ILEANA TAUSCHER

IMAGINED COMMUNITIES AND EVERYDAY IMAGININGS

Neocolonial Renderings of Citizenship in the Dutch State

I write, no matter where, to denounce them and to point out their responsibility for the deaths of many, in the hope to awake others. In the hope that more people will come into action, in whatever way. If according to their laws my words are labeled as 'sedition,' the state obviously feels threatened by it. All right then. Every word a spark! I am not finished yet. The state with its borders is worth nothing but its overthrow. It is time to mobilize resistance. And fast as well. For the freedom to live, not just to survive.

-Joke Kaviaar, January 2019

Imagined Communities and Everyday Imaginings:

Neocolonial Renderings of Citizenship in the Dutch State

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Master Thesis: Human Geography, Globalization, Migration, and Development

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February 2019

Radboud Universiteit

Acknowledgements

This project was possible only through the support and guidance of friends and loved ones…

Kolar and Olivier, for being a lifeline at the university.

Ita and Oliver, for always making me laugh until I cry.

Momma and Papa, for unending love and support, even from so far away.

Greg, my partner in crime, for showing me a new way to see the world.

Varsha and Nicole, for a friendship that makes distance disappear.

Peter, for listening, talking, and, of course, translating.

Simone, for a kick-ass cover design.

I am endlessly grateful to those who shared their stories with me and inspired by those surrounding me who fight. To those who take it up, I'll meet you in the streets.

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Abstract

In the past few years, discourse surrounding Dutch citizenship has shifted away from inclusionary and multiculturalist models towards those that stress cultural assimilation. This thesis examines how this shift can be understood as a neocolonial ordering that has persisted from the Dutch State's colonial past. Analyses of forms of neocolonial ordering at both the institutional level and through everyday racisms reveal a narrative in which 'whiteness' becomes imbricated with 'Dutchness.' Such a narrative reinforces 'othering' processes in which those deemed outsiders are unable to achieve full inclusion within Dutch society, creating contested citizenships between insider and outsider that are reinforced by the Dutch State.

Part I

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> For the men who needed to believe themselves white, the bodies were the key to a social club, and the right to break the bodies was the mark of civilization - Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me*

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Introduction

In *Between the World and Me,* Ta-Nehisi Coates opens his memoir describing a television interview in which the host asks Coates 'what it meant to lose [his] body' (Coates, 2015, p. 5). The question was not a literal one, but metaphorical, and though she did not use the words, it was understood that when she asked him to explain why he believed that the centuries of progress for white people is linked to the plunder and violence towards others, she was asking about his body, the body of a black man. She, too, was asking for him to reinforce a narrative that she had no doubt grown up with, one that conflicted with his own narrative. What should have been a moment of understanding became an impasse, one that has resonance for many others.

This thesis explores the border between state and body; in particular, it will challenge the notion that this border is fixed and impermeable. Instead, I will show that the state violates the integrity of specific bodies in order to maintain a fixed order upon which it depends for its existence. As I will show, states with colonial histories relied upon race as a way to organize their populations (Goldberg, 2002). Therefore, I play close attention to the ways the state used race as a mechanism to control and regulate bodies, a practice that continues to this day. Building on this, I will demonstrate how this is reflective of a neocolonial structuring that is reinforced on the social level through everyday racism (Essed, 2013). What emerges is a dynamic ordering reinforced both top-down at an institutional level and bottom-up in the everyday, manifesting most clearly within the

social and political dimensions of citizenship. Ultimately, I argue that the underlying theme that connects the interplay between the institutional and the everyday is violence for the sake of maintaining order. The end result is a transfer of agency and autonomy from person to state. It is herein that the border between the two becomes contested, despite notions that the state exists to protect and guarantee universal rights and freedoms.

David Theo Goldberg provides a genealogy of state formation that demonstrates the utility of race to the modern state project (Goldberg, 2002). Because such themes are always geographically situated and informed by the particularities of specific histories, I have chosen to study the Dutch State and Dutch citizenship. One reason for this is that the Netherlands is often upheld as a progressive and democratic state, celebrated for its openness, tolerance, and liberal attitudes (Jones, 2015; Jones, 2016; Vasta, 2007). Indeed, this has become a rather salient component of Dutch self-understanding (Essed & Hoving, 2015).

My research will show that in fact, like many modern European nation-states, the Dutch State is not immune to a pervasive racism that continues to be central to the formation of its identity, and that much of this racism manifests as color-blindness. Many scholars have explored this, including David Theo Goldberg, Gloria Wekker, Ann Laura Stoler, Philomena Essed, Guno Jones, Patricia Schor and Edgar Martina, some calling it an epistemology of ignorance or white innocence (Wekker, 2016; Schor & Martina, 2018) or everyday racism (see Essed, 2013). A more personal reason for choosing the Netherlands is the pushback I encountered early in my master's. A former advisor reacted poorly when I spoke of the racism I had come to notice – most notably when I learned of the debate surrounding Zwarte Piet – which led me to want to study racism in the Netherlands. I was told I was an outsider and would never understand the Dutch context; that I was too emotional to write an 'objective' thesis; and repeatedly questioned on why I, as a white person, cared about racism. This encounter was the opposite of discouraging: it signaled that these are questions that must be probed.

I draw from a variety of theorists from the field of postcolonial/decolonial, critical race/whiteness studies and feminist studies, as well as from scholars of geography, political science, sociology and anthropology. In what may seem a somewhat abnormal move, I have chosen the book *Between the World and Me* by Ta-Nehisi Coates to illustrate what it means for bodily integrity to be violated and to illustrate the entrenched racism that is needed for the persistence of Dutch society. I look towards this piece of literature for several reasons, as follows.

Between the World and Me is a short nonfiction, written in a first-person narrative as a letter by Coates addressed to his fifteen-year-old son, Samori. The central metaphor of the letter is the Black body and its instrumentalization by those who 'believe that they are white,' through both

structural and direct violence, as well as the instilling of fear as a mechanism of control (Coates, 2015, p. 7). Already, one can see that in academic parlance, this is the language of governmentality and biopolitics, which is the first reason that I find this text critical to analysis of racialization by the state. Though it is literature and not social theory, it, too examines social and political structures. Critical, too, is Coate's use of James Baldwin's annihilation of whiteness, or, rather, his assertion that whiteness is not a fixed, natural category, but is a belief system that people subscribe to (Baldwin, 1998). This is the everydayness of racism, which is manifest at the social, rather than institutional, level.

The second reason I have chosen Coate's work is that though many scholars - mainly feminist – have located the body as a primary site of inscription of social meanings, the materiality of the body causes discomfort within disciplines that carry the legacy of a mind/body dualism. What I mean by this is that the concrete form bodies take reduces philosophical inquiry to a contestation between ontological inscriptions of (gendered, racialized, classed) markers onto bodies as a result of *social processes* versus the irreducibility of the materiality of bodies to these particular markers. Judith Butler differentiates these as theories of cultural construction in regard to the former and the topography of construction for the latter (Butler, 1993). While I find this fascinating on the intellectual level, I find it difficult to translate to lived experience, since such theorizing does not do justice to the extraordinary consequences of racialization and exclusionary practices. Coates does not shy away from talking about the effects of white supremacy upon the body. I believe using literature helps to narrate and bridge the gap between lived experience and the theorizing involved in social sciences.

Research Question

The induction of a citizenry and its continuity lies in part by iterative expansions and compressions of the border between insider and outsider. The Netherlands has a long, intimate history with this process, both within the bounded territorial confines of what is now the modern Dutch State in Western Europe, as well as historically within its colonial possessions.

The question this thesis explores is as follows:

> *How has the legacy of Dutch colonialism led to a production of racialized citizenship within the Netherlands?*

I will look at both formal (policy) and informal (everyday racisms) processes where racialization manifest. In the following sections I will discuss the research theoretical perspectives and methodologies that guided my research design.

Scientific and Societal Relevance

To date, many studies have been conducted within the Dutch academe that explore citizenship and related themes of identity and national belonging with regard to migrants from former colonies and elsewhere. Very generally, this can be sorted into two groups: postcolonial studies and migration/transnational studies. Since my thesis relates more closely to the first, I will elaborate on it briefly below. A more in-depth discussion of citizenship theory follows in 'The Landscape of Citizenship Theory.'

Scholars have made important strides over the last decades in regard to understanding postcolonial minorities within the colonizing state and the dynamics of postcolonial citizenships (Jones, 2015). These studies have paid close attention to the identity politics of these groups as they have arisen *from* these groups, as well as provided helpful conceptualizations of Empire and of Europe. Yet, as Jones (2015) writes, they treat 'the role of dominant actors within the state apparatus…as secondary and "reactive"' (p. 316). What this thesis seeks to do is to add to a complimentary, if nascent, body of literature that uncovers the Dutch State's role in shaping citizenship, identity and belonging explicitly along race, class and gendered lines. Doing so is a move to destabilize accepted norms suggesting the neutrality of the Dutch State in certain debates, as well as notions that the Dutch State functions as a benign (or worse, compassionate) arbiter in citizenship debates.

With regard to societal relevance, there is much to say about the current political climate within the Netherlands. The mainstreaming of blatantly racist populist rhetoric, the demise of multiculturalism (depending on who you read), and a politicized refugee 'crisis'[1] co-opted by both the left and right to justify hardening borders, suggest a shift away from a certain vision of Dutch society. Although these require further study, the writing of this thesis is in service of political ideologies that have always been wary of the State. The social relevance, therefore, is to pick up the thread from antiauthoritarian and radical political thought, which has seen a resurgence the past few years in response to a global rise of the far-right.

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[1] I am going to quickly problematize the use of the word 'crisis,' which has been used, unchecked, by the media and politicians in recent years to refer to the sharp increase in people arriving to Europe from elsewhere. The 'crisis' as captured in mainstream media largely denotes a crisis for Europeans, resulting in stricter migration controls and tightening borders. This is a prescriptive that does not address the fact that many people arriving in Europe are fleeing conflicts begun by or supported by European nations, or that draconian border and migration policies do not hinder arrivals, but often exacerbate problems by forcing people to seek more dangerous routes (Trilling, 2018). The crisis does exist, but it is not a threat towards Europe, but rather a far more complex situation worsened by Europe's border system and policies of securitization.

Theoretical Groundings

There are several theoretical lenses that I have drawn on in the writing of this thesis. These lenses, though distinct, bleed into and overlap with one another. I will therefore use the term 'critical theory' to denote references to critical race/whiteness, feminist and postcolonial[2] studies. Where it is necessary to be specific, I will refer to a particular school.

Kincheloe and McLaren (2008) summarize basic assumptions made by those who comprise the realm of critical theory, mainly, that social and historical material relations shape power dynamics between researchers and their sites of study; that researchers cannot disimbricate themselves from such relations and assume a position of neutrality or objectivity; and that researchers must not fall into the trap of privileging certain oppressions over others, for example, by ascribing greater weight to class as opposed to gender or race in examining any given subjectivities. Related to the second point, a notion of 'facts' existing as unmediated descriptors does not take into account baseline ideological assumptions that are more often second nature to researchers in knowledge production (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2008). Here, decolonial thinkers, too, have helped us to reveal the Eurocentric and historicist modes of understanding that underlie many epistemologies. Thus, shedding notions that researchers are discoverers of penultimate truths to explain the social world means we are less likely to fall into the traps of replicating gender, race, religious and class oppressions (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2008).

Criticalists also offer a new take on theories of power that nuance ideological consensus that accompanies the formation of cultural hegemony (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2008). Earlier understandings of ideology treated it as if it were monolithic, propagandist, and, more importantly, a tool manipulated by an elite to coerce a passive majority (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2008). This is a point of departure I have with Criticalists, for while I see emancipatory elements here (refusing to see people as passive), statist forms of thinking are so pervasive that it is truly only a small (albeit, very outspoken) minority that is able to call attention to the hegemonic dominance that is the assumption that people naturally tend towards organization into nation-states. This, too, is a form of methodological nationalism.

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[2] For the purposes of this paper, postcolonialism and decolonialism are somewhat interchangeable, although there is a difference. Very briefly, postcolonialism refers to a school of thought grounded by the works of Edward Said, Homi K. Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak and linked to cultural studies. Decolonialism comes from works by Walter D. Mignolo, Anibal Quijano and María Lugones, and has closer ties with the Frankfurt School, world systems theory and development/underdevelopment theories (for a full discussion, see Bhambra, 2014). What they share is a 'speaking back' to Empire (Western/European hegemony) by directly challenging notions of progress and modernity that shape historical narratives emanating from Europe (Bhambra, 2014).

Bricolage and Compositional Study

Criticalists have adopted two stances that separate them from traditional researchers. The first is to draw on many different schools and traditions in a move that reflects the hybridity of the everyday world (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2008). The second is to be open about partisanship and to be forcefully critical of research that claims to be neutral or apolitical (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2008). For this thesis, I find both to be very helpful and have therefore guided my choice of method, the bricolage and compositional study.

Related to the notion of hybridity is the move towards a methodology that is anchored by what Kincheloe and McLaren (2008) call 'an epistemology of complexity' (p. 421). This is a commitment to acknowledge that theory cannot explain the social world, since theory itself is a cultural and linguistic artifact that, too, is a byproduct of this world (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2008). While this may make the task of conducting research seem hopeless, it is in fact a much more hopeful way of embarking on any research project. This is because it creates much more space to critically explore the social world and power dynamics that have given rise to it. As for methodological instruments, it also makes space for the bricolage, a form of doing research that is interdisciplinary and responsive, rather than static, universalizing, and constrained by the particulars of a given discipline.

Bricolage comes from *bricoleur*, a French word that meaning 'handyman,' and describes a person who completes a task by making use of the tools at their disposal (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). First described by Claude Levi-Strauss in *The Savage Mind*, it is a mode of conducting qualitative research that requires a synthesis of various fields and disciplines (Kincheloe, 2001). This is done to overcome the limitations and short-sightedness of traditional praxis and to introduce a different kind of rigor that does not preclude blind loyalty to a single discipline (Kincheloe, 2001). Opening up deconstruction of phenomena to a wider range of theoretical lenses means creating opportunity to uproot accepted paradigms and acknowledge embedded assumptions. It also means that the shortcomings of one mode of research praxis can be addressed by assuming a separate lens. For example, Marxist and early postcolonial writings often disregarded race and gender, respectively; therefore, queer and feminist methodologies fill in the gaps where Marxism and postcolonialism fall short.

The researcher as *bricoleur* resonates with queer scavenger methodologies formulated by Halberstam (1998) in *Female Masculinity.* In this work, Halberstam drew on a range of methods from historiography, ethnography and archival research, to name a few, in order to 'remain supple' as well as '[betray] a certain disloyalty to conventional disciplinary methods' (Halberstam, 1998). This is not unlike bricolage, which, too, avoids a frame that is strict and reductionist,

avoiding the rigidities of disciplinarian conformism (Kincheloe, 2001). Both the bricoleur and the scavenger methodologies are open about the political implication of such a research praxis; the project then serves as an attempted disentanglement from canonized and heavily regulated forms of knowledge production. This is particularly important when one site of research production is the university, which bears the same racism and sexism prevalent in our societies.

