

# Partnerships for Peace

**INGO – NNGO Partnerships in the Palestinian Peacebuilding Process**



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“Give me the money that has been spent in war and I will clothe every man, woman, and child in an attire of which kings and queens will be proud. I will build a schoolhouse in every valley over the whole earth. I will crown every hillside with a place of worship consecrated to peace.”  
~Charles Sumner

## Executive Summary

This thesis focuses on the workings of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) and National Non-Governmental Organizations (NNGO) in the co-operational form known as a partnership. Partnerships between NNGOs and INGOs are a relatively new form of co-operation between organizations, in which the involved organizations create a different relationship in comparison to the most common way of collaboration, namely the donor-receiver relationship. Instead of the situation where the INGO functions as the donor and the NNGO as the receiver, thus solely responsible for the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, a partnership calls for collaboration on all aspects of a project. Both organizations contribute to the partnership according to their available resources, which range from financial support, expertise, and knowledge. Both organizations are involved in the partnership project from the beginning to end, agreeing on the responsibilities each organization has in conducting the project and reaching the aims and goals agreed upon.

Partnerships have been researched before this thesis, from which general ideas and theories on partnerships have been published. The situation, however, in which a partnership is conducted is not as general or universal, based on the difference between each conflicting situation. To create better understanding in the discrepancy between the existing literature and the situation in reality, a case study is chosen to acknowledge whether or not the existing theories can be put against a certain situation. The situation in this thesis is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the partnership chosen as a case study is between War Child and CCRR, who together implement a project within the West Bank, focusing on peace education to adolescents between 12 and 18. The main idea of this thesis is to being able to conclude whether or not the rhetoric of the how and what of a partnership can be applied to the reality of a partnership in the complex Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Next to this comparison comes the idea whether or not the use of a partnership between an NNGO and INGO is a profound way for NGOs to co-operate. After looking at the partnership more closely, we turn to see whether the partnership collaboration does affect or contribute to the ongoing peacebuilding process in the West Bank. This is done according to the ideas on peacebuilding taken from the ideas and theories of scholars on the positive or negative

influence of NGO participation in the peacebuilding process. This will show us whether NGO involvement through partnerships does or does not influence or affect the outcome or workings of the peacebuilding process on the short or long term.

The result of this thesis will hopefully contribute to the thinking process of INGOs and NNGOs when it comes to the idea of pursuing a partnership.

## Acknowledgements

Choosing the Master of Science Human Geography more than a year and a half ago has made my final period of studying the most interesting, fun, exciting, and challenging episode of my life so far. I will conclude the Master specialization 'Conflict, Territories, and Identities' at the Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management with this thesis. My interest for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be related to growing up with the conflict and hearing about it continuously through the media. The choice of diving into this particular conflict might be put off as easy, due to its high profile. I believe, however, that even with what I had learned throughout the years, nothing has or would have prepared me for what was to be expected when getting into a conflict as complicated and difficult as this one. What made this thesis and the foregoing period of the Master the most challenging was the internship opportunity. After deciding to take on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict I choose to do an internship in either Israel or Palestine to get an even clearer view and better knowledge of what is going on. I got an internship in the city of Bethlehem, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (the West Bank) and by deciding to live like the Palestinians do, voluntary occupied one could say, I have experienced something that might not even be possible to put into words. During my 5 month stay in the city of Bethlehem, which even without the struggle is an experience in itself due to its role in our history, I was able to meet and talk to many Palestinians and Israelis who all told me their own personal experience and stories. Each personal and inspirational story, experience, and every person I have met during my time in the Middle East has shown and taught me that hope is the most important aspect of living your life under such scrutiny. After 5 months in Bethlehem, I returned with the same feeling of hope that both the Israelis and Palestinians carry with them in their hearts, hoping that one day it might all get better.

First I want to thank the Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation for providing me with the internship opportunity. Special thanks goes to CCRR's director, Dr. Noah Salameh, a inspirational person who has gone through every hardship possible. Dr. Salameh was born in a refugee camp and has spent nearly 15 years of his life in an Israeli prison. After going through

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I hope you enjoy reading this thesis,

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## Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	11
1.1 Methodology	14
1.2 Overview of Chapters	16
Chapter 2: Context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	18
2.1 The Origins of Zionism and Nationalism	18
2.1.1 Jewish Zionism	18
2.1.2 Arab Nationalism	19
2.2 Historical Overview until 1948	20
2.3 From 1948 to the 1970s	21
2.4 First Intifadah	23
2.5 The Failure of the Oslo Accords	24
2.6 Second Intifadah	25
2.7 The Gaza War	27
Chapter 3: Intra-Palestinian Conflict	29
3.1 Politics of the Palestinian Authority	29
3.2 Everyday Life	30
3.2.1 Palestinian Infrastructure and Movement Restrictions	30
3.3 Effects on the Economy	32
3.3.1 Water & Resources	33
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework	34
4.1 Peace Building	34
4.2 Actors and Track Diplomacy	36
4.3 Multi-Track Diplomacy	37
4.4 NGOs in Peace Building	39



4.4.1 NGOs and their activities	41
4.5 Value of NGOs in Peacebuilding	43
4.6 Limitations of NGOs in Peacebuilding	45
4.7 Partnership in Peacebuilding	46
4.8 Rhetoric of a Partnership	47
4.8.1 Principles of Partnership	49
4.9 Value of Partnership	50
4.10 Limitations of Partnership	50
Chapter 5: Partnerships for Peace	53
5.1 War Child Netherlands (INGO)	53
5.1.1 Approach	54
5.1.2 Mission & Vision Statement	55
5.2 CCRR: (NNGO)	55
5.3 Young Negotiators Program	57
5.4 The Partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR	59
Chapter 6: Rhetoric v. Reality	64
6.1 Execution of the partnership	64
6.2 Partnership Rhetoric	69
6.3 The Success of the Project	74
Chapter 7: Contribution to Peace Building	77
7.1 Positive incentives	77
7.2 Negative Aspects of NGO Peacebuilding	79
Conclusion & Recommendations	87

List of References	87
Appendix I	91
Appendix II	93
Appendix III	100
Appendix IV	101
Appendix V	115

# Introduction

## Research Problem

For over 60 years the countries of Israel and Palestine have been known, not for their beautiful nature, their great food, and the amazing people living there, but by what we learned through the media. The first, and mostly the only, association that comes to mind when hearing about both countries is the raging conflict, the biggest issue being to whom the land involved belongs to.

International and national non-governmental organizations are trying to provide for the needs of the people victimized and involved, and are trying to break grounds towards a better situation for all, and maybe even pave the way for a final resolution to end the conflict. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in every layer of the community; from peace education to medical care, from cultural exchanges between the two opposing parties to faith based meetings between representatives from the three main religions to create better understanding.

The relationship between international and national non-governmental organizations is the main issue in this research. From this point on national non-governmental organizations will be known as NNGOs and international non-governmental organizations as INGOs. These terms will help clarify the differences between the organizations, mostly based on where the NGOs are located and how this influences their workings. The mainstream notion on the relationships between INGOs and NNGOs is the donor-receiver relationship. The INGO is the organization raising the money and then choosing an NNGO to donate the money to, thus being on the receiving end. A different notion of a relationship between an INGO and an NNGO is what is known as a 'partnership'; a supposedly equal relationship between the INGO and the NNGO that results in an equally involved contribution to the design, the policy, the execution, and implementation of the project. This kind of cooperation is mostly based on the shared belief that both the INGO and the NNGO will contribute according to their knowledge and experience. Contemporary literature on the relationship between INGOs and NNGOs focuses mainly on how these kinds of projects are designed and how a partnership-cooperation is created, which will be further elaborated on later on in this thesis. Much of the theory that is published on the

partnership relations between different kinds of NGOs gives a primarily general view on how these partnerships function, what a partnership is or should be, and whether or not partnerships tend to be a more complete method of co-operation between NGOs. The more general information that can be deducted from what has been published skips the fact that every situation in which these partnerships are executed, differs. Although a certain idea or part of a theory can be applied in every situation, there seems to remain a gap in the existing literature on how partnerships work in different situations. We all know that one conflict or war is not the other. The workings of NGOs, whether NNGO or INGO, also differs in every situation; resulting in the issue that partnerships also work differently in every situation. The gap that exists between the theories on partnerships in general and a specific situation will hopefully be bridged by using the more general theories and subject them to a certain situation and the workings of a specific partnership. This research will therefore focus on the partnerships existing within a particular conflict with a focus on one case in particular, to create a more detailed view of how partnerships work within a certain conflicting situation and how the results from this partnership do or do not contribute to the ongoing peace process.

‘Partnership’ and ‘partners’ are terms that have risen to prominence and are linked directly with both bridge-building and capacity-building (Lister, 1997). These terms stand for the idea that the cooperation between different organizations can increase the influence of a project or organization, which then creates better understanding within a certain community, including better understanding of the differences between groups within a community. Before going into this, however, there seems to be a disparity between what is said to be a partnership and the reality of these NGO partnerships in existence. In this research I will therefore look at the existing discrepancy between the rhetoric of NGO partnerships and how they function in reality. This in itself is not something new; many scholars have focused on the different relationships between INGOs and NNGOs, but have not always taken into consideration the society and atmosphere in which these partnerships are put into action. The theory existing on the relationships between NGOs will be extracted and used on one ‘partnership’ in particular, between War Child Netherlands and the Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CCRR). This partnership was designed as a contribution to the peace process

within the West Bank. The partnership resulted in a project involving only Palestinian participants, focusing on creating or contributing to a more stable Palestinian community that is necessary to someday move on to the creation of a path to peace. The choice of this particular case is a result of the close observation of a project set up in co-operation between the two organizations during an internship in which I worked for the NNGO and operated as the link between the NNGO and the INGO. Due to this internship I had the opportunity to not only observe but also participate in a partnership, enabling me to view the workings of the partnership project up close and even contribute to the implementation. The complex situation of the conflict where the partnership is conducted drove me to look more close at the ideas, theories, and opinions of partnerships, resulting in the situation where published articles, theories, and ideas on partnership sometimes did not completely relate to this particular situation, both within the conflict and the partnership itself. The choice to generate a research with a case study created the opportunity to see whether specific situations can or cannot be related and explained according to more general ideas of the how and what of partnerships in peacebuilding.

Hence the research question:

*How do INGO-NGO partnerships function and to what extent do they contribute to the peacebuilding process in the West Bank, Palestine?*

The goal of this research is to provide a better understanding of what does or does not contain a partnership, the discrepancy between what partnerships consist of on paper and how those partnership policies turn out in reality, rhetoric v. practicality, or rhetoric v. reality. The partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR functions in a deeply rooted and complex conflict and because of this complexity it cannot be explained by the use of general theories on partnerships. Hopefully, this research will give more insight in how a partnership does or does not function within a particular society and conflict; its functioning will be linked to whether or not a partnership is a suitable manner to contribute to the peace process in the West Bank? Hence, I will not argue whether or not the partnership relations between INGOs

and NNGOs are better suited than other co-operational relationships between NGOs, but I will argue what the advantages (or disadvantages) of a partnership relation can or cannot be.

In order to be able to get to an adequate answer to the research question, the following sub-questions have been formulated:

- According to theories and policies, what is an INGO/NNGO partnership? What are the principles on which such a partnership is based?
- How does a partnership between an INGO and a NNGO come into existence? Which principles do the involved parties use as selection criteria for finding counterparts for their cooperation?
- According to the INGOs and the NNGOs: What is (or is not) the added value of an INGO/NNGO partnership?
- A) How does the partnership between War Child and CCRR function on paper?  
B) How does the partnership between War Child and CCRR function in reality?
- In what way does the War Child and CCRR partnership function according to how it should be functioning? (as supposed in the theories and policies existing)
- What is (or is not) the supposed addition of an INGO/NNGO partnership to the peace process in the West Bank, Palestine?

## **1.1 Methodology**

As a focus, this thesis has a case study, for which several methodologies were used to gain the information needed. Theory testing research aims to use the existing theories to retrieve information and to eventually check the validity of the theories. In this research the validity of the theories on INGO/NGO partnerships will be tested on one particular case, the partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR, existing within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A question that one can ask oneself before reading this research is: How do the existing theories hold up against one case in particular? Keeping in mind the complexity of the conflict, it might give us insight in whether or not the general theories are capable of explaining or showing us

what might be the most suitable way for INGOs and NGOs to be involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The choice for a case study, and this case study in particular, comes forth from the idea to look into detail at certain aspect of peacebuilding to test academic explanations that may be useful to generalize to other aspects. As peacebuilding in itself is such a broad and complex issue, I chose to analyze a part of peacebuilding to line it up against the general definition. This part of peacebuilding that came to mind is the cooperation between Western organizations and local organizations, which is a common way for NGO to execute their programs. During the first weeks of my stay in Bethlehem I became involved in project between such an INGO and an NNGO, but their choice of collaboration was a partnership, and not a more common donor-receiver relationship. Being involved in a partnership, and therefore learning the ins and outs, I ran across many theories applied to partnership, which aspects I many times did or did not recognize in the partnership I was involved in. That is when it dawned that it might be useful to test general ideas on partnership on one case in particular, instead of looking at partnerships in general. While I was involved in this partnership, the choice to use War Child and CCRR's partnership as an example was right in front of me. The choice of using a case study in this research has both its values and its limitations. A case study gives the opportunity to look at a specific case which can be used as an explanation on a larger scale, in this case the War Child-CCRR partnership instead of partnership as a whole. Although the outcome of the analysis of this particular case study does not give an explanation about other particular cases, it does present a valuable idea about the workings of other partnerships, as every partnership is different. This case study is an example of how general ideas on peacebuilding can or cannot be related to specific case studies. Looking more closely to a case, also gives more insight in different variables which, from first glance, might not be taken into consideration during the research. A more detailed view on a certain event or aspect in peacebuilding simultaneously gives a more detailed view on the issue as whole. Specific details that could be important might be overlooked when taking on a more general view of peacebuilding. A trade-off that came to exist when choosing this particular case-study is the issue of selection. By choosing this particular case-study due to my involvement, I realize that the of selection of this particular case might undermined the validity of the outcome of the

research, as the choice for this case is biased due to my involvement. Also, the design of my research might have been influenced by my choice, as I designed my research according to my observations and opinions. However, this can be explained by viewing my close involvement of the case as a positive influence on the research, as it provided with me with insights I might not have gained by being an outsider to the partnership. My close involvement in the partnership and the two organizations gave me the opportunity to not only observe, but also participate, resulting in the situation where I was able to gain insight from both an external point of view and by working within the partnership from the inside. As an outsider, being an intern and not an employee of either of the organization I was able to look at the case using my own perceptions. Being involved in the partnership and having knowledge on both organizations, their approaches, and work ethics, I was able to look at the partnership not only as an observer, but also as a participant.

This research seeks insight in behavioral patterns of INGOs and NGOs in the Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding process. I will aim to provide more insight into both the positive and negative consequences a partnership can have when looking at a certain case in particular, trying to provide better knowledge on whether or not general theories can be accounted for in different situations and conflict.

To be able to provide the insight stated above and to be able to answer the the central research question and subquestions of this thesis, three methodological approaches were used: participant observation, literature analysis, and interviews and informal conversations. The theoretical discussion on the subject is done by a literature study to provide a framework of theories for this thesis. The theoretical framework in this thesis will demarcate the concepts 'partnership' and 'peacebuilding'. The concept partnership and the role of NNGO/INGO partnerships in peacebuilding are the main focus of this study, due to the many different interpretations of the concept available. The concept 'peacebuilding', as used in this thesis, provides insight in what the peace process contains and how a partnership does or does not function as an addition to the ongoing process towards peace. The main rationale behind the literature study approach is to set up a framework to combine existing theories and ideas on partnership to create insight in what a partnership contains. The analysis of existing literature



will result in the starting point of what a partnership is, which aspects should a partnership contain and most importantly; what makes a partnership a partnership? The theoretical framework consist of two parts, the second part being about peacebuilding to provide insight in the the how and what of peacebuilding, what peacebuilding contains, the types of activities and approaches used in peacebuilding and the role of NGOs in the peacebuilding process. The framework that results from the literature study will provide access to the rhetorical part of this thesis, the way partnerships function on paper. The rhetoric of partnerships will be gathered through academic literature, NGO policies, project reports, partnership agreements, project evaluations and annual NGO reports. The academic literature was mainly collected through magazines, both hard copies and digital. The other data was collected partially through the websites of NGOs, email, phone and direct contact and partially through employees of the NGOs themselves. A part of the data comes from the two organizations whose project functions as a case study in this thesis. The information about these two organizations provides a view on the approaches they use, the kinds of activities they conduct, and the relationship between the two organizations and other organizations in peacebuilding.

The second methodological approach focuses on interviews and informal conversations. During a 5 month stay in Palestine, from Februari 2010 until July 2010, four interviews were conducted with both directors (two) and employees (two) of four Palestinian organizations in the West Bank, and three interviews with employees of two INGOs (Appendix . These organizations came to me through my involvement in a partnership project between an NNGO and an INGO. The director of the NNGO, CCRR, referred me to several Palestinian NGOs who in his idea would be useful to interview, who then referred me even further to other NGOs, which is known as snowball sampling. Also the INGO referred me to several organizations and contacts for interviewing. After listing possible organizations I contacted the organizations to check whether or not the organizations are or have been involved in a partnership with either an NNGO or an INGO, respectively. This resulted in a selection of 2 INGOs, both involved with the NNGO that is part of the case study in this thesis, and four NNGO that have experience with partnership cooperation with an INGO. During the selecting and conducting of the interviews two limitations occurred: it turned out to be rather difficult to agree upon meeting times and places

cause by a lack of punctuality of the Palestinian employees, second, occasional turbulent situations within the West Bank and the passing of checkpoints when going from Palestine to Israel sometimes prevented travelling, sometimes making it impossible to reach a certain destination.

To ensure comparability between the answers given in the interviews, the interview questions were standardized and every person interviewed was asked the same questions. The questions can be divided into categories: the activities and approaches of the NGO, their experience with partnerships and cooperation with INGOs, their views on the pros and cons of partnership cooperation, their view on the contribution of partnerships to the ongoing peacebuilding process. Whereas every person interviewed was asked the same questions, the follow-up questions differed according to the answers that were given throughout the interview.

In addition to the in-depth interviews, informal conversations with several additional employees of NNGOs and INGOs in the West Bank, provided me with additional data. These conversations, combined with the interviews give a good insight in the approaches of the NGOs involved in peacebuilding, their experiences with partnerships and their opinions on the collaboration between NNGOs and INGOs, and their views on whether or not the use of partnerships contributes to the existing peacebuilding process in the West Bank.

The third, and last approach used in this research is participant observation, which was conducted during a five month internship at the Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution (CCRR) in Bethlehem, the West Bank. Participant observation, according to DeWalt & DeWalt (2002) is the process that gives researchers the opportunity to observe and learn about people in their natural setting, by observing their activities and participating in the activities. It is a process of learning by which researches learn about the participants through exposure and involvement in the day-to-day routine (Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte, 1999). As part of this participant observation process I attended different activities, including NGO workshops and the workshops of the partnership project The Young Negotiators Program. The internship I conducted gave me the possibility to attend workshops which were part of several programs of CCRR. In cooperation with a Palestinian colleague, who explained what was

being done and who translated what was being said, I could observe how these workshops were executed, but more importantly I could study the attitude of the participants towards these workshops. Since NGOs work mainly on the community level and focus on the “ordinary people”, it is essential to know what the attitude of these people is towards the work of the NGOs, and what the effects of this work are according to these people themselves. There were several limitations concerning these workshops that have to be noted; first of all, the majority of the participants did not speak English, which prevented me from interviewing them myself about their perception towards the workshops and the work of NGOs in peacebuilding. Next to workshop observation I, for a long period of time, attended several workshops of the Young Negotiators Program. A total of 8 schools participated, and I attended at least 2 or 3 workshops per school. Next to actually observing the workshops I participated in them, to get a better feeling of the attitude of the participating adolescents towards the program. A clear attitude change was displayed between the first workshop and as the program was going along. This combined with the pre- and after- questionnaire the participants received I was able to see whether their attitude during the workshops I observed could be translated to how they actually felt when asked to write it down. Participating as one of them was also important, as to fill the gap that was created due to my attendance. Having a (female) foreigner in the room who observes them, but barely speaks their language was in the beginning sometimes a difficulty. By participating I was able to show them I was one of them, after which they gradually became open about themselves and I got to see them for who they were, and not just as the group of people I had to observe. DeWalt and DeWalt (2002) argue in this line that this is one of the limitations of participant observation. According to them male and female researchers receive different pieces of information, as there is a difference between male and female as to which people and which settings they are exposed to. They state that the researcher must realize that their gender, ethnicity and sexuality might bias the data and can affect observation and analysis. Although it can be argued that during participant observation, a certain distance between the observed and the observer should be kept in order, I thought it was important to learn not only about the group as a whole, this as to being able to see the situation ‘through their eyes’.

