



ONLINE CONFLICT DELISTING:

**THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON STORE
SWITCHING AND BRAND SWITCHING**

RADBOD UNIVERSITY

First supervisor:
Seán Patrick Donnelly

Sanne Relou
s1037993

Second supervisor:
Marleen Hermans

Title of this research project

Online conflict delisting: The impact of publicity on store switching and brand switching

Personal information

Name: Sanne Relou

Student s1037993

Email: sanne.relou@student.ru.nl

University: Radboud University

Master: Business administration

Specialization: Marketing

Supervisors**Name of assigned**

supervisor: Seán Patrick Donnelly

Name of assigned

2nd examiner: Marleen Hermans

Preface

Before you start reading this thesis, I would like to take a moment to thank everyone who has supported me throughout this intensive and educative journey. I especially want to express my gratitude to my supervisor Seán, who helped us out when we were in need of a new supervisor. Thank you for all your guidance and support. I would also like to thank my second supervisor Marleen Hermans for her expertise. Lastly, I want to thank my family and friends for motivating me and supporting me when things got really difficult. Especially my father who was always there for me when I needed to talk to someone. Furthermore, I would like to thank Mirte, Tim, Daphne and Sanne, my fellow students, for their feedback and support. It was nice to work with you guys!

Enjoy reading,

Sanne Relou

Nijmegen, August 2020

Abstract

These days the negotiations between retailers and manufacturers have turned into power battles, which can result in a conflict delisting, where the manufacturer's brand gets delisted from the retailer's assortment. This forces customers to switch to another brand or go to another store. Conflict delisting cases often receive a lot of media attention. This research aims to see whether the store and brand switching intentions differ if there is a lot of publicity. This publicity can result in the consumer being aware of the online conflict delisting before they place their order. With an experiment via an online survey, this research does establish that customers switch to another store or to another brand. However, there is no difference in switching intentions between an unannounced online conflict delisting and an announced online conflict delisting. This research contributes to the existing literature by providing more insights in the role of publicity on switching behaviour. The results of this research can assist retailers and manufacturers in the decision whether to start an online conflict delisting in the first place. Another implication for retailers and manufacturers is that making the announcement by one of the parties involved does not give them an advantage over the other party since this strategy will not lead to more or different switching behaviour.

Content

Chapter 1 Introduction	7
1.1 Conflict delisting	7
1.2 Gap in the literature	8
1.3 Contribution of this research	9
1.4 Structure of the report	9
Chapter 2 Literature review	10
2.1 Conflict delisting	10
2.1.1 Private labels	10
2.1.2 Customer data	11
2.1.3 Retailer – Manufacturer power battle	11
2.1.4 Online conflict delisting	12
2.2 Switching behavior	13
2.2.1 Customer response	13
2.2.2 Type of product that enhances switching behavior	14
2.2.3 Informing the customer	16
2.3 The role of publicity	17
2.3.1 Unannounced online conflict delisting and its impact on switching behavior	17
2.3.2 Announced online conflict delisting and its impact on switching behavior	17
Chapter 3 Methodology	20
3.1 Research context	20
3.2 Method	20
3.3 Measurement of variables	21
3.3.1 Design of the stimuli	21
3.3.2 Dependent variables	21
3.4 Sample	22
3.5 Data collection procedure	23
3.6 Research ethics	25
Chapter 4 Results	26
4.1 Descriptive statistics	26
4.2 Correlations	27
4.3 Data analysis	28
4.3.1 Assumptions of a paired-sample t-test	28
4.3.2 In the case of an unannounced online conflict delisting the store switching intentions are not higher than the brand switching intentions	28
4.3.3 In the case of an announced online conflict delisting the store switching intentions are not higher than the brand switching intentions	29
4.3.4 No difference between an unannounced and an announced online conflict delisting	29
4.4 Additional analyses	31
4.4.1 The significant impact of brand loyalty	31
4.4.2 No influence of gender	32
4.5 Summary of the results	32
Chapter 5 Discussion and conclusion	34

5.1 General discussion and conclusion	34
5.2 Theoretical implications	36
5.3 Managerial implications	38
5.4 Limitations and directions for future research	39
5.5 Conclusion	41
References	42
Appendices	45
Appendix 1: Transcript interview Dr. Leach	45
Appendix 2: Recruitment of participants	53
Appendix 3: Survey	55
Appendix 4 Results	60
4.1 Pivot tables	60
4.2 Frequency tables	60
4.3 Correlation table	61
4.4 SPSS output data analysis	63
4.5 Additional analyses	63
Appendix 5: Population characteristics	74

Chapter 1 Introduction

“Get closer than ever to your customers. So close that you tell them what they need well before they realize it themselves” – Steve Jobs

1.1 Conflict delisting

Over the years the grocery retailer landscape has changed and large retailer concerns have gained more market share, resulting in a landscape dominated by a few big retail concerns (Nielsen, 2019). This enabled retailers to collect more customer data and catch up with the manufacturer. Due to the development of private labels and the huge amount of customer data the power of the retailers increased (Draganska, Klapper, & Villas-Boas, 2010; Leach, 2021). Because of these developments, negotiations between the retailer and the manufacturer have become power battles, since both parties have strong negotiation positions. When both parties perceive themselves as very powerful they can use an aggressive strategy, which in the end could lead to a conflict delisting (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). Since the power of the retailer has increased, there is an increase in the number of conflict delisting cases (Breugelmans, Gijsbrechts, & Campo, 2018). An example is the conflict between supermarket Albert Heijn and Johma, who had disagreement about the commercial arrangements. Due to this disagreement the products of Johma were not available at Albert Heijn for some time (RTVOost, 2018).

In the literature a conflict delisting is defined as a temporary unavailability of a product due to a conflict between the manufacturer and the retailer (Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, & Cleeren, 2017). Therefore, a conflict delisting differs from a normal delisting, which can have other reasons, such as an assortment reduction or temporary out of stock (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). A conflict delisting can be initiated by the retailer as well as by the manufacturer and occurs in different industries. Fun, a toy store, for example, delisted the Mattel products, since they did not agree with the higher prices of Mattel (Standaard, 2011). This research will focus on conflict delisting cases in the grocery industry.

A disadvantage of a conflict delisting is the loss of sale for either the manufacturer or the retailer, with the retailer being more vulnerable (Van der Maelen et al., 2017). When confronted with a conflict delisting, customers cannot buy their preferred product and will either have to switch to another brand or to another store (Campo, Gijsbrechts, & Nisol, 2000; Sloot &

Verhoef, 2008). When the consumer has a strong preference for the brand the store switching intentions increase (Campo et al., 2000; Florez-Acosta & Herrera-Araujo, 2017; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). However, when the retailer has a large assortment with sufficient alternatives, the probability of the customer switching to another brand increases (Campo et al., 2000; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008).

1.2 Gap in the literature

Something that is inherent to a conflict delisting is publicity. A conflict delisting generally receives a lot of media attention, more than any other product unavailability (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Hermans, 2017; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). This could result in the customer being aware of the conflict delisting before he or she enters the store. Previous research on conflict delisting cases considered media attention at a generic level. Hermans (2017) focusses on whether advertising is relevant when a conflict delisting receives a lot of publicity. She concludes that when a conflict delisting receives a lot of media attention the advertising effectiveness decreases (Hermans, 2017). Another conclusion is that a conflict delisting has a negative impact on the firm value of the retailer and the manufacturer, especially when there is a lot of publicity. Meanwhile Van der Maelen et al. (2017) conclude that when confronted with a conflict delisting both the retailer as well as the manufacturer lose sales, though the retailer is the most vulnerable party, which indicates that the customer switches to another store or brand or postpone or cancel their purchase. They found support that both the retailer and the manufacturer lose more sales in the necessity categories than in the impulse categories. A possible explanation for this result is that purchases in the necessity categories are planned in advance (Van der Maelen et al., 2017). A conflict delisting often receives a lot of media attention, so therefore the customer could be aware of the conflict delisting before he or she enters the store and alter their shopping plans (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). Based on this literature it is possible that an announced online conflict delisting has a different impact on switching behavior than an unannounced conflict delisting. Yet not a lot of empirical research has been done about this subject. Hence, the research question is: *Is there a difference in store switching intentions and brand switching intentions between an announced online conflict delisting and an unannounced online conflict delisting?* The objective of this research is to see whether there is a difference in the store switching intentions and brand switching intentions between an announced online conflict delisting and an unannounced online conflict delisting. This research will only look at online conflict delisting cases, since this a new

and interesting area for research as well due to the rise of online grocery shopping (Supermarkt&Ruimte, 2020). Whether or not a full-scale delisting takes place, where the product could also be removed offline is outside the scope of this research.

1.3 Contribution of this research

The contribution of this research is to expand the current knowledge about the impact of an announced and unannounced online conflict delisting on switching behavior, by testing whether the customers adjust their shopping plan if they are informed about the online conflict delisting before they order their groceries. First, this research contributes to the existing knowledge about conflict delisting cases, which is important since these are occurring more often (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Hermans, 2017; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). Second, this research aims to expand the current literature by providing more insights in the role of media attention, which is inherent to a conflict delisting, and its impact on switching behavior of the customers, since the consumer can be aware of the online conflict delisting before they enter the store. Lastly, this study provides more insights in the switching intentions of the online grocery shoppers, which have not been considered in the field of conflict delisting cases.

This study also gives relevant managerial implications for retailers as well as for manufactures, since this research shows what the consequences are of an online conflict delisting and whether publicity has an impact on switching behavior. This can assist managers in their decision to start an online conflict delisting or not and helps them to understand the role of publicity in a conflict delisting.

1.4 Structure of the report

The report is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 presents a literature overview of the existing literature. In chapter 3 the methodology of this research is described. The results of this study can be found in chapter 4 while chapter 5 presents a discussion, with the managerial implications, the limitations of this research and a conclusion.

Chapter 2 Literature review

In this chapter the relevant literature concerning a conflict delisting and switching behavior will be discussed. Based on this literature review, several hypotheses can be formulated, and a conceptual model can be drawn. To enhance the understanding of the phenomenon conflict delisting an interview was conducted with Dr. Leach, who wrote his PhD about supplier and retailer collaboration and has worked for 30 years as a consultant in the market for fast moving consumer goods. The transcript can be found in Appendix 1.

2.1 Conflict delisting

In literature a conflict delisting is defined as a temporary unavailability of a product due to a conflict between the manufacturer and the retailer (Van der Maelen et al., 2017). It is a tool which can be used by retailers as well as by manufacturers, but it is mainly used by retailers to strengthen their position during negotiations with manufacturers (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Wiebach & Hildebrandt, 2012). Therefore, a conflict delisting differs from other types of product unavailability, since the delisting is a consequence of a disagreement (Van der Maelen et al., 2017). Over the years the number of conflict delisting cases has increased due to the rise of private labels and the increase in the retailers' firm size (Draganska et al., 2010; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). Retailers united, resulting in big retailer concerns, which gave them the advantage of economies of scale (Draganska & Klapper, 2007). The availability of scanner data and the development of private labels allowed retailers to catch up with the manufacturers (Kusum L Ailawadi, 2001; Amato & Amato, 2009; Draganska et al., 2010). These two developments contributed to the rise of conflict delisting cases (Leach, 2021). All major supermarket concerns in The Netherlands have private labels. This research focusses on supermarket concerns which have next to these private labels a full coverage of A-brands. The development of private labels and the collection of customer data will be discussed in short in the next paragraphs.

2.1.1 Private labels

One of the reasons for the increasing number of conflict delisting cases is the development of private labels or store labels. Retailers can reduce the power of the manufacturer by offering strong private labels and create store loyalty (Amato & Amato, 2009; K.L. Keller & Swaminathan, 2019; Leach, 2021). Prior research (Kusum L Ailawadi, 2001) claims that private labels have several benefits for the retailer. Retailers can use private labels to compete

with the A-brands and for price conscious customers and at the same time it enables them to keep up their margins (Kusum L Ailawadi, 2001; Draganska & Klapper, 2007; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). It can also be used as leverage in negotiations with the manufacturer, which gives the retailer more power (Kusum L Ailawadi, 2001; Draganska & Klapper, 2007). Lastly, retailers can create store loyalty with their private labels (Kusum L. Ailawadi et al., 2010). This means that private labels give retailers more bargaining power (Meza & Sudhir, 2010). However, the influence on the retailer-manufacturer relationship is limited, since people still have a strong preference for A-brands especially in mass categories (Meza & Sudhir, 2010). Therefore, it is important for the retailers' profitability to have A-brands in their assortment (Kusum L Ailawadi, 2001; Gázquez-Abad, Martínez-López, Esteban-Millat, Mondéjar-Jiménez, & Rejón-Guardia, 2016; Leach, 2021). Manufacturers of A-brands can create high brand equity and customer loyalty which will reduce the power of the retailers (Amato & Amato, 2009; Breugelmans et al., 2018).

2.1.2 Customer data

In the past customer data was only available for manufacturers, since retailers did not have the required financial and human resources to collect customer data (Chu, 1997). New scanner technologies, like scanner data and loyalty programs, enabled the retailers to catch up with the manufacturers. With the information from scanner data and loyalty programs, retailers can see which products the customers prefer. This strengthens their position in negotiations with the manufacturer and enables them to use the conflict delisting as a tool to gain more power in negotiations, since they know what the consequences of a delisting would be (Wiebach & Hildebrandt, 2012).

2.1.3 Retailer – Manufacturer power battle

The manufacturer and the retailer need each other, so they are dependent on each other. Manufacturers are depending on retailers to sell their products (Wiebach & Hildebrandt, 2010). Then why does a conflict delisting occur? The answer is that the negotiations about for example, price or shelf space are often power battles (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Hermans, 2017; Leach, 2021; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). Large retailers perceive themselves to be very powerful, since they determine whether the manufacturer can have access to their customers via their store. When a retailer perceive themselves as very powerful, they often use a very aggressive strategy to get better deals during negotiations (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Hermans, 2017;

Leach, 2021; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). These retailers can use a conflict delisting or the threat of a conflict delisting as a tool to negotiate better deals (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Gázquez-Abad et al., 2016; Hermans, 2017; Van der Maelen et al., 2017).

There are two ways a manufacturer can react to this aggressive strategy. On one hand the manufacturer can agree with the retailer's demands, which will decrease the gross margin on the side of the manufacturer. In the end this will result in an increase in the power of the retailer and will weaken the position of the manufacturer. This makes the manufacturer vulnerable (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). On the other hand the manufacturer can also choose the strategy fight (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). This could lead to a temporary delisting of the manufacturer's products and sales risks for both parties. However, when customers start to complain to the retailer and even go to another store, the retailer must give in, which will strengthen the position of the manufacturer. Though only strong brands or brands in the hedonic product categories or a combination of these, are able to fight the retailers (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). The reason for this is that the buying process of utilitarian products differs from the buying process of hedonic products. When buying utilitarian products, the customer only has rational motives, while hedonic products are bought for fun or pleasure. So therefore, the hedonic buying process also includes emotional motives. Due to this customers bind more with hedonic products (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). In the end a conflict delisting arises when both parties or one of the parties perceive themselves as very powerful in the negotiations, because there are sales risks, when customers probably can switch either to another brand or to another store (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Van der Maelen et al., 2017).

