CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC
IDENTITY IN A MULTICULTURAL DUTCH NEIGHBORHOOD

Beyond the Boundary

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BACHELOR THESIS

HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

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Beyond the boundary

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Conflict, Violence and the Social Reconstruction of Ethnic Identity in a
Multicultural Dutch Neighbourhood

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A wider of more altruistic attitude is very relevant in today's world. If we look at the situation from various angles, such as the complexity and inter-connectedness of the nature of modern existence, then we will gradually notice a change in our outlook, so that when we say 'Others' and when we think of Others, we will no longer dismiss 'them' as something that is irrelevant to 'us'. We will no longer feel indifferent.

Dalai Lama

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Bachelor Thesis: 'Beyond the Boundary: Conflict, Violence and the Social Reconstruction of Ethnic Identity in a Multicultural Dutch Neighbourhood.'

II | Acknowledgements

In front of you lies the product of a remarkable and exiting year. A year in which I moved to Nijmegen in order to follow a new academic direction – human geography at the Radboud University – and came to new and refreshing ideas about our social world. The fact that this bachelor thesis lies in front of you proves that we cannot foresee our future yet we can shape it by addressing opportunities.

When I first heard about the alleged ethnic riots in the multicultural neighbourhood Terweijde in Culemborg, I did not think I would write my bachelor thesis using this as a case study. I remember it very well though. Riots between ethnic minorities in the Netherlands were, as far as I knew, regarded as a 'new' phenomenon in the Netherlands and by that highly controversial. Subsequently, there was not a shortage of – often very essentialist – opinions about these happenings: bald statements as calling it 'race-riots' in *The Telegraaf* or choosing sides as certain politicians did actually *happen*. I found it hard to notice this, because I deeply believe in the interconnectedness of human beings in a society. For me, this research confirmed the idea that 'the *many* contains the *few* and the *few* the *many*', or in other words: that everything is interconnected. Therefore, I believe that – indeed – a wider and more altruistic attitude is highly relevant in today's world. While doing research, interviewing Moluccan and Moroccan respondents and writing this thesis, I learned a lot about the importance of ethnic identities and especially the importance of acknowledgement. Although identity is socially constructed and shaped through discourse – consciously or unconsciously, we should not forget that it is often perceived as something 'solid' and fundamental; as something inherent to one's body and essential to one's existence. That is why I believe that we should be more aware of the idea that we all need each other.

Of course, this also counted for writing my bachelor thesis. Therefore I am very grateful to my tutor Olivier Kramsch for our conversations and his comments on the subject. I want to thank Gearoid Millar for some advice regarding the approach. Thanks to Fedde Holwerda, I was able to turn this in, even though I find myself in an internet café in Mwanza, Tanzania at this very moment. And thanks to Sander 'bundles and constellations' Linssen; Peter 'stigma' de Boer; Pieter Jan 'wat kinderachtig' Schut; Stan 'gluutzilla' Crienen and Robbert Wilmink, we could discuss and compare 'Appels en Peren' while enjoying (gluten-free) beer.

Josse Groen, July 2012

III | Summary

At New Year's eve 2009-2010, riots occurred between Moluccan and Moroccan ethnic groups in the Dutch multicultural neighbourhood Terweijde in Culemborg. The news reports in the newspapers were not very nuanced and some (*The Telegraaf* 5-1-10; *NRC Handelsblad* 5-1-10) even called these happenings 'race-riots'. This poststructuralist research utilize these happenings as a case study in order to examine how binaries can lead to conflict and violence and how these discourses subsequently shape the reconstruction of ethnic identity. Ethnic identity needs to be treated within the context of circumstances and surroundings. This research will state that ethnic identity is dynamic, shaped through discursive discourses and defined by the flexible, vague but at the same time solid perceived boundaries constructed by their ethnic members. These boundaries are perceived as 'fixed' by the ones defining them, but should be regarded as 'fluid'. The aim of this research is to undermine this 'fixed' perception of ethnic identity though deconstructing the boundaries and to reveal the interplay of the 'us/them' binary within the context of Moluccan and Moroccan identities in the neighbourhood of Terweijde in Culemborg. Therefore, this research is divided in three parts. Part I will provide an introduction into the conflict and the boundary. It is a treatise in which the purposes – analytical study regarding boundaries and the effects of conflict and violence on the social reconstruction of ethnic identity – and the social and scientific value – a 'beyond the boundary' attitude would be highly relevant in today's society – of this research will be scrutinized. Because of the constructivist (ethnic identity is socially constructed) and anti-essentialist character of this research, scrutinized in the theoretical framework – taken-for-granted and/or a-priori perceptions on ethnic identity will be criticised or at least avoided. It is neither the aim to judge or to give some kind of 'definite' alternative: instead it is highly suspicious for claims like these. Part II is a qualitative study which put part I in practice. It will first treat the ethnic narratives of Moluccan and Moroccan ethnic identity. Subsequently, it will analyse how ethnic members construct boundaries and finally it will reveal the interplay between these 'members' by looking beyond the boundary. Part III is the final part of this thesis, in which the findings of part I and II are put in practice through a case-study of the riots between Moluccan and Moroccan youth in Terweijde, Culemborg especially during New Years Eve 2009-2010. The border-production process will be scrutinized. I will conclude with an emphasise on the interconnectedness of ethnic identity in the Netherlands. Indeed, the opening quote could also be the last sentence of this research.

Part I | A foundation which is an abyss

"We are all mediators, translators"

Derrida, 1995

1 | Introduction

1.1 The Conflict & the Boundary

On the fifth of January 2010 *The Telegraaf*, a Dutch newspaper, headlined with 'chocolate letters' on it's front-page: '*Rassenrellen; Marokkanen en Molukkers uit hele land in staat van oorlog*' ('Race riots; Moroccans and Moluccans from all over the country in state of war') (Van den Dongen, 2010). And also in the international version of *NRC Handelsblad*, these riots were called race riots (NRC 5-1-10). Why? During New Year 2010 riots occurred in the area of Terweijde, Culemborg between specific groups of Moroccan and Moluccan youth.

These riots included violence such as cars set on fire, bricks thrown through windows and other violence between these two specific groups. The conflict started with a small fight between two persons – a Moroccan and a Moluccan – but escalated when 5 Moroccans, who were finished celebrating New Year, were driving in at a neighbourhood where Moluccans were celebrating New Year. Obviously, there were some borders crossed here physically and non-physically which resulted in violence and riots afterwards. Police forces (ME) had to patrol; streets were blocked – as showed in the photograph on the front-page of this thesis. The major of Culemborg declared a 'state of emergency' and Moluccans took control in own hands through guarding their 'own' neighbourhood. The major and the chief of police both publically declared that they felt 'helpless' and 'powerless' (Adang 2010: 163). "The behaviour of some of the youth is so 'intolerable' there is no point even talking to them (NRC 5-1-10).

Although behaviour specialist Otto Adang of the Dutch police, writer of the *Zijn wij anders? Waarom Nederland geen grootschalige etnische rellen heeft (2010)* (Are we different? Why the Netherlands does not know large-scale ethnic riots (2010)) rapport stated that these riots were just ways for youth to increase their 'status' in their group of so-called friends (NRC, 5-1-2010), the emergence of violence before (Elsevier 13-9-09) and the reoccurrence of violence in 2011 (NOS 27-8-10), as well as some warnings before New Years Eve 2010 of growing tension between the two 'groups' (NRC 14-9-09) are an indication that more is at stake. The Dutch police rapport of 2010 rejects the statement of race-riots in Culemborg. It did affirm the assumptions that there were indeed 'ethnic components' in this riot, but the term 'race-riots' was called one step too far: 'although there was indeed a conflict between two ethnic groups, the main motives of the groups weren't ethnical determined' (Adang, 2010: 13). In this perspective, the conflict wasn't started by difference in ethnic

identity, but did affirm that different ethnic identities were at stake. This thesis will examine this statement. To what extent can we speak of ethnic conflict/violence, what is the role of ethnic identity and how are ethnic identities constructed and reconstructed in the *becoming* of this conflict?

Meanwhile, news reports, articles and opinions about the riots were extensively published by the Dutch media and even The Hague interfered with the Dutch populist and anti-Islamic politician Wilders who offered to come to Culemborg in order to support Moluccans against Moroccans (*Algemeen Dagblad* 6-1-10; 7-1-10). The proposed interference of Wilders indicates that we do not only have different ethnic groups at stake, but that they also have different social positions within the Dutch society. After all, he, and with him a lot of Dutch people, are clearly 'taking position' in this conflict. So what is the position of these ethnic minorities in the Netherlands? An answer about the 'social hierarchy' of the Netherlands is given by Hraba, Hagendoorn and Hagendoorn (1989). First we find groups of Europeans, then we find colonial immigrants and at the bottom we find Islamic groups. Moluccans themselves, as a study to ethnic identity of South-Moluccans in the Netherlands points out, reject the label of 'foreigner', making a clear and consistent distinction between themselves and other ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999). The same distinction is made by Han Entzinger (2009) who stated that 'guest-workers' as Moroccan entities were perceived fundamentally different from the Dutch and as people in need of emancipation.

Violence is the cause of the difference between potential and act. But then the question arises: 'what did both rioting youth want?' That is a question that cannot be answered that quickly. One can for example see similarities between both groups. Both groups were born in the Netherlands with parents or grandparents who were immigrants, both have had a 'radical' second generation and both are ethnic minorities.

Newspapers tend to see ethnic identity as the main cause of the riots. NRC stated January the sixth: 'integration can not be forced'. A very much primordial's, essentialist perspective of identity: identity cannot be 'manipulated' or changed. But this is a very disputable claim when knowing Foucault claims that identity can be shaped through power discourse. In another Dutch newspaper, 'Algemeen Dagblad', one of the articles about the riots headlined on January the 9th: "*Morokkanen zijn de Molukkers van toen*" ("Moroccans are the Moluccans from then"). 'Moroccans are behaving as Moluccans did 'then'.' Although newspapers tend to subscribe identity as fixed or *a-priori*, this statement – probably unconscious – claims that identity is 'fluid' and dependable per circumstance: after all

Moluccans have somehow 'changed' and the 'problem' now is Moroccan youth. The Moluccans desire to 'stay together' is subsequently also seen as a main trigger. Some call the Moluccan neighbourhood policy of the 60's – a policy in which Moluccans were designated specific neighbourhoods – an historical mistake, because of the many disturbances in the past (NRC 6-1-10). However, these news reports tend to give bald statements or a too simple explanation.

For me, as a student human geography with a specialisation in conflicts, identities and territories, the emergence of violence between ethnic groups in a multicultural neighbourhood is an interesting discourse. What is this discourse that resulted in violence between second and third generation colonial immigrants and migrant workers – both minorities in the Netherlands – and in the creation of physical border blocks and boundary delineations between two these two groups.

1.2   Purposes

This research attempts to give insight in conflicts at a micro level where identities are at stake. It is a case study in conflict that hopes to provide knowledge on how identities and the emergence of ethnic boundaries can be moving factors in the emergence of small-scale (micro) conflicts in a multicultural neighbourhood. Although there has been a lot of media attention to the riots in Culemborg of New Years Evening as well as there is written a lot of different opinions about this conflict, a critical and specific scientific research about the emergence of the riots in Culemborg and the aspects of ethnicity and identity within this small community has never been published. Because the subject is controversial in the Netherlands, I will argue that there is a need to fill the gap between the conflict and the discourses that led to the conflict in the first place. Subsequently, I want to argue that more and deeper knowledge is needed in order to provide a solid framework though which we can take a look at the conflict. Hence, I will argue that a 'constructivist' (ethnic identities are socially constructed) view on ethnic identity is important in order to provide this solid framework.

Because 'nothing is fundamental', the aim of this research is purely an analytical one. It will not judge, it will not claim an absolute truth nor will it give an 'outcome' or 'alternative'; instead it is highly suspicious with writings claiming this. Having said this, the purpose of this research will be the following.

By deconstructing the identity of two ethnic groups in the area of Terweijde in Culemborg, and by scrutinizing the process of bordering, ordering and othering, this

research attempts to deconstruct the conflict in Culemborg of 2009/2010, and provide both a solid framework through which the Culemborg riots can be examined as well as it will subsequently give knowledge in the question how ethnic identity is reconstructed through violence.

A recurrent aspect in the research will be the boundary which divides the two groups who are central in this thesis. Taking a closer look at this boundary means taking a closer look at the ethnic identity of both Moluccans and Moroccans, their social position in the Netherlands and their interethnic attitudes. Subsequently, I want to scrutinize the process of *bordering*; *ordering* and *othering*. How do identities express themselves in relation to the Other? "When desiring to understand the importance of borders for a given entity (…) it is not enough to study the line, the limit, the border itself; there is a need to also study the transformation process, the genealogy of that line; the bordering (van Houtum 2010).

1.2.1 Structure

In part I, this research will scrutinize the theoretical framework and the methodology chosen to meet these requirements. Subsequently, in part II, Moluccan and Moroccan ethnic narratives will be scrutinized through literature and interviewees from the Dutch town Barneveld, in order to deconstruct the (re)construction of boundaries between ethnic identities. Hence, this knowledge will be examined in part III on the case study: Terweijde, Culemborg and the riots of 2009-2010.

1.3 Social & scientific value/relevance

The Netherlands is a multicultural country. We can all see that in our everyday life. However, the debate about migration and 'allochtonen' – the overarching name for (non-western) immigrants and part of the construction of the allochtoon/autochtoon binary – has become more and more prominently present on the political and social agenda. In the 1980s, the term 'multiculturalism' was not as common as today (Entzinger, 2009: 820). The policy during this time could certainly be labelled that way, but is currently often seen as a failure: "The Multicultural Tragedy" published in January 2000 in the Dutch newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* was a well-known article of the member of the Labour Party, Paul Scheffer, who voiced the view of many who didn't want to say it out loud (Entzinger, 2009: 822): a concern of the construction of ethnic boundaries, through continuing immigration and stagnant integration, which would undermine social cohesion.

There was a 'golden' time when the Dutch were reputed to be exceptionally tolerant of religious diversity and came to be a magnet for immigrants. This was also the time of the colonization of Dutch-India. After 1945, decolonization occurred and our colonial history literally came home with great demographical changes. It began when approximately 12.500 Moluccans, many of whom were fighting together with the Dutch in the KNIL – the *Royal Dutch Indie Army*, had to leave their country when it became independent and arrived in the Netherlands. Increased prosperity made way for 'guest-workers' from non-western countries. And yes, post-war Netherlands was praised for being a tolerant country which did not begrudge newcomers a safe place to live and where there was no room for racism. At the end of the twentieth century however, the change was dramatically (Oostindie, 2010: 9). Of course the Netherlands is still a open country where racism is not socially acceptable, but the discussion about the costs of immigration – low participation of immigrants on the labour market, while social provisions and levels of representation (crime rate, school drop-outs) were on the wrong list of statistics– was getting harsher. The rise and success of national parties as the LPF (of Pim Fortuyn), the PVV (of Geert Wilders), events as the 9/11 attacks and the murder on Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh did harden the social debate in the Netherlands. During the same period, discussions about 'our' national identity became prominent. A statement of princess Maxima – who claimed that she never had found the 'real' Dutch identity – was subject to a storm of protest and was even called 'dangerous' (Verkuyten, 2010: 8). "In the early 1970's British scholar Christopher Bagley praised the Netherlands for being 'one Western country which can claim a measure of success in its race relations' – that type of tribute is certainly not the first thing that comes in mind today (Oostindie, 2010: 10). Although ethnic relations seem to be hardened and differences more often become disputes (Verkuyten, 2010: 11), a quote from a rapport *etnische minderheden* (ethnic minorities) from 1979 shows that the attention on identities is not entirely new and is even highly relevant for this study:

> "Growing up in two worlds with a different social status, with different opinions which have little mutual understandings and are sometimes even hostile to each other, but which both invokes loyalty, puts these generations in great identity problems of which a certain anomie could be the result."
>
> *Rapport etnische minderheden* 1979 in Verkuyten, 2010: 10

Indeed, the binaries in identity and opinion, but with the similarity of invoking loyalty are the main issues during this research. The current interest in identity and unity makes the occurrence of anomie, shown during the riots in Culemborg at New Years Eve 2009-2010 and an analysis of how interethnic identities are getting along highly relevant for the social society. After all, a society can only be called a 'society' when people are aware of their inter-connectedness with the Other.

