

UNDERSTANDING THE VIABILITY OF MILITARY ALLIANCES
*How the perspectives of interests and identity can explain why NATO survived and
SEATO failed*

Master Thesis

by

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Submitted to the department of Political Science
Radboud University Nijmegen
in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science

2015
Faculty of Management



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ABSTRACT

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How the perspectives of interests and identity can explain why NATO survived and SEATO failed

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Are we able to explain why some alliances are stronger than others? Much has been written on alliances between states, how they are formed, how they evolve and why they continue or dissolve. Most of the current studies within International Relations literature are dominated by traditional theories such as Realism and Liberalism. But are they both able to answer all the questions as to why alliances form, evolve or dissolve completely?

In this study, a comparison between two specific cases is made. Both NATO and SEATO were founded in the same era, in the same context and with the same purpose. How is it then that NATO is still going strong today while SEATO dissolved? To find an answer to this question, Liberalism and Constructivism both shed light on the two alliances. Liberalism has been one of the most influential theories in international organizations when it comes to describing the behavior for international organizations and focuses mostly on the common interests of states. Constructivism on the other hand, is a school of thought that has gained more attention in recent years and shifts the focus more towards more interpretative reasons such as common norms and identity as to why states should cooperate.

Empirical results of this study show that the liberal hypotheses are confirmed while constructivist hypotheses cannot, for the most part at least, be confirmed with the presented literature. This means that the fate of alliances seems to be based on interest calculations of its members and that identity only plays a marginal role.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my girlfriend, Simone Pardoel, and my parents, Karin Van Samang and Jo Hendrikx. Without you, my family, there is no way I would have made it through this program or to this point. Thank you so much.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is an honor for me to be able to thank those who helped to make this thesis possible.

The first person I would like to thank is my thesis promotor, dr. Thomas Eimer, without whom I never would have finished the initial concept or let alone the finished end product. Thank you for guiding me through the entire writing process and for having the patience, kindness, and ideas and for challenging me by playing the devil's advocate during our meetings.

The second person I would like to thank is the second reader for taking the time to read through it all and for giving me much welcomed feedback after.

The third person I would like to thank is my girlfriend, Simone. Thank you for being patient throughout the months of working and writing on this thesis, for bearing with me and for giving me all the support and kind words that I needed to carry on. I consider myself very lucky indeed and realize I could not have done it without you!

Finally, I would like to thank my mother, my fellow students, friends and colleagues for supporting me throughout the entire process. The repeated questions you kept asking about what I was in fact writing about, silly enough, kept me focused all the way and challenged my own thoughts and convictions on how to continue in the process. Your support kept me grounded through the thesis and the master's program and I could not have done this without all of you!

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INTRODUCTION

After World War II the U.S. and the USSR divided the world. Both superpowers experienced increasing threats from each other and acted accordingly. This resulted in the installment of security pacts among states such as the Warsaw Pact in the East directly opposing NATO in the west. In order to block the advancement of the communists in Southeast Asia, the South East Asia Treaty Organization or SEATO was founded in 1954 by the Manila Pact. Its main aim was to collectively defend Southeast Asia. Today, few people know SEATO even existed as it dissolved in 1977. At the same time NATO is more alive than ever. This makes one wonder why only one of the two continues to exist.

In present times, NATO has often been in the eye of the media as debates among its members discuss its evolving goals and the potential expansion of the current cooperation. But in the discussion, the actual existence and the future life of NATO as an independent organization remains unquestioned. This while it is not to be taken for granted. SEATO, which was NATO's sister organization in South East Asia in the fifties, sixties and part of the seventies, has not fared so well. It dissolved completely before it achieved its goals. This leaves us with the general question: "why do some alliances dissolve before or after they reach their initial goals and why do other alliances stay together or evolve?" Applied to this thesis this leads to the general research question: "How can we explain the difference in fate between NATO and SEATO?"

Much has been said about alliances such as NATO as there is plenty of literature to be found. Its existence and evolution has been debated as well but most of the debate so far fit quite neatly within the boundaries of existing, conventional theories within International Relations. Most literature on the viability of military organization revolves around realism and it would make sense to start with this theory as the primary interpretative lens. This thesis however opts to leave it out for analysis. Realism would predict SEATO to be maintained during, and NATO to dissolve after the Cold War. Instead, SEATO vanished and NATO's tasks evolved. I should note however, that the latter is outside the comparative scope of SEATO and NATO in this thesis. The demise of SEATO happened before the fall of the USSR, which begs the question what other causes are of influence. Realists understand alliances to have a particular purpose, either to combat a threat or make their commitments more credible (Fearon, 1997; Morrow, 1991; Morrow, 1994). These agreements tend to be temporary, these authors argue, ending when their goals are reached. However, this view is grounded in Cold War ideas about alliances and does not correspond with the fate of these organizations. The question then arises how to explain for this occurrence when Realism clearly is unable to explain for the fate of international organizations such as NATO after the cold war. This calls for a new and broader insight and for a theory that preferably can predict the behavior before and after the Cold War. The theory chapter will also touch upon this in greater detail/

The starting point for this thesis therefore only consists of the conventional theory of Liberalism and the theory of constructivism as an alternative in our quest to find explanations for the difference in outcome. As NATO and its similar

counterpart SEATO did not have the same fate, it would be interesting to see how Liberalism copes with explaining the potential course of alliances. Constructivism, a relatively new strand within International Relations theories, can also be used to understand the diverging trajectories of these organizations and be compared to the conventional theories to see how it holds its own. For obvious reasons of comparison, the analysis takes note of the period 1945-1977. This was the period during which both organizations were operational.

One of the key insights in the Liberal arena is the idea of complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2003) and international regimes (Keohane, 2003). With these two important concepts, liberals claim that, as states become more connected they are less likely to have conflict with one another. Alliances for a liberal are not necessarily temporary and instead can take the form of long-term, meaningful interactions between states. Liberals theorize that alliances are a means towards more cooperation in general, rather than to accomplish any one goal. SEATO on the other hand, was founded in the same era and is no longer present today. This highlights the underlying research questions: "Can liberalism explain the foundation, maintenance and evolution of NATO?" and "Can liberalism explain the foundation, maintenance and dissolution of SEATO?"

In recent years, constructivist theory has become more and more present in International Relations debates. This theory looks beyond the tangible, empirically visible facts but also grants importance to other aspects of the inter-state relations such as identity, ideas and norms. Constructivists (Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 2003) argue that national interests and the international system are both entirely socially constructed. Therefore, it is very important to study what constructs the system in order to understand the way the system behaves. Comparing the conventional views on alliances with the constructivist perspective that focuses on ideas and norms may shed light on the potential differences in how they explain things like alliance role evolution and continuation. This eclectic approach may provide an alternative insight and explanation to the general research question by answering the underlying research questions: "Can Constructivism explain the foundation, maintenance and evolution of NATO?" and "Can Constructivism explain the foundation, maintenance and dissolution of SEATO?"

The use of these aforementioned theoretical lenses leaves me with several hypotheses that need an answer. Liberals tend to focus primarily on interests and expect that alliances are founded, evolve or are maintained only when this is in the interest of the member states. Constructivists would focus more on identity leading to the hypotheses that alliances are in the first place founded because there is a perception of shared identity and norms among the member states and they are maintained and only evolve because of the members' desire to reinforce, reaffirm and protect the common norms and identity between them.

The relevance of this thesis in current literature is that it takes and examines two seemingly similar organizations with different fates. The thesis positions itself in the debate within political science literature and attempts to add to it and the in depth insights into the motivations of states to engage in alliances are the main justification. The in depth analysis of both cases from a liberal and constructivist

angle will be compared by using a most similar systems design, which means that their similarities make it easier to distinguish key variables. These may tell us what theory is capable of explaining the difference in outcome, as one alliance is still present today, while the other one completely vanished. In this light, the case selection may be the largest added value. By comparing NATO to SEATO, this thesis does not merely focus on the success stories but also takes into account that some organizations simply fail to survive and evolve.

There is however also a relevant aspect that concerns military alliances in particular. NATO after the fall of the Berlin Wall has been deemed as an organization left with relatively less meaningful use. However, in times such as the period in which this thesis is written, escalating violence in Eastern Ukraine, an increasing Russian interference and the fundamentalist uprising of the Islamic State show there can still be a use for military alliances. It is in moments like this that NATO reaffirms the ties it forges between its allies and takes the forefront of international relations. It is also in times like this that the tensions reveal the interests states have in various regions around the world and what in what way they can benefit from military alliances or the lack thereof. A very clear example of this is the U.S. benefits in the South China Sea region. Ever since the disappearing of SEATO the United States have put a huge amount of effort in negotiating deals on a bilateral and multilateral basis with all the concerned partners and international economic organizations such as ASEAN (Bader, Lieberthal, McDevitt, 2014). Since there is no military alliance left in the region, the United States have intensely tried to promote Asia-Pacific economic interdependence and dynamism. This fits into the larger strategy of mitigating security tensions within the region. Nevertheless, the current maritime territorial disputes threaten these dual objectives of the United States in its Asian Policy.

Finding answers for the research question helps not only to contribute to existing research and literature but it also helps to understand the dynamism within military alliances and help explain the differences between both SEATO and NATO. I hope it will provide more in depth knowledge where risks for the future of NATO lie and what the organization can do to guarantee its own longevity.

In the following chapter the attention goes towards providing an overview of the theoretical frameworks and the hypotheses. In the second chapter, the used methods are described and the operationalization of terms, the design of the study, case selection and justification of sources are further outlined. The third and fourth chapters are dedicated to the case studies. They contain an outline of the different phases in the evolution of NATO and SEATO as well as an analysis of these phases from both liberal and constructivist perspectives. The final chapter, the conclusion, contains an overview of the original hypotheses, the respective findings and conclusion on whether interests or shared norms are suited to explain both cases, the extent to what these findings can be generalized. The conclusion also sheds light on the weaknesses of this research and proposes further research directions.

Chapter 1. Theoretical Overview

This chapter is divided in an overview of the theoretical concepts. The first part of this overview focuses on the expectations and predictions as to why these organizations are founded in the first place and why they are maintained and evolve or dissolve. The second part discusses the method of analysis. As will become clear in the overview, there is a big difference in ontology between the theories included. Conventional theories see the world out there as something separate, disconnected from us and of our interpretation. Constructivism on the other hand considers we are part of the world surrounding us, and that of our perception of it is created by social relationships and interactions.

There is also an overview of current literature presented. This thesis takes note of the many hypotheses made so far within literature but aims to contribute to the existing debate surrounding the inability of Realism to come up with explanations by adding the additional views of Liberalism and Constructivism.

Scientific literature on alliances is mostly approached from conventional and interest-based approaches of realism and liberalism and has recently gained more attention from constructivist scholars. Each theory presents a different view on the nature of the international system. Where realists focus primarily on power and anarchy, Liberals look at possibilities for cooperation. Constructivism on the other hand turns its attention more towards ideas, norms, and identity. These different views on the international system by the various theories are displayed in their conceptions of the foundation and existence of alliances as well as their persistence and reasons for their dissolution. This thesis views the inability of Realism to explain for the continuation of NATO as a starting point for Liberalism and Constructivism to come up with better explanations.

In order to compare the different schools of thought and their outlook on alliances, three main questions will be asked throughout each of their summary. First we should look into the question why these alliances were founded in the first place. Second, the question why and how the discussed alliances are maintained arises as well as the reason why alliances dissolve or evolve. Obviously this last question is key in order to find a solution to the research question in this thesis but the first questions help us compare both cases better in order to see any potential similarities and differences, which is required in order to use a most similar systems design case scenario as will be further outlined in the methodology chapter.

1.1 Realism

Realism is a conventional and dominant approach to international relations, especially in the US and Europe. Realism is often referred to as 'Realpolitik' or 'Power Politics' and shapes the thinking of virtually every foreign policy

professional today in the United States and much of the rest of the world (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 246).

But why the need to include realism in this theoretical chapter if we deem it unable to provide us with a coherent explanation for the evolution of a multilateral military alliance such as NATO? The reason for this is twofold. The first and main reason is the fact that policy makers in the era in which both organizations were founded were heavily influenced by the realist paradigm and acted upon that. Realism played a large and beneficial role in shaping the way Americans thought about foreign policy after World War II. It did so in preventing the Americans to apply the naive form of liberal internationalism, such as primary reliance on the United Nations for security (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 251). During that era Realism was the appropriate framework for understanding international politics because the world acted according to realist premises. This happened not just because it represented timeless truths but because the world was divided between states of radically differing and mutually hostile ideologies (Ibid.: p. 251). In the post-World War period, any other alternative framework seemed unable to provide the same level of solutions for questions regarding security.

The second reason is that it is important to understand why in this thesis the emphasis lies with Liberalism and Constructivism. Understanding this requires a basic knowledge of Realism and of the reasons why it is deemed inadequate to answer the posed research question. In order to understand its weaknesses, one needs to understand what realism is all about. The course of history has proved to pose problems for the explanatory power of this theory, which was and perhaps still is the single most influential theory in International Relations.

In realism in general, a distinction is made between classical realism, neorealism or structural realism and neoclassical realism. Classical realism is an approach that starts off with the writings of the Greek historian Thucydides on the Peloponnesian war. It recognizes the central role that power has in politics of all kinds as well as the limitations of power and in the ways it can be made self-defeating. Classical realism also stresses the ethical dilemmas at play and the practical implications of them (Morgenthau, 2003). In this line of thought, it can be needed to base influence on shared interests and persuasion.

There are however some core assumptions present in all of its forms. All realist theories start from the assumption that insecurity is a universal and permanent feature of the international order (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 247). This is because Realists take anarchy as a given within the international system (Morgenthau, 2003; Walt, 2003) and claim that anarchy necessarily leads to certain conditions within that system. Mearsheimer (2001) for instance, argues that great powers are only interested in their survival and must for that reason show plenty of military threat in order to deter external threats. According to realists, the state is the sole important and sovereign actor within the anarchic system. This form of ontology will become apparent when compared to the other theories that follow. Realists tend to approach states as one would the individual. Individual states are presented as the prior condition for a structure of anarchy, which then constrains the actor and its behavior (Waltz, 1979). The primary concern for

states is to survive and in order for states to survive they must always be prepared for war in order to defend themselves. This is a key part of the security dilemma states face. Realists would argue, for the specific reason that states distrust each other, that continuation and maintaining the alliance is uncommon. In the lines of realist ontology, following a different logic of action would be suicidal. This creates a situation of socialization in which the effects of the structure (anarchy) are produced by socialization of the individual actors and through the competition between them (Keohane, 1986, p. 63).

The realist ontology and core assumptions help us to find out why, according to realists, alliances are formed in the first place. Realists understand that states use alliances to accomplish a specific purpose. This purpose is either to combat a threat or to make the commitments states make more credible (Fearon, 1997). A common threat is hence needed for states to form an alliance. The reason why these alliance are subsequently maintained depends on the continuing presence of a common threat, be it the same threat or new threats that arises. Without a common threat, there would be no practical purpose for remaining in an alliance. This is, as explained further on, the main reason for excluding realism as a potential explanatory theory for the research question.

Realist literature on the subject of military alliances defines the concept of an alliance in several ways. As mentioned before, realists tend to attribute an alliance with a specific purpose and focus on the subject of threat perception. Alliances are seen as a formal type of agreement between sovereign and independent states in order to cooperate on a military level (Leeds and Savun, 2007, p. 1119). They are a means to pool resources between states that together, attempt to counter the common threat. From another utilitarian perspective, Fearon claims that alliances are another way of making actions and threats more credible on the international level as they make it very difficult for a state on which is being relied on for this threat, to break or change its promise (Fearon, 1997). This is a nuance of the self-help system as is outlined by Waltz (1979).

According to Walt, alliances display two expected actions of states, balancing and bandwagoning (2003, p. 108). In the case of balancing, member countries ally with other members in order to balance against a recognized threat. The other action, bandwagoning, occurs when a state allies with the threat itself in order to avoid being overtaken by it. It is sometimes argued that military alliances promote peace, a quality that liberalism, as we will see further on, tends to attribute to international institutions (Long, Nordstrom and Baek, 2007). This also answers the third question. The condition under which realists assume the dissolution or continuation of alliances occurs is when they reach their goal or when the external threat is gone, also meaning the goal has been achieved. According to realists, the commitments between the states within an alliance are believed to be very short-lived in general and thus immediately end when the end goal is reached.

What are in retrospect the weaknesses of Realism as a theory for understanding developments in international relations? We need to question the use of the framework for describing reality as well as prescribing policy (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 252). We should not merely accept its premises and ignore the fact that it does

not fit past and current events in the world. Realism rests on two very uncertain foundations: a reductionism concerning the motives and behavior of human societies and failure to address the question of history (Ibid.: p. 254). There is no clear reason why a state should feel threatened by any other state. In the purest form, realism tries to block out any consideration of internal politics and to deduce the possibility of war from the structure of state system alone.

The shortcomings also show when the realist assumptions are applied to historical questions. The unwillingness to abandon realism has already led to some strange proposals. The subject era in this thesis is the combined lifespan of both NATO and SEATO. SEATO dissolved before the end of the cold war. This means SEATO as an alliance broke down before it met its final goal as the enemy that was considered to be the reason for its founding was not yet defeated while NATO remained intact. The inability for realism to provide an explanation here can be considered enough for looking beyond it and rather more towards the suggested alternative theories. But as there are a few later examples also, this strengthens the motivation for this choice even more.

It so happens that after the demise of SEATO a few other historical explanatory shortcomings of realism were added. For instance the suggestion of realism of how to think and act in a post-cold war era according to realism. One of the suggestions was that the Warsaw Pact should be kept alive as it was seen as the main cause for the bipolar stability with NATO since 1945 (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 252). As a consequence, the argumentation was that the end of the division of Europe would lead to a period of greater instability than was the case during the Cold War.

Another unexpected consequence for realists was the evolution of disintegration of the Soviet Union. This specific assumption is what caused the demise of realism after the cold war according to many, with NATO being the prime example. According to Realism, democratization within the USSR should make no difference to their strategic position. For a realist it was unthinkable that the Soviets would allow for the tearing down of the Berlin Wall or the loss of the control on the Eastern European countries, but this was exactly what happened. The Soviet national interest was not a given but reinterpreted by Gorbachev in minimal terms and was called "new thinking" and was also accompanied by a reassessment of the external threat that the USSR had to face, and thus a reinterpretation of NATO.

