



**Radboud Universiteit**

# **Refugee Crisis and the EU External Border Regime: The Greek Case**

Paschalina Garidou (s1026190)

Master Thesis Supervisor: Professor Dr. Henk van Houtum

Faculty: Nijmegen School of Management

Department of Geography, Planning and Environment

Master's in Human Geography

Specialization in Europe: Borders, Identity and Governance

Research Organization: Praxis Greece



## Table of Contents

<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1. Problem Statement.....	3
1.2. Research Objective and Research Questions .....	5
1.3. Societal Relevance .....	6
1.4. Scientific Relevance .....	6
1.5. Research Methodology and Conceptual Framework.....	7
1.6. Thesis Outline .....	8
<b>2. Theoretical frameworks and mechanisms.....</b>	<b>10</b>
2.1. B/Ordering and Othering processes .....	10
2.2. Postcolonial Governmentality .....	14
2.3. The three-fold EU border mechanism .....	16
2.3.1. “Visa Border” or “Paper Border” .....	16
2.3.2. “Iron Border” .....	17
2.3.3. “Border Camp” .....	20
<b>3. EU external border management: Milestones and manifestations .....</b>	<b>22</b>
3.1. The Dublin System .....	23
3.2. The EU-Turkey Agreement .....	25
3.3. The EU Hotspot Approach .....	28
<b>4. The EU external border regime failure: The Greek case .....</b>	<b>32</b>
4.1. The Greek genealogy: From population mobility to population entrapment ....	32
4.2. The Crisis threefold: Financial, Refugee, Humanitarian.....	33
4.2.1. Paper Border-ing Greece: The genealogy of a failing Asylum System.....	36
4.2.2. Radicalizing the external EU-Greek border: The EU-Turkey Deal hazard.....	43
4.2.3. Hotspot Approach-ing “Catch-22”: The Greek experiment.....	50
<b>5. Discussion and Conclusions .....</b>	<b>60</b>
5.1. Discussion.....	60
5.2. Proposed future work .....	63
5.3. Final remarks .....	67
<b>6. References.....</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>7. List of Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>8. Acknowledgments .....</b>	<b>87</b>

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Problem Statement

“The world will not be destroyed by those who do evil, but by those who watch them without doing anything”, Albert Einstein once said (GlobalGiving, 2019). Well, if science could endow him with sixty more years of life, the aforementioned phrase might have provided Einstein with the Nobel Peace Prize 2015. That was the catalyst moment for Aylan Kurdi, a Syrian toddler whose body was casted up, on September 2<sup>nd</sup>, in the Mediterranean near Bodrum, Turkey (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017; Kingsley, 2016). That was it: The so-called refugee crisis repercussions reached the external EU borderlands.

In a desperate attempt to survive, many people flee Civil War, violent conflict zones and political and religious-based persecution and seek asylum in the Southern EU countries (Tondo, 2019). Still, their way to Europe is never paved with roses, since those who are wealthy enough to pay a fortune to the smugglers, risk their lives and in various cases become among others victims of rape, trafficking and finally death (Trilling, 2018). The refugee and migrant populations who manage to reach Greece (i.e. the EU south-Eastern border) face the following challenges: a) Initially, a tremendous bureaucracy awaits asylum seekers, who come from a non-Schengen country, in order to be accepted in the external EU border regime. b) Consecutively, a militarization of security takes place, with a whole border security industry been set from the EU, along with external border controls, in order to safeguard the EU South from the “irregular” trespassers. c) Last but not least, border camps are installed in the external EU border regions (i.e. Greece and Italy), as receptors of the newcomers (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020).

Since these three stages are manifested in Moria camp, in the Greek island Lesbos, many are those voices rightfully arguing that now more than ever the EU is lacking to provide appropriate humanitarian aid for the asylum seeking populations in need of international protection (Kale, Dimitriadi, Sanchez-Montijano, & Süm, 2018; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Indeed, since the refugee crisis repercussions’ outbreak in the EU, the question of a successful migration crisis management consists an everyday challenge. One could claim that until nowadays the EU Migration Policy cannot be characterized as a “mission accomplished”. On the contrary, it has evolved into a contemporary bone of contention, with the EU in a state of a somewhat “international protection-inertia”. To paraphrase Einstein, it seems that humanity is currently being destroyed by those who do not act, with the EU external border currently being proved to be the deadliest of all (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020).

Talking about borders, one could argue that in general city-planning and mapping of geographical spaces is an indicator for the spirit, ideology, identity, origin, religion, language and living conditions of those living in that exact territory. Additionally, all these indications make people different than “others” and simultaneously similar to “these” (Bueno Lacy & Van Houtum, 2015; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017, 2019; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). This rationale is reminiscent of the nation-state building and subsequently of the EU narratives (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2013; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). I keep reflecting sometimes on the words of the author Zoe Weil, “someday, I hope that we will all be patriots of our planet and not just of our respective nations” (Goodreads, 2019). Yet still, “patriot” seems so “national” to me. It does necessitate supererogation, a

transcendence of our individual identity, our self-definition on the map, either as national or European citizens. It preconditions that non-Europeans would not need a visa to be welcome within the EU borders. It seems that sometimes *difference* is a tough price to pay.

While population mobility has always consisted a part of the Greek spacetime continuum, dealing with the current refugee and migrant population reception inasmuch as with its (im)mobility is a different, an exceptional phenomenon for the country. As a matter of fact, Greece deals with the refugee crisis rather unsuccessfully, since a large number of refugees is trapped inside the country and many times end up in accommodation sites with inhumane living conditions, such as Moria (Kitsantonis, 2019; H. Smith, 2019; Tondo, 2018; Wood, 2020). What many scholars referred to as the EU thanatopolitics/necropolitics could be incarnated at the national context, in the asylum model of Moria (Mbembe, 2003). To slightly dive into the terminology, the aforementioned thanatopolitics contradicts the Foucauldian biopolitics that displaced the nineteenth-century sovereign's power to take a life or let it live (Foucault, 2007, 2008; Lemke, 2001; Murray, 2006, 2008). It even contradicts the contemporary, Agambenian biopolitical perspective of the post-sovereign state power, which decides through multiplex neoliberal networks what "to make live or let die" (Agamben, 1998, 2005; Murray, 2006, 2008). It would seem that thanatopolitics and biopolitics consist a Janus-faced entity: The hard core of biopolitics is powered by life per se, while thanatopolitics could be considered as its lethal underside.

Thus, Moria's thanatopolitics/necropolitics have an end in itself: Rather than protecting the asylum seekers from the traffickers and smugglers that promise a safe transport via illicit, perilous ways and sinking boats, the EU along with the Greek state take not effective enough measures to combat the life-drainage in the Aegean. Rather than embracing the persecuted that were forced to leave their countries in fear of death and various horrendous tortures, both the EU and national Asylum Systems have created an impermeable bureaucratic regime at the borders, which accumulates these people inside modern concentration camps ad infinitum. Rather than expressing their compassion towards those seeking international protection and putting all their hopes on Europe, a) the EU and the Greek governments are further criminalizing them as notorious prisoners, b) the media "use" them as pawns and c) a vast ideological spectrum [either left-wing or (extreme) right-wing] of the political parties nationally exploit this criminalization, in order to "proselytize" voters and win elections. Thus, the overall crisis management from both the EU and its Greek counterpart could be considered to indicate a certain threshold of death as its *modus operandi*. And where there is death, there is a failure.

This thesis is founded upon and unfolding through this perception, in order to investigate and explain why Moria constitutes the epitome of a failing EU external border management regarding the refugee crisis and how this situation has unfortunately been evolved into a current refugee-protection crisis, even worse, into a humanitarian crisis at the Aegean islands of Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Leros and Kos. Therefore, what tantalizes me the most is the fuzzy logic behind the Greek version of the refugee populations' accumulation and entrapment at the Aegean hotspots. And this is the exact reason behind my central research interest focus, the whys and whereabouts of the aforementioned situation all the way, paved from the EU up until the Greek case.