2.1.4 Online conflict delisting

Previous research has been about a conflict delisting which resulted in the delisting of a product offline (Florez-Acosta & Herrera-Araujo, 2017; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Van der Maelen et al., 2017; Wiebach & Hildebrandt, 2012). This research is focused on an online conflict delisting because of the increase in online grocery shopping and the lack of research on this. This research does not compare an offline conflict delisting with an online conflict delisting. However, the results of this research are compared with previous research about online and offline conflict delisting cases.

An online conflict delisting is the same as an offline delisting, only the product will be delisted online instead of delisted from the physical store. Based on the definition of Van der Maelen et

al. (2017) the following definition is used: *an online conflict delisting is the temporary unavailability of an online product due to a conflict between the brand and the manufacturer*. This definition was chosen because this definition is commonly used in other research about conflict delisting cases. An online environment differs from an offline environment, because in the case of a removal of the product online the transaction costs for customers are lower. Transaction costs are the costs of switching behavior like time and distance to switch to another supermarket for example, while there are search costs when switching to another brand. In an online environment it is easy to switch to another store and it is easier to find information about the different brands. This enhances switching behavior (Peterson, Kim, & Jeong, 2020). Transaction costs are not incorporated in this research because it is out of the scope. This research focusses on the main effects and wants to establish whether an online conflict delisting leads to switching behavior and if it matters whether this online conflict delisting is announced or not.

2.2 Switching behavior

2.2.1 Customer response

A conflict delisting can result in loss of sales, market share and profit for the retailer as well as for the manufacturer (Borle, Boatwright, Kadane, Nunes, & Galit, 2005; Hermans, 2017; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). A possible explanation for this is switching behavior. The customer's preferred product is not available so the customer has to adjust their shopping behavior (Campo et al., 2000). Literature (Campo et al., 2000) describes four ways customers can react to a product unavailability:

1. *The customer can switch to another product;*

When the retailer offers sufficient alternatives, the customer can decide to switch to another product. This can be temporary or permanent (Campo et al., 2000; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). When a consumer is loyal to the store, the probability of brand switching increases (Campo et al., 2000; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). Store loyalty can be defined as: *“The biased (i.e. non random) behavioural response (i.e. revisit), expressed over time, by some decision-making unit with respect to one store out of a set of stores, which is a function of psychological (decision making and evaluative) processes resulting in store commitment”* (J. Bloemer & de Ruyter, 1998).

2. *The customer can buy their preferred product at a competing store;*

When the customer is brand loyal, it is very likely that he or she will go to another store to buy the preferred product (Campo et al., 2000; Ku, Kuo, & Huang, 2017; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Wiebach & Hildebrandt, 2010). Brand loyalty can be defined as: ‘*The biased (i.e. non-random) behavioral response (i.e. purchase), expressed over time, by some decision making unit with respect to one or more alternative brands out of a set of such brands which is a function of psychological processes resulting in brand commitment.*’ (J. M. Bloemer & Kasper, 1995). When the consumer switches to another store it can result in category loss for the retailer or the loss of the consumers’ entire shopping basket (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008).

3. *The customer postpones their purchase;*

Customers can decide to postpone their purchase and buy their preferred product on another shopping trip. When a customer has a positive attitude towards shopping it is more likely that he or she will postpone their purchase. This option is often chosen when the preferred product is not immediately necessary (Campo et al., 2000).

4. *The customer drops the purchase;*

The last option is that the customer drops the entire purchase. This happens more often when the customer is on a major shopping trip. A possible explanation for this is that the unacquired product is only a small loss compared to the entire shopping basket (Campo et al., 2000).

These customer responses can all lead to significant sales losses at the side of the retailer as well as on the side of the manufacturer (Borle et al., 2005; Campo et al., 2000; Dadzie & Winston, 2007; Fitzsimons, 2000; Van der Maelen et al., 2017; Wiebach & Hildebrandt, 2010, 2012). This research will focus on the first two options since this study is interested in the role of publicity on switching behavior. In the case of a delisting switching behavior occurs more often than postponement or cancellation of the purchase (Van der Maelen et al., 2017). This research also investigates whether consumers switch with their entire shopping basket to another store. In addition, store loyalty and brand loyalty have been measured in order to perform additional analyses and to access whether this could have an impact on the results.

2.2.2 Type of product that enhances switching behavior

A retailer or manufacturer can decide to delist various products. However, for the customer it matters which type of product gets delisted. A retailer must be careful with an offline delisting when the product has the following characteristics as customers will switch to another store when the retailer delists a brand:

- *which has a high brand equity and a high market share.*

High brand equity will create a higher customer loyalty. Customers are prepared to search for the brand in other channels when it is not there (Amato & Amato, 2009; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). According to Kevin Lane Keller (1993) customers respond more favorable to a product and its marketing when the brand has a high brand equity. This also includes customers who are willing to search for the brand in another distribution channel. When customers respond less favorable to the product and the marketing the brand has a low brand equity (Kevin Lane Keller, 1993; K.L. Keller & Swaminathan, 2019). The probability of a customer visiting another store will be higher when the customer has a strong preference for that particular product (Florez-Acosta & Herrera-Araujo, 2017).

- *which is in the hedonic category.*

A product in the hedonic product category is considered as a luxury product like cigarettes or beer (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). It is an attitude towards a brand (Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000). Customers buy hedonic products for fun therefore the buying process includes emotional motives. Because of this they bond more with hedonic brands (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008).

- *In a small assortment.*

If there is a low number of alternatives, because of the small assortment the customer will switch to another store (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008).

In the case of an offline delisting of a brand with a low brand equity, which falls in the utilitarian category and the retailer has a large assortment, the customer will switch brand and remains loyal to the store (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008).

This research will focus on a delisting of a product with a high equity brand, high market share, in the hedonic product category, in supermarket with a large assortment, since a delisting of these products have the strongest effect on switching behavior (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). By using the delisting of a product with these characteristics, it is possible to establish whether there is an effect in the first place. This literature has been done in an offline context, but due to lack of research on online conflict delisting cases this research assumes that in an online context a product with these characteristics would also have the strongest effect on switching behavior.

2.2.3 Informing the customer

When faced with a delisting or stockout (online and offline) the retailer and manufacturer can decide to either (1) inform the customer before they place their order, no alternative suggested, (2) Inform the customer after a purchase attempt, or (3) inform the consumer before they place an order and suggest alternative options (Breugelmans, Campo, & Gijsbrechts, 2006; Breugelmans et al., 2018). Each strategy will be discussed in more detail in the next paragraphs.

Inform the customer before they place their order, no alternatives suggested

The retailer or the manufacturer can inform the customer right away. The advantage of this strategy is that customers are aware of the online conflict delisting and are not frustrated because they have not attempted a purchase yet. By providing them with information before the purchase the customers can adjust their expectations (Pizzi & Scarpi, 2013). However, it does confuse customers and by not offering any alternatives the customer can adjust their shopping plan and visit another store (Breugelmans et al., 2006). Informing the customer about the conflict delisting can harm the image of the brand's product and the retailer's webshop (Peterson et al., 2020).

Inform the customer after a purchase attempt

By informing the customer when he or she attempts to purchase the product, retailers hope to enhance the customer's perception of the assortment. Nonetheless the customer could get frustrated since the purchase attempt did not succeed which can affect their satisfaction (Pizzi & Scarpi, 2013). It even reduces the category purchases (Breugelmans et al., 2006). Customers who are surprised by the news that their preferred product is not available are more likely to switch the store, while informing them in advance the customer is more likely to postpone their purchase (Zinn & Liu, 2001).

Inform the consumer before they place an order and suggest alternative options

By offering alternative options the retailer tries to keep the customer in their web shop. By suggesting an alternative option, the consideration and choice probability from the customer increase. When the customer finds an acceptable alternative, the retailer does not lose any sales (Ku et al., 2017). However, when the retailer is suggesting a more expensive product the customer gets suspicious of the retailer's intention (Breugelmans et al., 2006).

These three options of informing the consumer about a delisting are very common in an out-of-stock situation and are not taken into account in this research, since it is not a special characteristic of a conflict delisting.

2.3 The role of publicity

In the case of a conflict delisting, there is another option. Conflict delisting cases receive a lot of media attention (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Hermans, 2017; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). A result of this is that the customer already knows about the conflict delisting before he or she enters the store without being informed by the retailer or the manufacturer. When the customer is notified by media on the conflict delisting both the retailer and the manufacturer are very vulnerable when the customer plans their purchase in advance (Van der Maelen et al., 2017). A result of this notion could be that customers can use the knowledge on the conflict delisting to adjust their shopping plans before the shopping trip starts (Van der Maelen et al., 2017). Since media attention or publicity is a specific aspect of a conflict delisting this research will focus on whether the customer finds out during shopping or is informed beforehand through news and social media (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Hermans, 2017; Van der Maelen et al., 2017).

2.3.1 Unannounced online conflict delisting and its impact on switching behavior

In the case of an unannounced conflict delisting the customer is not aware of the conflict delisting and finds out about the conflict delisting during shopping. The customer can react surprised or frustrated when their preferred product is not there. The surprise and frustration can lead to the customer switching store (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Dadzie & Winston, 2007; Florez-Acosta & Herrera-Araujo, 2017; Peterson et al., 2020; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Zinn & Liu, 2001). However, when the retailer has a large assortment with enough alternatives the probability of the customer switching brand increases (Campo et al., 2000; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Wiebach & Hildebrandt, 2010, 2012). *In this research an unannounced online conflict delisting is a conflict delisting which did not receive any media attention.*

2.3.2 Announced online conflict delisting and its impact on switching behavior

When a conflict delisting is announced in the news or on social media, the customer is aware of the conflict delisting before he or she enters the store. This leads to less frustration and surprise, but the customer can adjust their shopping plans and visit another store (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Breugelmans et al., 2018; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). *In this research an*

announced online conflict delisting is an online conflict delisting which receives a lot of publicity. The online conflict delisting is announced in the news and on social media. It is out of the scope of this research whether the retailer or the manufacturer announces the online conflict delisting in the news, as well as retailer or manufacturer announcements are out of the scope of this research.

2.4 Conceptual model

This research investigates whether there is a difference between the brand switching and store switching intentions if the online conflict delisting is announced or not. First, the impact of an *unannounced* online conflict delisting on store switching and brand switching is investigated. When customers find out about the online conflict delisting during shopping, they are surprised that their favorite brand is not there, which results in frustration and confusion. Because of the frustration and confusion, the expectations are that the store switching intentions are higher than the brand switching intentions (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Dadzie & Winston, 2007; Florez-Acosta & Herrera-Araujo, 2017; Peterson et al., 2020; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Zinn & Liu, 2001). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: In an unannounced online conflict delisting scenario, the consumer has a higher intention to switch store than to switch brand.

In the case of an *announced* online conflict delisting, the expectations are that the store switching intentions are higher than the brand switching intentions. When customers are informed about the online conflict delisting before they enter the store, through social media or the news, the customers can adjust their shopping plans and visit another store (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Breugelmans et al., 2018; Van der Maelen et al., 2017).

H2: In an announced online conflict delisting scenario, the consumer has a higher intention to switch store than to switch brand.

In order to see whether the customer reacts differently to an announced or unannounced online conflict delisting, the two situations are compared. Based on literature, the predictions are that an announced online conflict delisting results in higher store switching intentions compared with an unannounced online conflict delisting. When customers are informed before they go to the store, they can adjust their shopping plan and switch store (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Breugelmans et al., 2018; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). When customers are confronted with

an online conflict delisting while they are shopping, they are surprised and frustrated, but if the retailer has a large assortment with enough alternatives, the customer switches brand (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Campo et al., 2000; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). Hence, the expectations are the in the case of an *announced* online conflict delisting the store switching intentions would be higher compared with the store switching intentions in an *unannounced* online conflict delisting. Because the store switching intentions are higher in the case of an *announced* online conflict delisting, it is expected that the brand switching intentions will be lower compared with an *unannounced* online conflict delisting.

H3a: In an announced online conflict delisting scenario, the customer has a higher intention to switch store compared with an unannounced online conflict delisting.

H3b: In an announced online conflict delisting scenario, the customer has a lower intention to switch brand compared with an unannounced online conflict delisting.

This results in the following conceptual model:




Figure 1 Conceptual model

An online conflict delisting can be announced or unannounced. The expectations are that an announced online conflict delisting results into higher store switching intentions compared with an unannounced online conflict delisting (H3a). The second prediction is that an announced online conflict delisting leads to lower brand switching intentions compared with an unannounced online conflict delisting (H3b).

Chapter 3 Methodology

In this chapter the research context and the data collection method are described, followed by a description of how the variables will be measured. After that the sample is described as well as the data collection procedure. Lastly, this chapter discusses research ethics.

3.1 Research context

The research context will be the delisting of a beer brand at an online supermarket. The reason to choose for the beer category is that it has many high equity brands and a lot of brands with a high market share. It is also a hedonic product category (Alcholbeleid, 2011; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008) . As described in paragraph 2.2.2 a delisting of products with these characteristics will have the biggest impact on switching behavior, which makes them the most interesting (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008).

Only supermarkets which have an online shop but also an offline store and a physical network of stores will be considered in this research. This is done to make future comparison between an online conflict delisting and offline conflict delisting possible. For this reason, for example Picnic, an online supermarket with no physical stores, will not be included. The two biggest online supermarkets in the Netherlands with offline stores are Albert Heijn and Jumbo. Together they have the biggest market share in online grocery shopping (e.g. Albert Heijn 47.2% and Jumbo 19,7%) (Nu.nl, 2021). Respondents will be asked at which online supermarket they order their groceries. However, this research is not interested in supermarket preference and will consider it at a more generic level. Both Albert Heijn and Jumbo are full-service supermarkets who operate both online and offline with a large network of physical stores. Because these are quite similar supermarkets it is possible to compare the results for these.

3.2 Method

This research is a quantitative research. The data on online switching behavior is collected via an online survey. With an online experiment in the form of a survey it is possible to establish whether there is a difference in switching behavior between an unannounced and an announced online conflict delisting, and the results of this study can be compared with earlier research. An online survey was chosen, because a large sample is needed to establish whether there is a significant difference between an announced and unannounced online conflict delisting on store switching intentions and brand switching intentions. A within-subject design is most suitable

because this research wants to establish if customers switch to another store or brand when confronted with an online conflict delisting. This means that all respondents get all treatments (Hair, 2019). The within-subject design makes it possible to track the difference in switching behavior when an announced online conflict delisting is added (Field, 2013; Hair, 2019).

3.3 Measurement of variables

3.3.1 Design of the stimuli

This stimulus in this research is an online conflict delisting. Respondents are exposed to two different situations. This research has a within subject design, which means that all respondents see all the situations (Hair, 2019). They receive a situation with an announced and an unannounced online conflict delisting. The stimuli development was as follows:

1. Situation 1 unannounced online conflict delisting: *Imagine you are doing your online groceries. You already put a few products in your basket. When you want to select your favorite beer brand, you find out it is not there.*
2. Situation 2 announced online conflict delisting: *Imagine that you read on social media or the news that your favorite beer brand is temporarily not available at your supermarket. The next day you are ordering your groceries online.*

These two situations are used to measure the store switching intention and the brand switching intention after an announced and unannounced online conflict delisting.