When we look at the present, the current tasks of NATO include the provision of support for peaceful interaction in the international community as well as promoting democracy all over the world (NATO, 2014). Realists consider evolution of an alliance less common than dissolution, as occurred in the case of SEATO. The latter did not achieve its initially stated goals. After the cold war, no similar new threats have appeared in the international arena. NATO's purpose has become more collaborative in the sense that it allowed for cooperation with North America and Europe without the presence of an actual threat in the background. Naturally, this is hard to explain for realists.

In this thesis the comparison between NATO and SEATO is made and the investigation into NATO does not go as far as after the end of the Cold War. It is

however necessary to stress the deficiencies of Realism in order to support the discard of this theory in favor of liberalism and constructivism.

1.2 Liberalism

Liberal ontology

Liberalism, or liberal institutionalism is realism's main rival. Liberalism attempts to resolve the issue of security and cooperation and is also generally regarded as a conventional theory within International Relations. Liberalism emphasizes three phenomena in international politics that characterize it and stresses the potential peace promoting effect. Liberals also make assumptions about the international system, which they deem is anarchic. Anarchy does not necessarily mean that states cannot cooperate with the presence of international organizations. In fact, a lot of the liberal literature attempts to confront realism by arguing that conflict is not something inherent to the international system (Doyle, 2003; Keohane & Nye, 2003). A peaceful state of nature is a core idea of Rousseau who denies that vanity or 'amour propre' is natural to man (Fukuyama, 2006. p. 255). The argument here is that the natural man, fearful and solitary is essentially peaceful because he only has few selfish needs and his fear and insecurity do not lead to a continuous quest for power after power but to isolation and quietude. States seek more than self-preservation. This is manifest in contemporary states that can be perceived as middle powers, such as Canada, The Netherlands, Spain, who are besides NATO members states that seek not just to become more powerful but mostly more wealthy (Ibid.: p. 257). Wealth here is mostly for the sake of domestic consumption, not so much the relative power position compared to other states. States therefore not just pursue power but a variety of ends constrained by the concept of legitimacy.

Taking the nature and perception of the international system for granted, can be considered a weakness of both Realism and Liberalism. Realists would not expect alliances to continue or evolve once the initial goals have been met as they consider states weary and distrustful in nature. The peaceful influence of liberal ideas on foreign policy can be seen in the changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the 1980's (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 263).

Why, according to liberals, do states found alliances for cooperation?

Liberals can think of a few reasons as to why states would cooperate in the first place. Opposing the realist idea of a 'zero-sum game' in which uncertainty of intentions of other states in an anarchic environment lead up to suboptimal outcomes, Liberals see a possibility for International Organizations and alliances as a potentially optimal solution to collective action problems. The idea is that the international organizations can change the rules of the game and act as figurative lawyers who advise their client(s) (Pease, 2012, p. 69). Liberals consider cooperation to be more practical than aggressive, unilateral action.

Liberals claim that the world is a 'positive-sum game' where absolute gains are what matters, not the relative higher gains compared to other nations. Liberals

therefore assume that states are not troubled by the gains of others but with strengthening their own position in the international arena. This means that alliances are not necessarily temporary and can become very important and meaningful for the included states over a long period of time. Another important difference that the previous insight delivers and where liberalism clearly differs from realism is the claim that military power should not be at the center of international relations at all times, as this can only lead to war.

When specifically applying the liberal school of thought to alliances the attention is focused towards institutions more than just utilitarian or individual aspects as is the case with realism. It is also expressed by authors such as Fukuyama that, for liberals, the answer to why states would form an alliance can be found in the notion of cooperation. Here the notion is that cooperation leads to potentially optimized gains and the situation of complex interdependence makes it so that the risks of conflict are minimized. The introduced idea of complex interdependence fits within the subject of alliances as the more interconnected countries become, the less likely the chance of war is present (Keohane and Nye, 2003). This interconnectedness is in turn often achieved through the network of alliances and the central role being played by formal institutions in order to create a genuine and meaningful form of cooperation (Keohane and Axelrod, 1985).

Why, according to liberals, do states maintain alliances and why do they evolve or dissolve?

For a liberal, alliances and international cooperation in general can be supported and long lasting. To answer the question why and how the formed cooperation is to be preserved and maintained, liberals propose several angles that may serve as an explanation. In fact, liberals would argue that alliances both can and should be persistent as cooperation is the best way for states to achieve their interests. Keohane (2003, p. 132) outlined his “functional theory of regimes,” saying that international regimes are a good way to get states to cooperate internationally. Here the liberal answer to why International Organizations such as alliances should be maintained or how they can evolve can be found. Regimes are sets of rules, norms, and institutions surrounding a particular issue, like climate change, trade, or human rights. Keohane goes on to argue that regimes affect transaction costs, making it easier to go with a regime than to go against it (Ibid.: p. 133).

Keohane and Nye developed the theory of complex interdependence in which they specifically state that other types of issues such as human rights and economics should be considered with the same amount of priority as military issues (Keohane & Nye, 2003). As will also later be in the constructivist chapter, these aspects add an additional layer to the purely utilitarian views. Complex interdependence links states in a way that conflict becomes too costly and impractical to use as a tool, and therefore peaceful tactics like cooperation and negotiation take to the forefront. Complex interdependence contains three main characteristics: (1) the use of multiple channels of action between societies in interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations, (2) the absence of a hierarchy of issues with changing agendas and linkages between issues prioritized and the objective of (3) bringing about a decline in the use of military

force and coercive power in international relations. Again, this emphasis on cooperation is a typical display of the liberal outlook on an international system that focuses not just on the relative gains of a zero-sum game, but rather on the positive and absolute gains. This comes close to another present day idea about democracy and peace, as it is also the basis for the Democratic Peace Theory. The Democratic Peace Theory is the belief that liberal democracies will not go to war with one another, as they're cooperation is so entangled that everyone suffers from the potential conflict. It is considered a major liberal critique of realist thinking (Doyle, 2003).

Other authors focus on international organizations and international law (Hoffmann, 2003), arguing that these laws create costs that make it difficult to go against them. There is a clear distinction between the reasons for states to join or create an alliance and their behavior once they are a part of them. Liberalism emphasizes the power of international cooperation, regimes, and organizations to set the agenda. If the states agree to follow the rules set out by those institutions, then it becomes more difficult for a single state to go against those institutions. Even though states have obligations towards the international organization, these organizations generally have very few coercive tools of enforcement (Hurd, 2011, p. 267). This does not mean that it is costless for states to violate the made agreements. Resulting costs come in many forms and can be more or less than is revealed in the legal charter (Ibid.). Most international organizations exist by virtue of authority delegated to them by states and yet their purpose is to constrain or shape these same states, even when this might not fear to be in the direct interest of these states. The success of the organization can either be measured through the quantity of members that carry out their obligations or by the success of the measures themselves. But the dilemma of how the organization influences its members to carry out their obligation remains the same (Ibid. p.267-268). So while some international organizations punish non-compliance, sometimes with legal means or with means provided by other member states, others make the obligations themselves easy to satisfy. The International Organization here, can position itself as an actor in the international arena and sometimes has the desire to become more autonomous (Ibid. p. 268). Costs of non-compliance also come in the form of potential exclusion which means states are no longer included in the decision making process which means they also lose the ability to influence it.

Liberals also have several assertions about alliances. First, states form alliances based on a perception that those alliances serve national interests better than acting unilaterally. Second, alliances can be formed based around a larger set of issues than exclusively military ones. Finally, alliances persist or can evolve as long as the relationship continues to be beneficial to all parties.

When it comes to alliances, liberals such as Fukuyama (2006) in particular look at two things. Formal institutions firstly are a necessary tool in order to achieve a truly meaningful and extended form of cooperation and secondly they claim that, even though alliances are not necessarily promoting peace, they provide potential peaceful ways to resolve conflict rather than through military aggression. From a utilitarian perspective, the economic cost of war has increased exponentially with advances in technology (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 262).

The latter implies that alliances can help save costs when it comes to defense or at least can it provide the ability to pose a greater common threat for the same budget.

This then also answers the third question we pose to the theories. Liberals see alliances as an efficient means of cooperation with the added benefit of minimizing the risk of conflict. Expansion of the cooperation and thus evolution on other terrains through spillover can be made possible by altering the initial goals of the alliance, which causes the alliance itself to evolve. International regimes, even when initially in the form of a military alliance, can thus be seen as one of the best ways for a state to achieve its interests.

For the fate of a military alliance, this means that dissolution must be the result from transaction costs outweighing the benefits for cooperation. The creation of a long-lasting relationship with other states makes cooperation on security and other levels possible and desirable. More often than not, these relationships occur between similar democratic states with similar interests. This view is essentially identical to the idea of complex interdependence, which is explained, in a former paragraph. An additional remark here is that the type of government may potentially have an effect on the likelihood that the alliance is being formed in the first place (Lai and Raiter, 2000).

Liberalism in retrospect always traces the fate of an alliance back to the idea that they rely on the particular interests of the member states involved. Alliances are founded to counter collective action problems, achieve the interests of the member state and minimizing the amount of risk involved. Maintenance and evolution of a state depends on the complexity of the cooperation and whether cooperation remains to be of interest for the member states. It is been said by Jervis however, as a side note here, that the larger an alliance becomes, the more difficult it becomes for the alliance to perform its function effectively, and the more difficult it becomes to perform in the best interest of *all* the member states involved (1976, p. 110). These best interests can be both the gains in security or economic gains through cooperation.

Since the last decade, alternative approaches such as constructivism have come into play. In this thesis an attempt is made to use constructivism for comparison. Theories like constructivism have a different ontology and a different outlook on the international arena. Their different assumptions leads to different hypotheses as further outlined in the next paragraph and in the methodological chapter.

1.3 Constructivism

Constructivism and its ontology

In order to understand constructivism, one needs to understand the main difference with traditional theories as described in this study. Where traditional, rational studies are based on the empirically visible, constructivism is different in nature. There is a difference in ontology and epistemology between both strands (Ruggie, 1998, p. 866). Key here is that the way people understand

reality is of the utmost importance. Perceptions can alter the way how people interact with one another and with the world surrounding them.

Constructivism is an approach designed to analyze the ideas and norms that make up assumptions about the inherent nature of the international system and has a distinctive difference in ontology from the conventional theories of realism and liberalism. To construct something is an act that creates something that would otherwise not exist. This includes not only material but also social objects. Constructivism within International Relations is therefore often referred to as social constructivism. It is not the first time that constructivism is used to explain the lifespan of alliances. Hemmer & Katzenstein (2002) have already written an important contribution to the insights of constructivism to determine why there is no NATO in Asia, something I will refer back to their claims further on in this chapter and in the analytical chapter.

Constructivists argue, similarly to social scientists, that the way that people understand reality is important. Perceptions shape how people interact with each other and with their world, and therefore social scientists should consider them as a powerful motivating factor. A constructivist would claim that both realists and liberals start on a false idea, being that there is anything inherent to the system or to states at all. These conventional theories such as therefore have an individualist ontology. As explained in the paragraph of Neorealism, Neorealists like Waltz look at states as the primary unit of analysis and present the individual states as a basic precondition for a structure of anarchy, which in turn constrains their character and behavior (1979). Some neoliberals have however taken the role of ideas into account and point out to a similar tension between the individual and the social. Ideas are treated as causal factors that are exchanged by fully formed individuals (Keohane and Goldstein, 1993). But as Ruggie claims, the individuals in this neoliberal story are not born into any system of social relationships that helps shape who they become. When they are first encountered, they are already completely constituted and put into a state of problem solving (Ruggie, 1998, p. 866).

The relationship between the individual and the social structure is important to both rationalists as constructivists, but is conceived in different ways by each. For rationalists, structure is a function of competition between individuals or states and the distribution of material capabilities. Structures primarily constrain the actions of states. Constructivists question this idea of an individualist ontology of rationalism and stress that a social ontology is needed to better understand the actions in international politics. As humans are social beings, individuals or states cannot be separated from the context of normative meaning. If we look at the idea of sovereignty, it is, more than anything else, a social and constitutive category as a necessary precondition for the recognition of the sovereignty of individual states as a shared understanding and acceptance of the concept itself. This concept needs further explanation.

Constructivists do not discard the notion of an individual structure but recognize that the relationship between it and the social structure is important for both constructivism as well as rationalism. The relationship between them is however conceived in a different way by both. As said before, rationalists see the structure

of the international system as a function of the competition and distribution of material capabilities between states. These structures constrain the actions of the state. This means that the ones subjected to this logic think they are guided by a Logic of appropriateness which means that acts are conducted randomly with the intention to produce an outcome that maximizes the interests of the individual actor (Sending, 2002, p. 449). Constructivists see the relationship however as a two-way street as the structure not only constitutes and thus constrains the behavior of the actor but the actor also constitutes the structure itself. This is what constructivists call the 'mutual constitutive effect'.

Even as they focus in particular on the norms and shared understandings of legitimate behavior, material factors still continue to play a role according to Constructivists. The way they see it, structures do not only constrain but also constitute the identity of actors. This means that, as we are subjected to this logic of constructivism and may or may not be aware of it, we are guided by a Logic of consequences. Whether actions are rational depends on the function of legitimacy, which is defined by the shared norms and values within institutions or other social structures rather than purely individual interests (March and Olsen, 1989). The 'self' in this logic becomes social by the gain and fulfilling of an institutional identity. In this context, norms are not only constraints for behavior but also constitute the identities of actors (Sending, 2002, p. 449). An interesting example of this is the norms concerning human rights. Here, norms are not really constraints because of power considerations as much as human rights being an integral part as a constitutive attribute to liberal democratic states increasingly as well as their identity at the international level. The emphasis on norms and abiding by rules can be contrasted with from rational behavior of actors doing the right thing instead of optimizing their own preferences (Risse, 2000, p. 4). Specifically applied to alliances this would mean that member states would take other courses of action than to just maximize interests and minimize risk but would potentially act in the benefit for the organization, as that is what becomes expected by and from the other member states also.

As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, sometimes norms become so institutionalized that actors begin to take them for granted or to believe that they are something inherent (1998). They go on to argue, however, that these assumptions are dangerous. Both realists and liberals take some facets of the international system as inherent, which implies that those facets cannot be changed. However, constructivists argue that as norms change in response to events, the international system also changes. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that the best way to observe a norm is to look at justification. If a leader must justify an action, then it is outside the norm of behavior for his or her country. A good way to observe the effects of norms, then, is to see which actions must be justified and which don't have to be justified. Norms legitimize and justify beyond the realm of "rationality," appealing to the subjective behaviors and identities that make up "us" and "them."

This idea of mutual constituency points to a social structure that leaves room for agency, which means that in turn, the individual or state can influence their environment as much as it can be influenced by it. In an effort to expand social constructivism to the international level, many authors (Finnemore, 1996;

Wendt, 1999) argue that states construct the international system the same way that people construct their states. In particular, Alexander Wendt says that social construction occurs on two levels. First, people get together and begin to codify their shared ideas and norms. This eventually constructs the state, which both constructs and is constructed by its citizens. In the same way, states construct the international system, which then constructs and is constructed by the states (Wendt, 1999). The way that people understand international politics, then, eventually makes its way upward to the state and then onward to the international community. Constructivists, then, argue that ideas and norms about the international system shape how that system behaves. This strongly differs from realist thought which takes anarchy and violence as a given.

Why, according to constructivists, do states found alliances for cooperation?

Constructivists consider other reasons than liberals for building alliances as they as they focus on common values and norms as well as the perception of shared identities as the necessary preconditions. When looking at the reasons for founding alliances, constructivists tend to put identity at the center of their analysis (Checkel, 1999; Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002; Lai & Reiter, 2000, Risse-Kappen Owen, 2000). Constructivists focus on the reasons for and the power of an alliance to protect or establish an identity or codify norms internationally, which is contrasted to the utilitarian and other rationalist approaches.

Collective identity can be a powerful thing. Owen argues that common ideologies can occasionally be an important motivating factor behind forming an alliance, like in his case of the Holy Roman Empire (2005). Other constructivist scholars (Barkin, 2003; Finnemore, 1996) argue similarly to realists, saying that national interests can dictate who joins what alliance. But as Finnemore argues, it is the states and their citizens themselves who construct what this national interest entails (1996).

A constructivist, then, argues two things about alliances. Like realists and liberals argue, states form alliances based on a perception that it is within the national interest to do so. This interest here needs to be seen as a necessary precondition. In the same way norms and ideas of citizens change, so too can national interests of governments change. According to Finnemore (in Hurd, 2011, p. 271) military intervention and the appropriateness to do so has changed over the past centuries. This means that not only the perception of states, but also the shared perception within an alliance is perceptible to change.

The second claim constructivists make, as is outlined in the following paragraph, is that alliances have the ability to form collective identities between their members. This collective identity is believed to be an important factor in continuing cooperation within alliances. Perceptions and identity play a key role within constructivism regarding every stage of alliance formation, maintenance and evolution.

Why, according to constructivists, do states maintain, evolve or dissolve alliances?

The application of constructivism on the continuation of alliances as well as their dissolution has been conducted from different constructivist angles. Thomas Risse-Kappen, for example, argues that alliances continue to exist because of a shared identity within the alliance between its members, an identity that did not exist before forming of the alliance itself (1996). Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) have mainly analyzed the role and importance of the largest and most powerful member states for their analysis of alliances. Their article "why is there no NATO in Asia" is by far the most influential constructivist literature on the subject. They contend that the differences in densities of collective identity between the most powerful member state and its allies explain the variation in alliance strategies for this member state (Ibid.: 2002). After having analyzed the realist assumptions of 'the Great Power Status' they concluded that, whenever the discrepancy between the most powerful member state and its allies becomes too big for the powerful state to be able to benefit from the multilateral agreements, cooperation ceases (Ibid.: p. 9). Whenever there is a larger gap between the smaller and greater powers, bilateral alliances are designed for dealing with its alien and inferior partners.

Literature that is concerned with identity for the continuation or dissolution of alliances also focused on the identity of the members that form a part of both alliances. Acharya (2005) and Nguyen (2014) also attempted to challenge the most-powerful-state centered approach by Hemmer and Katzenstein. They made claims that we should not solely focus on the powerful states but also on the identity of the members and the common identity within the alliance. According to Acharya, regions may have norms so unique that they lay the basis for the success or failure of a collective defense in the form of a multilateral military alliance. Resistance to the localization of global norms can mean some norms are more difficult to diffuse to other regions. As an alternative this may lead to failure or only to a minimal implementation of these norms in the alliance. The claim here is that the absence of a common identity and the great differences are a threshold for continued cooperation in the form of a tightly knit security alliance.