The information gained during the research for this thesis, the literature, the interviews, the written reports, the evaluations of the partnership project from previous years, and my own observation, participation, and written evaluation are the basis of this thesis. The answers to the sub-questions will be answered according to the information acquired. The subquestions answers' will be used to derive a complete and clear answer to the main research question as introduced earlier in this chapter.

## **1.2 Overview of Chapters**

The next chapter, chapter 2, will give a historic overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict describing the most relevant events that have taken place. This overview will create insight in how the current situation came to be. In line with this historical account of the conflict lies the importance of religion within the region, which is a part of the conflict by itself, but also important when considering the norms and values that INGOs and NNGOs have to take into account. Chapter 3 follows up on chapter 2, with the introduction of the most important issues and problems that have risen out of the conflict on both political and economical levels and are still visible this current day. This chapter introduces a set of problems that most NGOs have as a focus and on which they base the design of their projects. Chapter 4 will then function as the framework on which the rest of the research will be based. It will contain the theoretical framework, which includes the existing published literature and theories on INGO-NNGO cooperation, specifically partnership cooperation, the workings of NGOs in general, the types of INGOs and NNGOs, the workings of peacebuilding, and the workings of partnerships. Chapter 5 will be the introduction of the chosen case study: the partnership between the INGO, War Child Netherlands, and the NNGO, Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation. The last part of chapter 5 will focus on partnerships; how they are created, designed, the ideas of the parties involved, and the rhetoric of how a partnership should function. Chapter 6 combines the theories from the theoretical framework from chapter 4 and the case study introduced in chapter 5. It combines the theory with the practicality of the chosen partnership. With this I will

be able to define the differences between the rhetoric of a partnership and the reality of a partnership, taking into consideration the conflicting situation. It will give insight into whether the theories can or cannot be applied to the reality.

The following chapter, chapter 7, of this research will focus on the possibilities of a partnership to add more value to the ongoing peace building process. Therefore I will focus on how the use of a partnership by INGOs and NNGOs can or cannot be a more useful addition to the peace process. Chapter 6 and 7 use the general theories of partnerships and peace building to research whether or not a partnership functions as it is supposed to function and what is, or is not, the supposed contribution of partnerships to the peacebuilding process. The subquestions mentioned above have their own role within the overview of this thesis. Subquestions 1 to 5 will provide for the theoretical framework and subquestion 6 provides a practical framework that comes forth from the theories chosen in this research.

## **2. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

Understanding the origins of Israeli-Palestinian dispute requires understanding of its complex and often contested history. Its history, and different perceptions of history, is the most important factors of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both sides use their account of the history as a claim to justify and negate their intentions. A balanced view of the conflict is therefore necessary to provide a fair introduction to the Israeli and Palestinian history and the history of the conflict.

### **2.1 The origins of Zionism and Nationalism**

Jews and Arabs, or Israelis and Palestinians, cannot be understood within their own context when seen primarily through the struggle in the Middle East. Before being able to get an understanding of the conflict, it deems necessary to understand each people on its own terms, history, culture, and without any premonition from the adversary (Tessler, 1994).

Long before the initiation of a possible conflict, there was palpable interaction between the two peoples. The rise of two movements among both parties, centuries ago, Jewish Zionism and Arab Nationalism might have been an indication of what might come to be hundreds of years later.

#### **2.1.1. Jewish Zionism**

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the definition of Zionism is ‘the Jewish nationalist movement that has had as its goals the creation and support of a Jewish national state in Palestine, the ancient homeland of the Jews.’ The term Zionism can be derived from the name of one of the hills of ancient Jerusalem, called Zion. Zionism therefore recalls the Jewish quest for a Jewish nation, a home for all Jews across the world, secured by law. The Zionist movement was basically conceived to be a non-religious movement, based upon the Jewish history and culture that connects them to their historical land of birth.<sup>1</sup> Zionism became a political movement during the 19<sup>th</sup> century through the ideas of Theodor Herzl, in 1897 to be exact, a

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<sup>1</sup> ([www.britannica.com](http://www.britannica.com)) March 2, 2011

journalist who found that assimilation of the Jewish was a prerequisite, but the growing idea of anti-Semitism made this impossible. He argued that under pressure of anti-Semitism the only way for Jews to lead a normal existence was by a reuniting and concentration of the Jewish people in one territory (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009; Tessler, 1994). In the years to come after the establishment of the political Zionist movement, anti-Semitism became more visible and the outbreak of World War I reasserted the ideas of the Zionist movement. Political Zionism was reasserted and in 1917, during the war, the Jews received the promise from Great Britain, stated in the Balfour Declaration, that they would support the Jews in the creation of a national home (ibid).

### **2.1.2 Arab Nationalism**

The first stirrings of Arab nationalism can be calculated back during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. The rise of the movement can be traced back to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century during a period when Europe initiated a shift from the existing legal system established under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, to a system as in the Western world (Tessler, 1994). As an answer to this new European involvement, many intellectual and political movements within the region initiated an opposing view to this Western involvement. A notion for the need of decentralization became the point of focus (Tessler, 1994). Not until the Young Turk revolution in 1908, when The Young Turks introduced a nationalist movement based on Turkish identity, did other countries follow their lead, creating several movements all with a focus on an Arab nationalist ideology (ibid).

The outbreak of World War I stopped the rise of nationalism, when in 1918 Britain overruled the Ottoman forces and ending the Ottoman rule (Tessler, 1994). In the years before this moment, France and Britain had already drawn up an agreement on which parts of the former empire would be placed under British or French rule. The British became the authority over the land of Palestine and simultaneously where making agreements with both the Zionist movement (Balfour Declaration) and the Arab citizens of the former Ottoman Empire (McMahon-Hussein Correspondence) (ibid). Both received promises from the British during World War I and both Jews and Arabs hoped for recognition of their political aspirations.

Arab nationalism is an ideology based on the common cultural, religious, and historical identity of the Arab people (ibid). This ideology is similar to the initial ideas of the Zionist movement. Both the Jewish and Arab movements were not particular religion based movements, but based on the ideas of the formation of unity within their own peoplehood. Despite the similarities of their ideologies, both Jews and Arabs came to be each other's adversaries in the years after the establishment of the British Mandate.

## **2.2 Historical Overview until 1948**

In the year 1917 the ancient city of Jerusalem was captured by the British and was placed under military occupation, which lasted until 1920 (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Before the occurring of this event, France and Britain had already divided the territory into several parts, the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This agreement would be put into place in case of an Allied victory. In the same year, Britain issued a unilateral declaration which recognized the British' sympathy towards the Zionist movement, and secured the potential of the British strategic interests in Palestine (ibid). The Balfour Declaration was a supporting declaration towards the Zionist movement, exchanging a sympathetic view towards the aspirations of the Jews for a national home. Some years later the League of Nations was created which approved the mandate over Palestine. Included as a provision to the already existing mandate was the incorporation of Hebrew as one of the official languages in Palestine (ibid). Due to approval of the League of Nations and the support of Great Britain the Zionist movement was able to continue their quest for a Jewish national home. The Zionist movement, however, came to interpret the Balfour Declaration as a declaration and formal approval of the building of a Jewish state. According to Britain, this was never the intention as they clearly also stated that they would uphold the rights of the other communities, or non-Jewish communities (ibid). It is clear that the Balfour Declaration might have been vague in its intentions, whereas every party involved was able to interpret the declaration to its own likings. This supposed ambiguity in the declaration, the ability to interpret in many different ways, became a problem that continues until the present day. While there still might not be a clear answer to what the declaration's intentions might



have been, the British found it necessary to clarify its plans by the issuing of the White Paper in 1922. The most important statement in the White Paper is that the Jewish home in development in Palestine did not mean that the Jewish nationality would be forced upon the people of Palestine (ibid). To even further clear other imperfections the British came up with an integrated system that would include both Arab and Jewish leadership with as goal the creation of a unitary state (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009; Lockman, 1999). The idea of an integrated system with both Jewish and Arab leadership failed miserably when both communities were not able to create united institutions, but only developed their own separate representation (Lockman, 1999).

During the 1930s Adolf Hitler had started its campaign against the Jewish population and around the same time Germany invaded Poland, marking the beginning of World War II. The hunt for the extinction of the Jewish community throughout Europe influenced the future of Palestine considerably. The Holocaust marked a general feeling of the Western World that the by giving them the certainty of a Jewish State in Palestine the West could redirect their guilt for what they had inflicted upon the Jewish community (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009) It was after World War II that several events initiated the coming to existence of the state of Israel. In 1948 the British announced the termination of the British Mandate over Palestine and the United Nations took over to create an end to the conflict. The result of the termination was anarchy and chaos: the Jews sought to make sure that the territory they had gained so far would remain in their hands and they did so by force (ibid). The official proclamation of the state of Israel was issued only hours after the last Brits departed and the Soviet Union and the United States immediately recognized its existence (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 2001)

### **2.3 From 1948 to the 1970s.**

Israel's neighboring countries Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan invaded Israel as their answer to the declaration of the state of Israel, but eventually, in the same year, this resulted in their defeat and left Israel gaining more territory, which made the creation of a Palestinian Arab state under the proposed United Nations proposal impossible (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009; Meital, 2006). What was supposed to be the Palestinian Arab state was divided among Israel,

Egypt and Jordan, making the Palestinian population instantly refugees in their in their own territory (see map 1.1).



Map 1.1 The Arab-Israeli Armistice Lines, 1949

In the years to come Israel build their nation. The June war of 1967 and its outcome were positive and at the same time negative to the building of the Jewish nation. Positive due to the conquest of the West Bank (formerly under Jordanian rule), the Golan Heights (former Syrian territory), and the Gaza Strip (formerly under Egyptian rule) and negative due to the millions of Palestinian Arabs now brought under Israel's rule (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Israel remained occupied by building their state and the decision making process that comes with it, Palestinian refugees realized that the only way to get back the land that belonged to them, was through putting up resistance. It was then that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under the leadership of Yasser Arafat was successful in getting the issue of the Palestinians under the attention of the United Nations (ibid).

Another war erupted in the year 1973, the day of Yom Kippur. Coordinated attacks by Egypt and Syria were launched on Israeli strategic positions. Where the Israeli Defense Forces were completely taken with surprise, after several days they were able to turn the war into a military victory (ibid). In the Camp David Accords of 1978, Egypt and Israel came to an agreement about the withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai and created a situation where future problems would be openly discussed (ibid).

## **2.4 The First Intifada**

When the first signs of a major uprising come into view, the Israeli administration had been using a firm strategy on what now were known as the Palestinian Occupied Territories. It had been pursuing deportations, censorship of press, and many ways of collective punishment to undermine the growth of Palestinian nationalism (Tessler, 1994). The goal of the Israelis was by using these kinds of policies, to contain the any signs of unrest and uprising. The result of these kinds of actions, however, was miscalculated by the Israeli administration, and their way of handling the occupied territories soon seem to be inaccurate. At the end of 1987 it resulted in a movement of uprisings and demonstrations that in quantity and graveness exceeded any civil disobedience seen in the territories so far (ibid). The intensity of the uprising surprised the Israeli administration and the large scale of unrest became known as the Intifadah, which means as much as 'shaking off' the policies and treatments of the Israelis over the Palestinians. The uprisings were fuelled by two other problems, which created a general feeling amongst the Palestinian to sustain the demonstrations. The first issue was the continued flow of settlers into the Palestinian territories, living in settlements build on formerly Palestinian land, executed by the beliefs of Zionism that the land rightfully belonged to the Jews (ibid). With this increasing flow of settlers, another problem rose, namely the Israeli control over water resources within both the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians living in those areas suffered from water shortage due to the water being diverted for the use of the Jewish settlers living in the settlements within the occupied territories (ibid). Another event that inflamed the already ongoing of the intifadah, was the move by one of Israel's ministers, Ariel Sharon, to an apartment in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, which, obviously, was viewed by

the Palestinians as an act of provocation far beyond the implemented policies in the occupied territories (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). The intifadah lasted for almost three years, in which Israel, despite using every option they had to contain the uprisings, did not succeed to suppress the ongoing events by the use of force.

## **2.5 The failure of the Oslo Accords.**

In the year 1993 the world learned that there had been negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which were conducted in secret in Norway. Within the months of these secret negotiations the parties had already reached an agreement that would be a breakthrough in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine, the Declaration of Principles (Tessler, 1994). The Declaration of Principles (1993) states that *“it is time for the Israelis and Palestinians to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation.”*

On September 13, 1993, the Declaration of Principles was sealed at the White House in Washington, where Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and President of the United States Bill Clinton gave speeches about what this Declaration would mean to the settlement of the conflict. The signing of the Declaration was symbolized by Rabin accepting the hand of Arafat to conclude the accords settled (Tessler, 1994)

It seems clear that the map to peace drawn in the Declaration was another effort to kick-start the peace process that had been going on for a long time, but had reached a stalemate. The Declaration was a new initiative in the continuation of the ongoing peace process, and therefore just as difficult to implement as any other initiative taken throughout the years (Barak, 2005).

When trying to reach an agreement on a conflict, the needs, interests, and goals of all parties need to be taken into account. Conflict might arise when these needs are not fulfilled in the

first place and accords or agreements will fail when these needs are not met (Barak, 2005). When struggling with two parties, who both have their own needs, interests and goals, the collective goal for reaching a settlement is by accommodating the interests of both groups. The agreement signed in 1993, did indeed acknowledge the pluralism in interests between both parties, it failed to recognize that peace cannot be reached when the most difficult issues in the conflict are not negotiated (ibid). Issues that had not been negotiated in the Oslo Accords were the issue of Jerusalem, the Jewish flow of settlers, the problem of Palestinian refugees and their right to return home to their own land, and the issue of the Palestinian state (ibid). In other words, the agreement failed to address several needs on both sides, thus failing to meet the needs both groups so desperately vied for. While the Oslo Accords did recognize the presence of two communities, it failed to recognize the most sensitive issues on the agenda. Both groups felt left out of what should have been discussed and settled, undermining support from the Israelis and Palestinians to get the peace process back on track. Actual peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict came nowhere near existence.

## **2.6 The Second Intifadah.**

In 2000 both sides returned for a two-week summit known as Camp David II, a conference that was about to face the biggest challenges in the creation of a final status. The summit would be about negotiating the issues of sovereignty over East Jerusalem, the future of the Jewish settlements, and the right for return of Palestinian refugees (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). It was the first time since the signing of the Oslo Accords, which did not include the issues mentioned above, that they came subject of negotiation. The summit failed to deliver, the issues being too difficult to reach an agreement on. During the summit the President of Israel, Barak, offered the Palestinian Authority sovereignty over several sections in East Jerusalem, which did not meet the demands made on the Palestinian side, but was far more than Israel had considered before (ibid). Their disapproval of the offer resulted in the resignation of several of Barak's cabinet members, leaving him with a minority government and leading to Barak's own resignation and a call for new elections (ibid). In those same years, another uprising had started in the region,

prompted by the failure of the Oslo Accords, the continued colonization of the Gaza strip and the West Bank and the Palestinian Authorities failure to govern.

The increasing oppression by Israel over the West Bank and Gaza strip with the creation of new settlements and the continued confiscation of Palestinian land by the Israeli settlers led to feeling of deprivation among the Palestinians. These feelings exploded in violence when Ariel Sharon, accompanied by 1000 security personnel, visited the Haram al-Sharif, in Jewish terms Temple Mount (ibid). The Haram al-Sharif houses both the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque, making it one of the holiest places for the Islamic religion. The provocation by Sharon, to show that any Jew could go when and where resulted in an outbreak of violence.

The second Intifadah differed from the first Intifadah by degree of militarization on both sides. The Palestinian side intensified their suicide bombing campaigns and they were supported by the Palestinian security forces. On the Israeli side the use of force to stop the violence was far more reaching than before (ibid). In 2002, when the Intifadah was still going, Israel escalated their operations by the reoccupation of the territory in both the West Bank and Gaza that it had earlier turned over to the Palestinian Authority (ibid).

In December 2003, Israeli and Palestine issued their own effort in ceasing the difficulties, known as the Geneva Accords. These accords included the policy of 'disengagement', meaning the unilateral separation from the Palestinians, by the removal of all settlers from the Gaza strip and from four settlements in the West Bank (ibid). Another aspect of this disengagement policy was the building of a barrier between the borders of Israel and the West Bank, consisting of a concrete wall, patrol roads, and electric fences (ibid). The building of this barrier resulted in the isolation and a grave division between Palestinian villages and taking large amounts of land owned by the Palestinians. Families were torn apart, as some of them now lived on one side of the wall, and others on the other side. It became no longer possible to visit each other or to cross from one side of the barrier, to the other side.

## **2.7 The Gaza War**

In 2008 and 2009 a three week armed conflict erupted in the Gaza Strip and the South of Israel, a war fought between Israel and Hamas, who came to power in Gaza after elections, a group known for their harsh stance on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The war was triggered when an Israeli raid killed six Hamas gunmen within the Gaza strip in November 2008 (Cordesman, 2009) The seizure of the Gaza Strip by Hamas was also an underlying trigger in the first place, as Israel was now confronted with a new opposition in their Southern border region (ibid). Hamas states that they will not seek a compromise with Israel, as the leader of Hamas, Sheikh Yassin says: "There can be no dialogue between a party that is strong and oppressive and another that is weak and oppressed." The response by Israel on the seizing of Gaza by Hamas, was the imposing of an economic blockade on Gaza, limiting aid to Gaza and the creation of the label terrorist organization when talking about Hamas (ibid). As a result to this imposition, Hamas replied with force, setting up systems to smuggle arms and weapons into Gaza. Hamas started launching rockets into Israel that were smuggled into Gaza. The goal of Hamas was to break out of its economic isolation, while Israel sought to retain its security by preventing attacks and keeping Hamas in check (ibid). The war came to a ceasefire at the end of December.

Since the ending of the Gaza war, it has been relatively quiet, aside from the still ongoing oppression of the Palestinians in the West Bank by the physical barrier. The Israeli's use this barrier as a weapon against Palestinians crossing over to Israeli territory by imposing checkpoints. When wanting to cross these checkpoints, a special permit must be retained and a formal reason for crossing is needed. When or if Palestinians are allowed to cross these checkpoints, they come under scrutiny by the Israeli security forces securing the fence, which contain hour long waiting lines, searching of bags & clothing and humiliation. The economic blockage and isolation of Gaza is also still upheld, with international and national organizations trying to break the blockage. The flow of settlers moving into settlements within the West Bank is also still going strong, which includes all other problems that come to exist by the building of these settlements. Water resources for the Palestinians are scarce, forcing many to build a

water reservoir under their house. The control of Israel within the West Bank is visible in every aspect, from social life to the economy. Only certain parts of the West Bank are now under the control of the Palestinian Authority, but with the presence of Israeli control always in the background.



### **3. Intra-Palestinian conflict trouble**

#### **3.1 Politics of the Palestinian Authority**

The West Bank and Gaza together form what is known as the Palestinian Authorities, which since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 are governed by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The creation of the PNA as a result of the Accords was to provide the Palestinians with a interim tool of governance while the negotiations of the final states was/is still pending (Rubin, 2000). While the PNA functions according to how a state is governed, it has yet to be recognized internationally (ibid). The creation of the Palestinian Authority did mark a break in Palestinian history and in the national movement; it did not, however, change or solve the issues that had been on the agenda before the signing of the Accords. These problems, therefore, remained.