3.3.2 Dependent variables

The dependent variables are store and brand switching intentions. The switching behavior was measured with the store switching intention (SSI) and the brand switching intention (BSI). SSI and BSI will indicate what the probability is that the customer will switch to another online store or another brand in case of an online conflict delisting. A reason to choose this metric is because it has been used in earlier research of Sloot and Verhoef (2008), who conducted a research about the effect of a delisting on store switching and brand switching intentions. They are interested in the probability of a customer switch store or brand when their preferred product is delisted. Hence, they used the metrics SSI and BSI to measure the probability of customers switching to another store or brand. Since the research of Sloot and Verhoef (2008) is similar to this research, the researcher decided to also use the metrics SSI and BSI. However, the questions have been slightly modified after feedback from the test respondents, since they did not fully understand the questions of Sloot and Verhoef (2008), which is a danger for the internal validity.

Instead of using a 5-point Likert scale, a 7-point Likert scale was used to gain more insights in respondents answers (Joshi, Kale, Chandel, & Pal, 2015). The 7-point Likert scale varied from 1, very small to 7, very big. The questions were:

- How big is the chance that you would buy another brand?
- How big is the chance that you would go to another store to buy your favorite beer brand?

These questions are the same for situation number two.

An overview of the operationalization of all variables can be found in table 1.

Table 1 Overview of the measurement of the constructs

Constructs	Items	Sources
Switching behavior	Store switching intention, Brand switching intention	(Sloot & Verhoef, 2008)

3.4 Sample

The population exists out of 3 million people, who do their groceries online (Retailnews, 2020). To reach enough respondents, the snowball method which is also called the chain referral method was used. This approach has several advantages and disadvantages. A main advantage of this method is that it is easily accessible and can result in a sufficient sample even when there is a lack of necessary tools like access to the customer database of an online supermarket (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). The method has two disadvantages. First, there is discussion whether the results are generalizable to a wider population or only to a population with the same characteristics as the sample, so it has consequences for the external validity. Second the sample can be biased because only cases from the existing social network are selected (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). In Chapter 5 these disadvantages will be evaluated. As within the timeframe of this research there was no possibility to get access to customer databases of the retailers nor was it in the scope of this research. The chain referral option was the only realistic sampling method available.

First, the survey was sent to people within the network of the researcher. Participants are then asked to send the survey to other people. This method is a non-probability sampling method which means that not everyone who orders their groceries online has an equal opportunity to participate in this research (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). In order to reach more participants, a link was posted on various social media accounts like Facebook and LinkedIn. Lastly, the link was posted in a public Facebook group for survey respondents. The posts about the recruitment of participants can be found in Appendix 2.

The total sample consists of 224 respondents, who filled in the survey between April 21st and May 2nd 2021. 152 Respondents indicated that they order their groceries online. 72 Respondents indicated that they do not order their groceries online, which meant that the survey ended there for them. This leads to a missing value of 72 respondents which can be described as system missing (Field, 2013). Of these 152 respondents 64.5% are female and 35.5% are male. The biggest age category is 46-55 years (28.9%), followed by the age categories younger than 25 years (19.7%), 25-35 years (17.8%), 36-45 years (14.5%), 56-65 years (14.5%) and older than 65 years (4.6%). Most of these respondents live in the south of the Netherlands (Limburg, 30.9%) and the east of the Netherlands (Overijssel, 27.6%). Others are from the provinces Gelderland (19.7%) and Noord-Brabant (11.2%). The respondents indicated that they do their online groceries once a week (42.8%) or once a month (23.7%). The main reasons to do their groceries online are convenience (49.6%), time saving (32.1%) and Corona (20.1%). Lastly respondents were asked to indicate their favorite beer brand and supermarket from a list. Most respondents preferred Albert Heijn (41.1%) over Jumbo (26.8%). The most preferred beer brand was Hertog-Jan (18.3%), followed by Grolsch (12.9%), Heineken (11.6%) and Brand (10.3%).

3.5 Data collection procedure

Respondents participated in the survey via Qualtrics. On average it took them 7.2 minutes to complete the survey. The survey introduction and questions can be found in Appendix 3.

First, the respondents read the introduction where the researcher introduced herself and the goal of this research was explained. Following the research ethics respondents were informed that they could withdraw from this research at any stage. Respondents also were informed that their data was confidential and anonymous. By continuing in this research, the respondents agreed that their data was used in this research.

Second the respondents were asked whether they do their groceries online, since this research is only interested in online grocery shoppers. When respondents clicked the option “no” the survey ended for them. When they answered “yes”, the respondents got a few background questions about their online shopping behavior in order to set the scene and make respondents think about their favorite beer brand and favorite supermarket. Respondents were asked how many times they order their groceries online, what the reason was to do their groceries online and how far the physical supermarket was. Lastly respondents could indicate

what their favorite supermarket was and their favorite beer brand. Respondents were able to choose between two supermarkets who had an online store as well as a physical store, who had a full coverage of A-brands and a high market share (Nu.nl, 2021). They were also able to choose from 7 high equity beer brands. These beer brands were selected since they have a large market share, high brand equity and are available in both supermarkets (Alcholbeleid, 2011).

After this the respondents got a question about their brand loyalty and a question about their store loyalty. These two questions were asked because this could explain why respondents would choose to switch to another store or brand and to make sure any additional analyses could be performed.

Next the first situation was presented: *Imagine you are doing your online groceries. You already put a few products in your basket. When you want to select your favorite beer brand, you find out it is not there.* This situation was to measure the store switching intentions and the brand switching intentions after an unannounced online conflict delisting. When respondents answered option 5, 6 or 7 and thus indicating that it was (very) likely that they would switch to another store, they were led to the question about whether they would switch with their entire shopping basket in order to see whether the retailer has category losses or losses the entire shopping basket.

Following the first situation, respondents got to see situation number two: *Imagine that you read on social media or the news that your favorite beer brand is temporarily not available at your supermarket. The next day you are ordering your groceries online.* Respondents got the same questions as in situation one to see if it matters when the customer finds out about the conflict delisting. Again, when respondents chose option 5, 6 or 7, indicating that they are (very) likely to switch store, they were asked if they would switch with their entire shopping basket.

Next, the respondents got two questions about their reasons not to switch to another supermarket or beer brand. These questions can be used to understand why the customer would not switch to another brand or store. Respondents were able to click multiple options or add an option.

Lastly, the respondents got some questions about their demographics, which was gender, age, and in which province of Netherlands they lived, which are used to describe the sample, which is important for researchers who want to replicate this study. As a closure respondents were able to leave a comment or ask a question. They could also leave their mail address when interested to receive the results of this research.

3.6 Research ethics

In order to meet the research ethics, the researcher used the APA guidelines to acknowledge the work of other authors and researchers (Smith, 2003, January). All communication related to this research has been done honestly and transparently. All participants are respected, and their privacy and anonymity has been ensured. Participants had the right to withdraw from this research at any moment. Participants got sufficient information beforehand. Any offensive or unacceptable language has been avoided.

Chapter 4 Results

In this chapter the results of the survey will be presented. In paragraph 4.1 the descriptive statistics are described. After that the correlations between the dependent variables are discussed in paragraph 4.2. Lastly, the results of the hypotheses testing are presented in paragraph 4.3. Some additional analysis can be found in paragraph 4.4.

4.1 Descriptive statistics

First the descriptive statistics were checked to see if there was any abnormality in the data. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. It is notable that the statistics show there are 72 missing values. These missing values are classified as system missing values due to routing. These 72 missing values are the 72 respondents who answered 'no' on the question whether they order their groceries online. The survey ended there for them.

Secondly, a remarkable point is that all the means of the dependent variables are all around 4. In the 7-point Likert scale this is the middle and it seems like people do not switch to another brand or store. However, when looking at the individual responses with a pivot table, which can be found in Appendix 4.1, respondents who scored low on brand switching, scored high on store switching and the other way around. The frequency tables, which can be found in Appendix 4.2 show that the data is distributed over all 7 options, where 1 is very unlikely and 7 is very likely. However, most respondents chose either option 1 or 7, so they either are likely to switch store or brand or unlikely to switch at all.

When comparing the means of the different variables it is notable that when the customer finds out about the online conflict delisting during their shopping trip the brand switching intentions are slightly higher than the store switching intentions ($M = 4.38 > M = 4.08$). When the customers are notified of the online conflict delisting before they order their groceries the store switching intentions are almost equal to the brand switching intentions ($M = 4.26 > M = 4.20$).

The standard deviation measures the dispersion of the data around the mean (Field, 2013). The standard deviation is relatively large compared to the mean, so therefore the scores are more spread from the mean.

Lastly, looking at the skewness and the kurtosis the data is not skewed, which means that the data is symmetrical and there are no data clusters. The kurtosis, however, shows that the data is more clustered at the end of the distribution (Field, 2013).

Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the store and brand switching intentions

		Brand Switch Unannounced	Store Switch Unannounced	Brand Switch Announced	Store Switch Announced
N	Valid	152	152	152	152
	Missing	72	72	72	72
Mean		4.38	4.08	4.20	4.26
Median		5.00	4.00	5.00	5.00
Std. Deviation		2.058	2.239	1.998	2.224
Skewness		-0.327	-0.071	-0.240	-0.248
Std. Error of Skewness		0.197	0.197	0.197	0.197
Kurtosis		-1.217	-1.501	-1.230	-1.475
Std. Error of Kurtosis		0.391	0.391	0.391	0.391
Minimum		1	1	1	1
Maximum		7	7	7	7

4.2 Correlations

After checking the descriptive statistics, the correlation tables were checked to see if the dependent variables, store switching intentions and brand switching intentions, are correlated with each other. The expectations were that when the store switching intentions increase the brand switching intentions should decrease and vice versa, since customer will either switch to another store or to another brand (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). In order to determine how the dependent variables correlate, Pearson's correlation coefficient was used (Field, 2013). The assumptions of this test can be found in Appendix 4.3. Table 3 provides the correlation matrix, which confirms the expectations. The dependent variables, brand switching and store switching in an announced or unannounced online conflict delisting, all significantly correlate with each other. The brand switching intentions negatively correlate with the store switching intentions, which means that when the brand switching intentions increase the store switching intentions decrease and vice versa. All correlation coefficients are above 0.5 and can therefore be considered as a large correlations (Field, 2013).

Table 3 Correlation matrix

		Brand Switch Unannounced	Store Switch Unannounced	Brand Switch Announced	Store Switch Announced
Brand Switch Unannounced	Correlation coefficient	1.000	-0.734	0.796	-0.611
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	0.000	0.000	0.000
Store Switch Unannounced	Correlation coefficient	-0.734	1.000	-0.559	0.795
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	.	0.000	0.000

Brand Switch Announced	Correlation coefficient	0.796	-0.559	1.000	-0.584
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	.	0.000
Store Switch Announced	Correlation coefficient	-0.611	0.795	-0.584	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	.

4.3 Data analysis

4.3.1 Assumptions of a paired-sample t-test

The paired-sample t-test can be used to compare means of a single group and see the difference in mean scores when they are exposed to different experimental manipulations (Field, 2013). By comparing the means of the store switching intentions and the brand switching intentions in the case of an unannounced and announced online conflict delisting, it is possible to see if there is a difference between an announced and unannounced online conflict delisting. It enables the research to see whether the store switching intentions are higher than the brand switching intentions. In order to perform a paired-sample t-test the data must be normally distributed. The sample is greater than 30, which means that according to the central limit theorem, normality can be assumed (Field, 2013). Since the normality assumption was met, several paired-sample t-test have been performed. An alpha of 5% was used to see if there is a statistically significant difference (Field, 2013).

4.3.2 In the case of an unannounced online conflict delisting the store switching intentions are not higher than the brand switching intentions

H1: In an unannounced online conflict delisting scenario, the consumer has a higher intention to switch store than to switch brand.

When confronted with an *unannounced* online conflict delisting 52% of the respondents chose option 5,6 or 7 at the brand switching question, so they are (very) likely to switch to another brand, while 34% indicated that it was not (very) likely that they would switch to another brand (option 1,2 or 3). At the store switching question 45% chose option 1, 2 or 3 while 46% of the respondents chose option 5, 6 or 7. The mean of the brand switching intentions was $M = 4.38$ and is almost equal to the mean of the store switching intentions, which is $M = 4.08$. A paired-sample t-test was performed to see if this small difference is significant, which was not the case, with $t(151) = 0.912$, $p = 0.363$. Hence, no support was found for H1. The results can be found in Table 4.

Table 4 Results paired-sample t-test unannounced online conflict delisting

Variables	t	Significance	Mean	Std. deviation
Brand Switch Unannounced vs. Store Switch Unannounced	0.912	0.363	0.296	4.001

4.3.3 In the case of an announced online conflict delisting the store switching intentions are not higher than the brand switching intentions

H2: In an announced online conflict delisting scenario, the consumer has a higher intention to switch store than to switch brand.

When looking at the frequency table of brand switching, 36% of the respondents indicated that they would rather not switch brand, which is option 1, 2 or 3. Whereas, 52% of the respondents chose option 5, 6 or 7, claiming that they are (very) likely to switch to another brand. In the case of store switching 38% of the respondents chose option 1, 2, or 3 and are not likely to switch to another store. On the contrary 53% of the respondents chose option 5, 6, or 7 indicating that they are (very) likely to switch to another store to order their favorite beer brand. The very small difference between the means ($M = 4.20$ vs. $M = 4.26$) was tested with a paired-sample t-test. This difference was not significant, with $t(151) = -0.173$, $p = 0.863$. Therefore, no support was found for H2. An overview of the results is presented in Table 5.

Table 5 Results paired-sample t-test for an announced online conflict delisting

Variables	t	Significance	Mean	Std. deviation
Brand Switch Announced vs. Store Switch Announced	-0.173	0.863	-0.053	3.759

4.3.4 No difference between an unannounced and an announced online conflict delisting

H3a: In an announced online conflict delisting scenario, the customer has a higher intention to switch store compared with an unannounced online conflict delisting.

Looking at the frequency tables it is notable that when confronted with an *unannounced* online conflict delisting most respondents (46%) are very likely to switch to another store. However, when confronted with an *announced* online conflict delisting most respondents (53%) indicated that it is likely that they would switch to another store. In the case of an *unannounced* online

conflict delisting the mean is $M = 4.08$, while in the case of an *announced* online conflict delisting the mean is $M = 4.26$. So, there is a small difference in store switching intentions when the respondent is confronted with an announced or unannounced online conflict delisting. However, this difference is not significant according to the paired-sample t-test, $t(151) = 1.627$, $p = 0.106$. Hence, no support was found for H3a.

H3b: In an announced online conflict delisting scenario, the customer has a lower intention to switch brand compared with an unannounced online conflict delisting.