My personal interest for this particular topic has mainly emerged from an introspective impulsion. I keep reflecting sometimes on the phrase engraved at the door of Plato's Academy: "Let no one ignorant of Geometry enter" (in ancient Greek Ἀγεωμέτρητος μηδεὶς εἰσίτω) (Bernard, 2004). How could an individual relate their philosophical quest for existential answers with mathematical logics? In this case, the pursuit for individual identity met with probability theory. In fact, my roots consist an amalgam of border trajectories. Each of my grandparents come from a different descent: Giresun in Turkey (formerly Cerasus), Plovdiv in Bulgaria (formerly Philippopolis) and the Greek cities of Didymoteicho (at the northeast borders with Turkey), and Kastoria (at the northwest borders with Albania). However, all of them have been carriers of the Greek cultural practices of religion, customs, traditions, language and the same passion for the uniqueness of the ethnic-religious identity. In other words, for all the things that define them as individuals and members of a society. The aforementioned routes define me as native Greek, still with a "refugee record".

## 1.2. Research Objective and Research Questions

*Ultimate goal* is the thesis is to *shed light on the role of the EU external border regime regarding the refugee crisis management and consequently to transfer the research findings into the Greek case, which consists the most notorious counterexample concerning the incoming populations' management*. In order to do so, I highlight the dynamics between the EU external border regime and its implementation in Greece, regarding the refugee crisis management. In other words, I attempt to build on the argument that EU and Greece constitute two magnetic poles that inevitably incite a vicious "circle of evil", an unbreakable chain of deficient decision-making and management. This leads to the perpetuation of the asylum seeking populations' indefinite entrapment at the exact site of the south-Eastern Schengen border. In order to forge my argumentation, I claim that the EU external border regime, manifested via Dublin System, EU-Turkey Agreement and EU Hotspot Approach, consists the knowledge prerequisite, in order to understand the current entrapment situation of the incoming, asylum seeking populations in the EU external borders. I argue that the Greek case, consists a microcosmos of the failing EU external border management which not only perpetuates the deficient EU strategies, but also combines them with national initiatives, that seal once and for all the margins for feasible solutions to the wicked reality that the refugee populations face within the EU-Greek border. In order to decipher the Greek "riddle", it is imperative that I answer the following questions: How did the EU external border regime result in a failing refugee-crisis management? What mistakes did Greek governments do, that turned the EU refugee crisis into a humanitarian one?

To answer the aforementioned research questions I found my argumentation upon the followings. I argue that:

- The EU insufficiency regarding the provision of international protection for the asylum seeking populations is regarded to its failing external border regime.
- The Greek case constitutes the ground zero, namely the focal point of the EU external border management.
- The Greek governments' decision-making and management led to the transformation of the refugee to the contemporary humanitarian crisis.

### 1.3. Societal Relevance

The societal purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the asylum seeking populations' "lodgment" within the EU borderlines. That is, the incoming populations' entrapment, unfolding in the EU and subsequently in Greece. Towards this direction, the thesis attempts to explain how the situation escalated from the inhumane conditions in the Greek accommodation camps to finally the contemporary humanitarian crisis. Thus, it is of the utmost importance that the research goal is to highlight the societal impact and a closer insight on the asylum seeking populations whose life is in constant peril: Initially, from the moment they flee their countries of origin and probably even more, since they have finally reached and crossed the EU borderlines, where they face a second round of perilous living conditions at the Greek islands' hotspots. In essence, throughout the thesis, insights are provided with regard to the micropolitics (i.e. the asylum seeking populations' lives at constant stake) unfolding collaterally with the EU macropolitics (namely the large-scale politics, EU Migration Policy and Agendas), regarding the refugee crisis management and specifically the EU external border regime. Essentially, the outcomes of this thesis shall provide insights on the severity of the living conditions for the asylum seeking populations of the Aegean hotspots and thus highlight some important factors that will finally lead to more targeted Migration Policy focal points, which ultimately will facilitate towards a more sufficient overall EU external border management.

Moreover, the thesis will pave the way in order to a) understand what lies behind the failing EU external border regime and b) reflect on and pinpoint its specific weak spots (namely the Dublin System, the EU-Turkey Agreement and the EU Hotspot Approach). Essentially, I will identify the exact reasons behind the failing Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and discuss some reformations on the core deficiencies of the EU external border management. Unveiling the inadequacies of the EU and the Greek handling, might even unsettle the grounds of the EU institutions' efficiency and competence to manage the overall refugee crisis. Could the unsuccessful EU external border management regarding the refugee crisis escalate into a future contesting of the overall EU purposes and lead to the worst-case scenario, as an institutional EU crisis?

### 1.4. Scientific Relevance

In order to investigate the whys and whereabouts concerning the EU refugee crisis management unfolding into its current form in Greece, the argumentation of the thesis builds upon the followings: Initially, the foundations of the theoretical framework are forged upon an amalgam of two pylons, that is of a) the B/Ordering and Othering processes (Van Houtum, 2010b, 2012; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002) and b) the notion of the Foucauldian Governmentality (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Foucault, 1975, 1980, 2007, 2008, 2010), par extension of Postcolonial Governmentality (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Böröcz et al., 2001; Hooper & Kramsch, 2007; Kramsch, 2006; Loomba, 2007; Rumford, 2009). The interweaving between these two approaches consists the theoretical/ideological basis, upon which the EU three-layered B/Ordering mechanism is introduced, namely the "visa border" (or "paper border"), the "iron border" and the "border camp" (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). This mechanism could be considered as a combination of B/Ordering and Othering technics and the manifestation of Postcolonial Governmentality and thus it consists a further expansion of the aforementioned theoretical approaches. Since there has been a heated academic debate regarding the efficiency of the EU refugee

crisis management, the aforementioned mechanism applies on the argumentation that the EU external border regime failure is due to its “paper border”, its “iron border” and its “border camp”. This thesis stands in favour of this argumentation and builds upon it, in order to investigate the Greek case.

### 1.5. Research Methodology and Conceptual Framework

The research design follows a deductive reasoning: The refugee crisis repercussions’ management is analyzed on the basis of the E.U external border regime and then the focus shifts to the Greek case. Regarding the *qualitative methods*, they are mainly part of a grounded theory analysis reasoning. The main focus is on the post-structuralist/postcolonial geographical theoretical approaches. Towards this direction, there is a deployment of academic publications and other sources (e.g. magazine/newspaper/journal articles, books, web pages, etc.). Principally, the thesis attempts to shed light on a contingent causal relationship between the contexts of investigation (i.e. EU and national), by following the model of the Greek case-study. With regards to the *quantitative methods*, it focuses on the collection of secondary data (i.e. databases and official documents): data and official documents originating from EU Agreements, Agendas, Regulations, Migration Policies (EU lenses) and official documents regarding the national Migration and Asylum Policy (national lenses).

The conceptual framework of the thesis is implemented on two poles, EU (**A**) and Greece (**B**). In order to reach the thesis objective, that is the explanation and understanding of the refugee crisis unfolding in Greece, the two aforementioned contexts (the EU and the national Greek) are investigated on the basis of the EU external border regime during the ongoing refugee crisis. In particular, the research questions are investigated through the following analytical lenses:

**A. European Union context (EU) (zooming out of Greece)**

Considering that the refugee and migrant populations seeking asylum in the EU are accumulated and trapped indefinitely in the threshold of Europe and literally at a grey zone at its external, Greek border, I argue that this situation is due to the failing EU external border regime and management. After the theoretical framing is established, I attempt to apply it principally in the EU context. I follow the logic of the Foucauldian Genealogy and retrospectively refer to some EU milestones (i.e. the Dublin System, the EU-Turkey Agreement and the EU Hotspot Approach), which I interweave with the three layers of the EU border mechanism, referred in the [Chapter 1.4](#). In this way, I investigate the Dublin System as a “visa border” failure, the EU -Turkey Agreement as an “iron border” failure and, the EU Hotspot Approach as a “border camp” failure, respectively).

