# Class Voting in the 21st Century

## Class Influences on Economic and Cultural Ideological Positions and Vote Choice

Radboud Universiteit


Stan Hermsen

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Prof. Dr. C.T. van Ham
Nijmegen School of Management
Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

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## Abstract

Where class voting was once a given in many Western democracies, research at the end of the last century found that the working class increasingly voted less for parties on the left. A debate between scholars emerged on whether this phenomenon should be viewed as either dealignment or realignment. Following the funnel of causality, this thesis aims to find out to what extend class has an influence on the ideological position and vote choice of an individual. As politics has become two-dimensional, the ideological position on the economic and the cultural dimension has been studied. This has been done by using ESS data from 2002 till 2020 for nine European countries. The analyses showed that the importance of class in influencing the economic dimension has decreased over time. Contrary to expectations, the influence of class on the cultural dimensions is also decreasing, yet class continues to significantly impact vote choice. While traditional class voting has decreased, class remains a critical factor in the vote choice of individuals. Modern class voting depends on both the economic and cultural dimensions of politics and thus classes seem to have realigned along these dimensions, although or some classes the cultural dimension has become the most important.

**Key words:** class, class voting, economic dimension, cultural dimension, realignment

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# 1. Introduction

Research on voting choice in Western democracies after the Second World War, practically always highlighted the considerable influence the social positions of individuals had in voting for a certain party. Although other lines along which political conflict organises itself have also been important in predicting vote choice, such as religion, ethnicity and language, class stands out by being the most significant predictor (Alford, 1963, 1967; Rose, 1974; Inglehart, 1984). Despite the fact that this relationship between class and vote choice, known as *class voting*, was stronger in some countries than in others, it was present to some degree in every Western European country (Nieuwbeerta, 1995). These studies repeatedly found that the lower or working classes tended to vote more for leftist parties, while those from higher classes tended to vote more for rightist parties. As Lipset (1960, p. 223) put it: "*The most important single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower income groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher income groups vote mainly for the parties of the right.*" According to Campbell and colleagues (1960), class voting has been meticulously studied for multiple reasons, in addition to its significance as a predictor of vote choice. The first being that, unlike other social groupings, class includes the entire electorate in the analyses. Instead of focusing on a specific minority, class is relevant for every individual in the electorate, as they have a certain position in the class structure. Thereby, class voting has a social, economic, and political aspect. As class is a social grouping where different classes differ in their economic interests, which subsequently manifests itself in political conflict. This is something that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) also show with their cleavage theory. According to them, the industrial revolution caused a clear class divide, which has manifested itself in the party system. Although the party system of some countries consists of other cleavages, the class cleavage is present in all Western democracies.

However, in the 1980s and 1990s, researchers started to find a downward trend in class voting across almost all Western democracies (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin, 1992; Nieuwbeerta, 1995). These findings sparked a debate between scholars studying class voting. This debate reached its peak when Clark and Lipset (1991) published an article with the provoking title: "*Are social classes dying?"* This article argues that class is an outdated concept, as class hierarchies have declined. In politics, this means that class is becoming less and less relevant to explain vote choice. This argument relates to the *dealignment thesis*, which entails that the traditional ties and loyalties between classes and parties are decreasing. The main argument is that where there once was a situation of *stable alignments*, with the lower class mainly voting for the left and the higher class for the right, is this no longer the case. These alignments have decreased in a way that individuals base their vote choice more on specific issues than on loyalties towards parties (Dalton et al., 1984). As is usual with debates, not everyone agreed with the argument made. The most notable response came from Hout and colleagues (1993), claiming that it is shortsighted to completely disregard the concept of class. According to them, finding a decline in class voting was primarily a methodological problem, as the dichotomous distinction between classes on which most analyses were based is too simple and more complex techniques should be used to study class voting. However, even when using these new techniques and class schemes, scholars such as Nieuwbeerta (1995) and Knutsen (2006) still find a decline in class voting. In other words, the lower classes now vote less overwhelmingly for the left and the higher classes less overwhelmingly for the right.

Still, the debate on the state of class voting has not settled. According to Oesch (2008), this has two reasons. First of all, different scholars have different interpretations of class voting as a concept. Some scholars may see class voting only in terms of lower classes voting for the left, like Clark and Lipset (1991, 1993). Others, like Hout, Manza and Brooks (1993, 1995), understand class voting as a phenomenon in which there are systematic alignments between certain classes and certain political parties. Where the first type of scholar sees the decline of the alignments between the left and the lower classes as the decline of class voting, for the second type of scholar this is not proof that class voting is in decline, only that that specific alignment is becoming weaker. Secondly, Oesch (2008) argues that the inconclusive findings may also be the result of research not using the right class scheme in the right period. As the social stratification in Western Europe is changing, so should the class schemes used in research on class voting. A class scheme is a systematic categorization of individuals into classes based on their occupation. Although it may have been sufficient to use a manual versus non-manual labour distinction in the decades following the Second World War, the high industrialisation of the 1970s may call for a more complex class scheme, like the EGP-scheme, which can consist of eleven different classes. Nowadays, a class scheme constructed by Oesch (n.d.) himself might be more effective, as it distinguishes classes not only based on hierarchy, but also on the content of the activities. Some occupations involve more technical expertise, where others deal more with individuals' social demands, which may influence their political stances in different ways.

Although most scholars agree that class voting in the traditional sense is in decline, not all scholars subscribe to the dealignment thesis. In other words, that the lower classes do not exclusively vote for parties on the left and higher classes for parties on the right, does not have to mean that the relationship between class and vote choice is in decline altogether. Another possibility is that the class basis of parties has changed, which is called the *realignment thesis* (Hout et al., 1995). So instead of voting purely based on issue preference, a certain class may also have shifted their loyalties from one party to another. According to Oesch (2012), this is due to the emergence of a new cleavage, which simultaneously emerged with two new types of parties. In the 1970s, the New Left emerged when new issues came up that were not discussed by traditional parties on the left, as these issues were not distributional in nature (Bornschier, 2010b). These issues, like feminist and gay rights, gave rise to an opposition between progressive and conservative values. This was reinforced with the rise of radical right parties in the 1990s, which concentrated more on different conceptions of community, concerning issues about globalisation and migration. Where the New Left converged with the traditional leftist parties, the radical right and the centre-right did not. This led to three distinct party blocs, namely the left, centre-right and radical right, which are positioned along two dimensions, the traditional economic dimension and a newer cultural dimension. When the cultural dimension would become more important, it may be that the alignments between classes and political parties could also shift. This is something that Oesch and Rennwald (2018) have found evidence of. This could mean that class voting may still very well be alive, however not in the same form as before. This leads to the following research question:

*To what extent is class voting still relevant in Western democracies?*

Despite the discussion on the state of class voting discussed above, a question that still may arise is: why is it important to study class voting at all? The study of class voting holds both a scientific and societal relevance. Starting with the scientific relevancy, a first reason to study class voting is that class is, as a rule, not influenced by partisanship (Evans, 2017). Although it may technically be possible that a person is self-employed because of their rightist values, the causality is usually the other way around (Bartle, 1998). When compared to candidate evaluations, it may very well be that an individual has a positive attitude towards a candidate because of their partisanship, instead of the other way around. The second reason is closely related to this argument. As class is located at the back of the causal chain explaining vote choice, it usually also influences factors that are more proximate to vote choice, like issue and candidate evaluations. It may therefore explain why some candidates are hated by some, while being loved by others and why some individuals react very strongly to a change in unemployment, while others focus more on inflation. Third, class is one of the most stable factors influencing vote choice. For example, one can change their opinions on specific issues as frequently as they want, whereas their class does not change as often. Therefore, class is able to explain more long-term changes in electoral behaviour. When a certain class is a loyal base of a certain party, but due to societal changes the size of the class changes, it can be expected that the support for that party will also change. This is relevant, both scientifically and socially. By studying how demographic changes affect electoral success, researchers can find and explain patterns that are fundamental for political shifts. This helps them to gain a better understanding of vote choice and changes in party systems. With regards to the societal relevance, this can be primarily useful for political parties. If parties are aware of their demographic base, and specifically changes in their demographic base, they may tailor policies to attract specific demographics. In the case that the most loyal demographic decreases in size, that party may alter their policies to attract voters from other demographics. A last reason to study the influence of class on vote choice, primarily holds societal relevance. In instances where one desires a representative sample, a stratified sample is sometimes the best option. This is a sampling technique where the population is divided into certain strata based on certain characteristics, like class, which are then randomly sampled. If class influences vote choice, it would make a valuable stratum to include in the sampling process. This may be the case for deliberative forms of democracy, like mini-publics (Smith & Setälä, 2018) as well as opinion polls (Jagers et al., 1985), where they use stratified sampling to ensure a representative sample.

In the following chapters, an answer has been formulated to the research question. This has been done by first constructing a theoretical framework for understanding vote choice. Starting with a general causal model of vote choice, the framework is gradually refined, beginning with the role of class. This then leads to the formulation of specific hypotheses that are tested against empirical data. This data includes multiple European countries over multiple years, spanning from 2002 until 2020. Finally, the results of the analyses are discussed, leading to either support or refutation of the formulated hypotheses. Eventually, this provided a clear to an answer to the research question.

# 2. Theoretical framework: Class influence on vote choice

## 2.1 General explanations of vote choice

To be able to understand why (or why not) class voting happens, one would first need to understand the causal mechanisms explaining voting behaviour. As voting behaviour is a rather broad concept, as it can relate to turnout, vote choice, or political participation in general (Anderson, 2009), it is necessary to specify what aspect of voting behaviour will be studied. As class voting mainly concerns the relationship between class position and vote choice, this is the aspect of voting behaviour that will be studied. Additionally, it is important to make a distinction between the demand side and the supply side of politics. Political behaviour can be studied from the viewpoint of individual voters, the demand side, and from the perspective of existing political parties and institutions, the supply side (Rose, 2009). Although the two are often intertwined, this study will mainly focus on the demand side.

An important framework that organises multiple explanations of individual vote choice is the *Funnel of Causality*. The *Funnel of Causality* is a metaphor introduced by Campbell and colleagues (1960) in their seminal work called *The American Voter*. With this metaphor they describe a theoretical approach to be able to explain a single behaviour at a fixed point in time, in this case vote choice. Proximate influences on vote choice are thereby subject to causally prior forces. The axis of this funnel stands for a time dimension, where the mouth of the funnel represents the least proximate explanations and the stem of the funnel the most proximate explanations. This means that more proximate explanations of vote choice are a result of multiple prior causes, which in turn are responsible for multiple effects too. As you approach the dependent variable of vote choice, the funnel narrows as well as the focus of interest. For example, the personal evaluation of a presidential candidate, might be partly explained by loyalty to their party, which may be explained by socio-economic characteristics such as class. However, as Bartle (1998) points out, it is not always possible to rule out reciprocal causation. For example, social class is expected to be causally prior to ideological positions. It is however imaginable that, for instance, rightist values in the long run may lead to self-employment. Therefore, it is necessary to assume that causal arrows flow primarily in one direction. Goldberg (1966) transformed this theoretical framework of the funnel of causality into a more empirically testable causal model in which he included parental influences, sociological characteristics, party identification and partisan attitudes to explain vote choice. Later scholars such as Miller and Shanks (1982) also posited a causal model inspired by the funnel of causality, in which explanations can have direct influence on vote choice as well as indirect influence via more proximate explanations. In this model ideological predispositions may lead to policy preferences, which in turn may lead to performance evaluations and ultimately decide vote choice.




**Figure 1.** Causal model for vote choice

The Michigan tradition, under which the funnel of causality was introduced, centres on the concept of *party identification*. This holds that individuals have a prolonged emotional attachment towards one of the two parties, to the point that it becomes part of their identity (Bartle, 1998). While this may be an essential step to explain vote choice in a two-party system, it may be more troubling to apply to most (Western) European democracies, as the effective number of parties in those countries' party systems is (much) larger. For example, Bowler and colleagues (2018) show that the relative approval (the difference in approval between parties) is smaller between ideologically similar parties. Klingemann (1972) therefore suggested that it may be more logical to replace the concept of party identification with *left-right ideological positions* in a multiparty system, as it functions in a similar way. Van der Eijk and Franklin (2009) offer a causal chain of individual voting behaviour with this in mind. In their model, an individual's social characteristics (such as age, ethnicity, educational attainment and class) have an effect on voters' left-right identification, which has an effect on their policy preferences and leads to their party preference. This ultimately leads to a causal chain like Figure 1, where fixed personal characteristics affect stable socio-economic factors (like class), which affects an individual's ideological position, which has an effect on issue preferences and leads via candidate evaluations to vote choice. Studying the influence of class on vote choice thus means studying a the influence of a structural factor, that is located further back in the causal chain than the more proximate factors. Although this causal model lays the foundation of the relationship between class and vote choice, the exact mechanism is still unclear. To understand the mechanism behind this relationship, one needs to begin with cleavage theory.

**2.2 Traditional class voting**

Cleavage theory has played a prominent role in research on voting behaviour for decades. Introduced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), a cleavage is a type of political conflict along social or cultural divisions in society, that is rooted in historical processes. The two revolutions of the 19th century, namely the national and the industrial, have structured four cleavages in Europe, by aligning social groups and political parties. These cleavages then determine aggregate voting behaviour as well as the party system of a country. The national revolution gave rise to the *centre-periphery cleavage* along with the *church-state* or *religious cleavage*. Later, the industrial revolution produced two cleavages as well, namely the *sectoral* cleavage (also called the *urban-rural cleavage*) and lastly the *class* or *worker-owner cleavage*. In Europe, these four historical cleavages have structured politics in important ways, such as producing modern party systems. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) used the metaphor of "freezing" to describe this phenomenon. In their words: *"the party systems of the 1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s".* As different cleavages have structured the party systems of different countries, there happens to be one common denominator: the class cleavage (Bornschier, 2009). In the UK, the political system is mainly organised along this cleavage, with the Labour Party on the left and the Conservatives on the right. Most other European party systems, however, have overlapping cleavages. For example, the party system of the Netherlands can be characterized by being structured by the class cleavage as well as the religious cleavage. The class cleavage produced parties like the rightist VVD and the leftist PvdA, while the religious cleavage made it possible to vote for parties like the protestant ARP and the catholic KVP.

Focusing on the class cleavage in European politics enables us to simplify politics to a single economic dimension. The work of Downs (1957) has made a big contribution to this. He developed a spatial model in which voters and parties can be placed on a left-right dimension, based on one central question: "*how much government intervention in the economy should there be?"* (Downs, 1957, p. 116). The extreme left of this dimension represents full government control of the economy, whereas the extreme right of this dimension represents a fully free market, without government intervention. Downs (1957), however, was aware of the fact that this is unrealistic, as most parties have leftist as well as rightist standpoints and that right wing extremists can be libertarian, but can also be in favour of fascist control of the economy instead of a deregulated economy. Despite this, the simplicity of the left-right dimension makes it much easier to model voter behaviour and party strategy (Mair, 2009). In addition, it also has benefits for voters, as it can serve as a "shorthand" device to position political parties and themselves, and facilitate vote choice. The concept of left and right provides an abstract standard that is applicable to different contexts and periods, while parties may change over time (Mair, 2009). All in all, this offers voters a way to discuss politics, without having specialised knowledge of every subject. Empirical research shows that voters think of themselves and parties in terms of the left-right dimension and that this strongly affects vote choice (Dalton, Ferrell & McAllister, 2011). This framework assumes that voters behave rationally and vote for the party nearest to them on the left-right dimension. So when a voter positions themselves at 6 on a (ten-point) left-right dimension, with party A at 4 and Party B at 7, the voter would vote for party B. Generally speaking, leftist parties advocate for an active role of the government in the economy, implementing higher taxes, active redistribution of wealth and support for organizations like trade unions, whereas rightist parties oppose this and favour little government intervention in the free market (Evans, 1999). According to the logic of the spatial model, we should expect manual classes, such as (un)skilled and agricultural labourers to be generally leftist, as their interests align mostly with leftist parties. Conversely, employers may be more likely to vote rightist, as they have higher occupational security than the manual classes and have less interest in wage regulations for example. Although originally only encompassing economic topics, the left-right dimension over time became more ambiguous, as also cultural topics came to be categorized in the left-right dimension. The change in the meaning of left and right will be further elaborated upon in later sections.

Nieuwbeerta (1995) distinguishes three generations in research on class voting, with each using different class measurements and analytical techniques. The first generation of class voting research was characterized by using a simple class measurement. The most prominent scholar in this generation was Alford (1963), who divided social classes into a binary distinction between manual and non-manual occupations, which allowed him to make cross-national comparisons. Thereby, he used an index in which he measured class voting by taking the difference in percentage of support for the left between these two classes, which later became known as the *Alford Index*. The second generation of class voting research generally still used the binary distinction between manual and non-manual occupations, but used more complex techniques to predict the effects of class on vote choice, such as linear regression. The third generation of class voting research borrowed tools from research on social stratification and mobility. This meant that they used a more complex technique and a detailed and cross-nationally comparable class scheme. A prominent technique was the *Thomsen Index*, in which odds-ratios and log-odds-

ratios were used. The advantages of using the Thomsen Index over the Alford Index lie in its insensitivity to fluctuations in the overall support of parties. Scholars from this generation of research argued that the dichotomous class scheme previously used hid variations in the composition of these classes, which distorted the relationship between class and vote choice. The most prominent class scheme is one developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979) and is conveniently called the "EGP" class scheme. This class scheme consists of the following classes: higher-grade professionals, lower-grade professionals, routine non-manual workers, small proprietors with employees, small proprietors without employees, farmers and smallholders, supervisors of manual workers, skilled manual workers, unskilled manual workers and agricultural workers. The EGP class scheme is based upon the idea of dividing class positions into three distinct categories: employers who purchase the labour of others, workers that are self-employed and do not purchase the labour of others, nor sell their own labour, and employees who sell their labour (Zijdeman & Lambert, 2010). Thereby is this class scheme hierarchical in terms of prestige, which means that higher classes are more prestigious, be it due a higher skill-level or monetary reward for their work. The most extended version of the EGP class scheme consists of eleven classes, but it is also possible to narrow it down to seven, five, three and two classes. Due to an increase in the number classes, when compared to the binary distinction, the EGP class scheme could be used to examine class voting with more detail.