Finnemore (in Hurd, 2011, p. 271) claims that international organizations may, to some level, have the ability to correct the behavior of other states. Not behaving by the shared standards of appropriateness may cause disbelief and outrage and the perception of that state by other members. This can be described as a productive form of power. Alliances may directly cause that state to change course through coercion or shaming. Barnett and Duvall (in Hurd, 2011, p. 270) have also described the previous direct form of power and call it the compulsory form of power international organizations have. They also mention two other forms of power, most of them not so direct. These are the institutional and structural aspects of power. The institutional form of power refers to the power the organization has to put something on the decision making agenda (Ibid.: p. 270-271). Structural power refers to the changes caused in the policy of states without threats or coercion but by choice by the states themselves.

While concluding the theory chapter we should take note of the question of agency. The research in this thesis focuses fully on the agency that lies with the member states as opposed to the organizations themselves. Liberalism and constructivism leave room for an interpretation from a different agency perspective, respectively in the idea of complex interdependence and the identity of an organization or alliance. There were however no initial indications that identity on the part of these alliances played any crucial role in explaining their behavior during the scope of this research. As will be further explained in the empirical chapter, during the foundation stages the alliances did not have full autonomy or were not yet completely developed as they were towards the end of SEATO's lifespan. If agency on the level of the alliance was present at all, it occurred most likely after the Cold War. This is why the research contained here leaves out this agency perspective.

3. Research Design

The overview of theories provided us with several hypotheses. Realist assumptions and derived hypotheses have proved unable to provide any answers, as they do not reflect reality any longer. This supports to shift our focus towards the Liberal and Constructivist assumptions and hypotheses.

3.1 Hypotheses

Liberal hypotheses

For the interest-based Liberals, the first assumption is that the reason for alliances to be forged is because it is in the interest of the participating member states, which are the main unit of analysis. This interest can be shaped by the costs and benefits that come with cooperation that can be shaped by an external threat. This first assumption is not so different from the realist view but liberalism as a theory does seem to explain events after the cold war better. The second expectation is that alliances can persist as a means of cooperation that is already taking place and can be used to continue cooperation on other issues as well. As explained in the paragraph on complex interdependence, it becomes increasingly difficult to break away from existing institutionalized forms of cooperation. The institutionalized meetings are already in place and help to cut down on costs. Third, according to Liberals alliances do not dissolve as long as they remain in the interest of member states. Liberals see alliances as an efficient means of cooperation with the added benefit of minimizing the risk of conflict. Expansion of the cooperation on other terrains can be made possible by altering the initial goals of the alliance, which causes the alliance itself to evolve.

These assumptions lead to the three main liberal hypotheses:

1. *'Liberalism expects an alliance to be founded if it is in the interest of participating states';*
2. *'Liberalism expects an alliance to be maintained or to evolve if it is in the interests of the member states to confirm or expand cooperation';*

3. *'Liberalism expects an alliance to dissolve if it is no longer in the interest of the member states'.*

For the two cases used this means that cooperation in the form of NATO started because of common interests of the member states. Also, this cooperation continued and was maintained because it acts as a means for other forms of cooperation. NATO has not yet dissolved because, as the hypothesis suggests, the cooperation is still within the interest of participating states.

These hypotheses lead to different explanations for the SEATO case. Cooperation within SEATO was also started because of the common (security) interests of the members, just like NATO. Maintenance of the organization throughout the 50's, 60's and 70's is considered to be a confirmation of interests. In the case of SEATO there is a deviation of the liberal hypothesis in that the it was not still within the interest of members to continue the cooperation.

| | Why was the alliance founded? | Why has the alliance been maintained or why has it evolved? | Why has the alliance dissolved? |
|--------------|--|--|--|
| NATO | It was in the interest of participating states | It was in the interest of the members to maintain or expand the existing cooperation | / |
| SEATO | It was in the interest of participating states | In was in the interest of the members to maintain or expand the existing cooperation | It was no longer in the interest of (some) member states |

Graph 1. Overview of Liberal Hypotheses

Constructivist hypotheses

Constructivists see one specific reason for the founding of a multilateral security alliance. A shared identity creates the desire to cooperate on those terrains that are in the mutual interest of all participating states. In the case of NATO and SEATO the main interest was to preserve the shared identity and protect it from external influence.

For constructivists the continuation of NATO and demise of SEATO can be caused by several factors, according to the view used. Here, the expectation is that alliances can persist as a means of reinforcement of the shared norms in order to protect them and that alliances dissolve when there is a loss of (perception of) belonging together and shared values and norms between its members.

The assumptions lead to these three constructivist hypotheses:

1. *'Constructivism expects an alliance to be founded if there is a perceived shared identity and norms amongst the member states';*
2. *'Constructivism expects an alliance to be maintained or to evolve if members wish to reinforce, protect and expand the perceived shared identity and norms, and';*
3. *'Constructivism expects an alliance to dissolve if there is a loss of (perception) of a shared identity and common norms'*

What do we expect to see if the hypotheses hold true? For the two cases used this means that cooperation in the form of NATO started because of common perception of shared identity between the member states. Also, this cooperation continued and was maintained because through NATO the common norms could be protected and reinforced. NATO has not yet dissolved, as there is still a perception of a common identity between all members. The hypothesis leads to a different explanation for the SEATO case. If the hypotheses hold true, cooperation within SEATO was also started because of the common (security) interests of the members. Maintenance of the organization throughout the 50's, 60's and 70's was carried out to reinforce and protect the shared norms. In the case of SEATO there is an expected deviation of the NATO hypothesis that in the 1970's there was a loss of (perception of) common identity between its members. This could mean that either the United States as a the sole great power lost their interest in SEATO while were still interested in NATO as demonstrated by Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) or that separately, the participating member states of SEATO lost their feeling of shared identity. This would also imply that members within NATO have more shared norms and values than the SEATO members had. This also begs the question whether this has ever existed, been developed and if they have evolved in NATO. Cooperation in SEATO according to this view is mainly based on shared perception of common interest and threat. There is no longer a common and shared identity.

| | Why has the alliance been founded? | Why has the alliance been maintained or why has it evolved? | Why has the alliance dissolved? |
|-------------|--|--|--|
| NATO | There was a perception of shared identity between founding members | Members wanted to reinforce, reaffirm and expand protection of common norms and identity | / |

| | | | |
|--------------|--|--|---|
| SEATO | There was a perception of shared identity between founding members | Members wanted to reinforce, reaffirm and expand protection of common norms and identity | There was no longer a (perception of) shared common identity and norms between (some) members |
|--------------|--|--|---|

Graph 2. Overview of constructivist hypotheses

3.2 Operationalization of terms

3.2.1 Operationalization of dependent variables

The alliance

In this thesis there is a continuous comparison between two alliances. But what constitutes an alliance? An alliance is a pact, coalition or friendship between two or more parties, made in order to advance common interests and goals and a means to secure these goals and interests (Lieshout, 2007, p. 61, 68). It is a political agreement between countries to support each other in disputes between them and other states. Often alliances are military in nature and there have been many of them throughout history.

Distinction of the life stages of both alliances

For methodological reasons of comparison in this study, something that is elaborated upon in the next paragraph, the different stages of alliance formation, maintenance, evolution and dissolution are distinguished. As will be shown, this will make it easier to compare the two and shed a clear light in what specific stage both organizations differ. The stages are outlined in the next sections.

The treaty and foundation phase of an alliance

As stated in the previous section, most alliances are political agreements between countries in order to advance and secure common interests. Both NATO and SEATO are, as their name implies, treaty organizations. Both thus came into effect after signing a common treaty amongst the member states. NATO was founded at the treaty of Washington on the fourth of April, 1949 (Lieshout, 2007, p. 70). SEATO was founded shortly after as it came into effect when the treaty of Manila was signed on the eighth of September, 1954 (Leifer, 2005).

Maintenance and evolution of an alliance

Alliances, after their initial formation, may grow as their goals need to be institutionalized and the mutual obligations of all member states need to be controlled and penalized when their contribution is insufficient. There are many factors at play here, most of which can be measured. Maintenance of an alliance occurs and is visible when states reaffirm their desire for cooperation and their commitment towards the alliance. The amount of members may change however, as members decide to leave prematurely or join the alliance well after its foundation. The key difference here, between maintenance and evolution of an alliance, is the accomplishment of its goal(s).

Evolution within an alliance is more difficult to lay a finger on. If an alliance persists after reaching its goals, this can be considered more extraordinary. After reaching the original goals set out, the participating members may decide to use this cooperation that is already in place, as are its institutions, to foster other forms of cooperation, such as economic cooperation. Also, when the official goals as stated by the alliance or the member states themselves change over the course of the lifespan of the organization this can be seen as an indicator for evolution.

Formal separation and the Dissolution phase

Just as the formation of an alliance occurs at the signing of a political treaty, the alliance may formally dissolve. As a formal agreement is a very clear instrument to operationalize and measure the dissolution, the date of SEATO's dissolution, 30th of June, 1977, can be used as the set date for the end of the comparative analysis between both alliances.

3.2.2 Operationalization of independent variables

Shared interests

Shared interests are often the reason behind the formation of an alliance or any other political agreement. This means that, as it is one of the key goals, it is included in the treaty. Within the treaties of both NATO and SEATO we need to look for the common interests. To measure shared interests across states we need to evaluate the similarity in alliance portfolios (Bueno de Mesquita, in Quackenbush, 2015, p. 136). An alliance portfolio is defined as a complete array of alliance commitments. This means that, by comparing alliance portfolios we are assessing the degree to which all of the commitments of one nation match that of another nation (Ibid.). This means that the alliance itself can also be used to measure shared interests between states. The scope of this thesis is limited to a comparison of security and economic shared interests of some members.

As outlined in previous sections and the theoretical chapter, the shared interests of the member states of an alliance are twofold. First there is the perceived shared threat that members of both alliances aim to tackle jointly. Then there is the liberal idea that such organizations can also provide a platform for other forms of cooperation, mostly in terms of economic cooperation, which is called a

positive spillover (Haas, 2004). As there is already an institutionalized form of cooperation present, members do not have to invest as much time, energy and money to search trade partners, inform them of opportunities or negotiate and enforce terms. Transaction costs of expansion of cooperation will presumably be lower if the countries are already cooperating on other levels. This can be measured through analysis of historical sources and other academic material, which refer to their interests and the perceived usefulness of ongoing cooperation.

Common norms and identity

This study takes a historical analytical perspective and presents an overview of second hand literature on the current constructivist works on norms and identity within military alliances. Here too, the statements of decision makers in historical sources or other academic literature can be used as an indication of their norms, values and identity constructions.

Identity is often defined as a combination of a shared culture, language, history, common norms and values. Norms are difficult to measure as they are completely subjective. They cannot be observed empirically as a consequence. This means that researchers, who do attempt to measure them, need to develop a means of observation for either the norms or the visible consequences of them. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, our perceptions of reality are colored as our observations and the 'lens' we use. Given the scarcity of available resources and data, especially in the case of SEATO, this study is limited in the sense that it relies mostly on the interpretation of other authors.

Constructivism fits within the crossroads between international relations and comparative politics (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Constructivism poses questions that can only be answered by taking both domestic and international actions into account. Norms are created by states and other actors on both levels, according to Wendt (1999). Hopf feels that being able to deal with domestic factors, taking them into account is a clear sign that this is a main strength of constructivism (1998).

3.3 Case Selection

3.3.1 Justification for the use of an Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD)

As a research method, this study performs a comparison between both alliances. This is conducted through the principle of a most similar systems design (MSSD), a technique that is more commonly used in the field of comparative politics. Basically, it is a type of theory-driven small-N analysis (Mills, A.J., Durepos, G., Wiebe, E., 2010). MSSD is a strategy of concomitant variation, which can serve as a case selection process as well as method of analysis. The logic of MSSD is that two cases, which differ in dependent variable, are identically composed except for one characteristic, when one of the cases shows an effect that the other does

not, the prior circumstance on the variable in which the cases differ must be the cause or part of the cause.

But how does this most similar research design work in practice? Most similar systems designs use a minimum of two cases and in its purest form, the chosen pair of cases are very similar in all respects, except the variable of interest, as further described and elaborated in the next section (Gerring, 2007, p. 131). Often, fruitful analysis begins with an apparent anomaly: two cases are apparently quite similar but they surprisingly have a different outcome. The hope is that an intensive study of these cases will reveal one or several factors that differ across these cases. These are the putative cause(s) (Ibid.: p. 131).

MSSD sometimes begins with a strong hypothesis in which case a research design is confirmatory (hypothesis-testing) from the outset. This means that the research aims to identify cases that exhibit different scores on the factor of interest and similar scores on all other possible factors (Ibid.: p. 131).

(A) Hypothesis-generating (Y-centered):

| | | X_1 | X_2 | Y |
|-------|---|-------|-------|-----|
| Case | A | ? | 0 | 1 |
| types | B | ? | 0 | 0 |

(B) Hypothesis-testing (X_1/Y -centered):

| | | X_1 | X_2 | Y |
|-------|---|-------|-------|-----|
| Case | A | 1 | 0 | ? |
| types | B | 0 | 0 | ? |

X_1 = the variable of theoretical interest. X_2 = a vector of controls. Y = the outcome of interest.

Graph 3. In: Gerring, 2007, p. 132.

If a researcher discovers such a case, it is regarded as providing confirmatory evidence for the proposition, as well as the starting point for an exploration of causal mechanisms. The point here is that the purpose of an MSSD, and hence its basic setup, may change as a researcher moves from an exploratory to a confirmatory mode of analysis. Regardless of the initial starting point however, once published, the outcome of the research looks like a hypothesis-testing research design (Ibid.: p. 132). This means that in the graph above, the question marks have been removed: (A) becomes (B) and consequently the notion of a 'most similar analysis' is usually understood as a tool for understanding a specific X_1/Y relationship. In practice there is an important remark to be made. The problem of coding continuous variables in a dichotomous manner (common interests, common norms and identity) is threatening to any most similar analysis (Ibid.: p. 133). The requirements for case control are thus not so stringent and it is not necessarily the case that the researcher needs to *measure*

control variables (with a high degree of precision) in order to control for them (Ibid.).

The purpose of a case study like the MSSD is somewhat different in situations where any large-N cross case analysis has already been conducted. However, in cases such as NATO and SEATO there is no prior large-N research. This means that here we are more interested in the covariational patterns that are discovered between X1 and Y (Ibid.: p.138). As with other methods of case selection, the MSSD is prone to problems of non-representativeness. If this technique is used in a qualitative fashion and without a systematic cross-case selection strategy, potential biases in the cases that are chosen must be addressed in a speculative way. If the researcher applies a matching technique of case selection as he or she would use within a Large-N sample, the problem of potential bias can be addressed by assuring a choice of cases that are not extreme outliers (Ibid.: p. 139). Most similar cases should also be typical cases, though some scope for deviance around the regression line may be acceptable for purposes of finding a good fit among them.

Justification for use of MSSD from a positivistic perspective

MSSD can be regarded as an extension of the falsificationist form of research as suggested by Karl Popper (2002). He suggests that all scientific theories are conjectures and therefore inherently fallible (Ibid.: p. 44). According to Popper, knowledge is fundamentally uncertain, but there are degrees of (un) certainty. In trying to determine what kinds of science is better than other kinds of science and whether scientific progress is possible

Popper argues that we can distinguish science from other types of knowledge. Instead of trying to verify a certain theory, we should rather make attempts possible for falsification. Scientific knowledge therefore should be knowledge that we are able to falsify which means in practical terms that we must be capable to conflict them with possible, conceivable observations (Popper, 2002, p. 51). Popper is famous for his searchlight theory of knowledge, in which he describes scientific theories as searchlights. What the eye is focused on is the theoretical content (Ibid. p. 49). What is not focused on is the empirical content. Theories that try to account for everything are meaningless. It is because of the lack of empirical content means that nothing is excluded and therefore nothing to test or disprove the theory with. We should instead of taking all options as given, try to exclude as much as possible. We should not try to come up with highly probable theories but even more with highly contestable theories.

According to Popper, there is no such thing as a naked observation (Ibid. p. 63). Conceptual notions that determine what questions we ask and how we conduct research to find answers for these questions color all observations. We interpret reality according to predetermined theoretical notions. So we start with theory, which is one of the main arguments against inductivists. We cannot write a theory based on (repeated) observations because the observations themselves are derived from a theory. So we start with theory. Popper does however

describe a problem related to this, the clash between theory and fact. Theory or problem, which comes first? A theory or the (observation of) a problem? Popper points to the theory of inborn expectations (Ibid. p. 76). As Popper suggests, the main aim of scientific knowledge gathering is trying to falsify theories, but in order to do so, we need to take into account that our perceptions are colored as our observations are based on the possibly fallible theories causing us to miss or misinterpret our findings. We also need to have a consensus within the scientific community on how to falsify our theories (Ibid. p. 77).

With a MSSD setup we are not only capable to clash theory with empirical facts but we can immediately compare the results to how a competing theory holds up the confrontation with the same empirical facts. If we follow Popper's logic, the falsification of one or both theories leads to the general growth of knowledge and thus contributes to the literature about this subject.

3.3.2 Empirical Cases of this study

In the case of NATO and SEATO, the dependent variable of persistence of the Alliance differs. As most of the dependent variables seem similar, such as the era in which both alliances were founded, their context as well as most of their members and both the liberal and constructivist hypotheses that explain the foundation and maintenance for both organizations. Still, SEATO was dissolved in 1977. By using the MSSD analysis, this study tries to show the main reason for the dissolution of SEATO. Afterwards, a comparison between Liberalism and constructivist theories may provide us with explanations that can account for the difference.

The reasons behind the choice for these two organizations are related to their superficial similarities. First and foremost, both organizations are founded in the same era. The period of comparison and thus the scope of research is the period in which both were active. This means we compare both organizations from the foundation of NATO in 1949 until the dissolution of SEATO in 1977. SEATO was founded only a few years after NATO (1954) and as NATO was still in its infancy and not yet fully institutionalized this is not considered to be problematic in the analysis as provided in this thesis.

Second, the initiating states are for the most part alike, with the United States being the most powerful and common state for both alliances. The main focus in the analysis will be on the largest or most important members as these were presumably the most influential members during all stages of the lifespan of both organizations. Additionally, more literature can be retrieved regarding these members.