In the case of an *unannounced* online conflict delisting 52% of the respondents chose option 5, 6, or 7, so they are likely to switch to another brand. This is the same for an *announced* online conflict delisting. However, the means do differ slightly. The mean of brand switching intentions in the case of an unannounced online conflict delisting is $M = 4.38$ and the mean in the case of an announced online conflict delisting is $M = 4.20$. According to the paired-sample t-test, this decline in brand switching intentions is, however, not significant, $t(151) = -1.533$, $p = 0.127$. So, H3b is also not supported. The results can be found in Table 6.

Table 6 Results paired-sample t-test comparing announced with unannounced

Variables	t	Significance	Mean	Std. deviation
Store Switch Unannounced vs. Store Switch Announced	1.627	0.106	0.171	1.296
Brand Switch Unannounced vs. Brand Switch Announced	-1.533	0.127	-0.178	1.429

Since no support was found for any of the hypotheses it was interesting to know why respondents would not switch to another store or brand. For this the additional questions come at hand. 110 Of the respondents say that they would not switch to another supermarket because they are used to their current supermarket, while 38 respondents say that they are loyal to their current supermarket. 36 Respondents say that it takes too much time to create a new account at another supermarket. Reasons not to switch to another brand would be that the other beer brand does not taste as good as their preferred brand (106) and 40 respondents describe themselves as brand loyal, while some commented that they would switch to another beer brand.

Another interesting result is that when confronted with an online conflict delisting, the consumer does switch to another store, but they do not switch their entire shopping basket to another store. When respondents answered option 5, 6 or 7 and so indicating that they would switch store, the respondents were asked whether they would switch with their entire shopping basket. In the case of an *unannounced* online conflict delisting 31.4% answered yes, while 68.6% of the respondents answered no. When confronted with an *announced* online conflict delisting 37.1% of the respondents answered that they would switch with their entire shopping basket, while 62.9% would not.

4.4 Additional analyses

In order to offer some more in-depth insights into the results some additional analyses were done. For this additional analysis the additional questions were used in the survey.

4.4.1 The significant impact of brand loyalty

Variables that could impact the store switching intentions and the brand switching intentions of the customer are store loyalty and brand loyalty. In order to see if store loyalty and brand loyalty had a significant impact on the store switching intentions and the brand switching intentions in the case of an announced and unannounced online conflict delisting, a regression analysis was performed. The expectations were that when the store loyalty increases the brand switching intentions would increase and the store switching intentions would decrease. In the case of brand loyalty, the brand switching intentions would decrease and the store switching intentions would increase. A regression analysis is the most suitable test, since it enables the researcher see whether one variable, in this case store loyalty and brand loyalty, predicts another variable, which are store switching intentions and brand switching intentions.

The assumption check and the SPSS output can be found in Appendix 4.5.1. The results show that in the case of an *unannounced* online conflict delisting brand loyalty has a significant impact on brand switching intentions ($b = -0.414$, $p = 0.000$) and a significant impact on store switching intentions ($b = 0.693$, $p = 0.000$). The impact of store loyalty on store switching intentions and brand switching intentions is not significant. In the case of an *announced* online conflict delisting the results show that brand loyalty also has a significant impact on the brand switching intentions ($b = -0.395$, $p = 0.000$) and a significant impact on store switching intentions ($b = 0.728$, $p = 0.000$). The impact of store loyalty on *brand switching intentions* was not significant. However, the impact of store loyalty on *store switching intentions* was significant ($b = -0.339$, $p = 0.035$).

One has to take in consideration that it is questionable whether the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. In the P-Plot it seems like the data is not equally distributed. When this assumption is not met the result of this test should be handled with great care.

4.4.2 No influence of gender

64.1% of the respondents are women, while 35.5% are men. In order to see whether gender has an influence on the dependent variables a chi-square test was performed. The results can be found in appendix 4.5.2. The chi-square test is not significant. In the case of an unannounced online conflict delisting, gender has no significant impact on the brand switching intentions ($X^2 = 1.201$, $p = 0.977$) and no significant impact on the store switching intentions ($X^2 = 2.815$, $p = 0.832$). In the case of an announced online conflict delisting, gender has also no significant impact on brand switching intentions ($X^2 = 2.299$, $p = 0.890$) and store switching intentions ($X^2 = 5.081$, $p = 0.534$).

4.5 Summary of the results

Based on the results no support was found for the hypotheses, which are summarized in Table 7. When confronted with an online conflict delisting, customers either switch to another brand or to another store. There is however no difference in store and brand switching intentions whether the online conflict delisting is announced in the media, or whether the online conflict delisting is not announced.

Table 7 Summary hypotheses

Hypothesis	Result
H1: In an unannounced online conflict delisting scenario, the consumer has a higher intention to switch store than to switch brand.	Not supported
H2: In an announced online conflict delisting scenario, the consumer has a higher intention to switch store than to switch brand.	Not supported
H3a: In an announced online conflict delisting scenario, the consumer has a higher intention to switch store compared with an unannounced online conflict delisting.	Not supported
H3b: In an announced online conflict delisting scenario, the consumer has a lower intention to switch brand compared with an unannounced online conflict delisting.	Not supported

Since no support was found for the hypotheses, this resulted in a new conceptual model which can be found in Figure 9. An online conflict delisting does result in the consumer switching to another store or brand. However, there is no difference in the store and brand switching intentions if the online conflict delisting is announced or not.




Table 8 Summary hypotheses results

Chapter 5 Discussion and conclusion

5.1 General discussion and conclusion

The purpose of this study was to examine the difference in store switching intentions and brand switching intentions in the case of an announced online conflict delisting and an unannounced online conflict delisting. The expectations were that in the case of an *unannounced online conflict delisting* the store switching intentions would be higher than the brand switching intentions, since the customer would be surprised, confused or frustrated (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Dadzie & Winston, 2007; Peterson et al., 2020; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Zinn & Liu, 2001). In the case of an *announced online conflict delisting* it was expected that the store switching intentions would be higher than the brand switching intentions, since the customer is informed of the online conflict delisting and they can alter their shopping plans (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Breugelmans et al., 2018; Van der Maelen et al., 2017).

When comparing the announced and unannounced online conflict delisting, the assumption was that in the case of an *announced online conflict delisting* the store switching intentions would be higher compared with an *unannounced online conflict delisting* (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Breugelmans et al., 2018; Van der Maelen et al., 2017).

Based on the results it can be concluded that when confronted with an online conflict delisting, respondents are likely to switch to another brand or to another store, which is in line with the expectations. However, the store switching intentions are not higher than the brand switching intentions, so for this the expectations were not met. Also, no difference in store and brand switching intentions was found between an unannounced online conflict delisting and an announced online conflict delisting. The results of this research are discussed in more detail below.

First, as mentioned above, in the case of an *unannounced online conflict delisting* the expectations were that the store switching intentions would be higher than the brand switching intentions (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Dadzie & Winston, 2007; Peterson et al., 2020; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Zinn & Liu, 2001). This study does find support that when confronted with an unannounced online conflict delisting, customers either switch to another store or to another brand. However, the store switching intentions are not higher than the brand switching intentions, which contradicts previous research. A possible explanation for this contradiction is that previous research (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Dadzie & Winston, 2007; Peterson et al.,

2020; Sloot & Verhoef, 2008; Zinn & Liu, 2001) has been about stock-outs or brand delisting cases, while this research is about an unannounced online conflict delisting. Consumers can react differently to an online conflict delisting compared to a stock-out or brand delisting (Breugelmans et al., 2018).

In the case of an *announced online conflict delisting*, it was also expected that the store switching intentions would be higher than the brand switching intentions (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Breugelmans et al., 2018; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). Again, this research does find support that the customers either switch brand or store which is in line with Breugelmans et al. (2006), Breugelmans et al. (2018) and Van der Maelen et al. (2017). But the store switching intentions are not higher than the brand switching intentions as described by Breugelmans et al. (2006), Breugelmans et al. (2018) and Van der Maelen et al. (2017). Apparently, the consumers do not alter their shopping plans when they are informed about the online conflict delisting before their shopping trip. A possible explanation for this result is that the data is distributed over the complete scale of responses, which results in almost the same means for brand switching intentions and for store switching intentions in both the case of an unannounced as an announced online conflict delisting. When looking in more detail, if a respondent has a low score on store switching, he or she has a high score on brand switching and vice versa. Overall concluding the customer does switch to another brand or store when he or she is confronted with an announced or unannounced online conflict delisting.

Secondly, there is no difference in switching behavior whether the online conflict delisting is announced or unannounced. In both situations the brand switching intentions and the store switching intentions are almost the same. Apparently, it does not matter for the respondents if they are informed on the online conflict delisting during shopping or if they are informed through social media and the news before shopping, which is not in line with the expectations. A possible explanation for this could be the transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs it takes to switch to another store or brand, like the amount of time, effort and money (Singh & Rosengren, 2020). In an online environment these transaction costs are lower than in an offline environment, because it is easier to switch to another website (Peterson et al., 2020). However, the results of this research show that in the case of an unannounced conflict delisting the store switching intentions are not higher than the brand switching intentions. In fact, the brand switching intentions almost equal to the store switching intentions. This could suggest that the transaction costs in the case of online groceries might not be as low as literature (Peterson et

al., 2020) expects in general for online shopping. A reason for this could be that grocery shoppers who order their groceries online do this for convenience and to save time. However, when they have to switch store they have to get familiar with a new website, make a new account and deal with the fixed order costs, which is not convenient for them (Breugelmans et al., 2006).

Lastly, brand loyalty has an impact on the consumers' store switching intentions and brand switching intentions. When the brand loyalty is higher, the brand switching intentions are lower and the store switching intentions are higher. It does not matter whether the online conflict delisting is not announced or announced. This is in line with Campo et al. (2000), who describes that a strong loyalty does decrease the switching intentions. However, store loyalty has no impact on consumers' store switching intentions or brand switching intentions in the case of an unannounced online conflict delisting. In the case of an announced online conflict delisting store loyalty does have an impact on the store switching intentions, but not on the brand switching intentions. When the store loyalty increases the store switching intentions decrease. A possible explanation for this result is that the assumption of homoscedasticity is not met, since the data in the P-Plot appears to be unequally spread (Field, 2013). Therefore, this conclusion should be handled with great care, and it is questionable whether the test can be interpreted like this.

It is also notable that when confronted with an online conflict delisting most consumers do not switch with their entire basket. This implicates retailers only experiences a loss in category sales and not in overall sales. This is in line with Sloot and Verhoef (2008) who concluded that in some cases the consumer switches with their entire basket, but most of them switch either to another brand or store.

5.2 Theoretical implications

This research expands the current knowledge by providing information about what kind of impact an announced or unannounced online conflict delisting has on online store switching and brand switching. The conclusion is that some people are very likely to switch brand, while others are very likely to switch to another store. However, for the switching intentions it does not matter for the customer whether the online conflict delisting is announced or not, since the brand and store switching intentions remain the same. This research contributes to the existing literature with the following.

First, this study expands the current knowledge about conflict delisting cases. Conflict delisting cases are occurring more often due to the increase in retailer power, however, there is a lack of research about this subject (Breugelmans et al., 2018). This research provides more insight in the consequences of conflict delisting cases and enhances the understanding of this phenomenon. This research came to a similar conclusion on the negative sales impact of an online conflict delisting for the retailer as well as for the manufacturer as the online conflict delisting results in both store switching and brand switching behaviour, which is in line with Van der Maelen et al. (2017) and Hermans (2017). However, Van der Maelen (2017) found support that the retailer is the most vulnerable party. This research does not support this finding since the store switching intentions are not higher than the brand switching intentions.

Second, this research expands the existing knowledge by providing more information about the role of media attention in an online conflict delisting, since media attention is inherent to a conflict delisting. A conflict delisting generally receives a lot of media attention, therefore a conflict delisting differs from other types of product unavailability. The media attention can result in the consumer adjusting their shopping plan because they are aware of the conflict delisting before they start ordering their groceries (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Van der Maelen et al., 2017). This study, however, shows that in the case of an online conflict delisting for groceries it does not matter for the customer whether the conflict delisting is announced in the media or not, since the brand switching intentions and the store switching intentions remain the same. Hence, the role of media attention is not as big as expected. The customers do not adjust their shopping plans when they are informed about the conflict delisting before they order their groceries.

Third, by conducting this research in an online setting, this research expands the current knowledge about conflict delisting cases with more information about the switching behaviour of the online grocery shopper. It is notable that the online grocery shopper reacts similar to a conflict delisting as an offline grocery shopper. Like Van der Maelen et al. (2017) described, a conflict delisting has negative consequences for the retailer and the manufacturer. Van der Maelen et al. (2017) concludes that both parties experience sales loss, but the retailer is the most vulnerable party. This study comes to a similar conclusion, namely the online grocery shopper either switches to another brand or to another store. However, the retailer is not more

vulnerable than the manufacturer since the brand switching intentions almost equal the store switching intentions.

5.3 Managerial implications

This research offers retailers and manufacturers insights in the consequences of a conflict delisting. This can support them in the strategic decision to delist a product online or not or even start a partial delisting. The results of this research lead to the recommendation that retailers as well as manufacturers have to be careful with an online delisting. An online conflict delisting does result in switching behaviour. It is unknown whether the customer will return after the online conflict delisting is ended or that they have switched permanently. This is outside the scope of this research, but an interesting topic for future research. Therefore, retailers and manufacturers need to be cautious with an online conflict delisting.

For the retailer as well as for the manufacturer it does not matter if the online conflict delisting receives a lot of media attention. The switching intentions will remain the same and the announcement as such has neither influence on the store switching intentions nor on the brand switching intentions. This is an interesting conclusion as this implicates that making the announcement to the media by one of the parties involved does not give them an advantage over the other party since this strategy will not lead to more or different switching behaviour. However, bad publicity can severely harm the image of the retailer or of the manufacturer (Pizzi & Scarpi, 2013). In order to prevent any harm to the brand or prevent disappointment, the retailer or the manufacturer can announce the online conflict delisting themselves, however future research is needed to make sure what the impact is of a retailer announcement or manufacturer announcement and the type of message in the announcement, since this research focused on media announcements (Breugelmans et al., 2006; Breugelmans et al., 2018; Pizzi & Scarpi, 2013; Zinn & Liu, 2001).

Another important managerial implication for manufacturers is that brand loyalty reduces the consumers' brand switching intentions in the hedonic product category. This could increase the power of the manufacturer and might prevent the retailer to delist the brand, since brand loyalty increases the store switching intentions. Therefore, it is important for the manufacturer to create brand loyalty which can be done via different ways, like good marketing, where people connect with the brand.

Lastly, some consumers switch with their entire shopping basket when confronted with an online conflict delisting. However, most consumers do not switch with their entire shopping basket to another store. Hence, the retailer only experiences category sales loss. The risk of losing the consumer when the retailer engages in an online conflict delisting is limited, whereas the manufacturer can suffer great sales losses. The retailer has the possibility to compensate the category sales losses with other category sales.

