The European Neighborhood Policy:
A Closure of EU Enlargement?

A

Cosmopolitan Interpretation of

the Case of Ukraine

by

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Preface

In my thesis which I have called the "The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Closure of EU Enlargement? A Cosmopolitan Interpretation of the case of Ukraine", I am going to first present the theoretical basis for my research, explaining the scientific and societal relevance, then introducing the hypothesis, the central research question as well as the subquestions. In the second section, I will start with a factual and historical background of Ukraine, then provide an overview over the European Neighbourhood Policy, explaining what the policy is, as well as what the documents say, and giving an idea of how the policy has developed over the years. Proceeding, I am going to provide a conceptual view of the ENP, showing what geographers and researchers have said about it and which conclusions they have reached, and thus making it clear how this relates to my case study which is Ukraine in the ENP. After that I am going to provide an overview over the cosmopolitan border theory and connect this to the case of Ukraine in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Here I will show how this relates to an understanding of the EU, the ENP and the creation of a European space. Finally in my analysis section, I will use the cosmopolitan theory as well as my own research and interviews to attempt to fulfill my hypothesis, and with that applying a cosmopolitan view on the case of Ukraine in the ENP. Finally, I will have a conclusion where I reflect on what I have found through my research, as well as providing a summary of my topic.

Section 1

1.0 Introduction

There is a broad consensus saying the European Union find themselves in several crises these days. The most obvious one is the financial crisis, related to the common currency, as well as the debt crisis haunting countries such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and potentially more to follow. In addition, the EU struggles with low approval ratings throughout Europe. European citizens experience the EU as something distant and detached from daily life, and say it is too invisible. This is especially emphasized by the low voter turnout at the European Parliamentary elections and low general knowledge about the EU. As a consequence, due to the institutional design of the EU, there is little appetite among the member states for further enlargement outside of those who currently hold candidate status, currently the West-Balkans.

The question of how the EU should relate to Ukraine has been present arguably since its independence in 1991, following the breakup of the Soviet Union and as the EU expanded and evolved throughout the 1990s. Situated in the near periphery of both EU and Russia, it is providing Brussels with headache as the EU are trying to create a name for themselves as a geopolitical actor. EU-Ukraine relations reached its positive peak following the 2004 Orange revolution, followed by a slide towards autocracy under President Yanukovich. Now with the controversy surrounding the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoschenko, and the upcoming October election, one hopes,but remain sceptical, that Ukraine can align itself with Europe to a larger degree, something they claim to want themselves. However, what will happen is hard to predict. as the EU seems to be of limited ability to expand beyond what is currently projected.

Many researchers claim the Ukraine have by the nature of the ENP framework(see Section 2.1) been excluded from future membership in the European Union. As such, one cannot escape the question of where Europe ends. This is something the EU themselves are struggling to figure out themselves. Additionally, there are many different Europe's, something I will touch on further in this thesis. Presumably many do not view Ukraine as a European country, or eligible for European Union membership. Regardless, the summer of 2012 Ukraine, successfully, co-hosted the European Football Championship with Poland, which must mean that they are a part of at least one Europe. Additionally they are members of Council of Europe and several other institutions or regimes. In this thesis I attempt to challenge the consensus saying Ukraine has been excluded from any

possibility of European Union membership and paint a more nuanced picture of the situation. I aim to do this by using the cosmopolitan border theory, and hence hope to be able to reveal a more varied picture of the ENP and the outlook of the borders, based on cross-border activity at the EU's border with Ukraine, as well on interviews with people with experience from working in and living in Ukraine. I will also analyze official policy documents, and take into account research that has been done on the topic. The *sui generis* nature of the EU limits any relevance of grand scientific theories designed to understand and predict the EU. There have been several attempts, but they have all been repelled by yet another theory, exemplified by the rise and fall of federalism, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism(Cini 2007). Therefore I am genuinely interested in looking more closely at something new and unique in EU, or indeed European history, the ENP, and what it will mean in the future of Europe, and specifically for Ukraine's EU aspirations.

1.1 Research Framework:

- **Hypothesis/Central Goal:** The European Neighborhood Policy is not a closure of the EU enlargement prospects, but the result of several ongoing EU crises: economical crisis, identity crisis as well as well as so-called "enlargement fatigue". This requires the term *"enlargement"* to be left out of the vocabulary of the ENP. I will argue that even though membership prospects are not mentioned in ENP documents, it may still be possible for Ukraine to become a member of the European Union in the future.

- **Research question:** To what extent is the EUs border with Ukraine more flexible and fluid than the prevailing research suggests?

- **Subquestions:**

- What does the visa liberation scheme mean for the EU in terms of being perceived as a geopolitical actor?

- Is the border becoming more cosmopolitan?

- Which actors see Ukraine as a future member of the EU?

- To what extent is Ukraine a part of a 'networked European space' ?

1.2 How did I land on this topic for my thesis?

Before I started my Bachelor degree in European Studies at the University of Oslo, I had a genuine interest to learn more about the EU. My curiosity was also aided by the fact that relevant Europe-wide issues regarding the EU are rarely present in Norway. The EU as a general topic, apart from the financial crises, is virtually invisible in the media and in political debates. I did however know that the EU viewed from Europe is much more present than what is the case in Norway, and this further inspired me to pursue an education that could help me understand more of the European Union. In my Bachelor studies I got some insight into the EU as a political actor, the decision-making process and through subjects covering EU history and basic EU law. However, my main specific topic of interest was, and has always been since I as a small boy remember Norway's vote of no in 1994, EU enlargement.

When deciding to attend Radboud University as part of the Human Geography Masters Programme, I was confident that the Europe: Borders, Governance and Identities specialization would satisfy my interests. I knew I wanted to write my thesis in something related to EU enlargement, however the

class Geopolitics of Borders taught by Dr Henk van Houtum contributed to me being able to see the EU in a different light. The class taught me that borders are always contested, and that the EU is a significant actor in this respect. The class also contributed to me being able to view the ENP in geopolitical terms, which became a crucial factor when developing the topic for this thesis.

When specifying a topic for my thesis, it was more or less obvious that it had to be about European enlargement eastwards. Geographically Europe can not be stretched further west or north(apart from Norway), in the south the Mediterranean provides a natural barrier for the limits of Europe, or alternatively the EU. Additionally, most countries in the Western Balkans are already on the EU's near future enlargement agenda by having been granted candidate status or from being in accession negotiations. I also wanted my topic to cover new ground in that sense, hence I was able to narrow my focus down to the European Neighbourhood Policy countries. The country that immediately attracted my attention was Ukraine. I had visited the country once before, in 2008, and nothing about my stay made me believe this was not a European country, or that indeed it could not be a member of the EU one day.

A small digression on a related matter: After one weeks work of obtaining visa's for the whole group, one spring evening in 2009, I was traveling to Minsk, Belarus from Warsaw by nighttrain. As we approached the border, the Polish side of the Bug river that follows the border was well lit up and had nothing unusual about it. The Belarussian side was almost completely dark, except for one guard tower and some old storage buildings. As we passed dozens of heavily armed soldiers, the train came to a halt. The soldiers thoroughly examined every person on board's identification, as well as the mandatory Belarussian insurance which you can not enter the country without. I wondered what the need was such for an extensive border control when entering such a poor and forgotten country, before I realized that this is the way it usually works: closed societies tend to have closed borders,without making the comparison to the extreme example of North Korea. Perhaps to distance itself from its northern neighbour, perhaps as a small sting to the side of the EU, Ukraine's borders are open to EU citizens, and have been from 2005. This also contributed to me wanting to explore what borders say about the society within it.

Further, the curriculum of the class Cross-Border Governance taught by my supervisor Olivier Kramsch gave me additional help in developing my topic. The theory of cosmopolitanism gave me additional valuable insight into the nature of borders, insight I saw as perfect for this topic. My

knowledge of European borders before starting this master program was more or less limited to knowing that they were increasingly abolished within the EU. The cosmopolitanism theory perfectly illustrated through its polysemic and diversified nature why I believe that the ENP does not necessarily mean the end of European Union enlargement. As a young European blessed with the possibilities of dissolved borders, I am genuinely interested in exploring how far eastwards the EU are able or indeed willing to export this phenomenon.

1.3 Societal Relevance

This thesis has societal relevance because it contributes to an understanding of the European space, to what we can call "Europe" and how we do think of "Europe". It also has societal relevance because it can make EU policies, who often seem distant from the average EU citizen, more understandable. Additionally, it can also contribute to an understanding of what makes a border, how borders actually work, and what kind of role borders play for society in Europe and in the world.

I believe that this thesis can as mentioned contribute to an understanding of how we see Europe. Seemingly, it is something, a content we take for granted, that has always been there. It is not strange to view Europe like this as such, but there is a big distinction between the EU and Europe, a distinction that is often blurred and confused by all kinds of actors, sometimes perhaps deliberately. With the more or less constant "widening and deepening" of the EU, it is easy to confuse it with Europe. However, it is important to bear in mind that Europe was a creation, and possibly still is. The original idea was created by Jean Monnet(Delanty&Rumford 2005:69), but it is fair to say the idea of Europe has a different meaning nowadays. As Delanty& Rumford(2005:69) argue *"it can also be stated that Europe does not exist as a clearly defined geographical territory and there are many tensions between the continental and civilizational dimensions of Europe"*. This is exactly what I hope to shed some light on, in present, but hopefully also in the future. Actors, especially the EU are always trying to define what Europe means, whereas ordinary citizens may have a vastly different view. This can for example be exemplified by the question of Turkeys accession to the EU, which has met significant resistance among EU citizens. I am exploring ways to put Ukraine into a similar context.

1.4 Scientific Relevance

The scientific relevance of this thesis lies in the utilization of the cosmopolitan border theory as a contribution to an increased understand of the EUs foreign policy. Alternatively, it is a contribution to an understanding of the the EU's practice of creating a European space, or of a redefinition of what we refer to as "Europe". Additionally, it can be contribute to an analysis of what the European Neighbourhood Policy is. There has been done lots of research on this field, but the opinions vary greatly. Among the critical points is wether the ENP is a geopolitical "tool" invented by the EU, and if, is it a hard or soft tool? Merje Kuus(2011) argues that:

>*"ENP represents the most effective geopolitics: one that appears to not be one, a category of practice but not of analysis.*

I believe that this thesis can contribute to a greater understanding of the ENP, one with more nuances, and an understanding that makes the reader see the complexities involved in this policy and for its member states. I also believe that after reading this, the reader will see that it is hard to make quick and easy conclusion about what the ENP is. As Boudeltje and van Houtum point out, "*power and policies are imposed in a flexible framework in which the EU takes different forms*"(Boudeltje&van Houtum 2011:141). With this point of departure, I aim to create a nuanced understanding of what the ENP means geopolitically with regards to the case of Ukraine, especially vis-á-vis Russia, which still view Ukraine, and arguably also the EU, and the world in light of "hard" politics. As seen from the figure, I hope to shed some light on the at times confusing overlappings between Europe, the ENP, and the EU(See Fig 1).

It also has scientific relevance in the way we think about borders, or perhaps more appropriately, frontiers. In an EU context, where the shifting and diversification of borders has been common throughout recent history, I aim to look at the role of borders in the context of creating a "Europe". To be precise, I aim to examine wether Ukraine falls within what we with reason can call "new European borders".

Fig 1: Overlappings

Considering that, it is essential to remember that borders are in the words of Paasi *"contextual phenomena and can vary from alienated to coexistent, or from independent borderlands to integrated ones"*. Additionally, boundaries also play a role as institutions and symbols(Paasi 1998:72). Following this logic, I will further examine wether Ukraine can in the future be incorporated into the institutions that constitute the EU external border.

1.5 Why Cosmopolitanism?

In this thesis I have chosen to make use of the cosmopolitanism theory. The reason for this is because I believe it covers all the relevant aspects of present and future cross-border interactions between the EU and Ukraine to a larger extent than other theories. However, several other theories possess relevance for this topic. Parts of Foucaldian thinking and the theory of the EU as a colonial legacy both have relevance to my topic. Especially Foucault's concept regarding "the art of government" has relevance when discussing the EU and the expansion of its governmental functions. Further, Foucalt through LaPierre argues that the definition of government in no way refers to territory(Foucalt 1991:93). Applying this logic, Foucalts theories are highly eligible for discussing the ENP. Additionally, Walters(2002) claims that bordering represents a particular art of government. However, where Foucalt's thoughts are probably stronger when discussing governance, cosmopolitanism in my opinion trumps his thoughts when discussing the nature of European borders. As Balibar(1998) puts it: *"The 'borders' of Europe: Does the 'of' indicate an*

objective or a subjective? As we shall see, both are necessarily involved, and what is at stake is precisely the 'Europeanness' of Europes's borders".

Further, borders as a biopolitical phenomena is highly relevant to my topic, and holds large elements of truth in it. Regardless, it is my perception that by using the cosmopolitan framework, I will be able to cover more aspects of the EU-Ukrainian border. In my opinion, this particular border cannot be reduced to being "just" biopolitical, geopolitical and national as exemplified in Walters' article regarding the Schengen area. In my opinion the border is all of the above, and much more, which is the very essence of cosmopolitan thinking. Throughout this thesis, I aim to highlight a subtle prediction that the EU-Ukrainian border will change significantly in the years to come, and I believe cosmopolitanism will capture and present those dynamics better than the other theories. Another crucial aspect in my selection of cosmopolitanism as my lens is the fact that cosmopolitanism to a larger degree accounts for borders as an evolving phenomena. For my choice of topic, the ability to reveal (parts of) the changing nature of Europe's Eastern borders in a timeframe is essential. Also, cosmopolitanism strongly accounts for the important question for my topic, the question of *who* conducts borderwork in Europe(see Section 2.4.1), as pointed out by Rumford (2008).

We also have the marxist theory, which does a significant job regarding description of the dissolving of the economic borders of the world. The theory argues that borders do not exist, only societal classes do. In my opinion the theory has relevance in todays world of economic globalization, but it does not hold a significant degree of accounting for the spread of political integration through regimes and international institutions. In the case of Ukraine, the spread of political practices and values such as election standards, freedom of speech, harmonization of legislation and other political instruments are of paramount importance to their desired European integration, which is why I feel the marxist thinking is insufficient for analyzing the present and future of the EU-Ukrainian border. Liberal intergovernmentalism is also a relevant theory, and focuses on the rise of international regimes and the structuring of state behaviour by international institutions. The theory is heavily used to explain for example EU decisionmaking processes, but has shortcomings for example in areas where the member states have final say, such as foreign policies, as well as finance and judicial policies. As the European Neighbourhood Policy is placed under the External Action Service, member states have veto rights, and consensus among all member states is hard to come by. This is especially evident in the case of Ukraine, where member

states have a high degree of variance among policy preferences. For this reason precisely, I believe cosmopolitanism is better suited to account for the diverse range of actors on various levels who contribute to the making and diversifying of the EU external border. I also believe the rhetoric used by both the EU and Ukraine regarding the shared European spirit and values identifies the relevance of cosmopolitanism when analyzing the relationship between the EU and Ukraine.

Within my topic of choice, the geopolitics of attraction is also a relevant component, with Ukraine situated right between the European Union and Russia. Within this specific subquestion, I believe that cosmopolitanism is well suited to account for the forms of cross-border interaction that are not exclusive to the top political level. Culture is for example an important part of this type of geopolitics. If one was to ask Ukrainians in a survey, a majority would say that they feel like Europeans, especially in the western regions(Berstad: Interview:05.07.2012). As Delanty (1995:147) argues: *"...it would appear that the only homogenous culture which is really capable of cutting across such divided societies is that of popular culture: western style consumerism, advertising, TV and the entertainment industry. To an extent this really is the integrating cultural mechanism in Eastern Europe today and not western political culture in the traditional sense of the word."*. With this and all other forms of cross-border activity considered, I believe cosmopolitanism is suited to capture the broad and diverse functions of the EU-Ukraine border.

