



MASTER THESIS

Dutch development policy: Achieving climate justice

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Dutch Development Policy: Achieving Climate Justice

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Executive summary

Developed countries have agreed in the Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015) Agreements to mobilise 100 billion US dollar of climate finance for developing countries by 2020. Dutch international climate finance is managed by the development cooperation branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which means that climate-relevant aspects are included into existing development policies and activities. This approach of combining social and environmental development is in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals and ensures that projects in developing countries are climate proof. It also means that the activities carried out by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs can be researched through a climate justice lens: in what way the benefits (or burdens) of adaptational projects in developing countries are distributed, and how the procedure of such projects unfolds.

This research focused on the project formulation of three climate-relevant activities in developing countries that are funded by the Ministry, which are all characterised by a different mode of governance. The concept of climate justice was operationalised using Walker (2012); governance was operationalised using a framework by Lang et al. (2013) and Driessen et al. (2012). Justice aspects and modes of governance were analysed for each case and subsequently compared. It was found that the approach to climate justice within the three cases was very diverse, ranging from detailed documentation to unspecified methods or no mention at all. The modes of governance proved to be very complex in all three cases and presented a hybrid mix of multiple forms of governance.

It was concluded that the mode of governance appeared to have an influence on the recognition of aspects of climate justice, with NGOs likely having a positive influence on justice, in particular aspects of recognition and participation/inclusion. It seemed that an emphasis on market participation or private investments could lead to trade-offs with social matters, although this did not necessarily have to be the case when checks and balances were put into place.

Lastly, a number of policy recommendations were identified, such as the need for a more intersectional perspective on vulnerability, a more extensive reflection on potential negative side effects resulting from a programme, an accessible and independent complaint mechanism, and improving direct access to funding for small/local grassroots organisations.

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List of acronyms

AfA	Aqua for All
BHOS	Buitenlandse Handel and Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation – a separate branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that focuses on development cooperation)
BZ	(Ministerie van) Buitenlandse Zaken (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
CBD	Community-based Development
CBO	Community-based organisation
CSO	Civil society organisation
DGIS	Directie Generaal Internationale Samenwerking (Director General International Cooperation)
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
IFC	International Finance Cooperation
IRM	Integrated Risk Management
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PfR	Partners for Resilience
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

1 Introduction

As has been recognised for decades, action against climate change and environmental pollution does not occur in a vacuum, but should be closely linked to social and economic development. This is aptly illustrated by the widely cited definition of sustainable development that was put forward by the Brundtland Commission in 1987. In their report *Our Common Future*, it was argued that human development and the environment are not two separate spheres, but that they are in fact inseparable and should be promoted in tandem. In addition, the impacts of climate change will be felt around the globe, but they will differ in terms of severity. The effects will be most devastating in developing countries who have insufficient resources, technology and flexibility to cope with them (O'Brien et al. 2014). Developed countries, on the other hand, have better means to adapt to climate change. This can be seen as unjust because historically, developed countries have been the leading emitters of GHG emissions, yet the impact for them will be less severe (Williams 2015).

As a report commissioned by the World Bank (Hallegatte et al. 2016) has shown, climate change poses a serious threat to the eradication of poverty. Poor people and developing countries are especially vulnerable to climate-related shocks, and this could mean that progress in poverty reduction could come to a standstill or even be reversed. A similar point is made in the 1.5°C report by IPCC (2018): “The consideration of ethics and equity can help address the uneven distribution of adverse impacts associated with 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming [...] particularly for poor and disadvantaged populations” (p.20). The synergies of climate action and sustainable development and poverty reduction are highlighted: climate efforts are usually more effective when combined with social and economic development, while sustainable development and social equity in turn enable the fundamental societal transformation which is needed to limit global warming to 1.5°C. In fact, there were very few models in the 2018 IPCC report where the 1.5°C goal was reached without also addressing poverty and inequality. These findings tie in closely with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include priorities on both human and natural development.

Thus, climate change stabilisation and socioeconomic development (such as the ending of poverty and the promotion of social equality) should be jointly tackled. However, developing countries cannot do this alone; they need support from the international community. This means that climate change has also become an important part of international development assistance. As Williams (2015) rightly notes: “climate change is an issue of economic and social *justice*”, not only of economic and social *development* (p.12).

The UNFCCC's fundamental principle, recorded in its founding treaty, is that Parties will take action against climate change “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but

differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC 1992). Action should thus be taken according to a country’s responsibility for causing climate change, as well as their economic capacity to take measures against climate change. What exactly constitutes these ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ has been the subject of much debate, both in climate negotiations and in academic literature (Holz, Kartha & Athanasiou 2017). Under the Paris Agreement (2015), in addition to proposing domestic pledges for emission reductions (the Nationally Determined Contributions or NDCs), developed countries agreed to assist developing countries in taking action against climate change. This has been documented in Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Paris Agreement: “Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation”. Thus, international climate finance has become the major vessel for climate justice.

The provision of financial resources as mentioned in the Paris agreement is concretely translated into development activities with a climate focus, funded directly by governments of developed countries or indirectly through multilateral funds (such as the UN Green Climate Fund) or development banks (such as the World Bank). From 2020 to 2025, the global figure of climate finance to developing countries is set on 100 billion US dollars per year, as agreed in the 2009 Copenhagen Agreement.

Ensuring that the costs and burdens of mitigation and adaptation are distributed fairly across countries will promote climate justice. However, climate justice is more than just a fair distribution of burdens or benefits; it also involves the way social justice aspects and existing power structures are recognised and addressed in climate action. When climate policies do not take existing inequalities related to livelihoods, resource access and climate risk into account, such efforts could threaten process toward poverty reduction (Eriksen et al. 2011; Smucker et al. 2015).

1.1 Research problem statement

As has been highlighted in the introduction, the importance of integrating social justice, poverty reduction, and climate efforts in development cooperation cannot be overstated. Climate justice (or lack thereof) is already present in the earliest formulation stage of a development project: the way a developed country distributes the benefits of their projects, assesses and any potential negative impacts of their projects, identifies the vulnerability of local groups, and involves various stakeholders in their projects. If the social aspects of sustainable development are not sufficiently taken into account, this could negatively affect the progress towards achieving the SDGs and the effectiveness of climate action.

1.2 Research aim & research questions

This research takes into account three climate adaptation activities in developing countries that have been funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These activities are undertaken in partnerships with market actors and/or civil society actors on various levels (Dutch, international, local) as well as local governments in developing countries, and are thus characterised by different modes of governance. The aim of the research is to determine in what manner aspects of climate justice are taken into account in the design of the activities, and whether the mode of governance that characterises an activity could have an influence on the formulation of climate justice.

It should be noted that the research will not present an impact assessment of Dutch international climate finance; instead the focus will be on the formulation of activities and their procedural and anticipated distributive aspects. The word ‘anticipated’ is added to distribution here because the research does not measure the actual distributive practices, only the distribution process that is recognised/expected in the design of an activity.

The research questions of this thesis are as follows:

- Main research question: *To what extent do governance modes, which characterise climate-relevant activities in developing countries funded by the Netherlands, influence the approach to climate justice?*
- Sub-question 1: *To what extent does the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognise anticipated distributive justice aspects when formulating climate-relevant activities for developing countries?*
- Sub-question 2: *To what extent does the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognise procedural justice aspects when formulating climate-relevant activities for developing countries?*
- Sub-question 3: *What are the differences/similarities between the governance modes of the three activities analysed in this research?*

1.3 Scientific relevance

This research can provide a relevant contribution to interdisciplinary environmental studies. The notion of sustainable development, as referring to social as well as environmental development, is not new. However, the specific case of social justice in climate-related development activities (which contribute to international climate finance goals) has not been extensively researched yet, particularly not through case studies. A feature especially lacking in most studies is a thorough reflection on the definition and operationalisation of the concept of climate justice, something this study will aim to do.

Furthermore, there are few to none studies that look into the way modes of governance could potentially impact justice aspects of climate-related development programmes. The majority focuses on the notion of global environmental governance on the level of organisations such as UNFCCC, and are mostly theoretical studies (for example Adger 2001; Paavola 2005; Paavola 2008). This study, on the other hand, focuses on modes of governance within a number of empirical case studies (specific development activities). In that sense this research could definitely add interesting new insights to the scientific debate. In a more general sense, Lang et al. (2013) assert that it is crucial to conduct empirical research into the effects that certain modes of governance have on sustainable development. There is a knowledge gap concerning what forms of governance lead to what outcomes. This research could contribute to the debate by attempting to chart if there is an influence of the mode of governance of an activity on the formulation of climate justice.

1.4 Societal relevance

As this research is concerned with the justice aspects of climate-relevant development activities, it is highly relevant in societal terms. It is estimated by Oxfam (2018) that most public climate finance which is used to fund activities comes from national ODA (Official Development Aid) budgets; a similar conclusion was drawn by Pickering et al. (2013) after studying climate finance dynamics in various donor countries. This means that the Netherlands (and the other donor countries) gear a part of the budget that was originally designated for socio-economic progress in developing countries, towards climate action. This is a desirable move; it has become clear from the introduction that climate and social concerns need to be addressed simultaneously – this even creates a synergy between the two. However, it makes it vital that the social aspect remains a point of interest and that the trade-offs between climate and social efforts are kept to a minimum. It is equally important that justice concerns are being considered to prevent side effects such as the reinforcement of existing inequalities and patterns of misrecognition.

This is what will be studied in this research: in what way social and justice concerns are being taken into account when it comes to formulating climate-relevant activities that are funded by ODA money.

2 Literature review

This literature review will consist of four parts: after introducing the main topics of this thesis in section 2.1, a degree of conceptual reflection is warranted: (climate) justice is a highly elusive concept and it is the aim of this research to give an overview of existing interpretations (2.2) before eventually settling on a working condition; the same will be done for the governance concept. This conceptual reflection will come before a discussion of existing literature and empirical work (2.3), since it is important to first understand the concept before delving deeper into previous publications. Section 2.4 will provide a short description of the current policy context. The theoretical framework (chapter 3) will then outline and justify the conceptual and operational choices used in this particular research.

2.1 Introduction: Development, justice and climate change

Climate change poses a serious threat for social and economic development as well as social justice issues. This is highlighted in the sustainable development approach, which assumes the dialectical relationship between human and environmental development and well-being (see for example Raworth 2012). The SDGs are a concrete example of this sustainable development lens. The eradication of poverty (SDG 1) is arguably the most pressing issue in developing countries and climate change has a substantial negative impact on poverty; this interaction has for example been analysed by the World Bank (Hallegatte et al. 2016). The worsening effects of climate change will thus become an increasingly major obstacle to poverty reduction. This is mainly due to three reasons:

1. Climate change could result in 5% global crop yield losses by 2030 and reach 30% by 2080; these numbers *include* adaptation measures such as higher yield crops. Lower agricultural production in developing countries is shown to be the main driver of climate-induced poverty, as many people could lose their livelihoods and food security;
2. Natural disasters, which damage poor people's assets, will only increase;
3. Diseases such as malaria and diarrhoea affect poor people more. These diseases will expand due to climate change and lead to health shocks. (Hallegatte et al. 2016)

Of course, these impacts affect not only the poor. However, poor people are disproportionately exposed to climate shocks and they are more vulnerable to them: they lose relatively more when affected by such shocks. In addition, they have less social or financial resilience to manage the impacts of climate shocks.

As has been highlighted in the introduction, high-emission (developed) countries have largely caused climate change. The economic development of the countries in North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand from 1850 until 2002 has cumulated in 76% of all emitted CO₂ in this period (Williams 2015). At the same time, developing countries in the Global South will struggle most to adapt to the consequences of climate change – countries who have historically contributed only a small share of global GHG emissions. From this angle, there is a clear injustice aspect to the distribution of the harmful effects of climate change, and the responsibility for that harm. As Walker (2012) puts it: “If miraculously it was the highest carbon emitters that were to suffer the severest consequences of climate change, then we could speculate that much might be different in the way that the problem and its solutions are viewed” (p.193).

The problem is further complicated by the central role carbon plays in modern capitalist society. Every attempt to ‘decarbonise’ that society will “rub up against all sorts of vested interests and established hierarchies of wealth, influence and status” (Walker 2012, p.186). The development of modern capitalism has led to enormous social-spatial inequalities, which are in themselves a huge barrier to organising collective action against climate change (Sayer 2009). Thus it is not only the spatial injustice of the global distribution of climate change impacts, but also social injustices and the distribution of power.

The way climate change, social justice and socio-economic development interact can be referred to as climate justice. As a concept, climate justice came after the environmental justice movement, which originated in the United States (Schlosberg and Collins 2014). At first the movement was largely related to the unequal distribution of toxic waste sites and pollution among social groups in the US, with (racial) minority communities often being most affected. Many scholars (such as Capek 1993; Pellow & Brulle 2005) point to protests against a landfill in Warren County, North Carolina in 1982 as the catalyst of the environmental justice movement (although environmental concerns of course consisted before this). Faber and McCarthy (2003) describe the movement as a coming together of civil rights groups, environmental groups, health and safety concerns, social and economic justice, and indigenous land rights movements. The concept of climate justice became mainstream a little later; the first Climate Justice Summit took place in The Hague during the sixth COP in 2001. Hurricane Katrina then drew international attention to the unjust impacts of climate change and the broader social injustice for minorities and the poor. Climate justice takes a strongly international approach, as humans all over the globe are responsible for causing it (some far more than others, of course) and it will affect people and ecosystems everywhere. Environmental justice, on the other hand, can adopt a more local lens as well, for example by focusing on local pollution or waste sites.

2.2 Conceptual reflection

2.2.1 Shades of justice

Climate justice has been approached from a wide variety of angles and disciplines. Schlosberg and Collins (2014) identify three broad societal groups that have engaged with defining climate justice: academic circles, NGOs, and grassroots movements.

The academic theories are described by Schlosberg and Collins as attempts at “applied philosophy”, where “more or less ideal notions of justice” are used to “provide a normative justification for global climate change policy” (p.365). There are a great many scholars who view climate justice from the perspective of ethical philosophy (Roser & Seidel 2017). This angle is interesting but very theoretical, as it often considers justice matters in an (semi)ideal situation (the way actors *should* be behaving); Roser and Seidel stress the need to take into account a nonideal situation, in which other actors do not act in a (fully) just manner. Questions that are central in such an ethical approach are for example: What needs to be done when one agent does not fulfil their duties, for example when it comes to reducing emissions? Does that decrease or increase the responsibility of the other agents?

However, there are also academic angles that are not mainly based on philosophical considerations. There is the human-rights approach, which is for example taken by Skillington (2017): “Accelerating climate change means grave losses in and major deprivations to essential resource reserves for growing numbers worldwide, who have rights as members of the wider community of humanity regardless of nationality, ethnicity, class, and so on” (p.52). Another angle is the legal one, for example expanded on by Thorp (2014), who frames climate change as a constitutional issue and attempts to formulate a legal framework that can serve as a basis to protect common resources.

Even more pragmatic is the approach taken by Posner and Weisbach (2010), who entirely reject the idea that “certain intuitive ideas about justice should play a major role in the design of a climate agreement” (p.5). They argue that climate treaties should not necessarily reflect justice based on past emissions. By attempting to solve so many serious world problems at once (such as the unequal distribution of wealth between the North and the South), the chance of successful climate action decreases. Instead, optimising the global level of emission reductions should be done independently of tackling other global issues, such as poverty.

A second group that engages with climate justice, according to Schlosberg and Collins (2014), are “elite-focused” NGOs (p.365). Their approach focuses on influencing policy makers and policy processes, more than on movement building. Thirdly, the definition of climate justice carried out by grassroots movements is different still; it means “moving to a post-carbon energy system, paying for the ecological and social damage of climate change, and protecting the voice and sovereignty of the

most vulnerable” (p.367). More recently, within grassroots groups increasing emphasis is being placed on the role of multinational energy companies and their entanglement with national governments, as well as the broader economic context (capitalism) in which they operate (Schlosberg and Collins 2014).

2.2.2 Distribution, procedure, recognition

There are various aspects of climate justice that can be focused on. In the literature three aspects are generally to be found: distribution, procedure, and recognition.

Distribution is the most obvious and prominent one of the three. It relates to the impacts of climate change, which are shared or distributed across countries, groups, or individuals. Many questions regarding distributive justice arise: for example, there is the question of *what* exactly is distributed. Roser and Seidel (2017) argue that there are advantages and disadvantages to climate change. The advantages are perhaps less apparent than the disadvantages, but a changing climate could for example transform a region that was previously too cold to sustain agriculture into one where crops can thrive due to higher global temperatures or changing precipitation patterns. The disadvantages of climate change are numerous and well known (extreme weather events, rising sea levels, an overall increase in global temperatures). According to Roser and Seidel (2017) these can be grouped into the disadvantages that we manage to avoid, and the disadvantages that will occur despite our best efforts.

Furthermore, there is the question of *how* the (dis)advantages of climate change will be quantified: will they be expressed in resources, money or, as is argued by Roser and Seidel (2017), in human well-being? Roser and Seidel also outline that it is important to consider who the recipients of (re)distribution are, and on what grounds they are receiving certain (dis)advantages.

The second aspect of climate justice is the procedural one, which is about the fairness of the decision-making process (Pickering, Jotzo & Wood 2015). Here attention should e.g. be devoted to who is included in decision making, the weight that is given to each participant’s opinion, the power (im)balance between participants, etc. Thomas and Twyman (2005) argue for the inclusion of procedural aspects in any consideration of climate justice, stating that justice “should relate to a wide range of issues including: decision-making processes – who decides, who responds; frameworks for taking and facilitating actions; [and] relationships between the developed and developing world” (p.116-117).

The third aspect is one that has recently gained traction within justice theory: recognition. According to Young (2011), the central justice concern is not distributive inequality itself, but rather what causes it. She argues that exclusion, both on a cultural and political level, leads to inequality

and vulnerability. In short, lack of recognition for certain (minority) groups or individuals is the key driver of injustice. Walker (2012) concludes that “at the core of misrecognition are cultural and institutional processes of disrespect which devalue some people in comparison to others” (p.50). Fraser (1996) identifies three types of misrecognition: general cultural domination, nonrecognition, and disrespect/stereotyping. According to Schlosberg (2012), the Small Island States are a prime example of misrecognition when it comes to climate change; the concerns of these small states, which threaten to completely disappear due to rising sea levels, are too often brushed aside in global negotiations or conferences. In a way, recognition in the climate change debate can thus also be seen as a demand for cultural survival. However, Schlosberg also asserts that recognition alone is not enough; it also needs to be translated into political participation.

2.2.3 Adaptation and mitigation justice

Commonly, a distinction is made between climate adaptation and climate mitigation. This division is also relevant to the issue of climate justice, because the object of distribution is vastly different depending on whether we speak of mitigation or adaptation.

Bulkeley (2001) states that the emphasis in the literature has traditionally been on mitigative justice, for example on questions such as who has the right to emit greenhouse gases, how the remaining net global emissions will be divided across countries, who should provide the financial costs of mitigation, and how historical responsibility plays a role in this. Roser & Seidel (2017) provide an overview on the various ways climate justice can be put into practice. As the object to be distributed, they assume emission budgets or costs for emission reductions, thus maintaining a focus on mitigation. The distribution options range from the well-known ‘polluter-pays principle’ to emissions egalitarianism (all individuals get an equal share of the remaining global emissions budget), the ‘grandfathering principle’ (emission reductions need to be equal relative to the status quo), and a number of others.

A number of the principles discussed by Roser and Seidel (2017) could also be applied to adaptation, such as the polluter-pays principle, the beneficiary-pays principle and the ability-to-pay principle. In these cases, the object to be distributed would be the costs of adaptation, as opposed to the costs of emission reductions. Roser and Seidel argue that mitigation is the most pressing effort and thus do not at length discuss adaptational justice. However, they do recognise that adaptation and mitigation are two different matters, and that what is needed is “the form of a combination of two principles, each of which governs the distribution in one of these two ‘spheres’ of climate justice: one principle for the adaptation and compensation costs, and another principle for the mitigation costs” (p.159). Paavola and Adger (2006) argue that adaptational justice is more complex, as

adaptation not only questions who should be responsible for the costs of adaptation, but also how the benefits of technological or monetary assistance should be distributed between recipients. Unlike mitigation, where the object of distribution is either emissions themselves or the cost of emission reduction, adaptation has a wide range of burdens *and* benefits that can be distributed.

Pelling (2011) identifies three types of adaptation depending on the extent to which justice is considered: resilience, transitional adaptation and transformational adaptation. The first is to do with increasing the flexibility of populations to deal with the effects of climate change and, according to Smucker et al. (2015) is “most pervasive in development and donor policy perhaps precisely because it does not explicitly address inequality, wider social and political questions” (p.41). Transformational adaptation, then, is situated at the opposite side of the spectrum; it is a far-reaching, intentional process of change to social, cultural, political and economic structures that create vulnerability to climate change. Transitional adaptation takes a middle ground between the two, encompassing a change *within* existing social structures and pursuing procedural and distributive justice by reforming established governance systems.

2.2.4 Climate governance

The concept of ‘governance’ refers to the notion that the governing of society is increasingly becoming a shared responsibility of state, market and civil society, not of the government alone. Many varieties or ‘modes’ of governance exist. Lang et al. (2013) define ‘modes of governance’ as “forms of realising collective goals by means of collective action” (p.5).

An important question in the governance debate is which mode of governance (or mix of modes) is most suited for sustainable development. The body of literature on this topic has been growing over the past years. Meadowcroft (2007) defines governance of sustainable development as “processes of socio-political governance oriented towards the attainment of sustainable development” (p.299).

As was the case for climate justice, most sources on climate governance also take an international approach, outlining the dynamics between states, the nature of international treaties, and the proceedings of climate negotiations such as the COP (Andonova et al. 2009; Okereke et al. 2009). This is understandable given that climate change is a transnational issue. However, more recent studies have begun to chart the changing climate governance landscape, which is exhibiting characteristics of polycentricity and multi-level governance (Jordan et al. 2015). Examples of this include collaborations between cities and emission trading systems (Bulkeley 2012). Jordan et al. (2015) assert that this shift is following many of Ostrom’s (2010) predictions about polycentric governance, and also observe that:

“The strand of work on transnational governance has tended not to explore state roles that deeply, having implicitly embraced a ‘small state’ framing of governance. But more detailed work is now shedding light on the multiple, sometimes overlapping roles that state politicians and bureaucrats play. For example, through ‘new’ climate governance work we are now appreciating that so-called ‘leader’ states that engage in policy innovation, also work through international organisations (such as the World Bank) and supranational bodies (such as the EU) to ‘orchestrate’ new forms of transnational governance” (Jordan et al 2015, p.18).

2.2.5 Frameworks for sustainable governance

A substantial body of literature exists on sustainable/environmental governance; a few of the most relevant theoretical accounts will be discussed here. Firstly, Bäckstrand et al. (2010) provide a framework for analysing the legitimacy of new modes of governance. They identify three broad forms of governance: hierarchies (strong chains of command in a top-down fashion), markets (self-organising form of governance based on free transactions between actors), and networks (relying on links between public and private actors). In addition, three forms of governance rationality are categorised (administrative, economic, and deliberative) and dimensions of input and output legitimacy of a mode of governance are identified. Bäckstrand et al. assert that environmental governance has been under wide debate recently, especially with the birth of new modes of public-private governance.

Secondly, Van Zeijl-Rozema et al. (2008) propose a similar model to Bäckstrand et al. (2010), but use a continuum instead of separate categories. Here, governance is placed on an axis with on one side hierarchical governance and on the other side deliberative governance “in which societal actors shape societal goals through dialogue and social learning” (p.413). Two sides of a sustainability continuum are also identified: ecological sustainability, with a focus on ecological boundaries and scientific evidence, and the well-being perspective, which places more emphasis on societal concerns and involves the environment in as far as it provides resources for human well-being. The two continuums are then combined and various examples of modes of governance are placed on the axes.

The framework designed by Howlett, Rayner, and Tollefson (2009) also includes two axes: firstly, hierarchical to plurilateral governance, and secondly, state-centred/formal governance to non-state/informal governance. These two axes are then applied to the political, institutional, and instrumental dimension. “These three dimensions are related in a nested fashion: institutional structures affect configurations of political power which, in turn, constrain the choices of types of regulatory tools used in specific circumstances” (p.386). Thus, within each of these three contexts, an

assumption on governance can be detected which can be placed somewhere on the aforementioned two axes.

The dimensions of Howlett, Rayner, and Tollefson (2009) are similar to those identified by Lange et al. (2013). In their framework, modes of governance are regarded as “dynamic relations among political processes (*politics*), institutional structures (*polity*), and policy content (*policy*)” (p.2). This triad has also been used by other sources, such as for example Christou and Simpson (2009), Kritzinger and Pulzl (2008), and Treib et al. (2007); it is also often used in political science (Lang et al. 2013). The only difference between Howlett, Rayner, and Tollefson (2009) and Lange et al. (2013) is that the former use a third dimension focused solely on regulatory/instrumental aspects, whereas the latter emphasise the broader content of policy, which includes but is not limited to policy instruments.

2.3 Overview of existing literature

2.3.1 Justice and climate finance

As has been mentioned before, developed countries provide financial assistance to developing countries to help them adapt to and mitigate climate change. Two justifications for the flow of international climate finance can be given (Fankhauser, Sahni et al. 2015). The emphasis can either be placed on the strategic aspect of reaching an investment optimum: where would investments have the highest impact? For countries that have a high capacity to raise funds as well as a large share of the emissions responsibility, the fair share of their global emission reduction is higher than they could possibly achieve with domestic emission reductions. Thus, these countries would have to cooperate with developing countries to fulfil their fair share of mitigation effort (Holz et al. 2017). The other reason for international climate finance is justice related and has been elaborated upon in the previous section; it concerns the (distributive) disparity between the developed countries’ responsibility for historical emissions and developing countries’ lacking ability to adapt to the effects of climate change. In other words, especially adaptation finance can also be seen as a form of compensation to developing countries for the damages inflicted by climate change (Walker 2012).