Where bricolage allows for a betrayal of regimented disciplinarity, compositional studies offer a framework for integrating a dialogic model where theory speaks to the empirics of a given research project. As a tool of social sciences, compositional studies pay close attention to how individuals and groups are embedded within particular social, political and economic realities, and how these realities are inflected with power dynamics (Fine & Weis, 2008). Fine and Weis (2008), pulling from ethnographers who write on 'oscillating' works, describe it as 'a deliberate movement between theory 'in the clouds' and empirical materials 'on the ground' (p. 87). They elaborate upon three analytical pillars compositional studies rest upon, the first of which has already been mentioned, that ethnographic material is contextualized within specific societal conditions. The second is where the departure from poststructuralists occurs, which is to attribute salience to social identities, since in terms of institutional life they '[yield] dire political and economic consequences' (Fine & Weis, 2008, p. 89). This is not to remove all autonomy from people, or to suggest that they are powerless in the face of certain conditions; rather, it is to acknowledge the existence of realities that shape lives. The third is that in seeking to understand groups and individuals there is a deliberate search for fissures, variety and dissent by those who reject and/or move between categorizations (white, Black, man, woman, etc.) and an understanding that in-group coherence is a hegemonic construction (Fine & Weis, 2008).

Action/Activist Research

My thesis falls under the action research umbrella and is meant to contribute to a particular body of work termed activist or action research. The above approaches, bricolage and compositional studies, are also related to a wide tradition of action research which seek to 'transform inquiry into praxis, or action' (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p. 46). As mentioned above, because researchers in this field do not shy away from announcing their politics, action research is conspicuous in its democratizing goals (Hale, 2001). This speaks back to positivism, as well as traditional ethnographies. Denzin and Lincoln (2008) use the image of the 'Lone Ethnographer' to describe the origins of the field researcher, who, in his adherence to traditional ethnographies, is '[complicit] with imperialism, a belief in monumentalism (the ethnography would create a museum like picture of the culture studied), and a belief in timelessness (what was studied would never change). The Other was an 'object' to be archived,' (p. 20).

What unifies these openly political methods is an attempt to create work that is emancipatory and democratizing. While I believe this to be a noble goal, there is some language I would like to point out that makes me wary. 'Democratizing' is an agenda many people can get behind, but it has also been a tool wielded by the West as a way to marginalize groups of people, sponsor imperialist projects, and, more recently, entrench such imperialism in the form of developmentalism (Grosfoguel, 2000). The language of 'thinking through' research with subjects carries a tinge of a colonial mindset; after all, this meeting of minds in research setting does not occur on a level playing field, simply because researchers and subjects are rarely coming together by affinity. I feel it is more important to still assert that in certain settings, I am an academic, that this body of research comes from the university, and that the completion of this project furthers my own academic career. This is simply a recognition of my own positionality, and throughout my research, were things I was in constant negotiation with.

Fieldwork

The analyses that follow are from a combination of empirical research and desk research. Unlike a traditional ethnography, the fieldwork I have completed does not have a specific start and end date that corresponds with a moment I descended into the field. Rather, I will be drawing on a number of experiences I have had as an activist and volunteer, for it is the spontaneous moments – conversations, things I have witnessed – which have shed the most light on the aspects of my research question that center on everyday racism. I kept a document recording various conversations and observations along with my reflections and impressions dated between October 2017 and February 2018.

During this period, I also volunteered for Doorbraak, a grassroots organization that supports anti-racist, anti-sexist, and anti-capitalist movements throughout the Netherlands. As a member of the organization, I participated in regular meetings in Nijmegen, Utrecht and Leiden and helped organize and attend demonstrations in Nijmegen, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Thus, my 'field' during this time centered around my political activism, mainly in Nijmegen, but also elsewhere. For issues of safety, I did not write down notes or record details or conversations that occurred during meetings. This is to ensure anonymity of meeting participants, since the activist scene has cross-over with those who may not have papers. Further, many activists are surveilled, so as a safety measure, I did not keep written record of meeting contents. Because my role as researcher and activist blurred, I made clear that I was working on a thesis that would draw from my experience as an activist, so as not to mislead people I was interacting with. This, too, gave them space to be selective with information they gave, so as not to betray confidentiality that often comes as an unspoken understanding when doing activism with people you have just met. As will become evident in my thesis, however, the conversations I had that were most relevant to my

question were unplanned and random, rather than those I had while in meetings, attending protests, and otherwise organizing.

I made the choice to not conduct interviews during this research project and rely instead in everyday encounters and informal conversations. The reason I made this choice is because I am aware of an uneven power balance when the topic at hand is racialization and I, as the researcher, am white, and therefore a beneficiary of neocolonial structures and white supremacy. I wanted, too, to invert a traditional narrative when racialized subjects are involved, which is that it is those who are racialized requiring study, therefore becoming objects. Rather, I wanted 'whiteness' to be the problematic and the object of study.

Deskwork

Supplanting the observations and participatory observations from fieldwork is document analysis. The documents I used are as follows. The first is an official practice exam from the 'Knowledge of Dutch Society' section of the *inburgeringsexamen*, a state-mandated exam given to those who apply for Dutch citizenship, made available on the government website of the Education Executive Agency (Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs). I transcribed the exam and translated from Dutch to English, then analyzed and coded each question according to keywords such as economy, family, authority, and electoral politics. The second document I analyzed was a 1979 report titled *Ethnic Minorites: A report to the Government Towards an Overall Ethnic Minorities Policy*. An English version of the report was available, which I cross-referenced with the Dutch version to double check how certain phrases were translated. I also reviewed parliamentary papers (*kamerstukken)* and legislative proceedings (*handelingen)* whose focus were policies related to minority governance as well as citizenship debates from the period spanning 1952 to 1978. The research involving these documents required looking at text in the Dutch, which I then cross-referenced with English and Dutch primary and secondary texts. Translation tools and the patience and help from a Dutch-speaking friend who was kind enough to check through my work meant I stayed as close as possible to the original language. Where it is useful, I will include Dutch, but will mostly stick to English translation in quotations taken from Dutch texts.

A Note on Whiteness

The new people were something else before they were white—Catholic, Corsican, Mennonite, Jewish—and if all our national hopes have any fulfillment, then they will have to be something else again. – Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me*

Before delving into analysis, it is important to spend some moments in consideration of the term 'white' or 'whiteness.' I am doing so to hopefully prevent misunderstanding that by white, I am

not referring alone to white people. Earlier, I made the claim above that race and racism are not biological facts, but belief systems that inscribe bodies, hierarchize lives and structure social relations. Coates describes this above, maintaining that 'whiteness' is transitory, rather than a static designation. Therefore, white ignorance, white innocence, white epistemology, etc., do not refer to the mindset or belief system of all 'white' people. In the passage, Coates (2015) goes on to elaborate:

> ...difference in hue and hair is old. But the belief in the preeminence of hue and hair, the notion that these factors can correctly organize a society and that they signify deeper attributes, which are indelible—this is the new idea at the heart of these new people who have been brought up hopelessly, tragically, deceitfully, to believe that they are white. (p. 7)

Crucially, Coates identifies the newness of the belief in whiteness, as well as notions that 'hue and hair' are differences that should order society. This is not to say that exploitation of people, in itself, is new, but exploitation along racial hierarchies is a distinctly European vision of the world (Baldwin, 1998). Baldwin wrote extensively of how within Europe, there is an investment in whiteness, though its forms have shifted over time. Though this thesis focuses on racialization by the Dutch State, it is necessary, too, to consider how the emergence of racialized bodies in the Netherlands arose out of the development of Dutch self-understanding as an association with whiteness. This comes through both explicitly, as in the dicta of colonial rule, and implicitly, as I will show through empirical examples of everyday racism. As much as possible, I will try not to reinforce the association of Dutchness with whiteness by specifying white Dutch, though at times I will just use 'Dutch' to refer to an imagined homogenous majority.

Part II

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But race is the child of racism, not the father. And the process of naming "the people" has never been a matter of genealogy and physiognomy so much as one of hierarchy. - Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me*

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Everyday Racisms

This thesis could begin in several places. It could begin with the time I tried to attend a discussion about Zwarte Piet[3] at a social center in Nijmegen, one that was subsequently interrupted by hooligans, leading to an intervention by the police who blockaded the street, preventing entrance into the building. This incident was my foray into the loaded national conversation about the blackface children's character, one that evokes hysteria in many white Dutch around cultural preservation. It could also begin with a meeting with a professor, whose reaction to my ideas to write about racism and citizenship in the Netherlands drew intense pushback, for he could not fathom that the racism I noticed shortly after moving here could be so pervasive. Both instances revealed a deep problem: that, like many modern Western nation states, white supremacy inflects Dutch society, hidden enough so that those who choose not to see it may not, but not so well that those who choose to name it face derision from those who would rather remain blind.

As an outsider, and, in particular, an American, I face two challenges in speaking about racism in the Netherlands. The first challenge is that because I am not from here, there are many aspects about Dutch culture I will never understand. Related to this is the potential to inappropriately transpose a framework suitable for understanding race and racism in the American context onto the Dutch context, thereby not taking into account the particularities under which the two exist and flourish within differing geographies. The second challenge is the charge of oversensitivity. Because I come from a place described in some literature as the penultimate white supremacist state (Goldberg, 2002; Mills, 2007), I could be overly sensitive in my perception of racial inequity. There is much to say on this, but what I will take a moment to point out is that that accusation is generally leveled by a member of the majority population, particularly those who might feel their

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[3] For readers not familiar, Zwarte Piet is the companion of St. Nicholas who appears during Christmastime. The character has been particularly divisive within Dutch society because those dressing as the character typically don blackface, large red-painted lips, and curly black wigs in what is clearly a derogatory showing of stereotypical features of black people. The debate as to whether or not this is actually racist has raged on for some time in the Netherlands; on one side is a vehement defense of the character, on the other, an attempt to raise a conversation about the perverse racism.

position of power is threatened when the topic of racism surfaces. Secondly, I believe sensitivity, and its twin, empathy, to be a critical human emotion, one needed to embark on questions of justice, a theme most social scientists believe themselves to be engaged with.

Ultimately, there is no single moment, no line embedded within a particular piece of legislation, no racially motivated act of violence towards a person that I can point to that can capture precisely what race or racism is and how and when it manifests. For race is not a biological fact, but an inscription and belief system that is maintained through repetitive acts of violence, over which the State has a monopoly, and by complicity from a majority group. Coates, in a nod to James Baldwin, opens his work describing just this, the illusory quality of race and racism, which manifest as easily and as openly in the everyday as they are able to osmose into institutional structures or be rendered invisible by those who benefit from it.

This thesis moves through time, but rejects linear chronology; traverses geographies, but denies specific locations; explores borders, but fixates on fissures and ruptures; names phenomena, but avoids universalizing narratives. I will begin with citizenship theory, then move into the sociological and historical evolution of citizenship under Dutch colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and end with a discussion on contemporary effects of colonialism on citizenship.

Over the coming paragraphs, two figures will emerge: the colonial subject and modern citizen. These will unwrap over different spaces and times, suggesting that the one resides in the past, the other in the present. No need telling which belongs where, though acceding this means ascribing to historicist modes of thinking, an organizing principle that has dominated the writing of history for centuries. Returning, then, to prior remarks on the consideration of citizenship from both historical and sociological perspectives, although the forthcoming analysis will take on a rather traditional form, I would ask the reader to suspend, if possible, reading these developments as occurring along a linear trajectory. Rather, both subjects should be regarded as coeval, the presence of one necessitating the existence of the second.

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It is worthwhile to spend time looking at citizenship from both a historical perspective – that is, under the system of colonization – as well as from more of a sociological perspective. The discussion that follows about the in- or exclusion of various groups, namely, Moluccans, Eurasians, Surinamese and Antilleans lends itself to the first, an illustration of the historical evolution of Dutch citizenship. It tells us, too, of the sociological implications of citizenship, or the degree to which one is seen to belong to an imagined political community. This second aspect is linked to anxieties

that arise in contemporary populist debates that focus on the preservation of Dutch culture from the encroachment of outsiders. But slippages occur elsewhere, and do not necessarily lie in the extremes (i.e. under colonial rule or in populist rhetoric), but rather in the everydayness of casual encounter. Here, too, we can see the how and when of marked bodies, which I can illustrate with two short anecdotes. The first occurs sometime in February 2018. I'm having dinner with a friend and a new acquaintance. The acquaintance, who is Dutch, is talking about her extended family, which is comprised, in part, of people of color. Rather than refer to herself or immediate family as white, she uses the term 'normal' and jokes about her to duty to preserve this. The second instance occurs in August 2018 when I'm working in a warehouse packing online orders for office supplies. Another person working the same shift with me hears my accent and asks where I am from. Out of politeness, I ask him the same, to which he responds, 'I don't look like it, but I'm Dutch' then explains that he carries two nationalities, Dutch and Turkish.

For quite different contexts, these stories share something significant. In the first, whiteness is equated with normality; even within her own family, the acquaintance speaks about non-white as an aberration, one that would not be expected in a Dutch family. In the second instance, the person responding to my question, 'where are you from' preempts his response with an explanation to account for the fact that although he is Dutch, I might resist this idea because he doesn't appear so. Here, Dutchness is equated with whiteness, a conjecture I can make only because he made reference to his physical appearance. Both occurrences illustrate everyday racism, a concept created by Philomena Essed to describe the less overt forms of racism that appear in everyday encounters (Essed, 2013). Essed (2013) teaches us that racism is a phenomenon that is not reserved alone for the explicitly racist, but makes appearances through commonplace social behavior by a majority. It is unlikely that the acquaintance meant to be racist when she said 'normal' when what she meant was 'white,' but this comment shows that there is an internalized racism which allows her to casually draw the bounds of what is normal, what belongs. This is reflected by the young person who anticipates a specific response from me when he tells me that he is Dutch, namely, that I would assume he couldn't possibly be because of his physical characteristics. Where the acquaintance easily assumes her membership in a community, the second person, no less entitled to this group, must give an account of himself.

Both of these occurrences relate to what is mentioned above, which is belonging in an imagined community, a salient component of citizenship. The state requires cohesion amongst its citizens, felt most strongly when people believe themselves to be a natural part of a political community, and will therefore spend considerable effort manufacturing this feeling. Founding myths serve this purpose, creating stories of origin from which a linear version of historical events can be linked back to, but more importantly, evoked in order to supersede the banality and isolation of the everyday or asserted in the face of perceived threat from an outsider (Hall, 2002).

One interesting aspect to consider here is that there seems to be an apparent duality emerging; on the one hand lies the State and its attending mechanism of order and control - namely citizenship - and on the other, the elements of community and belonging - also citizenship - but less formal than that which is codified by law. Both are political projects, which, depending on vantage point, concern the ascription of borders around territorial space or around social space (Trudeau, 2006). I do not see the two spheres as either oppositional or constitutive, but rather reinforcing, and for the purpose of this thesis, I am interested ultimately in both the everydayness of that reinforcing, as well as locating the State's responsibility in it. To put it in different words, the power of the State to demarcate citizenship along racial lines requires complicity by a majority, but calling the State the puppet master for white supremacy gives it more power than it deserves (thus disregarding nodes of resistance), and also plays into a logic of ignorance, treating something like racism as an anomaly in a supposedly egalitarian society, when it is a system of dominance that is reinforced on the individual level (Mills, 2007).

