

# The Populist Politics of Recognition

## A Cross-Regional Study on Inclusiveness and Exclusiveness in the Contemporary Populist Party Discourse in Africa and the European Periphery

Master Thesis

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## **Abstract**

Despite the fact that inclusion and exclusion are seen as key aspects of populism, often they are not the main topic of research. Furthermore, studies wherein these aspects are at the core, have resulted in strongly opposing conclusions. Therefore, the current (case) study will perform a discourse analysis, focusing on the in- and exclusiveness of four populist parties from Africa and – from a geographic perspective – the European periphery. Populism in Africa is a relatively new research topic and there is no study to date that deals with the ‘inclusion/exclusion issue’ in Africa. Additionally, a significant amount of manifestations of populism have emerged in the European periphery this century. While there is a general lack of focus on Africa, the European periphery has been the subject of many studies on populism. However, the in- and exclusiveness issue within this latter region has largely been ignored. In sum, the main aim is to distinguish how in- or exclusionary contemporary populism is in Africa and the European periphery, to achieve a better understanding of these types of populism. As a secondary benefit, this study is designed as such that the results will provide information about less exposed regions, thereby enabling a (new) cross-regional comparison. The analyzed cases are: Fidesz (Hungary), SYRIZA (Greece), EFF (South Africa) and ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe). This study shows inclusionary and exclusionary elements in both regions. A more general conclusion is therefore that the notion of an inclusive-exclusive dichotomy should not be pushed too far. The populist discourse in the European periphery is variable: SYRIZA’s populist discourse could be labeled as strictly inclusionary, whereas Fidesz’ populist discourse could be labeled as mostly exclusionary. However, the populist discourse in the African region is largely exclusionary, excluding particularly the white population. Hereby, the current study adds to existing cross-regional research on the in- and exclusiveness of populism.

**Keywords:** Africa, discourse, European periphery, inclusion, exclusion, populism

## Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress	
DIMAR	Democratic Left	Dimokratiki Aristera
EC	European Commission	
EU	European Union	
ECB	European Central Bank	
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters	
Fidesz	Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance	Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség
FN	National Front (National Rally)	Front (Rassemblement) National
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
IMF	International Monetary Fund	
LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally	Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós
MAS	Movement for Socialism	Movimiento al Socialism
M5S	Five Star Movement	Movimento 5 Stelle
ND	New Democracy	Nea Dimokratia
NL	Northern League	Lega Nord (Lega)
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima
PSUV	United Socialist Party of Venezuela	Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left	Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front	

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Figure 1: Number of books in English in which the word “populism” or “populist” appears in the title

Figure 2: Analytical framework used for the initial focus of the discourse analysis.

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### 1.1. Populism as an exclusionary threat or an inclusionary corrective?

*“The growing interest in populism arguably is due to the common opinion that populism embodies a dangerous trend, which, by emphasizing the idea of popular sovereignty, may pursue problematic goals such as the exclusion of ethnic minorities. However, populism can also be conceived of as a kind of democratic corrective since it gives voice to groups that do not feel represented by the elites, and forces them to react and change the political agenda”* (Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 184-185).

Populism is a hot topic. It is spreading across the world and in some countries and regions populism is dominating politics. The election of Donald Trump in 2016 was a clear and recent example of this. This election made a populist – or at least a politician with some populist characteristics – the President of the United States (U.S.). After this (for many) surprising election result, a lot of media attention was devoted to the national elections in the Netherlands, Germany and France in 2017. A lot of important media were speaking of “a populist crossroad” and the “year of the truth” for Europe (Adler, BBC, 9 February 2017). Everybody wanted to know whether the rise of populism in Europe would continue or stop after the U.S. elections. The results of these elections were ambiguous. None of the populist parties succeeded to become the biggest party in their country. Yet, all of these three countries experienced an increase of their populist vote share. Meanwhile, it seems clear that populism will stay at the heart of European politics for the foreseeable future. The recent Italian national election in March confirms this picture. Two populist parties, the *Movimento 5 Stelle* (M5S) and *Lega*, achieved an overwhelming victory. This resulted in a fully populist coalition which is pictured by some media as a “new threat to Europe” (Horowitz, New York Times, 23 May 2018).

One of the main reasons why there is so much discussion about populism is that populism in general could be seen as a corrective or as a threat for democracy. This normative assessment is linked to the ‘inclusion/exclusion issue’. On the one hand, inclusionary populism could be seen as a corrective for democracies, because it tries to include and represent people that do not feel represented by the political elites. On the other hand, exclusionary populism could be seen as a dangerous trend for democracy, because the idea of popular sovereignty could be used for the exclusion of (ethnic) minorities. The scholarly literature is full of suggestions regarding how populism could be seen as a corrective or threat

to democracy (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 20). The term populism is often used pejoratively, arguing that populists should be criticized for what they are: “a real danger to democracy” (Müller, 2016, p. 103). However, populism did not have this negative connotation at its origin. Moreover, several political scientists offer a more positive perspective on populism, which argue that populism is intrinsic to democracy (Laclau, 2005, p. 154.).

## **1.2. Aim and research question**

It might be clear that the normative assessment of populism is linked to its inclusionary or exclusionary character. As a result, the question whether populism is in- or exclusive is present in much research on populism. However, in most of these studies the inclusion/exclusion issue has not been the main topic. Furthermore, studies wherein this issue is at the core have resulted in strongly opposing conclusions (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 166). Therefore, the main aim of this study is to achieve a better understanding of these two types of populism. With more knowledge of these types of populism, one could learn more about populism in general, one could better understand its empirical manifestations and one could better assess whether populism should best be seen as a threat or a corrective for democracy. Furthermore, in the current era - which is characterized by globalization, regional and international cooperation, immigration and refugees - national identity is under pressure. As a result, who belongs to ‘us’ and who does not belong to ‘us’, has become an important (populist) political question. This is clearly linked with the ‘inclusion/exclusion issue’, and therefore the aim of this study is to increase the knowledge about the contemporary in- and exclusionary populism. Despite the fact that this issue is linked with a normative assessment of populism, performing the latter will not be an aim of this study.

This study further aims to increase knowledge about cross-regional populism and less examined regions. Note however that these are not the main aims of the study. Nevertheless, they form an important gap in existing research which deserves empirical attention. Many political scientists note that research on populism is lacking cross-regional studies (Hawkins et al., 2017, p. 268). Moreover, most studies on populism have focused on the Americas and Western Europe (Kaltwasser et al., 2017, p. 10). The regions that are subject to the current study are Africa and the European periphery. It is important to note here that in the current study all references to ‘European periphery’ entail cases from the European border area, rather than Western Europe.

Populism in Africa is a relatively new topic of research, which has overall been an understudied continent in terms of populist politics (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016, p. 3). To my knowledge there is not yet a study that deals with the ‘inclusion/exclusion issue’ in Africa, nor a cross-regional study that considers African populism. These are the main reasons to include this region in this study. There are two reasons for selecting the European periphery. Firstly, since the current century there have been a significant amount of manifestations of populism in this region (Bugaric, 2008, p. 191). Secondly, despite the enormous amount of research that has already focused on this region, the in- and exclusiveness issue has been largely ignored.

In sum, the main aim is to distinguish how in- or exclusive populism in Africa and the European periphery is. As a secondary benefit, this study is designed as such that the results will provide information about less exposed regions, thereby enabling a (new) cross-regional comparison. I hereby pose the following research question:

*How inclusive or exclusive is the populist discourse in Africa and European periphery ?*


To answer this research question, I will perform a discourse analysis of party manifestos, elections programs and websites of the parties. The cases that are selected for this study are for the African region the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) from Zimbabwe and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) from South Africa. For the European periphery I have selected the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) from Greece and Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) from Hungary.

### **1.3. Significance**

At the heart of much of the interest in populism, both in- and outside the scholarly community, is its complex relationship with democracy (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 147). It is therefore no surprise that the fact that populism has become an increasingly large phenomenon in the contemporary world, has resulted in a proliferation of scholarship on populism (Kaltwasser et al., 2017, p. 1). Although populism has a long tradition, the growth process of the phenomenon really started with the (re)emergence of populist actors and parties in both Europe and Latin America in the 1980s (Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 184). As a result, populism became one of the most researched and discussed subjects in comparative politics. Hence, a wealth of research exists which should be used and built upon (See fig. 1. on the next page).



**Fig. 1: Number of books in English in which the word “populism” or “populist” appears in the title (absolute number per decade) (Kaltwasser et al., 2017, p. 10).**



Clearly, there is a proliferation of research on populism. This then raises the question why the current study is a relevant addition thereto. The main reason is that the current study aims to provide answers regarding an important research gap, namely that existing research has rarely focused on the in- and exclusiveness of populism, despite them being seen as key aspects (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 147). They are discussed in much research on populism, but are almost never the main topic of research (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 147). Furthermore, studies wherein in- and exclusiveness are at the core have resulted in strongly opposing conclusions (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 166). Consequently, the current study is scientifically relevant because it enables the development of a better and more complete understanding of inclusionary and exclusionary populism.

An additional research gap consists of a lack of cross-regional comparisons, whereby existing studies focused on a limited number of (often studied) countries. Hence, the current research scientifically contributes by providing a cross-regional comparison of understudied regions. In the *Oxford Handbook of Populism*, one of the most important points of critique from political scientists regarding the research on populism is the presence of a dearth of scholarly attention to cross-regional research (Hawkins et al., 2017, p. 268). Furthermore, it is seen as a ‘welcome development’ in political science to include more different regions in their research (Kaltwasser et al., 2017, p. 10). Consequently, by focusing on both aspects, the current study adds to existing research.

Furthermore, a societal relevance is present in this research too. This is aligned with the scientific relevance. A broader and better understanding of populism and its characteristics has societal relevance as well. Studies like the current study contribute to a better understanding of populism, which could enable people to have a better understanding of

populism in their own country and region. The fact that the rise of populism has been witnessed in almost all world regions over the last three decades (Hadiz & Chrysosgelos, 2017, p. 399), increases this notion of societal relevance. Populism plays an increasing role in politics, therefore a better understanding of populism is important to comprehend national or regional politics and society.

#### **1.4. The structure of the study**

The second chapter contains the theoretical framework of this study, wherein I will elaborate more on the concept of populism. Additionally, I will elaborate the two central concepts: inclusive and exclusive populism. The third chapter will discuss the methods of the study. I will provide a detailed explanation regarding the conduction of this case study. The fourth chapter - which will be the empirical core of this study - consists of the actual case studies on which my conclusions are based. This is where I perform the discourse analysis of the party manifestos, elections programs and websites of the parties. The fifth and last chapter concludes with a summary of the most important findings and its implications for future research.

## Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

*“There can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is quite clear just what it is”* (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969, p. 1).

This quote by two of the founding fathers of research on populism is almost fifty years old, but it still represents to an extent the contemporary state of play. The previous introductory chapter clarified that populism is an important political phenomenon. However, besides populism being one of the most important phenomena in political science, it is also a notoriously vague concept (Canovan, 1999, p. 3). Both in the scientific world and in normal day language, the concept of populism has been contested for decades, between and within disciplines, between and within regions (Mudde, 2004, p. 543).

It is an impossible task to debate all the existing definitions of populism, and more importantly, it is not necessary for this research. It is however, in my opinion, crucial for the current research to discuss the origins and the development of the concept of populism. In line with this, it is also very important to determine a definition of populism which will be maintained in this study and elaborate on the reasons for this choice. More attention for this theoretical and conceptual side of research could be a first step to overcome the conceptual perplexity, that is present in much research on populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 148). In line with this, I deliberately choose to discuss the origins, first historical manifestations of populism and the problems concerning the definition of populism. Then, the most important concepts and definitions for this study will be introduced and explained.

### 2.1. Origins, historical manifestations and definitional problems

The idea of populism can be traced back in time through the history of democratic legitimacy (Kaltwasser et al, 2017, p. 2). From a normative and a sociological perspective, one could argue that all political associations are somehow created by their members and that the government is ultimately responsive to them (Kaltwasser et al, 2017, p. 2). This means that ‘the people’ are, to a certain degree, part of any theory in which a government is seen as legitimate. Furthermore, the people were not only seen as the source of political authority. They were seen as an unified entity which was able to act and to retrieve power from government officials, which is known as ‘the sovereign people’. This thought is a great legitimation for democratic politics (Kaltwasser et al, 2017, p. 2). Furthermore, it could be seen as a crucial thought because it has paved the way for populism (Kaltwasser et al, 2017, p. 2).

The first real historical manifestations of the term populism come from nineteenth-century political movements in the United States and Russia (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016, p. 1). Although these instances are generally seen as the origins of the phenomenon, they have more differences than commonalities. The Populist Party from the United States was essentially a mass movement for farmers who demanded a radical change of the political system (Hirano, 2008, p. 135). The ideas of this party were based on hostility towards the establishment. More specifically, they were based on the establishments of the railroads and banks, and the political elite in Washington. Besides this, it was also a third-party force attempting to fragment the politics of the United States by arguing that the Democrats and the Republicans were too close to each other and too tied up to the interests of elites (Hirano, 2008, p. 135).

The other historical manifestation of populism was the Russian *Narodniki*. This was a group of middle-class intellectuals who endorsed a romanticized view of rural life (Pauwels, 2014, p. 14). The movement attempted to stir the Russian peasants into over-throwing the Tsarist regime in the 1860s and early 1870s. Although the Russian movement differed a lot from the Populist Party in the United States, they shared their peasant character and the uncurbed sense that the establishment needed overturning (Pauwels, 2014, p. 15). Therefore, despite the different contexts wherein these movements arose, they could be seen as the first, parallel versions of populism.

It is quite common to include a third historical manifestation in the discussion of the origins of the concept of populism: the peasant movements that appeared in several parts of Eastern Europe and the Balkans in the early twentieth century (Ionescu & Geller, 1969, p. 98). These movements could be seen as a transition between the populism of the *Narodniki* and the ‘peasantism’ in Eastern Europe (Ionescu & Geller, 1969, p. 99). What the movements had in common was that they were in favor of an agrarian program wherein the peasantry would be the main pillar of the economy and society (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2004, p. 3). The Eastern European movements shared strong anticapitalistic and anti-liberal characteristics with the Populist Party in the United States. Additionally, East European populists criticized the alien roots of their countries. Capitalism was seen as a foreign element forcefully implanted in East-European societies by antinational elites (Mudde, 2002, p. 39-40).

The three aforementioned political movements are generally seen as the first historical manifestations of populism. Despite changes and progressions of the concept of populism, there are common values in the three cases that are close to more recent expressions and ideas of populism. The movements all shared a direct appeal to ‘the people’ as inherently dutiful and virtuous (Kaltwasser et al, 2017, p. 5). There also was a powerful sense of opposition

towards the establishment and a strong belief that democratic politics needed to change and become closer to the people. Furthermore, a great amount of nationalistic pride was present in all three cases (Kaltwasser et al, 2017, p. 5). The movements in Russia, Eastern-Europe and the United States could thus be seen as the foundational cases of populism.

However, the first significant spreading of populism happened in another region: Latin-America. With the rise of the Great Depression in the 1930s, populism really began to spread across the region. The first populist leaders, like Vargas (Brazil) and Perón (Argentina), are now viewed a new generation of politicians, who were able to build multiclass coalitions and mobilize lower-class groups, by appealing to ‘the people’ rather than to the ‘working class’ (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 3). For this reason, they were able to appeal to a very broad electorate instead of an intellectual vanguard (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 3).