Not only do the Palestinians suffer from a conflict with the Israelis, they simultaneously suffer from an internal conflict over recent disruption between the two areas that together make up the Palestinian Authority. This conflict is raging between the Hamas governed Gaza Strip and the West Bank governed by Fatah, the two being the main political parties in the Palestinian Authority. Disruptions between the two parties started in 2005, after the passing away of the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Yaser Arafat. In 2006, Hamas won the democratic elections, but deemed a terrorist organization, there immediately followed a Western blockade on suspending all foreign aid on which the Palestinians so strongly depend. Tensions rose when Fatah commanders refused to take orders from the Hamas government, leading to the eruption of violence both areas of the Palestinian Authorities. After Fatah and Hamas fail to reach an agreement to share the power of government, more violence breaks out, especially in the Gaza Strip. In 2007, Hamas sieges power of the Gaza Strip after a several days of fighting between Hamas and Fatah affiliates, which results in a immediate closure of the Gaza borders by Israel and Egypt. Fatah remains the most powerful in the West Bank, where Abbas calls for the dissolution of the unity government and establishes a separate government.

Recent events have produced a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah, which was announced on April 27, 2011 (The Guardian, 04/27/2011). Mediated by Egypt, where the secret negotiations have been taken place since 2010, the two factions agreed upon a joint government and elections to be held in 2012. Hamas will remain in control of security in Gaza, while Fatah will remain to do the same in the West Bank, all the while Hamas will also see upon their entry into the Palestinian Liberation Organization (ibid).

### **3.2 Everyday life**

The intensity and complexity of the conflict has, unfortunately, influenced the Palestinian community on many different levels involving everyday life within the Palestinian West Bank, from local to regional politics, education, social and cultural life, to Palestinian economics, and even issues over water resources and movement. While an historic perspective is necessary to provide an overall view of the ongoing conflict, it is also necessary to provide insight in how the conflict influences the lives of the community that has its focus in this research, the Palestinians living in the West Bank. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank influences the lives of Palestinians in every way possible, resulting in a situation where even the most basic ideas of normal life are under the influence of the Israeli occupation. NGOs working in this context, base their functioning on the workings of life within the given situation. Their projects, with which they try to make a difference, are implemented and designed according to everyday life, its restrictions and how their projects could make a difference, by hopefully contributing or influencing the process towards peace. Projects (whether through a partnership or not) try to change the path and bring change in what is now everyday life under occupation.

#### **3.2.1 Palestinian Infrastructure and movement restrictions**

One of the results of the signing of the Oslo Accords was the deployment of the Israeli forces out of certain areas within the West Bank, giving full or semi-responsibility over these areas to the Palestinian Authority. A large part of the West Bank did remain under Israeli authority. These areas are known as Area A (Palestinian Control), Area B (supposed joint control between Israel & Palestinian Authority), and Area C (Israeli control) While this restructuring of land

authority did give the Palestinian Authority some more independence over some parts of the West Bank, it resulted in a fragmentation of the territory, that created major infrastructural problems. Most of the C Areas within the West Bank are Jewish Settlements within the Palestinian Authority.

These settlements are illegal under international law: *"Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and an obstacle to peace and to economic and social development [... and] have been established in breach of international law."* (International Court of Justice Ruling, July 9, 2004)

The Israeli government has, despite numeral rulings of illegality, not put a definitive end to the building of these settlements, ignoring the rulings and articles of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the United Nations, The Hague Convention and the 4<sup>th</sup> Geneva Convention.<sup>2</sup> The people living within these settlements are not allowed into A Areas and Palestinians are not allowed within C areas. Under Israeli control the settlements in the West Bank should be connected to Israel, without the settlers having to drive through areas populated by (Palestinian) Arabs, as a measure of security. The creation of these 'by-pass roads' throughout the West Bank, resulted in the splitting up of villages and land. Movement throughout the West Bank became an even bigger issue, especially for the Palestinians, who have to drive around the settlements and its roads to reach family that formerly lived in the neighborhood, which now has been split into two with a road in the middle.

The restriction of movement, as a result of this fragmentation, settlements or security issues influences the daily life of every Palestinian living within the boundaries of the West Bank. The resurrection of the security wall between the West Bank and Israeli territory, or 'the Wall', has created even more problems for the Palestinians, which does not only comply to issues on movement, but goes far beyond the restrictions on infrastructure.

The wall, which separates the West Bank from Israel, also encloses parts of Palestinian territory, annexing those parts to Israel. In some places it runs through villages and neighborhoods, cutting people off from family or work or medical assistance when needed.

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<sup>2</sup> The articles and rulings of the international organizations can be found in Appendix III

Palestinians who used to work on what is now the other side of the wall, where left out of jobs. This loss of jobs due to no longer being able to cross to the other side has left many Palestinians deprived in a way to provide for their families. These days, wanting to leave the West Bank, one needs a special permit, which allows Palestinians to pass the security checkpoint into the Israeli side. These permits, however, are scarce, and not everyone is permitted such a pass to cross the border. When you are able to obtain a permit, every day there is the issue of passing through the security checkpoint, which puts people under scrutiny from the Israeli Defense Force, containing long waiting lines in front of the checkpoint, full body & bag searches, and the checking of identities and permits. There is also resistance from the Israeli's living in the settlements, because the wall also does cut off, in what are in their opinion, Israeli neighborhoods from Israel. This problem however, is now being settled by building 'by-pass roads', once again through Palestinian territory.

### **3.3 Effects on economy**

The West Bank, in the last decade, experienced a slight economic growth in the last couple of years due to the flow of donor aid, the implementation of economic and security reforms by the Palestinian Authority and the easing of some of the Palestinians movement and access restrictions from the Israeli government (CIA World Factbook, 2011) Despite this minor economic success, the overall living standard of the Palestinians has been the same as a decade ago due to the decade-long implemented closure policies, restrictions in movement and access pointed at as security measures by the Israelis, which have created a steady disruption in the internal and external flows of labor and trade, industry and basic commerce (ibid). The Palestinian Authority heavily relies on direct foreign donor assistance, with which they have had the opportunity to see a rise in retail activity in urban areas within the West Bank, but the lack of movement and access to land and resources and the import and export restrictions still remains the biggest impediment to economic improvements (ibid).

The restrictions posed upon the Palestinians living in the West Bank create problems in every aspect imaginable, due to the fact that every aspect or restriction that goes with the issue can be connected to the next issue. A problem that can be related or is even an effect of

another problem is the declining economy in the West Bank. The building of the Wall, the (illegal) Israeli settlements and the bypass roads influenced the economy of the West Bank heavily.

### **3.3.1 Water & Resources**

According to recommendations of the World Health Organization, every person is in need of a minimum of 100 liters of water per day. The settlements build on the Palestinian territory are the cause of the lack of access to water for the Palestinians, partly due to their confiscation or location near key water resources. Israeli West Bank settlers consume about 280 liters of water per day per person, which is 3 times the amount of water a Palestinian finds available for him daily ([www.palestinemonitor.com](http://www.palestinemonitor.com)). Settlers use far more water than is deemed necessary, but choose to do so. A Palestinian, however, does not even get the amount of water that is branded as necessary for a person. These numbers only include what is used per person domestically, and excludes what is used for the 'community', farming, or industrial purpose. Settlements and their inhabitants are also the cause of inequalities to other natural resources between the Israelis and Palestinians. This is the result from the situation where the settlements are built on prime agricultural land that has been confiscated from the Palestinians. And while the number states that only 3% of the land in the West Bank is 'settled', it does not take into account the fact that a settlement confiscates land that is both residential and agricultural around the settlers simultaneously, containing more than 40% of the land in the West Bank ([www.palestinemonitor.com](http://www.palestinemonitor.com))

## Chapter 4 Theoretical Framework

The central research question that this thesis tries to answer is: *How do INGO-NNGO partnerships function and to what extent do they contribute to the peacebuilding process in the West Bank, Palestine?* To be able to answer this question, a theoretical framework has to be designed. The creation of this theoretical framework depends on several aspects that have to be taken into consideration. The first aspect to be established is what is a partnership? This contains the how and what; how do they function, what does a partnership consist of? Second, how do partnerships function according to the existing theories and policies? Third, what is peacebuilding and how do the NGO partnerships contribute to peacebuilding?

The first part of this chapter will focus on this third aspect. What is peacebuilding and how do NGOs function in the peacebuilding process? The next part of this chapter will focus on what exactly is a partnership and it ends with an elaborate exploration of how the works of a partnership is explained according to existing literature, theories and policies.

### 4.1 Peace Building

The concept of peacebuilding in this thesis comes from the actors who, after the Cold War, used this concept to frame their activities in post-conflict areas. Peacebuilding itself is a very broad term and to create insight in what peacebuilding means in this thesis, it is necessary to provide a conceptualization of peacebuilding and its different approaches. To create this understanding I will use several definitions to create insight in what 'peacebuilding' contains. The first and foremost used definition is the definition given by former United Nations' Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, which is as follows: "peacebuilding is the action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict." The UN registered definition of peace building seems the most used and known explanation, due to the universal working of the UN as an organization. The definition sees to clarify that peacebuilding is more than just the elimination of armed conflict. It seeks to eliminate the causes of the conflict by instigating the creation of a just peace, so that the future or existing incentives to fall back upon violence are exterminated (ibid)

A second definition is taken from Verkoren (2008, p. 51), who states that peacebuilding is “the short hand of a broad field of intervention activity by NGOs, states, and international organizations in order to avoid relapse into conflict.” She also bases her definition of peacebuilding not on the elimination of armed conflict by itself, but to avoid relapse, focuses on other aspects simultaneously. “Peacebuilding includes what is called peacemaking (negotiation to reach a settlement between warring parties or military action to enforce peace) and peacekeeping (military missions that keep warring parties apart) but goes beyond those interventions as it strives for lasting solutions that address the underlying causes of a conflict”(Verkoren, 2008, p. 51). In her opinion, peace building goes beyond the managing of peace, but goes as far to include the transformation of the conflict as one of the major aspects to be considered in peace building, including influence from external players and inequalities between parties involved (ibid).

A third definition of peace building comes from John Paul Lederach (1997: 75), renowned professor of International Peace Building, who states peacebuilding in a metaphorical way: “it involves a long-term commitment to a process that includes investment, gathering of resources and materials, architecture and planning, coordination of resources and labor, laying solid foundations, construction of walls and roofs, and finish work and ongoing maintenance (ibid) He emphasizes that peacebuilding is a difficult and long term process, which includes commitment on every level thinkable. Lederach also emphasizes that peacebuilding centrally involves the transformation of relationships. In other words he names his view on peacebuilding ‘Sustainable reconciliation’(ibid), which requires both structural and relational transformations. According to Lederach, the aim of peacebuilding is to foster development on the social, economic, and political level.

The three definitions, the UN’s, Lederach’s and Verkoren’s, are similar in the sense that they explain peacebuilding activities as processes that can prevent relapse into conflict and the changing of structure in society, politics, and economy. Change of structures in conflicting societies to strengthen a possible peace is what they call for. Many other definitions of peace building exist, but due to earlier explained motives I choose to use the original definition of UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali from 1992 from this point as the leading concept of peace

building in the rest of this thesis. This because in my opinion this concept of peacebuilding gives functions as an umbrella, including the other definitions who fit within this concept given by the United Nations. Aspects in other definitions of peace building can be traced back to the definition given by the United Nations. Due to the universality of the United Nations as an institution, the idea given by Boutros-Ghali creates the most general and clear view on the workings of peacebuilding as a whole.

#### **4.2 Actors and Track Diplomacy**

As can be distilled from the UN definition of peacebuilding, it includes various activities across several levels of a society. Track Diplomacy, in which the tracks stand for the different levels, aims to promote and make a distinction between what these different levels are. Track diplomacy consists of three tracks, or levels. Track one, first level, is aimed at the leaders of the parties involved in the conflict, the higher level in society. This higher level of society consists mainly of heads of states, ministers (both national and foreign), and international and intergovernmental organizations (UN). The main activity of track one aims at high-level diplomacy and mediation to prevent warfare, after which peacebuilding on this level focuses on the strengthening of government and the creation of institutions to make the government accountable to citizens (Verkoren, 2008). Not often are NGOs involved in Track One diplomacy, with the odd exception every now and then. Track One diplomacy tries to strengthen government legitimacy, building up the judicial system, army, and police forces. Activities to be considered peacebuilding strategies for the long term (ibid). Track Two mostly provides support on a more societal level due to the failure of a peace agreement to be implemented. This failure of implementation often comes from the gap between high-level peace on a governmental level and the more basic issues within society. Track Two initiatives aim at drawing important societal figures into a peace process in the hopes of giving it a broader base. Track Two involves high-profile, influential societal figures, such as political party leaders, journalists, interest groups, local government leaders, and religious organizations (Verkoren, 2008). NGOs often work at this Track Two level, sometimes in cooperation with international organizations, like the UN (Ramsbotham et al. 2005).



The last track, Track Three, focuses on the 'normal' people, the communities at the 'grassroots' of society. Its focus is on the causes and consequences of the conflict at the level of individual citizens (Verkoren, 2008: 53). The issues dealt with on this level, are far different from the issues discussed in Track One or Two. They include inter-communal issues as hatred, discrimination, inequality, and poverty. Interventions on Track Three level are carried out mostly by NGOs, sometimes in cooperation between local or national governments. The interventions include development work, peace education, training of community mediators, the organizing of dialogue, and psycho-social work (Ibid).

#### **4.3 Civil Society in Peacebuilding**

To create what is known as a just peace, the influence of civil society organizations plays a major role in achieving such goals. The key functions of civil society, including those of INGOs and NNGOs, are numerous. To create a better understanding of the role of civil society in peacebuilding (as explained by the definitions above) it is necessary to look at the various functions civil society can obtain in the peacebuilding process. According to Catherine Barnes (2006) the key functions of civil society are visible in every point of the development of conflict and its resolution from situations of surfacing violence to the prevention of violence, from the creation of conditions necessary for peace talks to the mediation of settlements, the setting of a peace agenda and even the healing of psychological issues due to conflict. She maps out eight different functions of the role of civil society in the building of peace:

- 1) **Waging Conflict Constructively:** life in conflict for many is, even without full scale war, oppressed by structural violence. Civil society can play a major role in surfacing this situation and changing the threat of violence into non-violence. By challenging the existing problems they create an awareness that fosters the transformation of attitudes and relationships as a way towards empowerment.
- 2) **Reframing and the changing of conceptions:** Civil society organizations promote direct dialogue across the conflict so that the existing divisions start to shift. The direct communication between those who perceive each other as enemies can change the existing perceptions about one another.

- 3) Envisioning a better future: Civil society actors can be the ones identifying problems that might be overlooked and they can create a situation in which gaps can be lessened. This to surpass the idea of only needing to end the fighting, but to pay attention to the societies involved.
- 4) The mobilizations of constituencies for peace: People involved in armed conflict often justify their actions on the basis of authority or by claiming to represent a certain cause. Civil society often challenges these assertions with the demonstration of rejections of the used approaches in the armed conflict.
- 5) Promoting security: State security forces, although functioning to provide for security for every civilian, due to power structures, are many times part of the problem in itself. Although civil society actors are not schooled to provide for that same safety, they do have the ability to provide in the de-escalation of violence by preventing violence through other ways of settling disputes. Or through accompaniment, interpositioning, or civilian peacekeeping
- 6) Making peace: Although peace settlement is often reviewed as a task for governments and leaders, numerous civil society peacemaking initiatives have been valuable in supporting the prospects of an agreement. The position of civil society organizations in the community creates a better view on which topics are important for the people within society.
- 7) Community Level Peacemaking or 'pragmatic peace': Civil society peacemaking initiatives are mostly aimed at peacebuilding on a local community level. So even when national peace processes are stalled, local actors can still act to address the issues on a more local scale.
- 8) Transformation of the causes and consequences of conflict: This transformation can be achieved through the demilitarization of the minds, by healing of the psychological consequences, fostering of reconciliation, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and peace education.

Although the functions of civil society organizations can obtain more than the ones mentioned above, it gives an overview of how organizations try to function within the given conflict and

how they try to exude influence in the ongoing situation. A wide variety of peacebuilding by organizations exists and every organization will have its own focus and own way of functioning to the ability that they are able to provide.

The next paragraph will create more understanding of the role of NGOs within the peacebuilding process, from the emergence of NGO involvement, to the activities nowadays.

#### **4.4 NGOs and Peace Building**

The main focus of this research are INGO-NNGO partnerships in the Palestinian West Bank. Before coming to this part of the research it is important to zoom in on the more general aspect from which these partnerships arise, namely the involvement of NGOs in the peacebuilding process. Looking to emergence of present-day NGOs will give more insight in the activities of NGOs in peacebuilding. Before going into this, a definition of what a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) is seems necessary. NGOs are many and every NGO is different from another one, based on focus, background, expertise etc, making it difficult to create a universal definition.

“A non-governmental organization (NGO) is any non-profit, voluntary citizens' group which is organized on a local, national or international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of service and humanitarian functions, bring citizen concerns to governments, advocate and monitor policies and encourage political participation through provision of information. Some are organized around specific issues, such as human rights, environment or health. They provide analysis and expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms and help monitor and implement international agreements.”<sup>3</sup>

While the definition of an NGO depends on interpretation and different ideas, the above definition given provides insight in the diverse functioning of diverse NGOs.

According to Fischer (2006) the antecedents of present-day NGOs emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century after the founding of the Red Cross, which gave rise to non-state actors to fight for a

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.ngo.org/ngoinfo/define.html>

range of issues, including international law, slave trade, and women's rights. In the last two decades the number of NGOs involved in human rights protection, international development policy, and humanitarian aid has increased substantially. NGOs, nowadays, play an important role in the mobilization of diverse campaigns and activities (ibid). Debiel and Sticht (2005) give four explanations for the increased significance of NGOs:

- 1) Major incentives for the establishment and expansion of existing NGOs were created by the UN World Conferences of the 1990s.
- 2) Mass media and globalization of communication by electronic information technologies supports the increase of transnational networking activities of non-state actors.
- 3) International civil society organizations now function as substitutes for former state-driven welfare services, as a consequence of the neo-liberal project of decreasing state activities in this field
- 4) NGOs, more and more, function as substitutes for formerly state-run activities in health and education, due to international programs forced states to reduce public services, especially in developing countries.

The main cause of the expansion of NGO activity appears to be the growing incentives and practice of international and national development agencies to channel aid through NGOs (ibid). Partnership co-operation, next to other types of INGO-NNGO relationships, are a direct consequence of this kinds of practice. Barnes (2006) states that NGOs have also been increasingly active in other kinds of development: conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peace building activities.

The next paragraph will focus on the kinds of institutions and different actors in peacebuilding, discussed through the idea of track diplomacy, which the chosen case study also can be linked to.

#### 4.4.1. NGOs and their activities

NGO activities differ per organization, as every NGO has a different focus. NGO is often seen as a general term for several kinds of organizations, but many times are seen as one and the same. The term NGO hides several kinds of classifications, which according to Vakil (1997) are the following:

<b><u>Type</u></b>	<b><u>Description</u></b>
BINGO	Big international nongovernmental organization
CBO	Community-based organization
CB-NGO	Community-based nongovernmental organization
DO	Development organization
DONGO	Donor nongovernmental organization
GONGO	Governmental nongovernmental organization
GRO	Grassroots organization
GRSO	Grassroots support organization
IDCI	International development cooperation institution
INGO	International nongovernmental organization
NGDO	Nongovernmental development organization
NNGO	Northern nongovernmental organization
PO	People's organization
PSC	Public Service Contractor
QUANGO	Quasi-nongovernmental organization
SCO	Social change organization
SNGO (1)	Support nongovernmental organization
SNGO (2)	Southern nongovernmental organization
WCO	Welfare church organization

Vakil's typology gives an overview of the existing types of NGOs, while the term NGO functions as an umbrella definition for all these types. A distinction between NGO's can also be based on

their particular focus, which Barnes (2006) and Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) see as a distinction in focus between early warning activities, preventive diplomacy through third-party intervention (multi-track diplomacy), facilitation of dialogue workshops and mediation, negotiations, networking and initiatives for cross-cultural understanding and relationship building. The NGO handbook, however, makes its own distinction between types of NGOs, which are: humanitarian NGOs, human rights NGOs, educational NGOs, environmental NGOs, women's NGOs, children's NGOs, youth NGOs, peace and conflict NGOs.<sup>4</sup>

After these typologies, we go further as to look at which types of activities come forth from these types of NGOs. Going back to an author used earlier in this research, Verkoren (2008: 58-61) explains that existing literature on the range of activities by NGOs are scarce. Based on her own research she has categorized the activities of peacebuilding NGOs in nine different types of activities, which can be considered as a further elaboration on the functions of civil society given by Barnes earlier on this chapter. The activities of NGOs, as a part of civil society, given by Verkoren are as follows:

- 1) Dialogue and reconciliation
- 2) Peace education
- 3) Civilian mediation
- 4) Peace zones and civilian peacekeeping
- 5) Representing a particular group
- 6) Organizational development, training, and networking
- 7) Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR)
- 8) Early warning for early response
- 9) Addressing broader structural issues of democracy, human rights, and development

NGOs, most of the time, are not active in only one of these activities in particular.