The Landscape of Citizenship Theory

Much of citizenship theory is concerned with universalist notions of juridical and doctrinal equality, legal rights and protections, state and supra-state apparatuses, and models for inclusive democratic participation, usually inscribed within the borders of a single state (Jones, 2015). Renewed interest over recent years in citizenship has come up as a result of an alleged decline in the importance of the nation-state in the face of globalization (Schinkel, 2010; Schaffer, 2011). This is supported by an argument that individuals are increasingly at the whim of non-state bodies such as multinational corporations and international institutions (Schaffer, 2011). Thus 'transnational' and 'cosmopolitan citizenship' – i.e., citizenship that transcends membership to a single nation-state, often meaning political membership in a supranational body such as the European Union – have been conceptualized as forms of future citizenship (Held, 2002).

Alongside greater scrutiny around the meaning of citizenship and the importance (or not) of the nation-state is a new critical look towards epistemic values of citizen and nation-state. Within the social sciences, many studies take for granted a normative relationship between individual and state, the result being that the State deflects scrutiny because it is regarded as a natural organizing body (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). This is termed 'methodological nationalism' and has implications if there is a tacit consensus that nation/state/society is the logical form for the modern world (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Its attending features, nationalism and ethnicity, are relegated to the status of 'pre-rational phenomenon…thought to be a transitory stage on the way to the modern, rationalized and individualized class society based on achievement' (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002, p. 303). Thinking was structured in this way in part because of canonical

divisions within the social sciences; the study of nationalism and ethno-national warfare in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe belonged to history, communitarianism and nation-building outside the Western world, to anthropology and political science (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). This is one facet of methodological nationalism that has produced a blindness, even in consideration of a modern world that functions as an exchange and interplay (of people, goods, ideas, etc.) between national communities, rather than as flat, globalized system of societies organized around a 'principles of achievement' (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002, p. 304).

There are a few other elements of methodological nationalism relevant for consideration here. The first builds on the normativity of a world comprised of nationally bounded societies, thus removing focused analysis from the 'national discourses, agendas, loyalties and histories' that serve(d) to build and maintain states (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Glick Schiller and Wimmer (2002) write that one consequence of this is that scholarship regarding post-WWII decolonial movements saw nation-building as an imperative, part of the process of modernization. Part and parcel to decolonial movements were anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles led by minority groups. Within both 'modernizing' as well as Western states, such groups were marginalized on the basis of inherent difference due to historical origin or migration history; they were, therefore, an incongruence within a dominant population (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Methodological nationalism allows for the problematization of those who lie outside a majority population, but fails to understand, as Glick Schiller and Wimmer (2002) explain, that 'a central part of the nation-state project [is] to define all those populations not thought to represent the '"national culture" as racially and culturally different, producing an alterity that contributed to efforts to build unity and identity,' (p. 306).

Over the last fifteen years, citizenship theorizing in the Netherlands shifted from models emulating multiculturalist policies and integration for noncitizens (Schinkel, 2007; Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010), to increasingly assimilative models that place emphasis on individual adjustment to Dutch cultural mores (Hurenkamp, Tonkens, & Duyvendak, 2011; Dekker, 2018; Mepschen, Duyvendak, & Tonkens, 2010). The reasons for this shift are the usual culprits, migration and globalization. These phenomena made impossible ideal models of democratic societies, described by moral and political philosopher John Rawls (1993), who writes 'like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system…we are not seen as joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a society where we will lead a complete life' (p. 40). Unless nations are to exist as static entities that regenerate in closed systems, the flux and flow of people, ideas, and commodities invalidate models of inclusivity premised first and foremost on a homogenous, stable populous.

Scholars have dubbed this the fall of multiculturalism, the failure of Western democracies to be able to absorb and manage the stresses and tensions of plural societies (Kymlicka, 2010). Two key issues in particular are attributed to this notion that the multicultural experiment has failed. The first is that amidst fears of a refugee crisis and mass migration to Europe, populist sentiment has begun to dominate the politosphere, with calls for the reassertion of traditional values and homogeneity (Kymlicka, 2010). In the Netherlands, this is most obvious in the rise of right-wing political parties such as Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) and Forum voor Democratie (FvD), led by demagogues Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet, respectively. Seizing on the sharp rise in the arrival of the mostly black and brown and mostly Muslim asylum seekers to Europe, politicians are able to forward an agenda built upon a tripartite narrative of first, geopolitical security, or the threat of terrorism by newcomers; second, human rights, or the preservation of cultural norms and political rights against those who would bring with them illiberal and undemocratic points of view; and third, economic security, or preventing the arrival of those not able to participate in the workforce, thus becoming burdensome to the welfare state (Kymlicka, 2010). Disregarding for a moment the racism of such a narrative, building platforms on these issues has proven to be a recipe for success for the right, particularly in instances when it is able to cull support from both a racist elite, as well as sections of the population on the losing end of neoliberalism.

The second is that the persistence of societal ills such as segregation, poor economic prospects, and political and social exclusion within minority groups is the 'unintentional' result of multiculturalist policies (Kymlicka, 2010). That these groups have failed to gain equal standing in terms of economic prosperity, or proportional representation in boardrooms, higher education, political office, and such, is attributed various explanations. Some concede to systemic injustice, but more often than not, the rhetoric of personal responsibility is more pronounced. This is particularly true of the Dutch context, which values highly the spirit of capitalistic entrepreneurialism and liberalism, dating back to the days of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) as I will explain later.

Drawing such a conclusion, that longstanding inequities show little sign of being ameliorated through policy-making, takes an ahistorical understanding of the history of Dutch citizenship and the state-building project. What I mean by this precisely is that while there is room for optimism, it is blindness that leads theoreticians to be able to conclude that fifteen years of redress is enough to counter four hundred years of colonial history (although perhaps a charge of optimist is still too generous, since the pronouncement of the death of multiculturalism was made less than a generation after its conception, not giving people much time to launch themselves into the upper echelons of social, political and economic strata). Charles Mills (2007) refers to an epistemology of ignorance—white ignorance— to classify those able to afford a privileged vantage point whereby equal citizenship can be summoned through the generosity of the State and its

lawmakers. Offering an analysis of social and individual cognitive processes, Mills (2007) shows that 'interests may shape cognition, influencing what and how we see, what we and society choose to remember, whose testimony is solicited and whose is not, and which facts and frameworks are sought out and accepted' (p. 24). White ignorance allows for the flourishing of a particular kind of ideological hegemony that positions the West as synonymous with freedom, democracy, equal access and opportunity. Further, it takes for granted that in seeking to understand issues of justice, 'it [would] be more theoretically appropriate to start from the "ideal theory" assumption that society is the product of mutually agreed upon, nonexploitative enterprise to divide benefits and burdens in an equitable way,' (Mills, 2007, p. 34).

One can see such assumptions throughout literature on citizenship, as it begins almost always with the key element, as Mill explains, of mutual agreement. Exploring this further brings attention to an ontological tradition under which theorists confine their understanding of democratic systems of government as a horizontal relation between State and citizen. This is also popular sovereignty, another expression of mutual agreement, or the understanding that the State and citizen function in a two-way relationship: citizens form a legal polity with rights guaranteed by the state, and the state derives its authority as a conferrer of such rights because those citizens, as equal and free participants, have made those laws democratically (Fung, 2013). Further, the relationship is 'nonexploitative,' because all have bought into this form of governance and this understanding of society. White ignorance makes it possible to obscure the colonial structures needed to sustain this majoritarian view of society, of how it came to be and the oppression upon which it is maintained (Goeman, 2017).

Gloria Wekker (2016) provides an elaboration of white ignorance within Dutch society under the more innocuous phrase 'white innocence.' Her choice to use innocence 'speaks not only of soft, harmless, childlike qualities… it is strongly connected to privilege, entitlement, and violence that are deeply disavowed,' (Wekker, 2016, p. 18). This disavowal, too, is a disavowal of a history of colonial conquest and violence, as well as the practice of slavery in parts of the Dutch empire. Such an amnesiac forgetting of the process through which the Dutch State was rendered makes possible the fissure between the ideal view of Dutch society, and how many actually experience it. To build on this, the next section is a closer look at these processes, which will later serve to form a different take on contemporary Dutch citizenship and its entanglements with colonialism.

Historical Citizenships: From the East

The period following WWII was characterized by numerous colonial independence movements worldwide. In the Dutch East and West Indies, various factions began to advocate for independence from the Dutch State, setting off a series of debates within parliament regarding the status of Dutch citizens and subjects in the overseas territories. An analysis of *kamerstukken* (parliamentary papers), *handelingen* (legislative acts), and policy reports document how the Dutch

State formulated its notions of modern citizenship, though this debate centering on just who should be regarded a Dutch citizen stretches back much earlier.

In 1949, four years after declaring independence, the Dutch State formally recognized the transfer of sovereignty of the Dutch East Indies to Indonesia (Jones, 2015). Several hundred years of colonization and European exploration had resulted in a patchwork of ethnicities within Indonesia; waves of Portuguese, German, Spanish, and Dutch colonizers and traders, as well as migrants from China, had mixed with native peoples. The resulting miscegenation meant blurred lines between populations and a 400-year headache for colonial administrators in charge of managing the local people[4]. Throughout their occupation, Dutch bureaucrats assembled and sustained various categorizations to demarcate those of European descent from mixed-blood and native peoples, a practice which was no less straightforward than it was absurd[5]. The various terms used – *totoks* to mean white Europeans and their descendants; Indo, *Indische* and Eurasian to mean a mix of European; and native – provided for systems of classification that came with separate sets of rights and privileges (Stoler, 2009).

It is no accident that along with Dutch colonization came a regime of hierarchized relations between European, native, and mixed, based on race and ethnicity. European exploration and conquest conceived of a world order premised on newly minted racial categories derived from physiognomic traits, thus marking a beginning to the long-entrenched idea of race as biological fact. Aníbal Quijano calls the emergence of this racial and ethnic classificatory schema under colonialism 'coloniality of power' (Quijano, 2007). What this phrase depicts is a particular mode of intersubjective knowing that developed alongside colonialism, one that was grounded in a 'European paradigm of rational knowledge' (Quijano, 2007, p. 172). Meaning, that concurrent to the consolidation of power Western nations through territorial acquisition, resource extraction and labor exploitation under colonialism was the development of Cartesian rationality, a form of philosophical inquiry that defined subject-object relations. This is rather important because it illuminates how colonial domination was more than an economic or political system: it was the spread of a new knowledge paradigm which oriented how European invaders encountered those they colonized. Coloniality of power cemented power structures based on racial domination in the Dutch East Indies because it allowed for the entrenchment of a Eurocentric epistemology, the aforementioned classificatory schemas (Quijano, 2007). Identities such as Indo, *Indische,* Eurasian, and native were homogenizing – eliminating the diversity that was present in such categories -

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[4] It is helpful to remember that the colonial project can be understood to have two main objectives. The first is primarily economic – to enrich a nation through the extraction of resources and exploitation of labor, usually forced. The second objective arises more out of necessity and practicality, and that is to create and maintain a bureaucratic apparatus aimed at the management of a heterogenous population (Goldberg, 2002).

[5] For an extensive (and fascinating) study on racial categorizations in the Dutch East Indies, see Stoler, 2009

and systematized one's proximity to an ideal, which was European. Because the creation of such categories was not borne out of intersubjective exchange, the relation between Dutch and other was that of subject-object, rather than subject-subject (Quijano, 2007). This helped to naturalize racial hierarchies between the groups that were eventually codified into law.

In 1854, the State divided the population into two, Europeans and *Inlanders*, further codifying racial classifications that would play out nearly a hundred years later during Indonesian independence (Stoler, 2009). This bifurcated colonial administration, creating a dualism within administrative, legal and judicial proceedings so that separate rules applied to each group (Heijs, 1995). Within the category of *Inlanders* could be found both natives (*inheemse bevolking*) and those who fell under the category of '*vreemde Oosterlingen'* literally 'foreign Orientals' (Stoler, 2009). These categorizations would be the basis of an 1892 citizenship law which shifted citizenship allocation based on birth (*jus soli)* to descent (*jus sanguinis)*, the purpose of which was to bar natives and their like from attaining Dutch citizenship (Heijs, 1995; Stoler, 2009). The unanticipated result of the new law, which stated that only children of European Dutch men would be granted Dutch citizenship, was that it rendered the majority of the population living in the Dutch East Indies stateless (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk, 2013). This issue was not dealt with by the State for another twenty years until a 1910 amendment creating a second-tier citizenship was enacted (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk, 2013). Under the new law, those who were not European Dutch citizens were assigned the category 'non-Dutch, Dutch subject' (*Nederlands onderdaanschap van niet-Nederlander)* (Heijs, 1995; Jones, 2007). The use of the term 'onderdaanschap' is critical, for it established Dutch *subjecthood* (the literal meaning of the word *onderdaanschap*) and by adding 'van niet-Nederlander' (of non-Dutch) codified Dutch nationality, not along the lines of political membership, but along the ethno-racial lines of a nation. Barring *Inlanders* from citizenship, the 1910 amendment would have far-reaching consequences later when it would be used as a blueprint for who was to become an Indonesian versus Dutch citizen with Indonesian independence.

It is important to spend some moments considering not only the ethno-racial lines that were carved, creating a border between citizen and subject, but the gendered aspects of citizenship as well. Gender is another means by which the Dutch State validated certain bodies, exemplified here by deeming a father's lineage the path along which Dutch citizenship travels. Under the 1910 law, offspring between Dutch men and women *Inlanders* receive Dutch citizenship, unlike the offspring of Dutch women and men *Inlanders.* According to the State, the former and his children are more legitimate members of the Dutch social and political community than the latter, a severe consequence for a nonsensical distinction. This is exemplative of the ability of the State to inscribe hierarchies into particular bodies, for in the case of a Dutch mother and native father, the child

would not have access to citizenship. As a result of state intervention, citizenship begins to emerge as a systematic ordering along the lines of both gender and race.

Variations of legitimacy and illegitimacy, and the processes by which these arise, has been discussed at length by gender theorists. In particular, Judith Butler (1993) uses the notion of abject bodies to delineate where material and discursive constructions collide, and ultimately fail to account properly for how bodies come to be inscribed and suffer the consequences of those inscriptions. That is, relegating questions on things such as race or gender to the realm of philosophical debate alone can result in neglecting that we all have bodies that feel and experience pleasure and pain, often as a result of racial and gender configurations. Nevertheless, a focused look at both material and discursive arguments can help to explore the citizen-noncitizen and individual-State divides and the State's role in inscribing meaning into bodies.