Regardless of the motivation behind it, international support is essential to prevent trade-offs between climate change action and poverty reduction in developing countries. Hallegatte et al. (2016) assert that international climate finance is especially important “for investments with high upfront costs that are critical to prevent lock-ins into carbon-intensive patterns (such as for urban transport, energy infrastructure, or deforestation” (p.3). This is because it is unlikely that domestic resources are sufficient to make these investments, and because private climate finance is likely to focus on the cheapest, short-term options which do not always prevent carbon-intensive lock-ins.

Apart from financial resources, the international community can also offer knowledge and resources on climate risk analysis and project preparation, as well as strengthening international risk-sharing mechanisms.

Climate finance from developed countries is used to undertake concrete mitigation and adaptation projects in developing countries. Thus, climate finance needs to be regarded in the broader context of international development cooperation. In the last twenty years, development cooperation has been greatly reformed – a process that was particularly driven by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. This reform entails a “shift from assistance to recipients, to cooperation with development partners” (Gomez-Echeverri 2013, p.643); a more tailored approach to the needs of each country; and ensuring that development partners have ownership of the aid they receive. These characteristics also define the approach that is taken to climate finance, which is channelled by donor countries into local, climate-related development projects in the global South. The activities analysed in this thesis provide examples of such projects.

2.3.2 Scales of justice

Geographical scale also plays an important role when it comes to climate justice. The *environmental* justice movement, especially at its inception, has been more focused on local issues such as pollution. *Climate* justice, on the other hand, mostly devotes attention to global justice, GHG emissions, and nations as actors, with less attention for smaller scales (Bulkeley et al., 2013; Thomas & Twyman 2005). Fisher (2012) states that climate justice “has been constructed as an international ideal and been implicitly and explicitly understood as the relationships between nations” (p.21). Posner and Weisbach (2010) point to a problem in this approach, arguing that in ethical philosophy the principles of distributive and corrective justice are morals that are meant to be applied to individuals, not to states; thus caution is needed when applying it to countries.

Despite – or because – of the transnational focus persisting in the literature, the need for attention for other scales has been recognised by various scholars. Hassoun and Herlitz (2018) for example propose an equity framework that is based on distribution on three different scales: distribution of goods across countries, distribution of goods within countries, and distribution of goods between individuals in the world. The first distributive issue is usually the focus in international negotiations, as it relates to responsibility for past emissions. The second one becomes the focus when the negative consequences of a shift from a high- to a low-carbon society are considered. The third version of distributive justice is usually the focus of climate economics and climate ethics. Schlosberg (2012) adopts a climate justice approach based on the capabilities of

individuals, and also stresses the importance of taking communities into account and including them in mapping the external threats to their capabilities.

In addition, Colenbrander et al. (2018) argue that justice specifically related to climate finance has also largely been considered at international or national level, for example by advocating for developing countries' representation at the boards of multilateral climate funds. Only a small portion of adaptation finance is channelled directly to locally-designed and locally-led projects (Fenton, Reid, Wright & Huq 2015); mostly, the money flows through MDBs, large funds and governments. This means that "some of the social, political and economic processes that create and sustain inequalities within a country will typically be the same processes that allocate climate finance" (Colenbrander et al. 2018, p.903). It is important that climate finance not only increases climate justice between countries, but also within countries themselves. The spatial aspect of justice is thus important to consider.

2.3.3 Existing case studies into adaptational climate justice

A variety of case studies into climate justice exists, with or without a link to climate finance in particular. A number of examples will be outlined here, all with a focus on national or local projects since this is also the focus of this research.

Bulkeley et al. (2013), for example, analyse the way discourses of climate justice exist in climate projects in urban spaces. They conclude that the explicit consideration of climate justice is limited; where it is present, it is largely framed as a distribution of rights. For projects concerning urban adaptation, individual rights are often the focus (the rights to protection), whereas in mitigative projects the emphasis is placed on collective rights. With regards to mitigation, there was limited concern for the responsibilities of taking action against climate change. It was found that in the Global South, attention was also given to procedural justice, whereas in the North this was mostly lacking.

Barrett (2014) tracks the distribution of international adaptation finance in Malawi using a complex econometric model which includes variables such as climate vulnerability, government support, and ODA¹ activity. The study found that climate finance is channelled to districts that have high physical vulnerability, but low socio-economic climate vulnerability. In other words, districts that have better socio-economic means to adapt to the effects of climate change receive the bulk of adaptation finance, whereas "districts at high [socio-economic] climate risk are disproportionately low recipients of adaptation finance activities" (p.135). In addition, finance is mostly allocated to districts that already exhibit high ODA activity. This can be explained by the fact that formal aid

¹ ODA: Official Development Aid

networks already exist in these regions, and that transaction costs are minimised here. Lastly, districts with high agricultural activity received more funds. The distribution of adaptation finance is thus based on “accessibility, cost minimisation, and economic functionality” (p.139), where districts need pre-existing infrastructure and experience in managing funds to be eligible for adaptation support. In a follow-up study on local implementation of adaptation finance, Barrett (2013) found that adaptation finance had a greater and more long-term impact when compared to informal adaptation practices, and that more climate risks were addressed. It was also found that the villagers who received formal adaptation assistance had increased agency to respond to climate risks. Therefore it can be concluded that the adaptation finance was successful, but as Barrett (2014) notes in the subnational study, finance must be present in vulnerable locations to begin with. The two studies undertaken by Barrett are prime examples of the focus on distributive justice, in this case the distribution of adaptation finance.

Another study, done by Colenbrander et al. (2018), focuses on the justice aspects of adaptation finance in urban areas in developing countries, drawing from a wide range of examples. The authors stress that in adaptation finance flows, the principle of subsidiarity should be taken into account. They conclude that channelling adaptation finance to local projects may ensure that more resources reach the most vulnerable, and that it makes decision-making more accessible to a wider range of stakeholders. Often, local governments are responsible for the design and enforcement of public health and safety regulations such as pollution control, as well as for risk-reducing infrastructure such as drainage systems. This makes them suitable to enhance the climate resilience of their local area. Local civil society groups can also play a role by drawing attention to an issue, by initiating small collective infrastructure projects themselves, by negotiating with local governments, or by sharing resources and information.

An article that provides a critical justice view of adaptation policy is that by Smucker et al. (2015). The authors use Ferguson’s (1994) notion of the ‘anti-politics machine’; a concept coined after Ferguson’s study of foreign aid efforts in Lesotho in the 1970s and 80s, where development projects were presented as inherently anti-political by development agencies but turned out to (unintendedly) expand bureaucratic state power in the region. Smucker et al. (2015) see a similar trend of depoliticization in national adaptation policy in Tanzania. Although these policies are designed by the Tanzania government and not directly related to development cooperation, plans such as the National Action Plan for Adaptation (NAPA) were drawn up by Least Developed Countries as a response to international climate finance agreements. Smucker et al. stress that adaptation should not be seen as “merely an unavoidable response to environmental change but a set of individual and collective choices embedded within existing institutions and structures of development” (p.40); as such, procedural and distributive justice aspects should be taken into

account. In addition, existing local coping strategies (also referred to as ‘spontaneous’ or informal adaptation) need to be considered when designing adaptation plans or policies. “Pressures resulting from narrow technical approaches emanating from national policy”, the authors conclude, “may conflict with people’s multifaceted responses to recent changes in climate variability” (p.45). This conclusion shows discrepancies with Barrett’s (2013) findings that planned adaptation resulting from climate finance flows was usually more effective than spontaneous adaptation efforts from local communities.

2.3.4 Existing case studies into sustainable governance

Similarly to the case studies concerning climate justice, which were outlined in the section 2.3.3, there are also many case studies into modes of sustainable governance. Some take a more explorative approach, whereas others use an existing framework to analyse modes of governance. An example of the first category is the study by Chan, Mert, and Pattberg (2017), who look into a specific public-private partnership (the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund) operating in China. The study is mostly descriptive in identifying the actors who participate in the project, as well as outlining how the global approach of the partnership is translated into local application. Another descriptive case study was conducted by Kropp and Türk (2017), who observed local climate governance in the Alps in order to determine the conditions for proactive sustainability governance.

Research that takes a deductive approach, starting out with a theoretical framework to facilitate analysis, is for example done by Bäckstrand et al. (2010) whose framework was discussed in the previous section. Several cases in Sweden and the EU are analysed according to form, rationality, and legitimacy. Howlett, Rayner, and Tollefson (2009) also apply their framework, in this case to governance modes in sustainable forest management in British Columbia, Canada.

2.4 Policy context

2.4.1 Current situation in climate finance

As previously mentioned, developed countries have agreed to annually mobilise 100 billion US dollars in climate finance for developing countries by 2020. After 2025, this number is only expected to increase: by 2030, it is estimated that developing countries will need between 140 and 300 billion USD per year for adaptation alone (UNEP 2018). This also includes domestic investments, not just international flows.

In 2018, the Standing Finance Committee (SFC) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) released an assessment and overview report of global climate finance flows. In total, the SFC estimates that 74.5 billion US dollars was channelled to developing Parties in

2016 (UNFCCC 2018). This means that in 2020, an additional 25.5 billion US dollars will need to be mobilised. However, other reports such as the Oxfam Shadow Report (2018) are far less optimistic; here, the amount of global climate finance was estimated to only be 16-21 billion US dollars. This is mainly because Oxfam does not count entire loans as climate finance, only the grant equivalent of those loans. In addition, the climate-relevance of bilateral funding is expected to be over-reported.

The UNFCCC report also highlights the fact that more financial support is attributed to mitigation efforts than to adaptation efforts. The report concludes that the share of climate finance is only a small fraction of overall global finance flows (see figure 1). “The level of climate finance is considerably below what one would expect given the investment opportunities and needs that have been identified” (p.9) and so efforts urgently need to be scaled up. Not all global finance has to be specifically directed towards climate, but flows should aim to be ‘climate consistent’: they must at least prevent a negative impact on the environment.




Figure 1: Climate finance in context (UNCCC 2018)

2.4.2 Situation in the Netherlands

Currently, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (specifically its Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation branch) is responsible for the tracking and increasing of Dutch international climate finance. A major focus of the Ministry is the so-called ‘mainstreaming’ of climate policy. This means that adaptation and mitigation measures are integrated in programmes from other departments (most notably food security and water policy) so these efforts can be partly counted as climate finance. Other major sources of international climate finance are multilateral development banks (MDBs), public-private partnerships, international climate funds such as the GCF, and of course the

Ministry's own primary climate activities in developing countries. In 2018, a total 578 million euros of public climate finance was reported by the Dutch government; an additional 498 million euros of private finance was mobilised.

In the policy document of the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Sigrid Kaag, the plans of the Ministry are outlined for the coming years (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2018). Social development is an important part of international climate policy: for example, companies and knowledge institutes are mobilised to share their technology and know-how internationally. Furthermore, promoting gender equality is a cross-cutting aim of Dutch development cooperation.

The focus of the Ministry's climate-related programmes is mainly on adaptation. An important reason for this is that adaptation is often less commercially attractive than mitigation; thus the funding/investment opportunities for adaptation are lower and the ODA contribution is most needed in sectors to do with adaptation. In line with this, international NGOs such as Oxfam (2018) have called for more international climate finance to be directed towards adaptation. Another main reason for the Ministry's focus on adaptation is that it naturally combines with other development priorities, such as access to drinking water and food security. It can even be said that development cooperation is only valuable when the impact of climate change is taken into account, as this ensures the sustainability of projects and infrastructure in the future.

3 Theoretical framework

This research is focused on determining the way climate justice is recognised in climate-relevant activities in developing countries which have been funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and how the concept of climate justice is operationalised into distributive and procedural aspects. As such, the underlying research paradigm is constructivist in nature, because the focus lies on the way a particular concept is interpreted and institutionalised. The assumption is that there is no such thing as an objective, empirical definition of climate justice which can be discovered by research, but rather something that is (re)negotiated by a variety of actors.

Two frameworks were used in this research to guide the analysis: justice theory and governance theory. These provide a number of categories that served as focus points in the study.

3.1 Climate justice

The concept of 'justice' (in this case, specifically climate justice) is central in this research. As has been mentioned before, the distributive and procedural aspects that are recognised in the formulation of climate projects will be analysed, as it is beyond the scope of this research to measure the impacts of such projects.

The theoretical framework for this research is based on Walker's (2012) thorough synthesis and categorisation of climate justice concepts. The categorisation of justice in distributive and procedural aspects is widely seen across the literature (Walker 2012; Roser & Seidel 2017; Bulkeley et al. 2013; Gardiner 2011; Thomas & Twyman 2005; Smucker et al. 2015), as well as the more recent notion of recognition (Fraser 1996; Young 2011). What is striking about the vast majority of studies is that they largely take two approaches. They either apply one or more of the three justice categories in a case study without much elaboration on the operationalisation of these concepts (Bulkeley et al. 2013; Barrett 2013; Barrett 2014; Thomas & Twyman 2005; Colenbrander et al. 2018), or they attempt to define the way international climate justice should be put into practice based on ethical considerations (Roser & Seidel 2017; Posner & Weisbach 2010; Caney 2014; Ferreira et al. 2017; Schlosberg 2012) – such as for example the polluter-pays approach, the ability-to-pay approach, carbon egalitarianism, etc. Few sources actually provide a more theoretical approach aimed at establishing a framework for climate justice.

An example of such a framework is that of Hassoun and Herlitz (2018). As was mentioned in the literature review, their focus lies on distribution on international, intranational, and individual level. Their equity framework is designed specifically for the evaluation of environmental policies. The authors use the Gini coefficient to measure inequality; thus their focus is on the distribution of

wealth and not on other aspects such as health, social position, or power relations. Their framework to evaluate climate change policies for the three forms of distributive equity consists of complex calculations. These take levels of inequality as their starting point; presumably, one wants to limit the level of inequality on all scales as much as possible. However, this model is less useful for this thesis as it only focuses on income and the starting point is not justice, but existing inequalities. In addition, the approach taken in their study is quantitative, whereas a qualitative study fits better with the aim of this research since concepts such as climate justice are not easily (if at all) quantified. An approach such as used by Barrett (2014) is also less applicable here, given that his study focuses solely on distributive justice and uses quantitative, econometric methods to measure the allocation of climate finance.

Walker (2012) gives the most comprehensive and well-motivated overview of not only the main justice categories, but also possible sub-dimensions. Furthermore, these are applicable in a qualitative study as is conducted here. The figure below highlights the interconnectedness of all three forms of justice:




Figure 2: Interrelations between distribution, participation and recognition (Walker 2012, p.65)

In this study, however, recognition is not seen as a separate category, because it actually represents the core of the research. The main research question asks how elements of climate justice are recognised by the Dutch Ministry. The concept of recognition is also present in most subcategories of both distribution and procedure that are outlined below. Especially because this study does not contain an impact or implementation assessment, the main focus lies on what distributive aspects are *recognised* or anticipated, rather the way the distributive process itself works in practice. In procedure, recognition is most explicit in 2c: the patterns of (mis)recognition across social groups. In procedure, too, the core is which actors are recognised and included, and subsequently the power which is attributed to each actor in the decision-making process.

Thus, Walker's (2012) model has been adapted slightly for the purposes of this research. The two central justice concepts that were applied are distributive and procedural justice, with recognition running as a central thread through both dimensions. The forms of justice are sub-divided as follows:

1. *Distributive justice* is seen as the central topic of justice theory. The four most important dimensions of distributive justice are:
 - a. The *benefit* or *burden* that is being distributed
 - b. The way the physiological, social, economic or cultural *vulnerability* of certain groups affects distributive justice
 - c. The way the *need* for access to resources is represented in distributive justice
 - d. The way *responsibility* for the production of environmental burdens is reflected in distributive justice
2. *Procedural justice* is about the justice of the decision-making process. Four dimensions include:
 - a. The availability of *information*
 - b. *Inclusion* and equal vote in decision-making, as well as the resources available for *participation*
 - c. Patterns of *(mis)recognition* of social groups, for example based on gender, race, religion, etc.
 - d. Access to *legal processes*

3.2 Governance

A number of frameworks for sustainable governance have been outlined in chapter 2. The one proposed by Van Zeijl-Rozema et al. (2008) is less useful for this thesis, as the framework is not very detailed, and sustainable development forms one of the axes – a concept that is not under discussion in this research. The framework by Bäckstrand et al. (2010), in turn, points to legitimacy of governance as one of the main dimensions; this is further sub-divided into input legitimacy and output legitimacy. This is an interesting distinction, as input legitimacy has close ties to procedural justice and is even alternatively described as 'procedural legitimacy' in the paper. It can definitely be argued that governance will have the most impact on the procedural aspect of justice. Where the link between governance and justice is concerned, Bäckstrand et al. (2010) is certainly an important framework to consider; however, their focus is also on output legitimacy, which concerns the input of policy, something that is not measured in this thesis. In addition, their governance modes are less detailed and extensive than those outlined by Lange et al. (2013). Similarly, the model by Howlett, Rayner, and Tollefson (2009) is less extensive than Lange et al.'s (2013) because it only focuses on

the instrumental aspect of policy, whereas Lange et al. cover more aspects of policy content. Lastly, Lange et al.'s conceptual distinction between politics, polity and policy allows for a highly detailed operationalisation using the ideal-types described by Driessen (2012). Therefore, the theoretical framework used in this thesis is that of Lange et al. (2013).

In more detail, the aspects of Lange et al.'s (2013) modes of governance can be characterised as follows:

- The dimension of *politics* in a mode of governance includes the actors within a mode and the relationships between these actors. It is about the way different interests and preferences are translated into policy choices and collective action.
- The dimension of *polity* refers to the structural, institutional side of governance, or the 'rules of the game' that influence the patterns of interactions between actors. This can also include the institutional level of interaction (from international to local) and the degree of formality.
- The dimension of *policy* covers the content of governance, meaning policy formulation and implementation. In this research, the implementation of policy is largely undiscussed.

The interplay between these three facets is also important. The two-sided link between polity-politics determines how institutional forces shape the actors and vice versa; the underlying notion here is that of structuration theory (Giddens 1984). The relationship between polity and policy determines the institutional setting (procedures) in which policies are formulated and implemented. Lastly, the ability of (non-)state actors to participate in policy-making is determined by the link between politics and policy. Because the three facets of a mode of governance are closely intertwined, a change in one of them will inevitably lead to a change in the others.

The framework by Lange et al. (2013) can be illustrated by the figure below:




Figure 3: Modes of governance (Lange et al. 2013)

3.3 Conceptual model

The theoretical framework is illustrated in the model below:




Figure 4: Conceptual model

This research focuses on the two aspects of climate justice that were discussed in the previous section: distribution and procedure. These concepts were then used to analyse and critically reflect on one or more climate-related activities funded by Dutch climate finance. In addition, the modes of governance used in these activities were mapped. These findings were into consideration in the conclusion to see if different modes of governance might have an impact on the way climate justice is recognised by the Ministry. The research focuses on project formulation; project implementation and project impact are outside the scope of this research.

3.4 Operationalisation

The distributive and procedural aspects of justice were operationalised using the sub-dimensions outlined in the theoretical framework. Using Environmental and Social Risk Assessment guidelines from the Adaptation Fund (2016), the Green Climate Fund² (2018a; 2018b), and the OECD (2012), a number of variables was established for the operationalisation of the sub-dimensions of justice. These variables served as a starting point for the analysis and are included in Table I below. During the Atlas.ti coding process, it soon became apparent that two kinds of procedural aspects could be distinguished: those related to the procedure within projects and the interaction between stakeholders on various levels (most notably with stakeholders on a local level), as well as procedural

² The GCF bases their guidelines on those of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the commercial branche of the World Bank

aspects on a broader meta-level, related to the way a specific project is selected, prepared and assessed. As the Ministry is not the implementing organisation of any of the programmes they fund (NGOs and/or market actors are usually tasked with this), risk assessments, monitoring and evaluation are important tools to keep track of an activity's progresses or setbacks and provide support where necessary. Frameworks for monitoring and evaluation are designed in the project formulation phase and thus provide an insight as to what goals/tools will be emphasised in a project. The meta-level procedural aspects were added to the operationalisation table as categories Procedure e, f, g.

Another category that proved ambiguous was the anticipated burdens. In a broader sense, as intended by Walker (2012), this refers to burdens as a result of climate change, and how these are distributed across a population. This also means that category Dd asks who is responsible for creating these climate burdens. However, in the risk assessment guidelines analysed for the operationalisation, 'burdens' refers to the unintended harmful side effects that are created as a consequence of the climate/development programme. This is also the way 'burdens' will be interpreted in this research. Therefore, the example variables under Dd are 'the fund' and 'the accredited entity', as these would be the actors executing a programme.

A full list of all coded variables per case will be provided in the appendix containing the primary research data.

Table A: Operationalisation of justice

Dimension of justice	Operationalisation (starting examples)
<i>Distribution</i>	
a. What is being distributed	<p><i>Burdens</i> resulting from the programme: (Air) pollution; GHG emissions; (hazardous) waste; noise; degradation of critical natural habitats; decrease in biodiversity; land/soil degradation; involuntary resettlement; reduction of water flows; depletion of natural resources</p> <p><i>Benefits</i> resulting from the programme: Basic health services; clean water/sanitation; energy, education, housing, safe working conditions, land rights; equitable access to development benefits</p>
b. Influence of vulnerability on distribution	Gender; age; socioeconomic status; income level; working conditions; labour rights; land rights; ethnicity
c. Need for resource access	(Indigenous) communities depending on natural resources (water, forest, raw materials) for

	livelihoods; access to cultural/religious heritage; vulnerable groups may have more urgent needs
d. Responsibility for creation of burdens as result of programme intervention	The fund; the accredited entity
<i>Procedure (within projects)</i>	
a. Availability of information	Public and timely provision of information; accessible in local language; tailored to local culture
b. Inclusion/resources for participation	Include local/affected communities; informed participation free of coercion; following up on consultations (addressing comments); engagement from design phase throughout lifecycle of activities
c. (Non/mis)recognition of social groups	Children, women and girls, the elderly, indigenous peoples, tribal groups, refugees, displaced people, people with disabilities, people with HIV/AIDS
d. Access to legal processes	(Independent) grievance mechanism that is accessible, fair, transparent and effective; adequate compensation / livelihood restoration
<i>Meta-procedure</i>	
e. Analysis beforehand	see Appendix C
f. Selection criteria	See Appendix C
g. Monitoring and evaluation	See Appendix C

Governance was operationalised by first identifying all the relevant actors that are involved in an activity and drawing up a stakeholder diagram to visualise the relationships between the actors. The governance mode was further characterised using the ideal-typical modes outlined by Driessen et al. (2012) and used by Lang et al. (2013). Driessen et al. (2012) offer an extensive list of variables for politics, policy and polity; what forms these variables can take; and how they are linked to different modes of governance (see figure 5 below). The variables were a useful tool for analysis although they were not equally applicable in all cases; see discussion section 7.6 for more. It is important to stress that the modes of governance below are ideal types and that the reality is more complex.

Table 3. Ideal-typical governance modes according to Driessen *et al.* (2012); S = central state; s = decentralized state; M = market; CS = civil society; -> = dominant role; < - > = equivalent role; - - - = background role






	Centralized governance 	Decentralized governance 	Public-private governance 	Interactive governance 	Self-governance 
<i>Actor features</i>					
Initiating actors	Central gov't agencies (or supra national bodies)	Gov't at its various levels of aggregation (subsidiarity)	Central gov't agencies; private sector is granted a preconditioned role also	Multiple actors: gov't, private sector and civil society	Private sector and/or civil society
Stakeholder position	Stakeholder autonomy determined by principal agency	High likelihood of stakeholder involvement	Autonomy of market stakeholders within predetermined boundaries	Equal roles for all network partners	Self-governing entities determine the involvement of other stakeholders
Policy level	(Supra) national level	Lower levels of gov't	Local to international level	Multiple levels	Local to international level
Power base	Coercion, authority and legitimacy (democratic representation at the national level)	Coercion, authority and legitimacy (democratic representation at lower levels)	Competitiveness (prices), contracts and legal recourse, legitimacy (agreement on relations and procedures)	Legitimacy (agreement on roles, positions, procedures and process), trust, knowledge	Autonomy, leadership, group size, social capital and legitimacy (agreement on relations and procedures)
<i>Institutional features</i>					
Model of representation	Pluralist (popular (supra) national election and lobbying)	Pluralist (popular local election and lobbying)	Corporatist (formalized public-private governing arrangements)	Partnership (Participatory public-private governing arrangements)	Partnership (Participatory private-private governing arrangements)
Rules of interaction	Formal rules (rule of law, fixed and clear procedures)	Formal rules (rule of law, fixed and clear procedures)	Formal and informal exchange rules	Institutions in its broadest form (Formal and informal rules)	Informal rules (norms, culture), Self-crafted (non-imposed) formal rules
Mechanisms of social interaction	Top-down, command-and-control	Sub-national governments decide autonomously about collaborations within top-down determined boundaries	Private actors decide autonomously about collaborations within top-down determined boundaries	Interactive: social learning, deliberations and negotiations	Bottom-up: social learning, deliberations and negotiations
<i>Features concerning content</i>					
Goals and targets	Uniform goals and targets	Uniform and level specific goals and targets	Uniform goals, targets actor specific	Tailor-made and integrated goals and targets	Tailor-made goals and targets
Instruments	Legislations, permits, norms and standards	Public covenants and performance contracts	Incentive based instruments like taxes and grants, performance contracts	Negotiated agreements, trading mechanisms, covenants and entitlements	Voluntary instruments, private contracts, entitlements, labelling and reporting
Policy Integration	Sectorial (policy sectors and levels separated)	Sectorial (policy sectors separated)	Sectorial (branches and industries separated)	Integrated (policy sectors and policy levels integrated)	Sectorial to integrated (depends on problem framing by communities of interest)
Policy-science interface	Primacy of generic, expert knowledge	Primacy of generic expert knowledge. Room for issue and time- and place-specific knowledge	Dominance of issue and time- and place-specific knowledge, expert and lay (procedures and consumers)	Transdisciplinarity: expert and lay knowledge in networks. Emphasis on integrated and time- and place-specific knowledge	Dominance of issue and time- and place-specific: expert and lay (citizens)

Figure 5: Ideal-type governance modes based on Driessen *et al.* (2012)

Figure 6 below depicts the research operationalisation in detailed steps, outlining how each stage of the research contributes to the next. The research steps will be outlined in further detail in the methodology section.