Activities of NGOs in the West Bank focus on several of these activities, mainly dialogue, reconciliation, peace education, and civilian mediation. Most of the NGOs conduct several projects, each of which simultaneously represents a particular group in Palestinian society or

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<sup>4</sup> [http://www.ngohandbook.org/index.php?title=NGO\\_Overview](http://www.ngohandbook.org/index.php?title=NGO_Overview)

the Palestinian community as a whole. The reason for the focus on these four types of activities is a result of the situation of the conflict. The conflict between Israel and Palestine has created gaps among every line of society, between the Israelis and Palestinians, between different political groups, within Palestinian communities and even along religious and gender lines. The choice of Palestinian NGOs to focus on reconciliation, peace education and dialogue is to lessen those existing gaps and create understanding amongst the people affected and involved in the conflict. Not only is there a need for dialogue, reconciliation and mediation between the two warring factions in this conflict. Within the Palestinian community there is a similar need for these activities to create better understanding amongst each other. Many West Bank NGOs therefore focus not only on the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, but look further into their own society. Their idea behind this is that peace and understanding between Israel and Palestine can only happen when Palestinians are no longer divided themselves.

Consequently, the work of most NGOs is done through several types of the mentioned activities, based on their chosen focus. It is therefore possible for an NGO to be active in both peace education and civilian mediation, all while representing a particular group simultaneously. Other authors can use other typologies of activities, but in this research I, from this point on, will use these kinds of peace building activities to identify INGO-NNGO relationships.

#### **4.5 Value of NGOs in peace building**

The position of NGOs in peace building is a next issue to be considered, leading to the question of what is (or is not) the added value of NGOs to peace building. Verkoren (2008) states that for peace to be sustainable peacebuilding has to be more than just a top-down process. NGOs are able to fulfill positions on several different levels, from the top-down to grass roots. NGOs are organizations that operate close to communities, in which peace has to take root before it becomes valuable. The enabling of ordinary people to take stance on their needs and due to their engagement in ordinary daily lives, they are well placed to engage in peace building. Goodhand (2006: 115) says about NGOs:

“mid-level actors with linkages upwards to political leadership and downwards to communities; they have the potential to play a bridging role between identity groups in contexts characterized by extreme horizontal inequalities; they have the ability to work across lines and gain access to communities living on the wrong side of a conflict; [and] they [...] can work in high-risk environments” (ibid.).

He adds to this that NGOs are often considered to be more “flexible, adaptive, and innovative” than governmental and intergovernmental institutions (ibid.) He goes on about the added value of NGOs to the peace building process with an aspect relating to the values of NGOs itself:

“[t]hey do not only seek to get things done, they embody a particular set of values or way of thinking about the world. Therefore, just as material resources interact with the political economy of conflict, NGOs’ values and ways of thinking interact with ideational and discursive aspects of war and peace. Individual peace entrepreneurs [...] play an important role in the diffusion of ideas and the generation of social energy that can transform social structures and social relations. [...] An example of this [...] is the use of the media to broadcast messages of peace and reconciliation and to counteract pro-war propaganda.” (Goodhand, 2006: 121-122)

Barnes (2006) goes on about the positive value of NGOs in peacebuilding that they represent the issues that until that point have been undermined or underrepresented. Academics seem to be able to identify many advantages of NGOs over state-regulated peace building activities, including their political independence, flexibility of mandates, impartiality and high standards of credibility (ibid.). Van Tongeren (1998: 23) elaborates on this statement:

“Collectively, NGOs have the ability to a) function without being constrained by narrow mandates of foreign imperatives, b) achieve access to areas inaccessible to official actors, c) talk to several parties without losing their credibility, d) deal directly with grassroots populations, e) operate in confidentiality without media, parliamentary or public scrutiny, f) take the greatest risks, given their public advocacy and social-justice agendas, g) effectively network, given their longstanding relationships, built on trust, with civil society in the conflict zones, h) draw upon public opinion to galvanize political will to focus on a longer-term perspective than governments are able to.”



#### **4.6 Limitations of NGOs in peace building**

NGOs working within the peace building process face certain difficulties and constraints. These restrictions are many, but most of them can be related back to the political environment of the region where they are holding office. The conflict situation in itself can be a major restraint on the workings of NGOs in peace building. Another important issue that can put limitations on their value is the influence of international donors.

Most peace building practices take place in a (post)-conflict situation where the situation is relatively calm and stable, but where conflict also has not ended completely. This inbetween situation means that incidents still occur and that the risk of return of conflict is reasonable. NGOs working in peace building, therefore, work in circumstances that are often risky and difficult. The status of the conflict, or post-conflict, puts restraints on NGOs in certain ways, including restrictions of movement and opposition to peace building activities. The NGOs abilities can be less effective due to limitations brought upon them by the conflict situation. The second restriction can be related to the political environment NGOs work in. Verkoren (2008) relates to this restriction with the statement that local NGOs goals and aims do not always correspond well with governments or other political identities. Carrying out work while governments do not support, or work against their presence, thwarts the possibilities of the NGOs to implement their policies.

The role of international donors is a third constraint on the workings of NGOs; their demands and their role in the setting of the peace building agenda can thwart the actual success of an NGO to carry out their responsibilities. Many local NGOs in (post-) conflict situations are funded by international (mostly Western) organizations. This way of funding can simultaneously have positive as well as negative consequences for the NGOs. NGOs are often pressured by international organizations to create a system to show the level of success or effects of their work. Working in peace building and the consequences of this peace building work is a concept that can hardly be measured through a system of measurement. The successes or failures of the work of NGOs can, due to this difficulty, not be traced back as effects of the work of the NGOs. This lack of the possibility of measurement can lead to the international NGO to stop funding due to uncertain results, creating a vacuum for the NGOs in which they cannot point to

their effects, not knowing whether or not their continuation of their programs will be for the long or short term (ibid.).

International organizations also try to put their ideas on peace building on the agenda of the local NGOs creating a gap between the policies of the international donors and the context in which these policies will be applied (Bornstein, 2009) International donor policies are mainly based on western concepts, which do not take into consideration the local situation, making the application of western concepts in the actual situation impossible to carry out due to different circumstances (ibid.). The local NGOs dependence on international funding is so severe that they have no other choice but to apply the international policies in their work, or they will not be able to work at all (ibid.). This effect is often also turned around. Local NGOs will comply to the needs of international donors as much as possible, to be able to receive as much funding as possible, where the actual needs of the situation is lost out of sight. Their goal then turns to gain as much funding as possible, instead of responding to the social needs of the people, severely limiting the valuable contribution to the peace building process (ibid.). More on this can be found later on in this thesis in chapter 6 & 7.

#### **4.7 Partnerships in peacebuilding**

An apparent trend in development relief and aid during the 1980s and 1990s can be characterized by the upsurge in the number of non-governmental organizations (Ghataoura, 2008). Alongside this trend, there came the notion that there was a dire need to improve relations between NGOs, especially between those residing in the North and South (ibid.); or between INGOs and NNGOs. This notion meant that the need for a strengthening of relationships between INGOs and NNGOs and to call for coherence in structure, policies, and coordination. This new type of relationship became known as a 'Partnership', providing a framework for NGOs involved in development in the North and South to influence economic, political, and social policy (ibid.). This framework became through the idea that the combining of resources from both INGOs and NNGOs would be the most viable form of cooperation.

Before diving into the significance of a partnership, it deems necessary to gain insight into the actual definition of partnership. For this we turn to the work of Alan Fowler, who describes a partnership as, “understood and mutually enabling, independent interaction with shared intentions” (Fowler, 1997: 117) Partnerships, as he wrote in 2000, can be understood as an explanation to reflect humanitarian, moral, political, ideological or spiritual solidarity between INGOs and NNGOs that decided to join together to pursue a common goal for change (Fowler, 2000). His definition of partnership is based on an idea of sharing, mutuality and equality for all partners involved, as this sharing of responsibilities creates better incentives to deal with all aspects of operation by NGOs in general (ibid.). The idea of partnerships comes forth out of always ongoing debate about appropriate roles for both INGOs and NNGOs in peace building. Partnerships emphasize the increasing need for bridge building between different layers of actors involved in the peace building process. USAID (1997: 220) made the following observation about partnerships between INGOs and NNGOs, or North (INGOs) and South (NNGOs):

“... [North-South] partnerships can make it possible to tailor development projects to local needs and concerns, thus leveraging the development expertise and resources of outsiders well beyond Northern capabilities. Widespread capacity building enhances the ability of Southern partners to deliver and expand their services - while reducing costs and increasing legitimacy with local governments and actors.”

#### **4.8 Rhetoric of a partnership**

The most important question that will be answered in this paragraph is what makes a partnership a partnership? Can we call every form of cooperation between organizations a partnership? And, what kind of aspects makes a partnership valuable and viable?

A partnership has two parts, first what exists as a partnership on paper and how it plays out in reality. The working of the chosen partnership will be compared between what will here be explained what it consists of on paper. The reality of partnership comes back later on in this research in chapter 6.

The best starting point for the rhetoric of a partnership is the observation by John Paul Lederach that peace building is a process that needs to be carried out from the top-down, bottom-up, and middle out (Lederach, 1997) The key to this cross cooperation seems to be a partnership between organizations. Greater ownership in the peace building process, in his view, creates a more legitimate process and more sustainable outcomes, due to the outsiders' (INGOs) ability to create spaces and support NNGOs who then can get more involved in the processes that address the causes of conflict (ibid.). Lederach views the involvement of INGOs as a contribution to the building of capacity for the NNGOs involved in the cooperation. NGOs policies on partnership differ per organizations and partnership, but most NGOs have developed policies concerning their partnership cooperation, in which certain trends can be noticed; a) there is a shift from being operational to working with Southern partners; b) there appears a trend towards developing systematic policies and a strategic focus; c) The move away from a specific project focus to a partner focus as a part of the process going from discrete interventions to strategic, result-oriented ways of working (INTRAC, 2001). This shift in the development of partnership policies has become a key part in international peace building processes. The concept of a partnership can be seen as an expression of solidarity that goes far beyond financial aid, but gives the intention of bringing benefits based on their comparative advantages (ibid.) in which the sum of the whole is more valuable than the loose parts. Differences in types of partnerships are many, but not many NGOs actual carry a certain classification for the type of partnership. INTRAC (2001: 2) does recognize different types of partnerships based on the following differences:

- 1) Funding-based differences: a funding-only relationship at one end of the spectrum and a partnership based on policy dialogue with no funding at the other end.
- 2) Capacity-based differences: a Partner with limited capacity requiring support from the Northern Partner; contrasted with a partnership with a strong, autonomous organization that contributes from its own experience.
- 3) Trust-based differences: control of the Southern Partner at one extreme and unconditional trust at the other.

#### **4.8.1 Principles of Partnership**

Can the definition of a partnership be used to describe any type of co-operational relationship between two or more organizations? Relying on the existing literature that will be called upon in this part of the research, the answer to this question is very easy; No. When looking at the concept that lies beyond the idea of a partnership, it seems wrong to put every type of cooperation under the definition of a partnership. Fowler (2000: 4-5) argues why this is not a viable possibility as it states “the term partnership should only be employed for a particular quality of relationship”. This particular quality is, according to them, based on the following elements of authentic partnership extracted from definitions used by both INGOs and NNGOs:

- Partnership is about working together to accomplish agreed results and accepting joint responsibility for achieving them.
- Partnership carries with it a long-term involvement.
- Partnership requires defined mutual roles and responsibilities - as covenants not contracts.
- Partnership is about trust, respect, integrity, accountability and equality.
- Partnership requires an acceptance of the principle that a local organization has the right to set the final agenda for its own work.
- Partnership must not lead to a situation where the link between an organization's constituency and leadership is weakened.
- When negotiating relations or contributions from outside the 'partnership', the spirit and letter of existing partnerships must be taken into account and respected.
- Within a partnership, neither party can unilaterally accept other relational conditions that materially influence the partnership.
- Partnership must not alter the basic priorities related to the identity, vision and values of any of the organizations.
- An underlying assumption of partnership co-operation is that the organizations concerned will become more competent in reaching their goals beyond this specific relationship (ibid).

In the rest of this research this list will be used to identify whether or not the chosen INGO-NNGO partnership consists of what can be identified as the elements of which a partnership should consist of.

#### **4.9 Value of Partnerships**

After defining what a partnership contains (or should contain) the next step in defining partnerships in general, is what the supposed added value of a partnership is (or is not). The choice of INGOs and NNGOs to put more focus on working as partners instead of other types of cooperation, means that there are certain aspects to this way of cooperation that add more value to the relationship.

Different partners bring different items to the table when coming to agreement on a partnership between organizations, whereas these aspects are often not directly comparable but when combined can provide for more effectiveness (Fowler, 2000) The combining of these different aspects can bring more effect to the goals set by both organizations, as one organizations might entail aspects that the other organizations does not have the capacity for. The most basic effect of the combination of an INGO and an NNGO is that INGOs most of the time offer their finances, whereas the NNGO can offer its local knowledge and leverage and development performance on the ground (ibid.). The change in relationship between INGOs and NNGOs, from donor-recipient to partners, can be seen in the sharing of resources. The effect of this globalizing process of partnership has created the opportunity for INGOs and NNGOs to work across institutional boundaries.

#### **4.10 Limitations of partnerships**

Every positive aspect has a negative counterpart, and where the added value of partnerships can be explained in short, they contain major consequences for the workings of peace building organizations. However, looking at one side of the spectrum forces us to look at the other side to, where every positive aspect has a negative aspect. Critics of peace building partnerships state that the aspect of equality and mutuality is one that can never be possible, mostly due to the control of money within a partnership. INGOs remain the head funder of the project, how equal and mutual they would like it to be. This immediately brings inequalities to the table

where the NNGO can bring as much to the table as they have to offer, money has been and will always remain the most critical issue.

“... this is a dialogue of the unequal, and however many claims are made for transparency or mutuality, the reality is - and is seen to be - that the donor can do to the recipient what the recipient cannot do to the donor. There is an asymmetry of power that no amount of well-intentioned dialogue can remove.”(Elliott, 1987: 65)

Connected to this is the idea that the idea of partnership is a mostly Western idea, as a need for Western aid agencies and NGOs to establish more legitimacy for operations in what is known as the South and to demonstrate that their involvement goes beyond the funding of projects (Lewis, 1998) The competing for scarce resources within peace building results in the INGOs using a partnership to promote their own institutional survival, rather than a way of advancing common objectives between the organizations (ibid.).

INTRAC (2001: 2) also questions the effectiveness of a partnership and its principles, seeing the following aspects as the main limits to successful partnerships:

- The role of the Northern NGO as donor: this is a major obstacle to achieving equality. The imbalance in the relationship created by the Northern NGO's control of over resources skews the power balance.
- Funding processes and distorted accountability: whilst in theory accountability to local constituencies is important, in practice the funding processes 'hijack' the accountability mechanisms and re-orient them towards Northern donors. Northern NGOs assume a control function, whilst Southern NGOs risk becoming donor-driven and distanced from their grassroots constituencies. (more on the accountability of NGOs in Chapter 6 & 7)
- Organizational capacity limits: capacity mismatch often occurs between Partners of different sizes; partnership dialogue is more feasible between organizations of a similar size and capacity. The capacity limits of the Northern NGO themselves are also a constraining fact. The number and depths of partnerships, lack of co-ordination between Northern NGOs and high staff turnover are all limits to effective partnerships.

Fowler (2000) sees the limitations of INGO-NNGO partnerships mainly in the lack of effect due to a mismatch between what the involved organizations consider their rights when compared

with the obligations the other organizations might feel towards them. This due to the idea that the organization bringing the money might eventually feel that it is their right to make demands and impose those demands on the NNGO (ibid.).

## **Conclusion**

It is possible to imply much more limitations to the use of a partnership in peace building, as they are many. The main idea of partnerships, as a shared, equal, and mutual process contains aspects that can be viewed as positive and negative simultaneously. Further on in this research the specific positive and negative aspects of the chosen case study will be developed further on in this thesis to see if on which levels this specific partnership matches both positive and negative aspects.

This chapter has given insight in the rhetorics of partnerships and the workings of partnerships in peace building. The theoretical elaboration in this chapter functions as a general idea of both the how and what of a partnership, how it should function according to theory and how it functions within the process of peacebuilding. The next chapter introduces the case study of the partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR. It elaborates on both organizations involved in the partnership and the project that came to exist from the partnership.



## Chapter 5 Partnerships in Peace

In this chapter I will introduce the chosen case study for this research. The argumentation behind the choice of a case study lies in the idea to reflect general partnership theories from chapter 4 to a certain conflict situation and primarily a specific partnership. Every specific partnership differs in design, set-up, and implementation. A partnership, however, comes to exist according to a partnership policy, which includes the rhetoric on how the particular partnership should come to exist, how it should function, and what its specific goals are. An introduction to the international non-governmental organization (INGO), the national non-governmental organization (NNGO), and its partnership project is therefore needed.

The case study I have chosen for my research is the partnership between War Child Netherlands and the Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation. The first, international, organization (INGO) has its headquarters in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, but for its work in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, has a sub-office in the city of Jerusalem. The latter organization, the NNGO, has only one office, to be found in the city of Bethlehem, the West Bank.

### 5.1 War Child Netherlands

War Child is part of an international network of three organizations: War Child UK, War Child Canada, and War Child Netherlands. The organizations are independent carrying the same name and logo and all three are committed to the improvement of the well being of children affected by (former) conflict. The organizations are independent in legal, financial, and administrative terms, but function in collaboration as equal partners with the same objective. War Child is an organization mainly focused on the rights of children with a special commitment to psychosocial development. Their work is based on the principles of several international human rights instruments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child by UNCRC. Their focus is also set on theories of development in social anthropology and psychology (psychosocial). There are two articles drawn up by the UNCRC which create the main focus of

the work of War Child; Article 38 protection and care of children affected by (former) armed conflict and Article 39, psychosocial recovery and social integration of children who have fallen victim to armed conflict.<sup>5</sup> (The well-being of children affected by (former) armed conflict is the highest concern on their priority list.

Next to working with the children itself, War Child tries to raise awareness on the rights of children, by incorporating their work into the communities involved and by ensuring that policy changes and law changes always take the protection of the children into consideration. This idea entails War Child's belief that governments are responsible and can be held accountable when it comes to the protection of the children's rights. The involvement of the community comes forth out of the belief that both the parents and the community are responsible for their own children, but that the international community which War Child belongs to have the responsibility to support these actions in their efforts.

#### **5.1.1 Approach**

War Child implements their work based on a set of community-based approaches:

- acknowledge and build on existing coping strategies and protection mechanisms within the community and which,
- Seek to enhance the resilience of children and their families. Understanding and respecting the culture is fundamental in planning and implementing programs. Existing practices and traditions can be of great importance in facilitating children's recovery and future development.