1.4   Main Question and sub-questions

The main question of this thesis will be the following:

- *To what extent is the construction of ethnic identities – part of a border-production process – a factor in the emergence of violence and can we by so deconstruct the riots in the Culemborg of 2009-2010 as an expression of ethnic violence?*

Sub-questions will be:

- *How are identities of third generation Moluccan and second generation Moroccan entities constructed in the Netherlands?*
    - o *Are Moluccan and Moroccan identities socially constructed and how can we describe this construction process?*
    - o *What role do ethnic narratives fulfil in the creation of both Moluccan and Moroccan identities?*
    - o *How do both Moluccan and Moroccan entities define their sense of identity in relation to and from the Other?*
- *How come interethnic attitudes to be sedimented and reconstructed in Moluccan and Moroccan identities after conflict?*
- *Can we define the riots occurred in 2009-2010 in Terweijde, Culemborg as ethnic violence?*

2 │ Theoretical Framework

Where the theoretical direction of this research shall be framed, where truth without Truth is 'claimed'; where the presence of a thing is constituted by what is absent from it; what deconstruction – in a nutshell – would be; where the assertion is done that 'ethnic identities are socially constructed' and by so will be seen as 'social categories'; where identities are fluid but perceived as fixed; where borders are made by making others; where only that which has no history can be seen with any certainty and where space is a verb rather than a noun.

2.1   Poststructuralist theory

This research' primary aim is to *deconstruct* the *social construction* of identity of Moroccan and Moluccan youth in the Netherlands and specifically in the area of Terweijde, Culemborg within a conflict situation. In a place where interethnic identities are living *apart together,* it hopes to reveal the complexity of a seemingly – especially in the media (such as the term 'race-riots' in *The Telegraaf* 5-1-10) – simplified situation. So in stead of seeking to an 'origin' from where this conflict is raised to its escalation on New-Year's eve, context should be created. Therefore, this research will be written within a poststructuralist framework which tries to make a critical assessment of the discourses let to the conflict in Culemborg central in this research. Discourses which contain texts, speeches, dialogues, ways of thinking and actions; bodily practices, habits, gestures etc. (Wylie, 2006). Discourse is not *about* identity, it is about what *creates* identity. This is a transforming process, like borders, and the aim of this research is to examine the discourses which constructed identities that are at stake and the boundaries between these groups. This research does not have the aim to provide an absolute truth or claim as such, nor will it provide an 'outcome' or an 'alternative'. Poststructuralist theory does not work like that; in fact it is very suspicious for such claims and states that 'nothing is fundamental'. In this aspect, poststructuralist theory has a postmodernist component: 'what proof is there that my proof is true" (Lyotard, 1984: 24 in Clarke, 2006)? 'This is the 'cold truth' … of poststructuralism: its truth without Truth: its secret which is not a secret; its foundation which is an abyss' (Harrison, 2006: 123). By so, poststructuralist theory is anti-essentialist and states that identity is an effect rather than a cause. Above all, poststructuralist theory is concerned with otherness and difference, one of the central themes in this research: There can be no future as such without radical otherness [that which 'defies anticipation'], and respect for this radical otherness' (Derrida, 2001: 21 in Harrison, 2006: 129).

2.1.1 Deconstruction

"One day, two years ago, when I was in Cambridge … a journalist took the microphone said: 'Well, could you tell me, in a nutshell, what is deconstruction?' Sometimes of course, I confess, I am not able to do that. But sometimes it may be useful to try nutshells."

Jacques Derrida, 1997 (in Caputo, 1997: 16)

Deconstruction leads us towards recognition of the differential impacts and outcomes occasioned by our dreams of presence and absence, identity and difference (Wylie, 2006). In order to 'discover' or 'reveal' the discourses which did construct opposing identities and subsequently led to conflict and violence, this research' usage of deconstruction is needed in order to 'pull aside the curtain of rhetoric and language' – such as the term '*rassenrellen*' (race riots) used by the Telegraaf 4-1-10) – and to see the actual *come about* of the conflict.

By calling into question certain fundamental axiom's in Western thought, such as identities as stable, bounded and constituted via a negotiation, Jacques Derrida (1969) tried to rethink difference, outside a binary and hierarchical structure, as part of an ultimately political project of creating spaces of 'radical heterogeneity' (Gibson-Graham, 2000: 97). Derrida argued that these binary structures were inherent in the Western pattern of producing meaning to an object or identity and established a relation of opposition and exclusion rather than similarity and mixture (Gibson-Graham, 2000: 98). But meaning is not constructed by the signifier; rather it is created through its relation with other things – a relation of binaries which Derrida would name *violent hierarchies* (Wylie, 2006). The binary 'us/them' would be a good example. 'Us' is defined by what is 'not-us' (see 2.2; identities and difference). So meaning is created through difference and interplay. Important for this research is the aim that after deconstruction, 'the force of essentialism is swept away into a contingent variation of immanent consistency: an assemblage hold together' (Doel, 2000: 119). It is the quest of deconstruction to revalue the binary and reveal its interplay: to blur the boundaries or binaries (Gibson-Graham, 2000). "Preparing for the in-coming of the other, which is what constitutes radical democracy – that is what deconstruction *is* (Caputo, 1997: 44 in Harrison, 2006: 129)." One can do that by highlighting similarities on both sides of the divide [of us/them], and to undermine the solidity and fixity of identity, so that it shall be visible that the excluded 'other' is so embedded in the primary identity that its indistinctiveness is ultimately unsustainable (Gibson-Graham, 2000: 99).

The question of the journalist in the quotation above would be a perfect example of how the media is trying to provide a simplified coverage of much more complex things – an excess of journalistic haste and impatience (Caputo, 1997: 31). The very aim of deconstruction is to show the complexity of things – beliefs, societies, practices etc. – which have no definable meanings: that the exceed the boundaries they currently occupy (Caputo, 1997: 31). However, a 'thing' – like a belief or an identity – can be seen as a 'nutshell', with its own 'unity'. So when deconstruction finds a nutshell – a secure axiom – the very idea is to crack it open. And although there is a clear paradox: deconstruction opposes the idea of a 'fixed' nutshell, 'one might even say that cracking nutshells is what deconstruction is. In a nutshell' (Caputo, 1997: 32). So let us crack the nutshell of the 'us/them' binary of Moluccan and Moroccan identities and see how they are produced.

2.2   Identities and difference

The two groups central in this research are two ethnic identities, with their own shared historical and geographical narratives – genealogy. However, these identities are *not* pure or coherent. They are two sides of the coin: they are not produced in isolation from each other. Rather, they are inextricably intertwined, like all identities living together (Wylie, 2006). Our society and culture is littered with binaries like 'us and them'. To claim an ethnic identity is to distinguish ourselves from others: it is to draw a boundary between "us" and "them" on the basis of the claims we make about ourselves and them, that "we" share something that "they" do not. An ethnic group cannot exist in isolation. It has meaning only in a context that involves others (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998; 20). 'To put this another way: the presence of a thing, its existence, identity, validity, etc., is constituted by what is absent from it, or what is excluded from it (Wylie 2006: 300).' Interesting is the fact that the sorts of binary distinctions under discussion are linked to violence both real and symbolic (Wylie, 2006). This is what Derrida means with the term *violent hierarchies*. Ethnic identity is relational, that is, dependent on comparisons and distinctions, but the fact that people make a distinction between 'us' and 'them' does not imply a preoccupation with the Other. The preoccupation may lie entirely within the group to which people belong and the differences that exist within this group. Hence, "us" may be defined in relation to a more or less undefined "them" or "not-us" rather than in actual contrast to a specific Other (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 66). Talking about oneself as an ethnic group need not be markedly oppositional, but self-definition in group terms is unavoidably divisive (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999).

2.2.1 The search for identities

In order to start deconstructing discourses let to conflict in Culemborg, first it is needed to define[1] the words *identity* and *ethnicity*: words that are at stake in the aim to deconstruct the conflict. Because it is impossible to talk about *ethnicity* without the word *identity*, let's first scrutinize the emergence and perceptions of this highly examined and contested word. Indeed, this is more difficult than presumed: 'those who write about [identity] simply assume the reader will know what they mean, as do the readers themselves. But if pinned down, most of us would find it difficult to explain just what we do mean by identity' (Gleason, 1983). And that is interesting, knowing that identity is among "the most appealing moral terms of our time" (Keniston in Gleason, 1983). Identity is not simply an answer to the question "who am I?" Rather, it is something that all people have, seek, construct and negotiate (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 2). So let us 'identify' the word identity first: a semantic historical quest central in the treatise *Identifying Identity* of the historian Philip Gleason (1983).

Identity is a word which relatively recently became popular in social science. The *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, published in the early 1930's, carries no entry at all for identity, and the entry headed 'Identification' deals with fingerprinting and other techniques of criminal investigation (Gleason, 1983). So where does it come from? *Identity* comes from the Latin root *idem*, which means 'the same'. By so, the word identity has been associated with the perennial mind-body problem in philosophy since the time of John Locke (Gleason, 1983). Locke declared in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690) that "identity … consist in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized Body" (Locke in Gleason, 2003). By so, he used the word identity to call into question the "unity of the self." The Self, who always has to fleet Particles of Matter, is – according to Locke – by so always a subject of change.

Erikson (in Gleason, 1983), a scholar who popularized the word identity in modern social science, states that an identity is developed through experiences and tasks related to biological maturation, but also through social interaction to the milieu in which the individual finds

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[1] Because this research is written in poststructuralist theory, it is not the aim and we might even say 'not done' to give a single and 'definite' definition of the word *ethnicity* and *identity*: 'while a concept seems to identify something certain and immutable … it is rather the sedimentation of a history of mutations and conflicts over definition (Harrison, 2006: 123). Indeed, as is shown in this description, there are many different perceptions and interpretations of these words. However, to not fall into the 'poststructuralist trap' of vagueness, I will conclude with a broad and widely accepted starting point of these words by taking multiple paradigms or perceptions in account.

himself; the features of that milieu are in turn conditioned by the historical situation of the culture that shapes the social world in which the individual and his fellows exist. It is a process located in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes, in fact, the identity of those two identities.

> One of the areas where identification may most easily take place is that of social values and attitudes … Sometimes a child who confronts a social issue for the first time will ask his parents what attitude he should hold. Thus he may say, "Daddy, what are we? Are we Jews or gentiles; Protestants or Catholics; Republicans or Democrats?" When told what "we" are, the child is fully satisfied. From then on, he will accept his membership and the ready-made attitudes that go with it.
>
> <div align="right">Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954) in Gleason, 1983</div>

Erikson and the citation above implicate that elements of interiority and continuity within identity are indispensable: identity is – wholly contained within the (structuralist) Freudian tradition – somehow 'located' within a deep psychic structure of the individual, and is then shaped through interaction with the social world. However, this perspective on identity is a contested one:

> "Looked at sociologically, the self is no longer a solid, given entity … It is rather a process, continuously created and re-created in each social situation that one enters, held together by the slender thread of memory."
>
> <div align="right">Berger in Gleason, 1983</div>

As illustrated in the citations above, identity was for a long time being regarded as private and well-defined, while it is now much more regarded as public and variable (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur 1999:2). The quest of identifying identity resulted in two theoretical paradigms – primordialism and circumstantialism. To prevent being oblivious of their equivocation it is needed to elaborate these perspectives, and examine them within poststructuralist theory before taking a starting point on ethnic identity for this research.

2.2.2 Fixed or Fluid?

Primordialism and Circumstantialism[2] seem to contradict each other because they differ significantly on whether identity is to be understood as something internal that persist through change or as something ascribed from without that changes according to circumstance (Gleason, 1983; 918). Primordialists regard ethnicity as a given, a basic element in one's personal identity that is simply there and cannot be changed – fixed by human nature (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; 848) – while [circumstantialists] hold that ethnicity is not an indelible stamp impressed on the psyche but a dimension of individual and group existence that can be consciously emphasized or de-emphasized as the situation requires (Gleason, 1983, 919), or in other words: "for primordialists, identity is deep, internal, and permanent; for [circumstantialists], identity is shallow, external, and evanescent" (Gleason, 1983; 920). Now, this seemingly dichotomy has intellectual costs: it [identity] tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity). However, as De Koning (2008) argues, it is not about choosing one approach over the other. In fact: they complement each other.

Primordialist thinking stems for a large extent from Geertz (1973), who emphasized on the phenomenon of loyalty within an ethnic group, and Shils (1957), who described the loyalty as in a family tie as a tie "not merely to the other family member as a person, but as a possessor of certain significant relational qualities, which could only be described as primordial" (Shils 1957: 142 in De Koning 2008: 26). These ties would not come forth from self-interest or mutual obligations, but from 'some accountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself' (Geertz, 1973; 259 in De Koning, 2008; 26). The strength of primordialism is its effort to confront the power of ethnic ties. These ties, according to Geertz, "seem to flow more from a sense of natural – some would say spiritual – affinity than from social interaction" (Geertz 1963 in Cornell and Hartmann, 1998:53). By so, primordialist perspective on identity is criticized for being essentialist with a static and a-priori character (De Koning, 2008).

Current – circumstantialist – thinking on ethnic identity stems to a great extent from the work of Barth (1969) (Verkuyten, 1999; De Koning, 2008, Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). Barth redirected the then dominant focus on the cultural content of ethnicity to the social

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[2] The term has carried a number of different names (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 41). I use the term '*circumstantialist*' (identity is constantly dependant on the circumstances or context) mentioned in De Koning (2008); Verkuyten (1999) and Cornell and Hartmann (1998) as a counterview from *primordialism* on ethnic identity. The 'alternative' term '*optionalism*' mentioned in Gleason (1983) and Fearon and Laitin (2000), would also be sufficient in explaining identities as a fluent, constantly produced and re-produced entity.

organisation of cultural differences. He treated ethnic identities as emergent and problematic properties of everyday life and emphasized on the practices whereby ethnicity and ethnic boundaries are situationally constructed (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999:63). We should not emphasize on (as primordialists would argue) cultural characteristics and differences but on social context and the necessity of marking group-boundaries and interaction between groups (De Koning, 2008). The location and meaning of particular ethnic boundaries are continuously negotiated, revised, and revitalized, both by ethnic group members themselves as well as by outside observers (Nagel, 1994). Circumstantialist perspective is by so existentialist and could fit very well in poststructuralist theory because it emphasizes on the shifting, *becoming*, nature of existence. Despite this, a common point of criticism of circumstantialism would be that it deals too much with the assumption that ethnic identity is predominantly the calculation of costs and benefits or of advantages and disadvantages (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 63). The permanent, typical and emotional sense of identity by the actors themselves is often ignored or dismissed as 'essentialist' (De Koning, 2008, Verkuyten, 1999: 2). "If it is fluid, how can we understand the ways in which self-understandings may harden, congeal, and crystallize (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 1)?"