As previously explained, traditional class voting expects the lower classes to vote more leftist than higher classes. For decades, the empirical literature has shown this to be the case in practically all Western democracies (Alford, 1963; Franklin et al., 1992; Heath et al., 1995; Kemp, 1978; Korpi, 1983). That social class once was an important factor in individual and collective voting behaviour is beyond dispute. However, there is a lot of debate about the current state of class voting. Lipset (1981) and Inglehart (1984) already observed class voting to be in decline at the beginning of the 1980s. They observed that class was no longer an important base of voting behaviour, which has become known as the *class dealignment thesis* (Heath et al., 1995). An article that really sparked the debate about the relevance of class voting was written by Clark and Lipset (1991), titled *"Are Social Classes Dying?"*. In this article they argued that class is an increasingly dated concept. Their main argument is that societal changes, like rising education levels and an increase in the size of the middle class, caused the decline in hierarchy, which caused classes to become less salient and that resulted in the dealignment. Where there have been substantial societal changes since the concept of class emerged out of the writings of Marx and Weber, the concept itself has not changed that much. They argue that traditional hierarchies have declined, which has caused class to become less salient. With the help of the Alford index, they show that this also translates to politics, as class voting declines. Where the Alford index score for Sweden was around 50 at the start of the 1960s, it dropped to 30 in the 1980s. They found that this decline exists in multiple countries.

Although this dealignment was almost conventional knowledge at some point (Knutsen, 2009), this view has been challenged by other scholars. Manza and colleagues (1995) point out that it could as well be a misreading of the empirical evidence or an overestimation of the importance of these changes. In their review of the literature on class voting in the United States, they find more support for "trendless fluctuation" and in some cases even "realignment", than dealignment. With realignment they refer to a situation in which class voting still is prevalent, but

that the alignments between the classes and political parties has shifted. A further elaboration on realignment will be provided in the following section. They suggest that instead of using the manual/nonmanual dichotomy, the EGP class scheme should be used to better understand the relationship between class and voting behaviour. Heath and colleagues (1995) find similar results for class voting in the United Kingdom. When accounting for a more detailed class scheme and more complex techniques, they find no support for a decline in class voting. Instead of dealignment, they find trendless fluctuation.

The most extensive research on the state of class voting at the end of last century was carried out by Nieuwbeerta (1995). In his book he tries to settle the debate about the state of class voting, by using different class schemes and more complex techniques and applies them to twenty Western democracies. The countries in his analyses include seventeen European countries, two North American countries (Canada and the United States) and Australia. When using the manual/nonmanual dichotomy he finds that in most of the democratic countries class voting has indeed declined in the postwar period. There are, however, substantial differences between countries. Scandinavian countries appear to have experienced the biggest decline in class voting, followed by Germany and the United Kingdom, whereas the United States had a relatively small decline. In contrast, he finds that Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands did not experience a systematic decline in class voting. It is important to note that these countries also had different starting points, as the Scandinavian countries had higher levels of (manual/nonmanual) class voting, while the North American countries had lower levels. With regard to the different measurement methods, Nieuwbeerta (1995) finds that the Alford indices and Thomsen indices are heavily correlated with each other. When using a more detailed class scheme, like the EGP scheme, he finds similar results. Again the Scandinavian countries showed the biggest decline in class voting, but also had the highest starting point. However, when using the EGP scheme and more complex techniques, no trends are found in Switzerland and the United States, which shows that different class schemes can show somewhat different results. All in all, even though the current state of class voting has been subject to a heavy debate, the literature seems to show support for the class dealignment thesis. Which means that the traditional way of operationalizing class voting, that is when the lower classes vote for leftist parties, is in decline in most, if not all, Western democracies (Knutsen, 2009). Scholars seem to be mostly in agreement with this statement, as seen by the few to no studies that have been conducted on traditional class voting in the twenty-first century.

If traditional class voting is in decline, an exploration of the underlying reasons for such a decline becomes necessary. Because in the literature there still is some debate about the state of class voting, the explanations of this decline in traditional class voting are still fairly uncertain. In search for these explanations, a lot of factors have been put forward. The most comprehensive studies on the explanations of this decline have been carried out by Knutsen (2006) and Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999). These explanations can be divided into two categories, namely material and non-material interests of voters. Firstly, the explanations that have to do with the material interests of voters are income inequality, standard of living, intergenerational mobility and the union density in a country. However, it is important to note that this is merely a selection of the most important explanations according to these two studies and the list is therefore not exhaustive. The main

argument here is that these contextual factors influence to what extent a self-interested individual can win or lose by voting for a certain party.

The first factor that may have contributed to the decline of class voting is the difference in incomes within a country. The argument is that when the difference in incomes between classes is bigger, the classes are able to economically win or lose more by voting for a certain party (Alford, 1963). So for example, a high income difference between the classes gives the lower classes more incentive to vote for leftist parties. This would also mean that when the income inequality between classes decreases within a country it could cause the class voting to decline as well. Empirical research of Knutsen (2006) corroborates this hypothesis, as he finds a correlation between income inequality and class voting.

The same line of reasoning goes with the standard of living within a country. When the general standard of living is lower at a certain point in time, the lower classes are also expected to win more when voting in accordance with their economic interests, which leads them to vote for leftist parties. This leads to the expectation that when the standard of living is lower, class voting is likely to be higher. The literature confirms this hypothesis, as Knutsen (2006) as well as Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999) find evidence of this.

Another factor that may have had a contribution to the decline of class voting, is intergenerational mobility. As Lenski (1966) has pointed out, intergenerational mobility seems to dampen the degree of class hostility. The longer an individual belongs to a particular class, the more their behaviour tends to align with the economic interests associated with that class. As individuals get socialized in the class they originated, individuals in higher classes that originate from lower classes, are more likely to vote leftist and vice versa. This means that it is to be expected that a higher level of intergenerational mobility, leads to a lower level of class voting. However, Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999) found evidence pointing at the opposite effect.

The last factor that concerns the material interest of voters, is the union density in a country. As more manual workers become members of unions, chances are that leftist voting among them will also increase. The assumption is that unions help them crystallize their economic interests which leads them to vote more for leftist parties. Thereby, is it necessary to assume that the effect of union membership on leftist voting behaviour is bigger for the manual classes, as trade unions often specifically target manual workers. Which leads to the expectation that a higher union density, leads to more class voting and the other way around. This explanation has seen a lot of confirmation within empirical research, as Korpi (1983), Knutsen (2006) and Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999) have found a positive relationship between union density and class voting. Knutsen (2006) even finds union density to have had the strongest effect on class voting, as well as being the most consistent predictor.

Where material interest directly speak to the economic interest of individuals, non-material interest concern topics of identity. The most important factor that concerns the non-material interest of voters, is the proportion of manual workers in a country's population. As politicians seek to be or remain in office and voters vote according to their material interest, a rational politician will respond to changes in a country's class structure. That means that when the portion

of manual workers in a country decreases, the less leftist politicians will try to reach that part of the electorate, because focussing on their interests speaks to a smaller proportion of voters, which makes it less likely for them to win the election. (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999). Although Nieuwbeerta and Ultee do not find a significant effect, Knutsen (2006) overwhelmingly does so. He finds that in all eight of the countries analysed, the proportion of manual workers partly explains the decline of traditional class voting.

**2.3 Modern class voting**

In the previous section, the expectation was expressed that traditional class voting is in decline. Precisely, it is assumed that the class base of the leftist parties is no longer mainly rooted in the lower classes and vice versa. This expectation remains intact, regardless of the techniques and class schemes used. This decline points towards a change away from a period of stable alignments of voting behaviour in societies according to class cleavages. According to Dalton and colleagues (1984), there are two patterns of possible electoral change, that is *dealignment* and *realignment*. The first of the two, dealignment, is a period during which voters become more loosely attached to a political party, or in the framework of this thesis, ideological position. In the context of the causal model of Figure 1, this would mean that the link between class and ideological position has weakened, or even has ceased to exist. Political preferences then have become a matter of individual choice (Marks et al., 2020).

However, the second pattern of electoral change opposes this view. Where voters in dealignment lose attachment, realignment states that they gain new attachments. Realignment should therefore be seen as a shift of classes to different ideological positions (Dalton et al., 1984). As Manza and colleagues (1995) state, most research on traditional class voting and its trends assume that lower classes vote for leftist parties and higher classes for parties on the right. Any discrepancies in this relationship are automatically assumed to signify a decrease in class voting. This line of reasoning of traditional class voting research disregards the possibility that certain classes have shifted in their loyalties from one ideological position to another. This does not mean that dealignment never happened. As Key (1959) suggested, realignment can follow dealignment, since attachments need to be loosened to be able to shift to new attachments.

According to Manza and colleagues (1995, p. 152): *"A full understanding of the significance of class divisions for political outcomes requires considerations of class differences in voting, irrespective of which party a particular class lines up with"*. As a solution, Hout and colleagues (1995) have made a distinction between traditional class voting, which is outlined in the previous section, and total class voting. Total class voting contrasts with traditional class voting in two important ways. First, as class shapes partisan choice, it shapes voter turnout as well. It is therefore important to also include non-voting too, as differences in participation among classes may have consequences for public policy. Secondly, total class voting includes every type of relationship between classes and political parties and therefore does not assume a specific alignment between classes and parties. Although total class voting includes all types of relationships between class and political behaviour, there still can be certain expectations on how classes align themselves with certain political parties or ideological positions. In other words, total class voting may reveal support for the *realignment thesis*.

An often-mentioned cause of the decline in traditional class voting and the dealignment, that is not mentioned the previous section, could potentially explain a realignment towards what will be referred to as *modern class voting* from this point onward. This cause has been named differently among scholars, as it has been termed 'New Politics' (Knutsen, 2009), value change (Manza et al., 1995), changing political party dynamics (Clark et al., 1993) and changes in the social and ideological bases of political attitudes (Hout et al., 1995). All these different terms stress the same point, namely that political conflict in Western democracies has re-articulated along cultural lines (Bornschier, 2010b; Kriesi et al., 2012; Marks et al., 2020). This *cultural divide*, as Bornschier (2010a) calls it, can be attributed to the educational revolution of the 1960s and the process of globalisation of recent decades. The educational revolution has helped create this create this divide, as higher educated individuals are often socialised with universalistic values. The first signs of this cultural divide were shown in the late 1960s, as new political issues led to the emergence of parties such as Ecologist parties and prompted a transformation within several Social Democratic parties, collectively referred to as the New Left (Bornschier, 2010b). These new political issues, like gay rights, the right for abortion and recognition of minorities, created a new dimension of political conflict, cutting across the old economic left-right dimension. This first transformation produced an antagonism between culturally libertarian and traditionalist values. In the 1990s radical right parties emerged, both to challenge the New Left and to raise new issues, like immigration. This can be seen as the driving force behind the second transformation, where an opposition between universalistic and communitarian values arose. This created a divide that Bornschier (2010b) labels as libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian, where the New Left and the radical right are at opposites of this cultural spectrum. Bornschier (2010a) argues that the process of globalisation has had an indirect influence on the strengthening of the cultural divide, by weakening the old economic divide.

However, this does not mean that the cultural divide completely replaced the old cleavage. These new divides do not translate into the political system straightaway (Martin, 2000, as cited in Bornschier, 2009). As certain old, historical cleavages are frozen into party systems the established parties will try to prevent new parties from entering parliament, by responding to these new divides, within the realm of the old cleavages. This results in a party system where the new divides are cutting across the old cleavages, creating a two-dimensional sphere of political conflict (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). Although political conflict may be structured along two dimensions, this does not mean that the traditional cleavage has the same strength as the new divide. Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995) argue that there appears to be a zero-sum relationship between these dimensions. This means that the strength and relevance of the new cultural divide, is at the expense of the traditional economic cleavage. This gives reason to assume that the relevance and strength of the cultural divide is increasing relative to the economic cleavage. This leads to the firs two hypotheses, which read:

> **H1:** The relationship between class and an individual's position on the economic axis has become weaker over time.
> **H2:** The relationship between class and an individual's position on the cultural axis has become stronger over time.

About the existence of the cultural divide there is little to no debate (Bornschier, 2010b; Kriesi et al., 2012; Marks et al., 2020; Oesch, 2012). However, there is still no consensus on how the poles of this dimension should be named. Bornschier (2010b) labels these poles of the cultural divide as libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian. The distinction between libertarian and traditionalist concerns mainly issues regarding gay rights, abortion, alternative life-styles and the like, where the distinction between universalistic and communitarian mainly concerned individualistic or communitarian conceptions, like cultural diversity or the preservation of cultural traditions. Instead of this libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian distinction, Kriesi and colleagues (2012) label these poles as integration (or cosmopolitan) and demarcation (or nationalist). Integration or cosmopolitan stands for values related to a more 'open' society, like in terms of immigration and European integration. The opposite side of this dimension, the demarcation or nationalist side, opposes these values. In this study, the labelling of the poles of this cultural divide will be provided by Hooghe and colleagues (2002). They make a distinction between 'Green', 'Alternative', 'Libertarian' (GAL) and 'Traditionalist', 'Authoritarian', 'Nationalist' (TAN). This dimension contains multiple noneconomic issues, like ecological, lifestyle and communal issues (Marks et al., 2006). Where the GAL pole of the dimension prioritises issues like environmental protection, multiculturalism and social justice, the TAN pole is associated with issues like traditional values, national identity and immigration control. Although these three ways of labelling the poles of the cultural divide only have subtle differences, the GAL-TAN distinction encompasses the broadest range of cultural issues. Therefore, this description of the cultural divide will be used in the analyses, however due to the readability progressive will be used to describe the GAL pole and conservative will be used to describe the TAN pole from this point forward.

Oesch and Rennwald (2018) have argued that these two dimensions of political conflict have led to a tripolar political space. This tripolar political space is characterised by three party blocs, namely the left, the centre-right and the radical right. As previously explained, the economic dimension has separated the left from the centre-right. The more recent cultural dimension, however, separates these two party blocs from the new radical right. This leftist party bloc includes party families like the social democrats, communists, greens and the new left, which are united by being economically leftist and culturally progressive. Centre-right party families are the Christian democrats, conservatives and liberals, who are generally lean right on economic matters, while being progressive on certain issues and conservative on others. Lastly, the radical right includes right-wing populist parties, for whom socio-economic issues are of lesser importance and strongly oppose issues such as immigration, multiculturalism and European integration, making them conservative on these issues. The reason that the two dimensions of political conflict have not led to four party blocs, is because where the cultural divide split the right into two blocs, on the left it has led to a convergence between the mainstream social democrats and the newer greens on the progressive side of the cultural dimension (Kriesi et al., 2015).

In order for realignment to occur, there needs to be alignment. In other words, there has to be a certain attachment between classes and these political blocs. The previous section about traditional class voting already has established that class positions influence voters' attitudes on the economic dimension. However, it could be argued that attitudes on the cultural dimension

are also affected by one's class position. As Oesch and Rennwald (2018, p. 786) state: *"In their job, people not only make a living, but are also exposed to experiences of autonomy and control, and to a specific set of social interactions with superiors, colleagues, clients, patients or pupils"*. As a result, it becomes possible to predict the position of a particular class within the two-dimensional political space. When applying the same logic used in traditional class voting to modern class voting, namely that individuals tend to vote for the party that is ideologically the most proximate, one can also predict the class base of these three party blocs. In their study, Oesch and Rennwald (2018) identify three types of relationships that relate classes to these party blocs. Namely where a certain class is the *preserve* of one of these party blocs, where a traditional stronghold of one of the two traditional party blocs is contested by the radical right (*contested stronghold*) and where all three party blocs are in *open competition* for the same class. If, over time, classes are increasingly basing their vote choice for one of the three party blocs on the cultural dimension, instead of the economic one, the total class voting should not change. In other words, this realignment should not change the intensity of the relationship between class and vote choice, as individuals are just shifting their loyalties. This leads to the following hypothesis:

> **H3:** Due to the shift in loyalties based on the economic dimension to the cultural dimension, the relationship between class and vote choice has remained stable.

Class is a rather ambiguous concept and there has been quite some discussion on how to measure it (Knutsen, 2009). Before explaining the different types of measurements, it is valuable to be familiar with the historical roots of the concept "class". This concept can be traced back to two of the most prominent scholars in early social science, namely Karl Marx and Max Weber. Marx defined class by making a distinction between "producers" and a minority who control the means of production, the "non-producers" (Knutsen, 2009). Where Marx bases his class distinction on the relationships individuals have to the means of production, Weber puts more emphasis on the market in his class distinction. His notion of class is multi-dimensional, which means that a class position is dependent on multiple dimensions. So does he distinguish between "ownership" classes and "acquisition" classes, those who depend on their marketable skills. In contrast to Marx, this notion of class is not dichotomous, as individuals who possess no property but have high marketable skills may be seen as middle classes.

