Guaranteeing Safety: An Analysis of Security Strategies for INGOs in South Sudan

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I. Abstract

For humanitarian aid workers, in 2018 South Sudan has been one of the most dangerous countries to work in. Most aid organizations have been active in the region since the days the country was still part of Sudan, but over the last couple of years the violence has increased. This research focuses on the security strategies as employed by humanitarian aid organizations and the strategy/ies that is/are the best to counter the increasing security risks in the country. Qualitative research, including semi-structured interviews and literature research, has been conducted with the help of four INGOs, situated both in the Netherlands and in South Sudan. The research shows that given the experiences of the four organizations that have been analyzed, the most effective security strategy for INGOs is mainly based on acceptance of the local community. Good local acceptance strategies can lead to less need for protective and deterrent strategies that diminish productivity.

II. Preface

III. List of Abbreviations

ACAT	Accept, Control, Avoid, Transfer
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
DC	Democratic Change (South Sudanese political party)
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
RSM	Roving Security Manager
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
SSLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
TCSS	Transitional Constitution of South Sudan
UN	United Nations
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

IV. Table of Contents

V. Table of figures and tables

Figures

1. Introduction

(International) non-governmental organizations ((I)INGOs) play a major role in the course of conflicts; not so much by actually fighting the war, obviously, but by helping people in one way or another, as a supposedly neutral party. For example, organizations like WarChild, the Red Cross and others are active all around the world, helping people in need. Most of the time, INGO employees can do their work in relatively safe circumstances, but not every country is as welcoming to INGOs. Some aid workers are at a high risk of being taken hostage, raped or even murdered. The parties enacting atrocities like this can have all kinds of motivations and might differ from country to country. Some countries seem to be more prone to violence directed at aid workers than others; Syria and Afghanistan, for example. However, the number one country with the highest number of attacks against aid workers is South Sudan (OCHA, 2017).

The civil war in South Sudan has been raging ever since current president Salva Kiir Mayardit accused his former ally Riek Machar of staging a coup d'état (Koos & Gutschke, 2014). However, this is only a part of the story. Ethnic hatred is also a major factor, with 64 different tribes living in the area of South Sudan after it split from the rest of Sudan (Foltyn, 2015). Many young people are taking up arms to fight for their families. This takes the conflict beyond mere politics; civilians are sometimes actively targeted and retaliate in kind. In essence, the whole of the country is at war. This is where the INGOs come into play. They are active in South Sudan helping the weaker, more vulnerable people to survive, trying to build peace. This is, however, not taken in kind by some of the locals. With violence against aid workers being so extreme in South Sudan, one wonders what can be done to help the aid workers to do their work safely. What is the best way to protect and help the local community of South Sudan, while at the same time protecting the INGO aid workers against violence committed by that very same local community. To make matters worse, the South Sudanese government seems to be the main perpetrator of violence against aid workers (Lynch, 2016).

In such a perilous environment, what is the most effective way of securing the INGO aid workers? In this research I will try to answer this question by comparing the three main security strategies: acceptance, protection, and deterrence. Which one (or combination) of these three strategies is most effective in keeping INGO personnel in South Sudan safe and secure, while at the same time allowing them to be as productive as possible?

1.1 Research Objective

The objective of this research is to find out which security strategy is the most viable for INGOs active in South Sudan. This research is not built on the illusion to be able to change the situation single-handedly. However, there is a well-funded hope that this research might help some INGOs (especially those INGOs that will be used as respondents) in finetuning their security measures. Opening a window for new research and better security is therefore the minimal goal of this research, as it can only reach so many people.

1.2 Research Questions

To reach this objective, this research tries to answer the following main research question:

What security strategy for INGOs in South Sudan best achieves the goals of the INGO and the security of both aid workers and the local community?

In order to be able to answer this research question, there's a need for a few sub-questions that will contribute to answering the main question through either clarifying concepts or delivering important data. First, to lay a groundwork for the central question, we need to answer the following question: *Is there violence against aid workers in South Sudan? If so, why and how?* This will clarify the scope of violence against aid workers in this situation and will therefore put the anticipated interviews and surveys into perspective.

The second question is: *What are the effects of (terrorist) violence on aid workers?* This question tries to explain how the violence affects aid workers in their work and productivity and can therefore clarify what is needed to increase productivity.

The third question is: *What security strategy is best for staff security?* This question will analyze the three strategies and determine which one will best protect the aid workers.

The fourth question is the counterpart of the third: *What security strategy is best for productivity?* This question is based on the same analysis of the strategies, this time with a focus on the effects on productivity. The third and fourth questions together will result in a definite answer to which strategy overall will be best for the organization itself.

The fifth and final question is: *What security strategy is best for the local community?* This question will take in the local community as an important (f)actor. Critical theory proposes to include all important actors and this research intends to do so. Answering this question is meant to connect the local community to the various security strategies and examine their potential roles.

1.3 Societal and Scientific Relevance

1.3.1 Societal Relevance

As mentioned previously, the security measures of INGO employees are of utmost importance. It is not just their well-being, it's their very life that could be at stake. While security strategies have been implemented in many different ways by INGOs and the United Nations, it is important to understand what strategy is most effective in keeping the employees as safe as possible, while still being able to do their job.

While there are a few security strategies, comparisons between the quality of these various strategies are mostly conducted in rather general terms. It is very important to apply the strategies to a specific case. No conflict area is the same and we should not generalize the effectiveness of security strategies just for the sake of simplicity. For example, an important issue in South Sudan is that the authorities indoctrinate the local community with the idea that humanitarian agencies are mostly spies. The Minister of Cabinet Affairs even claimed that "most of the [humanitarian] agencies are here to spy on the government" (Cusack, 2017, p.1). At the same time there is a large amount of ethnic violence between dozens of tribes. The political climate is volatile, often changing. If elements like these are singled out, they are present in most conflict situations. But this very specific combination of conditions is unique to South Sudan. How then, can we ever compare the results of a more general study to this very specific case of South Sudan? This thesis is therefore trying to gain knowledge about the effectiveness of these security strategies in South Sudan specifically. I will elaborate on this more in the next section, dealing with the scientific relevance.

If we gain more knowledge about the situation in South Sudan and how security strategies for INGO employees work in the region, INGOs can adapt to that knowledge. This knowledge can then be used to design and employ their own variations of the scientifically proven successful strategy, based on whatever needs their specific organization has. If all of this is implemented correctly, this might lead to a decrease in violence against aid workers. This might be seen as large-scale thinking, and I do realize that the scope of a master's thesis is not broad enough to solve the problem on its own. However, it may help to fill some very specific gaps in the knowledge, which may (partly) contribute to the eventual solution of the problem at hand.

1.3.2 Scientific Relevance

This research adds to the existing academic debate revolving around security studies. This field has seen many changes during the last few decades, against the background of increased globalization. This section briefly summarizes the various positions in the debate and what this research might contribute. The debate will be elaborated upon further in the literature review.

According to Williams (2012), the major debate around security has recently taken a new turn. The concept of globalization has changed the classic approach to thinking about security. However, the older, slightly pessimistic, Realist approach is still very relevant. It places emphasis on the state-level; conflict is a phenomenon between states, and only on that scale. Even though it has quite a variety of sub-approaches, the general idea is that conflict and

security are based upon violence and fear (Elman, 2007). This has not changed because of globalization, and the relations between these concepts are generally still the same, despite a decreasing number of wars. The Liberalist approach tends to defy this state-centered approach, and argues for a more flexible understanding of conflict and security (Navari, 2012). Democracy and individualism are key concepts in trying to forge a lasting peace. These two approaches, Realism and Liberalism, still cling to a very structuralist view, however. Social constructivism in security studies tries to counter this by seeing conflicts and security as social constructs (Karacasulu & Uzgören, 2002). Humans and their connection to the social environment are central to this view. This approach is expanded upon by the more recent developments in security studies: critical and feminist theories. These studies take race and gender as very important notions in conflict and security (Hendershot & Mutimer, 2018). Taking in all perspectives as equally important in a social framework, is the most effective and just way to study the concept of security. However, because it is going to be near impossible to interview South Sudanese locals in the scope of this research, their perspective will be the least showcased.

This thesis tries to contribute to the debate by giving a focused perspective on security of INGO personnel. So far, this topic has not been researched extensively – see also the literature review – and this research can therefore provide much-needed knowledge and insights. Finding out which security strategy is most effective in the case of South Sudan, can offer support to the various approaches in the debate. For example, if acceptance turns out to be most-promising, this would support the peace studies and critical approaches. However, if protection and/or deterrence are more promising, this supports Realist or Liberal approaches. So, beforehand it is hard to say exactly which side this thesis will contribute to, but it will bring more knowledge into the debate that can clarify and strengthen particular points of view. All these approaches and theories will be further discussed in the 'Literature review' section.

1.4 Thesis Outline

In this first chapter the research objectives and questions have been introduced. Chapter 2 contains the theoretical background used for this research. This includes concepts like security, violence, productivity, INGOs, and aid workers. Chapter 3 describes the methodologies of the research, with clarifications as to the why and how of the methods used. Chapter 4 discusses the history of South Sudan as a country, as well as its people. This is to better understand the context the aid workers are working in. Chapter 5 describes the four INGOs: their background, productivity, and security strategies. Chapter 6 combines the information of the previous chapter with insights from aid workers who have worked in South Sudan and discusses which security strategies are most viable for each specific context. Chapter 7 provides some reflection on the research process. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the research with a final answer to the main question.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this section we will expand upon the theory, as briefly addressed in the section dealing with the scientific relevance of this research. To best shape this thesis, we will have to address and frame particular concepts that are relevant to it and position ourselves in the relevant debates. The first concept is security and the various security strategies, as that is the main issue at hand. Secondly, we need to define local community as a general term. Thirdly, we need to address the role of the INGO and its aid workers. Lastly, we will need to discuss the concepts of violence and productivity and its relationship; what is violence, and when does it impact productivity? What is productive in this context? Explaining these various concepts serves as a basis for the following section on methodology, but also for the conceptual framework that will be used in this thesis.

2.1 Security

2.1.1 Grand Theory

The concept of 'security' is hard to define in a single sentence. Authors argue that we have to analyze various other aspects of security in order to truly define security within the framework of this specific case (Baldwin, 1997; Williams, 2012). Relevant questions in this respect are; security for whom?; security at what cost?; security against which threats?, etc. This thesis focuses on humanitarian aid worker security, but how does that fit in the larger security narrative? To start with, an analysis has to be made of the grand theory behind security, and specifically of the schools of thought that are best suitable for the most important concept of this research. By taking the questions proposed when defining security as a concept into account, we conceptualize security as the personal and physical security of the INGO personnel in question. Security in this sense is much smaller in scope than most definitions of security (like global, national or regional security). However, personal security for all of the aid workers means a sense of local security, too; if they live in one location together, that place has to be secure. No matter the scope, the idea of security is the same; the situation has to be safe enough for INGO personnel to do their work without physical and/or mental damages caused by unforeseen sources.

This section discusses the grand debate on the concept of security. Throughout the years, the field of security has changed; numerous approaches characterize this debate. The very foundation of contemporary security studies can be found in the Realist approach (Wohlforth, 2010). This approach, as well most of its sub-approaches, holds that security is dictated by three core concepts: groupism, egoism, and power-centrism. The first term, groupism, is an approach that assumes that "humanity is naturally divided into groups, each of which possess their own set of particular traits which a priori should be cultivated" (Latella, 1994, p.138). The idea can be linked to a broader form of nationalism. One defining element of nationalism is that conforming to the nation's rules and norms is the best way to acquire security. Groupism expands on this by adding not only the nation state, but any other kind of

'group' an individual can be part of: family, race, religion, ethnicity, etc. (Latella, 1994). This idea assumes that such a group has a common goal, in this case 'security'. In some cases, like South Sudan, security for all groups is not compatible; the groups will not live peacefully together. This is where security becomes more important and groups tend to intensify their 'groupism'; essentially leading to polarization (Wohlforth, 2010).

The second dimension, egoism, is seemingly the exact opposite of groupism; it is based on the idea that self-interest is the foundation of morality, and therefore one's own personal safety is what is most important (Oxford, 2019). The way in which this complies with the concept of groupism, is through the sense that being part of a group can increase one's own personal security, as already mentioned before. In this sense, caring about the 'group' is ultimately founded in caring about yourself. If the group is doing well, you are doing well.

Finally, the concept of power-centrism holds that human relations on every scale are always dictated by inequalities in power (Wohlforth, 2010). This means that there is always one entity (human, council, etc.) that has access to and control over resources in a group. More importantly, with various groups in one setting, this means that no group will have the same level of 'power'; some groups will be marginalized in their ability to have necessary resources, while others will have the control over these very resources.

These three concepts together make up the school of Realism in security and come together in the interesting and relevant conclusion that the only way to gain security is through some sort of central rule and order. This notion answers the question 'Security for whom?' Essentially, realism holds that security will be provided to anyone inside a group with an authoritative order. The main emphasis on security should therefore be put on group/community security. Anyone (or any other group) outside of the main group with malicious intent should be rejected, so as to safeguard the security of the group. The basic idea here is that people value power as the most important resource in a conflict and will therefore go out of their way to gain as much power as possible for themselves or for the group they belong to. The Realist view might be seen as quite pessimistic, as expressed by Carr in his classic 'The Twenty Years' Crisis' (Carr, 2016). In this book, originally published in 1939, Carr argues that peace is a valuable albeit unattainable goal. The chaos and anarchy of the international playing field do not allow for peace. Neorealist approaches tend to be a bit more optimistic, but still hold that war is inherent to the contemporary international climate (Wohlforth, 2010).

After World War I, Liberalism became a more prominent approach to security studies. Its main critique on Realist thinking is that it believes peace is actually attainable (Navari, 2012). One of Liberalism's main concepts and building blocks is individualism (Owen IV, 2010). This differs from the notion of egoism of Realism, since egoism is based on self-interest, disregarding others, while individualism is about self-reliance. It is the idea of not needing other people to reach your goals, but that does not mean that you should not care about other lives. This small but important difference is also what makes the concept of security so distinct for Liberalism. This individualism includes the human rights as we know them today: rights regarding freedom of speech, freedom of movement, and many more. This does not only apply to the smaller individual scale, but also to a larger, institutional scale. Institutions should have the same right to make choices as individuals, so as to strengthen the security of those individuals (Navari, 2012). Peace can be fostered through the use of liberalist institutions, like democracy and a free market.

The idea that peace, and therefore security, can be gained through democracy, is nowadays very widespread. The so-called democratic peace theory is based on the idea that political leaders of democratic countries will act out of self-interest (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). At a first glance this might seem like a counterintuitive approach; how can a country be at peace with a self-centred leader? This is where democracy comes in: a leader will not be re-elected if his/her actions do not serve the security of the country. The will to do good for the people is therefore fuelled by self-interest; based on the theory, that should be enough to build peace. Democracies also tend to be more defensive in conflict situations (Schweller, 1992).

While most of these theories are based on a nation-wide perspective, they can also be used for specific institutions or organizations on a smaller scale. Peace and security can be gained in an organization characterized by the same mindset. It can also apply to larger institutions, like the European Union or the United Nations, classic examples of manifestations of the school of liberalist institutionalism. However, many critiques to the Liberalist way of thinking have been voiced. Barkawi and Laffey argue that it is too Euro-/Western-centric (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006). Security relations in Western countries, where democracy mostly seems to function, are based on that very power structure. Countries in the global South are weaker on the world stage and therefore function very differently. Most of the research in the previous decades has been conducted from a Western point of view. This means that the concept of peace through democracy can-not simply be generalized for the entire world. It only applies to the strong, and quite some research still needs to be done regarding the power structures of the weak, the majority of the world's population. Others simply argue against the effectiveness of democracy as a peacebuilding mechanism in general (Cooper, Turner & Pugh, 2011). The question they ask, is whether this peace through democracy actually serves all people justly. The huge diversity of people within one democracy will almost certainly cause uneven development in said democracy. On a larger scale, the democratic worldview will cause uneven development between the nations of the world. Although nowadays the Liberalist idea is mostly used in Western countries, it does have its flaws. The main point, however, is that security and peace in a Liberalist approach are to be attained through democracy and institutions. The individual is meant to be safe from malicious forces through the combined effort of these institutions.