This development caused Latin America to be the region where populism has gained most visibility during the twentieth century and where, in some countries, populism even dominated the national politics. This was not the case in other regions. In Western Europe populism jumped onto the scene only at the end of the previous century. Furthermore, populism was not that present in Canada and the United States between the 1930s and 1970s (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 4). In sum, the influence of populism in other regions was minimal up until the 1980s.

Despite the fact that populism has played a dominant role in Latin American politics throughout the twentieth century, and is spreading in other regions since the 1980s, providing a definition of populism has haunted scholars for some time. Despite targeted efforts (Inescu & Gellner, 1969; Canovan, 1981) even a minimal definition has been an issue, in part, due to the wide range of phenomena to be covered (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012, p. 4). Scholars from different disciplines have contributed to these studies before the political science community began to take ownership of the topic in the 1980s (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 4).

In the nearly fifty years that have passed since the first efforts to define populism, the number of scholars focusing on populism and the amount of studies have increased exponentially. Despite this, some say we are probably even further from a definitional consensus within the scholarly community (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 4). The challenge of defining populism can be explained to some extent by the fact that the term has been used to describe political movements, parties, ideologies and leaders, all in different contexts (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 3). In line with this challenge, there is a general agreement in the comparative literature which states that populism is confrontational, chameleonic, culture-

bound and context-dependent, varying from polity to polity and taking on the hue of the environment in which it occurs (Arter, 2010, p. 490). As a result, populism has proved itself hard to define.

This brief overview of the origins and the main historical manifestations of populism before the 1980s is far from complete. However, it sketches where populism finds its origin and clarifies that only in Latin America it has played a significant role in politics before the end of twentieth century. Furthermore, this overview helps illustrating that the concept of populism has been applied to a wide range of experiences and that the concept of populism has developed into a ‘fuzzy concept’. Therefore, it hopefully has become clear that developing a useful and plausible definition of populism is far from simple.

## **2.2. Populism as a thin-centered ideology**

There are three main conceptualizations of populism: populism as a political strategy, as a political style and as an ideology. In this study, populism will be conceptualized as an ideology. I will elaborate on the reasons for this choice and the advantages thereof for this study, but first I will shortly discuss the other conceptualizations.

Populism as a political strategy has proven to be a popular starting point for empirical analyses, particularly in the literature on Latin American populism (Resnick, 2017, p. 101). Following Weyland’s influential definition, populism is seen as ‘a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, un-institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers’ (2001, p. 14). Populism as a political strategy therefore relies on individual politicians who seek to augment their power and autonomy and who depend on mobilizing a large majority of the population (Weyland, 2001). As a result, two core components of a political strategy lay at heart of this conceptualization: the type of political actor that seeks and exercises power and the principal power capability which that political actor mobilizes as support basis (Weyland, 2017, p. 55).

Those who view populism as a form of political strategy typically emphasize the identity of the political leaders and their relation to other political actors (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 4-5). Therefore, populism is seen as resting on personal leadership. The populist leader competes with the established political elite and tries to rise above it. Furthermore, specific programmatic promises have limited effectiveness for a populist leader, because they want to mobilize a diverse mass (Weyland, 2017, p. 59). Therefore, the depiction of the leader as the embodiment of ‘the people’ is an alternative and an often used

tool. Leaders promote a direct identification with their followers, which bypasses all forms of intermediation, such as clientelism and party organization (Weyland, 2017, p. 59). One of the most famous examples of this is Venezuelan populist leader Hugo Chávez who proclaimed: “*Chávez is the people and the people is Chávez*” (Weyland, 2017, p. 59). While the personal characteristics of political leaders are frequently cited in studies of populism, some warn against this criterion in operationalizing populism, which is in particular the case with the political strategy approach. For example, Barr argues that charismatic leadership is often associated with populism, but that it is not a constitutive element of populism because there have also been many non-charismatic populist leaders (2009, p. 42.).

A main alternative approach defines populism as a political style rather than a political strategy. Moffit and Tormey define the concept of political style as ‘the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations’ (2014, p. 387). As a result, they are specifically interested in how the ‘performances’ influence the relationship between the populist leader and ‘the people’, and vice versa (Moffit & Tormey, 2014, p. 387) .

Populism as a political style entails three elements, following Moffit and Tormey. Firstly, the appeal to ‘the people’, which is the central element that differentiates populism from other political styles (Moffit & Tormey, 2014, p. 391). The people is both the central audience of populists, as well as the subject that populists attempt to ‘render present’ through their performance (Moffit & Tormey, 2014, p. 391). Secondly, populism gets its impetus from the perception of crisis, breakdown or threat (Moffit & Tormey, 2014, p. 392). This in turn leads to the demand to act decisively and immediately. The effect of the evocation of emergency in this fashion is to simplify radically the terms and terrain of political debate, which is reflected in the tendency towards simple and direct language. Lastly, they characterize the populist style by ‘bad manners’ (Moffit & Tormey, 2014, p. 393). This means that populism has resulted in the coarsening of the political discourse (Moffit & Tormey, 2014, p. 393). This is linked with the populists’ disregard for ‘appropriate’ ways of acting in the political realm. The famous political scientist Canovan (1999, p. 5) has identified this specific populist characteristics as a “tabloid style”.

The element of ‘bad manners’ in populism could also be identified as the ‘low’ of a high–low axis that runs orthogonal to the traditional left–right axis. In line with this axis, Ostiguy stresses that populism essentially revolves around socio-cultural performances, including what he terms “the flaunting of the low” (2017, p. 73). Such performances may rely on the use of popular, coarse, accessible, and sometimes vulgar language and dramatic, colorful, and even politically incorrect acts that grab the public’s attention, as opposed to the



‘high’ behaviors of rigidity, rationality, composure and technocratic language (Ostiguy, 2017, p. 77).

Despite the clear importance of the above-mentioned conceptualizations, the conceptualization of populism as an ideology has gained the dominant position in the literature over the past few years (Moffit & Tormey, 2014, p. 383). Much of this can be attributed to Mudde’s contribution to the ideological approach (Moffit & Tormey, 2014, p. 383). Therefore, in this study populism will be defined as a thin-centered ideology, following Mudde (2004, p. 543):

*Populism is a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people”.*

Although it is still far too early to speak of an emerging consensus, it is undoubtedly fair to say that this definition of populism is most broadly used in the field today (Mudde, 2017, p. 28). Furthermore, this specific definition has multiple advantages in comparison with other definitions. In the following section, I will clarify what the thin-centered definition of populism is and what these advantages are.

The thin-centered definition of populism is based on previous work on minimal definitions and thin-centered ideologies (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 149-151). Minimal definitions are definitions that include only the core characteristics of a concept. The advantage of minimal definitions is that, because they are based on a reduced number of characteristics (little intension), they can be applied to analyze a great range of cases (high extension) (Sartori, 1970, p. 1044). Additionally, a thin-centered ideology is one that arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts (Freeden, 1998, p. 751). In other words, populism could be seen as a thin-ideology because it is unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology and it lacks the capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent program (Stanley, 2008, p. 95). Therefore, compared to other political ‘isms’, populism has many of the attributes of an ideology, but not all of them (Taggart, 2000, p. 1). Thin-centered ideologies habitually appear in combination with very different concepts and ideological traditions. As a result, thin-centered ideologies do not provide answers to all the major socio-political questions. Hence, they could be compatible with other more extensively developed political belief systems, such as socialism or liberalism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 151). Unlike their mainstream counterparts who often operate on a more coherent ideological platform, populist parties are



driven by a ‘thin ideology’ of populism (Freeden, 1998, p. 758).

The thin-centered definition that will be used in this study is based on three core elements, the ‘pure people’, the ‘corrupt elite’ and the ‘general will’. So, this definition consists of the juxtaposition between the pure people and the corrupt elites and additionally the belief that the leitmotif of political life should be the will of the people (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). The friction between the people and the elite is crucial for the definition of populism. In this friction, the general will is seen as virtuous and placed in contrast to the moral corruption of elite actors (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). The friction is created in the way that the concept of the elite takes its identity from the people (being its antagonist) (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3). The thin-centered definition also implies that populism is moralistic rather than programmatic (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). Essential to the discourse of the populist is therefore the Manichean outlook, in which there are only friends and enemies. Opponents are not just people with different values and priorities, but they are pictured as evil. Consequently, compromise is impossible, as it ‘corrupts’ the purity of the people (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3).

By consistently using the thin-centered definition of populism, one goal for the current study is to overcome the regional differences and the conceptual perplexity that exist in the field of populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 148). Furthermore, using this specific definition of populism offers two main advantages for the current study.

First, the advantage of this kind of approach is that it focuses the debate on the core aspects of populism, and consequently does not make broader generalizations about the potential impact of populism on democracy. In other words, since minimal definitions of populism do not have a preference for an ideal model of democracy, they are less prone to developing normative biases that predetermine the findings (Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 185). Since it should be important for every study to maintain unbiased, the current study aims to do so as well.

Secondly and more specific for this study, the minimal definition can and has been applied in empirical research around the world. Consequently, the minimal definition used in this study permits us to identify the lowest common denominator present in all expressions of populism. This helps to avoid ‘conceptual stretching’, that is, the distortion that can result when a concept developed for one set of cases is extended to additional cases for which the characteristics of the concept do not apply (Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 185). As a result, this definition ‘travels well’ and is therefore very suitable for cross-regional research (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 154). Because of the fact that in this study the cases are from different

regions and because the African region and the European periphery will be compared, it is crucial that the chosen definition of populism is suitable for the comparison of different regions, which the minimal definition allows for.

### **2.3. Populist parties**

The current study focuses on populist parties. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between what populism is, and what a populist party is, despite the fact that these two concepts are logically intertwined.

Populist parties are the main manifestations of populism. To define a populist party it is important to focus on its form of organization and mobilization. As a core concept of populism, the people are seen as a homogeneous group. As a result, populist parties do not define the people based by class or by political ideology (Zaslove, 2008, p. 321). It is therefore important to note that although left-wing populist and right-wing populist parties differ in characteristics, they both use this general notion of the people. Furthermore, political parties situate the people within the larger polity (Zaslove, 2008, p. 321). The people are subsequently juxtaposed with the elites. Consequently, populist parties are typically marked by an anti-establishment/anti-elitist impulse, by highlighting the direct rather than representative aspects of democracy (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016, p. 5).

Populist parties combine centralized organizational structures with populist leadership. This leads to a centralization of leadership and to a low level of party institutionalization (Taggart, 2002, p. 67). The centralized leadership is essential for populist parties since it dovetails with demands for an unmediated link between the leader and the people (Taggart, 2002, p. 67). Claiming to represent the people in a direct and unmediated fashion is reflected in the populist style and communication. Populist leaders present themselves as political outsiders, which are not driven into politics because of power or money, but out of a sense of duty for their people (Barr, 2009, p. 44). Therefore, populist parties have specific organizational features that include a (charismatic) populist leader who claims to possess a direct and unmediated relationship with the people and speaks for the people (Zaslove, 2008, p. 324). This all leads to the following definition:

*A populist party is a party that connects organization and mobilization with the core ideas of populism ('the pure people', 'the corrupt elite', 'general will'). Therefore, for the people to serve as the foundation of democracy, there has to be a direct link with their leader in direct and in unmediated fashion in order to represent the political will of the people.*

## 2.4. Inclusionary and exclusionary populism

In the studies on populism, especially those regarding the relationship between populism and democracy, the ‘inclusion versus exclusion issue’ is probably the most important question discussed (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 147). The studies concerning this issue have been mostly about Latin America and Western Europe. Generally, Latin America is seen as a region that has more inclusive capacities of populism and Europe is seen as a region that has more exclusive capacities.

Rydgren defines right-wing populist parties as movements of exclusion (2005, p. VII). This is because these parties have a narrow conception of the ‘people’. This conception is narrower than for other parties within the party systems. This is reflected in the thoughts on immigration by these right-wing populist parties. They argue that this should be stopped or radically reduced, and immigrants that already live in the country should assimilate (Rydgren, 2005, p. VII). As a result, inclusive populism is characterized by a broader conception of ‘the people’. The notion of the people – the constructed idea of who belongs to the people and who does not - is crucial for the definition of inclusive and exclusive populism.

Inclusionary populists and exclusionary populists both use a different notion of ‘the people’. Inclusionary populists construct the people as a pluralist and heterogeneous collective subject that can include different social classes, ethnicities, religions and sexual orientations. At the same time they emphasize the need to re-incorporate and represent the marginalized, the ‘lower classes’ or excluded sectors of society (Katsambekis, 2017, p. 205). Inclusive populism is therefore characterized by the demands that politics be opened up to stigmatized groups, like the poor or other minorities (Markou, 2016). Exclusive populists seem to favor a strictly ethnic (even racial) understanding of the people, portrayed as a homogeneous organic community. They thereby oppose minorities (religious, ethnic, etc.) and express xenophobic, racist or homophobic views. Finally, they connect the well-being of the ‘native’ people to the exclusion of alien ‘others’ and the restriction of the rights and freedoms of the latter (Katsambekis, 2017, p. 205).

The definitions used in this research result from a combination of the elaborated definitions of inclusionary and exclusionary populism. The definitions that will be used in the current study for inclusionary and exclusionary populism consist of the following:

*Inclusionary populism: is based on the assumption that the pure people are an ethnically or culturally heterogeneous collective subject which results in the inclusion of people from stigmatized groups and the representation of the marginalized.*

Exclusionary populism: *is based on the assumption that the pure people are an ethnically or culturally homogeneous subject which results in the exclusion of people from stigmatized groups on the grounds of racist and nativist premises.*

Now that the definitions for inclusionary and exclusionary populism are set, it is important to discuss three points about these definitions to perhaps avoid confusion. First, it is important to note that the definitions of in- and exclusionary populism both fit the general definition of populism in this study. Inclusionary populism highlights the pluralistic character of the people, which could be seen as a problem, because of the people's assumed homogeneousness in the general definition of populism. It is however crucial that also within inclusionary populism, the people are seen as a collective, which have a bond. So, building on Mudde's definition, the notion of the people within inclusionary populism is homogenous, but in a light way. It is logical that the degree of homogeneousness of the people within inclusionary populism is less clear than within exclusionary populism. Inclusionary populism includes people, that were initially not part of the notion of the people. This will go at the expense of the homogeneousness of the people. Therefore, the homogeneousness is less crucial with inclusionary populism, but still present. This homogeneousness plays a bigger role in exclusionary populism, because it excludes people that do not belong to the (original culturally or ethnically) homogenous people.

For both definitions applies that they emphasize the purity of the people. This refers to the 'goodness' and 'moral wisdom' of the people that are not corrupt (i.e., in contrast to the elite). As a result, compromising between the pure people and the corrupt elite is impossible, as it 'corrupts' the purity (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). In particular for exclusionary populism, the purity of the people could also have a racial connotation.

Another important point to make is that these definitions are based on the notion of the people. The notion of the elite plays an ambiguous role in in- and exclusionary populism. As became clear while discussing the definition of populism and populist parties, the notion of the people versus the elite is crucial for populism. As a result, populist parties are to some extent always exclusionary. Exclusion of the elite is inherent to populism. Therefore, the exclusion of the elite is present in the discourse analysis of this study. The argumentation for this is twofold. First of all, the presence of the exclusion of the elite in the discourses of the parties proves partly that we deal with populist parties. Secondly, the exclusion of the elite plays a crucial role in a populist discourse and is therefore necessary if one wishes to provide a complete view of a populist discourse. It is however important to note that the emphasis in

this research is on the inclusiveness and exclusiveness in the populist notion of *the people*. Whereas the exclusion of the elite plays an important role in the discourse of populist parties, it is an inherent feature and therefore always present. As a result, it cannot provide information regarding the true in- or exclusiveness of the parties subject to study in the present research. The in- or exclusiveness of a populist discourse depends on the notion of the people. Therefore, only the inclusion or exclusion of the people can determine how inclusionary or exclusionary a populist discourse is. In sum, despite the vital role of the exclusion of the elite in a populist discourse - because it is inherent to populism - it does not tell us much about how in- or exclusive a populist discourse is. As a result, only the in- and exclusiveness of the notion of the people will be used to determine how inclusive or exclusive the populist discourse in Africa and the European periphery is.