An alternative to the manual versus nonmanual distinction is the EGP class scheme. As seen in previous sections, the EGP class scheme only distinguishes between classes based on one dimension, namely hierarchical. However, Oesch developed a two-dimensional class scheme. These two dimensions are, as he calls it, vertical and horizontal. The vertical dimension is similar to distinction the EGP class scheme makes, as it distinguishes between more and less advantageous employment relationships (Oesch, 2006). More advantageous employment relationships include a higher level of job security, higher wages, more favourable benefits, among others. However, the horizontal dimension is what makes this class scheme unique and therefore deserves more explanation. With the horizontal dimension, Oesch (2006) distinguishes between four different work logics: independent work logic, technical work logic, organizational work logic and interpersonal service work logic. A work logic refers to differences in the nature of the occupations. For instance, where the interpersonal work logic requires social skills, the

organizational work logic requires coordination and control skills. These two dimensions together form eight classes, specifically: (1) *large employers and self-employed professionals,* (2) *small business owners*, (3) *technical professionals,* (4) *production workers,* (5) *managers*, (6) *clerks,* (7) *socio-cultural professionals* and (8) *service workers*. Table A2 in the appendix shows the eight classes, to what dimensions they belong and gives examples of occupations for each class.

The socio-cultural professionals are also expected to be a preserve, namely for the left (Oesch, 2018). Although their high level of skills and expertise, and their often relatively high wages may make one expect them to be rightist on the economic left-right dimension, As this class is mostly employed in the public sector, they are often wage earners without major managerial responsibilities and they have less market-liberal interests (Oesch, 2012). Socio-cultural professionals therefore are expected to favour a strong welfare state and income redistribution (Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015). Culturally, socio-cultural professionals are supposed to be the most progressive class. As their work involves many social interactions, they are expected to have a high tolerance for social and cultural diversity (Kriesi et al., 2012). This leads to the following hypotheses:

**H4a:** Socio-cultural professionals hold leftist economic stances
**H5a:** Socio-cultural professionals hold progressive cultural stances
**H6a:** Socio-cultural professionals vote disproportionately for the left

In contrast with the socio-cultural professionals, both managers and the large employers and the self-employed professionals do have major managerial responsibilities. This leads them to show considerable interest in free market capitalism and hold values more closely associated with the old middle class (Kriesi, 1998). As they can be seen as 'winners' of globalisation (Kriesi, 1998), they are also predicted to have culturally progressive stances, as their privileged position leads them to be relatively unfazed by globalisation, immigration and multiculturalism (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). As managers can be seen as delegates of large employers, they are predicted to have slightly less rightist stances as the large employers and the self-employed professionals. As they are also to a lesser degree winners of globalisation, they are also expected to be slightly less progressive. The most proximate political bloc on the political spectrum is therefore the centre-right, which leads to the following hypotheses:

**H4b:** Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals hold rightist economic stances
**H5b:** Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals hold progressive cultural stances
**H6b:** Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals vote disproportionally for the centre-right

As the sections on traditional class voting explained, the working class, in this class scheme the service and production workers, originally was a stronghold of the left. This was mainly according to the economic interests of this class. As the cultural dimension emerged, the radical right increasingly competes with the left for the vote of the service and production workers (Oesch, 2012). As they are vulnerable to, and even the losers of, processes such as globalization and immigration, they are expected to be culturally conservative (Kriesi et al., 1998). Consequently, on the political spectrum they are located between the left and the radical right, with the left representing their economic preferences, while the radical right represent their cultural preferences. However, it is important to note that, while being more conservative than progressive, service workers likely hold less conservative stances than production workers, due

to their interpersonal service work logic, which causes them to have many social interactions (Oesch, 2018). This leads to the following hypotheses:

**H4c:** Service and production workers hold leftist economic stances
**H5c:** Service and production workers hold conservative cultural stances
**H6c:** The vote of the service and production workers is divided between the left and the radical right

Where the radical right competes with the left for the vote of the service and production workers, they compete with the centre-right for the vote of the small business owners. The small business owners support more market-liberal policies, because they are pro-business and hence have rightist economic preferences, which traditionally led them to vote centre-right (Oesch, 2018). Culturally, however, they are more conservative. Along with the service and production workers, they can be seen as losers of globalisation as this led to a more skill-intensive and competitive economy (Kriesi et al., 2012; Oesch, 2012). Their cultural preferences are thus more in line with the radical right. This leads to the following hypotheses:

**H4d:** Small business owners hold rightist economic stances
**H5d:** Small business owners hold conservative cultural stances
**H6d:** The vote of the small business owners is divided between the centre-right and the radical right

Lastly, with regard to technical professionals and clerks, the prediction is that their location on the political spectrum is close to the median voter. This means that no single party bloc has a significant advantage over the others, which causes there to be an open competition for their vote between the three political blocs (Oesch, 2018). This implies that, ideologically, they are expected to be positioned at the centre of both the economic and cultural axis. However, as a result of their higher education and above-average wages, technical professionals are probably somewhat more rightist and progressive as clerks. This leads to the following hypotheses:

**H4e:** Technical professionals and clerks hold centrist economic stances
**H5e:** Technical professionals and clerks hold centrist cultural stances
**H6e:** The vote of the technical professionals and clerks is divided between the left, the centre-right and the radical right

# 3. Data and measurements

## 3.1 Data

To be able to carry out analyses to research the hypotheses put forward in last chapter, data from the European Social Survey (ESS ERIC, 2023) is used. Started in 2001, the European Social Survey (ESS) is a cross-national survey, that is being held every two years across 38 countries in Europe. This means that since the start of the ESS, there have been ten rounds, of which 15 countries have participated in every one of them. In each of these rounds, respondents from the age of fifteen are questioned in an hour-long face-to-face interview, answering over 200 questions in their own language. For every country, approximately 1.500 face-to-face interviews are conducted, which ensures a representative sample size that is sufficiently robust for analyses.

As the hypotheses point towards a change over time, the data that will be used consists of each of the rounds conducted by the ESS. As there are fifteen countries that have participated in each of the rounds, initially these were also the countries that would be subjected to the analyses. However, six of these fifteen countries had to be deleted from the dataset and have not been included in the analyses for various reasons that will be explained in the following sections. This left the following nine countries to be included in the analyses: Belgium, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This includes countries from all four major regions of Europe, namely Northern Europe (Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom), Eastern Europe (Poland and Slovenia), Southern Europe (Spain) and Western Europe (Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands). Nevertheless, countries from Northern and Western Europe are represented more than those from Eastern and Southern Europe. This causes the analyses to have a limited generalisability across Europe. Therefore, the results are only applicable to the countries in the analysis.

In order to minimize and possibly even prevent bias, the ESS (n.d.) applies multiple guidelines to their sampling process. First of all, their sample must be representative of all individuals from fifteen years old and older. This is done by using random probability sampling. To achieve a minimum effective sample size, the ESS aims to interview 1.500 individuals in countries with a population of more than two million. In countries with a population of less than two million, a minimum of 800 respondents is used. Another standard in the data collection is that the response rate target is 70%, which means that 70% of the respondents that has been approached has to have completed the survey. Additionally, the ESS applies standards in data collection to be able to validly compare between countries.

Although the data collection usually is based on face-to-face interviews, COVID-19 posed a big challenge. This made certain countries (Germany, Poland, Spain and Sweden) switch to self-completion surveys in the tenth round. This has two potential consequences (ESS ERIC, 2023). The first being that some respondents may have answered differently than they would have when being interviewed face-to-face. Secondly, the sample composition of the respondents in the self-completion survey may be different. Comparing countries that used face-to-face interviews and those who used self-completion surveys in round ten, should therefore be done with caution due to these two reasons.

In addition to the ESS, data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) has been used to classify vote choice for certain parties into vote choice for party blocs (Jolly et al., 2022). The CHES trend file includes six rounds, conducted in 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2019. Although most of the initial fifteen countries available in all of the rounds of the ESS were also available in the CHES trend file, Norway and Switzerland were not. This is why these countries have not been included in the analyses.

As the analyses mainly concern the relationship between class and vote choice, prior to conceptualising the variables, a pre-selection had to be made. This is to ensure that the sample is a good reflection of the target population, namely adults that voted in their last national election and are economically independent for their sustenance from their parents. Before the pre-selection the sample included 179.557 individuals. Both the EGP class scheme (Erickson & Goldthorpe, 1992) and the Oesch class scheme (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018) are mainly based on an individuals' occupation, which is also related to income and education, as their class socialisation happens at their occupation. This entails that students are part of their parents' social class and have not yet developed their own. Due to this reason 16.081 students have been eliminated from the analyses. Thereby, as the vote choice of an individual is one of the 3 dependent variables, individuals who were not eligible to vote in their last national election and those that did not vote were also deleted. This was the case for 43.763 individuals. Lastly, there still remained some individuals in the sample that were seventeen years or younger, these 63 individuals were also deleted, which resulted in a final sample of 129.157 individuals. After deleting the missing values, this total dropped to 102.499. The amount of individuals that were deleted due to them having missing values is large, but necessary to perform good analyses. In the following section the missing values will be explained per variable.

## 3.2 Measurements

### 3.2.1 Dependent variables

#### *3.2.1.1 Economic axis*

As there will be three different analyses conducted, there also happen to be three different dependent variables. More information on the nature of the analyses will be provided in later sections. The dependent variable of the first analysis is the economic left-right dimension. This variable is constructed by asking what the respondents thought about the following statement: "*The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels*". Respondents were able to answer on a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) '*Agree strongly*' to (5) '*Disagree strongly*'. Although the ESS also includes a variable that directly asks the respondent to place themselves on a left-right scale, as discussed in the theory section the terms left and right have been blurred by the increasing association (also) with the cultural dimension (Mair, 2009). Therefore the economic left-right axis, as Downs (1957) once meant it, can better be measured by asking a question about economic redistribution. To make this variable easier interpretable, it has been standardised by min-max standardisation. This created a scale from (0) left to (10) right. Although most respondents answered this statement, there were also respondents that refused to answer, did not know or did not answer for another reason. These respondents have been classified as having a missing value, which caused them to be deleted from the data. This included 1.417 respondents. The descriptive statistics of this variable are shown in Table 1.

#### *3.2.1.2 Cultural axis*

The second dependent variable, the cultural or GAL-TAN axis, was constructed by making a scale of three items. For the first item the following question was asked: "*… would you say that cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?"*. Respondents could answer on a scale from (0) '*Cultural life undermined* to (10) *'Cultural life enriched'*. This item has been reversed so that a higher score pointed toward more TAN attitudes. For the second item, the following question was asked: "*Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?"*. Respondents could answer from (0) *'Unification has already gone too far'* to (10) *'Unification should go further'*. This item has also been reversed, meaning that a higher score points toward a more TAN attitude. The last item that was used to construct this scale, asked how much they agreed with the following statement: "*Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish"*. Respondents could answer based on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) '*Strongly agree*' to (5) '*Strongly disagree*'. To make this item compatible with the first two, it was standardised using min-max standardisation, which resulted in a variable ranging from (0) '*Strongly agree*' to (10) '*Strongly disagree*'. Although from a theoretical standpoint these three items address the range of issues concerning the GAL-TAN divide very well (Marks et al., 2006), statistically the scale does not work as well. The item about the rights of homosexuals is very weakly correlated with the other two, as in both cases the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0,017. When constructing a scale of the three items, the Cronbach's Alpha, which shows the reliability of a scale, is 0,272. When the item about the rights of homosexuals is deleted, the Chronbach's Alpha increases to 0,459, signifying a more reliable scale. Based on theoretical grounds and operationalisations of others (Van der Brug & Spanje, 2009; Oesch, 2018), these three items were constructed into one variable. This was done by coding every item into the same scale, where a '0' denoted the GAL end of the axis and a '10' the TAN end of the axis and then taking the average. A respondent had to have at least a valid answer on two of the three items to be included in the scale. Those who had two or three missing values were treated as missings and deleted. This included 2.227 respondents. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for this variable.

#### *3.2.1.3 Vote choice*

The third and perhaps even most important dependent variable is vote choice. Vote choice was measured by asking the following question: "*Which party did you vote for in the [last national] election?"*. As individuals from various countries and different survey rounds also have different 'last national elections,' the answers were specific to each country and survey round. All these different political parties were then each categorised in one of three party blocs, namely the left, the centre-right or the radical right. The CHES (Jolly et al., 2022) data set was used to make this categorisation, as their trend file (1999-2019) almost overlaps entirely with the ten rounds of the ESS (2002-2022). As the CHES data categorises political parties in party families, these each had to be categorised in party blocs. This was done in a manner akin to the approach taken by Oesch and Rennwald (2018) in their study. The party families belonging to the left party bloc are the socialists, the radical left and the greens. The centre-right includes a higher number of party families, as the conservatives, the liberals, the Christian democrats, the confessionals and the agrarians belong to this party bloc. Finally, the party bloc of the radical right only concerns the party family with the same name. Although almost all parties could be categorised in these three

party blocs, not every party in the ESS data was also represented in the CHES trend file. As the two datasets do not overlap perfectly, newer parties in more recent elections were not available in the CHES trend file. To avoid missing values on individuals that voted for these parties, they have been categorised based on their European Parliament group. For the left, parties that were affiliated with the *S&D*, *Greens-EFA* or *GUE-NGL* have been included in this party bloc. The party bloc of the centre-right includes members of the groups: *EPP*, *Renew* and *ECR*. The European Parliament group belonging to the radical right party bloc is *ID*. This is not a waterproof method. Especially the ECR poses a problem, as at a certain point in time both the Dutch *ChristianUnion* (centre), as the *Dutch Forum for Democracy* (radical right), were affiliated with this European Parliament group. Nowadays, most members are conservative parties, which is why they have been classified as centre-right (ECR, n.d.). The regionalist party family also posed a problem, as their shared ideology has to do with their goal to increase the political power of certain regions. Examples may include the Flemish *N-VA* in Belgium and the Basque *BNG* in Spain. Although these political parties are both regionalists, they differ considerably from each other on the economic and cultural axis. To combat this issue, the same approach has been taken as with the newer parties. If they were affiliated with a European Parliament group, this was leading in their classification. Parties that were not affiliated, had to be deleted from the analyses. Furthermore, different countries posed different challenges. Firstly, citizens of Germany are able to cast two votes in their national elections, the first being for a regional candidate and the second being for a national list (German Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, 2023). For Germany the choice was made to include the second vote, that is for a national list, as 'personal' ties with a candidate play a lesser role in this vote than they may with the vote for a regional candidate. Secondly, especially Spain and Poland have a culture of coalitions on ballots. For example, in Spain a coalition of parties, named *Unidas Podemos*, participated in a couple of elections. Although not every party in this coalition was represented in the CHES trend file, the biggest parties were. For this reason, these coalitions were treated the same as their biggest parties. Ultimately, this formed the variable of vote choice, where every country had at least one radical right party in these years. Because Portugal and Ireland did not have a radical right party in one of the rounds of the ESS, they have not been included in the analyses. Although a lot of effort has been devoted to deleting as little parties as possible, this variable still has a large number of missing values, namely 19.954. These missing values come from these newer and regionalist parties that could not be classified in one of the three party blocs and from individuals that refused to answer the question. Table A1 in the appendix shows the political parties by country and party bloc and for the descriptive statistics of vote choice is referred to Table 1.

#### 3.2.2 Independent variable

The key independent variable that will be used in all three analyses is class. The class variable is constructed based on the 8-class Oesch scheme. The class scheme formulated by Oesch (2006) is based on two dimensions, which has also been discussed in the theory section, namely a vertical and horizontal one. The vertical dimension distinguishes between employment relationships of varying degrees of advantage. So does this dimension make a difference between production workers and technical professionals. The horizontal dimension distinguishes between multiple work logics. This refers to differences between occupations in (the potential for) labour division, the skill sets required and the nature of authority relation. In this dimension Oesch (2006) distinguished four different work logics, namely: independent work logic, technical work logic,

organizational work logic and interpersonal service work logic. This horizontal dimension is what distinguishes the Oesch class scheme from the EGP class scheme. As different work logics way cause classes to be positioned differently along the cultural and economic dimension, the Oesch class scheme is better fit for the analyses than the EGP class scheme. An overview of the eight different classes and their place on these two dimensions is shown in Table A2. This variable was constructed with help of the already available syntax made by Oesch (n.d.). The following questions were asked: "*What is/was the name or title of your main job?"*, *"In your main job are/were you…?"* and "*How many employees do/did you have?"*. The first and third questions were open questions, meaning that respondents could fill in their occupation and the number of employees they had without chosen categories. Their occupation was categorised in ISCO-88 classifications. On the second question, the respondents could answer with *'An employee', 'Self-employed'* or *'Working for your own family's business"*. Based on their occupation, employment relation and possible number of employees, the eight classes were constructed. If the respondent had a missing value on this variable, their class was substituted for the class of their partner, if they had one, which was constructed in the same way. This resulted in the following eight classes: '*Large employers and self-employed professionals', 'Small business owners', 'Technical (semi-)professionals', 'Production workers', '(Associate) managers', 'Clerks', 'Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals'* and '*Service workers'*. For France and Hungary it was not possible to construct a class variable, due to missing variables. Therefore, have these countries not been included in the analyses. Although some missing values were substituted with the class of their partner, there still ended up 6.068 missing values. These have been deleted from the analysis. The descriptive statistics of each class are shown in Table 1.