**B. National context (Greece) (zooming in the research centre)**

The EU external border regime démarche is diffused from the EU postcolonial metropolis and its central institutions, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU to its periphery/external borders. Thus, I argue that Greece as an external border EU region follows the same rationale and thus constitutes a microcosmos of the EU external border regime. At the same time, it cannot be characterized as a tabula rasa, an absolute implementor of the EU Directives, since at some extent it also shows a strong and unique political character in its attempts to implement the EU external border management démarche, in order to deal with the situation



inside its borders. At this stage, I investigate the position of Greece in the EU external border management scheme: I connect the threefold border mechanism manifested on the EU context with the Greek case. In order to build on this argumentation, I follow what I claim to be an idiosyncratic, three-phase model: The financial, the refugee and finally the humanitarian phase. The locus of focus is situated at the second phase, namely the refugee crisis period, where I implement the findings of the EU context analysis upon the Greek case. In this way, I attempt to shed light on the refugee crisis management at the national Greek context, following the reasoning of the EU context analysis. Particularly, I apply the EU “paper/visa border”, “iron border” and “border camp” and their one-to-one correlation with the milestones of the EU external border regime (i.e. the Dublin Regulation, the EU-Turkey Deal and last but not least the EU Hotspot Approach) on Greece, in order to further explain the Greek responsibilities and management deficiencies that led to the humanitarian phase. The last phase of humanitarian crisis and its interweaving with the Hotspot Approach probably constitutes the Ariadne’s string in the unfolding of the Greek enigma, regarding the indefinite entrapment of the asylum seeking populations inside the Greek borders.

## 1.6. Thesis Outline

To dive into its research trajectory, the thesis unfolds into the following Chapters:

[Chapter 2](#) introduces and gradually builds on the theoretical frameworks ([Chapter 2.1](#) and [Chapter 2.2](#)). These are expanding from the level of ideology/theory to the EU external border mechanism ([Chapter 2.3](#)). In particular, [Chapter 2.1](#) introduces the theoretical framing of the B/Ordering and Othering processes, while [Chapter 2.2](#) connects the notion of Postcolonial Governmentality with the aforementioned B/Ordering and Othering processes in order to set the theoretical foundations of the EU external border regime. [Chapter 2.3](#) implements the theoretical, ideological framework into the EU reality: The three-fold EU B/Ordering mechanism, namely the common external visa border (“paper border”), the actual, material border (“iron border”) and the post-border (“border camp”) (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). The aforementioned framework is applied in both contexts, namely the EU (in [Chapter 3](#)) and the Greek (in [Chapter 4](#)), respectively.

[Chapter 3](#) elaborates on the practical implementation of the abovementioned theoretical frameworks, namely the most important manifestations of EU external border regime, on the basis of the three-layered EU mechanism, in order to highlight the regime’s Achilles heel that resulted in a failing overall refugee crisis management. The “visa border” is manifested via the Dublin Approach ([Chapter 3.1](#)), the “iron border” via the EU-Turkey Agreement ([Chapter 3.2](#)) and the “border camp” via EU Hotspot Approach ([Chapter 3.3](#)).

At [Chapter 4](#), the research is transferred from the EU centre to its periphery, the south-Eastern EU external border of Greece. Initially, [Chapter 4.1](#) introduces the role of the Greek state towards the refugee crisis and highlights the genealogy of the population mobility in Greece from antiquity up until nowadays. [Chapter 4.2](#) argues that Greece corresponds to a unique triptych of the Crisis (From financial, to refugee and finally humanitarian crisis) and investigates the country as a microcosmos of the aforementioned EU external border regime, its three-layered B/Ordering mechanism, inasmuch as its practical manifestations ([Chapter 4.2.1](#), [Chapter 4.2.2](#) and [Chapter](#)



[4.2.3](#)). The Chapter's ultimate goal is to explain the phenomenon of the asylum seeking populations' entrapment inside Greece.

Finally, [Chapter 5](#) concludes this thesis. Specifically, [Chapter 5.1](#) discusses the research findings and highlights the overall significance of the results originating from the thesis conceptual framework, while [Chapter 5.2](#) evaluates its overall contributions and proposes recommendations regarding both urgent actions and future academic research. Last but not least, [Chapter 5.3](#) provides the thesis final remarks.

## 2. Theoretical frameworks and mechanisms

This Chapter elaborates on the theoretical framing of the B/Ordering and Othering processes, along with the notion of Postcolonial Governmentality, in the context of the EU refugee crisis management. Towards this direction, [Chapter 2.1](#) investigates the theoretical lenses of B/Ordering and Othering processes and introduces their practical implementation in the EU context (Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002). [Chapter 2.2](#) sheds light on the notion of Postcolonial Governmentality and its influence on the EU reasoning and decision-making (Kramsch, 2007; Loomba, 2007). These two sub-chapters elaborate on the ideological/theoretical framing of the thesis. [Chapter 2.3](#) moves from theory into the practical manifestations of the EU external border management. In particular, it explains the amalgam of the EU B/Ordering and Othering mechanisms with Postcolonial Governmentality, regarding the EU external border regime, via the threefold border mechanism: The “visa border” ([Chapter 2.3.1](#)), the “iron border” ([Chapter 2.3.2](#)) and the “border camp” ([Chapter 2.3.3](#)) (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Towards the unfolding of these three mechanisms and among others, it elaborates on Frontex and Eurosur, which constitute some rather visible manifestations of the EU failing Migration Policy which pushes, accumulates and detains refugees at its external borders (European Council, 2016c; European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019; Official Journal of the European Union, 2016).

### 2.1. B/Ordering and Othering processes

To paraphrase Louis Althusser, there is no national ideology without the human subject (Althusser, 2006). Therefore, we may perceive the personal as part of the national identity. With the added collective value and the strong feeling of belonging, people wear the same masks in their battle to root out their self-existential fear. They forge and share the construction of a fabricated “imagined Truth”, a “national utopia”, an “imagined community” and a common national ideology (Anderson, 1983; Van Houtum, 2016). In this way, they occasionally leave behind their personal heterotopias, in order to embrace their national ideology (Foucault, 2007; Van Houtum & Bueno-Lacy, 2017). Its most powerful nuance is the sense of borderness (Green, 2012), that is the border ideology or “borderology” (Van Houtum, 2012). And this ideology has its practical expression in space and time: Bordering (Van Houtum, 2016; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002).

*Bordering* is a “big deal” and it’s highly politicized: People still border their territory in the context of “methodological nationalism” (Agnew, 1998). Actually, they have not yet detached themselves from modernism and its derivatives, essentialism of the borders and its naturalization processes. Spinoza in his book “Ethics” described fear as “an inconstant pain arising, from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue” (Nadler, 2006). This fear could be correlated with Nietzsche’s “horror vacui”, that is the horror of his own emptiness, the nihilism as a consequence of the death of God (Van Houtum, 2010c). What if bordering and mindset starts, at least partially, from the immanent instinct of human introversion? What if the border is created “in image and in likeness” of the pure human nature?