This is why both perspectives in fact seem beautifully congruent (Gleason, 1983). Indeed, as Verkuyten (1999, 2: 7) mentions, there is a too much *this-or-that* 'state of mind' about ethnic identity, in which the tendency is there to regard the very own explanation [on ethnic identity] as the *one and only* explanation. The criticism that primordialism regards identity as *a-priori* does not do right to the purpose of Geertz (1963) who stated that not identities are a-priori or primordial, but that the actors *regard* their identities as being a-priori or primordial. We need to take into account why, how and under which circumstances a certain (ethnic) identity is experienced as primordial (De Koning, 2008). In this regard, the primordial 'character' of identity is socially constructed through circumstances and experiences and through this, both circumstantialist and primordialist accounts in fact complement each other. From a poststructuralist perspective, we can state that 'ethnic identity is socially constructed' (through difference or what it is *not*) and that ethnic identity subsequently is a 'subject of change' and by so, ethnic identity is *fluid*. "… No more givens, just shape-shifting ways of being. Hereinafter, identity is just a habit or habitus: it is an effect of embedment and conjunction" (Doel, 2000: 119). The notion that ethnic identity is fluid and a subject of change coincides with the idea that language, religion, and culture among other indicators of ethnic identity are also subjects of change: 'Ethnicity is constructed out of the

material of language, religion, culture, appearance, ancestry, or regionality' (Nagel, 1994: 152). It is an effect rather than a cause (Harrison, 2006: 122). However, we should not forget to mention the primordial, a-priori *experience* of a *fluid* identity: 'everyday primordialism'. This is what ethnic identities are experiencing in their *everyday life*. What this and the assertion that 'ethnic identity is socially constructed' means will be elaborated in the next paragraph.

2.2.3   The Social construction of Ethnic Identity & 'Everyday Primordialism'

The assertion that "ethnicity is socially constructed" is commonplace among social scientist, and it is widely supposed that anyone who fails to grasp this fact will not be able to explain or understand ethnic violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 847). The constructivist approach (ethnicity is socially constructed) has been successful in discrediting primordialist explanations on identity by showing how the content and even membership rules of taken-for-granted categories like man/woman or hetero/homosexual have changed over time (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 849). However, people often do believe that social categories are natural, inevitable and unchangeable facts about the social world, fixed by human nature rather than by social convention and practice. We can term this primordialist belief *everyday primordialism* (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Many current examples of these violent hierarchies come to mind: 'the so-called 'clash of civilizations' between the west and Islam, 'genuine' and 'bogus' asylum seekers, 'organic versus genetically modified foodstuffs, globalization and anti-globalization' (Wylie, 2006). We can also see the quote of Allport (1954 in Gleason, 1983; 2.2.1 *The search for identities p. 20*) as an expression of everyday primordialism because the child is fully satisfied when heard what 'we' are, which is part of his nurture but felt as his 'nature'. In the case of this research we can see the construction of a clear 'us' and 'them' binary and a prominent support of Moluccan *social categories* versus Moroccan *social categories* through the words of the Dutch politician Geert Wilders – "*Molukse gemeenschap een hart onder de riem steken*" (*Algemeen Dagblad* 6-1-10) – who by so very much confirmed his idea of a certain ethnic hierarchy in The Netherlands. Research has shown that an ethnic hierarchy does exist in Dutch society by placing Europeans on top, then colonial immigrants and then Islamic groups at the bottom (Hraba, Hagendoorn & Hagendoorn, 1989; Verkuyten, Hagendoorn & Masson, 1996). Subsequently, we can see the binary of 'us/them'; 'Moluccan/Moroccan' or 'Moroccan/Moluccan' as a – as Jacques Derrida would say – *violent hierarchy* because clearly one of the two terms is understood to be 'superior to the other' in the eyes of Wilders and many others – at least a part of his [Wilders] voters. However, by

marking ethnic identity as fixed and unchangeable, *everyday primordialism* arguments provide the luxury of ignoring certain social and historical contexts when explaining the behaviour of certain groups. It – *everyday primordialism* – provides an explanation for the 'way things are' without threatening the 'way things are' (Zeitgeist: Moving Forward (2011) 17:00).

2.2.4   Ethnic identity as social categories

In this research, the 'somewhat murky' term *ethnic identity* will refer to more concrete term *social category* – in this case a Moluccan or a Moroccan, but what also could be refer to a Serb, man, homosexual, American, Catholic, worker, and so on – and in particular to a social category that an individual member either takes a special pride in or views as a more-or-less unchangeable and socially consequential attribute (Fearon and Laitin, 2000) – "a participation of the same continued life (…) united to the same organized body". Identity refers to what people conceive themselves to be in a specific context, or to which category they belong (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999; 65). Social categories are sets of people given a label (or labels) and distinguished by two main features: (1) rules of membership that decide who is and is not a member of the category; and (2) content, that is, sets of characteristics (such as beliefs, desires, moral commitments, and physical attributes) thought to be typical of members of the category, or behaviours expected or obliged of members in certain situations (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Subsequently, an ethnic identity should here be understood as (1) descent group membership and (2) typically composed cultural attributes, such as religion, language, customs, and shared historical myths – historical narratives we shall examine later in this thesis. When we regard identities as social categories, we can state that identities – membership rules, content and valuation – are the products of human action and speech, and that as a result they can and do change over time (Fearon and Laitin, 2000).

2.3   The border production process

In fulfilling the aim of this research – in what extent is identity a factor in the emergence of violence, and by so, whether we can call the riots in Culemborg ethnic violence – it is needed to take a close look at the boundary between the groups central in this research. To do this, one has to describe the process of bordering, ordering and othering. Not just the line of difference, but the process – the genealogy of that line (Van Houtum, 2010). This starts with the process of *bordering*.

The process of *bordering* is not a once-and-for-all event. It is a continuous search for the legitimisation and justification of the location and demarcation of a border, which is seen as a manifestation of one's own claimed, distinct and exclusive [in this case] identity and territory (van Houtum, 2010). The occupation of territory is fundamental to human existence (Smith, 1990). Thus we share geographical space and inherently divide geographical space. Territory means inclusion and exclusion, demonstrated in the border production process. Territoriality is a social construct; it can take different forms in different geographical and historical circumstances. Also, it is inherently connected to human identity. Conceive oneself to a specific identity – a social category – intrinsically implies a conception of those to whom one does not belong: to be 'us' one needs those who are 'not us'. Barth (1969) emphasized on the boundary between 'us' and 'not us' or 'them'. ….As a first cut, it is useful to point out that ethnic groups have more permeable boundaries than states (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Indeed, ethnic groups are even portrayed as 'well-delineated "teams"' (Hardin in Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 856), and Frederik Barth (1969, in Fearon and Laitin, 2000) argued that ethnicity is not something defined by cultural characteristics of group members but by the differences thought to distinguish them from others. However, and unlike states who were quite successful in constructing seemingly 'definite' borders, the lines between ethnic groups are less definite and much harder to police, since they can be altered or infringed upon by assimilation and other everyday acts that blur or call boundaries into question (Fearon and Laitin, 2000).

The second dimension is the *ordering* process. It is a process which includes remaking a socio-spatial order, with the 'codes' or identities of the group in charge. This could be done violently, but also through symbols as the production of belonging and nostalgia through traditional, historical, ritual, exclusive narratives. It is a normalising discourse perceived through, for example, language politics, education politics and labour politics, which are all territorially defined and demarcated as the norm (Foucault, 1975 in van Houtum, 2010). In the case of Culemborg, we can find shared historical and traditional narratives well known with the 'group members', as well as a territorially defined *place,* such as the Moluccan neighbourhood.

Thirdly, we can make borders by making others: *othering*. It involves the production of 'Us' and 'Them'. This often leads to discrimination between what is to be ours and what is to be 'those'. It is the non-physical border between groups and explains why identities define themselves not by who or what they *are*, but by what or who they are *not*. In the case of Culemborg, I will scrutinize this othering mainly by means of the qualitative research, but

also by seeking shared historical, ideological, religious and traditional narratives which are in a certain way symbols of inclusion and exclusion.

2.4 Ethnicity & Violence

According to the previous paragraph, we can state that ethnic identity is fluid, subject of change and by so, circumstantialist. Subsequently, ethnicity is defined by its differences with others (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 856). However, when ethnicity is often perceived as primordial, ethnic violence subsequently would be seen as the product of differences that are fixed in time and space. Indeed, there is evidence that the construction of *everyday primordialism* from on-the-ground interactions can lead to intra- and intergroup violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 857). The notion that we can speak of 'race-riots' in Culemborg, as the Dutch newspapers *The Telegraaf* (5-1-10) and the international version of *NRC Handelsblad* (5-1-10) asserted, is therefore very typical and curious at the same time and an example of *everyday primordialism*. For the study to *The Media and Conflict* (Allen and Seaton, 1999) this news-paper headliner would be a perfect example for some reiterated misconceptions about ethnic violence: "First, contrary to the implicit, and sometimes explicit, view of many accounts, wars are not the product of natural differences, but of social processes. To treat ethnicity as something primal and natural is to conflate the concept with discredited understandings of race" … "It follows that there is no special category to ethnic war, but that all war has a ethnic aspect" (Allen and Seaton, 1999: 2 and 3). The label of 'race-riots' in Culemborg – also rejected in the police-rapport *Are We Different, Why the Netherlands does not know large-scale ethnic riots* (Adang, 2010) – can therefore be referred to the trash.

However, and back to *ethnic* violence; Fearon and Laitin (2000: 869) consider ethnic violence *'ethnic'* if either (1) we think the participants are motivated by a generalized animosity to the ethnic other; (2) actors directing or leading the violence justify it by saying that it is on behalf of an ethnic group; or (3) attackers are essentially indifferent about the identity of their victims apart from their ethnicity. According to these preconditions, ethnically determined motives are not a necessity for calling a violent discourse 'ethnic violence'. This subsequently undermines the previous named police-rapport of 2010, which did not labelled the riots 'ethnic violence' because the motives were not ethnically determined (Adang, 2010: 13).

Fearon and Laitin (2000, 874) also see evidence that other motivations, such as looting, land grabs and personal revenge can be a cover for 'ethnic violence', or to prevent

'boundary crossing'. So why do people follow? Some ethnic groups sustain (and are defined by) discourses that prepare and dispose them to act violently toward ethnic others, while other discourses do not. One class of answers to this puzzle proposes that innate or learned psychological bias leads members of ethnic groups to discount or ignore their own leader's involvement in producing ethnic conflict, so that the Other takes all the blame. Even if people do not know which side to blame for the failure of constitutional negotiations, an ethnic riot, or incident of ethnic violence, they do know that one or both sides are to blame. Thus, observing any such event should lead them rationally to increase their belief that the other group or its leaders may be dangerous or at fault, even if it happens in this case that their own leadership provoked the conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 854). We can name this a certain group-behaviour: no critical notion on the own group, but through the binary, the Other takes the full blame.

Through different conflict cases in the research of De Koning (2008) to Moroccan Muslim identity we can state that ethnic and religious differences not always lead to conflict and that conflicts between Moroccans and others – in de Koning's cases it were Dutch natives – don't have to be ethnic of religious from origin but that they can become ethnic or religious. This is in accordance with many other researchers who conclude that ethnic or religious elements occur *during* the conflict and not *before* (De Koning, 2008: 100). In the television debate 'Pauw in Culemborg' this discourse is called *kuddegedrag*.

3 | Methodology

3.1 The Study

This research is both an empirical study (qualitative research in the form of interviews) as a literature study. It is both concrete (in examining the events as they occurred) and abstract (in providing a theoretical framework through which the riots can be examined). This research is on a micro scale and can be called innovative, since no scientific research/article other than one police rapport regarding the riots of Terweijde saw the daylight. The material will come from 8 in-depth interviews. Interviewees are located in a town similar to Culemborg: Barneveld, since it was impossible (through the unwillingness of the municipality of Culemborg but also through its habitants who, understandably, want to go on with their lives) to do fieldwork in Terweijde. The interviews had a duration of half an hour each and were all taped with the exception of one on insistence of the interviewees. Gender does not play a role in this research and all interviewees were – coincidentally – male (my apologies to all feminist geographers and researchers). The focus in these interviews lay in the way how boundaries are constructed and reconstructed through conflict and violence.

3.1.1 Research phases

I. A literature study: Theoretical framework regarding identity and difference through Moluccan and Moroccan ethnic narratives identity.

II. A qualitative research: Eight dept-interviews with (4) Moluccans and (4) Moroccans about Moluccan and Moroccan identity, conflict and the (re)construction of identity. The interviewees are from Barneveld, a town in the Netherlands similar to Culemborg. This was necessary because the municipality of Culemborg did not really cooperate and in fact put me on a side-track for a while. That is why I choose for Barneveld: a municipality which, like Culemborg, has a 'Moluccan neighbourhood' as well as Dutch-Moroccan habitants.

III. The case study: the actual case of the 2009-2010 conflict in the area of Terweijde, Culemborg where Moluccan and Moroccan identities came into conflict. Research data will come from the results of part I and II, but also through analyzes of discourses of speech and text about the events occurred.

IV. Conclusion

3.2   Casestudy

Because I use poststructuralist theory in scrutinizing and analyzing a micro level conflict between ethnic entities in a small neighbourhood in Culemborg, the Netherlands, I choose the research strategy of the 'casestudy' (Verschuren 2010: 163). This complement the deconstruction approach I apply in this research, because it tries to extent the depth of the research. It tries to expose in a detailed manner all the finesses of a discourse through investigating specific events/discourses. In this case the events of the riots in Culemborg and Moluccan and Moroccan ethnic identity. A casestudy is to be recognised by the following:

1. *A small scale domain*; the area of Terweijde, Culemborg.
2. *A labor-intensive approach*: both a literature and an empirical way of getting results.
3. *More depth than width:* the aim is to deeply expose discourses let to conflict, such as identity through historical and geographical narratives, but also to examine personal senses of identity through a qualitative research.
4. A selective or strategic sample: in interviewing 8 persons, 4 Moluccans and 4 Moroccans, and by asking them specifically about their sense of identity, this is a selective and strategic sample of the situation as it occurred. These people will be interviewed in the Dutch town Barneveld.
5. The alleged counts in many cases for the totality: This research will scrutinize the identity of Moluccans and Moroccans but the aim is not to provide an absolute truth or claim as such. The theoretical framework used in this research also opposes this. Subsequently, this research is about seeking how identity, shared by *all* in these specific groups, did affect the conflict.
6. An open observation at location: the research will provide in this in part III by analyzing discourses as speech and text (opinions) from persons who experienced the conflict. This will be done through analyzing the television-debate 'Pauw in Culemborg', appeared on Dutch television on Wednesday 21 December 2011, 23:00 by the VARA where both Moluccans and Moroccans from the neighbourhood Terweijde will speak and respond to each other.
7. Qualitative data and similar research-methods: in the case of Culemborg, I will both scrutinize identity through literature and through qualitative research. The research will be in threefold: I) a literature and theoretical study and a genealogy of Moluccan and Moroccan identity; II) a qualitative research by interviewing Moroccan and

Moluccan identities in Barneveld and III) a casestudy of the riots in Terweijde, Culemborg from 2009-2010 through discourses shown on Dutch television.

There are different types of casestudy. This research belongs to the *singular* casestudy, in which one specific case is examined. A disadvantage of this research strategy is the possibility of loosing a representational image of the examined situation. This because relative few people will be interviewed. The external validity can become under pressure. But poststructuralist theory fills this gap, stating that nothing is fundamental. Emphasize on a personal sense of identity in relation to conflict is one of the main aims of this research, and by so, the singular casestudy can provide in this.