One of the few studies on the 'exclusion/inclusion' issue is: 'Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Based on a comparison of four cases, *Front National* (FN) and *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) in Europe, and *Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* (PSUV) and *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) in Latin America, they argue that populism in Europe has mostly exclusionary characteristics and that populism in Latin America has inclusionary characteristics (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 147). Moreover, they conclude that populism in Latin America predominantly has a socioeconomic dimension (including the poor), while Europe populism has a primarily sociocultural dimension (excluding the 'aliens') (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, 167). Mudde and Kaltwasser conclude that their exploratory research has resulted in tentative conclusions and that future studies should research more about the in- and exclusiveness of populism, which are labeled as key characteristics (2012, p. 147-148).

Besides the fact that this study is arguably one of the most influential studies on the exclusion/inclusion issue, it uses a clear framework that distinguishes between the material, political and symbolic dimension regarding exclusionary and inclusionary populism. This framework makes it possible to compare their findings with other regions. As a result, the analytical framework that will be used in this study, is based on that specific framework.

## **2.5. In- and exclusion on the material, symbolic and political dimension**

A clear conceptual framework is crucial for a credible comparative assessment. In the current research, in- and exclusiveness of populism will be based on three dimensions: material, symbolic and political (Filc, 2010, p. 130) In the following paragraphs these dimensions will be further defined. A clear and concise clarification of the essence of these dimensions is crucial for the current research, because the analysis of the cases will be based on these dimensions.

Exclusion and inclusion on the material dimension refer to the distribution of state resources, both monetary and non-monetary, to specific groups in society (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, 158). In the case of material exclusion, particular groups of society are excluded from access to state resources, like jobs or welfare provisions. Material inclusion is quite the opposite. Specific groups in society are targeted to receive more state resources. One important reason to do so is to overcome long-established patterns of discrimination against these groups (Kaltwasser, 2012, 159).

In political terms, exclusion and inclusion refer essentially to the two key dimensions of democracy identified by Robert Dahl: political participation and public contestation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 164). Political exclusion means that specific groups are prevented from participating in the democratic system and they are consciously not represented in the arena of public contestation. In contrast, political inclusion specifically targets certain groups to increase their participation and representation. In most cases these groups were already part of the electorate - they had the legal right to full political participation and representation - but were ignored and marginalized by the political establishment (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 164).

The symbolic dimension is about setting the boundaries of 'the people' and 'the elite'. When populists define 'the people' in their rhetoric and symbols, without referring to characteristics and values of certain groups, 'the elite' are symbolically excluded (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, 161). Similarly, when particular groups are linked to 'the elite' (i.e., 'them' and 'they'), these groups are symbolically excluded from 'the people'. At the same time, when groups are explicitly included in the definition of 'the people' (i.e., 'we' and 'us'), these groups are symbolically included (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, 161). This specific dimension is overlapping with the other two dimensions. This is logical because who gets included or excluded on the material and political dimension is based on who does or who does not belong to the notion of the people. The symbolic dimension is about the definition and the nature of the people. Consequently, when it is explicitly discussed who are and are not in-/

excluded, this discussion is part of the symbolic dimension. For example, when discussing political exclusion, the political element is the central point. Nevertheless, this political exclusion element is still based on the (symbolic) notion of the people.

In sum for this chapter, it should be clear that populism is a contested concept. Populism has a long tradition, but has changed and developed in many different forms and sorts. Therefore, it is hard for political scientists to come to a definitional agreement. Although there is still no consensus, it is fair to say that the thin-centered definition, which will be used in this research, is currently the most broadly used (Mudde, 2017, p. 28). This chapter elaborated on the origins and first historical manifestations of populism, together with the problems regarding the definition of populism. Furthermore, in this chapter all concepts for this study are introduced and defined. Hence, this chapter could be seen as the necessary foundation for this research. In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the operationalization of the concepts that are introduced in the current chapter and discuss the methods that will be used in this study.

## **2.6. Expectations**

The theoretical framework will be completed with two factors that are probably most important to determine the discourse of the parties, namely whether the parties are left or right (European periphery) and the ethnic context of the parties' countries (Africa). However, it is first important to introduce the cases that are selected for this study. The cases that are selected are the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) from South Africa and the African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) from Zimbabwe, for the African region. For the European periphery SYRIZA from Greece and Fidesz from Hungary are selected. The next chapter will provide an elaboration on the reasons for choosing these cases and what could be gained from comparing them. The rest of this section will discuss the expectations regarding these cases based on their left-right distinction and the ethnic context in their countries.

It is important to note that in the literature the inclusion/exclusion issue, is linked with (resp.) left-wing and right-wing populist parties. Given the party families nativist character, right-wing populist parties are therefore primarily seen as exclusive (Zaslove, 2008, p. 170). This sets them apart from contemporary left-wing populist parties like in Latin America which are primarily geared at including the working-class (van Kessel, 2016, p. 83). This general distinction tells us something about the linkage between the left-right distinction and inclusionary/exclusionary populism. However, it does not make this study irrelevant. As a matter of fact, I would argue that this linkage could get in the way of a better and more



complete understanding of the in- and exclusion issue. Moreover, right-wing populist parties could also strive for inclusion, for instance of the ‘silent majority’ of native people (van Kessel, 2016, p. 83). Additionally, left-wing populist parties could for instance be exclusionary in their wariness of intra-EU labor immigration (van Kessel, 2016, p. 83). As a result of the identity of the parties that will be analyzed in this study, there are expectations linked to this. It is however necessary to comprehensively analyze these cases to establish the results.

The cases from the European periphery represent both left-wing and right-wing populism. This is an important distinction to make regarding populism in Europe (Kriesie, 2014, p. 369). As a result, I expect the European left-wing populist party (SYRIZA), to be more inclusive in their discourse than the European right-wing populist party (Fidesz), which I expect to be more exclusive. It is important to note that these expectations are based on a general distinction between these two types of populism. Only after the comprehensive analysis of these cases, one could determine how inclusive or exclusive the political discourses really are. Therefore, the analysis of the in- and exclusiveness in this study will look further than the general statements based on the left- and right-wing distinction.

Both African parties that are selected for this study (ZANU-PF and EFF) are categorized as left-wing populist parties. However, it is important to note that in African political leaders and parties, especially populist ones, fused norms from both the left and right ideological spectrum (Resnick, 2017, p. 112). Hence, the traditional left-right distinction does not tell us that much as compared to other regions. Therefore, there is no literature where I can derive my expectations from regarding how inclusionary or exclusionary the African populist discourse will be. This highlights the explorative notion of the African region in this study.

Because the left-right distinction is less significant in Africa, it is important to use another theoretical factor to base my expectations about the African cases on. It is widely recognized that sub-Saharan African population is ethnically complex (Parboteeah, 2014, p. 982). The sub-Saharan African societies did not experience the kind of homogenization northern African societies did with respect to domains such as religion, language and customs. Such factors explain the high level of ethnic diversity experienced by most sub-Saharan societies (Parboteeah, 2014, p. 984). This extreme ethnic diversity is also seen in Latin America, because of the legacy of powerful indigenous empires, colonialism, the African slave trade, and contemporary immigration (Yashar, 2015, p. 33). This ethnic context plays a crucial role in Latin America politics (Madrid, 2006, p. 2). Many successful parties from



Latin-America have been parties that combine an inclusive ethnic appeal with a traditional populist platform (e.g., MAS, PSUV) (Madrid, 2006, p. 3). Additionally, these parties in Latin America have built multi-ethnic coalitions by avoiding exclusionary rhetoric, developing an inclusive populist platform, and forming alliances with organizations dominated by members of other ethnic groups. (Madrid, 2006, p. 4).

I will base my expectations on the diverse ethnic situation in the African parties' countries, mainly because of the fact that Latin-America contains a comparable ethnic situation. Due to this large degree of comparability, Latin-American cases might be informative for the current purpose of the study. It is known from previous research, that populism in Latin America is largely inclusionary (de la Torre, 2017, p. 195). For this reason, I expect the African parties' discourse to be inclusionary to a large extent as well.

## **Chapter 3: Methods**

In the previous chapter the theoretical framework – the foundation for this research – was provided. It is now clear that populism is seen as a fuzzy concept. Therefore, it is crucial that the definition of populism for this research, populism as a thin-centered ideology, has been set. The research question - how inclusive or exclusive is the populist discourse in Africa and European periphery? - will be answered by conducting a discourse analysis on party manifestos and party websites for four cases. The cases that are selected are the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) from South Africa and the African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) from Zimbabwe, for the African region. For the European periphery SYRIZA from Greece and Fidesz from Hungary are selected.

In this chapter I will further elaborate and justify the chosen research design and case selections. Furthermore, I will elaborate shortly on the left-right distinction between populist parties and its consequences regarding the expectations and the analysis of this study. Finally, at the end of this chapter the theoretical concept will be operationalized and the analytical framework will be presented.

### **3.1. The case study approach**

In the present study, a case study method will be used. A researcher has to determine whether they want to observe lots of cases superficially (Large-N) or a few cases more intensively (Small-N) (Gerring, 2006, p. 1). With a ‘Small-N approach’ (more generally: case studies) one focuses on just a few cases, which can then be examined in a more detailed way. For this reason, case studies are one of the main forms of research in comparative politics (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 205). However, good case studies should not only say something meaningful and interesting about the cases which are being studied. They should also aim to focus on a case more generally and engage in wider academic debate that might be applicable to other contexts and other cases (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 205). As a result, a case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single or a few cases for the purpose of understanding a larger class of cases (a population) (Gerring 2006, p. 37).

Although the case study method is one of the main forms of research for many social sciences, the method occasionally receives criticism. Following political scientist and methodology expert John Gerring, this is mostly due to a paradox regarding case studies (Gerring, 2011, p. 1136). Case studies constitute a large proportion of work generated by social science disciplines and therefore much of what we know about the empirical world has been generated by case studies. Despite this, Gerring argues that the case study method is

poorly understood (2011, p. 1136). One of the main points of critique regarding the case study method is that its design is less structured compared to quantitative methods (Gerring, 2011, p. 1136). To overcome this pitfall, it is necessary for a researcher to add structure in their case studies.

The method of conducting a case study has important effects on the results and the validity of the research. Additionally, the way in which populism is defined in the research has particular implications for the way wherein research on the topic is carried out. If one follows the tradition that populism is seen first and foremost as a bundle of ideas, it follows that empirical studies should primarily direct their attention to the programmatic statements made by political actors, treating the latter as the primary unit of analysis (Gidron & Bonikowski, B, 2013, p. 7). In line with the definition of populism in this study, party manifestos will be analyzed. However, in order to triangulate the political discourses, other sources like messages on the party websites and secondary literature will also be used.

### **3.2 Case selection**

The regions that are subject to the current study are Africa and the European periphery. Populism in Africa is a relatively new topic of research, which has overall been an understudied continent in terms of populist politics (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016, p. 3). To my knowledge there is not yet a study that deals with the ‘inclusion/exclusion issue’ in Africa, nor a cross-regional study that considers African populism. These are the main reasons to include this region in this study. Selecting the European periphery has two reasons. Firstly, since the current century there have been a significant amount of manifestations of populism in this region (Bugaric, 2008, p. 191). Secondly, despite the enormous amount of research that has already focused on this region, the in- and exclusiveness issue has been largely ignored (Mudde, 2016, Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2015; Kouki & González, 2018; Pappas, 2014, Becker, 2010). In addition, most studies on the in- and exclusiveness focus only on Western Europe and generalize those conclusions to the whole of Europe (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2014, p. 147). In my opinion, these generalizations should not be made too easily, because they could be unjust given the societal and political differences in Europe. Therefore, it is interesting to see whether the conclusions for the current research coincide with previous studies regarding ‘Western Europe’.

Populism is a relatively new phenomenon in Africa that has come to prominence with the formation of African populists that emerged as a consequence of military coups in the 1980s (Resnick, 2017, p. 102). Generally speaking, there have been two waves of populism in

Africa. The first populist wave started in the 1980s and was precipitated by disappointment with democratic experiments and the emergence of a corrupt elite that appeared detached from the poor masses. These revolutions of the 1980s were generally driven by outsiders, particularly military leaders. The second wave of African populism started in the 2000s, of which the populist leaders are not characterized as outsiders anymore and are longstanding insiders who enter politics by forming new parties (Resnick, 2017, p. 114-115).

For the current research the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are selected as African cases. These cases are chosen because they represent both populist waves in Africa. The ZANU-PF is established in 1987 and therefore one of the oldest populist parties in the region. Also, it is a clear example of a populist party from the first wave. Robert Mugabe has been the leader of this party from its foundation up until 2017 and ruled Zimbabwe first as prime-minister and then as president in this period. It is important to note that although there have always been elections in Zimbabwe, there are many questions raised over their competitiveness as there have been occasions when they have been questionable and dubious (Chigora, 2015, p. 7).

The EFF is established in 2013 by Julius Malema, a former member of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa who broke with his former party. The fact that the populist EFF is founded by a political insider makes it a representing case for the second African populist wave. Although the EFF is a new party, they managed to become the third biggest party in South Africa, only a year after their foundation. The first few years of the existence of the EFF therefore suggest that its populist approach, has been quite successful (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016, p. 17).

Because not much research focuses on populism in Africa, I cannot use a great body of literature for the case selection. This however does not mean that these cases are a improvident choice. Following Resnick (2017, p. 117) there are six recent parties in Africa that fit the ideological definition of populism. The EFF and ZANU-PF are part of this selection. Furthermore, these specific cases represent the two waves of African populism and the cases are highly institutionalized for African norms. Many other populist parties are not institutionalized enough, which makes it hard to study African populism and to compare parties (Resnick, 2017, p. 2). As a result, I am convinced that the selected African cases are the most suitable for this study. Whether the outcomes of this study are generalizable for more Africa populist parties, is hard to say. Because no known studies have focused on the same cases and/or taken the same approach, the current study should be seen as explorative.

Therefore, further research should be conducted to determine whether the findings of this study are generalizable for more African cases and whether there are homogenous outcomes.

Populism is a phenomenon in Europe that has come to prominence with the formation of the populist radical right in the 1980s. Traditionally, populism in Europe seems to experience a kind of ‘marriage of convenience’ with the radical right in Europe today, because of the dominance of right-wing populist parties in Europe (Eatwell, 2018, p. 252). However, after the recent financial recession some successful left-wing populist parties like SYRIZA in Greece and PODEMOS in Spain have emerged (Kaltwasser et al, 2017, p. 8).

I want to note one final time that in the current study all references to ‘European periphery’ entail cases from the European border area, rather than Western Europe. The cases that are selected from the European periphery are two of the most successful populist parties in this area: Fidesz from Hungary and SYRIZA from Greece. Fidesz is among the oldest populist parties of Europe, established in 1988 as a left-liberal party. Through the years and with Victor Orban as their leader, Fidesz became a populist right-wing party that has been in government since 2010. The other case, SYRIZA from Greece, was originally founded in 2004 as a coalition of left-wing and radical left parties. In 2013 the coalition changed into a unitary party. Since the European elections of 2014 SYRIZA is one of the biggest parties in Greece and since 2015 part of the Greek government.