A relevant example of human nature shaping an aspect of human existence is religion. In many polytheistic religions of antiquity along with some monotheistic ones, people used to shape mainly humanized personas of their gods and goddesses. Mortals and

immortals shared very similar attributes. For example, Olympian God Zeus was conceptualized at the same time as autocratic and giving towards all his offspring, representing in Weberian terms the Idealtypus of patriarchy (Hesiod & West, 1999). Furthermore, in Genesis (Greek: γένεσις, meaning the source of origin), the first book of the Hebrew Bible Tanakh and of the Old Testament, Moses was said to have written the following: “So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them” (Towner, 2005). Man resembled God and vice versa, God resembled the man. In addition, we also find this reverse model of resemblance in Roman mythology: The God Janus, the two-faced God “of the end and the beginning, of the passage, of the guard between the world above and the nether-land” was depicted as an introvert and an extrovert character (Van Houtum, 2010c). So human desire could be expressed by Nietzsche’s diptych of *paranoid* and *schizoid* desire. The former represented by the God Apollo, the “Monad”, a symbol of harmony, self-control, introversion, symmetry, beauty, borders. The latter represented by the idea of the God Dionysus, the Übermensch, the “NoMan” and “Nomad”, the uncommitted, who follows the chaos, the pleasures without limits (Van Houtum, 2010c). Through the construction of religion, the man externalizes his inherent, deterministic tension to believe in and hope for a divine power (the belief in theism). In other words, he “calls to arms” the Gods, in order to get what he desires, eternal life and combat his fear of death.

In fact, neither desire nor fear ever fade to eternity. They constitute the two poles of the “Janus-faced” border. As long as they constitute the most powerful *raison d’être* for the existence of personal and par extension political borders, they will never cease being “a testament of the desired eternal life” of their nation-state (Van Houtum, 2010c). Consequently, how do we, at the national scale, cope with the fear of losing our national space, of being “colonized” by the foreigner who invades our land? A foreigner who overwhelms and frustrates us, who renders us “unheimlich”, that is in the words of Freud a frightened man in defense (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007)?

For a national border to be produced, a territory has to be demarcated by a sovereign power. Mapping and remapping the borders, are two processes that consist of a primordial space strategy of demarcation (Van Houtum, 2012). In essence, bordering primarily addresses the forging and the strengthening of the national identity. It ensures the security, necessary for the national space from the outside dangers (Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002).

In order to be legitimized, justified and to obtain the identity of a nation-state, the aforementioned territory has to become part of a historical continuum, (Van Houtum, 2010a). The border consists an empty signifier, which has to be re-inscribed with a new national ideology (Green, 2012). A new reality and truth have to be constructed by the “bordered power container”, i.e. of the sovereign power of the state (Giddens, 1978). At this moment, the border is institutionalized (Paasi, 2009). Initially, the process of *ordering*/normalization takes place to build a socio-spatial consciousness, a form of collective consciousness (Paasi, 2009), through “spatial socialization” (Paasi, 1996). The new national territory, its borders and identity are internalized by the people via the mechanisms of ordering, which are quite similar to the terms of “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) and “Governmentalité” (Foucault, 2007). Specifically, through the hegemonic structures of internalization, subjection and civic obeisance, the collective representations and narratives of belonging, nostalgia, memories, traditions and history are inscribed to the national identity of the

people (Van Houtum, 2010a). The key to success is the repetition of social practices, the imitation or mimesis of the internalization processes, the “habitus” (Bourdieu, 1990). In other words, the power of habit, the Aristotelian “hexis” (Aristotle, 2002). For example, during the Second World War the historical narratives in the German educational system significantly differed from the French ones, due to the fact that each conducted a different role to their national identity (Carrier, 2006).

The institutionalization processes revolve around the Foucauldian “art of governing” (Cheah, Robbins, & others, 1998). Specifically, there has been a shift of interest from the ruling of a territory to its management. That is, the measurement by the authority figure of the bare life down to the minus detail. Population became the center, the object of governance and life has been perceived not as a static, but as a fluid relational dynamic between the sovereign and its subjects (Cheah et al., 1998). Towards this, ratiocination, maps, images, representations and vocabulary constitute powerful instruments and “technics of power” for the European regional and transboundary spatial policy discourse. This is because they frame specific ideas, relations and realities, from which certain others are excluded (Bueno Lacy & Van Houtum, 2015; Huggan, 1989; O. B. Jensen & Richardson, 2003; Van Houtum, 2012; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2019). In other words, a map comprises a utopia (“ou-topos” in Greek means no place), a cultural illusion and a “metaphorical imaginary of social spatialization” (O. B. Jensen & Richardson, 2003). In Foucauldian terms, the aforementioned map description could also resemble an insidious instrument of Governmentality, which could be utilized by regional institutions (i.e. EU) and national governments (i.e. Greece), in order to measure who is “in” and who stays “out”.

In the EU case, the collective consciousness of the “imagined community” by the name “Euregio”, the non-nation European state, might be founded upon the reconnection of the European continent with its colonial roots, most likely through the iconographies of a map (Kramsch, 2007). However, the “Euregional experiment” is characterized by an invisible nature of cross-border political administration and it also lacks a common European narrative and identity. The latter deters people from integrating the Euregio in their everyday life and experience (Kramsch, 2007). Moreover, citizenry and citizenship are intertwined with the notion of nation-state and the national scale of governance instead of the transboundary regional scale (Bryant, 2004). The difficulty of understanding the governing body, in combination with the absence of the feeling of belonging to a national entity and being represented by a certain ideology and identity inevitably equates to the devaluation of the Euregio and a remaining unfulfilled regional-scaled utopia (Kramsch, 2007).

Since there is a border, there is also the “other side”. The *Othering* process constitutes the creation of the sentiment of “otherness”. This process is a further attempt for unity and familiarity of “us”, in contrast to the criminology/demonology of the “others”. This is primarily achieved by creating the fear, the moral threat of the evil other (Merler, 2016; Van Houtum, 2010c; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017, 2020; Walters, 2004). This threat of the others, i.e. the refugees in the context of EU refugee crisis management, is the basis of Domopolitics. That is of the securitization of contemporary governments and their discourse and practices, border management and policies of security against the “refugee risk” (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020; Walters, 2004). Therefore, it is not just about the inclusion in the nation-state, anymore. It is also about the exclusion from it.

In the past, quarantine was a very famous practice for the benefit of the sovereign power and the strengthening of the borders. Nowadays, this security policy has been updated along with the biological technologies, in the context of globalization (Smart & Smart, 2012). Biometrical controls and scanning are conducted by the border “guards” to those who intend to enter the national borders and in this way their bare body becomes the real passport (Van Houtum, 2010c). This biosecurity practice is usually combined with a situation of long-term waiting of the people in a place between two nation-states, a place transformed into a no-place from the welcoming state power (Van Houtum, 2010c). At that point an Agambenean “state of exemption” is created for those who are conceived as bare bodies, a life at its simplest form, composing contemporary refugee asylums and detention camps (Agamben, 1998, 1999, 2005; Heller-Roazen, 1998; Tsianos, Hess, & Karakayali, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Thus, there is nothing natural in this separation except from the crystallization of a certain form of bio-power originating from and strengthening the sovereign power’s institutionalization processes (Cheah et al., 1998; Tsianos et al., 2009). The abovementioned “state of exemption” is further analyzed at [Chapter 2.3.3](#).

Foucault compared this strict bio-political practices to a panopticon (Foucault, 1975). By definition, Panoptes were meant to be the many-eyed giants from the Greek mythology, who were never asleep, but always monitoring and usually were involved in the various affairs of the Gods (Λάμπας, 1980). Foucauldian panopticon was a symbol of institutional power, the residency of the state’s officials on the border (Foucault, 1975). At its sight, people feel stripped from their privacy and vulnerable, so they tend to internalize and embody the ideas and “the gaze of the gate keepers”, the representatives of the Law and finally to become their own gate keepers (Van Houtum, 2010c).