Evoking Foucault, Butler (1993) states '"sex"…is a part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs, or, whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce – demarcate, circulate, differentiate – the bodies it controls,' (p. 1). Sex is a means of social control manipulated in the 1910 law by the Dutch State to create the categories of subject and citizen. Under this law, male European bodies are validated as vessels for Dutch citizenship, whereas female European bodies are not able to provide the same legitimation to their children. A material reading would relegate 'sex' to the realm of biological distinction, and thus citizenship, by extension, could be said to be ordered around a natural dualism between male and female, of nature given coherence by a patriarchal social system.

Honing in on its 'productive power' helps to uncover discursive arguments, which is that sex relates to the cultural domain which is reified and maintained by performativity (Butler, 1993). Crucially, the body as a site also becomes the place where nature is displaced by the social in a move that posits nature 'unintelligible,' unless it has acquired value from the social (Butler, 1993). For example, 'sex' alone is meaningless until it is imbued with 'gender,' which is the social performance of sex. The biological essentialism of sex dissipates, only to be reconstructed by a discursive understanding of it, meaning, that sex only becomes known when it is assembled by discourse (Butler, 1993). Butler tells us this is highly problematic because it does not give us an account of the consequences of bodies marked by sex, or of the lived experience of gender. Whether one takes the angle that something like sex is a biological 'fact' versus a sociological performance relates to questions of agency (can a subject refuse sex, is it always imposed?) and ontological reducibility of sex.

What does begin to emerge concretely is a zone of abjection, or the notion that identity is affirmed by fixing a border between what is being defined, and that which lies outside of that definition

(Butler, 1993). Because what is inside falls short of material or discursive readings, it is easier, then, to create a strategy under which the outside becomes constituted through its supposed incongruity with a homogenous inside. The zone of abjection is one of inhabitability, those who are outside, what Foucault called, the domain of the intelligible (Butler, 1993). Butler (1993) summarizes:

> This zone of uninhabitability will constitute the defining limit of the subject's domain; it will constitute that site of dreaded identification against which – and by virtue of which – the domain of the subject will circumscribe its own claim to autonomy and to life. (p. 3)

Here, she touches upon something critical, which is that the domain of abjection is at once lacking the status of 'subject' but is nevertheless crucial in the formation of the subject (Butler, 1993). Because the contours of a given subject are shaped by what it is not, it emerges through exclusion, and one with bodily ramifications – a 'claim to autonomy and to life,' (Butler, 1993, p. 3). The body, and in particular the colonized body, becomes a site of contestation, where nation – a socio-cultural connotation – meets the citizen/subject – or political – divide (Goeman, 2017). Under the 1910 law, the Dutch State weaponizes sex against the bodies that occupy a zone of abjection. A sort of biopolitics materializes when one begins to look more closely at the State's ordering of subjects and citizens, a process of rendering particular bodies known or intelligible, so that a system of classification can be created. At this point, population management becomes a political problem, and thus falls under the domain of the State.

That nation can be ensconced within the sexed body is evinced by the degree to which white women throughout history were regarded, by virtue of reproduction, as the conduit for maintaining racial purity (Goldberg, 2002). Goldberg (2002) describes the role of white women as literal 'bearers of future generations of citizens' or assisting in the ideological production of citizenry as caretakers, governesses, and teachers (p. 89). Hence the complications that arise in the bodies of colonized women, which retain symbolic significance as the abject, but present a problem of management and thus requiring ordering. Dutch citizenry at first glance seems straightforward: those born of a European Dutch father alone have access. But, as I will expand on below, this assumes both a degree of homogeneity which did not exist in the colonies, nor in the mother country, as well as the assumption that miscegenation can be controlled, or at least, managed. As the various categories above show, colonial rule was often a bureaucratic nightmare, with people eliding fixed categorizations. Dutchness, then, becomes more of a floating signifier, one that becomes defined by that which it is not.

The importance of the 1910 law would play out forty years later when the category of Dutch subjecthood would be used as a designation for who was to become an Indonesian citizen and who would have access to Dutch citizenship with Indonesian independence. The 'natural'

difference for colonial administrators between non-Dutch and Dutch within the East Indies was on full display during debates leading up to the passage of the law, captured by the following statement made by Minister of Colonial Affairs Jan Hendrik de Waal Malefijt:

> A Dutchman is simply different from an Indian[6], though the latter absolutely is not less than. They are both Dutch subjects, but I believe that a very insignificant meaning should be given to the word Dutchman, if that is the most suitable name to give to the people of the Dutch East Indies. (Handelingen II, 1909/1910, p. 1272)

Malefijt makes reference to an inherent inferiority, but it is veiled in a form of paternalistic racism: the *Inlander* is not 'less than,' however, a new nomenclature is still needed lest 'Dutchman' is watered down by the application of that term to those of non-European origin. Conceiving of a polity that includes the colonized does not extend to the even application of a term like 'Dutchman,' which should be reserved to those of a particular genetic makeup. Here, it is easy to see that exclusion from an imagined Dutch community was not a matter of political belonging, but it was often reduced to essentialist notions reflecting beliefs in racial superiority.

In *Racial State,* David Theo Goldberg (2002) emphasizes the particular racial project which is the modern state and writes that 'the state – and nation-state especially, where nation here becomes the cultural reproduction of hegemonic consensus to state administrative mandates – is all about institutionally reproductive homogenization' (p. 30). Allegiance to state mandated homogenization relates to long held anxieties around hybridism, or miscegenation (Goldberg, 2002). Nineteenth century scientists embarked on a mission of providing scientific proof of polygenism, or the idea that races are species that are biologically distinct from one another (Goldberg, 2002). The hope was to provide scientific evidence of a biologically superior race and subsequent justification for the domination of one over another. This project ultimately failed and was eclipsed by Darwinist evolutionary theory, which Goldberg describes as a 'shift from strictly scientific technologies of race and racism towards more culturalist articulations' (p. 25). Thus, because there was no proof of biological superiority of any one particular race – i.e. racism could not be justified on scientific grounds - states needed to defend colonization and other forms of economic, political and social domination on different grounds.

Articulations of racial superiority, therefore, began to manifest through cultural preservation, to which the non-European posed a threat. Miscegenation and hybridism were externalized to the colonies, an act that required a form of mental division (because it meant ignoring heterogenous

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[6] Minister Malefijt uses the term '*Indiër*' which translates to 'Indian.' This is somewhat unusual; by this time the term was quite antiquated, having fallen out of official use in the early 19th century. By then *Indische* or *Inlander* were most commonly used. Perhaps it was a purposeful use of the term, and perhaps it is an example of how little colonial administrators understood of the people they had colonized.

populations present in the motherland) as well as physical division, since the 'problem' of racial mixing could remain far away from the colonial capital. Goldberg (2002) points out that the process of externalizing heterogeneity to the colonies while promoting homogeneity in the mother land has no basis in historical reality. Using the Dutch as an example, he states: 'The Dutch were 'a people'…whose very constitution was a product of immigration, not least within Europe: Flemish and Huguenots fleeing religious intolerance, Sephardic Jews chased out by Catholic terror in Spain and Portugal, Ashkenazi Jews escaping from East European intolerance' (Goldberg, 2002, p. 18). Returning to the Dutch East Indies, the imagery of the Dutch nation, from which *Inlanders* were now formally excluded (though it goes without saying that they were always excluded), through a forced reproduction of homogenization seems rather confused when Dutchness, to an extent, always meant hybridity. Even if we admit that the hybridity outlined above has to do with the mixing of European peoples, thus seemingly supporting a notion that Dutchness must then equal Europeaness, this erases the fact that by the time the 1910 amendment was passed, Amsterdam had had black inhabitants for centuries. Goldberg (2002) writes of recent scholarship that detail the lives of black people in Amsterdam, asking us to consider not that their presence has been documented as proof that racial homogeneity is farcical, but to consider how their presence is deemed 'exceptional' and outside of the 'norm.' Looking at it from this perspective he states:

> …the historical exceptionalism is at work here, it should be clear, is not a product principally of self-determining 'minority separation,' an infantilizing celebration of ethnic self-identification. Rather, it is a product primarily of that initial ignoring, rendering invisible…representational exceptionalism, an emphatic foregrounding focus, becomes the only possibility for writing strangers and outsiders, black people in particular, back into the historical record. (p. 23)

The silence surrounding the history of non-white or non-European people within the Dutch mainland is bound in the exclusion of non-European and non-white from Dutch citizenship, because without acknowledging certain people's existence, there is no room to imagine a community that transcends a particular ethnic or racial makeup. By creating the two citizenship categories – Dutch native (*Nederlander*) and non-Dutch, Dutch subject (*Nederlands onderdaanschap van niet-Nederlander)*, the Dutch State created and codified race as an instrument for control. The state-making project becomes a racial project in which the state 'seeks to control not least by 'knowing' them', where the 'them' are racialized others, becoming known by being named (Goldberg, 2002, p. 34).

In 1949, seventy million *Inlanders* with the 'non-Dutch, Dutch subject' categorization would be automatically rendered Indonesian citizens, regardless of how they might self-identify (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk, 2013). Separate from the seventy million *Inlanders* were roughly 250,000

inhabitants of the archipelago who were able to keep Dutch citizenship (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk, 2013). Despite legal recognition as Dutch subjects, this group was quickly problematized by the State. The reluctance on the part of the State to embrace these particular citizens is owed to the fact that between 60-70 percent of this group were Indo-European (*Indische)* (Jones, 2015). The State found this group of people to be unsuitable Dutch, a sentiment captured in repeated claims that they were 'strongly oriented' towards Indonesia, mean this group's loyalty to the Dutch State should be questioned (Jones, 2016; Kamerstukken II 1951/52).

Indeed, this kind of language about 'orientation' appeared regularly in citizenship debates, so much so, that parliamentarians gave the 250,000 Dutch citizens a two-year window to acquiesce Dutch citizenship in favor of Indonesian citizenship (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk, 2013). Parliamentarians so earnestly hoped that the majority would exercise this option that once the two years passed with minimal buy in by this group of citizens, they appeared rather blindsided. As the two-year grace period came to an end, thus ending hopes for a collective identity crisis on the part of Indo-European Dutch, they expressed growing concerns at what might seem a permanent acceptance of 250,000 into the Dutch nation:

> Many members expressed great concern about the large group of strongly Indonesian-oriented so-called *Indische Nederlanders.* 27 December 1951, is rapidly approaching, the date on which the possibility expires to obtain Indonesian citizenship in a simple manner. The members here spoke of their conviction that the choice of the Indonesian nationality by the vast majority of the *Indische Nederlanders* should be regarded as a direct and essential interest for them. (Kamerstukken II, 1951/52, p. 6)

Terms like 'Eastern-oriented' and 'Indonesian-oriented' had been applied from the start of the independence movements at the end of WWII up and through the debates about multiculturalism that characterized the 1970s. Great concern over the ability of Indo-Europeans to assimilate into Dutch society was expressed, especially as the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia began to result in increased migration from the former colony to the Netherlands.

In the 1950s and 1960s migrants totaled approximately 312,500, of which 200,000 were Indo-European, 12,500 Moluccan and 100,000 *totoks* (white, of European descent) (Jones, 2015). Moluccans, in particular, were almost immediately framed as a problem group by the Dutch State, a characterization informed by a complex geo-political situation in which Moluccans made clear that their future in the decolonized Dutch East Indies was conceivable only as a part of an independent and free Moluccan State. This position arose during the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table (RTC) talks on the issue of nationality. As Dutch subjects, Moluccans were to obtain Indonesian citizenship, something that did not sit well considering difficult relations between Moluccans and a possible Indonesian State. Prior to decolonization, Moluccans had served in the

Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), fighting against Indonesian nationalists during separatist movements (van Amersfoort, 2004). Coupled with their own strong identities as Moluccans rather than Indonesians and desirous of their own state, relations between the Dutch State and Moluccan community were aggravated when orders were given by KNIL serviceman and their families to demobilize in Indonesia (Jones, 2007). For 12,500 Moluccans, this was impossible, a sentiment that was corroborated by Dutch courts who ruled that forced demobilization in Indonesia unconstitutional (Jones, 2015). Moluccans were then granted entrance into the Netherlands, a plan Secretary Leonard Antoon Hubert Peters of Union Matters and Overseas Territories decried as 'the worst conceivable solution' (Kamerstukken II, 1950/51, p. 11) Of the Moluccans, Secretary Peters stated:

> The Government is of the opinion that the living habits, customs and social views and the physical and mental condition of the [Moluccans] do not dispose them for a permanent stay in the foreign and unknown Dutch community…From the outset the government has therefore considered a possible stay of the [Moluccans] in the Netherlands to be temporary. (Kamerstukken II, 1950/51, p. 11)

From their arrival, the State was proactive in its construction of Moluccans as problematic, citing biological inferiority, antisocial tendencies, and incompatibility with Dutch society. Not surprisingly, the Moluccan community in the Netherlands began to experience hardships that comes with isolation from a political, economic and social community. A 1977/1978 parliamentary paper entitled 'The Problem of the Moluccan Minority in Netherlands' lamented that 'since the beginning of the seventeenth century great groups of immigrants with a clear, deviating [more the norm] cultural identity distinct from the prevailing pattern' had 'sought and found connection without much difficulty' (Kamerstukken II, 1977/78, p. 8). In contrast, Moluccans reject Dutch society, favoring instead the preservation of a Moluccan identity and culture at the expense of assimilation (Kamerstukken II 1977/78). 2, 8).

Returning to Goldberg, there is a second element to his theories of racial rule that can be applied here to understand the evolution of Dutch colonial administration to one of management of heterogeneous population within the colonies, to the management of pluralism on the State's European soil. By mid-twentieth century, in a liberalizing world order premised on freedom and democracy, most forms of colonial subjugation attracted international scorn and condemnation (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2003). Nevertheless, the remnants of colonial rule continued to permeate regimes now organized around notions of law and order, especially those experiencing migration of formerly colonized peoples. To better understand how the logic of colonialism shape contemporary democracy requires going back once again to the genesis of colonial occupation and associated myths.

European discovery of New Worlds is a fable that tells of the first encounters between the civilized and the barbarian, those that inhabit the realm of the Enlightened, and those who represent a State of Nature (Hall, 2002; Goldberg, 2002). Some postcolonial scholars trace this mode of thinking to the sixteenth century Valladolid debate between Chiapas Bartolomé de las Casa and Juan Gines de Sepúlveda, which was considered the first moral debate on slavery, colonialism, and human rights (Grosfoguel, 2013). De las Casa argued that Native people in the Americas had souls, thus making slavery immoral on the grounds that their souls were salvageable in the eyes of the Christian god (Grosfoguel, 2013). For some, this equation of Native with in/humanity is the first instance of recorded racialized thinking: here, Europeans are justified in their acts of genocide and mass enslavement because those murdered and enslaved were not fully human, unlike their colonizers. According to this mode of thinking, the notion of enslaveablity and soullessness are inherent qualities of non-European people, 'Native' becomes synonymous with barbarian, never able to develop out of this 'natural' state. In opposition to the advanced European, natives become ensconced in a permanent prehistoric time (Goldberg, 2002). Goldberg (2002) calls this form of racial configuration 'naturalism,' and if early colonization represents the start of this kind of thinking, then the explicitly racist regimes Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa and Jim Crow South are its progeny. The argument that Native people do have souls and are saveable, as argued by de las Casas, elevates by creating space for development, so that the Native is not condemned to the space of prehistory and savagery, but is transformed by potentiality (Goldberg, 2002). He calls this 'historicism,' the foundation for contemporary developmentalism and liberalism.