The Realist and Liberalist approach do have one thing in common; they are quite positivist, characteristic of many 'older' schools. During the last decades, the field of security studies has taken a new turn towards more constructivist (and often individualist) approaches. The school of Constructivism in security studies tends to focus more on the various (f)actors that might have effects on security and conflict (McDonald, 2012). Social, cultural and historical factors are taken into account, making security a social construct; something that originated as a shared assumption between individuals. This is exactly where Constructivism deviates from the previous two perspectives: there is simply no universal truth to which security works best. There are too many different people, too many different social, cultural and historical contexts. Constructivists argue that these contexts are the structure on which security studies should be built, specific for each different context. This social structure then defines security studies, or as Farrell puts it: "Where actors are great powers, the social structure is an international system that gives meaning to great power..." (Farrell, 2002, p.50). The word 'power' in this quote relates to the ability to provide security, but also to endanger the security of others for the very sake of

your own security. This complex web of various actors with less or more powers defines how we should think about security studies.

This perspective leads to a more thorough use of negotiation and debate in the stage of security (McDonald, 2012). For example, political leaders and local communities ('the people') can negotiate on certain choices. In this way all views will be incorporated and, in a perfect world, the solution will then arise from this debate. Security is defined by the collective voice of everyone involved. However, this collective voice might be strongly influenced by a central speaker with high authority. The so-called Copenhagen school of constructivist security studies coined the term securitization (Wæver, 1993). Securitization is the process in which a central speaker can refer to certain (f)actors as 'existential threats', leading the narrative of security in a specific direction. While this concept has mostly been used on the level of states, it might also be applied to smaller scales. In the context of South Sudan: if one ethnic group would conjure a strong argument as to why another ethnic group is dangerous, security on the receiving end is then changed. The opposite of this concept is, obviously, de-securitization, which defines certain (f)actors as non-threatening on a security level.

There are also those that focus on the habitual behavior in world politics (Neumann, 2002). This gives more power to the individual and his/her behavior as important actors and factors in security and conflict. The difference between this type of individualism and that of the Liberalist perspective, is that its effect is more external. In this context, power and influence come from the individual, and that is why the individual should be respected as a scientific concept. Liberalists simply act out of the interest of the individual, which is more an inward perspective. In the critical theory, the power of the individual is even more emphasized in critical approaches to security, like those based on gender and race. The argument here is that previous approaches to security studies have focused too much on one perspective only: the white male (Sjoberg, 2018; Hendershot & Mutimer, 2018). In most research, the perspectives of women are ignored. In others, the native population is dumbed down to one simplified term; for example, all various and numerous tribes in all of the single countries in Africa are often interpreted as simply being 'African' (Baaz & Verweijen, 2018). This is detrimental to a clear understanding of the true structures and individuals that play equal parts in security and conflict.

The theories discussed above will be used in the analysis of the data of this thesis research. The data will show what kinds of security strategies are used by NGOs and how they are interpreted by employees. This will then show the theoretical basis their strategy is built on; intentionally or not. This might provide details on what the more successful theoretical perspective is in the specific case of security for NGOs in South Sudan. The interviews will contain questions, formulated in such a way as to be able to distinguish the various perspectives discussed here. This is not only useful for the conclusions, but will also function as practical examples of the theoretical debate itself. More of this will be discussed in the methodology section. Aside from providing a theoretical base for analysis, this debate also provides the grounds for this very research and the questions that are asked. Even though all theoretical perspectives discussed will be included, the thesis itself is more constructivist in nature and critical approach-oriented. The local community is part of the research, as are the different levels of power within an organization.

2.1.2 Security Strategies

Now that the 'grand theory' has been discussed, we will delve more into the specific   context of this research, and narrow it down to what security actually is and which security strategies can be applied. For this thesis, the following three strategies will be compared: acceptance, protection and deterrence (Van Brabant, 2010). These three concepts entail various security options and actions that range from 'soft' (acceptance) to 'hard' (deterrence). While these three strategies can be used separately, in the day-to-day reality they often overlap quite a bit; there is a fluid connection between the three. Nevertheless, there is discussion among scholars as to which strategy is generally the best, despite the overlap and fluidity.

The framework as depicted in Figure 1 shows the most important concepts and factors that influence security strategies. Each of these aspects will be touched upon in the theoretical framework. 'Who are you' and 'Intra-agency factors' will be discussed for each INGO in its own section. 'People factors' will be discussed in the sections on productivity and violence in this chapter. 'Where are you' will be elaborated upon in the chapter dealing with the context of South Sudan. The rest ('security strategies' themselves, 'security planning', and 'post-incident') is all part of this section.

Figure 1: Security Management Framework (Van Brabant, 2010, p.10)

The theory of this thesis is based on the security strategies as described by Van Brabant and Martin: acceptance, deterrence, and protection (Van Brabant, 2010; Martin, 1999). These three strategies are often misunderstood as being absolutes. While the theory might suggest this, in reality Van Brabant argues that it is more often a combination of the three. To understand this, we have to describe these three strategies thoroughly.

The first strategy, acceptance, is based on softening an assumed threat (Martin, 1999). This means that an organization that employs acceptance strategies will try to gain the general favor of the local population. Because of a general trust in the organization, the population will then decrease their attacks, or even protect, that organization. This can manifest itself in a population allowing safe passage through their villages, but also in protection offered by local authorities. This type of security strategy is therefore based on reducing threats. This might be reached by, for example, involving the local community in a project through discussion groups, publicly behaving in a neutral way, being culturally sensitive, or by developing good working relations with local governments.

The second strategy, protection, is based on strengthening the position of the target of certain threats (Martin, 1999). In this case, the organization employing security strategies is seen as the target. This is basically the most well-known aspect of security. Strengthening and reinforcing the target takes place through physical protection devices (like gates or guards), policies and procedures, and by working together with other organizations. It is mostly focused on making the target stronger, so that a potential threat will be less likely to succeed in case of attacks. This does not only count on an organizational level, but on a personal level as well (Van Brabant, 2010). Personal self-protection, for example by not resisting attackers, is one of the key elements of this strategy. For INGOs specifically, protection will always be non-violent: for example, guards will not be armed. But any non-violent measure may be used.

The third and final strategy, deterrence, is about developing possibilities for a counter-attack towards threats (Van Brabant, 2010). This is generally seen as a rather extreme strategy and is often only used as a very last resort. Its goal is to discourage the threat to even attack, as it may have repercussions for its own well-being and safety and security. On national or corporate levels, this might entail armed combat in reply to a particular attack. However, for INGOs the deterrence strategy has to be non-violent, which means that the strategy has to be enacted through legal, political or economic means. Another strategy could be to suspend all aid assistance if the safety of employees can't be guaranteed. However, this strategy is seldom used by INGOs.

Now that all of the strategies have been described, it begs the question: which one (or which combination) is the most effective at safeguarding personnel for a multinational, or the UN, or INGOs? Obviously, this is the very question this thesis tries to answer. To achieve that goal, it is important to know what scholars have to say about it and what arguments are used for or against a particular strategy.

In the INGO world, the acceptance strategy is most widely used (Childs, 2013). However, Childs argues that this strategy has become ineffective as of late, as violence against humanitarian aid workers has increased. The acceptance strategy only reduces the possibility of a threat, but does not eliminate it. This makes it very susceptible to flaws in implementation. A major flaw can be found in the worldview of the community one should be secured from; their worldview might be different in such a way that the aid organization's work alone may not grant enough acceptance, therefore compromising security. Fast et al. (2013) argue that acceptance can actually still be the most valuable strategy; it needs to be implemented in a correct way, however. A mistake many make is to not clearly define acceptance as a real strategy, with policies, procedures and concepts to clarify the strategy being used. However, Childs and Fast et al. would agree that acceptance should at least be part of an INGO's security plan; the question is rather how prominent its part in the strategy is compared to other security strategies.

Where acceptance fails, protection and deterrence are able to take over (Avant, 2009). However, INGOs often tend to shy away from these approaches, as they go against the very essence of their goal. INGOs are peaceful in nature, and protection and deterrence can feel too combative or unaccepting of the local communities. Their effectiveness is very apparent, however, and many INGOs are slowly changing their security plans to incorporate more protection and/or deterrence (Stoddard, Harmer & DiDomenico, 2009). This mostly takes place in regions and states that are simply too insecure to only rely on an acceptance strategy, like

Afghanistan, Somalia, and South Sudan. However, the problem with employing more non-acceptance strategies is that this might (negatively) impact the existing acceptance that is still necessary for aid agencies to do their work properly. This can even lead to a vicious cycle: an incident happens, which increases protection security through convoys, physical security, etc., which in turn leads to complications in efforts to build local acceptance, which might decrease the security gained from acceptance, which then may lead to incidents being more likely, which will then increase other security strategies again. Thus, it is very hard for INGOs to strike a balance in the security triangle. Others argue that this difficulty of finding a balance is simply a part of the job: working in a conflicted environment will inherently lead to risks, with some areas being worse than others (Collinson et al., 2013). Protection or deterrence will not necessarily help if acceptance is not enough.

2.2 Local Community

The second major concept to be explained is the local community. This concept is important, because INGOs always work with and within a local community and their security strategies are always based around a local community as well. Another reason is that while INGOs mostly try not to choose sides and stay neutral, this very decision might result in violence. Helping one group may antagonize another and it is therefore good to understand this concept. This section focuses on the very concept of a local community; the specific local communities of South Sudan will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3.

McMillan and Chavis define local community as people with a sense of community: a perception of interconnection, shared responsibility and goals (McMillan & Chavis, 1986). This implies that in working with a local community, it is important to be aware of these perceptions that make them a community. Its needs, resources, and important thought processes differ from community to community, and it is therefore important to understand them. This definition also makes it clear why some communities are having trouble co-existing. In the case of South Sudan, the needs and resources need to be shared between the various communities and these resources are scarce. This inevitably leads to competition over these resources, and if the communities can't find a way to share them in a viable way, conflict might erupt. Such a civil war can then lead to one (or more) of the communities being marginalized by the stronger ones (Collier, 1999).

Most INGOs see it as their goal to help the weaker communities by providing the building blocks that are needed for further development of the community, for instance by providing medical aid or building schools (Jordan & Van Tuijl, 2000). The goal is to eventually make the community self-reliant, where it does not need outside help anymore to be stable. In this thesis, local communities are therefore always on the receiving end of aid and often a marginalized community.

Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that even if INGOs help a number of communities, they do not help them all. Some don't need their help, while others do not want it. However, other communities that are not directly helped by INGOs still need to be considered, so as to be able to see a specific context in its entirety.

2.3 INGO's and Aid Workers

Next, we need a brief definition of an INGO and its personnel. A non-governmental organization (NGO) is defined as (usually) a non-profit organization, independent of governments (Lexico, 2019). Despite being non-profit, they do accept donations and (government) funding. This strongly sets them apart from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), like the UN, which actually do have a base in governments, uniting them for a common purpose. In the case of this thesis, the NGOs are all international; they work and are based in numerous countries worldwide. This is simply called an international non-governmental organization, or INGO. INGOs are mostly active in humanitarian work, ranging from health care and environmental protection to human rights advocacy. Because of this wide variety of activities, the definition of an INGO is often refined to accommodate for an organization's particular goals and priorities (Ahmed & Potter, 2006, p.8). The INGOs that are the focus in this thesis all deal with humanitarian aid in conflict areas. The specific goals and mandates of these INGOs are described in Chapter 5.

Most people working for these INGOs in South Sudan are known as expatriates, or expats in short. They are defined as people residing in a country different from their native country, often for work reasons (Oxford, 2019). There often is also local staff in the country, in this case South Sudanese people employed by the INGO in question. Together they form the organization's team of aid workers in the country.

2.4 Productivity & Violence

Productivity is mostly considered to be the ratio of output in relation to the input (Sickles & Zelenyuk, 2019). In the case of this thesis, productivity needs to be defined by the standards of the INGOs' output; meaning that the productivity of each aid worker can only be defined when the goals of the INGO are known. This definition will become clearer in Chapter 5, where the goals of the INGOs are explained. However, how the productivity will generally be measured is the same for all of these INGOs, as their general goals are very similar. They are providing aid for a community and the effectiveness of this aid can be identified through numbers and quotes from employees. In addition, the productivity will also be measured by how well the aid worker can relate to and work together with the local people. This factor is critical for INGOs, as their work is defined by their connection with the local community.

The last concept to be discussed is 'violence' (specifically against aid workers), which is a bit harder to define. In light of this thesis, violence can take on various forms. Most obvious is the dictionary definition of violence: "the use of physical force so as to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy" (Merriam-Webster, 2019). This type of violence is definitely present in the case of South Sudan and will be part of the research, but it's not the only definition that is used in this thesis. There's also mental violence and mental torture that might be prevalent in this conflict. In addition, violence can be seen as a multiple-perspective concept. What is considered to be non-sensical violence by one person, may be seen as a culturally significant action by another (Whitehead, 2007). This makes violence and the reasoning behind it a tough concept to tackle, albeit a very important one. There is also a large impact of the threat of violence on productivity of aid workers (Cardozo et al., 2012). Humanitarian aid workers have an increased risk of

depression and burnouts, both severely decreasing their productivity. If the threat of violence, or the violence itself, increases, the productivity on a personal level therefore tends to decrease. This effect can also be seen more clearly on a larger scale, like how (the anticipation of) an attack on a compound can make it impossible in a practical way to do any work for a specific period of time.

This thesis tries to incorporate the various perspectives as much as possible, to get a clear view of how violence affects productivity and most of all, which security measure can be most effective.

2.5 Conceptual Model

The conceptual model described below is based on the theoretical discussion. The aid workers are the main actors, as all data essentially flows through them. The productivity is based on their work, as well as the effects of violence. The relationship between INGO personnel and the respective INGO and local community is also important. The INGO has more to do with the security strategy, or rather the three different strategies as described in the model. They are all connected to each other, because the various strategies can be mixed. This in itself has an effect on the violence that the aid worker experiences. Finally, the productivity is important for both the INGO and its personnel, as this is their main goal. This also includes the local community, since its connection is with the aid workers as well as with the INGO. Now that the theoretical background of this thesis has been addressed and framed, we can move on to the methodology of the research. There we will use the framework to operationalize and formulate questions, and explain other elements of the practical part of this research.


Figure 2: Conceptual Model

3. Methodology

The purpose of this study is to describe the best security strategy approach for safeguarding INGO personnel in South Sudan. To do so, this thesis uses a case study design. Out of the various possible types of case studies, the intrinsic case study applies best here (Creswell, 2013). This is because of the unique situation of South Sudan as the most dangerous country to work in as an aid worker. A single instrumental case study would not pay enough attention to the uniqueness of South Sudan. While the research is partly about fixing a global issue (being violence against aid workers), the focus is more on South Sudan. Extrapolating the knowledge and insights this research might bring will be hard and is also outside the scope of this master thesis. It is more an opening, a starting point for similar research in other countries, but the issue at hand is definitely South Sudan itself. A collective case study won't work either, because time is in short supply. A truly significant collective case study on this topic would need to incorporate multiple countries, which is not realistic to do in the context of a master's thesis.