In practice, EU has been characterized by many as an “impermeable deadly fortress” that excludes people and deprives them of their fundamental right to a chance of living in dignity (Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). Thus, this is how EU borders function: they either include or exclude. As mentioned above, the EU Neighborhood policy aims at the production of a new European border ideology, based on the creation of a community sense among the Euregions/nation-states. Conversely, this policy constructs extensive criminalization of migrants trying to enter the EU (Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Therefore, EU has created an external border regime, with “Janus-faced” external borders. They function according to the apartheid rationale, that is of a “white” or a “black” list country: If someone comes from a “white-list” country, they are welcome and vice versa. On the contrary, if they come from a “black-list” country they are unwelcome and undergo a grinding, back-breaking procedure, in order to be granted asylum (Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). At that point names are forgotten and human life at its simplest form becomes a number, quite reminiscent of the Nazi labor and death camps of our horrible 20<sup>th</sup> century. This discrimination and exclusive Othering practice is rooted on the geopolitical space of origin and religion of the incoming people (Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009). The best described religion-based example would be that of the Islamic countries of the middle East (Merler, 2016). A vast majority of those countries’ population, namely Iraqi (Yazidi Kurds), Afghan, Iranian and Syrian refugees, has sought refuge in the various Greek accommodation centres. Moria camp, in the island of Lesbos, consists the most notorious example of the EU external border regime. It could be considered to comprise its microcosmos, since the “others”

are outcasted indefinitely in “border camp” facilities, at the northern-Eastern Greek borderlines with Bulgaria, along with the maritime Aegean borders with Turkey. With every new arrival, these installations become even more crowded and finally these people find themselves trapped in the threshold, literally on the border. Quite often I catch myself wondering why this chaos prevails specifically in the EU South and par extension in Greece. How did this external border management escalate throughout Europe and what is the rationale behind it? In order to search for answers on the abovementioned questions, one should recall the EU genealogy, its historical evolution into a set of powerful, supra-national institutions. In other words, its transformation into a European, postcolonial entity of Governmentality.

## 2.2. Postcolonial Governmentality

B/Ordering and Othering dynamics also constitute a strategy, well embodied with a historical dimension, inherited to the EU from its former colonies (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; S. Jensen, 2011; Kinnvall, 2016). Throughout the colonial history of Europe from 18<sup>th</sup> throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a vision of a prevailing, modern and progressive civilization was “transplanted” from the various metropolises to their colonies (Kramsch, 2007). This process of a primitive “Europeanisation”, namely the making of “Europeanness”, was accompanied with a vivid differentiation between the superior, more civilized westerns and the colonized, inferiorized and exoticized subjects of the barbarian civilizations (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Mignolo, 2012; Radaelli, 2003; Trilling, 2018; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). The most renowned expression of this racialization was what Said referred to as “orientalism” (Said, 1995). For example, the French “Mission Civilisatrice” directed to the French colonies (i.e. Algeria, French West Africa, and Indochina) is the most prominent example of the metropolis’s Idealtypus (Kramsch, 2007). In the words of Fanon dating back to 1969,

“The native and the under-developed man are today political animals in the most universal sense of the world.” (Kramsch, 2006, 2007)

Since the end of last century, colonialism continues to have an afterlife under the auspices of the EU (Hooper & Kramsch, 2007; Kramsch, 2007; Loomba, 2007; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Specifically, a new era of imperialism takes place inside the EU *geopolitical borders*, which are gradually transformed from metropolitan into postcolonial boundaries (Kramsch, 2007). In fact, there is an apparent impetus from the EU part, in its way to become a global “player”. In order to achieve this goal, it embraces some nation-state attributes, dated back to the imperialistic visions and colonization by its former powerful metropolises, the “laboratories of European modernity”, like France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands and Great Britain (Böröcz et al., 2001; Kramsch, 2007). Particularly, a certain vocabulary is constantly being cultivated, referring to the “European values”, the “European culture”, the “ethos of Europe”, in order to construct the new collective European identity and its subject (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Rumford, 2009). Nevertheless, the European identity and consequently the public EU sphere and culture are still significantly overshadowed by the national ideology (Balibar, 2009; Kramsch, 2007). A contingent reason for the national scale sovereignty would be the fact that the national borders are not only socially constructed, but also socially inhabited (Mignolo, 2012).

In this interconnection between the colonial past and the postcolonial present, the EU empire colonialism is indeed dependent on, and simultaneously significantly different



from its predecessor colonial nation-states (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Loomba, 2007; Rumford, 2009). This exceptionality lies on the fact that EU is targeting both a different scale and size of power (Hooper & Kramsch, 2007). Nowadays we live in a world “constructed” by the European states, which currently resides under the colonial shadow (Loomba, 2007; Rumford, 2009). However, the contemporary nuance of the Foucauldian “art of governance” is composed of an amalgam of transboundary political attributes and their coexistence with the *démarche* of the liberal market economy at a global scale (Kramsch, 2007). Therefore, in order to interpret the contemporary EU refugee crisis management, in [Chapter 2.3](#) I reflect on the expression of the postmetropolitan Governmentality and its Ordering and Othering manifestations.

Based on the colonial principle of the power originating from the center of the metropolis and its distribution to its edges/borders, EU created a central core of supranational institutions. With the Treaty of Maastricht (February 7<sup>th</sup>, 1992), EU initiated an expansion process to export its “border form” to its periphery, such as the current refugee welcoming Member States of Greece and Italy (Balibar, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). The accession and integration of the new EU members (or the new colonies) consist a process of deep institutional reforms of the newcomers, with simultaneous embracement of the European values, in order to “catch up” with the EU *Idealtypus* (Baun, 1995). Additionally, the EU Neighborhood Policy aims at the creation of a “ring of friends” at the external EU borders. This is mainly achieved via the Europeanisation and, in many cases, democratization of these non-European countries, by the promise of a current gentrification, accompanied by agreements of different nature (i.e. mainly trade and investment agreements) and a future accession, following an EU membership (Haukkala, 2008; Radaelli, 2003; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Surprisingly enough, there are some Islamic states (e.g. Syria, Iraq, etc.), which EU has intentionally left outside its “ring of friends” (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020).

Schengen Area (known as “Schengenland”) is a space where EU implements its Governmentality practices (Walters, 2002). The external border regime of Schengen is associated with the institutionalization (B/Ordering processes) of the political and economic activity of the countries it encompasses. Particularly, the Schengen borders are comprised by three major attributes: They serve at the same time *geopolitical*, *national* and *bio-political* purposes (Walters, 2002). With regard to their *geopolitical* expression, the Schengen borders consist a “sacred, politically charged institution” of cross-border governance (B/Ordering processes) (Walters, 2002). The *national* nuance of Schengenland concerns “the modern border to be a continuous structure enclosing a political territory” which “seals the nation”, mainly expressing the issue of national “domo-political” security (Walters, 2002, 2004). Furthermore, the most popular body-filtering *bio-political* technology that came along with Schengen Agreement was the Schengen Information System (SIS), for the exchange of information between national authorities. The main purpose of this information exchange between the Member States was the “Risk Analysis” regarding the incoming, dangerous “irregular” migrants, executed by the EU supranational authorities and institutions (e.g. Frontex, Eurosur, Eurodac, etc.) (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2019; Walters, 2002). On the contrary, with the implementation of the Schengen Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty afterwards, the EU had already activated a doctrine of excessive internal freedom of movement, totally antithetical from the aforementioned external rigidity. Hence, it created its “Janus-faced”,



manichaeen external borders, for which it has been characterized by many as “gated community” that measures and filters the body, in order to include or exclude it (Bueno Lacy & Van Houtum, 2015; Van Houtum, 2010a).

But why the EU Postcolonial Governmentality is the case for the Greek case investigation and not a different theoretical combination? Since Greece is a Schengen member, the external EU-Greek border not only applies on the aforementioned border triptych, but it rather manifests itself as a micrography of the EU external border regime. So, the question still stands: Which are the mechanisms through which the EU external border regime’s Postcolonial Governmentalité is manifested?

### 2.3. The three-fold EU border mechanism

The EU external border regime constitutes the epitome of the interweaving between the B/Ordering and Othering processes and the EU Postcolonial Governmentalité. The Schengen borders and specifically their southern external part is currently considered to be the deadliest on the planet (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Which are those attributes, their exact mechanisms that make these borders by far the most notorious ones? To address this question, I attempt to expand the theoretical framings analyzed above and thus to incarnate them into something more tangible. That is, the three-fold EU mechanism which combines the amalgam of the B/Ordering and Othering processes with the Postcolonial EU governmentality. For this, I build on the theoretical notion of the three-layered EU external border mechanism, as formulated by van Houtum and Bueno-Lacy, namely the pre-border (i.e. the “*visa border*” or “*paper border*”), the physical/territorial border (i.e. the “*iron border*”) and the post-border (i.e. the “*border camp*”) (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020).