Figure 6: Research steps

4 Methodology

4.1 Research strategy

This research takes a constructivist approach to reality, so the ontological and epistemological assumptions are based on this paradigm. Ontologically speaking, the belief is that multiple realities exist, which are constructed by individuals or groups through their lived experiences and interaction (Cresswell 2013). This is reflected in the wide variety of interpretations of climate justice that was discussed in chapter 2. The assumption that reality is constructed in many forms means that it can only be known as a subjective interpretation; epistemologically speaking, the research process is about interpreting the data in a certain way whereby the researcher's assumptions and biases are made clear. Reality will never be objectively known; research presents one of many constructed versions of it (Cresswell 2013).

Social constructivism is mostly studied using qualitative methods. According to Cresswell (2013), social constructivism makes use of “an inductive method of emergent ideas [...] obtained through methods such as interviewing, observing, and analysis of texts” (p.36). This research used all three of these methods to ensure validity (see 4.3).

Several studies have shown that qualitative policy analysis is a useful method to gain an understanding of social and political structures (Pieterse 2010; Ireland 2012) such as modes of governance, and (implicitly) forms of justice. An example of a qualitative policy study is Nagoda (2015). Although her research is centred on how vulnerability is framed in policies, she implicitly also recognises justice: “I pay particular attention to how the policies regard social and political structures and relations (such as historical, social, cultural and political contexts leading to social exclusion, gender, caste and class differences; and access to power to control resources and/or decision making processes)” (p.572). As in this research, Nagoda uses various coding categories to analyse policy documents and qualitative interviews with relevant actors. Nightingale (2017) conducted a similar research into power and recognition in adaptation efforts in Nepal, also including participant observations and the analysis of media reports.

A research strategy similar to Nagoda's (2015) and Nightingale's (2017) policy analysis was used in this research. However, instead of focusing on only one case, three different activities funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were selected, making this a collective or multi-case study. The word 'activity' is used here to denote the wide variety of programmes funded by the Ministry. As these programmes are different in terms of scope, actors, mode of governance and focus, within the Ministry the umbrella term 'activity' is used. A similar approach is therefore taken in this document.

This research used a comparative case study design (Creswell 2013) with a focus on justice and governance within each case. Using the obtained data, a within-case analysis of each activity was made, followed by a cross-case analysis to compare the multiple activities.

4.1.1 Case selection

As was shown in section 2.2.3, climate justice takes different forms depending on whether adaptation or mitigation is the focus, in terms of scale (2.3.2) as well as in terms of the burdens or benefits to be distributed (emissions budgets/costs versus a wide variety of burdens and benefits). In this research, activities that focus (primarily) on adaptation are the object of analysis because the focus of the Dutch Ministry's development programmes lies on adaptation above mitigation (see section 2.4.2).

The reason three activities were selected is because this fits best with the scope of the research. By analysing more than one activity, a better understanding of the Ministry's approach to justice was reached, and a comparison between various modes of governance was made possible. Unfortunately, more than three activities were not feasible given the time constraints of this research. The selected cases are multi-variance cases: different types of activities undertaken by the Ministry that are characterised by different modes of governance.

One activity that was analysed is a strategic partnership with NGOs called Partners for Resilience (PfR). Here, the Ministry provides funding and NGOs execute programmes in designated countries. The focus of PfR is on the strengthening of local civil society organisations so they can advocate for disaster risk reduction measures and increased resilience of their communities.

Another focus is the Aqua for All (AfA) programme, named after the eponymous executing organisation which aims to empower local innovators/entrepreneurs and make water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) initiatives into commercially viable business models that can function independently of development funding. Thus the focus of AfA is very much on business innovation and the attraction of private funds. The Ministry does not engage with market actors directly, but instead funds Aqua for All to do this in a local context.

The third activity is the newly founded Dutch Fund for Climate and Development (DFCD) which receives funding from the Ministry but is managed by a consortium. This consortium consists of development bank FMO, fund manager Climate Fund Managers, and two NGOs. Thus, this fund is an example of an activity that has both an NGO and a commercial angle. The fund focuses on four specific themes: water and sanitation, environmental protection (for example ecosystem protection/restoration and flood prevention/control), forestry, and agriculture. Eventually, the goal of DFCD is also to help create commercially viable ('bankable') projects.

The reason these three cases in particular were selected is because of their innovative character. PfR does not only cooperate with (local) CSOs, but its main goal is specifically to strengthen the capacity of these organisations. In most Ministry programmes, cooperation with CSOs/NGOs plays a role but it does not usually take centre stage the way PfR aims for. AfA takes a unique approach in the sense that (successful) upscaling of water projects or innovations using private mobilisation is rare in the WASH/development cooperation sector. DFCD is similarly innovative with their focus on themes that are traditionally hard to make commercially interesting, such as forestry and environmental protection. In addition, DFCD as a fund has a large budget, which allows for an integrated landscape approach in a region, where various DFCD projects can complement each other. Also interesting is that DFCD is managed by NGOs as well as more commercial partners. Choosing these cases thus ensured maximum variation of governance modes.

As mentioned in section 3.4, analysis focused on the procedural aspects within projects as well as on a more meta-level how specific projects within an activity are selected and assessed. A visualisation of the different activity ‘levels’ is pictured in figure 7 below.




Figure 7: Visualisation of activity levels

4.1.2 Data sources

The main source of information about Ministry-funded activities are policy documents, in which the official policy framework consisting of a Theory of Change, strategy, goals, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are outlined. These documents were obtained from the Ministry’s internal cloud service. For every activity, the most recent annual report, annual plan, and original project proposal were selected as well as other relevant documents such as for example monitoring or assessment frameworks. In the case of DFCD, only the two inception documents existed.

There is usually one policy officer responsible for each activity (unless the activity is especially large). Since these are all employees working in or close to the department of the researcher, it was easy to contact them and set up an interview. Through snowball sampling, more participants for

interviews were identified: the policy officer was able to provide a reference to external partners involved in the activity, who in turn could refer to their colleagues.

It was the intention to attend meetings for all three activities in order to ensure data triangulation. However, PfR was the only activity that had scheduled any meetings during the research period. This can be explained by the fact that (evaluation) meetings between the Ministry and implementing partners are only scheduled every six months; in addition, part of the research period consisted of the summer months, when the government goes into recess and there is a lower level of activity than usual.

Below, a list of data for each activity is provided. The respondents and NGOs were all assigned a number in order to present the data anonymously. Transcripts of the interviews can be found in Appendix B.

Table B: List of data for Partners of Resilience

Documents	Interviews	Observations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Programme document (2015) - Annual plan for 2019 - Context analysis - Post-2020 strategy - Annual report 2017 (at the time of analysis, the 2018 Report was not yet available) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Respondent 1 (global coordinator) - Respondent 2 (coordinator NGO 1)³ - Respondent 3 (Ministry) - Respondent 4 (coordinator NGO 2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussion of post-2020 strategy - Discussion of the 2018 annual report

Table C: List of data for Aqua for All

Documents	Interviews	Observations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Programme proposal second cycle - Annual Report 2018 - Field assessment 2017 - Water results framework 2018 - Annual plan 2019 - Summary mid-term review 2017 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Respondent 5 (Ministry) - Respondent 6 (senior programme manager) - Respondent 7 (senior programme manager)⁴ - Respondent 8 (JustDiggIt) 	No meetings

Table D: List of data for Dutch Fund for Climate and Development

Documents	Interviews	Observations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bid application with project proposal - Grant subsidy framework 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Respondent 9 (Ministry) - Respondent 10 (FMO) 	No meetings

³ Due to respondent's time constraints, respondent 1 and 2 were interviewed together

⁴ The interview conducted with Respondent 7 (AfA) could not be transcribed due to technical malfunctions and is thus unfortunately not included in the analysis apart from a few hand-written notes made during the interview

4.2 Research method

4.2.1 Procedure

The first stage of the research included the analysis of policy documents (see section 4.1.2). These gave an overview of the definitions and criteria for climate justice and inclusiveness that are used by the Ministry. It also provided a starting point for the mapping of the involved actors and the modes of governance that are used within the activities, and provided input for the interviews.

After this, an interview guide based on the policy documents and the theoretical framework was written (appendix A). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with Ministry employees who were involved in these activities; during the interview, questions about for example the procedural process were asked, as the day-to-day dynamics between partners are not extensively discussed in the documents (unlike the formal coordination). It also provided an opportunity to get input on the way practice differs from paper; i.e. how the intentions outlined in the project proposals were applied. Note: it is not the aim of this research to provide a cohesive impact or implementation assessment of the Ministry's activities. However, it is useful to get some idea of the way justice aspects are actually used and how they are institutionalised. Additional questions about the role of various stakeholders could also be asked, if needed.

Interviews were also conducted with partners outside the Ministry, such as representatives from the NGOs involved in the Partners for Resilience partnership, the DFCD consortium and the project coordinators at Aqua for All. This way, a more balanced (and less biased) understanding of the integration of climate justice was achieved.

Thirdly, observations of meetings were used to triangulate the data and create a better, more ad hoc sense of the interactions between various stakeholders. Notes were taken during the meetings.

4.2.2 Data analysis

The policy documents and semi-structured interviews were coded using Atlas.ti. The pre-established categories for climate justice and modes of governance, based on the literature on these topics (see section 3.4) served as an anchor point to organise the data and recognise the core concepts. It was important to use a number of pre-set categories so it would also become apparent when a category was *not* recognised in the documents and interviews – nonrecognition is an important aspect of justice, after all. During the coding stage, many additional (sub-)categories were identified; thus, a degree of inductive coding was also present in the data analysis.

After the coding stages, the findings were compared to the meeting observations; this enriched the analysis and potentially identified discrepancies between the written approach and the

actual dynamics between stakeholders. After an analysis per case was made, the three cases were compared and conclusions with regard to the research questions were drawn.

4.3 Validity and reliability

The validity of this research was established through triangulation. Different forms of data were used, namely policy documents, semi-structured interviews and meeting observations. In addition, partners from outside the Ministry who partake in the activities were also interviewed. This led to a multi-faceted, less biased view of the approach to climate justice within these activities.

The aim of this research is not to prove absolute causality between modes of governance and approaches to justice. Rather, the research takes an explorative and constructionist angle where the possibility of a relationship between governance and justice is considered. In addition to this, it is also not the aim of this research to generalise the findings of the case study comparison for a larger group. Rather, as was discussed in section 3.1, the number of adaptation-specific case studies into climate justice that provide extensive deliberation on the operationalisation of the underlying theoretical notions and the operationalisation of the 'justice' concept, are slim. Furthermore, Lange et al. (2013) close their paper by stating that "the focus of future research – especially regarding sustainable development – should be on a better empirical understanding of governance modes" (p.19). Thus, the aim of this study is to offer a starting point for these identified gaps in the body of literature – that is, to provide research in which both the operationalization of climate justice and the empirical understanding of governance modes are a key part of the research design.

In terms of reliability, it is important that the research is repeatable. Therefore, the methodological considerations and approaches are discussed in detail. As this is a qualitative study, the results are not exactly replicable. However, the same case study approach can be used as an inspiration for other studies into climate justice and governance modes, especially because the research design addresses gaps in the literature as described above. That being said, this research is constructivist in nature, which means that the way climate justice is constructed/institutionalised within the Ministry is central and that the interviews and policy documents are coded and interpreted with a degree of subjectivity. Thus, what is presented as the conclusion is by no means a value-free, objective account – the researcher's own assumptions and biases will always lead to some interference (see also limitations, section 7.6).

5 Results

The results of the analysis of the three case studies will be presented here. To make a convenient and concise comparison possible, some of the variables included in the theoretical were summarised very briefly in this section and their more detailed analysis was transferred to the annex; see references where applicable.

5.1 Partners for Resilience

Partners for Resilience (PfR) is one out of 25 so-called ‘Strategic Partnerships’ managed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These partnerships are dedicated to strengthening civic space in developing countries; in other words, enabling local CSOs to lobby for societal change. PfR, specifically, focuses on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) through Integrated Risk Management (IRM), supporting CSOs in their lobby and advocacy activities, promoting awareness on climate change impacts and existing (inter)national policies, and strengthening the implementation capacity of local governments.

5.1.1 Governance

Politics

A wide variety of actors is involved in the PfR programme, which is first and foremost carried out by five NGOs whose names are anonymised in this research. NGO 1 has its own branches in developing countries to implement the programme; these are independent organisations from the Dutch branch of NGO 1. The other organisations do not have permanent local offices; instead they employ local representatives or consultants. These in turn work with southern CSOs, local governments and other local actors. This form of development cooperation where Dutch NGOs or ‘co-financing agencies’ are allocated funding to support partner organisations in the global south, is common in Dutch development cooperation: between 11 and 14% of the total ODA budget flows through such co-financing agencies (Guijt 2009).

The stakeholder diagram below presents an overview of the actors involved and their respective responsibilities and relationships.




Figure 8: Stakeholder diagram PfR

As is demonstrated by the diagram, PfR represents a highly complex governance arrangement involving many actors and taking place on many levels. In one of the observed meetings (3 April), it was mentioned that PfR has approximately 50 contracted CSO partners in developing countries and a staggering number of 270 non-contracted partners. When analysing PfR in light of the framework by Driessen et al. (2012), the programme's governance mode best resembles interactive governance where actors (politics) are concerned; see Table V with the full analysis in Annex I.I. However, ideal types and reality always differ. The power relations between the Dutch branches of international NGOs and their southern partners was critically discussed by Respondent 3, who pointed out that the bulk of funding went to the former:

“Als je het hebt over besluitvorming, geld is macht, he, zo moet je het echt zien. Money is power. Dus uiteindelijk denk ik, als het geld ligt bij de grote clubs, denk ik dat de macht daar ook ligt.”

She also mentioned that the relevance of funding Dutch NGOs instead of southern CSOs directly should be evaluated regularly:

“In landen, bijvoorbeeld Kenia, zijn zulke sterke NGO’s inmiddels, Keniaanse NGO’s, die niet meer noodzakelijkerwijs eerst geld via een Nederlandse organisatie hoeven te ontvangen. Dus je kan daar soms best een stap tussenuit halen [...] waarom versterk je – geef je dan eerst geld aan een Nederlandse organisatie? Die vraag moet je je soms denk ik echt stellen. En we hopen dan ook dat we in de toekomst veel meer zuidelijke penvoerders zijn, die dan wel samenwerken ook met Nederlandse organisaties, maar in andere machtsverhoudingen. Want nu gaat uiteindelijk – weinig geld komt bij de echt lokale clubjes terecht.”

This is not to say that Respondent 3 does not see the relevance of Dutch NGOs: she mentions they have strong local networks, are experienced in monitoring and writing reports, provide a link with the international lobby world, and are able to hold the Dutch government accountable for its policies. However, the fact that Respondent 3 mentions PfR is aiming for more Southern CSOs as leading organisations who will work in different power relations, shows that current relations between Dutch NGOs and Southern CSOs are not (fully) equal. From the 25 Strategic Partnerships, for example, only one so far has a Southern CSO in the lead.

The five PfR members and the Ministry are described as “equal partners with differentiated roles” (Programme Document 2015, p.4) who can have “differing views, stemming from partners’ specific mandates and principles, and be each other’s critical friends” (p.4). An example of the status of ‘critical friend’ came up during Respondent 3’s interview:

“Want wij financieren bijvoorbeeld een Oxfam, BothEnds, weet ik wat, die ons vervolgens gaan wijzen op onze beleidsincoherentie die we hebben [...]. En terecht wijzen organisaties ons soms daarop en wij financieren ze dus in die politieke rol. En daar zijn heel verschillende meningen over.”

Thus, the Dutch NGOs use their critical role, even against their funders. As Respondent 3 mentions, even within the Ministry this is a controversial matter which can lead to tension.

This is not to say that NGOs never struggle in their autonomous role. The designing of a monitoring and evaluation framework, for example, was a bottom-up process where the NGOs were granted much freedom. “Maar wat je eigenlijk ziet is dat die organisaties zelf die ruimte niet pakken, en alleen maar kijken ‘wat wil BZ⁵, wat wil BZ’. Terwijl ik denk: nee, waar ligt jouw meerwaarde? Ga niet op een kader toeschrijven, want je weet niet of dat wel of niet goed is, doe gewoon waar jij goed in bent” (Respondent 3). It is interesting that NGOs appear uncertain in such a situation – it could indicate that they are not used to being able to make decisions about matters such as a monitoring and evaluation framework.

⁵ BZ: Buitenlandse Zaken; a.k.a. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Polity

According to the framework by Driessen et al. (2012), the polity aspect of Partners for Resilience best resembles interactive governance, see Annex I.I for Table VI, as well as a more detailed description of the institutional set-up.

During the meetings in the Hague that were observed for this research, the interaction between stakeholders went along the same lines as the intentions outlined in the policy documents. In the first meeting (taking place on 3 April), the new policy coordinator from the Ministry, M-1, introduced himself to the members of the PfR team that were available at the time; these consisted of representatives from NGO 2 and NGO 1, the global coordinator of PfR, and Respondent 3 (another Ministry coordinator). M-1 invited the partners to be open and frank and to have no hesitation to share concerns or hampering progress. He stressed that the Ministry did not want an ‘everything goes super fantastic’ narrative, but that he wanted an open conversation in which all partners were critical of themselves and their learning process. Respondent 3 underscored this message, making similar points as in her interview; namely, the importance of more equal decision-making processes and direct access funding.

The second meeting (12 July), where the Annual Report 2018 was discussed, had a similar character. Present were representatives of NGO 1 and NGO 5, as well as M-1 and Respondent 3 from the Ministry, and Respondent 1 (global coordinator). M-1 again stressed he did not only want to hear the bright sides, but also the difficulties. Respondent 3 even described this year’s report as better because it presented a less ‘brilliant’ narrative. Respondent 1 stated that the partners assume a critical position with each other during country meetings, although this does not always show up in reports.

However, that does not mean no problems continue to exist where relationships between actors are concerned. The NGO 1 representative brought forward that the story is polished more and more throughout the chain of actors, and that it is hard to be honest about failures. When assuring the Southern organisations that the Ministry is their partner, she often receives a response along the lines of ‘yeah right, they have the money’. Her assumption here appears to be that Southern partners do not have the impression of equality, even though this is the intention from at least the Ministry and partners in the Netherlands. It seems, therefore, that even though a degree of critical exchange and equality exists between partners within a certain level (such as the Dutch partners or the country partners), it is more difficult to achieve this sense of equality between different levels/scales.

Policy

The primary aim of Partners for Resilience is to strengthen the capacity of southern CSOs, who will subsequently be better equipped to advocate for Disaster Risk Reduction measures and the needs of the local population. In practice PfR also helps to build the implementation capacity of local governments. PfR's policy content best resembles an interactive mode of governance; see Table VII in Annex I.I.

The tables V, VI and VII included in Annex I.I clearly show that PfR as a programme shares most similarities with interactive governance. Since this is a real-life governance structure, it will never completely fit the description of an ideal-type mode of governance. For example, the market sector (which is included as one of the main actors in Driessen et al. 2012), plays a virtually non-existing role in PfR. In addition, the observations and remarks of the actors show that although cooperation and equal decision-making are the aim of the programme, this does not always work out in practice, particularly in the exchange between two levels. This conclusion is in line with statements made by Torfing et al. (2012):

“Neither practitioners nor public policy researchers should fool themselves into believing that interactive governance involves an unpolitical exchange of resources through rational, consensus-seeking deliberations among policy experts and relevant stakeholders [...]

Interactive governance involves complex power games.” (p.48)

This ties in with Respondent 3's interview statements about international NGOs having the money and thus the power over smaller organisations. On the other hand, the observations and interviews showed that actors were capable of being critical of each other and themselves, at least within their own governance scale. However, as with all parts of this research, the focus lies on project formulation and not on the practical implementation of governance agreements. Especially considering the enormous amount of actors, levels and locations involved in this programme, it would be impossible to draw any definite conclusions about questions of governance and power for the entire programme as a whole.

5.1.2 Distribution

Benefits (Da)

A variety of benefits were mentioned in the data; see Annex I.II.

Burdens (Da)

No negative (unintended) side effects of the programme were anticipated or included.

Impact of vulnerabilities (Db)

The benefits and burdens that are recognised are not all there is to distributive justice – it is also vital how these are distributed among the population. This issue is addressed by the way vulnerability (Db) and the need for access to resources (Dc) affect distributional justice. As for the first category (Db), 28 factors were taken into account. This means that many new variables were created during the coding process, as the original list included in section 3.2 (Operationalisation) only consisted of 8 variables. Some of the most common were:

- Degree of exposure to natural disasters
- Socioeconomic status
- Gender
- Livelihood that is dependent on natural resources / weather patterns
- Lack of land rights

The vulnerabilities mentioned in the data also related to which groups were eventually recognised as generally being marginalised, discriminated or excluded from participatory processes (Pc), as it is usually the most vulnerable groups who are not (sufficiently) taken into account in the decision-making process.

Need for access (Dc)

The need for access to resources (Dc) remained largely implicit in the PfR data; see Annex I.II.

Responsibility (Dd)

The question of responsibility (category Dd) for the creation of burdens as a side effect of the programme did not come up in the data because no side effects were anticipated.

5.1.3 Procedure

Availability of information (Pa)

The provision of information to local stakeholders was not touched upon in the data, see Annex I.III.

Participation (Pb)

Overall, PfR aims to employ various ways to include local participation in their programme. The Country Team is a key player here. In the Programme Document (2015), the following composition of the team is suggested: “PfR strategic country team; PfR Country Coordinator; specialists for lobby, gender, and advocacy; representative from the Netherlands embassy where possible; other key stakeholder(s) on the IRM agenda in-country; ensure female representation in the team” (p.33).

The Country Team conducts a context analysis of the region, where the most vulnerable groups are identified. The team also designs the country plan independently from the Dutch partner organisations. Local participation is strived for by including local partners in context analyses and conducting participatory risk assessments with local communities (see Annex I.III for more details and quotations). Subsequently, reflection workshops are organised twice a year, where “a joint reflection and analysis is made by the country teams, discussing the main outcomes [...] and progress and challenges [...] Furthermore, inputs are received from discussions with country leads, field visits, participation at events and conferences” (AR 2017, p.6). This way, engagement throughout the cycle of the programme is established. The power relations between various stakeholders (for example government, PfR members and communities/CBOs) at such workshop and decision-making moments were not touched upon in the data and can unfortunately not be established in this research, although it remains an important point. The mere presence of groups does not equal meaningful participation and an equal vote, after all.

It also becomes apparent from the quotes above that ‘communities’ are cited as single entities who can either be in- or excluded. This fails to acknowledge, however, that communities are heterogenous groups with their own power relations and vulnerable or excluded members. See chapter 7 (Discussion) for more.

Another issue the coordinators at PfR struggle with is whether it is their place to change local power dynamics. Respondent 3 stresses that the programme aims for “dat je mensen juist faciliteert om het zelf te doen, in plaats van dat wij als witneuzen binnenkomen en zeggen: ‘kijk, hier heb je alles’”. She highlights the importance of letting southern organisations lead: “Kijk, je kan heel snel als Nederlandse organisatie weggezet worden als: ‘oh, daar komt zo’n westerse club die ons komt vertellen wat we moeten doen’. En dat wil je niet”. She also mentioned that the Ministry does not set specific rules for the composition of Country Teams, only suggestions (such as female representation). When asked why, she explained:

“Je wil niet tegen organisaties gaan zeggen: je moet met deze en deze organisaties gaan samenwerken. Want dan word je heel autoritair in je besturingsmechanisme terwijl centraal staat – het maatschappelijk middenveld is onafhankelijk. En we proberen ze ook in die onafhankelijke rol te steunen.”

Respondent 1 is also aware of this issue: when describing how he brought up women involvement during a trip in India, he concluded with: “ik check altijd wel met onze CSO-partners van, oh jongens, heb ik nou niet de hele boel in de war geschopt met mijn Nederlandse values”. Thus, the balance between improving social equality in developing countries and at the same time avoiding a neo-colonialist image is a precarious one that can easily lead to difficulties; see chapter 7 for more.

A similar question about representativity can be asked about the CBOs and CSOs that PfR chooses to cooperate with. Respondent 3:

“De meeste landenkantoren worden natuurlijk gewoon gerund door eh Kenianen, eh, everybody. Dus je moet je ook echt voorstellen, dat zijn in principe mensen die geworteld zijn in – ja, het land, maar iedereen in een andere community, dus het zegt niet zoveel over dat mensen dus worden ingesloten [...] Soms heb je hele sterke lokale partners die ook echt bijvoorbeeld minderheidsgroepen vertegenwoordigen [...] En sommige organisaties doen dat veel minder.”

In the 12 July meeting, the NGO 1 representative brought up the example of Manilla Bay, an area inhabited by 32 million people, and wondered how to ever represent all these people – even if you include a fisherman organisation in the decision-making process, how do you know if you have the ‘right’ fisherman? Respondent 3 subsequently confirmed that choices always have to be made and you cannot include everyone – in addition, PfR does not only exist for the marginalised but also for ‘regular’ citizens. She stressed the importance of awareness and documentation of who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’.

In any case, it should be kept in mind that involvement of CBOs/CSOs also does not mean that diversity and equality are automatically established; similar to communities, civil organisations are also subject to existing power relations, both within the organisation and in relation to broader society. As with any organisation, CSOs are not completely altruistic – they too have a wish to survive: “Organisaties volgen natuurlijk het geld, terwijl ze niet altijd misschien goed zijn in dat onderwerp” (Respondent 3).