5.4 Limitations and directions for future research

This study has several limitations concerning methodological and generalizability issues. Based on these limitations different directions for future research are addressed. First, this study focused on one single product category, which was the beer category. This category was chosen because it has a lot of beer brands with a high market share and a high brand equity, and it is considered a hedonic category. However, it is questionable whether these results can be generalized to other product categories as well. This research can be replicated with different high equity product categories or with low equity product categories, to see whether customers would switch brand or store when the conflict delisting takes place in a product category other than the beer category.

Secondly, there are some disadvantages of the case referral method concerning the validity of this research. Since the researcher had no access to an online database of customers who do their groceries online, the snowball sample method was the best method. This has consequences since it is unknown whether the sample equals the characteristics of the population, which affects the generalizability of this research (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). Because the researcher did not have any access to a retailer's database it is unknown whether the characteristics of the sample match with the population. However, CBS, the Dutch national statistical office, investigated what the age and gender is from people who order their groceries online, which can be found in Appendix 5. They say that the number of men is almost equal to the number of women. There are slightly more men ordering their groceries online (CBS, 2021). Thereof, the sample of this research has an overrepresentation of women, since 64.5% of the respondents were women, while 35.5% were men. When looking at age most people who order their groceries online are between 25 and 45 years old (CBS, 2021). In the sample, the biggest age category is 46-55 years old. Hence, this age category is slightly overrepresented, while the

age category of 25 to 45 years old is underrepresented. Therefore, the sample is not generalizable to the entire population, since the sample characteristics do not entirely match with the population characteristics. The advice for future research is to consider a cooperation with a retailer to gain access to their data bases. This helps to get in touch with the intended sample and to get information which can be extrapolated to the entire population.

Another limitation is that this research is based on hypothesized situations and measures intended behaviour instead of real behaviour. In real-life situations the respondents might act differently as they intended to do (Sloot & Verhoef, 2008). Most of the time purchase intentions are however a good predictor of actual behaviour, especially when consumers are asked about a specific brand (V. Morwitz, 1997; V. G. Morwitz, Steckel, & Gupta, 2007). Zinn and Liu (2008) did found support that when confronted with a stockout half of the consumers who intended to go to a competitor, actually went to a competitor (Zinn & Liu, 2008). In order to get a good indication on whether consumers actually do switch brand or store, future research can conduct an interview or a survey right after the consumer is confronted with a conflict delisting and a couple of weeks later conducting a second interview to see what the consumer actually did (V. Morwitz, 1997; Zinn & Liu, 2008).

Fourth, the variable loyalty is also interesting to consider. When a customer is brand loyal the probability of brand switching will decrease. When the customer is store loyal the probability of the customer switching store also decreases (Campo et al., 2000; Dadzie & Winston, 2007). This research did find support that brand loyalty has an impact on the store switching intentions and brand switching intentions. Nonetheless no support was found that store loyalty would have an impact on brand and store switching intentions. A possible explanation of this result is that the data is not homoscedastic. Hence, loyalty might moderate the relationship between a conflict delisting and switching behaviour. Future research can consider taking this variable into account to see if it truly moderates the relationship between a conflict delisting and the store and brand switching intentions. This can be done with an experiment where there is a group of store loyal consumers and a group of brand loyal consumers and a control group in order to see if store loyal and brand loyal consumers react differently on a conflict delisting compared with the control group.

The last limitation of this research is the response option for the consumer. In this study, respondents were only able to choose between brand switching and store switching, when in

fact consumers can also postpone their purchase or cancel their purchase, as described by Campo et al. (2000). This was a deliberate choice as the consumer mostly switches store or brand when confronted with a conflict delisting (Van der Maelen et al., 2017). Future research on conflict delisting cases can give consumers the option to choose between store switching, brand switching, postponing the purchase and cancelling the purchase.

The most interesting subject for future research is to see whether the customer reacts differently when the retailer or the manufacturer announces the conflict delisting themselves compared with the customer response when they are informed through the news or social media. An announcement from the retailer or the manufacturer can prevent harm to the brand image or can prevent greater disappointment (Breugelmans et al., 2018; Pizzi & Scarpi, 2013). It would also be interesting to see if it matters for the customer who makes the announcement, the retailer or the manufacturer and if this results in a difference between the store switching intentions and the brand switching intentions. Future research can test this with observational research using AB testing messages. One group receives a message of the retailer or the manufacturer about the online conflict delisting, while the control group is not informed about the online conflict delisting. This does require some extensive literature research on which type of message the retailer or the manufacturer can send.

5.5 Conclusion

Overall, this research is somewhat in line with previous research. Just like Van der Maelen et al. (2017) and Hermans (2017) this research found evidence that an online conflict delisting has negative consequences for both the retailer as well as the manufacturer, but the negative consequences are not higher for the retailer and not higher when the online conflict delisting receives a lot of publicity. When confronted with an online conflict delisting the customer switches to another store, while others switch to another brand. The contribution of this research to the literature is the conclusion that it does not matter for the customer whether the online conflict delisting is announced or not, the store switching and brand switching intentions remain the same.

References

- Ailawadi, K. L. (2001). The retail power-performance conundrum: what have we learned? *Journal of Retailing*, 77(3), 299-318.
- Ailawadi, K. L., Bradlow, E. T., Draganska, M., Nijs, V., Rooderkerk, R. P., Sudhir, K., . . . Zhang, J. (2010). Empirical models of manufacturer-retailer interaction: A review and agenda for future research. *Marketing Letters*, 21(3), 273-285. doi:10.1007/s11002-010-9107-0
- Alcoholbeleid, H. N. I. v. (2011). *Bier in overvloed, een analyse van prijsacties voor bier supermarkt en slijterij*. Retrieved from <https://www.stap.nl/nl/publicaties/rapporten.html/3455/4971/bier-in-overvloed-een-analyse-van-prijsacties-in-supermarkt-en-slijterij-2010>
- Amato, L. H., & Amato, C. H. (2009). Changing retail power and performance in distribution channels. *International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management*.
- Biernacki, P., & Waldorf, D. (1981). Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 10(2), 141-163. doi:10.1177/004912418101000205
- Bloemer, J., & de Ruyter, K. (1998). On the relationship between store image, store satisfaction and store loyalty. *European Journal of Marketing*, 32(5/6), 499-513. doi:10.1108/03090569810216118
- Bloemer, J. M., & Kasper, H. D. P. (1995). The complex relationship between consumer satisfaction and brand loyalty. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 16(2), 311-329. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870\(95\)00007-B](https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870(95)00007-B)
- Borle, S., Boatwright, P., Kadane, J. B., Nunes, J. C., & Galit, S. (2005). The effect of product assortment changes on customer retention. *Marketing Science*, 24(4), 616-622.
- Breugelmans, E., Campo, K., & Gijsbrechts, E. (2006). Opportunities for active stock-out management in online stores: The impact of the stock-out policy on online stock-out reactions. *Journal of Retailing*, 82(3), 215-228.
- Breugelmans, E., Gijsbrechts, E., & Campo, K. (2018). 9. Product unavailability. *Handbook of Research on Retailing*, 202.
- Campo, K., Gijsbrechts, E., & Nisol, P. (2000). Towards understanding consumer response to stock-outs. *Journal of Retailing*, 76(2), 219-242.
- CBS. (2021). Internet purchases, personal characteristics. Retrieved from <https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/84889ned/table?ts=1628768362401>
- Chu, W. M., Paul R. (1997). Information and Channel profits. *Journal of Retailing*, 37(4), 487-499. Retrieved from <https://www.sciencedirect-com.ru.idm.oclc.org/science/article/pii/S0022435997900312>
- Dadzie, K. Q., & Winston, E. (2007). Consumer response to stock-out in the online supply chain. *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management*.
- Dhar, R., & Wertenbroch, K. (2000). Consumer Choice between Hedonic and Utilitarian Goods. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 37(1), 60-71. doi:10.1509/jmkr.37.1.60.18718
- Draganska, M., & Klapper, D. (2007). Retail environment and manufacturer competitive intensity. *Journal of Retailing*, 83(2), 183-198.
- Draganska, M., Klapper, D., & Villas-Boas, S. B. (2010). A larger slice or a larger pie? An empirical investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel. *Marketing Science*, 29(1), 57-74.
- Field, A. (2013). *Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics*: sage.
- Fitzsimons, G. J. (2000). Consumer response to stockouts. *Journal of consumer research*, 27(2), 249-266.

- Florez-Acosta, J., & Herrera-Araujo, D. (2017). Multiproduct retailing and buyer power: The effects of product delisting on consumer shopping behavior.
- Gázquez-Abad, J. C., Martínez-López, F. J., Esteban-Millat, I., Mondéjar-Jiménez, J. A., & Rejón-Guardia, F. (2016). How delisting all national brands in a given assortment impacts on consumers' store switching intentions. In *Let's Get Engaged! Crossing the Threshold of Marketing's Engagement Era* (pp. 115-116): Springer.
- Hair, J. B., William; Babin, Barry; Anderson, Rolph. (2019). *Multivariate Data Analysis*: Cengage Learning EMEA.
- Hermans, M. (2017). *Performance implications of manufacturer-retailer power battles*. Maastricht University, Retrieved from <https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/performance-implications-of-manufacturer-retailer-power-battles>
- Joshi, A., Kale, S., Chandel, S., & Pal, D. K. (2015). Likert scale: Explored and explained. *Current Journal of Applied Science and Technology*, 396-403.
- Keller, K. L. (1993). Conceptualizing, measuring, and managing customer-based brand equity. *Journal of Marketing*, 57(1), 1-22.
- Keller, K. L., & Swaminathan, V. (2019). *Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity, Global Edition*: Pearson.
- Ku, H.-H., Kuo, C.-C., & Huang, W.-T. (2017). Message-related effects on consumer switching when the preferred product is out of stock. *European Journal of Marketing*.
- Leach, C. (2021) /Interviewer: S. Relou, M. v. Vugt, & T. Grommas.
- Meza, S., & Sudhir, K. (2010). Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power? *Quantitative Marketing and Economics*, 8(3), 333-363.
- Morwitz, V. (1997). Why Consumers Don't Always Accurately Predict Their Own Future Behavior. *Marketing Letters*, 8(1), 57-70. doi:10.1023/A:1007937327719
- Morwitz, V. G., Steckel, J. H., & Gupta, A. (2007). When do purchase intentions predict sales? *International Journal of Forecasting*, 23(3), 347-364. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2007.05.015>
- Nielsen. (2019). Food Universum. Retrieved from <https://www.distrifood.nl/food-data/marktaandelen>
- Nu.nl. (2021). De onlineboodschappentaart is veel groter, het stuk van AH veel kleiner. Retrieved from <https://www.nu.nl/economie/6115598/de-onlineboodschappentaart-is-veel-groter-het-stuk-van-ah-kleiner.html>
- Peterson, R. A., Kim, Y., & Jeong, J. (2020). Out-of-stock, sold out, or unavailable? Framing a product outage in online retailing. *Psychology & Marketing*, 37(3), 428-440.
- Pizzi, G., & Scarpi, D. (2013). When out-of-stock products DO backfire: Managing disclosure time and justification wording. *Journal of Retailing*, 89(3), 352-359.
- Retailnews. (2020). Aantal Nederlanders dat online boodschappen doet is verdubbeld Retrieved from <https://retailtrends.nl/news/59297/aantal-nederlanders-dat-online-boodschappen-doet-is-verdubbeld>
- RTVOost. (2018). Lege schappen door ruzie tussen Johma en Albert Heijn. Retrieved from <https://nos.nl/artikel/2211866-lege-schappen-door-ruzie-tussen-johma-en-albert-heijn.html>
- Singh, R., & Rosengren, S. (2020). Why do online grocery shoppers switch? An empirical investigation of drivers of switching in online grocery. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 53, 101962. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretconser.2019.101962>
- Sloot, L. M., & Verhoef, P. C. (2008). The Impact of Brand Delisting on Store Switching and Brand Switching Intentions. *Journal of Retailing*, 84(3), 281-296. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2008.06.005>

- Smith, D. (2003, January). Five principles for research ethics. *Monitor on Psychology*, 34. Retrieved from <http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan03/principles>
- Standaard, D. (2011). Prijzenoorlog houdt Disney-poppen uit Fun-winkels Retrieved from https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20110209_089
- Supermarkt&Ruimte. (2020). Nieuw onderzoek naar online supermarktbestedingen Retrieved from <https://www.supermarktenruimte.nl/17598-2/>
- Van der Maelen, S., Breugelmans, E., & Cleeren, K. (2017). The Clash of the Titans: On Retailer and Manufacturer Vulnerability in Conflict Delistings. *Journal of Marketing*, 81(1), 118-135. doi:10.1509/jm.15.0282
- Wiebach, N., & Hildebrandt, L. (2010). *Context effects as customer reaction on delisting of brands*. Retrieved from
- Wiebach, N., & Hildebrandt, L. (2012). Explaining customers' switching patterns to brand delisting. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 19(1), 1-10.
- Zinn, W., & Liu, P. C. (2001). Consumer response to retail stockouts. *Journal of business logistics*, 22(1), 49-71.
- Zinn, W., & Liu, P. C. (2008). A comparison of actual and intended consumer behavior in response to retail stockouts. *Journal of business logistics*, 29(2), 141-159.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Transcript interview Dr. Leach

Interviewee: Dr. C. Leach

Function: Consultant in FMGC

Interviewers: S. Relou, M. van Vugt and T. Grommas

Starting time: 10.00 hour.

Duration: 49 minutes

C: My PhD in conflict delisting. First my background so that you know where I come from. So, I did many years ago a first degree in retail marketing in the UK, Manchester and I worked for two suppliers, two food suppliers, in sales and category management. I then worked for Tesco in the UK in the Head office. I ran the grocery and marketing team. And then I worked as a consultant for 21 years. I worked with both retailers and suppliers globally. So, category management, marketing, less in marketing across the world, different types of retailers. I worked at Walmart, Tesco, Shell, Unilever.

C: Can you tell us a bit more about your PhD?