To answer the five sub-questions, multiple data collection techniques have to be used. As described by Yin (2009), a case study research asks for many different forms of data collection. He proposes the following six: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts (Yin, 2009). In the case of this research, not all forms are possible (or useful) to implement. Direct and participant observation are out of the question, as this would necessitate fieldwork in South Sudan. The country is defined as a no-travel zone by the Dutch government; Radboud protocol forbids travel to such regions, and therefore it is not possible to directly witness how security strategies are implemented. This also applies to the physical artifacts method; useful physical manifestations of security strategies are only to be found in the country itself, and therefore not possible to investigate. This missing information is replaced by interviews, however, where individuals who have been in South Sudan will explain their situation and experiences. This will fill in the blanks left behind by the impossibility of visiting the country itself. The main bulk of information comes from interviews with INGO security experts and INGO personnel that work or have worked in South Sudan. Documents and archival records are also used to determine an INGOs goal/productivity in a country. Each of these data collection methods will be discussed in the following sections.

3.1 Interviews

During the period of April-June 2019, seven in-depth interviews have been held with interviewees from four different INGOs based in the Netherlands. To get diverse data, the sampling has been done through critical case sampling. As described by Miles and Huberman, this type of sampling permits logical generalization and maximum application of information to other cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.28). By talking to security experts from various INGOs, a general view has been gained as to an INGOs security strategy; most were surprisingly similar. The same has been applied to the INGO employees working in South Sudan. All of

them were working for the same INGO, but worked in different areas in South Sudan. This leads to a diverse view which can then again be generalized to formulate significant conclusions. In a practical sense, the sampling for these interviews has been done partly through the customer database of the internship organization, and partly through other contacts and the snowball method. The internship organization has many INGOs as clients, so the respondents could be contacted through the company. These respondents often helped me to find other interesting individuals to interview.

The specific INGO employees this thesis targets are its international personnel in particular. The reason for this limitation is that foreign personnel does not have any (extensive) personal ties in South Sudan from the beginning, while local INGO employees are already embedded in the conflict, one way or the other. The two groups of personnel vary greatly from a security context perspective, and this thesis only focuses on the international ones. Another reason is the difficulty of contacting national staff outside the Netherlands. Interviews with international staff working locally was possible through the use of Skype, and most of the contact was made through their own organization in the Netherlands.

The content of these interviews needed to be tinkered in such a way that all the necessary information is addressed. For the employees working in South Sudan, this is generally divided into the following sections: background information, personal experiences, communication with the local community, personal view on security measures, and personal productivity. For the interviews with the security experts of the INGOs, the focus was more on INGO strategies and productivity overall, using the following sections: background information, goals of the INGO, security strategies of the INGO, and productivity of the INGO. If a certain security strategy is not used by the INGO in question, an explanation will be inquired. This reasoning can be used to clarify certain choices. These perspectives together form a coherent framework of how the situation in South Sudan actually is. The interview guides used during the interviews have been made with these choices in mind (See Appendix II).

The interviews themselves were conducted as semi-structured interviews. The strength of a semi-structured interview is that the interviewer can lead the interview through a specific guide, but is open to unexpected input (Longhurst, 2003). This type of interview works best for this thesis, especially during the interviews with the employees who have worked in South Sudan. Their experiences might range extremely wide and any side-track or personal story can lead to new, welcome information. The interviews with the security experts have been a bit more structured in the sense that the type of information needed was very clear. However, there were still possibilities to deviate where they felt the need for it. All of the interviews were recorded with a phone and transcribed afterwards. Those transcripts were coded and analysed, which is further elaborated upon in Section 3.5. The final outcomes of these interviews are included in Chapter 5.3 for the security expert interviews, and Chapter 6 for the INGO employee interviews.

3.2 Statistical Data

The second source of information is acquired from documents and archival records. The most important information gathered here is information about the INGO's large-scale accomplishments and goals. All of the INGOs involved in this research provide year reports and

strategic plans on their website, open for anyone. These documents are used thoroughly to find out exactly how successful the INGO has been in South Sudan during the last year (or other years, depending on the most recent year report published). The amount of information depends on the INGO in question. Some INGOs have published a plethora of information: infographics, annual reports, reports about child safety and gender equality, for instance, while others have simply provided just their annual report. Whatever information is available, has been used. If there is a strategic plan, this is also analysed, but it only gives a sense on what they are trying to do, rather than how well they have been doing in the past. Other documents regarding more general bits of information, like statistics about violence against aid workers, have also been used. How all these documents were analysed is discussed in Section 3.5. The data these documents provide have been used to strengthen (or weaken) particular arguments used by the interviewees. The information may add to (or fill in the gaps of) the information already acquired during the interviews.

3.3 Small Talk

During the months-long course of doing research for the thesis, there have been many conversations with all types of people who are or have been relevant in the world of security and INGOs. This small talk has not been recorded or specifically planned or anticipated upon beforehand. A true methodology behind these conversations does therefore not exist. However, it should be mentioned that these conversations have taken place, and that they have been very useful in the formulation of the final conclusion of this thesis. The benefit of this small talk is that it is a relevant conversation without any strings attached. Where an official interview might scare people into giving specific answers, because they are being recorded, a normal conversation allows for people to be freer to express their own opinions.

Examples of such small talk conversations are the following: multiple people I've met through my internship, who had some knowledge about security strategies and advised me on books, contacts, and more; employees from private companies working in South Sudan; and experienced INGO personnel who have worked in South Sudan in a time period too long ago for this thesis. These people will not specifically be mentioned, but the information they provided helped strengthen my own theories and conclusions, and fortify the information I already had.

3.4 Ethical Considerations

While conducting interviews, it is important to think about ethical issues that might arise during these interviews. First of all, it is important as an interviewer to be as clear and honest as possible, and to always have consent for the procedures necessary during an interview (Lipson, 1994). This means that no sound recordings are made without the consent of the interviewee. This is the first question that should be asked at the start of every interview. The contents of the interview also need to be clear for the interviewees, so as to not unwillingly surprise them with questions that may seem offensive. For the sake of the interview, which has to be open for unexpected input as mentioned in Section 3.1, the interview guide was not shown to the

interviewee. However, the general subject of the questions has been provided, so the interviewees knew what they were in for.

Secondly, anonymity is an important aspect of the interviews in this thesis. Due to the precarious nature of working in South Sudan, all INGOs interviewed will stay anonymous, so as to minimize the effect this thesis might have on their work in South Sudan. While the INGOs have been very transparent and clear about their efforts to the public, there is a chance that certain quotes could be taken out of context. If a local staff member or local official in South Sudan would read this thesis and read something out of context as such, this may very well impact the way the respective INGO is working in South Sudan and cause operational harm. This issue can be avoided through anonymity. As such, organizations and employees will be assigned numbers in the analysis and discussion of the interviews.

Lastly, the subject of this thesis touches upon some very sensitive issues. War, ethnic hatred and violence are not issues people like to casually discuss. In the case of this thesis, this applies especially to the aid workers who are working or have worked in South Sudan. These interviewees may have been through traumatic experiences like a compound attack or severe aggressive behaviour, or generally seeing despair among people they were helping. It is therefore important to be alert to these sensitive issues during the interviews. Effort should be made by the interviewer to not push the interviewee to talk about any subject he/she is uncomfortable with. If the conversation would lead that way, or if a question comes up concerning an event that may have been traumatic, it is important to first ask if the interviewee is comfortable talking about the subject. Even when consent has been given, attention should be paid whether visible distress can be seen in the interviewee later on in the conversation. If the interviewee is no longer feeling comfortable, the interviewer should either steer away from the subject, or halt the interview altogether; whatever is most comfortable for the interviewee.

3.5 Analysis Theory

After all data was acquired, the analysing process could begin. This was done by using Creswell's graph on Data Analysis (2013, p.190-191). First, the data had to be organized digitally. Next, the data (specifically the transcripts) was read and coded with the help of the AtlasTI program. After all data was coded and organized, the actual putting together of the information could begin. First, a broad description of the case and its context was needed, in this case the conflict in South Sudan. This includes general information about South Sudan, its history, current conflicts, and local communities. This is important background information, necessary for a better understanding of the specific situations and events relevant to this research. After this, the data was analysed again, using its codes so as to find specific themes and patterns. The goal was then not to compare the INGOs, but to try to come to naturalistic generalizations with the use of said patterns. This means, trying to find aspects of an INGO that resonate with other INGOs, leading to a generalization. These generalizations are used to formulate a representative analysis of the general use of various security strategies among INGOs in South Sudan. The generalizations are based on a structured interpretation of the data. It is important to not just focus on the hard facts the interviewees provide, but also on what they mean by it, on their perceptions. There might be a hidden contempt for a specific strategy or

action that was undertaken, which is not necessarily directly expressed in words, but which might be interpreted as such. The challenge here is to not misinterpret the true meaning of the interviewees' words. The various analyses and interpretations have been compared. Also, the aid workers themselves were compared to each other, to see whether or not their opinions are uniform. Not only their opinions are analysed, but also their views on the goals of their INGO. Finally, their answers were compared to the statistical data as well, to find a natural generalization amongst their own INGO and feelings of safety in South Sudan. Both batches of interviews (security experts and INGO personnel, respectively) were combined to see if the security strategies are actually successful in keeping personnel safe, while at the same time allowing for enough productivity. All this information will, through the various sub-questions, provide an answer to the main research question of this research: What security strategy for INGOs in South Sudan best achieves the goals of the INGO and the security of both aid workers and the local community?

4. Context of South Sudan

At the very basis of this research is the country of South Sudan. If we want to even begin to understand the role of INGOs and the various effects security measures can have, we need to have a thorough understanding of the perils of the country. How did they end up here, what are the Sudanese people going through and what is the role of the INGO? To best explain this, we use this section to first briefly state some facts about South Sudan; information needed to understand its (social) geography. This chapter also includes a map of South Sudan, to clarify certain locations mentioned in the thesis.


Figure 3: Map of South Sudan (Reeves, 2014)

4.1 General

South Sudan is a landlocked country in East-Central Africa (CIA, 2019). It is currently the youngest country in the world, only in existence since July 9, 2011, when it gained its independence from Sudan. The country is bordered by Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. Its capital and largest city is Juba. The country is made up of 32 states, divided into 180 counties. South Sudan is one of the world's poorest countries and has been in a state of conflict ever since its conception.

South Sudan's population consists of approximately 10 million people from a variety of different ethnicities. Since the country is only eight years old, its people are bound to be incredibly diverse. Just like almost any African country there are a lot of different ethnic groups, in total about 60. The largest of these are the Dinka and the Nuer, who together make up more than 50% of the country's population. Others include the Bari, Azande and Shilluk. These local ethnic groups and their role in this research will be discussed later on in the 'Local Community' section. As opposed to the ethnic divide, religion is not really an issue in South Sudan itself (Jeffrey, 2018). The majority of the people (about 60%) are Christian and the churches are one of the most stable institutions in the country. Another interesting element of South Sudan's population is its age structure. The vast majority of the population is very young; about 63% is under 24 years of age, the median age is only 18 years.

South Sudan's political history has been one of turmoil, as will be seen in the following sections. After many (still ongoing) reforms, the current system is based on the 2011 Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCSS) (South Sudan, 2011). The National Legislature of South Sudan consists of the National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States. The executive branch of the government is headed by the president, who can have a maximum of two five-year terms. The current president is Salva Kiir Mayardit, of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). This party also comprises the vast majority of seats in the National Legislative Assembly: 160 out of 170. Four seats are held by Democratic Change (DC), the rest by independent representatives. The next elections are scheduled for 2021, when Salva Kiir will have fulfilled his two terms as president.

4.2 History

With some of the most basic information of South Sudan covered, we can now focus on the important details for this research. Let us first focus on the history of South Sudan as a country and how it has come into a state of perpetual conflict.

The recent history of South Sudan can only be explained in the context of the country it has gained its independence from: Sudan. The first major insurgence by southern Sudan was between 1955 and 1972: the First Sudanese Civil War (Baas, 2011). This war took place during an important period in Sudanese history. The country was still under British rule in 1955 and only unified as one Sudan in 1956; without much attention to what the leaders in the southern parts of the country thought of this. The South Sudanese people were (and are) culturally very different from the northern Sudanese people and so the action was not taken in kind. During this period the National Unionist Party (NUP) became the leading party in the government of Sudan, both under British rule and their own. Then-president of Sudan, Ismail al-Azhari, adopted a new

policy in 1954 where positions of power in southern Sudan would be held by Northerners, allowing the oppression of the south. As the final straw that broke the camel's back, this policy caused the military in the south to rebel. In various large cities in southern Sudan soldiers mutinied and even though large-scale conflict was still not the case, the message they tried to send was clear (O'Ballance, 1977). After a few years of guerrilla warfare, an official secessionist group was formed, called 'Anyanya' – a name that would have importance in the later Sudanese civil conflict; it is sometimes used as another name for the civil war: the Anyanya Rebellion. However, despite the motivations for a free South Sudan, the secessionists could not find common ground on a lot of issues. Multiple coup d'états took place during this time, some more successful than others. Anyanya eventually stayed in power and in 1971 changed its name to the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Shortly after, in 1972, the government of Sudan (led by President Gaafar Nimeiry) and the SSLM began negotiations that would eventually lead to the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement (Baas, 2011). This agreement stated that the south would be considered as a single autonomous administrative region with well-defined powers, but only if it would end its rebellion. The south agreed, and the messy war was over. However, sceptics argued that the agreement was not strong enough and that rebels would keep on fighting for southern independence. The sceptics would be proven right just one decade later.

While nowadays religion is not an issue in South Sudan, the problems between Sudan and South Sudan are very much based on this. Where South Sudan is mostly Christian, Sudan is an Islamic country. So, after numerous violations of the Addis Ababa agreement by Sudan trying to gain control over the oilfields in the border region, religion would be the last straw (Basha, 2006). Some Islamic fundamentalists in the Sudan's government were not that happy with the agreement, as it gave autonomy to a Christian region. When they eventually gained power in 1983, President Nimeiry declared all of Sudan to be an Islamic state. The Shari'a law was also established. Just like in 1955, the South retaliated. Only this time the rebel movement was far more organized. An official military branch was formed under the leadership of John Garang, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). This eventually became, and today still is, South Sudan's national army. The SPLA fought against the central government, which itself was in turmoil. A 1985 coup changed Sudan's leadership and after many failures a coalition was finally formed, headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi. During his presidency, negotiations were held between the central government and the SPLA, but given the intensity of the fighting, these negotiations would take a long time and were founded on flimsy foundations. The instability and indecisiveness of the central government eventually caused Omar al-Bashir to take over in a military junta in 1989. He would hold supreme power in the country until 2019. Under al-Bashir's rule, the situation deteriorated to extreme lows; Shari'a law was enforced stricter than ever and the central Sudanese government hired militias to fight the war in the south. The period between 1991 and 2005 was very bloody and includes various massacres. One of these massacres was committed by a coalition of southern rebel factions, SPLA United, who were in opposition to the SPLA under John Garang. This Bor massacre, as it is now known, was primarily an ethnicity-based attack (Copnall, 2014). Nuer soldiers of SPLA United, together with the Nuer White Army, massacred more than 2000 Dinka people. However, this is only a small fraction of the number of people killed in this war; estimates put the number of dead (both civilians and soldiers) at around 2 million (USCR, 2001). This makes it one of the bloodiest wars in modern times.