Although local inclusion in general was discussed extensively in the data, the participation of marginalised groups in particular was addressed less; where mentioned, the focus was on engagement of women. For example, the Programme Document (2015) asserts that “ensuring equitable power relations; fair and non-threatening decision-making and negotiation processes; ability to lead, influence, participate meaningfully in groups; engagement with male change agents and collectives to challenge social norms” (p.9) are all means to ensure the meaningful participation of women. Furthermore, it is stated that “inclusive decision-making processes for all groups in society, in particular women and girls, are promoted” (p.11), but subsequently only a strategy for women participation is highlighted.

The interviews brought up various issues with inclusion in the implementation of local programmes, which shows that project formulation does not always correspond with realities on the ground. Although the following examples are based on experiences of the implementation process,

they are included here because they highlight important issues regarding the participation of vulnerable groups.

Respondent 3 observes a lack of diversity (once again, the examples all centred around women) in decision-making processes in PfR programmes:

“Bij PfR ben ik een keer in Mali langs geweest. Daar kom je in een ruimte waar alle vertegenwoordigers in dat land [...] vijftien mannen en één vrouw. Ja, hoe representatief is dat? Dus ik heb die vraag ook gesteld: hoe kan dit? [...] In Mali is het opleidingsniveau van vrouwen natuurlijk veel lager, dus het zal moeilijker zijn inderdaad om je staf op die manier divers te krijgen. Tegelijkertijd denk ik: het is ook waarschijnlijk een gebrekkige investering in het verkrijgen van vrouwen en het betrekken van vrouwen en meisjes in je programma. Maar goed, dat is een beetje een aanname die ik doe.”

The NGO employees themselves, when asked, also stated that diversity and inclusion remained tough going in some countries. Respondent 2:

“Ja, ik denk in sommige landen blijft het altijd moeilijk en je ziet dan ook vaak wel als er bijeenkomsten of conferenties zijn en dingen, en je ziet foto's van een meeting room waar mensen bij elkaar zitten, dat vrouwen toch meestal zwaar ondervertegenwoordigd zijn [...] dat is natuurlijk al jarenlang een aandachtspunt maar dat is ook niet zo'n verandering die van de ene of de andere dag gebeurt.”

Respondent 2 also noted that even when women are present at meetings, they often do not dare to speak up against their male counterparts. “Dus het was dan ook wel belangrijk om aparte bijeenkomsten met verschillende groepen te hebben, want zodra ze eenmaal in één ruimte zitten, zullen die vrouwen toch niet zo heel snel zich uitspreken”. To get the perspective of women, separate meetings or focus groups were organised. Furthermore, Respondent 1 gave the example of the programme in India:

“CSO-partner Seeds, die heeft een fantastische genderpolicy [...] En dan ga je naar Bihart provincie, een van de armste gebieden, daar kom je bij Seeds binnen en alleen maar mannen. En dan vraag je: ‘Waarom is dit zo?’ – ‘Ja, jongens, we proberen het echt, maar we lopen er tegenaan dat van de vijftien applicants waren er dertien man, en die andere twee wilden óf alleen in communities werken waar ze zelf mensen kenden, óf alleen met haar man de communities in’. Dat is een voorbeeld van dat het echt gewoon heel veel tijd kost en dat CSO's en organisaties het echt wel proberen, maar dat je echt gewoon tegen cultural values en standaarden aanloopt waar je – die gewoon decennia nodig hebben om te veranderen.”

There is a contradiction here: Respondent 3 assumes, from the Ministry point of view, that the NGO-partners perhaps do not always invest enough resources in (women) participation. However, the representatives from NGOs assert that an effort is certainly made, but that social and cultural

values present a barrier for the inclusion of women. They state that they do try to stimulate diversity, such as ‘leading by example’: “laat gewoon zelf zien dat je een hele diverse organisatie bent vanuit Nederland” (Respondent 1). When possible, they address the importance of diversity and inclusion with their southern partners: “maar het is ook dingen onder de aandacht brengen tijdens specifieke momenten door het jaar heen en zeker als je – wij hebben af en toe nog wel eens de mogelijkheid om ergens zelf heen te gaan, om dan dingen aan te stippen” (Respondent 1).

The case of Partners for Resilience presents an interesting example of the complexity of participation and how a clear solution is not directly apparent. The Ministry does not want to set strict rules for the NGO partners because the goal of the programme is to increase the independency and capacity of civic space; the NGO partners, in turn, do not want to set strict rules for their southern CSO partners for fear of appearing neo-colonial and fostering long-term dependency on western aid.

Recognition (Pc)

A total of 23 different vulnerable groups were recognised in the documents and interviews. Partners for Resilience uses the word ‘vulnerable’ to refer to vulnerability induced by natural disasters as well as by social constraints. The group referred to most often was by far women, other groups that were often mentioned were:

- Women/girls
- Youth
- Disabled people
- Pastoralists
- Elderly

As was explained by Respondent 1 and Respondent 2, the recognised vulnerable groups were area-specific and were identified in the context analysis. Throughout the data, however, vulnerable groups remained neatly delineated. For example, when asked about the specific composition of Country Teams, Respondent 2 replied:

“Denk dat het wel heel verschillend is. Je hebt wel lokale organisaties die bepaalde groepen vertegenwoordigen, maar het is niet zo dat in alle landen organisaties in de landenteams zitten die echt hele – ja, denk wel vrouwengroepen zitten er zeker in, belangengroepen voor vissers, voor boeren...”

The assumption Respondent 2 makes here is that women are separated from fishers or farmers, when it is in fact possible and even desirable (also according to PfR’s own goals) to have women

farmers or women fishers. This is a theme that recurs throughout the data: vulnerable groups are outlined but always clearly separated, with no attention for issues of intersectionality.

There were some initial issues with specifying the vulnerable groups who would be specifically targeted by PfR:

“Maar wat je vervolgens zag is dat ze niet goed specificieerden wie dan die groepen waren [...] Op wat voor manier worden welke groepen getroffen door klimaatverandering en hoe gaan jullie met je partners daar verandering in brengen? Dat was niet goed gespecificeerd en daar zijn ze toen op aangesproken. Maar toen hadden ze wel in principe – hun voorstel was al goedgekeurd.” (Respondent 3)

This lack of specification was later corrected by conducting the context analyses. It is interesting to note, though, that the PfR proposal was able to get Ministry approval before this part of the programme was extended and improved.

Legal access (Pd)

This category was not specified in the data, see Annex I.III.

Analysis beforehand (Pe)

The context analyses or risk assessments that were done beforehand (category Pe) have already been touched upon in the previous paragraphs. In these processes, southern partners and community members were involved to various extents, for example through participatory risk assessments and workshops. A landscape-level approach was taken, which “examines the entire landscape in which risks originate and manifest themselves, and facilitates an inclusive and participatory process, starting with the communities at risk” (2020 and beyond, p.2). Local partners, authorities and communities were also involved in the local programme design, such as the inception workshop in Mali demonstrates: “The last two days of the workshop were used with a smaller group of 15 directly involved partners, community and district government representatives, to focus on the actual programme design [and] complete the target group analysis” (p.31). Once again, though, it can be questioned who these representatives were, how they were selected, to what extent they can be seen as representative for the local population, and whether all participants had an equal vote in the decision-making process.

Selection criteria (Pf)

Another interesting point to consider is the selection of regions and partner organisations. In the Context Analyses, selection criteria for the location of a programme are outlined; see Annex I.III.

In the interview, Respondent 1 admitted how tough the decision for the selection of a region could be:

“En dat blijft lastig, om aan te vullen, natuurlijk. Want, hè, waarom dat dorp wel en dat dorp ernaast niet? En dat proberen we wel inzichtelijk te maken door middel van die risicoanalyse, maar ja, uiteindelijk is er ook maar een beperkt budget en beperkte capaciteit beschikbaar, en zul je toch altijd keuzes moeten maken, hoe pijnlijk die ook af en toe zijn.”

The context analyses also included criteria for the selection of local partners. Local partners cooperate with the country field offices established by the Alliance members, but they can also be subject to capacity development themselves (Programme Document 2015). The criteria are:

- Long-term partnership with PfR member(s) in the implementation of community-driven disaster risk reduction programmes
- Familiarity with local situation
- Well-embedded in local communities
- Implementation capacity

As can be seen, one of the criteria is an existing, long-term partnership with the NGOs who are members of PfR. This also came up during the interviews: “Bij PfR zijn ze voor een groot deel gewoon gaan verder werken met de partners die ze al hebben” (Respondent 3). Respondent 1 explains the reasoning behind this choice:

“Die continuïteit is wel heel belangrijk, ook nu voor de implementatie van het werk, als we met lokale CSO-partners samenwerken die al tientallen jaren daar actief zijn, ook klein begonnen en gegroeid [...] Dat zou je vanuit Nederland niet eens kunnen orkestreren [...] Daarbij helpt het enorm dat elk van de PfR partners gewoon hele sterke partners heeft.”
(Respondent 1)

It also strengthens the implementation of the programme: “Het maakt natuurlijk best een groot verschil als er al enige capaciteit zit of je moet echt helemaal from scratch beginnen [...] dat heeft enorme impact op je implementatie” (Respondent 1). This is a fair observation, since most programmes only get funding for four or five years (with the possibility of renewal), so they need to aim for impact within this relatively short time frame.

Respondent 3, on the other hand, questions the process of choosing CSO-partners:

“Wat je veel ziet is dat een Nederlands consortium een tender gewonnen heeft, dus ze hebben gehoord: we krijgen geld. Toen naar die landen zijn gegaan waar ze wilden gaan werken, en daar gaan vragen: met wie kunnen we hier werken? [...] Maar eigenlijk – ja, in een ideale wereld zou je misschien willen dat lokale organisaties die Nederlandse

organisaties bijna selecteren om met hun te gaan werken [...] Om je resultaten hier te kunnen behalen heb je ons nodig.”

In addition, when ‘the usual suspects’ are chosen to cooperate with, a smaller opportunity exists for newer (grassroots) organisations, such as those representing marginalised groups, to become involved. It can also be questioned whether organisations that already have a partnership with PfR members are the ones who are most in need of capacity strengthening. Nevertheless, it should be noted that new partners are also involved, albeit on an ad hoc basis:

“Als organisaties in een bepaalde regio actief zijn, dan werken ze natuurlijk ook vaak samen met andere organisaties die daar actief zijn [...] Want juist bij een lobby en advocacy programme is het natuurlijk belangrijk om eh... die impact kun je natuurlijk enorm vergroten als je met veel meer organisaties samenwerkt.” (Respondent 2)

Respondent 1 stressed the importance of a continued network, but also stated that “soms is daar overlap en soms zijn het weer nieuwe partners en worden er weer nieuwe samenwerkingsverbanden lokaal opgezet”. Similar to the power relations in section Pb, the balance between using an existing network (for fast results) and empowering new civil organisations is a difficult one to achieve.

Overall, the cooperation network is many-layered, as was illustrated by Respondent 1 when he described visiting India:

“Dus je hebt gewoon een boertje, die is vertegenwoordigd door een community representative, die heeft weer contact met – zit misschien nog een stapje tussen – met onze coördinator van Seeds, dat is een lokale CSO die alleen in India actief is. Die heeft weer contact met de partner van Seeds van NGO 5 en NGO 4 in India [...]. En ik heb weer contact met ons country lead in India, en ik ben dan global zeg maar. Er zaten dus vijf, zes schakels daar in dat hutje.”

Although this is a complex arrangement, Respondent 1 experienced the importance of it firsthand:

“Je moet vertrouwen winnen [...] En daarvoor heb je al die schakels en daarvoor die complexiteit echt wel nodig. [...] En die versterken elkaar ook allemaal, dat zag je ook in dat gesprek. Dat zag je meteen, oké, die community gaat naar die ene persoon, maar die kan iemand anders ook weer supporten.”

As was also mentioned in the governance section, the complexity and many-layered character of PfR comes with its advantages (such as earning trust and increasing representation) and disadvantages (hard to govern, decrease in transparency).

Monitoring and evaluation (Pg)

As was explained in section 3.4, monitoring and evaluation frameworks are designed in the project formulation phase and provide important clues of the aspects that are deemed most important within a project. This section will provide some examples of previous implementation and monitoring issues where these are relevant for evaluation practices in the design of the current cycle of Partners for Resilience.

Assessment of the status and future of projects is done every six months, during a reflection workshop organised by country, regional and global teams (Annual Plan 2019). An important aspect of the monitoring and evaluation process for Partners for Resilience is the use of qualitative methods. These mostly take the form of case studies, but other assessment methods such as visual ethnography (film) and community mapping exercises are also used (Annual Plan 2019). The Programme Document reads:

“The results of lobby and advocacy trajectories are the outcomes of complex, non-linear processes [...]. Verification and validation of these results is therefore not only important but also challenging. Since these results cannot be captured by simple indicators or checkboxes, case studies are intended for this purpose [...]” (p.52)

In light of the aims of PfR, the use of case studies definitely appears to be a necessity. However, equally important is which perspectives are taken into account during these case studies. The programme document reads that “where possible, case studies will also include interviews with – or secondary input from – persons, groups or organisations affected by the observed changes” (p.52). Including the opinions of local stakeholders directly involved or affected is certainly a vital point; what remains vague here is whether this will be done often, who will be selected to give input, and what the effect of using ‘secondary input’ instead of direct interviews would be. Apart from case studies, quantitative indicators are also used to track progress; see Annex I.III.

Numerous times, Respondent 3 critically reflected on monitoring and reporting. For example, when talking about quantitative data, she asserted that it is useful to know how many people have been reached by a project, but that issues also exist: “Wij worden daar ook een beetje toe gedwongen door de politiek [...] Het kan soms echt wel een perverse prikkel zijn. Dat je denkt: ja oké, we laten die vrouwen wel even een dag meedraaien en dan hebben we er weer 60 bij”. She questioned the representativity and interpretation of quantitative results: “Ja, en dan? Dan heb je duizend vrouwen die betrokken zijn geweest bij een ontbossingsproject. Wat zegt dat? [...] en welke vrouwen? Zijn dat allemaal vrouwen van de president, die uiteindelijk – [...] het zegt ook gewoon heel weinig soms”. And later: “Als je het hebt over sociale transformatie, dan slaat [alleen kwantitatief meten] natuurlijk nergens op [...] het zegt níks, die nummers, soms. Iedereen meet anders”.

A culture exists in (certain parts of) the Ministry that focuses too much on the (quantitative) results of a programme.

“Nee, hou op, maar het is ook te droevig. Je moet echt niet altijd geloven – of af gaan wat je allemaal in dit gebouw hoort. Mensen zijn soms echt een beetje wacko’s als het gaat om resultaten meten [...] Nee, je moet wel kritisch blijven nadenken, hoor. Denk ik echt. Want we leven in een wereld waarin steeds meer wordt gezegd: resultaten! We managen die resultaten!” (Respondent 3)

The focus on tangible results can be especially problematic, given that even well-designed, strong programmes do not always lead to results: “Je kan geweldige lobby-programma’s hebben terwijl een land alleen maar conservatiever wordt [...] het is niet altijd te meten aan vooruitgang, helaas, in de wereld”. In light of this, Respondent 3 highlighted the importance of including mixed-method monitoring in any M&E framework: “Ik denk dat [kwantitatieve data] echt wel relevante informatie is, maar het zegt nog niet zoveel over de impact voor vrouwen in het land. Daar heb je ook wel verhalen voor nodig”.

An important issue with the reports is that it is tough to assess the reality of a programme’s progress. As the Ministry is not the implementor of its programmes, and relies on periodic meetings and reports for information, it can be very hard to monitor or steer an activity. This problem is exacerbated by the complexity of activities and the number of stakeholders involved. Respondent 3 confessed: “Ik vind het heel lastig om daar [over inclusiviteit] echt concluderende uitspraken over te doen want ik loop niet in het programme mee, dus ik weet niet hoe ze het echt – ja, wat kan ik zeggen van een rapportage?” She also gave the following example of a meeting with a gender expert:

“Ik heb hun [PfR] de afgelopen jaren heel vaak aangesproken op hun inclusiviteitsbeleid, omdat er gewoon heel weinig aandacht leek voor gendergelijkheid, vrouwenrechten [...] Ik heb bijvoorbeeld ook een genderexpert hier uitgenodigd en PfR uitgenodigd. Toen zijn we met elkaar in gesprek gegaan: hoe kunnen jullie dit nou beter doen? [...] Toen kwamen zij wel goed voorbereid met ‘nou, dit is – we hebben eigenlijk nu goed gekeken en dit doen we allemaal al’. En toen kwamen ze met tal van voorbeelden over allerlei gendertrainingen en inzet die ze hadden. Ze zeiden: ‘het ligt ook voor een groot deel aan dat we het gewoon niet goed documenteren, wat er allemaal wel gebeurt’.”

This example demonstrates that it is not only the setbacks that may remain undocumented, but also the successes, and that it is thus of vital importance to institutionalise gender (or broader vulnerability) indicators in the monitoring and evaluation framework before project implementation begins.

In fact, this topic brings us to a question not addressed in this research: how does project formulation, in the end, translate into practice? Respondent 3: “In praktijk – daar zit natuurlijk een beetje de crux van in – in hoeverre is dat [inclusiviteit] ook zo in de praktijk?”

Here, Respondent 3 stresses the need to be careful about conclusions that can be drawn from this research:

“Ja, what do I know? Ik weet het niet. Ik ken die lokale partners niet [...] Ik heb een keer het programma in Mali ontmoet en de programmacoördinator in Kenia, maar ja, wat zegt dat? [...] Dan zou je echt gewoon diepte-interviews met gewoon echt de beneficiaries moeten hebben. De mensen om wie het gaat, die PfR probeert te bereiken. Dat kun jij niet doen, dus ik dat daarin moet je ook een beetje voorzichtig zijn over wat voor conclusies je precies kan trekken. Je kan het trekken over eh, in ieder geval hoe het beleid in elkaar zit. En wat er beoogd wordt en de manier waarop dat, in ieder geval vanuit hier, vormgegeven wordt.”

5.2 Aqua for All

Aqua for All (AfA) is a non-profit organisation originally established by the Dutch water sector, which aims to deliver WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) services in developing countries by creating self-sufficient business models. They do this by helping innovative ideas to become ‘bankable’ (commercially viable) business cases, and subsequently to ‘scale up’ successful projects by matching them with investors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has been a long-term funder of AfA. At the time of writing, AfA was at the end of their project cycle and was being renewed for another cycle; for this they had submitted a new project proposal for ‘Aqua for All 2.0’. In addition, AfA is part of cooperation projects with other actors which receive external funding; these will not be discussed in this research as MFA has not played a role.

5.2.1 Governance

Politics

As can be seen in the stakeholder diagram below, Aqua for All’s governance structure differs from Partners for Resilience (see section 5.1.1). Where the PfR consortium was specifically established to respond to the Strategic Partnership policy framework published by the Ministry, AfA is an organisation originally set up independently from the Ministry’s goals and it carries out projects with various other (funding) organisations as well. The proposal for Aqua for All 2.0 reads:

“[...] how crucial DGIS⁶ support has been in developing initiatives and models that no other donor was willing to fund. At the same time, we acknowledge the importance of having other funding than DGIS alone [...] we see opportunities with likeminded donors like DGIS [...] to deliver a similar program.”

Thus, although MFA is a key donor for AfA, the latter has a more diversified access to funds than PfR. For the programme analysed in this research, however, the Ministry is the main funder and thus AfA is accountable to the Ministry.

Other important actors are the Dutch water sector and private/public investors, in the Netherlands as well internationally or in partner countries. The developed business cases are carried out by local companies or sometimes through local NGOs.

⁶ DGIS is the part of MFA which is specifically focused on development cooperation




Figure 9: Stakeholder diagram AfA

Aqua for All as an organisation has a somewhat elusive character – although describing themselves as a non-profit organisation on their website and being registered as a foundation, they do not rely on donations for income and have a highly business-oriented approach, acting as an facilitator/intermediary between investors and WASH initiatives. Respondent 5, the Ministry’s AfA coordinator, addresses the unique character of the organisation: “We hebben ze een subsidie gegeven op basis van uniciteit, dus een unieke organisatie. Enerzijds [...] dat ze echt een scharnier zijn, een broker, facilitator [...] tussen de private sector en de watersector [...] het andere aspect is, zij weten heel veel geld aan te trekken”. In light of their non-profit and social approach, AfA will be characterised as belonging to civil society; however, it should be noted that the organisation differs from the NGOs analysed in section 5.1.

In the policy documents and during the interviews the importance of local partnerships and networks was emphasised. “Per case and thematic focus we proactively look for and engage in necessary partnerships in local contexts. This means including different kinds of partners: business/market sector, finance, knowledge, civil society/communities and (local) government” (Programme Proposal AfA 2.0). However, the respondents also brought up problems with local actors. Respondent 6, programme coordinator at Aqua for All, implies that local water companies are corrupt at times: “Maar soms zijn waterbedrijven, die hebben er wel belang bij dat het allemaal niet zo transparant is”. Respondent 8, employee of an NGO contracted by Aqua for All, admits that they do not usually cooperate with local governments: “Die worden wel betrokken en geïnformeerd, maar

we kiezen er bewust voor om met niet-overheid, dus NGOs, samen te werken omdat het gewoon veel prettiger samenwerkt. Ja, het is heel veel bureaucratie en traagheid". Respondent 5 also describes how the significance of water can make AfA's projects politically charged:

"Water word ook bij veel overheden gewoon gezien als 'dat is van ons, dat moeten wij leveren, dat gaan we niet uit handen geven want het is een primair levensgoed', dus probeer daar maar tussen te komen en te gaan zeggen [...]: dit moet je door een private partij voor een deel laten opzetten, of dat moet je uit handen geven, decentraliseren."

This is an important point; even though local governments might not always be effective (or even corrupt) at supplying WASH to their populations, it is also understandable that they are hesitant to hand other parties control over a resource as vital and scarce as water. The privatisation of water supply is indeed a trend with possibly problematic implications; see chapter 7 for more.

AfA's mode of governance in terms of politics is not easily classified, but can be said to present a hybrid form of interactive and public-private governance; see Table VIII in Annex II.I.

Polity

The institutional arrangements of AfA focus predominantly on the programme's financial side: who can apply for funding, what types of funding are available, what amounts, etc. AfA describes their own role as that of an "enabler and facilitator among stakeholders, providing coaching and support, triggering innovation and creating knowledge" and a "financier" who uses "smart granting" (AfA 2.0). The focus always lies on establishing public-private partnerships for WASH services.

In their role of facilitator, AfA also makes sure that the involved actors have official governance agreements in place:

"We mediate and oversee that they take their responsibility and facilitate the collaboration with government and other stakeholders [...] Crucial herein is that the roles and responsibilities of government and other stakeholders (businesses, financiers and communities/customers) are clearly defined and agreed upon."

Such an agreement can for example take the form of a contract of Memorandum of Understanding. As water is a vital and politically sensitive commodity, cooperation agreements are important for an effective institutional environment.

An example of AfA's support can be illustrated by the case of JustDiggIt, a Dutch NGO who carries out landscape restoration projects in developing countries. When asked how JustDiggIt and AfA have cooperated, Respondent 8 (employee at JustDiggIt) responds:

"AfA heeft ons financieel gesteund [...] Heel veel financiers die geven alleen geld voor projecten zelf, en AfA heeft juist ook geholpen om soort van – ja een aantal

randvoorwaarden mogelijk te maken. Dus dat we de organisatie konden doen, maar ook dat we ons programma zo konden inrichten dat er zoveel mogelijk positieve spinoffs uitkomen.”

An example of such a ‘positive spinoff’ is the creation of a social enterprise for grass seeds in developing countries. AfA sets conditions for their funding, including justifying the expenditures through reporting as well as the need to set an example and get other stakeholders involved: “Het ging met name om dat we konden aantonen dat we zo’n proces in gang hadden gezet waarbij het geld dat [AfA] geïnvesteerd had, mogelijk had gemaakt dat er een soort vliegwiel ontstond, dat ook andere partijen aan boord stapten” (Respondent 8).

As no meetings took place during the research period, informal ways of interaction could not be observed. Where polity is concerned, AfA presents a hybrid form of interactive and public-private governance, see Table IX in Annex II.I.

Policy

Aqua for All has a clear mandate: providing access to WASH services to those who as of yet do not. They do this by establishing local business systems that eventually become self-sufficient. Within their programmes there is also a focus on climate adaptation: improving water efficiency in agriculture for example, or promoting circularity by using human waste for various things (fertiliser, biogas, etc.).

An interesting aspect is the way AfA engages with scientific studies: Respondent 6 mentioned various times throughout the interview that new projects are often inspired by recent research or that academic literature helps them to test their assumptions. “Zo’n studie is ontzettend belangrijk. De conclusies daarvan hebben ons laten zien: het kan wel interessant zijn [...] Dan weten we al dat er een bewijs is dat iets zou kunnen werken” (Respondent 6). The utilisation of academic literature was also mentioned in the policy documents and is thus institutionalised.

As a way to make social progress more attractive for investors, AfA aims to develop tools to monetize social impact, which “will be a great tool to provide quantitative data on value created with a great potential to attract impact investors” (AfA 2.0). Avoided negative impacts are also to be translated into monetary value. This reflects a wider trend in social and environmental services, such as for example the valuation of ecosystem services (see Costanza et al. 2014, among others). It can also be questioned whether the focus on business approaches lead to a trade-off with social justice aspects; see the conclusion (section 6.4) for more elaboration on the role of private actors in development cooperation.

The dominant mode of governance where policy is concerned appears to be public-private governance, see Table X in Annex II.I.

As this section has showed, Aqua for All has a less unequivocal governance mode than Partners for Resilience. The way AfA and the Ministry cooperate is mostly similar and takes the form of interactive governance, although Aqua for All as an organisation has had a period of independency from MFA: AfA existed for around a decade before entering in a partnership with MFA, whereas PfR specifically formed a consortium in response to a Ministry policy framework. In the way AfA carries out its projects and the policy content itself, though, the mode of governance is largely public-private and the focus lies on attracting investors and developing viable business cases. It can thus be said that AfA presents a hybrid mode of public-private and interactive governance.