A weakness cosmopolitanism may have is the question whether crossing a border, either as an individual or as an object is a form of cosmopolitanism. A just question, given how frequent bordercrossing is these days. I would say this depends on the individual mind,and which border is in question, and is not necessarily cosmopolitan as such,but may well be. However on the other hand, I would say the EU currently projects elements of the forms of cosmopolitanism suggesting we are citizens of the planet, and are trying to create a European identity whom citizens, also within the ENP area, share. As Beck(2007) states: *"Reality is becoming cosmopolitan. The Other whom borders can no longer keep out is everywhere,"* (Beck 2007:115), but crucially also claims that *"cosmopolitan integration is based on a paradigm shift in which diversity is not the problem but rather the solution"*(Beck 2007:116).

1.6 Methodology

As this thesis is not based on quantitative data, statistics are not the focal point when I attempt to provide grounds for my hypothesis. It is difficult to measure European integration by numbers or variables, therefore my research method for this topic is qualitative, hence my data will be textbased, and for this reason literature study, interviews and analysis are the main basis for my hypothesis, research and conclusion. Within my qualitative methodology, by literature I refer to books, scientific journals and articles, as well as news stories and other media articles. The deskbased research is essential as I want to present the concept of cosmopolitanism in a way that relates to my specific topic, and also makes it understandable for the reader. In addition to that, literature study is essential when I attempt to connect cosmopolitanism to real examples that can be related to the contemporary situation at the EU-Ukraine border. According to Ukraine's ambassador to the EU, the potential signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement would stop any discussion regarding whether Ukraine is going east or west[1]. Therefore, an important part of my research is finding and identifying ways and means Ukraine are integrating with the EU. Several of these ways, such as legal procedures and governance issues are not measurable in numbers. Needless to say, a significant part of the literature includes relevant examples from the nature of the border. It was also a big part of my task to locate, identify and put in context, forms of cross-border cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. This could be small regional initiatives, or broad supra-national regimes such as human rights charters. All forms of cross-border cooperation play a part in painting the complete picture of the present and future cross-border activity. For this reason, acquiring and providing an overview is essential. I have also tried to find examples that explicitly can link the situation to the cosmopolitanism theory. Connecting my conceptual view to the real situation is essential for the thesis' scientifical credibility.

In addition, a significant part of my deskbased research was researching, and contacting potential interview subjects. Additionally, some of my meetings were interesting, but were not relevant enough to merit a full transcript in the thesis as well as well as providing basis for conclusions. As my thesis does not contain a lot of statistics, I felt like it was important to conduct interviews with persons who have professional experience and knowledge of EU-Ukraine relations. I held an informal conversation with Jakub Godzimirski from Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the

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[1] Euractive 21.09.2012:URL http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/ukraine-calls-eu-anchor-west-news-514930

Norwegian Institute for International Affairs. My second informal conversation was with Bothild Nordsletten who covers political and energy issues at the Norwegian Embassy in Warsaw. Most importantly, whose interviews I have transcribed and included, I held one interview with Marcin Swiecicki, Member of Parliament from Platforma Obywatelska(the main government party in Poland) and former Director of the UNDP Blue Ribbon Analytical Centre in Kiev. Finally, I held an interview with Olav Berstad, former Norwegian Ambassador to Ukraine, now Advisor on Russia and Eurasia energy issues at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The interviews were partially unstructured, I did not have a pre-fixed questions manual for the interviews, as I wanted to have the flexibility to diverge and deepen into anything that I found interesting and relevant during the course of the interviews.

1.6.1 Demarcations

There exists countless amounts of research on the nature of borders, and their role in society, as opposed to being mere lines on the ground or on a map. Due to spacial concerns in this thesis, I do not have room to account for as much of this research as I would have preferred. Therefore I have selected to follow the logics of Paasi(1998), who emphasizes that borders are manifestations of social narratives used to distinguish social groups from others, as well as for creating identities. In this sense, borders work as both institutions and symbols(see section 2.2).

 I will only briefly mention the origins of the idea of Europe, where the term Europe first was invented and how the idea of Europe has evolved throughout history. This is because I feel that Europe in older historical terms is only partially relevant to the topic of this thesis, which is more related to conceptions of Europe in the future, and also wether Ukraine can be said to be incorporated in this conception(s).

Euroregions as a cooperation form will be briefly mentioned, but not extensively, as the cooperation is largely coordinated, negotiated and implemented at the intra-state level between the high level representatives. Euroregions nevertheless highlight a part of the cross-border cooperation, and an important referencepoint for analyzing the role of borderlands, and hence merits a mention within this topic.

As Ukraine is closely linked to Russia ethnically, historically and linguistically, it is obvious that Russia is a significant actor within EU-Ukraine relations. However, this thesis does not have room for providing an extensive background of the links between Russia and Ukraine. Hence I will mention the most important aspects of this relationship, and where it can be directly related to what can be traced to EU-related matters. The topic of EU-Ukraine relations is already a broad one, and will be even more extensive if one is to fully include Russia within this theme. For this reason Ukraine's and the EU's relationship with Russia will only be mentioned when it can be directly related to the topic of this thesis. Hence historical matters will not be a big part, and more focus will be laid on the geopolitical relationships in the future, and what kind of role todays ENP and the current border regimes play in this matter.

Further, regarding the cosmopolitan border theory, I will only briefly mention its historical origins as well as how it relates to thinkers like Kant and Marx. This is because I prefer to strictly stick to the parts of the theory that can be directly related to the questions of European Union borders (internal or external), citizenship, as well as the diversification and proliferation of borders across Europe. The theory of cosmopolitanism is a broad and complex one, and it was in my desire to extract only the relevant parts for this thesis.

In terms of the 'Europeanisation' of Ukraine, I will stick to EU related issues, and largely leave the NATO aspirations out even though this represents a form of European or western integration. This is because I see NATO as an entirely different prospect than the EU, despite the fact that NATO membership has tended to precede EU membership. I hold this view especially because it is a military alliance, with limited impact in the daily life of citizens, and in developmental aims. Additionally, NATO is as much connected to USA as it is to Europe, let alone the European Union, as certain EU members are not a member of NATO.

1.6.2 Limitations

My main limitation and obstacle when writing this thesis has been language. Since I do not speak Russian or Ukrainian, my chances of speaking to Ukrainian policy officials have been limited. I have thus been forced to rely on the official policy documents from the EU, research from englishspeaking think-tanks and research institutions,journals, my interviews and informal

conversations, as well as various forms of journalism in the languages I do speak, English and Norwegian.

Additionally, I did not have the chance to visit Ukraine nor Brussels, partly due to the fact that I elected to do my internship for a research institution based in Warsaw. Therefore my research is based on literature study, policy analysis and interviews conducted elsewhere, both in Warsaw and in Oslo.

Section 2
2.0 Brief Historical and Factual Background of Ukraine

Ukraine is a country large in size and population, covering 603,700 square kilometers and has 45,1 million citizens(URL-BBC:10/05 2012[2]). It borders Russia to the east and north, Belarus to the north, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary to the West as well as Romania and Moldova to the south. It also has a long coastline to the Black Sea to the south(Magocsi 2002:222).

Throughout history, Ukraine,which literally means something related to borderland in Russian, has always found themselves at junctions between different empires, or indeed in or around several definitions of Europe. In 1668 Poland's(in a Commonwealth with Lithuania) eastern border stretched into Ukraine as far as outside Kiev and along the Western bank of the Dniepr River. However, Poland was being contested by both Prussia, the Russian Empire, and from later on, Austria-Hungary(Magocsi 2002:67). In the years 1772 to 1795 Poland, and thus the Western part of Ukraine, was partitioned and split between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Prussia. Napoleons conquerings changed this, and following his downfall, the state of Poland reappeared in the form of a Kingdom, but significantly smaller, and landlocked(Magocsi 2002:76). Ethnolinguistically speaking, around year 1900, Poles were inhabiting lands in and around the current Ukrainian border, and also in cities like Lviv and Ternopil. Likewise Ukrainians were also living in what is currently Poland, as well as in Belarus(Magocsi 2002:99).

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[2] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18006246

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Ukraine as we know it today was divided between the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and the Russian Empire. The first state carrying the name Ukraine was established in the wake of the revolutionary events (as was Poland) in the Russian Empire throughout 1917 and due to the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in October 1918. Ukraine was recognized as an independent state following the Brest-Litovsk Treaty signed by the Central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary in March 1918(Magocsi 2002:137). However, the Ukrainian land was contested by Poland whose eastern border had not been finalized and by Russia who had seen the Bolsheviks come to power. Poland at one point controlled parts of Ukraine as far as Kiev, but were eventually forced to agree on a new border at the Treaty of Riga in March 1921. The established border gave Poland control of Galicia, which included todays Ukrainian cities of Ternopil and Lviv. Ukraine was linked by an alliance treaty with Soviet Russia, and became a member of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1922(Magocsi 2002:137).

Fig 2. Ukraine 1991

The borders of Soviet Ukraine remained unchanged until the outbreak of World War 2 following the fall of Poland. The Soviet Union annexed Polish territory as far as the San River, these territorial

gains for Soviet Ukraine were however wiped out following the German Invasion of the Soviet Union. After the war, following the Polish territorial gains of Silesia and West Prussia(a de facto westwards movement of Poland)(Magocsi 2002:190) the western borders of Ukraine were established and included what the Soviet Union annexed in 1939, with the exception of the northwestern part of the border that followed the Western Bug River, which subsequently gave the Kholm province to Poland. Soviet Ukraine also gained a large chunk of the Carpathian Mountains known as Transcarpathian Ukraine in a Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty(Magocsi 2002:137-139). This constitutes the Ukraine as we know it today. It is also worth mentioning the big population transfers that occurred after World War 2. Vast numbers of Germans were relocated from western parts of Poland, Poles were relocated from Ukraine and Belarus to the western parts of Poland and Ukrainians were relocated from Poland and Slovakia back to Ukraine. In addition many Russians from other parts of the Soviet Union moved to Ukraine and Belarus, hence the big increase in number of citizens in Ukraine(Magocsi 2002:190-191).

After the fall of the Soviet Union; Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova all claimed their independence in August 1991(Magocsi 2002:221). In 1994 a Partnership Agreement with the EU was entered into force(URL-EEAS)[3] with an agenda for cooperation in all areas of reform. This was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003(see section below). Within this framework, an Association Agreement including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement has been signed, but not yet put into force as it needs to be ratified by all 27 member states. For this to happen, there are certain obstacles that need to be overcome. Since the presidential election victory of Viktor Yanukovich in 2010, democratic standards have detoriated within civil liberties, political rights and media freedom. The most striking example of this is the use of courts to oppress the political opposition. Former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko has remained in custody without a verdict since December 2010, and in October 2011 former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoschenko was sentenced to seven years in prison for abuse of power regarding a gas deal made with Russia in 2009.(Lyubashenko 2009). Ukraine has been downgraded to the 'Partly Free' category by the organization Freedom House.[4] This situation, as well as other technicalities with the Action Plan (see section) are the main obstacles for ratification of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, and thus further EU integration. It is also worth noting that EU trade with Ukraine amounted to 17,3 billion € in 2010 in exports, and 11,4 billion € in imports. The main goods of Ukrainian export to

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[3] http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/index_en.htm

[4] http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine

the EU are iron, steel, mining products and agricultural products. EU exports to Ukraine are mainly machinery, transport equipment, chemicals and agricultural products. Foreign Direct Investment from EU to Ukraine was 19,8 billion € in 2008[5].

2.1 The European Neighbourhood Policy Framework- A Document Summary

Fig 2. The European Neighbourhood Policy

In 2002 Commission President Romano Prodi held the first speech that announced the contours of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Prodi identifies the Balkans, the Middle East and Afghanistan as challenges for world and european stability, and states that the EU must become a global player (Prodi 2002:2). Interestingly, he also states that the current enlargement is a contribution to sustainable stability and security on the European continent. Equally crucial, Prodi says: "But we

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[5] http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/ukraine/

cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project….We need a debate in **Europe** to decide where the limits of Europe lie and prevent these limits being determined by others"(Prodi 2002:3). Prodi goes on to introduce the term "ring of friends" , "surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbour, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea". Furthermore the speech uses the description "sharing everything but institutions", yet also states that "A proximity policy would **not start with the promise of membership** and it would **not exclude eventual membership**".(Prodi 2002:4-5).

Following the completing of the accession talks of the 2004 EU Enlargement, the Commission in 2003 announced a new framework for the external relations regarding the EUs neighbors. In a joint communication from the EU Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The Commission announced and initiated what would come to be known as the European Neighborhood Policy. This communication clearly states the EU's wish to "develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood- 'a ring of friends' - with whom the EU enjoys close,peaceful and co-operative relations"(EU Commission 2003:4).

 Furthermore, the communication states that the four freedoms (people, goods, capital and services) shall be extended to all the neighbouring countries, and thus that "If a country has reached this level, it has come as close to the Union as it can be without being a member"(EU Commission 2003:10). Additionally, the document has a section labeled " Neighbourhood: Different Countries-Common Interests". Here it is stated that the EU recognizes the differences between every country, and that thus a "one-size-fits-all" policy is insufficient for this framework. Yet on the other hand, it is stated that both the EU and the Neighbourhood countries are are confronted by the same opportunities and challenges surrounding the three announced key words *Proximity, Prosperity and Poverty.* Proximity refers to geographic proximity, which presents the EU and its neighbours with both opportunities and challenges. This is emphasized within border management. The document states that "The EU and the neighbours have a mutual interest in cooperating, both bilaterally and regionally, to ensure that their migration policies, customs procedures and frontier controls do not prevent or delay people or goods from crossing borders for legitimate purposes."(EU Commission 2003:6).

Regarding prosperity and poverty, the document reads "proximity policy must go hand-in-hand with action to tackle the root causes of political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional

deficiencies, conflict and poverty and social exclusion". Furthermore, it proposes country and/or regionspecific Action Plans, to measure progress and determine common benchmarks(EU Commission 2003:16). However, in analytical terms, the most interesting fact one can draw from this communication is the absence of a membership perspective for the countries included in the ENP framework. In fact, the document explicitly says that "The aim of the New Neighbourhood Policy is therefore to provide a new framework of a new relationship which would not, in the medium term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union's institutions."(EU Commission 2003:5).

The Action Plan for Ukraine was adopted in 2004, and replaced the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994. The plan emphasises the same points as previous agreements, like economic cooperation, participation in political programs and support for legislative approximation. Like the other official documents, the Action Plan names several priorities for action. These include strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions, ensuring democratic conduct of elections in 2004 and 2006 in accordance with OSCE standards, ensuring respect for the freedom of the media and freedom of expression, enhanced co-operation in the common neighbourhood, as well as WTO accession(European Commission 2004:3-4).

The Action Plan was then replaced with the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda in 2009. This Agenda among other thing announces the start of negotiations of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which was ready in December 2011, but has not yet been ratified and put into action. The Association Agenda follows the same steps as previously documented and lays out the path leading towards the implementation of Association Agreement, which includes the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. The Agenda has not replaced any of the overarching principles from the Action Plan(European Commission 2009:3-4).

There has been an evolving of the ENP since its initiation in 2003, both in rhetoric, and actual policies the EU are framing. In 2006, the EU Commission released a new communication announcing the strengthening of the ENP. This will be primarily done throughout strengthening the economic and trade component, facilitating mobility and migration and promoting people-to-people exchanges(EU Commission 2006:4-6). In addition the funding was strengthened and funded under the new European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) from 2007. Again, however, there is no mention of a membership perspective for the ENP countries. Nevertheless, the communication

does express that "the ENP does not in any way prejudge the possible future development of their relationship with the EU, in accordance with Treaty provisions."(EU Commission 2006:13).

In order to intensify and increase the effectiveness of the ENP, certain member states called for a differentiated approach to the Eastern and Southern Neighbours. The Polish-Swedish proposal for an Eastern Partnership was implemented following the May 2009 Prague Summit. The emphasis in the new Eastern Partnership lies in " a more ambitious partnership". It is similar to previous statements in its language, which says "...builds on and is complementary to existing bilateral contractual relations. It will be developed without prejudice to individual partner countries' aspirations for their future relationship with the European Union. It will be governed by the principles of differentiation and conditionality"(EU Council 2009:5). The Eastern Partnership aims to create the necessary conditions for acceleration of political association and economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries. Means to reach this goal are new Association Agreements tailored individually, the development of Comprehensive Institution-Building Programmes individually with each partner country, as well as supporting mobility of citizens and visa liberation(EU Council 2009:7).