The two opposing parties eventually held successful peace talks, leading to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005). It was signed by both parties, effectively ending the Second Sudanese Civil War. This agreement included various elements, like the sharing of wealth generated by land resources, and new security arrangements. But, most importantly, it set the stage for a referendum on South Sudanese independence. Between 2005 and 2011, the relations between Sudan's central government and its southern parts were quite stable. All northern soldiers had left the southern regions by 2008 (Reuters, 2008). When the time eventually came for the referendum, the results were staggering. A total of 98.83% of the people in southern Sudan voted for independence (Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, 2005). The Sudanese central government had no other choice than to comply, and on July 9, 2011, South Sudan became an independent nation.

4.3 South Sudanese Civil War

While the country was still ecstatic about the outcome of its referendum, peace was not in sight yet. While the war with Sudan was essentially over, there was (and still is) a lot of infighting in the country. For example, inter-ethnic warfare came to the forefront now, with various ethnic groups still at odds (Al-Jazeera, 2012). Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army was still active in South Sudan (Al-Jazeera, 2011). However, a large-scale political struggle would flare up two years later, in 2013. The South Sudanese Civil War is still ongoing, and offers the background for this thesis.

From the beginning, the new country was characterised by inner strife. According to De Waal, South Sudan has always had a corrupt government (De Waal, 2014). Interim president Salva Kiir has fostered a militarized and corrupt government, where most national funding goes to military and politics. Almost nothing reaches the public services, leading to a country with an imbalanced power structure. De Waal fittingly calls it a 'kleptocracy'. Because of this, numerous rebellions flared up between 2011 and 2013. His opponents, consisting of multiple parties but most importantly Kiir's former vice president Riek Machar, openly claim that Kiir was taking steps towards a dictatorship (Al-Jazeera, 2013). In response to Machar's open defiance, Kiir claimed that Riek Machar had attempted a coup in December 2013. Machar denied and began to lead the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), in opposition to Salva Kiir's Sudan's People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Eventually fights broke out between the two factions. It was not hard to foster a dislike of the government among the people. Soldiers formerly fighting for the SPLA would turn towards the SPLM-IO, because their senior officers had granted themselves increasingly an elite status (Pinaud, 2014; De Waal, 2014). They would claim most resources and distribute them among their subordinates; this led to a hierarchy where senior army officers became the 'dominant class'. Not everyone agreed, and within SPLA ranks a rebellion grew. De Waal argues that the idea of liberation among some of these rebels is not necessarily the liberation of the country. Their own personal liberation is most important, resulting in a war where liberation actually means self-enrichment. They themselves would be liberated from the corrupt hierarchy, but this would not bring the country to a healthier state.

Another important factor in the start of the civil war is the underlying ethnic tension. In the simplest sense, the country is divided between the two largest ethnicities: the Dinka and the Nuer. However, this is merely a simplification of the immensely complicated ethnic politics of South Sudan. Ever since 2005, South Sudan has been characterized by great internal struggles, where numerous ethnicities were not able to really reach an agreement (Rolandsen, 2015). The internal struggles between ethnicities will be reflected upon more thoroughly in the next section. The ethnic divides are connected to the civil war through a very simple similar divide in politics: Salva Kiir is an ethnic Dinka, Riek Machar an ethnic Nuer (Al-Jazeera, 2013). This leads to an almost natural divide in the country; Dinka people are more likely to support the government and the SPLM, while Nuer people are more likely in favour of the SPLM-IO.

When the war officially started in 2013, the mission of the UN in South Sudan (UNMISS) was tasked with a lot more work. It worked towards a peace (or at least a ceasefire) agreement, supported by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which was, in turn, assisted by some major powers. While many agreements were made, none was sustainable. At one point, Riek Machar even briefly returned to his position as vice-president under Salva Kiir, only to be ousted from the city again just a few months later (Al-Jazeera, 2016; BBC, 2016). Salva Kiir then appointed a new vice-president, Taban Deng Gai, who chose this position above his position among the rebels. His rebel group followed, and so infighting became much more common among the rebels. However, loyalists and Dinka have also been prone to infighting. The intricacies of these relations will be further addressed in the 'Local Community' section. Most importantly, the civil war itself and its effects still extract a heavy toll on the country and its people. Even though a so-called Revitalized Peace Accord has been signed, asking for a power-sharing government by May 2019, this agreement is quite fragile. Just recently, on April 11, 2019, Machar and Kiir met with Pope Francis, who kneeled, kissed their feet, and asked them to solve their differences and make peace (Bordoni, 2019).

4.4 The People

The people of South Sudan, as already mentioned in previous sections, are divided by ethnicity. There are 64 different tribes in South Sudan, with the Dinka (36%) and the Nuer (16%) being the largest (Fotlyn, 2015; CIA, 2019). Even though the civil war might be mainly political in nature, it cannot be ignored that the various groups fighting each other are divided into tribes; the government forces are mainly made up of Dinka, while the rebels are aligned with Nuer groups. There are many more underlying historical conflicts between particular ethnic groups, like between the Dinka and Azande, or between the Otuho and Murle people – the complexity of it can-not be fully addressed in this thesis. Nor is this the goal; describing every single tribe and every single conflict between them would take away from the more important issues at hand in this research. The conflict between Dinka and Nuer is most important here, as they are the most politically active and motivated, while also being the largest two ethnic groups in the country. Although a brief explanation of other conflicts is included, the focus is on the Dinka and Nuer people.

These two ethnic groups are in themselves very diverse groups of people who have historically been part of many smaller tribes, and are in some sense even part of the same

ethnic group (Southall, 1976). Both Dinka and Nuer are part of the larger category that is the Nilotic people, indigenous to the Nile Valley. It is important to note here that all ethnic groups in South Sudan have been framed and named not by themselves, but rather by Western researchers. Outside influence is very often a factor in culture, and in this case the ethnic categorizing is likely to have influenced the Nuer and Dinka to see themselves as such in today's world, despite perhaps being historically the same. However, for the sake of this thesis and the underlying tensions, we will speak of the Nuer and Dinka as they live now.

The main ethnic group of South Sudan, the Dinka, comprise 56 different clans and are mostly located in the north-western parts of the country. They traditionally believe in one God (Nhialic), and when British missionaries arrived during the 19th century, Christianity did not take long to take over traditional religions. Their living is mostly based around agriculture and pastoralism, the latter of which has been the root cause of conflicts with other ethnic groups. The original founder of the SPLA, John Garang, and current president Salva Kiir are both part of the Dinka ethnic group.

The other ethnic group, the Nuer, lives in the north-eastern parts of the country. Their society is mostly based around cattle herding; the cattle serve as currency, companions, and lifestyle (Hutchinson, 1992). The Nuer are still mostly based around traditionalist religions; missionaries failed to convert a majority of them to Christianity. Salva Kiir's political rival, Riek Machar, is part of the Nuer ethnic group.

The clashes between the Dinka and the Nuer, as they are known today, find their origin in the 19th century under British rule (Metz, 1991). Some of the Dinka seemed to be more content with the British rule than the Nuer. The resisting Nuer were seen as hostile, and so the first clear animosities took root. It has to be noted that previously there were probably many different clashes amongst the groups, concerning either land or cattle. However, as mentioned before, these early clashes took place between numerous ethnic groups, and the ethnicities were more fluid back then. A clear divide between Dinka and Nuer was made by British anthropologists, and therefore their first 'official' clashes originate from that period. However, despite the smaller divides, the main issue of today can be traced back to the Second Sudanese Civil War, when multiple factions split from the SPLA because of ethnic differences, most notably Riek Machar's SPLA-Nasir. This split also led to the atrocity known as the Bor massacre, which was ordered by Riek Machar and executed by the SPLA-Nasir and the Nuer White Army, a militant organization comprised of Nuer people (Copnall, 2014). At least 2,000 Dinka were killed and another 25,000 died because of the subsequent famine.

While the scope of these attacks goes far beyond cattle wars, there are still constant clashes amongst the groups (and many other groups, like the Murle, Shilluk and Fertit) about land and cattle. Jok and Hutchinson refer to it as one of the four major themes that prolong ethnic conflict in South Sudan in a broader sense: "the transformation of previous patterns of interethnic competition over scarce economic resources into politicized programs of ethnicized violence" (Jok & Hutchinson, 1999, p.125). Issues of economic resources might have been politicized, but that does not mean they're not real issues, especially during the frequent famines. But the increasing violence and militarization of the Nuer/Dinka conflict is an altogether different dimension. According to Fearon and Laitin, the two ethnicities can be seen as socially constructed identities (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). These ethnic groups may turn violent when elites are able to persuade the masses to do so, for all sorts of reasons. In the case of the Nuer and

the Dinka, their respective leaders have certainly called for violence. Even when we go as far back as the British rule during the 19th century, the British elites have in a way formed the very antagonisms between the tribes. In line with the argument by Oberschall (2000): it might also simply be that the South Sudanese people are in a state of crisis and that that is the reason why they turn violent – it is a way to survive in harsh times. Although Oberschall's study focusses on Yugoslavia, the same might be applied to South Sudan. After all, the South Sudanese have been through multiple civil wars and famines, especially the younger people. They have lived all their life in a state of crisis, which might explain seemingly extreme forms of violence against each other.

Not everything points to violence, however. Peace initiatives have been made by both ethnic groups. For instance, the 1999 Wunlit Peace Conference has been a successful initiative, calming qualms between parts of the tribes (Jok & Hutchinson, 1999).

Nevertheless, despite these partially successful peace attempts, feelings of hatred still exist. For example, in 2011 the Nuer White Army reformed and it declared it would wipe out the entire Murle tribe. Interethnic violence and conflict have increased ever since South Sudan became independent. According to Jok, this is a major threat to the very existence of the country (Jok, 2012). Despite the peace initiatives, ethnic differences lead to continued insecurity, and this is not likely to end anytime soon.

5. INGOs in South Sudan

In this chapter we will discuss the various INGOs that have been investigated for this thesis. This is divided into three parts: first a brief explanation of the INGO in general, including general goals and projects, size and scope, and organizational structure; followed by, secondly, a summary of the INGOs' goals in South Sudan, including their self-appointed targets and year reports to measure their success (this part is of particular importance in measuring the INGOs' productivity); and finally an in-depth explanation of the security strategies used by the INGO in both a general sense and in South Sudan in particular.

All INGO's will remain anonymous in name, as per request. Their actions and projects are discussed, but only in general terms if necessary, in order to maintain the INGOs' and interviewees' anonymity and safety. The INGOs are referred to as INGO #1, INGO #2, INGO #3, and INGO #4, respectively. For more information on the ethical considerations of this anonymity, see Chapter 3.4.

5.1 INGOs' Background

5.1.1 INGO #1

INGO #1 is a large-scale fund, focused on improving the lives of children. It tries to do so by providing education, healthcare, and a better economic situation. This is done through active work on location, but also by influencing policies of relevant governments. It acts in conjunction with other organizations and companies. INGO #1 is active all around the world, in every continent, ranging from 'first world' countries to conflict regions. The latter means that it also provides emergency aid for children in areas that have been hit by natural disasters, war, and other critical situations. INGO #1 has been active in South Sudan even before it became independent; its projects started in 1991, when it was still (unified) Sudan.

In South Sudan, the focus is specifically on protecting children from conflict, famines, and natural disasters. There are also projects to help former child soldiers to reintegrate in society. The general goal remains the same: to provide children with education, healthcare and opportunities.

While INGO #1 is active in over one hundred countries, the organization itself is an umbrella organization, divided into national organizations. This means that in most countries projects are overseen by a part of the organization that is located in another country. However, all employees of this alliance are bound to follow the same bylaws and Code of Conduct; standards formalizing the shared beliefs and principles of the organization. From a security point of view, INGO #1 has an interesting managerial structure which allows for more on-site decision-making. Because of this special structure, many employees working in South Sudan are knowledgeable about security issues. The employees working in South Sudan that might be interviewed have therefore been chosen from this INGO. Their unique knowledge allowed for insightful discussions about local security issues. This structure will be elaborated upon more in Section 5.3.1.

5.1.2 INGO #2

INGO #2 is a confederation of various independent charity organizations. The organization focuses on fighting poverty all around the world, by advocating human rights, empowering women, disaster relief, and increasing empowerment, accountability and inclusiveness for everyone. This is done by working on location as well as by advocating policy changes. INGO #2 is active in every continent, in almost all countries were poverty poses a serious threat. INGO #2 has been active in South Sudan for more than thirty years; once again preceding the independence of South Sudan.

In South Sudan specifically, INGO #2 works from multiple bases in order to reach its goals. It supports half a million people with humanitarian assistance (like clean water, food, and income), and builds a resilient community for the future by improving education, local infrastructure and more. It also provides women with opportunities for economic independence and stability, and promotes good governance by holding institutions more accountable and giving marginalized peoples a voice in the country's future.

As mentioned previously, INGO #2 is a confederation of multiple organizations. This is primarily a merger, as all of these organizations are officially registered under INGO #2. Their affiliates are mostly located in Western countries like the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Canada, with only a few exceptions. The INGO's internal structure is rather flat, in that there are not many hierarchical levels. The number of managers is intentionally kept low, with volunteers being relatively abundant for an INGO. It does have a central authority making the main decisions for the organization, significantly influencing its work in all countries, no matter the affiliate.

5.1.3 INGO #3

INGO #3 is one of the largest development organizations, focused on relief and development aid through multiple channels, like healthcare, emergency aid, and education. It tries to achieve these goals by campaigning for change, at the same time working to bring that change about. Local governments, local communities, and other important (local or international) actors are encouraged by INGO #3 to provide adequate resources and public services, while keeping policies fair and just. The work is done from a community standpoint: what the community needs, INGO #3 will work for. It is relatively young compared to the other INGOs, as INGO #3 has been active only since the 1990s. It has been working for the majority of that time in South Sudan, even when it was still Sudan.

INGO #3's work in South Sudan has focused on projects concerning humanitarian and security projects; this includes healthcare, security, justice, humanitarian aid, and help in building up resilience for the future. Fragile communities are the focus of this INGO; empowering them is key to INGO #3 to the eventual development of the country.

The organizational structure of INGO #3 is primarily based in the country of origin (which will remain undisclosed). From here, the organization has a network of hundreds of partner organizations in a multitude of countries, including in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. INGO #3 supports these partner organizations mostly through financial means, and by raising awareness in relevant countries. The management and supervisory board are all based in the country of origin and work tightly together to reach INGO #3's goals.

INGO #4, finally, for the most part focuses on increasing the quality and self-reliance of healthcare in conflict and disaster areas. It tries to combine its international knowledge with local practices and traditions, allowing for an integrated approach to healthcare. Its vision of healthcare includes disease control and providing systems of care, but also mental healthcare; a significant part of the population in its target areas has been scarred by some event or another. INGO #4 tries to reach its goals by mobilizing the local communities and developing a large enough local capacity to eventually allow these communities to sustain a health system themselves.

INGO #4 has been working in South Sudan for decades, even when it was still Sudan. Its work in South Sudan has mainly focused on increasing healthcare in the broadest sense of the word. Sustainable and fair healthcare is the final goal, and it tries to reach this by restoring trust between the local communities and by providing help and opportunities for them.

Similar to INGO #3, INGO #4's top organization is based in its country of origin. From there, the main employees support several thousand employees in all the countries they work in. It also uses many local advisors and experts who are employed on a project basis. This means that while the main managerial body is based in the country of origin, many local partners and advisors have their own part in the organizational structure.

5.2 INGO's Goals

In this section, the respective INGO's goals and productivity will be addressed as the INGO has documented it itself. This means that both strategic plans and year reports have been analysed and compared (preferably of the same year). This information shows how successful the INGO in question has been in the previous year (or in its most recent year report). The information used for this has mostly been found in data provided by the INGO itself. It has to be stated that productivity can only be measured to a certain degree; for example, a decrease in child mortality can never be fully attributed to the activities of one INGO. For the sake of this research, they will be attributed partially for that. Exact percentages are impossible to calculate, however, and so the INGO's impact will be mostly estimates and assumptions, albeit with a theoretical base.