Both naturalism and historicism provide a blueprint – 'classifying schemas' – for ordering heterogeneity, which as stated above, is one premise of the colonial project (Goldberg, 2002). Under the former, only complete subjugation of a colonized population is considered. The latter is intertwined with the legacy of civilizing missions, bestowing upon a colonized people 'cultural, social and intellectual progress,' in other words, 'European, Christian virtue and practice' shot through with industrious adherence to capitalist advancement (Goldberg, 2002). In short, this is call for assimilation and integration of a formerly backward people:

> [R]ecourse through repressive state assertion…prompts shifts from naturalist to historicist or progressivist or evolutionary terms, from the stasis of 'Being' to the developmentalism of 'Becoming,' from objects of natural order to subjects (though not – at least not yet – as citizens) of the state, from racial subjection through technologies of the whip, sword, and gun to racial management via the funneling technologies of education, opportunities, and access. (p. 95)

What Goldberg is talking about in this passage is a doubling-down of the State to reimpose order, once easily maintained under naturalist presuppositions. The case of the Moluccans exemplifies just this: the political situation necessitated granting entry of Moluccans into the Netherlands was

considered highly undesirable. Thus, the Dutch State seeks 'recourse' through repressive means, namely, it becomes a gatekeeper via 'funneling technologies of education, opportunities, and access.' The Moluccans, once in the Netherlands, are segregated into camps, including former Nazi concentration camps Westerbork and Vught, and at the urging of Dutch labor unions, are prevented from entering the labor market (Minority Rights Group International, 2018; van Amersfoort, 2004). Initially, children were to be kept from attending Dutch schools, but this idea was quickly abandoned (van Amersfoort, 2004).

This passage tells us something of the genealogy of modern state formation, of how colonial rule morphs into systems of governance that would seem to offer paths to full participation and inclusion. The '[technology] of the whip' becomes outdated and is replaced with 'racial management.' To understand what Goldberg means by this, consider, once again, the prior discussion on homogeneity and heterogeneity, as well as Butler's abject body. Heterogeneity allowed for the creation of anxiety and, by extension, a solution for the management of diverse populations, configured of bodies conceived abject. Colonialism was a form of governance, of racial management, but it also embedded itself within the everyday, thus allowing colonial modes of thinking to flourish under the guise of what would later become historicism (Goldberg, 2002). Colonial rule requires a status quo that is reiterated in informal daily life, and it is this that has persisted as the more archaic institutions have fallen away (Goldberg, 2002). It is an oversimplification to fix the Dutch State as it appears in its modern form from the mid-twentieth century onwards in a system of colonial governance premised on 'technologies of the whip.' As Goldberg (2002) writes, this would provide an excuse, one used most prominently by moderates and progressives, to disengage with the legacy colonialism on the premise that these times are long past.

This, too, is precisely why historicism is slippery: it sidesteps accusations of overt racism, on the one hand, while providing a scapegoat on the other: namely, racialized others. If 'education, opportunities, and access' become the new instruments of control, those unable to wield them in their favor are made to seem personally responsible for their failure, and what could be more democratic than personal responsibility? Returning, then, to the ostracization of Moluccans, the Dutch State racially configured the group as unfit for Dutch society in part because of their rejection of assimilationist policies, ones whose terms were dictated solely by the State. Such rejection is an affront to a system dependent on control and homogeneity. The same anxieties colonial administrators had towards a heterodox population in the colonies is present in the quote above regarding the Moluccans mental and social fitness for in a 'foreign and unknown Dutch community.' This is the colonial subject, one on the brink of 'Becoming,' who roundly rejects the terms as presented by the State and must therefore be dealt with.

By the late 1970s, it was clear that the Moluccans 'temporary' stay had turned out to be of a more permanent nature. A few decades in the Netherlands meant that there was now a second generation of Moluccans, a generation the government never considered to be Dutch in any way, despite the Netherlands being the only place they knew. Only after violent political events during which Moluccan youths, fueled by Moluccan nationalism and exacerbated by ostracization from Dutch society, hijacked trains on two separate occasions, leading to civilian deaths did the Dutch State begin to reformulate its relationship to the Moluccan community (Jones, 2015). The 1976 *Act Concerning the Status of Moluccans* passed the Dutch parliament granting Moluccans social citizenship, though they were barred from exercising political rights such as voting (Jones, 2007). The statue was designed as amelioration from the exclusion from Dutch society and from then on, the Netherlands was constructed as the de facto homeland of the Moluccans (Jones, 2007).

By the 1970s, ant-imperialist and anti-colonial sentiment had entered the political mainstream and the Dutch State began to invest energy into studying minority groups and the problems persistent within these communities. In an influential 1979 report entitled 'Ethnic Minorities Report: A Report to the Government Towards an Overall Ethnic Minorities Policy' – the first comprehensive study on government policy with respect to ethnic minorities – three sets of problems were identified. A quick perusal is enough to reveal that the 'problems' of minorities were largely of their own making. The first set, called 'problems of social backwardness,' asked 'to what extent is the ability of the members of these groups to participate in society on equal terms restricted by their socio-economic position' (Penninx, 1979, p. VII). Inflected with historicism, this point captures popular sentiment regarding inequities. On the one hand, a problem has been acknowledged, but the yoke of responsibility is borne on the group. It is important to note, again, the anti-imperialist and anticolonial climate. This fostered anti-racist attitudes and a desire to shed a racist past. However, rather than implicate the State or Dutch society, quiet agreement on colorblindness took hold, a belief that the egalitarian should choose to see a 'raceless' society. It becomes easy, then, to scapegoat minorities, as Goldberg (2002) writes, since '"if racism is a thing of the past, so contemporary racial inequities must be due to the individual, or even group, inadequacies,"' (p. 99). Even if able to concede a less secure socioeconomic position, the terms are still that the group should be able to participate on equal footing, despite lacking (often severely) the necessary resources to cover the basics of living such as food, housing and healthcare. Further, no step is taken by the State to assume responsibility for an unequal wealth distribution, despite it being the key architect of a lucrative colonial system that flourished for hundreds of years on the premise of resource extraction, labor exploitation, and a robust slave trade, that more than unfairly benefitted that very State. Rather, the State makes a culprit out of 'social backwardness.'

The second set of problems named in the report, called 'cultural or identity problems' asked, 'to what extent are these groups or their individual members prepared and able to adapt to the dominant culture, or else to preserve and experience a sense of independent identity' (Penninx, 1979, p. VII). It is important to note that the stress of 'independent identity' in the second quote reflects anxieties regarding group solidarity, since this was seen to conflict with cohesion within Dutch society:

> Dutch society, on the other hand, tends to give its norms and values a general validity. In the whole of social values and norms it focuses on the individual person: it is not permissible for an ethnic or cultural minority to force its members to behave in accordance with the group norms. (Kamerstukken II 1977/78, p. 30)

This was a response to a general fear that group solidarity amongst minorities would foster political extremism and hostility towards the Netherlands, of which Moluccans, in particular, were often accused. That the Moluccans, barred from Dutch citizenship initially and unwilling to accept Indonesian nationality, had in the decades following their arrival essentially become stateless, was not the focus of why problems might be arising. Rather, they were portrayed as having group characteristics causing maladaptation to Dutch society. By contrast, Indo-Europeans, initially thought to be too 'Eastern-oriented' to assimilate and whose migration to the Netherlands was thought would result in 'irresolvable uprootedness' were now celebrated for having successfully integrated within Dutch society (Jones, 2016; Jones 2007; Penninx, 1979).

Finally, the third set of problems asks, 'to what extent is the host society prepared to develop towards a society in which people of diverse ethnic backgrounds can live together harmoniously' (Penninx, 1979, p. VII). Note the difference between minorities 'ability' versus the host society's 'preparedness' to adapt. One is considered to have an intrinsic ability, which it may or may not choose to exercise; the other is questioned whether it has that ability at all.

Gender, too, plays a prominent role in the report. Of the role that women play in acclimatizing their children to a new environment, the report justifies 'intensified intervention' by authorities on the following grounds:

> Children's academic performance at school is strongly influenced by the home environment. Many parents - and especially the mother, as the one principally concerned with upbringing-can do little if anything to help their school-age children. For boys and girls to participate successfully in present-day Dutch education they must have an attitude of independence and motivation towards self-development. Such attitudes can only develop in a family and upbringing situation in which the wife enjoys a position of equal status with the husband… Among a proportion of the minorities, however, family relationships are strongly hierarchical in nature. (Penninx, 1979, p. XII)

Replacing the age-old 'mother knows best' adage is a new one: 'the State knows best.' The passage is infused with hetero-patriarchy, assuming a highly gendered schema one the one hand – that the responsibility of childrearing belongs to the mother – but under the guise of feminism – that the women should be of 'equal status' with her husband. According to María Lugones, this logic is in line with the logic colonialism, which is to impart the traditional family structure and its attending values. Building on Quijano's coloniality of power, Lugones (2007) offers a framework that intertwines racial classification with gender as another element of his 'structural axis.' If colonialism subjected individuals to forms of subjugation along biological 'facts' of race, creating a system of domination that permeated all aspects of life, then gender, too, was marked by colonialism (Lugones, 2007). Thus, we can begin to understand colonial subjectivities with more clarity; prior discussions on the passing of citizenship through a Dutch father and the emblematic status of the European mother for nation are not only relations construed along racial lines – i.e. the preservation of a homogenous ethno-nation. Rather, they are also systems of gendered heterosexism under which race cannot be considered the ultimate relation of power in a colonial system (Lugones, 2007). The European, bourgeois female is not sanctified because she is the counterpart to the European, bourgeois male; she is sanctified for her service in the role of mother and caregiver, through her subservience (Lugones, 2010). Ironically, it is such subservience that the State finds disdainful in minorities, noting that it is in *those* communities that strong hierarchies between women and men exist. The State is blindsided towards its own imposed hierarchies: childrearing in a family unit between a heterosexual man and heterosexual woman and the imparting of specific values organized around individualism and self-determination. Ultimately, raising a productive citizen is of foremost importance, and in this, minority women fall short.

Historical Citizenships: From the West

The 1970s proved to be a significant decade for people of the former Dutch West Indies as well. Following Indonesian independence at the end of WWII, the Dutch State spent considerable time and energy reformulating its relationship to its possessions in the Caribbean. No longer called 'colonies,' Dutch-owned islands in the Caribbean and the remaining possession in the East, New Guinea, would be referred to as 'overseas territories' (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2003). Internationally, colonialism by the end of WWII had fallen out of fashion, and the Dutch State, in its reluctance to let go of Indonesia, was earning a reputation for being repressive and old-fashioned (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2003). Independence was not yet in order for the West Indies, but rather a strengthening of the Kingdom of the Netherlands through a new constitution on the grounds of '"freedom, equality and solidarity"' (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2003, p. 77). A 1954 Charter with the Kingdom granted Suriname and the Antilles autonomy with regard to internal affairs, and full Dutch citizenship was granted to inhabitants (Oostindie & Klinkers 2003; Jones, 2015).

This is one of the marked differences in colonial administration between the Dutch East and West Indies. Missing from legal canon in the West Indies was the '*Nederlands onderdaanschap van niet-Nederlander*' subjecthood designation between natives and Europeans. The 'traumatic loss' of Indonesia was felt strongly by the Dutch State, which had focused decolonization efforts almost solely on keeping the archipelago, at the expense of paying much attention to the Caribbean islands (Jones, 2015; Oostindie & Klinkers, 2003). Economically, the Netherlands was in dire straits having lost Indonesia, a critical asset to Dutch coffers. Exacerbating this was the fact that the Antillean and Surinamese islands were chronically running at a deficit, an issue predating the abolition of slavery 1863, which passed Dutch parliament not out of any moral gesture, but because it had long ceased to be profitable. Hindering the process was an irritating issue of having to compensate slave owners who were to lose their precious inventory, thus painting a picture of just how much regard the Dutch State had towards the majority of its inhabitants in the Caribbean (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2003). Therefore, in an unhappy twist, when the Caribbean became the Dutch State's remaining possessions, a fervor towards cementing the bonds of a Dutch Kingdom erupted.

During the 1950s, the Netherlands began to see increased migration of both Surinamese and Antillean workers. While this was welcome and encouraged actively through policies designed around recruitment, Dutch politicians expected migration to be temporary, with workers expected to return to countries of origin when labor contracts finished (Jones, 2007). The irony of statements such as these was lost on lawmakers, for as full citizens of the Dutch State, Surinamese were already in their own country, unless the citizenship enjoyed by these workers did not include the presumed freedom of movement and settlement within their State.

By the 1960s, Surinamese male workers, in particular, began to be constructed as a problem population. Alleging criminality and a lack of work culture, political discourse shifted from initially welcoming workers to citing a 'workers culture' that was incongruent with Dutch society (Jones, 2007). In a parliamentary discussion about the Surinamese versus Antillean migrant labor force, it was surmised that it would be best to recruit more heavily from the Antilles, since 'Surinamese were perhaps more adventurous in spirit than the people of the Dutch Antilles' (Handelingen II 1963/64, p. 1401). Using a colonial framework, it is not challenging to decode language such as 'incompatibility,' Surinamese 'workers culture,' and 'adventurous in spirit.' The first, a notion of incompatibility, can be likened to contemporary assimilationist stances taken towards migrants. The second and third have clearer racial undertones, the second relating to a perceived laziness long associated with the people of color, and third with lose mores and the inability to control oneself, in opposition to the self-possessed Christian discipline and entrepreneurialism of the white European Dutch (Wekker, 2017). Contrasting Surinamese workers to Eastern and Southern

European migrant workers who were also arriving in the Netherlands in large numbers, parliamentarians made the following observations during state budget debates:

> They are men from the tropics arriving in the first place to a whole different climate, but also to a different social and political environment…Surinamese should be given greater attention in terms of their adjustment difficulties, because they come from a completely different world than many European foreign workers. (Handelingen II, 1963/64, p. 1401-1402)

In reviewing these papers, it is hard to ignore the rather confused nature of the discourse surrounding Surinamese and Antillean Dutch. Flip flopping between outright racism and paternalistic coddling, there are also *mea culpa* moments, when parliamentarians seem to acknowledge that the receiving society is at fault for encouraging migration from the Caribbean, only to face an influx of people for which the State is not equipped to provide adequate employment and housing. One member states:

> I do not argue that the Surinamese people should be prevented from coming. It would be a good thing, however, if one could ensure that their arrival only took place in a responsible manner. As it happens now, there is a danger that Surinamese people will gain disappointing experiences in the Netherlands. (Handelingen II, 1963/64, p. 1397)

While great attention is being paid to the lack of resources available for Surinamese and Antillean, and, at the national level, there is a degree of outspokenness concerning discrimination by white Dutch, especially towards students of color at university, the surmising of disappointment and hardship is shot through with beliefs in inferiority and ill-suitedness for Dutch society. Though Dutch citizens in name, arrivals from Suriname and the Antilles are too foreign for their own good. Unemployment in these communities persisted, with official response tending towards culpability on the part of the worker. To further exemplify how the newcomers were being perceived, consider the following article circulated by an official of the North Holland Department of Social Work advising on appropriate kinds of work for Surinamese:

> The Surinamese people, by whom I mean Creoles, a group whose predominant ancestor is the Negro, is generally cheerful in nature, uncomplicated, often childishly naïve to boastful or lying…In general he is not very industrious, at least his working rate is rather low and he hates agricultural labor, because it reminds him of the period of slavery of his ancestors. He prefers to do activities that do not require too much labor power – as chauffeur, tractor driver, or operator of mechanical devices. (Schuster, 1999, p. 125)

There is a similar persistence in Eurocentric historical records of native and New World savages as there is of sambo-like characterizations of the 'negro.' The discussion of Surinamese in the quote

above reflects many of the themes above: a stark historicism, that would relegate people of color to the status of young children; subject-object relationality, under which the rational, developed white Dutch dutifully catalogues the behavior and demeanor of the colonial subject so as to better know and understand him; and a colonial power matrix that validates the superiority of the speaker who is able to write into the annals of history the mishaps that occur alongside a clash of cultures, namely, trouble within the labor market. It must be continuously emphasized that it is with these attitudes that white Dutch regarded fellow citizens, for the arriving Surinamese were a part of the same Kingdom. This is also not dissimilar to earlier discussions on externalizing heterogeneity to the colonies; the encounter with nonwhite bodies on the Dutch mainland evokes a particular kind of anxiety that could previously be pushed to the margins, if not literally, at least mentally. Similarly, the figure of the negro is glued to an alternative time and locked in predevelopment, thus bringing to fore temporal ruptures when this subaltern figure begins to arrive to continental Europe (neglecting, of course, those who were already there).