For the last half of 2011 and the first half 2012, The European Union External Action Service released a document with a list of the the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda with 90 priorities for 2011-2012. The priorities are more or less identical to those already formulated in previous policy documents, but are technical, specific, and cover a wide range of topics, such as taxation, health, energy, science and culture. However the most emphasis is given to the stability and independence of institutions, independence of the judiciary, respect for human rights and democracy, combating corruption as well as economic cooperation(European Union External Action Service 2011).

2.2 Border Epistemology

According to Paasi (1998) boundaries are manifestations of social practice and discourse, as opposed to mere lines on the ground. Furthermore, people come to be what they are by their locations within the social narratives, in which they are told and are in a way embedded in. Crucially, he emphasizes that narratives associated with cultural and institutional formations and as well as inter-subjective networks play an essential role. *" it is narratives connected with the*

institutions of nation, state and territory that are of vital importance… ontological narratives-stories that actors use to make sense of their lives as members of social collectives and to define who 'we' are. Boundaries are thus crucial in establishing an 'us' and the creation and perhaps exclusion of 'others'(Paasi 1998:75). This in the authors words makes boundaries one specific form of institution, carrying out the function of establishing structures for human interaction.

It is also emphasized that borders manifests themselves in many institutions, like education, the media, novels, memorials and ceremonies. They are present in symbolism, social control and communication. This is closely linked to education in geography and history, which contributes to producing and reproducing the iconographies of the boundaries, meaning a construction of the history and meaning of a territory. This iconography is created by both material and textual manifestations, such as newspapers, books, drawings, paintings, songs, poems memorials and monuments. Further, the construction of identity narratives is a contested political process and part of the distribution of social power in society. To distinguish between the material and the textual, one can say that *"the boundaries of nations and national states may be determined by military, economic and political factors, but their significance for their inhabitants derives from the joys and sufferings associated with a particular ethnoscape"*(Paasi 1998:76-77).

Paasi additionally points out that territoriality, boundaries and identities should not be understood as something given and primordial, but situational and contextual. Furthermore, boundaries are both symbols and institutions that simultaneously produce differences between social groups and are produced by them. Even so, boundaries mediate contacts between groups as well. Boundaries provide normative patterns that regulate interactions between members of social groups. These are regulations on how to cross boundaries, and regulating the exchange of people, goods and symbolic messages(Paasi 1998:80). As symbols, boundaries are mediums of social control and of construction of meanings and identities. As institutions, they link the past, present and future by constructing a continuity for social interaction. Further, collective identity is not naturally generated, but constructed socially and produced by the social construction of boundaries(Paasi 1998:81).

2.3 The End of Europe? And Other Aspects of the EU's Bordering Practice.

According to Kostadinova, the ENP is sometimes regarded as an effort to set the final borders of the EU, and also points out that this is in contradiction with claimed aims of the EU. The ENP offers an interpretation of which states are European and who are not, and thus which countries who are geographically eligible for applying for EU membership(Kostadinova 2009:246). The ENP also implies establishing a specific kind of dividing line between the parties, which is referred to as a 'soft' border. Then again, Kostadinova also writes that the ENP contributes to the creation of 'hard' borders. She also points out that the ENP itself is an important dividing line, and thus a border. The author also observes that within the ENP, it is geography that sets the frame, but that it is values that make the borders(Kostadinova 2009:247). Furthermore Kostadinova also emphasizes how the ENP countries are subjected to being "others" whom the EU need protection from(Kostadinova 2009:249).

2.3.1 Inclusion or Exclusion?

Boudeltje and van Houtum (2011) suggest also that the ENP is in fact a closure of the EU. Furthermore, they argue that the ENP has colonial empire like features, such as spreading certain values beyond one's own borders. They also make a point of the creation of new spaces of influence for Europe, for example through deliberately confusing Europe, and the European Union. They furthermore argue that the consistent use of the term 'wider Europe' resembles another imperial term, 'Greater' or 'Great', and as such revealing grand politics, or in their words *"a design of hierarchical self-projection towards the direct neighbouring countries*(Boedeltje& van Houtum 2011:139). Interestingly, the authors argue that the use of the term 'Europeanisation' suggests that Europe has become a project designed and desired by its inventors. They furthermore interpret it like *"a Europe-based project of political-economic integration is dominating the projection of a European-wide state-based project relying on the naturalness of its member states"*.

Boedeltje and van Houtum additionally state the 'hard' expressions of European power, such as bordering practices, citizenship and right to entry regulations as well as surveillance mechanisms, no longer follow (only) the territorial logics of the past. This leads to what the authors refers to as Europeanisation contradictions that come into being from policies of conditionality on the one

hand, and everyday simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion on the other(Boudeltje&van Houtum 2011:140-141). Related, they argue that the power and policies that the EU project are embedded in a flexible framework which makes the EU take different forms. Hence, the EU is constantly ordering its geopolitical space through defining itself, defining its neighbours, defining its complex multilateral and bilateral relations and defining its changes through enlargement and relations with its neighbours. They refer to this is a 'post-Westphalian' notion of overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional arrangements and multiple identities (Boedeltje& van Houtum 2011:141). Boedeltje and van Houtum furthermore argue that despite the EU articulating themselves in way that resembles 'soft' power and that the ENP is a 'soft' initiative, the ENP is also if not primarily designed to protect Europe from 'hard threats'. Finally, this practice inevitably produces a fuzzy space between inclusion and exclusion, between the EU member states and their neighbours(Boedeltje& van Houtum 2011:142).

Kuus(2011) also emphasizes that the ENP creates outsiders who are expected to comply with EU internal standards, referring to the program as an umbrella framework seeking to influence its members without offering the incentive of membership(Kuus 2011:1145). She also interestingly points out that the ENP is formally placed under the External Action Service, it attempts to export the EU's internal law and thereby has the look of domestic policies[6]. She also emphasizes that officially, the ENP is framed as the opposite of geopolitics. She points out that the ENP is not designed to draw diving lines in Europe, as the EU would lose leverage from this. It is also stated that this strategy from the EU is not a new phenomenon, and has been done since the end of World War Two.(Kuus 2011:1147). In her well-researched article, she also interviews several EU officials, who all have differing views on what the ENP actually is, but the main consensus is that it is not an act of geopolitical zero-sum policies. In fact, many pointed out that the ENP may look like an accidental form of geopolitics due to the EUs magnetism. Many interviewees also stress that there is 'no cultural definition of Europe, no Huntington'. It is also pointed out that the EU covers 90 % of Europe, the rest are borderline cases(Kuus 2011:1148).

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[6] For example,the announcement of the amendment of the Visa Liberalisation Plan for Ukrainian citizens, was done by Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström.

2.3.2 Grand Geopolitical Aspirations?

Kuus also emphasizes the general notion, especially in the Commission that Europe is not geographical, ENP is not geographical, and that nothing is as irrelevant in the EU as geography. Asking questions about the geographical limits of Europe is even considered out of date and suspicious(Kuus 2011:1149). It is also revealed in the article that bigger EU states tend to see external relations in terms of their own national spheres of influence, as well in terms of regions as opposed to sovereign states, and thus assume the other states will go along. It is also mentioned that the new states don't see things the same way, and are more willing to see for example Ukraine separately from a regional approach. Furthermore, newer member states tended to see Europe as a conceptual tool against Russia, thus all of a sudden making geopolitical connotations. Regarding Europe, one said that *"Europe is important, but in the sense of what has been achieved within the EU. This is what Europe means within the Commission. But we are not interested in defining it. Europe is useful; fixing the limit is not useful"*(Kuus 2011:1149). It is also said that Europe is not completely territoriality-free. Europe does signify a certain cultural space, and that it is based partly on values and partly on common culture.

On the other hand, many of Kuus' interviewees quite explicitly stated that ENP was something geopolitical. This had changed significantly between her round of interviews between 2007 and 2009, likely due to the Russian-Georgian crisis in 2008. One interviewee said that there is now a bigger tendency to see things in political terms. Previously it was more in terms of programs and sectoral cooperation, and gradually the EU is more self-consciously becoming a political actor with its own interests. However the interviewees are all quick to emphasize that this never gets mentioned officially because it is something the EU 'does not do'. It is also emphasized that even if the EU is not viewed geopolitically by everyone, Russia does view the EU this way, and is thus still viewed geopolitically(Kuus 2011:1150-1151).

Van Houtum and Piijpers(2007) also emphasize the bordering practices of the EU at their external borders. They argue that the effect of the EU's immigration policy essentially becomes a categorizing of immigrants in productive or unproductive, friendly or fiendish, and good or bad strata. Additionally, they argue that the protectionist policy of the EU is a desire to conserve a pure national identity. This has been transferred into the vocabulary through what the authors refer to as "communifying" we often see in ENP policy documents with words such as "Europeanization",

"member states", "Ring of friends", wider Europe", "borderless Europe" and "European citizenship"(van Houtum& Pijpers 2007:295). The authors also refers to the EU's economic borders, quoting Sassen (1988): "Border enforcement is a mechanism facilitating the extraction of cheap labour by assigning criminal status to a segment of the working class illegal immigrants"(van Houtum &Pijpers 2007:299).

Boedeltje, van Houtum and Kramsch(2006) refer to the ENP as a qualitative improvement of existing relations, taken from official policy documents. They also put forward Agnews distinction of the two Europes. One Europe as an "idea", and one Europe as a "project". They also emphasize the seemingly deliberate mixing of the terms European Union and Europe in EU policy documents and speeches, exemplified by the use of the question 'what sort of European Union' instead of 'what sort of Europe'(Boedeltje,van Hotum & Kramsch 2006). They also provide a translation of a speech held by Eneko Landaburu, then Director General of DG External Relations of the European Union. He says: 'how can we encourage prosperity, stability, security (PSS) beyond our borders'. The authors translate this, in geopolitical terms, as 'how will the EU pursue our geostrategic interests in expanding the zone of prosperity, stability and security beyond our borders'. In addition they remark that the title of the conference was "Revitalising Europe", suggesting that some parts of Europe need to be revitalized by means of prosperity, stability and security, projected beyond the European Union border.

Moreover, the authors argue that the top-down nature of the ENP may break with the attractiveness of the ENP, which Prodi described as essential in 2002. They mention high and numerous demands and conditionality criteria and the vagueness of the longterm goals and destination as the main reasons for this. Additionally, they claim that the EU prefers this vagueness and and un-clarity as it gives more freedom for action in these circumstances regarding the differing nature of the partner countries, as well as the broader geopolitical issues. On top of that, it also questionable whether the EU is authorized to declare unilaterally which countries have a perspective of accession according to its own funding treaties(Boedeltje, van Houtum&Kramsch 2006).

Further, the authors also interpret the speeches as something akin to 'realpolitik' and pointing to the fact that 'sharing everything with the Union but institutions' implies spreading commitments and values to the neighbours, in what they refer to as 'Europeanisation' beyond traditional western Europe. Europeanization is described by the authors through Emerson as combining rational

institutionalism through conditionality, and sociological institutionalism through norm diffusion and 'social learning'. This is formulated as democracy, good governance, human rights, rule of law and market economy. They hence understand Europeanization as a normative process of hooking up with modern European norms and values. They identify three forms of conditionality by Emerson and Noutcheva (2005): (1) Normal sectoral conditionality, relating to every category of incentive offered to states involving all traditional sorts of aid. (2) Negative conditionality, for example sanctions, whom are often used to encourage changes, for example in the case of Belarus where authoritarian President Lukashenko and other political actors are not welcome in the EU, in addition to financial sanctions.(3) Positive conditionality is generally seen for those with membership aspirations, and where wishes to reform faster and deeper is met with increased aid. They do however argue that positive conditionality is unclear, and that 'socialisation' will prove more effective if stimulated over time coupled with a membership perspective(the return to Europe idea), whereas now the ENP could be perceived as an aggressive form of foreign policy(Boedeltje,van Houtum &Kramsch 2006).

2.4 The Cosmopolitan Border Theory

There is an abundance of ways or quotes one can use to define cosmopolitanism. The theory is a broad one, thus I will not try to find one grand summarizing example or quote. Instead I will use several definitions within the appropriate framework that relates to the issue I am discussing in this thesis. Therefore I attempt to make the theory understandable where it needs to be understood and put in context. Here I am referring to the nature and proliferation of borders, the various concepts of Europe, as well as the question of citizenship and identity. David Held makes the following definition, and one that can be used to describe cosmopolitanism within my framework:

"The idea that human well-being is not defined by geographical or cultural location, that national or ethnic or gendered boundaries should not determine the limits of rights or responsibilities for the satisfaction of basic human needs, and that all human beings require equal respect and concern are notions embedded in aspects of contemporary regional and global legal and political thinking, and in some forms of transnational governance"(Held 2002:316).

In my opinion, it is not a stretch to connect dots to what Held refers to as transnational governance to the earlier and perhaps present form of the EU with the making of a European identity as well as the making of a European citizenship. However when the EU proclaims a European identity or a

European citizenship, it implies that Europe refers to the borders of the EU, or indeed borders of the European Economic Area or alternatively the Schengen Agreement. These often problematic distinctions will be problematized later in this section. In this example, the question is wether the term transnational governance as in creating an identity or a citizenship can be said to include the ENP area as well? This is in fact a subordinate question for the whole thesis. It can not be answered by a yes or a no. Therefore I will attempt to look more closely at the case of Ukraine through a cosmopolitan frame, to paint a more nuanced picture in my anticipation that the answer lies somewhere between yes and no.

Regardless, another way to understand cosmopolitanism is also exemplified by Held: *"… the degrees of mutual interconnectedness and vulnerability are rapidly growing. The new circumstances of cosmopolitanism gives us little choice but to consider the possibility of a common framework of standards and political action, given shape and form by a common framework of institutional arrangements"*(Held 2002:308). Again, this gives associations to the EU, however the same question arises of how the ENP relates to this thinking. Nevertheless, since the topic of borders is crucial in this thesis, it also essential to mention that *"The boundaries of polities are understood to be historically arbitrary, and most often the result of coercion and violence. Borders obscured the common circumstances of humankind and, thus, could not have the moral significance frequently ascribed to them. … The individual belongs to the wider world of humanity; moral worth cannot be specified by the yardstick of a single political community*(Held 2002:309). This observation is interesting when put into a context regarding the EU, and especially the ENP.

2.4.1 Whose Borders Are They?

However there are more aspects of cosmopolitan thinking than the ideas of transnational citizenship and the arbitrary nature of borders. Balibar views cosmopolitan thinking vastly different, but equally essential in my opinion. He mentions the prospect of actually *being* a border, and also presents a different concept for understanding European borders. He does this through three aspects; the current vacillation of borders, the interiority and ideality of borders, and the conflict or the overlapping of cultures around the "European triple point"(Balibar 1998:217). Regarding the vacillation of borders, Balibar says *"… the managing of the phenomena of inequality and exclusion and of the flows of active and inactive populations), has definitively escaped the jurisdiction of national states, without thereby coming under the control of apparatuses that could be called*

'global'. The jurisdiction of national states is a crucial element here, especially when discussing the EU, and even more so the ENP. However there are more aspects of this particular angle of the theory. Balibar adds, explicitly, that borders are vacillating, but not disappearing. On the contrary he argues that we are less than ever in a world without borders. Borders are constantly being multiplied and reproduced in their localization and function. This also means that borders are no longer the limit of where the politics end because the community ends. This is especially true for the European Union, but can this be transferred even further to include the ENP? Balibar cites Clausewitz who says that when crossing such a border, politics can only be continued "by other means" (Balibar 1998:219-220). Then the question that remains to be asked is if this can be unequivocally traced back to the EU and the ENP. The nation state and its primary functions in a Westphalian sense does after all still exist.

In the second aspect, Balibar refers to the interiority and ideality of borders. He points to history and mentions the many partitions of the world(often done by europeans), and also what the partitioners have wanted the border to mean or project. He writes that *"state borders, understood equally as the borders of a culture and an at least-fictive identity…. They have always served not only to separate particularities, but always also at the same time, in order to fulfill this 'local' function, to 'partition the world', to configure it, to give it a representational figure in the modality of the partition"*(Balibar 1998:220). Regarding this aspect, borders and divisions historically were made to project a perception of similarities and dissimilarities, differences in civilizations, or alternatively, the reconcilable and irreconcilable or the compatible and incompatible.