5.2.1 INGO #1

Over the past few years, INGO #1 has been very transparent in its goals and results. The strategic plans are laid out over a period of three years, meaning that the strategic plan that is used in this research refers to the period of 2016-2018. There is also a strategic plan for 2019-2021, but this one is not used for this research, since the future yields no data yet, and is therefore irrelevant for the conclusion of this study. The most recent annual report of INGO #1 is about 2018, so this can be cross-referenced with the strategic plan formulated three years before. There were also some more specific documents available, with rankings and significant data about childhood issues and gender equality.

The strategic plan 2016-2018 provided by INGO #1 lists the priorities on a general scale in nine different ways. The ultimate goal is to "inspire breakthroughs for children" and "help the world's most deprived and marginalised children". These breakthroughs are clarified in three goals for children: surviving, learning, and being protected. This ultimate goal is of course very broad and is in line with what INGO #1 has always stood for. However, it has applied some changes to its strategic plan, compared to previous years, like more focus on gaining knowledge and launching a more global campaign to allow INGO #1 to stay relevant in an increasingly globalized world. These changes (and their overall strategy) are embodied in the nine priorities mentioned before. They are divided in four different aspects: achieving results, increasing awareness, maximising the use of knowledge, and becoming truly global. The most important of these for this thesis is, obviously, 'achieving results'. The rest might be important to its overall productivity, but security strategies will not (directly) influence awareness around the world. The effects a security strategy can have on the other three aspects is negligible, and so the focus is mainly on achieving results.

Achieving results was anticipated to be realised through a strengthening of the thematic focus and building humanitarian capabilities. This is, in a sense, just increasing the efficiency of its humanitarian work on location; specifying each of the three 'breakthroughs' to address them more efficiently, and simply strengthening the ability to support children in need.

The field office in South Sudan has specified these broader goals into more specific numbers. Some examples of these are: 75% of all children will have free basic medical facilities, 100% of school-going children can read and write, and child protection laws and policies will be enacted properly. This is only a small part of the full plan, however. There are also numerous strategies on how to contribute to one (or more) of the nine priorities (a strengthening of the thematic focus), showing that there is a willingness and drive to apply this strategy in day-to-day reality. However, there is hardly any mentioning of changes in philosophies around staff security strategies. There is some acknowledgement that a deteriorating economic situation will lead to more security risks as crime rates will rise, but there is no mention of a solution to this. It is merely registered as an external restraint. At least based on these open-source documents, there is no apparent direct link between staff security and productivity and goal orientation.

What is clear from the year report is that South Sudan is undeniably one of the worst countries for a child to live in, and, despite INGO #1's efforts, it ranks still quite low on the list: 172 out of 176 countries, just above Mali, Chad, Niger and the CAR. This low ranking can-not be attributed to a lack of productivity, however, as the projects of INGO #1 have had some effect. Birth rates among teens, for example, have decreased by 47% since 2000, the greatest reduction in all of Africa. This decline is seen as a substantial progress by the INGO, primarily caused by an increased use of contraceptive methods. And despite an increase in armed conflict in South Sudan, child mortality is also down 47%. Still, it has to be noted that although these results are significant, it is a trend that can be seen in almost every country. In comparison to other countries, South Sudan has even reached a lower rank, despite an increase in its own score. In the end, it is hard to exactly establish the effectiveness and productivity of INGO #1's projects. Its year report is very general, and makes no specific mention about South Sudan. The numbers used here were taken from its self-produced global childhood report, which does contain childhood index scores, but not much information on their own projects. However, INGO #1 has had positive results in 2018. When we combine this with

its own data showing that children are (slightly) better off in South Sudan, we might carefully conclude that, in the broadest sense, its projects have had positive effects for the children in South Sudan. This conclusion will be further examined in Chapter 6, where these results will be compared to the experiences of the employees.

5.2.2 INGO #2

The strategic plan for INGO #2 that has been used for this research, is the plan for 2013-2019. This is compared to the annual report of 2017-2018; the most recent one. It has to be noted here that INGO #2 has an official policy on program evaluation, which is of relevance for this research. The general idea is that this program evaluation constantly improves the quality and impact of projects, creating opportunities, enhancing accountability and transparency, and strengthening credibility. This is the mindset behind the annual reports, and (if followed properly) shows that these reports are credible and critical.

The strategic plan 2013-2019 is divided into six external goals, describing the way in which this INGO wants to use its resources and programs, and six internal goals dealing with how it wants to change the organization so as to allow for better effectiveness. Both of these lists are ways to reach the overall goal: decreasing poverty in the world. The six external goals are: improving human rights, advancing gender justice, saving lives, providing sustainable food sources, fair sharing of natural resources, and the financing for development and universal services. The six internal goals are about creating a network, increasing program quality, strengthening accountability, investing in people, increasing cost effectiveness, and improving the income strategy. Once again, not all of these are as relevant for this research. The most important goals are the ones that show a way to increase their productivity on location. Since there is no specific strategy for each and every country, South Sudan is not specifically mentioned. The year report does make specific mention of South Sudan, however, so the evaluation of its local projects can be compared to the relevant goals mentioned above. This means that if there is specific data about food security, this might be compared to its more general goal for food security globally.

The focus of INGO #2 in South Sudan has been mostly on providing clean water, emergency food distributions, and promoting hygiene. In this, it has been moderately successful. A water treatment plant has been built, thousands of displaced people have been provided with clean water and sanitation, and food has been distributed to about 25,000 people. In total, 1.2 million people have been helped by the actions of INGO #2. In its strategic plan 2013-2019, the goals regarding these specific methods have been described along the following lines: fewer people will die because of illness, deprivation and insecurity, and have exercised their right to obtain clean water, food and sanitation. INGO #2 has reached these goals over the years, as it has helped over one million people quite effectively. South Sudan as a country has been the second largest target for INGO #2 in the period 2017-2018, as far as expenditures go. However, its help has mostly been in a very direct, straightforward manner. Although helping people directly is part of the goal, it is also important to eventually let the people of South Sudan care for themselves. The level of self-sufficiency is only sporadically mentioned in the year report. For example, there is a case of school children working with INGO #2 to help fight diseases in their own community, and there are people working in INGO #2 facilities so they can provide for themselves. Although they care for themselves in a way, the organization as such is

still an integral part of their lives. In other words, self-sufficiency has not (entirely) been reached. The further lack of mentioning of this does not necessarily confirm that self-sufficiency is lacking, but it is safe to assume that it's also not one of the stronger points of INGO #2.

To conclude, INGO #2 has generally been quite successful in its self-proclaimed goals and strategy. The aspect most lacking is the self-sufficiency of the people of South Sudan, but the lack of success here can have various causes. The continuing conflict in South Sudan, be it national or regional, can obviously have a large effect. There might also be a lack in communication and cooperation with local and national governments; this unwillingness to cooperate may come from both sides. There could also be a connection with the security strategies used by INGO #2; this will be further elaborated upon in Section 5.3.2.

5.2.3 INGO #3

INGO #3's most recent annual report is from 2017, divided into two parts: a document highlighting the various goals that have been reached and a document specifically focussing on the financial aspects. The first part has been used more than the second, as money flows can only tell part of the story. These documents would normally be compared to the proposed strategy for that year, but INGO #3 does not have a strategy plan available for that year. It might exist internally, but the only one accessible is the most recent one: 2018-2020. This is not relevant for the report from 2017, however, and so the overall productivity will be based on what the organizational goals are, being the ones as described in Section 5.1.3.

The organization categorizes the countries it works in with a particular priority rank. South Sudan is assigned the highest rank, meaning that INGO #3 has operated with an integrated program approach among various sectors. It shows that South Sudan has been a high priority for the organization, which can also be seen in its local activities. It has provided basic services like water, food and hygiene in the most insecure areas of the country, while also promoting and supporting peacebuilding processes. Quite uniquely, INGO #3 has also reported the difficulties in implementing its plans. In South Sudan, most difficulties stem from the extreme violence against humanitarian workers. The outbreak of conflict in 2017 led to a suspension of the food project for several months, as staff had to be evacuated. In other words, security issues have severely impacted some of the projects in the country.

In its year report, INGO #3 has made quite clear that the safety of its staff is a high priority. There have been 21 reported incidents in South Sudan for the organization, and this has led to an adaptation of its security strategies. All procedures had been reverified and security training became even more of a priority. Although security may have been improved, that does not take away the fact that INGO #3 has been barred from successfully implementing its projects as it would have wished. As mentioned in the overall strategy, the main goal is to reach marginalized and weak communities and to help them get back on their feet. This goal in specific has been impacted the most; activities in the fields of governance and policy have not been suspended due to the conflict. While the immediate care projects had been suspended for several months, they were picked up again when possible. The INGO has even shifted its focus a bit more to immediate humanitarian crisis aid, on top of the enhancement of food security in general. However, even when this is taken into consideration, their overall goals have not been as successful as they could have been. This is due to the security issues in South Sudan. Its

security strategy is likely to have impacted this outplay of events, and will therefore be further elaborated upon in Section 5.3.3.

5.2.4 INGO #4

Finally, INGO #4's most recent annual report dates from 2017. The document showcases its highlights, programmes, research, and financial statements. The report is quite minimal, taking just a few examples and explaining progress in the programmes and research projects only briefly. Just like in the case of INGO #3, no earlier strategy plan has been published, so there is no possibility to review plans and results together. However, INGO #4 does describe every project separately on itswebsite, including the eventual goals. Since the organization has two major projects in South Sudan, these will be used to compare the website statements with the 2017 annual report.

The main project for INGO #4 in South Sudan is the development of sustainable and fair primary healthcare. One of the largest successes the organization has had is the improvement of mother and child healthcare. Through health education, provisional kits, and specific social programs allowing groups of women to share experiences, the number of women safely giving birth in health facilities has increased. Between 2016 and 2017, the number of family planning services distributed, quadrupled or even more. This can be seen as a huge success on this specific field of health humanitarian work, and is described as one of the goals of INGO #4. However, the project strategy also includes basic healthcare for all (not just mothers and their children), and an overall improvement in the quality of local healthcare systems. The report does not contain information on all these other parts of the project, so it can't be said whether they have been productive in that respect or not. One successful part of a project does not necessarily make for a complete success. Regarding the research projects; there is no specific mentioning of the research it is conducting in South Sudan. However, it is mentioned that its approach to researches in general has improved. There is a more global approach connecting multiple researches, while at the same time integrating the local stakeholders more in these programmes.

Aside from the stories about healthcare for pregnant women and the researches in general, the report also mentions how the intensification of the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan has impacted INGO #4's ability to work efficiently. There is increased insecurity, and many more refugees and people in need of aid than before. This led to a lack of access for INGO #4 staff, meaning that some projects and activities had to be suspended or cancelled. There has even been one critical incident regarding a hostage situation. It is clear that the local conditions have impacted the organization's ability to do its work efficiently. Once again, the role of its own security strategy needs to be considered for the final conclusion. This will be done in Section 5.3.4.

5.3 Security Strategies

In this section we address the interviews held with the security officers of each INGO. These interviews have clarified and explained the security strategy used by the organization, why this

is used, and the philosophies behind it. The interviews have touched upon general security strategies (which overlap with most other countries they work in) and the strategy for South Sudan in particular. The knowledge gained from this will be compared with the alleged productivity as discussed in the previous section. This will give a general idea of how security strategies may impact productivity, and with that knowledge answer parts of three of the sub-questions, namely: What security strategy is best for aid workers' protection and productivity, and for the local community itself?

Generally, no INGO has made clear and active use of the deterrence strategy, and protection is also only used in non-protective ways. This may lead to discrepancies as it can be hard to draw conclusions if not every security strategy has actually been used. To counter this issue, they have still been taken into account in the interviews themselves: if a certain security strategy is not used, what was the reasoning behind that? If the reasoning is shared among all INGOs, a general assumption might be made that clarifies why these strategies are never used, and why they would therefore never be the 'best strategy'.

5.3.1 INGO #1

INGO #1 has a very unique structure in its field of security compared to the other INGOs. Instead of employing a sort of overarching security officer, its security experts mostly find themselves divided per country and mostly active directly in the field. The person I spoke to was not necessarily the security expert, but rather the part-time safety coordinator; the one overseeing security needs for the staff that is sent out. The 'real' strategy choices are made by security officers on location.

The interviewee explained to me: "We don't tell them how to do it. No, they know that way better over there than we do here." The context of each specific country INGO #1 is active in, is best known by the local staff; especially details like a curfew or other security decisions are made locally. The interviewee's task is therefore not to decide on any security strategies in the country, but on how the travelling employees can stay safe. In this research, this unique structure is only present in INGO #1, and that is the reason why more employees have been interviewed from this INGO. Two out of the three interviewees in Chapter 6 are local security officers, so that chapter will provide more answers from a local perspective, and clearer answers for the question this thesis poses.

Since most of the security plans are made by local staff, there seemingly is no overarching security philosophy. The INGO as such largely focuses on acceptance, but the exact balance between the three security strategies is strongly dependent on the specific countries. However, there is a general recognition that safety and security are important aspects for INGO #1's work. If the staff is locally/regionally/nationally not accepted, they will try to employ those security measures that will still allow them to do their work. In this sense, security is a means to an end; they only need to be so secure that they can do their work (help children) properly. Success is made through security. The philosophy behind the security in the countries themselves is decided locally, but there is some international support. Basic security protocols do exist, like not driving at night, taking (online) training before travel, or only having trained staff. There has to be an awareness of these security protocols to work efficiently and safely. All other safety measures are decided locally and if necessary communicated to the international offices.

According to the interviewee, the productivity of the organization is enhanced by this type of security structure. Efficiency is increased due to the local decision-making. First of all, this saves time. If an all-around security officer needs to make choices for every country and needs to communicate these to a local security officer, valuable time might be lost, especially if the information the international security officer needs is taken into consideration. This information is often gained through local means; the channelling back and forth of information would take quite a bit of time. Having a local security officer with the power to implement security policies by him/herself saves a lot of time in communication. However, it has to be noted that there is also less control; while there is communication with higher management if necessary, most of the basic choices are made without too much control. Of course there is an issue of too much control, but it has to be acknowledged that this way of defining security strategies can get out of control easier because of a lack of dialogue. Then again, it can also provide more stability in a volatile country like South Sudan. Clear choices can be made faster, allowing the organization and the local staff to be more flexible.

The results in productivity speak for themselves, as INGO #1's year report showed that the organization has been quite successful. This unique hierarchy system in the field of security does also seemingly have its merits in the protection of staff. There has only been one major attack on INGO #1 staff worldwide during the past few years, and this was not in South Sudan. If this success is because of the hierarchy or to the specific security strategies (or both) is still unclear and will be decided upon in Chapter 6, where we will discuss the specific security strategies used by INGO #1 in South Sudan.

5.3.2 INGO #2

In INGO #2, there are basically two different types of security: security support (the regular security management) and crisis management. While crisis management is definitely an important element of security strategies, the regular security management is more important in the context of this thesis. The security support is a lot more hierarchical compared to INGO #1. In the country itself is a full-time local security officer/advisor (there is a part-time security focal point in lower-risk countries, but South Sudan is not among these). This local security officer is supported by a regional security advisor, who is in turn supported by a global security team of security advisors/experts. For normal day-to-day security business, the program director, regional director and country director are all informed. There is also a team of 'roving security managers' (RSMs) in case "shit hits the fan". An unexpected large-scale humanitarian crisis may ask for one of these RSMs to get involved. So, the security team is quite diverse here, with experts on various levels. This also allows for the INGO to have a clear view of its overall security strategy/philosophy.