Why Surinamese came to be constructed by both the State (through policy and in parliamentary discourse) and popular sentiment as a problem group can be chalked up to two phenomena; the first, similarly to the discussion on migrants from Indonesia, is that migration was anticipated to be of a temporary nature; Surinamese and Antillean workers were expected to return to their home countries after a period of work. Further, Surinamese were arriving in much greater numbers than Antillean, which is why, perhaps, Dutch parliamentarians more easily spoke of the virtues of Antilleans in contrast to Surinamese. In the mid-1960s, Surinamese numbered around 11,000, which grew to about 30,000 by 1970.

But it was not just immigration to the Netherlands which concerned politicians. With the independence of Indonesia, Indonesians living in Suriname had lost the 'non-Dutch Dutch subject' designation, and therefore access to Dutch citizenship (Heijs, 1995). In 1954, a provision was created giving the Governor of Suriname the power to grant Indonesians Dutch citizenship. Ten years later, a second arrangement for immigrants living in Suriname opened another path to citizenship: along with certain residency requirements, this new rule stated that those born in Suriname would receive Dutch citizenship upon turning 21 (Heijs, 1995). Under these two provisions, roughly 12,000 people in Suriname became naturalized Dutch citizens. This alarmed Dutch parliamentarians, who, in a 1972 report stated that '[t]he immigration policy and related policy concerning the granting of Dutch citizenship to foreign nationals…is starting to raise more and more displeasure among the population of our very heavily overcrowded country' (Kamerstukken II, 1971/72, p. 1). The new Dutch nationals, according to the report, would contribute further to the shortage of living space and would place unnecessary stress on an already overburdened labor market and healthcare system (Kamerstukken II, 1971/72, p. 1). It was not just a matter of overpopulation and a strained welfare system; the new nationals were construed

as highly undesirable. Chinese migrants made up a sizable portion of those naturalized, about which Dutch parliamentarians had the following to say:

> With regard to the Chinese…it is clear that they cannot feel at home here and – as it has been proven in the past – often do not attempt to adapt to Dutch conditions and norms. Naturalized Chinese do not see any objection to settling in the Netherlands, thereby causing damage, in particular, to the Dutch middle class. In the catering sector, the situation is currently so serious that in almost all major cities, more and more Dutch catering companies are being taken over by Chinese people with the aid of foreign capital. (Kamerstukken II, 1971/72, p. 2)

The alleged incompatibility between Chinese migrants and Dutch culture is reflective of earlier apprehension regarding groups such as Surinamese and Moluccan, as captured by the statement 'they cannot feel at home here.' The concern beforehand, however, aligned with either political and social incongruity, or failure to integrate successfully into the labor market. With naturalized Chinese, it takes on a new anxiety because Chinese migrants, according to the passage above, were outdoing Dutch natives in terms of economic success. The threat of successful Chinese catering companies looms large enough for the speakers to attribute a possible erosion of the Dutch middle class to them, a rather dramatic claim. The racism is rather heavy-handed here, though it does nuance racist sentiment in the Netherlands because it exemplifies how the discourse shifts to create new categories of racialized others. What naturalized Chinese migrants are most at fault for, here, is not knowing their place, for they 'do not see any objection to settling in the Netherlands.' This is a direct and – judging by the severity of the language – formidable threat because it might lead to the displacement of the white Dutch middle class. This is particularly uncomfortable, for it clashes with Dutch self-understanding, which is linked to being enterprising, frugal, and productive, informed by a long history of imperialistic expansion during which Amsterdam long enjoyed the status of a key player in international trade (Goldberg, 2010; Schor & Martina, 2018). This is further evinced when the power of foreign investment is alluded too, heightening the fears of Dutch parliamentarians of losing control. Here, the State is explicit in its role to safeguard the white Dutch middle class against the encroachment of unwelcome foreigners, even those who have Dutch citizenship. There is an explicit bordering between two citizenship categories, white Dutch middle class on the one hand and naturalized Chinese on the other, enacted by the State.

The incredulousness at naturalized Chinese migrants' assimilation into Dutch society is evocative of a pathology that Paul Gilroy (2006) has written about in regard to the emotions that arise during the aftershocks of loss of empire. The manifest form of racism in the quote above is xenophobic and anti-immigrant, locked in tightly with a form of nationalism that paves the way for claims of incompatibility with Dutch norms and culture. The mechanisms that allow for such thinking

depend on key psychologies discussed earlier: first, there is Mill's white ignorance and Wekker's innocence, which allow for a forgetting – an amnesia – of the particulars of the Dutch colonial context which created patterns of migration and mixing that obliterates the possibility of a uniform Dutch identity. Ignorance, in particular, supports the social democratic welfare state because it posits a type of neutrality whereby the starting point of the modern State is – to borrow from Gilroy – a convivial agreement between parties with equal footing (Mills, 2007; Gilroy, 2006). Gilroy (2006) adds to this mix denial, guilt, and shame, a toxic mix that compound forgetting colonialism with an aversion towards productive conversations about its legacy. He writes that it is these emotions - ignorance, denial, guilt, and shame – plus an inability to move past a loss of global preeminence (remember the fears of foreign capital stated above; this, coming from a former leader in global trade) that has developed into 'pathological features in... contemporary encounters with the strangers, the Others, the migrants who are now within Europe's borders, within the metropolitan communities,' (Gilroy, 2006, p. 2). Ultimately, these feelings generate a sort of melancholy at loss of empire, which cannot be healthily dealt with, so that the victims, at the end of the day, are the former colonizers, rather than the colonized (Gilroy, 2006). This is exemplified in the quote above: the Dutch middle class is victimized and thus requires protection from State as an abatement from encroaching outsiders.

By the 1970s an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist political climate created a sense of urgency for seeing through independence of the Caribbean territories. Paradoxically, though antiracist attitudes generally inspired this movement, notice how this concept of victimization unfolds. In a parliamentary paper, Surinamese were 'victims of Dutch nationality' who had been misled into believing that the Netherlands was an appropriate adoptive new (temporary) home:

> In short, it comes down to the fact that very many people from Suriname and the Antilles come to the Netherlands under the assumption that they will find paradise-like conditions. They receive no information about reality beforehand and are not or hardly received or supervised here. The disappointment comes quickly: housing, education, youth and employment problems. Cases of discrimination are also known. (Kamerstukken II, 1971/72, p. 1)

While on the one hand, parliamentarians could agree that discrimination towards Surinamese and Antillean was one factor that led to issues with employment and 'integration,' there was little the Dutch government was willing to take responsibility for when it came to widespread problems faced by the two groups. A PvdA member noted that 'the great social risk from the inflow of Surinamese and Antilleans – and indeed foreign workers as well – is...that there is an increasing resistance among 'the white Dutch,' though in the same discussion it was stated that 'the view that this [employment issues, IT] concerns ordinary Dutch people is untenable' (Kamerstukken II, 1971/72, p. 2).

At first read, the quote appears to acknowledge that Surinamese and Antilleans are the victims, coming to the Netherlands under false pretenses. Yet, it is resistance from 'white Dutch' that agitates the balance between coexisting groups, though it is quickly asserted that this has nothing to do with 'ordinary Dutch,' a rather remarkable statement, considering that it is their resistance being discussed. Like Moluccans, problems that Surinamese and Antilleans were encountering were regarded as largely self-inflicted or resulting from a lack of contact from their native homes, resulting in 'cultural isolation' (Jones, 2007). Therefore, responsibility for poor integration belongs largely to them. In this sense, they cannot be victims in this constellation, since it is not victims who should be held responsible for the conditions they find themselves in.

With Surinamese independence[7], determination of who was to keep Dutch citizenship and who was to acquire Surinamese citizenship was made through a 'place of birth' and 'place of residence criteria' (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk, 2013; Heijs, 1995). All those born in Suriname after November 25, 1975, would be granted Surinamese citizenship, with two exceptions: first generation Dutch citizens of European origin would retain Dutch citizenship and second-generation Dutch citizens of European origin could opt for Dutch citizenship though Dutch citizens of Surinamese or Asian origin were not given the ability to similarly acquire Dutch citizenship (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk, 2013). This resulted in the majority of white Dutch citizens either keeping or being able to opt into Dutch citizenship, while the majority of non-white were not (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk, 2013; Heijs, 1995).

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[7] The Dutch State did wish to see through Antillean independence, though this did not manifest. To this day, the Antillean islands – comprised of Bonaire, Curaçao, Sint Eustatius, Aruba, and Saba – remain a part of the Dutch Kingdom, though at differing levels of autonomy.

Part III

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> Hate gives identity. The nigger, the fag, the bitch illuminate the border, illuminate what we ostensibly are not, illuminate the Dream of being white, of being a Man – Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me*

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Contemporary Citizenships

Up until this point, this thesis has looked at the historical construction of citizenship within the Dutch State and analyzed the colonial logics which have shaped Dutch society. Now, I would like to bring the narrative firmly into the present to underscore that such logics have not died away. To connect the different historical contexts, it is necessary to look once again at the 1979 Ethnic Minorities Report, which identified areas of social life that are main sources of tension for minorities. The examples given in the report are 'the relationship between men and women, family relationships, the work ethic, eating habits, the attitudes of citizens towards the authorities, etc.', (Penninx, 1979, p. IX). I return to this line because there are remarkable parallels between it and today's *inburgeringsexamen*, the civic integration exam required by the State for some immigrants (often asylum seekers) seeking Dutch citizenship or an extended (non-temporary) residence permit. The exam was introduced in 2003 and consists of two parts: Knowledge of Dutch Society and Knowledge of Dutch Language (de Leeuw & van Wichelen, 2012). The exam is compulsory for those coming from outside an EU/EEA country, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, United States of America, Vatican City (Ministry of Justice and Security, n.d.).

The 'Knowledge of Dutch Society' section tests those wishing to integrate on various aspects of Dutch culture. Analysis of practice exams made available on the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science website (the online portal with information on acquiring Dutch citizenship), reveals what is required of a person to successfully participate in Dutch society, namely, appropriate demeanor towards authority figures, generally police, but also bosses and doctors; fluency in financial matters, such as buying or renting housing or requesting a small business loan; understanding of the political system and electoral procedures; and family relations, particularly appropriate forms of childcare and schooling (*inburgeringsexamen*). The exam is comprised of multiple-choice questions, each of which has a prompt in which a voice reads out loud a particular scenario, accompanied by a picture with characters of that scenario. Exam participants pick what they believe to be the most appropriate response in each scenario. They are given three possible answers and the answers generally are hypothetical verbal responses that a character in the scenario gives to another character. A copy of the exam can be found in Appendix 1.

The exam is not subtle in its messaging of what is required to successfully integrate and become a respectable Dutch citizen. The underlying messaging is that proper citizens are those who respect and listen to the police and other authority figures (questions 2-6, 27-29); are productive members of the workforce who participate in the economy by paying taxes, taking out loans for mortgages, or rent property (questions 7-10, 19-20, 30-32); they do not disturb peace and quiet (questions 21-23; confine political participation to electoral politics and membership to traditional parties (questions 17, 35-37); learn Dutch and behave appropriately with fellow Dutch in social situations (questions 1, 21); and rear children accordingly (questions 24-26). The assumption is that if one is able to conduct their social, political and work life along these principles, then one is prepared for a life as a Dutch citizen.

It is worth emphasizing that migrants from Western democracies are not required to take the exam, as exemplified by the above list of those exempt. The prevailing logic used to justify exemption for arrivals from the West come from countries that have similar social, economic and political climates and thus would not lead to 'undesirable immigration' or 'fundamental problems with integration' (de Leeuw & van Wichelen, 2012, p. 203). Such discriminatory behavior by the State defies both the 1969 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (de Leeuw & van Wichelen, 2012). This underscores Goldberg's thesis on the modern state project as an explicitly racial one: the fallacy of homogenization is supported, through the instruments of law and order, precisely because modern state formation arises out of racial restriction (Goldberg, 2002).

The everyday implications of such a state-led project is what Essed and Goldberg (2002) call 'cultural cloning...a process of control, of preservation, of (constructed) sameness *in view of maintaining privilege and status difference*' (Essed, 2005). Cultural cloning is a better metaphor for the integration exam than discourses focusing purely on exclusionary practice, since the exam goes further than gatekeeping; it adopts a stance whereby the State mandates a form of replication of its citizenry. Hence, the use of the term 'cloning': Essed and Goldberg illustrate that racial, gender, ethnic, religious, age, ability and other forms of discrimination are not just forms of othering, but are normative processes under which certain combinations become construed as the ideal. In the case of migration, the Dutch State privileges select groups of migrants over others to stay as close to this ideal as possible.

Characteristics typical of social democratic liberalism permeate the exam. For example, there is an underlying feminism, making clear that within Dutch society, there is a de facto understanding that men and women are on equal standing. This is made evident by the correct answers to scenarios, which reinforce this, albeit indirectly. To illustrate, the following scenarios appear on Version 1 sample test of the exam.

Question 17: Two women, Zara and Fatma are looking at a newspaper, which contains information about an upcoming election. Fatma asks Zara if she is going to vote, to which participants must choose the best possible answer: a) yes, or else I must pay a lot of money; b) yes, since then I can express my opinion; and c) no, because my husband always votes for me.