#### 2.3.1. “Visa Border” or “Paper Border”

The “paper B/Ordering” policy was implemented with the Schengen Agreement, in 1985. Since then, EU facilitated the free movement among its Member States internally via this common visa B/Ordering regime. Simultaneously, it imposed a strict external border control rule, for the outsiders willing to enter its Schengen border (Refugee Council, 2016; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Over the years, the whole procedure of entering the EU external borders has been forged by various EU Law enforcements regarding a common Migration Policy, among others the Dublin Convention (in 1990), the Maastricht treaty (in 1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (in 1999). These consisted the cornerstones, aiming at the establishment of a common Asylum policy and later on its enrichment with common external border surveillance systems, such as the Schengen Information system (SIS) and the Visa Information System (VIS). In the words of Anderson, EU fabricated an “imagined community”, in image and likeness of its Member-Nation States, which has the authority, from a distance, to include or, most likely nowadays, to exclude from its external border the non-natives, the “others” (Anderson, 1983; Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Van Houtum, 2016; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002). The EU political project’s precondition for a country to be its Member State, is to appertain and belong to the EU historical trajectory, inasmuch as to its cultural heritage, in a sense to ironically be connected “by blood” in the EU fabrication (Balibar, 2009; Baun, 1995; Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Bueno Lacy & Van Houtum, 2015; Hooper & Kramsch, 2007; Huggan, 1989; O. B. Jensen & Richardson, 2003; Kramsch, 2007; Mitchell, Jones, Fluri, & Van Houtum, 2019; Rumford, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). In the words of Giddens, EU managed to become a “bordered power container” of the

EU identity, what is referred to as Europeanness, as the founding stone of the Othering processes manifested in its Schengen border (Giddens, 1978; Green, 2012; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009). This rationale goes back again at the Schengen list, regarding the visa status of those interested to enter the EU borders: the country of origin determines whether or not a non-EU citizen is accepted inside or forbidden (blacklisted) to enter the EU. The Schengen list is based on the principle of nativist discrimination and has been a principal cause against the legal entrance of mobilizing populations in the EU. Under the pretext of geographical origin, those who are born non-“Europeans” and have a non-Christian faith, find themselves in front of an impermeable Gordian knot, the visa absence (Hathaway & Foster, 2014; Merler, 2016; Mitchell et al., 2019; Van Houtum, 2010b, 2010c, 2010a, 2016; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2013, 2020; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007).

These tremendous Postcolonial EU B/Ordering and Othering practices applied via the “paper border” are plainly a bureaucratic affair “regulated” from afar. In the words of van Houtum and Bueno-Lacy, this “visa border” constitutes the form of a contemporary “*tele-bordering*” (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). This new external “*tele-bordering*” regime renders the EU an “impermeable deadly fortress”, at the first place, since it forces people, who flee their countries of origin in danger of political persecution, internal conflict, economic despair or natural disaster, to attempt to reach the EU external borders with “irregular” and life-threatening methods, just because they are not allowed a visa. Embarking on an airplane does not constitute a feasible option, since the aviation system abides by the EU visa strategy (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Paradoxically, to become a “legal” asylum seeker, complying with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the aforementioned populations have to pave their way via illegal means, like the smuggling business. Ironically, the EU anti-smuggling Migration Policy is founded on the perpetuation and the EU synergy with smuggling, trafficking and corruption, which are proven to be dramatically aligned with the EU external B/Ordering regime: Thanatopolitics (Mbembe, 2003; Murray, 2006, 2008; Trilling, 2018; Tsianos et al., 2009; Van Houtum, 2010c, 2010a; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020, 2013, 2019; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). One could claim that this is the first layer of the external B/Ordering manifestations of the Foucauldian EU Governmentality, that is of its contemporary “art of governing” (Cheah et al., 1998; Foucault, 2007; Lemke, 2001). The EU bureaucratically institutionalizes the Schengen border for both the insiders and the outsiders. In other words, it is preparing to “unleash the Kraken”: Its “guardians of power”, the “iron border”.

### 2.3.2. “Iron Border”

The second layer of the EU external border mechanism consists its territorial materiality, in other words its physical presence. From the invisible bureaucratic strategy far away from any border, the “iron border” is purposely visible (Trilling, 2019; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Fences of any kind are being built on a daily basis both at the EU Southernmost external borders (e.g. Greece and Italy) and even at the national context from an increasing number of Member States (e.g. the 110 mile long Hungarian-Serbian border fence, etc.), so as the refugee mobility “consequences” not to “invade” inside their private, national territory (Agnew, 1998; Kale et al., 2018; Merler, 2016; Mitchell et al., 2019; Van Houtum, 2010c, 2010b; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). At this layer, the Member States present a relevant autonomy of political movements internally, by forging their populist

discourses regarding the EU external border strategy (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Positioning themselves for or against in the whole refugee crisis management scheme might affect their parliamentary power and provide them with the voters' sympathy. In times of Crisis, the more nationalist, ethno-exclusionary and xenophobic the discourse, the "happier" the citizens (by the various Othering political manifestations) (Bueno Lacy & Van Houtum, 2015; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2009). This way, the Member States follow the EU Directives and thus nurture the aforementioned exclusionary logics of the EU "paper border" in practice (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020).

For every refugee on one side of the fence, there is a camera recording on the other, creating myths of the evil barbarian invaders and negatively covering what they consider "catchier". Since visibility constitutes one side of the coin, the media and the digitalization of the border are the other one (Trilling, 2019; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). These digital archives and the exaggerated reality they depict, become the excuse for the "paper" to be evolved into the "iron border" (Lemke, 2001; Smart & Smart, 2012; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2019, 2020). There is a radicalization of the EU external borders, via an intense militarization, with sophisticated technological equipment, passport controls, surveillance systems and maritime patrols, which "theatrically" perform the border (Minca & Rijke, 2017; Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Who are the main actors of this perpetuated play, which manifest the EU external border management?

Along with Eurodac (EU Asylum fingerprint database for illegal entrants) and the aforementioned SIS, one could argue that Frontex (i.e. European Border and Coast Guard Agency) completes the EU triptych of bio-political tools. Nevertheless, Frontex had limited mandate in assisting the EU Member States, while it lacked the necessary staff and equipment, in order to perform its duties (e.g. various border management operations, etc.). On June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2016 the European Council confirmed that, in agreement with the European Parliament, Frontex would acquire expanded tasks: Together with the national authorities of the Schengen countries, it would be responsible for an Integrated Border Management (IBM) of the migration flows at the EU external borders. Additionally, for the overall security of the EU, it was granted the right to intervene in urgent situations. In this way, Frontex was forged into the new, fully-qualified European Border and Coast Guard Agency, officially launched on 6<sup>th</sup> October 2016 (European Council, 2016c; Official Journal of the European Union, 2016). However, Frontex did not escape the criticism, since there are scholars to support that even though it is supposed to be a non-political Union Agency, Frontex influenced the policy-making process during the preparations for the establishment of the Eurosur system (Rijpma & Vermeulen, 2015).