INGO #2's security strategy is in its essence based on acceptance. Simply said, the other two are not needed if acceptance is high enough; however, reality shows that protection and deterrence are still very much in need. The general strategy is to befriend the local communities by making clear what the INGO's goals are. Often, an INGO has no problems with showing the benefits for the local people. Their work often brings stability and safety, which translates into a happy community and therefore safer working conditions. However, it is important that a balance is struck with every member of the community, as opinions may often

differ. In South Sudan, for example, there are many different recipients of humanitarian aid, and while the organization wants to help all, the security strategy of acceptance might be impeded by opposing views. Often, this issue is solved by INGO #2 by sticking to the core humanitarian values (used by all INGOs), such as independence, impartiality, and neutrality. Especially the latter showcases an important dimension of the acceptance strategy. By staying neutral, one can avoid the difficulties that opposing parties might present. The argument is always: no matter how or if you work together, we will help both of you. If this value is upheld consistently, acceptance tends to increase overall. It is a constant battle to uphold this level of acceptance. However, sometimes security needs to be prepared for threats. According to the interviewee, protection is often a necessary divergent method. This part of the strategy includes static guards, walls, communication, and more. "All the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that will keep the bad guys out." The level of protection strategy for INGO #2 strongly depends on the location; high-risk countries and large cities (like capitals) often need more protection. However, the point is made that guards are never armed. In a country like South Sudan, it won't even be of use to have weapons: "The countries we're going to, there are armies fighting there, militias. Even if you have a weapon, you're gonna lose that battle." It is therefore again explicitly stated that acceptance is so important, in order to negate such threats.

Deterrence was also mentioned, but only as one of the most extreme measures. Again, no weapons will ever be used in this strategy. The only deterrence INGO #2 can bring is the threat to stop all its projects. But even this strategy finds its roots in acceptance. Deterrence won't make a change if people do not want you there anyway. In that case it's simply for your own benefit to leave, which is generally not the humanitarian philosophy of INGO #2. In summary, the overall security strategy if mainly based on acceptance, with protection where necessary. Deterrence is almost never used, only being held in the back of the mind as a worst-case scenario.

INGO #2's specific strategy in South Sudan is generally the same as its overall strategy. It is a logical consequence of the hierarchical security structure. However, during the interview some specific situations were brought up. For example, in South Sudan the challenge of staying neutral has an extra dimension. There a very diverse population with numerous ethnicities that often dislike each other; and this very problem goes all the way up to the government itself. Riek Machar and Salva Kiir were once friends but became enemies, and once more over again. This type of uncertain politics can be detrimental to the projects of INGO #2, but it tries to counter this by staying neutral no matter the political climate. Another issue is the visibility. It is hard to categorize this in one of the various types of security strategies; showing flags and logos may or may not affect security. It can be a double-edged sword. Visibility is quite high in Juba, where INGO #2 can easily show itself. However, in for example Malakal and its surroundings, the visibility is significantly lower. This might be seen as a protection measure; the acceptance is not high enough, so it has to hide its name. Aside from these few issues, the interviewees were confident that the security strategy in South Sudan is working; acceptance is quite high, mainly because of the continued and consistent neutrality. This is supported by the absence of attacks on aid workers from INGO #2. Despite South Sudan experiencing the highest number of attacks on humanitarians, this INGO seems to have dodged the bullet.

Continuously upholding acceptance in the relevant communities seems like a lot of work, and it does have its effects on the productivity of the organization. Normally, the security

proposal regarding acceptance has already been written before the projects are started; this is done to avoid any unexpected difficulties that may arise during the length of the projects, impacting its productivities. Preparation is an important aspect of security organization. However, in some volatile (political) situations, the context changes so much that the preparation isn't really effective or relevant anymore. This can lead to projects being slowed down or even put on hold if the security risk is too high, decreasing productivity. This is taken into consideration constantly, every day, for every activity: "Is the risk worth it to eventually reach what we want to do?" If it's not, they might have to wait for a few weeks. This can inhibit work activities, from an external cause. But there also internal causes. "Security is often seen as an obstacle". Staff might get annoyed by security officers' jurisdictions. While external factors are quite obvious, often there is internal discussion about how to proceed from there. Communication about this topic can be quite difficult. INGO #2 tries to avoid these types of problems and discussions by sharing the risk: working together with other organizations, both locally and on an international level. If another group of people has better acceptance, or is convinced it can move about more freely, then INGO #2 combines its own program with theirs. This leads to reduced risks and continued productivity. It does pose a risk for the organization as a whole, especially when it goes awry, but that is simply another risk that might have to be taken. In the end, productivity is only slightly impacted by INGO #2's security strategy. The less successful projects mentioned in Section 5.2.2 do not seem to be impacted too much by the security strategy either. The idea that communication and cooperation with the local/national governments might affect these projects, is not likely to be true. Neutrality is INGO #2's main prerogative. The reason these projects failed can more likely be found in some other cause, like an increased level of conflict, or unwillingness from the local community.

The security strategy does not seem to have a significant direct effect on the local community itself. If any, it allows the INGO #2 to do its work properly and so increase the livelihood of the local communities themselves. There also seems to be little hostility towards this specific organization, which might mean that there are also not any significant indirect negative effects towards the local community. If there were any, the locals might retaliate against the organization.

The security strategy of INGO #2 is to be a solid one. The balance between acceptance and protection, and the (almost) lack of deterrence), has showed positive results. INGO #2's staff has been quite safe in dangerous South Sudan, and their work has not been impacted much by it either. While there may be some internal discussions about the strategy and its implementation, these discussions are apparently handled well. This might also have to do with the scope of the organization, as it is one of the largest in the world. It has perfected its craft and is also well-known internationally, leading to easier acceptance and therefore better security.

5.3.3 INGO #3

INGO #3 uses a rather direct hierarchical system for its security, albeit on a smaller scale than INGO #2. The main responsibility for each country lies at the national level with the country director, who is supported by a security expert/advisor/focal point. Which level of security officer will actually be used, is based on the level of risk of the country involved. In the case of South Sudan, a full-time security expert is at work. Above the national level is the international

technical security advisor (the interviewee), and even higher up is the board of directors, consisting of the CEO and CFO.

The interviewee explained that INGO #3 tries to use a security strategy that is as diverse as possible. All three sides of the triangle are considered equally. It is best explained by the interviewee himself:

"We use acceptance, because we're aware that the threat may still exist. We're reducing the likelihood. Protection, where we're putting [up] a barrier. So the threats still exist, but we're reducing the impact. And then deterrence, where we're implementing a counterforce, so we're saying: you're gonna harm us, we also have the potential to harm you."

It has to be specifically noted, however, that the 'harming' in this quote does not mean any physical harm, as INGO #3 has a strict no-weapons policy. The only threat they can utter is the termination of operations, an extreme but clear consequence. However, the focus is, as with most INGOs, for the most part on the acceptance part of the strategy. While there is no clear strategy, the organization relies on their staff's communication and honesty. INGO #3 defines itself by the following three principles: mission, mandate, values. These directly translate into what they expect of their staff's communications: clear, concise, and consistent messaging. This means that if these values in communication are followed, acceptance will also follow. There can be no question of the values of INGO #3; if there are, doubts may arise which can lead to discontent. This method of discourse is being taught to every employee through trainings, and is maintained by briefing every single member on any aspect of a project. This way, each and every one can communicate clearly about the project in question and that fosters acceptance. However, this does bring on another risk. Being clear is of course respected, but if locals don't agree with the message there might still be discontent. This is where protection and deterrence would normally come in, but the interviewee explained a particular fourth element of security strategy: avoidance. By adding this fourth element, a 'square' of security risk mitigation strategies can be made: Accept, Control, Avoid & Transfer (ACAT). This can be added to the triangle of Van Brabant, which in this case would mostly be about security management strategy. The graph in Figure 3 illustrates the way the ACAT matrix should be used. The graph shows both the likelihood and the impact. A particular event/situation should be placed in this graph along those lines: if a specific event has a high likelihood of taking place, but a low impact, then it should be put on the upper left of the graph. With this in mind, we can divide the various risk mitigation strategies among these indicators. If the likelihood and impact are both low, the strategy would be to accept (A) the small risk and just face the consequences. If either the likelihood and/or impact are getting stronger, the situation moves into the C&A area, where the strategy would be to either control (C) or avoid (A) the situation. Lastly, if the likelihood and impact are both very high, the risk is so high that the best strategy simply is to Transfer, meaning that the team needs to be transferred away from the project location. This


Figure 4: Security Risk Mitigation Graph

graph illustrates a different dimension of security strategies: a very direct event-specific approach, instead of the ideological views of Van Brabant's triangle. Both can work together very well and are incorporated in the strategy of INGO #3.

The interviewee described South Sudan on a level scale used by the organization to categorize countries based on their risk levels; the highest risk level being 5, the lowest 1. South Sudan is categorized as a level 3 country, with some regions even being level 2, which is quite surprising. A country like Afghanistan ranks at level 5. There probably is a level of uncertainty that might result in lowering the overall level. Whereas Afghanistan is well-known for how dangerous it can be, hence level 5, South Sudan is very volatile in the sense that it is unpredictable and unclear what will happen next, therefore ranking lower. Anyway, to counter this unpredictability, INGO #3 uses local experts. While international security experts tend to think in very technical and broad terms, and make decisions based on those terms, the local security experts' knowledge is more specific. As the interviewee said: "South Sudanese staff are the experts. We're just the technical people, we need to then formalize it." This combines knowledge about the country and its politics with knowledge about security overall into one specific security strategy for South Sudan. This can then, when necessary, be adjusted with advice from local partners and experts; if a situation suddenly becomes very dangerous, it is discussed with this person. So, despite the hierarchy, there is a very clear level of cooperation between the team. Nevertheless, INGO #3 is the organization with the most confirmed incidents (21) of the four INGOs that are part of this thesis. Whether that is because of internal or external problems is unclear; it could just be that INGO #3 is simply active in the most dangerous locations. Still, it can't be denied that the incident level is quite high, which means that staff safety could – and should – be better.

As staff security is impacted, so is the productivity of the staff. As already mentioned before, productivity has been impacted by security risks. Teams have been evacuated and projects have been put on hold for several months. This is part of the security strategy and it obviously increases the security of the staff, but severely decreases productivity. This also shows that the ACAT graph can be used in a variety of ways. It highly depends on the risk level an organization is willing to take. It seems as if INGO #3 does take risks, but may be quick to Transfer. However, this statement can-not be made with certainty, as the exact circumstances of the incidents are not known.

The organization communicates with the local community, starting from a position of honesty. While honesty is arguably a value an INGO should be respected for, it should also be said that honesty and clarity alone are not always the best ways to connect with the local community. Being honest and clear does not always make the local community trust you; if they believe your organization is telling lies for whatever reason, simply telling the truth is not always enough. Nevertheless, INGO #3 says to work from the point of view of the community: what the community needs, they provide. If the communication about what the community itself actually wants is clear and honest, then it is likely to lead to positive results. However, this type of work ethic could also mean superimposing particular values and ideas on the local community that they do not always care for. This is a treacherous line to walk, and the effects might have shown in the security incidents that have occurred.

INGO #3's security strategy is very clear and concise, but it may lack a personal dimension. The values of communication mentioned as a way to accumulate acceptance can be

a double-edged sword. However, the ACAT graph does have its value as a way of looking at the issue that has not been considered so clearly by another organization (at least not in the interviews). Other organizations most likely have certain boundaries as to when to act or not to act, but the theoretical basis in the case of INGO #3 is very strong.

5.3.4 INGO #4

Being the smallest organization in this research, the security team is also quite minimal. There is only one person, the Senior Operations Officer, who enacts overall security strategies for all countries they work in, including South Sudan. This role is in direct connection with the country offices, where the more local choices are made. The security strategy is made in the main office, and country offices can adapt these policies to their own environment and situation.

The general strategy used by INGO #4 is to almost exclusively focus on acceptance, as argued by the interviewee: "The places we work in, the only way to function there is to gain acceptance." INGO #4 tries to gain this acceptance by working with mostly local staff. A lot of security issues can be solved by someone who actually lives in the country and knows the specific contexts very well, speaks the language, etc. However, INGO #4 has difficulty doing so in South Sudan, leading to a slight decrease in acceptance from its own perspective. Cooperation tends to be a bit harder for INGO #4 since there are quite a bit of threats from local partners. This has also resulted in having its own personnel stay in hotels instead of in a regular neighbourhood or guest house, as is the case in other countries where the acceptance is better. This would normally be part of the visibility strategy: the less you make a target of yourself, the smaller the chance you get attacked. The fact that South Sudanese personnel is staying in a hotel makes them more of a target, according to the organization's policies. Another way of gaining acceptance is by simply doing the job well. The organization focuses on healthcare and sees it as a basic principle that people they help should have a say in their own healthcare. By allowing the local community to work together with the organization and being open for discussion, INGO #4 makes sure its work is integrated into the community. This is likely to increase the acceptance, and turns out to be successful in South Sudan. Regarding the other types of security strategies: deterrence is mostly shunned away from, and protection is only regarded as minimal. However, it has to be noted here that the interviewee's definition of protection is different from the one as described in this thesis. Quite a significant portion of its security strategy is indeed protection, such as gates and guards, but not regarded as such by the interviewee. Protection as seen by the interviewee is more centred around specifically armed guards, and INGO #4 never arms their guards. Nevertheless, it does use protection methods as previously described.

The safety of INGO #4's personnel in South Sudan is generally okay, compared to the other organizations. There has been one significant incident (a hostage situation) and some suspension of projects, but other than that the staff has been relatively safe. The incident in itself might show that the acceptance is not as high as they would want it to be. This might have all sorts of reasons, as previously addressed in 5.2.4, but one of the reasons may very well be the lack of local staff. Cooperation might have been harder because of this. However, this one isolated incident could also have been random; not targeted against the organization specifically. Apart from this incident, the staff seems relatively safe; the close cooperation with

the local community may attest to that. The interviewee also made the point that they never discriminate between the people they help. Although his example refers to Afghanistan, the point is clear: if it comes down to it, both Afghan military and Taliban warriors are aided with healthcare issues. People with health problems, be it through sickness or through physical injury, are considered to be the same and their allegiances are disregarded. This works the same in South Sudan, where they will help all people, disregarding their allegiance and ethnicity. This clearly harks back to the neutrality/transparency principle of humanitarian aid, and tends to contribute to acceptance.

As mentioned previously, the productivity of INGO #4 has been impacted by the intensification of local conflicts. The increase of people in need and the inability to effectively reach some of these people have obviously decreased their productivity in the country. However, it looks like this is not because of a lacking security strategy. External forces like conflict simply can't be affected by one INGO, and so this is obviously out of their hands. The accessibility could be increased by using more local staff, however, since they would likely find it easier to reach communities in volatile situations. Still, this is also not necessarily the fault of the security strategy; normally they would have more local staff, but flawed cooperation and threats have made it difficult to realize that goal. And even if there was local staff, it might have been against protocol to go to these locations anyway, meaning that productivity would be impacted solely through external forces. The organization's productivity is therefore not (very) negatively impacted by its security strategy; more leniency could be used, but that would decrease staff safety.

The local community seems to only positively be affected by the security strategy. The almost complete focus on acceptance has led to indiscriminate medical help and healthcare. The openness INGO #4 displays in working together with locals to discuss about their own wishes regarding healthcare also shows an inherent care for the local community.