5.2.2 Distribution

Benefits (Da)

Aqua for All's most prevalent benefits related to WASH provision and the creation of local business cases; see Annex II.II.

Burdens (Da)

As with PfR, no specific negative side effects of AfA's interventions were anticipated. A few times anticipated unintended side effects are hinted at; see Annex II.II.

Influence of vulnerability (Db)

The factors that are seen as making individuals vulnerable in the WASH sector are limited when it comes to Aqua for All. Four categories are identified:

- Income level
- Gender
- Age
- Living area

Income level here is by far the most important – AfA consistently asserts that they focus on poor populations who do not have (sufficient) access to WASH services. It is notable that no subgroups are identified within these poor populations apart from gender and age; arguably, there are other factors that could make a poor person even more vulnerable to a lack of WASH services. See 5.2.3 for more.

Respondent 5 explains why women are seen as vulnerable when it comes to a lack of WASH services:

“Soms moeten ze lang naar putten lopen ofzo of... ze zijn ongesteld en er zijn geen faciliteiten waar – waar ze afgescherrmd gewoon eh... daarmee bezig kunnen zijn, om het zo te zeggen.

En dan moeten ze het vaak 's nachts ergens gaan doen en dan lopen ze ook in het donker rond.”

Need for access (Dc)

An important issue within development cooperation was brought up in the AfA data: the overwhelming amount of people in need (in this case of water and sanitation). When asked whether the level of needs influenced the selection of locations, Respondent 6 replied: “Needs zijn er overall”. See the selection criteria (Pf) in section 5.2.3 for more.

Responsibility (Dd)

Similar to Partners for Resilience, the responsibility for the creation of burdens was not touched upon since no burdens were anticipated; see Annex II.II.

5.2.3 Procedure

Availability of information (Pa)

Information availability was not explicitly touched upon in the data; see Annex II.III.

Participation (Pb)

Matters of participation and representation are less detailed in this case than in the PfR data. Aqua for All does not have offices in their partner countries; instead, they hire what they call a ‘local liaison’. This liaison has a number of tasks: scouting new projects/partnerships, representing AfA to local partners, coordinating local activities, supporting projects during implementation, and conducting monitoring (AfA 2.0). The exact form of representation can differ:

“In Kenya and Ethiopia, we had a hybrid form of local representation: having someone working on a project and act as an Aqua for All representative. In VIA Water we used part-time local liaisons (15-20 days a year) as a general representative of the whole programme.”
(AfA 2.0)

Presumably, the part-time local liaison did not also perform AfA executive work; nevertheless, it can be questioned whether having local representation for 15-20 days a year is sufficient to get an in-depth insight in the local context and feedback from local communities/organisations. Respondent 6 notes the need to validate your assumptions locally:

“Wij proberen dat zo te doen dat je lokaal je eigen assumpties valideert. Als je dat niet doet, dan maak je vaak grove fouten. Dat is heel vaak gebeurd. Daarom hebben wij – werken wij

ook het liefst met lokale mensen. In de meeste landen waar we werken hebben we gewoon mensen – dat zijn onze lokale vertegenwoordigers of consultants.”

The representative helps AfA to understand the local context: “Die weten ook wat wij aan innovatieve dingen proberen neer te zetten. Die kunnen dat vertalen naar de lokale context [...] de lokale gevoeligheden die kunnen zij ons helpen begrijpen”. The liaisons are usually hired through an application procedure or through existing relationships.

Having local representation in this way is not guaranteed to have the best outcomes when it comes to diversity, equal decision-making or participation. As was noted before, 15-20 days a year is not much, especially considering the large number of tasks; this could lead to certain aspects being neglected. Of great importance is also which individuals are selected to be liaisons, how they fit with existing power relations and how well they are expected to represent local interests, particularly of vulnerable groups. More reflection on this process would be advisable. As opposed to PfR, where multiple partners are present in the local context, it appears from the data that only one representative exists on the ground in each location. This means that no mutual reflection or discussion can take place between partners in one area. Lastly, it appears that the local representative is mostly concerned with executive and consulting tasks and it can therefore be questioned what role they would play in the decision-making process.

Where the inclusion of local groups/communities is concerned, the programme proposal (AfA 2.0) is swarming with buzzwords:

“All relevant stakeholders are considered: government, communities, businesses, financiers and knowledge partners. Aqua for All builds on what is already being done locally. Our base is local embedding, being rooted in the local context, local expertise and local collaboration.”

How AfA means to ensure this ‘local embedding’ is not entirely clear; presumably the local liaison and/or partner organisations make sure that a project “has been developed with the local (Base of the Pyramid) users in mind”. In the preliminary Theory of Change it reads that a “system analysis per initiative” is to be done “to identify public and private parties, and other service value chain players, which will define ways to involve governments and communities”. Possibly the system analysis that is conducted at the start of a project identifies means of participation, but who carries responsibility for this (the local actors? AfA? the local liaison?) is not institutionalised in the policy documents.

In the interview with Respondent 8 an ad hoc strategy for participation became clear from the side of implementation, albeit for the specific case of JustDiggIt. Respondent 8 describes how they first sat down with their partners to determine what areas would be suitable for land restoration projects. He then drove around Kenia for three days with someone from a local organisation who grew up in the area; the goal was to determine whether the areas chosen would indeed be suitable.

“Dus vervolgens hebben we een heel aantal sites die volgens ons geschikt zijn, en dat gaat dan weer terug naar communities toe, en die gaan we uitleggen: wij zouden graag dit willen doen, [...] wat vinden jullie? Is het goed als we dit hier gaan doen? En nou ja, dat varieert, soms is het goed en soms komen zij met andere suggesties die we dan gaan bekijken.”

This example shows that input from communities is asked and taken seriously; if communities do not agree with a selected site, an alternative that carries their approval is considered. Again, though, the tendency to see communities as a homogenous entity is very much present: it could very well be that some people in a community do not agree with a certain site but are not allowed to voice their opinion.

Despite these concerns, the JustDiggit example does show that local input is gathered despite the fact that it is not specified in the AfA programme proposal – thus, the lack of clarity in the official policy documents does not necessarily have to lead to lack of effort on the ground. However, with delicate matters as inclusion it is preferable to have these institutionalised to ensure performance throughout the entire programme. Respondent 5 emphasises that in the next project cycle, this will be improved: “Kijk, het voordeel wat zij dan wel weer hebben, is dat zij [...] they delivered, in de eerste fase [...] alleen we vinden wel dat die garanties meer moeten zijn in te bouwen vanuit onszelf, dat zij du sook meer met gender bezig zijn, youth employment. Maar ook bijvoorbeeld een WASH-strategie, een duurzaamheidsclausule”.

The involvement of local organisations is illustrated by the example of VIA Water, the innovation window of AfA. In the previous cycle, of the over 60 projects “more than 30 projects were led by an African entity, mostly a social enterprise or NGO. Almost all other projects have at least one African partner” (AfA 2.0). This means that at least half of the project are led by local organisations; a trend that is set to be continued in the formulation for the new project cycle. JustDiggit also works with local partners, who they train at first and who subsequently take over the daily execution of the project. These partners are a few small local NGOs with around 15 to 20 employees. Again, it needs to be noted that working with local organisations does not ensure representativity or equality.

In addition, VIA Water organised Innovation Challenges specifically aimed at African innovators, to help them develop programme proposals; something that will also be done for the new project cycle. “Although it might seem unorthodox for a funding program to provide support in developing proposals for its own fund,” the AfA 2.0 document reads, “we explicitly developed this approach to level the playing field for African applicants. We believe that any good and innovative idea should get a change to be funded, not just those by applicants that are seasoned proposal writers”. This is definitely a method to ensure more participation from the local population, especially since Aqua for All also helps the entrepreneurs find funding for the upscaling of their ideas.

Although local participation is to a certain degree accounted for, the inclusion of vulnerable groups less well-formulated. From category Db and Pc it becomes clear that a limited amount of vulnerable groups is identified; the main group are people with low incomes and the remaining focus is on women, similar to PfR. The programme proposal 2.0 sets ambitious intentions:

“Aqua for All applies a comprehensive gender lens in our selection and funding of initiatives, e.g. checking whether women are involved in the initiative itself, and whether women benefit from the solution. [...] We monitor and evaluate actively on these aspects, by way of a gender (baseline) survey, due diligence with a gender perspective, and equal involvement of women and men in the design, operation and maintenance of service delivery models.”

In other words, female participation will be promoted and project benefits specifically for women are foreseen – water supply close to home will mean (substantial) time saving for women, for example, who are usually tasked with collecting water; this time can be spent by going to school or working. A specific and detailed strategy is lacking, though. Respondent 5 mentions that for the coming project cycle, AfA will need to provide a clearer plan of action: “We hebben ze toch gevraagd het gender aspect nog duidelijker terug te laten komen, of beter uitleggen hoe ze dat gaan doen”.

Also during the interviews some discrepancy became apparent on the topic of gender. When talking about time saving for women, Respondent 6 states:

“Het is bijna impliciet maar je moet het wel echt – je moet wel echt kijken of het ook gebeurt. Je moet wel kijken: treedt dat effect echt op, doen we het op de juiste manier. En dan kijk je naar: wat zijn de machtsverhoudingen in een land? Hoe kan je dat zo beïnvloeden dat het bijdraagt aan de verbetering van de positie van vrouwen?”

Respondent 6 here specifically underlines that it should be verified that positive effects on women occur. However, when asked how this is done, she replies:

“En hoe meten we dat? Voor een gedeelte gaan we uit van de bestaande onderzoeken die dit bevestigen. Dus we hoeven niet alles opnieuw te bewijzen. Dus wij zoeken naar onderzoeken waarin dat aangetoond wordt en als dat aangetoond wordt, dan zeggen we: oké, dan gaan we dat soort dingen doen.”

This is in line with the means of evaluation within AfA, which focuses on outcome monitoring rather than impact monitoring (see category Pg). Still, it is remarkable that Respondent 6 contradicts herself here. Respondent 7, along similar lines as Respondent 5, admitted in her interview that the gender approach within AfA was not strong/explicit enough and that this was definitely something to be improved for the next programme cycle.

Recognition (Pc)

As stated before, few vulnerable groups were recognised in the AfA data and reflection on the interaction between two or more vulnerabilities was scarce; it was only touched upon when it came to women. The emphasis was almost solely put on poor people and women/girls; see Annex II.III.

Legal access (Pd)

Similar to PfR, little information about this category existed. A complaint procedure was mentioned in the data but it was unclear for whom this procedure was intended; see Annex II.III.

Analysis beforehand (Pe)

Most aspects of this category have already been touched upon in the preceding sections. The analysis beforehand includes:

- A risk assessment of potential (external) threats and mitigating measures; it specifically does not include any mention of unintended side effects of the AfA programme
- Checking/verifying assumptions with local population
- A system analysis per thematic focus, where problems/opportunities, key stakeholders, and necessary changes in the system are identified. This appears to be similar to the context analysis used by PfR
- A sustainability analysis based on the FIETS methodology: Financial, Institutional, Ecological, Technical and Social/Governance

Such a context or stakeholder analysis is conducted at the start of a new project:

“Dan zijn er allerlei... wat je focus groups noemt. Dan gaan een lokale onderzoeker, die gaat kijken: welke personen hebben er belang bij, welke mensen hebben invloed daarop. Probeert de hele omgeving te scannen om te kijken: heeft zo’n idee zin. Dus dat noem je dan focus groups of het zijn... in ieder geval, daar neem je altijd lokale partijen – er zijn altijd lokale NGOs of research instituten die dat goed kunnen.” (Respondent 6)

It is unclear from this quotation under what circumstances focus groups are actually conducted and with which specific groups, particularly because it is not specifically mentioned in the policy documents. It appears, however, that local organisations conduct these analyses. As with all categories, the organisations that are selected to carry out this process heavily influence the degree of inclusivity and bias of such an analysis.

Selection criteria (Pf)

When accounting for the selection of regions, the AfA 2.0 document cites a number of reasons:

- Regions experience challenges with WASH services and Integrated Water Resource Management
- Existing experience and track record of AfA in these regions
- Established partnerships and networks
- Focus regions⁷ outlined by the Ministry

Other project-specific criteria can also be used by implementing partners; Respondent 8 from JustDiggIt explains that they chose Kenya and Tanzania to carry out landscape restoration projects because of their representativity: large parts of rural Africa have either small-scale farming or pastoralism, which are the two types of regions JustDiggIt focuses on. “Voor het armste deel van de bevolking zijn het een beetje die twee smaken, dus we willen laten zien dat je in die twee typen landschappen, met zulke sociaaleconomische omstandigheden, dat je daar dingen kan doen die positief zijn.”

Where the selection of partners is concerned, Respondent 6 explains that most of the time interested parties approach AfA. Sometimes, the search is more active, such as for example in the Innovation Challenges discussed earlier. As with PfR, there is a preference for existing partnerships; see annex II.III.

Lastly, the choice of projects – those which will receive AfA support and those which will not – needs to be analysed. In general, projects need to focus on the Base of the Pyramid; they need to have the potential to become self-sufficient in the long run; and the offered solution needs to be structural. “Wij investeren niet in flessenwater [...] dat is niet een structurele oplossing” (Respondent 6). Specifically for the SCALE window, where AfA looks for projects that have the potential to be implemented on a large scale, the criteria are focused on business aspects: initiatives need to have “a clear and viable business or investment case with proof of concept”, they need to envision “a pivotal role for private sector players” and the SCALE project needs to eventually match the criteria of market investors. From the data, it does not appear that any other social or inclusivity concerns are institutionalised as entry criteria. It does state in the programme proposal AfA 2.0 that the involvement and benefit of women are part of the “selection and funding of initiatives” but no concrete ways to ensure this are mentioned either in the policy documents or the interviews.

Monitoring and evaluation (Pg)

The evaluation process from Aqua for All differs greatly from that of PfR: there is a predominant focus on quantitative results and ‘numbers’. This already became apparent in the discussion about

⁷ Focus regions are the areas that Development Cooperation policy will centre on under the current government

monetizing positive social impacts (see policy section) and is proven further in the 2018 Annual Report, which mostly evaluates AfA performance in mobilised private finance, the number of beneficiaries reached, the number of involved organisations, etc. Even the outcomes in the area of gender equality are converted into money: “we are developing models that can capture time saving credits and enhanced safety for women [...] This gender dimension of our programmes can attract additional funders and investors, either upfront or – more likely – through outcome payment mechanisms”. It should be noted that most of the numbers in this report are based on prognoses done by the implementing organisations and that actual numbers will only become available after the projects have finished their four-year cycle; their reliability can therefore be questioned. The focus on monetary value and numbers can be explained by the fact that for AfA, monitoring is an important means to attract investors – it proves their concept works, after all – and the fact that their programme centres around business cases, public-private partnerships and helping as many people as possible to get access to WASH services. It is also a requirement set by the Ministry, as explained by Respondent 5:

“Dat ligt aan ons he. Want wij vragen hen te rapporteren op voortgang en tegenwoordig willen we alles in die resultatenkaders hebben en daar moeten vooral allemaal nummertjes in voorkomen [...] Je hebt waarschijnlijk wel meegekeken hoe ontzettend veel discussie er is over die resultatenkaders want juist de echte thema-experts kraken dit om deze redenen. Ja, je kunt heel mooie getalletjes hebben maar als de onderliggende factoren of aangelegde infrastructuur maar drie jaar standhoudt, hoeveel is dat dan waard.”

Respondent 5 shares similar sentiments on the rigid results frameworks as Respondent 3, who was also very critical of the focus on ‘managed results’ within the Ministry. When asked if he found it hard to judge the progress of a programme based on annual reports, Respondent 5 replied that it was definitely not a flawless method, but “het is uiteindelijk the best we have”. He also asserted that it was not in an organisation’s own benefit to deliver low-quality work because it would mean irreversible damage to their image: “Dan kom je nooit meer binnen [...] Het systeem houdt zichzelf een beetje goed doordat inderdaad, je kunt je niet zoveel fouten veroorloven als je aan de ontvangende kant zit. Want voor jou wel drie anderen letterlijk, vaak”.

The use of *qualitative* evaluation was present in the Field Assessment Report (2017), an assessment which appears to be carried out every 2-3 years. The report reads: “It was found that a field survey was required to provide an independent and more in-depth analysis than could be obtained from the [sustainability] surveys that were largely quantitative and self-reported” (p.3). Although the Field Assessment Report obviously focuses on implementation, some interesting matters were still brought up; these have been transferred to Annex II.III.

As briefly discussed before, AfA focuses on outcome monitoring:

“While the terms ‘impact assessments’ and ‘impact investments’ are often used and while we obviously aim at achieving impact, Aqua for All believes that measuring results at *impact* level – such as health impact – is not only very costly to monitor, it also runs into complexities around attribution. Therefore, we would like to focus in *outcome* monitoring (social, economic and environmental return on investment) whereas we rely on literature and studies for connections between the outcomes and the impact to which these outcomes contribute.” (AfA 2.0)

AfA’s choice and reasoning are interesting and tie into the larger debate around the reliability of results reports and monitoring, as was also touched upon in the PfR case; see chapter 7 for more. The Ministry is not always convinced of the assumptions AfA makes, though. Respondent 5 describes AfA’s response to the new sustainability clause that will be included into the contract to ensure longevity of the projects:

“Hun reactie was van: ja, kijk, als er externe financiering bij komt, commerciële financiering, die gaan nooit ergens in zitten als er geen sustainable business model achter zit, dan investeer je niet. Dus hey, solved. Maar dat vonden wij toch niet genoeg [...] Een business kan zich ook weer terugtrekken.”

Following input from the assessments and the Ministry, it appears in the programme proposal for AfA 2.0 that they aim to improve some of their monitoring and evaluation practices:

“More than in the past, we will focus on customer satisfaction and stakeholder feedback on what (positive/negative) changes have occurred and how they value these changes. As before, Aqua for All works with data supplied by its partners, but will strengthen its system of independent verification of the data on a random sample basis.”

Hopefully, this would help to verify the positive impacts that were assumed based on scientific studies. Interestingly, although the Mid-Term Review carried out in the same year is mentioned in the programme proposal, the Field Assessment is not. From the Mid-Term Review, the overall positive conclusion was adopted whereas more critical conclusions from the report were not mentioned (such as the fact that according to the report, “the systematic inclusion of southern and private actors should remain an issue of attention and concern” (p.6)). Overall, the Mid-Term Review included some critical perspectives on inclusion, interaction between stakeholders, and governance. Since the aim of this research is not to review implementation, this section shall not go into detail, but it should be noted that (critical) attention for such matters is indeed present in the monitoring and evaluation, albeit seemingly only in the in-depth reviews carried out by independent consultants every 2-3 years.

5.3 Dutch Fund for Climate and Development

The Dutch Fund for Climate and Development (DFCD) is a major ‘flagship’ fund recently set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and receiving a total of 160 million euros in funding over the course of a four-year period. After this period, the fund will remain active until approximately 2037 by making use of so-called ‘revolving’ financial instruments, where the money granted to a specific project will flow back to DFCD if the project is successful and generates income (although donations and grants are also provided). Similar to Aqua for All, the focus is on developing bankable projects, specifically for climate change adaptation.

5.3.1 Governance

Politics

As the fund has only recently been set up and at the time of writing is not active yet, the stakeholders illustrated in the diagram below are limited to those based in the Netherlands and do not include southern partner organisations.




Figure 10: Stakeholder diagram DFCD

The consortium which manages DFCD consists of development bank FMO, Climate Fund Managers, and two NGOs. As with all consortia or partnerships that the Ministry cooperates with, one organisation is made the ‘lead partner’ who manages the funds and is held accountable – in this case, FMO is the lead. Respondent 10 from FMO explains how the consortium was formed:

“Het is natuurlijk sowieso een hele moeilijke markt die adaptatiemarkt. Dus toen zijn we eigenlijk direct gesprekken aangegaan omdat we zelfs zonder tender requirements wel door

hadden dat het een heel grote uitdaging zou worden, om het alleen als FMO te doen. [...]

Toen zijn we echt met een breed aantal partijen gaan praten.”

Eventually the three other partners were selected because of the additional and important expertise they brought to the table: Climate Fund Managers is experienced at mobilising private climate finance; NGO I was chosen for their conservation/ecosystem background and NGO II for their experience with social development. Both NGOs also bring an extensive local network in developing countries, something that FMO does not possess.

DFCD means to mobilise much private finance, which can happen in two ways: at fund level and at project level. Respondent 9 explains:

“Op fondsniveau zijn het meer grote investeerders die niet, en dat is vooral het grote onderscheid, die zijn zelf niet betrokken bij die projecten. Dus zij kopen in feite gewoon financiële producten af van de... ze zijn alleen maar betrokken bij DFCD als geheel. Ze zijn niet betrokken bij die specifieke deal in dat specifieke land. Iemand die in een project gaat investeren is dat wel.”

It can be questioned why the Ministry does not manage DFCD themselves, instead of funding Dutch organisations to do it. This also relates to Respondent 3's comments about the use of funding Dutch NGOs instead of funding southern CSOs directly. Respondent 9 gives two reasons for this: firstly, the Ministry does not have the capacity to select, manage and monitor individual projects themselves; and secondly, NGOs serve as a 'neutral middleman' to make manoeuvring in an international political setting easier.

“Daarom heb je hun ook, precies. Anders zouden we deze afdeling vier keer, vijf keer moeten vergroten, nog afgezien van dat je in heel veel issues terechtkomt met betrekking tot internationale relaties die je ook niet wil – dat een bepaald project een soort speelbal gaat worden tussen de relaties tussen verschillende overheden [...] Je wil het ook een beetje op afstand hebben om niet de hele tijd daarover te gaan zitten steggelen.”

This is an interesting point and one that has not been brought forward in any of the other interviews. It points to development cooperation being a politically charged subject that requires a 'neutral' actor as an intermediary.

Because the fund is so new, much of the data in this sub-chapter focuses on the designing of the grant subsidy framework and the selection of a consortium. This process is discussed in further detail in section 5.3.3, most notably in category Pf. See Table XI in Annex III.I for the mode of governance according to Driessen et al. (2012), which in the case of politics best resembles interactive governance.

Polity

The Ministry published what is called a tender: a grant subsidy framework with preconditions for the potential fund manager, to which any stakeholder or combination of stakeholders could submit a proposal: “Dutch and non-Dutch organisations with legal personality (including NGOs, financial institutions, knowledge institutions, companies and services providers) and a good track record in the area of climate change and international finance” (Q&A, p.1) could apply; only “local governments, intergovernmental organisations and organisations in which the government is the sole shareholder” were excluded from applying (p.1). According to Respondent 9, this choice was made for political reasons:

“Worden wij er gelukkig van als het naar een buitenlandse partij zou gaan? Nou ja, toen was de vraag – nou ja, nee. Aan de ene kant vinden we dat lastig omdat het een heel politiek fonds is, aan de andere kant, als een buitenlandse partij de beste is, dan is die de beste en er zijn niet zoveel partijen in Nederland die het kunnen beheren [...] Toen is er dus voor gekozen oké, we stellen het wel open voor buitenlandse partijen, maar we willen bijvoorbeeld niet dat het open wordt gesteld voor buitenlandse overheden.”

As mentioned before, DFCD is a ‘flagship fund’ for the Dutch government, so it was seen politically undesirable if a foreign government would become the fund manager and effectively claim its successes. In addition, projects above a certain monetary value threshold are obliged to be opened for the entire European market, according to European law, with some exceptions that might have applied to the case of DFCD (see annex III.I for details). Eventually a public tender procedure was chosen, which increases the degree of transparency and equality of opportunities, although it can be questioned whether the Ministry could have justified that only one party was suitable to manage the fund in any case.

The cooperation arrangements between the four consortium partners are described in the Bid Application; see Annex III.I for details. Table XII in Annex III.I shows that DFCD’s mode of governance is characterised by interactive governance as well as a form of public-private governance.

Policy

The Dutch Fund for Climate and Development has a fairly similar approach to AfA where content is concerned. The aim is to develop bankable projects, which is done through two windows: the Origination Facility (which corresponds to AfA’s VIA Water), where promising projects are scouted and offered technical assistance and grant funding to develop them into viable business cases; and the Land Use and Water Facilities (similar to AfA’s SCALE), which will invest in fully developed business cases coming from the Origination Facility or FMO’s and CFM’s external networks.

Specifically, the aim of DFCD is direct most of their funds towards climate change adaptation and as opposed to AfA, all their projects must be 100% climate relevant. The consortium decided to focus on a few specific themes: water, agriculture, forestry and general environmental protection, as these are identified as sectors “where there is the strongest need to demonstrate the opportunities for investment with low-carbon, climate resilient development impact” (Bid Application p.61). In other words, DFCD will also play an exemplary role:

“De sectoren die zij willen gaan doen, zijn zeer relevant voor klimaat en nog niet zo heel erg ontwikkeld, maar hebben wel de potentie om ontwikkeld te gaan worden. Hun voorstel heeft dus de interessante mogelijkheid om een aantal sectoren die nog heel erg op donaties draaien, om die financieel rendabel te gaan maken.” (Respondent 9)

This is similar to the aim of AfA to make WASH projects, which are traditionally not seen as attractive investment options, commercially viable.

DFCD Projects will be developed using an integrated landscape approach “that adequately addresses climate impacts through synergies and de-risking between projects, and which is informed by landscape-specific climate risk studies” (Bid Application, p.57). The landscape approach will make it a little easier to develop bankable projects in the adaptation sector, as explained by Respondent 10:

“Ik denk dat dat ook een van de uitdagingen gaat zijn in de komende tijd, om te kijken wat mogelijk is, welke businessmodellen zouden kunnen werken. En die zullen er zeker zijn, maar het zal niet makkelijk zijn. Wat ik ook voor me zie is dat door het partnerschap dat we hebben, we kijken naar wat voor soort projecten eromheen zijn. Dus het kan zomaar zijn dat we een water project hebben wat wel commercieel haalbaar is ook, en dat we daaromheen nog een project bouwen wat misschien gefinancierd wordt met technische assistentie [...] Dus het is ook kijken naar, hoe kunnen projecten elkaar aanvullen of hoe kan je een klein gedeelte wat op zichzelf stand niet volledig bankable is, onderdeel maken van een groter project.”