Not recognizing and valuing what already exists within a culture will lead to a failed intervention. War Child also finds it essential that the community is actively involved in the programs to ensure success.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.warchildholland.org/nieuws/1226/child-rights-a-child-protection-framework.html>, 10-01-2011

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.warchildholland.org/about-us/philosophy>, 10-01-2011

### 5.1.2 Mission & Vision Statement

War Child's goal is to empower children and young people in war-affected areas through community-based programs, which strengthen their psychological and social development and well-being by means of psychosocial programs, creative arts, creating public awareness which dedicates its work towards the development, wellbeing and the uniting of children in (post)war zones.<sup>7</sup>

From War Child's vision, sound psychosocial conditions for children and youth are a prerequisite to being able to create a peaceful society. When children grow up in a safe, stable environment where their rights are not violated, the chances are that they will grow into well-balanced grown-ups. As such they will be able to avoid or resolve conflict situations in the future. Therefore War Child's assistance aims to improve children's psychosocial wellbeing, to bring together groups of children separated by war and to draw attention to problems, needs and rights of children in war-affected areas.<sup>8</sup>

## 5.2 CCRR: The Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation

The Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (From now on named CCRR) is a local non-governmental organization based in the city of Bethlehem. Bethlehem is situated in the West Bank, which officially is one of the two regions that make up the Palestinian Authorities or Occupied Palestinian Territories. The CCRR is a Palestinian NGO that focuses on the improvement of the peace building process between Israel and Palestine and within the Palestinian community. They reason that without peace within the Palestinian Territories and communities, there will be no peace between the Palestinians and the Israeli's (CCRR, 2010) CCRR's mission statement is as follows:

*"The CCRR is committed to an alternative approach to conflict transformation. We cherish the values of peace, reconciliation, forgiveness, respect, and hope. It is our mission to contribute to a prospering, non-violent Palestine by empowering marginalized groups to participate in the*

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.warchildholland.org/about-us/mission-and-vision>, 10-01-2011

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.warchildholland.org/about-us/mission-and-vision>, 10-01-2011

*decision-making process that affects their lives. CCRR seeks to strengthen democracy, human rights, and justice as they are essential to a lasting peace.*

*We are working to turn the culture of violence into a culture of non-violence, believing reconciliation to be a long-term goal. We campaign for peace and justice both within the Palestinian community and among the people of our region.” ([www.crr-pal.org](http://www.crr-pal.org))*

CCRR conducts their work in the field of peace and peace education in civil society. CCRR approaches its work suitable to the Palestinian context and reality, and culture to promote peace. Peace is not only a political concept; it is a social, philosophical, human and cultural embedded phenomenon (CCRR, 2010). Their idea of bringing peace within the Palestinian community is based on the idea that peace within yourself is necessary. This will then lead to a society that can promote values such as peace, justice, democracy and non-violence. The projects that CCRR implements are therefore based on conflict resolution as a set of deeply rooted ideas that come from a dominantly Muslim Palestine (ibid).

CCRR’s projects take place along two tracks, the first one being the mentioned relations within Palestinian society. This track aims to increase acceptance of others by creating mutual respect and encouraging critical thinking. It also tries to create forgiveness and to decrease the existing pressure within the Palestinian society caused by the decade long occupation (ibid).

Most projects that CCRR takes on or has carried out seek to strengthen the weaker or marginalized groups in society by promoting dialogue; in particular on children and youth. The second track that CCRR follows is by discussing and analyzing the conflict. This discussion and analysis searches for ways to address the existing violence and how to create solutions based on the concepts of justice, human rights, peace, equality, and (mutual) respect. They promote the use of non-violence as the just method to being able to reach an end to the occupation and the problems it has created (ibid).

Projects that CCRR has carried out so far are: ‘Negotiating our Future’, a project between CCRR and the Israeli organization Neve Shalom, to give youth the necessary means to discuss, analyze and reach a common understanding of what might be a just solution for the conflict according to both the Palestinians and Israelis (ibid). Another project that brings together

people from both or more parties is the 'Interfaith Dialogue' project. Interfaith Dialogue focuses on the influence of the different religions in the region and the role of religious leaders in involved societies. Religious leaders from Christianity, Judaism, and Islam have been participating in the creation of a reflection and exchange of ideas amongst each other (ibid). A third project focused on 'Women in Conflict', a project not only about the problems within the conflict, but one that also deals with the conflict within themselves in the context of their development, traditional society and existing values (ibid).

CCRR does not shy away from controversy when it comes to their choice of projects to conduct. Their focus on all aspects and groups within the Palestinian society makes them an attractive donor organization and its well-established position within the West Bank makes them a valuable partner for further cooperation.

### **5.3 Young Negotiators Program**

The joint partnership project that is the fruit of the cooperation between War Child Netherlands and CCRR is the Young Negotiators Program. The program already existed and has been carried out by CCRR since 2002, but in 2007, with the agreed partnership is grew more steady into a project that now has reached over a 100 schools within the West Bank. The Young Negotiators Project is a project designed to provide Palestinian adolescents (between 12 and 18 years old) and their educators with the values of peace, non-violence, human rights, democracy and to give them the knowledge and tools for non-violent conflict resolution ([www.crr-pal.org](http://www.crr-pal.org)) The aim of the project is also to provide a safe environment for discussion to discuss issues involving the educator-student, educator-educator, educator-principal, student-family, and student-student relationships. The schools chosen for the project are widespread across the West Bank and are mainly located in more remote areas.

The project consists of several workshops for the groups involved, starting with the workshops for the teachers, director and the social worker of the school. The parents of the children are also involved in the project by attending several workshops to create a bridge between the knowledge taught in school and the private life of the student. The parents are encouraged to continue the non-violent education outside of school, to be able to put into

practice the knowledge outside of school. The children that participate in the project receive workshops, a total of 30 hours. These workshops are done by both the trainers from CCRR as well as the school's social worker. In these workshops the children get simple and challenging exercises. The children that participate are being exposed to violence that comes from the ongoing occupation. When a child is exposed to a certain type of behavior over a longer period of time, this type of behavior becomes normal and the children will copy that behavior. The result of this overexposure to violence is that the use of violence to settle a difference in opinion or another problem becomes an accepted way of behavior. The goal of the workshops is to provide the children with a framework that violence is not the answer, and that if you want to settle a dispute, it is better to accomplish this through non-violence communication, or dialogue. This also teaches them that it is never wrong to have a different opinion on the subject matter, and that it is important to accept that some people might think otherwise. Through interactive activities and exercises where the children have to work, think and act together, this way of communication and problem solving is taught to them.

The Young Negotiator Project follows the Middle East strategy by War Child and also works with children affected by a conflict. CCRR works mainly with marginalized groups, of which children are one, and tries to offer them the teachings of non-violent resistance and communication. The joint effort both War Child Netherlands and CCRR put into this project is in line with the policies both organizations execute and promote. War Child's strategy document focuses on several factors that will strengthen the protection of adolescents between 12 and 18 and the joint Young Negotiator Project completely fits in according to the strategy. The Young Negotiator Project addresses the specific problems that are the main focus of both organizations:

*“Life skills of adolescents (e.g. teaching them non-violent conflict resolution skills; increasing self-esteem),*

*Adult support (e.g. increasing teachers understanding and support for adolescent problems; increase skills of teachers to teach non-violence),*

*Peer interaction (e.g. teaching adolescents positive ways of interacting with each other) A safer,*

*more peaceful environment (increasing awareness and support for non violence in Palestinian society)” (War Child Middle East Strategy, 2005-2010)*

#### **5.4 The Partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR**

While a partnership is based on the cooperation between 2 or more organizations, the initiation of the partnership between War Child & CCRR has come forth from the INGO. This can be extracted from the fact that the INGO is the organization that localizes a potential partner from the basics of a partnership policy. This partnership policy is drawn up as a guidebook to the how and what of a potential partnership. War Child’s partnership policy explicitly states the underlining guidelines for what War Child holds as essential to being able to connect with an organization to set up a cooperation resulting in a partnership. All the information in this paragraph can be found in the attached partnership policy (Appendix IIII).

Before it is in any way possible to gain insight in the partnership between War Child and CCRR it is necessary to define the partnership as seen from the INGO point of view. War Child states the definition of a partnership as follows:

*“A cooperative relationship between WCH and other groups or organisations where involved organisations share their complementary resources in terms of skills, knowledge, human resources and/or finances to achieve common goals based on the rights of children, and accept joint responsibility for achieving them.” (War Child Partnership Policy draft version, 2010)*

From this definition can be extracted that a partnership should function as an equal and mutual cooperation in which both organizations share and put in their particular knowledge and experience and take on equal responsibility for the partnership in question. Through mutual input they seek to achieve the goals that are set up as common and to jointly reach those goals. Every organizations involved puts in its skills, knowledge, resources and finances to reach the goals of the partnership, with an idea of mutuality and equality. The definition does not, however, state whether the input of these resources should be equally divided between the involved organizations. The joint responsibility mentioned in this definition can therefore be subject to change, where it seems unclear which organization takes responsibility for which

kind of resources. Both organizations can agree upon the input of different resources, for example, the INGO being responsible for the finances, whereas the NNGO provides the partnership with its communal and on the ground knowledge to create a better incentive for success.

Because of this implication War Child has also stated a set of guidelines that play an important role in the choice of a partnership partner, the set up of the partnership and the implementation of the joint project that emerges out of this partnership. Potential partners are asked to agree and report on these principles by demonstrating that they will conduct their work based upon these principles (War Child Partnership Policy, Draft version, 2010)

The principles upon War Child bases their choices are as follows:

- Equality; meaning that power resources may differ amongst the partners involved, it should be obvious that every organisation puts in resources according to its capacity and skills. For War Child and its partners, equality therefore does not mean equal and the same input from every partner, but it states the right of both partners to influence and determine partnership through its ability to contribute to programming, operationalisation, and most of all respect for each organization's values, norms, restrictions and resources.
- Reputation; meaning that both partners will, without exceptions, protect their own and its partners' brand
- Transparency & Accountability; both of these aspects should be reached through trust, openness and communication between both organizations involved.
- Programs resulting from a partnership will be based on an analysis of Child Rights to survive and develop through physical, psychological, emotional, social, and spiritual development.
- Do No Harm; the principle that is based on the fact that according to the partners that the interest of the children is always the highest concern when designing, implementing, and evaluation of the project.



- Child safety; a principle that draws upon the principle Do No Harm and encompasses a fundamental duty to the protection of children as stated in War Child's Child Safety Policy
- Conflict Sensitivity; keeping in mind that that developmental or humanitarian involvement of an organization can be in some way harmful to the context in which a partnerships functions. All organizations will therefore pursue to take measures to minimize any negative effects or consequences. (War Child Partnership Policy, Draft Version, 2010)

These guidelines seem to speak for themselves, as they do not say anything specifically about the criteria that War Child uses when choosing a potential partner or partners. A set of criteria are drawn up in the same partnership policy. A potential partner should accord to all of the set criteria, no exception, before being able to sign or agree to a partnership agreement or Memorandum of Understanding. This partnership agreement or memorandum binds both organizations to the negotiations, criteria and principles that have been set out for a partnership to be successful.

War Child states the following criteria to which a partner has to comply to be being able to work with and become a partner of War Child Netherlands (War Child Partnership Policy, Draft Version, 2010)

- Commitment of the partner to follow the principles of partnership as stated in the guidelines
- The ability to contribute to the vision, mission, objectives, strategies and approaches of War Child to contribute to the joint idea of a partnership
- The bringing of skills, knowledge, and resources that complement the workings of War Child to reach the potential impact and sustainability of the partnership and the projects.
- Respect and a positive track record among peer organisations and the authorities involved in the region
- Commitment to building a trustful relationship that can bring understanding, mutual learning and a shared influence amongst the partners involved

- Willingness to sign and commit to the partnership through a written agreement, which will entail definition of the expectations, goals, objectives, activities, contributions, roles and responsibilities, evaluation and reporting procedures.

A partnership is, as it suggests, a co-operation between the partners involved. The input of the different organizations is based on their available knowledge, skills, and resources. The amount of input of a certain aspect might therefore differ per organizations. All the organizations involved, however, have to fulfil certain types of expectations in order to guarantee their commitment to the joint responsibility of the partnership. War Child does this through ascertaining ground presence in each of its programs, whether partnership or not, by being present in the field. This to be closely involved in the program and to make dialogue and communication with partners, participants and other involved possible. Their effort to be involved from close range creates a feeling of joint involvement, because both organizations bare witness to the goals and aims that have been settled beforehand. They are able to observe each other according to the partnership agreement. War Child and its partner, due to close co-operation in the field are then able to give input to each other's strategy, which then is taken into consideration when drawing up the evaluation of the program. With this assessment, existing policies can be reviewed, which positively supports the growing of the project to its fullest potential. Due to the idea that a partnership is a long term commitment, this close collaboration can lead to the perfection of a certain project and contributes to the organization's learning process and capacity building.

All these named commitments, guidelines, and criteria are taken into account by War Child when they look for a potential partner. Not one of the mentioned rules can be overlooked, in order to guarantee full commitment to War Child's idea of a partnership.

War Child, to achieve its vision, commits to different types of partnerships, meaning that they seek partners on different levels, ranging from local NGOs, to international NGOs, government institutions, and private sector organisations.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter focused on the partnership by introducing the two organizations, their mission, goals, and aims as an organization and their partnership according to existing policies. The next chapter will use these policies, combine them with existing theories on partnership and will then create an analysis on how these parts combined come to life in reality. What exists on paper will be put into perspective by using experiences from reality.

## **Chapter 6 Rhetoric v. Reality**

In the following chapter a more detailed view will be given on the specifics of the chosen case study in this research; the partnership between War Child Netherlands and The Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CCRR). Every aspect of this case and every aspect of the used theories above mentioned will be put together to analyze the rhetoric of the partnership and whether or not this rhetoric can be upheld when looking at the results of the partnership in reality. The most important issue in this chapter will therefore be about the similarities or differences between what a partnership ought to be and how reality differs from the ideas on paper. Most of the observations in this chapter are based on my own observations and from interviews and informal conversations during my internship as PME executive at CCRR in 2010.

### **6.1 Execution of the Partnership**

In the case of the chosen partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR, the project that came out of the partnership had been executed for some years. From the interview with the two employees of War Child I received knowledge on how The Young Negotiators Project had been carried out on a small scale, with funding from a different INGO. The project ran for several years, but on a small scale. Some years later, the INGO decided to stop the funding for the project, due to them wanting to provide in other projects after this one had run for several years. Country Director Andres Gonzales told me in short sentences how the partnership came to exist. War Child approached CCRR for a joint project. After going through the principles, guidelines and other policies that War Child holds as guidance, see chapter 4 or Appendix III, it was decided that CCRR would be a promising partner for a new project; designed and implemented together. During negotiations it was decided that the already existing Young Negotiators Program was the kind of project that War Child was eager to be involved with, considering their focus on the psychosocial wellbeing and development of children in (post)war zones. The existing project was reviewed and re-assessed, responsibilities per organization were distributed between each partner's available resources and War Child, being the funder in the partnership, committed to the execution of the Young Negotiators Program, in which both

organizations would be responsible according to their available resources. A partnership between CCRR and War Child Netherlands was born, all made official with a partnership agreement, which states responsibilities, principles, and guidelines that both organizations had agreed upon. These principles and guidelines can also be found in Appendix III, which holds the draft partnership policy of War Child Netherlands, 2010. When researching a partnership on both its rhetoric and reality, it deems necessary to look more detailed into the partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR and to see whether the existing situation upholds these aspects mentioned.

In an interview with the country director of War Child Netherlands, Andres Gonzales, he confirms that, despite the idea of partnership, there still remains an unbalanced relationship between the INGO and NNGO. He states that the partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR is not an equal partnership, he prefers to use the term mutual because it's mainly based on common understanding, capacity building, and mutual respect and support. "War Child and CCRR share common goals, but where War Child mainly brings in the financial aspect, CCRR brings in primarily local knowledge and experience." (Gonzales, 11-07-2010, Appendix II) He does acknowledge that the aim of a partnership is an equal relation, but despite this aim, he knows that it is extremely difficult, or even impossible to achieve. He does add to his statement about partnerships that "do not forget that while War Child has the financial means, the NNGO holds the power; they are the reason INGOs can exist and execute projects in the regions they prefer" (ibid.). Gonzales claims that the existing knowledge, expertise, and capacity brought in by the NNGO makes it possible for the INGO to actually have the ability to use their financial means to its full ability. The INGOs lack of local knowledge and expertise might result in the situation where War Child does support projects, but without the NNGO, does not use its means to the fullest of its ability. His explanation provides insight in the claim that the relationship between War Child Netherlands and CCRR is mainly a partnership based on mutuality; War Child Netherlands provides for the empowerment of CCRR, and CCRR gives War Child the means to spend and use their financial means to its full ability.

Looking at the workings of the partnership in reality, equality, in every sense or explanation possible, cannot be notified. Even the equality as an idea of respect between the

organizations is difficult to notice. To blame for this non-existing 'equality' that the relationship between War Child and CCRR strains, are both organizations. From informal conversations with CCRR's director, being a very opinionated and dominant man, it became clear that he does not have a very high esteem of War Child and its projects, including the project that they execute together. His view comes forth from his opinion that War Child makes the implementation of the project more difficult, due to them wanting a clear monitoring, planning, and evaluation of the project. This high demand from the INGO is a result of the situation where there are so many possible partners to co-operate with, that the INGO needs some visible feedback. If an NGO cannot comply, there are many other organizations eager to become a partner. His vision is that they should not care much about a visible or touchable change, due to the difficulty of the actual measuring of a project. He told me that looking at the visible changes, the questionnaires and the feeling you get when observing has more weight in concluding a project's success. In conversation with War Child, in return, I was told that does not always have a very high esteem for CCRR's director, due to him being very stubborn to communicate with about the what and how of the project. This example can be underlined by the situation with another INGO that CCRR has a partnership with, namely the DED (Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst). CCRR and the DED have been conducting a partnership for several years, similar to the execution of the partnership with War Child, although with a different project and a different way of handling the co-operation. The DED, as one of their demands, has one of their representatives working at the office of CCRR, to be able to have a direct collaboration on a day to day basis. They, too, have set up a partnership agreement, which includes every aspect of the implementation of their project and a division between each organization's responsibilities. The actual execution of the project and the relationship between the DED worker and CCRR's director, however, went along a very different line than the line set out in the partnership agreement. In the interview with the DED worker this issue was pointed at as one of the reasons why partnership, in their opinion, does not work. Their different approaches, and as the DED worker stated, cultural, religious and ethical issues makes cooperation on a mutual level extremely difficult. Both the DED worker and CCRR's director, being as dominant and stubborn as they were, did not always work along what was agreed

upon before their co-operation came to existence. This disagreement on how things should be done brought a lot of tension, not only between them, but within both organizations. The reality of their partnership also did not comply to the rhetoric of the partnership that was settled upon in their partnership agreement.

This strained relationship between the organizations goes back and forth; none of the organizations making an effort to create better understanding. When observing the partnerships it became obvious that while both organizations play the equal card, none of them seem to comply with the agreements set up beforehand.

Through observation and dialogue with both partners there came to be the notion that both partners mistrust their counterparts, both on organizational and personal level. Surprising about their mistrust of each other, is that both partners tend to overlook their mistrust when it comes to the result of the project as the most important goal of their co-operation. They both act as if the knowledge they have about each other does not exist, because to them, the outcome of the project is the most important. This due to both organizations putting their differences aside to look at the result of the project, instead of looking at what is wrong within their partnership or within their organization. This view was created after asking both organizations in interviews about why, despite the strained relationship and difficulties, they continued their cooperation. However, War Child's country director also told me in our interview, that they are fully aware of the way CCRR's director uses (or abuses) the information and finances provided by them. From my own observation I have been a witness of how the finances provided for by War Child are used for aspects that do not always account for the result of the project, or sometimes even used for the director's own good. One example that can be given is applying for grants after a workshop for participants who did not even participate in the workshop, which I observed myself when returning to office after the workshop. CCRR receives financial support for the participants, which includes a refund for gas, supplies and the rent of the accommodation, or by raising the financial needs in the budget for a new proposal, making sure that when they would receive a donation, that donation would be as high as possible.

CCRR's director, on the other hand, mistrusts the workers of War Child for keeping a hidden agenda and keeping information from him. On my own account I have seen how both organizations' mistrust plays a part in their co-operation. From the side of the NNGO, meaning that money supposed to be used for the project, sometimes is used for other means. Although no direct evidence of, what basically is corruption, can be provided, the resources the director has gained for himself and his family goes without saying. Whereas you might expect from a director who, in his own words, lives to provide for a better Palestinian community, it seems rather disturbing that according to Palestinian standards, the director's living accommodations and resources are much higher than the average Palestinian has. This in itself might not be evidence enough, but considering that when CCRR was founded in 2000, the organization's director, by his own account, started with nothing more than any other Palestinian living in the West Bank. In those 10 years of working as CCRR's director, he has acquired 3 houses; one for his family, one vacation home, and a house in Jordan for his daughter. He also has been able to send all of his sons and daughters abroad for their education, granting them financial security to complete their education at a foreign university.