Regarding the third aspect of the concept for understanding European borders, Balibar proposes that Europe is not and never has been made up of separate regions meaning camps, empires or nations, but of overlapping sheets or layers, and that this very fact is overlapping itself. For example there is an overlapping of a West, an East, and a South(Balibar 1998:225). He mentions former Yugoslavia as such a triple point, and as the most extreme example of clashes between certain projections of ideality and vacillations of borders. Interestingly, the author presents the argument that there many such triple points, not only within Europe, but all over the world, and hence argues that there are many Europes we do not know how to recognize. Balibar claims that instead of searching for images of ourselves when looking for Europe, we should be searching for structures. The concept is neatly summarized by saying that *"these are the cultural or identitarian overlappings in which the possibility of constructing political singularities are played out today. Each of these figures has its*

own history and its own dynamic, but all of them are constituted by working on European schemata
of partition and the border and adapting them to their own contingencies"(Balibar 1998:226).

Pheng Cheah also has a different view on what cosmopolitanism is, that is worth mentioning. The
idea of cosmopolitanism can be traced back to Kants ideas of a common humanity as an
institutional framework for regulating the behavior of states(Cheah1998:24). Cheah makes the
comparison with Marxs ideas in terms of analyzing the role of nationality, which they both agree is
of little or no importance. Cheah also discusses the relationship between cosmopolitanism and the
nation state. He emphasizes that if the idea of cosmopolitanism is to grow there needs to be a
strategic alliance with the nation-state. He then asks if a global consciousness exists, if it can be
sufficiently institutionalized to be an alternative to the nation-state form(Cheah 1998:36). This can
give associations to the EU, which is the closest we have such an institutional arrangement. The
author then makes a grand obersvation, stating that cosmopolitanism, and nationalism are *"formed*
from the complicated intertwinings of culture, politics, and economics, and that we can
conceptualize these phenomomena adequately only by working in the volatile zone where ethical
philosophy, political theory, cultural anthropology, social theory, critical theory and cultural
studies intersect(Cheah 1998:38).

2.4.2 Borders In Other Forms

According to Chris Rumford borders take new shapes and forms and appear constantly in new
places. He mentions the appearance of borders at railway stations, airports, along motorways, even
in internet cafe´s and supermarkets(Rumford 2008:52). He furthermore points to the fact that recent
developments of the European Union such as the establishment of the single market, the Schengen
zone, the Eurozone as well as enlargements to the east, have multiplied as well as substituted old
borders for new ones. This is all included in what he calls a multiplicity of new types of borders and
bordering processes. What's more, he argues that recent thinking on these practices, bordering, de-
bordering and re-bordering, has made it impossible to pretend that Europe is separate from the rest
of the world. To summarize briefly, Rumford says:

    "Cosmopolitanism cannot be limited to questions of world citizenship, identification with
the 'Other', choosing to belong (or not belong to) particular communities, or establishing justice
beyond the nation state. Nor can cosmopolitanism be reduced to a general mobility. However,
cosmopolitanism does imply a particular kind of mobility: the ability of individuals to cross and re-

cross borders. Importantly, this view of the relationship between borders and cosmopolitanism assumes not borderlessness but a proliferation of borders"(Rumford 2008:53).

Importantly, Rumford also emphasizes that on contrary to the historical perspective of cosmopolitanism, it is not only the business of elites, but a central component in the everyday lives of a great deal of Europeans, as well as for people elsewhere. This leads to another crucial point, one also mentioned by Balibar,the fact that Europes cosmopolitan borders are not experienced the same way by everyone: *"borders are diffused through society, differentiated, mobile and networked, also increases the chance that they are experienced differently by different groups, some of whom encounter them as anything but cosmopolitan"*(Rumford 2008:54).

Another crucial factor in Rumfords view on cosmopolitanism is *who* is responsible for the bordering and rebordering. He points to the fact that national states have passed this task upwards to the EU, and furthermore the fact that some of these borders have brought problems with them that only the EU has been able to solve through a common border framework, hence the creation in 2004 of Frontex, formally called European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation of the Member States of the European Union. However, borderwork has not only been delegated upwards, but also downwards to not only regional and urban levels, but has also become the business of more actors, including interest groups, citizens, enterprises as well as residents associations(Rumford 2008:54). This is why the question of who does the bordering is important when analyzing cosmopolitanism. The very idea that Europe possesses cosmopolitan borders does indeed reflect the involvement of a range of non-state actors and groups. Thus we can see that the borders that define Europe is increasingly being determined less by nation-states than by the EU. The EU seems to have the power to shift, dismantle and construct new borders to a large extent, which was never previously possessed by any nation-state. The EU are doing this through enlargements as well as re-definition of where the EUs eastern border lies(Rumford 2008:54).

In addition to the essential components to border thinking and analysis, Rumford emphasizes the fact that we have a great variety of many different "Europes". These are as mentioned above Europe as in the Schengen zone, the Council of Europe, the European Economic Area, the Eurozone, the EUs outer borders, and others. He summarizes this as a multiplication of borders all within Europe (however you define it), as well as the types of borders. It is also being underlined that there is a "blurring" or "fuzzing" of borders from a lack of distinction between what is outside and inside.

This is exemplified by the fact that each member state becomes a representative of the other. This happens for example when someone is granted a visa to any European Union country within the Schengen zone, they are free to travel to whichever country they see fit[7].

Rumford also mentions the abilities of cosmopolitanism to view Europe beyond the two dominating concepts; securitized borders associated with rebordering and borderless Europe(the internal market). This is due to the compatibility with the term "network Europe", where Europe is seen as a network polity linked by connectivity stimulated by global flows of capital, goods and services, rather than a collection of pre-existing national states(Rumford 2008:55). Rumford then uses the term "network Europe" for the concept of networked borders. He argues that Europes borders are increasingly networked because they vary in scope and tightness. As an example he mentions the EUs external border, which is more heavily fortified on terms of securitization, than the corresponding economic, telecommunication and educational borders, whom facilitate as opposed to reduce, mobility. Essentially, Rumford argues that Europes borders are increasingly networked because they are diffused and mobile throughout society. They are modulated and between administrative entities, and are periodically dissolved, shifted and reconstituted. They also appear where mobility is highest, such as at airline check-in desks, Eurostar terminals and even along motorways where migration controls exist. However, Rumford does accept that the concept of "network Europe" can only be understood sufficiently in conjunction with the a notion of networked or cosmopolitan borders(Rumford 2008:55-56).

Another vital point in Rumfords idea of cosmopolitanism is the question of "whose" borders are they? As mentioned nation states no longer have the main function of defining borders, which is increasingly done by the European Union. Furthermore, he points out that borderwork is thus also being done by a diverse group of actors, including urban authorities, citizens, social movements as well as crime interests. An example of the latter is the breakaway region of Transdniester, which lies between Ukraine and Moldova. This region is quoted as a state which is a family-owned criminal enterprise, and vice versa(Rumford 2008:57). This led to the EU in cooperation with Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities assisted them in patrolling and monitoring the borders of Transdniester[8]. This example, along with the Russian enclave Kaliningrad, whom is now surrounded by EU member

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[7] This is often described as a "problem", for example for countries in Northern Europe who generally receive a flow of migrants who are eligible for free travel within Schengen due to temporary citizenships they have obtained for example in Spain or Italy(often in the case of African migrants).

[8] EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)- http://www.eubam.org/

states after the 2004 enlargement, are examples of the EU becoming a stakeholder over borders for whom it has no formal or judicial responsibilities over. Elsewhere, a congestion charging zone in London is an example of a bordering practice done by city authorities. in fact such practice has been performed since the security cordon around the City of London distract in 1983, in response to bombing campaigns by IRA(Rumford 2008:58). Citizens and non-governmental organizations may have influence through the use of lobbying methods directed at politicians. In Norway, an NGO has recently begun employing the often persecuted and oppressed Roma people as sellers of a magazine, with fixed and regulated employment contracts. Normally, the Roma people come looking for work (but are often forced to begging) on a Schengen visa, meaning they are permitted to stay for three months. With an employment contract, they are granted not only a right to stay longer than the three months, but are also given rights to economic welfare and health services (URL-NRK:14.07.2012[9]). Thus, this non-governmental organization is altering the terms of their entry, in essence conducting bordering work, or one could say acting as a border authority.

For Rumford, the polysemic nature of the European borders is essential. Related, he also points out that among citizens, there is a desire for borders, or at least for a certain kind of borders. This can be exemplified by the fact that some choose to live in a gated neighbourhood, or the selective nature (with regards to migrants) of the EUs external border itself. It also mentioned that criminal networks and others who profit from illegal border crossings desire this border, the border is exactly what creates the (illegal) market they profit from(Rumford 2008:60).

Within cosmopolitanism, local cultures around a borderland can also reveal information about the border. These cultures can either reinforce state borders, or subvert them(Rumford 2008:61). Cultures may often be a border themselves, or they can stretch beyond the border due to ethnicity or for historical reasons. Hence, these local cultures can be active in the construction of nations and states. The author points out that ethnical and national identities are often configured differently at the border, and thus has an effect on the visibility of the border, such as for example the Irish border. To summarize, Rumford states: *"The state imposes itself upon a territory and its population whose cultural values and local activities may give legitimacy to that border, or, alternatively, to erode that legitimacy"*(Rumford 2008:61).

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[9] http://nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.8243443

Regarding cross-border activity, whether it is tourism, shoppers, smugglers or transportation of goods, they all require a border in order to operate. The emphasis here is on the dual nature of a border, it is in most cases both a barrier and a bridge. Regardless, *"the same activites that transform the experience of the border also work to consolidate it"*(Rumford 2008:62). To summarize what Rumford proclaims about cosmopolitan borders, he states that borders and borders crossings can constitute a resource for identity reconstruction, self-actualization as well a sense of belonging. *"In order to live in multiple communities or to be at home with multiple identities we must be comfortable with and adept at crossing and re-crossing borders*(Rumford 2008:66).

2.4.3 Citizenship Beyond Borders

Holston and Appadurai(1996) have interesting observations regarding questions of citizenships. They point to the fact that some in places, the nation is no longer a successful arbiter of citizeship. There are uncertainties regarding its form of organization, inclusiveness, ethical foundations and location of sovereign power, which up until recently has seemed secure. It is common to consider these transformations as dichotomies between the national and the global(Holston &Appadurai 1996:188). The authors additionally point to the way cities may be detached from its nation state, thus leading to many feeling that their desires for rights to religious or sexual practices may not be sufficiently embodied in the national sphere of rights, even though their local communities may approve them. This is characteristically for countries who have experience recent transitions to democracy and market capitalism in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe. They underline the fact that for example legally resident non-citizens often possess virtually identical socioeconomic and civil rights as citizens(Holston & Appadurai 1996:190).

A response to this has often been that one tries to make citizenship more exclusive, or excluding. This implies the aim of some to deny social services to various categories of non-citizens, or attempts to legislate the use of one language exclusively. Others use the enclosement of residential neighbourhoods in urban areas, guarded by security companies, for example in Los Angeles or in Sao Paulo. On the contrary, there are approaches that go the opposite ways, and attempts to make citizenship more inclusive. These approaches aim to make citizenship available regardless of

national origins, residence or place of work. Examples of these are movements for human rights, transnational citizenship and continental associations(The EU, NAFTA, Mercosur). However, the authors also emphasize some of the consequences of such responses. Localism can generate xenophobic violence, whereas elimination of local community as grounds for citizenship tends to prevent active participation, something we have seen especially in the EU(Holston & Appadurai 1996:191).

The authors furthermore argue that to form a solid basis of national citizenship, there needs to be a common understanding with all the citizens, that they all perceive that they are sufficiently similar to each other to form common purpose. Factors that contribute here are meaningful common goods, that participation leads to the establishment of these common goods, and that there are equal rights among all who participate. Holston & Appadurai hence argue that this perception is under threat many places due to growing inequality between citizens, due to the economic growth being redistributed unfairly or not at all. This leads to a failure in citizens to connect with many of their fellow citizens and also their national state(Holston & Appadurai 1996:192). Examples of the most vocal critics of this so-called liberal citizenship are groups deriving from specific identities, for example feminism, religious groups or fractions and minorities. They thus argue that *"politics of difference has become so intense precisely because it suggests a change in the historical role of citizenship: it indicates the increasing disarticulation of formal citizenship as the principal norm for coordinating and managing the simultaneity of modern social identities in highly differentiated societies. In that suggestion, it ignites deep anxieties about what form such coordination might take, both juridically and symbolically, if citizenship no longer has that primary role*(Holston & Appadurai 1996:195).

2.4.4 Europe In Different Shapes and Forms

Using the cosmopolitan framework, it is important to account for where the "idea of Europe" came from, and what Europe has implied, historically. There is mostly an agreed consensus that the eastern border of Europe lies somewhere in, or perhaps somewhere along Eastern Europe's eastern border. But according to Gerard Delanty(1995), the term Eastern Europe is misleading and vague, and argues that Eastern Europe includes at least two regions which can be contrasted to western europe on one hand, and Russia and Turkey on the other. The first one is south-east Europe, first and foremost the Balkans, and the second is the lands between Germany and Russia, meaning

Poland, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Baltic states(Delanty 1995:48). Delanty furthermore argues that the east-west border from the Baltic Sea to the Aegan Sea more or less coincided with the division between Orthodoxy and Latin Christianity. Therefore, when the idea of Europe (secular modernity, cultural framework) began to take root in Western Europe, it was only partially extended to Eastern Europe, and separated the West Slavs(Poles and Czechs) from the East Slavs(Russians)[10]. For this reason, Europe as a geopolitical framework was never compatible with the cultural model of Europe(Delanty 1995:49). As mentioned elsewhere, and something we see nowadays in rhetorics regarding the ENP, *"the eastern frontier was the most impermanent one since there was no natural line of demarcation.....There had always been an Eastern Question as far as Europe was concerned, and indeed, its very existence required it"*(Delanty 1995:49).

Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford put forward several convincing cosmopolitan arguments in their book Rethinking Europe. First and foremost they point to the fact that every age has constructed a Europe in response to the concerns of the present situation. The idea of Europe arose in the sixteenth century in response to threats to Christianity, and then continued as ideals and ideas regarding a European civilization(Delanty&Rumford 2005:28). However, in the aftermath of fascism, Europe could no longer claim to represent the Western civilizational ideal model, whose role fell to America. However, among all the confusing descriptions of what Europe is, among all the projects that Europe is, Delanty and Rumford summarize it in terms of Europe taking a new form, of which the contours are not yet clear. Firstly, they argue that Europe can longer be conceived of in terms of the West. Secondly, in geopolitical terms, Europe is not just one thing but many. Thirdly, the postcommunist era has not led to the erasure of the East but its reconfiguration. Interestingly, for this thesis, they argue that *"Europe has always had two faces, a western and an eastern one. We are now witnessing a new expression of the latter, and with this comes too a new identity for Europe"*(Delanty&Rumford 2005:30).

The authors also have interesting takes on European borders. They argue that the outer limit of the EU is similar to a traditional border, whereas within they are increasingly abolished. They thus argue that this double dynamic prevents the outer borders of Europe from becoming a great frontier, because all borders and frontiers will remain contested by boundary constructions (Delanty&Rumford 2005:32). They also emphasize that the renogitation of borders in newer

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[10] According to Delanty, the disappearence of the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom which stretched from Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, contributed greatly to the future divisions between Western and Eastern Europe.

European history, have not only been the work of political organizations like EU or NATO or nation-states, but also of the soft borders of civilization, such as Christianity, or indeed the symbolic borders that constitute the notion of a European continent.

Regarding the European continent, they justly ask the question; where does Asia end and Europe begin? The simple answer to this question is according to the authors that there is no simple answer. This is due to the abundance of east-west splitting events throughout history, either religious, political or conquerings. It is furthermore argued that if Europe has been shaped by the pull of Rome from one side and Byzantium on the other side, then in the 20th century it has been shaped by the pull of United States on one side and from Russia on the other side. Regarding this mix, they say that *"Given the role of the eastern border in the making if Europe and the obvious fact that Europe contains large parts that do not fall under the general category of 'western', it must be concluded that the plurality of europe is more than a diversity of cultures and nations, but extends into its very civilizational nature. In other words, as a geographical entity Europe is as much Eastern as it is western"*(Delanty &Rumford 2005:35).