The focus on ‘bankability’, commercial viability and attraction of market investors is prominent in DFCD, like in AfA. Respondent 9 reflects on the reasons for this:

“Deels vanuit heel simpel de gedachte dat publiek geld nooit genoeg gaat zijn [...] En de tweede reden ook wel, en daar hebben we het natuurlijk al wel eens eerder over gehad, als je alleen maar donaties blijft doen, dan zal niks ooit zelfverzienend worden [...] Wat dat betreft ben ik wel echt een gelover in het marktgedeelte. Als je niet wild at je als overheid altijd de kraan open moet houden, dan moet het op een gegeven moment interessant worden.”

This corresponds to the assumptions present in AfA: a capitalist, competitive approach is needed to make the transition to a sustainable society; see chapter 7 for a critical reflection. The emphasis on bankability also means that when a project that enrolls in the Origination Facility fails to become bankable, it is discontinued: “Wat er vervolgens mee gebeurt, is dat we kunnen kijken of een andere partij het misschien interessant vindt om het project over te nemen. Als dat niet het geval is, dan wordt er vanuit DFCD wel gestopt met het project” (Respondent 10).

Respondent 9 does admit that the focus on private sector development has its disadvantages: “Ik snap wel de kritiek daarop, dat [private mobilisatie] niet voor alle projecten kan, terwijl die wel heel erg relevant zijn, daar ben ik het helemaal met je mee eens. Dit fonds is alleen [...] niet voor dit issue.” In addition, there is the possibility of funding private projects that do not necessarily need public support: “Er gaat dan overigens ook heel veel geld op die manier naar commerciële projecten die al – die nu al zouden kunnen bedruipen, dat vind ik altijd het nadeel, want wij hebben heel weinig zicht in wanneer het wel en wanneer het niet noodzakelijk is dat er geld bij komt” (Respondent 9).

See Annex III.I, Table XIII for the mode of governance analysis according to Driessen et al. (2012).

From this section it can be concluded that DFCD presents a hybrid form of governance which at times takes the form of interactive or public-private governance. Whereas Driessen et al. (2012) see public-private governance as predominantly a partnership between government and market actors, in the case of DFCD this also includes civil society actors. In this sense, it is comparable to AfA; however, DFCD differs from AfA in that NGOs and market institutes (FMO and CFM) together form the DFCD board, whereas Aqua for All (as non-profit organisation) is the only lead partner. Further comparison on the modes of governance of all three activities is provided in the conclusion (chapter 6).

5.3.2 Distribution

Benefits (Da)

See Annex III.II for the benefits anticipated from DFCD programmes.

Burdens (Da)

Anticipated negative side effects are mentioned a few times in the data, although they are not made specific. The Bid Application reads: “The DFCD will actively manage environmental and social risks in its emerging market projects. These risks stem from the intrinsic nature of the projects, which in some cases could carry negative environmental and/or social impacts” (p.104). This ‘active risk management’ includes conforming to international standards such as the IFC Performance Standards

and the UN Principles on Human Rights, making upfront assessments, and establishing a complaint mechanism. It is also mentioned that the integrated landscape approach will help to mitigate negative side effects: “The landscape focus provides opportunities to identify projects that amplify the impacts of others or to offset the negative impacts that a standalone project might have” (p.63).

Another precondition set for the consortium is that they have to publish all ‘pipeline projects’ (projects that are still in an early design/negotiation phase) before the contracts are definitively signed. Usually projects or deals are not published until after the contracts are signed in order to prevent reputational damage. Respondent 9:

“Dus alle deals worden straks wel op de FMO-website openbaar gemaakt alvorens een contract is getekend. Dat betekent dus dat als er vanuit de NGO-wereld grote bezwaren zijn... Dat betekent niet zozeer dat ze hun per se zouden kunnen tegenhouden maar ze zouden wel daar de fondsmanager op kunnen aanspreken en stennis kunnen schoppen.”

This measure enhances the degree of transparency of the fund and allows NGOs to fulfil their role as a ‘watchdog’ at a time in the process where their input could potentially still have influence. When asked to elaborate on potential negative impacts, Respondent 9 gave the example of a hydro power plant, which can come with negative side effects. She continues:

“Nou hebben wij dus ook geëist van alle fondsmanagers in de toets dat ze bestaand beleid hebben op het controleren op mensenrechten, sociale, milieu-effecten, genereffecten, etc. van wat ze doen. Maar goed, dat betekent nog niet dat een individueel project niet toch effect kan hebben. Die ofwel onderschat zijn ofwel niet genoeg gezien zijn, of dat ze daar echt een fout in maken, dat kan allemaal.”

The reason that DFCD is more explicit about unintended side effects as compared to PfR and AfA can be explained by the fact that its budget is much higher and that the projects are thus more large scale and include infrastructure, which are usually the types of projects that cause negative impacts.

Since DFCD also has a major focus on private mobilisation, the Respondents were asked about any trade-offs between social development and private finance (see also 6.4). Respondent 10 explains that safeguards are put into place to prevent this:

“Er zijn altijd afwegingen denk ik, die we in alle gevallen zo goed mogelijk proberen af te dichten [...]. Iedereen heeft hele sterke environmental, social, governance standaarden waar we aan moeten voldoen. Dus er is denk ik een vrij sterke baseline waar alle projecten aan moeten voldoen om te voorkomen dat de afweging teveel doorslaat naar bijvoorbeeld de commerciële kant.”

Influence of vulnerability (Db)

Approximately 18 factors that lead to increased vulnerability were mentioned in the data. Those mentioned often were income level, gender, religion, ethnicity, and culture. Overall, the vulnerability factors were varied and included some that were not mentioned in the other two projects, such as birth status and language.

Need for access to resources (Dc)

Vulnerable groups depending on natural resources are seen as having the most urgent need for access, see Annex III.II.

Responsibility (Dd)

From the burdens section (Da) it became apparent that negative unintended side effects resulting from DFCD projects were anticipated, and that they would be mitigated, offset or otherwise compensated by DFCD.

5.3.2 Procedure

Availability of information (Pa)

Timely information provision is touched upon in the data to a certain extent, see Annex III.II.

Participation (Pb)

The codes in category Pb covered a variety of aspects and did not lead to one or more codes being more frequent than others. A few examples of codes in this category include:

- Inclusion of local communities and vulnerable groups
- Informed free participation
- Focus groups with marginalised groups
- Community-based development
- Reducing power asymmetries

The aim of DFCD is to engage “all relevant stakeholders, including the most vulnerable communities and populations” in order to “ensure that investment is benefitting the most vulnerable and poorest populations” (Bid Application p.38). Focus groups are mentioned as a way to gather input from local groups: “Typically focus group discussions are conducted with women-only groups; as well as other vulnerable groups including peoples of ethnic, religious or cultural minorities; young people; and the elderly” (p.39).

What is interesting is that participation in the DFCD data is sometimes interpreted as simply meaning ‘consultation’ and at other times as ‘decision-making’. For example:

“CFM seeks out to [...] recognise and include vulnerable populations across all of its projects [...]. An open and inclusive approach to *consultation* increases the opportunity for stakeholders to provide comments on the project and voice their concerns” (Bid Application, p.39, italics mine).

Another section reads:

“Participatory *decision-making* promotes empowerment and transparency, as well as accountability of policy makers to citizens. Ensuring projects engage with and provide benefits for different vulnerable groups is at the core of the strategies of the four Consortium Parties” (p.38, italics mine).

Consultation and decision-making are not the same thing and could definitely influence the extent to which local (vulnerable) populations are able to provide input; see chapter 7 for more reflection.

As far as the aim of CFM’s consultation is concerned, this remains a little vague:

“Through these stakeholder consultations CFM prepares a community development program with key informant interviews and focus group discussions providing input as to the most important needs of the various communities. Throughout the lifetime of CFM’s involvement in each of its projects it provides grant funding to inclusive, community-led development programs which allow communities, including vulnerable groups, to share in the benefits of the projects” (p.39).

From this passage, exactly what constitutes a community development programme is not clear. It appears to be a ‘side project’ to any bigger (infrastructure) projects DFCD might be planning, as these community projects are provided with grant funding and will allow local groups to ‘share’ the benefits of the (actual) projects.

Consultation is also closely linked to Free, Prior and Informed Consent; a subject that came up in the interview with Respondent 10.

“Stel, het is een groot energieproject dat we doen, dat zijn allemaal projecten waarbij we in gesprek gaan met de lokale bevolking, waarbij de lokale bevolking ook inspraak heeft op de projecten. Dus dan doen we een soort – consentmeetings worden er dan gedaan waarbij er inspraak gedaan kan worden. [...] Dan heb je ook veel meer te maken met hele complexe processen waarbij overheden betrokken zijn, waarbij lokale bevolking bij betrokken is.”

She explained that these procedures differ depending on the project; for example, where an agricultural project is concerned:

“Dan kijk je bijvoorbeeld veel meer naar hoe de onderneming met de werknemers omgaat. Het kan natuurlijk ook zijn dat het een project is dat juist met heel veel kleine boeren

samenwerkt, dan ben je weer veel meer bezig met hoe je... dan zijn er natuurlijk boeren die zelf kunnen instemmen of ze meedoen met een project – dan ben je veel meer bezig met het trainen van de boeren.”

There is also an emphasis on community ownership of natural resources, particularly of indigenous groups. The Bid Application mentions that NGO I aims to focus on these issues:

“Indigenous people’s engagement and ensuring lasting benefits to these people is key in many of the landscapes where [NGO I] is active. Benefits range from (i) secured access to (natural) resources and land; (ii) additional and alternative income improvements; (iii) enhanced climate resilience [...]; and (iv) meaningful participation in decision-making and respect of traditional (natural resource) management systems” (p.39).

Examples on how to give (indigenous) communities access and ownership over natural resources are Community-Based Natural Resource Management and a programme called ‘People Protecting Landscapes’. The concept of ‘meaningful participation’ mentioned in the passage is not elaborated upon, however.

Similar to the other programmes, DFCD puts a special emphasis on gender. “The Consortium commits to understand the gender-specific impacts of its investments to ensure women and men enjoy equal economic opportunities [...]. Gender and diversity are considered throughout the project cycle and in particular when identifying, engaging and working with key stakeholders and partners” (p.41). It was already mentioned that women focus groups would be organised. In addition, women need to be involved “in the case of any resettlement planning” (p.41) – apart from a gender perspective, this also implies another potential negative side effect, namely resettlement.

Participation should not only be limited to consultation or a role in the decision-making process, however – it should also be considered where the possibility of applying for funds directly is concerned. In the case of DFCD, it is stated that “projects and businesses which receive grant funding from the Origination Facility will be supported by [NGO I] or [NGO II] [...] to complete their climate and development impact assessments” (p.83). This removes an application barrier for organisations less experienced at formal assessments. On the other hand, DFCD aims for scale, so the projects it will fund will receive a sum between 1 and 10 million euros (although grant projects will sometimes be less). This means that for grassroots or small-scale organisations it will be virtually impossible to apply, since it is unlikely they are able to manage funds of approximately a million euros – unless they form a consortium with other parties.

Two other issues remain to be discussed for the case of DFCD: existing power relations and ‘communities as single entities’. Where the first issue is concerned, the consortium wants to “attain socially equitable and environmentally sustainable development through reducing power asymmetries and dysfunctions, including corruption” (Bid Application, p.41). How they intend to do

this and whether this extends to communities, local government etc. instead of only their direct clients, it is not clear. Where the assumption of community homogeneity is concerned, the IFC Performance Standards actually address this:

“When the stakeholder engagement process depends substantially on community representatives, the client will make every reasonable effort to verify that such persons do in fact represent the views of Affected Communities and that they can be relied upon to faithfully communicate the results of consultations to their constituents.” (p.7)

Presumably DFCD will also comply with this standard, although it is not specified in their Bid Application and communities and vulnerable groups are mostly presented as single entities.

Recognition (Pc)

The following groups were most often referred to as vulnerable/marginalised:

- Poor people / those living in Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
- Women/girls
- Indigenous people
- Youth

Other recognised groups were: smallholder farmers, fishermen, religious groups, ethnic groups, pastoralists, elderly, disabled people, rural populations, forest dwellers, and those without access to financial services (such as loans etc.). As with PfR, vulnerability is seen as highly context-specific. Again, though, the intersectional perspective is lacking by dividing vulnerable groups up so clearly and not taking into account that vulnerabilities can overlap and influence each other.

Legal access (Pd)

DFCD promotes transparency and accountability by publishing their intended projects before signing the contracts and by using participatory decision-making. There is also an Independent Complaints Mechanism in place which consists of an independent expert panel to assess issues. These matters are further ensured through the IFC Standards.

Analysis beforehand (Pe)

Initial assessments are based on the landscape approach and include “landscape-level climate risk and opportunity assessments to inform private sector action [...]. These studies will also involve engagement with local and national level decision-makers” (p.64). According to Respondent 10, identifying vulnerabilities can be done through (existing) research from local knowledge institutes,

using the NGO I and NGO II offices and networks, or by hiring a consultant. Whether the consultation with local communities/groups is also included in this, remains not entirely clear.

Selection criteria (Pf)

Because DFCD is still in its begin phase, the theme of 'selection' was ubiquitous throughout the data: selection of consortium, selection of partners, selection of projects. It is important to distinguish between the Ministry's requirements and those established by DFCD in their proposal.

Where MFA is concerned, many requirements for projects were set – see Annex III.III. Respondent 9 explained that it was hard to write the grant policy framework because it sets the boundaries within which the consortium has autonomy. "Het lastige is dus dat het van tevoren moet. Dat heeft het voordeel dat je heel goed nadenkt over wat je nou precies wil, maar het heeft wel als nadeel dat als je het niet van tevoren had afgedekt, dat je achteraf ook heel moeilijk nog kan bijsturen".

Within the framework boundaries, projects will be selected in different ways. Because DFCD focuses on adaptation, which is not an established market for investments yet, projects need to be actively looked for. "Het zal natuurlijk wel een tijd duren ook voordat er projecten ontwikkeld zijn. Dus in de eerste jaren gaan we zelf ook voornamelijk op zoek" (Respondent 10). She states that FMO will send specialised investment teams to countries to scout projects: "dit zijn de onderwerpen of de sectoren waar we geïnteresseerd in zijn, daar moeten jullie gaan kijken of er interessante projecten zijn". Other ways to discover projects are through the Dutch embassies, conferences, NGO II's and NGO I's local networks, and through the landscape approach: "Dat [NGO II] bijvoorbeeld een project heeft en dat ze in hetzelfde landschap ook iets zien wat misschien wel bankable is, en dat interessant is voor CFM of FMO".

An important selection criterium for projects which is not specifically mentioned in the MFA framework but emphasised by Respondent 10 multiple times is scalability, which is an important requirement to attract investors:

"Een van de vereisten van de investeerders zal ongetwijfeld zijn dat ze wel een bepaald rendement willen halen [...]. Ze zullen ook heel sterk kijken naar hoe schaalbaar een project is. Als een project niet schaalbaar genoeg is, dan zal het vaak niet een heel interessant project zijn [...] dus hele kleine projecten worden vaak lastig, ook omdat je uiteindelijk bepaalde transactiekosten hebt."

Similar to AfA, commercial viability is seen as key for projects to become sustainable and independent from Dutch funding for the long term. Through project development in the Origination

Facility, DFCD aims to close the current gap between projects funded by NGOs and those that are able to attract private investments:

“Je ziet heel vaak heel duidelijk een gat tussen de NGO-wereld en investeerders, waarbij je ziet dat projecten een paar jaar gefund worden door NGOs en dan de aansluiting niet kunnen vinden bij investeerders [...] en dat NGOs dan stoppen met de funding en dat het project dan stopt. Terwijl dat vaak ontzettend goede projecten zijn en ook haalbaar om uiteindelijk commercieel te maken [...] We zien inderdaad dat het anders af en toe... dat er echt wel bepaalde afwegingen zijn, maar met dit fonds proberen we dit gat echt te dichten.”

(Respondent 10)

In the last sentence of this quote, it appears that Respondent 10 is admitting that focusing on market investors comes with certain trade-offs, especially when compared to projects funded by NGOs. According to Respondent 10, though, DFCD aims to have the best of both worlds: climate and development impacts traditionally championed by NGOs, and commercial models of revenue and self-sufficiency required by market investors.

Overall it appears that the Ministry framework has covered some important aspects. Two critical notes need to be made, however. Firstly, the lack of specification of ‘vulnerable groups’ that should be targeted (only women and the poor are specifically mentioned) by DFCD interventions could theoretically leave room for the fund manager to maintain a superficial focus on vulnerability. In this case, the Bid Application of the consortium does contain more specifics about vulnerable groups and how they intend to reach and include them, and since the consortium is bound to their application and the Ministry framework, this risk is mitigated, especially also since the consortium has to monitor and report on their efforts to reach the most vulnerable. Secondly, no prerequisite exists in the Ministry framework about procedural inclusivity: the engagement of local or marginalised groups in the decision-making process or the inclusion of such groups in the implementing organisations is not mentioned. In the consortium’s proposal this aspect is covered to a degree but as remarked in section Pb, ambiguities remained. This is not to say that the consortium will not make an effort in this area in practice, but it does mean that it is not institutionalised and included in the two binding documents for the fund.

Monitoring and evaluation (Pg)

Where monitoring is concerned, the Ministry sets the following guideline: “Hiertoe dienen meetbare kwantitatieve of kwalitatieve indicatoren te worden gehanteerd voor het beoordelen van de ontwikkelingsrelevantie en de wijze waarop ook de meest kwetsbare groepen worden bereikt” (p.11). It is interesting that the choice of method – qualitative and/or quantitative – is left to the fund

manager. Arguably, as was brought up multiple times in the PfR case, qualitative data is key in determining social impact. The consortium describes the methods they decided to be using:

“Evaluations could follow different methodologies, to be determined depending on information requirements. Ex-post studies⁸ to measure effectiveness of the investment and impact generated at investment/project level. Thematic studies to advance knowledge on strategic topics of interest for the fund. Impact evaluations to establish, in a rigorous manner, evidence of the causal relationship between the financing of the project and the impact at household or end-user level. Prioritised will be those investments or themes where there is little scientific evidence and where some of the impacts reflected in ToC [Theory of Change] cannot be measured solely by impact reporting. If sufficient evidence already exists to make impact plausible, the focus will be on ex-post studies and thematic evaluations in line with DFCD’s impact objectives.” (p.102)

The idea of establishing causal relationships that was touched upon in the Aqua for All data returns here, as well as relying on scientific evidence. Unlike AfA, however, Dutch Fund for Climate and Development aims to conduct their own impact studies if insufficient evidence is available. This can be explained by the fact that DFCD has a much bigger budget to conduct such studies; in addition, DFCD intends to focus on projects in various markets that are underdeveloped and thus are likely to have little empirical examples yet.

The indicators included in the Bid Application are both qualitative and quantitative; the qualitative indicators are concerned with the provision of definitions. For example the indicator ‘number of family farms (headed by women and men) that have become more resilient to climate change’ is split into two indicators: the number of farms disaggregated by whether they are headed by a man or woman (quantitative), and the definition of the increase of household resilience, which should be motivated in the funding proposal and be project specific. As is the case in this example, indicators are disaggregated by gender or by vulnerable group when they concern numbers of people. In addition, ‘narrative reporting’ (qualitative) will be used to describe the impact created by the projects.

The Bid Application document asserts that the assessments are “systemic [...], not a one-off, but [using] information from several time points inclusive of baseline, midline, routine monitoring, and end line information” (p.102). There will also be an independent evaluation every five years conducted by external consultants. Although detailed monitoring is positive when it comes to evaluating projects, it can also lead to a high reporting burden for implementing organisations, which distracts from the actual executing of projects.

⁸ Ex-post studies measure the actual financial returns of a project (as opposed to the expected returns)

As DFCD is not active yet, no annual reports or other evaluations could be analysed for this section; the data thus relies on the intended manner of reporting that is outlined in the Bid Application. No conclusions about for example the content of the 'narrative reporting' could be drawn.

6 Conclusion

The research question and sub-questions of this thesis were as follows:

- Main research question: *To what extent do governance modes, which characterise climate-relevant activities in developing countries funded by the Netherlands, influence the approach to climate justice?*
- Sub-question 1: *To what extent does the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognise anticipated distributive justice aspects when formulating climate-relevant activities for developing countries?*
- Sub-question 2: *To what extent does the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognise procedural justice aspects when formulating climate-relevant activities for developing countries?*
- Sub-question 3: *What are the differences/similarities between the governance modes of the three activities analysed in this research?*

In order to answer the main question, first each of the sub-questions will be discussed by comparing and contrasting the findings of the three case studies central in this study: Partners for Resilience, Aqua for All and Dutch Fund for Climate and Development.

6.1 Sub-question 1: Distribution

To what extent does the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognise anticipated distributive justice aspects when formulating climate-relevant activities for developing countries?

All three activities analysed in this research included ample references to the anticipated benefits their projects would bring, although these were sometimes rather abstract/broad. However, anticipated burdens resulted from the programme were overall less clear: in PfR, none were mentioned at all, AfA interview statements remained vague about the topic, and in DFCD data it was admitted that the possibility of unintended negative impacts existed although these were not specified. Due to their focus on private investments, AfA and DFCD respondents were asked about potential trade-offs between social and financial goals (see also 6.4). The AfA respondent remained abstract about this, stating that this was something to be aware of and assumptions needed to be validated beforehand in order to prevent mistakes. The DFCD Respondents asserted that such trade-offs would be prevented by adhering to environmental and social standards such as those from IFC.

The influence of vulnerability on distribution was covered extensively in two of the cases (PfR and DFCD) and less in the case of AfA, where only four factors that increased vulnerability were mentioned. As these are all development cooperation programmes, it is obvious that poverty is a key area of focus. Gender, in addition, was mentioned extensively in all cases as well, which can be explained by the specific gender equality goals included in the current Minister's policy notice (BHOS Nota). Reflection on the interaction or overlap between vulnerability factors was lacking in all three cases.

In general, the data pointed towards a relation between categories vulnerability (Db), need for access (Dc) and recognition (Pc). The factors that were seen as making an individual extra vulnerable for the impacts of climate change (Db) lead to a greater need for access to resources (or benefits of the programme) (Dc); also groups that were recognised as marginalised, vulnerable or targeted by the programme (Pc) shared many of the characteristics of category Db, for example the codes 'gender' (Db) and 'women/girls' (Pc); 'age' (Db) and 'elderly'/'children' (Pc). In turn, vulnerability and need for resource access were weighed for importance and translated into concrete selection criteria in category Pf.

It also became apparent that the question of responsibility (Dd) did not occur in two of the cases (PfR and AfA) since in these cases no negative side effects were anticipated. One case (DFCD) mentioned that negative side effects might occur and that measures would be taken to mitigate any negative impacts resulting from their interventions.

A final remark should be made about the existence of 'spontaneous' local adaptation efforts that are already in place in developing countries. Smucker et al. (2015) reflect on the negative impact planned adaptation policy, as is present in the three cases, can have: "Pressures resulting from narrow technical approaches emanating from national policy may conflict with peoples' multifaceted responses to recent changes in climate variability" (p.45). Local coping strategies are only to a degree recognised in policy documents, such as for example the natural resource management traditionally practiced by indigenous communities (DFCD); but they are not systematically analysed and reflected upon throughout all the cases.

In short, matters of anticipated distributive justice were only partly taken into account in the project formulation of Ministry programmes, although differences existing between the programmes. Particularly aspects concerning burdens resulting from programme interventions and the responsibility for such burdens – project-specific or related to climate change in general – were mostly absent (two out of the three cases).

6.2 Sub-question 2: Procedure

To what extent does the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognise procedural justice aspects when formulating climate-relevant activities for developing countries?

Procedural justice represents the majority of the data, particularly the participation category. From the three case studies it became apparent that all activities took procedural justice aspects into account in one way or another, although the approach and extent differed greatly across and within projects.

Two of the three cases presented a detailed strategy for participation/inclusion of local groups in their programmes (PfR and DFCD). Given the nature of their programme (capacity strengthening of local CSOs), Partners for Resilience demonstrated a high level of participation from local organisations, first and foremost the country teams, who for example designed the new country programmes independently from the PfR steering groups in the Netherlands. Other means of inclusion were participatory risk assessments, reflection workshops, and focus groups for women. From the interviews and meeting observations it also became apparent that participation and inclusion were critically and extensively discussed within the programme, especially from the Ministry's point of view provided by Respondent 3. It was concluded by all PfR respondents that participation of especially vulnerable or marginalised groups was an important goal but not perfect, which was at least partly caused by existing social and cultural norms on for example the role of women.

In turn, DFCD had a clear and institutionalised approach for inclusion and participation based on the IFC standards. The data mentioned a number of instruments such as key informant interviews, focus groups with vulnerable populations, consent meetings and community-based programmes. On the other hand, considering the size of the projects (between 1 and 10 million euros), smaller local or grassroots organisations will have difficulty applying for funding directly, something that is possible in a programme like Aqua for All.

One case (AfA) presented less explicit and institutionalised methods of local consultation, although this did not mean that it did not occur ad hoc in programmes (as was demonstrated by the JustDiggIt example, where cooperation with local communities was extensive). On the other hand, local organisations and entrepreneurs were in the lead in over half the projects supported by Aqua for All and specific efforts were included to lower the application barrier, such as open Innovation Challenges; two trends that were also included in the formulation of the new project cycle. The strategy for the inclusion of specific vulnerable groups in either the decision-making, consultation or

implementation process (for example as applicants) was not very extensive and the focus was virtually only on women.

In terms of recognition, many different groups were recognised as vulnerable or marginalised in two cases (DFCD and PfR data) and only a few in one case (AfA). The recognition in the three cases had a demarcated character in the sense that an intersectional point of view was lacking.