In conclusion, INGO #4's security strategy is generally adequate in keeping its own people safe, while also maintaining good relations with the local community. The productivity has been impacted by the sudden increase in intensity of the conflict. Where other organizations might sometimes be able to work through such difficulties, the small scale of INGO #4 might have made it a bit harder to work effectively in conflict-ridden areas of South Sudan. However, it seems that this is mostly caused by its inability to enact the security strategy as it would have wanted; by using local staff. INGO #4 has been able to enact this strategy in Afghanistan better, and projects are a lot more resilient there. In the end, security issues are mostly out of INGO #4's hands; the security strategy is adequate in keeping its employees safe and the local community well. The only issue is to be found in productivity, but that is grounded in other elements of management.

6. Safety Interpretations of INGO Personnel

This chapter brings the various perspectives mentioned before together, and combines them with the experiences and interpretations of INGO personnel working in South Sudan. Based on this, concluding answers to all the sub-questions are given, so the main question can be answered in the conclusion. First, the issue of violence against aid workers in South Sudan is addressed, with data illustrating the exact severity of the situation. Next, we will discuss how this violence has affected the aid workers working in the country; whether it influenced their work, productivity, psychology, etc. Finally, the remaining three sub-questions are answered: what security strategy is best for aid workers' safety, productivity and the local community? To answer these, the information provided by the security officers will be combined with that of INGO personnel.

From the interviews, it became clear that violent deterrence and protection strategies would never be used by an INGO. This would go against their values and possibly negatively impact their productivity more than any other security strategy would. Violent security strategies would most likely lead to distrust in both the local and international communities, making it harder to do their work locally, but also to collect funding for their projects. Simply said: practically no one wants to support (or be supported by) a humanitarian organization that uses violence. It's contradictory in every way. So, the question "what security strategy is best?" still applies, but it has to be taken into account that some strategies are never used by the INGOs in question. However, the reasoning for not using these strategies is very clear and logical, and shows that these strategies would be disregarded anyway by any INGO. While the discussion will still take place as usual, violent security strategies will be quickly disregarded, because they would never be the best strategy for an INGO.

6.1 Violence against Aid Workers

In order to quantify the violence against aid workers, the Aid Workers Security Reports of 2018 and 2019 are used. In total, in 2017 313 victims of 158 major attacks were recorded, increasing to 399 victims of 221 major attacks in 2018 (AWSD, 2018; AWSD, 2019). Victims are described as either being killed, wounded, or kidnapped. Most of these major attacks were perpetrated in conflict-affected countries, including South Sudan. In both years, South Sudan saw the highest number of attacks against humanitarian workers: 46 in 2017 and 55 in 2018. For both years, shootings were the most common incident in South Sudan, accounting for about half of all total attacks. These numbers have not only increased during the past two years, but have been steadily on the rise since the very birth of the nation state. Interestingly, there is quite a difference worldwide between national and international aid workers in the severity of the attacks. Whereas international aid workers are more often the target of major attacks, the fatality rate for nationals is much higher. The data are unclear whether this trend is also visible in South Sudan. However, it does show that INGOs generally use more local staff, just like for

instance INGO #4 tries to do. In the end, it is not of great importance for this thesis; the issue is violence against aid workers in general, without a distinction between national and international.

The increase in violence can have numerous causes. One of them is offered by Rehana Zawar, a country director in South Sudan: the increase in violence "suggest[s] a troubling trend of armed groups using this tactic to assert control over aid operations" (Roby, 2018, p.1). In other words, the various armed groups try to claim aid operations for themselves by threatening them with violence. This obviously affects an INGO's basic values and will therefore likely be resisted. This unwillingness to give in to the threats may likely be a reason why violence against aid workers has intensified steadily. Another reason might be the increasing hostility of the national government towards humanitarian organizations. Since the South Sudanese government is one of the main perpetrators of the violence, it might very well be that they feel threatened by Western influences and seek to repel them (Lynch, 2016). As argued before, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs has even openly claimed that "most of the [humanitarian] agencies are here to spy on the government" (Cusack, 2017, p.1). This type of rhetoric obviously influences how militias, armed groups, and local communities view humanitarian aid organizations. Both of these explanations as to why violence against aid workers has increased in South Sudan are external. Internal problems, like INGO mismanagement, are also likely explanations; problems in security strategies could be an explanation, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Externally, aid organizations obviously can't change the volatile tactics used by armed groups and the government, and if they want to help local communities, it simply adds a major element to humanitarian work that needs to be considered. This is where the security strategies come into play, for better or worse. But before we discuss the effects of security strategies and which one (or combination) is best suited to tackle this problem, it is important to know the effects of these increases in violence on the humanitarian aid workers themselves.

6.2 Effects of violence

In this section we will discuss the effects humanitarian violence has on the aid workers themselves. Aside from the effects of an attack on their own person, this question includes all other forms of attack. The very situation as described in Section 6.1 can already have its effects on how safe the aid workers in South Sudan feel.

How safe the employees themselves feel obviously differs from person to person. The first two interviewees (INT #1 & INT #2) both mentioned they have often not felt safe in South Sudan. INT #1 primarily worked in Juba but was sometimes transferred to field offices further into the country. Juba felt safer for her compared to the field, but also very different. Juba was busier and therefore less predictable, but the crimes were also less severe. People snatching purses, for example, is way more common in the large cities, which is mentioned by all three interviewees. These smaller crimes take place less often in the field, but the impact of these incidents is often much higher. Kidnappings and shootings are more likely there; shootings can also be accidental during clashes. "It's not always a targeted attack. It is often being in the wrong place at the wrong time." Because of the possibility of such incidents, INT #1 was very adamant in following security protocol and completely understood the reasoning behind it. For example, a curfew at 9:00 PM in the city felt very logical to her, because she herself didn't feel

safe outside around that time anymore. So, while INT #1 often did not feel safe, in particular when it was dark, it actually made her more conscious of her decisions in the country which may have contributed to her own personal safety.

INT #2 said she was feeling even less safe. All the time she was in South Sudan, she has been working in the field, and this is a lot more volatile and unpredictable. The reason for her not feeling safe is mostly found in that very insecurity: she can't let her guard down, something might happen at any time. "Today it seems completely okay, and tomorrow someone hits someone". This insecurity has severely affected her sleep cycle, too. INT #2 explained how she hasn't had a single night in South Sudan with a good night's rest. She rests, but never truly enjoys a deep sleep because of the anxieties created by the uncertainties of possible attacks. She also mentioned her living conditions and lack of amenities as an uncomfortable aspect of her life there. She actually described the situation as something you only see in a Hollywood movie: "I didn't think that it was possible [...] and I thought that media was overreacting." However, not all is bad for INT #2, as it also creates a certain excitement in her life. She feels that experiencing something like this has made her life more exhilarating.

Despite these few positive elements, it has to be noted that the effects of violence in South Sudan has had some detrimental effects on INT #2. She has worked in South Sudan for almost a year and not sleeping well during all that time is bound to decrease productivity and mental health. The excitement of it all may give her some energy, but while that might prove useful in the short term, the long-term situation she is in may not benefit from an adrenaline-driven life. Still, she mentions that her remaining alert is also important for her job, as she is the security officer in her field office. It allows her to be more aware and also more careful while considering not only her own safety, but that of others as well.

Contrary to the other two interviewees, INT #3 has generally felt safe in South Sudan. She described that safety is one of her top priorities, and that she wouldn't be in the country if she didn't feel safe. She did mention that there are many things "beyond anyone's anticipation or control", but that that does not necessarily affect her feelings of safety that much. The only thing that really sticks out for INT #3 regarding her own safety is the lack of efficient communication within the organization itself. This will be discussed further in Section 6.3, but the general sentiment is that staff in South Sudan are not informed thoroughly enough about particular threats. They simply hear that there is a threat and so a certain meeting can't continue, but they never really know what the threat itself is. This creates more uncertainty, which only enhances by the already existing uncertainty. However, this is more of a security strategy issue and will therefore be elaborated upon later.

With two of the three employees generally not feeling safe, one might expect that the majority of the staff in South Sudan does not feel entirely safe. This is not surprising, as it is a country at war. The main issue seems to be the uncertainty and volatility of the conflict and security issues. Incidents often happen, almost always randomly. This seems to create a sense of unease in most staff that can lead to fear and, for instance, a lack of sleep. However, at the same time, it seems that productivity might increase in a certain sense: there is more of a direct incentive to do something about the problems they face, as they are the very problems they seek to alleviate others from. Still, the general idea is that the violence in South Sudan creates a sense of fear in a lot of aid workers, which can negatively impact their productivity and own mental health.

6.3 Security Strategy: Staff Security

Now that the actual effects of security issues have been examined, the next step is to see how security strategies try to alleviate these issues.

Aid workers should not just feel safe, they should actually be safe. While the interviewees could not elaborate too much upon their own actual safety, they did tell me whether they had been in any sort of incident. However, this is just a snapshot of three aid workers and their own experiences. For the conclusion, these answers will be combined with the data and information provided in Section 5.3.1.

Both INT #1 and INT #3 made clear they'd never been in any large incident that threatened their own safety in a significant way. INT #3 told that the only way incidents have impacted her is by reducing her productivity. If there was an active security threat, her team would have to move or hide, which would impact their productivity. However, this method has always kept her and her team safe. These experiences were mostly in the field. INT #1 was primarily located in Juba and therefore had some other safety issues to care about. Random checkpoints and drunk youth on the street were mentioned as a form of harassment, but never to the point of any physical (or mental) injury. However, she did mention that "enough colleagues have been through terrible things. So, I've been lucky." This shows that despite her own personal safety, some of her colleagues have been involved in incidents that have had a significant impact.

As a field officer and security officer for INGO #1 in South Sudan, INT #2 had quite a bit to say about their own safety. While she already brought up that she almost never really feels safe, she did not mention any incident she had been through. Her job as a security officer probably makes her that much more aware of security issues. She described some of the security strategies she personally uses, and most of it was based on protection. Fences, guards, security lights, curfews; all of these are used by INGO #1 at her location. However, the fence at her compound has collapsed and there is no money for repairs. So, even though INT #2 did not mention any incidents, it is clear that the quality of the protective measures could be better. INT #1 mentioned that sometimes the guards outside of her compound in Juba were a bit too lenient. Flawed protective measures could negatively impact the safety of the aid workers. However, the interviewees themselves have been safe. The incidents happening to INT #1's colleagues were outside the compound, as well. Still, protective measures should not just be questioned when an incident has taken place; they have to be adequate enough to try to avoid any incident from ever happening. Not to mention the feeling of safety of the staff, which is definitely impacted even by a broken fence, as mentioned by INT #2.

The practical staff security is quite adequate for INGO #1. Despite the sometimes flawed protective measures, the safety of the staff has been quite effective. None of the interviewees have been part of significant incidents, with the exception of some colleagues of INT #1. There is also no specific mentioning of incidents described in the year report of INGO #1, leading us to believe that they are doing quite well in securing its own staff. The strategy of having local security officers take up most of the work, arguably has its merits. Both INT #2 and INT #3 were happy with this way of working, at times also frustrated because of a lack of communication.

Lacking money to repair a fence, or not getting enough information from higher up in the hierarchy, can be tiresome if you are the one who needs to make the choices. This is also what the security coordinator of INGO #1 argued: coordination between the national security team and the international organization could be better.

But, how does INGO #1 compare to the other INGOs in this aspect of security strategies?

First of all, protection should be recognized in the staff security section. Protection is the most apparent (often physical) security strategy layer of staff security. As such, the similarities in the protection security strategies across all INGOs are quite apparent. All organizations use unarmed guards, fences, gates, and curfews. However, the mentality behind it might differ. In particular INGO #4 stands out, as its vision of protection is different from the one described earlier in this thesis. Its vision on protection is more aggressive, and so it seems like the protection methods described by INGO #4 are part of the acceptance strategy, since there are no arms involved. However, in light of this thesis, its strategy does show a similar protection strategy as the other organizations use. For the sake of staff security, the protection strategies are essentially the same and therefore offer no real conclusion. The only issue is that it has to be implemented correctly, an element that is somewhat lacking for INGO #1.

The acceptance strategy has more obvious differences for staff security. While all INGOs focus on acceptance, their exact strategies are quite different. The most effective strategies are the ones from INGO #1, #2, and #4, since they are all based on doing a good job and cooperating efficiently with the local community. INGO #4's strategy of primarily using local staff might be successful, but for them this is not feasible in South Sudan. However, all three are the same in their strategy to gain acceptance by being neutral and accepting and involving the community, and by doing their job right. INGO #3 is the odd one out here, as its strategy consists of primarily gaining acceptance through clear communication. While this is almost the same as neutrality and independence (also used by INGO #3), the problem here is that a specific focus on communication does not necessarily mean that you build up a relationship with the local community – you just know how to answer their questions properly. They might still dislike your overall strategy, and that could eventually lead to less acceptance and even dangerous situations for the organization's staff.

The deterrence strategy is not often used by organizations, as it is a last resort where acceptance and protection are not enough. It has been used in some way by INGO #1, #3 and #4, but more for their own safety than as an actual strategy. They all had to leave or be caught up in a violent war. Any organization could be forced to make this choice, depending on their location, and the deterrence strategy therefore has no large effect on the eventual conclusion among these INGOs.

Now that we have all the relevant information, we can answer the question: *"What security strategy is best for staff security?"* The answer is that INGO #1 and #2 have the most feasible and safe security strategies regarding their own staff security. Their staff has been in the least incidents; INGO #3 and #4 have been through some major incidents during the past few years, while INGO #1 and #2 have had no large-scale problems. This means that it is likely that the best acceptance strategy is to befriend the local community through hard work, integrating them in this work, and using protection only when necessary.

6.4 Security Strategy: Productivity

There is a general consensus among the interviewees that all security strategies have a negative impact on productivity. Projects being halted, not being able to meet a contact person because of security reasons, not being able to use a specific road; all security methods lessen the ability to do one's work. INT #1 mentioned that there are many security procedures one has to go through if you want to go somewhere in the country. "You're not even allowed to go to field locations in a car, everyone needs to go by plane." Since INGO #1 does not have its own planes, it has to use planes run by the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). These only operate according to a set schedule and therefore impact the ability to travel efficiently. This doesn't only affect personal travel, but also logistical transport. INT #2 told that they could use cars for short distances, but their cars could only be delivered by plane. INT #3 also mentioned that productivity decreases when travelling is not possible; not only because of the lack of transport, but also because of a lack of human interaction. In the field it's even hard to have good internet connection for a simple Skype call (this very interview had to be rescheduled because of this). She did mention that these problems are less impactful when working in larger cities like Juba, or the country office. Internet connection is often way better there, and meeting people locally is safer and more efficient.

Another issue brought up by INT #2 is the danger of working in places where INGO #1 is not accepted. The Muerle tribe does not accept INGO #1, because their values are in direct opposition: some of the Muerle tribe take children from other families to work for their own, which an organization promoting children's rights can simply not accept. This makes work in certain areas harder, given this lack of acceptance. However, in this case it can be argued that security strategies can't influence this. The differences are so very stark and extreme that a middle ground is practically impossible.

It is clear that every organization suffers from – at least some – negative effects on productivity because of their security strategies; be it through the use of restrictive transport procedures, curfews, or other strategies. However, INGO #3 and #4 are the only two that have had a significant negative effect on their productivity. They had to halt projects and pull out of at-risk regions. While the latter is also the case for INGO #1 and #2, there is no specific mentioning of it. The main reason for needing to move away from the project area is because of the dangers posed by local militia forces. This could mean that acceptance is not entirely adequate. However, it is hard to say how much of this can be attributed to a flawed security strategy. When a conflict erupts or clashes break out, the safety of staff can often only be guaranteed by evacuation. At the same time, INGO #1 and #2 do have less casualties, and less evacuations. It may be that the lack of local staff in INGO #4's team, and the apparent lack of social cohesion with the local community in INGO #3's, has led to less acceptance and therefore greater danger for staff when clashes break out.