It is important to note that all of the selected parties fit within the thin-centered ideology definition of populism (‘*the pure people*’, ‘*the corrupt elite*’, ‘*general will*’) and the maintained definition of a populist party (*connecting the thin-centered ideology with political organization and mobilization*). In this sense, it is important to highlight that the analysis of the current study is based on cases which could be considered as typical cases for the regions. The selected cases represent other cases in their regions (at least to an extent) and are all successful to their own degree. For Africa, cases from both waves of populism were chosen, and for Europe both a left-wing and a right-wing party were selected. However, I am aware of the fact that generalizations of these cases result in tentative conclusions that should be tested further in future studies that will analyze other and more cases. With this in mind, I believe that the four cases in this study represent a good view on how in- or exclusive the populist discourse in Africa and European periphery currently is.

Furthermore, I expect the comparison between the two African cases and the two cases from the European periphery to be valuable. There is a large amount of studies on the European cases, whereas there are almost no studies on the African cases. As a result, in this study, the European cases can function as a baseline with respect to the African cases. There

is a lot more populism research on SYRIZA and Fidesz. As a result, there is more known about these cases and the expectations are based on more information. Although there has not been much research on the in- and exclusiveness of the European cases, it is probably valuable to test the method first on the cases that are relatively more obvious, because of the general populism research about these cases. This gives the cases from the European periphery an extra function as testing ground. For the African cases, I have some theoretical expectations, but because of the fact that Africa is a understudied region regarding populism, the current study will be more hypothesis generating. Therefore, I will start with analyzing the European cases and then I will analyze the African cases.

### **3.4. Discourse analysis**

To analyze the primary sources, the discourse analysis method will be used. In recent decades, growing awareness of the importance of language and meaning for political analysis and the power of the mass media has produced a dramatic upsurge of interests in textual analysis (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 309). In line with this trends, discourse analysis has become one of the main methods to do a textual analysis (Mayring, 2000, p. 2).

Discourse analysis is a qualitative type of analysis that explores the ways in which discourse gives legitimacy and meaning to social practices and institutions (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 309). The elements of a discourse can be brought to light through analyzing the language and semiotics (i.e., the latent meaning in text: which is best described as ‘reading between the lines’) (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 309). It is generally more sensitive to the context in which texts are produced and better able to tell us about actual meanings of texts and conventions found in a variety of written, oral and visual ‘texts’. While textual analysis can reveal the elements of a discourse, the meaning that they produce or reproduce can only be understood in relation to some broader context. Consequently, discourse analysis is concerned with analyzing not just the text itself, but the relation of a text to its content (its course, message, channeled, intended audience, connection to other texts and events), as well as the broader relations of power and authority which shape that context (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 309-310).

As an approach to understanding political phenomena, discourse analysis is an interpretive form of textual analysis and based on the fundamental idea that ‘words are deeds’ (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 310). Thus, discourse analysis is concerned with language, not as an abstract system, but as something that people use to do things. People use language for

instance to promise, threaten, insult, plead and demand (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 311). The goal of discourse analysis is to explore the relationship between discourse and reality in a particular context. To investigate this, the researcher will choose a discrete body of written work and conduct an analysis of what reality its language, metaphors, and/or symbols help to construct (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 313-314).

With the discourse analysis approach, the researcher is able to be more interpretive in their research. Additionally, different interpretations are not a problem and may be a source of data about the specific discourse in the analysis (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 332). However, to ensure the validity and reliability of this study, I will use an analytical framework for the analysis of the sources. Furthermore, the broad body of sources (party/election manifestos, the party websites and secondary literature) that will be used in the analysis ensures that the results are triangulated. The fundamental idea of discourse analysis – that words are deeds – is very applicable to the political sources in this study. These sources are constitutive for the political discourse. Therefore, closely reading these sources will give insight in the in- and exclusiveness of the discourses that are used by the parties.

Besides discourse analysis, also content analysis has become particularly prominent in political research (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 309). This analysis can be either quantitative or qualitative. The aim of both sorts of content analysis is to draw inferences about the meaning and intention of a text through an analysis of the usage and frequency of words, phrases and images, and the patterns they form within a text (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 310). Although a discourse analysis and a content analysis have much in common, I think that a discourse analysis is better suitable for this study. The main reason for using the discourse analysis approach is because this method is known for its ability to analyze language ‘beyond the sentence’ (van Dijk, 1998, p. 24). This means that a discourse analysis is not a tool used to determine the presence of certain words or sentences, but is a hermeneutic way of analyzing. Performing a discourse analysis thus enables the researcher to be more interpretive. This has in my opinion certain advantages. First of all, a close reading of the sources is more suitable to discover and analyze in- and exclusionary populism. This is mainly because in- and exclusionary populism are related to discrimination and racism. I can imagine that, especially for a political text, expressions of discrimination and racism are more easily discovered by being inductive and through close reading of the text, rather than by being deductive and through focusing on certain words or sentences. This is linked to the fact that in political text, the literal words can be different from what is actually meant. The discourse analysis enables the researcher to read between the lines. In this study, the discourse analysis will be



performed on the complete primary sources, which differs from other forms of textual analyses wherein specific textual parts are central. I will thus not focus on keywords, sentences or paragraphs. As a result, a close reading of the whole text will provide a more extensive understanding of the populist discourse, because I am not attached to certain keywords.

A discourse analysis could be deductive or inductive. The way the discourse analysis is performed in this study is not just deductive or inductive. I created an analytical framework, which provides the initial focus. It provides certain initial elements for the analysis. In line with this I provided a small amount of keywords, to give an indication of the analysis. However, the close reading of the sources, will be done with an open vision.

### **3.5. Material selection**

The sources that will be used to establish how in- or exclusive the populist discourse in Africa and European periphery is, are in line with the traditions regarding discourse analysis and the thin-centered definition of populism. This is because party manifestos, elections programs, messages on the party websites and secondary literature will be used. All of these sources are searched for and found on the official party websites or on websites that collect manifestos and official party documents from various parties. I have tried to collect sources that were as recent as possible. The manifestos that are used in this research have a time-range from 2007 till 2018. For the EFF, their founding manifesto (2013) and the election manifesto (2016) will be analyzed. For Fidesz their election manifesto (2007) will be analyzed. For SYRIZA their election manifestos (2012, 2015) and their economic manifesto will be analyzed (2012). For ZANU-PF the two most recent elections manifestos (2013, 2018) will be analyzed. All of the sources that are used in this study are accessible online (list of used sources with links p. 70-72).

It is important to note that these sources are all in English. Because the official language in Zimbabwe and South Africa is English, the sources for ZANU-PF and the EFF are analyzed in their native language. The sources from Greece and Hungary are also studied in English, but these sources are not analyzed in their native language. I am aware of the possible (translation) risks that this entails. However, despite the risk of mistakes in the translation, these sources are still useful for this study. Furthermore, it is important to note that the sources that were not originally written in English, are translated by the party themselves. This increases the chance of getting a right insight into their political discourses.



### **3.6. Operationalization of the theoretical concepts**

As stated in the previous chapter, the definition that will be used in the current study for inclusive populism is: ‘the assumption that the people are an ethnically or culturally heterogeneous subject which results in the inclusion of people from stigmatized groups and the representation of the marginalized’. Additionally, exclusive populism is based on ‘the assumption that the people are an ethnically or culturally homogeneous subject which results in the exclusion of people from stigmatized groups on the grounds of racist and nativist premises’.

To establish how in- or exclusive the populist discourse in Africa and European periphery is, party manifestos, party programs, party websites and secondary literature are analyzed for a better understanding of the political discourses. With the analysis of this broad spectrum of sources, I am able to triangulate the findings regarding this political discourse. To give an initial focus to the analysis, an analytical framework is constructed and will be used (see figure 2). It is however important to note that this analytical framework will not be used strictly. For the close reading of the sources it is important that the researcher preserves its freedom and open vision for the analysis. The analytical framework should therefore not be seen as a ‘cage’ wherein the researcher is trapped, but a framework which functions as an aid for the researcher. This creates a heuristic method that will be used in the analysis. The framework consists of three dimensions: the material, symbolic and political dimension that indicate the in- and exclusiveness of the discourse.

The framework is based on Filc (2010) and Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012). In general, the exclusion and inclusion on the material dimension refers to the distribution of state resources, both monetary and non-monetary, to specific groups in society (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, 158). The symbolic dimension refers essentially to setting the boundaries of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, 161). This specific dimension is overlapping with the other two dimensions. This is logical because who gets included or excluded on the material and political dimension is based on who does or who does not belong to the notion of the people. The symbolic dimension is about the definition and the nature of the people. The political dimension refers to originally to two key dimensions of democracy: political participation, public contestation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 164). However, because of the fact that Mudde and Kaltwasser did not perform a discourse analysis, I choose to complement the political dimension with another element, which is key for a populist discourse. In a populist discourse the ‘us’ and ‘them’ opposition is

indispensable for the concept of power and dominance to exist: one having power entails another person's lack of it (Wirth-Koliba, 2016, p. 23) Someone's superiority and dominance over others implies the latter's inferiority, thus the 'us' and 'them' polarization is clearly visible (Wirth-Koliba, 2016, p. 23) This added polarization element concerns both polarization in the notion of the people and the notion against the elite. Therefore, considering polarization is a useful addition to the analytical framework.

By analyzing the party manifestos, election manifestos and messages on the party websites – which represent the political discourse that the parties want to project - using this analytical framework, the degree of in- or exclusiveness will be determined. This means that the three dimensions that are discussed and defined in the analytical framework have formed the basis for the analysis. The primary sources will be read closely and the framework will be used for the initial theoretical orientation. Because I conduct a discourse analysis I deliberately choose to hold an open vision on the sources. This is crucial because the words and content in the parties' discourses could vary across the cases or regions. Consequently, I will keep in mind that parties will use words that are connected to their specific identity, their country or region. The analysis consists therefore not of the strict use of the analytical framework, but a more open analysis and interpretation of the sources.

The three dimensions of the analytical framework will be used to assess how inclusionary or exclusionary each case is per dimension. Those three dimensions are combined in an overall assessment of the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of the parties' discourses. As discussed in the part on inclusionary and exclusionary populism, it is important to note that the definitions of these two types are based on the notion of the people. The notion of the people versus the elite is crucial for populism. As a result, populist parties are to some extent always exclusionary. In sum, despite the vital role of the exclusion of the elite in a populist discourse - because it is inherent to populism - it does not tell us much about how in- or exclusive a populist discourse is. Therefore, the exclusion of the elite has a role in the analytical framework and will be used to analyze the populist discourses. However, only the in- and exclusiveness of the notion of the people will be used to determine how inclusive or exclusive the populist discourse in Africa and the European periphery is.

The discourse analysis will be performed based on the analytical framework. This will eventually result in an assessment of how inclusionary or exclusionary the populist discourses of the selected parties are. Moreover, this will result in a conclusion about how inclusionary and exclusionary the populist discourses in Africa and the European periphery are. Additionally, this will result in a cross-regional comparison.

**Figure 2: Analytical framework**

Three dimensions of inclusion/exclusion:			
<b>1: The Material Dimension</b>	<b>Inclusion:</b>	<b>Neutral:</b>	<b>Exclusion:</b>
In general: exclusion and inclusion on the material dimension refer to the distribution of state resources, both monetary and non-monetary, to specific groups in society.	-When groups are specifically targeted to receive (more) state resources.	No material inclusion, nor material exclusion.	-When particular groups are specifically excluded from access to state resources.
	Keywords: ( <i>e.g., poor, working-class, welfare</i> )		Keywords: ( <i>e.g., minority, state-resources, jobs</i> )
<b>2: The Political Dimension</b>	<b>Inclusion:</b>	<b>Neutral:</b>	<b>Exclusion:</b>
In general: exclusion and inclusion on political dimension refer essentially to the two key dimensions of democracy: political participation, public contestation and polarization.	-When certain groups are specifically targets to increase their participation and representation and they are consciously represented in the arena of public contestation. -When there is no constructed polarization of the opposition camp ('them') versus the allies ('us').	No political inclusion, nor political exclusion.	-When specific groups are prevented from participating (fully) in the democratic system and they are consciously not represented in the arena of public contestation. -When there is a constructed polarization of the opposition camp ('them') versus the allies ('us').
	Keywords: ( <i>e.g., representation, participation</i> )		Keywords: ( <i>e.g., ban, opposition</i> )
<b>3: The Symbolic Dimension</b>	<b>Inclusion:</b>	<b>Neutral:</b>	<b>Exclusion:</b>
In general: exclusion and inclusion on the symbolic dimension refer essentially to setting the boundaries of 'the people' and 'the elite'.	-When groups are explicitly included in the definition of 'the people', – into the 'we' or 'us' instead of the 'them' and 'they' – these groups are symbolically included.	No symbolic inclusion, nor symbolic exclusion.	-When populists define 'the people', in their rhetoric and symbols without referring to (characteristics and values of) certain groups. -When particular groups are linked to 'the elite', they are implicitly excluded from 'the people'.
	Keywords: ( <i>e.g., indigenous, domestic, us</i> )		Keywords: ( <i>e.g., foreigners, elite, them</i> )

This chapter has clarified how the research question – to what degree populism in Africa and in the European periphery is inclusive or exclusive? – will be answered. This will be done by performing a discourse analysis of two cases from Africa and two cases from the European periphery. The theoretical concepts that are central for the present study, which are discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, are operationalized in the current chapter. This has resulted in an analytical framework, which will be maintained in the following chapter for the central element of this research: the analysis of the cases.

## **Chapter 4: The analysis of the cases**

Now that the methods are chosen and justified and the theoretical concepts are introduced and operationalized, the most important chapter has come. With the analysis performed in this chapter the research question will be answered. In this chapter, the party and election manifestos, messages on party websites and secondary literature of the cases will be analyzed, based on the analytical framework. First, the two cases from the European periphery, SYRIZA and Fidesz will be analyzed. Then, the two African cases, ZANU-PF and EFF, will be analyzed. As explained in the previous chapter, this order of cases is deliberately chosen. In this study, the European cases can function as a baseline with respect to the African cases. There is more research done on the European cases, which provides a stronger basis for expectations. Following this chapter, I aim to answer the research question and present the results in the conclusion.

### **4.1. Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)**

#### **Material inclusion**

The recent global financial crisis and the European debt crisis, are crucial in SYRIZA's political discourse. The party emphasizes that a large part of the Greek society is dealing with the effects of the recent financial crises and is living in great insecurity (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 8). In addition they mention that a small section of the Greek society is still prospering (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 8). The unemployed, citizens receiving minimal incomes and pensions, bankrupt households, insolvent professionals and small business holders are the victims of that crisis (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 8). The social stratum directly above this is still surviving financially, but lives in depressing insecurity (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 8). SYRIZA's political discourse is directed at these victims of the crisis.

The political goals of SYRIZA are therefore twofold. On the one hand, SYRIZA wants to accomplish material relief for the victims of the crisis and the policies of the 'Memoranda' (i.e., the agreements between the EC, ECB, IMF and the Greek government about a financial aid program). On the other hand, SYRIZA aims to prevent an even more massive and deep economic catastrophe and to revive hope and create new visible prospects for the Greek people (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 8). To meet these goals SYRIZA argues that it needs all available means and resources, with interventions concerning incomes, taxation, credit policy, access to public resources and support to forms of economic solidarity (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 8).