The last and perhaps most important factor that is mentioned here is their main common goal, which for both NATO and SEATO is to deter and protect its members from the large external security threat that is the USSR. This goal is specified in the signed treaties of both organizations.

3.4 Justification of sources

As stated in the introduction of this second chapter, the analysis focuses mostly on secondary literature on the subject as this thesis takes a historical approach. This is mainly due to the fact that data of these organizations, for the specific era, specifically aimed at the three stages, at least in the case of SEATO is very limited. This limited data, combined with a scarcity of resources devoted to a master's thesis makes the available secondary literature not only very useful but also an absolute necessity. It should be said however, that this limitation could potentially lead to a bias. Even though this secondary literature mainly sums up relevant events, we have to take into account that these events may already be based on a rational or even realist perspective.

Most of the researchers that are used for the secondary literature based their research primarily on the on the treaties that founded these organizations, the (financial) data and newspaper articles for the liberal analysis.

Constructivist analysis was based primarily on secondary literature in which norms and identity were interpreted by the author during their research of speech acts of the main leaders of the member states involved as the wording and intentions by them indicated their ideas and (threat) perception. The latter also meaningful in the attempts to define the perception of a state or its citizens of the membership of either organization in the light of the events that went on during the era of analysis.

The analysis is based on a comprehensive overview of secondary literature by two authors in particular. One of the key sources is the work of Fenton (2006) who gives an extensive overview of SEATO and the defense of Southeast Asia from 1955-1965. The second key source is Lieshout (2007) who discusses the organization of the Western European Cooperation and founding of NATO. Many more sources, both historical and academic, have written about NATO so these are more mixed. All of the previously mentioned sources are complemented by other sources of 'grey literature'.

Depending on secondary literature that is mostly available in current libraries and Internet databases can be considered as a weakness. At the time during which the events that are examined occurred, there was no Internet or a global databases available, which means some of the relevant data is missing or unattainable. Another weakness, especially in the case of SEATO may be the distance and language barriers that prevent searching local sources. A final weakness, as also highlighted above, is the fact that secondary literature may be inaccurate, incomplete or already biased based on the convictions and interpretations of the original author.

Chapter 4. NATO

4.1 Study Outline

The structure of this chapter was determined by the way the design of this research was set up. In order to determine whether liberalism or constructivism can account for the difference in the fate of NATO and SEATO better, the hypotheses derived from both theories focused on the same stages of life of both organizations. These stages are the foundation and early stages, maintenance and evolution and finally dissolution in the case of SEATO, in the same way the analytical chapters are structured.

4.2 Background, foundation and purpose

Historical context

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has existed for so long now and has been so successful during its existence that West-Europeans and Americans could not imagine how a military alliance should be composed in a different manner (Lieshout, 2007, p. 61). The institutionalized and permanent meetings amongst its treaty partners and the agreements on the course to follow and the integrated command structure of the NATO forces are now seen as very familiar and commonplace.

After the Second World War, American, British and French policy makers made various assessments of the strategic security position of Western Europe in preparation of a potential Soviet attack and the possible response to such a calamity. The general opinion is that the then recent war efforts have crippled the Soviet army in such a manner that any Soviet aggression for an invasion in Western Europe or the U.S. should be deemed highly unexpected. At the same time there remains the fear that, should the U.S. not be willing to fully commit to defending Western Europe or underestimate the Soviet military capacity, the latter could make an attempt (Ibid.). Should Soviet troops cross the river Elbe 'by accident', then the lack of sufficient manpower by Western allies would provide little or no resistance to the Soviet advances. The Americans at the time only had two divisions stationed in Germany. These were mostly charged with policing tasks (Osgood, in Lieshout, 2007, p. 61-62).

The U.S. developed several scenarios in the course of 1947 and 1948, all of which had foreseen a needed withdrawal behind defensive line in the Pyrenees along with bombardments on Soviet targets. Should these attempts not put a stop to Soviet advancements, the U.S. would attempt to do more beach landings as it did in the Second World War (Lieshout, 2007, p. 62). The British shared the American idea that the strategic position of Western Europe would be useless in the case of a Soviet attack and realized the number of British forces were insufficient to pose any resistance. The French government emphasized that the

U.S. would again come to its aid in the case of another war in Europe. However, another war would be more than France could take after such a long period of hardship and destruction and so the country refuses to accept a passive attitude. The French position is that the defense of Western Europe should be waged on West German soil and that a substantial amount of American forces should be a part of this defense (Ibid.). In the next paragraphs I will show that the United States will eventually agree with these French terms but that the French will have to pay a high price in return, including agreeing to the principle of West-German troops taking part in the defense of Western Europe.

The United States and Containment strategy

Why is containment mentioned as a part of this thesis? Containment was the main strategy employed by the U.S. during the cold war and was part of the U.S. foreign policy as formulated in the Truman Doctrine in 1947 (Leffler, 1994, p. 236). Cooperation with allies through military alliances such as SEAT and NATO were believed to be an essential part of this strategy.

The concept of containment was derivative of the idea that isolation would lead to stagnation, as it had been successfully used not so much as a strategy or policy in the past, but rather as a tactic. The state subjected to containment politics could only rely on the means that were still in its own controlled environment for survival (Ibid.). Another way to dislocate the enemy was by creating a situation of relative isolation. In practice, this often results in the use of espionage or sabotage. The result was that, as a consequence, every introduced dislocation will cause an extensive amount of damage that will take a very long time to recover from as long as there is a continued disruption from external aid and supplies (Ibid. p. 237).

President Truman vowed to help allied states, anywhere in the world, to preserve their freedom and, if necessary, send economic or military aid. The expansion of communism in Eastern Europe was the main reason for his strong position on the matter (Lieshout, 2007, p. 64-65). This form of action taken by states or alliances to protect against equally powerful alliances is part of the deterrence strategy within the Truman Doctrine and was a deviation from the so-called rollback strategy used prior by President Dwight Eisenhower. Rollback means the withdrawal of military forces in order to prevent the escalation of a conflict (Leffler, 1985, p. 236-237).

Different steps of the foundation phase

The treaty of Brussels and the resulting Vandenberg resolution was the first on the road to NATO. The treaty initially started out as a British initiative. After a conference in 1947, the ministers of foreign affairs once again could not come to an agreement on the German issue. In response, British foreign affairs minister Bevin, met with his American colleague Marshall and asked him to start a tripartite meeting between the United Kingdom, France and the United States and an inquiry on how to get the United States more involved in the defense of

Western Europe (Ibid. p. 62). Marshall suggests a joint European initiative such as the rebuilding program as that would be better received by the U.S. congress (Young in Lieshout, 2007, p. 62-63).

The British response is fairly negative. Parallel to the French perception, the debates in the British house of commons suggest that any cooperation in the form of a Western Union to resist the Soviet threat should be based on a network of bilateral treaties of mutual military assistance between the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries, such as the previous treaty of Dunkerque (Jansen & De Vree in Lieshout, 2007, p. 63). Even though France agrees with Bevin's proposal, the Benelux partners reject it. The Benelux suggests the founding of a multilateral regional security organization for collective defense, in agreement with the United Nations manifesto and in response to the 1947 American pact of Rio, and with consideration of a contribution by the United States (Spaak, in Lieshout, 2007, p. 63). Also in the U.S. these proposals are not met with enthusiasm. The American State Department suggested to Bevin that a European Safety Pact should be founded that is based on the Inter American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, article 3 in the Rio treaty, in order to ensure a duty of assistance to any state who becomes a victim of an armed attack, regardless of who the attacking state is (FRUS in Lieshout, 2007, p. 63). This ensures that any European safety pact is not necessarily aimed against Germany and will make it easier to involve Germany in the defense of Western Europe, something not only the United States but also the United Kingdom are comfortable with.

The French continue to clash with the U.S. and the U.K. on the former matter. As France already came under German rule twice in the previous decades, they formulate two demands. The French want nothing more but a permanent German decentralization and a more coal from the British occupied territories to France (Young in Lieshout, 2007, p. 63). The French demand agreement on the former matters first, before any agreement can be reached on the proposition of mutual assistance. Even though this cannot be considered as a good start for the mutual assistance initiative, within a few weeks the French and the British come to an agreement about the contents of the treaty. In order not to startle the Soviets, these contents are based on a series of treaties signed with the USSR in 1942 and 1944 in which mutual assistance against German aggression would be guaranteed (Jansen & De Vree in Lieshout, 2007, p. 64). The signing of the treaty itself occurred on the fourth of March, 1947 in Dunkerque, France and, even though it is the results of remnants of the old way of thinking, it can be considered as the first step in the organization of Western European cooperation.

The positions of the UK and France on one end, and the Benelux countries on the other end, are so far apart that it endangers the potential success of the organization. The communist take-over during the coup of Prague in 1948 however, brings all parties closer together (Lieshout, 2007, p. 64-65). The developments in Czechoslovakia underline the Western European and American fears for the Communist expansionism and the inability of Western Europe to face these threats independently. This causes the negotiation process to speed up after France had given up on the demand for a network of bilateral treaties. The French had shifted towards a preference for a concrete military alliance

(against Soviet attack) with definite promises to do definite things under definite circumstances (FRUS in Lieshout, 2007, p. 65). The negotiations lead to the signing of the 'Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation and Collective Defense treaty, better known as the treaty of Brussels (Lieshout, 2007, p. 65). Especially the fact that this predecessor of NATO involves economic and socio-cultural aspects for the treaty is of importance for the comparison between the interest and identity based theories in this thesis.

In the treaty of Brussels, the main concern is how to deal with the reference France made towards any potential German aggression, even though the French have agreed to a mutual assistance obligation comparable to the pact of Rio and including German involvement. The American president Truman explicitly stated in his speech in congress in March 1948 that he intends to provide full support for this European initiative. The same day, Bevin and Bidault send a message to Marshall in which they establish that the road has been paved for further arrangements in order to execute Truman's commitment (Lieshout, 2007, p. 65). Within a couple of days after the speech in Congress the first of a series of secret meetings between representatives of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom takes place on how the American military aid for Western Europe should best be organized (Ibid.: p. 66). Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican chairman of the Senate committee for international relations, had several meetings with representatives of Canada and the U.K. in order to define the conditions under which the Senate would be able to provide large support for larger American involvement in the defense of Western Europe. One of the most important results of these meetings was the Canadian and British agreement of the idea that there should be a treaty for a 'regional security arrangement in the North Atlantic Area' (Ibid.: p. 66). The U.S. state department requested the Senate Commission for international relations lead by Vandenberg to prepare a resolution for the participation of the United States in regional collective security organizations, something of later importance for NATO as well as SEATO. After the resolution was passed, the countries of the treaty of Brussels approached the United States to commence negotiations regarding the way the organization is to be constructed. The president of the United States in response announced he agreed to start these discussions as long as they were executed on the basis of 'effective self-help and mutual aid'. This would obligate Western European countries to be equally engaged in the process and to distribute the costs of the rebuilding of Europe so that these would not be the sole responsibility of the United States.

The North Atlantic Treaty

Only two weeks after the acceptance of the Vandenberg resolution, tensions in Europe reach a new high as the Soviet Union blocks all access roads to Berlin (Lieshout, 2007, p. 67). As a symbol of their commitment to the defense of Western Europe, the United States sent 60 of their B29 'atomic bombers' with the capacity to strike the USSR to Great Britain. In July, the countries of Western Europe on one side, and representatives for the United States and Canada on the other started negotiations on how to expand the involvement of the latter in the

defense of Western Europe. The United States stresses the fact that these meetings remain exploratory and not binding in any way. The first phase of the meetings is concluded with a memorandum, the so-called Washington Paper in which the delegations inform their governments of the agreements so far (FRUS, 1974, p. 238). The general idea for all the participants however is that results are hopeful and should open the opportunity for a treaty on a North Atlantic security system.

One of the main concerns during the follow up is the credibility of the future treaty partners and their commitment to live up to their promises and execution of threats. Protagonists France and the United States equally fear that the other will not live up to their promise when push comes to shove. In the opinion of France, any alliance with the United States may seem as a provocation in the eyes of the USSR (Lieshout, 2007, p. 67-68). Should war follow as a result, then France is the one paying the price as the country could be completely overrun by Soviet troops well before the Americans are completely mobilized. This is why the French plea for immediate and vast weapons deliveries to rebuild the French army. In the opinion of the United States however, US presence in Germany shows plenty of commitment for helping defend Western Europe. They deem it is time for the European allies to show their commitment instead in fulfilling their part of the deal such as the rearmament and coordination of their combined war efforts as was included in the pact of Brussels (Ibid.: p. 68).

Skepticism regarding the contribution of other countries combined with the issues the United States sees with the way the treaty of Brussels formulates a binding form of mutual assistance does not help their credibility. In article IV of the treaty of Brussels, it is provided that all countries are automatically at war as a result of some occurrence outside the own borders or by vote of others without own concurrence (Lieshout, 2007, p. 68). Also article I and II are subjected to skepticism by the United States and Canada as these articles are aimed towards the economic recovery of Europe. The U.S. the other hand were only concerned with agreements that enhance their own strategic safety and given the limited number of states that signed the treaty of Brussels, it is not adequate. This is why, and for the first time during the negotiations, the United States claims to favor the formation of a North Atlantic community that includes not only the countries of the Brussels treaty but also Iceland, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Ireland. They also suggest a separate agreement for Italy and Sweden after the initial negotiations (Ibid.). Inclusion of Portugal is however very striking. The country was ruled by the 'Estado Novo', an undemocratic government under Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, and it is believed that the other founding members of NATO only tolerated them due to their anti-communist nature (Meneses, P., 2009, p. 240). At the same time however, the Fascist regime did still have control over colonies, something the United States in particular, as focused on during the Suez crisis, is not too happy with.

The Washington paper is accepted as the basis for further negotiations on the North-Atlantic Pact and a concept version of the pact was ready before Christmas of 1948. Article V became the most difficult threshold during the negotiations. In the article it was stated that an attack on a single member should be considered as an attack against all and that, consequently each member, in accordance with

article 51 of the United Nations Charter and by exercising the individual and collective self-defense, is expected to assist the party or parties attacked by taking military or other action, individually and in concert with other parties, as may be necessary to restore and assure the security of the North Atlantic Area (FRUS, 1974, p. 335). Even though this article is more or less in line with article IV of the Brussels pact, according to the Senate it does violate the independence of Congress in the United States as this is the only institution that can officially declare war. This meant that there should be a formulation in which the independence of Congress was not to be violated. This was done by adding a clause to article V that stressed that every member needed to assist in the way that it deemed necessary, including the potential use of force which left room for Congress to make the final call for war (Lieshout, 2007, p. 69). Further difficulties regarding the negotiations were related to the size of the treaty area as France would like to include French-Algeria, something the United States disliked, as this was not deemed in their own interests. But as the French threatened to abandon the negotiations all other states agreed upon this demand (FRUS, 1975, p. 131). In early march 1949 the negotiations had reached such an advanced stage that all participants agreed to go to Washington for the final negotiations and the eventual signing of the treaty of Washington which occurred on April 4th.

At a first glance, the military balance between Europe and the United States at the time would make article V and the treaty as a whole seem superfluous, as does the added option to use military force. But this interpretation does not do the treaty justice (Lieshout, 2007, p. 70). Article III provides the effective self-help and mutual aid clause as provided by Vandenberg and article IX that introduces a council that watches over the implementation of the treaty. But the treaty as a whole can be seen as a milestone with great psychological value because it is the first time where the United States, through the eyes of the rest of the world, agrees to a treaty on an equal footing as the Western European states. The negotiating parties aim to forge a political basis that needs to strengthen the sense of security in Europe (Richardson, 1972, p. 604).

After signing in the treaty of Washington, France and the United States proceed with their quest for concrete gestures (Lieshout, 2007, p. 71). While the French stress the direct need for military aid, the United States refer towards article IX which states that the Western European allies have to take proper measures to create a common defense of their territories as a prerequisite for a large scale American military aid program. At the same time however, the United States and France are not only preoccupied with the creation of a credible defense against a Soviet attack, but France is also greatly concerned with reinforcing its own position against West-Germany that has been left out of the military aid program (Ibid.). The European partners jointly state that they are in line with the agreement combining their effort for the joint defense but that are relying on American military aid because of the deplorable economic conditions after the war that prevents them from having economic growth as well as investing in military capabilities. The original proposition is hence adjusted so that the council of foreign affairs ministers of the allies could start the first of several negotiations on how to structure the alliance (Ibid.: p. 72). During the fourth meeting in London in May of 1950, the transformation of a North Atlantic Pact

based on a classic form of alliance with mutual assistance agreement towards an organization for collective self-defense occurred. According to Acheson, this was the meeting that put the 'O' in 'NATO' (1969, p. 399). The most important element of the meeting was the decision to install a permanent council of replacements that are responsible for the continuous development of common defense. During this stage, there was no integrated command structure for the armed forces of the alliance and there was still no indication that the American involvement of the defense of Western Europe would become permanent (Lieshout, 2007, p. 72).

Important to realize is that the United States sees this organization makes it possible for West-Germany to become part in the defense of Western Europe once again, which they deem as a necessity. The French on their behalf want to use the alliance as a means to demonstrate that, once the French military has been rebuilt, in cooperation with the United States, any West-German involvement is unnecessary (Ibid.: p. 73). Most other alliance members agree with the United States but as the issue is received as a great taboo in France, the other members steer away from this discussion just yet as it may weaken or stall any of the ongoing negotiations. This consensus is however broken during the attack of North Korea on South Korea in June 1950. As a first response, the United States raise the amount of aid towards their European allies drastically (Ibid.: p. 74). At the same time they take all kinds of precautions that facilitate arms production and they demand the other allies do the same. The United States, in this same line of thinking, starts investigations regarding the use and potential of the Western German industries for this purpose and this puts West German rearmament also back on the table. Where the French continue to see Germany as a buffer zone on which French, British and American troops can be installed, the Americans consider it a possibility to have German troops under the command of an international coalition (Ibid.: p. 75). After some time of internal discussions the United States publish a memorandum with several proposals, also referred to as the 'one package proposal'. The first proposal is that Western Germany will not have its own army and secondly, the United States will contribute fully to the defense of Western Europe. Third, American divisions will become part of the European defensive force within NATO context in which army division of all members will contribute, including West German divisions. Fourth, this European army would be a supranational responsibility and in the international staff there should be room for West Germans also. With the proviso that the highest German rank would be that of general of a single division and the Germans do not have their own independent general staff (Ibid.).