3.3   Research material

The theory used for this research focus mainly on Moluccan and Moroccan ethnic identity (Verkuyten, 1999; De Koning, 2008; Van Amersfoort; 2004; Veenman, 2001: Rinsampessy, 1974; Quarasse and van de Vijver, 2004; Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007; Crul and Doomernik, 2003; Entzinger, 2007; Verkuyten, van de Calseijde and de Leur, 1999); on theories of violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Allen and Seaton, 1999) and on poststructuralist theory, identity and difference (Doel, 2000; Wylie, 2006; Gleason, 1983; Caputo, 1997; Harrison, 2006; Gibson-Graham, 2000; Cornell and Hartmann, 1998) Furthermore I will use dept interviews to gain information of how identities are socially constructed. Hence I will use and analyze discourses as speech and text such as the television debate 'Pauw in Culemborg' and the documentary "Twee waarheden in Culemborg" ("Two truths in Culemborg"), made by both a Moroccan (Nordin Lasfar) and a Moluccan (Lani Ohorella) director, to support my thesis that identities are reconstructed through violence/conflict.

Part II | Beyond the boundary

"All things appear and disappear because of the concurrence of causes and conditions.
Nothing ever exists entirely alone; everything is in relation to everything else."
Buddha (563-483 BC)

Clearly within poststructuralist theory, it would be a misconception to use history in order to find the 'origin'; the underlying principles of the development of a phenomenon – in this case Moluccan and Moroccan identity. This would be equal of claiming 'Truth with a capital T', which always points in one direction and allows words to keep their meaning. However, the question *'How have we become what we are?'* (Foucault, 1984: 43 in Harrison, 2006: 126) needs to be treated historically in order to create a certain context which is shared but differently perceived by their 'subjects' – in this case Moluccan and Moroccan ethnic identities. Not to create facts, but to create interpretations: "We do need history, but quite differently from the jaded idlers in the garden of knowledge, however grandly they may look down on our rude and unpicturesque requirements. In other words, we need it for life and action, not as a convenient way to avoid life and action … (Nietzsche, 2010: 3)." Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) stated that only that which has never had a history can be defined with any certainty (Harrison, 2006). This is crucial because it point out the shifting nature of existence, and by so, it is impossible to bind a particular ethnic identity to a single person part of this or that group. However, we can acknowledge that ethnic identities do have *"… a belief in their common descent …"* (Weber, 1968: 389 in Verkuyten, 1999: 44). In order to 'crack the nutshell' of the violence and social reconstruction of ethnic identity in Culemborg, we do need the history – the shared historical narratives – of Moluccan and Moroccan ethnic identity in order to expose the process of constructing ethnic boundaries. Because claiming an ethnic identity includes drawing a boundary between "us" and "them", the focus lies here on boundaries between ethnic identities and to expose the *binary structure* of "us" and "them" (see chapter 2). Subsequently, it is needed to describe the influence of violence on the perception of ethnic identity and its constructed boundary. Hence, it is the aim to *deconstruct* this binary structure, to *blur* the boundaries (Gibson-Graham, 2000: 99) in order to *expose* the interplay of ethnic identity. In other words: to look *beyond* the boundary.

4 │ Moluccan Ethnic Narratives

"Us Moluccans, we are the history of the Netherlands. We are your history, and you should know about your own history."

<div align="right">20 year old male in Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 71</div>

4.1   Moluccan narratives through time and space

Of the four post-colonial migration flows into the Netherlands, the immigration of a relatively small number of Moluccan former soldiers and their families has had the most dramatic consequences, both for the resulting immigrant community and for Dutch society (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 152). The history as it will be scrutinized here – of a people in a dynamic diaspora – is still highly relevant in many Moluccans' everyday life and can be seen as part of their ethnic identity: their shared historical narrative. 'Being Moluccan was said to be important … because of the unique Moluccan culture and the history of political struggle and endurance (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 68).' Indeed, for all interviewees the issue of the RMS *(Republic Maluku Selatan)* was a topic which cannot be ignored (Steijlen 1996 in Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 68): it is so much part of Moluccan history that everyone faces the question what it means for themselves and the group of Moluccans. 'Tales about historic homelands and about the generations of ethnic brethren who gave their lives to defend those homelands may seem half-baked and artificially constructed, but they often resonate with those who tell them and those who listen to them. They subsequently affect the cohesion, unity, and mobilization of ethnic groups (Toft, 2003: 16).' So how was it possible that, after (violent) internal conflicts, Moluccans could assimilate and integrate in their host society and at the same time were able to maintain their ethnic identity within this 'host society' (Van Amersfoort, 2004)? Although history – the shared historical narratives of the Moluccans from the East Indies, particularly habitants of the island Ambon – is seen as 'static', it is in fact a process, still going on and by so still highly relevant.

4.1.1   A diaspora

In 1830, many years after the first contacts with and colonization of the East Indies and its habitants by the Netherlands during its 'golden century', the Dutch established a special army to defend the territory and maintain order: the KNIL *(Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Leger)*. Officers in this army were generally Dutch but the soldiers were recruited locally, especially from the island Ambon and its surrounding islands (Haruku, Saparua, Nusulaut and Ceram).

The habitants of these islands, most of who were converted to a Calvinist branch of Protestantism, were regarded as reliable soldiers, absolutely loyal to the Dutch Crown, and therefore submitted in the KNIL. It was this reputation that made them unpopular with the Indonesian nationalists (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 154).

After the occupation of the East Indies by the Empire of Japan during World War II, the KNIL tried to fill the vacuum of power and restore Dutch authority over the Indonesian archipelago. During these *politionele acties* (police actions) the Moluccan soldiers fought side by side with the Dutch for this colonist goal. However, political power relations in the world had changed and the rise of Indonesian nationalism ensured that the Netherlands was forced to relinquish sovereignty on 28 December 1949 to the *Republic Indonesia Serikat*. By so, the KNIL had to be disbanded, which put the 62.000 native soldiers of the KNIL in a difficult position: or join their former enemy: the Republican army of Indonesia, or being demobilised. It was during this time that the RMS *(Republic Maluku Selatan)* was proclaimed and in order to join the struggle for the RMS, Moluccan soldiers wanted to be discharged at Ambon. However, as soon as the sovereignty was handed over, the *Republic Indonesia Serikat* became a centralised republic and regarded the RMS as an anti-nationalist rebellion. Ex-soldiers were forbidden to land at Ambon or one of the other islands. And because of international pressure, the Netherlands had no other option then to make them part of the normal Dutch Royal Army and transfer these last 3.578 soldiers (Veenman, 2001) among with their family members – 12.500 persons in total – to the Netherlands and discharge them there (Van Amersfoort, 2004). The Moluccans now became a people in diaspora: a settled community of a population that considers itself to be 'from elsewhere' and whose common and most important goal is the realisation of a political ideal in what is seen as the *homeland* (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 152). This diaspora would have a central place between the interaction of the Moluccan and the Other and their identity politics.

4.1.2 *'Stank voor dank'*

In 1951, approximately 12.500 Moluccans arrived in the Netherlands, where they were placed in camps and monasteries: not only geographically far away from the *homeland* but also geographically and socially isolated from Dutch society (Van Amersfoort, 2004). This first group consisted of 3.578 ex-KNIL soldiers (Veenman, 2001), deprived from their military status which had been the base of their existence (Van Amersfoort, 2004). Culturally the camp population reoriented itself to the ancient pre-Christian culture – the *adat*: rules and customs that in some cases had already been faded away on the islands were revitalised to

strengthen an Ambonese[3] identity. 'Even people in the camps who had never been in the Moluccans, but had lived on Java or had been born in the Netherlands, became interested in the old traditions (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 157).' The *adat,* together with the ideal of the RMS were important parts in the forming of the diaspora.

Because the Netherlands perceived itself as a country of emigration, not of immigration, and saw the stay of the Moluccans as temporary until the time came that they could return to the Moluccan islands, their were no plans of integration of Moluccans into Dutch society, Moluccans were not permitted to enter the labour market and children were not included in the Dutch school system (Van Amersfoort, 2004). Contact with the Moluccans only went through the *kampraden* (councils of representatives) and representatives of the Dutch CAZ (Commission for Ambonese Care). The representatives of the *kampraden* were mostly non-commissioned officers from the KNIL who took the lead over their community members. However, the frustration of ex-servicemen and the oceans of time they had to fill in the camps led to intense and violent internal conflicts. Although the group formed on arrival an exceptionally homogeneous group of 'immigrants', these conflicts implicate a certain heterogeneity in religion (the majority was Christian, but there were also Catholics and a small percentage of Muslims) and in heritage (the majority was from Ambon, but other South Moluccan islands were also represented). However, their shared struggle for the *Republic Maluku Selatan* provided a sense of unity and a new social perspective now that their military career, and all that went with it, no longer provided a frame of reference (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 157).

Because the Dutch government was not by power to influence the situation in the eastern part of Indonesia, the support for the RMS in Dutch society waned while the Indonesian state established itself more firmly. This, together with the deprivation of their military status, 'made the Moluccans feel betrayed and left to their own devices *('stank voor dank')* by a government and country for which they had risked their lives and which had promised to take care of them' (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 66). As the Indonesian government was far away, the Dutch government became the more concrete enemy (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 157). Van Amersfoort (2004) contextualizes the emergence of

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[3] Initially, before 1970, Moluccans were named Ambonese, because most Moluccans came from Ambon. However, both terms are strictly speaking not correct because the Moluccan archipelago is large and maintains different customs and laws: the *adat*. One of these specific groups is the Ambonese – of whom a relatively large number belong to Protestant churches – from the island Ambon and the surrounding little islands. But when talking only about Ambonese, we forget the 10 percent Moluccans who have a different *adat*. When young Ambonese speak of Moluccan *adat*, they clearly mean Ambonese *adat* (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 171). The term South-Moluccans would be better, when talking about Moluccans who support the RMS, something done by Verkuyten (1999). This is why the RMS is the Republic Maluku *Selatan* – *Selatan* means south.

violent actions through the *zeitgeist*: a time of growing discontent among the generation of young men which even President de Gaulle of France did waver. The lack of political success of the RMS government in exile, the unwillingness of the Dutch government to support the RMS, together with the 'Moluccan fear of integration into Dutch society' which would diminish loyalty to the Moluccan community and its political ideal, and to overcome internal strife by directing actions against Indonesian objects and the Dutch, fuelled the emergence of a 'call for action'. Subsequently, the execution of Chris Soumokil in 1966, second president of the RMS, was the 'go-ahead' of violent actions of Moluccan youth, initially against Indonesian diplomatic targets – such as the raid on the Indonesian ambassador in Wassenaar in 1970 (Van Amersfoort, 2004) – later also against Dutch civilians (Veenman, 2001: 21) – such as the train hijackings in 1975 where three people were killed, and the even more dramatically ended train hijacking of 1977 at *De Punt*, where after military intervention six hijackers and two hostages were killed (Van Amersfoort, 2004). A few months before the first train hijacking, Elias Rinsampessy (1975: 4) stated that the violent actions of Moluccan youth should be regarded in a perspective of centuries of colonial domination, the decisions made during the political complications after the Second World War in Dutch-Indie and in the perspective of the Dutch policy regarding the Moluccans during their stay in the camps. By so, these actions left their mark among the Moluccans and the Dutch alike. The Dutch government took various measures to improve the situation of the Moluccans, and many changes occurred in the Moluccans' living conditions and in their position in society (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999).

4.1.3   From camp to neighbourhood

During the 1950's, the Dutch government 'simply had to admit that the 'temporary situation' was freezing into a permanent one' (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 158). Indeed, in 1957, a commission was set up to investigate the possibilities of Moluccan integration into Dutch society. In 1959, the commission came with the rapport *Ambonnezen in Nederland* which concluded that in order to integrate Moluccans in Dutch society it was needed to take into account the Moluccan identity and that their expectations in the future had to be respected as much as possible (Rinsampessy, 1975: 8). Although the rapport didn't came with a new perspective, the recommendation to construct special Moluccan neighbourhoods consisting of normal social housing to end the camp situation was in the end a kind of compromise (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 159). The neighbourhoods would be spread through municipalities in the Netherlands and the last one was completed in 1969. Rinsampessy (1975) stated that this

'Moluccan neighbourhood policy' was for him an indication that the 'in-growth process' had began. And although their was opposition – leaders feared integration into Dutch society would diminish the loyalty to the political ideal and weaken the diaspora – Moluccan leaders had come to the conclusion that further violence could only have negative consequences, both for the internal cohesion of the Moluccan neighbourhoods and for relations with their Dutch surroundings (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 165). By so, the situation of 'non-communication' with the Dutch government changed after the period of violence. This had two consequences. In the first place young intellectuals placed the situation of the Moluccan islands in a wider international perspective in which not only the situation in Ambon was regarded important. The KNIL then, of which their fathers had been so proud, was regarded as an instrument of colonial repression. Secondly, the situation in the Netherlands was not seen as a political but as a social problem. For example, a plan was made to create 1,000 jobs for Moluccans in government service. The boundary diaspora, so clearly visible since the arrival of the Moluccans till the 1970s, began to wane (Van Amersfoort, 2004).

Veenman (2001: 16) states that despite the difficult position of the Moluccans in the Netherlands – the result of an orientation and expectation of the return to the Moluccans; their geographical and social isolation from Dutch society; the strong group cohesion within Moluccan community; as well as their prohibition to join the Dutch labour market, a gradual integration process did occur: at first 'insidious' but inescapable – 'like water flowing through the dikes', and later more quick, even from within the Moluccan community. A higher number of interethnic marriages in the second generation, a lesser attention on the political struggle of the RMS in their nurture (the ideal of RMS was presented as something of the previous generations in particular (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 68)) of the third generation Moluccans and the influence of the youth culture were indications for a prediction of the American anthropologist Bartels (1989 in Veenman 2001) that the third generation would be the first to entirely integrate within Dutch society.

4.1.4 The third generation

Despite the promising outlook given above, we can see a stagnation regarding social integration of the third generation Moluccans. In 2001 approximately one third of the third generation already appeared on the labour market, in 2012 all would have the age to be part of the labor force. Veenman (2001: 23) notes relative low school results among Moluccan youth. In addition, they aren't discontent with this: *Sombong*, arrogance or haughtiness, isn't tolerated by the 'group', climbing the career ladder equalizes group abandonment (Veenman

in Schravesande: NRC 9-1-10). Although the unemployment level of Moluccans is the same as for Dutch, their employment *position* is lower, as well as their employment *level*. The number of Moluccans who have more contact with *autochtonen* (Dutch natives) than with Moluccans is lesser in 2001 than 10 years before 2001 (from 27% to 20%) (Veenman, 2001: 24).

Figure 1: The three generations of Moluccans in the Netherlands to gender with an age of 15-64 year, 2000 (in percentage).

Source: FORUM factsheet Molukkers, February 2011

4.2   Constructing the boundary

Ethnic minority identity is dependent on a range of processes of construction (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 76): constructions of boundaries which can be seen as primordial or essential to one's ethnic identity, but which are in fact discursive processes: discourses of construction through speech and act. Boundaries and the nature of identities are defined by making comparisons and arguing about them (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 67). Comparisons are made within Moluccans, with the Dutch and other ethnic minorities, such as Moroccans, in the Netherlands. Therefore, I will submit that we can perceive 1) history as a boundary; 2) *satudarah* as a boundary; and 3) the Other as a boundary.