On a procedural meta-level (categories Pe, Pf and Pg) local input is planned to be gathered beforehand in the form of context analyses or risk assessments in all three cases. These analyses are carried out by consultants or local country teams/offices/representatives. Partners for Resilience formulated the clearest methods of ensuring local representation in this process through focus groups and workshops; Aqua for All also conducts focus groups or at least tests its assumptions with the local population; Dutch Fund for Climate and Development's way to ensure local voices in the analysis, selection and evaluation process was not clear from the policy documents but will presumably be done according to IFC standards. The selection criteria for partners and projects varied per case, but all have in common that they aim to target vulnerable populations in vulnerable regions (in whatever way vulnerable groups were defined in the proposal) and make use of existing networks and partnerships in developing countries. In addition, the 'bankable'⁹ potential of projects is of great importance for two cases (DFCD and AfA).

The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are important for the Ministry as these reports show whether a programme is on track and fulfilling the requirements of the policy framework. The indicators included in these M&E frameworks, which are developed in the project formulation phase, show where the emphasis is put within an activity and also what aspects of (climate) justice are actually going to be monitored – and thus taken seriously in the later implementation phase. From the interviews it became apparent that the reporting process could cause frustration. Ministry employees involved in PfR and AfA expressed that annual reports did not always give a good idea of the state of a project, especially where matters such as inclusivity were concerned. From the side of partner organisations it became clear that the monitoring process could be time consuming, a factor that also makes (direct) participation of smaller organisations more difficult as they do not have the resources or experience to fulfil the complex M&E requirements.

It can also be argued that qualitative methods such as case studies are more useful than quantitative methods to evaluate procedural justice aspects, given their context-specific and often complex nature. One case (PfR) made use of qualitative methods often, which suits the lobby and advocacy goals of the programme; another case (AfA) had a predominant focus on quantitative

⁹ The concept of 'bankability' is not specified in either DFCD or AfA documents; in a general sense it refers to a project being able to attract (commercial) investors

results explicable by their mandate of developing business cases for WASH; and a third case (DFCD) made use of mixed methods. To establish causality between any reported progress and the project's interventions, two cases (AfA and DFCD) also rely on scientific evidence for proof. When using qualitative methods, it is also important to keep in mind whose perspectives are being included in the narrative.

Furthermore, there is the possibility of reports presenting a too rosy image because the implementing organisations are trying to secure their funding; to a degree this is mitigated by independent field assessments or mid-term reviews that are conducted in all three activities analysed in this research. An important aspect that was mentioned in the previous paragraph is the resources it costs to conduct M&E and that for budgetary and practical reasons it is not always possible to monitor everything; this means that trade-offs will no doubt have to be made. Of course, the choices provide an insight into the priorities of the Ministry and its partners.

Lastly, two categories that were not widely covered in the data were information availability and legal access. The first was only elaborated upon in one case (DFCD) and remained implicit for the other two cases; the second was not included in one case (PfR) but did receive some attention in AfA (although it was unclear for whom the complaint mechanism was intended) and DFCD (who have an independent grievance mechanism).

Overall, some key issues concerning procedural justice were reflected in the data. Firstly, in all three cases 'communities' and 'vulnerable groups' were often referred to as a single entity without reflection on the heterogeneity of communities or groups and the power dynamics within. It is likely that within groups and communities different perspectives will be present and that some voices (such as those of women or youth) will not be heard in standard community consultation procedures unless a specific effort is made to include them (see also section 7.2). That being said, such intended efforts were not absent in the data, although they appeared to be largely in place for women only and not for other vulnerable groups. Specific methods such as focus groups to get input from women are mentioned in one case (PfR) and another case mentions conducting focus groups for different vulnerable groups including women (DFCD); but one case (AfA) does not have specific (written) measures in place.

This brings us to the representativity of local organisations such as CBOs, CSOs, NGOs or interest groups. An organisation or spokesperson never speaks for every individual in their constituency and therefore it is difficult to determine when a sufficient level of representativity has been achieved (or when representation can even be called sufficient). This was brought up during one of the meetings of PfR when the NGO 1 representative wondered how to ever adequately

represent the 32 million people living in Manila Bay and how to know when you have the ‘right’ fisherman to represent the interests of fishermen in the region.

In short, procedural justice aspects are taken into account in varying degrees in the Ministry’s programmes, depending, among others, on the aim of the activity (civil society strengthening or private mobilisation) and on the capacity of and funds allocated to the implementing organisation(s). Issues with representativity, inclusion of marginalised groups, the availability of information and legal access were particularly present in the data.

6.3 Sub-question 3: Governance

What are the differences/similarities between the governance modes of the three activities analysed in this research?

It can definitely be concluded that the three cases are characterised by various complex and hybrid forms of governance. The way the Ministry governs the organisations that receive funding is similar and most closely resembles interactive governance; however, the cooperation between funded organisations and their implementing partners took on different forms. Due to the intricate and many-layered governance arrangements, the figure below presents simplified versions of the stakeholder diagrams to clearly show the differences between the three cases:



Figure 11: Simplified stakeholder diagrams

As the figure demonstrates, Partners for Resilience foresees no (important) role for market actors. AfA does, acting as a broker between businesses, investors and NGOs in developing countries. As was discussed in section 5.2.1, it was difficult to assign Aqua for All to one of the three sectors. In the figure it is referred to as a non-profit organisation (NPO) but the organisation can best be seen as existing somewhere between the market sector and civil society. Dutch Fund for Climate and

Development is the only one of the three activities that includes market actors in the consortium that receives Ministry funding. On an executive level, PfR's mode of governance can best be characterised as interactive; AfA as public-private and DFCD as public-private with the equal inclusion of civil society.

DFCD and AfA are relatively similar in terms of governance structure whereas PfR is a fundamentally different programme: it does not aim for project or infrastructure development and instead the focus is on intangible matters such as lobby and advocacy, capacity strengthening and developing Disaster Risk Reduction plans. AfA and DFCD have a fairly similar set-up: both programmes have an 'incubation' facility where business cases are developed and a 'scale-up' facility where bankable projects receive funding and are implemented on greater scale. The difference between AfA and DFCD is that the latter has a much bigger budget and is thus able to invest in bankable cases itself, whereas AfA acts more as a mediator who matches projects with investors. The focus of DFCD is also on multiple themes; AfA is directed solely towards the WASH sector. Lastly, Aqua for All only consists of one organisation receiving direct Ministry funding, whereas DFCD is a consortium consisting of multiple partners (market and NGO).

6.4 Main question

To what extent do governance modes, which characterise climate-relevant activities in developing countries funded by the Netherlands, influence the approach to climate justice?

Elements of procedural and distributive justice are recognised to a reasonable degree in the formulation of Dutch climate activities in developing countries, although differences exist from case to case and improvements can still be identified (see section 7.5). The table below provides a simplified overview of the extent to which aspects of procedural and distributional justice were present in each case.

Table E: Overview of justice aspects within each case

+ Present; institutionalised in detail » Present; broad or not specified
 # Not institutionalised but occurring ad hoc - Not present
 ? Not enough data available

Dimension of justice	PfR	AfA	DFCD
<i>Distribution</i>			
Da. Benefits	+	+	+
Da. Burdens	-	-	»
Db. Influence of vulnerability	+	»	+
Dc. Need for resource access	+	+	+
Dd. Responsibility for burdens	-	-	+
<i>Procedure (within projects)</i>			
Pa. Availability of information	-	-	+
Pb. Participation	+ / #	» / #	+
Pc. (Non-)recognition	+	»	+
Pd. Access to legal processes	-	» / ?	+
<i>Meta-procedure</i>			
Pe. Analysis beforehand	+	» / ?	?
Pf. Selection criteria	+	- / #	»
Pg. Monitoring and evaluation	+	»	» / ?

Causality between the mode of governance and the approach to climate justice can never be established with certainty. However, it can be speculated that the presence of NGOs or other civil society organisations improves the degree of attention for justice aspects, particularly the recognition of marginalised groups and the attention for inclusivity and participation in the procedure. Accordingly, the role of civil society in project formulation was smallest in AfA and overall, aspects of inclusivity and participation were least documented in this case. PfR on the other hand, a programme carried out by and for NGOs, showed the most extensive documentation and discussion where justice and participation issues were concerned. DFCD, which also has two NGOs in its executive board, also covered key elements of justice; though given the size and political significance of the fund this would have been a Ministry precondition even for a consortium without any NGO members. Of course, as has been extensively discussed in this research, the involvement of NGOs definitely does not guarantee a just approach, but it does seem to be the case that their presence has a positive influence on matters such as inclusion and participation.

There is also the question whether a focus on private mobilisation – and the inclusion of market actors – leads to trade-offs with aspects of justice, because matters of inclusivity and participation are not immediately associated with revenue or bankability. There is some literature that points at this – Schulpen (2002) asserts that the objectives of the market sector and those of donors are not always aligned and that more thought needs to be given to “how [donors] can operationalize ideas like social inclusion/exclusion in terms of private economic activity” (p.12). Kwakkenbos and Romero (2013) conducted an analysis of multilateral development funds with a commercial mandate such as the IFC (part of the World Bank Group). They conclude that such institutions “need to demonstrate better that they engage exclusively in pro-poor and equitable investments [...] where development impact is held above financial returns” (p.29). In addition, Griffiths (2012) states that private investment success in terms of poverty reduction and sustainable development is also highly dependent on the national political and policy context. In this research trade-offs were also hinted at, for example by Respondent 9 and 10 in the case of Dutch Fund for Climate and Development (see section 5.3.2).

Aqua for All attempts to reconcile private and social interests by assigning a monetary value to everything, even social development (such as the time credits for women) as a means to include these into business cases. DFCD does not adopt such an approach; instead environmental and social safeguards (IFC Standards) are put in place to ensure that projects cannot lose sight of social justice in favour of commerciality all too much. It could thus be speculated that inclusion of market actors could lead to less attention for justice aspects, but this definitely does not have to be the case as long as proper safeguards are formulated to ensure balance between the financial and social aspects of the programme.

Overall, it can be concluded that modes of governance, including the aim of the programme and the type of actors, most likely influence the approach to justice that is present within a programme. However, there are other factors that could influence this, such as the size and budget of a programme, its public visibility, and of course the local context of developing countries.

7 Discussion

Many interesting subjects arose during the analysis of the three cases; a number of these will be discussed in more detail in this section. The limitations of this study along with recommendations for further research are also elaborated upon, as well as policy recommendations.

7.1 Flavours of participation

Note: This section does not address the quality of participation but only the various types occurring in the data.

Section 5.3.2 (DFCD) already briefly touched upon the distinction between types of participation. From the cases in this research three types of participation can be distilled: consultation, decision-making, and implementation. The first was most common throughout the data, for example in the form of participatory risk analyses (PfR), reflection workshops (PfR), key informant interviews (DFCD), informal community discussions (AfA), and focus groups (PfR, DFCD). The effect of consultation differs depending on its goal and when in the project cycle it occurs: in the early design stage of the project (for example as part of an initial risk assessment or context analysis), or in a later stage when the project is already established and the local population can comment on and perhaps alter (details of) the project proposal.

Decision-making on the other hand, although an abstract concept in itself, implies a more active and fundamental input in the programme's design and goals. It was unclear in the cases of DFCD and AfA to what extent the intended consultation with local groups also leads to a role in decision-making; in other words, what the weight given to their opinions would be. In PfR there was a clearer example of decision-making: the Country Teams designs the project proposals for the new programme cycle without interference from their Dutch counterparts.

Lastly, there is participation as implementation. Implementation in all three cases is done by local organisations, but this still leaves the question of how inclusive and 'open' this implementation process will be – who will be eligible to become implementing partner, how are they selected, etc. AfA places particular emphasis on this in their aim to engage local innovators (through for example Innovation Challenges) and have local organisations in the lead. DFCD and AfA also mention community-based or community-lead development, which are also examples of 'participation as implementation'.

It must be noted that these different 'flavours' of participation are sometimes used interchangeably, as was for example the case in DFCD. It would be useful if programmes included an explicit definition of participation and were more consistent in its application. Sometimes

participation was mentioned in the same breath as distributive benefits, such as for example in AfA: “Aqua for All applies a comprehensive gender lens in our selection and funding of initiatives, e.g. checking whether women are involved in the initiative itself, and whether women benefit from the solution” (AfA 2.0). This is not a problem in itself, as long as organisations remain aware that *targeting* a group with their interventions is not the same as *including* them meaningfully in the procedures.

It can be wondered how representative practices of participation generally are. As was put forward by Pollard and Court (2008): “Many have argued that those CSOs that are selected to take part in formulation processes tend to be those whose political sympathies and approaches are already well-aligned with donors, limiting the extent to which they influence policy in any meaningful way” (p.140). This might potentially also be so for the cases in this research; many actors stated that they usually work with established partners and networks. On the other hand, however, it was remarked by Respondent 3 that NGOs funded by the Dutch government sometimes also lobby against the interests of that same government.

7.2 Community-based development

A note about the assumption of community homogeneity should also be made, as well as the default positive image that exists of approaches such as community-based development, community resource management, etc. A study by the World Bank (Mansuri & Rao 2004), for example, reviewed studies into community-based development (CBD) projects. The authors found that “most CBD projects are dominated by elites and, in general, the targeting of poor communities as well as project quality tend to be markedly worse in unequal communities” and that “a naïve application of complex contextual concepts like ‘participation’, ‘social capital’ and ‘empowerment’ is endemic among project implementers” (p.1). Thus, community involvement is in itself not a guarantee for an inclusive and equal participatory environment, and making (part of) a ‘community’ responsible for development projects in their region could perpetuate existing power relations. “Every time an external agent interacts with a group of people it creates competition between different interests [...] the success of a project may also depend upon how those incentives are aligned”, Mansuri and Rao (2007, p.3) conclude. Numerous case studies into this topic exist; the more recent articles use the notion of ‘elite-capture’ to refer to elite domination of participatory development programmes. Such an example is the study by Rigon (2014) which found that a development programme in Nairobi institutionalised “pre-existing power imbalances between landlords and tenants” through “the creation of structures of community governance and ‘participatory enumeration’” (p.257).

This is of course not to say that CBD-related projects are automatically problematic, either. However, it is important to be aware of the difficulties that come with community-driven projects and to reflect on internal power dynamics and ways to avoid 'elite-capture' (Wong 2010; Rigon 2014).

7.3 Neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism

One of the key difficulties of contemporary development cooperation is the role that northern organisations play or should play in the development of countries in the global South. In evaluating the Dutch co-financing model (which is also present in Partners for Resilience), Guijt (2009) concludes that participation, however critical, does not necessarily mean transformation of power inequalities; NGOs need to recognise and analyse "the importance of different manifestations of power", including their own power position in-country, in order to ensure alternative and more effective strategies (p.169). On the other hand, as much as community involvement or community-based development does not ensure equal power relations or inclusion of all (vulnerable) groups, it should be questioned whether it is the place of western organisations to change or 'fix' power relations or social structures in developing countries according to western notions of equality and good practice.

Several articles even point out development cooperation contains neo-colonial echoes in the way it aims to influence (or even control) aspects of political, economic and social life in developing countries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Asongu & Nwachukwu 2014). This is perhaps too easily generalised; as became apparent from the PfR case, both Ministry and NGO employees were aware of the risks of appearing like 'white people who came to tell the poor Africans how to go about things'; they struggled to find a balance between an imposition of western values on the one hand, and the perpetuation of inequality on the other hand. Most likely, this is an issue in development cooperation that will remain, especially for those organisations explicitly engaging with social structures in southern countries.

Another aspect of development cooperation that can be questioned is the focus on neo-liberal instruments and goals as are present in DFCD and AfA. Wallace (2009) writes that "northern NGOs increasingly rely on official donor funding and goodwill, and as the conditionalities attached to that aid increase, they are inevitably drawn into supporting and even spreading many aspects of the dominant global agenda" (p.203). She observes that the NGO sector and business sector become increasingly entangled, leading to NGOs adopting tools and approaches from the 'new public management' paradigm which are "embedded in northern principles and analyses of what count as

effective interventions” (p.203). This seems certainly true for Aqua for All and Dutch Fund for Climate and Development, which heavily focus on the establishment of ‘economic ecosystems’ and commercially viable business cases.

This matter presents an interesting dilemma: on the one hand, focusing on business cases that are self-sufficient in the end will make it more likely that development projects remain operational after NGOs or other development organisations withdraw, and presents the opportunity for duplicating or ‘upscaling’ successful project designs in other locations. Monetizing matters such as gender equality or social progress – another feature present in AfA – allows for environmental and social development to be incorporated more easily in capitalist decision-making processes. On the other hand, the development of modern capitalism has led to enormous social-spatial inequalities, which are in turn a huge barrier to organising collective action against climate change (Sayer 2009), as was also mentioned in the introduction (chapter 1). It can therefore be questioned if a similar neo-liberal approach will be the best option for developing countries – or indeed, the rest of the world – for the long term; this discussion however is beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, a final remark on the topic should be that the focus on capitalism and monetizing practices foregoes the possibility of transformational change – it can be said that to truly create a sustainable society a more structural change is needed. This has been argued by various scholars, such as Haberl et al (2011): “The challenge of sustainability is, therefore, a fundamental re-orientation of society and the economy, not the implementation of some technical fixes” (p.1).

The case of water privatisation, which is advocated by both DFCD (in their Water Facility) and AfA, is a particularly controversial subject as access to water is a human right. According to the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002), water as a human right does not mean that the public sector must be the provider or that there is no role for market actors. As Budds and McGranahan (2003) put it:

“There is no inherent conceptual contradiction between private sector participation and the achievement of human rights, but contradictions will arise in particular circumstances. Only a critical examination of private sector participation can determine whether [it] is advancing or hindering the realisation of a state’s obligations to the achievement of human rights [...]. At least some of these obligations extend beyond the boundaries of countries where there is inadequate access to water and sanitation to, for example, donors that are promoting private sector participation in recipient countries.” (p.95).

Thus, donor countries such as the Netherlands should keep in mind the sensitivities surrounding privatisation of water services, and stay especially mindful to keep their projects’ water provision affordable for the ‘base of the pyramid’ such as targeted in Aqua for All.

The spreading of western values and economic models under the veil of adaptation or development efforts also ties in with the notion of the ‘anti-politics machine’ coined by Ferguson (1994) and applied to adaptational development by Smucker et al. (2015). As the above two paragraphs have shown, political aspects are present in adaptational efforts funded by the Netherlands in developing countries, although it is not framed in this way. Smucker et al. noted that from Pelling’s (2012) three types of adaptation, ‘resilience’ is the most common in development policy because it is an apolitical version of adaptation. It became apparent from the three cases that resilience is one of the most referred to benefits of Dutch adaptation policy. In addition, Smucker et al. (2015) assert:

“An anti-politics of adaptation would frame adaptation as consisting of expertly designed, neutral interventions to address urgent societal needs, namely the protection of a vulnerable population from the highly generalised threat of climate change [...] [herein] technocratic interventions targeting productivity and improved management of environmental resources are the primary means of avoiding environmental calamities.” (p.40)

This form of adaptation is definitely pervasive in the case of DFCD and AfA. It can be said that PfR, on the other hand, aims more for transitional adaptation since the programme does not implement technical interventions but instead strengthens the capacity of local organisations to bring about structural change themselves.

This is not to say that climate change adaptation programmes funded by the Ministry are designed with the purpose of spreading for example neo-liberalism in mind. However, this does not mean that such values are not implicitly present in the assumptions made about what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ practices, ‘sustainable’ and ‘unsustainable’ models, ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ social dynamics. It is therefore important to be aware of these assumptions and critically reflect on them; a process that was already observed in the case of PfR.

7.4 Reporting and causality

A last subject that will be highlighted in this discussion concerns the monitoring and reporting process. The Ministry employees stated that it could be hard to assess reports; the NGO partners expressed their difficulties in compiling such reports. Specifically in the AfA case the question of causality came up: it was (rightly) argued that causality between AfA’s efforts and improvements in the WASH sector can never be established with certainty, and that the programme managers thus relied on scientific to link intervention and impact. DFCD mentioned a similar approach although also the intention was also expressed to conduct own intervention-impact studies. Some critical remarks about this approach can also be made, however. Scientific research is not infallible and is also not

guaranteed to prove causality between one project and any (positive) changes. In addition, studies can be specific for the context they took place in and cannot be transposed to another context by default (although AfA seems to address this by checking their assumptions with a local representative beforehand). Lastly, a biased selection of literature could be made: it can be tempting to focus on the studies that prove a positive impact and ignore (or simply be unaware of) studies that come to different conclusions. On the other hand, peer-reviewed scientific studies are (at least one would hope) more reliable, thorough and unbiased in terms of research methods and outcomes than stakeholders involved in AfA's projects or local consultants would be (who would usually carry out monitoring and evaluation). Thus, whether AfA's approach to the establishing of impact is an airtight one can definitely be questioned; however, no perfect alternative is (or likely ever will be) available and choices always have to be made.

7.5 Policy recommendations

Following the evaluation of distributive and procedural justice elements in all three cases, a number of recommendations can be made. These are:

- Improve information availability for local populations (or document this better);
- Provide universal access to an independent and easily accessible complaint mechanism for all actors involved in or influenced by a Ministry programme;
- Adopt an intersectional approach to matters of vulnerability and marginalisation and reflect on the interaction between different kinds of vulnerability;
- Extend the focus on vulnerable/marginalised groups to include more than (mainly) women;
- Promote the use of qualitative reporting methods when it comes to matters of inclusion, equality, participation, empowerment, etc. and include diverse perspectives in these case studies;
- Institutionalise justice aspects in the design and evaluation of programmes, for example by including clear monitoring indicators related to this topic or incentivising employees to promote inclusivity;
- Promote transparency and honesty between actors across various levels of governance so as to also better highlight challenges and areas of improvement;
- Provide a clearer idea of any negative unintended side effects that could occur as a result of the intervention(s), as well as who would be impacted by these and what mitigating measures will be taken;

- Improve opportunities for direct access funding for smaller local/grassroots organisations and have southern organisations be the lead wherever possible
- Take into account how a programme ties in with existing 'spontaneous' adaptation efforts and adjust the programme accordingly.

7.6 Limitations

There are certainly a number of limitations to this research. Firstly, the fact that no meetings took place for Aqua for All and Dutch Fund for Climate and Development during the research period meant that data triangulation was impossible for these two cases. The data for DFCD in general was less varied; although the Bid Application was very extensive (over 120 pages), not many different documents existed yet and it was only possible to interview two stakeholders – other potential respondents stated they were unavailable for an interview because the design of various important documents such as Environmental and Social Safeguards was still under construction during the research period. In hindsight, it might have been better in terms of data saturation to have chosen another activity instead of DFCD, despite its interesting and large-scale character as explicated in the method section (4.1.1), or even to focus on two cases instead of three. In addition, due to an overwhelming amount of available policy documents in the cases of Partners for Resilience and Aqua for All, less time remained for the conducting, transcribing and analysing of interviews; in an ideal situation, more interviews would have been conducted since the respondents' answers often contained interesting information.

Another important limitation is the lack of interviews with stakeholders in developing countries. Although it was explicitly stated that this research would not focus on project implementation or impact, interviews with representatives from partner organisations (such as an employee of a local NGO office for example) could have provided an interesting additional perspective on local project formulation.

Furthermore, during the governance analysis it became clear that although the variables provided by Driessen et al. (2012) proved to be useful conceptual tools, it was often very hard to ascribe a specific mode of governance to the cases or even to approximate one. This was mostly because insufficient information was available about certain sub-topics or simply because the governance modes were so complex. Therefore, this manner of analysis was perhaps not the clearest way to compare modes of governance between the three cases, although no better-suited method was found during the initial literature review phase.

It should also be noted that the subjectivity of the researcher plays a role in the data interpretation. In this case, a personal preference for alternatives for neo-liberalist approaches and for a strong NGO role could, for example, have led to some biases in the conclusions presented

7.7 Suggestions for further research

From the literature review it became apparent that this study contributed to a number of research gaps, such as a lack of empirical case studies into governance and climate justice, and the overall ambiguous definition of the concept 'climate justice'. Hopefully this thesis has been able to provide some substantiated reflection on the definition and operationalisation of climate justice, as well as presenting an interesting comparative case study into climate justice and governance in development project formulation. Further research could utilise a similar research design as in this thesis, giving an alternative perspective by for example choosing development projects from another donor country than the Netherlands or by going even more in-depth into one or two cases. Another approach could be to focus on both project formulation and implementation to see how the intentions outlined in policy documents (such as participation of the local population) translate into practice. Additional contributions to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of climate justice are also very much encouraged.

Given the focus on activities as a whole, the data sometimes remained fairly abstract as these activities serve as 'umbrellas' for an array of specific local projects. Further research could therefore also select a number of specific local projects and fully analyse these in order to present more concrete data.

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Annexes

Annex I: Partners for Resilience

I.I Governance

Table V: Politics

Actor features	Approximate ideal-type mode	Evidence
Initiating actors	Interactive governance: multiple actors (gov't, private sector, civil society)	PfR is a cooperation between the Dutch government, local governments in developing countries, and NGOs/CSOs. However, the private sector plays a very small (if any) role
Stakeholder position	Public-civil governance: autonomy of stakeholders within predetermined boundaries	This is an adapted form of public-private governance: the Ministry sets the policy framework which sets preconditions concerning the actions/projects NGOs (instead of market actors) can carry out; within these boundaries actors have autonomy
Policy level	Interactive governance: multiple levels	As was demonstrated in the stakeholder diagram, PfR operates on various levels; it was even estimated by Respondent 1, the global coordinator, that there were around five or six 'links' between him and a community farmer in a developing country.
Power base	Interactive governance: legitimacy, trust, knowledge	The programme document reads that the relationships between actors have an "increasingly reciprocal nature" (p.17), although this can be questioned – see paragraph below.