Because of the crisis, SYRIZA wants to materially include certain victims of the financial crisis. They want to do this with for instance free health benefits for the unemployed, homeless and those with low salaries, and the increase of financial aid for the unemployed (SYRIZA, 2012). Additionally, SYRIZA has initiatives like free electricity for 300.000 households currently under the poverty line and a special program of meal subsidies to 300.000 families without income (SYRIZA, 2014). Many citizens are currently struggling to recover from the crisis, which SYRIZA portrays as a humanitarian crisis in Greece as a result of the financial crisis (SYRIZA, 2014).

It may be clear that the financial crisis and its effects on the Greek society, especially the lower-end of society, are very important in SYRIZA's political discourse. As an answer to the crisis SYRIZA wants to materially include the victims of the financial crisis. SYRIZA also wants to materially include certain groups of people, like women that deserve salaries equal to men's (SYRIZA, 2012) and they want to invest heavily in knowledge, research and new technology in order to attract young scientists, who have been massively emigrating over the last years, back to Greece (SYRIZA, 2014).

### **Material exclusion**

SYRIZA wants to stand up for the victims of the crisis, resulting in the party focusing on themes of socioeconomic inequalities between the people and the elites. The latter consists of the political class of people that were previously in government and part of the wealthiest of the Greek society (Tsatsanis, 2017, p. 10). This notion of the rich and influential elite which is linked to the 'corrupt domestic oligarchy' is crucial in the political discourse of SYRIZA (Tsatsanis, 2017, p. 10).

### **The material dimension**

The material dimension is important for the political discourse of SYRIZA. SYRIZA has the traditional characteristics of a left-wing populist party by framing themselves as the representative of the people and victims of the financial crisis, while other politicians and the wealthiest class are being pictured as the elite and enemy of the people. This discourse is very visible in all of their sources.

## **Political inclusion**

In the political discourse of SYRIZA the party portrays itself as representors of people with normal jobs or people that lost their jobs because of the financial crisis. SYRIZA wants to politically include these people, because these are the people their discourse is directed at. Therefore, SYRIZA tries to provide solutions and pave the way for the social and political emancipation of labor and youth (Greece currently has the highest youth unemployment rate in the EU) (SYRIZA, 2015, p. 12).

SYRIZA argues that the transforming of the political system to deepen democracy is one of the main pillars in SYRIZA's manifestos. SYRIZA aims, for instance, at the regional organization of the state, the enhancement of transparency and empowerment of the institutions of direct democracy (SYRIZA, 2014). With these measures, SYRIZA wants to stimulate the democratic participation of the Greek citizens. Although SYRIZA's discourse is especially directed at the working class and the unemployed, they want to politically include the Greek population in general, rather than a specific group of the population.

## **Political exclusion**

The financial situation in Greece has a vital part in SYRIZA's political discourse, which logically results into the EU also having an important role. However, their discourse about the EU is ambiguous in some sense. On the one hand, SYRIZA emphasizes the institutional and political challenges that the EU is facing (<https://www.syriza.eu/>). SYRIZA argues that the massive participation of European citizens is crucial to overcome these challenges. (<https://www.syriza.eu/>). Furthermore, SYRIZA acknowledges the limit of Greeks power considering its financial situation, but to promote the Greek goals, communication with the citizens is necessary to make them understand that political mobilization is the most effective way to achieve more (<https://www.syriza.eu/>).

On the other hand, SYRIZA uses a more negative discourse when talking about their agreements with the EU. SYRIZA argues for instance that the memorandum agreement was signed under "coup conditions", following an unprecedented "blackmail" during the negotiations with the Creditors (SYRIZA, 2015, p. 5). According to SYRIZA, this crystallizes the specific balance of forces that was recently formed in the context of the Eurozone (SYRIZA, 2015, p. 5). Furthermore, they maintain that in every aspect, in every chapter and every provision, the agreement reflects the results of this asymmetric negotiation (SYRIZA, 2015, p. 5). The political discourse that SYRIZA used for these topics is seen by some as 'a

toxic discourse’, which is aimed at externalizing guilt by picturing these agreements as ‘blackmail’, ‘humiliation’ or using #ThisIsACoup (Mudde, 2017, p. 22).

Taken together, the political discourse of SYRIZA regarding the EU is ambiguous. On the one hand, they emphasize that political mobilization and participation of the Greek people is important for the EU and for Greece. On the other hand, SYRIZA uses a ‘toxic discourse’ regarding the EU.

SYRIZA acknowledges that Greece has issues regarding their fiscal deficit, issues with their balance of payments and a big corruption problem, and emphasizes that the Greeks do not need the memoranda to know this (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 3). SYRIZA’s task was to end the extreme austerity policy in Greece and to negotiate with EU partners as well as with the ECB and the IMF (<https://www.syriza.gr>). These austerity policies play a crucial role in their political discourse. The enemy in SYRIZA’s discourse clearly consists of “those forces which, throughout the past years, have been dictating and implementing austerity policies leading to unprecedented levels of recession, unemployment and poverty” (<https://www.syriza.gr>), which are the international financial institutions like the IMF and the EU.

There is however an additional level where this specific discourse comes at play. Specific political forces within Greece are targeted by SYRIZA (i.e., DIMAR, LAOS, ND and PASOK) (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, p. 131). SYRIZA portrays itself as the representor of the people that stand for the productive forces of democracy, the people fighting to create a society of justice, equality and freedom. On the other side, a discourse is projected wherein the EU and financial institutions are connected with certain Greek parties. In SYRIZA discourse this connection is labelled as the external-internal troika, which refers to the troika of the European debt crisis (i.e., a decision group formed by the ECB, IMF and EC) (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, p. 131). The previous three-party coalition government between ND, PASOK and DIMAR was effectively equated with the country’s emergency lenders, the EC, the ECB and the IMF. These parties are portrayed as ‘them’ and seen as passive, anti-democratic and authoritarian, while SYRIZA reflects ‘the people’ as future-oriented, active, inclusive, democratic and emancipatory (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, p. 131).

### **The political dimension**

Just like the material dimension, the political dimension of SYRIZA’s discourse is focused on the financial crisis in Greece. Although SYRIZA emphasizes that it wants to politically



include the Greek population, the main part of their political discourse is directed at the EU, financial institutions and political opponents. In SYRIZA's narrative, the main reason why the economic crisis in Greece has been so deep and protracted was that the 'cure' (i.e., huge bailout loans coupled with unprecedented destructive austerity) had been worse than the 'disease' (i.e., the high deficits and lack of competitiveness that left Greece unable to cope with the global credit crunch after 2007–08) (SYRIZA, 2015, p. 10). Therefore, the EU and financial institutions are portrayed as enemies of Greece.

SYRIZA blames the social and economic problems of Greece on decades of political corruption and mismanagement by the two formerly hegemonic parties: PASOK and ND (SYRIZA, 2015, p. 7). SYRIZA's discourse is therefore very polarizing, through portraying their political opponents as those which are to be blamed for the financial problems and which represent the external-internal troika that is an enemy to Greece.

### **Symbolic inclusion**

SYRIZA's discourse is clearly organized on the basis of an antagonistic schema, with the pattern 'them/the establishment' against 'us/the people'. SYRIZA emphasizes that the people are the ones that have lost in the years of the crisis, be it salary or pension cuts, their works and so on (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, p. 132). This notion of 'the people' is however not constructed to exclude plurality and social heterogeneity. As a matter of fact, gender equality and LGBT rights are important in SYRIZA's discourse. Hence, the party has portrayed itself as the main parliamentary party officially supporting the right to gay marriage (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, p. 132). Furthermore, since its constitution SYRIZA has been one of the most consistent advocates of the immigrants' equal rights and their full inclusion in Greek society (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, p. 132). The refugee crisis plays a great role in Greek society and politics. SYRIZA advocates that human rights for the refugees have to be guaranteed and they want to facilitate the reunion of immigrant families (<https://www.syriza.eu/>).

In line with their notion of the people, SYRIZA rejects the theory of the 'collective guilt' of the Greek people for the policies implemented by Greek and European governments (SYRIZA, 2015, p. 6). SYRIZA emphasizes that the Greek people are not responsible for the fact that Greece does not have a decent taxation system or an effective social state (SYRIZA, 2015, p. 6).

### **Symbolic exclusion**

SYRIZA's discourse is based on a clear 'us' versus 'them' distinction. According to their discourse SYRIZA represents the people that are hit by the austerity policies. The 'other' represents the political establishment that implemented the policies dictated by the so-called troika. This distinction is clearly pictured by their main slogan for the campaign of the May 2012 elections: "They decided without us, we're moving on without them" (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 1). This slogan aims to capture the popular sentiments of frustration and anger against the harsh austerity measures from the EU, financial institutions and the previous governing parties (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, p. 121).

### **The symbolic dimension**

SYRIZA's main slogan for the campaign of the May 2012 elections gives a good indication of their discourse on the symbolic dimension: "They decided without us, we're moving on without them" (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 1). Messages like this slogan could be seen as a discursive tool to establish equivalence among the Greek victims of the crisis by establishing their opposition to a common 'other': the 'pro-austerity' forces and the external-internal troika. SYRIZA's discourse thus divided the social space into two opposing camps: 'them' ('the establishment, the elite') and 'us' ('the people'). SYRIZA combines this populist discourse with inclusionary elements like the inclusion of the victims of the financial crisis and refugees.

### **In- and exclusiveness towards the people in SYRIZA's populist discourse**

Generally, populism in Europe is seen as exclusionary (van Kessel, 2016, p. 83). This is mostly based on the fact that right-wing populist parties are more present and successful in Europe than left-wing populist parties. The European right-wing populist parties base their exclusiveness on nativism. This is predominantly translated in anti-immigration views (van Kessel, 2016, p. 83). These general characteristics are not applicable to SYRIZA. SYRIZA maintains a political discourse that is very inclusive. SYRIZA portrays itself as a representative of the people, especially the people who are the victims of the crisis. They want to materially and politically include these people and their notion of the people does not exclude plurality and social heterogeneity for the sake of a homogenizing 'unity'. In line with this, SYRIZA has been one of the most consistent advocates of the immigrants' equal rights and their full inclusion in Greek society. In this sense, SYRIZA's populism could only be described as an clear example of 'inclusionary populism'.

## **4.2. Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz)**

### **Material inclusion**

The family is seen as a crucial element in the Hungarian society and therefore plays an important role in Fidesz' political discourse. According to Fidesz', for the establishment of a sustainable society, there must be a reinforcement of the most important and strongest community unit: the family (<http://fidesz-eu.hu/en/>). As a result, the family is seen as a top priority and Fidesz wants to materially include the families by pursuing policy that gives priority to families in both economic and cultural terms (Fidesz, 2007, p. 8). For instance, Fidesz wants to introduce a family-friendly personal income tax system so that families are eligible for significant breaks on their income tax based on the number of children they raise (Fidesz, 2007, p. 8). Furthermore, the family is portrayed as the basis for the survival of the Hungarian nation (Fidesz, 2007, p. 8). By placing the family among their top priorities, Fidesz aims to show that supporting families and protecting individual freedom and innovative policy can have positive impact on demographic trends, consumer confidence and economic stability (<http://fidesz-eu.hu/en/>).

Besides the family, the Roma citizens play a vital role in the political discourse of Fidesz. This is not that remarkable, considering that many right-wing populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe have taken a hostile stance towards ethnic minority groups (van Kessel, 2016, p. 83). This applies not the least to the Roma minority (van Kessel, 2016, p. 83). It is however, remarkable that Fidesz' discourse is different. It pictures the integration and advancement of the Roma citizens as a common cause for all Hungarians (Fidesz, 2007, p. 23-24). Additionally, one of the most fundamental aims is to allow an increasing number of Roma people to enter the labor market in order to enable them to sustain their families and contribute to the public good (Fidesz, 2007, p. 23-24). The leading role on the road to integration is reserved for education, because in that way Roma people could be educated for professions that are marketable and are important for the entire Hungarian society (Fidesz, 2007, p. 23-24). Fidesz tries to materially include the Roma people in their political discourse and emphasizes that this is beneficial for the Hungarian society.

### **Material exclusion**

The exclusion of refugees and immigrants is crucial in Fidesz' political discourse. This entails the material exclusion of these people. In Fidesz' narrative the refugees are pictured as 'profiteering pseudo-victims' (i.e., people that act like victims so that they can profit from the

Hungarian society and its wealth) (Haraszti, 2015, p. 38). In 2015 Fidesz sent the "National Consultation" survey to every Hungarian citizen. It featured strongly leading questions, such as: 'Do you agree with the government that instead of allocating funds to immigration we should support Hungarian families and those children yet to be born?' (Haraszti, 2015, p. 38) and 'Do you agree that economic migrants jeopardize the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians?' (Thorleifsson, 2017, p. 322). This survey was followed by an anti-migrant campaign with billboards that warned refugees in Hungary (e.g., "If you come to Hungary, don't take the jobs of Hungarians") (Haraszti, 2015, p. 38). Overall, it may be clear that in Fidesz' political discourse the refugee crisis is linked with materially exclusion and Fidesz pictures the refugees as an economic threat.

### **The material dimension**

In their discourse, Fidesz stands up for the Hungarian families. These families are seen as the core of the Hungarian society. Furthermore, the family is portrayed as the basis for the survival of the nation. Besides the emphasis on the family, the Roma minority plays an important role in Fidesz' discourse. Fidesz emphasizes that the Roma minority has to be included in the Hungarian society and pictures the integration and advancement of this minority group as a common cause for all (Fidesz, 2007, p. 23-24). Considering the fact that many right-wing populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe have taken a hostile stance towards this ethnic minority group (van Kessel, 2016, p. 83), it is remarkable that Fidesz is very inclusive in their discourse towards this group.

### **Political inclusion**

Hungarians that live abroad, are very important for Fidesz in their political discourse. Despite the fact that they are living in another country, Fidesz wants to politically include these people. Fidesz wants to stimulate the commitment of these people to Hungarian national interests (Fidesz, 2007, p. 43-44). Furthermore, Fidesz supports the efforts of Hungarian communities abroad that are setting up autonomous institutions (Fidesz, 2007, p. 43-44). The party emphasizes that the linkage between the Hungarian communities abroad and Hungary is very important for the Hungarian language and culture (Fidesz, 2007, p. 43-44). Fidesz sees the free entry of Hungarians to Hungary as a manner to stimulate this linkage. Therefore, the party wants to give Hungarians who live abroad the possibility to apply for Hungarian citizenship (Fidesz, 2007, p. 43-44). This is an important part of Fidesz's political discourse, because by taking up the issue of 'Hungarians beyond the border' they could make it a

central component of its ideology and policy priorities. Furthermore, this issue is related to their discourse regarding the importance of the Hungarian culture and they could address new possible voters (Waterbury, 2006, p. 485).

### **Political exclusion**

Fidesz' discourse is partly aimed at the political exclusion of their political opponents. The party emphasizes that the previous coalitions has been unable to make life better, but has tried everything in its power to cover up its inabilities and lack of talent with a flood of lies (Fidesz, 2007, p. 7). Fidesz highlights that the economic policies pursued by the previous governments are dangerous because they lead to intensification of social inequalities and degradation of public services (Fidesz, 2007, p. 25). Furthermore, these policies leave economic tensions untreated in the long-run, and all this will jointly lead to a significant lag relative to neighboring countries (Fidesz, 2007, p. 25). Therefore, Fidesz portrays it as their responsibility – which is greater than ever before – to restore people's faith, restore democracy and lay the foundations for Hungary's return to prosperity (Fidesz, 2007, p. 7).