Question 32: Lisa and Ali are talking about an open cashier position at a supermarket. Lisa tells him she wants the job, but that a classmate, Pieter, wants it as well, and so she is worried she won't get the job. The responses for Ali over who will get the job are: a) Lisa, because working as a cashier is for women; b) Pieter, because boys are always more successful than women; and c) whomever can do the best work.

Question 33: Lisa no longer wishes to live with her parents. She tells her father, Ali, that when she turns 18, she will go live somewhere on her own. Th following possible responses from Ali are: a) when you're 18, you can go live somewhere on your own; b) a girl should live with her parents at home; and c) you can go live with your husband when you get married

Question 34: Lisa is about to receive her VMBO diploma. She tells her father, Ali, that next she would like to go to technical school. Ali can respond: a) if that's what you want, you should do it; b) technical school is not good for women; and c) no women attend technical school.

These scenarios demonstrate a strong women's rights discourse within Dutch society by emphasizing equality on the job market, a women's freedom to live independently of a husband and her family members, and the ability for women to speak their mind freely. It underscores an accepted premise that Dutch society can be characterized, foremost, as a community of equals. This is at the heart of what it means to be a Dutch citizen. Patricia Schor and Egbert Alejandro Martina elaborate on this notion in an essay titled *Claiming Greyness*, about political polarization within Dutch society. Schor and Martina (2018) contend that 'Dutchness' 'is the normative standard by which all are judged' and that this neglects uneven power balance between *autochtoon* (native Dutch or white) and *allochtoon* (foreigner, nonwhite, or of migrant background). Dutch society, rather than being neutral, egalitarian and fair, is 'a closely managed collective of subjects differentially imbued with power and authority and conferred (degrees of) citizenship' (Schor & Martina, 2018, p. 81).

What this narrative on a presumed egalitarianism does is silences the violent response when an individual is unable to conform to particular standards. It, too, neglects structural racism present within Dutch society. For example, the exam presents interactions with the police as one of polite and neutral exchange, where correct conduct by a civilian will be rewarded by equal treatment by

an officer. This disregards well-documented instances of harassment and arbitrary violence often directed towards migrants and people of color by Dutch police (Amnesty International, 2016). The exam, too, emphasizes participation in the labor market, where one's skills are the determiner for job placement and success depends upon qualifications. In reality, racial profiling is pervasive in Dutch society, as outlined by a 2013 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance Report affecting in particular those of Moroccan, Dutch and Antillean backgrounds (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2013). The report notes discriminatory attitudes manifested with regard to how candidates presented themselves at job interviews, religious characteristics such as wearing headscarves or having beards, and poor Dutch language skills (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2013). Further, the report notes that as of its writing, the State had scaled back programs to train employers in diversity management and sensitivity, despite recommendations in a prior ECRI report that more resources be allocated towards tackling this endemic issue (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2013). Structural racism such as profiling by police and workplace discrimination are instances of institutional violence, for they remove a person's ability to move safely in the streets without fear of harassment and to afford the basics of living such as housing, healthcare, food and clothing. Because such issues only affect the marginal, there is a general silencing of this particular narrative in favor of the narratives described above, that Dutch society is stable and egalitarian, equally accessible to those who must simply learn social and cultural mores. What this does is it covers up the violence of neocolonial ordering needed to sustain the imagined homogenous and just present.

The second section of the Dutch integration exam is Knowledge of Dutch Language. Acquisition of the Dutch language is meant to equalize, granting access to Dutch society and paving with way for more full participation (Vermeulen, 2004). In fact, the Netherlands pioneered the inclusion of language testing as a part of the integration process in the early 2000s, which was soon after replicated by other EU member-states, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria and Denmark (Horner, 2015). This falls in line with a general shift from integration to assimilation, and what some would argue is a break with multiculturalism (Schinkel, 2010) and a shift towards state-sponsored monoculturalism (Vermeulen, 2004). Language-testing is a mode of governance operationalized through policy, exemplifying the State's role in demarcating a sociopolitical order. This is not to ignore the practicalities of language acquisition generally; it is not possible (or productive) to argue against it, but probing assumptions that learning Dutch is an equalizing force can reveal, in particular, the link between exclusionary practices that are state-mandated and exclusionary practices that manifest in the everyday. To illustrate, I present three conversations I've had, occurring in the following order from December 2017, February 2019 and September 2018.

The first is from a Dutch friend who is telling me about a recent night out. He is with friends in a fast food place, when a girl joins the conversation, shortly after remarking that he speaks good Dutch. When I ask him if this happens often, he says yes. Presumably this is because he is of Turkish descent, eliciting the expectation that he is a foreigner unfamiliar with the language, rather than a member of the second-generation of his family born and raised in the Netherlands. The second story is from another friend, who is Syrian. We are sitting at the dinner table and he is talking about his attempt to speak Dutch with sales associates in shops. Upon hearing his accent, they nearly always switch to English, even when my friend persists in Dutch. What results is a conversation conducted entirely in English by them, and entirely in Dutch by him. This persists in instances when a second sales associate joins, during which the two will speak Dutch with one another, and switch to English with him. Throughout the conversation, my friend modulates between humor and exasperation, stating he can pass the Knowledge of Dutch Society part of the integration exam, but the difficulties posed by practicing Dutch in everyday scenarios means he is uncertain whether he can pass the language portion of the exam.

The final conversation is between me and a Syrian student of mine who I've met him through the English classes I give at a non-profit in Nijmegen. I've agreed to meet him outside of class to help him prepare for the International English Language Testing System (IELTS) exam, a standardized English language exam which he is required to pass so that he can apply for a master's program. We are practicing the spoken portion of the exam using practice materials taken from the IELTS website to replicate the exam environment. In this particular portion, the exam is set up as a two-way discussion between the examiner and participant. The participant is prompted with questions from a range of topics which the participant is expected to present an opinion on a topic. The topic in the prompt we are practicing is about family and marriage, with questions such as attitudes toward marriage and traditional gender roles in the participant's country of origin. In his answer to a prompt on traditional gender roles, my student explains that he believes marriage to be more important for women because they are more family oriented, and that young girls often grow up looking forward to the day they will marry. When he is finished answering, he asks me to answer the question as well, as a way to practice listening. I give my answer, explaining that I do not support traditional gender roles and that the importance of marriage to a person should not rely on gender, but that in the United States, the traditional family is still upheld and therefore dictates gender dynamics. When I am finished speaking, my student says that he agrees with me, but that his level of English does not allow him to express his true opinions on many of the topics presented in the exam.

The first story reflects the earlier stories I told of the othering process as it occurs in simple, everyday interactions. My friend's appearance betrays an otherness that is inconsistent with Dutchness. Remarkably, he has a strong regional accent, which, rather than clueing in that he is

from the Netherlands, is still overshadowed by how he looks. Fatima El-Tayeb (2011) writes of this form of exclusion as one that is particular to those with migrant backgrounds, or those who are 'frozen in the state of migration through the permanent designation of another, foreign national identity,' (p. xx).

The second story is not as straightforward: it can be interpreted as a form of gatekeeping, since the refusal to speak Dutch to someone who is competent enough in the language to carry out a transaction in the store establishes a boundary between native Dutch and foreigner. While on the one hand it might be benign – my friend remarks that this likely has to do with the fact that he believes many Dutch speakers like to speak English when given the chance – this is the same banality of Essed's everyday racism which makes it so difficult to pinpoint. My friend describes the apology that sometimes ensues – the sales associate finally registering that he has been speaking Dutch ('Ah, Nederlands? Sorry!), but in this moment, does the admittance help the situation? To what extent is something pure accident, something innocent, and to what extent does it reveal a person's blinders? Is it the incomprehensibility of my friend's accent, or the incomprehensibility that he could be proficient in the language? Vermeulen (2004) writes that language can be seen to '[reflect] and [produce] social differences that relate to power differences' (np.). This challenges the idea of language as either an equalizer or as producer of a sense of community.

The third story is more complicated. My student, in his answer about his culture and his opinion on gender roles defaults to a simplistic explanation, one that could be seen to reinforce stereotypes aimed, in particular, at Muslim asylum seekers. Because of his level of English, he is not able to fully express himself in a way that would do justice to the fact that he is a complex person with thoughts, feelings and beliefs that are multifaceted and dynamic. This would be one thing if I could believe that in a scenario with an examiner, upon hearing the same answer he gave to me, he would be given the benefit of the doubt, and that there would be a tacit understanding that the simplicity of his answer was a specific strategy of his to ensure he would pass the test. This is a survival strategy; the cost of the test at 231 euros is prohibitive, and failure means not being able to continue his education, inhibiting participation in Dutch society. Considering mainstream attitudes towards migrants, especially male Muslim migrants, I can only imagine scenarios in which this response compounds stereotypes, stereotypes that might lead to the implementation of an integration exam that tests whether a subsection of newcomers have illiberal attitudes, which render them undesirable.

The tropes associated with Muslims in Dutch society link up to the earlier racist discourse surrounding the previously discussed groups, such as Moluccans and Chinese. In contemporary Dutch society, the particulars of racist epithets directed towards Muslims are emblematic of a kind of neocolonial historicism that fits into a twenty-first century context. In comparison to the secular

and liberal white Dutch, Muslims – whether new arrivals or themselves Dutch – are relegated to an inferior status, which is informed by a belief that they universally adhere to an orthodox version of Islam that denigrates women, is intolerant of homosexuality, and otherwise extremist views, especially in regard to the West (El-Tayeb, 2011). This characterization allows for a positioning of white Dutch as tolerant and secular, and thus culturally at odds with Islam. A crucial feature is that identity construction in contrast to a Muslim other does not necessarily occur along the lines of race, religion or nation, but of culture and gender (El-Tayeb, 2011). This is one reason why anti-racist efforts often falls flat in the Dutch context: biological essentialism is not the lingua franca that undergirds this mode of whiteness. Rather, cultural superiority is implied and upheld through emancipatory feminist and gay rights discourses. The Muslim other is one who is unfit for Dutch society, much in the way that previous groups were 'too backwards' or 'Eastern-oriented.' This is the familiar historicist binary, which circumscribes the recognition of Muslims as full citizens.

This view is upheld at the institutional level, as shown above in the integration process, and reinforced socially. To exhibit, consider the following cartoon that appeared in *De Volkskrant*, a major newspaper that is politically centrist.

Doorbraak.eu

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The cartoon depicts a boat full of migrants approaching Amsterdam, that has been refused by Italy, Spain, Portugal, France and Belgium. There, they are greeted by a gay pride float, which is so shocking, they make an attempt at escape by throwing themselves overboard. For the migrants, swimming away from refuge is preferable to getting any nearer to the group of gay men. There is nothing subtle about the cartoon, which supports the narrative that refugees (who are largely Muslim and non-white) are homophobic. The image does not require further elaboration on this front, as it simply reinforces a widely-held stereotype. What is worth mentioning is the choice that the artist made to racialize the characters in the image, rather obscenely, so that the gay men in the float are not only all white but are also unique, drawn with features that are distinct from one another. The migrants, on the other hand, are a uniform mass of inhuman black shapes. To say that the migrants in this cartoon have been racialized is putting it lightly. Because the medium is a cartoon, this is meant to elicit laughter, a kind that positions those who might be offended at it as too serious and lacking a sense of humor. This discredits and delegitimizes the anger of those who would point out that such an image is a manifestation of racial exclusion, the aftermath of colonialism (Schor & Martina, 2018). Ultimately, not being able to engage in a meaningful way with the underlying messaging of the image and how it fits in with the greater social context is symptomatic of not having seen through a proper reconciliation process with colonial histories. Gilroy (2006) tells us that in his view, this has led to a situation in which racism is unable to be responded to in a political way, the de facto stance is rather denial because those implicated in racist exclusionary practices are 'deeply and acutely uncomfortable at what they discover about themselves in the process of seeing how deep their own feelings of hostility run,' (np.). Rather than face this discomfort, it is easy to externalize those feelings and direct them towards those deemed threatening. The Coates (2015) quote at the beginning of this section underscores just this: it can only be hatred and hostility that motivate exclusion, since it is these that 'illuminate the border, illuminate what we ostensibly are not' only to preserve, for some, 'the Dream of being white,' (p. 60).

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But all our phrasing – race relations, racial chasm, racial justice, racial profiling, white privilege, even white supremacy – serves to obscure that racism is a visceral experience, that it dislodges brains, blocks airways, rips muscles, extracts organs, cracks bones, breaks teeth. You must never look away from this. You must always remember that the sociology, the history, the economics, the graphs, the charts, the regressions all land, with great violence, upon the body – Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me*

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Conclusion

In 2006, during a parliamentary debate Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende urged 'Let us be optimistic. Let us say: The Netherlands can do it once more! That VOC mentality! Looking beyond borders! Dynamic! . . . Right?!' (Jordan, 2014). The 'VOC mentality' refers to the entrepreneurialism of the United East India Company (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* or VOC, in operation from 1602-1789) whose success on the world stage ushered in the Golden Age, when the Dutch empire was at its height. This was when the Dutch nation established itself as a leader in mercantile trade, earning its place in world history (Jordan, 2014). The fondness the Minister has in this moment for the VOC, going so far as to sentimentally call for a return to its spirit, blatantly disavows the epoch's entanglement with mass murder, rape, slavery and routine violence. In subsequent backlash, the Minister apologized, stating that he never intended to refer to colonialism and its violence (Kooiman, 2015). This is white innocence, the ability to claim good intentions on the one hand, while being able to afford ignorance of the meaning of his words. His defense reduces calling on the legacy of the VOC to a momentary slip of the tongue, something that should not be spoken of, so that the entire episode becomes accidental, rather than being something he should be held accountable for.

History tells us that the centuries marked by colonization should be referred to as centuries of discovery and exploration. The violence that accompanied was merely incidental, written out of the historical record. Mills (2007) describes the role of collective social memory in identity formation, writing 'if we need to understand collective memory, we also need to understand collective amnesia,' (p. 28-29). The collective amnesia Mills is referring to is the intentional forgetting and erasure of particular histories, reinforced by systematic silencing of voices and seeding distrust of testimonial from those who are not white (Mills, 2007). Collective amnesia keeps hidden the barbarism of the colonial project, in the same way that it keeps hidden the contemporary racisms which are its remnants. This is why, in the quote above, Coates implores his son, Samori, to remember that 'the sociology, the history, the economics, the graphs, the

charts' have a direct link to a visceral racism. Coates emulates the power of collective social memory, one that refuses to be obscured by either rhetoric or founding myths.