**3.2.3 Control variables**

Lastly, the analyses will also include several control variables. Incorporating these control variables in the analyses reduces the omitted variable bias and allows for a better estimation of the causal relationships. However, control variables should be picked out with care. Achen (2005) argues against blindly adding as many variables into the statistical model as possible, which is something he calls 'Garbage Can Regressions'. Instead of your models being more accurate after adding control variables, the opposite may be the case. Carelessly adding control variables could lead to overfitting and a lack of meaningful interpretation. Fortunately, the funnel of causation, specified in the theory section, provides sound options for control variables. As the goal of this study is to understand the relationship between class and vote choice, with class being one of the structural factors explaining vote choice and hence being further away in the causal chain from the outcome of interest, it is useful to control *only* for other structural, less proximate explanations for vote choice, which are in this case fixed personal characteristics. Controlling for more proximate causes of vote choice, like ideological and policy positions, can cause the effect of class to disappear.

The first control variable is age, which was calculated based on the following question: "… *in what year were you born?".* Originally the ages of the respondents ranged from 15 through 123. As the pre-selection already deleted the minors and coincidentally the individuals older than 102 from the analysis, the ages then ranged from 18 through 102. As the sample included no outliers, no extra action had to be taken. The respondents with missing values were all deleted, which concerned 784 respondents in total.

The second control variable is gender, which was administered by the interviewer. Because gender is a dichotomous and thus categorical variable, a dummy variable was made. With this dummy variable a score of (0) stands for a man and a score of (1) stands for a woman. There also happened to be 340 respondents with missing values, which were in turn deleted.

The third and last control variable that will be added to the analyses is the ethnicity of the respondent. This variable is constructed by asking three questions, namely: *"Were you born in [country]?"*, *"Was your father born in [country]?"* and *"Was you mother born in [country]?"*. This resulted in a variable with three categories, the first being someone that is from the ethnic majority. This means that both the respondents and both of their parents were born in the country where the interview was conducted. The second category is a first-generation migrant, which is someone that is not born in the country where the interview was conducted. The third category is a second-generation migrant, which is someone that is born in the country where the interview was conducted, but at least one of their parents was not. Thereby did this variable include 659 respondents with missing values, which were deleted from the analyses.

**Table 1.** Descriptive statistics

| | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Left-right position** | 0 | 10 | 3,085 | 2,588 | 127.740 |
| **GAL-TAN position** | 0 | 10 | 3,779 | 1,650 | 126.930 |
| **Vote choice** | | | | | 109.203 |
| Left | 0 | 1 | 0,420 | 0,494 | |
| Centre-right | 0 | 1 | 0,507 | 0,500 | |
| Radical right | 0 | 1 | 0,073 | 0,260 | |
| **Class** | | | | | 123.089 |
| Self-employed professionals and large employers | 0 | 1 | 0,031 | 0,173 | |
| Small business owners | 0 | 1 | 0,115 | 0,319 | |
| Technical professionals | 0 | 1 | 0,085 | 0,279 | |
| Production workers | 0 | 1 | 0,174 | 0,379 | |
| Managers | 0 | 1 | 0,183 | 0,386 | |
| Clerks | 0 | 1 | 0,105 | 0,306 | |
| Socio-cultural professionals | 0 | 1 | 0,142 | 0,349 | |
| Service workers | 0 | 1 | 0,166 | 0,372 | |
| **Gender** | | | | | 128.817 |
| Woman | 0 | 1 | 0,502 | 0,500 | |
| **Age** | 18 | 102 | 52,449 | 16,354 | 128.373 |
| **Ethnicity** | | | | | 128.498 |
| Ethnic majority | 0 | 1 | 0,887 | 0,317 | |
| First generation migrant | 0 | 1 | 0,061 | 0,248 | |
| Second generation migrant | 0 | 1 | 0,053 | 0,224 | |

Source: ESS1 (2002) - ESS10 (2022), N =102.499

Note: Descriptive statistics after removing missing values. The N in the column denotes the amount of valid cases before removing the missing values.

### 3.3 Methods

In order to test the hypotheses, three analyses will be performed, applying two different methods. The first two analyses will use the same method, namely a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. An OLS regression is a statistical method that can be used to determine the dependent variable and the independent variables. In a dataset with different datapoints, the OLS regression will find a line that minimizes the sum of the squared differences between the observed and predicted values (Field, 2017). This model can involve one independent variable, but also multiple. By including multiple independent variables in the model, a relationship between two variables is estimated while holding the other variables constant to gain an accurate picture of this relationship. The general regression equation looks as follows: $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 \ldots + \epsilon$. In this equation $Y$ stands for the dependent variable, where the $X$'s stand for the independent variables. Thereby does this model also include the intercept ($\beta_0$) and coefficients for the independent variables ($\beta_1$, $\beta_2$). The coefficients show the increase in the value of the dependent variable, when the value of the independent variable is increased by one. Lastly the error term ($\epsilon$) represents the variance in the dependent variable that is not being explained by the independent variables. Thereby is it also possible to include a interaction term in the model, which is created by multiplying the independent variable and the interaction variable. This standard equation can also be specified for the relationship between class and position on the economic dimension [1], as well as the relationship between class and position on the cultural dimension [2].

The last analysis will use a different statistical method, namely multinomial logistic regression analysis. This analysis can be used in a model where the dependent variable is categorical, which in the case of this analysis is vote choice. Instead of predicting a value of the dependent variable based on the independent variables, it estimates the probability of each category of the dependent variable based on the values of the independent variables. This also means that the equation of this model looks different than the OLS regression equation. The equation looks as follows: $P(Y) = 1/(1+e^{-(\beta 0 + \beta 1X1 + \beta 2X2)})$. In this equation, $P(Y)$ denotes the probability of Y occurring instead of the reference category, $e$ the base of natural logarithms and the rest of the equation is similar to the linear regression analysis. The only difference is that, instead of the coefficients ($\beta_1$ , $\beta_2$) denoting the increase of the dependent variable when the independent variable rises by one, the coefficients denote a change in the probability. Therefore, a positive coefficient represents that the probability of the dependent variable happening is higher that the reference category and vice versa. Again, it is possible to add a interaction term to the model by multiplying the independent variable with the interaction variable. This equation can also be specified, for the relationship between class and vote choice [3].

To be able to carry out the analyses mentioned in the previous sections, certain assumptions must be met (Field, 2017). The first assumption is the independence of observation. Initially, this assumption was violated due to the fact that the data consist of multiple waves and multiple countries. This causes individuals to be nested in their counties and in their year. This can cause downwardly biased standard errors, which may cause a type I error in which the null hypothesis

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[1] $Position\ economic\ axis = \beta_0+\beta_1(class) +\beta_2(year) + \beta_3(class * year) + \epsilon$.

[2] $Position\ cultural\ axis = \beta_0+\beta_1(class) +\beta_2(year) + \beta_3(class * year) + \epsilon$.

[3] $P(voting\ for\ radical\ right) = 1/(1+e^{-(\beta 0 + \beta 1(class) + \beta 2(year) + \beta 3(class*year))})$ as well as $P(voting\ for\ centre\text{-}right) = 1/(1+e^{-(\beta 0 + \beta 1(class) + \beta 2(year) + \beta 3(class*year))})$

is incorrectly rejected. In order to combat this problem, the groups in which the individuals are nested are controlled for in the analysis, also called the *fixed effects approach*. Another assumption which has to be met is linearity. In order to perform a linear regression, the independent variable has to have a linear relationship with the dependent variable (Field, 2017). Because the independent variable (class) in the analyses is a categorical variable, this is not a problem. The third assumption, is homoscedasticity. This entails that the variance of the independent variable does not depend on the dependent variable. If this is the case and a variable is heteroscedastic, it might lead to a type II error. This is a situation in which the null hypothesis is incorrectly accepted. This can be tested with help from the White Test. As the White Test detected heteroscedasticity, this assumption has been violated. To combat the problems caused by heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors will be used. Another assumption is that there should be no multicollinearity. When a correlation between two independent variables in the model is too strong, multicollinearity arises. Multicollinearity can cause multiple problems, such as untrustworthy coefficients, limiting the size of R and making it difficult to determine the importance of an individual predictor (Field, 2017). Multicollinearity can be spotted by looking at the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). When VIF-values are higher than ten, the assumption might be violated. Because this was not the case in any of these analyses, the assumption of multicollinearity was not violated. Lastly, there should be no outliers within variables, as these can influence the coefficients as well as the standard errors. As this only applies to continuous variables, only for the variable 'age' have the outliers been deleted.

# 4. Results

## 4.1 The economic dimension

The figure below shows the position of the classes on the economic axis, or in other words, their economic left-right position, over time. To accurately capture if a class has leftist or rightist stances, the axis has been standardized, meaning that mean position on the economic axis has a score of zero. When looking at the two working classes, the service and production workers, it is notable that they both hold leftist stances over the whole period examined. The other class that was expected to be on the left side of the spectrum, the socio-cultural professionals, seems to paint a more complex picture. Figure 2 shows that in 2002 the socio-cultural professionals seemed to be slightly rightist. Over time, they appeared to have become leftist. As the figure only shows descriptive statistics, no statements can be made about the significance of this change. The clerks, along with the technical professionals were expected to hold centrist economic stances, this only seems to be the case for the clerks. Although they tend to be more leftist they seem to be less distinctly leftist than the other leftist classes. Technical professionals however, are more on the right side of the spectrum, although seemingly becoming more centrist over the years. The small business owners, although being on the right side of the spectrum, are less pronounced rightist than the theory would expect. This is not the case for the remaining two classes. Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals seem to be the two most rightist classes, by some distance. Especially the large employers and self-employed professionals have shown to be the most rightist class, over all the years observed. Although Figure 2 provides a helpful insight into the position of the classes on the economic axis, there can be no conclusions drawn on the basis of this figure alone.




**Figure 2.** Position of classes along the economic axis, over years.
Note: The economic axis has been standardized, a negative score indicates leftism and a positive score indicates rightism, the mean position of the classes is noted between the brackets.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499

To be able to make statements about the position of a class over time and to be able to confirm or reject hypotheses one and four, the results of the regression analyses in Table 2 will be used. Model 1 in Table 2 shows the relationship of the classes with their position on the economic axis. As clerks were deemed to be the closest to the median voter, this class was used as reference category. A negative B coefficient indicates classes to be more leftist when compared to clerks and a positive B coefficient indicates classes to be more rightist when compared to clerks. This however does not mean that a positive B coefficient indicates that a class is located on the right side of the economic axis, as the clerks may not be located exactly at the mean.

Model 1 in Table 2 shows that two classes are significantly more leftist than clerks, namely the production workers and the service workers with B coefficients of -0,414 and -0,284 respectively. This indicates that, on a ten-point scale, production workers have, on average, a more leftist score of 0,414 than clerks. Again, socio-cultural professionals paint a more complex picture. Table 2 shows that socio-cultural professionals are only slightly but significantly more rightist than clerks, with a B coefficient of 0,064. Technical professionals and clerks were both expected to be located in the centre of the economic axis. However, Table 2 shows technical professionals to be significantly more rightist than clerks, as the B coefficient is 0,430. With a B coefficient of 0,463, the small business owners are significantly more rightist than clerks. The remaining two classes, managers and large employers and self-employed professionals, are indisputably positioned at the right side of the economic axis. With an B coefficient of 0,692 and 1,219 respectively, especially the large employers and self-employed professionals are fairly rightist when compared to clerks.

In order to observe a possible change in the relationship between class and an individual's position on the economic axis, interaction terms have been added to the analysis, visible in Model 2 of Table 2. It shows that the relationship between four classes, namely service workers, production workers, socio-cultural professionals and technical professionals, and their position on the economic axis has not changed over time compared to clerks, as the interaction term is insignificant. For small business owners Model 2 does show a change in the relationship over time. The significant and negative B coefficient denotes that their position over the years has become slightly more leftist. As their B coefficient pointed out that they are distinctly rightist, this small effect has little influence on their position on the economic axis. The same effect can be found with managers and large employers and self-employed professionals. Although their interaction term is bigger than the small business owners, they also were more distinctly rightist. Again, for these two classes there has not been a substantial change in their position on the economic axis over time.

Taken together, the descriptive statistics and both models allows to conclude whether the expectations raised in the theory section are supported by the results. However, for the first hypothesis it is important to look at the explanatory power the models hold and if this has changed over time. Both models in Table 2 have a $R^2$ of 0,077. This means that the variables in these models, explain 7,7% of the variance in position on the economic axis and thus has fairly limited explanatory power. This $R^2$ indicates the explanatory power of the model on average over the timespan in the sample. However, when looking at the change of the $R^2$ over time, a gradual but substantial change becomes apparent. As Table A3 (appendix) shows, where the $R^2$ was 0,107

(10,7%) in 2002 is has decreased to 0,068 (6,8%) in 2020. This decline indicates that the relationship between class and an individual's position on the economic axis has decreased, which supports the following hypothesis (**H1**) stated: "*The relationship between class and an individual's position on the economic axis has become weaker over time"*.

With regard to the class-specific hypotheses, the following conclusions can be drawn. The results have shown that the service workers and production workers hold leftist positions on the economic axis and that this has not changed over time. This means that the hypothesis (**H4c**): "*Service and production workers hold leftist economic stances"*, can be confirmed. The results for socio-cultural professionals are less clear. Although the results show socio-cultural professionals to be slightly more rightist than clerks, the descriptive statistics show that they have become more leftist over time. This is not visible in the interaction term, which shows no change over time. Therefore, the hypothesis (**H4a**): "*Socio-cultural professionals hold leftist economic stances"*, has to be rejected. Technical professionals and clerks were both expected to hold centrist economic stances. The results show technical professionals to be more rightist than clerks. Although both of these classes are near the centre of the axis, it is difficult to call them centrist. Therefore, as clerks seem to be more on the left and the technical professionals more on the right side of the axis and the distance between them is of a considerable amount, the hypothesis can be rejected. This hypothesis (**H4e**) stated: *"Technical professionals and clerks hold centrist economic stances"*. Small business owners are rightist, as shown in the results. Although this has become slightly less distinct as the interaction term shows, they still remain on the right of the economic axis. This leads to support for the following hypothesis (**H4d**): "*Small business owners hold rightist economic stances"*. The remaining two classes, managers and large employers and self-employed professionals, are indisputably positioned at the right side of the economic axis, as the results indicate. Similar to the small business owners, the interaction term of both classes show that over time they have moved slightly, but significantly, towards the centre. As this effect is relatively small, this does not change their position on the economic axis substantially. leads to the confirmation of the following hypothesis (**H4b**): "*Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals hold rightist economic stances"*.

Besides the relationship between classes and their position on the economic axis, Table 2 also shows other interesting insights. For example, it shows that older individuals become are more leftist on the economic axis when growing older. When age increases with one year, a person becomes 0,013 more leftist, on a ten point scale. Thereby are women also significantly more leftist than men, with a B coefficient of -0,336. First generation migrants are also slightly more leftist, while second generation migrants do not significantly differ from the ethnic majority . It also shows that individuals have become slightly more leftist over the years, with a B coefficient of -0,017.

**Table 2.** Regression analysis economic dimension

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Robust SE | B | Robust SE |
| **Constant** | 3,851*** | 0,044 | 3,781*** | 0,056 |
| **Independent variable** | | | | |
| Class (ref: clerks) | | | | |
| Production workers | -0,414*** | 0,030 | -0,402*** | 0,054 |
| Service workers | -0,284*** | 0,029 | -0,270*** | 0,055 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals | 0,064* | 0,031 | 0,310*** | 0,059 |
| Small business owners | 0,463*** | 0,034 | 0,474*** | 0,064 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals | 0,430*** | 0,037 | 0,596*** | 0,071 |
| (Associate) managers | 0,692*** | 0,031 | 0,746*** | 0,057 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals | 1,219*** | 0,057 | 1,425*** | 0,107 |
| **Moderation variables** | | | | |
| Production workers * year | | | -0,001 | 0,005 |
| Service workers * year | | | -0,001 | 0,005 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * year | | | -0,026 | 0,005 |
| Small business owners * year | | | -0,001*** | 0,006 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * year | | | -0,017 | 0,006 |
| (Associate) managers * year | | | -0,006** | 0,005 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * year | | | -0,022* | 0,010 |
| **Control variables** | | | | |
| Age | -0,013*** | 0,000 | -0,013*** | 0,000 |
| Woman | -0,336*** | 0,017 | -0,336*** | 0,017 |
| Ethnicity (ref: ethnic majority) | | | | |
| First generation migrant | -0,031*** | 0,036 | -0,033*** | 0,036 |
| Second generation migrant | -0,132 | 0,033 | -0,132 | 0,033 |
| Year | -0,017*** | 0,001 | -0,009* | 0,004 |
| Country (ref: Belgium) | | | | |
| Germany | 0,260*** | 0,031 | 0,263*** | 0,031 |
| Spain | -0,615*** | 0,035 | -0,613*** | 0,035 |
| Finland | -0,313*** | 0,034 | -0,312*** | 0,034 |
| United Kingdom | 0,625*** | 0,035 | 0,626*** | 0,035 |
| The Netherlands | 0,747*** | 0,035 | 0,744*** | 0,035 |
| Poland | -0,143*** | 0,038 | -0,143*** | 0,038 |
| Sweden | 0,230*** | 0,032 | 0,230*** | 0,032 |
| Slovenia | -0,891*** | 0,039 | -0,891*** | 0,039 |
| **$R^2$ Model** | **0,077** | | **0,077** | |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

### 4.2 The cultural dimension

Similar to the previous analysis, Figure 3 illustrates the position of the classes along the cultural axis, over time. Again, the axis has been standardized to capture if a class is more progressive or conservative than the average. The class that stands out most are the socio-cultural professionals. Although some fluctuation, this class seems to have remained progressive over the whole period. For the technical professionals, clerks, managers and service workers, the picture is less clear. Figure 2 shows that these classes fluctuate along the average over the whole period. Thereby are their average positions over the whole period close to zero, with -0,01 for the technical professionals, 0,01 for the clerks and managers and 0,02 for the service workers. The large employers and self-employed professionals seem to be slightly conservative, as they are over the years mainly located on the conservative side of the spectrum. The same is true for the production workers, although they seem more conservative. Lastly, the small business owners seemed conservative over almost the whole period and thereby the most distinctly conservative.