4.2.1   History as a boundary

The history of how and why Moluccans are in the Netherlands has a function of cohesion and is the construction of a boundary in itself. Van Amersfoort (2004) named this cohesion – and loyalty for the Moluccan ideal – the boundary of a diaspora. The history of the Moluccans in the Netherlands is a history of constructing and reconstructing the binary of 'us' and 'them', from Moluccan as well as from Dutch perspective. The Netherlands itself, although remarkably homogeneous from an ethnic perspective till the period of immigration, interestingly, also has a history of binaries through the phenomenon of pillarisation

(verzuiling): a system of denominational communities who enjoy provisions that guarantee equal treatment by the state (Entzinger, 2009: 818). This system was also envisaged for the integration of immigrants. Since the Dutch colonial elite [in Indonesia] had been pillarised along dividing lines similar to those in the mother country, they could be incorporated smoothly into the existing institutional arrangements (Entzinger, 2009: 819). Although the Moluccan group was – despite of some internal conflicts (see: p. 32) – indeed quite homogeneous and could, by so, be seen as an 'ethnic pillar' – we can state that 'smooth incorporation' was not really the case. In fact, this historical immigration narrative was not only used in the construction of a boundary itself between Moluccans and the Dutch, but also between Moluccans and other ethnic groups in the Netherlands. Indeed, history is an important and essential perceived part of Moluccan identity in the Netherlands. The knowledge of shared Moluccan ethnic narratives through history, mainly from the period during and since the arrival in the 1950s, is regarded as *inevitable* for *being* a Moluccan and therefore regarded as a *primordialist* and *static* boundary'.

> *"History is important for every Moluccan, we're based on that"* (Male, 27 years old).

> *"Half Moluccan, half Indonesian, the background of my parents, for that matter I take it always with me. That's just in me and that's how I see myself"* (Male, 26 years old).

Historic narratives are used to differentiate Moluccan identity from others and as something in need of acknowledgement. Although the interviewees were very aware of the idea that Moluccan and Dutch history was intertwined during the colonial time and after the independence of Indonesia, the idea that the history has a little place, if not no place at all, in the history books at high schools in the Netherlands is the construction of a boundary in itself – as history and culture are seen as connected and as two essential parts of Moluccan ethnic identity:

> *"The Moluccan culture, at least the history, is still too unknown. We are the heritage of the whole colony, the whole Dutch history of Indonesia and the Moluccans. And as long as that doesn't stand in the history books and as long as there aren't made any excuses... Well, that [Making excuses] is a step in the right direction, not only to get acknowledgement for the first generation – that has no use anymore, most of them are already dead – but for the generation of now, in order to conclude that and to move on, that is something important, a precondition..."* (Male, 26 years old).

"I think it's a disgrace, really a disgrace, that we as Moluccans have no place in the history books. Seriously, and I will not forget that, or forgive. In my class I never noticed anything about Moluccans. Moluccans were the most loyal soldiers of the Dutch army. Even when Indonesia wanted to become independent, the Moluccans still fought for the Netherlands, to keep the Dutch on the Moluccans. They even had a Dutch flag hanging and long live the queen and that bullshit. I just think it's a disgrace… That will always be a part of me, en it will be a part of my children and the children after them. We don't even have a place in the history books, but we have done the most for you guys in Indonesia" (Male, 27 years old).

As Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur (1999: 68) noticed that although the different stances towards the RMS, 'the political struggle and hardships of these [previous] generations provided an important means of affirming a close connection. Indeed, this is an important part of Moluccan ethnic identity, which provides not only a frame of reference (Van Amersfoort, 2004), but also means a feeling of unity and belonging to one people (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999): a function of cohesion.

"I have two Moluccan friends and with them I share those things yes, certain Moluccan things. It is not so strong anymore, but sometimes we did graffiti like RMS – Republic Maluku Selatan. We put that down and I thought, this is who I am, you know" (Male, 21 years old).

Although the RMS provides a frame of reference and a feeling of unity, a distinction can be made between the perception of the RMS through first- second- and third generation Moluccans (and in the very near future the fourth and fifth generation). As shown in the following, the RMS is less relevant for the third generation than for – obviously – the first and second generation. None of the interviewees in this research – and in other researches (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999; Veenman, 2001) it was not very different – see the RMS as something still achievable. The *principle/practice* dichotomy (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999) defines the attitude of the third generation to the issue of the RMS. The RMS is mostly considered as a principle question, which is hard to put into practice.

"The RMS doesn't play a big role for me. We are the third generation; we are not really raised with that. The generation before us, they experienced it all. I can tell you less about it; you should ask the older." (Male, 22 years old).

4.2.2 *Satudarah[4]* as a boundary

The boundary created through history is the result of the treatment of the first generation Moluccans by the Dutch, given through to younger generations, and by so constructed after arrival in the Netherlands. The first (geographically very clear) boundary, however, was created by the Dutch government when they placed the Moluccans in camps and monasteries. When it became clear the stay of Moluccans would be permanent, the Moluccans themselves also began to construct boundaries, for example through a reorientation to the traditional *adat* which on the islands already merely was faded away (Van Amersfoort, 2004; Veenman, 2001). And although some 'characteristics' – such as the closeness of the community – are seen the same *here* as *there*; *"That closeness is also there, but more as one big community. People don't talk easy there, with problems people here talk very quickly, but this is different there and here [with us]"* (Male, 26 years old) – the fact that a relative small group arrived here together, also constructed a boundary through the sense of unity in itself:

> *"Are the people there [at the Moluccan Islands] as pride as we are? No, I can give you that. That is way different. You come with a small group to the Netherlands; there are a few million there. They are the norm there. We pretty much value ourselves here in the Netherlands. We feel special because there are so few Moluccans here. That's how I experienced it. This band has always been tight."* (Male, 27 years old).

> *"Yes, there [the Moluccan islands], is everyone the same, and when arriving here in the Netherlands you feel different. Then you feel pride because you have your own 'part' which you want to show.* (Male, 21 years old).

> *"Take a look at the Dutch in Canada. They feel themselves as a minority and yet they want to express their identity. They do that through Queens-day. We have RMS day, the celebration of the independence of the Republic Maluku Selatan. Then Moluccans show themselves, through a demonstration of driving with Satudarah for example."* (Male, 26 years old).

The same counts for religion. Just like the reorientation on the adat since the arrival in the Netherlands, the Moluccan church was established and Moluccans tried and still try to keep traditions high:

> *"Religion is very important; The Moluccan church which is very traditional. When you take a look at the Moluccan community, then you will see that this tradition has not changed. They still hold*

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[4] Satudarah: 'one blood', is 'officially' an (in)famous motor club founded by Moluccans in the Netherlands. The term will serve here as a metaphor regarding the feeling of unity – of 'one family' – of Moluccan ethnic identity.

on to traditions from 60 years ago, while it on the Moluccan Islands – presumably – will be more freely." (Male, 26 years old).

What we can see within this diaspora is the reconstruction of ethnic identity through the fact that the Moluccans arrived as a small ethnic group in a quite homogeneous country of Dutch people. This has strengthened the awareness of the ethnicity of many Moluccans, from a reorientation of the traditional *adat* till calling someone of the third or second generation '*oom*' (uncle) or '*tante*' (aunt). Therefore, respect and the sense of community are important perceived parts of Moluccan ethnic identity.

> *"There are uncles and aunts, that's how you call everyone here. Why do you name someone like that? Yes, that is something that you learn out of respect. Imagine I will be at the Moluccan Islands, then it would probably not be like that, but here in the Netherlands it is formed that you call everyone 'u'[5] and each other (mothers and fathers of Moluccan friends) uncle or aunt."* (Male, 21 years old).

> *"Jeah, when someone has a 'big mouth' to his father of mother, well, when I would do that, I would get a 'turn to my ears'. Or greeting someone with u [is important]. Dutch people can sometimes be very rude. Respect is important to us."* (Male, 22 years old).

The distinction between first, second and third generation Moluccans is not only noticeable in the perception on the issue of the RMS, but is also socially constructed through the commune. Respect is a term which always came back in the interviews as an important part of Moluccan culture. Obviously, the pronouncing of 'aunt' or 'uncle' is part of that; it clearly creates a distinction between the generations but at the same time it constructs the feeling and idea of unity and *oneness* between these generations though emphasising the community-life; the idea of *satudarah:*

> *"Satudarah; means 'one blood"* (Male, 22 years old).

> *"It is my people; we are one. That's how I see it. They [other Moluccans] just have to make the phone call and I'll be there"* (Male, 27 years old).

The emphasize on *satudarah* deals with the notion of 'one family' and is by so perceived as a primordial 'given'. A family – or a shared concept as *satudarah* – inherently means inclusion

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[5] In the Netherlands, there is a distinction in the usage of the word 'you'. People often say 'jij', but when one want to show more respect (such as speaking to adults, grandparents, or in a formal political debate) one will use the word 'u'.

and exclusion and therefore it is the construction of a boundary and an expression of the 'us/them' binary: in this case a very essentialist, primordialist boundary based on the 'fact' of 'having the same blood'. Therefore, *satudarah* is a subject of 'everyday primordialism'.

However, and although this emphasize on *satudarah* – or *oneness*, the interviewees were (unconsciously) aware of the fluid character of ethnic identity. Like 'water flowing though dikes', the Dutch have had, through the decennia, an inevitable influence on Moluccan ethnic identity (Veenman, 2001), and this regards defining 'real' and 'less real', more westernised or 'Dutchified' Moluccans (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999).

> *"I am as Moluccan and I am Dutch, so there is a pride in me that I am a Dutchman and there is also a pride in me that I am a Moluccan.* (Male, 21 years old).

> *"My father always told me: 'Moluccans felt like scapegoats'. Still? Not anymore, at least partly, some still have that. But Moluccans and Dutch are going better together these days.* (Male, 21 years old).

> *"I may count myself lucky that I'm born here, and yes, I'm thankful for that."* (Male, 27 years old).

The last citation is from the same interviewee who also was very critical on the role of the Dutch during the arrival of the first generation Moluccans in the Netherlands (p. 36). Although a boundary is clearly created through history, the present is not forgotten when one considers himself lucky to live here. By that, a continuum through the present is also created: an acknowledgement of the connectedness between the Dutch and the Moluccans.

4.2.3   The construction of the Other as a boundary

The construction of *satudarah* also fits in the 'desire to be distinctive': not only from the Dutch but also from other 'ethnic minorities', such as Moroccans.

> *"Moluccans, those days, didn't got the chances to develop themselves, Moroccans now are getting all the chances to develop themselves; school, work. They don't take them and are going to express themselves in that." ... "I think the difference is too big to say that the Moluccan community is the same as the Moroccan community, the history is just too long for that." (Male, 26 years old).*

> *It is not that we just came here ... just to work here. No, here we shall have that part ['our' identity] too, not only there. It is not that we shall be the lesser here." (Male, 21 years old).*

"Thinking about Moluccans is thinking about pride, respect and the desire to be distinctive from other cultures." (Male, 26 years old).

Boundaries are here constructed not only between Moluccans and the Dutch, but also between Moluccans and 'guest-workers', or economical immigrants. Moluccans will always claim that they in fact aren't immigrants; they didn't *choose* to come 'here'. By so, they don't want to be treated as any other foreigners – *"The others came here voluntarily, but the Dutch brought us here, promising that we would go back some time. We can't help being here. ... I don't want to be compared with the Turks and the Moroccans; I don't want to be considered an immigrant, because that's not what we were"* (Female, 20 years old in Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 73). Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur (1999) states that notions of freedom and responsibility are important here. As was said above, it was argued that Moluccans didn't choose to be in the Netherlands, or at least not stay in the Netherlands. Moroccans, as economic migrants, did however choose to come 'here' – *"just to work here" (Male, 21 years old)* – and therefore 'should bear the responsibility of integration' (Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 74). Hence, in the interview it was argued that 'they' – the Moroccans, did received enough chances in order to successfully integrate, in contrast to the first generation of Moluccans. How this binary can be seen as a violent hierarchy will be the topic of the next paragraph.

4.3   Violence and the reconstruction of ethnic identity

The perceived boundaries of Moluccan ethnic identity were treated in the previous paragraphs, based on history, *satudarah* and the construction of the Other. 'Us' is here defined by what is 'not-us' and thus, this is how 'us' gathers its meaning. But because meaning is created trough its relation with other things (Wylie, 2006) – its difference and interplay, the term *violent hierarchies* comes here into play. Indeed, the binary 'us/them' can also be seen as an hierarchy, knowing the Hraba, Hagendoorn and Hagendoorn (1989) research to ethnic hierarchy in the Netherlands. For the casestudy of Terweijde in Culemborg, the following citation might be useful.

"The RMS never came. So my grandpa always said to my father, and my father to me: 'don't let them walk all over you, because I never want others to experience what I experienced'. All the soldiers, who got fired from the army [KNIL], have said that to their children and you can notice

that and you can see that. When a Moluccan has a fight, he has an attitude such as; 'Bring it on!'
We shall not be put out by it." (Male, 27 years old).

We can find here the construction of a very flexible boundary, based on 1) experiences from history, 2) *satudarah* and opposed to 3) the Other. The never – physically – realized RMS provides here a frame of reference: a feeling of unity through a shared social perspective. By so, history provides *satudarah*, and this sense of unity was given through from father to son and from mother to daughter. It was subsequently the condition for an attitude which could be characterized through the expression '*stand your ground'* (Male, 21 years old), an expression opposed to the Other. The construction of this boundary is flexible because it depends on the question when, against whom and in which situation this attitude plays a big role and when not. We do can acknowledge here the assertion that boundaries between ethnic groups are indeed in essence more permeable and less definite than the boundaries of states (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 856).

"A deal was made with the Moluccans [the realization of the RMS], and then you come into an unknown country and expect to be accepted… Well, it turned out to be different. … It then only becomes stronger [the sense of identity]. Then you grow towards each other instead of towards the other so the group will only be formed worse… I mean stronger. (Male, 21 years old).*

The idea of being a minority and a lack of acknowledgement for the history or ethnic interests (RMS) can lead to a reconstruction of ethnic identity and groups. We can see that through the construction of *satudarah*, for example, through a reorientation in the traditional *adat*. We can also see this in the construction of the Other or everything which is *'not-us'*. Conflict will only strengthen the *satudarah* and by so automatically strengthen the boundary between 'us' and 'them'. The 'us/them' binary subsequently becomes more hierarchical and possibly violent – the train hijackings of 1975 and 1977 can be seen as examples of this discourse. To the question why the unity of the group becomes stronger, the answer was: "because you don't want to be effaced.

"When Moluccans came here, they didn't want to feel lesser than the people who were actually living here" (Male, 21 years old).

"Being a minority, you want to differentiate yourself. You do that by showing how big you are although you are small. You can compare it with the smallest boy in class who you should not make angry" (Male, 26 years old).

Again, the notion of acknowledgement comes back into play (after all, no one wants to feel lesser than others) and is, as mentioned in two of the interviews as well, a precondition for a continuum of good relation and a condition to blur boundaries.

"I once received a phone call: 'stay available'. You just do that then" (Male, 27 years old).

When boundaries and attitudes like these are constructed, a critical opinion about the behaviour of the own group decreases. We can notify here a learned psychological bias which leads members of ethnic groups to discount or ignore their own leader's involvement in producing ethnic conflict, so that the Other takes all the blame (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 854; see also p. 26). At the same time, it is interesting to see how the interviewees were acknowledging the similarity with Moroccans as an ethnic minority. They too were supposed to have an attitude of 'stand your ground'.

"In Culemborg played this [attitude] a big role I think. And Moroccans are just like that. It is an addition: 1 + 1 = 2" (Male, 27 years old).

