuáles de estas características se encuentran en Ceuta?

Ceuta tiene al menos dos graves problemas: un altísimo nivel de fracaso y abandono escolar y un altísimo índice de desempleo, dos estadísticas íntimamente relacionadas que se concentran en su población árabo-musulmana (casi el 50% de sus 80.000 habitantes). La mitad de su población activa es funcionaria, en su inmensa mayoría cristiano-occidental. El sector privado es residual, sobre todo de Servicios básicos, y la actividad emprendedora prácticamente nula. También deberíamos hablar de un contexto político cautivo, con el PP repitiendo amplísimas mayorías absolutas (por encima del 60%) desde hace más de diez años y sin alternativa a la vista. Tampoco conviene olvidar los recelos, en forma de racismo y clasismo, existentes en la comunidad cristiano-occidental hacia la árabo-musulmana, que al mismo tiempo cultiva un sentimiento de exclusión hacia la otra. Ello se traduce en inminente riesgo de quiebra social que, hasta la fecha, se ha sabido evitar con un alto nivel de protección social.

c) Cambiarán las características de Ceuta después de hacerse miembro de la Unión Aduanera? Como?

Habrá que verlo. En teoría, debería fomentar mayor competitividad, innovación y desarrollo económico real.

4) Ceuta en el futuro entre Marruecos y Europa

a) Cómo es su imagen utópica de Ceuta? Como debería desarrollar Ceuta?

Ceuta es una ciudad con un alto grado de población joven en la que conviven cuatro culturas de forma más o menos armónica. La ciudad carece de terreno para un aprovechamiento industrial, pero cuenta con ventajas económicas y fiscales que deberían servirle para atraer empresas de sectores que no necesiten grandes superficies para desarrollar su actividad (básicamente, Nuevas Tecnologías). También tiene ventajas sustanciales en forma de seguridad jurídica sobre el país vecino. Puede ser un

hecho económico y cultural singular con atractivo turístico hacia el norte y un hecho económico-financiero y comercial con atractivo hacia el sur.

b) Qué papel toma la relación Europa en este imagen?

Europa debería servir para limar la tensión de las relaciones entre España y Marruecos cuando se abordan temas relacionados con Ceuta y Melilla prestando todo su apoyo y respaldo a la que será una de sus dos únicas fronteras terrestres en África.

c) Qué papel toma la relación con Marruecos en esto?

Entiendo que es una incógnita cómo se desarrollará la denominada 'primavera árabe' en Marruecos y cómo gestionará el nuevo Gobierno islamista moderado de Benkiran la reivindicación territorial sobre las dos ciudades, que en su programa prometía llevar a la Comisión de Descolonización de la ONU. Durante los últimos años ambas ciudades han ocupado un lugar secundario en la agenda política de Rabat, más preocupada por el Sahara. El desarrollo económico del Norte del país es un hecho irrefutable en el que Ceuta debe encontrar, con el apoyo de la UE, un papel principal.

5) Marruecos y la decisión sobre la Unión Aduanera de Ceuta

a) Qué imagen tiene en general de Marruecos? Qué es típico de Marruecos?

Tengo una buena imagen del pueblo marroquí y no tanto de sus instituciones, que siguen arrastrando una calidad democrática y un nivel de respeto a los Derechos Fundamentales y las libertades básicas deficientes. La corrupción sigue siendo una seña de identidad que cualquiera percibe con sólo cruzar la frontera. En ocasiones se ha dicho que las instituciones marroquíes pretenden, por la vía del desarrollo económico del norte de su país, 'ahogar' económicamente a Ceuta y a Melilla, que hasta ahora no han sabido, sobre todo sus sectores empresariales, implicarse en ese avance para participar y beneficiarse de él.

b) Qué papel tenía la relación con Marruecos para no hacerse miembro de la Unión Aduanera?

No tengo el nivel de conocimiento suficiente para responderte a esta pregunta, aunque opino que sin duda fue elevado. Te recomiendo profundizar con el periodista Ignacio Cembrero sobre este punto. Intuyo que España nunca ha querido tensar sus relaciones con Marruecos reclamando, por ejemplo, una aduana comercial en Ceuta. Pienso que se busca el respaldo de la UE para superar esa dificultad bilateral. Cembrero asegura que la petición para entrar en la Unión Aduanera generará problemas con Rabat.

c) Qué papel tiene la relación con Marruecos para formar parte de la Unión Aduanera en futuro?