So my PhD came about from working in the industry with more looking from a supplier perspective and the world of collaboration. Why would the experiences then with the retail customers, largely the same now as when I started in the industry 20 years ago. The industry structure massively changed. The amount of data, the type of customers, online, offline etcetera etcetera, complexity, mergers and acquisitions. Yeah the point of Coca Cola working with Ahold. So largely they have the same fights, the same discussion, the same threats. They always have been, so why would that be the case. When you look at other industries where the supplier customer relationship, like for instance the airline industry we would say Rolls Royce the engine manufacturer you can see cases where they completely transformed the value proposition on how they collaborated together. From Rolls Royce selling them an engine to Rolls Royce leasing them services to pay for by the hour, for example. That is one example. You know more examples I am sure. So that was what got me into the research which was how suppliers collaborate with their retail customers and how they create and capture value. What on earth is going on? That was the research I did. I did four cases. I can't name them because we did it under confidentiality of 5 years. We still have some years to run. But those four cases where companies you would recognize the name of. My method was detailed document review from top to bottom. From strategy plans to account plans. I did team meeting attendance so attending their meetings and I did one to one interviews 10 to 12 per company. Again, top to bottom so from promotion manager down to accounting team, to category manager. But that is the context. In terms of what you guys call conflict delistings, this did come up in my research for all four businesses. My research was in the UK so I can only speak for the UK retail market. I was speaking to account teams that were largely dealing with either Tesco, Sainsbury, Morrisson so one of the top 4. The big picture that came up was the retailer essentially saying I want eggs and the supplier saying I won't give you eggs. Therefore, they start delisting their products. What was interesting about one of them. One of them is a Multinational multi category supplier who has a close affiliation with your country. They were experiencing conflict delisting in other categories then they had the conflict with. In one particular category they were having a commercial fight about terms and you know. Tesco wants eggs and we can't or we won't give them eggs so then Tesco implemented a delisting across all categories. Not just the one they were fighting the whole thing. Quite an interesting way to do it. In the other examples they were all purely about trading terms. So, the retailer demanded certain things about their

credit terms and as a leverage they started delisting products. What was interesting from my perspective, might not be your question but what was mine question was: how to supply collaboration. What do they do to (inaudible). What value do they have? They were using, all of them, methods largely around which I would call category management. So, are you aware what category management is? They were all using category management ways of working so collaborative effort, category drives, category taxes etcetera etcetera. And all the retailers were doing that work with them. But what was interesting from my perspective was the minute the commercial debate, negotiations, wasn't going the way the retailer wanted they would shut that work straight down getting to this conflict position or delisting. Which leads to the concept that they must not get great value from this work because if they did, if they saw that this collaborative work was gonna increase their value of working with them. You know they were gonna make more money from this work they would have had carried on. But they didn't. They shut it down and they went straight to we are gonna delist this and this. So, from my perspective this brings the doubt value of some of the activities the supplier was doing. They were spending a lot of money on data, insights, consultants like me, etcetera etcetera to do all this work with the retailer. But at the first sight of the retailer, like I wanna have eggs and you are not going to give me eggs I will just stop all that work. Often a conflict delisting is one of the tools they use. There are cases in the UK, you may already have seen them, publicly stated cases because obviously neither of the parties want to talk about it. But in the UK Coca Cola got into this situation with Tesco about three years ago where everybody would have thought Coca Cola was untouchable in this context from a consumer, from a shopper perspective. Tesco didn't feel that and they delisted many of the products, ultimately, they came back. Tesco also did it to Carlsberg where they delisted their entire range and that entire range actually never came back. They decided that based on what happened when they took it out, they didn't need it back. That was a couple of years ago, something like that. So there are few cases the public talked about but not that I am aware of. You probably know more than me cause I didn't go into a lot of detail on this. Does that give a big picture of it?

Mirte van Vugt: "So it is more like a one-sided relationship where the manufacturer tries to please the retailer and the retailer thinks they have all the power this time?"

Dr. Leach: Yeah part of my research was also into it. The power and how that works. In the UK four retailers take about 80% of the market. In other markets it is even worse, I can't remember the Netherlands now, is it Jumbo, Albert Heijn. In Australia there are two retailers who take 85%. The discounting effect in a lot of these markets, in the UK now which was always lagging, the discount effect is eating into their share. Not in a significant way but still in the UK they have 40-50% total discounting share. So, they do hold the power. I think what it is making suppliers do, this is maybe linked to my real life work consulting. It makes them think about how to grow their business around different channels to reduce their reliance on those channels where there is a power disadvantage. So discounters maybe one, online is another one, convenience channel, direct to consumer where they can set their own websites and bypass retailers completely. Classically a few years ago you saw that with Nespresso and Nestle but now you see Gillette with shaving and P&G is doing it, some brewers in the UK are doing it in Europe as well. They are trying to expand their channel base. Still after that they are still working with retailers who 'dominate' them in terms of power. M: Online as well. C: Yeah absolutely online as well. I am doing some work on this right now. Currently doing a book on my research. Online is bad news in a few ways essentially. One of the ways again this is an example, I think you can look it up. I think it was Target with Proctor and Gamble. So these retailers are now looking at online and obviously it is quite a threat especially in some categories, not all categories, but some categories. One category that I was looking at was baby care in the US. A couple of years back, again this is a publicly available one, P&G got into a

relationship with Amazon and started to do some specific packs and they were using Amazon shipping to the market, and Target in the US then delisted all the Pampers products because P&G was doing that with Amazon. But not just for the supplier what are the sales opportunities in these channels. It is what is the reaction of these guys if I do that with Amazon. But it is really tricky for them, really difficult. I mean one of the ways they classically tried to installate them from some of these discussions to an extent is to differentiate their packs. So let's go back 10 years or more. The main way you would get into a conflict delisting, not the only way, but the main way you get into a conflict delisting with a supplier is retailer A sees your brand sold at retailer B at a cheaper price and decides that you the supplier are the one who is funding that so therefore I am gonna punish you because you don't give me that price or I am gonna do something and delist you. That shifted, a lot in the UK, through legislation, which the retail price is the digression of the retailer that can't get into a discussion now. One of the ways they try to isolate themselves is to do differentiated packs. An example is Coca Cola decided to change their multipack can offering, you know coke, diet coke and coke zero etc etc. in different pack sizes for different retailers. So in the UK they sell to Akda which is more of a big family shop they sell them a 12 pack whereas to Sainsbury which is less family profile they only sell 6 pack and at other an 8 pack. That was one of the techniques of Coca Cola but more people would try to do that differentiation. To try and isolate them from that comparison. Like well you have a different pack so that is why it works differently that sort of discussion. M: Yes, I have seen that in the Netherlands as well. Jumbo they have the lowest price guarantee so if you find it at another retailer for cheaper you can get that price. They ask their suppliers to change different pack sizes and products to not get that problem. C: yeah for suppliers this is both good and bad. Good in the sense they fix that problem. Bad in the sense that this introduces a lot of complexity into their supply chain and costs. It costs them because they don't just sell one package volume. They are selling 8 different packs in less volume. It is not a cost free solution but it is a solution or part of a solution.

C: What is your point of view on conflict delistings? Is it a good mechanism or something dangerous?

I think, having worked on both sides, I think suppliers massively overestimate the value and loyalty to their brand. I think largely from what I have seen, with a few exceptions, shoppers switch and retailers know this. The supplier has all the data. Who is buying a product, where etc etc. So all these insights are in suppliers hands. A lot of retailers themselves own a lot of data that is very powerful about who is buying your brand at my shops.

The days of suppliers that have been able to put up a story that says: Well if you do this, this couple will shift and they know from their data. And they've got quite detailed analytics to say; what would happen? How would that value transfer, if I remove that SKU or that brand. What will happen? where would it go? And a lot of the time they are not afraid, because they have got these analytics, so they can go to the supplier and say: We're not worried. We'll keep the volume. And they also know, because they have got the data; where they shouldn't mess around in certain SKU's. And those SKU's are potentially not the ones you would be thinking of. So, one of the things that came out of my research, thinking about retailers is: they are not going to differentiate themselves by just selling the same products you buy everywhere. Everybody has got these packs of coke etc. They are going to differentiate themselves to be their own brand or stocking things that other stores don't stock. And it is sometimes the smallest SKU's with the highest loyalty to them and the ones that are the most powerful to them and the ones that they shouldn't delist. People come to buy it there and like buying it there and that will vary by category. In terms of, is it dangerous? From a retail perspective, they are often not worried because they've got the analytics and the experience. The question is: will I lose a shopper, if i

delist this SKU. And largely the answer is no I think, from my perspective. It is frightening for the supplier because you know it pushes the question to their range.

S: If you were a supplier, how would you react when the retailer is threatening to delist your product? What is the best way to react?

The first way they try to react is the way I just described, which is they'll go to their category teams and their marketing teams and say "Give me the data about who is buying these products or this range of products. Talk to me about what their needs are, where they buy it, the value that it brings to the retailer, give me all the data and insights." And they will go back to their retailer and say the shopper for this fits your shopper, they are really loyal to you, they spend this amount of money and if you didn't have them they wouldn't buy this. Sometimes they bring arguments about their baskets and say: "The shopper for Coca Cola 24-pack is an above average spend of their total basket as well so if you loose that shopper, you'll loose that basket. So you should be scared that they will do all of their shopping elsewhere." Etc. A lot of retailers, not all off them, have their own analytics which they trust the most. Albert Heijn and Tesco for example have their own analytics. So for them it's a low risk. because they can get rid of these SKU's, and if something bad happens they can bring them back within the week, for them it's not a huge risk. What normally happens is that a supplier asks the default to them which is to give them more money. Because that's why they're doing this I could be convinced to keep this product if you would give me whatever that is, more margin, more support, more promotion funds, whatever it might be. And that got to the heart of my research, which is regardless of all this work that is going on it always seems to boil down to: If you don't do X, I'll do bad things to you. One of the examples is the conflict delisting.

S: Do you think it is a good thing that conflict delistings occur or do you think that you should collaborate more because that creates more value?

Depends who you would ask. The idea of collaboration to create value between two business operators like a retailer and supplier is sound. And there is lots of evidence that suggest if you do that, you will create more value in the longer term. There is all sorts of evidence around that. The challenge is the time frame. With your thesis in your research you have been looking around for some of this. You look for retailers heading of on corporate level about the value of their supply base, and how we would like to collaborate with our suppliers and they are very important to our future. And they make all these big pictures and statements about that and how it is going to work and it is all wonderful and they're partners etc. But the reality of being a buyer in one of these retailers is quite different. They're not measured on the medium/long termed. They are measured on now, on the short term. If you're a buyer under enormous pressure which they are, and you're being challenged on a weekly level instead of a six month, twelve month level about achieving certain targets, specifically like margins and investments of suppliers, the only short term mechanism in your hand is, when you need something of a supplier, is to threaten them. Like: I want X amount of money by the end of this week, or in two weeks time, you just need to get that money. When the supplier company starts with the idea: 'let's start a project where we are going to do some collaborative working and joined working, in 6-12 months time we might realize a new way of looking at the picture,' which they sure will do as well, but the buyer sits there: 'I've got something to do by the end of the month, so you need to give me the money.' And that is the tension at the heart of this debate, not just your debate, but the debate of the industry. The tension is, they're being driven in a very short term passion, and therefore their tools and tactics are limited to: 'what can I threaten you with in order for you to give me my cash, straight away.' 'I'll do something to you that you don't like so you will give me that cash'. Think, as I said earlier, since there is a lot of data now they get

more confident about their decisions as a retailer, not less confident. They are more confident about not losing shoppers. So again, there are UK examples in discounters is growing quite a lot from a small base. Which is much different than the rest of Europe, they're a lot bigger, the big impact on the top 4, one of the things the top 4 leadership locked on to, was one of reasons these guys are so successful is they have limited ranges which makes it easier to shop, that's what they got in their heads. So, last year I think it was Sainsbury's and Tesco, all going to suppliers and say: we're going to get rid of 30% of our range. We're going to delist it. Obviously the question for the supplier is: how much of that 30% is going to be you? Well, it could be less of you, if you start with giving us more money. Do you want to be one of the ones that is left? Conflict delistings start in a different way. And they will say: Our shoppers want simplicity, it's easier for our stores to manage, bla bla bla.. The message for the supplier basically is: 'Do you want to be some of the suppliers that are still left? And if you do, you're going to have to pay for it.'

I think if I were the supplier, what I would make them do, after looking into this area is making them look much harder at the assortment and product range and what its purpose is, and what money it actually makes. And a lot of the suppliers in the past five years are investing in teams of people which they're typically calling Revenue Growth Managers, and these teams are purely focused on price promotions, and the investment mix. They're looking quite deep dive analytically at, if I'm talking to Albert Heijn, what would be the most profitable and efficient SKU's for us and them to stock. And let's just focus on the key products that will deliver return on investment, and profitability etc. So, I would making them think harder. Before, suppliers were constantly turning out new products (more flavour & pack size variations etc.) and gave little thought about the consequences. Now they are more thinking about the actual costs of new products, or changing products. So, they're investing more in their analytics, and thinking harder about it. Some of them at least, not all of them.

C: How does the customer react?

I haven't done a lot of research on that as well. I have seen research, I think if you look at retailer specific data, they will largely tell you for a lot of products, although customers will initially be confused or a little bit upset, but they are not going to switch stores over it. They are not going to walk out. I think there are very few brands or SKU's they would walk out from. I remember seeing some research done around out-of-stock situations. Which is quite similar, the products are not there. And for some key SKU's, that research said that they give the retailer three attempts before they decide or think about whether they will switch store. So if you visit one, they'll not be happy, I'll go back next time, oh it's still not there, I will go back one last time and when it's still not there then they are not going back. But I'm not sure about conflict delistings. And some of the retailers in the UK, are not just delisting it and saying nothing, they are putting things above the shelves, the reason it's not there. And they'll even put it there: 'Why won't you try this?' It depends on the language they use but they will go: why don't you try this instead? And I know when I worked at Tesco I remember doing a pretty big range reduction in jams etc. we took out about 35% of the range. And now they've got loyalty cards, they will be doing it in a much more sophisticated way where they will be mailing shoppers that used to buy these products, and giving them vouchers or anything. And again, as a supplier there is nothing you can do about that.

M: Does this happen more often with regular out-of-stock situations? Because conflict delistings are often quite unexpected.

They can do these things so quickly They can target you the next week if they want to. And again that could be another tactic they use to the supplier because if the supplier knows about this they would be like: 'Okay, week one you've delisted the product and week two you are

mailing the shoppers to try a competitor product'. That puts pressure on them. I mean this is the heart of it as well where you think about the different agenda of suppliers and retailers, where my research was coming in which was, in theory, both the supplier and the retailer have at their heart, the shoppers needs. And meeting the shoppers needs, but the retailer is quite prepared to make short term decisions. They've really got nothing to do with the shopper. It has everything to do with their needs. And they will let that roll. And as I said, a lot of the time, they discover that it makes no real difference to the shopper so therefore they are not too bothered. It's like, well I took it out, and not a lot happened, but if there is a big enough bag of cash on the deck, they'll bring it back. None of that has got anything to do with the shopper.

M: Does a conflict delisting in a high involvement category like beer, have an impact on the brand loyalty of the customers? Do you think customers are always willing to buy another brand?

It depends on the category. The loyalty to a brand is a metric that the retailer looks at, by using their data. The retailers know if the manufacturer's brand is one with high loyalty or a high share of spend. The retailer does then take more of a risk. But this is by category, but also by brand in a category as well. So I mean, I did some work on beer, while I was in Germany working with ... (inaudible). Even in that channel, convenience, they were doing almost (inaudible) specific ranging, because of the massive difference in loyalty to brands in Germany on beer. You know, brand A was really strong in this region, while disappearing in other regions etc. So in those situations, you are very careful. So there is so much loyalty to certain brands, I need to be really careful. Because if I get rid of that, they will never come to buy anything. But in a lot of categories I worked in, that was just not the case. M: Yes, especially now because private labels have become a lot better. The quality often is just as good as the A-brands. So, I think that is a big influence. Most categories there is always another option for the same kind of product. Dr. Leach: I mean, there are probably a few brands, but if you walk into a supermarket, you would expect and always want to find I would guess. But there are only a few of them. I mean, Coca Cola is drastically (inaudible). These are sometimes the ones that have the highest loyalty are not the biggest sellers, but quite got a uniqueness that people want to buy. And you said, own brands are the things that they are investing in, but it is a creator of differentiation, because they are the only place where you can buy it. They also want to do it in fresh foods, fruit and meats etc etc. Because they can get high margin loyalty to these products you can not buy anywhere else.