Regarding the prospects of feeling "European" in a cosmopolitan way, Delanty and Rumford argue that this is not uncommon. however it implies being European in a very specific way. Firstly, they say that there is no European self-confronting an Other, pointing to the fact that Islam does not fill this role. Additionally, Europeans are unlikely to unite against an Other. It is argued that what threatens Europe cannot come from the outside because Europe is unable to constitute itself as an inside. *"To be European is not to identify with something called Europe or have a common identity comparable to a national identity and for which the hyphen is needed….Europe does not exist except as a discursively constructed object of consciousness and Europeans do also not exist as a people with a shared past. To be European is simply to recognize that one lives in a world that does not belong to a specific people"*(Delanty &Rumford 2005:76-77).

2.4.5 Network Europe

Another interesting view on the European borders Delanty and Rumford present is the outlook on Europe as something dynamic. They argue that borderlands are useful in this context because it highlights the indeterminacy of European space as well as indicates the problems associated with viewing the EU in terms of bordered and integrated territory and undifferentiated, uniform space.

They present three key features of the EU as a dynamic space. Firstly, the new creation of ENP for example, is a creation of borders, but these border are not lines or frontiers they argue, but they are spaces to be governed. Secondly, borderlands represents forms of connectivity between discontinuous systems. This can be exemplified by Greece, whom shared no border with any other EU member state,until the accession of Bulgaria in 2007. Thirdly, dynamic spaces do not distinguish between networked and non-networked places(Delanty & Rumford 2005:134-136).

To summarize briefly, and to put cosmopolitanism within a European Union context, Delanty and Rumford say that cosmopolitanism aspires to be at home with difference and diversity as well as societal tensions, whom which national citizenship and multicultural identity have engaged with but failed to resolve. Moreover, cosmopolitanism stimulates the idea that we each contain a clash of cultures, just like(European) society does. They furthermore state that: *"In this sense, we have never been European, but, with a cosmopolitan mindset, we might now aspire to be it"*(Delanty & Rumford 2005:194).

Section 3. The Case of Ukraine Viewed Through a Cosmopolitan Frame

3.1 Linking the Conceptual Discussion to the Empirics

Boudeltje and van Houtum(2011) emphasize what is essential when trying to understand EU-Ukraine relations. They bring forward the notion of the EU as a geopolitical subject as opposed to 'agent' or 'actor' described by Pami Aalto. According to the authors the EU can be portrayed as *"an unfinished and ongoing construction process that is not necessarily a subjectivity that is represented simultaneously by all member states"*. The authors further state that in some cases the EU has the ascendancy and in other cases the most powerful member states have it(Boudeltje&van Houtum 2011:141). In this light, it is my opinion that the theory of cosmopolitanism does a satisfying job of taking into account the fact that all cross-border activities are initiated, monitored and coordinated at varying levels of the EU hierarchy, and spread out among a diverse range of actors. Joenniemi (2012) argues that the EU has breached its foundational narrative, and is in search for a new one through achieving 'ontological security', a stable and secure sense of self(Joenniemi 2012:26). The EU has clearly moved on and progressed from being a mere free-trade area designed to prevent war in Western Europe. However the EU can not be portrayed as a single actor or agent. The actions of the EU are composed of compromises between a whole range of actors, including state politicians, Commission officials, elected MEP's, national parliaments as well as interest groups through lobbying. I therefore believe that the broad and multiplex nature of cosmopilitanism is suited to account for the diverse range of actors who play a role in the creation and evolving the of the EU's outer borders, and does so satisfactory in my choice of topic, the EU-Ukrainian border.

Thus, I do believe that the examples I have given are reflections of the cosmopolitan theory's relevance. The free-trade agreement, the visa liberalization prospects, Ukraine as a part of cultural and geographical Europe, Ukraine as a part of a networked European space, are all factors who add up to completing the picture of Ukraine today, on the fringes of EU integration and in constant motion, but situated firmly within Europe geographically and culturally.

It is my perception that cosmpolitanism can be used as a mediator between the EU and Ukraine when analyzing the current situation. This is especially the case as one of the questions arising in this framework is wether the ENP is 'the end of the EU', or of Europe. An essential part of cosmopolitanism is the fact that it asks us 'which EU' or 'which Europe' ?, and subsequently is

successful when problematizing and contextualizing the many different 'EUs' and 'Europes' we have, but which are hidden beyond the sometimes misleading borders we see on maps.

3.2 To What Extent is the EUs Border with Ukraine More Flexible and Fluid Than the Prevailing Research Suggests?

Regarding the vocabulary of the official policy documents, it is essential to distinguish between the timeframes they regard. Equally, one must distinguish between the various areas of the ENP as well. The ENP countries in Northern Africa and in the Middle East have different policy priorities and EU aspirations than for example the Eastern Partnership countries. Even within the Eastern partnership there are differences. The countries in the Caucasus region clearly have different perspectives and needs than for example Ukraine and Moldova. As it stands, the official documents say little about time perspectives other than state that in the medium term membership or a role in the institutions will not be on the agenda. While membership may indeed have been excluded in the future for some ENP countries, as stated elsewhere, vagueness is often a part of EU discourse to maintain room to maneuver. As the EU often have a hard time finding a consensus on foreign policy issues, results will often be 'the lowest common denominator' and the policy formulated will reflect the lack of consensus and thus be flexible in the future.

Perhaps as an anecdote with reference to EU history, one argument worth mentioning when claiming that the ENP is not a closure of EU Enlargement is the argument regarding the spillover process. This process is a central component in the neo-functionalist theory, being used to describe (aspects of) EU integration. The spillover process can be split in two categories, functional spillover and political spillover. A spillover refers to integration in one area of cooperation, which then can be made more effective by integrating in another related area. An example of this, the functional spillover, is how the Single Market became more effective when health and safety matters related to work environments became harmonized, thus ensuring a more stable flow of goods across the borders. A political spillover refers to situations where there is a more deliberate political process, such as when actors make package deals to establish common agreement in several political areas (Cini 2007:90).

Therefore, it is potentially possible to get such a situation in the ENP framework where this becomes a reality. It is emphasized that cross-border cooperation should increase between the EU and Ukraine through the ENP framework, especially with the planned Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, which has been negotiated, but needs to be ratified first(European Commission 2012:12). There is typically a will from both parties to make policy more effective by integration in other areas as well. If previous EU history is anything to go by, we can expect a spillover effect from the economic area of integration into the political area. Furthermore, Adam Balcer from DemosEuropa argues that *"Economic integration must be accompanied by the EU's will and determination to implement a political agenda as it has done in the case of the Western Balkan countries"*(Balcer 2011:115). The lack of a political agenda, including membership prospects, to accompany economic ties has been a dominant critique of the ENP(Pelczynska-Nalecz 2011).

Taking the theory of cosmopolitanism into account, it is difficult to imagine research on borders done in the past or present being unquestionably valid in the future, regardless of wether that is the medium or long term. In the section regarding cosmopolitanism as a border theory, I have given an overview over how the borders, frontiers and boundaries are constantly diversified, proliferated, re-drawn and dissolved all over the EU, and even Europe. In the case of Ukraine, this is evident. As Delanty and Rumford points out, and mentioned above as well, the EU's security border is something completely different than the EU's economic, education and telecommunication borders (Delanty&Rumford 2005:130), which is the case for Ukraine. This is proven to me, by the fact that despite not being offered a membership perspective, Ukraine nevertheless are offered a Visa Liberalization Plan which will make it it easier for its citizens to cross the border into the EU. It is not only offered, but has been formulated as a goal for the EU. This plan was amended as recently as this summer, to include even more of Ukraine's citizens(URL-European Union External Action Service 07/2012[11]).

Therefore, it is a vital point in my argumentation that the nature of ENP is in fact more nuanced than what Kostadinova, Kuus and other scholars on the ENP suggests. For example the observation that the ENP contributes to a framing of the ENP countries as 'Others'. This is most likely true for most of the ENP countries, especially the ones from the Southern Neighbourhood, but I will argue this is not the case for Ukraine. My reason for this claim is that the EU simultaneously are trying to

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[11] http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/2012_07_24_2_en.htm

bring forward a Free Trade Agreement, as well as Visa Liberalization Plan, which would make trade and border crossing only easier and more frequent. In my opinion, this would not have been done if they had considered Ukraine and/or Ukrainian citizens something they needed protection from by increasingly harder and securitized borders. The same argument applies to van Houtum and Pijpers (2007) who believe that in a desire to preserve what is seen as a pure national identity, the EU often use a new normative vocabulary. This is due to what they refer to as a pressing need to communify. According to the authors this is part of the search for an appropriate way to define outsiders. Hence, it is my opinion that the authors claim are likely to be accurate for other ENP countries, but not for Ukraine.

Additionally, the EU has acknowledged Ukraine as a European country with European identity that shares a common history and common values with the EU(EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee 2012). This will in turn lead to a different policy regarding for example immigration, than what is the case for for example African migrants attempting to enter the EU through the Spanish enclaves in Africa or by crossing the Mediterranean. Ukrainians are not perceived to be a 'migrational threat' either(Olav Berstad:Interview 05.07.2012). In this light, it is also well worth pointing out that not every country in the ENP are seeking EU membership. In fact, only Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia do(Kuzio 2006:100), which in the long term does take away some pressure from the EU's much debated institutional capacity, and hence, will make it easier to tailor an individual policy for Ukraine.

3.3 The Way Forward For the European Neighbourhood Policy

Pelczynska-Nalecz(2011) claims that it is possible for Brussels to formulate a clear and attractive strategic, without a clear offer of membership. This can be done by replacing emphasis on 'neighbourhoods' with an idea of a 'united Europe' , which may bear more fruits in the future. Furthermore Pelczynska-Nalecz observes that Eastern European countries have three major assets, which are that they are relatively functional, the region has significant potential for grassroots democracy, and that most of the countries show significant potential related to their European identity(Pelczynksa-Nalecz 2011:8). She also essentially points out that drawing the neighbourhood closer to the EU is a process which requires longterm action and gives few instant successes. As pointed out elsewhere, she also states that ruling out membership prospects would undermine the EUs credibility as this would be contrary to Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union. Jarabik

and Kobzova(2011) argue that it is primarily the higher living standards in the EU which attracts it neighbours, not the EU policies itself. In this respect, there is progress throughout the neighbourhood, albeit one that is slow and sometimes invisible to the media(Jarabik&Kobzova 2011:8).

Despite the fact that membership prospects have so far been exempted from ENP policy documents, Browning and Christou(2010) argues that the neighbourhood countries have a certain kind of power from being perceived as 'Others', that can be used to influence the EU. This can be explained by two factors. Firstly, the 'Self', in this case the EU, needs recognition and legitimacy in order to actually be able to claim to be a certain kind of an actor, to proclaim a certain identity. The authors refer to this is a recognition game, and uses the 2004 enlargement as an example. The prospective members kept enlargement on the agenda by consistently referring to the EU's foundational myth as a 'peace project open to all in Europe'. It was implied that the legitimacy of the EU's self-identity was at stake, and would only be recognized by the outside if membership was still on the table (Browning&Christou 2010:110). The second factor regards what kind of 'Others'. The authors argue that 'Others' are not necessarily negative, threatening or oppositional 'Others'. They can be friends and partners, as well as enemies. Further they can be contending and complementary as well. Others may also be considered as in need of emulation. This was for example case of the Eastern European countries, who brought forward the idea of 'returning to Europe' after the fall of the Soviet Union. This discourse implies that these countries were the same, but were separated from the assumed European 'mainstream experience' of western Europe(Browning&Christou 2010:110).

The authors further use the concept of the 'power of margins', arguing that the margin opposed to the center, can use several strategies to wield influence. The underlying principle here is the fact that even though margins are often considered subordinate to the centre, the margins are sites of action themselves. More precisely, it is the *"connections that exist across borders in the margins which points to the fact that the very definition of the centre is also dependent on what happens at the margins"*. Since margins and centers are defined via their relationship, the capacities of the center are already in some sense dependent on the margin(Browning&Christou 2010:111). Within this context, there are five relevant strategies. The first is obtaining loyalty rewards, where the margin seeks benefits from the center in return for not moving towards another center, for example threats of orienting oneself towards Russia instead of the EU. The second strategy is obtaining

intermediation rewards by attempting to gain benefits by positioning the margin as an important boundary between two competing centre's spheres of influence. The third strategy is playing one centre off another. Here the margin seeks to create competition between two centre's and then receive benefits in return for the margins loyalty. The fourth strategy is manifest emulation. Here a marginal actor pretends to adopt characteristics from the identity of the center. This is done selectively in order to appear familiar, reliable and easy to deal with, or it can be done extensively (real/selective appropriation). The last strategy is manifest rejection, where one marginal actor simply rejects a centre's overtures.

Regarding the ENP specifically, the authors argue that the emphasis on developing close relations and becoming 'like us', but not actually 'of us'. However it is emphasized that this differs according to which part of the European Neighbourhood one is referring to. It is essential that the EU has fully endorsed the Europeanness of the eastern neighbours, additionally, the europeanness of the east has never been questioned. To the authors, this gives the eastern neighbours a rhetorical resource to use against the EU to challenge the attempt to use the ENP to demarcate the final borders of the EU. This power of the outsider is also strengthened by the internal divisions in the EU, exemplified by Sweden and Polands and others' support for Ukrainian EU membership (Browning&Christou 2010:113).

In the case of Ukraine, the manifest emulation and playing one centre off another has previously been used. Ukraine's European identity has been based on geographical and historical references. However, this somewhat altered after the Orange Revolution in 2004, and the 'shared spiritual and moral values' became the dominating reason for the orientation towards Europe and the EU. The authors nevertheless refers to the strategy as manifest emulation, but in the form real appropriation, with trying to legitimise the case for Ukrainian membership through internalising EU norms and fuzzying the distinction between Ukraine as the 'Other' and the EU self(Browning&Christou 2010:114). Despite the fact that the terms of the Association Agreement was negotiated by the previous government, and that no membership perspective was included, the Ukrainian government did not let the issue die with its rhetoric. Implementation of the Action Plan and statements saying that 'Ukraine is a part of Europe', not a neighbour of the the EU kept the topic of membership on the agenda. The Ukrainian governments view of the Association Agreement as a stepping stone as a part of the manifest emulation strategy has made sure that the possibility of securing a membership perspective in the future is still there(Browning&Christou 2010:114).

3.4 Is the Border Becoming More Cosmopolitan?

Again, staying with the cosmopolitan theory, is it possible that the ENP can contribute to including Ukraine in a single networked European space? According to Delanty and Rumford, proximity politics as the Commission refers it to, concerns the creation of borders as spaces to be governed (Delanty&Rumford 2005:135). However one can not stretch this concept so far to say that the Ukraine is now de facto governed by the ENP or the EU, but the EU does hold a conditionality to which the Ukraine adjust to, meaning for example the acquis communautaire, democratic values, participation in the EU Energy Community, as well the DCFTA(Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement) as well as the Visa Liberalisation Plan. According to Rumford(2008), borders are also experienced differently by individuals or groups, which is part of what he refers to as the 'cosmopolitan paradox'. That means that even the networked space will be experienced differently. Crucially, one can make the argument that if it, alternatively when it will be, implemented, both the DCFTA and the Visa Liberalization Plan can cement Ukraine's position within a networked European space with free movement of goods, capital, people and services. Bialasiewicz et.al. (2009) points out that borders which separate the EU from non-EU are provisional, shifted by enlargements and eroded by pan-European networks of communication and mobility which extend beyond EU member states(Bialiasiewicz et.al 2009:84). The Visa Liberalisation Plan and the DCFTA are examples of this, if they are implemented. The networked European space might make even more sense if it is seen in context with O'Dowds argument that transformation of European borders needs to be understood within the context of the development of the EU as an institutionalized mediator between global markets and national states(Rumford 2008:62).