Adenauer, the West German chancellor, launches a counterproposition by suggesting the formation of a large Federal Police force that should be strong enough to withstand communist interventions. The United Kingdom responds positively to this suggestion but for the United States this proposal does not meet its own intentions and for France this police force should be denied for its size and for the same reason the French do not want a German military presence (Ibid.: p. 75-76). Even though in the follow up meetings the need for German involvement becomes ever more apparent for all member states, France keeps resisting. The only promise the French are willing to commit to is to approve of

further research on how West Germany can contribute to the common defense of Western Europe (Ibid.: p. 77).

France felt the pressure of all other member states as well as the constant communist threat in the background. It launched the Pleven Plan as its counterproposal to show that it was willing to cooperate in a constructive manner and did so in the light of its plans for a Coal and Steel council. The latter is to put the European coal and steel industry, also essential for the military industry, under supranational control (Ibid.: p. 78). Their first proposal contains the idea for a European army under European supervision. This army will operate under NATO and jointly with American and British divisions. In time, West German forces will be required to be integrated but then only on the smallest scale possible. The third proposition is that this plan can only be executed once the treaty for a coal and steel community is signed. Many countries oppose these propositions for a number of reasons. The package deal with the idea for a coal and steel community may delay negotiations and for the United States the idea of a West German contribution in the smallest form possible would not be in line with creating a legitimate opposing force against communist influence. The United Kingdom even threatens complete withdrawal of its troops and cooperation to the creation of a command structure should these plans be executed. This creates complete impasse. (FRUS, 1977, p. 415-425).

Specific structure of NATO and Collective Security:

The Americans and the French start meetings in late 1950 with the intention to launch a compromise. In the so called Spofford Plan, the United States is prepared to support a conference in which the execution of the Pleven plan is discussed and France is prepared to accept and facilitate the preparations for a West German contribution, possibly within the context of a European army, within a Northern Atlantic defensive force. (Lieshout, 2007, p. 79). France will not stall these plans by awaiting progress of negotiations for the Coal and Steel community. A second compromise France makes is that the German contribution will not be on the smallest scale possible but on the scale of a regiment, even though the United States still stress it would be even better to have the Germans contribute on the scale of a division (Ibid.). Following this compromise, on the NATO council of December 1950 it is decided to install a 'Supreme Headquarters Atlantic Powers in Europe' (SHAPE) and the council unanimously moves forward General Eisenhower for the position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). The election occurred the same day and Truman stated the United States would send some divisions to West Germany in the following months (Ibid.). An American always holds the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe so U.S. troops were never to fall under foreign command, answering to the North Atlantic Council of ambassadors from member states. The NATO council is led under the supervision of the Secretary General of NATO, who is always a European citizen.

The intention of the United States throughout the whole of negotiations described here is to show the European allies that all of its efforts and sacrifices

are not in vain so that the Western European allies gain confidence and also invest in the rebuilding process (Ibid.: p. 80). It acts as a great power that looks after its self-interests which are, in this case at least, to prevent Western Europe to fall into the lap of the Soviet Union and so it is willing to give them a common good. Not giving in on the matter of the German contribution was simply its way to prevent free-rider behavior by the Western European states. The United States clearly showed way more commitment to this cause than the United Kingdom who acted as a 'flank power'. This meant that they preferred to keep away from continental European issues and quarrels (Ibid.).

Initial goals of NATO

After the signing in of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4th 1949 in Washington D.C., the organization was founded in order to support the treaty and ever since its headquarters can be found in Brussels (NATO, 2014). Other alliances, almost without exception, consist of loose coalitions of states who all decide for themselves in what way they wish to contribute to the common goal and who, in most cases, only cooperate for a few consecutive years on end. Because of the extensive cooperation and integrated command structure with its supranational elements in the execution of its policy, NATO formed a fundamental innovation in general international cooperation. This could be considered ironic, as it was the very last thing the United States intended upon its foundation. When the organization to be founded was based on the traditional idea that cooperation remained voluntary (Lieshout, 2007, p. 61).

NATO (2012a) itself argues that it had not just two but three purposes when it began. The first and main purpose was to counterbalance the Soviets. Alliances have worked to deter attacks on member states by credibly demonstrating that an attack on one member is an attack on all members. NATO is credited for balancing against the soviets as the end of World War II created rewrote the map and changed the balance of power. NATO also helped preserve the peace in Europe after the Cold War (Duffield, 1992, 1994a, 1994b). The end of World War II pushed Europe in the middle of two superpowers. Because the post-World War II era gave rise to these superpowers, European states had to make a decision on which power to support. For many European states such as the UK and France, the Soviet ideology did not have the preference for support. This is when the United States becomes more involved into European politics. NATO provided the framework within which European democracies and the United States could cooperate and balance against the Soviet Union.

The second purpose of NATO was to prevent the rise of more militant nationalism in Europe. NATO's foundation along with its goals was a reflection of the times. Militant nationalism in Germany had just caused the bloodiest conflict the world had ever seen, and the ongoing threat of Soviet-style Communism in the background along with the communist regimes that had established in place in Eastern Europe was felt by many European states. By bringing in the US, NATO states hoped to balance against these threats and encourage more interdependence between their members. One could argue it is because of this that NATO early on combined realist ideas about power and balance with liberal

ideas about cooperation and interconnectedness, something more defined in the third purpose of the alliance.

The third and last purpose was to encourage European integration amongst its members. These goals were obviously motivated by the reasons and outcome of World War II. They reflected the demands of NATO member countries to prevent Europe from returning to the situation preceding that conflict. The member countries' first goal was a response to the perceived threat that Communism posed to democracy and freedom, again reflecting the common ideology of NATO member countries. The third goal derives from the first two, with NATO countries wanting to encourage more interdependence in the region as an attempt to prevent a potential outbreak of conflict.

The original goals of the organization thus consisted of deterrence of the expansion of Soviet influence and the expansion of Communism and to further European political integration and to stop any attempted revival of militant nationalism in Europe (NATO, 2012). These goals seem to have been reached and now also seem to be surpassed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has persisted and its goals have evolved as NATO has seen a big shift in its purposes (Lemmons, 2012, p. 19). Currently, NATO is seen as an advanced and effective network between the member states. In the context of this study, the question remains whether interests or identity is better at explaining the course of the organization.

4.3 First NATO activities from 1949 until 1955

The years 1947 and 1948 knew several events that had Western European states become concerned about their physical and political security. This was when the United States in particular became more closely involved in European affairs (U.S. Department of State - Office of the Historian, 2015). The Soviet sponsored coup in Czechoslovakia helped form a Communist government come to power on the borders of Germany. In Italy the Communist party increased significantly in size and furthermore in Germany there were concerns regarding the long disputed occupation (Ibid.). The growing tension in Germany led to the Soviet blockage of West Berlin, which was under joint U.S., British and French control at the time. The Berlin Blockade from April 1948 until May 1949 that jumpstarted the meetings on collective defense is considered the first great crisis NATO had to deal with. The Soviet Union blocked all access roads to West Berlin. American security advisors were not completely surprised with this event however as they anticipated the possibilities of Soviet Blockades (Lieshout, 2007, p. 67). These events laid the foundations for rapid expansion of the alliance. This crisis brought the United States and the USSR on the brink of conflict and the United States managed to relieve much of the tensions by installing a massive airlift to resupply the city for the duration of the blockade. The event made the United States realize, in an attempt to deal with the security concerns, some of the Western allies might negotiate with the Soviets (U.S. Department of State - Office of the Historian, 2015).

Very soon after the formation of NATO, the outbreak of the Korean War had members deciding very quickly about the necessity of a centralized HQ, as discussed in the previous paragraph on the formation of NATO. The North Korean attack on South Korea was regarded as a key example of how Communist aggression directed by Moscow sought for expansion and what this could potentially mean for Europe (Ibid.).

On February 18th of 1952 the first big change in terms of NATO expansion occurred with the accession of Greece and Turkey (Allied Joint force Command Naples, 2015). In terms of the treaty this meant that these two members were able from that moment on to further the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic Area. This begs the question why these countries, both over 3000 km away from the border of the Atlantic Ocean could become part at all. The decision to include them neatly fit within the Cold War strategy as defined in the Truman doctrine against the Soviet Union and these countries, both with anti-Communist governments, were viewed by the West as bulwarks against the spread of Communism in Europe (International Business Times, 2012). Truman was also concerned with the fact that there was an ongoing civil war in Greece along with tensions in Turkey. This led him to assert that the United States should provide them and any other nation struggling against an attempt at subjugation with military and financial help (NATO, 2015). There was also another advantage to the Turkish membership for NATO. Their membership was key to help NATO deal with political instability in Eastern Europe and the fact that Turkey's government is secular-Islamic meant that the country also formed a political bridge into the Arab World (Leffler, 1985, p. 807).

Both Greece and Turkey also contributed troops to fight in Korea. NATO inclusion also allowed for the extension of military and economic aid to states vulnerable to Soviet expansionist threats (Ibid.). The accession of both countries however, has not remained unquestioned or uncontroversial as they are considered old adversaries. This caused Greece to be forced to leave NATO in 1974 following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus where they formed the separate state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Greece rejoined NATO in 1980 with Turkey's cooperation (Ibid.). This stage of NATO is discussed in the next paragraph in more depth.

One of the first joint missions under the NATO flag was operation 'Gladio'. The Soviet threat caused NATO allies to create policies fitting the potential aggressive actions by the USSR. One of these resulting policy strategies devised by the CIA and NATO in 1952, was the creation of a 'stay-behind-networks' in Europe (Ganser, 2005). Operation Gladio is the name of the Italian department but was created similar to the other networks. In case of a Soviet attempt to overrun Western Europe, this network had two main goals. The first and main goal was to operate as an autonomous guerilla group during the occupation in case nuclear weapons alone would not stop Soviet advances (Ibid.). The second goal was to conduct emergency operations in the country of origin. Military intelligence determined what was understood as an emergency. Depicted emergencies included events such as the rise of socialist and communist parties that were seen as a threat to freedom (Ibid.). All stay-behind-networks were coordinated

internationally by the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) and the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC), both connected to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). 1952 was the year in which also the first large scale maritime exercises were conducted by NATO members.

In 1954, Molotov, the foreign affairs minister for The Soviet Union, proposed the idea that the USSR should issue a diplomatic note to the Western powers stating its willingness to consider joining NATO (Roberts, 2014). The proposal was done as part of a larger Soviet campaign for collective European security at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers and was intended as an alternative to Western Plans for a European Defense Community (EDC) (Ibid.). Western Representatives on two grounds later on rejected the proposal. The first reason is that the United States, along with Communist China, was relegated towards the background to act as an observer. The second reason was that the Soviet proposal was claimed to aim at disrupting plans for NATO and halt the formation of the EDC (Ibid.). This second reason is presumably the most interesting case for this thesis.

4.4 Maintenance and evolution of NATO from 1955 until 1977

In this era, the Soviet Union kept detonating atomic bombs and there was still no end to the outburst of a civil war in Korea. NATO fully incorporated military cooperation into its structure at this point (NATO, 2012). Late 1954,

West Germany joined on the 9th of May 1955, which is seen as a decisive point in history and only three years after NATO expanded with Greece and Turkey (NATO, 2012). At this point in time, NATO could be completely seen as military alliance designed to counter the Warsaw Pact, which had been established by the Soviet Union, its satellite states in Eastern Europe and other Communist states in 1955. The Warsaw Pact in its turn was a response to West Germany's inclusion of NATO (Lieshout, 2007, p. 140). The incorporation of West Germany was the result of the insight that, without its manpower, it would have been impossible for the other Western allies to put up enough resistance to the Soviets (Isby, D., Kamps, Jr., 1985, p. 15). One of the immediate results was the formation of the Warsaw Pact by the Soviet Union on the 14th of May 1955 that included Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and East Germany making the tension and alignment between East and West complete.

The alliance experienced some struggles in the period 1958 to 1966 when France under Charles de Gaulle eventually decided to remove itself from all military aspects of NATO (NATO, 2001). This was one of the indirect results of the Suez crisis in 1956, which caused significant damage to the Anglo-American relations. The invasion of Suez by the Israelis, the French and the British was not acceptable for the United States as it was perceived to be an act of colonization and old world style of thinking. There were however other NATO members such as Portugal that had colonies at the time. The Soviets agreed with the United States on this matter, something that at the time was seen as a unique event. The end of the Suez crisis is often regarded as the end of both France and Great Britain as great powers (Kissinger, 1995, p.523). American criticism on the

behavior of France and Great Britain coincided with the Soviet incursion in Hungary, deemed an unacceptable form of aggression that meant the United States could not tolerate a French-British invasion into Egypt even longer and forced these parties to end military activities (Ibid.). Even though the British soon after mended their relations with the United States, for the French the situation was more complex. The alliance had changed over the course of the decade it existed at the time. Europe had grown more powerful on both an economic and a military level and became less dependent on the United States. The USSR had launched the Sputnik and again underlined its nuclear capabilities which caused disbelief amongst many Europeans that the protective 'umbrella' by the United States, consisting of a huge retaliation as a response would be sufficient as a means of reassurance (NATO, 2001).

France kept having its reservations about the usage about the direction of Allied policy at the time and after his election De Gaulle expressed his dissatisfaction with aspects of the leadership role of the United States and more specifically with NATO's nuclear policy and integrated command structure (NATO, 2001). This leads to France no longer assigning its forces to NATO in 1966 and withdrawal from the integrated military structure with the additional consequence of causing frustration amongst other member states. France deemed it necessary to have the option to mend a form of peace with the Warsaw pact in case of an incursion of East German forces into West Germany. After moving its headquarters to Brussels, Belgium following that announcement, NATO moved into an era of détente until the late 70's, attempting to ease relations between the Soviet Union and United States.

Interesting in the light of this thesis is why NATO, even during this period of struggle and détente still carried on while, on the other side of the planet SEATO did not manage to survive as an organization. This could be perceived as a sign that other factors were in play. So how about other forms of cooperation within the NATO context? Economic issues grew more and more salient in the late 60's and early 70's when a few studies had emphasized the importance of economic relations between the members of the Atlantic alliance (Sperling & Kirchner, 1997, p. 1). Even then, economics were initially framed within a security context and seen as critical struts undergirding the alliance and the security of its member states. As the threat of war in that era became ever more distant, the opposite occurred in terms of economic conflict. The period saw the erosion of American influence and the rise of Germany and Japan, the slow collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system between 1971 and 1973, the two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 and the concerns about access to critical raw materials (Ibid.). Yet it lasted until the late 1980's before economic issues moved to the top of the table. It was the time in which particularly Germany was increasingly expressing its security concerns in economic rather than military terms.

4.5 NATO after 1977 and the dissolution of SEATO

The main difference between both organizations in this thesis is expressed in the fate of both organizations. The era after SEATO lies outside of the primary scope

of this research because of it. Yet it is interesting in the case of NATO to also take a peek at the decades after SEATO. As shown in the previous paragraph, the late 70's not only marked the end of SEATO but more importantly the beginning of the shift towards economic issues and forms of cooperation.

As NATO kept evolving after the dissolution of SEATO, it may be of importance when we try to determine in short how both theories can explain for the continued existence of NATO and to see how their relevance still holds up today. It does seem the case that NATO increasingly adapts and expands its original goals. One prime example is the fact that economic cooperation came onto the table in the late 1960's and early 1970's, around the time of SEATO's dissolution. Liberal expectations during the 60s and 70's resembled those of realism but were rather limited because of their main focus on common security goals. It was only after the cold war era that cooperation expanded, something that was once again expected by liberalism but different from realist expectations.

Apart from an incentive for cooperation revolving around common security issues between the members of NATO, they can contribute to maintain the alliance not just at a military level but also on an economic or financial level. In a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 1982, there was a review of the contribution to NATO of several preceding years by member state Turkey as stated in the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with Turkey (GAO, 1982, p. 1-68). DECA was part of the deal for Turkey's membership with NATO. Turkey's contribution was facing difficulties as the country, at the time, was faced with tremendous economic problems and thus lagged behind other NATO members on the level of economic as well as military contributions and, in the end was reliant of the other members (Ibid.). DECA did not mention a specific level of commitment for U.S. assistance but did include an umbrella agreement to foster military, economic and social development. As a result, the U.S. improved its military operations and interests in Turkey and assisted with a security assistance package of \$700 million, still leaving a shortage of funds to meet the Turkish military needs (Ibid.). It is cases like these that illustrate the military and intertwined economic cooperation and funding to help make NATO as an alliance not only viable but also credible as members strive to maintain their capabilities and responsibilities. Even though the review took place a few years after the dissolution of SEATO, the calculations did include the final years when SEATO was still active. It also paints a picture of how in practice NATO was maintained by the more powerful member states, primarily the United States.

The American investments in the military sector have always been a strong economic stimulant (Kendry, 2012). NATO's founding treaty also encourages economic collaboration between its members and suggests spending 2% of the Gross Domestic Product on defense as a demonstration of solidarity towards the other members and, in essence, to be considered as a membership fee (Ibid.).

After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the era of détente was at an end (NATO, 2012a). With the introduction of a new and democratic Spain into the alliance in 1982 (NATO, 2012b), NATO began its old policy of balancing against the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. In time, the Soviet Union began to

disintegrate and NATO moved slowly towards the background. Spain, unlike Portugal, was not included into the membership during its time of dictatorship under the Franco regime.

The reuniting of East and West Germany as one was a result after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. East Germany subsequently joined NATO as a part of that newly reunified Germany (NATO, 2012b). Even though the Soviet Union no longer existed, NATO's shifted towards two new goals, the first being preventing the rise of militant nationalism in Europe and the second being the promotion of European integration. These at the time were considered most important to its members. The post-Soviet power vacuum in much of Eastern Europe, further, was a source of instability in the region. One place that felt the fall of the Soviets very strongly was Yugoslavia, which devolved into civil war shortly after the Soviet Union's fall. NATO became involved in the conflict in Yugoslavia in an air campaign in 1995, and further implemented a peacekeeping force after the conflict ended (NATO, 2012a). Other conflicts also arose during this post-Soviet period, and NATO began to take an important role in promoting peace both in Eastern Europe and throughout the world.

In 1999, countries of the former Warsaw Pact including Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic joined the alliance (NATO, 2012b). This was a major turning point for NATO as this was the first enlargement of members the organization had seen after the first post-Cold War. The fact that this enlargement consisted of former Warsaw Pact countries was also a very significant, showing that NATO was willing to move beyond the Cold War and focus on the future. The future as they saw it largely consisted of a newfound sense of identity among the members. "NATO country" ceased to be synonymous with "enemy of the Warsaw Pact" or "ally of democracy." Instead, "NATO country" now signified a commitment to peace and cooperation in Europe and across the Atlantic. Without a clear enemy, NATO began incorporating these more aspiring goals into its identity (Ibid.).