In Fidesz' political discourse, the democratic process is represented as a choice between life and death, truth and lie, past and future, good and evil (Bozóki, 2005, p. 11). This discourse is used to stigmatize the 'enemies of the nation' and the polarization and reduction of political pluralism to one single dimension. National symbols (the flag, the circle ribbon, and the national anthem) that represent the unity of the nation were used to strengthen Fidesz' 'us' versus 'them' discourse. The slogan "Go Hungarians" became the campaign slogan of the party, thus stressing the idea of division between people that are part of the people and people who are not part of the people (Bozóki, 2005, p. 11).

Also NGOs are involved in Fidesz' 'us' versus 'them' discourse. Fidesz wants to politically exclude these organizations and portrays them as a danger for Hungary (Győri et al., 2017, p. 73). Fidesz argues that NGOs are foreign agents who undermine the Hungarian sovereignty in the interest of some foreign powers. As a result, NGOs lack "democratic legitimacy" and need to be cleaned out (Győri et al., 2017, p. 72). The announcement of an offensive against NGOs and the aggressive rhetoric, is part of Fidesz' political discourse, wherein their political opponents and NGOs are portrayed as enemies of Hungary.

### **The political dimension**

Fidesz emphasizes that the linkage between the Hungarian communities abroad and Hungary is very important for the Hungarian language and culture (Fidesz, 2007, p. 43-44). This issue of ‘Hungarians beyond the border’ is related to their discourse about the importance to preserve the Hungarian culture.

However, this does not mean that Fidesz’ discourse is only inclusive on the political dimension. As a matter of fact, their political discourse is also directed at excluding NGOs and opposition parties. Fidesz highlights that the previous coalitions have been unable to make the Hungarians lives better (Fidesz, 2007, p. 7). The economic policies pursued by other political parties are portrayed as dangerous (Fidesz, 2007, p. 25). Therefore, Fidesz portrays it as their responsibility to restore people’s faith, restore democracy and lay the foundations for Hungary’s return to prosperity (Fidesz, 2007, p. 7). This discourse is used to stigmatize the ‘enemies of the nation’ and the polarization of Hungarian politics. Also, NGOs are involved in Fidesz’ ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discourse. Fidesz wants to politically exclude these organizations and portrays them as a danger for Hungary (Győri et al., 2017, p. 73). Fidesz argues that NGOs are foreign agents who undermine Hungarian sovereignty in the interest of some foreign power, which is part of an offensive against NGOs.

### **Symbolic inclusion**

One of the most important aims of Fidesz’ discourse is to politically include Hungarians that live abroad. However, this core characteristic of Fidesz’ discourse also has to do with their notion of the people and thus with symbolic inclusion. The Hungarian identity is vital for Fidesz and they want to defend this. Therefore, Fidesz argues that the Hungarian cultural diplomacy should rely far more than currently is the case on the relations built by the Hungarians living in scattered communities in the West (<http://fidesz-eu.hu/en/>). Additionally, Fidesz has stood up for Hungarians living outside the country and arranged that they can apply for citizenship since 2010 (<http://fidesz-eu.hu/en/>). The issue of the ‘Hungarians beyond the border’ is important for Fidesz’ idea of the people. This diaspora issue is constructed and shaped in relation with their discourse on Hungary’s future prosperity and cultural survival (Waterbury, 2006, p. 485). The party framed the ‘Hungarians beyond the border’ issue as one of independence, strength and moral rightness (Waterbury, 2006, p. 495).

## **Symbolic exclusion**

Fidesz emphasizes that foreigners in Hungary are not part of the people. Refugees and immigration are vital points in the political discourse of Fidesz. The recent refugee crisis in Europe has only increased this and gave it more societal relevance.

In Fidesz' political discourse, migration is seen as a threat and connected with risks and sources of danger like terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, international crime and the selling of illegal weapons (Fidesz, 2007, p. 14). The fact that these issues are linked, says something about the perception and negative connotation of migration in their political discourse. Furthermore, Fidesz sees migration as bad and portrays countries or organizations that consider global migration as a positive phenomenon or seeks to encourage and organize it, as enemies of the Hungarian nation (<http://fidesz-eu.hu/en/>). The resolution of the EU, which seeks to define migration as a human right is portrayed as in conflict with Hungary's interests (<http://fidesz-eu.hu/en/>). In Fidesz' political discourse, migrants are portrayed as people that could take Hungary away from its citizens (<http://fidesz-eu.hu/en/>).

Furthermore, migrants are pictured as 'polluting migrant'. This is served to reinforce the ethno-nationalist boundaries of Hungarian-ness and strengthening the image of Hungary as the righteous protector of Christian European civilization (Thorleifsson, 2017, p. 318). Migrants are criminalized in Fidesz' discourse as posing a threat to national culture, welfare, security and even Christian civilization as a whole. Additionally, migrants are portrayed as an economic threat that prompted their further racialization and dehumanization in the image of the "crimmigrant" (Thorleifsson, 2017, p. 319). Through the securitization of migrants from Muslim majority lands in right-wing discourse and practice, the boundaries of an imagined Hungarian nation were reconfigured and reinforced (Thorleifsson, 2017, p. 319).

The Roma or anti-Gypsy feelings play also a role in their political discourse about migration (Tremlett & Messing, 2015, p. 1). Fidesz linked these two issues in their discourse and has stated that Hungary can't accept any more migrants because it must tend to the integration of its Roma minorities (Tremlett & Messing, 2015, p. 1-2). Roma and migrants are thus both seen as problematic groups of 'others' (Tremlett & Messing, 2015, p. 2), but the inclusion of the Roma citizens is used as a reason to exclude migrants.

## **The symbolic dimension**

Fidesz argues that the Hungarian state should invest far more on the relations with the Hungarians living abroad (Fidesz, 2007, p. 48). This 'Hungarians beyond the border' issue is constructed and shaped in relation with their discourse on Hungary's future prosperity and



cultural survival (Waterbury, 2006, p. 485). Fidesz emphasizes that they see Hungarians in foreign countries as an important part of the Hungarian people. They however also emphasize that they see foreigners in Hungary not as part of their people. The whole ‘Hungarians beyond the border’ issue is framed as a need for the Hungarian cultural survival and is framed as an inclusionary part of their discourse. However, this issue also has clear exclusionary characteristics, because it emphasizes that only the ‘Hungarian race or people with the Hungarian culture’, are truly part of the Hungarian people.

This exclusiveness is also seen in Fidesz’ political discourse regarding refugees and immigration. The recent refugee crisis in Europe has only increased this. In the political discourse of Fidesz migration is seen as a dangerous threat for Hungary and the Hungarian people. Migrants are portrayed as people that could take Hungary away from its citizens and pose a threat to national culture, welfare, security and even Christian civilization – which Fidesz wants to protect – as a whole (<http://fidesz-eu.hu/en/>).

The old Roma or anti-Gypsy feelings play also a role in their political discourse around migration, because Fidesz has stated that Hungary cannot accept any more migrants and the inclusion of the Roma citizens is used as a reason to exclude migrants.

### **In- and exclusiveness towards the people in Fidesz’ populist discourse**

The political discourse of Fidesz has both inclusionary as exclusionary characteristics. What is remarkable in their discourse is that it is internally exclusive, focusing on the “us against them” message regarding political opponents, NGOs and refugees. Simultaneously, their discourse could be seen as externally inclusive, by consistently evoking the idea of the larger nation extending across the borders, which is key in their ‘Hungarian beyond the border’ issue (Waterbury, 2006, p. 483). Their notion of the people is very important. They want to defend the Hungarian culture, therefore the political discourse is aimed at including the ‘Hungarians beyond the border’ and excluding foreign refugees, because those are seen as a threat for the Hungarian culture. Therefore, the ‘Hungarians beyond the border’ issue is used as an inclusionary element in their discourse. However, it depicts a clear cultural/racial distinction, which also contributes to their exclusionary discourse, which is directed at opposing those who are not Hungarian or do not have the Hungarian culture.

This idea of migration as a threat for Hungary is a crucial point in Fidesz’ political discourse. Therefore, their anti-immigration campaigns combined three major themes – economy, culture and security – thus catering to multiple audiences, from those fearing labor competition to those fearing cultural contamination (Thorleifsson, 2017, p. 326). Also the



Roma minority is seen as problematic group of 'others'. However, in their political discourse Fidesz linked the Roma's with the refugees and has stated that Hungary cannot accept any more migrants because it must tend to the integration of its Roma minorities. Hence, the inclusion of the Roma citizens is used as a reason to exclude migrants.

Generally, the political discourse of Fidesz is seen as strictly exclusionary. I would argue that a little more nuance is in place. It is incorrect to argue that Fidesz discourse is strictly exclusionary. Although Fidesz's discourse is mostly exclusionary, it also has inclusionary elements, which cannot be forgotten for a complete understanding. It is however difficult to establish whether certain elements are inclusionary or exclusionary, because sometimes the knife cuts both ways. The best example is in my opinion the Hungarian abroad issue. Although this is clearly framed as an inclusionary element, it contributes to their exclusionary discourse at the same time. In this study, I choose to discuss how certain elements are used and framed, to give a more complete understanding of the discourses. Consequently, I also explain why it contributes to their exclusionary discourse.

### **4.3. Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)**

#### **Material inclusion**

Although the ZANU-PF state that they want to facilitate and take measures to empower all marginalized persons, groups and communities in Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 35-36), the essence of their ideology is to economically empower “the indigenous people” of Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 7). This notion of the ‘indigenous people’ of Zimbabwe keeps returning in all sources used in this study from ZANU-PF and is a key element in their political discourse. From their own sources it does not become clear which people are entitled to call themselves indigenous Zimbabweans and which people are considered to be ‘non-indigenous’. However, it is known that this constructed group of non-indigenous people of Zimbabwe entails “whites”, “non-African immigrant groups such as Indians and Asians”, “Cape Coloureds” and other people of “mixed race” descent (Muzondidya, 2004, p. 215).

The notion of indigenous people is present in most of the messages and policy initiatives from ZANU-PF. In for example their messages regarding the establishment of the Harare Stock Exchange, it is stressed that this stock exchange is exclusive for indigenous individuals and aimed at indigenous companies to generate incomes and create employment (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 14). Furthermore, ZANU-PF characterizes itself as an indigenous movement, which is founded and ruled by indigenous people (<http://www.zanupf.org>). Therefore, the political discourse of ZANU-PF is aimed at collecting support from indigenous Zimbabweans.

From these indigenous people they want to materially include the youth and women in particular. From the policy initiatives and party messages becomes clear that ZANU-PF believes that all institutions and agencies of government at every level must ensure that appropriate and adequate measures are undertaken to create employment for all indigenous Zimbabweans, especially women and youth (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 35-36). This aim results in the promise of millions for funding innovative women’s and youth’s initiatives (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 13), and quotas for the youth and women for their participation across all sectors of the state and the economy (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 15 & ZANU-PF, 2018, p. 17/18). ZANU-PF has two leagues that are sections of the party and that are formed to promote the status of women (<http://www.zanupf.org>) and to increase the chances for good education and reduce the unemployment among the youth (<http://www.zanupf.org>).

Besides the fact that in particular the indigenous women and youth are part of their inclusive political discourse, ZANU-PF uses the youth also for other purposes. In the eyes of

the party, the youth has an instrumental use which can be manipulated because of unemployment (Chigora et al., 2015, p. 12). ZANU-PF recruits them into engaging in violence in order to attain the party's objectives (e.g., violence against political opponents) (Chigora et al., 2015, p. 12). This is seen as a vital cog to the party's survival and longevity in power (Chigora et al., 2015, p. 12).

Another specific group of people that are in particular materially included by ZANU-PF are the veterans fought in Zimbabwean liberation struggle. This liberation struggle is very important for the legitimation of the ZANU-PF and has been located within a particular historical discourse around national liberation and redemption from "the colonial nightmare" (Raftopoulos, 2004, p. 161). Because of the vital role that these veterans played in the national liberation and therefore in ZANU-PF's political discourse, the party materially includes these veterans through measures for the welfare and economic empowerment of veterans of the liberation struggle (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 68-69). Furthermore, according to ZANU-PF, the veterans deserve recognition for their contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe and suitable welfare such as pensions and access to basic health care (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 68-69). With this special treatment the myth of the liberation struggle is maintained, which is in the interest of the party.

### **Material exclusion**

The fact that the ZANU-PF distinguishes between indigenous people and people that are not indigenous and subsequently relates this to the distribution of state resources, makes it perfectly clear that the inclusion/exclusion issue is at play here. As became clear, the political discourse of the ZANU-PF is aimed at including the indigenous people. However, this logically results in an exclusionary discourse against people not part of this group of indigenous people.

The most important way to exclude the non-indigenous people is by policies on land ownership. ZANU-PF has therefore pursued policies on indigenization and economic empowerment (ZANU-PF, 2018, p. 7). This has resulted, following ZANU-PF, in that 91 percent of the land has now been restored to indigenous ownership. These measures are framed in relation to the liberation struggle, emphasizing that the dispossession of the "ancestral land" was the fundamental reason for waging the liberation war (ZANU-PF, 2018, p. 7). These policies on land ownership resulted in non-indigenous people losing their land and therefore they were materially excluded. At the same time, it enabled the party to add an

an image of a modern day ‘African Robin Hood story’ in their political discourse. This contains taking land away from the ‘white settlers’ to provide resources for the indigenous Zimbabweans (Dorman et al., 2007, p. 17).

With the non-indigenous people, the largest group of excluded people in Zimbabwe is captured. However, there is one more little group that gets materially excluded in ZANU-PF’s political messages. The party emphasizes that the so called well-connected individuals or political elites are excluded from the beneficiaries of certain policies, like for instance the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Policy (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 92). This exclusion could be seen as remarkable, because the political elites are members of the ZANU-PF. On the other hand, this could be seen as an important part of their political discourse, due to the corruption allegations that the party is facing. Since the upswing of serious opposition parties around 2000, these parties have been blaming ZANU-PF for the corruption in Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF has been struggling with these allegations (Kriger, 2005, p. 26). This particular part of their political discourse could be interpreted as a way to anticipate on the critique of these opposition parties, by emphasizing in their initiatives and messages that political elites do not benefit from certain policies.

### **The material dimension**

What becomes clear from the discourse analysis regarding the material dimension is that ZANU-PF emphasizes the interest of indigenous Zimbabweans. It is absolute key in their discourse that they want to include indigenous people in their distribution of state resources and that they want to materially exclude people that do not belong to this group. The most important manner wherein the party combines this distinction between indigenous people and non-indigenous people and the material dimension, is with land ownership policies and reports, because the party relates these with the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.

### **Political inclusion**

ZANU-PF specifically targets women to increase their political participation and representation. These aims are framed with their story against colonialism, emphasizing “that women fought side by side with their male counterparts during the liberation struggle” (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 21). As a result of this, the party argues that the goal of gender equality is profoundly embedded in the Zimbabwean mindset (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 21) ZANU-PF argues that it is for this reason that ZANU-PF policy seeks gender equality and that ZANU-PF has raised the status of women by championing gender equality through laws,

empowerment programs and promotion of women in politics and specific political positions previously held by men only (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 21). Furthermore, ZANU-PF emphasizes the importance of gender equality, which includes equal opportunities in political, economic and social activities (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 71). The party even intends a parliamentary change that entails an additional sixty women members of parliament (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 71).

### **Political exclusion**

In ZANU-PF's political discourse there clearly is a polarizing 'us' versus 'them' construction present. The opposition parties are pictured as corrupt and as a threat for Zimbabwe. Moreover, ZANU-PF argues that the success of their policies are threatened by corrupt urban councils run by opposition formations (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 56). Besides, as a threat, their political opponents are framed as political amateurs, which are ideologically bankrupt, inexperienced, corrupt, linked to sexual scandals and which abandon the Zimbabwean people in pursuit of selfish interests (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 61). This part of ZANU-PF's political discourse clearly polarizes.