Disconnection

This is the tension, from the retailer perspective, I believe, they are in now. Which is, the industry construct is shifting this way. This construct can achieve great things with very limited assortments. That they can turn very fast and reinvest their savings of (inaudible) etc etc into pricing and keep the prices going down. The traditional retailers, mostly resellers, (inaudible) convenience formats. The big boxers, with large amounts of range, are complex and costly to manage. They are stuck in this area of less range and turning back to (inaudible), have better margins and putting prices where we wish to. We are not up to do that. We just don't have that, we have got big footprints with big ranges. You know, 30000 or 40000 feet or etc. And they are struggling with that, they are really struggling with that. As a retail strategic composition, which means they are pushing that down to the suppliers. They try to do something (inaudible) they can do. So to give you another example, Asda in the UK has just started taking out space and range of grocery products etc etc. But installing (inaudible) and cafes. Tesco has just done a deal with a big restaurant/cafe chain in the UK. Where they gone put (inaudible) in Tesco

stores. Skip all of the products and put these cafes into their shops. What they are seeing is I got too much space, which is inefficient and costs me too much and I can't compete with discounters. What else can I do? I could offer services, I could offer cafes, I could offer drycleaner. And then they (inaudible) into a sort of discounter within a big shop. If that makes sense. So I am going into a 80000 square foot (inaudible) and buying this amount of discounter range of groceries. And also of those clothings and electricals. These retailers, that is their strategic dilemma. They are carrying a cost range, but they want to operate like a discounter. They want to operate with the same prices as the discounter. And all that pressure they are putting to the supplier. They are doing it, e.g. Unilever, and saying: "I don't want to operate at that range and I want the prices they are selling out." And the supplier will be saying: "You can't. You are not that model." And that is where this is. One of the tensions they are in.

M: Is that also because, products in general are becoming a lot better at quality and now people are still massively going for the lowest price? Instead of choosing better quality for better price and therefore choosing the best retailer. Therefore the best retailers want to give the best experience but also want to give the best price to attract people.

Dr. Leach: (inaudible) I think the UK, in terms of development compared with the world, is earlier with its own brand and more developed with its own brands. Trying to do that type of thing. Which is, with our own brand, we can offer you fantastic quality at a great price. The challenge for them is that it costs a lot of money to do. Because they have to invest in development. It is quite a costly exercise to develop a product in that way. It takes a lot of money and time to do it. Which is one thing. Which again, the discounters don't do, they don't have that problem. So they don't do that. The other challenge is, what is happening, I think, again if you look at the consumer shopping landscape. Shoppers are quite savvy with stores or categories which they prepare to invest money in like that. I really want the best experience right here and I am not paying off. At which party they are savvy about, does not really make a difference. If they chose A, B, or C, they are all the same. I just buy that. So the edge of the retailers being able to just put a badge on things and calling it the best of this or the finest of that, or whatever. I don't think that is there anymore, shoppers are really savvy about this. And I am not prepared to invest in categories like that. Some categories they just don't care. You know, after working in this area and very different categories and retailers and suppliers. You know there are certain categories, they come in the store for. They want to go in and out of a store quickly. They just want to buy their things quickly and they are not interested in browsing or in (inaudible). Dispirited whatever you will do as a supplier or retailer. And some categories are interesting. They are prepared to invest time. You know, classically in a supermarket, a category like wine is one of those categories. That is an interesting category and I am willing to spend more. Or fresh foods are like that. But a lot of categories are not. For example, soft drinks. (inaudible) Get me in, get me out. And give me a great price and I just don't care. You know, you can show me anything and I am not bothered.

M: Yeah, because it is almost the exact same product as any other store.

Dr. Leach: You can buy it anywhere. If I really wanted to, I could go and buy it at the discounter in a big bag and put it in the boot of my car. Just put it in the garage or something.

M: Because you can't really explain why it is more expensive there.

Dr. Leach: No, there is such a visibility of pricing now. They know what things cost. So even, I don't know how it is in the Netherlands right now. But in the UK, where they are looking at convenience channels. Shoppers are more obviously in convenience channels. Where a lot, especially in the last year, because of working at home etc etc, they are used to be, to some extent, the retailers (inaudible) price much higher in convenience channels and they, well you are paying for the convenience. You know, your (inaudible) bottle of Coke costs you 75p cents in retail gonna cost you a euro in the convenience channel. And (inaudible) that disappeared, because shoppers are like: "Why would I pay anymore for it? How does that work?" So they

are losing that as well, you know, shoppers are just more knowledgeable. And through the visibility of the internet (inaudible). So all those things are adding up to make their lives harder and harder. The default for the retailer in this context is just to go to the supplier. Because it is (inaudible), quick win. I need money, however you want to breathe it up. Investment, margin, motion funds. You are the sorter of the money, the supplier. And that is the debate, and that is the half of a conflict delisting, which is one of their leavers. Well, if you don't, I will (inaudible) this product out.

S: Have you ever experienced a conflict delisting, where it was the other way around. So where the supplier was: Ok, I'm not going to deliver any products to you any more?

Dr. Leach: Firstly no, but there was one case in the UK which was quite famous in the industry. About 5 years ago. It was a brand of potato chips or kettle chips. Which is still around. I think they are owned by Pepsi now, but they were not at the time. And they are a premium, handcrafted, potato chips. So they were quite a premium price. And they were sold in specialist shops, e.g. delicacies channel and such places. They were very careful about how they sold the product. (inaudible) premium. And Tesco does this a lot. I am sure all of the retailers do, but I was involved with Tesco. Tesco did a lot of search on what they call the grey market. I don't know if you came across this. Tesco (inaudible) in the UK and they were (inaudible) about buying Coke from the bottler in the UK. But then they discover that they could go to a continent, a different bottler. For example, in Hungary or something. And get the same Coca Cola, but at cheaper prices. So they just do that, because they can. So, that is one example of a grey market. So what Tesco did, they saw these kettle chips and thought, those are really interesting. And at this time, they were pretty new and premium. We want to have some of these. And they started buying them from wholesalers and they were buying products somewhere and putting them on their shelves. But (inaudible) to stop selling their products. And they made a big PR about this. And they did, Tesco did at this time. But this is the only one I can think of, where it was done the other way. What is, where they did remove their products from sale. The vast majority of brands would not do that. Unless..., I can not think of any example where they would do it. At least in a grocery context.

S: Okay, I don't have any more questions. I don't know if Tim does have any more questions?

T: No, all questions are answered actually.

M: Yes, it was really interesting, because you have a lot of experience in the field.

Appendix 2: Recruitment of participants

Participants were recruited via the social media channels of the researcher. On Facebook and LinkedIn respondents saw the following post:



The following message was displayed:

‘Ik ben op dit moment bezig met mijn master thesis. Voor mijn enquête heb ik flink wat respondenten nodig. Ben jij iemand of ken jij iemand die online boodschappen doet? Dan zou je mij enorm helpen door deze enquête in te vullen of door te sturen. Het duurt maar 5 minuten en het helpt mij met afstuderen. ‘

In English: *‘At the moment I am working on my master thesis. I am looking for participants for my survey. Are you someone or do you know someone who orders their groceries online? You could help me by filling in the survey or send it to other people. It will take only 5 minutes and it would help me graduate.’*

The Facebook post was shared 32 times.

The same photo with a message was posted in a Facebook group called ‘Respondenten gezocht (onderzoek, enquête, vragenlijst, scriptie, afstudeer)’. The following message was posted:

‘Ik ben op dit moment bezig met mijn master thesis. Voor mijn enquête heb ik flink wat respondenten nodig. Ik ben opzoek naar mensen die ooit wel eens online boodschappen hebben gedaan. Het duurt maar 5 minuten en het helpt mij met afstuderen. ‘

In English: *“At the moment I am working on my master thesis. I am looking for participants who have done their groceries online. It will take only 5 minutes and it would help me graduate.”*

13 people commented on this post.

Appendix 3: Survey

The survey was in Dutch but is translated in English for this research.

Page 1

Dear respondent,

My name is Sanne Relou and I am studying a Master Marketing at the Radboud University. For my master thesis I am doing a research about the phenomena conflict delistings. A conflict delisting is a situation of temporary product unavailability at a supermarket, due to a conflict between the retailer and the manufacturer. The brand of the manufacturer is still available at other supermarkets. This research is about the consequences of an online conflict delisting at an online supermarket.

This survey takes about 5 minutes of your time and it would help me to graduate. Your answers will be completely anonymous and confidential and will only be used for this research. Participation is completely voluntarily and you can withdraw from this research at any stage. If you would have any questions or comments you could always contact me at the following mail address@....

Many thanks in advance.

Page 2

1. Have you ever ordered your groceries online at Albert Heijn or Jumbo?
 - ☐ Yes
 - ☐ No

Page 3

2. How often do you order your online groceries per month?
 - ☐ More than once per week
 - ☐ Once per week
 - ☐ Once per two weeks
 - ☐ Once per three weeks
 - ☐ Once per month
 - ☐ Other, namely...

3. What is the reason that you order your groceries online (multiple answers possible)
 - Convenience
 - Online store has a large assortment
 - To save time
 - No opening hours
 - Corona
 - No supermarket nearby
 - Other, namely...
4. Which of these online supermarkets do you prefer?
 - Jumbo
 - Albert Heijn
5. How far is the nearest physical store?
 - Less than 5 kilometers
 - 5 kilometers
 - 7.5 kilometers
 - 10 kilometers
 - 15 kilometers
 - More than 15 kilometers
6. Which of these beer brands do you or your friends / roommates prefer?
 - Heineken
 - Grolsh
 - Amstel
 - Brand
 - Hertog-Jan
 - Bavaria
 - Jupiler

Page 4

7. What are the chances that you buy the same beer brand on a regular base?

Very small
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Very big

8. What are the chances that you order your online groceries at the same supermarket on a regular base?

Very small ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Very big

Page 5

Situation 1: Imagine you are doing your online groceries. You already put a few products in your basket. When you want to select your favorite beer brand, you find out it is not there.

9. How big is the chance that you would buy another brand?

Very small ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Very big

10. How big is the chance that you would go to another store to buy your favorite beer brand?

Very small ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Very big

Routing. When selecting option 5,6 or 7 at question 16 respondents were directed to the following question:

Do you order all your other groceries at this store?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

Page 6

Situation 2: Imagine that you read on social media or the news that your favorite beer brand is temporarily not available at your supermarket. The next day you are ordering your groceries online

11. How big is the chance that you would buy another brand?

Very small ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Very big

12. How big is the chance that you would go to another store to buy your favorite beer brand?

Very small ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Very big

Routing. When selecting option 5,6 or 7 at question 16 respondents were directed to the following question:

Do you order all your other groceries at this store?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Page 9

13. Why would you **not** switch to another online supermarket? (Multiple answers possible)

- It takes too much time to create a new account at the other supermarket
- I am used to my current supermarket
- The other supermarkets are too expensive
- The delivery costs at the other supermarket are too high
- I am loyal to my current supermarket
- Other, namely...

14. Why would you **not** switch to another beer brand? (Multiple answers possible)

- I would describe myself as brand loyal
- Other beer brands are too expensive
- Other beer brands do not taste very well
- Other, namely...

Page 10

15. What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Non-binary
- I prefer not to say

16. What is your age group?

- Younger than 25 years

- 25-35 years
- 36-45 years
- 46-55 years
- 56-65 years
- Older than 65 years

17. In which Dutch province do you live?

- Drenthe
- Flevoland
- Friesland
- Gelderland
- Groningen
- Limburg
- Noord-Brabant
- Noord-Holland
- Overijssel
- Utrecht
- Zeeland
- Zuid-Holland
- Other, namely...

Page 11

If you have any questions or comments, you can leave them here.

...

If you are interested in the results of this research, you could leave your mail address below.

This mail address will be used once to communicate the results of this study.

...

Appendix 4 Results

In this Appendix the SPSS output of the main analysis can be found.

4.1 Pivot tables

Aantal van ResponseId		Q20_1_SS_Unannounced								
Q19_1_BS_Unannounced		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total	
1	1						2	18	21	13,8%
2				1		1	10	4	16	10,5%
3				2	2		7	3	14	9,2%
4	3		2	1	6	5	3	2	22	14,5%
5	2		1	6	1	4	4	1	19	12,5%
6	7		10	10	2	1	2	1	33	21,7%
7	18		3	1	3	1		1	27	17,8%
Total	31		16	21	14	12	28	30	152	100%
	20,4%		10,5%	13,8%	9,2%	7,9%	18,4%	19,7%	100%	

Aantal van ResponseId		Q24_1_SS_Announced								
Q23_1_BS_Announced		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total	
1	3				1		2	14	20	13,2%
2	1		2			3	10	6	22	14,5%
3					1	4	6	2	13	8,6%
4	1		1		4	2	6	4	18	11,8%
5	1		7	7	3	7	5	1	31	20,4%
6	7		9	2	4	3	2		27	17,8%
7	14		3				1	3	21	13,8%
Total	27		22	9	13	19	32	30	152	100%
	17,8%		14,5%	5,9%	8,6%	12,5%	21,1%	19,7%	100,0%	

4.2 Frequency tables

Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Unannounced					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	21	9.4	13.8	13.8
	2	16	7.1	10.5	24.3
	3	14	6.3	9.2	33.6
	4	22	9.8	14.5	48.0
	5	19	8.5	12.5	60.5
	6	33	14.7	21.7	82.2
	7	27	12.1	17.8	100.0
	Total	152	67.9	100.0	
Missing	System	72	32.1		
Total		224	100.0		

Q20_1_Store_Switch_Unannounced

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	31	13.8	20.4	20.4
	2	16	7.1	10.5	30.9
	3	21	9.4	13.8	44.7
	4	14	6.3	9.2	53.9
	5	12	5.4	7.9	61.8
	6	28	12.5	18.4	80.3
	7	30	13.4	19.7	100.0
	Total	152	67.9	100.0	
Missing	System	72	32.1		
Total		224	100.0		

Q23_1_Brand_Switch_Announced

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	20	8.9	13.2	13.2
	2	22	9.8	14.5	27.6
	3	13	5.8	8.6	36.2
	4	18	8.0	11.8	48.0
	5	31	13.8	20.4	68.4
	6	27	12.1	17.8	86.2
	7	21	9.4	13.8	100.0
	Total	152	67.9	100.0	
Missing	System	72	32.1		
Total		224	100.0		





Q24_1_Store_Switch_Announced

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	27	12.1	17.8	17.8
	2	22	9.8	14.5	32.2
	3	9	4.0	5.9	38.2
	4	13	5.8	8.6	46.7
	5	19	8.5	12.5	59.2
	6	32	14.3	21.1	80.3
	7	30	13.4	19.7	100.0
	Total	152	67.9	100.0	
Missing	System	72	32.1		
Total		224	100.0		

4.3 Correlation table

Assumptions Pearson's Correlation coefficient

Linearity



There are no major outliers hence linearity can be assumed. Due to the central limit theorem the data is also normally distributed. Lastly, the data is measured on a Likert scale which can be considered as a continuous scale. Overall the assumptions are met and Pearson's correlation coefficient can be used (Field, 2013).