In the second round of post-Cold War membership expansions in 2004, NATO chose to add seven more member states. Those new members were Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (NATO, 2012b). Again, many of these countries were former members of the Warsaw Pact, with Slovenia being the one exception as it had been a member of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War (Non-Aligned Movement, 2002). This second enlargement was meant to reinforce the new NATO identity as an active and omnipresent participant in international politics that has the ability to use military power when deemed necessary.

The most recent round of membership expansion was in 2009, when Albania and Croatia joined the alliance (NATO, 2012b). It went on to further expand its role in international relations by affirming a commitment to "address the full spectrum of crisis, before, during and after conflicts" (NATO, 2010). One good example of this commitment is "Operation Unified Protector," where NATO chose to intervene in the 2011 civil war between Muammar Gaddafi's forces and those rebelling against him (NATO, 2012c). This was the first large-scale NATO military intervention in a conflict since the war in Afghanistan of 2001, and was

the first intervention since Yugoslavia that didn't involve a direct attack on a NATO member.

With the evolution of NATO, also after the Soviet Union, some questions arise: Why has NATO persisted? And what makes this alliance so durable, even without a consolidated opponent? NATO is an example of an alliance that has evolved after completing its goal. The role of NATO has evolved and now their goals consist of providing support for peaceful interaction in the international community and to promote democracy all over the world (NATO, 2014).

4.6 Analysis of NATO

NATO is an interesting case in many ways. The member states signed the treaty and thus created this military alliance even before the opposition, the Warsaw Pact, was fully operational (Lemmons, 2012, p. 29). The fact that it existed until and after 1989 also makes it a highly successful alliance that achieved its initial aims. Finally, it has not lost any importance and is still on the forefront of international politics today.

This analysis attempts, apart from forming a personal analysis, to not only summarize some of the leading arguments in literature, as there has already been written much on this topic, but also criticize these arguments.

4.6.1 Foundation of NATO explained from both perspectives

The foundation of NATO from a liberal perspective

Liberalism predicts the rise of a military alliance when its existence is in the shared interest of the member states. We have established in the theoretical and the methodological chapter that this interest is multi-faceted, based on common security interests primarily as well as on other (economic) interests and cooperation. Economic cooperation is more complex than just the trade between member states and involves cost and benefit calculations as well as economic aid, growth and stability to foster military capabilities and trade. Security is a concept that is intertwined in this mutual dependence and has the ability to shape externally perceived threats.

During the preliminary negotiations and the formation of NATO there were different but complementary interests involved among the participating states. In the case of France in particular interests included the fear of external threats and the desire for self-preservation. They also saw the alliance as a means for controlling other state(s). Other NATO members at the same time also deemed self-preservation and the ability to become a credible threat to the Soviets of great importance and acknowledged that the alliance provided a means for cooperation on other issues such as the economy as well. Most European members knew that NATO membership almost certainly meant that they would be provided with financial and military aid. Additional interests included reinforcing the own position in the international playing field for the smaller members such as the Benelux countries, the ability to remain at the negotiation

table for the skeptical members such as the United Kingdom and Canada and the possibility to pool resources more efficiently between members for the United States. For the latter, NATO was a means to stimulate European members to rebuild their own economy in order to be less reliant on U.S. aid so that they too could contribute to the alliance.

This analysis is in line with the opinion of other authors such as Lemons (2012). Apart from a direct security perspective alone, Communism was seen as a threat for the economic interests of Western states. Containing and isolating the Soviet Union, as part of the containment policies and the aforementioned Truman doctrine was expected to prevent the spread of communism and helped the West maintain its strategic advantage. The risks of a threat and costs evolving from them did not outweigh the benefits for the United States (Lemmons, 2012).

The original hypothesis states: "Liberalism expects an alliance to be founded if it is in the interest of participating states". The empirical data showed that there was a presence of shared interests of NATO's founding member states. The liberal hypothesis is therefore confirmed.

The Foundation of NATO from a Constructivist perspective

According to constructivists, the potential foundation of a military alliance occurs when there is an overlap in shared (threat) perception or shared identity between the member states.

As steps leading up to NATO demonstrated, the French at the time didn't intend to mend friendships with their (West) German counterparts. They would rather want to use the organization as a means to keep Germany from becoming a threat again by convincing other NATO members not to rearm them and to install a separate organization that would oversee coal and steel production. The inclusion of Portugal also does not support idea that a common identity is a necessary precondition. All in all, common identity or shared norms between the founding members were rather limited at the time. There is however the common factor of perceived Soviet threat. All founding members consider NATO as a much better and more credible threat.

Not finding a lot of support for the constructivist argument contradicts some authors on the subject. The most compelling idea about collective identity in the case of NATO comes from the U.S.-centered authors Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002). In their article "why is there no NATO in Asia", which is by far the most influential constructivist literature on the subject, they contend that the different densities of collective identity between the United States and its allies in Europe versus Asia explain the variation in U.S. alliance strategies (Ibid.: 2002). They argue that the writers of the North Atlantic Treaty, perhaps unintentionally, conceived a "North Atlantic identity" that legitimized cooperation between the member states. In addition, they argue that the ingredients for this identity already existed: as they had been allies during World War II these states were used to cooperating with each other and the United States (2002, p. 588). Furthermore, they all had similar forms of government and the previously

mentioned commitment to peaceful and democratic values. The construction of the North Atlantic as a region put the United States in a grouping of roughly equal states with whom the U.S. identified itself and hence the multilateral organizing principles followed. In a way Hemmer and Katzenstein argue that the North Atlantic identity was imagined by the future members of NATO (Ibid.). Although Hemmer and Katzenstein claim the founding members are also the founders of a collective identity, the opposite causal connection can be explained with this information just the same. From the gathered literature it seems obvious that the founding members have a fear of the Soviet Union in common, have similar capitalist and democratic backgrounds and most of them were only a decade prior still engaged in war. There remains however the example of Portugal, a country that was undemocratic but also anti-communist under the reign of Salazar. This shows that a common democratic identity was not essential for participation but rather a more specific shared anti-Communist orientation was.

According to Katzenstein the emergence of a security community in Western Europe was built around a German-French rapprochement and this had no equivalent in South East Asia (2002, p. 36). The empirical analysis also contradicts this initial desire for rapprochement. Even though this can be preferred by some of the founding members, France had no interest in fostering a friendship but rather in keeping West Germany under control.

The argument of Hemmer and Katzenstein bears a striking resemblance to Anderson's (2006) work *Imagined Communities*, in the sense that nationalism led to the outbreak of the second World War as well as the desire to create an organization afterwards that would be able to mitigate between the former adversaries. Anderson argues that, even though nations predate nationalism, it is nationalism that leads to the process by which nations realize what they are and what identity they have. Collective identity in the form of alliances, then, can be seen as a kind of "international nationalism," where states form identities based on the norms they share. Here also the argument I expressed prior applies. Although there are common norms, they are not necessarily essential for cooperation in the NATO context as the example of Portugal (and later, the inclusion of Spain in the 1980's) showed. The term nationalism used by Anderson would presumably cause weariness with the founding members as well. One of the key goals of NATO was in fact to keep militant nationalism at bay and to further the integration of European states, how different they may be or however large their differences were then and in the past, even if they were to form a common 'nationalist' identity. And the difference in opinion in every step leading up to NATO would suggest that at the time this common identity, other than a common threat perception, was far from present.

The original constructivist hypothesis states: "Constructivism expects an alliance to be founded if there is a perceived shared identity amongst member states". As the empirical chapter has outlined, there are no clear and definitive shared norms and identities present in the used literature that could account for the foundation of the alliance. This means the constructivist hypothesis is refuted.

4.6.2 Maintenance and evolution of NATO explained from both perspectives

At the time of SEATO's dissolution, the USSR and the Cold War were very real and NATO states feel the need for continued cooperation to combat that threat. As explained in the theoretical chapter, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no immediate threat on that scale. The scope of this analysis stretches from the late 1940's to 1977; the end of SEATO, and the question is whether interests or identity are better capable of explaining NATO's maintenance and evolution.

Maintenance and evolution of NATO from a liberal perspective

Liberals assume that maintenance of a military alliance can be considered when it is in the shared interest of member states, both on common security and on economic grounds. Evolution is expected when there are interests and incentives to expand the cooperation.

Maintenance of NATO can be explained from the perspective of the member states, as there remained the threat of Soviet aggression. Some member states remained dependent of financial and military aid provided by stronger NATO allies, the United States in particular. Evolution within the organization however remained below liberal expectations. Even though the continental European founding members stressed the need for cooperation on other levels also, the main focus remained security issues. Several events such as the outbreak of the Korean War, the Prague coup, and the Vietnam War kept the aim towards Communist threat. It was only after the late 60's and early 70's, near the end of SEATO, that the alliance realized that they needed to focus more on the importance of economic relationships, as war was more distant. Apart from minor evolution with the inclusion of some members, this plan was put on hold, mostly due to French resistance. France's withdrawal of troops to NATO during this time did not result in total withdrawal from NATO all together. This indicates that the French leadership found it more attractive in terms of opportunity costs to have continued NATO protection and a seat reserved at the NATO membership tables than to renegotiate terms with every separate member again, like they did in the past. In the form of spillover or to reduce transaction costs

Liberalism has received criticism from authors such as Lemons (2012). This was mostly due to the fact that the real major evolution in NATO came near and after SEATO's dissolution. Even though cooperation on a military level lead to the stable foundation on which the European Union is based, along with it its economic trade and benefits, Lemons thinks Liberals would not argue that the military components of an alliance itself are most important (Lemmons, 2012, p.34). He thinks the evolution of cooperation would be expected not within, but outside of the alliance. Evolution of European cooperation within the EU however, in turn is to be expected according to him. Lemon's stance can be criticized. Liberals would expect possibilities for extended cooperation in the form of spillover once a framework; in this case NATO is in place. The empirical

data also contradicts his claim that maintenance is only expected when states contribute equally or when the (direct) costs are simply being outweighed by the benefits. States such as the United States make a more complex calculation on costs and benefits regarding NATO. That is, that maintaining the organization by supporting weaker states is cheaper in terms of transaction costs than to disband the organization and the costs of providing an alternative institutionalized form of cooperation or an alternative solution for the, at the time, still remaining security issues. The inclusion of West Germany in 1955 supports this argument. For West Germany, NATO membership was the only way to get economic and military aid. The costs the other members and in particular the United States had in order to help make this happen, did create a more solid partner and buffer zone against the Soviets.

The original liberal hypothesis states: "Liberalism expects an alliance to be maintained or to evolve if it is in the interest of the member states to confirm or expand cooperation." Support for this assumption is twofold, but present. There is more support for liberal assumptions concerning maintenance of the organization than for its evolution. As it was indeed in the interest of member states to maintain NATO and, to a lesser degree expand the scope of its cooperation at a later stage, the liberal hypothesis is confirmed.

Maintenance and evolution of NATO from a constructivist perspective

Constructivists find that alliances can be maintained or evolve when there is a desire among members to reaffirm, reinforce or protect the common norms and identity.

As NATO had no clear and definitive common identity during its foundation, it did not create one in later stages within the scope analyzed here. The inclusion of states such as Germany shows that common identity was not a key factor. But what the NATO alliance lacked in common identity between its members, it did share a common fear of Soviet aggression at best. The French also disagreed with the leading role that the United States took on them within the organization. This caused an era of French absence and an era of détente for NATO.

Even though empirical data in this thesis suggest otherwise, there are authors that support the constructivist assumptions. According to Katzenstein, concept of a Western community as Christian, democratic and capitalist states became a politically prominent concept in the 1950s (in Yamamura, 1997, p. 38). He claims that after the Second World War, Atlantic cooperation was ensured by the collectively shared notions that tapped into the roots of shared Western culture and that this concept gave expression to a collective purpose. I already criticized this notion in the analysis of the foundation of NATO in which I stated that not all countries shared a common identity, but rather a common anti-communist orientation. This was seen during the events when the Soviets applied for a NATO membership and the NATO members responded negative, as they perceived it as a means to disrupt plans for NATO and the formation of the EDC.

Risse-Kappen argues that the Cold War formed NATO's identity around ideas of peace and democracy and that NATO continues to exist because of a shared "North Atlantic" identity between its members, an identity that did not exist before forming NATO (1996). This position supports a statement previously made in this thesis, in that a common identity did not exist prior to the formation of NATO. There is also no clear indication that a genuine common identity formed after NATO was in place for some time either. During the formation period countries expressed differences in their desires and during its existence, NATO members such as France had different ideas about how to deal with West Germany. The suggestion that the inclusion of West Germany in order to prevent it from becoming Communist would support Risse-Kappen's idea as long as we accept the premise of joint fear of communist threat as a common identity.

Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) have mainly analyzed the role and importance of the United States for SEATO and NATO. They concluded that the discrepancy between the power of the United States and the European states was relatively small. Within NATO the benefits and obligations are shared fairly equally. The claim is here that the U.S. prefers a multilateral alliance like NATO with European partner countries who share a common identity. Bilateral alliances are designed for dealing with its alien and inferior partners (in Asia). As a result, SEATO mostly conducted operations that were aimed at helping specific regions instead of two-way cooperation between the members. SEATO members, as opposed to NATO members would not be able to offer any meaningful economic and military support to the United States (Feng, 2012, p. 229). As mentioned in the liberal analysis on the foundation of NATO, the Truman doctrine and the Marshall aid were all part of a larger scope when it came to rebuilding Europe. South East Asia did not have a similar experience as being part of the joint allies fighting the Axis powers in World War 2, nor did it receive a similar treatment after. But this argument would also apply to Europe during the first years after the war. Nevertheless, the claim here is that the influence of a powerful state such as the United States did matter as Europe became rebuilt quickly in contrary to the Asian allies. Yet still their arguments are not supported by the empirical data. The inclusion of West Germany also meant that there was, in the beginning at least, only one way economic and military support. The only deviation from original NATO goals here was when the United States pushed for West German sovereignty but this was only to insure that rearmament and integration into the defense of Western Europe became possible.

Feng and He recently introduced a new argument of a prospect threat alliance model to the NATO and SEATO case (2012, p. 228). It is a theory that draws from both constructivism as well as political psychology. According to their theory, we should account for the variation in U.S. alliance strategy by looking at the level of external threat perception. First, a countries leader sets the external threat level as a reference point for the prospected gains and losses. The first claim is that high threats frame decision makers in a domain of losses, which make multilateral alliances the more favorable option. States are more likely to take the risk of constraining their freedom of action in return for more help from multiple allies as well as for avoiding further strategic losses (Ibid.: p. 228). Secondly, lower threats put decision makers in a domain of gains and here bilateral alliances win out because states try to minimize risks in terms of

maintaining their freedom of action in seeking security through alliances with as few as possible allies. They think that the alliance policy of the U.S. towards Europe with the high Soviet threat is an example of the high threat domain (Ibid.: p. 246). The prospect threat model suggests that due to these high-level threats, the domain of losses faced by the United States in postwar Europe encouraged them to take more risks in forming a multilateral alliance with a strong commitment in Europe. The claim is that reason for the U.S. to include weak powers in NATO is done not to pool more resources but rather to avoid future losses in their competition with the Soviet Union. The reason to choose multilateralism is because the U.S. as the most influential state is willing to bear more risks within a domain of losses (Ibid.: p. 247). This previous example is supported by the U.S. preference for the inclusion of West Germany, regardless of French resistance. This is similar to previous statements in this thesis that founding members not so much resemble one another in terms of identity and norms but are similar in terms of the desire to ward off the Communist threat.

Additional but not less interesting remarks are made by Sperling and Kirchner who looked at the division of Europe and attempts to assure the future stability of the European security order and the successful transition of the central and eastern European states to the market economy and multi-party democracy (1997, p. 2). Even though they describe events that occurred in the 80's and 90's and are beyond the scope of this thesis and relevance for the constructivist hypothesis, these can be considered applicable to the NATO members after SEATO. The authors determined that the success of European states depended on a stable economic and political environment, which requires a redefinition of security. They suggest that the European security system has two elements that are mutually constitutive, the political military and the economic (Ibid.). These elements are interdependent and interrelated. They suggest states seek membership of established clubs such as NATO and the EU, their ideological enmity and conformity (Ibid.: p. 3). Also, the prospect of sustained cooperation within these organizations was highest. Empirical data does support their view that NATO does develop a less superficial identity that is only based on common security ideas. The organization starts to put other subjects on the table that are in the common interests of all the member states as shown in the liberal analysis, but more interestingly, the former Warsaw pact members request to join this successful alliance. This means that the exterior image of NATO provides an attractive alternative and a means for cooperation on other levels such as social and economic subjects.

The original constructivist hypothesis states: "Constructivism expects an alliance to be maintained or to evolve if members wish to reinforce, protect and expand the perceived shared identity and norms." With regard to NATO there were no clear indications in the used literature of a shared identity or common norms after its formation. This means that the constructivist argument can quite clearly be refuted, at least for the majority of the time period analyzed.


Chapter 5. SEATO

The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was a multilateral alliance with as its main aim the collective defense in Southeast Asia. As with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it was founded to support the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact as it was also referred to, which was signed in September 1954. Its founding principles were very similar to that of NATO. During over half of the time SEATO existed it was overshadowed and perhaps overwhelmed by the Vietnam War, as was the eventual failure of the United States and its allies to prevent the conquest of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by Communist forces. This brought a feeling of failure for the organization as a whole and as a result these negative events provoked the desire among the members to officially disband the organization in 1977. In the end, SEATO existed as an organization for 23 years and it was initially designed just like its Western military alliance counterpart in order to deter and defeat Communist aggression in the region.

5.1 Background, foundation and purpose

The cold war, its name aside, was not anything harmless or a form of potential conflict that could easily be avoided. Not only NATO but also SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, later called CENTO, provided allies with the necessary strategies and doctrinal links between many of those seemingly smaller conflicts. It was also inherent to the lengths many Western powers went to avoid escalation of yet another conflict into something destructive (Fenton, 2006, p. 8).