### **The political dimension**

Regarding the political inclusion and exclusion in ZANU-PF's discourse two groups catch the eye: women and political opponents. ZANU-PF argues that it wants women to fully participate in the Zimbabwean society and specifically targets women to increase their political participation and representation (<https://www.effonline.org>). These aims are framed with their story against colonialism, emphasizing that the liberation struggle has also been fought by the Zimbabwean women. On the contrary, ZANU-PF wants to politically exclude their political opponents. By means of polarization in their discourse, their political opponents are pictured as corrupt and as a threat for Zimbabwe.

### **Symbolic inclusion**

ZANU-PF argues that it wants to give African languages that are spoken in Zimbabwe the same status as the English language (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 15). With this initiative the party wants to include rural areas and villages, because traditionally these are mostly voting for ZANU-PF (Raftopoulos, 2004, 164). Initiatives like these could be seen as ways to involve these small communities in their discourse and to assert that these people are part of Zimbabwean indigenous people.

Additionally, the Zimbabwean diaspora plays an important role in the symbolic dimension of ZANU-PFs discourse. ZANU-PF argues that it wants to enable the return of the Zimbabwean's who left the country because of the Rhodesian Bush War (1964-1979) (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 15). This loss of a significant part of the indigenous population had detrimental effects on Zimbabwe according to the party (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 15). In their political discourse, ZANU-PFs highlights that it wants these refugees to return to their country and be a part of the Zimbabwean population again (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 15).

### **Symbolic exclusion**

Although a great deal from ZANU-PFs manifestos and messages on their website might be considered as 'relatively modern and Western', like the detailed initiatives and views on gender equality and the well-being of disabled people, homosexuality is still prohibited in Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 71). Not only is it forbidden, homosexuality is depicted as "an evil force" and ZANU-PF emphasizes that it will continue to protect the values and dignity of the Zimbabwean people "against such evils" (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 67). With the depiction of homosexuals as evil and dangerous for society, they are automatically excluded from the Zimbabwean nation. This attack on homosexuality comes from ZANU-PF's idea that the colonialization has resulted in the unmaning of African men by the white settlers (Raftopoulos, 2004, p. 15).

In ZANU-PF's discourse against homosexuality, colonialization also plays a vital role. It is therefore not a surprise that the exclusive character of the political discourse is mostly directed against the "white people" that colonialized Zimbabwe. Because of the colonialization and the liberation struggle, ZANU-PF portrays patriotism as the glue that makes and keeps Zimbabwe together (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 20). Therefore, enemies of patriotism are pictured as sellouts (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 20) and the heroes of the liberation struggle are portrayed as the pride of the people of Zimbabwe (<http://www.zanupf.org.zw/fallen-heroes/>). The 'National Heroes Acre' symbolizes the bravery and selflessness for those who waged a protracted, bloody and arduous armed struggle against the white settlers (<http://www.zanupf.org.zw/fallen-heroes/>).

These sentiments against the white settlers still play a vital role in ZANU-PF's political discourse. In line with these messages is the image that is created by ZANU-PF about NGOs. NGOs are pictured as an obvious and unacceptable threat to the Zimbabwean people (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 51). The existing apathy against the 'white settlers' is used by ZANU-PF to dismiss human rights questions and the democratic demands of civic groups,

like NGOs by framing them as an extension of Western intervention (Raftopoulos, 2004, p. 167). These statements on Western intervention also exclude the white part of the population in Zimbabwe. By emphasizing in their discourse that White people do not belong in Zimbabwe, they fuel the apathy against these people and therefore picture them as an enemy to the indigenous people.

### **The symbolic dimension**

This dimension which essentially alludes to setting the boundaries of ‘the people’, is both an overlapping and important factor in this discourse analysis. The symbolic dimension indicates who is part of ‘the people’ and who is not. It has become clear that ZANU-PF wants to include the indigenous people, especially the people from the smaller communities and the Zimbabweans who fled during the diaspora. On the contrary, homosexuals and white people are pictured as enemies of Zimbabwe and are excluded from ‘the people’. The apathy against the latter is crucial in ZANU-PF’s political discourse.

### **In- and exclusiveness towards the people in ZANU-PF’s populist discourse**

The discourse that ZANU-PF carries out has both inclusionary and exclusionary elements in it. The distinction between the indigenous people of Zimbabwe and people that are not indigenous is vital in this. The party is very inclusive towards the indigenous people, but this logically causes their ethnical based political messages to be inherently exclusionary. By deliberately including the people who are part of the indigenous people, on all three dimensions, they exclude the rest of the Zimbabwean population (particularly the ‘Whites’ and ‘Mixed Raced Africans’).

With their political discourse, ZANU-PF denies any legitimacy to claims of citizenship and ownership to both white and black Africans who support opposition groups. The party therefore creates an idea of the necessary overlapping between “Zimbabwean-ness with ZANU-PF-ness”(Dorman et al., 2007, p. 17). The fact that they are inclusive towards the youth and women does not compensate for their exclusive messages, because this too holds just for the indigenous population. The non-indigenous people are used as a scapegoat in ZANU-PF’s discourse, by arguing that these people are responsible for the political tensions and polarization in the country, the economic decline, the deterioration of physical and social infrastructure, the poverty and unemployment in Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF, 2013, p. 47-48). Overall, I would argue that the political discourse of ZANU-PF is mostly based on exclusion.

#### **4.4. Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)**

##### **Material inclusion**

The analysis of the sources from the EFF makes clear immediately that the distinction between ‘black’ and ‘white’ people plays a crucial role in their discourse. The EFF argues that it wants to integrate the black South African people, whatever their class location, into the mainstream of the economy and include them in the distribution of state resources (EFF, 2013, p. 1). This distinction is based on the colonialization and apartheid. The party argues that although the legalistic forms of this ‘white domination’ have been eroded 20 years ago, the economic system that marginalized, oppressed and exploited the black majority is still intact (EFF, 2013, p. 1). The EFF pictures itself as the party that could solve these problems and depicts itself as a weapon in the hands of the economically excluded, the landless and oppressed people of South Africa (<https://www.EFFonline.org>).

The notion of the oppressed people of South Africa plays a crucial part in their political discourse and contains many references to the ‘dominant White settlers’ and the ‘oppressed black South Africans’. The name (Economic Freedom Fighters) and the identity of the EFF is related to this notion of the black South Africans being materially and economically excluded by the white settlers. Therefore, the EFF portrays itself as a beacon of hope and inspiration for a generation that seeks to fight for economic emancipation and against the structural racism they are facing (<https://www.EFFonline.org>).

##### **Material exclusion**

The EFF pictures the society in South Africa as unequal, especially economically (EFF, 2013, p. 1). The party therefore wishes to stimulate employment for “their black population” and wants a better distribution of state resources for “their people” (EFF, 2013, p. 1). The EFF argues that the levels of unemployment are racially defined, because white people’s levels of unemployment are far lower than the unemployment levels of the African majority (EFF, 2013, p. 3). It may be clear that the EFF is using structures and feelings from the colonialization and apartheid in their political discourse.

An initiative that is related to this feeling and which therefore plays an important role in their political discourse, is the plan for land expropriation without compensation (<https://www.EFFonline.org>). This plan entails the confiscation of land in South Africa, which will then be redistributed. This idea is framed in relation with colonialization, stimulating the idea of ‘white settlers that have taken and still possess our land’. The EFF claims that there is



no other party in South Africa that has raised awareness about black people's landlessness more than the EFF (<https://www.effonline.org>). In line with this idea, the EFF promotes the annual 'Land Reclaiming Day' on the 6<sup>th</sup> of April. On this day, the EFF promotes to remember the anniversary of land dispossession on the day that the settlers arrived (<https://www.effonline.org>). The issue of possession and the reclaiming of land has clear connections with the legacies of the apartheid era. It is therefore an emotive issue which speaks directly to the black African majority (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016 p. 15). These messages about land expropriation are crucial in the political discourse of the EFF, simultaneously placing the black South Africans in opposition to the historically advantaged white capitalists and the newly advantaged ANC elite (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016, p. 14).

It may be clear that the EFF is emphasizing the material and economical differences between the black and white population in South Africa in their political discourse. However, their racial discourse is more extensive. The Indian and Asian population also play a role in the EFF's racial discourse, arguing that unemployment amongst these people is far lower than that of the "African and Colored" population (EFF, 2013, p. 24) Although these people are not depicted in the same 'colonial discourse', the party emphasizes that they have problems with the fact that the original black South African population has higher unemployment rates (EFF, 2013, p. 24)

### **The material dimension**

To fight for the economic emancipation of the people of South Africa, Africa and the world is the *raison d'être* of the EFF (EFF, 2013, p. 1). The political discourse of the EFF locates this struggle for economic emancipation within the long resistance of South Africans to racist colonial and imperialist, political, economic, and social domination (EFF, 2013, p. 1). This racial distinction between the colonial settler and the black South Africans is vital in their political discourse. The EFF portrays the economic distribution and the distribution of state resources in South Africa as unfair and based on the remains of the colonialization and apartheid. To overcome this unjust distribution they want to economically include the black South Africans and exclude the white colonial settlers. Their plans for the expropriation of land represent this aim, which is framed in terms of 'taking back the land that is ours'.

## **Political inclusion**

The EFF portrays South Africa as a nation that is dominated by racialized capitalism (EFF, 2013, p. 22). This racialized capitalism has historically and currently placed the black Africans at the lower end of society (EFF, 2013, p. 22). Therefore, the EFF wants to politically include the black South Africans, so that they can do something about the inequality in their country. The EFF argues that it needs political power in order to capture the state and transform the economy for the emancipation of black South Africans (EFF, 2013, p. 7).

From these black South Africans, the party especially focuses on the working class in their political discourse. The EFF argues that the African working class has suffered and continued to suffer excessive levels of oppression and exploitation (EFF, 2013, p. 23). The primary role of the EFF is to organize the working class into mainstream political and class organization of their party (EFF, 2013, p. 23). In this context, the African working class constitutes the core of the motive forces for radical change, because they stand to benefit from the struggle for economic freedom in their lifetime (EFF, 2013, p. 23). The messages on radical economic transformation and the support for wage demands by the working class creates an image of the EFF as representatives of the poor working class, which proved to be appealing to the unemployed and employed black South African who felt their upward mobility was blocked by racism (Southall, 2014, p. 89).

Besides the black working class, the EFF specifically tries to politically include students and women. With that aim, the EFF has established the EFF Students' Command (EFFSC). This organization within the party must mobilize students, because they can contribute to the intellectual and ideological discourse. This discourse aims to promote the struggle for economic freedom. Furthermore, students are an important target because the organization is seen as an important platform for future leaders of the EFF (<https://www.EFFonline.org/constitution>). Additionally, the EFF wants to create a Women's Command (<https://www.EFFonline.org/constitution>). Its main objective should be to raise the political consciousness of women and organize and mobilize women collectively by putting "the patriarchal, white-supremacist, capitalist oppression of women" to an end (<https://www.EFFonline.org/constitution>). The EFF pictures itself as the party that promotes the rights of black South African women and as the party that really wants to invest in their development as full and equal members of the South African society (<https://www.EFFonline.org/constitution>).

In addition to this claim, the EFF emphasizes that it already organizes women marches. These marches are being held in all South African municipalities to demand establishment of special courts for sexual offences (<https://www.EFFonline.org>). These marches are framed in relation to the 1956 anti-apartheids march. This was a protest march wherein more than 20.000 women participated and presented a petition against the carrying of identity passes by black women to Prime Minister Strijdom. These passes were identity documents that black people where forced, by law, to carry at all times to allow apartheid security officials to monitor their movements and activities.

The EFF portrays itself as the South African party that stands up for women. Furthermore, the EFF blames the ANC that after 20 years of democracy in South Africa, the liberation of women is far from being realized (<https://www.EFFonline.org>). The EFF argues that only women linked to the political and economic elite of the ANC have benefited since then (<https://www.EFFonline.org>). Moreover, the EFF highlights that the economic marginalization and racism as felt by the black majority has been felt in tenfold by black women in their society (<https://www.EFFonline.org>). With these statements, the EFF links the lack of women emancipation with colonialization, apartheid and the corruption of the ANC in their political discourse.

### **Political exclusion**

On 16 August 2012 the South African police killed 34 striking platinum miners outside the small town of Marikana. This ‘Marikana Massacre’ was a major event in the recent history of South Africa and plays an important role in the discourse of the EFF (Alexander, 2013, p. 605). The party’s official launch was held in Marikana, which gave the EFF the chance to emphasize some of its key messages: Marikana symbolizes what appears to be an ANC sell out to big capital, its failure to protect the interests of one of its largest labor constituencies and its susceptibility to the excesses of force that are a feature of authoritarian regimes (Mbete, 2005, p. 41). To launch the party at the site of this tragedy, the EFF could give impetus to its agenda of being the revolutionary alternative to what it argued was a politically compromised governing party (Mbete, 2005, p. 41). Additionally, the EFF claims that the ANC wants the people to forget about the brutality which was unleashed by the police during this massacre (<https://www.EFFonline.org>). Therefore, the EFF has commemorated the day of the Marikana Massacre since their founding (<https://www.EFFonline.org>). The Marikana massacre plays a crucial part in the EFF’s political discourse and the massacre has been used

to portray voting for the ANC as equal to voting for white economic control, racism, black elite sell-outs that would do nothing for ordinary black citizens (Everatt, 2016, p. 58).

With this political discourse, the EFF is polarizing the South African politics by constructing an 'us' versus 'them' distinction. The ANC is portrayed by the EFF as an enemy for the black South Africans and is linked with white domination. The portraying of the EFF as the representatives of the black South Africans and the portraying of the ANC and white settlers as the enemy of South Africa is vital in the EFF's political discourse.

### **The political dimension**

The EFF's political discourse is largely racially determined. Their main goal is to politically include the black South African workers and unemployed. At the same time, their political discourse is aimed at portraying the ANC as an enemy for South Africa. By framing the colonialization and apartheid with the ANC, they portray the ANC as responsible for racism in South Africa. Furthermore, the image of the ANC that the EFF creates, is one of a governing party that is unable to lift the burden of being black and poor in a country that still favors those who are white and privileged (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016, p. 13).

### **Symbolic inclusion**

The EFF pictures itself as the only South African organization that inspires organization of economic emancipation movements in other parts of Africa (<https://www.effonline.org>). This inspiration comes from the idea that economic emancipation is not limited to the colonial borders that are established by colonial conquerors (<https://www.effonline.org>). The ultimate aim of the EFF is therefore the development of the entire African continent, its unity, and the free movement of its peoples and goods (<https://www.effonline.org>). According to the EFF, this could only be established after a process of decolonization to free the African people socially, culturally and economically (<https://www.effonline.org>). In line with this idea, the EFF wants to regulate and abolish foreign control and ownership of strategic sectors of the economy in South Africa and the African continent. Therefore, the EFF aims to provide ideological, political and economic support to African countries that seek to discontinue foreign control in order to take ownership of their own economic resources (<https://www.effonline.org>). These messages and ideas clearly indicate the EFF's notion of the people in their political discourse. The EFF emphasizes that the 'original' African people are their people and they have to be liberated from foreign/colonial control.