Popescu(2008) points out that the regional development initiatives, Euroregions which are present all over the EU, also are introduced beyond EU borders. All of Ukraine's neighbours inside the EU have a 'Euroregion' cooperation framework that extends into Ukraine. He thus states that the Euroregions of Ukraine play a crucial role in implementing of the ENP serving as territorial interfaces between the EU and former Soviet space. As he puts it, while *"formally the EU stops at Romania's eastern borders, informally the Euroregions' territory is tantamount to a territorial overlapping between Ukraine and Moldova and the EU space."*(Popescu 2008:425). Popescu furthermore notes that Euroregions was pursued by Ukraine as means to consolidate their

independence, and to create political openings to the west. This was needed due to the fact that for most of the 1990's, Ukraine remained outside the western mental maps that redesigned the European space, due to the lack of direct cooperation with the EU. Most crucially though, Popescu states that whilst these Euroregions are not unified spaces outside the nation-state and the EU's hegemony, they are territories experiencing an ongoing process of retorritorialization in a multi-scalar spacial context(Popescu 2008:434). This means that withing the context of the EU-Ukraine relations, the borderlands themselves, or the Euroregions, largely go unaccounted for as the focus tend to lay on the top governmental level of cooperation.

Using Appadurai and Holston's views on citizenship as a reference, it is possible to see a link between citizenship given from a nation state to a citizenship given from a supranational institution akin to the EU, in the case of Ukraine. The prospects of the Visa Liberalization Plan for Ukrainian citizens is crucial in this aspect. The fact that this is desired by the Ukranian political elite as well as the people, indicate that certain aspects of the Ukrainian citizenship is unsatisfactory. Hence Ukraine is seeking to obtain at least certain aspects of a EU citizenship, with most notably travel freedom as the first priority. In relation to what has been said about the ENP, visa and travel freedom for Ukrainian citizens would contribute to Ukrainians to a lesser degree feeling like second class citizens, or indeed 'Others', as Swiecicki(Interview 28.05.2012) say they tend to do now. Notably, this would make Ukrainian citizenship itself be perceived as more attractive. As Ukrainians are currently only aspiring to the entry and traveling aspects of the EU citizenship, the potential problem of passivity as a consequence of expanding the inclusiveness of the citizenship that Holston and Appadurai would not apply.

3.5 Ukraine as a part of geographical and cultural Europe.

According to Delanty(1995), there are six main dominant conceptions of Europe. First, Europe as the 'West'. Second, Europe associated with the peace movement of the 1980s, where Europe basically ended at the borders of the Iron Curtain. Third, Europe as the European Union, which is the dominant idea, and one that much of former Eastern Europe aspires to. Fourth, an extended notion of Europe that included 'European Russia'. This can for example be De Gaulle's idea of Europe extending from 'the atlantic to the Urals'. Fifth, the idea of a European security area including USA and Russia as well as the former USSR. Sixth, the idea of Central Europe as an

alternative to Eastern Europe(Delanty 1995:148). Interestingly, Ukraine can be argued to be included in all these conceptions apart from the second and the first, and are aspiring to be included in the third. Delanty also argues that geographically speaking, the textbook Eastern border is the Ural mountains. However he argues that the Ural mountains are lowlying, and not even important enough to act as border between Russian regions, and are therefore as arbitrary as any border. Further, Alexander Von Humboldt even considered the western regions of Siberia to belong to Europe(Delanty 1995:58-59). Crucially for this topic, Delanty and Rumford argue that as a geographical entity, Europe is as much eastern as it is western(Delanty&Rumford 2005:35). The same authors further argue claim that we are now seeing a new expression of the eastern face of Europe. The case of Ukraine can be an example of how the east is no longer separated from the west in terms of ideology. I will to a large extent give Delanty and Rumford right in saying that the postcommunist era has not led to the disappearance of the east but its reconfiguration, and I further believe that this is exactly what is happening within the European Neighbourhood Policy, to varying degrees of 'Europeanisation'.

Further, as stated in section 2.1, large parts of Ukraine has often found itself within the mainstream dominating concepts of Europe throughout history. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth included at its biggest parts of Ukraine as far as to include Kiev, near the black sea and Donetsk where it collided with the Ottoman Empire(Magocsi 2002:60). Large parts of what is today western Ukraine was also included in the Austria-Hungary Empire. Western parts of Ukraine(as well as eastern parts of Poland) were inhabited by a mix of Poles and Ukrainians, and were also catholic from the seat in Lviv. Thus, large parts of Ukraine share a common history and heritage with its western neighbours. With that in mind, I will present the opportunity that if not present, in the the future, it will be possible for Ukraine to be included in what Paasi refers to as a borderland integrated in the bigger European narrative framework, and also within the European borders that act as symbols and institutions, following Paasi's line of reasoning. Regarding cultures, Rumford argues that cultures may constitute a border itself, or stretch across a border due to ethnicity or historical reasons. Hence, I will argue that Ukraine is not a cultural border as such. He further observes that such cultures may contribute to the visibility of the border. In this aspect, I will argue that the border between EU and Ukraine becomes more visible due to the common culture, values and history shared.

From the research of Kuus, we have seen that there is large element of territoriality in the picture when we are discussing what Europe is. We have also seen from the same research that geography is less important than values, and common culture. I will argue that for Ukrainian citizens in general, the common values and culture are shared based on the research of Delanty and others. However, the embrace for 'European' values are not shared to same the extent by the political and economic elites, whom currently place democracy and rule of law behind personal wealth and power in their priorities.

3.6 To What Extent is Ukraine a Part of a 'Networked European Space' ?

Within economic trade, Ukraine is already part of a networked European space. In addition they are part of several cooperation programs initiated by the the EU, such as the European Energy Community. If we are to follow the logic of Delanty and Rumford, who see the European Neighbourhood Policy as spaces to be governed, it can be argued that Ukraine is a part of networked European space. Granted participation in the Single market is not a reality as of yet, but may be in the near or medium future. The same can be said for visa freedom for Ukrainian citizens. If implemented, it will further contribute to Ukraine being a part of a networked European space. In addition to that, Ukraine is a member of several other influential European institutions and organizations. They are included in Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, European Court of Human Rights, and have signed the European Human Rights Convention. Ukraine is thus included in a significant amount of different 'Europes'. This significantly contributes to a blurring and fuzzing of the borders between the EU and Ukraine. To be a member in the mentioned European institutions may not significantly change the nature of the border as such, but it will contribute to Ukraine finding themselves within a European space, by being a part of common regimes within human rights, development cooperation as well as being a part of cultural frameworks such as hosting a sporting event of magnitude such as the European Championship, participation in UEFA or Eurovision Song Contest.

Related to the last paragraph, not only has the European aspirations of Ukraine made it complicated to formulate a clear and consistent enlargement policy. Previous decisions of the EU has also contributed to this. The fact that Turkey has been given candidate status has aggravated Ukrainian politicians, something former Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten describes in his revealing book. Taras Kuzio(2006:98) and Marcin Swiecicki (Interview 28.05.2012) also share this

view. He also mentions that his own explanations of this were unconvincing and lacked real legitimacy in retrospect(Patten 2006:145).

Using Paasi's logic regarding the role of boundaries in society, I will present the possibility of Ukraine finding themselves within such a border in the future. As Paasi claims that territoriality, boundaries and identities should be viewed as situational and contextual, it is possible to imagine Ukraine as a part of a European identity as well as a European territory. In the future, it may be possible for Ukraine to find themselves within a european 'narrative', as well as within the european boundaries acting as institutions by constructing a continuity for social interaction(Paasi 1998:81).This is also compatible with Delantys view of Europe as a cultural frame of reference that is legitimized when it is accepted as a part of a political framework(Delanty 1995:148). In this respect Jean Monnet himself remarked that Europe as a subject that has sovereign power must be created(Delanty&Rumford 2005:69). In my view, Europe as a polity and as a conscience or identity has successfully been created, as many agree with principles of shared sovereignty and a common European identity. However the expansion, or 'widening and deepening' in EU language of both concepts has made it more contested than what was previously the case. It is nevertheless my opinion that it is too early to say that Ukraine will or will not be accepted as a legitimate part of Europe (both as an identity and a polity) by all relevant actors in the future.

3.7 What does Ukraine Mean for the European Union?

James Sherr(2010) claims that Ukraine is important for the EU in terms of European energy security, for the future of Russia, for the safety of other states in Russia's neighbourhood, for the recovery of self-confidence among the newer members of the European Union and for the health of the democratic project in Europe as a whole. Talking about the future, he notes that as long as the EU fails to present Ukraine with credible membership prospects, it will be on thin ground in lecturing Ukrainians about European standards. He furthermore suggests that the EU could copy NATOs 2008 formula which states that 'Ukraine will be a member of the EU'. This would give the EU an authority it lacks now, and it will force Ukrainians to understand that the path of membership depends primarily on Ukraine itself. Furthermore, the EU needs to demonstrate that misguided policies will deprive Ukraine of the support and stimuli it needs to prosper, modernize and integrate with the rest of Europe. In order to do this, he states that the EU needs to remind itself that *these goals serves its own interest. It also needs a policy. Of late policy has suffered"*(Sherr 2010:17-19).

As early this year, a new and clearer policy and is not unlikely, depending on the situation of the political prisoners, as well as the fairness of the October parliamentary elections.

Several scholars argue that the EU may still have some leverage over Ukraine despite the fact that the biggest carrot, membership prospects, is currently missing. The perspectives of EU Enlargement eastwards are bleak in the short and midterm, according to Adam Balcer(2010). This is due to the EU struggling to recover from debt crises, ongoing political reforms from the Lisbon Treaty and the fact that the EaP countries face structural and development problems that discourages the EU from a deeper engagement. However, in the long term, certain factors point in the other direction. In addition to the geographical criteria, Balcer argues that the normative foundations of the EU reveals its moral duty to *"defend the people's rights to freely choose the political and economic model of development and to uphold democratic aspirations of citizens across Europe"*(Balcer 2010:100). In addition to that, the EU has important security stakes in the region, which can threaten Europe's security if they are neglected. Here it is referred to energy transit routes[12], illegal immigration, smuggling, organized crime, protracted conflicts and political instability. The region is also a gate of opportunity towards Russia, China, the Middle East and Central Asia and thus new emerging markets as well as labour supply. The Eastern neighbourhood is inseparably linked to EU-Russia relations, and hence instability could undermine sustainable cooperation. Finally, EU's international credibility will suffer if the EU fails to stabilize and transform its immediate vicinity(Balcer 2010:100).

Taras Kuzio(2006) identifies four obstacles for Ukraine's accession to the EU. They are enlargement fatigue, the EU's identity crisis, the Russia factor and the lagging reforms in Ukraine. Kuzio points out that with an enlarged EU and NATO at Ukraine's western borders, Ukraine no longer occupies the no-mans land of the 1990s(Kuzio 2006:106). In regards to the 'enlargement fatugie' he argues that ever since the 2004 enlargement, the enlargement of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 plus the future possible accessions of the Western Balkan countries, many feel like there needs to be a time to 'digest' the 10 or more new members. Thus, he says this could mean that Ukraines membership prospects are not closed forever but they will need to wait until the EU feel ready again(Kuzio 2006:95).

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[12] 80 % of all gas that Russia exports to the EU goes through Ukraine(Flikke 2011:25).

Andrew Wilson argues that Ukraine does not possess the strategic options nor the coherent narrative that can justify backing away from Europe. He emphasizes that Ukraine is even unable to copy Turkey's model- a powerful state on the edge of Europe increasingly able to act on its own terms. He points out that the economy is much weaker, and that Ukraine has much less appeal, as it can not even get on with its tiny neighbour Moldova. Nor is Ukraine a rival pole to the EU like China, and they are not drawn towards anyone else's pole. Wilson claims that the current presidency of Yanukovich stands or falls to the degree to which it stands up for local oligarch's economic interests, something Berstad also points out(Berstad: Interview 05.07.2012). Wilson argues that the sum of these components mean that Ukraine is not able to, and can not abandon democracy and human rights altogether(Wilson 2011:7). Wilson also believes that 'frustrated isolation' is more likely outcome for Ukraine than turning towards Russia. His reasoning states that the EU still has leverage over Ukraine because *"... Elites may be wary of the EU agreements in the long run as they will put pressure on them to clean up their act. But in the short term, Russia is actually a bigger threat to the elite's key priority, which is maintaining asset control"*(Wilson 2011:9). He furthermore projects that if the EU holds a firm line, it will show that (inevitable) setbacks in the transition to democracy are not necessarily fatal.

Regarding the domestic situation, Iryna Solonenko argues that despite the slow progress on reforms, there is a broad consensus among both the elites and population that the country should continue to aspire to EU membership. Ukrainian politicians and elites are said to disagree on everything but Europe(Solonenko 2010:10), and there is a majority among citizens for EU membership(Berstad: Interview 05.07.2012). There is a broad consensus saying that European norms are legitimate and suitable for the country. She furthermore argues that within the current framework and with what is currently put on the table from the EU, the EU may still have leverage both in short and medium term. She maintains that short-term incentives incentives that can be communicated to the public and linked to specific reforms might stimulate political elites to comply. As she claims; *"it is not about introducing new longterm incentives, but rather about structuring the way towards longer-term incentives"*(Solonenko 2010:11).

3.8 Who Supports Ukrainian EU Membership?

In terms of which countries support Ukraine's EU membership Kuzio claims that this largely depends on how each country views the European Union. He points out that the UK, who prefer the widening of the EU as free-trade zone over deepening of the political integration, are positive towards EU membership for Ukraine(Kuzio 2006:98). France who hold a Gaullist view and see the EU as an opposite pole to American influence in Europe and the world are more wary of accession for former CIS-states who have a pro-American foreign policy(Kuzio2006:97). Poland and the other post-communist member states (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria) also support Ukraine's membership in the EU as stability in their near east neighbourhood is a central component of the mentioned countries' foreign policy(Balcer 2010:8). Additionally, also Finland, Austria and Sweden support Ukraine's accession(Kuzio 2006:99). Furthermore, the European Parliament have a more positive view on Ukraine than the Council and the Commission, arguing that problems with issues like rule of law, democracy and human rights should not be a punishment to ordinary Ukrainian citizens(EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee 2012). Also related, Lithuania, whom hold the rotating EU presidency for the first half of 2013, have expressed a desire to have visa free travel for Ukrainians as a goal for their presidency[13]

Currently, as stated elsewhere, these times of crisis are not the most convenient for seeking enlargement. The enlargement agenda has suffered as the Euro's and even the EU's very own existence has been questioned. As it currently stands, those seeking an enlargement of the EU do not hold a strong position as the main focus for the big countries are now to save the common currency. Additionally, political struggles between the prime minister and president in Romania are giving fire to those who say that the bar must be raised for the countries who now want to join the EU. Therefore, a future enlargement, perhaps even for the ones who are already planned, are dependent on the EU recovering from the current financial crisis. Consensus among all member states is necessary, which may even require a vast restructuring of the EU budget, a controversial subject that may take years to find consensus on.

3.9 What does the visa liberation scheme mean in terms of the geopolitical relationship?

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[13] http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/lithuania-wants-visa-free-travel-news-511156

Long-term, the Visa Liberation plan will significantly contribute to portraying the EU as something attractive in a global perspective, especially in the near neighbourhood compared to Russia, who lag behind the EU economically. Looking at the bigger picture, if the Visa Liberalisation for Ukrainian citizens is implemented, it could prove to be a significant moment in history not only for EU-Ukraine relations, but for Europe as a united continent(Berstad: Interview 05.07.2012). This may potentially be crucial also because as Bogomolov and Lytvynenko point out, Russia continues to act as if the Russian language is a dominant medium of communication defining Russia true political borders(Bogomolov&Lytvynenko 2012:9). Russian in Ukraine holds the same function as English does elsewhere as the most effective means of access to Western and global culture. However, the authors emphasize that in the longer term, Russias obsession with symbolism, local identity, promoting one national discourse and combating another is a vulnerability, as it reduces Russian foreign policy to what it was in the Soviet era, a largely ideological enterprise(Bogomolov& Lytvynenko 2012:15). This means that even though the EU may not be perceived as equally attractive as before, there will not necessarily be a decline of perception in the future. After all, Russia not pocess huge positive attraction value in the future either, economically speaking. The EU does on the other hand not possess leverage and political will to confront Russia regarding the frozen conflicts in the Eastern Neighbourhood, and are forced to rely on soft power and development as means of attraction(Pelczynska-Nalecz 2011:57).