Another example of each other's mistrust I have been involved in. As CCRR's planning, monitoring, and evaluation worker for the Young Negotiators Project I functioned as the link between War Child and CCRR on a daily basis. I visited the participating schools on a regular basis, after which I was responsible to write a report on what I have witnessed during workshops and meetings. After one particular visit, I had to conclude that the head master of the school did not sit well with the intention of the project. Where the project tends to teach the children non-violence communication, the head master of the school did not grasp the intention of the project. Whether this was a case of not wanting to admit to the severity of the situation or the lack of information on the project remains in the middle. The fact is that I wrote this in my report and I communicated my feelings with CCRR's director. He told me that in no way my ideas and feelings were to be communicated with War Child. They should not know about any negative response to the project, which is a sign of CCRR trying to show them only positive feedback, not wanting them to know about things that might not go as expected. However, two days after this incident, the director of CCRR got an email from the



representative of War Child that a meeting should be planned to talk about the projects' progress, after which I was called into his office. He accused me of sending my report to War Child, blaming me for overlooking his authority and grouping with War Child's side to put him in a negative perspective. In other words, he was extremely anxious to make sure War Child did not find out about any negative aspects of CCRR's execution of the project, not wanting them to have any idea that sometimes things can go wrong. This attitude comes from the fear of losing War Child's (mostly financial) support, making sure that everything that War Child finds out about the project is positive and successful. NNGO's like CCRR, due to the building of capacity in co-operation with an INGO, are pushed into a certain direction, which results in the situation where NNGOs become experts on communicating and writing reports and proposals exactly along the lines of the INGO. Also, competition with other NNGOs on the receiving of donations or the opportunity to start a partnership brings on this intentional positive reporting by NNGOs, knowing exactly how to compliment the INGOs' aims, goals, and expectations. Overlooking the negative when reporting to War Child is CCRR's way to ensure that War Child forms the idea that CCRR is the perfect partner and that the project should be continued through this partnership for a longer period of time.

Although War Child is well aware of all of this, they seem to deliberately overlook this aspect for the greater good: the success of the project. Gonzales, when talking about this aspect, that while corruption is incorporated in the co-operation between INGOs and NNGOs, CCRR's director in their opinion is exactly the kind of person they look for when looking for a partner. He is well established within Palestinian society, well-spoken, well-educated and very persistent; qualities that matter when dealing with a conflict of complexity. The outcome of the project is exactly as War Child wants, and searching for a different organization to implement the project, will not take away the corruption, an aspect existent in Palestinian society and Palestinian peacebuilding. The issue of corruption will return later on in chapter 7 of this thesis, as it is also an aspect of Palestinian peacebuilding in a more general view.

## 6.2 Partnership rhetoric

War Child mentions, in their partnership policy, as a definition of partnership that a partnership in their terms means a co-operational relationship between the involved organizations where they put in their potential and available resources, whether skills, finances or knowledge, to achieve goals set up as common goals in the partnership agreement and for which both organizations are accountable and responsible. The combining of available resources does comply with the idea of partnerships that the combining of several parts counts for more than the loose parts. Joint co-operation between organizations is envisioned in peacebuilding as a way to tie together more ends, to achieve goals that without co-operation might not be achieved. War Child as an organization focused on children, brought their expertise on children's issues, whereas CCRR brought in their knowledge of the Palestinian community, expertise on how to 'sell' the project to potential participants and how to organize the project on the ground. Partnerships between INGOs and NNGOs make it possible to put more focus on the tailoring of development and to provide to local needs and concerns. This is due to the involvement of the NNGO who provides for local expertise and resources well beyond the capabilities of the INGO. The INGO on the other hand provides for capacity building resources, which then enhances the ability of the NNGO to expand their services.

Fowler (1997) states with his definition, however, that a partnership is based on the idea of sharing, mutuality and equality for all partners. Equality is, however, a difficult issue when talking about a partnership. Considering that the partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR is an INGO-NNGO partnership, the INGO in this case, as is in most cases, is the organization responsible for the financial aspect of the partnership. This due to the lack of financial resources of the NNGO. While interviewing other employees of NNGOs in the West Bank, this came to be as a general issue for every NNGO, as they do not have the financial means to implement projects on their own account. CCRR is not able to contribute to the partnership on a financial level, due to their lack of financial resources. CCRR does, to balance this idea, bring in the most knowledge about the working environment, knowledge on the conflict, the limitations because of the conflict and the experience, for it has executed the project before it became in essence a partnership project, for several years. War Child

Netherlands does in its statement realize the difficulty with the term equality, as in this case when the INGO remains the funder of the project. Equality in this partnership therefore does not mean an equal sharing of responsibilities divided amongst the possible and needed resources, but while War Child definition does not mention the word equality, its basis for co-operation lies in the shared responsibility and the sharing of resources, based on what the organization is able to provide. This is all well, but there can be no denying that there appears a discrepancy between the organizations that brings in the funds and the organization that shares its knowledge, skills, and other resources. The known phrase: money means power, although not as visible, also dominated this collaboration. Where War Child can, without CCRR, implement a project due to having its own financial resources, CCRR has no financial security and is therefore still dependent on the financial aspect an INGO brings to the table. While the responsibilities between the organizations are divided along available resources; money, as is always the case, brings power. Without the financial aspect brought in by the INGO, the NNGO will still remain helpless in executing and implementing projects. While a partnership might bring more support due to the combining of resources and knowledge, money always remains the bigger issue. War Child Netherlands is, in this case, the organizations holding the money, and therefore still remains the stronger organization. Money equals power, so while there is a feeling of shared and joint co-operation, War Child Netherlands remains the upper hand in the relationship with CCRR, simultaneously undermining of what appears to be the basis of a partnership.

War Child Netherlands chooses its partners according to its partnership policy, which provides for a framework on how a partnership, according to their opinion, should function. To be able to provide for more insight of the actual workings of the partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR there is the need to dive into the more internal workings of the partnership, where the division between the responsibilities is looked at more closely. The co-operation between the INGO and NNGO on a more 'on the ground' level provides insight in how the workings of partnership in reality between War Child Netherlands and CCRR complies to what the INGO-NNGO partnership should be according to the INGOs partnership policy.

A partnership, as stated before, exists according to the combining of available resources from both the INGO and the NNGO. In the case of War Child Netherlands and CCRR there is a mutual understanding that responsibilities, besides the sharing of resources, are to be divided between the two. On top of this comes the resource division, where War Child provides the financial means and CCRR shares its local knowledge, skills, and expertise. The other responsibilities in the partnership include the design, implementation, planning, monitoring and evaluation, as does the communication and dialogue between the two organizations to check on the projects progress and to provide for better understanding. It includes also the issues of trust and respect from one organization to the other and back as a basis for eventual success of the project that comes out of the co-operation and with that a successful partnership

So according to definitions by both INGOs and NNGO as put together in a list of principles of partnership by INTRAC in 2001, the list given by Sarah Lister, the partnership policy of War Child Netherlands and the workings of the War Child-CCRR partnership: can we define the partnership between War Child Netherlands and CCRR as an authentic partnership?

The first and foremost issue we have already touched upon, namely equality. War Child holds account for the issue that equality is a term affected by interpretation, as I was told in two interview by employees. They hold equality not as an aspect which means that everything must be shared 50/50 between War Child and CCRR, but as an aspect that where one organizations cannot account for half of the resources, it will be balanced through the input of other resources. While the input amongst different aspects between the organizations is not equal, their contribution by other means guarantees that all responsibilities are divided equally. INTRAC follows this idea through their statement that partner organizations should work together to accomplish results and accept joint responsibility to achieve those results. INTRAC uses the term equality, but from the context it can be extracted that this equality is better suitable for the way the organizations see upon each other; that both the INGO and NNGO see each other as equal partners, and not that one outdoes the other or one is undermined by the other. Due to the difficulty of the term, Sarah Lister in her list did not even extract a statement

about equality, probably with the idea that this is an aspect that might be too inexplicable to use when achieving a partnership.

The aspect of equality is directly linked with what War Child accounts for transparency and accountability according to their partnership policy, to be reached through trust, openness, respect; aspects that both INTRAC (2001) and Lister (1997) include in their lists as principles of an authentic partnership. Between CCRR and War Child, these aspects, although important and therefore included in the partnership agreement, thus undeniable needs for a successful partnership, are not met through their feelings of mutuality.

Joint responsibility for the project that derives from the partnership is a next aspect when discussing the principles of partnership. In the partnership agreement both War Child and CCRR have signed, responsibilities for both organizations before, during, and after the execution of the partnership project are taken into account. The changing of circumstances within the project itself, or external due to the conflict, is understandable. The situation in which the project has to be implemented many times influences the progress of the project, which can include restrictions in movement, insufficient participation etc. The course of the project can be affected on many levels, but this mostly contains the actual execution of the project, which is mostly done by the hired workshop trainers. CCRR, before implementation, is responsible for the hiring of trainers, who then gain responsibility for the actual workshops to take place. During implementation, CCRR is responsible for the monitoring of the project; which contains the visitation of the schools by one of the CCRR's employees that partake in the project and to report back to both CCRR and War Child. The project is of such a scale, that it requires one employee of CCRR to execute that responsibility, which is also included in the partnership agreement. One employee of CCRR, whose salary is paid for by War Child, has as his or hers only responsibility the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the Young Negotiators Project. In reality, this is not the case for when I interned at CCRR I was appointed for this responsibility, whereas the employee who should, was taken by other tasks given by the director. CCRR was not able to take on the responsibilities it had signed on for when agreeing to the partnership, and then used an intern, who did not receive any compensation for her work, to take on the project for which she was not hired.

War Child's responsibility during the project included at least one visit by the War Child employee responsible to every school involved (8 in total), them being partly responsible for the monitoring of the project. During the implementation of the project, during which I visited every school at least 2 times, the War Child employee only escorted me twice, of a total of 16 visits. Next to this observation of CCRR's monitoring responsibilities, the War Child employee was also to visit CCRR during the project to communicate about the project, to see whether changes needed to be made and to be involved on the same level as the CCRR employee and have the same amount of information. War Child, however, also failed to comply to this aspect, having visited CCRR only twice during the execution of the project. Both organizations during the execution of the project failed to meet the requirements agreed upon in the partnership agreement, not fully able to take on the responsibilities that they had settled upon.

This in-depth analysis of the responsibilities of both CCRR and War Child gives insight in primarily the structural aspect of a partnership, or in other words: the partnership agreement. The above mentioned issues prove that while a lot can be written down on paper and can be agreed upon, the reality of the partnership leaves a lot to be desired. On paper, according to the theories on partnership, this partnership seems authentic, proving to contain every principle that deems necessary for a partnership to be a real partnership. In reality, however, the partnership proves to be less authentic as it appears to be, not following the guidelines and principles CCRR and War Child both have set and agreed upon, either in their partnership agreement or according to War Child's partnership policy. The discrepancy between what a partnership ought to be and how it actually plays out to be is too obvious to ignore. It sets the conclusion that the how and what of a partnership cannot be appointed according to a policy or an agreement, thus not corresponding with what in theory a partnership contains. The case of CCRR-War Child Netherlands gives a clear example that the rules and principles existing as guidelines for an authentic partnership, do not comply with this case in particular, as it might not comply with other cases. The existing theories, in this case, although available on paper and accounted for in rhetoric, cannot be applied to the reality of the case between War Child and CCRR. The unsuccessful part of the partnership between CCRR and War Child does seem to lie within mainly the structural aspect of the co-operation. The idea behind a partnership as

explained earlier does seem to be a more theoretical aspect in their co-operation, than their actual execution. So while the idea of a partnership seems to be appealing, in the case of War Child and CCRR, it shows primarily in the rhetoric, and less in reality.

### **6.3 The success of the project**

The most striking issue about the partnership between CCRR and War Child is that, according to evaluations of the project, both from previous years and the one written by myself, do actually account for a very successful project. This result became visible through participant observation while interning at CCRR. My first and foremost conclusion when finishing this project and while evaluating it, is that despite the organizational and structural issues of the partnership between CCRR and War Child, the project that has grown from the co-operation, does seem to reach every aim and goal set by both organizations. The project, which teaches non-violent communication to adolescents, is a major success, based on the motivation and willingness of schools to participate. The enthusiasm displayed by headmasters, social workers, parents and children when taking part in the project is overwhelming. All participants are asked, beforehand and after the project, to fill in a questionnaire about how they communicate with each other, their teachers and family. The differences that show between pre and post questionnaires, when evaluating the project, are astonishing, especially the way of thinking and dealing from the adolescent participants. Their innocence and bluntness when answering the question, before and after, cannot be viewed as a way to make the project look better than it is. Also, the responses to the project given by the parents, who mainly come from rural areas, are primarily positive. The West Bank is a mainly rural region, where primarily Islamic norms and values are important and do not change according to industrialization, modernization, or globalization. The idea behind the Young Negotiators Project does ask for the parents to look beyond what they are used to. Therefore their positive response to the project is important, because changing their existing norms and values is a big issue within their society. Also, being a witness to the whole project I have seen the participating children going from not taking the project seriously to realizing that these workshops gives them a platform to communicate about their feelings, ideas, and dreams for themselves and their families. From making fun of each other to

actually listen to each other, respecting each other's opinions and realizing that in this complex situation, people do listen to them and give them a feeling that they matter, makes in this case, for a successful project.

The project, that has been the fruit of the co-operation between CCRR and War Child results in a very successful project. It therefore can be argued that despite all the issues, and while taking them in consideration, the project that came from the partnership does what it is supposed to do. The question remains, whether this successful outcome can be explained by the partnership itself or, and what the contribution of a partnership is to the peacebuilding process in the West Bank.

Combining of the above results creates the image of a partnership that, behind the scenes, functions far from optimal, while the results of the partnership project remain successful. The structural problems of the partnership between War Child and CCRR do not seem to spill over into the results of the project. If these structural problems were to be resolved, it remains in the middle whether or not the outcome of the project would be either as successful or even more successful.

## **Conclusion**

By giving first hand experiences about the chosen case study in this thesis I try to show how ideas, theories and existing principles of partnership do not comply when looking at a particular case. Although some parts are aligned with the rhetoric of partnerships, the co-operation between War Child and CCRR in reality seems far from what it should be. The how and what of a partnership as given in the theoretical framework of this thesis, does not comply to the actual execution and implementation of the partnership, for which both organizations are responsible.

The next chapter will look more detailed into whether or not the use of a partnership influences or contributes to the peacebuilding process in Palestine, either positive or negative.



## **Chapter 7 Contribution to Peacebuilding**

In the previous chapter I assessed the theories of authentic partnerships in comparison with the observations and reality of the chosen case study; the War Child CCRR partnership. The comparison between what is a partnership as it exists on paper, and the actual reality of the partnership when conducted gave answers to the question on whether or not general views and theories can be upheld in real life. Although the results of this analysis might differ when taking other partnerships in consideration, in the case of the War Child-CCRR partnership, the idea of partnership authenticity could not be found in every aspect of the partnership when looking at its implementation. It makes clear that every partnership is different, which means that not every rhetorical aspect, as seen in the theoretical part of this thesis, can be identified in the reality of the partnership implementation. The question that remains is whether or not the partnership is an actual partnership, even with the flaws it might display in its implementation. More important even, is whether or not partnerships contribute to the existing peacebuilding process. Does a partnership bring better incentives for the peacebuilding process? or does it fail to bring something extra and does it crumble under the flaws that many other NGO peacebuilding display?

### **7.1 Positive incentives**

Each type of NGO activity has a certain goal, or, in other words, is supposed to have certain effects. With the choice of an INGO and NNGO to partner together, instead of the donor-receiver relationship, it states implicitly that this type of co-operation is, in their opinion, more useful and successful for both organizations to contribute to the peacebuilding process. It is true that working together creates better opportunities for both involved organizations. As stated by Verkoren (2008) peacebuilding has to be more than a top-down process. When using the donor-receiving relationship as a way of building peace, this is exactly what can be identified. The main organization in this relationship is the INGO, the organizations that holds the finances. NGOs compete for donations through writing possible project proposals, hoping

to be chosen from many applicants to receive funding so they can execute their project. From several interviews I conducted, many of the NGOs told me that the main opportunity that grows from collaboration is that the process received input from two different points of view. NGOs can fulfill different positions on different levels in society. It seems clear to state that an INGO functions on a different level from the NNGO. NNGOs function very closely to the community, creating incentives for peace to take root in society, before it becomes to mean something. INGOs function on a different level, being able to look at a situation from a different perspective, therefore able to bring new ways of working to the table. Together with an NNGO, the peacebuilding process can take root both from the top-down to the grassroots level. Combining two organizations working on different levels can create for what Lister (2007) sees as bridgebuilding and capacity building opportunities.

It comes down to what Goodhand (2006) states that working together as two organizations from the middle, they create lines upwards and downwards to the community, building bridges between different groups and to cross lines that have been negatively affecting the peacebuilding process.

A second contribution that the NGOs see when asked about the role of partnership is that INGO-NNGO co-operation also evolves into the situation where both organizations, together, create better opportunities and therefore better capacities for their activities. This comes from the idea, as stated earlier, that putting two things together creates for better outcomes than one loose part. Both organizations put in their available resources to create a project that works for both organizations and to for both organizations this means that they can use their resources to the best of their abilities. With this strengthening of capacity, as a result from partnering, both organizations also create the ability to learn from each other. INGOs and NNGOs create opportunities to educate each other according to their own expertise. NNGOs, working closely within a certain community, can educate INGOs on how their way of working is successful. INGOs on the other hand, can teach NNGOs their way of working, which then both organizations can use to optimize their own way of working. Indirectly, this means that while working together through a partnership optimizes bridge building and capacity building, the organizations individually also optimize their own way of functioning for future project.

Partnerships in peacebuilding do contribute to the peacebuilding process by creating the opportunity to optimize their way of working and functioning and to create better incentives for peace by combining resources to create better results.

However, while partnerships might be a different way of collaboration between INGOs and NNGOs, the limitations to NGO peacebuilding, unfortunately, do not pass by this form of co-operation. Negative aspects of NGO involvement in peacebuilding remain visible, also in NGO partnerships. These negative results have been assessed in the previous chapter, but the more general limitations of NGO involvement in peacebuilding will be discussed further.

## **7.2 Negative aspects of NGO Peacebuilding**

Within Palestinian peacebuilding, there are several aspects that might limit to the contribution of NGOs to the peacebuilding process. As already analyzed in chapter 6, is that both external and internal problems might influence the way of functioning of peacebuilding activities, which became also visible from own observations. In this part of the thesis I will go further into the limitations of NGO peacebuilding. Peacebuilding, whether through a partnership or not, seems not to be able to overlook the limitations visible in Palestinian peacebuilding in general. The involvement of NGOs, no matter the form of co-operation, limits the success of peacebuilding in several ways.

The first aspect discussed in this part will be focusing on the internal structure of NGOs, which can be divided into the decision-making process of NGOs and the negative consequences of corruption. Palestinian men, as head of their families, behave according to the role of the Pater Familias, being the most important man of the family. This hierarchical structure can be identified in the structure of many NGOs in Palestine. The director of the organization is the most dominant, knowledgeable person in the organization, whereas most of the employees of NGOs are women. This was also the case for CCRR, as explained earlier in this thesis. The patriarchal system in NGOs and the prominent dominant male directors do tend to overlook a democratic structure. The organizations therefore tend to revolve around the director. These directors tend to position themselves as the only decisive power in the organization,

overlooking the possibility of consultation of other staff members of the organization. This was also identified in both interviews with the INGOs, War Child and the DED who, from their perspective, see this hierarchical system as negative. Internal decision-making structures in Palestinian NGOs tend to be rather hierarchical, instead of spread out. From my own experience and from conversation with a female employee of a Palestinian NGO I retrieved the statement that male organization directors prefer female staff over male, because it is easier to overrule the women. This idea comes from the general conception in Palestinian society that it is not accepted that women challenge males in public, making it easier for a male director to do what he prefers. A result of this is that the skills of female employees are not put into good use, which might effectiveness of the work of the NGOs. Simultaneously, as stated by War Child, a strong leader can also be effective to represent the organization.