Fundamental. Todos los agentes coinciden en señalar que el paso debe servir para tener aduana comercial, además de reforzar el carácter europeo en términos políticos de la ciudad frente a la reivindicación permanente de Marruecos como territorio propio de Ceuta y Melilla, a las que se refiere constantemente como 'ciudades ocupadas' y 'presidios'.

6) En dónde están Ceuta, Marruecos y Europa en comparación?

a) Cómo ve la situación de Marruecos en comparación a Europa?

La de Ceuta y Marruecos es la frontera donde se da el mayor salto económico del mundo, superior al de México-EEUU. Te recomiendo leer o contactar con Íñigo Moré para ampliar detalles. El país se está desarrollando, de forma especialmente visible en el Norte durante los últimos años, pero aún así en términos económicos es imposible de equiparar a Ceuta o al resto de Europa. Su nivel de calidad democrática y respeto a los Derechos Humanos también deja, en comparación con Europa, mucho que desear.

b) Cómo ve la situación de Marruecos en comparación a Ceuta?

Sirve parte de la respuesta anterior. El entorno marroquí encuentra en Ceuta comercios, asistencia sanitaria, empleo (habitualmente irregular, mano de obra barata para Ceuta), seguridad jurídica, oportunidades de ocio... que no hay en su territorio. Ceuta ha vivido hasta ahora de espaldas hacia el país vecino, singularmente su población cristiano-occidental, que extiende sus recelos a la población árabo-musulmana local, que accedió a la nacionalidad en los años ochenta y a los que el país vecino considera nacionales suyos.

c) Cómo ve el futuro de Marruecos en relación a Europa?

A la espera de ver cómo evoluciona en Marruecos el islamismo radical y la 'primavera árabe', entiendo que la UE intentará atraer al país vecino como socio preferencial

7) España

a) Cómo ve el papel de España en todo eso?

El papel de España es fundamental porque es el Estado el que debe tramitar la incorporación de Ceuta a la Unión Aduanera ante las instituciones comunitarias. En este paso habrá que ver cómo gestiona el Gobierno de Mariano Rajoy el probable malestar de Marruecos por la decisión ceutí de entrar en el marco comunitario.

b) Cómo será el papel de España en futuro?

Los Gobiernos de España siempre ha mantenido que no hay nada que hablar con Marruecos sobre Ceuta y Melilla. Habitualmente, en la ciudad se observan con agrado las reuniones entre ambos países que concluyen con la aseveración de que no se hablado "de nada" sobre las dos ciudades. Últimamente el PSOE, tras perder el Gobierno central, ha advertido de que en realidad hay "mucho" de lo que hablar con Rabat sobre Ceuta y Melilla salvo de soberanía. No contemplo, a corto o medio plazo, un escenario de diálogo bilateral como el que se ha establecido en torno a Gibraltar con el Reino Unido