4.4   Beyond the boundary

When we take a closer look at the discourses which formed this historical narrative, we can see an overarching discourse: a discourse of obstructing while at the same time constructing interaction between Moluccans and the Dutch, 'a push and pull game' motivated by the fear to loose 1) one's ethnic identity and by that, 2) one's loyalty for the 'group' and its ultimate ideal (Van Amersfoort, 2004). This overarching discourse corresponds very much to the idea that a groups' identity is created through difference and interplay, that is has only meaning in the context of involving the Other. Therefore, the Moluccan' (re)construction of boundaries has to be seen as a constant negotiation in a Dutch context: it was the Dutch who 'brought' the Moluccans in a diaspora, it was the Dutch who became the more concrete opponent in the struggle for the RMS during the 1960s and 1970s and it was during this period that the construction of boundaries was not only active but also violent. The train hijackings are notorious examples of these boundary-construction discourses. From a Dutch perspective, we can see quite the same: they 'placed' the Moluccans in camps, geographically isolated from the Dutch. The Dutch didn't see themselves as a country receiving immigrants (Entzinger, 2009).

However, the remembrance of the first Moluccans came to the Netherlands 60 years ago already past us by, and the Netherlands became a multicultural country. Therefore, we

should not only see the (re)construction of boundaries in a context of constant negotiation with the Dutch, but also in the context of a constant negotiation with other immigrants and minorities, such as Moroccans.

Not all Moluccans were willing to leave the camps for the neighbourhood. Those who still had the hope for the RMS resisted against Dutch integration (Van Amersfoort, 2004). But in the end both saw interaction as inevitable and necessary to overcome conflict. The Dutch wanted the Moluccans to integrate in Dutch society and to see the Moluccan culture 'vanish' in the Dutch, the Moluccans wanted to keep their identity through leaders of camps and later of neighbourhoods, through radical youth hijacking trains because they feared that Moluccan identity and culture would vanish. By that they – unconsciously – were aware of the constructivist or circumstantialist position of their ethnic identity. The reconstruction of Moluccan ethnic identity in contrast to the Dutch and their desire to differentiate themselves from other minorities ('who, different from Moluccans, voluntarily did come to the Netherlands in order to make money') and the different position they therefore claim, could therefore be seen as a protection-mechanism. Indeed, Moluccan identity and customs were in fact reconstructed at the very moment they set foot on Dutch land.

The policies made by the Dutch to integrate the Moluccans in Dutch society were programs heavily contested by many Moluccan leaders – by the fear of loosing the Moluccan identity. This was not only the case with the unwillingness to move from the camps to Moluccan neighbourhoods, but also with the program to led Moluccans fly to Indonesia to see were there parents lived and the plan to create 1.000 jobs for Moluccans in the government (Van Amersfoort, 2004: 167). It is seen in the perception the Netherlands had as a country of emigration and not of immigration and 'our' incompetence to deal with newly arrived 'migrants' – to lock them in camps. When blurring the boundaries, it is necessary to acknowledge the paradox between the essential perceived history – "were all Moluccans are based on" – and the very pragmatic attitude, mostly of the third generation, towards the RMS, which has to be seen more symbolic then really something striving for. We can see here that history is continually (re)interpreted according to the context of the day. An acknowledgement for this would undermine the 'everyday primordialist' beliefs and one cause less for ethnic violence.

5 | Moroccan Ethnic Narratives

5.1   Moroccan narratives through time and space

One of the important questions concerning the construction of ethnic identity would Foucault's question already asked in the introduction of part II: *'How have we become what we are?'* (Foucault, 1984: 43 in Harrison, 2006: 126). Just like the construction of Moluccan ethnic identity, the construction of Moroccan ethnic identity needs to be treated historically and within and against Dutch society in order to create the necessarily context. However, as an ethnic group exists through a shared belief in a common descent (Weber, 1968: 389 in Verkuyten, van de Calseijde, de Leur, 1999: 44), treating only the history would be insufficient in scrutinizing Moroccan ethnic identity. Something, which unites Moroccans through history, is their shared belief in Islam: many Moroccans consider Islam as their primary identity (Quarasse and van de Vijver, 2004: 203). Moroccans subsequently use their Muslim identity in order to participate in the Dutch society and by doing so they try to relief themselves of the 'bad reputation' of Moroccan identity and its association with crime (De Koning, 2008: 93). Indeed, the Moroccan community in the Netherlands is low on the ethnic hierarchy scale (Quarasse and van de Vijver, 2004: 203; Hraba, Hagendoorn and Hagendoorn, 1989) and can be seen as the one of the groups whose integration is the most problematic of the recent five largest immigration groups in the Netherlands (Crul and Doomernik, 2003: 1040). However, there are some major differences in the situation of Moroccans in the Netherlands in contrast with other immigration groups. In order to scrutinize Moroccan ethnic identity in the Netherlands, it is needed to treat the historical background as well as the specific cultural and political positions in the 'homeland' first.

5.1.1   Berbers & Barbarians

One of the main examples of the process of *othering* within the border production process would be the ancient Roman usage of the word 'barbarian'. This word constructs a clear 'us versus them' binary and is the means of a system constructing a certain inclusion and exclusion. Therefore, it is most interesting and ironic that most Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands have their roots in this name, how plural and divers "they" – the "Berbers" – in fact are. Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands came mainly from peripheral regions – 65 percent comes from the Riff – and by so, a large number of migrants are Berbers (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 240). The term 'barbarians' is a negative way to describe and define what Berbers are *not* instead of what they are: their diversity across other

characteristics was not considered as relevant (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 235). And although only ruins remember of the Roman civilisation in Northern Africa, the distinction between Berbers in the *Bled El Siba* (land of dissent) and Others – now Arabs – in the *Bled El Makhzen* (land of government) is still convincing (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 236). Their relationship became (and still is) a complicated mosaic of dynamic relationships – unified by Islam but divided by language. Processes of unification in postcolonial Morocco by the 'new' independent kingdom were rejected by the population of the Riff – the Berbers, who had a tradition of resistance against Romans, Arabs, the Spanish colonial settlers and now the Arabs of Morocco again. Although their rebellion was ferociously suppressed and the fear for disloyalty of Berbers for the central rule remained, the central government has sought means to incorporate the cultural heritage of the Berbers. This was needed because people from the Riff began to urbanize which blurred clear dividing lines between the Arabs and the Berbers: in 1912, the population counted 5 million heads from which 90 percent lived in rural areas. In 1998 the population was grown to 28 million from which 50 percent lived in cities and from which 40-50 percent were assumed to be Berber (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 238). Therefore, the term 'Berber', with its negative legacy, was changed to '*Amazigh*' and a Royal Institute of Amazigh culture (IRCAM) was founded in 2001. However, the process of constructing a unity from a fragmented *Bled El Siba* and *Bled El Makhzen* and at the same time incorporating the cultural heritage of the Berbers which stresses differences is inherently tensioned. This quest for identity became not only difficult for the Berbers and Arabs in Morocco, but also for Berber and Arab immigrants who left Morocco to work and live in Northern Europe and experienced difficulties of preserving their language and cultural heritages.

5.1.2 Guest-working in the Netherlands

After the Second World War, the Dutch economy recovered way more rapidly than was expected and resulted in the growth of its industrial sector. This demanded relatively low investments and high numbers of unskilled or low-skilled labour (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 243). Workers from Mediterranean areas, such as Morocco, initially filled these places. Recruitment agreements were made with Morocco, such as in 1969, and focused mainly on the lowest socioeconomic strata – such as the Riff. Before these agreements, immigration was quite irregular and the first 'guest-workers' came on their own initiative. Many had for example tried their luck first in Belgium or Germany before coming to the Netherlands (Crul and Doomernik, 2003: 1041). The vast majority of these 'first generation'

Moroccan immigrants were indeed low-skilled and finished only primary school or Quran school before working for 15 or 20 years in the Dutch factories. In this period, a low emphasize lay upon integration, while, as said before, the Netherlands did not perceived itself as a country of immigration (Entzinger, 2009) This is why Moroccan immigrants were called 'guest-workers' and therefore were supposed to leave after they made enough money. Moroccan immigrants themselves regarded their migration to Europe as an extension of the experience they had with systems of circular migration, which had already existed for generations in peasant areas – especially in the Riff (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 244) and therefore also as temporary. Issues of identity and integration were therefore – by both – not seen as very important or necessary. This changed when the termination of guest-worker recruitment had not generated the massive return to the 'homeland' but had triggered more immigration instead (Crul and Doomernik, 2003: 1043). In 1965, only 4500 Moroccans were living in the Netherlands, in 1998 there were more than 163.000 and by 2007, this number had increased to 329.493 from which more than a third was under the age of 20 (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 245). This brought a change in Dutch politics as well as in the 'identity politics' of Moroccans themselves.

5.1.3   From multiculturalism to integration to assimilation

For the Dutch – which country was remarkably homogeneous from an ethnic perspective – it was interesting that the government now introduced the notion of ethnicity as a basis for differential policy-making in stead of on the more commonly used basis of religious or political orientation. The Dutch government acknowledged that most migrants would stay in the Netherlands, followed by their families, and that their integration therefore should be encouraged through promoting equal treatment while at the same time aiming to preserve the communities' cultural identity (Entzinger, 2007: 819). This discourse fits in the former discourse called the *pillarisation* of Dutch community (see also p. 35). Critics however claimed that stressing these ethnic differences would become an obstacle for integration rather than a catalyst of it. And indeed, in 1989 a report came out which stated that the policy had not been able to prevent massive low-skilled immigrant unemployment after the restructuring of the Dutch industry in the 1980s. Immigration became a growing burden, and a new ethnic underclass was emerging (Entzinger, 2007: 820-821). The multicultural approach shifted to a policy of integration after seeing that cosmopolitanism and their cultural relativism had allegedly prevented newcomers to adapt and respect for cultural difference had prevailed over defending the principles of liberal democracy. It was this discourse that led to a rise of fear for

further immigration, especially from Muslim countries. The leading idea became that it was migrants' themselves who were to blame for their slow integration. This led to the paradox that migrants who initially had been encouraged to preserve their own identity were now blamed for insufficiently identifying with Dutch culture (Entzinger, 2007: 824-825). Although religious and ethnic diversity is no longer considered as a public responsibility, many public and parliamentary debates in the past few years have focused precisely on religion and in particular Islam. We can see here the *ethnicisation* of the Islam (De Koning, 2008: 105): "One can only guess what impact the constant linking of Islam, security and immigration has had on public opinion in the Netherlands, both on the native population and on immigrants (Phalet and Ter Wal 2004 in Entzinger, 2007: 825).

5.2   Identity politics of Moroccans: the construction of boundaries

Because identity is fluid and ethnic boundaries are *situationally* constructed, there is a constant negotiation regarding one's own identity, but also with the identity of the Other (De Koning, 2008). Boundaries are made on the basis of culture and religion, through the construction of the Self and through the construction of the Other. The next quotation from a Dutch-Moroccan interviewee is a good example of why identity is constructed through what it is *not*, through what is *absent* from it (Wylie 2006: 300):

> *"Identity…? I am not a Dutchman, no. I am a Moroccan!"* (Male, 22 years old).

The situation of Moroccans is therefore, just as with Moluccan ethnic narratives, described in a Dutch context. However, far more disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances and no shared elements of history or language with the Dutch were characteristics which set them apart from other major immigrants – with an exception for the Turkish immigrants/guest-workers (Crul and Doomernik, 2003: 1041). Because Moroccan 'immigrants' were initially not really seen as immigrants by the Dutch, but more as workers – Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum (2007) call this discourse 'from worker to immigrant' – the notion of identity or religion was not very relevant or important. First generation guest-workers were not confronted with these questions because they were still rooted in their villages and family backgrounds (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 846). Therefore, identity politics for Moroccan immigrants were initially not very important, and as said above, not required in a society which regarded these immigrants as temporarily and did put great emphasize on preserving one's identity through the heritage of the system of *pillarisation*. However, when

Moroccans' stay in the Netherlands became more permanent, differences became obviously more relevant.

"I think it is difficult for Moroccans that their parents received no education; that they did not participate in this society. Like my father; who worked here for 40 years, but never did voluntarily work, who was never socially involved, who never participated ... who never went to a café to know what is going on there. Because there are also nice things about a café, not only people who are getting drunk and are bounced out of the café. These are things ... you get no feedback. For the youth this really is a problem" (Male, 30 years old).

These differences have a cultural aspect, but especially a religious one. Before the migration the question 'how do I maintain as a Muslim?' was not relevant. Although the first generation immigrants were regarding themselves Muslim, they did not practice it that much. Later, after the migration to the Netherlands, a lot of immigrants began to a reorientation on Islam. At first, this was because of their 'imagined kinship' with Morocco. After the reunification with their families it became even stronger (De Koning, 2008: 108). An explanation is the very 'us' and 'them' binary. It was (and is) for example way more difficult to maintain a state of 'purity' when one is in constant interaction with non-Muslims. Secondly, the nurture of children restricts the 'time of experimenting' of the parents, and provides a role for Islam in the nurture. Thirdly, when social and economic participation were not enough anymore (Entzinger, 2007: 828), the Dutch government and society increasingly linked the behaviour of immigrants with Islam, which placed interests on the sense of religion of these immigrants (De Koning, 2008: 109).

5.2.1 Social inequality and the Other

In the interviews with Moroccan interviewees, little emphasize was placed on history. The current position of Dutch-Moroccans in the Netherlands and the sense of social inequality were perceived as way more important and as a boundary between 'us' and 'them'.

"In the Randstad, it is far more difficult to find a job. You can send ten letters of application, the same they you receive nine back negatively. Yes, the last name: even when you are the best out of the selection, through the last name; you will not fit in the group" (Male, 21 years old).

For the interviewees, this boundary is based upon the Other's judgement of essential aspects, such as one's last name or one's physical appearance. It is a process of constant negotiation

with the Other, and by that a subject of change, but perceived as primordial: as something fixed through one's essential appearance.

> *"When I walk on the street, I see people looking at me, and then I feel different, you know. And because I feel different, I will defend myself way quicker"* (Male, 19 years old).

> *"At school, at football, I was the first foreigner. People know you look different – also a form of identity"* (Male, 30 years old).

> *"Appearance is most certainly important. That is not only important with Dutch-Moroccans… When you walk in with a 'hanekam' [a ''uncommon' haircut], people will also have something like ... even through you can be the best in what you are doing"* (Male, 21 years old).

In the last quotation, we can identity an unconscious acknowledgement of the negative social position of Dutch-Moroccans in Dutch society. The interviewee states that appearance is important and puts in the example of a person doing a job interview when having an 'uncommon' haircut. He or she faces the chance of getting judged by that in a negative way, even when the qualities and competences of that person would be the best for the job. But to equalize a person with an uncommon and even rebellious haircut with ethnic Dutch-Moroccans – by making this comparison – is significant. The same 'taken-for-granted' attitude regarding ethnic identity and its physical appearance is showed in the following citation.

> *"Of course, you notice people looking at you" (*Male, 21 years old).

There is not even a question why and this attitude was significant for the other interviews: all of them were fully aware of their differences through their physical appearance – a very 'fixed', essential and primordial awareness. However, at the same time interviewees acknowledged how identity is always negotiated with the Other. To the question why not everyone is succeeding in Dutch society, an interviewee stated:

> *"This is due through two things: (1) making loose from and (2) accepting by. Making one loose from one's own culture – you have to know that you do not have an option: if you want to succeed, you have to participate. Although there are aspects in your culture that are restricting, you have to go beyond that and be open. First you have to be open in stead of making prejudgements. On the other hand: when you do effort, the people have to be open for it. When someone participates, you have to know how much effort this cost – than you will understand it better. And then you find*

that it is very normal for yourself. The same happened with Dutch who immigrated to Canada, or Dutch to Spain, or wherever. That is exactly the same. In every movement and change of place you have to let things loose of what you have and you have to be open for… That is not always easy" (Male, 30 years old).