The next section of the internal structure is the issue of corruption, which I have already touched upon with examples of the NNGO in chapter 6. Although never explicitly discusses, it is striking how normal corruption seems to be in the Palestinian NGO sector and how easily it is overlooked by every actor involved in the peacebuilding process. In line with the patriarchal structure of Palestinian NGOs, another example of family values becomes clear. In Arab society, families are large and family values and norms are important. The support of their families functions as a bases in society, which takes shape by people favoring family members over other. This can be made visible in every aspect of life, but apply this to organizations, and it becomes clearer. There are no laws prohibiting this favoritism, but putting this into action without a legitimate reason makes it what we see as corruption. This form of corruption is nepotism, something not uncommon in Palestinian peacebuilding, including the NGO from the case. Family members, even when not qualified, are favored over people who have the qualities. An example of an Palestinian NGO I visited showed this by having four employees, two of them being personal friends of the director, not having a degree on the issue and also, according to a source, paid double of what the other employees receive, which lead to the next part: financial corruption. I do not want to make the claim that corruption exists in every NGO, but it does exists, and it is not even hard to identify.

In Chapter 6 I gave an example of this kind of corruption when talking about making claims for supposed participants of a workshop who did not show up and the wealth the director has gained over the years after setting up the NGO. Financial corruption sometimes results in the INGO shutting down funding or cancelling entire projects, as I was able to witness. The negative effect on peacebuilding is that cancelling projects or funding can severely damage the peacebuilding intentions and the effectiveness of peacebuilding.

A third issue that limits the contribution to peacebuilding is the distance of the NGOs to the Palestinian population. One of the valuable contributions many scholars, like Goodhand (2006), mention is the close relations of NGOs to the communities they provide for. Looking at the NGOs in this thesis, and many more from own experience, it seems that while they seem to function close the society, their pay scales are far better than the ordinary Palestinian. This results in the NGO sector becoming a sector where professionalism becomes a prerequisite. Professionals, due the higher pay scale, seek a job in the NGO sector as it pays more. From this grows the idea of the NGO sector as an elite sector, where only professionals with a certain level of education are employed, forgetting the ordinary Palestinian, who might have more knowledge about the needs of the community. This, instead of working closely to the community, it distances NGO practices as it becomes a sector where only educated people can be employed and where the salary upstages other jobs.

The relationship between INGOs and NNGOs and the community in this sense also becomes distance becomes the workers at NGOs no longer represent the ordinary Palestinian, as they are no longer themselves part of the normal society. Also, NGO workers, instead of seeking advice from the community then decide, based on their representational opinion, which projects are suitable for the Palestinian community. This feeling grows even stronger when taking into consideration that INGOs impose their ideas upon the NNGO, which already has a certain distance from the community. INGOs are even further distanced from reality, as they bring along their (mostly Western) values, norms and experience as the right way to impose projects based on the marginalized groups' needs.

NGO practices, while having its positive influence on peacebuilding, for these reasons do not bring the needed positive change. The problems that occur in the NGO sector, also when

we are not talking of partnerships, do not disappear when INGOs and NNGOs are getting involved with each other. It can even be stated that due to this collaboration the distance between the NGOs and reality becomes larger and therefore does not contribute positively contribute to the peacebuilding process.

## **Conclusion**

Every issue can be looked at from two sides, in this case both positive reinforcement of NGO activities and negative influences on the working of peacebuilding. While INGO-NNGO can influence the process positively, the existing problems that can be identified in Palestinian peacebuilding do not disappear when getting involved in a partnership. These negative aspects do however seem to overshadow the positive influence which partnerships can exude, due to the fact that the negative influence of NGO peacebuilding in general remains when looking at new ways of NGO collaboration. For partnership to function mostly positive, it deems necessary that such a way of co-operation has to take away already existing problems. This, however, is not the case.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

### Conclusion

The rationale of this thesis is to gain insight in the workings of partnership co-operation between INGOs and NNGOs and the contribution of those partnerships to the peacebuilding process. Partnerships exist on two different levels, in partnership rhetoric and in partnership reality. Theories on NGO partnerships try to explain how a partnership should work for it to be an authentic partnership. However, due to the general nature of these theories there remains the question whether or not each partnership can be explained according to those theories and whether these theories can be upheld when taking into consideration a certain partnership within a certain situation. The next issue is whether or not the use of NGO partnership does contribute to the peacebuilding process or if it does not. Hence the research question: *How do INGO-NGO partnerships function and to what extent do they contribute to the peacebuilding process in the West Bank, Palestine?*

To get an answer to this question a case study was chosen, a partnership between War Child (INGO) and CCRR (NNGO). This partnership has been conducting for several years, executing the Young Negotiators Project in the West Bank, Palestine. Using this case study, the goal was to see whether or not the theories on partnerships can be compared to the workings of the partnership between the two organizations. Comparing the rhetoric on partnerships and the actual working of the chosen partnership, it became soon obvious that there appear many discrepancies. Of the many aspects that belong to a partnership, only some appeared to be executed within the partnership between War Child and CCRR. What makes a partnership a partnership? Aspects of partnership can be identified in the case study, based on the partnership policies. Some of these aspects, although identified on paper and functioning as guidelines for the partnership between War Child and CCRR, were much harder to identify in the implementation of the partnership. The issue of equality between the organizations involved seems a tricky aspect, although both War Child and CCRR agree that equality in their case has its own meaning. Equality in the case of partnership means the division of equal resources, based on the availability of resources. Both organizations have their own resources, which can either be financial, or can be expertise or knowledge. In this case War Child holds the financial responsibility, and CCRR has other, less touchable resources, to contribute to the

partnership. Equality in this partnership means the sharing of responsibilities of the project and giving input according to the resources each organization has available. Another aspect of partnership is identified is that the involved organizations should trust each other and respect each other. The issues of trust and respect are aspects that are hard to identify in the relationship between CCRR and War Child, this based on observations while working for the partnership project. Both organizations mistrust each other, this because both organizations think the other has no idea about the wrongdoings within their organization. Both organizations have made clear that they do know what is going on, but this mistrust is either kept away, or sometimes even overlooked when the success of the project is taken into account. Both organizations think, or know, that the other organization is using its abilities to put the organization into a corner. Trust and respect is fake in this partnership, but both organizations try to appear trustful and respectful towards each other. The reason for this lack of trust and respects is due to several issues that can be identified in the structure of the partnership, the NGO sector and peacebuilding in Palestine. The lack of internal cohesion and the hierarchy of the NNGO contribute to this by not functioning according to what is agreed upon in the partnership agreement. The INGO contributes to this by not taking the responsibilities in the execution of the project as is agreed upon. Both organizations defy the agreements made in different ways, where the responsibilities divided are not conducted accordingly.

The answer to the question if partnerships have a positive or negative influence on the NGO peacebuilding process in Palestine becomes clear in the last part of the thesis. There are positive effects; the most important is the combination of abilities, resources, knowledge and expertise, with the idea that the combining of these aspects enlarges the capacities of both organizations. The idea that two can do more than one is the main idea behind this positive influence. The negative effects a partnership can have are mainly based on the problems that already exist within NGO peacebuilding and which do not disappear when getting involved in a partnership. Corruption remains an issue, although not discusses very prominently. The issue of corruption, both financial corruption and nepotism, is many times overlooked due to the positive outcome of the partnership project. The project between War Child and CCRR is just



one example. Where internally the partnership does not function accordingly, it does seem to reach an enormous amount of potential participants and the participants all remain very positive about the prospects the project has given them. The distance between NGOs and the community which they represent, due to the difference in pay scales and the expansion of the NGO sector as an elitist profession, does not contribute to the peacebuilding process either. While this is not a result of partnerships in general, it does undermine the whole ideology of partnerships, where both the INGO and NNGO in combination represent the marginalized groups in society.

The issue of partnerships is a disputable issue, as every partnership is different and cannot be universalized by using guidelines on how a partnership should function either on paper or in reality. Partnerships differ from each other as every conflict differs, as does every NGO. This does not mean that a certain partnership is not a partnership because it does not follow the theoretical guidelines. In the case of War Child and CCRR, despite the internal problems, does appear to reach the goals set in the partnership agreement. The outcome of the partnership project is successful, the internal structure, implementation and execution leave a lot to be desired. These flaws are partly due to the problems that arise in Palestinian NGO peacebuilding in a more general sense. Maybe when CCRR and War Child overcome these problems the contribution to the peacebuilding process gains momentum.

## **Recommendations**

This research has shown that there are many aspects to partnership and peacebuilding that should be reconsidered or reassessed. Although some of these aspects stem from the context of the NGO sector in Palestine, most of them come from the NGOs involved in the partnership and in peacebuilding. Apart from this research I would like to make some personal recommendations which, according to my point of view, could increase the potential for partnerships to function to its full abilities and might then create more positive influences on the peacebuilding process.

First, Palestinian peacebuilding NGOs have much to gain from a change of perspective when it comes to the cooperation between INGOs and NNGOs. The internal structure of partnerships lacks cohesion, trust, and respect towards each other's capabilities. Overcoming these issues strengthens the internal structure of both the NNGO and the INGO and their cooperation in general. This strengthening can then hopefully result in an even better project, which does have a great impact on the peacebuilding process in Palestine.

Secondly, corruption influences the result of peacebuilding greatly. Both NNGOs and INGOs should not overlook an issue as it influences the outcomes of the success of a partnership and the potential contribution to peacebuilding simultaneously. Corruption is a serious problem and should not be accepted as something that just happens. Taking on the issue of corruption can lead to an increased potential for both NNGOs and INGOs and their position as an NGO grows, as people see the seriousness of attacking such problems. As my research has shown, INGOs are well aware of the existence of corruption, but seem to close their eyes in order to protect the success of the project. When INGOs are clear about their intentions to take on corruption, the view of NNGOs on INGOs will change and they will be less likely to laugh behind the INGOs back because they are able to corrupt the system without receiving warning. NNGOs also might then receive more funding, because the trust of INGOs in NNGOs will increase and strengthened.

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
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- War Child Partnership Policy draft version, 2010

## Appendix I



Map 1: Area's A, B, C in the West Bank, source: [www.mideastweb.org/thefence](http://www.mideastweb.org/thefence)

## Appendix II

### Interview with Andres Gonzales, Middle East Representative War Child Holland

**23<sup>rd</sup> of June, 2010, War Child Holland Headquarters, East-Jerusalem**

After working as an intern at the Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation and my involvement in the partnership project Young Negotiators Program with War Child Holland, I sat down with Middle East Representative Andres Gonzales for questions about the collaboration between his organization and CCRR to discuss the partnership.

*1) Could u elaborate on the definition of partnership from your point of view?*

A partnership, from our point of view is collaboration with a local, regional, or national organization in the area where we work. A partnership is a relationship based on mutuality, common understanding between an international organization, War Child, and an organization based in the region. In a partnership we try to give each other mutual support to increase capacity for both partners based on a common goal. Partnerships aim for an equal relation between the involved partners, based on the available resources, for example financial input or knowledge, which in our case most of the time means that War Child is responsible for the finances and the partner provides knowledge. Equality is therefore a perception between the organizations, where we try to level the input not based on equal sharing of the same resources, but balance the input based on the possible resources a partner has. The local organization, in my view, has the power in a partnership, which I base on the fact that knowledge, expertise and capacity coming from a local organization provides us the availability to implement a project. This, combined with our financial input, empowers the local NGO.

*2) How does War Child Holland choose its partners?*

War Child uses selective criteria when it comes to choosing a partner. The first criterion is the project proposal. We choose a proposal that fits War Child based on our framework. We then organize meetings and discussions with the organization to create a proposal that fits both organizations. Different aspects of both organizations are measured according to the proposal to create a project in which both organizations can use their available resources. Eventually, War Child does still hold the 'power' to decide whether or not a partner is right for collaboration. After this decision we, both partners, then create a strategy to implement the project.

*3) Can a local NGO choose War Child as a partner? Or does War Child initiate cooperation?*



Although the partnership mostly comes forth from the choice of a certain project proposed by a local partner, we can be flexible when it comes to a local organization contacting War Child to create a project together, instead of a sort of contest of who has the best proposal. If an organization fits War Child's strategy, aims, and goals, we can always create the situation where a new project is designed from scratch between War Child and the other organization.

4) *What is the responsibility of the partner organization in the design of the project?*

The responsibility of the partner organization or War Child is based on the how and what of a project, which is created through meetings, discussions, questioning and takes into account the available resources of each organization involved. This differs in every partnership War Child undertakes.

5) *How many partnerships in Palestine? And in Israel?*

War Child has, in Palestine and Israel a total of 12 partnerships, 7 in Palestine and 5 in Israel. The focus of all of these partnerships is based on the same idea of human rights, or the Palestinian rights. The partnerships conducted in Israeli territory are also focused on the Palestinians, in this case the Palestinian Israelis; the Arab population living within the country of Israel, who have their own problems. It is good to know that War Child does not implement partnerships in every region we work, yet. At this moment we the Middle East and Columbia are the only regions where we work with partnerships alone. In other countries we combine self-implementation with partnerships and in other countries we focus on self-implementation only. The reason for this is that after years of experience, partnerships in the Middle East are for us the best way to get our job done.

6) *How long does a partnership last? How does this influence the sustainability of a project?*

War Child does not define the specific length of a partnership, although we do care about long-term results. War Child does not have clear policies on how short or long a partnership should last, it depends mostly on the experience within the partnership and the outcome of the project. A partnership has to last at least a couple of years to create sustainability and build more capacity in the implementation of the project. Most of the time a partnership lasts 3 to 4 years. In the case with CCRR, we have been in a partnership for almost 7 years, which makes it a special partnership. Sometimes, after a partnership ends, we search for a different organization to take on the already existing project to see whether or not things can be changed to create better impact or better outcomes. Our goal with the Young Negotiator Program (the project executed with

CCRR) is to reach as many children as possible, which in co-operation with CCRR is as high as we would like it to be.

- 7) *Why is CCRR a different case when it comes to partnerships?* As is said, we have been working with CCRR for 7 years, which is special. Normally, after a couple of years we switch partners to create a situation where the partnering with a different organization might bring some new insights or better or other outcomes. In the case of CCRR, the whole situation is different, which might be a little difficult to explain. We, at War Child, sense that the capacity building in the case of working with CCRR is different from any other organization we have worked with. This comes forth from the idea that it almost feels like CCRR is more of a company than an NGO. Not because CCRR wants to make a large profit from working with War Child, but because of the enormous success of the project, in terms of planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Of course, not everything is perfect. CCRR is in dire need of better organizations skills. We know exactly what is wrong within CCRR, although the director thinks we don't. We know there is corruption, fraud, manipulation etc. However, every organization has its flaws, and the mentioned flaws are plenty within Middle Eastern culture and other cultures. On the other hand, looking at what CCRR accomplishes, taking from witnesses, evaluations, and observation, the outcome of the project is great. The participation level of schools in the West Bank is high, schools are waiting in line to participate and the best explanation for this is because of CCRR's director. He has flaws, but on the other hand, he is intelligent, persuasive, highly esteemed in Palestinian community, his communication skills are excellent and seems to be highly motivated. He as a person is the kind of director we would like to see in every organization.

- 8) *How does War Child measure the success of the projects?*

Measuring the success of a project is not possible in the literal sense. There is no measurement tool to create numbers as an outcome to the success of the project. Most of the measurements, if you can see it like that, are done through evaluations, observations, return visits and the enormous motivation of schools to participate. The reaction, ideas taken from the children, head masters, social workers and parents involved in the project are taken into account to see how the project affects the community participating in the project. It is important to forget the bigger picture of peace building, but we look at the results on the ground, which is our way to achieve success.

- 9) *In what way does a partnership contribute to the peace building process in Palestine? Or how does the working through a partnership influence the peace building process.*

Peace building in itself is a difficult process, internal and external, so we try to look at it differently than peace building as a general idea. What I find positive about a partnership is that due to working together the role of the international organization becomes more neutral, due to giving the partner organizations the same amount of responsibility, which according to us creates more potential in reaching our goal. On the other hand, the local organization might receive more responsibility for a project that than they are used to. This can create problems, but also means that because of this, a suited organization becomes less easy to find, whereas this creates better co-operation. With this comes the fact that due to partnering with other organizations, War Child becomes involved more closely with different groups in Palestinian society, creating better knowledge on how to work and hopefully therefore we will be getting better results, thus contributing to the peace building process more successfully. Empowerment of staff is also important, both War Child and the partners are able to teach each other, creating better understanding amongst each other and therefore better knowledge about the how and what of peace building. We try to make a difference, but it is difficult to measure success on such a big scale. We tend to look at the smaller picture, but will hopefully inspire other organizations to take on the same ideas and together we will contribute to the bigger picture and influence the existing process.

**NOTE:** At the time of the publication of this thesis I was informed that after 7 years the partnership between CCRR and War Child Netherlands had been cancelled due to irreconcilable differences. The more detailed explanation of the cancellation has not reached me.

## Appendix III

### The rulings and articles on the illegality of Israeli Settlements

**Article 46 and 55 of the Hague Convention:** Article 46 prohibits confiscation of private property in occupied territory. Article 55 of the same Hague Convention stipulates “the occupying state shall be regarded only as administrator usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.” (<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/195-200065?OpenDocument>)

**Section III, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention** explicitly stipulates that “the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” (<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/380-600056?OpenDocument>)

**UN Security Council Resolution 465 (1980-unanimously adopted)** made it clear that “Israel’s policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants” in the Occupied Territories constitutes “a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East”. The Security Council called upon Israel to “dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction or planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.” (<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5AA254A1C8F8B1CB852560E50075D7D5>)

**The July 2004 ruling of the International Court of Justice in The Hague** declares that “Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and an obstacle to peace and to economic and social development.” (<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=71&code=mwp&p1=3&p2=4&p3=6&ca...>)

## **Appendix IV**

### **War Child Holland**

### **Partnership Policy**

October 2009.

## **Index**

### **PART I: THE POLICY**

Introduction .....	103
1. Partnership – a definition .....	104
2. Why Partnerships? .....	104
3. The Principles of Partnerships .....	108
4. Commitments and Expectations.....	110
5. Types of Partnerships.....	111

### **PART II: GUIDELINES FOR PARTNERSHIPS**

## Introduction

The case for partnerships is clear and straightforward. As an international organisation that aims for a lasting impact based on the real needs of children and young people in conflict affected areas, working with local partners is a logical approach which also promotes the empowerment of local actors and sustainability. This approach improves the quality of local partners and initiatives while optimizing the distribution of War Child Holland's (WCH) limited resources to positively influence the lives of children affected by armed conflict.

This Partnership Policy describes how WCH defines partnership, why WCH strives towards partnerships, what the principles of partnerships are, what partners can expect of WCH and the different types of partnerships in which WCH engages. This document includes a second part, which translates the policy into practical guidelines.

This policy document outlines the "why" and "what" of partnership and to a large extent also the "how". Still, the contexts in which WCH works are changing as is WCH itself. In that sense this document is not exhaustive and will change over time as new approaches will be added or updated to reflect WCH experiences and changing contexts. Nevertheless the policy provides WCH management, staff and its partners with a clear rationale and approach to partnerships.

This (revised) Partnership Policy was drafted as a result of a comprehensive consultation process, which began in June 2009 with a workshop during the WCH international program meeting. Following this workshop, extensive consultation sessions were held with WCH head office and field staff members from all levels of the organization. WCH's current partners across WPAs have also been consulted throughout the process. In addition, a field assessment was conducted in Uganda, to ensure in-depth field level consultation with WCH partners, children and young people.

## **1. Partnership – a definition**

WCH collaborates in many ways with a wide variety of different types of groups and organizations, but not all of these types of working relationships can be called partnerships.