What lies beyond the "thousand faces" of Frontex (intelligence, operations, training, research and risk analysis reports, partners, publications, etc.), is a dubious, post-modern era of biopolitics, biosecurity and bordering practices like the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019; Smart & Smart, 2012). Eurosur is an information-exchange framework, an integrated system for the EU external border management and it is designed to assist the EU Member States by tightening their "situational awareness and reaction capability in combating cross-border crime, tackling "irregular" migration and preventing loss of migrant lives at sea" (Rijpma & Vermeulen, 2015). At its core, Eurosur consists of a National Coordination Centres (NCCs) network, which directs the national scale border surveillance practices and constitutes the

information-exchange center. According to the information provided by the official Frontex web page,

“the Eurosur Fusion Services include automated vessel tracking and detection capabilities, software functionalities allowing complex calculations for detecting anomalies and predicting vessel positions, as well as precise weather and oceanographic forecasts. Fusion Services use optical and radar satellite technology to locate vessels suspected to be engaged in people smuggling that often puts the lives of migrants in danger. Many of the services are delivered in cooperation with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen).” (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019)

In a more informal translation, the EU surveillance system uses, among others, drones, scouting aircrafts, satellite remote and offshore sensors, which could be considered as “terror-spreading” means that “ring the bell” for the EU Postcolonial Governmentality. Eurosur is identified as a technologically advanced System of systems, with humanitarian aims, which “contains a range of fundamental rights safeguards, including the principles of data protection and *non-refoulement*, that is the practice of not forcing migrants to return to a state where they may be subject to persecution” (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019). Ironically, the EU does not “identify” an individual politically/religiously persecuted or fleeing violent conflict in their country of origin as legal asylum seeker, if they do not possess a visa. This complements the “visa border” rationale. Where is the humanitarianism in all this? In essence, Eurosur consists a set of narratives, such as the risk management and the immediate response ideas and an amalgam of security and human rights rationales, which in many cases are proven to be violated (Walters, 2017).

Another counterargument on the reinforcement of surveillance via Eurosur could be the fact that the only way for people, whose life is in peril, to have access in Europe is through dangerous criminal networks and totally unsafe embarkment on unseaworthy, illegal vessels (Heller & Jones, 2014; Trilling, 2018). Besides, what serious legal means and diodes has the EU offered to the “illegal trespassers” whose life is in peril? Militarization of the maritime, external EU borders, along with fathomless surveillance: A long-term “panacea” to a never-ending shipwreck of humanity. Again, according to the Eurosur system definition “situational awareness and reaction capability in combating cross-border crime, tackling “irregular” migration and preventing loss of migrant lives at sea” (Rijpma & Vermeulen, 2015). Ironically, Eurosur was inaugurated by the EU in October 2013, after a deadly overcrowded vessel with people mostly coming from Eritrea and Somalia caught fire and sank near Lampedusa (Walters, 2017).

To take a step further, in order to annihilate the business model of smuggling and trafficking alongside the Mediterranean, the European Council established, on May 18<sup>th</sup>, 2015, a military, EU operation by the name EUNAVFOR Med. Following the positive assessment of the initial operation, EUNAVFOR Med. transitioned to the second phase on high seas by September 14<sup>th</sup> 2015 (European Council, 2015b, 2015a). In order to monitor the development of migratory flows and keep up on the agreed measures, EU Member States and institutions were requested to participate in an information sharing rationale via a common platform. Therefore, the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) came along with a set of arrangements (October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2015). The Commission and the Union’s diplomatic service European External

Action Service (EEAS) provided on a regular basis integrated analyses of the shared information (European Council, 2015d).

One could claim that the Foucauldian logics of *Apparatus* is rather relevant in this case. Based on the Saussurian Sign Process and thus considering the EU external border management as a *Signifier* (physical existence), there are various and mostly heterogeneous *Apparatuses* revolving around it. Some examples involve the aforementioned “Security” (i.e. Frontex, Eurosur, EUNAFOR Med., EEAS, IPCR, Eurodac, SIS, European Police Office (Europol), Hotspot Approach), “human rights” (i.e. NGOs, media, EU Agendas on Migration Policy), “justice” (i.e. European Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), Dublin System, EU-Turkey Agreement), which could be considered as *Signified* (product of mental process). In this way, the *Signifier* is situated in the centre of the investigation, while the heterogeneous *Signified* form a network around it and thus it is their entanglement that finally defines the former (Barthes, 1968; de Saussure, 2011; Foucault, 2010). In other words, what essentially matters, regarding the EU external border management is the perspective from which the Foucauldian *Apparatuses* are viewed and analyzed.

In his diachronic poem “The Walls” dating back in 1896, Konstantinos Petrou Kavafis referred to those walls or “iron borders”:

[...] “Oh, when they were building the walls, how couldn’t I notice.  
However, I had never heard the builders’ noise or any other sound.  
Imperceptibly they blocked me out of the world.” (“CAVAFY ARCHIVE,” 2020)

This excerpt could be parallelized with the refugee and migrant populations’ entrapment in the current EU reality. If they are nowadays forced to follow the most life-threatening and perilous routes to avoid “getting caught”, what does our European anthem serves for? And what happens to the “lucky”, though “irregular” ones who survive trafficking, smuggling, harassment, death and finally manage to reach the external EU borders, stepping at “our” side of the fence?

### 2.3.3. “Border Camp”

The post-border consists the third layer of the EU external border regime. The “lucky” and the wealthy enough find themselves confined in some spaces of exclusion at the border (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). The technique of quarantine and isolation in camp-like caged spaces resembles the concentration camps during the Nazi Occupation period and/or the Communist detention camps in various isolated Aegean prison islands during the Greek Civil War (Aharony, 2010; Arendt, 2009; Coufoudakis, 2018; Milton, 1997; Δεμερτζής, 2015; Καλύβας, 2015). The phenomenon of political prisoners had been well established in Europe of nations and goes back in the nineteenth century, when EU consisted a futuristic chimera and the notion of Member State was considered a utopian aspiration (Voglis, 2002). Back then, political prisoners gradually experienced a preferential treatment (separated from common criminals, not forced to work and allowed to wear their own clothing and to read books and newspapers to have more visits, etc.), which was based on the fact that they were ideologically motivated and guided from noble, and not common and criminal ideas. This special treatment was apparent in the examples of *Festungshaft* in Germany, *détention* in France (mainly after the 1890 Decree) and “first division” in England (with the Act of 1865). During the twentieth century the phenomenon of political prisoners became emblematic, since it became the symbol of violent confrontations among social and political ideologies and movements. That

was the era that bonded imprisonment and exile with the Communist identity once and for all (Aharony, 2010; Voglis, 2002; Δεμερτζής, 2015).

In the modern times, imprisonment is being redefined in even more brutal terms. Refugees and migrants are filtered in terms of bio-security and since they do not possess papers, their bare bodies are bio-politically transformed into a passport, inside a gated no-man's land where they are nothing but lives at their simplest form: the first reception centres (Agamben, 1998, 1999, 2005; Foucault, 2007, 2010; Heller-Roazen, 1998; Papoutsi, Painter, Papada, & Vradis, 2019; Tsianos et al., 2009). At that moment an Agambenian "state of exception" is constructed, a well embodied strategy for the national history of various EU Member States. Besides, ethno-exclusionary, xenophobic along with religion-based discrimination discourses consist the epitome of the Othering processes.

If B/Ordering is one thing, Othering this geopolitical institutionalization is the other. If someone awaits before the border, before the Law in the words of Kafka, there is another preforming the Law at sight, at the border. And the one who waits, definitely belongs to and complies with the Law. And the guards are the living essence of the Law. In this perpetuality of micropolitics regarding the waiting procedure, the no-man who waits finally internalizes the gaze of the gate keeper the emptiness of waiting, and finally becomes a gate keeper of their own (Foucault, 1975, 1977, 1980, 2007, 2010; Van Houtum, 2010c). Whole nation states become "unheimlich", their fear of the evil refugees further enhances their defense against them (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). At this stage, the "irregular" migrants become invisible, exceptional, in contrast to the previous "iron border" mechanism, where they were over-projected and exposed by the media and thus manipulated, for populist and nationalist political purposes (Trilling, 2019). In this way they became "abnormal", even more exoticized and inferiorized in the form of life of some exotic animals caged in a circus: These camps show the world how they "teach these populations their place" in the EU context (Hooper & Kramsch, 2007; Kramsch, 2007; Said, 1995). The individual is the NoMan who belongs to a parallel universe called "border camp" (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020).