The purpose of Western defense alliances during the Cold War was always twofold. The main reason was to deter communist aggression and as a last resort it needed to defeat communist aggression should it arise. SEATO played a critical role of Soviet deterrence in Southeast Asia, but as such it was only one element of the much broader Cold War. The founding of a multilateral security alliance in South East Asia all fell within the containment policy of the United States as elaborated upon in the previous chapter, instituted by U.S. secretary of State John Foster Dulles. SEATO was a hot topic at the time, certainly after the French lost the Indochina War of independence after fighting for 8 years until their final defeat in 1954. (Fenton, 2006, p. 14).



Graph 4. Image: Southeast Asia from 1955-1965 (Fenton, 2006, p. 11).

As said in the previous section, it was President Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who is considered to be the major driving force behind SEATO's creation (Franklin, 2006, p. 1). It was however Vice-President Nixon who set in motion the negotiations for a South East Asian version of NATO after he returned from the region in late 1953 (De Toledano, 1969, p. 173-174). The background negotiations of SEATO remain rather short in comparison to NATO as the latter did set the precedent and provided a framework for the organization. But as I will elaborate on a little further, it was not a framework that was simply being copied.

In the early 1950's Eisenhower, who was still convinced that European allies would replace the American troops on the ground as soon as they had rebuilt their economy, suggests to his European partners to reduce the amount of troops. Allies under the leadership by West German Chancellor Adenauer claimed that such a move would undermine the public confidence in the commitment of the United States towards NATO (Fenton, 2006, p. 21). A similar situation occurred in Korea, even after it had effectively ended with the signing of the Armistice in 1953. Eisenhower and Dulles again were aware that reducing

the number of troops on the ground would be impossible once they were significant in size, regardless of the nature of the threat being faced and/or doctrine (Ibid.). It is in this context the creation of SEATO needs to be considered.

The Americans had originally not joined NATO with the intention to station troops in Europe permanently. NATO then, was far from a benchmark for the United States to follow when entering other multilateral military alliances in the 1950's but it was perceived more as a lesson to avoid. (Ibid.: p. 22). SEATO (and CENTO) was actually represented as an attempt to improve upon NATO. They did however not adequately take into account the effects of de-colonization. Former colonies were often unstable. In places where former colonizers left gracefully, the legacy of institutions and infrastructure were fragile at best and in instances where colonizers hadn't left easily, the U.S. was often placed in a very difficult position. Often, that colonizer was a NATO ally in Europe and the U.S. would have to maintain their close relations to that ally while at the same time distancing themselves from their actions abroad (Ibid.: p. 23). With that, the United States saw themselves as a host to the newly independent states as they were very vulnerable and prone to communist influence or intimidation, as was the case in Korea.

In Southeast Asia, the transfer from responsibility from former colonizers towards the United States occurred in order to prevent a power vacuum forming in the vulnerable region (Ibid.: p. 24). Initially the former colonizers intervened in the way of their choosing and still based on their old imperialist principles and privileges. Even though the U.S. often did not always approve of the responses and, certainly in the hopeless efforts of the Dutch to prevent Indonesian independence, they had no reservations to publicly condemn the actions of their allies either (Ibid.). They did however see no further need to intercede more forcefully at the time.

This was the case until the Communist Victory in China in 1949 that occurred during the First Indochina war that started in 1946 (Ibid.: p. 24-25). Americans no longer focused on the de-colonization of the region and there was then a direct physical link between much of Southeast Asia and a major Communist power. The Communists had the capability to galvanize their elements all over the region and, apart from its military might, could turn the process of de-colonization in their favor and as an instrument of expansion (Ibid.: p. 25).

The French quickly came to realize that their Viet Minh opponents were being supported by China. Even though Truman had little sympathy for France's aim of maintaining its colonial empire, the Americans could not afford yet another Communist victory in the region and so the French were offered substantial financial and military aid towards their war effort in Indochina (Ibid.: p. 26). They did so with the request that the French would give up their imperial motivations and attempt to persuade the Viet Minh to accept some form of liberties. But in 1953 and after seven years of combat, the French were worn out and there was still no end in sight. In its willingness to negotiate a form of settlement of the conflict, French, British, American and Soviet foreign ministers met in Berlin in early 1954. This led to the inclusion of the Indochina conflict in a

planned peace conference that also aimed to organize a treaty formally ending the Korean War (Ibid.).

In the meantime, the French tried to improve their military position in Indochina and thereby also their negotiation position at the treaty. The result however was yet another decisive French defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu (Ibid.: p. 26). The French, who until then had the exclusive control over the course of the war, requested the United States to undertake immediate military in order to save the remaining garrison. Even though there was support from Admiral Radford, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff for a B-29 air strike, the Eisenhower Administration was more cautious. He was also aware that support for any unilateral call on ground forces would be weak, should they be needed in case air strikes were not enough. Instead, he proposed U.S. intervention would occur only if three conditions are met: first, Washington only intervenes as part of a coalition of other free nations of Southeast Asia, including the United Kingdom; second: that France accelerated grants of independence to its Indochina territories to remove the possible criticism that the U.S. supports colonialism; and thirdly, that the French agree to withdraw all of their forces after the intervention (Ibid.). The French were reluctant to hand control over to the Americans and the British were not looking to commit to any intervention.

The following Geneva Convention only consolidated a Communist victory and the division of Vietnam between the north, ruled by the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DVRN) and the south. The newly independent states of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were extremely vulnerable to Communist aggression and, despite French military presence, the U.S. doubted their effectiveness in deterring or resisting any such aggression (Ibid.: p. 27-28). Dulles was at this point more than ever convinced that further territorial losses to Communist expansion were inevitable unless a regional defense alliance under U.S. leadership could be established.

Dulles received support from Eisenhower for his plans and he moved quickly to set everything in motion as he still had momentum from the pre-convention meetings. Negotiations started not only with France and the U.K. but also Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines and, even though not all of these parties were as afraid of immediate Communist threat, they did not want to be left out of an American led security framework for the region (Ibid.: p. 28). Within a few weeks, negotiations started in Manila and a council was formed to, as described under article V, 'Provide for consultation with regard to military and other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty Area may from time to time require' (in Fenton, 2006, p. 28).

Similar as the setup may be to the NATO predecessor, at the heart of the Treaty the first clause of Article IV stated: 'Each Party Recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes' (SEACDT, 1954). The statement makes way for the United States to keep its freedom of action. Often it is the reason why SEATO is consigned to

being a paper tiger and why the organization allegedly failed (Fenton, 2006, p. 29). At least half its lifetime, SEATO was the most significant forum for the co-ordination of Western defense and strategic planning for its region (Ibid.: p. 15).

5.2 Maintenance and evolution of SEATO

By late 1954 the potential threat to South East Asia posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and to a lesser extent, the People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN), was one that could not be ignored by the United States nor its allies in South East Asia (Ibid.: p. 32). The war in Korea had also demonstrated the present threat and readiness of the PRC as well as its ability to intervene and fight beyond its borders on the mainland of Asia. As the French were defeated in French Indochina by the Viet Minh, this created a power vacuum in the region, which led to the establishment of a communist state by the North Vietnamese. For the United States and its remaining South East Asian allies this communist geo-political force in the region led by the PRC and the DRVN as its principal protagonists was deemed unacceptable (Ibid.: p. 32). Especially since they were both capable of using military aggression in order to enlarge their influence in the region. These perceptions were to dominate the thinking and acting of the United States and its SEATO allies in the decades thereafter.

Common strategic concepts as a means


Throughout 1955 to 1956 meetings were held among the Staff planners to come up with a common framework that took place against the backdrop of a range of different strategic priorities of each SEATO member (Fenton, 2006, p. 105). The initial concerns and positions of some of the eight members had to be modified to accommodate the wider concerns of the alliance as a whole.

While the members of SEATO were united in their common commitment to deter Communist aggression in South East Asia, all members had different priorities when entering the alliance. The United Kingdom as well as Australia and New Zealand were mainly concerned with the defense of Malaya. The United States was less specific and focused on the security in the entire region with particular emphasis on the Protocol States and Thailand. The U.S. was also determined to display its New Look defense policy when formulating its response to those concerns (Ibid.: p. 133). France had only one immediate priority, which was to retain whatever influence it still had in the region. Pakistan was more concerned with attempts to modernize and expand its armed forces as it perceived being threatened by India, Afghanistan, China and the USSR. Thailand also wanted to use SEATO membership as a basis for modernization and saw the protocol as a point of no return. The Philippines felt protected by the U.S. presence and its surrounding oceans and SEATO membership could further affirm this. All parties saw that overcoming small issues was necessary in order to advance SEATO's strategic importance (Ibid.).

SEATO's specific structure as a military organization

During the early days of the military organization, the Military Advisor's Group (MAG) was established during the first SEATO Council of Ministers meeting held in Bangkok from 23-25 February 1955 and would remain the most senior body until the official deployment of SEATO military planning in 1973 (Fenton, 2006, p. 70). The MAG was to meet bi-annually in order to evaluate military issues affecting SEATO and its treaty area and to give recommendations in regard to those issues to the council (Ibid.: p. 71).

As shown in the previous section, the Manila Treaty did not contain enough statements of intent within its articles, nor an identical notion to article 5 in the NATO treaty, to deter communist aggression. If the statements were to have any influence in Beijing or Hanoi then the SEATO alliance would need to find a way to convince them that it involves genuine military cooperation among its members. SEATO's military structure has developed from a humble organization in 1955 to the creation of the Military Planning Office (MPO) in 1957 to a mature organization through reforms in 1960. The latter was a highly efficient and productive military organization capable of fulfilling all of the tasks assigned to it by MAG (Ibid.: p. 70, p. 104).



Graph 5: the organization of the MPO of SEATO (in Fenton, 2006).

The MPO was also responsible for the scheduling of military exercises under the SEATO flag. The first exercise "Firmlink" was held in Thailand over the first weeks of 1956 (Annex J, SEATO record: 1954-1977 in Fenton, 2006, p. 90).

MAG assigned tasks that included operational plans for the defense of Southeast Asia, the scheduling and coordination of SEATO military exercises, the development of a standardization program designed to insure a common framework of nomenclature and procedural techniques existed and the creation and maintenance of institutional knowledge about all aspects of the Treaty Area (Ibid.: p. 104). The MPO was assisted by and provided with information by the

SEATO Intelligence Committee and the IAC. SEATO also established formal relationships with both NATO and CENTO, even though this only had very limited benefits for all member states involved (Ibid.).

Even though its structure was built to be able to deter and withstand Communist aggression, SEATO was never officially involved in any actual military operation undertaken by Western powers in Southeast Asia (Ibid.: p. 15). At one point in time however, it did come close to an intervention in Laos during the Laotian crisis of 1961-1962. The strategic importance of Laos was already recognized at the first SEATO Staff planners' meeting in 1955 (Ibid.: p. 186). In the middle of 1958, for the first time there was a very real prospect that one of the three protocol states was prone to Soviet influence. But SEATO members previously made it clear that they were reluctant in counter insurgency planning. After elections in Laos in 1958, the stance of the new government is that Laos wanted to remain neutral and sovereign (Ibid.). With U.S. and Thai financial and military aid, the Royal Laotian Army in Laos was able to ward off any insurgencies in its north. Ultimately this meant SEATO was not called upon to act.

When a coup did eventually occur in 1960, The United States and Thailand in particular were highly concerned with the situation but still not sure whether this would justify a full-scale SEATO intervention (Ibid.: p. 198). At the same time, the USSR was supplying its Phoumist insurgents, who occupied two-thirds of the country with everything from small arms to heavy artillery by using an airlift around the clock. The MPO suggested moving SEATO troops in Thailand. But as the Laos government still did not request SEATO involvement, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and France rejected any unilateral SEATO actions as they would mean a breach of Article IV and politically unfeasible (Ibid.). They also thought this major presence could provoke the Soviet Union and North Vietnamese involvement. The diplomatic route had the support of France, the U.K. and the U.S. and attempts were made to have the Soviets keep north Laos in order to keep them away from the South and South Vietnam (Ibid.: p. 202). Thailand requested direct SEATO intervention and saw it as a test of the credibility of the organization while Australia wanted to send six to nine SEATO battalions into Laos in March 1961, which could have been recipe for disaster.

When the Pathet Lou launched an offensive that threatened to overrun more southern regions, SEATO showed its true color of a paper tiger. Subsequent statements from either the SEATO council meeting or the Military Advisors' Conference only affirmed their concerns with the events taking place (Ibid.: p. 203). Thailand took matters into its own hands and delivered a unilateral warning to the Soviets and North Vietnamese. The Soviets then also opted for a cease-fire but it took them a month to convince their North Vietnamese allies to do the same. Further negotiations took fourteen months before a settlement was reached and in the meantime, there were a couple of brief breaches of cease-fire (Ibid.). In 1962 however, the Pathet Lou, who were supported by North Vietnam, launched attacks on Phoumists near the Burmese border. As SEATO did not respond, the last Phoumist positions were overrun. SEATO members figured Laos was not the place for the alliance to make a stand, even though this may have been just the place to do this in hindsight.

5.3 Dissolution of SEATO

All member states agreed to protect each other in the case of an attack or weakening due to internal subversion. Poorer members were promised aid in the form of economic assistance. But as the situation in Laos had shown, the organization was indecisive and lacking initiative. For many scholars, this is seen as a turning point in the fate of the organization. This meant the beginning of the end for SEATO.

Confidence in SEATO was low after failure to initiate its plans for Laos. Especially the Thai were frustrated by the opposition of the U.K. and France in particular to undertake action (Ibid.: p. 207). For the United States, SEATO was still the means of preference to contain Communism in the region, in spite of French and British reluctance. For the U.S. it allowed to influence the other SEATO members, particularly the regional members as well as Australia and New Zealand (Ibid.).

By 1961, the Vietcong in North Vietnam were increasing in size and intensified attacks on government forces while using Soviet equipment. President Kennedy enormously increased U.S. support towards South Vietnam with military aid and a total of 200.000 personnel including an establishment of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) (Ibid.: p. 215). Even though Kennedy discussed the option of unilateral action into Vietnam, he considered it to be the final option as he wanted to explore SEATO options first which meant the MPO had to prepare a new plan for the counter of Communist insurgency in South Vietnam (Ibid.: p. 216). The proposed plans were met with great resistance as practically every member but the U.S. was unwilling to provide the requested amounts of troops and resources.

By 1964, the U.S. started to contemplate on SEATO's usefulness as it had more success applying unilateral strategies in the region (Ibid.: p. 237). President Johnson became more and more convinced that a form of intervention in the region was needed to stop further deterioration of the region. But despite American aid and support, the Vietcong insurgency progressed further throughout the South and its potential capacity became ever larger. Johnson preferred military intervention and started to prepare on both national and international levels (Ibid.: p. 238). SEATO's plan 7, as prepared by the MPO foresaw such a scenario but the U.S. never tried to activate it. Where the stance on Laos between SEATO members was rather similar, the developing crisis over Vietnam was characterized by a hardening of positions within the alliance, which meant there was no expectation of reaching a consensus in 1964-1965 (Ibid.).

The French in particular had a hardened stance on the American unilateral actions in South Vietnam and De Gaulle called for an international agreement for a neutralized and unified Vietnam in 1963 (Ibid.). De Gaulle's attempts to return to a multi-lateral balance of power were also expressed by officially recognizing the PRC in 1964 as well as open opposition of U.S. policy. Thailand and the U.S. were particularly afraid of a neutralized Vietnam, as this would invite communist insurgency even more. This led to the French use of SEATO as the public forum to criticize and oppose the U.S. position and to the withdrawal from SEATO exercises in 1965. Despite all of this, the French deemed it necessary to remain in

SEATO as the great power they were, and none of the other members officially tried to expel France (Ibid.: p. 240). This era coincided with the era of détente in NATO also.

If the French were to only ones to obstruct U.S. policy in the region, the U.S. might still have attempted to use SEATO for a collective action approach. However, also Pakistani opposition grew (Ibid.: p. 241). SEATO had until then always proved unwilling to get involved in the Indo-Pakistan conflict and its participation in SEATO became conditional on SEATO's willingness to involve itself in this conflict. Pakistan expressed its concern with Afghanistan and Kashmir and its fear of India in general. Pakistan knew however that the SEATO framework was only directed towards the communist threat (Ibid.: p. 242). In spite of this, Pakistan formally withdrew from SEATO in 1965.

The Sino-Indian war of 1962-1964 also changed the geo-political order in South Asia. Unresolved issues regarding their borders in Kashmir escalated when China launched two large military offensives (Ibid.: p. 244). India's call for aid was blocked by Pakistan who, at the time was still a member of SEATO. Pakistan believed that any aid given to India would strengthen India's position at the expense of Pakistan. The result was that India, in an attempt to modernize, accepted a huge military aid deal from the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963 (Ibid.).

SEATO did not take part in the Vietnam War as many of its members and allies disagreed. The U.S. was not convinced that SEATO was capable of mounting collective action and it would be futile to even attempt to reach an agreement on the implementation of plan 7 (Ibid.: p. 257-258). Patience of most members was exhausted after French and Pakistani interventions. Ironically, on August 4th 1964 two American destroyers mistakenly reported that they had been attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats and a few days later Congress gave president Johnson the authority to take all necessary measures including armed force to assist any member or protocol state of SEATO requesting assistance in defense of its freedom in the so called Gulf-Tunkin resolution. Now the U.S. considered itself free to fulfill its SEATO obligations with or without unanimous agreement of the other members (Ibid.: p. 258).

The British, who were also chairmen of the Geneva Convention, could not commit just as the U.S. to unilaterally commit troops. They were also already involved in one conflict in the region, against Indonesia and did not have enough military capacity to commit to a second conflict (Ibid.: p. 261). Australia and New Zealand did give in under pressure from the U.S. and assigned several battalions. Even after the Indonesia conflict, the British refused to commit as they expressed their worries regarding Borneo and the potential necessity for intervention there.

In the end, SEATO failed to contain the rise of Communism in Southeast Asia. In the wake of Communist victories in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975, SEATO was condemned as a failed alliance. Its continued existence would only be a reminder of the failure by the West to protect the protocol states from Communist aggression (Ibid.: p. 266). After the US left Vietnam, Pakistan withdrew in 1973, followed by France in 1974. At its twentieth meeting in New York on September 24th 1975, the SEATO council agreed to a phased dissolution

of the organization. SEATO was disbanded officially on June 30th, 1977 with the official closure of its secretariat's headquarters in Bangkok (Townson, 1999).