Bringing to fore the remnants of colonialism within contemporary Dutch society is deeply unsettling because it is a temporal rupture. The 'morally progressive, non-hierarchical, enlightened' democratic present is encroached upon by a savage past (Jones, 2016, p. 605.). This disruption is manifest in the appearance of postcolonial people whose bodies are subsequently politicized and policed. The 'other' is a haunting presence that shows the limitations of state, nation, and citizen, largely because it is only in relation to this 'other' that the self can be articulated (Butler, 1993; Dube, 2016). Without the 'other,' state, nation and citizen are empty signifiers. In this way, the Prime Minister's call to 'look beyond borders' is a contradiction, because it is precisely the act of bordering which gives shape to lived experience, primarily by serving as a way to identify one's place in the world. Looking beyond a border removes the contours for self-understanding, and it sabotages the State's ability to assert control over its population. Defining the racialized other is co-constituent with affirming a social order. Coates tells us that those imbued with this power to name others did so as a way to elevate their own status. There is a bitter irony in this, he writes, because it shows that the quest for whiteness is barbaric: 'For the men who needed to believe themselves white, the bodies were the key to a social club, and the right to break the bodies was the mark of civilization,' (Coates, 2015 p. 104). Césaire (2001), too, reflects on this irony but uses it to show how colonization 'decivilized the colonizer… to degrade him, to awaken him to buried instincts, to covetousness, violence, race hatred, and moral relativism (p. 2).

It seems quite extreme to euphemize modern citizenship with breaking bodies and race hatred. This has gotten me into trouble, quite a few times. It alienated my first advisor, has caused awkward moments with friends and family, led me to fail a paper (and nearly a class), and has certainly not elicited feelings of warmth towards me during conversations I've had now on both sides of the Atlantic. I understand why. 'Racist' is an incantation which yields a knee-jerk defensive. Coates remarks on this impulse, calling it 'the politics of personal exoneration,' an obsession, especially, of those who are white (Coates, 2015, p. 97). Rerouting the conversation to a focus on the State does not alleviate tension, especially when the State you are referring to is not your own. In a meeting with a professor I had after having failed the paper I submitted, the subject of which was a critique of deliberative democracy, I was told that I was too negative, that the paper left no room for optimism. 'If deliberative democracy does not work, what do you suggest?' I wanted to respond that I would need quite a bit more than 3,000 words to make my suggestion, but I did not, seeing that the conversation would go nowhere primarily because I refused to affirm his worldview.

I chose to use quotes from Ta-Nehisi Coates because his book, *Between the World and Me*, changed how I understood race and racism. It took something conceptual – whiteness – and linked it to the visceral experience of racism, so that I understand that whiteness is not incidental, but profits off the plunder of bodies. Acknowledging this refusing the comfort of a narrative of justice and democracy that is earned by goodwill and hard work, and above all, by being a law-abiding citizen. This belief is what Coates calls 'the Dream,' an allegory in his book that represents a refusal to see the workings of white supremacy. Adherence to the Dream even allows for 'passing acknowledgement of the bad old days, which, by the way, were not so bad as to have any ongoing effect on our present,' and letting it go means 'turning away from the brightly rendered version of your country as it has always declared itself and turning toward something murkier and unknown,' (Coates, 2015, p. 98).

Those who choose to acknowledge alternative histories of their states are rarely rewarded. Coates writes about institutional injustice within the United States, the prison system, police brutality, segregation, failed public schools. Here in the Netherlands, there, too, are those who speak of similar injustices. Activist Joke Kaviaar, a fellow member of Doorbraak, the organization I volunteered for, was recently jailed for two and a half months on charges of sedition for having written articles criticizing the Dutch State for its policies towards migrants and refugees. We have entered a remarkable time if the justice system in a country listed third in the 2018 World Press Freedom Index is able to incarcerate a private citizen for expressing her political views (Reporters without Borders, 2018). It is for this reason that there needs to be a continued examination of the Dutch political system and of the many manifestations of a repressive State apparatus. Only then can we begin to access true freedom and liberation, if not in body, then at least in mind.

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Practice Exam Version 1 – Kennis van de Nederlandse Maatschappij // Knowledge of Dutch Society

1.	Zara must ask the people what they would like to drink. Zara does not know if she should address them formally or informally (use formal 'you' or informal 'you' to address). What should Zara do?
	a) Ask Anne what she must say
	b) Do not say anything at all
	c) Use informal 'you' with everyone

2.	The director comes into the breakfast room. Zara has never met him before. What should Zara do?
	a) Offer the director a handshake and give her his name
	b) Continue working and wave to the director
	c) What until the director says something directly to her.

3.	Ms. van Dam is unkind to Zara. Zara is frightened by it. Zara has done nothing wrong. What should Zara do?

	a) Submit a complaint to the director.
	b) Get angry and refuse to give Ms. van Dam coffee.
	c) Stay calm and say to Ms. van Dam, 'I do not like this.'

| 4. | Mo saw an accident. A policeman asks Mo about the accident. He asks for Mo's ID.

What ID is best to show? |

	a) A credit card.
	b) A library card.
	c) His passport.

5. 	Mo sees an accident. Because of the accident, there are police. The police direct traffic. What must Mo do?

	a) Call 1-1-2
	b) Help the police.
	c) Do what the police say.

	Mo is near a traffic accident. A policeman asks for his driving license. The policeman notices his license is nearly expired.

What will the police say to Mo? |
6.	
	a) Go to city hall to renew your license.
	b) Use your wife's license as long as possible.
	c) Give us your license, then we will provide a new one.

7.	Jan and Hanna are thinking of buying an apartment. She wants to borrow money to buy the apartment. Why are they going to a real estate broker?
	a) A broker helps with moving to a new apartment.
	b) A broker helps with painting a new apartment.
	c) A broker helps with searching for and buying a new apartment.

8.	Jan and Hanna are thinking of buying an apartment. They therefore have to borrow money. Then they must pay interest every month. What other living costs will Jan and Hanna have to pay?
	a) The costs from energy.
	b) Rent.
	c) Travel costs.

9.	Jan and Hanna are thinking of buying an apartment. They are going to borrow money and must pay 500 Euro interest. Hanna thinks that's quite a lot. Jan says, but, we will not be paying it all ourselves. Why does Jan say that?
BELASTINGFORMULIER	a) A tax pays back part of the interest.
WONINGBOUW VERENIGING	b) You can ask for money from the housing association.
Huurtoeslag	c) You can apply for a housing allowance.

10.	Jan and Hanna want to buy a flat. They need to go to a notary. Why do they need to go to a notary?
	a) A notary must check all the papers.
	b) A notary must help with the search for an apartment.

	c) The notary has to give money to Jan and Hanna to buy the new flat.

11.	Emma is the daughter of Hanna. She is almost through with primary school. Now she will go to another school for older children. At which school can Hanna register her?
	a) The university.
	b) In the HBO.

	c) In secondary education.

12.	Lisa is the daughter of Ali and Zara. Lisa is 17 years old. She's currently at VMBO. In the following year, she will continue studying. In which school can she register?
	a) The university.
	b) At HBO.

	c) At MBO.

13.	Hanna has stomach pain. Jan wants to call a doctor for Hanna, but there is no available general practitioner on the weekend. Who is it best for Jan to call?
	a) A general practitioner.
	b) A specialist.

c)	c) The hospital.

14.	Hanna has stomach pain. Jan wants to call a doctor for Hanna, but there is no available general practitioner on the weekend. Who can give her a perscpription?
	a) A pharmacist.
	b) A GP.

	c) A dentist.

15.	Zara and Fatima are looking at the news. It is about the European Union. Fatima asks why is the Netherlands a member of the European Union? What can Zara best respond?
	a) Then all European armies work together.

b)	b) That is required of all European nations.
	c) It is good for the Dutch economy.

16.	Zara and Fatima are looking at the news. It is about the administration of the province Drenthe. Fatima asks, what does the administration there do? What can Zara respond best?

	a) They think of where to plan new housing.
BOUWVERORDENING	b) They make laws about building and renovating.
	c) They say whether you are allowed to build a house.

	Zara and Fatima are looking at the news. It is about the elections. Fatima asks Zara 'are you going to vote?' What can Zara best respond?
17.	

	a) Yes, or else I must pay a lot of money.
	b) Yes, so then I can give my opinion.
	c) No, my husband always votes for me.

	Zara and Fatima are looking at the news. It is about a flood in the province of Limburg. Fatima asks, where is Limburg?
18.	What can Zara best respond?

		a) In the middle of the Netherlands.
		b) In the north of the Netherlands.
		c) In the south of the Netherlands.

19.	Mo has written a business plan. In it is what he plans to sell and what he thinks he will earn. Why does Mo need this?
	a) To buy a store from the municipality.
	b) So he can borrow money from a bank.
	c) To register with the chamber of commerce.

20.	Mo wants to open his own store. Therefore he needs money. He tries to get money. What is best for Mo to do?
	a) Mo can borrow money from a bank.
	b) Mo can ask for money back from the tax authority.
	c) Mo can ask for a subsidy from the municipality.

21.	Hanna runs into Su. Su says, 'come by one time for coffee.' Hanna finds this nice. What is best for Hanna to do?
	a) Schedule a time when they can have coffee.
	b) Go to Su for coffee when Hanna has time.
	c) Wait until Su asks Hanna over for coffee one more time.

22.	Hanna and Jan's neighbor bought a dog. The dog barks the whole day. Hanna and Jan are going crazy from it. What is best for Hanna and Jan to do?
	a) Call the police.
	b) Complain to the housing association.
	c) Talk with the neighbor.

23.	Hanna and Jan are moving. Naturally, that makes a lot of noise. They are going to begin early. What is best for Hanna and Jan to do?
	a) As the movers to do everything very quietly.
	b) Nothing, the neighbors also make a lot of noise.
	c) Warn the neighbors in advance.

24.		Amel works until 6 oclock. She's looking for childcare for Ben and Bo. What is best for her to do?
		a) Bring Ben and Bo to a playroom.
		b) Request information from a nursery.
		c) Let Malika watch after he little brothers.

25.	Amel just had a third child. Therefore she does not have to work. Mo says, 'why don't you stay home a year?' What can Amel best respond?
365 dagen	a) I will return to work next year.
?	b) I will see how I feel.
12 weken	c) I have to work again after 12 weeks.

26.	Amel works a couple of days per week until 6 o'clock. She is not home when Malika's school is finished. Therefore, she is looking for childcare for Malika. Where can she ask to get the best information?
	a) At after school care.
	b) At a playroom.
	c) At a daycare.

|	
27.	Ali has a lot of trouble with headache. He has pain almost everyday. What can Ali do?
	a) Make an appointment with the GP.
	b) Make an appointment with the dentist.
	c) Make an appointment at the hospital.

 28.	Ali has a lot of trouble with headache. He goes to the doctor. The doctor says, you need to go to bed on time and take a painkiller when you have pain. Ali wants to go to a tea house tonight with his friends. What is best for Ali to do?
	a) He should stay home and go to bed early.
	b) He should go to the tea house with his friends.
	c) He should watch television until late in the night.

29.	Ali is coughing a lot. He wants cough syrup. He asks Zara to call the doctor. What can Zara best respond?
	a) We can buy cough syrup at the pharmacy.
	b) I first have to call insurance to ask for money.
	c) I will first ask the doctor for a prescription.

 30.	Jan is looking for work as an accountant. Jan has had four interviews. Each time he has not gotten the job. What is a good reason for a company **not** to give Jan a job?
	a) Jan is too old for the job as an accountant.
	b) Jan is not familiar with the company.
c) 	c) Jan does not have an accounting degree

31.	Jan must write application letters. Jan finds it difficult to do. What is best for Jan to do?
	a) Do a course on job applications letters.
	b) Write very many application letters.
	c) Have someone else write the letters for him.

32.	There is a position working as a cashier at the supermarket. Lisa tells Ali, 'I would like to work there.' Pieter, a boy in her class, also wants the job. Lisa is afraid she won't get the job. According to Ali, who will get the job?
	a) Lisa, because working as a cashier is for women; women
	b) Pieter, because boys are always more successful than
	c) Whomever can do the best work.

33.	Lisa no longer wants to live with her parents. Lisa says to Ali, when I'm 18, I will go live somewhere by myself. What can Ali best respond?
	a) when you're 18, you can go live somewhere on your ow
	b) A girl should live with her parents at home
	c) You can go live with your husband when you get married

| | This year, Lisa is finishing exams for VMBO. She is close to getting her diploma. Lisa then would like to complete a training. She tells Ali that she would like to do a technical training.

What can Ali best respond? |
|---|---|
| | a) If that's what you want, you should do it |
| | b) Technical school is not good for women |
| | c) No women attend technical school |

34.

35.		Mehmet reads a flyer from a political party. Mehmet asks Mo, 'What is the right to vote?' How can Mo best respond?
		a) Other people can vote for you.
		b) You can only vote in your own municipality.
		c) You can vote, but no one can choose you.

36.	Mehmet and Mo are talking about political elections in the Netherlands. Mehmet says, 'My neighbor is 18 and has lived in the Netherlands for 3 years. She cannot vote for the House of Representatives. Do you know why not?' What does Mo say?
	a) Only men 18 years and older can vote in the Netherlands.
	b) People must be at least 21 years old before they can vote in the Netherlands.
	c) She cannot vote because she does not have a Duth passport.

37.	Mo and Mehmet don't know which parties they can vote for. They are asking information about the parties. At the VVD booth, they ask 'What does this party find the most important?' What does the man from the VVD answer?
	a) We find Christian norms and values to be the most important.
	b) We find a clean environment to be the most important.
	c) We find a strong economy to be the most important.

38.	Zara and Ali are talking about naturalization. They want to ask more about naturalization. Where is it best for them to go?
	a) To the library.
	b) To the municipality.
	c) To the police.

39.	Zara and Ali are talking about naturalization. Naturalization has advantages and disadvantages. What is an advantage for Zara and Ali?
	a) They will get a new house.
	b) They will get higher salaries.
	c) They are allowed to participate in elections.

Appendix 2

Coding – Integration Exam, Knowledge of Dutch Society

Question	Category	Key Words
1	Authority	politeness, 'je of u', adressing people
2	Authority	politeness, boss, workplace, adressing people
3	Authority	politeness, boss, workplace, adressing people
4	Authority	police
5	Authority	police
6	Authority	police
7	Economy	buying/renting, housing, loans, banking
8	Economy	buying/renting, housing, loans, banking
9	Economy	buying/renting, housing, loans, banking
10	Economy	buying/renting, housing, loans, banking
11	Family	school, child care
12	Family	school, child care
13	Medical	doctor, correct procedure
14	Medical	doctor, correct procedure
15	Economy	European Union
16	Government	legal authority
17	Electoral politiccs	right to vote, feminism
18	Geography	Province
19	Economy	starting small business, loans, banking
20	Economy	starting small business, loans, banking
21	Social situation	politeness, neighbors
22	Social situation	politeness, neighbors
23	Social situation	politeness, neighbors
24	Family	childcare
25	Family	childcare, maternity leave
26	Family	childcare
27	Medical	doctor, correct procedure
28	Medical	doctor, authority
29	Medical	doctor, correct procedure
30	Economy	job seeking
31	Economy	job seeking
32	Economy	job seeking, feminism
33	Family	feminism
34	Family	feminism
35	Electoral politiccs	voting
36	Electoral politiccs	feminism
37	Electoral politiccs	political parties
38	Natuarliation	correct procedure
39	Natuarliation	correct procedure

Key

Authority	sitatuation with authority figures
Economy	banking, loans, renting, homeownership
Electoral politics	voting and elections
Family	childrearing and schooling
Feminsim	women's equality (implied)
Government	role, authority
Medical	dotor appointments
Naturalization	
Social situations	social interactions