**Figure 3.** Position of classes along the cultural axis, over years.
Note: The cultural axis has been standardized, a negative score indicates progressivism and a positive score indicates conservatism, the mean position of the classes is noted between the brackets.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499

Because Figure 2 is somewhat hard to read, it is important to base any statements on Table 3. Model 1 in Table 3 indicates the relationship between class and an individual's position on the cultural, progressive-conservative, axis. Similar to the previous analysis, clerks have been used as reference category, as they were deemed to be the most centrist class. A negative B coefficient in Table 3 indicates progressivism, while a positive B coefficient indicates conservatism. In the same way as the previous analysis, negative B coefficient does not necessarily indicate that the class is progressive; it only means that the class is more progressive than the clerks. Like in Figure 3, the socio-cultural professionals also stand out in Table 3 for being distinctly progressive. Their significant B coefficient of -0,412 indicates that, on a ten point scale, socio-cultural professionals are 0,412 more progressive than clerks. With regard to the managers and large employers and self-employed professionals, the results are less in accordance with the expectation. The B coefficients in Model 1 of Table 3 do not differ significantly from the clerks and Figure 3 shows these classes to be located along the centre of the axis, these classes seem to hold centrist cultural stances. Along with Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals, technical professionals also do not differ significantly from clerks with regard to their position on the cultural axis. The service and production workers do differ significantly from clerks, as can be seen in Table 3. As both the service class and the production class have a positive B coefficient they are both more conservative than clerks. However, Table 3 also shows that the B coefficient for production workers (0,188) is considerably higher than that of service workers (0,068). The remaining class, the small business owners, have the highest positive and significant B coefficient (0,243) of all the classes. This shows that they are also the most conservative class, something which has also been established in the descriptive statistics.

The interaction terms in Model 2 of Table 3 show whether the position of the classes along the cultural axis has changed over time. So does the significant and negative interaction term for socio-cultural professionals show that they have become even more progressive over time. The interaction terms for managers and large employers and self-employed professionals show that

they too, have become slightly more progressive over time. The position of technical professionals, relative to clerks, does not change over time. The interaction term for production workers show that they are becoming slightly, but significantly more conservative over time, as their B coefficient is 0,016. This is not the case for service workers, as their interaction term is not significant. This interaction is also not significant for the small business owners, meaning that relative to the clerks, their position on the cultural axis has not changed over time.

The results from the descriptive statistics and both models of Table 3 allows to draw conclusions and confirm or refute hypotheses. However, first of all it is important to look at the explanatory power of these models. The $R^2$ of 0,068 indicates that only 6,8% of the variance in an individual's position on the cultural axis can be explained by the variables included in the model. This $R^2$ has changed over time, as displayed in Table A4 (appendix). While the expectation was that class is increasingly important in an individual's position on the cultural axis, the results show the opposite. Where the $R^2$ was 0,114 (11,4%) in 2002, it decreased to 0,057 (5,7%) in 2020. This change in $R^2$ is in contrast with the hypothesis which means that it has to refuted. The hypothesis (**H2**) stated: *"The relationship between class and an individual's position on the cultural axis has become stronger over time"*.

Other results have shown socio-cultural professionals to be distinctly progressive, which is even increasing over time. All this information allows the confirmation of the following hypothesis (**H5a**): "*Socio-cultural professionals hold progressive cultural stances"*. For managers and large employers and self-employed professionals the results were more ambiguous. The results showed that they hold conservative stances, but are becoming more progressive over time. As this is not the case yet, the hypothesis (**H5b**) has to be rejected. This stated: *"Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals hold progressive cultural stances"*. As technical professionals did not differ significantly from clerks, which also did not change over time, based on the descriptive statistics it is safe to say that they hold centrist stances. This means that the following hypothesis (**H5e**) finds support. It stated: "*Technical professionals and clerks hold centrist cultural stances"*. Although both the production and the service workers are more conservative than clerks, the latter class is only slightly so. Also, where the production workers have become more conservative over time, the service workers have not. As the average position of the service workers is also closer to the centre they might be considered centrist, while production workers are definitely conservative. This leads to partial support for the hypothesis (**H5c**): "*Service and production workers hold conservative cultural stances"*. The results show that small business owners are distinctly the most conservative class, which also did not change over time. Therefore, the results seem to support the hypothesis (**H5d**), stating: "*Small business owners hold conservative cultural stances"*.

The results also show noteworthy findings regarding the control variables. Firstly, Table 3 shows that older individuals are slightly more conservative than younger individuals. However, the effect is fairly small, as individual aged eighty, score 0,060 more conservative than individuals aged twenty. The results also show women to be significantly more progressive than men, with a B coefficient of -0,102. Both first and second generation migrants are also more progressive than individuals from the ethnic majority. Thereby does Table 3 show that individuals have become, on average, slightly more progressive over the years. The country dummies show only the United

Kingdom and the Netherlands to be more conservative than Belgium, while the other countries are more progressive.

**Table 3.** Regression analysis cultural dimension

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Robust SE | B | Robust SE |
| **Constant** | 3,955*** | 0,028 | 3,941*** | 0,036 |
| **Independent variable** | | | | |
| Class (ref: clerks) | | | | |
| Production workers | 0,188*** | 0,020 | 0,059 | 0,036 |
| Service workers | 0,068*** | 0,019 | 0,032 | 0,036 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals | -0,412*** | 0,020 | -0,288*** | 0,038 |
| Small business owners | 0,243*** | 0,022 | 0,298*** | 0,041 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals | 0,008 | 0,024 | 0,074 | 0,045 |
| (Associate) managers | 0,001 | 0,019 | 0,067 | 0,036 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals | 0,046 | 0,035 | 0,180** | 0,066 |
| **Moderation variables** | | | | |
| Production workers * year | | | 0,016*** | 0,003 |
| Service workers * year | | | 0,004 | 0,003 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * year | | | -0,013*** | 0,004 |
| Small business owners * year | | | -0,006 | 0,004 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * year | | | -0,007 | 0,004 |
| (Associate) managers * year | | | -0,007* | 0,003 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * year | | | -0,014* | 0,006 |
| **Control variables** | | | | |
| Age | 0,001*** | 0,000 | 0,001*** | 0,000 |
| Woman | -0,102*** | 0,011 | -0,101*** | 0,011 |
| Ethnicity (ref: ethnic majority) | | | | |
| First generation migrant | -0,298*** | 0,024 | -0,301*** | 0,024 |
| Second generation migrant | -0,240*** | 0,021 | -0,240*** | 0,021 |
| Year | -0,003*** | 0,001 | -0,001 | 0,003 |
| Country (ref: Belgium) | | | | |
| Germany | -0,150*** | 0,020 | -0,147*** | 0,020 |
| Spain | -0,671*** | 0,023 | -0,670*** | 0,023 |
| Finland | -0,510*** | 0,020 | -0,511*** | 0,020 |
| United Kingdom | 0,667*** | 0,022 | 0,668*** | 0,022 |
| The Netherlands | 0,122*** | 0,021 | 0,118*** | 0,021 |
| Poland | -0,578*** | 0,023 | -0,579*** | 0,023 |
| Sweden | -0,241*** | 0,020 | -0,241*** | 0,020 |
| Slovenia | -0,364*** | 0,025 | -0,364*** | 0,025 |
| **$R^2$ Model** | **0,068** | | **0,070** | |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

### 4.3 Vote choice

The figures below, display the vote share of the party blocs by social class. To get an impression of a possible change over time, Figure 4 displays the vote shares of party blocs by social class in 2002, while Figure 5 shows the same thing, but in 2020. These figures show if a certain class votes less or more than average for a certain party bloc. When a bar is to the left of the vertical line, which denotes the average, a class votes less than average for this party bloc, and vice versa. Firstly, as the horizontal axis shows, the vote share of the radical right has grown, while the vote share of the centre-right has decreased. It therefore important not to look at the percentages of the total votes of a certain class that went to a party bloc, but to look at the percentage relative to the average of all classes combined. Although there has been change between 2002 and 2020, for some classes the difference is relatively small. Socio-cultural professionals and service workers, for example, voted in 2002 less than average for the centre-right and more than average for the left. Where they differ from each other is in the support of the radical right, as service workers vote more than average for this party bloc and socio-cultural professionals less than average. They remained to do so in 2020. Although technical professionals were more distinctly in their absence

of voting for the radical right, the direction of the vote share remained the same. The same goes for small business owners and large employers and self-employed professionals, as they voted relatively little for the left and relatively more for the centre-right in both years. Where they differ from each other is in support for the radical right, as the small business owners vote more than average for this party bloc and large employers and self-employed professionals less than average. The classes that changed in their support, compared to average, are the clerks, managers and production workers. Although clerks voted similar to the average for the left and centre-right in both years, they used to vote more for the radical right than they do now. The same is the case for managers, although they still vote less than the average for the left and more than the average for the centre-right, their support for the radical right changed from more than average, to less than average. Lastly, although production workers voted more than average for the radical right and less than average for the centre-right in both years, their support for the left decreased from more to less than average between these years.




**Figure 4.** Vote share party blocs by social class in 2002 (in percentages)
Note: The axis cut each other at their overall electoral vote share (42,8% for the left, 53,5% for the centre-right and 3,7% for the radical right).
Source: ESS1 (2002), N = 10.240




**Figure 5.** Vote share party blocs by social class in 2020 (in percentages)
Note: The axis cut each other at their overall electoral vote share (42,5% for the left, 45,9 % for the centre-right and 11,6% for the radical right).
Source: ESS10 (2020), N = 12.878.

To determine if a certain class votes significantly more for a certain party bloc than another, a multinominal regression analysis is used. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 4. As already mentioned in last chapter, this analysis provides results that are more difficult to interpret than a regular linear regression analysis. As also explained in the methods section, instead of the B coefficient indicating how the dependent variable changes when the independent variable increases with one, it indicates a change in probability of the dependent variable happening instead of the reference category. Again, the reference category for class is clerks. The multinominal model also requires a reference category for the dependent variable, which is the left. The negative B coefficient in for production and service workers in Model 1 in Table 4 shows that they are less likely to vote for the centre-right than the left, when compared to clerks. For production workers is this effect stronger than for service workers as the B coefficient is larger, being -0,333 and -0,260 respectively. Thereby does Table 4 show that both of the working classes are more likely to vote for the radical right than the left, compared to clerks. The negative B coefficient for socio-cultural professionals for both the centre-right and radical right, shows that this class is more likely to vote for the left than for the centre-right and radical right, compared to clerks. Especially the B coefficient of the radical right is very high (-0,885), which means that they are way more likely to vote for the left than the radical right. In contrast with the socio-cultural professionals, small business owners are more likely to vote for the centre-right and radical right than the left, compared to clerks, as their B coefficients are 0,664 and 0,521 respectively. Although differing in the size of the effect, managers and large employers and self-employed professionals both are more likely to vote for the centre-right than the left, compared to clerks. Thereby, they are both also less likely to vote for the radical right than the left. The last two classes, the clerks and technical professionals, are the most complex of them all. Table 4 shows that technical professionals do not differ from clerks in their likelihood of choosing between the centre-right and left. As the intercept is positive, both classes seem to be slightly more likely to vote for the centre-right than for the left. Thereby are they both more likely to vote for the left than the radical right.

Furthermore, Table 4 includes interaction terms in Model 2, to detect if there have been changes over time in the relationship between the classes and party blocs. As visible in Model 2, the a positive and significant interaction term for production workers in the column of the centre right (0,010), shows that the relationship between this class and voting for the left instead of the centre-right, is decreasing. Because of the relatively small coefficient, production workers are still more likely to vote for the left than the centre-right. The production and service workers both have a positive interaction terms in the column of the radical right, which denotes that over time the relationship between these classes and voting for the left instead of radical right. In this case, this also means that over time they have become more likely to vote for the radical right than the left. The negative interaction terms for the socio-cultural professionals indicate that, over the years, they have become even more likely to vote for the left than the other two party blocs. The last significant interaction term indicates that, over time, small business owners have become even more likely to vote for the centre-right than the left, as it is the interaction term is negative (-0,013).

The descriptive statistics, combined with the two models from Table 4, give enough information to draw conclusions from the data. Firstly, Table A5 (appendix) displays the Nagelkerke $R^2$ over the years. Although its value was 0,193 in 2002 and 0,250 in 2020, it fluctuated much over time,

indicating no real trend. Thereby, do the values of the Nagelkerke $R^2$ show that class is a relatively important predictor of vote choice, as roughly 18% of the variance in vote choice for these three party blocs can be explained by the variables in Table 4. This explained variance was even 25% in 2020. This is all in accordance with the hypothesis (**H3**), which stated: "*Due to the shift in loyalties based on the economic dimension to the cultural dimension, the relationship between class and vote choice has remained stable*".

Additionality, the results also allow to either confirm or refute the class-specific hypotheses. The expectation was that the service and production workers would split their vote between the left and the radical right. Instead, the results show that these classes are more inclined to vote for the radical right. This effect is even increasing over time for the production workers. The hypothesis (**H6c**) therefore has to be refuted. This hypothesis stated: "*The vote of the service and production workers is divided between the left and the radical right*". For socio-cultural professionals, the results show that they are most likely to vote for one particular party bloc: the left. This is accordance with the expectation that this class mainly votes for the left, which means that there is support for the hypothesis (**H6a**). It stated: "*Socio-cultural professionals vote disproportionately for the left"*. The results show that the small business owners seem to be most likely to vote for the centre-right and the radical right, with the centre-right gaining even more ground compared to the left over time. This is in support with the expectation that they split their vote between the centre-right and the radical right. The hypothesis (**H6d**) stated: "*The vote of the small business owners is divided between the centre-right and the radical right*". The analyses displayed that managers and large employers and self-employed professionals are way more likely to vote for the centre-right than the left, and more likely for the left than the radical right. Combined with the figures, this aligns with the expectation. Therefore, the hypothesis (**H6b**) finds support in the analysis. This hypothesis stated: "*Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals vote disproportionally for the centre-right*" . Lastly, the results showed that clerks and technical professionals were most likely to vote for the centre-right, shortly followed by the left. As the expectation was that these classes split their votes between the three party blocs, it has to be rejected. The hypothesis (**H6e**) stated: "*The vote of the technical professionals and clerks is divided between the left, the centre-right and the radical right*".

Lastly, Table 4 also includes some control variables, which also show some insightful results. So is visible that when age increases, individuals are more likely to vote for the centre-right and less for the radical right compared to the left. Thereby, are women more likely to vote for the left than the centre-right and the radical right. The same effect, but stronger, can be found with first and second generation migrants, as they are most likely to vote for the left. Over the years, individuals have voted slightly more for the centre-right than the left and also more for the radical right than the left. All countries, except Slovenia, are more likely to vote for the left than the centre-right than Belgium. Thereby, are Germany, Spain, The United Kingdom, Sweden and Slovenia more likely to vote for the left than the radical right, compared to Belgium. The Netherlands and Poland are the only countries that are more likely to vote for the radical right than the left, compared to Belgium. With regard to either voting for the radical right or the left, Finland does not differ significantly from Belgium.