It is crucial to bear in mind that for Russia, maintaining influence over Ukraine is more than a foreign policy, it is an existential imperative according to Bogomolov and Lytvynenko(2012). With that in mind, and using Delanty's logic that the 'battle' for Europe is to a large degree bound up with the formation of semi-peripheries and peripheries with regards to two poles, Western Europe and Russia(Delanty 1995:139), the case of Ukraine can be classified as a geopolitical battle of attraction. As stated elsewhere consensually, Delanty points out that Ukraine, as well as Belarus, Moldova and Russia geographically belong to Europe. However he asks if they are only European by their ability to distinguish themselves from their neighbours further east. I will argue that the Visa Liberalisation for Ukrainian citizens could have a strong role to play here. Opening Europe up to Ukrainians(students, researchers, journalists and academicians) is of crucial importance, especially since currently Russia finds itself ahead of the EU in terms of attracting Ukrainian students(Balcer 2010) for studying abroad. An easing of visa requirements as well as an extension of student exchange programs to Ukraine has the potential to help the EU overtake Russia as the most attractive destination for students. Crucially, an increase of Ukrainian students in the EU will

in the long term contribute to a westwards orientation of Ukraine, according to my interviewees Swiecicki and Berstad. Hence, in the grand scheme of European (geo)politics, the Visa Liberalisation Plan may significantly contribute to giving the EU an edge over Russia in the Eastern Neighbourhood, and possibly winning the 'battle' of the peripheries.

As several researchers (Balibar, Rumford) have emphasized, nation states are no longer the exclusive mediator of borders. The work of bordering has been diversified through society. This will in my opinion only add to the unpredictability of the future borders of Europe, or the European Union. The European Neighbourhood Policy is something completely new in terms of political structures, and no political science theories, or theories from other genres for that matter, can with satisfying accuracy be used to predict scenarios in the future of the the ENP area. Delanty affirms that in history, each age has created a 'Europe' to confront the current challenges. It can be argued that this is what is being done with the European Neighbourhood Policy, in a need to 'secure' and 'preserve' what is seen as the European identity. However we also see that certain elements from what we refer to as parts of our European identity are being offered to neighbours. I regard the visa liberation plan as something initiated to attract Ukraine towards the EU, and will stretch it further to present the possibility that is through proclaiming soft power the EU is redefining Europe in the face of the future challenges.

4.0 Conclusion

In this thesis I have started by presenting an overview over the ENP documents from initiation to present. The first contours of the ENP came when Commission President Romano Prodi in 2002, proclaiming a new and more ambitious framework for the the policy regarding the near neighbourhood. Here it is emphasized that the EU needs a stable and secure neighbourhood in order to become a global actor, as well as the fact that a debate of where Europe ends is needed. The most revealing fact from this speech was Prodi's choice of words, using terms like 'ring of friends', 'sharing everything but institutions', and that 'a proximity policy would not start with the promise of membership and it would not exclude eventual membership'.

The next official policy documents(2003) stated that the four freedoms(people,goods,capital and services) shall be extended to all neighbouring countries. I have also seen that in this document the terms Proximity, Prosperity and Poverty are introduced. Within this context, the concept of border management is also introduced. Tackling root causes of political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies, conflict, poverty and social exclusion. Countryspecific Action Plans was also introduced in this document. The document also states that a membership perspective or a role in the Union's institutions would not be present in the medium term.

A new and more ambitious framework was announced in 2009, which led to the creation of a more differentiated approach, where Ukraine would be a part of the Eastern Partnership. This framework also introduced new individually tailored Association Agreements, as well as institution building programs and the start of visa liberalisation plans(subject to certain requirements).

In the next subsection I then proceeded to account for the relevant parts of the research on the European Neighbourhood Policy. It appears that several authors view the ENP as a tool designed to draw dividing lines in Europe, in direct contradiction of what the EU officials and documents say. The authors make sharp observations due to their insights in the nature of borders aided by a good understanding of EU policies. I particularly found the relationship between geography and values when determining the end of the EU interesting. Both Kostadinova and Kuus emphasize this in their work, and point out that while the EU remain vague on where the ENP countries lie geographically

(in terms of belonging to Europe or not,or indeed EU in the future), the EU does not hide the fact the ENP countries are judged to be in need of increased 'Europeanisation'.

Boedeltje and van Houtum point out that the EU uses colonial-like features when the describing the ENP countries with the term 'Wider Europe', resembling terms like 'Greater' or 'Great' formerly used by expansion-hungry empires and nations. Among the researchers presented, there is an interesting consensus saying that the design and practices of the ENP are contradictory and confusing. This can be exemplified by Boedeltje and van Houtum who state that 'hard' expressions of European power such as bordering practices, citizenship and right to entry no longer follow the territorial logics of the past. This adds up to a conditionality on the one hand, and simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion on the other. They and other researchers have stated that this flexible framework makes the EU take different forms, which contributes to the confusion of the policy, as well as the questionable effectiveness of such a political framework. There is broad view among researchers that the ENP is an attempt to (b)order its geopolitical space through defining itself as well as through defining the neighbours.

Dominating research also claims that the ENP practices contribute to defining the ENP countries as 'others' whom the EU need protection from. This is being done by increased securitization over the external borders, patrols along the coast of Africa, detention centres for illegal migrants in non-member states as well as a practice of classifying migrants as productive or unproductive, illegal or legal, friendly or fiendish. Merje Kuus also curiously points out that formally the ENP is placed under the External Action Service led by Catherine Ashton, however it exports EU law and therefore resembles domestic politics. Kuus also observes through interviews that it is a deliberate policy from the EU to keep the geographical belongings of the ENP countries open and vague, as fixing the limits of Europe is judged to result in the EU losing leverage. It is also stressed that no cultural definition of Europe exists, leaving values as the one defining characteristic of what can be referred to as Europe.

Boedeltje, van Houtum and Kramsch bring forward Agnews distinction of two different Europes. Europe as an idea, and Europe as a project on the other hand. A practice within the ENP is mixing these two Europes, seemingly deliberately. Policy documents tend to ask 'what sort of European Union' instead of 'what sort of Europe'. The authors also point out that the ENP can be viewed as a tool utilized to project 'realpolitik' through spreading commitments and values but without the

benefit of a membership perspective. All the authors point out the normative character of the ENP without the carrot of European Union membership being offered the other way, which is what gives the ENP geopolitical connotations even though it is claimed to be the opposite in documents and speeches by EU officials.

 I then gave an account of the relevant aspects of cosmopolitanism. I have attempted to show that the ability to see, think and live beyond borders is central in cosmopolitan thinking. I have emphasized relevant aspects from the works of Cheah, Held, and more extensively Rumford, Balibar and Appadurai. All the authors offer valuable and fresh insight to the analysis of borders, and especially European borders. For Held, the idea that human wellbeing is not defined by geographical or cultural location is essential. He also claims that the degrees of mutual interconnectedness and vulnerability are growing at such a pace that the possibility of a common framework of standards and action in the form of institutional arrangements must be considered. Further Held also claims that boundaries of polities are arbitrary and results of coercion and violence, and thus can not have the moral significance ascribed to them.

Etienne Balibar uses three concepts for understanding European borders. He mentions the vacillation of borders, the interiority and ideality of borders, and the overlapping of cultures and conflict around the 'European triple point'. I mentioned that regarding the vacillation of borders, Balibar states that border management increasingly escapes the jurisdiction of national states. Crucially, Balibar states that borders are no longer the limits of where politics end because the community ends. Here I have made the connection to to the EU, and asked if it can be made to the ENP as well. Balibar cites Clausewitz who says that when such a border is crossed, "politics can only be continued 'by other means'. Regarding his second aspect, Balibar argues that partitions throughout history have been done to project a representational figure to the world, by bordering civilizations, and thus making projections of similarities and dissimilarities or compatible and incompatible. Regarding the third aspect, Balibar claims interestingly, that Europe is not made up of separate regions, empires or nations, but of overlapping sheets or layers, and that this fact is overlapping itself. He mentions the overlapping of a West, an East and a South, and points to the former Yugoslavia as such an overlapping.

Rumford points out the reappearance of borders in increasingly new locations, such as railway stations, airports, motorways, even internet cafes and supermarket checkouts. Rumford also makes

a crucial point when he asks who is responsible for the bordering. Responsibility has been passed upwards from nation states to the EU, and then to agencies like Frontex. However also interest groups, citizens and enterprises conduct bordering work at a daily basis. Additionally, Rumford points out the abundance of various 'Europes'. This can be Europe as the Schengen zone, the Council of Europe, the European Economic Area, the Eurozone, the EU's outer borders and others, whom all have different conceptions, borders, and jurisdictions. Rumford also mentions Europes networked borders, meaning that borders vary in scope and tightness according to what is actually crossing it. For example, economic borders are less closed than migration borders.

I have also seen that it is not only within borderwork the role of nation states is evolving. Holston and Appadurai reveal that also within citizenship, nation states are no longer the only sufficient provider. In several cases, the nation state is no longer a successful arbiter of citizenship. This is first and foremost regarding inclusiveness and ethical foundations. A common response has been to make citizenship more exclusive, or excluding. This can be demands for the citizenship, or legislation of exclusive use of one language. On the other hand, we have responses who have tried to make citizenship more inclusive, where citizenship is offered regardless of national origins, residence or place of work such as the EU or NAFTA.

I have also seen that the various Europe's also has a strict meaning in history. Delanty and Rumford point out that every age has constructed a Europe in response to the concerns of the present situation. Crucially and relevant, they argue that in geopolitical terms, Europe is not one thing but many. They also underline that Europe has always had two faces, a western and an eastern, and we are now seeing an expression of the letter, which also brings a new identity for europe. I have also learned that Europe as a dynamic space is a concept worth taking note of. Delanty and Rumford argue that borderlands are indicative of Europe in this aspect. They hence argue that Europe is a dynamic as opposed to uniform space for three reasons. First, the creation of ENP is not lines or frontiers, but spaces to be governed. Secondly, borderlands represents forms of connectivity between discontinuous systems. Thirdly, dynamic spaces do not distinguish between networked and non-networked places.

Lastly, in my section of analysis I have seen that Ukraine is included in many different Europes. It is well represented within international institutions and regimes, geographically, as well as in cultural frameworks. I have seen that through being a part of many various European levels, it can

be argued that Ukraine is a significant part of a networked European space. Further developments may well contribute to this even more, such as including Ukraine in the Single market through the DCFTA if the Association Agenda is ratified, as well the Visa Liberalisation Plan for Ukrainian citizens.

I have also seen that despite not currently offering any membership perspectives, the ENP may yet in the future have some leverage over Ukraine in terms of attracting it to orient its foreign policy more to Europe. This is also crucial for the EU's image as a global actor, as credibility will be lost of it is unable to stabilize and wield influence over its own vicinity.

I have also revealed several factors that can contribute to the border being increasingly cosmopolitan. The spread of bordering work and border management from nation states upwards to the EU and then to other actors is one example. The many cooperation forms that go across the EU external borders are another.

I have also seen that with reason, it can be argued that Ukraine is a part of geographical and cultural Europe. There is a dominant consensus saying that Ukraine is a part of Europe geographically. Regarding culture and values, the Ukrainian population share the same European values, but the political and economical elites do to a lesser degree. I have seen through research and interviews that in order to spread democracy and values, more people-to-people contacts must be initiated, especially through student exchange programs and more direct aid to civil society actors in Ukraine.

Further, it has become clear that Ukraine is important to the EU in several ways. It is important for the EUs energy security, it is important geopolitically through maintaining a good relationship with Russia, and it is important for the health of the European democratic project. Ukraine is currently lacking the 'European' values of democracy and rule of law, as well as an economy strong enough to be given a clear membership prospect. However they do not posses a narrative that can justify backing away from Europe and democracy, in addition they are not outright tempted to orientate towards Russia.

Within the European Union, member states such as Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, Austria as well as the central European states are positive towards Ukrainian membership. France, Germany, Spain

and Italy who are vary of increased costs of new members are for raising the bar for membership, do not support Ukraines membership prospects.

Finally, I have seen that the in future, the EU are capable of competing with Russia over Ukraine's orientation. Currently, Russia is more attractive for Ukrainian students wanting to study abroad, but the hopes for the future indicate that visa freedom for Ukrainian citizens will tip the balance in the EUs favor. The EU is also more attractive economically, but Russia uses symbolism such as the Russian language and the Orthodox church as projections of geopolitical power in its peripheries.

Executive Summary

As the research I have brought forward shows, there are several indications that Ukraine constitute too much of a problem and perhaps too little of an opportunity for the European Union to become a member in the future. Crucially, the EU are not as of this time able to see beyond solving the crises in the Eurozone and the common currency. In addition many several aspects of the EU institutional system and its *raison d'etre* are being questioned in more and more places. There is no policy for taking new members onboard in the current ENP framework, and there is also no consensus on wether Ukraine should be accepted even as a potential member. Ukraine itself struggles with corruption, weak institutions, low independence of the judicial systems and weak democratic traditions. The EU are currently offering a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement to Ukraine, in addition to a Visa Liberalisation Plan for its citizens. However these two 'carrots' are conditioned on Ukraine adopting EU legislation, which it has been willing to but to varying degree able to do, and a strengthening of democratic values, rule of law, independence of institutions and eliminating corruption. There is a will in Ukraine to adopt the EU legislation on most matters, however it is an entirely different prospect with the democratic values and human rights. As of now, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoschenko is in prison, as is former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko. The EU member states will refuse to ratify the readily negotiated Association Agenda, which includes the DCFTA as long as Ukraine insists on continuing the use of what they refer to as 'selective justice'. In this sense, the October 2012 elections will play a big role in determining what kind of Ukraine we will have in the future. If the opposition wins, there are reasons to believe that European integration will be increased and more work will be done to adopt to democratic values. If the incumbent wins, the process will likely be slower, but the desire will still be present to integrate Ukraine with Europe as much as possible.

Despite this, Ukraine is integrated in many forms of cooperation with the EU, and are members of several European institutions and regimes. Cross-border interaction is significant, and is likely to increase. Ukraine made a good figure as hosts of the European Football Championship, was portrayed as a European country which welcomes western tourists despite fears of racism and violence. The nature of the EU-Ukraine border is increasingly cosmopolitan, with bordering work to a lesser and lesser extent a responsibility of the nation states, and with greater diversification of those who actually are responsible for bordering work. Ukraine is a significant part of a networked European space, despite the ENP being of limited ability to promote attractiveness, stability,

prosperity and security as the official documents claim. Geopolitically, the inclusion of Ukraine in a European space is proceeding, and may further be sped up with inclusion in the single market and visa freedom for its citizens. I am of the belief that in the current framework of EU-Ukraine relations with every cross-border activity taken into account, there is still significant degrees of inclusiveness from the EU's side, and I will thus argue that it may yet be too early to determine wether Ukraine is eligible for EU membership or not.

Appendix

Interviews

<u>Marcin Swiecicki- Member of Parliament from Platforma Obywatelska and former Director of UNDP Blue Ribbon Analytical Centre in Kiev:</u>

JH: Do you feel like youre in Europe when you are in Ukraine?

MS: Yes, absolutely.

JH: Having worked there, do you feel they are moving in a "European" direction since the start of the ENP?

MS: Not so much,there are problems with democratic values, reform of economy, corruption, the reforms are going very slowly. There are worrying developments under Yanukovich, and they are not in in accordance with the declared european aspirations of Ukraine.

JH: The amount of EU aid for institutional capacity is quite substantial, do you feel institutional reforms are helping Ukraine reach European levels, institutionally speaking?

MS: It depends how you view it. First of all, EU aid for institutional reform is not so big. The aid to Central Europe was much greater. In my opinion, too much money is given for governmental projects compared to civil society or economical projects such as increased export and import. For example Ukrainian agricultural products are not exempted from toll. This is contradictory. There is a lot of money being spent in contradictory ways. For example the reform commission is attached to the presidential chancellery, but european assistance is still linked to several governmental departments. The main centre for reforms was deprived of assistance. There is also a deficiency of good lawyers in Ukraine who can draft laws in line with EU standards for the government. There are some good lawyers, but they tend to work in private companies or at universities. The money spent has been ineffective. Has there been progress though? Yes. But Ukrainians have had bad luck with leaders. Human capacity has been increased, but it has not been translated to economic policies for example.

JH: About the lack of reforms, democratic etc, do you think this is a lack of will or resources, or both?