The suspension of a project can also be part of a deterrence strategy, but that is only the case if the threat of suspension has actually been made. Sudden evacuation is more of a protective strategy than a deterrent strategy. While these strategies are successful in maintaining staff security, it has a very negative impact of productivity. It can even mean a

complete lack of work. The choice to evacuate may sometimes seem obvious, but there can be some discrepancy here as well. The ACAT graph used by INGO #3 illustrates this: when an organization's threshold to Transfer (T) is too low, evacuation will 'not be worth it'. The actual security risk in such a case may not even be that high. A threshold that's too high, on the other hand, can lead to a decrease in staff security, as they would be forced to work in a dangerous setting. However, it is not clear what the exact threshold of these INGOs is, especially if compared to each other. In the context of this thesis, this means that the protection and deterrence strategies can impact productivity significantly, but the effects are similar for each organization. The only change in protection/deterrence strategy would be a change in the threshold for the Transfer tactic.

The largest impact on productivity is mostly influenced by the acceptance strategy. Since INGO #1 and #2 have seen the least impact on their productivity, it is likely that their acceptance strategies are more adequate for maintaining productivity. This is mostly because of their lack of long-term evacuations and suspensions of projects. Other aspects, like travel prohibitions, are shared by all organizations. Based on this, we can answer the question: *"What security strategy is best for productivity?"* The answer is that INGO #1 and #2 have the best strategy, as they focus on acceptance so as to avoid leaning too much on protection/deterrence. Protection and deterrence are more likely to impact productivity, as witnessed by the long-term suspensions of projects by INGO #3 and #4. However, it has to be noted that INGO #4's original strategy of having more local staff would have created more acceptance if implemented correctly. South Sudan's context has made it harder to do so, but this is outside the scope of a strategy. Still, a better adaptive strategy for South Sudan could have been made, and this is why INGO #1 and 2 are still faring better regarding productivity.

6.5 Security Strategy: Local Community

Security strategies are mainly made for the organization itself, and the staff it employs. However, as we are talking about INGOs who work with the local community, it is also important to consider the effect of the security strategies on them. The interviewees themselves did not mention any apparent negative effects for the community. All of them mostly spoke of working together with the local community, which is generally going quite well. Then again, having a good cooperation is not necessarily part of the security strategy. It may lead to acceptance, but it is also simply their overall strategy as an organization. Due to the neutrality of the INGOs, their work practically always comes out as positive for the local community. Also, when the organization needs something from the locals or the local government, it is generally meant to further their own goals in helping those very locals. As INT #2 said: "You need to take as much as you can, so you can give as much as you can." However, in some instances the local community has been impacted indirectly by the organization's security strategies (or the effects thereof). For example, as given by INT #2: they can't operate in a particular region because of Muerle aggression; some Muerle tribe members abduct children from other tribes so as to make them work for them. INGO #1 is specifically advocating children's rights and therefore clashes ideologically with this tribe. This impacts the way in which they can help the local community.

Still, it's questionable if this is actually the responsibility of the organization. Their relations with the tribe are based on very fundamental values, not something that can be easily changed, unlike a security strategy. So, while lower levels of acceptance may have some effect on the ability of an organization to help a local community, in the case of INGO #1 this is beyond their control.

For all other organizations, the general effect of their work is seen as positive for the local community. It is their very goal to make their lives better, and so most security strategies really never impact the local community negatively. However, there is an indirect issue to consider: when there is less acceptance of an INGO, the local community is lacking help that they could have received. This does not mean that a security strategy has a negative effect on the local community, but rather that the positive effects can be diminished by it. So, when an acceptance strategy works better for an organization, it will also mean that they can do their work better for the local community. Protection follows the same formula; if the staff is better protected, they can do their work better.

As for the deterrence strategy, it should be noted that actually executing this strategy will never work in favour of the local community, as in that case they are not given the help that they would normally get. Evacuation and/or suspension are mostly linked to acceptance in the case of aid organizations anyway, which means that any deterrence strategy addressed in this thesis will not have a direct effect on the locals.

There are also positive effects for the locals of a security strategy. For example, using more local staff, like INGO #4 normally does, means a better view on what the local community really needs. This then enhances the aid an organization can give. However, since that specific strategy has not worked in South Sudan, it won't do anything for them there.

With all the effects being mainly positive, it is almost trivial to answer the question: *"What security strategy is best for the local community?"* However, this effect can mostly be attributed to an effective acceptance strategy. As brought up in Section 6.3 and 6.4, INGOs #1 and #2 are generally best accepted, which leads to higher productivity and staff security. This simply increases their impact on the local community. Nevertheless, INGOs #3 and #4 do not have any negative effects on the local community either; just a slight diminution of their positive effects.

7. Reflection

In this chapter I will briefly reflect on specific elements of the research process. A Master thesis is after all, not just a crown jewel on the Master's program, but also an important learning experience.

The first issue deals with the interviews. I have simply been too ambitious regarding the number of interviews I anticipated to hold. Initially, I wanted to speak to as many personnel in South Sudan as I could, to find out how they felt in the country while at work. However, after speaking to three different employees and four security experts, I noticed that while feelings sometimes diverted, the main story was the same. I might notice very specific nuances like how tall the walls were surrounding a compound, or how someone felt unsafe in a very specific environment, but the general sentiment was already made clear by my research, combined with the relevant literature. Also, the planning of interviews became increasingly tough. Even after various reminder e-mails and calls answers were lacking; umbrella organizations like the Danish Refugee Council told me they would keep an eye out, but never came with results. Visiting South Sudan was also not an option, as it is a 'red' country according to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It would've been against university rules to visit South Sudan. My initial plan was to find people in the Netherlands who had worked in South Sudan. This also turned out to be harder than I anticipated, since these (already scarce) humanitarian aid workers often don't return for a long period of time.

Related to the interviews is the uncertainty regarding the contents of these interviews, in particular regarding the feeling of safety and incidents. The interviewees I have spoken to have never been in any serious incident. While this could simply be a coincidence, there is also the possibility that people who have been through such incidents would rather not speak about it in detail with a student they don't know. From the beginning I have made clear that the interviews were to be about safety and security, and that might have scared off some of the possible contacts. I have done this for ethical reasons, since I did not want to omit too much regarding the interviews and catch them by surprise. However, at the same time I respect the fact that that may just be part of doing a research on a difficult subject like this. It could have let me gain a better understanding of the incidents themselves, and so increase the quality of my research.

Lastly, there is a lack of data on actual incidents for INGOs #1 and #2. They have not included any information about it in their year report, but that does not necessarily mean nothing happened. I have tried to find some alternative reporting in newspapers or other sources, but could not find any. While I do not have any confirmation of incidents taking place, I also don't have any confirmation of them not happening. So, I may or may not have overstated the openness of the organizations with such data.

8. Conclusion

The aim of this research has been to explore the differences between various security strategies of some INGOs, to eventually find out what type of security strategy works best for safety and productivity, as well as for the local communities. The answer to this will be formulated, connecting the various sub-questions that have been answered throughout this thesis.

The first sub-question was: *"Is there violence against aid workers in South Sudan? If so, why and how?"* The answer to the first part was found out rather quickly: yes, there is violence against aid workers in South Sudan. It is the most violent country to work in as a humanitarian aid worker. This means that security strategies should be made with staff security in mind first. All INGOs agree that their own staff's lives should never be easily disregarded; life is the most important asset and should always be a number one priority. When compared to other, less dangerous countries, security strategies may use another perspective that is geared more towards productivity. More lenient SOPs, more focus on communication, etc. However, in the case of South Sudan, the perspective lies mostly in the human lives of the staff, and so security strategies are focused mostly on keeping these people safe. The focus of these security strategies should then be on the why and how of these violent attacks. They need to incorporate the relevant information, like the ethnic conflict of South Sudan and the government's stance towards humanitarian aid workers. The types of attacks, mostly shootings, should also be regarded. The backbone of a security strategy lies in understanding this local context well.

The second sub-question was: *"What are the effects of (terrorist) violence on aid workers?"* This has been examined with the help of the three interviewees who have worked in South Sudan. Their stance towards the violence is mostly one of general apprehension. They all accept the dangers, even though one might be more afraid of the threats than another. However, they tend to not consciously let it influence their work. There are examples of a low quality of sleep, which can have a negative effect on productivity. However, the violence has mostly led to a careful stance in life, not taking too many risks when there is no need to do so. This means that the staff is generally more likely to accommodate to the security policies. It has to be noted here that the interviewed people have not been victims of a serious incident. People who have been would more likely be impacted more, resulting in a further decrease in productivity. A good security strategy also considers the state of mind of its employees, so they can further increase productivity and safety.

The following three sub-questions revolve around the various goals of a security strategy, specifically which strategy is most successful in reaching that goal in South Sudan. The first is staff security. Purely based on the number of major incidents, INGO #1 and #2 have had the least during the past few years: zero major incidents. The three interviewees that have worked in South Sudan, worked for INGO #1 and have also not been involved in any accidents. At the same time, INGO #3 and #4 have had some major incidents. This means, their security strategies might perhaps not have been as good as they could have been. Anyway, the best security strategies for staff security are the ones used by INGO #1 and #2. The best strategy for staff security is to befriend and incorporate the local community through hard work, respecting

protective methods (fences, guards, curfews, etc.) when and where necessary, and to stay neutral and independent towards any local stakeholder. Strategies that may work detrimental are: too much focus on acceptance, disregarding the real value of protection, not cooperating enough with locals, and relying on your own message too much.

The next strategic dimension is productivity. The research shows that the largest impact on productivity comes from the acceptance strategy. The protective methods that decrease productivity, like curfews and travel restrictions, are often only necessary because of a lack of acceptance. Where it is not due to a lack of acceptance, there is not really anything to change to the protective strategy that can increase productivity; the danger would still be there and protective measures would still be needed. The same goes for deterrence methods. So, the most effective security strategy to increase productivity is found in organizations that had the least need of protective and/or deterrence methods: travel restrictions, amount of evacuations, suspensions of projects, or other similar actions. Again, INGO #1 and #2 have fared the best in that respect. Their security strategies strike a balance between acceptance and protection and/or deterrence that is most effective to increase productivity. The most important aspect of a strategy is therefore this very balance. It has been argued that too much focus on acceptance is not good, as it may disregard the real value of protection (and deterrence). However, protection also includes fences and guards, whereas those specific elements do not significantly impact productivity. Acceptance is the best way to avoid having to rely on larger-scale protective and deterrent actions that may hinder productivity. So, the balance is not only to be struck between protection and the other strategies, but also between the various elements of protection that can be used.

The final strategic dimension concerns the local community. As humanitarian aid organizations, the well-being of the locals should be one of the top priorities; it is the very goal of such organizations. The research shows that the direct effect of a security strategy on the local community is almost negligible. All of the effects are mostly indirect and are discussed in the previous paragraphs: less productivity means less help for the local community, and the same goes for staff security. The three are inherently linked, but a security strategy in itself can't do too much to keep the local community safe. An effective acceptance strategy is generally the best for a local community: cooperating with and/or employing local staff, increasing the INGO's productivity and safety, and just being able to help more people.

Finally, an overall conclusion can be drawn to answer the main question: "*What security strategy for INGOs in South Sudan best achieves the goals of the INGO and the security of both aid workers and the local community?*" For the four INGOs that were part of this research, the conclusion is that a security strategy should mainly focus on acceptance, while respecting protective and deterrent measures to a reasonable degree. While deterrence is seldom used, and protection only in non-violent ways, the reasoning for this was quite obvious. INGOs never use violence, and possibly violent security strategies would therefore go against their values. Without those values, the productivity of an INGO would decrease severely: trust would deteriorate, from both the local communities and the international community, leading to less acceptance, less funding, etc. It can therefore be concluded that, while these security strategies were not able to be researched fully, they simply would never be used, as it would impact the INGOs ability to work far more than any of the other strategies. Acceptance is therefore still the

most obvious, and benevolent, choice. Working together with local staff, whether by employing them or through other channels, also seems to increase the safety as well as the productivity. Deterrent strategies should hardly be used; only if it is for the staff's protection, a suspension of activities might take place. Besides, threatening the locals goes against the very heart of a humanitarian aid organization's values, and is therefore not helpful when trying to reach particular goals. Protective measures should absolutely not be taken lightly in a country like South Sudan; a lot of the incidents are volatile and unpredictable, even if you are accepted. Protection is therefore a necessary element. However, both protective and deterrent strategies are for a large part reliant on the acceptance strategy.

The security strategies seemed to work best in the context of these four INGOs, but this is obviously just a fraction of the total number of INGOs being active in South Sudan. Although this research has tried to be as diverse as possible in choosing its INGOs, there are still many other INGOs out there with very different goals. This can of course have an impact on how they should approach their security strategy. A good follow-up to this research could therefore be to focus specifically on one type of INGO; for instance, healthcare-related organizations. This might clarify in a much more detailed way which security strategy is the most helpful for them. Another follow-up could focus on each security strategy separately. As this research has shown, 'protection' or 'acceptance' as a strategy is almost never one and the same. There are various different ways to go about these various strategies and a focus on each of them could help in finding the most successful method(s). However, in a most general sense, the acceptance strategy comes out as the safest and most logical of strategies for humanitarian aid organizations.

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Appendix I : Conceptual Model

Appendix II : Interview Guides

Interview guide Security Expert *INGO*
Adapt to specific INGO

1. **Basic information**
   a. What is your role in *INGO*?
   b. What projects does *INGO* have in South Sudan?
      i. *projects*
      ii. Own function, etc.

2. **Goal**
   a. What is *INGO's* goal in South Sudan?
      i. What are your people doing there exactly, and where?
      ii. Timespan? Scope?

3. **Security measures**
   a. What security measures are used by your INGO in South Sudan?
      i. Acceptance/Protection/Deterrence
      ii. Protocol on interaction with local community
      iii. Compound rules
   b. Do you think these security measures are sufficient to keep your employees safe?

4. **Productivity**
   a. How productive do you think your INGO is in South Sudan?
      i. Do you reach the aforementioned goals?
   b. How do you think the security measures might impact this productivity?
      i. Interaction with local community improved/decreased?
      ii. Compound rules; lead to boredom/excitement?
      iii. Protection units leading to trust/distrust among the community?
   c. What would you like to change if you could? And why?

Interview guide INGO employees in South Sudan
Adapt to specific INGO

1. **Basic information**
   a. How long have you been working for *INGO* in South Sudan?
      i. Dates of stay
   b. What was your function there?

2. **Experiences**
   a. How did you experience your time there?
      i. Boring, fun, exciting, scary?
      ii. How safe did you feel?
   b. Did anything of importance happen while you were there?
      i. Violence, kidnapping, car accident, etc.

3. **Local community**
   a. How was your relationship with the local community?
      i. Business? Friendships?
      ii. Interactions or no? If so, what kind?
   b. Did *NGO* have a policy for interacting with the local community?

4. **Security measures**
   a. What security measures were used for your compound?
      i. Acceptance/Protection/Deterrence
   b. Do you think these security measures are sufficient to keep you safe?

5. **Productivity**
   a. How productive do you think your time was in South Sudan?
      i. Did you reach your own goals?
      ii. Do you think you reached the INGO's goals?
   b. How do you think your experiences/events have impacted your productivity?
      i. Too scared to function properly?
      ii. Conviction made you work better?
      iii. Relationship with local community gave you positive/negative productivity?
   c. How do you think the security measures have impacted your productivity?
      i. Made you feel safer, therefore more productive?
      ii. Too limiting, so less productive cause of too tight measures?
   d. What would you change if you could?