It is important to acknowledge that success is linked with two processes, an intrinsic process (making the self free from his/her own culture) and an extrinsic process (accepting by the 'host-society'). This is acknowledged through research by Quarasse and van de Vijver, (2004: 202), who showed that perceived mainstream tolerance is associated positively with work-success. However, these two processes are hardly put into practice. The integration process is not a two-sided process. It is a process which only expects one side to adapt through 'a dominant discourse of straightforward assimilation' in order to identify with Dutch culture, adopt Dutch traditions, speak Dutch in as many situations as possible and choose Dutch friends and spouses (Entzinger, 2007: 826).

"Politics have said a lot on paper: 'integration, integration…' But it is not that you have to know that the queen of the Netherlands is named Beatrix, or that people like 'boerenkool met worst' or 'andijvie'. It is about the communication. In fact, there should not be an integration-course but a communication-course. 'How do I communicate with the Dutch in an optimal and effective way?' And that is not what is happening right now. It often goes wrong in the communication" (Male, 30 years old).

Through this discourse, people do acknowledge that ethnic identity is fluid and can change over time. This is in paradox with their essential perceived cultural and religious heritage. The same interviewee as above was aware of this:

"I do not think that I kept my own identity. I do not think I received the possibilities for that. Because you had to… you have to see it like this… thinking and feeling are two different things. The feeling, being very emotional through origin and nurture, being very familial. When you look at the Dutchman, he is very rational, having specific principles. In this we are, through my nurture, backward. So I had to let this loose in order to participate in this society" (Male, 30 years old).

The aspects scrutinized above all demand a certain loyalty from the Moroccans in the Netherlands. The Dutch rapport *'etnische minderheden'* (ethnic minorities) from 1979 already acknowledged this discourse (see p. 13 for the quotation). First, Dutch-Moroccans have their ethnic identity, mostly Berber or Arab. Secondly, it is expected that 'the primary loyalty of

the Muslims should lie in the Netherlands, and not elsewhere' (Entzinger, 2007: 831). Thirdly, Moroccans' primary identity is a religious one – Islamic – and by that, Moroccans in the Netherlands live between four different but interconnected worlds.

5.2.2 Living between four worlds

Young Moroccans – the second generation – were raised with a different school system, questions about religion, and differences between the languages at school and at home. They were confronted with four different but interconnected worlds: (1) a Dutch one, (2) an Arab-speaking Moroccan one; (3) a Berber one and an (4) Islamic one. The ethnic identity – the distinction between an Arab speaking Moroccan or a Berber – is here seen as primordial:

> *"When the national [Moroccan] football team plays you will just support Morocco, but when you meet other Moroccans, the question always asked is: "Are you a Berber or an Arab?" And that is always something to keep in the back of the mind ... a distinction there is absolutely made."* (Male, 21 years old)

> *"Because of the different culture/nurture you received, you will have a different attitude. Therefore, you will have the tension to react differently, or by not participating in ... a birthday for example. A birthday is in the Netherlands of course very important. Are you participating or not? Do you invite your friends or not? That can just be that piece through which you will be accepted or not. I experienced this as difficult"* (Male, 30 years old).

Culture here is seen as a 'given', as *a-priori* and as determining for one's behaviour and attitude in society. Although interconnected, these worlds can be conflicting and therefore posing difficult dilemmas for young Moroccans as an ethnic minority in the Netherlands (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 847), such as the distinction made between the Arab and the Berber one, or the Islamic/Moroccan and the Dutch one. The Moroccan in fact uses his or her Muslim identity in relation with his or her ethnic identity – "faith makes it different" (De Koning, 2008: 71), reflected in two different processes which can be called the (1) *ethnicisation* of the Islam or the (2) *religiounisation* of ethnicity (De Koning, 2008: 105). These processes mark the interconnectedness of the ethnic identity of Moroccans with their religious identity, such as claiming a Moroccan is the same as a Muslim. It also constructs a boundary between ethnic identities based on religion. As a respond to the question whether religion is an important part of one's identity, an interviewee said:

"Sure, the Islam is important; it comes from the area I come from. It binds us together" (Male, 22 years old)

We can see here again the discourse of combining religion and ethnicity. However, we should treat Islam as something beyond ethnicity (De Koning, 2008: 88), and as something which only strengthen the perception of being an 'ethnic minority' or 'being different' (De Koning, 2008: 105). We can see from the quotation above how Islam has a unifying function in further ethnically divided country of Arabs and Berbers. Subsequently, De Koning (2008: 71) observes an increasing 'gap' between 'the Dutchman' and the Muslim identity of Moroccans, while at the same time – and very consciously – this Muslim identity is used by Moroccans to participate in Dutch society. Muslim identity therefore enables and restricts interaction with non-Muslims. Moroccans are faced with this paradoxical discourse that seems to provide a guarantee for future conflicts in Dutch society (De Koning, 2008: 71).

Especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and more closely the murder on Theo van Gogh in November 2004, anti-Islam feelings in the Netherlands were rising as well as an awareness of the religious identity of Muslims in a non-Islamic society (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum, 2007: 253). Together with the killing of Pim Fortuyn in May 2002, the murder on Theo van Gogh led to a countrywide series of assaults on mosques and Muslim schools (Entzinger, 2007: 817). The idea of a 'struggle against Islam' constructs a boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims which becomes increasingly tight. Subsequently, when this idea is rising, ethnic and/or religious boundaries become sharper and in fact even become hostile, 'stronger' boundaries are needed in order to secure the group maintenance (De Koning, 2008: 85).

"Before 2001 the Friday pray was in a lot of cities 0 percent or something. Because of those happenings in 2001 and the responds of Europe and America – the propaganda – it was almost immediately 80 percent. Everyone was against us. And for the integration – the real integration – that would be dangerous. You begin to push people in a corner, and a cat in the corner makes weird jumps. You do not get the effect you want to achieve" (Male, 30 years old).

This quotation expresses a reconstruction of religious identity after the clash of 9/11 and the increased tension between Muslims and non-Muslims, expressed by Han Entzinger (2009: 817), de Koning (2008) and others. He describes a climate of increased sensitivity regarding immigration in general and Islam in particular, in which the events of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington could only reinforce the impression that a 'clash of civilisations'

as first predicted by Samuel Huntington in 1993, would be imminent (Entzinger, 2007: 823. Subsequently, research showed that Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands are becoming more religious involved when they feel less accepted and discriminated (Phalet and Haker, 2004 in De Koning, 2008: 77), and by so, this climate in fact enabled a reorientation on Islam. However, by combining immigration, integration and religion (Islam) in one statement, Entzinger (2009) and the quotation above (Male, 30 years old) both are connecting religious identity with ethnic identity. This is what de Koning (2008) means with the *ethnicisation* of Islam. An example would be the findings of researches (Kanmaz, 2003; Demant, 2005 in De Koning, 2008: 41) which show that after 'September 11' Dutch-Moroccan youth increasingly are categorized as Muslims – with a negative emphasize on the word Muslim. This is a paradoxical discourse – Moroccans have the feeling that they are increasingly be seen as Muslims and perceive this as stigmatizing and discriminating, but at the same time this is exactly a trigger for them to deepen their knowledge in the sources of Islam (De Koning, 2008). This is the reconstruction of a religious boundary on itself and enables the Dutch to categorize: 'the way how young Muslims perceive and practice their religion is influenced by Muslims, but also through non-Muslims. We can see the Islam a 'tool' for Moroccans to adapt in Dutch society with their Muslim identity, not as a Moroccan with its negative association, but as a Muslim since Islam is universal (De Koning, 2008: 93). De Koning (2008: 104) called this a 'struggle of negotiation', dominated by Dutch non-Muslims who place this on the political agenda and by so 'over-communicate' in stead of 'under-communicate', with the result that Islam is seen as a 'religion of resistance'. Important to note here is that Dutch-Moroccans are more sensitive for arguments regarding one's religion than one's identity: where there is a certain acknowledgement for the negative reactions on Dutch-Moroccans, negative arguments regarding Islam however are seen as unfair and insulting. According to De Koning (2008: 94), this can be a strong precondition for conflict.

"In addition, the media is always negative and tells lies. The Islam for example is very peaceful; you will find that yourself when you are there yourself" (Male, 22 years old).

5.3   The Media

In accordance to the citation above, all of the Dutch-Moroccan interviewees in this research placed critical side-notes to the role of the media, primary television for the current position of Dutch-Moroccans in Dutch society and the shift towards a policy of straightforward

assimilation. It was claimed the media was always negative and in fact *caused* problems and conflicts.

> *"I think that the media for 80 percent caused the problems [in Terweijde, Culemborg]"* (Male, 30 years old).

Of course, the media always takes a greater interest in the unusual rather than in the ordinary, in the exception rather than in the rule. Therefore, the media have been under fire for depicting immigrants primarily as 'people of concern' (Entzinger, 2007: 827). Fearon and Laitin (2000: 849) are concerned with 'weak, primordial arguments' sometimes found in the mouth of politicians seeking to justify courses of action or by journalists reporting everyday primordialist beliefs as historical facts. Indeed, the founders of the Forum Against Ethnic Violence (1993) were concerned by the resurgence of primordialist conceptions of social difference among protagonists in former Yugoslavia ánd by the acceptance of these conceptions by many journalists and political analysts (Allen and Seaton, 1999). It is sometimes claimed that 'it was the media that made Pim Fortuyn into a true 'hype' by letting him dominate most talk-shows: a serious analysis of the issues at stake was lacking in many of these programmes' (Entzinger, 2007: 827.

> *"When that conflict [Terweijde, Culemborg] was being magnified by the media, of course others too did not search contact with each other. Then only these families [who were seen as the main conflicting parties] remained with each other"* (Male, 21 years old).

> *"Actually it was after 9/11 and the reaction of a lot of Moroccans and the Israel-Palestina problem where the Netherlands is making a very special policy on, plus a lot of problems with Moroccan youth in the cities, that helped Wilders into power. And the people 'in the South' who only open that 'Telegraaf' and are for a while behind the internet. It is never the people who deepened their knowledge in persons or problems … what are the reasons of the behaviour of those people, what drives them… (Male, 30 years old).*

Although the media can indeed act as a catalyst for the beliefs of many in the Netherlands – such as, according to one interviewee, the 'people in the South' who only open the 'Telegraaf' to know what is going on – Entzinger (2009) is critical on this perception. The media does not have the power to set an agenda that is not broadly shared by their audience i.e. the electorate, whose persistent feelings of dissatisfaction with politics in general, and with immigration and

integration in particular, account for the structural nature of the shift in public opinion over the past few years (Entzinger, 2007: 827).

5.4   Violence and the reconstruction of ethnic identity

"Three, four years ago on every corner there was a police-car [in Culemborg]; *cars patrolling through the neighbourhood. Every time someone got arrested. Of course those guys will feel the pressure. When you are so impressed by the police it is just waiting for an expression"* (Male, 21 years old).

As a consequence of the construction of a boundary through the social inequality with the Other – the Dutch non-Muslims (De Koning, 2008) – violence is here explained as the result of the difficult position of Moroccans in the Netherlands. Just as the distrusting attitude towards the media, this position can determine violence action, because Moroccans are being seen as a 'cat pushed in the corner, who can make weird jumps' (see p. 55). In combination with notions of *everyday primordialism,* this can create dispersion for violence:

"Moluccans and Moroccans are like water and fire. We are pride, you know, we shall not be put out by it" (Male, 22 years old).

Although water is of course very much 'fluid' and fire very much 'unpredictable', the characters of the elements are perceived as very fixed and unchangeable: one will already know what is about to happen when we mix these elements. Therefore, water and fire would be the ultimate examples of essentialist, 'fixed' entities. However, let's have a look at the last sentence. "We shall not be put out by it" was also used by a Moluccan interviewee. Indeed, the combination of everyday primordialism and the unity of the group towards the Other, call it *satudarah*, call it something else, creates a possibly violent boundary or hierarchy. It is a negative statement, *opposed* to the Other, rather than *with* the Other. We can see here that the idea of belonging to a group necessarily involves differentiating one's self or one's group from an Other, therefore, identity construction necessarily entails the potential for a violent, antagonistic relationship with the Other. Therefore, it is likely that one is less critical at the behaviour of the own group and even more at the Other.

"Before that [the riots in Culemborg] *they* [Moluccans and Moroccans] *were getting along together. "When that conflict [Terweijde, Culemborg] was being magnified by the media, of*

course others too did not search contact with each other. Then only these families [who were seen as the main conflicting parties] remained with each other" (Male, 21 years old).

We can see here the reconstruction of ethnic boundaries through conflict, magnified by the media or not. Although it were probably only a few persons having a fight, it reconstructed feelings of choosing sides in this 'us/them' binary – which resulted in not searching contact with the Other. Despite possible mutual attitudes (see previous page and also p. 44) and understandings:

"When you look at the history of the Moluccans, the history of people who suffered repression, the roots, the parents… When the moment is there that something happens what you feel as a treat, you can respond very impulsive and wrong. That is not, eh, through language or talking, but through grabbing materials and through fighting. Despite yes, that these people in fact need each other, because they experienced the same. By so, we can also compare Moluccans and Moroccans in many ways" (Male, 30 years old).

5.5   Beyond the boundary

Although people are not born imprisoned in their culture (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 860), respondents of both Moluccan and Moroccan ethnic identity perceive their ethnic identity as something essential and primordial. It was said that having a different culture and nurture determined the behaviour of Dutch-Moroccans in a different Dutch society. However, as we can see from history – just like the reorientation to the *adat* with first generation Moluccans in the Netherlands – it was the arrival in the Netherlands and the reunion with the family what made Moroccan 'guest-workers' reorient to Islam – the primary identity of Dutch-Moroccans and a differentiation from Dutch society. Although Moroccans arrived more individual to the Netherlands, something which we can still see in the differences within the Moroccan community (such as the distinction between a Berber and an Arab), Islam turned out to be a unifying aspect, just as it was in Morocco. In addition, one interviewee claimed that he did not got the chance to keep his own identity in order to succeed in Dutch society. Let beside the pressure this had given to him and gives to other Dutch-Moroccans today, it shows that ethnic identity is something 'fluid' and indeed circumstantialist.

"Of course I feel Dutch. I no nothing except for living here. Anyone who says he does not feel Dutch is lying, even to himself. You can not deny you are Dutch, even through you look like a Moroccan" (Male, 22 years old).

Part III | "Two truths, one future": the case of Culemborg

"It is also such rubbish to say that this is an ethnic conflict. It would mean that we have some kind of Hutu's and Tutsi's over there or something."
Interviewee "Twee waarheden in Culemborg"

The headliner of the Telegraaf of January the 5th 2010 – '*Race riots; Moroccans and Moluccans from all over the country in state of war'* – and of course the happenings themselves gave rise to a lot of public discussion, already mentioned in the introduction. The aim of this part is not to write down exactly what happened, where it happened, when it happened, who was involved. The why however is very interesting and subject of a lot of different 'truths'. Two years after the New Years Eve riots of 2009-2010, a documentary was made under the name 'Twee waarheden in Culemborg' ("Two truths in Culemborg"). This title allows us to agree with Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who stated that there are no facts, only interpretations. Two years after the escalating riots during New Years Eve in Terweijde, its habitants come together in a gathering centre in Culemborg in order to discuss 'how to move on'. It was recorded and broadcasted, and Jeroen Pauw, a well-known host from the Dutch talk show 'Pauw en Witteman', led the discussion under the name "Pauw in Culemborg". After this discussion, the documentary of 38 minutes was broadcasted to create the necessary context, which the name already mentioned above.