**Table 4.** Multinomial logistic regression analysis vote choice

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Centre-right B (SE) | Radical right B (SE) | Centre-right B (SE) | Radical right B (SE) |
| **Constant** | 0,285*** (0,038) | -2,212*** (0,078) | 0,279*** (0,048) | -2,007*** (0,111) |
| **Independent variable** | | | | |
| Class (ref: clerks) | | | | |
| Production workers | -0,333*** (0,027) | 0,359*** (0,054) | -0,414*** (0,048) | -0,147 (0,111) |
| Service workers | -0,260*** (0,026) | 0,172** (0,054) | -0,328*** (0,048) | -0,201 (0,117) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals | -0,216*** (0,027) | -0,885*** (0,066) | -0,097 (0,050) | -0,674*** (0,140) |
| Small business owners | 0,664*** (0,030) | 0,521*** (0,060) | 0,783*** (0,056) | 0,238 (0,129) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals | -0,022 (0,031) | -0,197** (0,066) | 0,050 (0,059) | -0,230 (0,147) |
| (Associate) managers | 0,255*** (0,026) | -0,341*** (0,058) | 0,223*** (0,48) | -0,155 (0,120 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals | 0,576*** (0,041) | -0,307** (0,111) | 0,686*** (0,084) | -0,599* (0,226) |
| **Moderation variables** | | | | |
| Production workers * year | | | 0,010* (0,005) | 0,049*** (0,009) |
| Service workers * year | | | 0,008 (0,005) | 0,035*** (0,010) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * year | | | -0,012** (0,005) | -0,019* (0,012) |
| Small business owners * year | | | -0,013* (0,005) | 0,024 (0,011) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * year | | | -0,007 (0,005) | 0,004 (0,012) |
| (Associate) managers * year | | | 0,003 (0,004) | -0,017 (0,010) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * year | | | -0,012 (0,008) | 0,024 (0,020) |
| **Control variables** | | | | |
| Age | 0,004*** (0,000) | -0,004*** (0,001) | 0,004*** (0,000) | -0,004*** (0,001) |
| Woman | -0,100*** (0,015) | -0,305*** (0,030) | -0,099*** (0,015) | -0,304*** (0,030) |
| Ethnicity (ref: ethnic majority) | | | | |
| First generation migrant | -0,437*** (0,030) | -0,651*** (0,075) | -0,440*** (0,030) | -0,661*** (0,075) |
| Second generation migrant | -0,307*** (0,028) | -0,407*** (0,063) | -0,307*** (0,028) | -0,408*** (0,063) |
| Year | 0,007*** (0,001) | 0,095*** (0,003) | 0,008 (0,004) | 0,076*** (0,008) |
| Country (ref: Belgium) | | | | |
| Germany | -0,753*** (0,026) | -1,254*** (0,058) | -0,752*** (0,026) | -1,247*** (0,059) |
| Spain | -0,748*** (0,030) | -1,886*** (0,088) | -0,748*** (0,030) | -1,889*** (0,089) |
| Finland | -0,179*** (0,029) | 0,080 (0,055) | -0,179*** (0,029) | 0,082 (0,056) |
| United Kingdom | -0,320*** (0,028) | -1,308*** (0,076) | -0,319*** (0,028) | -1,308*** (0,076) |
| The Netherlands | -0,102*** (0,028) | 0,328*** (0,054) | -0,101*** (0,028) | 0,319*** (0,054) |
| Poland | 0,741*** (0,039) | 2,493*** (0,054) | 0,744*** (0,039) | 2,509*** (0,054) |
| Sweden | -0,430*** (0,028) | -0,639*** (0,060) | -0,430*** (0,028) | -0,640*** (0,060) |
| Slovenia | 0,637*** (0,031) | -0,339*** (0,091) | 0,638*** (0,039) | -0,342*** (0,091) |
| **Nagelkerke $R^2$ Model** | **0,181** | | **0,182** | |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001, reference category = left.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

### 4.4 Robustness check

To ensure the robustness and validity of the findings in the previous paragraphs, a couple of robustness checks were conducted. These are meant to check if the drawn conclusions remain when altering the analyses somewhat. This is done in two different approaches. Firstly, as the measurement section also discusses, is the operationalization of the cultural axis somewhat troubled. One of the three items in that variable does not correlate much with the other two. Therefore, the first robustness check will involve the same analysis for the relationship between class and the cultural axis. The only difference is that the less correlating item has been excluded from the cultural axis variable. The results are shown in Figure A1 and Table A6 in the a ppendix. The descriptive statistics show a clearer picture. Namely, that production workers, service workers, small business owners and clerks are located at the conservative side of the cultural axis and the other classes on the progressive side of the axis. The same phenomenon can be seen in the linear regression analysis. The two working classes and the small business owners are significantly more conservative than the clerks and the socio-cultural professionals, technical professionals, managers and the large employers and self-employed professionals, more progressive than the clerks. This changes some of the conclusions on the hypotheses. The hypothesis (**H5a**): "*Socio-cultural professionals hold progressive cultural stances"*, was confirmed and is also confirmed by this analysis. The same can be said about the hypothesis on the small business owners (**H5d**), stating: "*Small business owners hold conservative cultural stances"*. This class was conservative in the first analysis and is it too in this one. Where the the hypothesis (**H5c**): "*Service and production workers hold conservative cultural stances"*, found partial support, it now can be confirmed, as the service class is also conservative. Where the previous analysis found Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals to be centrist, this analysis finds them to be progressive. This is in support with the hypothesis (**H5b**), stating: *"Managers and large employers and self-employed professionals hold progressive cultural stances"*. The hypothesis about technical professionals was confirmed, but this analysis finds contradicting results, as it finds that clerks are conservative and technical professionals progressive. This leads to a rejection of the following hypothesis (**H5e**): "*Technical professionals and clerks hold centrist cultural stances"*. Thereby, does Table A7 show that hypothesis **H1** still has to be rejected, as the $R^2$ decreases over time. This hypothesis stated: *"The relationship between class and an individual's position on the cultural axis has become stronger over time"*. All in all, the robustness check shows that most hypotheses can be confirmed, with exception of one.

Another robustness check that was performed, converted the 'year' variable into dummies. As this variable might not have a linear relationship with the dependent variables, it is important to verify if there might be a significant relationship between one of these years and the dependent variables. The results of these analyses are shown in Tables A8, A9 and A10 in the appendix. Besides the incidental significance of a single interaction term, these tables do not show substantially different results. For example, on the cultural dimension, the production workers were significantly more conservative in 2012, 2016, 2018 and 2020, which is in line with the interaction term shown in Table 3. This leads to the conclusion that the results with regard to the interaction effects are robust.

## 5. Conclusion and discussion

In this thesis, the contemporary relevance of class voting was studied. By assessing the literature, three analyses were executed to gain a clear picture of class voting in the 21st century. The funnel of causation showed that structural factors, like class, influence both the ideological position of individuals as well as vote choice. Therefore, this paper has analysed the influence of class on an individual's economic left-right position, as well as their cultural progressive-cultural position. The last analysis examined the relationship between class and vote choice. These analyses then also showed the total effect class has on these variables, which allowed to make general statements on the importance of class. Throughout these analyses, this paper was able to formulate an answer to the research question that was presented in the introduction. This research question was: *To what extent is class voting still relevant in Western democracies?*

The first expectations that were raised involved the general effect class has on the ideological position of an individual, broken down into two dimensions, an economic and a cultural one. It was expected that the effect of class on the economic dimension would have decreased, as the rise of the cultural division would slowly replace the economic cleavage (Bornschier, 2009; Kriesi & Duyvendak, 1995). This also meant that it was expected that the influence of class on the cultural dimension would increase. The results showed that the effect of class on the economic dimension indeed was decreasing. However, the results also showed that the same was happening for the effect of class on the cultural dimension, something that was not expected. Because of the expectation that the economic dimension would become less important and the cultural dimension would become more important, the effect of class on vote choice was expected to stay the same. The results indeed showed this to be the case. It thereby showed class to have a sizeable influence on vote choice, with 25% of the variance on vote choice being explained by class in 2020.

Thus, the results showed that class still influences vote choice. This seems to show that a certain level of class voting is still present in Western democracies. However, class voting does not look the same as it did in the periods after the Second World War. The traditional conception of class voting was that the working classes tended to vote for the left, where the higher classes tended to vote for the right (Alford, 1963; Franklin et al., 1992; Heath et al., 1995; Kemp, 1978; Korpi, 1983). At the end of last century, this traditional class voting turned out to be in decline (Clark and Lipset, 1991; Nieuwbeerta, 1995). However, that the particular alignment between these classes and these parties ceased to exist, does not have to entail that class voting as a whole stopped existing. Oesch and Rennwald (2018) showed that, using a different class scheme, there still were ties between classes and party blocs.

Based on these alignments, expectations were raised. The general expectation was that where classes tended to vote based on their economic stances, the emergence of the cultural dimension would play an increasingly larger role in the vote choice of classes. Socio-cultural professionals were expected to hold leftist and progressive stances, which lead them to primarily vote for the left. This was also found during the analysis. Thereby, it was expected that managers and large employers and self-employed professionals were located on the right side of the economic dimension and on the progressive side of the cultural dimension, which lead them to disproportionately vote for the centre-right. Although the position of this class on the cultural

dimension was somewhat complex, this expectation was mostly supported by the results. The two working classes, namely the production and service workers, were expected to hold leftist economic and conservative cultural stances, which would lead them to split their vote between the radical right and the left. Although it was found that they indeed were located on the left and the conservative side, over time their vote went primarily to the radical right, where in the beginning their vote went also to the left. This shift from left to radical right displays the realignment pattern the clearest, as the cultural position of this class seems to have the most influence on their vote choice. Small business owners were also expected to divide their vote, in this case between the centre-right and radical right. This was based on their leftist economic stance and their conservative cultural stance. The results showed precisely this happening. The last two classes, the technical professionals and clerks, were expected to be centrist on both dimensions, and thus they were expected to split their vote between the three party blocs. These two classes painted a more complex picture. Where the technical professionals were found to be on the right, the clerks were found to be on the left side of the economic dimension. Also their position on the cultural dimension was not clear, as the robustness check showed different results than the primary analysis. With regard to vote choice, they primarily vote for the centre-right and the left, which is also in contrast with the expectation. Although this particular class is harder to allocate to a specific ideological position and party blocs, most expectation turned out to be in accordance with the results.

All in all, the results show that although the effect of class on both the economic ideological position and the cultural ideological position has decreased the effect of class on vote choice still remains substantial. Discovering that class still is a highly relevant is a valuable finding for those who use stratified sampling, such as organisers of opinion polls or mini-publics. Thereby can the finding that certain classes have shifted their loyalties from one party bloc to another, give valuable insights for political parties. For example, for parties on the left, the shift from the working classes to the radical right shows that they can either focus their policies on the socio-cultural professionals, or take more conservative stances which appeal more to the working classes. In the case of centre-right parties, the same applies to the small business owners.

Although this thesis provided valuable insights in the current state of class voting, it is not without its limitations. The first being the countries that were included in the analyses. As the sample only includes Germany, Spain, Finland, The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Slovenia, it is overrepresented by Northwestern European countries. This means that the results cannot be generalised beyond these countries to all European democracies, or to all Western democracies as a whole. Moreover, as the analyses included country-fixed effects, it is not clear in what countries modern class voting is more present than in others. It could be interesting to know which contextual factors contribute to the extent of modern class voting in each country, something which is not possible on the basis of these analyses.

Secondly, the construction of the cultural axis could be given more attention. The robustness check shows different results than the primary analysis, suggesting that there might be issues in how the cultural axis was constructed. This discrepancy could indicate that the item about the rights of homosexuals does not accurately capture the differing opinions between conservatives and progressives. Therefore, it could be helpful to study how to accurately capture this specific dimension of political conflict.

Although this thesis gave valuable insights into the current state of class voting, it also raised new questions. As such, proposing recommendations for future studies is an essential first step. Firstly, as class has been established as an important factor in influencing vote choice, it would be interesting to see how it holds up compared to other factors that have a similar place in the funnel of causation. Social characteristics other than class may include educational attainment, income, religiosity and ethnicity. As class explains about a quarter of the variance in vote choice, there is still quite some room left for other factors to also have a substantial influence on vote choice. Only when comparing the effects of these social characteristics on vote choice, can one really establish the importance class has in influencing vote choice.

Thereby, the analyses show that class has quite a small influence on the position of individuals on both the economic and cultural dimension. This becomes even more apparent when compared to the influence class has on vote choice, which is substantially bigger. The funnel of causation expects class to have a direct influence on vote choice, but also an indirect effect via the ideological position of a person. As mentioned before, the results show that the effect of class on an individual's ideological position is considerably smaller than the effect of class on vote choice. As it is important to understand the mechanism behind a relationship, mechanisms that do not involve the ideological position of an individual should also be considered. A possible mechanism that could explain the relationship between class and vote choice could involve identity rather than rational choice. As Bornschier and colleagues (2021) show that an individual's objective socio-economic characteristics relate to specific identities, which in turn can influence their vote choice. Delving into the role of identities in class voting should be the next step in gaining a more complete picture of modern class voting. In conclusion, although this paper already showed the contours of class voting in the 21st century, further research is necessary to deepen the understanding of its nuances.

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## Appendix

**Table A1.** Parties by country and party bloc

| Country | Party bloc | Abbreviation | Full party name | English translation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Belgium** | ***Radical right*** | FN | Front National | *National Front* |
| | | VB | Vlaams Blok; Vlaams Belang | *Flemish Bloc; Flemish Interest* |
| | ***Centre-right*** | CVP; CD&V | Christelijke Volkspartij; Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams | *Christian People's Party; Christian Democratic & Flemish* |
| | | MCC | Mouvement des Citoyens pour le Changement | *Citizens' Movement for Change* |
| | | PP | Parti Populaire | *People's Party* |
| | | PRL; MR | Parti Réformateur Libéral; Mouvement Réformateur | *Liberal Reformist Party; Reformist Movement* |
| | | PSC; CDH | Parti Social Chrétien; Centre Démocrate Humaniste | *Christian Social Party; Humanist Democratic Centre* |
| | | SLP; Spirit | Sociaal-Liberale Partij; Spirit | *Social-Liberal Party; Spirit* |
| | | VLD | Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten | *Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats* |
| | | VU; NVA | Volksunie; Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie | *People's Union; New Flemish Alliance* |
| | ***Left*** | AGALEV; Groen | Agalev; Groen! | *Agalec; Green!* |
| | | ECOLO | Ecolo | *Ecolo* |
| | | PS | Parti Socialiste | *Socialist Party* |
| | | PVDA; PVDA-PTB | Partij van de Arbeid van België; Parti du Travail de Belgique | *Workers' Party of Belgium* |
| | | SP; SPA | Socialistische Partij; Socialistische Partij Anders | *Socialist Party; Socialist Party Differently* |

| Country | Party bloc | Abbreviation | Full party name | English translation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Germany** | ***Radical right*** | AfD | Alternative für Deutschland | *Alternative for Germany* |
| | | DVU; NPD | Deutsche Volksunion; Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands | *German People's Union; National Democratic Party of Germany* |
| | | REP | Republikaner | *Republikaner* |
| | ***Centre-right*** | CDU/CSU | Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands / Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern | *Christian Democratic Union of Germany / Christian Social Union in Bavaria* |
| | | FDP | Freie Demokratische Partei | *Free Democratic Party* |
| | ***Left*** | Grunen | Bündnis '90; Die Grünen | *Alliance 90; The Greens* |
| | | PDS; Linksparei; Linke | Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus; Die Linkspartei; Die Linke | *Party of Democratic Socialism; Left Party; The Left* |
| | | SPD | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands | *Social Democratic Party of Germany* |
| **Spain** | ***Radical right*** | Vox | Vox | *Voice (Latin)* |
| | ***Centre-right*** | CC | Coalición Canaria | *Coalition Canaria* |
| | | CiU | Convergència i Unió | *Convergence and Unity* |
| | | Cs | Ciudadanos—Partido de la Ciudadanía | *Citizens—Party of the Citizenry* |
| | | EdP-V | Europa de los Pueblos-Los Verdes | *Europe of the Peoples-Greens* |
| | | IC | Iniciativa per Catalunya | *Initiative for Catalonia* |
| | | PNV | Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea/Partido Nacionalista Vasco | *Basque Nationalist Party* |
| | | PP | Partido Popular | *People's Party* |
| | | UPyD | Unión Progreso y Democracia | *Union, Progress, and Democracy* |

| Country | Party bloc | Abbreviation | Full party name | English translation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Spain (continued)*** | ***Left*** | BNG | Bloque Nacionalista Galego | *Galician Nationalist Bloc* |
| | | CHA | Chunta Aragonesista | *Aragonese Council* |
| | | EA | Eusko Alkartasuna | *Basque Solidarity* |
| | | EdP-V | Europa de los Pueblos-Los Verdes | *Europe of the Peoples-Greens* |
| | | EH | Euskal Herritarrok | *We Basque Citizens* |
| | | ERC | Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya | *Republican Left of Catalonia* |
| | | IU | Izquierda Unida | *United Left* |
| | | PA | Partido Andalucista | *Andalusian Party* |
| | | Pais | Más Pais | *More Country* |
| | | Podemos | Podemos; Unidas Podemos | *We Can* |
| | | PSC | Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya | *Catalan Socialist Party* |
| | | PSOE | Partido Socialista Obrero Español | *Spanish Socialist Workers' Party* |
| | | VERDE | Los Verdes | *The Greens* |
| **Netherlands** | ***Radical right*** | FvD | Forum voor Democratie | *Forum for Democracy* |
| | | LPF | Lijst Pim Fortuyn | *List Pim Fortuyn* |
| | | PVV | Partij voor de Vrijheid | *Party for Freedom* |
| | ***Centre-right*** | BBB | BoerBurgerBeweging | *Farmer-Citizen Movement* |
| | | CDA | Christen-Democratisch Appél | *Christian Democratic Appeal* |
| | | CU | ChristenUnie | *ChristianUnion* |
| | | D66 | Democraten 66 | *Democrats 66* |
| | | JA21 | Juiste Antwoord 2021 | *Correct Answer 2021* |
| | | LNL | Leefbaar Nederland | *Liveable Netherlands* |
| | | SGP | Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij | *Reformed Political Party* |
| | | VVD | Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie | *People's Party for Freedom and Democracy* |

| Country | Party bloc | Abbreviation | Full party name | English translation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***The Netherlands (continued)*** | ***Left*** | GL | GroenLinks | *GreenLeft* |
| | | PvdA | Partij van de Arbeid | *Labour Party* |
| | | PvdD | Partij voor de Dieren | *Party for the Animals* |
| | | SP | Socialistische Partij | *Socioalist Party* |
| | | Volt | Volt | *Volt* |
| **United Kingdom** | ***Radical right*** | BNP | British National Party | *British National Party* |
| | | Brexit | Brexit Party | *Brexit Party* |
| | | UKIP | United Kingdom Independence Party | *United Kingdom Independence Party* |
| | ***Centre-right*** | Cons | Conservative Party | *Conservative Party* |
| | | LibDem | Liberal Democratic Party | *Liberal Democratic Party* |
| | ***Left*** | Green | Green Party | *Green Party* |
| | | Lab | Labour Party | *Labour Party* |
| | | Plaid | Plaid Cymru | *Party of Wales* |
| | | SNP | Scottish National Party | *Scottish National Party* |
| **Finland** | ***Radical right*** | PS | Perussuomalaiset | *True Finns; The Finns party* |
| | ***Centre-right*** | KESK | Suomen Keskusta | *Finnish Center Party* |
| | | KOK | Kansallinen Kokoomus | *National Coalition Party* |
| | | KORJ | Korjausliike | *The Finnish Reform Movement* |
| | | RKP/SFP | Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue/ Svenska folkpartiet; Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue/Svenska folkpartiet i Finland | *Swedish People's Party; The Swedish People's Party of Finland* |
| | | SKL; KD | Suomen Kristillinen Liitto; Kristillisdemokraatit | *Finnish Christian League; Christian Democrats* |
| | ***Left*** | KIPU | Kirjava "puolue" - Elonkehän puolesta | *Ecological Party* |
| | | SDP | Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue | *Social Democratic Party of Finland* |
| | | VAS | Vasemmistoliitto | *Left Alliance* |
| | | VIHR | Vihreä Liitto | *Green League* |