Table VI: Polity

Actor features	Approximate ideal-type mode	Evidence
Model of representation	Interactive governance: participatory public-private governing arrangements	PfR is a partnership between government(s) and civil society, where CSOs have room to deliver input. The PfR members submitted a joint programme proposal as a response to a policy framework published by MFA.
Rules of interaction	Interactive governance: formal and informal rules	The formal arrangements between MFA and its partner organisations are outlined in the Programme Document; informal rules of interaction became apparent from interviews and observations

Mechanisms of social interaction	Interactive governance: social learning, deliberations and negotiations	There is an extensive focus on dialogue and mutual learning in all policy documents: “In dialogue [the actors] will discuss Lobby and Advocacy opportunities [...] They will share knowledge, exchange information [...] and seek for synergy” (Programme Document 2015, p.4) and promote South-to-South learning (p.11)
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PfR’s formal institutional features are to a certain degree outlined in the programme document, where the modes of cooperation between actors are described. NGO 1 is the lead organisation, which means that they hold the formal contracts with the Ministry. Within countries, Country Teams are lead by a Country Lead, who maintains contact with the Dutch office of PfR organisations. Per country, a stakeholder analysis and a description of the cooperation between actors are provided. The actors aim for biannual meetings to discuss progress and setbacks, both at global coordination level (taking place in the Hague) and at country level (taking place in partner country).

According to Lange et al. (2013), the level of interaction is also an institutional feature. As has been discussed, the PfR programme has a multitude of governance scales. “Decisions and actions [...] are taken at various geographical levels ranging from the very local to global, and thus do the civil society organisations need to focus their lobby and advocacy needs accordingly” (Programme Document 2015, p.12). For the implementation of sustainable policy and adaptation projects, it is recognised that “resilience can only be effectively increased if these governance levels are connected and supported [...]. This is why PfR has structured its programme around “intervention levels” (p.13). The intervention levels that are recognised in the Programme Document are communities, municipalities, provinces, nations, regions, and the global stage. The connection of governance scales remains a priority for the next phase of the programme: “PfR strongly promotes a (sub-)regional approach, bridging scales from local to regional levels, to ensure more emphasis on transboundary landscapes” (2020 and Beyond 2018, p.5). Given the transboundary nature of climate change impacts, this multi-level approach makes sense. However, the multitude of levels also increases the complexity of the governance arrangement and decreases the degree of transparency.

Table VII: Policy

Actor features	Approximate ideal-type mode	Evidence
Goals and targets	Interactive governance: tailor-made and integrated goals and targets	The PfR policy framework is very broad and is made specific for each country/region by the relevant Country Team (see section 5.1.3)

Instruments	Decentralised governance: public covenants and performance contracts	The Ministry sets the overarching goals of the programme and subsequently signs a contract with the implementing parties
Policy integration	Interactive governance: policy sectors and policy levels integrated	PfR focuses on Disaster Risk Reduction through Integrated Risk Management, where a variety of environmental and social factors are taken into account. In addition, the programme focuses on structural and political change through CSO lobby and advocacy. The integration of policy levels remains a difficulty.
Policy-science interface	Interactive governance: transdisciplinarity, expert and lay knowledge in networks. Emphasis on integrated and time- and place-specific knowledge	As mentioned above, PfR focuses on a wide range of environmental and social aspects and aims to strengthen the knowledge and capacity of local CSOs and governments through training and technical support.

I.II Distribution

A wide variety of **benefits (category Da)** resulting from this programme were mentioned in the various policy documents and interviews; 37 in total. Benefits occurring often were:

- Strengthened capacity/expertise of local CSOs
- Community resilience
- Disaster risk reduction / lowered impacts of disasters
- Enabling environment for (policy) dialogue between actors
- Strengthened government capacity

This is in line with the aims of the programme, namely the supporting of local CSOs and the promotion of resilience/DRR measures. These benefits still appear rather abstract, although it has to be noted that DRR was made more explicit throughout the data, for example by citing measures such as ecosystem restoration, strengthening/diversification of livelihoods, early warning systems, creating local cooperation networks, and water resource management. However, because PfR takes place in ten different countries, the programme is quite broad to ensure flexibility on community level.

The need for **access to resources (Dc)** remained largely implicit in the PfR data. However, it was clear that (poor) communities who depend on natural resources for their livelihoods were seen as having the most urgent need for access – these groups were consistently mentioned as target groups for the PfR programme, for example in the inception document:

“The Partners for Resilience will target the poorest communities that are vulnerable to natural hazards [...] the groups most at risk are indigenous people, fisher folks and poor rural

farmers who depend of ecosystem services and have climate and natural resource-dependent livelihoods.” (p.2)

See the selection criteria (5.1.3) for the considerations relating to vulnerability and need that were decisive in the process of selection regions/projects.

I.III Procedure

Availability of information (Pa) is another category that was scarcely mentioned in the documents and interviews. This can be (partly) explained by the fact that PfR does not provide ‘hardware’ support, meaning no infrastructure of any kind is being put into place or changes are made to the lives of local communities. In that sense, the importance of information provision about the programme is reduced somewhat. The topic of informed decision-making was briefly touched upon in the Programme Document (2015), which read that monitoring and evaluation serves the purpose of providing “reliable and timely information for Country Teams, Steering Group and Programme Working Group of the programme on all levels (local to global). The information gathered should lead to informed decision-making and change management” (p.49). Information provision about the PfR programme to local *communities* or vulnerable groups specifically is not mentioned, although the Country Team (which consists of local NGO representatives) and the local level are included here. On the other hand, the increase of expertise and knowledge of local CSOs is one of the aims of the programme; this will lead to them being able to “assess and understand information” pertaining to DRR, policy dialogue, governance, etc. (Annual Report 2017, p.38).

Participation (Pb) was by far the biggest category, comprised of 52 codes. Those mentioned often were:

- Involvement of local CSOs
- Inclusion of local/affected communities
- Local input for context analysis
- Ownership of plans
- Plans tailored to local context

About the role of the country team: The Country Team first conducts a context analysis of the region, which takes the form of “a one-week workshop [...] [which was] organised to collect inputs for the context analysis and develop the outline of the programme [...]. Representatives from several partners participated actively” (Context Analyses, p.1). In this stage, the most vulnerable communities are also identified:

“En daar wordt dan heel erg gekeken naar wie zijn de meest kwetsbare, waar zitten die maar ook voor in ons geval – we hebben het over het verminderen van risico’s op rampen – kijken we ook heel erg naar wat voor ramp [...] Je kan best andere kwetsbaren hebben dan met een

heatwave dan dat je met overstromingen of droogtes hebt. Dus daar moet je wel heel specifiek naar kijken in de lokale context [...] Dat wordt in gezamenlijkheid van partners wordt dat gedaan.” (Respondent 1)

The Country Team works closely with local organisations, as was highlighted by Respondent 2 during the interview:

“We werken heel veel met lokale organisaties. Het Rode Kruis is natuurlijk in alle landen actief en heeft vaak meerdere kantoren op nationaal niveau, op districtsniveau, en dan lokale branches [...]. Heel veel andere organisaties zijn natuurlijk ook al veel langer actief in bepaalde gebieden, bepaalde landen, dus die hebben daar eigenlijk in de loop der jaren een netwerk van organisaties opgebouwd.”

Based on the context analysis, the country teams contextualise the broad PfR Theory of Change, making it specific for the region’s vulnerabilities and marginalised groups. Respondent 4 states in her interview:

“Die landenprogramma’s, daar is geen Nederlander aan te pas gekomen om dat vorm te geven. Dat zijn echt de organisaties in die landen geweest. Het is echt een tabula rasa geweest, een leeg blad: wat gaan jullie doen, hoe ziet jullie Theory of Change eruit. Zolang het maar te maken heeft met lobby en advocacy natuurlijk.”

The organisations Respondent 4 refers to are the local branches of NGO 1 and the implementing partners of the four other Alliance members. Although these local organisations have considerable autonomy, they still need to remain within the boundaries of the policy framework. Respondent 4 illustrates: “Een lokale partij zei: ‘ja luister, ik wil ook wat aan die droogte doen. We zitten nu in een droogte en als ik een credible organisatie wil zijn moet ik ook rampen response kunnen leveren. Dat mag niet van dit geld, dus dat moet dan van een ander potje komen”.

At community level, specific disaster action plans are developed using participatory risk assessments:

“The strongest point in this programme is the ownership of local communities concerning the interventions at community level. The vulnerability/capacity assessment approach makes communities responsible for the analysis of hazards [...] and the interventions that will increase their resilience.” (Context Analyses, p.4)

This was also confirmed by Respondent 2 in the interview: “Vaak wat er dan in een lokale gemeenschap gedaan wordt, is dat er op dorpsniveau zo’n risico-analyse wordt gemaakt [...] en op basis daarvan wordt dan een soort van lokaal rampenplan gemaakt”.

Legal access (Pd) was another category that did not receive much attention in the data. Accountability is mentioned in the Programme Document (2015): “The Ministry and PfR partners in

The Hague and in the programme countries will explore [...] how inclusivity and accountability on Dutch investments towards local communities can be assured” (p.47). However, no mention of a complaints/grievance mechanism or any details about accountability are given.

The **selection criteria (Pf)** for regions are as follows:

- Level of climate threat / recurring natural disasters
- Lack of development/capacity of communities in the region
- PfR experience and existing contacts
- Presence of key ecosystem(s)
- Priority of the national government
- Amount of vulnerable people and their need for capacity building
- Communities’ dependence on ecosystem
- Existing CSO capacity
- Local conditions, such as the presence of state programmes, logistical access, security of the region, etc.

Where quantitative **monitoring and evaluation** are concerned: A total of six indicators are set for all Strategic Partnerships¹⁰; the country teams are to develop their own set of other indicators for each project (Programme Document 2015). Quantitative indicators are important for reporting to the Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives). Respondent 3 asserts the bottom-up approach that characterised the developing of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework: “Verder hebben wij gezegd: jullie zijn vrij om je eigen M&E kader te ontwikkelen. Sterker nog, we hebben gezegd: ontwikkel eerst je eigen M&E kader zodat het nuttig is voor jezelf”.

¹⁰ These include: number of CSOs with increased L&A capacities; number of CSOs involved in programmes; number of activities carried out by CSOs; number of laws, policies, attitudes that have improved; number of times that CSOs succeeded in creating civic space

Annex II: Aqua for All

II.I Governance

Table VIII: Politics

Actor features	Approximate ideal-type mode	Evidence
Initiating actors	Interactive governance: multiple actors (government, market sector and civil society)	AfA is a non-profit organisation that works together with the Dutch government and various other NGOs, and has a strong focus on cooperation with the market sector through attracting private investors and enabling local entrepreneurs
Stakeholder position	Public-private governance: autonomy of stakeholders within predetermined boundaries	The Ministry sets the policy framework which sets preconditions concerning the actions/projects stakeholders can carry out; within these boundaries market and civil society have autonomy
Policy level	Self-governance/public-private governance: International to local level	AfA is steered from the Netherlands, but implementation takes place in developing countries and is carried out by partners; AfA does not have established offices in developing countries
Power base	Interactive governance: legitimacy, trust, knowledge Public-private governance: formalised public-private governing arrangements	AfA and MFA agree on shared goals and procedures With the stakeholders involved in AfA projects, formalised business agreements are put into place (also see polity section)

AfA champions the involvement of local organisations, stating that they work closely with for example civil society and community organisations and “contribute to civil society strengthening and capacity building”. However, the 2017 Field Assessment asserts that:

“Organisations that do an excellent job do not necessarily get the appreciation they deserve in terms of increased chances for follow-up funding. Within the organisations visited, the consultant found it painful to see that organisations [...] that have proven during many years to deliver constant high quality work [...] are facing funding problems.” (p.16)

This is similar Respondent 3’s comments about small organisations’ struggle for access to funds. It begs the question how the distribution of money within AfA’s projects effects the power dynamics between actors.

Table IX: Polity

Actor features	Approximate ideal-type mode	Evidence
Model of representation	Interactive governance: participatory public-private governing arrangements	AFA places the emphasis on engaging in public-private partnerships with relevant stakeholders
Rules of interaction	?	?
Mechanisms of social interaction	Public-private governance: actors decide autonomously about collaborations within top-down determined boundaries	As long as AfA stays within the boundaries of the policy framework, they are free to decide on the partners they wish to work with to implement projects and form networks

Table X: Policy

Actor features	Approximate ideal-type mode	Evidence
Goals and targets	Public-private governance: uniform goals, targets actor specific	AFA has a clear overall goal: access to WASH services for the poorest. Depending on the project, the targets (when the project is considered successful) will differ.
Instruments	Public-private governance: incentive-based instruments like grants or performance contracts	AFA provides grants for technical support and project development; eventually the projects they engage with are meant to attract external funding and become independent
Policy integration	Public-private governance: sectorial, branches and industries separated	AFA clearly focuses on one sector (water/sanitation) although some of their projects also engage with climate adaptation or agriculture. However, these projects are not part of an integrated whole – AFA conducts their programme on a project-by-project basis
Policy-science interface	Self-governance: dominance of issue and time/place specific info, expert and lay (citizens)	As mentioned above, AFA engages explicitly with scientific literature to design their projects. These studies are very specific for WASH projects. Respondent 6 mentions that this knowledge is then adapted to specific local contexts with the help of local organisations/communities.

II.II Distribution

A few of the most prevalent **benefits** were:

- Clean water / sanitation
- Bankable business models in local context
- Social/technical innovation
- Enabling local business environment

- Climate change adaptation

Again, these are all relatively generic/abstract concepts. However, AfA provides a glossary at the end of the programme proposal for AfA 2.0 with definitions for their most important concepts. For example, creating an 'enabling environment' is explained as encompassing:

- Public domain and public authorities involved in water and sanitation
- Market/financial environment, such as access to finance
- Rules and regulations, bureaucracy, fighting corruption
- Culture and community, such as level of education
- Environmental awareness
- Technological skills of actors
- Infrastructure

Burdens created as side effects of AfA's programmes appear to be hinted at in the programme proposal for 2.0: "A risk assessment is part of screening and contracting a project. This includes identifying risks and agreeing on mitigating measures". At closer inspection it appears, though, that the risks identified for AfA in general are related to external factors and are not a result of AfA's interventions. Some examples are: political instability, capacity constraints within the AfA organisation, a lack of public investments, etc.

Another potential burden could be that the focus on business leads to trade-offs with social/justice aspects, as mentioned in the governance section. Asked directly whether Respondent 6 anticipates such trade-offs, she replies that entrepreneurs' main goal is investment return. "Dus voor een ondernemer is misschien niet altijd zo belangrijk of het nou een man of een vrouw is. Dus je moet denk ik niet alleen het belang van de ondernemer zien maar ook het belang van de mensen waar je het voor doet." She states that the interests of an entrepreneur and that of the intended beneficiaries are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but that it is something to be continuously aware of. She gives the example of an entrepreneur who wanted to raise prices of drinking water in a neighbourhood where no other facilities were available. AfA then advocated for more affordable prices. "Wij sturen daarop. Soms is het ook de overheid die erop stuurt [...] die zet vaak het drinkwatertarief [...]. Maar wat wij doen, wij moeten altijd kijken: voor wie is het betaalbaar?"

Overall, Respondent 6 states that by verifying the assumptions underlying the programme design, unintended side effects are prevented: "Wij proberen dat zo te doen dat je lokaal je eigen assumpties valideert. Als je dat niet doet, maak je vaak grove fouten."

The only mention of **responsibility** is made in the context of the cooperation within a project: "Government and regulations as well as financiers have their particular responsibility to take. We mediate and oversee that they take their responsibility" (AfA 2.0). However, this relates to executive

responsibility of a project, not to the responsibility of the creation (and mitigating) of burdens. Since unintended side effects only implicitly existed in the data, also no mention was made of responsibility in a project-specific sense.

II.III Procedure

Other than PfR, AFA does focus on service delivery and to a degree (water) infrastructure, and thus the **need for information** could be said to be more pressing (although no negative side effects are purportedly anticipated). However, since AFA does not actually execute projects but rather facilitates local organisations or businesses who do, presumably the latter are seen as responsible for information provision to local communities. Thus, ironically enough, insufficient information is available about information provision – although that can be said in itself to be noteworthy.

Some of the most common variables in the **participation** section included:

- Inclusion of local/affected communities
- Local representative/liaison
- Enable local innovators to create change
- Lead by local organisations
- Involvement local CSOs

Recognition existed for:

- The so-called ‘Base of the Pyramid’, which refers to people with low incomes who do not have (sufficient) access to drinking water and sanitation
- Women/girls
- People living in informal settlements / peri-urban areas
- People living in rural areas

Other groups that were mentioned once where elderly, children, small-scale farmers, pastoralists and youth. The majority of focus was on the Base of the Pyramid, however. In some way, this makes sense: so many people do not have access to water and these will virtually all be poor people; but as stated before, more reflection on how other vulnerabilities can increase the need for access to water even more would have been appropriate.

JT highlights the need to be critical about recognition when reading project proposals, since organisations can exhibit the tendency to write things they know will please the Ministry: “Kijk zij [AFA] lezen natuurlijk ook gewoon die BHOS nota¹¹ [...] dus daar moet je altijd een beetje scherp op blijven”.

¹¹ The BHOS nota is the document that outlines the Ministry’s strategy for the current four-year period

When **selecting** partners, Aqua for All prefers existing partnerships: “Vaak gaat het over bestaande samenwerkingsrelaties, dat je al een tijd samen optrekt met een partij en ziet: dat gaat hartstikke goed, zouden we ook in dat andere land samen kunnen werken.” Respondent 8 describes that for JustDiggIt, it is important to have local partners “die daar al jaren zitten, die de lokale omstandigheden heel goed kennen, die het vertrouwen hebben van de community, en andersom die weten wie je binnen de community moet benaderen om dingen gedaan te krijgen.” The preference for partners who are highly familiar with the local situation is understandable. However, this quote also illustrates how existing power relations are not addressed: the local partner needs to know who to address within a community to ‘get things done’ and this will most likely not ensure an inclusive or participatory process for various groups or individuals within the community.

It was mentioned that one of the goals of monitoring and evaluation was to ensure **accountability**. Part of the risk management guidelines also included a complaint procedure, “for both internal and external complaints”. Presumably, this would also mean that affected communities/individuals and participating organisations can use this procedure; a more detailed description of the way access to this complaint mechanism is ensured would be preferred. However, it could be that this exists and is not included in the documents analysed for this research given to the large quantity of material that exists for specific activities and Ministry guidelines as a whole.

The **Field Assessment Report** criticised the focus on quantitative data in the standard reports: “Organisations write reasonable reports. However, the focus is usually on numbers realised and little information is available on the quality, functioning, utilisation and management of facility and services” (p.13). This proves to be a valid point, as the Field Assessment found that not all projects that were part of the visit were of sufficient quality (3/13 were below standard). Indeed, it is dubious that AfA did not monitor their projects in quality at all – something that is vital when it comes to clean drinking water, for example. The Field Assessment concludes:

“In none of the projects visited, report or monitoring data regarding the quality of the facilities and services was found [...]. In its selection and other criteria and conditions Aqua for All should demand monitoring and reporting on quality issues with clear indicators and standards per WASH facility and service. The quality of especially technical works is often below standard.” (p.18)

Respondent 5 explains that this will be addressed in the new project cycle as well through the addition of a sustainability clause to AfA’s contract:

“[Dat het er] bij wijze van spreken over 15 of 20 jaar nog steeds staat, niet dat je wat infrastructuur weet aan te leggen met externe financiering en niemand kijkt er meer naar om. Dus – en dat hadden ze nog niet – dus we hebben ze wel gevraagd om in de loop van dit

jaar een duurzaamheidsclausule te ontwikkelen om te laten zien hoe ze dat gaan voorkomen, expliciet.”

Annex III: DFCD

III.I: Governance

Table XI: Politics

Actor features	Approximate ideal-type mode	Evidence
Initiating actors	Interactive governance: multiple actors (gov't, market sector, civil society)	The Ministry set up a fund which is managed by a consortium consisting of market and civil society actors
Stakeholder position	Public-private governance: autonomy of stakeholders within predetermined boundaries	The Ministry sets the policy framework which sets preconditions concerning the actions/projects stakeholders can carry out; within these boundaries actors have autonomy
Policy level	Interactive governance: multiple levels	DFCD is steered from the Netherlands and will carry out projects at local and regional level in line with their landscape approach
Power base	Interactive governance: legitimacy, trust, knowledge	The Ministry decided upon a consortium using pre-specified criteria; the consortium will manage the fund based on trust and mutual exchange

Table XII: Polity

Actor features	Approximate ideal-type mode	Evidence
Model of representation	Interactive governance: participatory public-private governing arrangements	The consortium exists of civil society and market partners who in turn engage in a government arrangement with a public body (the Ministry)
Rules of interaction	Interactive governance: formal and informal rules	Although the day-to-day cooperation between MFA and the consortium will probably be less formal, the cooperation agreements are characterised by a high degree of formality; this can be explained by the amount of financial capital that the DFCD manages, which makes it subject to e.g. European legislation. However, with no meetings to observe this cannot be concluded with certainty.

Mechanisms of social interaction	Public-private governance: Market / civil society actors decide autonomously about collaborations within top-down determined boundaries	The consortium decides which projects to execute, which implementation partners to work with and which private investors to attract, as long as they stay within the boundaries of the grant subsidy framework
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Respondent 9 said that foreign non-governmental parties indeed applied to the DFCD tender, but that eventually the current Dutch consortium was granted the tender because they scored best on the preconditions.

In fact, it was considered whether a subsidy tender would even be publicly published. Usually, the government is bound by European law to publish a public tender which is open for all applicants. However, under special circumstances this step can be skipped and the government can directly grant the project to an organisation, for example when it can be motivated that the project can only be carried out by one specific organisation (in Dutch this is procedure is referred to as ‘uit de hand gunnen’). Respondent 9: “Ook nog de vraag is geweest, moeten we het gaan tenderen of niet, of moeten we het gewoon onderhands gunnen aan een partij, ofwel extern ofwel intern. We hadden het bijvoorbeeld aan RVO¹² kunnen gunnen”.

As mentioned before, FMO serves as the lead organisation: “FMO will have ultimate responsibility for, and decision-making power over, the Consortium’s fund management activities [...] The decision-making power is effected through sub-delegation agreements with CFM, [NGO II] and [NGO I] as executing entities” (p.56). The DFCD Advisory Board is then set up for “ensuring that activities are consistent with the DFCD fund mandate, strategy and Theory of Change. It will oversee the collaboration of the three facilities. It will also be responsible for ensuring that results are monitored and evaluated” (p.56). All four consortium members are part of the Advisory Board.

The sub-delegation agreements would no doubt shed more light on the mode of cooperation between consortium members; however, at the time of writing these were in the process of being signed and thus not available yet.

Table XIII: Policy

Actor features	Approximate ideal-type mode	Evidence
Goals and targets	Interactive governance: Tailor-made and integrated goals and targets	DFCD focuses on multiple themes, each of which has their own targets. All themes are integrated using an integrated landscape approach.

¹² RVO: Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland – the Netherlands Enterprise Agency, a government agency set up to support Dutch businesses

Instruments	Public-private governance: incentive-based instruments like grants or performance contracts	Like AfA, DFCD has a structure where projects get grant support in the form of technical assistance in the development stage; later they can become eligible for other forms of finance if they prove to be bankable
Policy integration	Interactive governance: Policy sectors and levels integrated	DFCD covers a range of themes and sectors (forestry, agriculture, water and environmental protection) and its landscape approach ensures integration of projects over different scales
Policy-science interface	Interactive governance: transdisciplinary, expert & lay knowledge in networks, integrated and time/place specific knowledge	The consortium partners all contribute specific knowledge (through their own organisation and their existing networks). As was described in the politics section, the combination of actors ensures knowledge on conservation, social development, private mobilisation, and banking/investments, which can subsequently be integrated in the landscape approach.

III.II Distribution

Some of the **benefits** mentioned in the data are:

- Equitable access to development benefits / resources
- Strengthened livelihood
- Inclusion of vulnerable populations in public, social and economic life
- Ecosystem restoration
- Community resilience

Since DFCD focuses on a variety of topics, the anticipated benefits are also varied. As with the previously projects, the benefits have not (yet) been made more concrete, especially since the fund is still in the pre-implementation phase at the time of writing.

As was the case for PfR, the most urgent **need for access to resources** exists for vulnerable groups and communities that are dependent on natural resources.

“Addressing climate change is critically linked to economic and human development and poverty alleviation, through the effects that climate change has on the agriculture and ecosystems that poor people rely on; through the increase in probability and severity of natural hazards that disproportionately affect vulnerable people; and through its damaging impacts on human health.” (Bid Application, p.64)

III.III Procedure

As mentioned in section Da (burdens), timely **information provision** happens when intended projects are published before the contracts are signed, leaving room for NGOs or other actors to object. Since this is done on the (Dutch) FMO website, it seems unlikely that local grassroots groups or communities in developing countries would be able to monitor this information and object, however. The Bid Application also includes a section about information provision to potential fund applicants: “Clear instructions and guidelines [will be provided] to project promoters/applicants on the information format required to apply for DFCD funding” (p.83).

No specific mention of information provision is made in the Bid Application; however, DFCD is committed to the IFC Environmental and Social Performance Standards, which specifically refer to this topic. “Performance Standard 1 establishes the importance of [...] effective community engagement through disclosure of project-related information and consultation with local communities on matters that directly affect them” (p.i).

Regarding the **selection criteria** the Ministry set for DFCD, these are as follows:

- 100% climate relevance
- Direct impact on adaptation/mitigation; projects cannot exclusively focus on enabling environments
- At least 50% of total DFCD funding is meant for adaptation
- Projects need to be explicitly selected and monitored on positive development impact for vulnerable groups
- Human rights need to be respected and projects should not cause further harm to the environment or cause unwanted social effects
- Projects need to tie in with NDCs and other national climate plans
- At least 25% of funding is meant for Least Developed Countries and another 25% for the Ministry’s focus regions
- Projects should mobilise private finance
- Financing from DFCD should be between 1 and 10 million euros per project
- Activities including fossil fuels, nuclear energy or deforestation are excluded from any funding