3. Example of schemes of analysis of literature used to structure data for the indicator

Resistance and borderthinking

	13) own practices given priority/agency	14) anti European ethnic nationalism	15) Elitist character of transformation processes
Official discourse	<p>vanishespecially those which are irregular, will be moderated, shifted to Melilla (less European?), if not also integrating (contrabandores migrate t here?? In masses? No financial means!)</p> <p>(Aranda Gallego, p.333)</p> <p>The restrictions provoke an increase of trading irregularly by car which nowi s not existent, so far it has been only an infinite number of cars loaded to the roof (Cembrero, 2009b)</p> <p>interdependence, border and hinterlands, nogt taking risk of alternative economic commercial monocultures, endangering many Moroccans by absolute poverty (Flores, 2010)</p> <p>University professor Joaquin Aranda hands in the last report about the impacts of the economy of Ceuta on the North of Morocco (Aznar, 2010)</p>	<p>but it would not only foster the cite's Spanish but also European character of an occupied city, at first visit by king of Spain the Moroccan one withdrew his ambassador from Spain,</p> <p>will be difficult and Rabat will continue to neglect its commercial nature, With Europe we have more power being a commercial border, (Cembrero, 2008)</p>	<p>, extra value for tourism, disappearance of the custom passage for travellers from Ceuta – Eu and customs institution, new resources for the european custom tariffs, for attendant measures and more additional measures (Aranda Gallego, p.333)</p> <p>Politicians and entrepreneurs agree that the opening of the borderpassage is crucial after the disarmament of custom tariffis with Morocco, since the irregular trading, the engine of Ceuta's economy will not be lucrative anymore (cembrero, 2008b)</p> <p>Disappearance of irregular trade, similar price without strong social implications, nevertheless necessary adaptation of additional measures – citizens living on illegal trade, in morocco 10% - contrabando dejará pilar economías – empty eggs, service centres for Rif area? (Cembrero ,2001)</p>
Testa Mendez interview	<p>La entrada en la Unión Aduanera sólo se plantea manteniendo la mayor parte de las singularidades locales, haciendo posible el mantenimiento del REF con la incorporación y estableciendo regimenes transitorios para suavizar la entrada. El modelo que se cita constantemente es el de las Islas Canarias y su POSEICAN.</p>		<p>Debe ganar toda la ciudad salvo pequeños sectores ligados a la importación de países extracomunitarios</p>
Gomez Barcelo	<p>Pierde Seguramente la posibilidad de regular sus impuestos, al adoptarse el IVA aminorado y suprimirse el IPSI</p> <p>Pero queda Las ventajas fiscales que protegen su extra-peninsularidad, como cualquier otro territorio</p> <p>Utopica Ceuta Una ciudad multicultural</p>		
Jose maria Campos Martinez	<p>Que pierde Ceuta Depende de la negociación y el período transitorio.</p> <p>Dejará de ser en algún tiempo territorio franco, pero esto es cada vez menos importante.</p>		<p>Papel espana Lo ignoro, pero me preocupa porque no veo en el Ministerio personas con experiencia en las relaciones Ceuta-Marruecos.</p>

Mora	No va a desaparecer comercio contrabando, expectativas camiones, comercio documentado,		Frontera desigual, relacion con entorno, manifestamente mejorable para dos lados,
Moroccan border people	<p>Border: Afraid of not being allowed anymore to go to Ceuta. The only thing she thinks about. You cannot speak about friendship among the people. Casual meetings and conversation, being more with oneself, even not helping with coins if one has none left for bus. They are focusing on themselves. Very clearly competition! The women pay attention to conversations, to work somewhere else or taking over job" (housekeeper)</p> <p>"The border: A bad thing. The bad thing about the border is the queue, except the border everything is good. (IT expert)</p> <p>"I do not want to work in Ceuta because of the problem of the border. I do not have a big problem, nothing. As you work there your face, your character changes. The poor one who takes two bags, how are you? And they take things from them. But they never take from the rich ones. Working for years, I know a lot of policemen. If you are new. Nothing. I do not have problems with anyone, I do not work directly at the border. I do not have the problems which the people have who do work at the border. They have a bad life. Everything is bad. It takes you so long to pass. If you are lucky it takes you 30 minutes. Also take money from you, you have to pay like 3 Euro sometimes to the Spanish, in Morocco, every policemen takes money for sure, no one who does not take. (painter)</p> <p>"I go to Ceuta to sell something because you have to do a thing. You do not have a solution but to go. You can give like some persons, give him to go to Morocco. Good thing is the work, the business. You can have a lot of different for thing, you have low tax. Low tax. (trader)</p> <p>"Why don't we get the permission of residence? The people who work in Ceuta, everyone is searching for documents" (IT-expert)</p> <p>"A place for work for everyone. Other people at the border, it depends on the situation. Everyone goes there to work, they do not have a choice, they have a family, they are obliged to do so. There might be people whom they have to support, it depends on the individual. Everyone does what he can to enter, maybe to work in houses, like the women, they can enter to help cleaning. It is the circumstances which oblige them. Ceuta is a country where you can work. It depends – one day well one day not, you can find something" (smuggler)</p> <p>Because a lot of people from Morocco go to buy things there, now that there is the crisis. The people come to Ceuta, there is not yet as much crisis, there is little. It is a small one, not a big one, because there is so many working there,</p>		

	<p>people come from Spain to work there in Ceuta" (painter)</p> <p>The passage between Ceuta and Tetouan is very bad. Because, Morocco, the people, is losing a lot economically. The passage should be resolved. Also the buying and selling ... the people lose a lot, the border, the government has to think carefully about them for the future (politician)</p>		
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