| Country | Party bloc | Abbreviation | Full party name | English translation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sweden** | ***Radical right*** | SD | Sverigedemokraterna | *Sweden Democrats* |
| | ***Centre-right*** | C | Centerpartiet | *Center Party* |
| | | FP;L | Folkpartiet liberalerna; Liberalerna | *Liberal People's Party* |
| | | JL | Junilistan | *June List* |
| | | KD | Kristdemokraterna | *Christian Democrats* |
| | | M | Moderaterna; Moderata Samlingspartiet | *Moderate Party* |
| | ***Left*** | MP | Miljöepartiet de Gröna | *Environment Party—The Greens* |
| | | SAP | Arbetarpartiet- Socialdemokraterna Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti | *Worker's Party-Social Democrats Swedish Social Democratic Party* |
| | | V | Vänsterpartiet | *Left Party* |
| **Poland** | ***Radical right*** | Konfederacia | Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość | *Confederation Liberty and Independence* |
| | | PiS | Prawo i Sprawiedliwość | *Law and Justice Party* |
| | ***Centre-right*** | AWSP | Koalicja Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy | *Coalition Electoral Action Solidarity of the Right* |
| | | KO | Koalicja Obywatelska | *The Civic Coalition* |
| | | KNP | Kongres Nowej Prawicy | *Congress of the New Right* |
| | | LPR | Liga Polskich Rodzin | *League of Polish Families* |
| | | Nowo | Nowoczesna | *Modern* |
| | | PO | Platforma Obywatelska | *Civic Platform* |
| | | PR | Polska Razem | *Polska Razem* |
| | | PSL | Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe | *Polish People's Party* |
| | | RP | Twój Ruch (Ruch Palikota) | *Your Movement (Palikot's Movement)* |
| | | S | Samoobrona RP | *Self Defense of the Polish Republic* |
| | | SD | Stronnictwo Demokratyczne | *Democratic Party* |
| | | SP | Solidarna Polska | *United Poland* |
| | | UW; PD | Unia Wolności; Partia Demokratyczna | *Freedom Union; Democratic Party* |

| Country | Party bloc | Abbreviation | Full party name | English translation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Poland (continued)** | ***Left*** | Lewica Razem | Lewica Razem | *Left Together* |
| | | SDPL | Socjaldemokracja Polska | *Social Democracy of Poland* |
| | | SLD | Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej | *Alliance of Democratic Left; Democratic Left Alliance* |
| | | UP | Unia Pracy | *Union of Labour* |
| | | Wiosna | Wiosna | *Spring* |
| **Slovenia** | ***Radical right*** | SNS | Slovenska nacionalna stranka | *Slovenian National Party* |
| | ***Centre-right*** | LDS | Liberalna demoracija Slovenije | *Liberal Democracy of Slovenia* |
| | | LMS | Lista Marjana Šarca | *List of Marjan Sarec* |
| | | NSI | Nova Slovenija – Krščanski demokrati | *New Slovenia – Christian Democrats* |
| | | SDS | Socialdemokratska stranka Slovenije; Slovenska demokratska stranka | *Social Democratic Party of Slovenia; Slovenian Democratic Party* |
| | | SLS-SKD; SLS | Slovenska ljudska stranka | *Slovenian People's Party-Slovenian Christian Democrats; Slovenian People's Party* |
| | | SMC | Stranka Mladih Slovenije | *Party of the Slovenia Youth* |
| | | Zares | Zares | *Zares - For Real* |
| | ***Left*** | AS | Aktivna Slovenija | *Active Slovenia* |
| | | PS | Pozitivna Slovenija | *Positive Slovenia* |
| | | ZL; Levica | Združena Levica; Levica | *United Left; The Left* |
| | | ZLSD; SD | Združena lista socialnih demokratov; Socialni Demokrati | *United List of Social Democrats; Social Democrats* |

**Table A2.** The Oesch 8-class scheme

| | **Independent work logic** | **Technical work logic** | **Organizational work logic** | **Interpersonal service work logic** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **More advantageous employment relationship** | Large employers & self-employed professionals<br>*Entrepreneurs*<br>*Lawyers*<br>*Dentists* | Technical (semi-) professionals<br>*Engineers*<br>*Architects*<br>*Informational technology specialists* | (Associate) managers<br>*Administrators*<br>*Consultants*<br>*Accountants* | Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals<br>*Medical doctors*<br>*Teachers*<br>*Social workers* |
| **Less advantageous employment relationship** | *Small business owners*<br>*Shop owners*<br>*Independent artisans*<br>*Farmers* | Production workers<br>*Mechanics*<br>*Carpenters*<br>*assemblers* | Office clerks<br>*Secretaries*<br>*Receptionists*<br>*Mail clerks* | Service workers<br>*Waiters*<br>*Nursing aides*<br>*Shop assistants* |

Source: Oesch & Rennwald (2018)

**Table A3.** Development of $R^2$ over time (economic dimension)

| Year | R | $R^2$ | Adjusted $R^2$ | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2002** | 0,327 | 0,107 | 0,105 | 2,492 |
| **2004** | 0,329 | 0,108 | 0,106 | 2,510 |
| **2006** | 0,330 | 0,109 | 0,107 | 2,458 |
| **2008** | 0,296 | 0,088 | 0,086 | 2,462 |
| **2010** | 0,301 | 0,090 | 0,089 | 2,521 |
| **2012** | 0,314 | 0,098 | 0,097 | 2,431 |
| **2014** | 0,295 | 0,087 | 0,085 | 2,491 |
| **2016** | 0,264 | 0,070 | 0,068 | 2,420 |
| **2018** | 0,237 | 0,056 | 0,054 | 2,408 |
| **2020** | 0,261 | 0,068 | 0,067 | 2,495 |

Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

**Table A4.** Development of $R^2$ over time (cultural dimension)

| Year | R | $R^2$ | Adjusted $R^2$ | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2002** | 0,337 | 0,114 | 0,112 | 1,624 |
| **2004** | 0,307 | 0,094 | 0,092 | 1,500 |
| **2006** | 0,371 | 0,137 | 0,136 | 1,485 |
| **2008** | 0,317 | 0,100 | 0,099 | 1,461 |
| **2010** | 0,299 | 0,089 | 0,087 | 1,655 |
| **2012** | 0,325 | 0,106 | 0,104 | 1,484 |
| **2014** | 0,321 | 0,103 | 0,101 | 1,527 |
| **2016** | 0,279 | 0,078 | 0,076 | 1,552 |
| **2018** | 0,251 | 0,063 | 0,061 | 1,576 |
| **2020** | 0,239 | 0,057 | 0,056 | 1,720 |

Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

**Table A5.** Development of Pseudo $R^2$ over time (vote choice)

| Year | Cox and Snell $R^2$ | Nagelkerke $R^2$ | McFadden $R^2$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| **2002** | 0,156 | 0,193 | 0,102 |
| **2004** | 0,133 | 0,166 | 0,088 |
| **2006** | 0,228 | 0,276 | 0,148 |
| **2008** | 0,179 | 0,218 | 0,115 |
| **2010** | 0,177 | 0,214 | 0,110 |
| **2012** | 0,175 | 0,210 | 0,108 |
| **2014** | 0,162 | 0,194 | 0,098 |
| **2016** | 0,211 | 0,249 | 0,126 |
| **2018** | 0,178 | 0,209 | 0,103 |
| **2020** | 0,214 | 0,250 | 0,124 |

Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.




**Figure A1.** Position of classes along the cultural axis (robustness check), over years.
Note: The cultural axis has been standardized, a negative score indicates progressivism and a positive score indicates conservatism, the mean position of the classes is noted between the brackets.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499

**Table A6.** Regression analysis cultural dimension (robustness check)

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Robust SE | B | Robust SE |
| **Constant** | 4,007*** | 0,035 | 4,049*** | 0,045 |
| **Independent variable** | | | | |
| Class (ref: clerks) | | | | |
| Production workers | 0,559*** | 0,026 | 0,400*** | 0,046 |
| Service workers | 0,283*** | 0,025 | 0,249*** | 0,046 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals | -0,707*** | 0,024 | -0,726*** | 0,047 |
| Small business owners | 0,121*** | 0,028 | 0,183*** | 0,052 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals | -0,243*** | 0,029 | -0,310*** | 0,055 |
| (Associate) managers | -0,402*** | 0,024 | -0,420*** | 0,045 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals | -0,650*** | 0,041 | -0,710*** | 0,077 |
| **Moderation variables** | | | | |
| Production workers * year | | | 0,019*** | 0,004 |
| Service workers * year | | | 0,004 | 0,004 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * year | | | 0,002 | 0,004 |
| Small business owners * year | | | -0,007 | 0,005 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * year | | | 0,007 | 0,005 |
| (Associate) managers * year | | | 0,002 | 0,004 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * year | | | 0,007 | 0,007 |
| **Control variables** | | | | |
| Age | 0,010*** | 0,000 | 0,010*** | 0,000 |
| Woman | 0,046*** | 0,014 | 0,047*** | 0,014 |
| Ethnicity (ref: ethnic majority) | | | | |
| First generation migrant | -0,453*** | 0,029 | -0,454*** | 0,029 |
| Second generation migrant | -0,310*** | 0,027 | -0,310*** | 0,027 |
| Year | 0,001 | 0,001 | -0,004 | 0,003 |
| Country (ref: Belgium) | | | | |
| Germany | -0,397*** | 0,025 | -0,396*** | 0,025 |
| Spain | -0,668*** | 0,029 | -0,668*** | 0,029 |
| Finland | -0,664*** | 0,025 | -0,665*** | 0,025 |
| United Kingdom | 0,689*** | 0,027 | 0,690*** | 0,027 |
| The Netherlands | -0,252*** | 0,025 | -0,253*** | 0,025 |
| Poland | -0,804*** | 0,029 | -0,805*** | 0,029 |
| Sweden | -0,558*** | 0,025 | -0,558*** | 0,025 |
| Slovenia | 0,019 | 0,033 | 0,019 | 0,033 |
| **$R^2$ Model** | **0,095** | | **0,095** | |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499

**Table A7.** Development of $R^2$ over time (cultural dimension, robustness check)

| Year | R | $R^2$ | Adjusted $R^2$ | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2002** | 0,379 | 0,144 | 0,142 | 2,063 |
| **2004** | 0,320 | 0,103 | 0,101 | 1,872 |
| **2006** | 0,382 | 0,146 | 0,144 | 1,854 |
| **2008** | 0,368 | 0,136 | 0,134 | 1,823 |
| **2010** | 0,400 | 0,160 | 0,158 | 2,108 |
| **2012** | 0,334 | 0,112 | 0,110 | 1,850 |
| **2014** | 0,349 | 0,122 | 0,120 | 1,895 |
| **2016** | 0,303 | 0,092 | 0,090 | 1,936 |
| **2018** | 0,297 | 0,088 | 0,086 | 1,923 |
| **2020** | 0,278 | 0,078 | 0,076 | 2,095 |

Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

**Table A8.** Regression analysis economic dimension

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Robust SE | B | Robust SE |
| **Constant** | 3,886*** | 0,048 | 3,883*** | 0,085 |
| **Independent variable** | | | | |
| Class (ref: clerks) | | | | |
| Production workers | -0,413*** | 0,032 | -0,383*** | 0,095 |
| Service workers | -0,281*** | 0,031 | -0,314*** | 0,098 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals | 0,060 | 0,032 | 0,108 | 0,103 |
| Small business owners | 0,469*** | 0,034 | 0,358*** | 0,107 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals | 0,426*** | 0,037 | 0,580*** | 0,121 |
| (Associate) managers | 0,688*** | 0,030 | 0,639*** | 0,097 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals | 1,217*** | 0,051 | 1,328*** | 0,165 |
| **Control variables** | | | | |
| Age | -0,013*** | 0,000 | -0,013*** | 0,000 |
| Woman | -0,337*** | 0,017 | -0,336*** | 0,017 |
| Ethnicity (ref: ethnic majority) | | | | |
| First generation migrant | -0,027 | 0,035 | -0,030 | 0,035 |
| Second generation migrant | -0,128*** | 0,033 | -0,128*** | 0,033 |
| Year (ref: 2002) | | | | |
| 2004 | 0,001 | 0,036 | -0,078 | 0,112 |
| 2006 | -0,079* | 0,035 | -0,115 | 0,108 |
| 2008 | -0,094** | 0,035 | -0,068 | 0,107 |
| 2010 | -0,143*** | 0,035 | -0,254** | 0,109 |
| 2012 | -0,352*** | 0,035 | -0,471*** | 0,107 |
| 2014 | -0,343*** | 0,035 | -0,301** | 0,108 |
| 2016 | -0,345*** | 0,035 | -0,222* | 0,112 |
| 2018 | -0,309*** | 0,036 | -0,185 | 0,113 |
| 2020 | -0,163*** | 0,033 | -0,123 | 0,102 |
| Country (ref: Belgium) | | | | |
| Germany | 0,227*** | 0,030 | 0,227*** | 0,030 |
| Spain | -0,624*** | 0,036 | -0,623*** | 0,036 |
| Finland | -0,314*** | 0,033 | -0,313*** | 0,033 |
| United Kingdom | 0,625*** | 0,033 | 0,625*** | 0,033 |
| The Netherlands | 0,740*** | 0,033 | 0,735*** | 0,033 |
| Poland | -0,155*** | 0,036 | -0,157*** | 0,036 |
| Sweden | 0,218*** | 0,033 | 0,215*** | 0,033 |
| Slovenia | -0,902*** | 0,042 | -0,903*** | 0,042 |
| **Moderation variables** | | | | |
| Production workers * 2004 | | | -0,010 | 0,137 |
| Production workers * 2006 | | | -0,088 | 0,133 |
| Production workers * 2008 | | | -0,062 | 0,132 |
| Production workers * 2010 | | | 0,023 | 0,135 |
| Production workers * 2012 | | | 0,032 | 0,134 |
| Production workers * 2014 | | | -0,117 | 0,135 |
| Production workers * 2016 | | | -0,079 | 0,139 |
| Production workers * 2018 | | | -0,036 | 0,143 |
| Production workers * 2020 | | | 0,075 | 0,130 |
| Service workers * 2004 | | | 0,046 | 0,141 |
| Service workers * 2006 | | | -0,050 | 0,136 |
| Service workers * 2008 | | | -0,046 | 0,135 |
| Service workers * 2010 | | | 0,100 | 0,138 |
| Service workers * 2012 | | | 0,301* | 0,136 |
| Service workers * 2014 | | | 0,091 | 0,138 |
| Service workers * 2016 | | | -0,108 | 0,140 |
| Service workers * 2018 | | | 0,061 | 0,143 |
| Service workers * 2020 | | | -0,060 | 0,133 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2004 | | | 0,159 | 0,149 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2006 | | | 0,163 | 0,144 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2008 | | | 0,029 | 0,143 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2010 | | | 0,288* | 0,144 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2012 | | | 0,042 | 0,143 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2014 | | | -0,192 | 0,143 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2016 | | | -0,225 | 0,146 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2018 | | | -0,264 | 0,148 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2020 | | | -0,317* | 0,133 |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

**Table A8.** Regression analysis economic dimension (continued)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Small business owners * 2004 | | 0,193 | 0,156 |
| Small business owners * 2006 | | 0,097 | 0,149 |
| Small business owners * 2008 | | 0,101 | 0,148 |
| Small business owners * 2010 | | 0,191 | 0,151 |
| Small business owners * 2012 | | 0,246 | 0,147 |
| Small business owners * 2014 | | -0,008 | 0,149 |
| Small business owners * 2016 | | 0,084 | 0,151 |
| Small business owners * 2018 | | 0,047 | 0,154 |
| Small business owners * 2020 | | 0,129 | 0,145 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2004 | | 0,017 | 0,172 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2006 | | 0,000 | 0,167 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2008 | | -0,292 | 0,167 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2010 | | 0,102 | 0,171 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2012 | | -0,090 | 0,164 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2014 | | -0,235 | 0,165 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2016 | | -0,246 | 0,167 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2018 | | -0,402* | 0,167 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2020 | | -0,268 | 0,152 |
| (Associate) managers * 2004 | | 0,135 | 0,140 |
| (Associate) managers * 2006 | | 0,186 | 0,136 |
| (Associate) managers * 2008 | | 0,066 | 0,135 |
| (Associate) managers * 2010 | | 0,059 | 0,136 |
| (Associate) managers * 2012 | | 0,185 | 0,135 |
| (Associate) managers * 2014 | | 0,058 | 0,136 |
| (Associate) managers * 2016 | | -0,173 | 0,139 |
| (Associate) managers * 2018 | | -0,270 | 0,140 |
| (Associate) managers * 2020 | | 0,160 | 0,127 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2004 | | 0,210 | 0,239 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2006 | | -0,060 | 0,232 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2008 | | -0,330 | 0,225 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2010 | | 0,303 | 0,232 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2012 | | 0,018 | 0,230 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2014 | | -0,005 | 0,229 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2016 | | -0,598** | 0,233 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2018 | | -0,223 | 0,231 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2020 | | -0,309 | 0,213 |
| **$R^2$ Model** | **0,078** | **0,079** | |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