MS: I think will is essential here. For example in Poland there was great will. Of course in Ukraine its more difficult. They had more time under communism,they never had an independent state, and now they have had to build three things at once; a state, market economy, and democracy. So the

challenge was really a lot greater than in Central European countries. Balkans and Central Europe have had much more contact with Western Europe than Ukraine. I can not say that there are no reforms either however. Ukraine has for example joined WTO, and foreign trade has prospered. There were some reforms on small enterprises and taxation, but in general Ukraine has a low rating in "doing business" rankings. There are reversals in trends such as freedom of speech, but not so much in economy. There is no crisis in economy, but there is no good future either, without reform of the energy sector, agricultural sector etc.

JH: If you look at history, usually, when the EU sets themselves certain goals, they reach them in one way or another. Now they have set a goal of visa liberalization for Ukrainian citizens, do you think this is likely to happen? Obviously now it is complicated with the imprisonment of opposition politicians,but the Visa Liberalization, is it something you can see happening if certain situations are resolved?

MS: The Visa Liberalization is for the people, not for the government, and I think its very important to have as many Ukrainians as possible coming to Western countries. If you want to support democracy in Ukraine, we need to invite the students to study here through Erasmus programs etc, so they see how democracy works, institutions work, how society works. In my opinion, the Visa Liberalization must go on regardless. With the Schengen agreement, the Ukrainians are facing new walls, for going to Poland, Slovakia, the Baltic states, which they didn't need visas for before. Now after they joined the Schengen agreement, visa regimes were introduced and they are in a worse situation than 10 years ago. This is why this must go on,no matter what happens with democracy in Ukraine. This also has an economic impact on Ukraine. The biggest mistake the EU made, was after the Orange revolution, which was a very good moment to invite Ukraine to European Union. This would've mobilized people for reforms in government and in the opposition, by drafting new legislation, and given people some hope. Instead, now, the members of the Rada (Parliament),are asking why we should implement directives and laws that are so tough, so demanding. The implementation is very weak. For Poland, the single greatest thing EU could offer was membership. They didn't understand the laws, but they knew that if they didn't adopt them, Poland wouldn't be in the European Union. It was a terrible mistake by the EU to not offer this to Ukraine. Many countries were for, and some were opposing. Now this is working very well in the Western Balkans, and I think 5 years ago, Ukraine was not less prepared then some countries in the Balkans. Now Ukraine is "second best", and ENP is a substitute. There is also pressure from Russia, who wants Ukraine to be a member of the Customs Union. Being a member here, technically prevents Ukraine from being in the Common Market. And now Russia is doing everything by sticks and carrots to get

Ukraine involved. If Ukraine becomes a member, it is not for modernization. It will strengthen the nostalgia of the Russian Empire in Russia. If they do not join, and come closer to EU, it will be a good example for Russia to follow in terms of modernization. Now EU is in danger of losing impact they could've had with the Eastern Partners, by the use of wrong policies. Now we need to use a longterm policy that involves civil society in hope that in future they will be more attracted to Europe than what is currently the case.

JH: Related, in your opinion its important with Visa Liberalization in geopolitical terms to connect Ukraine to EU, whereas if they join the Customs Union it will go the opposite way. Do you feel the need the need for this Visa Liberalization to "tempt" Ukraine closer to the EU?

MS: Ukraine has been a subject of longterm use of brainwashing and prejudice towards the EU, democracy, market economy, NATO etc. I believe that the Visa Liberalization and human exchange will just make them more informed about their options.

JH: You mentioned the divisions among the EU, regarding who was for a membership, or a roadmap, can you say something more specific about how strong this camp is in the EU compared to those who are negative? Where do you think the majority lies?

MS: I know that more people in Europe supported Ukraine in EU than Turkey in EU. For the Western Balkans the declaration in 1999 in Thessaloniki of an offer of membership has been very important. I think many EU leaders lack the vision and understanding, and still see Ukraine as a part of (old)Soviet Union. I remember Commissioner Waldner said membership was not on the table, but of course on order from the governments. I don't think there is a natural division, but that many lack a vision, and especially in 2005. Verheugen(former Enlargement Commissioner) in Kiev, in february 2011 said it was a great mistake to not invite Ukraine to the EU after the Orange revolution, of course given that they fulfilled all the Copenhagen criteria.

JH: The october elections in Ukraine, how do you see the post-election scenario panning out for Ukraine's European hopes? Of course this depends on situation of the political prisoners, wether the election is fair etc. For example if Mr. Yanukovich wins, and the election is judged to be fair and free, do you think its maybe the end of Ukraine's integration to the EU?

MS: I think the issue is the fairness of the election. If the election is fair, then the dialogue of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement can continue. Now we have the Association Agreement, which will put Ukraine more or less on the same legal terms as for example Norway. This agreement needs to be signed and approved by the 27 member states. But this will not happen until they see that elections were fair and that the politically motivated trials have ceased. First we will have the election, then they will search for a solution for implementing the AA. If the elections

are unfair and not recognized, integration will come to a halt for the moment, since the next one is in four years. I am very much afraid that the other scenario, of the Customs Union, will lead to stagnation and a resurfacing of nostalgia in Russia.

JH: But you do not really buy the balancing act of Yanukovich? He has promised several times that something will be done with the political prisoners, but has broken this. Do you think he is consciously balancing between EU and Russia to get the most out of both?

MS: He is doing what he thinks is best for Ukraine, no matter what the price is, in my opinion.

JH: Last question: Assuming, given some progress of the situation of the political prisoners, free trade visa liberalization, etc, is it even realistic, we are talking 15 years probably, to have Ukraine in the EU?

MS: If the scenario is as you mention, then yes. If the opposition wins election, and Yanukovich can as president work normally with the opposition government like Kaszcynski in Poland, however I'm not sure if Yanukovich is able to do this. We should however do everything to make sure and help them have fair elections.

JH: So it's anyones guess what will happen?

MS: Yes. Regardless, visa liberalization should go on to expose young ukrainians to western values which will benefit Ukraine in the long term. Student exchanges like Erasmus is extremely important.

JH: There has been talk from leaders from certain countries of a boycott of the championship, do you think it will do anything for the situation in Ukraine?

MS: There was Olympic Games in China, and there will be in Sotchi, and I have heard nothing about a boycott there. I cannot imagine Angela Merkel will stay away from Germany's games in an election year.

Olav Berstad- Senior Advisor on Russia and Eurasian Energy Issues at Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to Ukraine:

JH:You were the ambassador to Ukraine in Kiev, for how long exactly?

OB: 5 years.

JH: Do you feel like you're in Europe when you are in Ukraine?

OB: Yes, but I also have wide definition of Europe, I would even include Russia in there.

JH: How interested do you think President Yanukovich is in implementing the reforms demanded by the EU? I'm referring to democracy, elections, economy etc.

OB: He is interested in a good relationship, and its obvious to him that Ukraine needs a modernization process. Many countries have done this, like for example Poland. They have accomplished a lot. Regardless, Ukraine or not, generally when you are in power, you are not necessarily interested in reforms that imply a division of power. It is very complicated. You have EU, who seems quite restrictive with regards to other ways of organizing societies. This does not always seem tempting to others, so I think they have an ambivalent attitude to these reforms.

JH: Since you mention the word ambivalent, do you think its a deliberate balancing act from Ukraine?

OB: Yes, however, in 2010, they adopted a law, which states that EU membership is a superior goal for Ukraine. It is of course flexible and can be interpreted different ways. NATO membership has been laid on ice,yet they cooperate with Nato. Regarding the EU, and the desire for membership, it is now firmly placed in Ukrainian law. How they use this to balance vis-a-vis Russia, one can only speculate in, but as a foundation, for Ukraine, this works as a roadmap for their foreign policy.

JH: Right, so one can not say he is working deliberately against the EU. I mean, some things have changed after all.

OB: Yes.

JH: Media tend to focus a lot on the democratic situation in Ukraine, saying it provides a huge obstacle.

OB: Yes, but remember they have the mentioned law, they have already completed the negotiations of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, they are using lots of resources on Visa Liberalization. And now a problem for the Ukrainian government, is the fact that the EU refuses to include the prospect of membership in the relations. So the principle that they want membership, has not changed. Then the question is why do they want this. The former government said it was in Ukraine's interest, not primarily the EUs. The argument of what is Ukraine's best is what is central for them and Ukrainian voters, they can not say they want membership to help out the EU.

JH: As I have understood, the oligarchs who are backing President Yanukovich, many of them are in favour of EU integration for business purposes, so the picture is not as black and white as media sometimes presents it to be.

OB: Not at all.

JH: You mentioned Visa Liberalization, but there are certain obstacles, such as introduction of biometric passports. Is it very optimistic to believe they can achieve this within a few years?

OB: Here they are in the same group as Russia. They have a roadmap, but there are technical obstacles such as data, border controls, legislation etc. However in Kiev this is viewed differently. They feel that even if they do everything that is required, the EU can and maybe will still say no to this. It is more than just technical obstacles here, such as values in legislation etc, which is subjective of course.

JH: There is no doubt that this is something Ukrainians themselves want?

OB: No. It was a big theme during the former government. They felt the visa process was too complicated, too expensive, even for visas to neighbouring countries like Poland.

JH: However, I can't help but think that the EU wouldn't have proposed this, if it wasn't something they actually wanted to happen?

OB: Yes, exactly. The Schengen zone has been problematic in this respect. Before this, the border between Poland and Ukraine was one of the worlds most crossed.

JH: This DCTA, which ready negotiated, but it has been connected to the election, the political prisoners, do you have a prediction for the election, if it will be fair or not? I mean, it has happened in the past, but one would think he didn't want to severe the relations with the EU.

OB: One would think so. But the last local elections, were not completely fair. After the Orange Revolution there were 3 elections, who were all judged to be fair. However there is a legitimate fear of the october elections not going fairly. Even if he wants to look good, if he is in danger of losing power, I believe he will use a lot of resources to not lose power, regardless. For example he has threatened to move forward the election, because he is uncomfortable with todays situation. On the other hand, if he does not, it gives him time to prepare certain methods of helping him win.

JH: Can you say something about how the Ukrainian governments experience being on the receiving of EU-directives etc?

OB: I think the EU is perceived as very bureaucratic, as something very huge and distant. However, I have noticed traveling around Ukraine that there is a big big focus on doing things in line with EU law. This is evident on all levels, local and regionally as well, regardless of policy areas. Its the same with the governmental departments in Kiev. I am positively surprised by for example by the energy department, who are taking this seriously and are an integral part of the EU Energy Community and adopting the EUs 2nd energy package. Then there is of course problems with getting this done quickly enough. But the fact that they are trying hard to adopt this is evident throughout the whole system, on all levels. Nearly all websites of Oblasts(regions) or municipalities have a section of the websites specifically devoted to explaining EU laws etc.

JH: And this energy package, this implies changing the prices of gas to an EU market price etc?

OB: Yes, but this also relates to demands from IMF etc, so it is very complicated. But they have an obligation, and they try to fulfill it, but it is going slowly.

JH: Do you have any perception wether the newly ended European Championship has changed the image of Ukraine as a European country, or a lack of being such?

OB: I have seen that there aren't that many reports in media from the cities itself. Compared to Eurovision Song Contest in May the focus on Azerbadjan was greater. Generally however, I would say everyone visiting Ukraine has been struck by how friendly and European the people and country are. However they have used a lot of resources on this specifically. When they applied, the argument was not to create an image, but to change the mentality of Ukrainians in terms of welcoming tourists with service, english skills, as well as regional development. Therefore I think the championship has been important. However reports about the amount of money spent has varied.

JH: I got an impression among all the fears in advance of racism etc, despite this it has been completely incident-free.

OB: I had some visitors from Ukraine recently and they told me locals were extremely happy, and the tourists as well. The atmosphere was exemplary among all the nations present.

JH: The obligatory question, what do you think will happen with Yulia Tymoschenko?

OB: This is difficult, and nobody understand why the government have painted themselves into a corner like that. It seems they have lost a bit of control. However I believe they wanted to remove her as a political rival, 100 %. It might not be Yanukovich personally, but other groupings have sentiments of revenge after she initiated similar processes towards former opposition members some years ago. It is hard to guess what will happen. It is easy to say what they should do. For example the court is not very independent for sure. There has been talk of a pardonment, but I doubt this will happen before the elections.

JH: Regarding the EU, many say they must put hard against hard and state that they must deserve this free trade agreement and Visa Liberalization before they can get it. Others say that Visa Liberalization must go on regardless of the democratic situation. What would you think is the best approach?

OB: This is a difficult question. Its about how you view Europe. I think to have have firm standards and demands is a strength for Europe. However, exceptions have happened. Such as the admissions of Romania, and Bulgaria whom all now agree was too early, and the situation in Greece. This is

unfortunate for Ukraine, and now is a bad time for seeking membership. I think the EU feel they need a break from enlargement due to the many internal crises. But the Visa Liberalization is interesting, in my opinion, it is one of the best things you can do. Especially since Ukrainians are not a big "migration threat", and it would give youth and students opportunities, and hope for the future, not even to mention equal opportunities as young europeans within the EU. It is a different time now, with the removal of border crossings in Europe. Historically, I think this can be extremely important for Ukraine. Therefore this is more a question of values, if one thinks Ukraine one will "succeed" or not. I do think what has given EU and USA respect as system, are the objective demands. I think Western Europe has learned after WW 2 and has successfully based themselves on certain principles. However nowadays, many feel the EU isn't as attractive anymore, as for example 5 years ago. The big question is what's going on in the mind of Ukrainians. if they perceive themselves as aligned with Western Europe or as one big common orthodox nation with Russia so to say.

JH: Do you have the impression that this varies from Western Ukraine to Eastern Ukraine?
OB: Yes, very evidently. There are big internal differences. But even in the east there is a majority for EU membership. obviously in the west as well.

JH: Many researchers perceive the ENP framework as something created to "control and stabilize its neighborhood" against threats such as terrorism, smuggling, etc, and that membership has been excluded for the countries involved. Yet in EU history the spill-over effect is present when talking about integration, and one cannot predict the future of EU history. I do think there is a possibility of increased integration, maybe not membership any time soon, but that it is not totally unrealistic to speak about this. Would you agree?
OB: As a basis, I don't think the ENP is designed to keep Ukraine away, but at the same time there is no policy for taking new members on board. Western Balkans is more prioritized and there is more consensus about this, security wise. From Brussels, Western Balkans is more important. Ukraine is a much bigger country, and more difficult. But I have heard people say, that if Ukraine was an economically advanced country, the resistance in the EU wouldn't be as big. But they have development problems, and it makes them less attractive. Therefore they now have to do their homework, and then later they can come to the EU. But we are talking 10-15 years. I don't think the ENP is created to keep Ukraine away at all costs and for all future, but they cannot formulate a perspective either. Therefore the Ukraine government say that the EU are breaking their own criteria, article 49, which says that if you are a democratic European country, you are permitted to apply for membership.

JH: This is what I'm trying to prove, that there are internal differences.

OB: This is about power structures within the EU, I mean Ukraine would receive a lot of power in the current voting structure, and it is also a question of covering the costs. One other thing worth analyzing more, is the fact that Russia view EU as more of a challenge nowadays. Previously they viewed the EU as an economical trade union or regime. But with current changes, Finland and Sweden as members, it makes Russia see things differently. Therefore, the question of Ukraine is difficult. Before in Russia, I believed Ukraine in the EU was seen as something that would strengthen economical relations with EU. Many Russians view the EU as an economical project that will evidently break down. Then it does not matter if Ukraine is a member or not. Now this has changed, and they view EU more as a security geopolitical actor. Russia's view on NATO for example. But they have started considering that membership for more and more countries provide a greater challenge for Russia. If Ukraine will be a member, it will be much harder to swallow for Kremlin. This is why EU are hesitating to drive integration further. For Brussels, Paris and Berlin, cooperation with Russia is important, and they are hesitant to change this significantly. They hence view Ukraine as something that will complicate this. Russia without Ukraine is not an empire as former advisor in the White House Brszesinski said, and I think they realize this in Moscow. Integration with Ukraine is more important in Russia than 10 years ago. Therefore the EU wants to avoid this topic.

JH: So this depends on Ukraine again, who are wary of Russia.

OB: Yes, this is why they are reluctant of the proposed Customs Union, which goes very much against the prospects of further EU integration.

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