Correlations

		Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Unannounced	Q20_1_Store_Switch_Unannounced	Q23_1_Brand_Switch_Announced	Q24_1_Store_Switch_Announced
Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Unannounced	Pearson Correlation	1	-.734**	.796**	-.611**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000
	N	152	152	152	152
Q20_1_Store_Switch_Unannounced	Pearson Correlation	-.734**	1	-.559**	.795**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000
	N	152	152	152	152
Q23_1_Brand_Switch_Announced	Pearson Correlation	.796**	-.559**	1	-.584**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000
	N	152	152	152	152
Q24_1_Store_Switch_Announced	Pearson Correlation	-.611**	.795**	-.584**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	
	N	152	152	152	152

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

4.4 SPSS output data analysis

Paired Samples Test								
		Paired Differences						Sig. (2-tailed)
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower Upper	t	df	
Pair 1	Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Un announced – Q20_1_Store_Switch_Un announced	.296	4.001	.325	-.345 .937	.912	151	.363
Pair 2	Q23_1_Brand_Switch_An nounced – Q24_1_Store_Switch_An nounced	-.053	3.759	.305	-.655 .550	-.173	151	.863
Pair 3	Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Un announced – Q23_1_Brand_Switch_An nounced	.171	1.296	.105	-.037 .379	1.627	151	.106
Pair 4	Q20_1_Store_Switch_Un announced – Q24_1_Store_Switch_An nounced	-.178	1.429	.116	-.407 .051	-1.533	151	.127

4.5 Additional analyses

4.5.1 regression analysis

Brand loyalty – Brand Switch Unannounced

Assumptions	
Normality	Central Limit Theorem
Linearity	Polynome variables are not significant so assumption met.
Multicollinearity	Tolerance values are above 0.20. Assumption met.
Homoscedasticity	Data is equally spread. Assumption met.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Un announced	4.38	2.058	152
No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	5.66	1.496	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty2	2.2229684	4.23823635	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty3	-4.5435039	19.5904559	152

Model Summary^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	Change Statistics			Sig. F Change	Durbin-Watson
						F Change	df1	df2		
1	.301 ^a	.091	.084	1.969	.091	14.931	1	150	.000	
2	.397 ^b	.158	.141	1.908	.067	5.913	2	148	.003	1.917

a. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec

b. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec, Centered_BrandLoyalty2, Centered_BrandLoyalty3


c. Dependent Variable: Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Unannounced

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	6.720	.628		10.709	.000		
	No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	-.414	.107	-.301	-3.864	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	9.293	1.005		9.250	.000		
	No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	-.801	.171	-.582	-4.680	.000	.368	2.720
	Centered_BrandLoyalty2	-.158	.148	-.326	-1.072	.286	.061	16.283
	Centered_BrandLoyalty3	.006	.036	.058	.172	.864	.050	20.119

a. Dependent Variable: Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Unannounced

Scatterplot



Brand loyalty – Store Switch Unannounced

Assumptions	
Normality	Central Limit Theorem
Linearity	Polynome variables are not significant so assumption met.
Multicollinearity	Tolerance values are above 0.20. Hence assumption met
Homoscedasticity	Data is equally spread. Assumption met.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Q20_1_Store_Switch_Unannounced	4.08	2.239	152
No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	5.66	1.496	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty	.0044737	1.49588433	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty2	2.2229684	4.23823635	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty3	-4.5435039	19.5904559	152

Model Summary^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	Change Statistics			Sig. F Change	Durbin-Watson
						F Change	df1	df2		
1	.463 ^a	.214	.209	1.992	.214	40.866	1	150	.000	
2	.478 ^b	.228	.212	1.987	.014	1.333	2	148	.267	1.885

a. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec


b. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec, Centered_BrandLoyalty2, Centered_BrandLoyalty3

c. Dependent Variable: Q20_1_Store_Switch_Unannounced

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.156	.635		.245	.807		
	No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	.693	.108	.463	6.393	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	-1.126	1.046		-1.076	.284		
	No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	.887	.178	.592	4.972	.000	.368	2.720
	Centered_BrandLoyalty2	.074	.154	.140	.480	.632	.061	16.283
	Centered_BrandLoyalty3	-.004	.037	-.036	-.112	.911	.050	20.119

a. Dependent Variable: Q20_1_Store_Switch_Unannounced

Scatterplot**Dependent Variable: Q20_1_Store_Switch_Unannounced*****Store loyalty - brand switch unannounced***

<i>Assumptions</i>	
Normality	Central Limit Theorem
Linearity	Polynome variables are not significant so assumption met.
Multicollinearity	Tolerance values are above 0.20 hence assumption met.
Homoscedasticity	The data is more focused to the right. Assumption not met.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Unannounced	4.38	2.058	152
No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	6.24	1.122	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty	.0034211	1.12171056	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty2	1.2499684	3.33310184	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty3	-2.9209714	15.2657794	152

Model Summary^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	Change Statistics			Sig. F Change	Durbin-Watson
						F Change	df1	df2		
1	.038 ^a	.001	-.005	2.064	.001	.213	1	150	.645	
2	.128 ^b	.016	-.003	2.062	.015	1.133	2	148	.325	1.880

a. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec

b. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec, Centered_StoreLoyalty3, Centered_StoreLoyalty2

c. Dependent Variable: Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Unannounced


Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	3.944	.950		4.153	.000		
	No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	.069	.150	.038	.461	.645	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	6.023	1.680		3.586	.000		
	No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	-.230	.249	-.125	-.924	.357	.362	2.762
	Centered_StoreLoyalty2	-.223	.263	-.361	-.847	.398	.036	27.398
	Centered_StoreLoyalty3	-.022	.053	-.164	-.420	.675	.043	23.087

a. Dependent Variable: Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Unannounced

Scatterplot

Dependent Variable: Q19_1_Brand_Switch_Unannounced



Store loyalty – Store switch unannounced

Assumptions	
Normality	Central Limit Theorem
Linearity	Polynome variables are not significant so assumption met.

Multicollinearity	Tolerance values are above 0.20 hence assumption met.
Homoscedasticity	The data is more focused to the left. Assumption not met.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Q20_1_Store_Switch_Un announced	4.08	2.239	152
No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	6.24	1.122	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty	.0034211	1.12171056	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty2	1.2499684	3.33310184	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty3	-2.9209714	15.2657794	152

Model Summary^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	Change Statistics				Durbin-Watson
						F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	.034 ^a	.001	-.005	2.245	.001	.174	1	150	.677	
2	.086 ^b	.007	-.013	2.253	.006	.463	2	148	.631	1.865

a. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec


b. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec, Centered_StoreLoyalty3, Centered_StoreLoyalty2

c. Dependent Variable: Q20_1_Store_Switch_Unannounced

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	4.504	1.033		4.359	.000		
	No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	-.068	.163	-.034	-.418	.677	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	3.219	1.836		1.753	.082		
	No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	.124	.272	.062	.457	.648	.362	2.762
	Centered_StoreLoyalty2	.051	.288	.077	.179	.858	.036	27.398
	Centered_StoreLoyalty3	-.007	.058	-.048	-.123	.902	.043	23.087

a. Dependent Variable: Q20_1_Store_Switch_Unannounced



Brand loyalty - brand switch announced

Assumptions	
Normality	Central Limit Theorem
Linearity	Polynome variables are not significant so assumption met.
Multicollinearity	Tolerance values are above 0.20 hence assumption met.
Homoscedasticity	Data is equally spread. Assumption met.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Q23_1_Brand_Switch_An nounced	4.20	1.998	152
No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	5.66	1.496	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty	.0044737	1.49588433	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty2	2.2229684	4.23823635	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty3	-4.5435039	19.5904559	152

Model Summary^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	Change Statistics				Sig. F Change	Durbin-Watson
						F Change	df1	df2			
1	.296 ^a	.088	.082	1.915	.088	14.410	1	150		.000	
2	.405 ^b	.164	.147	1.845	.077	6.790	2	148		.002	1.983

a. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec


b. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec, Centered_BrandLoyalty2, Centered_BrandLoyalty3

c. Dependent Variable: Q23_1_Brand_Switch_Announced

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	6.444	.610		10.562	.000		
	No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	-.395	.104	-.296	-3.796	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	9.292	.971		9.566	.000		
	No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	-.864	.166	-.647	-5.217	.000	.368	2.720
	Centered_BrandLoyalty2	.008	.143	.018	.058	.954	.061	16.283
	Centered_BrandLoyalty3	.047	.034	.464	1.376	.171	.050	20.119

a. Dependent Variable: Q23_1_Brand_Switch_Announced



Brand loyalty - store switch announced

Assumptions	
Normality	Central Limit Theorem
Linearity	Polynome variables are not significant so assumption met.
Multicollinearity	Tolerance values are above 0.20 hence assumption met.
Homoscedasticity	Data is equally spread. Assumption met.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Q24_1_Store_Switch_Announced	4.26	2.224	152
No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	5.66	1.496	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty	.0044737	1.49588433	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty2	2.2229684	4.23823635	152
Centered_BrandLoyalty3	-4.5435039	19.5904559	152

Model Summary^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	Change Statistics				Durbin-Watson
						F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	.490 ^a	.240	.235	1.946	.240	47.350	1	150	.000	
2	.507 ^b	.257	.242	1.937	.017	1.681	2	148	.190	2.108

a. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec


b. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec, Centered_BrandLoyalty2, Centered_BrandLoyalty3

c. Dependent Variable: Q24_1_Store_Switch_Announced

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.131	.620		.211	.833		
	No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	.728	.106	.490	6.881	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	-1.179	1.020		-1.156	.250		
	No_Rem_BrLoyalty_Rec	.917	.174	.617	5.277	.000	.368	2.720
	Centered_BrandLoyalty2	.120	.150	.228	.799	.426	.061	16.283
	Centered_BrandLoyalty3	.006	.036	.049	.154	.878	.050	20.119

a. Dependent Variable: Q24_1_Store_Switch_Announced



Store loyalty - brand switch announced

<i>Assumptions</i>	
Normality	Central Limit Theorem
Linearity	Polynome variables are not significant so assumption met.
Multicollinearity	Tolerance values are above 0.20 hence assumption met.
Homoscedasticity	The data is more focused to the right. Assumption not met.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Q23_1_Brand_Switch_An nounced	4.20	1.998	152
No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	6.24	1.122	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty	.0034211	1.12171056	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty2	1.2499684	3.33310184	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty3	-2.9209714	15.2657794	152

Model Summary^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	Change Statistics				Durbin-Watson
						F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	.108 ^a	.012	.005	1.993	.012	1.761	1	150	.186	
2	.145 ^b	.021	.001	1.997	.009	.702	2	148	.497	1.901

a. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec

b. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec, Centered_StoreLoyalty3, Centered_StoreLoyalty2


c. Dependent Variable: Q23_1_Brand_Switch_Announced

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	3.006	.917		3.278	.001		
	No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	.192	.145	.108	1.327	.186	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	4.595	1.627		2.824	.005		
	No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	-.034	.241	-.019	-.140	.888	.362	2.762
	Centered_StoreLoyalty2	-.200	.255	-.334	-.785	.433	.036	27.398
	Centered_StoreLoyalty3	-.024	.051	-.184	-.472	.638	.043	23.087

a. Dependent Variable: Q23_1_Brand_Switch_Announced

Scatterplot



Store loyalty - store switch announced

Assumptions	
Normality	Central Limit Theorem
Linearity	Polynome variables are not significant so assumption met.
Multicollinearity	Tolerance values are above 0.20 hence assumption met.

Homoscedasticity

The data is more focused to the left.
Assumption not met.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Q24_1_Store_Switch_An nounced	4.26	2.224	152
No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	6.24	1.122	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty	.0034211	1.12171056	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty2	1.2499684	3.33310184	152
Centered_StoreLoyalty3	-2.9209714	15.2657794	152

Model Summary^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	Change Statistics				Durbin-Watson
						F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	.171 ^a	.029	.023	2.199	.029	4.529	1	150	.035	
2	.205 ^b	.042	.023	2.199	.013	.976	2	148	.379	1.969

a. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec


b. Predictors: (Constant), No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec, Centered_StoreLoyalty3, Centered_StoreLoyalty2

c. Dependent Variable: Q24_1_Store_Switch_Announced

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	6.376	1.012		6.302	.000		
	No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	-.339	.160	-.171	-2.128	.035	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	4.330	1.792		2.416	.017		
	No_Rem_StLoyalty_Rec	-.051	.265	-.026	-.194	.847	.362	2.762
	Centered_StoreLoyalty2	.286	.281	.429	1.019	.310	.036	27.398
	Centered_StoreLoyalty3	.038	.056	.260	.673	.502	.043	23.087

a. Dependent Variable: Q24_1_Store_Switch_Announced



4.5.2 Chi-square test gender

Brand Switch Unannounced - Gender

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.201 ^a	6	.977
Likelihood Ratio	1.205	6	.977
Linear-by-Linear Association	.519	1	.471
N of Valid Cases	152		

a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4,97.

Store Switch Unannounced -Gender

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.815 ^a	6	.832
Likelihood Ratio	2.813	6	.832
Linear-by-Linear Association	.061	1	.805
N of Valid Cases	152		

a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4,26.

Brand Switch Announced - Gender

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.299 ^a	6	.890
Likelihood Ratio	2.378	6	.882
Linear-by-Linear Association	.179	1	.672
N of Valid Cases	152		

a. 1 cells (7.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.62.

Store Switch Announced - Gender

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.081 ^a	6	.534
Likelihood Ratio	4.910	6	.555
Linear-by-Linear Association	.273	1	.601
N of Valid Cases	152		

a. 2 cells (14.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.20.

Appendix 5: Population characteristics

Marges Waarde ▼

Perioden 2020 ▼

Onderwerp ▼

Persoonskenmerken ▼	Totaal online aankopen voor privé %	Soort aankopen: goederen
		Etenswaren, drank
Totaal personen	84,9	17,7
Geslacht: mannen	87,3	18,7
Geslacht: vrouwen	82,7	16,6
Leeftijd: 12 tot 25 jaar	87,8	14,7
Leeftijd: 25 tot 35 jaar	94,1	28,9
Leeftijd: 35 tot 45 jaar	93,5	30,3
Leeftijd: 45 tot 55 jaar	93,3	19,4
Leeftijd: 55 tot 65 jaar	86,4	13,8
Leeftijd: 65 tot 75 jaar	78,2	9,0
Leeftijd: 75 jaar of ouder	44,5	4,5

Bron: CBS