**Table A9.** Regression analysis cultural dimension

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Robust SE | B | Robust SE |
| **Constant** | 3,632*** | 0,031 | 3,606*** | 0,054 |
| **Independent variable** | | | | |
| Class (ref: clerks) | | | | |
| Production workers | 0,189*** | 0,020 | 0,058 | 0,060 |
| Service workers | 0,067*** | 0,020 | -0,034 | 0,062 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals | -0,407*** | 0,020 | -0,352*** | 0,065 |
| Small business owners | 0,243*** | 0,022 | 0,317*** | 0,068 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals | 0,009 | 0,023 | 0,222** | 0,077 |
| (Associate) managers | 0,006 | 0,019 | 0,190** | 0,062 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals | 0,048 | 0,032 | 0,353*** | 0,105 |
| **Control variables** | | | | |
| Age | 0,001*** | 0,000 | 0,001*** | 0,000 |
| Woman | -0,103*** | 0,011 | -0,102*** | 0,011 |
| Ethnicity (ref: ethnic majority) | | | | |
| First generation migrant | -0,298*** | 0,022 | -0,302*** | 0,022 |
| Second generation migrant | -0,243*** | 0,021 | -0,243*** | 0,021 |
| Year (ref: 2002) | | | | |
| 2004 | 0,480*** | 0,023 | 0,458*** | 0,071 |
| 2006 | 0,517*** | 0,022 | 0,572*** | 0,069 |
| 2008 | 0,432*** | 0,022 | 0,508*** | 0,068 |
| 2010 | 0,024 | 0,022 | -0,006 | 0,069 |
| 2012 | 0,317*** | 0,022 | 0,259*** | 0,068 |
| 2014 | 0,387*** | 0,022 | 0,546*** | 0,069 |
| 2016 | 0,327*** | 0,022 | 0,346*** | 0,071 |
| 2018 | 0,191*** | 0,023 | 0,230*** | 0,072 |
| 2020 | 0,205*** | 0,021 | 0,229*** | 0,065 |
| Country (ref: Belgium) | | | | |
| Germany | -0,129*** | 0,019 | -0,129*** | 0,019 |
| Spain | -0,671*** | 0,023 | -0,674*** | 0,023 |
| Finland | -0,509*** | 0,021 | -0,511*** | 0,021 |
| United Kingdom | 0,677*** | 0,021 | 0,677*** | 0,021 |
| The Netherlands | 0,141*** | 0,021 | 0,133*** | 0,021 |
| Poland | -0,561*** | 0,023 | -0,566*** | 0,023 |
| Sweden | -0,233*** | 0,021 | -0,236*** | 0,021 |
| Slovenia | -0,351*** | 0,027 | -0,352*** | 0,027 |
| **Moderation variables** | | | | |
| Production workers * 2004 | | | 0,108 | 0,087 |
| Production workers * 2006 | | | 0,050 | 0,084 |
| Production workers * 2008 | | | 0,130 | 0,084 |
| Production workers * 2010 | | | 0,109 | 0,086 |
| Production workers * 2012 | | | 0,197* | 0,085 |
| Production workers * 2014 | | | -0,021 | 0,086 |
| Production workers * 2016 | | | 0,278** | 0,088 |
| Production workers * 2018 | | | 0,227* | 0,091 |
| Production workers * 2020 | | | 0,327*** | 0,083 |
| Service workers * 2004 | | | 0,169 | 0,090 |
| Service workers * 2006 | | | 0,059 | 0,087 |
| Service workers * 2008 | | | 0,065 | 0,086 |
| Service workers * 2010 | | | 0,062 | 0,088 |
| Service workers * 2012 | | | 0,281*** | 0,087 |
| Service workers * 2014 | | | 0,035 | 0,088 |
| Service workers * 2016 | | | 0,098 | 0,089 |
| Service workers * 2018 | | | 0,177 | 0,091 |
| Service workers * 2020 | | | 0,089 | 0,085 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2004 | | | 0,052 | 0,095 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2006 | | | 0,034 | 0,092 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2008 | | | -0,02 | 0,091 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2010 | | | 0,080 | 0,092 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2012 | | | 0,073 | 0,091 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2014 | | | -0,256** | 0,091 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2016 | | | -0,114 | 0,093 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2018 | | | -0,167 | 0,094 |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2020 | | | -0,146 | 0,085 |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

**Table A9.** Regression analysis cultural dimension (continued)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Small business owners * 2004 | | 0,049 | 0,099 |
| Small business owners * 2006 | | -0,122 | 0,095 |
| Small business owners * 2008 | | -0,116 | 0,094 |
| Small business owners * 2010 | | -0,007 | 0,096 |
| Small business owners * 2012 | | -0,005 | 0,094 |
| Small business owners * 2014 | | -0,245** | 0,095 |
| Small business owners * 2016 | | -0,021 | 0,096 |
| Small business owners * 2018 | | -0,068 | 0,098 |
| Small business owners * 2020 | | -0,179 | 0,093 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2004 | | -0,167 | 0,110 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2006 | | -0,256* | 0,106 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2008 | | -0,392*** | 0,106 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2010 | | -0,096 | 0,109 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2012 | | -0,167 | 0,105 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2014 | | -0,366*** | 0,105 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2016 | | -0,175 | 0,106 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2018 | | -0,245* | 0,107 |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2020 | | -0,221* | 0,097 |
| (Associate) managers * 2004 | | -0,134 | 0,089 |
| (Associate) managers * 2006 | | -0,199* | 0,087 |
| (Associate) managers * 2008 | | -0,314*** | 0,086 |
| (Associate) managers * 2010 | | -0,073 | 0,087 |
| (Associate) managers * 2012 | | -0,109 | 0,086 |
| (Associate) managers * 2014 | | -0,333*** | 0,087 |
| (Associate) managers * 2016 | | -0,252** | 0,089 |
| (Associate) managers * 2018 | | -0,300*** | 0,089 |
| (Associate) managers * 2020 | | -0,141 | 0,081 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2004 | | -0,216** | 0,152 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2006 | | -0,467*** | 0,148 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2008 | | -0,475 | 0,143 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2010 | | 0,138* | 0,148 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2012 | | -0,302*** | 0,147 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2014 | | -0,486** | 0,146 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2016 | | -0,457 | 0,148 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2018 | | -0,245 | 0,147 |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2020 | | -0,439*** | 0,136 |
| **$R^2$ Model** | **0,079** | **0,081** | |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

**Table A10.** Multinomial logistic regression analysis

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Centre-right B (SE) | Radical right B (SE) | Centre-right B (SE) | Radical right B (SE) |
| **Constant** | 0,269*** | -2,149*** | 0,364*** | -1,619*** |
| | (0,042) | (0,091) | (0,072) | (0,168) |
| **Independent variable** | | | | |
| Class (ref: clerks) | | | | |
| Production workers | -0,333*** | 0,356*** | -0,414*** | -0,724*** |
| | (0,027) | (0,054) | (0,080) | (0,197) |
| Service workers | -0,261*** | 0,170** | -0,390*** | -0,468* |
| | (0,026) | (0,054) | (0,082) | (0,206) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals | -0,214*** | -0,887*** | -0,313*** | -1,092*** |
| | (0,027) | (0,066) | (0,086) | (0,247) |
| Small business owners | 0,662*** | 0,518*** | 0,660*** | -0,027 |
| | (0,030) | (0,060) | (0,095) | (0,224) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals | -0,016 | -0,195** | -0,070 | -0,790** |
| | (0,032) | (0,066) | (0,101) | (0,208) |
| (Associate) managers | 0,260*** | -0,342*** | 0,071 | -0,305 |
| | (0,026) | (0,058) | (0,082) | (0,196) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals | 0,579*** | -0,309** | 0,368** | -0,717 |
| | (0,045) | (0,111) | (0,141) | (0,456) |
| **Control variables** | | | | |
| Age | 0,004*** | -0,004*** | 0,004*** | -0,004*** |
| | (0,000) | (0,001) | (0,000) | (0,001) |
| Woman | -0,099*** | -0,306*** | -0,098*** | -0,303*** |
| | (0,015) | (0,030) | (0,015) | (0,030) |
| Ethnicity (ref: ethnic majority) | | | | |
| First generation migrant | -0,439*** | -0,650*** | -0,440*** | -0,658*** |
| | (0,030) | (0,075) | (0,030) | (0,075) |
| Second generation migrant | -0,309*** | -0,405*** | -0,309*** | -0,406*** |
| | (0,028) | (0,063) | (0,028) | (0,063) |
| Year (ref: 2002) | | | | |
| 2004 | -0,106*** | -0,250** | -0,202* | -0,376 |
| | (0,030) | (0,083) | (0,094) | (0,237) |
| 2006 | 0,085** | 0,599*** | -0,058 | -0,123 |
| | (0,030) | (0,072) | (0,091) | (0,227) |
| 2008 | 0,009 | 0,402*** | -0,062 | -0,061 |
| | (0,030) | (0,073) | (0,090) | (0,220) |
| 2010 | 0,191*** | 0,822*** | 0,016 | 0,221 |
| | (0,030) | (0,071) | (0,092 | (0,217) |
| 2012 | 0,106*** | 0,768*** | -0,050 | 0,085 |
| | (0,030) | (0,070) | (0,091) | (0,215) |
| 2014 | 0,231*** | 1,175*** | 0,035 | 0,587** |
| | (0,030) | (0,069) | (0,092) | (0,205) |
| 2016 | 0,155*** | 1,342*** | 0,059 | 0,737*** |
| | (0,031) | (0,068) | (0,095) | (0,206) |
| 2018 | 0,108*** | 1,447*** | 0,033 | 0,868*** |
| | (0,031) | (0,068) | (0,097) | (0,205) |
| 2020 | 0,019 | 1,563*** | 0,022 | 1,025*** |
| | (0,029) | (0,065) | (0,097) | (0,189) |
| Country (ref: Belgium) | | | | |
| Germany | -0,733*** | -1,240*** | -0,731*** | -1,235*** |
| | (0,026) | (0,059) | (0,026) | (0,059) |
| Spain | -0,745*** | -1,887*** | -0,743*** | -1,887*** |
| | (0,030) | (0,088) | (0,031) | (0,089) |
| Finland | -0,176*** | 0,086 | -0,175*** | 0,088 |
| | (0,029) | (0,056) | (0,029) | (0,056) |
| United Kingdom | -0,325*** | -1,318*** | -0,324*** | -1,315*** |
| | (0,028) | (0,076) | (0,028) | (0,076) |
| The Netherlands | -0,099*** | 0,327*** | -0,096*** | 0,321*** |
| | (0,028) | (0,054) | (0,029) | (0,055) |
| Poland | 0,748*** | 2,500*** | 0,753*** | 2,518*** |
| | (0,039) | (0,054) | (0,039) | (0,055) |
| Sweden | -0,421*** | -0,633*** | -0,421*** | -0,635*** |
| | (0,028) | (0,060) | (0,028) | (0,061) |
| Slovenia | 0,644*** | -0,338*** | 0,647*** | -0,340*** |
| | (0,039) | (0,091) | (0,039) | (0,091) |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

**Table A10.** Multinomial logistic regression analysis (continued)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Moderation variables** | | |
| Production workers * 2004 | 0,012 | 0,596* |
| | (0,116) | (0,286) |
| Production workers * 2006 | 0,080 | 1,137*** |
| | (0,113) | (0,270) |
| Production workers * 2008 | -0,040 | 0,878*** |
| | (0,112) | (0,266) |
| Production workers * 2010 | 0,103 | 1,100*** |
| | (0,115) | (0,262) |
| Production workers * 2012 | 0,150 | 1,302*** |
| | (0,114) | (0,259) |
| Production workers * 2014 | 0,174 | 1,225*** |
| | (0,116) | (0,249) |
| Production workers * 2016 | 0,101 | 1,227*** |
| | (0,120) | (0,250) |
| Production workers * 2018 | 0,228 | 1,285*** |
| | (0,124) | (0,251) |
| Production workers * 2020 | 0,115 | 1,355*** |
| | (0,113) | (0,234) |
| Service workers * 2004 | 0,061 | 0,022 |
| | (0,119) | (0,310) |
| Service workers * 2006 | 0,159 | 0,729** |
| | (0,115) | (0,284) |
| Service workers * 2008 | 0,003 | 0,392 |
| | (0,114) | (0,282) |
| Service workers * 2010 | 0,308** | 0,734** |
| | (0,117) | (0,274) |
| Service workers * 2012 | 0,154 | 0,820** |
| | (0,115) | (0,269) |
| Service workers * 2014 | 0,289* | 0,756** |
| | (0,117) | (0,261) |
| Service workers * 2016 | 0,072 | 0,754** |
| | (0,120) | (0,259) |
| Service workers * 2018 | 0,063 | 0,749** |
| | (0,123) | (0,259) |
| Service workers * 2020 | 0,231* | 0,787** |
| | (0,114) | (0,245) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2004 | 0,124 | 0,096 |
| | (0,125) | (0,379) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2006 | 0,247* | 0,785* |
| | (0,121) | (0,335) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2008 | 0,233 | 0,469 |
| | (0,120) | (0,337) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2010 | 0,257* | 0,435 |
| | (0,121) | (0,330) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2012 | 0,194 | 0,454 |
| | (0,120) | (0,328) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2014 | 0,078 | -0,076 |
| | (0,120) | (0,321) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2016 | 0,086 | 0,131 |
| | (0,124) | (0,314) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2018 | 0,020 | -0,006 |
| | (0,125) | (0,315) |
| Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals * 2020 | -0,140 | 0,072 |
| | (0,113) | (0,288) |
| Small business owners * 2004 | 0,188 | -0,051 |
| | (0,138) | (0,350) |
| Small business owners * 2006 | 0,063 | 0,687* |
| | (0,133) | (0,308) |
| Small business owners * 2008 | -0,044 | 0,526 |
| | (0,131) | (0,301) |
| Small business owners * 2010 | 0,085 | 0,531 |
| | (0,135) | (0,301) |
| Small business owners * 2012 | 0,034 | 0,639* |
| | (0,131) | (0,292) |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.

**Table A10.** Multinomial logistic regression analysis (continued)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Small business owners * 2014 | | 0,185 | 0,553 |
| | | (0,135) | (0,287) |
| Small business owners * 2016 | | -0,069 | 0,653* |
| | | (0,135) | (0,280) |
| Small business owners * 2018 | | -0,141 | 0,524 |
| | | (0,138) | (0,280) |
| Small business owners * 2020 | | -0,242 | 0,612* |
| | | (0,130) | (0,266) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2004 | | 0,122 | 0,581 |
| | | (0,145) | (0,401) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2006 | | 0,070 | 0,853* |
| | | (0,141) | (0,368) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2008 | | 0,097 | 0,234 |
| | | (0,140) | (0,389) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2010 | | 0,066 | 0,830* |
| | | (0,145) | (0,361) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2012 | | 0,170 | 0,938** |
| | | (0,139) | (0,346) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2014 | | 0,113 | 0,746* |
| | | (0,140) | (0,337) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2016 | | 0,100 | 0,576 |
| | | (0,143) | (0,338) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2018 | | -0,018 | 0,633 |
| | | (0,143) | (0,333) |
| Technical (semi-)professionals * 2020 | | -0,106 | 0,447 |
| | | (0,129) | (0,315) |
| (Associate) managers * 2004 | | 0,124 | -0,486 |
| | | (0,118) | (0,324) |
| (Associate) managers * 2006 | | 0,266* | 0,464 |
| | | (0,116) | (0,282) |
| (Associate) managers * 2008 | | 0,187 | 0,159 |
| | | (0,115) | (0,276) |
| (Associate) managers * 2010 | | 0,212 | 0,059 |
| | | (0,117) | (0,270) |
| (Associate) managers * 2012 | | 0,224 | -0,128 |
| | | (0,115) | (0,277) |
| (Associate) managers * 2014 | | 0,400*** | 0,074 |
| | | (0,117) | (0,262) |
| (Associate) managers * 2016 | | 0,262* | 0,025 |
| | | (0,120) | (0,260) |
| (Associate) managers * 2018 | | 0,189** | -0,104 |
| | | (0,121) | (0,259) |
| (Associate) managers * 2020 | | 0,069 | -0,291 |
| | | (0,108) | (0,238) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2004 | | 0,554 | 0,393 |
| | | (0,208) | (0,715) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2006 | | 0,178 | 0,693 |
| | | (0,200) | (0,602) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2008 | | 0,276 | -0,075 |
| | | (0,194) | (0,669) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2010 | | 0,316 | 0,009 |
| | | (0,203) | (0,627) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2012 | | 0,458* | 0,571 |
| | | (0,203) | (0,600) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2014 | | 0,149 | 0,411 |
| | | (0,198) | (0,565) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2016 | | 0,105 | 0,113 |
| | | (0,202) | (0,577) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2018 | | 0,328 | 0,859 |
| | | (0,205) | (0,534) |
| Large employers and self-employed professionals * 2020 | | -0,090 | 0,389 |
| | | (0,183) | (0,510) |
| **Nagelkerke $R^2$ Model** | **0,183** | **0,186** | |

Note: *p<0,05, **p<0,01, ***p<0,001.
Source: ESS1 (2002) – ESS10 (2020), N = 102.499.