The documentary itself was part of a special broadcast dedicated to the problems in Terweijde, Culemborg and was shown on Dutch television on December the 21st, 2011 and inspired by the approach of an American documentary: "Tho Towns of Jasper (2002)"[6], which gave two directors – one white, one black – the assignment to make a documentary about a very controversial and racist murder in Jasper, Texas. The result was interesting: two totally opposite truths were claimed. After this, the involved sat down to talk (Pauw in 'Pauw in Culemborg', 2011: 3:30). The same approach was envisioned for the conflict in Terweijde, and the comparison made already gives an impression of the expected discourse of *everyday primordialism* by putting two 'fundamentally' different perceived ethnic identities in one room to talk.

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[6] http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0303411/

6 | Like water and fire?

"I just don't get why it has to take so long, why they won't give each other just a hand and: 'sand over it' people, let us together… - 'in the end we will all go to one heaven?"

<div align="right">Dutch habitat of Terweijde in "Twee waarheden in Culemborg", 8:50</div>

6.1   A tensed atmosphere

In reaction, the host of the town meeting – 'Pauw in Culemborg', noticed that, hopefully, the time of going to heaven would still take a while. But in the meantime: 'how to move on?' A necessary question, knowing that the situation in Terweijde is still tensed:

> *"Moroccans…? Moluccans…? There is still a tensed atmosphere!"* (Moroccan responds in 'Pauw in Culemborg, 2011)

Indeed, this reaction, somewhere in the end of the discussion, seemed to be foreseeing. Although the constructive character of the discussion 'Pauw in Culemborg (2011) – agreed was not to wait for the municipality to intervene but to gather together on own initiative, without camera's etc, and to respond when one's own group is misbehaving – half a year later, on June 24th 2012, *the Telegraaf* and other Dutch newspapers came with the following news message: *"CULEMBORG - Saturday-evening, the police has arrested three men for public violence. The arrest follows to a conflict between a group Moroccans and a group Moluccans"* (The Telegraaf 24-6-12). Interestingly, according to this news message, we can not speak of conflicting Moroccan or Moluccan youth; the men were 47, 55 and 58 years old. The problem seems to be 'deeply' rooted in the community of Terweijde, a preposition heavily contested by participants of the documentary "Twee waarheden in Culemborg".

> *"The Moluccans and the Moroccans are not standing opposed to each other, diametrically ready for war. It is not true, it is just not true. They can say whatever they want, this is just an asocial fight between families"* (Moroccan interviewee in "Twee waarheden in Culemborg", 8:00)

> *"It is a clash between specific numbers of boys in a pubertal age. But you are of course dealing with a group who stand up for each other. And if there is indeed a Moroccan boy beaten up, he will get his friends and family, that is for a Moluccan exactly the same. What you will get is a conflict between one or two individuals that escalates very easily until groups are standing right against each other.* (Moluccan interviewee in "Twee waarheden in Culemborg", 8:18)

Let us go back to the starting point of the 'Twee waarheden in Culemborg': September 2009 – although Ahmed in 'Pauw in Culemborg' noted that it started earlier. The 'picturesque' Culemborg becomes national news after the clash of Moroccan and Moluccan youth. In a shoarma-shop two 16-year old boys got into a fight with each other. One slaps the shoarma-sandwich out of the hands the other. The one was Moluccan, the other was Moroccan. This was the beginning of a 'chain-reaction' (TV-host in 'Twee waarheden in Culemborg), escalating during New Years Eve 2009-2010.

> *"The following day, a couple of hundred men, friends of the Moluccan boy who joined the F-side of Ajax, walk there on the side where the Moroccans live with stones and wooden sticks despite it was not the boy from Terweijde who had a fight with the Moluccans"* (Moroccan habitant of Terweijde in 'Twee waarheden in Culemborg").

When taking a look at the chapter 'ethnicity & violence' on p. 25, we see that the citation above meets some requirements when calling something ethnic violence. We can most certainly speak of (1) a certain animosity against the ethnic other, in this case against Moroccans because that is where they were going with stones and wooden sticks. Secondly, actors would justify their actions through standing up for one of its members – but this does not have to be ethnical because the person was also member of the F-side; a group football supporters of the club Ajax Amsterdam. Thirdly, the attackers were, according to the opinion above, indeed indifferent about the identity of their perceived victims – they just went to a place Moroccans live and not to the person who actually was involved.

When one takes a quick look at the situation and sees a Moroccan group and a Moluccan group standing against each other, one can indeed claim that there is 'ethnic violence' going on there. Or a Moroccan-Moluccan war, as one of the attendees of the town-meeting notes ("Pauw in Culemborg"). But, as said on p. 25, "contrary to the implicit, and sometimes explicit, view of many accounts, war (or in this case a riot) is not the product of natural differences, but of social processes. To treat ethnicity as something primal and natural is to conflate the concept with discredited understandings of race" … "It follows that there is no special category to ethnic war, but that all war has a ethnic aspect" (Allen and Seaton, 1999: 2 and 3). When deepening one's knowledge about the history and the current social position of both Moluccans and Moroccans in Dutch society, one can indeed state that the conflicts in Terweijde are social processes. It is not an incident, neither is it something inherent to the neighbourhood.

6.2 'Kuddegedrag'

We can notify an agreement on the perceived origin of the conflict – an individual fight but within a 'group-culture', and by so, the notion of ethnicity – agreed is that both groups consist out of Moluccan youth and Moroccan youth – developed later on in the conflict. This is not in accordance with a statement given to me in an interview by Dutch-Moroccans, who claimed that Moluccans and Moroccans are like 'water and fire' (see p. 57), but is in accordance to an attitude of 'stand your ground' or 'we shall not be put out by it'. These attitudes, 'fixed' in the group-behaviour' are, as said in above citations, perceived as predictable. One will already know what will happen when these two get into conflict. This is called 'kuddegedrag' (herd-behaviour) in "Pauw in Culemborg" and is perceived as core of the problem and in the town-meeting regarded as controversial.

> *"I hear people saying things – Moluccans, Moroccans. You can walk as a herd behind each other without knowing what the reason is for this – and I think I have the right to speak here. For me it is important, the problem, that the older habitants of the neighbourhood do not have the guts to call the youth to order"* (Moluccan interviewee in "Pauw in Culemborg")

This reaction is followed by rumour in the town meeting, especially from within the Moluccan attendees. A reaction to this is the following:

> *"Well, I see ... is saying something about that 'kuddegedrag': If I am allowed to go back in time, to September 2009, a group comes in our street and throws in windows, do we then just have to remain sit inside?"* (Moluccan interviewee in "Pauw in Culemborg")

After this, the same attendee acknowledged that 'you can let go of the group', and by so, she acknowledged that group identity or by so, ethnic identity is not something 'fixed'. This paradoxical attitude towards ethnic identity is also reflected in the motto of the neighbourhood union:

> *"The problem is in us, the solutions comes out us"* (attendee "Pauw in Culemborg)

This sentence sounds very beautiful and hopeful. It places emphasize on 'us' and there is no 'them'. By that, it hopes to overcome the 'us/them' binary, which turned out to be violent in Terweijde. By that, this sentence acknowledges the interconnectedness and social processes of habitants in the neighbourhood. However, it places also emphasize on the idea that the problem is *in* us, in other words, *in the body, in the mind, in one's determined behaviour*. By

that, this motto is very paradoxical, because it inherently claims the problem is *in* the people, and not in the circumstances which led to the behaviour in the first place. Is the problem really in us or is the problem due to a social process, *outside* the body? This sentence places the problem in nature and the solution in nurture and is by so – at least partly – an agent of *everyday primordialism*.

6.3   Discourses through history & presence

One of the similarities between part II – the qualitative research through interviews, and part III – an analysis of the town-meeting in "Pauw in Culemborg" and the documentary "Twee waarheden in Culemborg", is the emphasize Moluccans place on history and the emphasize Moroccans place on the presence. To the question whether one can imagine how the Moluccan neighbourhood policy – a policy that gives Moluccan families the first choice for housing in a Moluccan neighbourhood – is old-fashioned, Ferry, a representative of the Moluccan community in Terweijde, answers:

> *"I can imagine that. However, it comes forth from a policy that is created in the past to receive Moluccans at their arrival in '51 who were put in barracks, monasteries and especially the habitants of Culemborg in the camp Lunetten, with the thought that it would be a temporal stay of six months. That was not realistic, because of the developments in Indonesia, and then is decided to integrate them in Dutch society under the title "integration with maintenance of own identity". Chosen was for new housing in smaller municipalities in which Moluccans were concentrated around a couple of streets or a church or an association building, and that is what happened in Culemborg. This has had far-going psychological consequences on the Moluccan community and it explains why they put big emphasize on the maintenance of the Moluccan neighbourhood. Those are houses of the first generation Moluccans!"* (Ferry, "Pauw in Culemborg)

This is the construction of a boundary – indeed, a physical one – based and justified by history and the treatment of the first generation Moluccans, as described in part II. Social inequality in the presence is something which constructs a boundary between Moroccans and the Other, in this case Moluccans with 'their' Moluccan neighbourhood. But, as shown in part II, also between Moroccans and Dutch natives, for example with the labour market:

> *Yes, there is spoken very negatively about boys who do not have discipline. I am one of those, but in another way. I did have the discipline to wake up at 7 o'clock to work, but when I on the working floor am determined by "well, that is that Moroccan from Terweijde", the discipline will vanish very quickly. Because being a Moroccan, being a 'Terweijdenaar' seems to be a four-letter*

word. And it has just been said again: "the common Dutchman" – we are the common "human-being" Dutchman, I think that we are "humans", I am sure about that" (Moroccan attendee, "Pauw in Culemborg")

"I experienced it myself, that I call with a dealer, because there is a board with the text: "wanted, employee for the weekend", so I call the entrepreneur and say: "I got a candidate for you". She said: "that is very good". "But it is a Moroccan". She said: "I don't do that". And as long as we have that, meneer Pauw in Culemborg, are we on the wrong track" (police officer in "Pauw in Culemborg").

6.4   The municipality & the media

*"You ask me what I think of the municipality? But we were sitting here talking, Moluccans, Moroccans, together. At this moment a photographer of the newspaper comes in and says: 'give each other the hand', a photo appears in the paper with the text: "it is over". It is not over! How can you say such af thing?" (*Giovanni, "Pauw in Culemborg").

"Letting a Moluccan and a Moroccan, who don't have a fight with each other, shaking hands while the major stands behind with "he look, it is solved!" then I think to myself; 'what are you doing as municipality'. (Ahmed in "Pauw in Culemborg").

Another similarity between part II and part III is the critical side-notes Moluccans and Moroccans place on the role of the media and the municipality. The role of the municipality and the police was seen as 'too little, too late' – in the words of Giovanni: "*I understand about the rules and so on, but enough is enough, also for the police it seems to me*". The documentary makers of "Twee waarheden in Culemborg" had to do the greatest effort to finish their documentary due to the distrusting attitude of the habitants of Terweijde[7].

6.5   Conclusion

Although the title of the documentary is called "Twee waarheden in Culemborg" – "Two truths in Culemborg", both groups were more agreeing than disagreeing during the town-meeting. Both were agreeing that avoiding '*kuddegedrag'* is crucial for ending the conflict. Both Farid en Ferry, representing respectively the Moroccan and the Moluccan community in Culemborg, were agreeing that the conflict still lives in Terweijde but that both parties are trying to come together through individual initiatives; both agreeing that a Moroccan and a Moluccan shaking hands for a picture in the news-paper isn't enough to solve the conflict.

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[7] http://programma.ntr.nl/10513/pauw-in-culemborg/informatie/

Both parties acknowledge their interdependence and that there is 'one future'. Also, both groups perceive their ethnic identity mainly as 'fixed' and primordial, and this is found in their language – their discursive discourses.

7 | Conclusion

This research focussed on the social reconstruction of ethnic identity and the role of conflict and violence has in these discourses. A first conclusion one can make is the notion that ethnic identities are socially constructed by discursive discourses of agents and that, therefore, ethnic violence is a social process. Ethnic identity is constructed through the Other and implicates therefore boundaries between them. It also implicates that ethnic identity *needs* the Other in order to define itself and its boundaries. These boundaries can become violent when differences become antagonistic. This was the case in Terweijde, Culemborg, where certain boundaries where crossed. Moluccans constructed boundaries through (1) history, through the (2) metaphor of *satudarah* or the Self and (3) through the Other. Moroccans constructed also boundaries through (1) history and the distinction between Arab and Berber, (2) the Self, mainly through Islam, and (3) the Other, mainly through the current situation of social inequality. Moroccans also constructed a boundary through their distrust in the media. Similarities were found in the discourse of the reconstruction of ethnic identity when arriving in the Netherlands. Moluccans did this for example through a reorientation to the *adat* and the construction of *satudarah* – a feeling of unity. Moroccans, who faced more fundamental perceived differences with the Dutch, did this through a reorientation on Islam, and also for them this provided a feeling of unity. This process can be called the *ethnicisation* of Islam. A second conclusion is that, besides constructing boundaries and similarities, continuities were also created. Both Moluccans as Moroccans stated that they also felt 'Dutch' to an extent. This is an acknowledgement of the 'fluid' character of ethnic identity. However, the interviewees were not very *consciously* aware of this. Ethnic identity is something perceived as *inherent to one's body:* internal. Therefore, the overarching discourse of the interaction between 'us' and 'them' is the *fear* of losing one's identity. We can see this in the policy of assimilation of the Dutch towards its immigrants, we can see it in the resistance of Moluccans to move into a 'common' neighbourhood and we can see it in the integration problems faced by Dutch-Moroccans at this very moment. This implicates a certain paradox in the perception of ethnic identity by its actors, a discourse of 'everyday primordialism' – perceived by the actors of different ethnic identities, Dutch, Moluccan and Moroccan. If ethnic identity truly is primordial, than policies regarding the preservation of culture and traditions are not necessary: it is already 'fixed' in the body. When ethnic identity is truly perceived primordial, than the fear of losing one's identity is ungrounded. However, the interviewees – sometimes very

consciously, sometimes unconscious – knew that there ethnic identity is a subject of change, and it is for this very reason that boundaries are constructed in the first place. Therefore – as a third conclusion, the solution has to be searched in this paradox. When people can acknowledge that ethnic identity is a subject of change, people can take a more congruent attitude towards each other. We will accept that we need each other to construct an own identity in the *first* place. An 'own' identity can by so only exist through interaction with the Other, so that identity never exists *solely*. Fourthly, can we call the riots of New Years Eve 2009-2010 in Terweijde, Culemborg 'ethnic violence' then? Ethnic differences do not lead to conflict necessarily, and can in fact be reconstructed during a conflict. In the case of Terweijde, we see a very clear group culture. These groups perceive the Self and the Other as a-priori and 'fixed', but simultaneously and paradoxically have the fear of losing their identity. In the case of Terweijde, one can perceive two groups standing opposed to each other very easily as ethnic violence by their physical appearance. However, when *blurring the boundaries* we can see that both groups are responding on social processes and interacting in this very similar by an attitude of 'stand your ground'. We can by so acknowledge that different ethnic identities are at stake, but that ethnicity was a process merely reconstructed *after* conflict started. They played the ethnic card *during* the game. Therefore, this research discredited everyday primordialism and states that Culemborg was a spectacle of violence with an ethnic component, but only *after* conflict started in the first place. Ethnicity is a crucial aspect of conflict in many cases, and this is exactly what we need to accept. It is a subject of change and therefore it needs to be acknowledged by all actors, so that 'when we say 'Others' and when we think of 'Others', we will no longer dismiss 'them' as something that is irrelevant to 'us'.

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