The idea of ‘the African people’ as a homogenous group, is important for setting the boundaries of the people. This is also indicated by the EFF’s views on African immigrants. The EFF stands up for African immigrants, whether they are in the country legally or illegally (EFF, 2013, p. 20) The party emphasizes that the manner in which immigrants are currently treated is undesirable: “many of these immigrants are denied medical care, are refused basic human services and are even refused burial rights in our cemeteries” (EFF, 2013, p. 20). EFF argues that the way African immigrants are treated is sub-human (EFF, 2013, p. 20) and portrays itself as a guard for “their African brothers and sisters” (EFF, 2013, p. 20).

### **Symbolic exclusion**

The EFF emphasizes in their discourse that Africans were defeated, humiliated and enslaved by colonial settlers. This is seen as a great inspiration for the EFF. The party wants to elevate the resistance against colonialization, pay tribute to all those who perished fighting for the liberation of the African people and all the oppressed people of South Africa (EFF, 2013, p. 1). The EFF emphasizes that after twenty years, when the black people of South Africa attained formal political freedom, the people still live in absolute mass poverty, are landless, their children have no productive future, they are mistreated and they are looked down upon in a sea of wealth (EFF, 2013, p. 1). The members of the EFF portray themselves as a generation that is fighting for the return of the land and wealth to the rightful owners (<https://www.EFFonline.org>). Their discourse is directed against the white settlers and the ANC which are seen as responsible for the poverty of the black South Africans.

### **The symbolic dimension**

In their political discourse, the EFF highlights the unity of the African people. People from other African countries are seen as brothers and sisters. This has two implications for their symbolic in- and exclusiveness. First of all, the EFF uses a discourse wherein the South Africans are included in the notion of the African people and vice versa. This notion lies at the foundation for their Pan-African ideas. Secondly, this notion of the unity of the African people is also complementary to their racial discourse against the white settlers. The colonial white settlers are excluded from the people of South Africa and Africa in EFF’s discourse.

### **In- and exclusiveness towards the people in EFF's populist discourse**

For the political discourse of the EFF holds too that it is largely racial determined. Where ZANU-PF uses the distinction between indigenous versus non-indigenous people, the EFF uses the black South African versus the white settlers. As a result, the EFF's discourse is mostly based on the colonialization and apartheid. Although the EFF is particularly inclusive towards women, students and African people from other countries, their discourse remains largely based on exclusion. The fact that the EFF pictures African people as their brothers and sisters is also used to strengthen the image of the white settlers ('they'), that do not belong in their country. Overall, the political discourse of the EFF is mostly based on racial characteristics and implies that it wants to include the black (South) Africans and exclude the white settlers. Therefore, their political discourse is based firmly on the (exclusionary) 'us vs. them' distinction within the notion of the people.

### **4.5. Comparison of the cases**

The discourses that ZANU-PF and the EFF utilize contain both inclusionary and exclusionary elements. Their inclusiveness is directed to the indigenous people. Furthermore, both parties use a political discourse which is remarkably inclusionary towards indigenous women. These inclusionary elements also reflect that both parties use a political discourse that is largely racially determined. This is reflected in ZANU-PF's distinction between the "indigenous" and the "non-indigenous" people, and EFF's distinction between the "black South Africans" and the "white settlers". Their discourses are therefore mostly based on the colonialization and apartheid. As a result, both parties picture themselves as representatives of the people ('us'), constantly contrasting it with the white settlers ('them'). Also, the idea of land reclaiming is crucial in their political discourses. This connects both the in- and exclusionary characteristics in their discourses. Both parties emphasize that the white settler 'has dispossessed their ancestral land'. Consequently, the role of land reclaiming in their political discourse represents, on the one hand, the exclusion of the non-indigenous people/white settlers. On the other hand, it represents the (materially) inclusion of especially the poor and the working class which are part of the indigenous people/black South Africans.

Unlike the African cases, the analyses of the parties from the European periphery have provided more ambiguous results. I would argue that SYRIZA uses a political discourse which is entirely inclusionary towards the people. This is represented best by the inclusion of the victims of the financial crisis and their views on immigrants. In contrast with SYRIZA's

discourse, Fidesz uses a political discourse that has mostly exclusionary aspects. According to the literature, a right-wing populist party like Fidesz should have an exclusionary discourse. Fidesz' discourse, however, also has an inclusionary character, which is best represented by their inclusion of the people concerning the 'Hungarians beyond the border' and the Roma minority in Hungary. However, it is important to note that both these inclusionary elements are also linked with their exclusionary discourse. The 'Hungarian beyond the border' issue is framed as a need for cultural survival of Hungary. This also entails that the cultural survival is in danger, which is an exclusionary element. For example, the inclusion of the Roma minority is framed as a reason why Hungary cannot accommodate refugees.

Although the African cases and Fidesz are very alike and have a political discourse that is mostly exclusionary, it is remarkable that the African cases have a significant role for the inclusion of women in their political discourse and Fidesz does not. Because of the fact that both the African cases and Fidesz are very much the same in their discourse on dividing the 'traditional inhabitants' of their countries with 'new/undesired inhabitants', the inclusion of women for the African cases is the biggest difference between theirs and Fidesz' political discourses.

In conclusion, this analysis shows that that inclusionary and exclusionary elements of populism are present in both regions. Based on the African case studies, I would argue that the political discourse of African populists contains both inclusionary and exclusionary elements. It is however important to note that the emphasis in both discourses is clearly on the exclusion of the white population. In contrast, the populist discourses of the cases from the European periphery varies more, with one being strictly inclusionary (SYRIZA) and the other mostly exclusionary (Fidesz). This difference is best reflected by their views on immigration and refugees. One can thus conclude that the populist discourse in the European periphery contains both inclusionary and exclusionary characteristics.



## Chapter 5: Conclusion

In this final chapter I will explicitly answer the research question of this study:

*How in inclusive or exclusive is the populist discourse in Africa and European periphery ?*

This study maintained a discourse analysis, which is an interpretive form of conducting research. Therefore, it is important to note that someone else could obtain (slightly) different findings when analyzing the primary sources. These differences do however not necessarily make the analysis less reliable, because they are inherent to a discourse analysis and different interpretations may even form a source of data about the specific discourse in the analysis (Halperin & Reath, 2012, p. 332). Additionally, by means of the analytical framework, a more systematic layer is added to the discourse analysis, which is used for the initial focus of the close reading of the sources.

First, the main findings of this study will be discussed, followed by my answer to the research question. Then I will discuss the wider significance of the findings. This will result in a cross-regional comparison between Africa and the European periphery, which will be connected to the literature on this topic. Finally, I will shortly focus on the contributions and limitations of this study and its implications for future research.

### 5.1. Main findings

The discourses that ZANU-PF and the EFF carry out contain both inclusionary and exclusionary elements. Their inclusiveness is directed towards the indigenous people. Both parties particularly emphasize the inclusion of the indigenous women in their political discourse. The inclusionary elements also reflect that both parties use a political discourse that is largely racially determined. This is reflected in ZANU-PF's distinction between the "indigenous" and the "non-indigenous" people, and EFF's distinction between the "black South Africans" and the "white settlers". Their discourses are therefore mostly based on the colonialization and apartheid. As a result, both parties portray themselves as representatives of the people ('us'), constantly contrasting it with the white settlers ('them').

In contrast to the African cases, the analyses of the parties from the European periphery have provided more ambiguous results. I would argue that SYRIZA uses a political discourse which is entirely inclusionary towards the people. This is represented by the inclusion of the victims of the financial crisis and their views on immigrants. In contrast with SYRIZA's unambiguous discourse, Fidesz uses a political discourse that has mostly



exclusionary aspects. The analyses have shown that the political discourse of Fidesz regarding immigration and refugees – an essential point in their discourse – is very exclusionary. However, Fidesz' discourse also has an inclusionary character, which is best represented by their inclusion of the people concerning the 'Hungarians beyond the border' and the Roma minority in Hungary. It is however important to note that both these inclusionary elements in their discourse could also be seen as part of their exclusionary discourse. The 'Hungarian beyond the border' issue is framed as a need for cultural survival of Hungary and is framed as the inclusion of the Hungarians that live abroad. However, it depicts a clear cultural/racial distinction, which also contributes to their exclusionary discourse. This is more often the case with the discourse of Fidesz. The inclusion of the Roma minority in Hungary is also part of their inclusionary discourse, but the inclusion of the Roma minority is framed as a reason why Hungary cannot accommodate refugees and contributes therefore to their exclusionary discourse.

This all results in the following answer to the research question: the African region is mainly exclusionary, whereas the European periphery is exclusionary as well as inclusionary. More specifically, the African region does contain some inclusionary aspects, but the focus is clearly on exclusion. In contrast, the populist discourses of the cases from the European periphery differ greatly from each other, with one being strictly inclusionary (SYRIZA) and the mostly exclusionary (Fidesz). One can thus conclude that the populist discourse in the European periphery contains both inclusionary and exclusionary characteristics.

## **5.2. Wider significance of the findings**

As becomes clear from the previous section, between the populist discourses in Africa and the European region many differences exist, as well as commonalities. Moreover, it is interesting to connect the findings of this study with the literature on populist discourses of Latin America and Western Europe.

Generally, European populism is labeled as exclusionary, while Latin American populism is labeled as inclusionary (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 167). Moreover, Latin America populism predominantly has a socioeconomic dimension (including the poor), while Europe populism has a primarily sociocultural dimension (excluding the 'aliens') (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 167). The different socioeconomic situations in these two regions are seen as the main explanation for this (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 167).

When comparing the findings of this study with previous findings on the topic of in- and exclusionary populism, it is interesting to see that the results for the European periphery are different from previous findings on Western Europe – which is in line with the expectations.

First of all, the results for SYRIZA prove that it is too easy to argue that European populism is solely exclusive. SYRIZA is a clear example of an inclusive populist party in Europe. Despite the fact that right-wing populist parties are predominantly seen as exclusionary and that there are more right-wing populist parties in Europe, ignoring the inclusionary populist parties in Europe does not contribute to a complete and better view of European populism. Furthermore, some political scientists even argue that there is ‘a fourth populist wave’ in the shape of left-wing populist parties now emerging in many corners of the world (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016, p. 8). If this is correct, it is even more important to highlight both types of populism.

Secondly, in the right-wing populist discourse of Fidesz, inclusionary elements are present as well. Based on the current findings, I argue that both in- and exclusionary elements are present in Fidesz’ discourse, but that it is mostly exclusionary. Because of the presence of both elements, an inclusive-exclusive dichotomy should not be pushed too far and a bit more nuanced view on European populism would be in place.

Furthermore, it is interesting to see that the inclusionary characteristics of SYRIZA are comparable with populism in Latin America. Greece is a Mediterranean country with a Marxist tradition and therefore has important commonalities with Latin America. Moreover, it is interesting to see that the socioeconomic situation plays a big role for both Latin America and Greece. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012, p. 167) argue that in Latin American populism has a greater socioeconomic dimension in comparison with Europe, which can be partially explained by the different socioeconomic situations in the two regions (i.e., the socioeconomic situation is worse in Latin America and thus plays a more important role in the populist discourse). The fact that Europe generally does not focus as much on the socioeconomic dimension might result in the expectation of a greater absence of the socioeconomic dimension in the populist discourse of Greece. However, this is not the case, as SYRIZA does emphasize the socioeconomic dimension in their populist discourse, most likely due to the financial crisis and the European debt crisis. As a result, SYRIZA’s populist discourse is inclusionary and comparable with the inclusionary populism in Latin America.

Because of the fact that there is, to my knowledge, not yet a study (other than this study) on the in- and exclusiveness in Africa, I cannot compare the findings of this study with

other studies on this specific region. It is however interesting to compare the findings for Africa with the other findings in this study and other literature. In my opinion, it is remarkable that the populist discourse in Africa has many similarities with the (exclusionary) populist discourse of the European periphery and Western Europe. The populist African discourse is aimed at including the traditional African people and excluding the white population, which in their eyes does not belong to their notion of the people (i.e., 'us'). This importance of a kind of traditional, national identity is also present in the populist discourse of Fidesz and the Western European populist discourse. They also want to exclude people that are not traditionally part of their notion of the people, like immigrants and refugees. Therefore, the discourse of African populism is partially similar to the discourses of Fidesz and Western European populist parties: all focus on the exclusion of non-native groups. In sum, although exclusionary populists claim to represent the voice of the people, this notion always entails a specific traditional group of the people. Thereby, they exclude values and people from 'outside'.

This outcome is, remarkably, the total opposite of my expectations based on the similar ethnic situation in the African countries and Latin America. Based on the extreme ethnic diverseness of both Africa and Latin America, and the inclusionary character of Latin American populism, I expected to find an inclusionary populist discourse in Africa as well. The most successful of the populist parties from Latin America combine an inclusive ethnic appeal with a traditional populist platform. Because of the fact that the ethnicity of both regions are largely comparable and the fact that there is no previous research on in-/exclusion in African populism, I expected the selected African cases to also be inclusionary. Remarkably enough, the outcome is the total opposite. Even though the discourse of the African cases is largely exclusionary, it has inclusionary elements and is strictly inclusionary towards 'the indigenous people' of their countries.

### **5.3. Limitations and further research**

The current study aimed to contribute to the closing of three research gaps. The main aim of this study was to develop a better understanding of the in- and exclusive types of populism and to assess how in- or exclusive the populist discourse in Africa and the European periphery is. Additionally, this study also has tried to increase the knowledge about cross-regional populism and understudied regions.

It is important to note that although the current study has tried to contribute to the closing of these research gaps, more research is needed for the closing of these gaps. First of all, a general argument of this study is that the notion of an inclusive-exclusive dichotomy – regarding the notion of the people – should not be pushed too far. In most cases, there were both inclusionary and exclusionary elements present in the populist discourse. This hopefully stimulates a new – more nuanced – view on the in- and exclusiveness of populism, which might be maintained in further research on the in- and exclusiveness of populism.

Furthermore, I argue that the studied cases have yielded outcomes that are at least to an extent generalizable for the African region and the region of the European periphery. Nevertheless, future research should focus on additional cases from these regions to add to a more complete image and to compare with the current findings. The importance thereof becomes clear from the current study as well: the existing image of European populism was found not to be generalizable when considering the European periphery as well. Thus, only after including more cases, it can be determined whether findings about the in- and exclusiveness in these regions are really generalizable.

Finally, there are still regions in the world that are understudied in relation to research on populism, such as the Middle-East and India (Hadiz & Chrysogelos, 2017, p. 399). An interesting development would be to apply a research design as maintained in the current study on these fairly understudied regions.

In line with the focus on understudied regions, I would argue that Africa should be studied more often. The case study of the EFF has resulted in very interesting and remarkable insights about notions of ‘Pan-Africanism’ in their discourse. EFF’s discourse mentions the bond between the ‘traditional African’ people. This is an interesting notion of the people, which could mean that for the EFF their idea of the people could be restricted to Africa as a whole, rather than South-Africa specifically. Their discourse contains some elements of a pan-national discourse, which is also present in the Arab culture for example. Moreover, it is interesting to see that the study of the discourse of ZANU-PF did not result in comparable results. Therefore, it would be interesting to see if further research could perform case studies on other African cases, which could analyze whether these ‘pan-African’ notions are only present within the discourse of the EFF, or is common in other African cases.

In conclusion, I see a lot of interesting and relevant possibilities for future research. I hope that this study will be followed by more studies on the in- and exclusiveness of populism, particularly in the form of cross-regional studies of understudied regions. In the current era – which is characterized by globalization, regional and international cooperation,

immigration and refugees - national identity is under pressure. As a result, who belongs to 'us' and who does not belong to 'us', has become an important (populist) political question. The fact that populism is spreading across the world and plays an increasing role in many national and regional politics, makes populism (still) a highly relevant subject for both the scientific and the real world.

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