5.4 Analysis

The main purpose of the analysis is to find out whether interests or identity can explain the foundation, maintenance or dissolution of SEATO better and whether interests or a shared identity explain the course of SEATO's lifespan better. As already demonstrated in the analysis of NATO, many authors have already tried to shed some light on these organizations with the use of Liberal and constructivist lenses. Quite a few of them have shown great insights and deserve mentioning, which will also be discussed.

5.4.1 Foundation of SEATO explained from both perspectives

Foundation of SEATO from a liberal perspective

Liberalism predicts the rise of a military alliance when its existence is in the interest of the member states. We have established in the theoretical and the methodological chapter that this interest is multi-faceted, based on common security interests primarily as well as on other (economic) interests and cooperation.

With the creation of SEATO, only four years after NATO's foundation, the United States did not copy NATO but used it as an example on how not to organize future alliances. It was an attempt to reduce the own troops by exchanging them by other forces once local economies were stable within SEATO context. Free riding behavior here can be seen in the threats to doubt U.S. commitment should they withdraw their own troops in exchange of those of other countries. In line with Europe, the U.S. realized that, in order to pose a strong message to the uprising of communism in the region the mere existence of an alliance was not sufficient. States within the region needed to make huge progress on both an economic as a military level. For the United States the foundation of a local Alliance was not only in line with its foreign policy of communist containment during the Cold War but also a calculated decision. An alliance could also help to prevent potential power vacuums in the region. An added benefit was that the U.S. could use the organization to influence other stakeholders in the region and to help France and the U.K. steer away from their colonial past. The French tried to improve their military position and colonial empire in the region and saw SEATO as a means for support after their defeat in Indochina. For the regional countries SEATO was seen as a means grow and modernize military capabilities and to gain support in the battle against Soviet insurgency.

This is in line with authors like Katzenstein who claim the United States during that time mostly dealt with countries on a bilateral basis. But in the case of both NATO and SEATO the United States applied their Cold War principles according

to Truman doctrine, as also described in the NATO analysis (in Yamamura, 1997, p. 37). U.S. Power in Asia after 1945 was much greater than in Europe. It was neither in the interest of the United States to create institutions that would have constrained independent decision making in Washington, nor in the interest of subordinate states to enter institutions in which they would have minimal control while there would be plenty of opportunities for free riding behavior and dependence reduction. But as the United States fully committed to the principle of multilateralism in Europe, it also chose to apply a different strategy than it would from a traditional preference for bilateral agreements in the organization of security relations in South East Asia (Ibid.). Support for Katzenstein's arguments can indeed be retrieved. As Fenton (2006) also described, the subtle changes in Article IV of SEATO meant its failure and that the organization is often called a paper tiger because of it. The inclusion of it was not a means to allow the U.S. to escape its commitments to its allies but a reflection of American policy on how best to meet those commitments in the context of the long-term demands of a global strategy of containment.

The original liberal hypothesis states: "Liberalism expects an alliance to be founded if it is in the interest of participating states." SEATO's foundation, as the used empirical data shows, was in the interest of the founding member states. Liberal assumptions and the hypothesis are therefore confirmed. There was however an imbalance of interests to be taken into account between the U.S. and former colonizers and other regional members.

Foundation of SEATO from a constructivist perspective

According to constructivists, the potential foundation of a military alliance occurs when there are shared norms or perception of a shared identity between the member states.

Even though the U.S. shared a recent common history with the U.K. and France during the war, their stance on colonization was very different. Were the U.K. and France were looking to reaffirm their position as a colonial power in the region, the U.S. opposed this old way of thinking and realized that cooperation with colonists could turn against them in the eyes of insurgents who were fighting the imperialist backed governments in the region. From a U.S. standpoint, the potential to move beyond the balance of power and interest based politics in its traditional form in Europe was not present in South East Asia. They deemed that a reasonably stable balance is the best that one could hope to achieve in the Asia - Pacific region. As a result, constructivists would not expect the foundation of a military multilateral alliance in South East Asia if it were not for the desire of the United States that had a tremendous influence in the region. Membership of an alliance led by the United States was much sought after and U.S. commitment was never in question as opposed to that of other members.

This is not in line with authors like Katzenstein. The global context conditions in which SEATO came about were similar to those of NATO. Katzenstein claims that power- and interest-based explanations for the foundation of SEATO are

insufficient unless they are complemented by a consideration of norms (in Yamamura, 1997, p. 37). As empirical data in this thesis suggest, these norms were not as clearly present during the foundation phase as in the early stages after SEATO's foundation. There were very few similarities in common history, language or culture between most South East Asian member states. There were also no prior collective multilateral arrangements in Asia that could form a basis for collective identities and norms. This meant that Asian security relations, such as a joint military alliance, were different to those in Europe. There were exceptions however, as some of SEATO's members were also NATO allies. But the overlap in their identity or norms is quite subjective.

The original constructivist hypothesis states: "Constructivism expects an alliance to be founded if there is a perceived shared identity and norms amongst the member states". Apart from a shared threat, there is no indication in the used literature that there was a shared norm or identity in place in the region. The constructivist hypothesis is therefore refuted in the case of SEATO.

5.4.2 Maintenance and dissolution of SEATO explained from both perspectives

Maintenance and dissolution of SEATO from a Liberal perspective

Liberals assume maintenance can be considered when it is in the interests of the member states and in line with the existing cooperation on common security or economic levels.

After the initial formation, common strategic concepts were outlined as an expression of the interests and goals of each and every member. These interests ranged from the defense of Malaya, security in the entire region, retain influence in the region as a colonial power and attempts to modernize and expand the armed forces. All parties saw that they needed to overcome small issues in order to advance SEATO's strategic importance as a whole. The organization and military structure of SEATO that was formed subsequently was efficient and had potential. During actual events and conflicts however, it was difficult to have all members commit equally and wholeheartedly and provide necessary resources to the organization.

This imbalance of resources is in line with the argument of Hemmer and Katzenstein. They conclude that the discrepancy between the power of the United States and the Asian allies was too big for the United States to be able to benefit from the multilateral agreements as opposed to NATO where the benefits and obligations are shared fairly equally. (2002, p. 9). In SEATO, there is a larger gap between the smaller and greater powers on both economic and military levels than there was in NATO. SEATO members would not be able to offer any meaningful economic and military support to the United States (Feng, 2012, p. 229). But perhaps also a different conclusion can be drawn from this uneven distribution. The United States knew beforehand that smaller states in the region were lacking capabilities. They opted for their inclusion in SEATO in order to

help them with military support in their framework of choice and out of fear of a potential power vacuum. Also, the conclusion of the other authors might sound strange knowing that Europe was left in ruins after the Second World War, and hence also subject to a large power disparity compared to the U.S. As I have already mentioned in the analysis on NATO, the United States needed to help rebuild Western Europe's economy and military through financial and material Aid as was provided in the Marshall program. Europe may have been more prosperous than the Asian SEATO allies before the Second World War, but the gap between them had become much smaller in the meantime.

Many had criticized SEATO during and after its demise. Buszinsky (in Fenton, 2006) claimed that it was incapable of performing both of its main functions, deterrence and defense. However, it should be noted that the three regional members, Thailand in particular, were never subjected to serious communist aggression during the SEATO period (Fenton, 2006, p.3). All of the above holds true. Some members had their own agenda and interests, which also halted SEATO progress. France under De Gaulle withdrew based on U.S. influence and their unilateral actions in South Vietnam. This also coincided with their withdrawal of NATO. Pakistan attempted to get SEATO support for their conflict with India and this support was conditional for their continued membership. The British remained evasive when asked for concrete support to SEATO, as they were more concerned and occupied with the defense of Malaya, Borneo and their colonies in the region. Some proposed actions were also seen as potentially provoking for the Soviet Union and not in all of the member's interests. This had effects on the credibility of the organization and has shifted the cost-benefit calculation.

The original liberal hypothesis states: "Liberalism expects an alliance to be maintained or to evolve if it is in the interest of the member states to confirm or to expand cooperation." In the case of SEATO, there are indications that the benefits for cooperation are gradually being outweighed by the extensive costs, at least from a security perspective. Liberalism would therefore expect the dissolution of the organization and the hypothesis is confirmed.

Maintenance and dissolution of SEATO from a constructivist perspective

Constructivists focus on the perception of shared ideas, norms, values and identity. The constructivist hypothesis is that, if there are shared notions of the kind above, a multilateral military alliance is maintained and can evolve.

In the case of SEATO there are no indications that there were shared norms or a form of shared identity present or formed after its foundation. The formation of common strategic concepts was mostly of military importance. Retaining influence in the region was only of importance for members who were former colonizers and represent how diverse the identity and norms in the organization was. The constructivist assumption is that a lack of common norms, values, ideas and identity can cause the failure and dissolution of a military alliance. This is for the most part confirmed by the empirical data.

This is in line with Katzenstein who examined the effects of collective norms and identities as the foundations of cultural commensurabilities in the region. According to Katzenstein, the fragility of Asian security arrangements must be underlined as the risks involved in Asian security go beyond those that in the past have led states to war even though there was a situation of balanced power in the absence of collective norms and identities (in Yamamura, 1997, p. 38). With a growing number of Asian polities experiencing economic revolutions and social transformations of unimaginable speed, the potential for economic dislocations and social explosions on a large scale increases. Large scale migration, environmental degradation, deep societal insecurities, growing inequalities and the contestation for power of the local regimes that are themselves experiencing fundamental changes all cause major difficulties for international and multilateral security in Asia as well as the ability and desire to pour means and resources into the project as a whole. The empirical data supports the suggestion of the fragility of Southeast Asian states during this time. But it is difficult to tell whether this has had any direct influence in the longevity of SEATO. Most of the struggles were brought about by Soviet insurgencies. There was at the same time one major overlapping norm, which was anti Soviet orientation. None of the member states however were experiencing major internal transitions except for some insurgency in some cases. The member states in SEATO displayed a rather equal footing and they also developed common strategic concepts that were commensurable and in the interests of all.

There is also another view regarding the previous, but more from a U.S.-centered position. Hemmer and Katzenstein claim that the different densities of collective identity between the United States and its allies in Europe versus Asia explain the variation in U.S. alliance strategies (Ibid.: 2002). They claim that, while the U.S. prefers a multilateral alliance, that is NATO, with the European partner countries who share a common identity, bilateral alliances are designed for dealing with its alien and inferior partners in Asia. As a result SEATO mostly conducted operations that were aimed at helping specific regions instead of two-way cooperation between the members. In search of any indication of the above, not much proof can be found on the basis of the included literature. It is highly contestable whether there is a huge collective identity within NATO, or that there is not one in SEATO. Some of the major members, the U.S., France and the U.K. are present in both organizations. Even though it is true that France and the U.K. still tried to reaffirm their control over certain colonies, SEATO members were treated equally during the creation of SEATO as much attention was given to the creation of common strategic concepts. All members created a common framework that took place against a backdrop of a range of strategic priorities of each member.

Other views that consider identity being of importance for the continuation of NATO (and the dissolution of SEATO) focus on the members taking part in both alliances. Acharya (2005) and Nguyen (2014) also attempted to challenge the U.S.-centered approach by Hemmer and Katzenstein. They claim we should not only focus on the United States as the most influential power but also on the identity of the members and the common identity within the alliance. According to Acharya, the Southeast Asian region had norms so unique that they were the main reason for the failure of a collective defense in the form of a multilateral

military alliance during the cold war. The newly independent Asian countries, in contrary to their European counterparts, saw an alliance under the leadership of the United States as a new form of great power dominance and intervention (in Feng & He, 2012, p. 232). Resistance to the localization of global norms, especially an emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention made the NATO norm more difficult to diffuse to other regions. For Acharya, this is the main reason why it never became really embedded in the Asian regional practices as was the case in India under Nehru, who was particularly anti-collective defense norms in Asia and that this lead to a minimal implementation of these norms in SEATO. The empirical data does not substantiate the above. All members created the joint strategic concepts as equals. But if the member states perceived the U.S. as a dominating great power, they would have refused membership or would accept it in an attempt to counter and influence this dominance. The U.S. was also concerned with partner members France and the U.K. as they had previously criticized their reaffirming strategies for their colonies in the region. By publicly criticizing France, the U.S. hoped not to be categorized as an imperialist power when it did help the French combat the Communist insurgency in Indochina.

In the end, three events in particular were responsible for the demise of SEATO. First there was French opposition to U.S. dominance within the organization and NATO. Second, Pakistan perceived its threats differently and could not get SEATO to support them against a militarized India. And third, unilateral actions by the U.S. in South Vietnam were testimony to a weak and indecisive SEATO.

The original constructivist hypotheses regarding maintenance and evolution of alliances states: "Constructivism expects an alliance to be maintained or to evolve if members wish to reinforce, protect and expand the perceived shared norms." in the case of SEATO there are no indications in the presented literature that there were many shared norms or a form of shared identity present or formed after its foundation, apart from anti-communism. According to the hypothesis therefore there is no expectation that attempts for maintenance or evolution will occur, The constructivist hypothesis is confirmed.

The constructivist hypothesis regarding the dissolution of alliances states: "Constructivism expects an alliance to dissolve if there is a loss of (perception of) a common and shared identity." In the case of SEATO, this is for the most part confirmed by the empirical data as there did not seem to be any clear common norms, values, ideas and identity present. This means that the hypothesis is confirmed. Perhaps unintentionally, an increasingly weak and undecisive SEATO caused damage to its own image. Ironically, if we can truly speak of an identity, it was only present near the very end and only helped to accelerate its decline.

CONCLUSION

This thesis focused on NATO and SEATO, two security alliances that were formed in the same era and with the same context conditions. Yet they both saw a different fate. The question in the original outline was: "Why do some alliances dissolve before or after they reach their initial goals and why do other alliances stay together or evolve?" Applied to this thesis this leads to the general research question: "How can we explain the difference in fate between NATO and SEATO?" The general conclusion of this thesis is that the fate of alliances is based on interest calculations by its members and that the used literature suggests that identity between members only plays a marginal role. A reservation here is that there was a severe limitation in available sources.

With the use of a most similar systems design (MSSD) I have analyzed the similar stages in the lifespan of both organizations by using two different theories. Both theories are commonly applied within the field of international relations and on multilateral (security) organizations. During the analysis, I also outlined some of the leading authors on these organizations and juxtaposed their findings to mine.

Liberalism focuses primarily on the interests of participating states. When it comes to the foundation, liberalism expects an alliance to be founded if it is in the interest of participating states. This hypothesis is confirmed for the foundation stage of both organizations. Regarding the maintenance and evolution stage of an alliance, liberalism expects an alliance to be maintained or to evolve if it is in the interest of participating states. This hypothesis is also confirmed in the case of both organizations, as there were common interests at play during this stage. Lastly, liberalism expects an alliance to dissolve if it is no longer in the interest of the member states. This hypothesis is also confirmed in the case of SEATO as the benefits of membership changed during its lifespan.

Constructivism focuses primarily on the shared norms and identity. Constructivism expects an alliance to be founded if there are perceived shared identity and norms amongst the member states. This hypothesis is refuted for both organizations based on the literature that is used. The empirical analysis shows that there is no clear common identity or norms. Second, constructivism expects an alliance to be maintained or evolve if members wish to reinforce, protect and expand the perceived shared identity and norms. I conclude that the constructivist hypothesis is refuted for the maintenance and evolution stage of NATO, but it is confirmed for SEATO. Third, constructivism expects an alliance to dissolve if there is a loss of (perception of) a shared identity and common norms. The hypothesis is confirmed with moderation for the dissolution of SEATO since there was a lack of common norms or identity. But the constructivist hypothesis concerning foundation was refuted by the installation of SEATO in the first place.

The results in this thesis can potentially be generalized to other, future military alliances. NATO and to a lesser degree SEATO were however quite unique. Nowhere in history similar alliances existed. This means that the findings can be generalized to future alliances that are based on or very similar to NATO. Presumably it also applies to different alliances. But because interests are based

on calculations by member states, the expectations, assigned tasks and pooling of resources and hence cost-benefit calculation can be different for other types of alliances.

Like in all academic work, there is room for improvement. As the time, resources and capacities contained within a Master's thesis are limited; most of the research is based on a historical analysis of secondary literature. The main issue here, is that most of the empirical data is secondary and comes from two authors because sources were scarce. This means that the analysis relies on the interpretations of these authors. It must be acknowledged that this can potentially lead to a bias, in this case to the disadvantage of constructivism. The two main sources, Lieshout and Fenton, are rather rational or perhaps even realist in nature, and this could mean that they have neglected or ignored any variables that are important for the constructivist arguments, mainly identity and norms. Only very few constructivist variables were noticed, they were not measured extensively. This is why the conclusion comes with a reservation.

To gain an even better insight in the specific interests of the member states concerned, more detailed data can be used, preferably from primary sources. Another potential area of improvement is the use of English sources. Some of the member countries may have additional literature available in another language. The era during which the events take place may also have its impact on the availability of literature. As the Internet was not as omnipresent as it is today, the national libraries of member states could still contain some missing relevant information that is not available online.

The outcome of this thesis also leads to several propositions for further research. There are two ideas that stick. The first idea is that interests are not just a question of a cost-benefit calculation and that we need to focus also on opportunity costs amongst other things. Most of the described interests within literature are mainly concerned with economic or military benefits. The idea that costs need to be outweighed by benefits is so vague that Historical institutionalists suggest that a much more in depth analysis of what these costs and benefits actually entail is needed. The second idea is that more research is needed on the empirical bits that are not mainly concerned with states and interests. The idea is that real evolution within NATO took place only once the threat level was in a decline, which indicates that there may be more to the perception of the potential threat level as an indication for persistence and evolution. This means we should account for the variation in alliance strategy by looking at the level of external threat perception.

Finally, the outcome of this thesis can also be regarded in the current societal and political context. NATO is still present which means it is still in the interest of its members to maintain the organization. In recent years, there was no significant evolution and expansion of the alliance. Around the time this thesis is submitted however, tensions rise high as civil war in the Ukraine is still going between pro-Western government forces and pro-Russian civilian militia and the annexation of the Crimea by Russia is still a fresh memory. The Ukraine is not a NATO ally and current member states do not accept their application. This is an indication that NATO-members do not regard Ukrainian membership to be

within their interests in the long term as it most certainly implies that the costs of Russian boycotts would become even higher. At the same time, NATO has increased the amount of exercises around its borders and installed a Rapid Reaction Force in response to the worries from NATO allies that share a border with Russia (Bendavid, 2015, April 9). These events indicate that NATO is as alive and relevant as ever and that its presence is still in the interest of its allies.

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