WCH defines a partnership as:

*A cooperative relationship between WCH and other groups or organisations where involved organisations share their complementary resources in terms of skills, knowledge, human resources and/or finances to achieve common goals based on the rights of children, and accept joint responsibility for achieving them.*

This definition implies a deliberate choice to jointly share responsibility, accountability and influence and goes beyond the notion of a one way funding relationship. It reflects longer term integral relationships where all parties contribute, learn, grow and benefit mutually in their organizational and programming capacity in order to achieve greater and better results for children.

## **2. Why Partnerships?**

### **2.1 General**

Partnerships are central to the way WCH works. The circumstances, the size and type of these partner groups or organizations as well as the way these partnerships are implemented vary. WCH considers its ability and determination to adapt to the needs of local contexts, including flexible arrangements with specific partner groups or organizations, as one of its strengths in working in partnerships.

#### **Focus on results for children and young people affected by armed conflict.**

WCH sees partnerships as a means and mechanism towards achieving better and greater results for children and young people (CYP) affected by armed conflict and ensuring that these results endure long after the partnership has ended. WCH will only engage in partnerships leading to clearly articulated and realistic results for CYP and their caretakers affected by armed conflict. WCH always puts the rights of CYP first, and in circumstances where partnerships are not a feasible option in effectively addressing this priority, WCH will self implement its programs. Particularly where the local and community structures are not functioning or are nonexistent there may be an initial need for self implementation. In these situations WCH may consider it important to support community based groups or initiatives to grow into independent and meaningful civil society actors. The mobilization, empowerment and strengthening of these initiatives enable communities, including CYP, to take up their responsibilities to ensure children's rights.

Partnerships are never used as a quick substitute for WCH self implementation and partners are always strengthened and supported by WCH through close presence and dialogue in the field.



This on-the-ground presence and direct accessibility, combined with an emphasis on hands-on support and building mutual trust through a close working relationship are unique and highly valued elements of WCH partnerships.

The implementing strategy in any situation is determined by an assessment of the viability of potential partnership's including the complementary and cohesive values, resources and capacities of an organization or group and WCH. When choosing to engage in partnerships, the organisations will complement and support WCH's vision, mission, strategy, program themes and cross cutting approaches<sup>9</sup>. When self implementing programs, WCH will proactively seek maximum coordination with other organisations and authorities and will ensure that actions are based on the meaningful participation and empowerment of children, young people and their communities.

## **2.2 Strategic fit**

WCH Holland is a fast growing independent and impartial international non governmental Child Rights based organization. WCH works in conflict and post conflict environments empowering children and young people to take up their rights and responsibilities. In order to guide its future growth in terms of program quality, scope, impact and required resources and skills, a vision, mission and strategic direction for 2010-2015 was developed. The vision and mission call for *unleashing the inner strength of children affected by war, using a creative and involving approach empowering children to shape their own future.*

The strategy describes WCH as a child rights based organisation, committed to

- Furthering the realization of children's rights as laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and other human rights instruments in all our programming and communications work.
- Being guided by children's rights standards derived from the UNCRC and other human rights instruments in all places and at all stages of our programming and communications process.
- Contributing to the development of the capacity of duty bearers to meet their obligations and supporting children to claim their rights.

This is achieved through the implementation of programs in thematic areas using specific cross cutting approaches and intervention strategies:

### **Thematic lines**

>> Child Protection. WCH strives towards a situation in which CYP in conflict affected areas are safe and protected. All CYP have the right to be protected from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse as per the UNCRC Articles 19, 38 and 39. To achieve this, WCH works

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<sup>9</sup> Refer: WCH Strategic Direction 2010-2015 and WCH Programming Framework.

towards increased quality and availability of child friendly protection systems, increased knowledge on the CRC in general and protection in particular, reduction of discrimination and stigmatization and increased opportunities for children and care givers to report and address instances of violence and abuse.

>> Education. WCH's interventions aim to promote access to quality formal and non-formal education which includes child centred and active learning methods in a safe participatory environment for all CYP. WCH considers education as the foundation for human development and the life long process of acquiring the knowledge and skills required to survive, develop full capacities, live and work in dignity, participate fully in development, improve quality of life and make informed decisions and continue learning. By supporting educational activities WCH also aims to restore certain levels of normality for CYP affected by conflict enabling them to regain their future perspective (CRC Articles 28, 29, 30).

>> Psychosocial support. The well-being of children is determined by a continuous interplay between psychological and social factors and consists of healthy emotional, cognitive, social and spiritual development. WCH builds the capacity of key stakeholders to improve the well-being of CYP by strengthening the protective factors that are crucial for their healthy psychosocial development and resilience (CRC Article 39).

**Cross cutting approaches.** WCH emphasizes three important approaches in its work, cutting across each program theme. These approaches constitute an essential part of WCH's identity and methodology. They are:

- Creative Methods. WCH aims to prioritize and effectively use creative interactive methods throughout its programs to empower and ensure that children, young people and those working with them can take part meaningfully in activities.
- Participation and Inclusion. Meaningful participation strengthens the capacities of children, young people and other key stakeholders to actively contribute to program activities and in decisions affecting their lives and provides them with the practical opportunity to do so. Inclusion ensures that all groups of CYP have the opportunity to participate, partnering with them and their communities in strengthening positive, non discriminatory practice and overcoming the causes of inequality and discrimination.
- Conflict Sensitivity. WCH aims to make all operations and programs conflict sensitive by applying conflict analyses to each stage of the program cycle and ensuring that WCH's actions and behaviours take into account the surrounding conflict(s).

The programs use three types of **intervention strategies**:

- Direct Service Delivery is the direct implementation of activities for CYP by staff members of WCH or partner organizations.
- Capacity building is the strengthening of capabilities, skills, knowledge and expertise of individuals, partners, communities and WCH staff to deliver quality in programming, child safety personnel policy, financial management, administration, fundraising, ICT, logistics and security to ensure accountability and sustainability in country programs;

- Advocacy is building a constituency of support for children and young people's rights by improving policies and practices in order to better protect and promote children and young people's rights via activities at the local and/or international level. These activities bring a lasting, structural positive change for CYP affected by armed conflict.

The ambition is to *directly reach one million children and young people in at least 15 to 20 (post)conflict zones by 2015*. This represents a significant increase from the current scope. These children will not be reached by the activities of WCH alone. The scope, quality and impact of WCH's programs are increasingly determined by the work with partners at all levels. The leveraging of this network in a comprehensive and focused way will achieve much more in the areas of advocating for children's rights, collective learning and coordination than WCH can accomplish alone. Children are increasingly reached through interventions with partners and through mobilizing and collaborating with coalitions, platforms and coordination groups.

To achieve objectives in the above mentioned areas, as set out in the organizational strategy and programming framework, WCH will engage in more, more focused and better informed partnerships; in more structural partner capacity building; and in strategic mobilization of partnership networks. Only through embracing partnerships can WCH's ambitions in cooperation with children, young people and their caregivers be achieved.

### **2.3 Added value**

WCH defines the added value and its reasons for engaging in partnerships as follows:

Better and greater results for children and young people. Leveraging WCH's limited resources with those of partners means that more children, young people and communities can be reached. More resources can be mobilized. The use of additional and complementary partner knowledge and expertise is expected to lead to better informed and more effective programs. Complementary partner expertise in the WCH program thematic areas and cross cutting approaches will deepen the quality of interventions. Partners that bring complementary skills in other program areas make a broader integral Child Rights program possible by addressing gaps in needs that would fall outside of the mandate and expertise of WCH.

- Stronger advocacy with and for children affected by war. Successfully influencing relevant policy through lobbying, campaigning, research, sensitization and education can only be achieved by joining forces with partners at different levels. Advocacy campaigns, led by local partners in politically sensitive environments, are often the best way to effectively achieve advocacy objectives. In other cases partner's participation will provide the legitimacy and increase the effectiveness of advocacy campaigns, while international lobbying is most effective through international coalitions and platforms. In circumstances where partners do not have the political space to advocate directly, WCH (in coalition with other international agencies) may opt for leading advocacy campaigns.

- More innovation and replication. Using innovative and replicable programs has become a central component of the WCH approach. Partnerships can lead and contribute to innovative programs. Bringing together additional resources, complementary expertise and knowledge is expected to lead to increased learning, resulting in better program methods and delivery models for all organizations involved. Partnership is an effective means of sharing lessons learned and replicating successful innovations. The scaling up of successful innovative interventions by mobilizing the networks of WCH as well as its partners provides more legitimacy and a wider impact. Partnerships are seen as an important means to initiate, implement, replicate and disseminate successful innovative models. Partnerships are also seen as an important tool to increase the coverage and ultimate impact of WCH's service delivery, advocacy and capacity building for sustainable development.
- More lasting and locally owned results. Ultimately WCH programs aim to ensure a peaceful future for all children which cannot be done without their direct and meaningful participation in issues concerning them. Partnerships aim to create stronger local organisations and structures enabling people to take charge of their own protection and development needs, sustaining the work of partner organisations. Lasting and locally owned development and promotion of children and young people's active participation will form the basis of a society where child rights are respected.

### 3. The principles of partnerships

WCH holds itself and its partners accountable to the following principles<sup>10</sup> underlying partnerships. WCH takes upon itself the obligation to demonstrate in a fair and accurate way that its partnerships are conducted in accordance with these principles. WCH will ask its partners to agree to and jointly report on these principles:

- Equality. Power, resources and the influence of each organisation in a partnership are of course rarely the same. Partner organization or groups bring different skills, capacities and resources into partnerships. These complementary inputs will be recognized and valued from the start of the partnership. For WCH and its partners, equality refers to the right of both partners to contribute to and determine the working relationship including its programming and operational components, based on mutual respect for each other's values, mandates, obligations, restrictions and independence.
- Reputation. The partners will protect each other's reputation and brand and commit to learning from each other.
- Transparency and accountability. Transparency is achieved through structural dialogue and a trusting relationship built on systematic accountability. Information on financial management, access to other resources, activities, results and/or lack of progress need to

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<sup>10</sup> Based on the work and principles of the Global Humanitarian Network.

be communicated openly and in a timely manner. Partner organizations hold a common responsibility to be accountable to stakeholders, donors and beneficiaries including children and young people. Initial consultations and joint needs assessments with partners should include recognition of the need to define how joint accountability and reporting will be dealt with.

- Programs will be built on a Child Rights analysis interpreting children's right to survival and development in the broadest sense, encompassing physical, psychological, emotional, social and spiritual development. Programs will mainstream the meaningful participation of children, young people and communities through inclusive and interactive methodologies. Working in a participative and inclusive way means actively promoting the participation of all groups, but especially group who are marginalized or vulnerable on the basis of religion, ethnicity, disability, gender, political affiliation, or other stigma; promoting meaningful participation of children at all levels of the program cycle, and reflecting the understanding of the evolving capacities of children to be active participants in their own lives.
- Do No Harm. Ensuring the best interest of children with whom partners engage is always the highest concern in program design, implementation and evaluation. WCH has the obligation to accomplish its work responsibly, with integrity and in a relevant and appropriate way. We must ensure that we commit ourselves to activities with partners only when we have the means, competencies and skills to deliver on our commitments. Adherence to the principles and standards of Child Rights and safeguarding children in our work with partners will guide our joint efforts.
- Child safety. WCH is committed to the protection of children and recognizes that we have a fundamental duty of care towards the children with whom we come in contact in the course of our work and acknowledges our responsibilities for keeping children safe in all interventions. WCH and its partners will uphold the standards as set in its Child Safety Policy.
- Conflict sensitivity. WCH is aware of the potential of any humanitarian or development intervention to have a negative impact on the context in which it is working. WCH will therefore, in all its partnerships take measures to minimize negative and increase positive effects of our work in every context in which we operate.

**WCH has developed a set of specific criteria that are applied in the process of engaging in new partnerships. WCH's partners should meet the following criteria:**

- Commitment to adhere to the principles of partnership (see above).

- Contribution to WCH’s vision, mission, strategic objectives, intervention strategies and cross cutting approaches so that joint planning, program implementation and evaluation based on the above is possible<sup>11</sup>.
- Bringing specific skills, knowledge and/or resources to the partnership that complement WCH core competencies and will lead to increased program reach and ultimately increased impact and sustainability.
- Good standing, respect and positive track record with authorities and peer organisations.
- Committed to building trust, mutual learning and sharing influence.
- Willingness and ability to formalize the partnership in the form of a written agreement (a Partner Agreement for implementing partners or a Memorandum of Understanding for other types of partners). In this agreement, the expectations, goals, objectives and activities of the partners are defined as well as the contributions, roles and responsibilities, evaluation and reporting procedures.

#### **4. Commitments and Expectations**

In order to realize the full potential of partnerships, WCH and its partners are committed to the following:

- WCH has on the ground presence in each of its program areas and understands and respects the culture and local context. Being present in the field makes it easier to address the partners evolving personnel, programmatic and organisational needs in a timely and flexible fashion. It enhances transparency and accountability in a natural and non-threatening way.
- WCH and partners engage in joint need assessments and written agreements identifying the partnership’s goals and projected outcomes. The agreement clarifies mutual roles, responsibilities, capacity building and organisational development requirements including monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and required resources. WCH and partners will undertake a joint Child Rights analysis and use the UNCRC as the basis for its programs. (Refer section 3; strategic fit).
- Partners are provided with capacity building and organizational development efforts, based on the outcomes of a joint needs assessment. This can be provided directly by WCH, or be outsourced to third parties.

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<sup>11</sup> Refer section 3, Strategic fit

- WCH (often) supports partners financially and may engage in joint fundraising or support partner organizations to conduct their own institutional fundraising from third parties.
- Partners give input into and collaborate with WCH's advocacy work.
- Partners give input into WCH's country strategy and plans. Partner program evaluations generate learning that influence policy reviews and annual planning. Cumulative learning at country level feeds into international policy and methodology development. WCH will provide opportunities for systematic partner dialogue and input. For this purpose WCH organizes at least one annual partnership consultation per WPA that brings together all partners or a representative delegation of partners, preferably together with other stakeholders, in order to exchange experiences, facilitate joint learning and articulate input into WCH strategies, programs and policies.
- WCH ensures information sharing and facilitation of access to WCH's networks and contacts.
- Partner relationships are potentially long term, recognizing the partner's contribution to WCH's own learning and capacity building that continues until mutually defined goals and outcomes are reached in the areas of programming, capacity building and/or advocacy.
- WCH gives clarity and ensures agreement with partners on monitoring, reporting and auditing mechanisms, as well as its policies on fraud, misuse of funds and child safety to which the partner will be held accountable.
- The signed partnership agreement contains a complaint procedure for partner organizations or groups to use in the case of a persistent difference of opinion between the partner and WCH, concerning WCH's adherence to the partnership agreement. Under normal circumstances however, differences of opinion will be settled in a collaborative manner between the partner and the WCH contract manager.

## 5. Types of Partnerships

In order to achieve its vision and mission of unleashing children's inner strength with a creative and involving approach and empowering them to shape their own future, WCH works with a diverse range of partners in the field, as well as internationally. The local context will determine the exact approach, activities and type of partner organisations all of whom are encompassed by the partnership policy. WCH partnerships should lead to<sup>12</sup>:

- Better and greater results for children and young people.
- Stronger advocacy.

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<sup>12</sup> Refer section 3. Strategic fit and added value.

- Innovative and replicable programs.
- Sustainability, with lasting and locally owned results.

These results are achieved by forming partnerships that either strengthen the implementation of WCH programs (partners bring complementary skills, knowledge and resources), a combination of strengthening the implementation of WCH programs as well as the partner organizations own programs or a partnership that brings complementary program activities to the same target population.

The choice for working with different types of partners follows from the following three intervention objectives:

#### **a. Service delivery**

Partnerships are formed to implement activities directly with CYP. If the context allows, WCH prefers partner implementation over self implementation. Partners are strengthened and supported by the presence of WCH in the field; WCH also learns from its partners as they stimulate innovation of intervention models.

#### **b. Social activation**

WCH believes that only change that involves CYP as decision makers will yield effective and lasting results. As a consequence, WCH specifically aims to build partnerships and networks with CYP and their communities. Guided by its the programming themes, WCH selects groups of CYP and community groups, building their capacity and supporting them in becoming meaningful civil society actors. WCH also seeks partnerships with (semi)governmental actors (e.g. teachers) building their capacity to respect and promote the rights of CYP.

#### **c. Influence on policy making**

As a key part of its focus on child rights, WCH aims to influence policy-making at all levels within the WPAs in order to complement and advance the achievements made by CYP at the community level,. WCH seeks partnerships with local and international actors as well as groups of CYP, with whom it engages in joint advocacy activities. WCH also supports the implementation of advocacy activities by partner organisations.

To reach the objectives above, WCH engages in the following types of partnerships:

- Partnering with **Community Based Organisations (CBOs)**. Community based approaches with the active involvement and empowerment of children and young people are a key to WCH programs. WCH works directly with children, young people and their communities and has a considerable track record of community mobilization interventions. CBOs can range from groups of young people to community representatives. Emphasis is placed on service delivery (direct implementation) and capacity building. In circumstances where there are no CBOs established, WCH will whenever possible and feasible support grass roots initiatives in order to empower them and build their capacities as a group. Mobilization enables these



groups to take up their responsibilities towards CYP in a structured and more sustainable manner and participate meaningfully in the implementation of WCH programs.

- Partnering with **local NGOs**. Local NGOs are generally more structured than CBOs, they have a longer track record and are formally registered as part of the broader civil society. These are important considerations for partnering with local NGOs; particularly in an urban context or where there are numerous NGOs already working in the sector which can be supported. For local NGOs, engaging in partnerships with WCH helps them increase fundraising opportunities, increase outreach and impact, and increase organisational and program capacity including advocacy. Their local knowledge of the socio – cultural dynamics and politics are essential contributions to the quality and relevance of our work and increases the sustainability of the program impact.
- Partnering with **International NGOs and International Organisations**. WCH partners with INGOs and IOs, particularly for advocacy, as well as joint funding and fundraising. Sharing complementary expertise and resources significantly broadens the scope, access and quality of WCH interventions. By working together, advocacy activities or campaigns can increase their momentum and impact through leveraging partner organizations networks and influence. The requirement of each partner to be accountable to different constituencies, for different results remains a challenge to be overcome. Cooperating rather than competing with international partners in terms of fundraising and marketing is advantageous as governments as well as major bi- and multi lateral donors require coordination and collaboration between organisations when applying for funding. Joint proposals based on complementarities stand a better chance of being funded and supported. This type of partnership is also used by WCH to jointly build CBOs and local NGOs capacities.
- Partnering with **Government Institutions**. Ultimately Governments are responsible for ensuring the survival, protection, development and participation of CYP. Supporting and advocating towards governments to prioritize delivering on children's rights even in the face of economic or security deterioration will have a large and structural impact on the lives and futures of CYP. Advocacy at this level is most effective if it is done as part of an alliance. Partnering and coordinating with governments at central and local levels is therefore important and necessary in all WCH intervention areas. The variance in influence, size and scope of partnership between WCH and Government Institutions in the WPAs is significant, as Governments' willingness and ability to uphold child rights and partnerships varies considerably from country to country.
- Partnering with **Private Sector organisations**. The private sector has an important role to play in the realization of child rights and represents not only a potential source of funding, but more and more a source of knowledge and expertise. Private sector organisations are a potential contributor of financial resources, supplies and services, staff secondments, providers of access to networks and contributors to advocacy campaigns. Generally however, the corporate sector is driven by profit. This means a careful appraisal of each

partnership in this area should be conducted, to ensure that the partnership is guided by a genuine sense of corporate responsibility to social and child rights issues and fits WCH's mission and principles. WCH is dedicated to protecting the dignity of the children and young people it empowers and its own reputation. Although these partnerships are governed by this policy they will not be further elaborated upon in this context due to their specific character.

## Appendix V

### List of Interviews

Nr.	Name	Organization	Date
1	Nafez Assaily	Library on Wheels for Non-Violence & Peace – Hebron	04-03-2010
2	Zoughbi Zoughbi	Wi'Am – Bethlehem	25-03-2010
3	Lina Tarifi	CCRR- Bethlehem	13-05-2010
4	Rasha Salah Eddin	NGO Development Center - Ramallah	18-02-2010
5	Susanna Baberg	DED - Bethlehem	02-07-2010
6	Andres Gonzales	War Child Netherlands – Jerusalem	07-07-2010
7	Gidon Decker	War Child Netherland – Bethlehem	12-02-2010