The amalgam of the "paper border", the "iron border" and the "border camp" constitutes the ultimate supranational super-mechanism of the EU external border regime and of its overall refugee crisis management. In practical terms, this threefold border mechanism is currently manifested via the EU Hotspot Approach, which could be considered as the epitome of the external EU border regime failure (European Commission, 2020b; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). In order to understand and explain the trajectory of the EU management of the refugee crisis and its current outcomes (i.e. the refugee populations' entrapment at the external EU borders), it is crucial to dive into the milestones/manifestations throughout the EU external border management genealogy and finally reach the top of the iceberg: the EU Hotspot Approach failure.



### 3. EU external border management: Milestones and manifestations

This Chapter moves further from theoretical frameworks to their implementation on the EU context. In essence, the EU threefold mechanism is investigated in practice throughout the historical trajectory/genealogy of the EU external border regime and via its manifestations: The Dublin System is researched as part of the EU “paper border” ([Chapter 3.1](#)), the EU-Turkey Agreement as part of the “iron border” ([Chapter 3.2](#)) and the Hotspot Approach as part of the “border camp” ([Chapter 3.3](#)). Specifically, it focuses on the EU external border practices towards the refugee populations through the followings:

- a) Regulations [focus on Dublin III Regulation/Dublin System, along with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)] (European Commission, 1990, 2016d, 2016a, 2018),
- b) Agendas [the European Agenda on Migration (in 23<sup>rd</sup> April, 2015) and the New Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024 for the reinforcement of the EU Migration Policy] (European Council, 2015e, 2019a),
- c) Agreements (EU-Turkey Agreement and subsequently the Joint Action Plan) (European Commission, 2016c; European Council, 2015c) and
- d) the overall decision-making processes, and specifically the EU Hotspot Approach (European Commission, 2020b; European Council, 2019b).

In essence, this Chapter brings the pieces of the EU border regime puzzle together. It interweaves the B/Ordering and Othering mechanisms of the Postcolonial EU metropolis to the most emblematic elements of the EU external border regime. And the question at this point is the following: Which elements of the EU border management are “to blame the most” for the current situation of the refugee populations’ accumulation and indefinite entrapment within the EU borders?

Essentially, this Chapter builds on the theory and analysis of the bigger picture, that of the EU external border regime. In this way the road is paved, in order to further zoom in the Greek case, and its national implementation of the EU external border management regarding the Greek Asylum System.

Since 2013, there has been a vivid response to the migratory pressures from the European Council, which could be summarized in a series of developments, regarding the external EU border management (European Council, 2019b). The refugee crisis bomb detonated in 2015, with various deadly attempts of migrants to reach Europe through the Mediterranean (it is estimated over 3,770 deaths) (IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, 2020). In fact, official estimations of Interpol have 500,000 undocumented migrants enter annually the EU via the southern European/Mediterranean route (Tsianos et al., 2009). In its “Missing Migrants Project” the Migration Data Portal of IOM indicates the overpowering amount of 18,997 migrant fatalities in Mediterranean, from January the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014 up until October 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2019 (IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, 2019). Within this pressing atmosphere, the European Council conducted a special meeting (on 23<sup>rd</sup> April of 2015), which resulted in the adoption from the part of the European Commission, of a European Agenda on Migration (European Council, 2015e). In particular, the Agenda identified a list of actions and measures on the basis of mutual responsibility, in order to forge a better and more consistent Migration management.



It focused on the domains of a) “irregular” migration, b) external border security, c) reinforced asylum policy and d) a new policy on legal migration. All the four domains forge the EU external border management.

However, the unfortunate phenomenon of the asylum seeking populations’ accumulation inside the EU borderlines was not a side-effect, but rather an undesirable result, the cherry on the top of the refugee-protection crisis cake (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017; Kale et al., 2018; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Looking back at the EU border management genealogy, there are some deficient elements which gradually led to the current disastrous, external border regime. It is imperative that we reflect on these milestones, in order to finally crystallize the reasons behind the impermeable, deadly EU fortress and its failing border regime.

### 3.1. The Dublin System

On June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1990 the Dublin Convention established the so-called Dublin regime. This Regulation was founded, on the basis of the Geneva Convention and the EU Qualification Directive. That is, on the criteria and mechanisms which determine whether an EU Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application for international protection/asylum, or not. The criteria are the followings: a) the principle of family unity, b) the insurance of residence (permits or visas), c) the illegal entry or stay in a Member State (currently the most applied Dublin criterion), d) the legal entry in a Member State and e) the application in international transit area of an airport. Specifically, the Dublin System consists of the aforementioned Dublin Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation for applicants’ identification (established in 2003) (European Commission, 1990). The Dublin regime came into force in 1997 and it was afterwards replaced in 2003, by the Dublin II Regulation.

These two aforementioned versions had a rather negative impact on the overall EU external border asylum application procedures. This is why refugees were being deported back to the first Member State they entered, often Italy or Greece, which were deemed to have the worst welfare provision in the E.U (Grant & Domokos, 2011; Mitchel, 2017; Moreno-Lax, 2012; Triantafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2011). Since the vast majority of arrivals accumulated in very few Member States/countries of arrival/border regions of the EU, namely in Greece and Italy, these two countries’ Asylum Systems had been put under immense pressure, which hampered significantly their overall effectiveness, in the context of international protection (Triantafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2011). According to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the asylum, “paper border”, long-term bureaucratic procedures dictated by Dublin effectively failed to protect and support the entrants from the risk of prosecution in their countries. This is why in many occasions they were not able to even access the asylum procedure. Even when they finally had access, what followed were long-waiting procedures, regarding the asylum application processes, which usually resulted in permanent entrapment in the first reception centres. Even worse, in various cases the responsible Member States undermined on a daily basis the fundamental human rights of the asylum seekers (Grant & Domokos, 2011; Mitchel, 2017; Moreno-Lax, 2012; Triantafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2011; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). So, where did the “Dublin failure” manifest itself in the most profound way? The answer might be hidden behind the case “*M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece*”.

ECRE, UNHCR and various other non-governmental organizations harshly criticized the Greek Asylum Service management and particularly the malfunction of the State’s

protective mechanisms of the unaccompanied minors/children (European Database of Asylum Law, 2011). On January 21<sup>st</sup>, 2011 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) adjudicated the case *M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece* (ECtHR - M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece [GC], Application No. 30696/09). This case regarded an Afghan asylum seeker, who had crossed Europe through Greece with his last stop in Belgium. The asylum seeker claimed that in Greece “he faced detention in insalubrious conditions before living on the streets without any material support. At issue in the judgment was the risk of violating Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and/or Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy)” (Clayton, 2011; European Database of Asylum Law, 2011; Moreno-Lax, 2012; Triantafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2011). According to the Dublin II Regulation, the Belgian Authorities transferred the asylum seeker back in Greece. For this move, the ECtHR also found the Belgian government guilty, since “by transferring the applicant to Greece the Belgian authorities knowingly exposed him to conditions of detention and living conditions that amounted to degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR”. Thus, the Belgian government should act upon the principle of *non-refoulement*, i.e. it had to make sure that the return of the refugee in Greece would be a safe move for his wellbeing. Both the Greek and Belgian governments were found guilty of violating the European Convention on Human Rights, by imposing their internal/national legislation on asylum seekers and they were both given fines of six thousand euros (for the Belgian government) and thirty thousand euros (for the Greek government) (Clayton, 2011; European Database of Asylum Law, 2011; Moreno-Lax, 2012; Triantafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2011).

In an attempt to ameliorate the situation, on December 2008 the European Commission proposed amendments to the latest Dublin form and finally on July 19<sup>th</sup>, 2013 it was replaced by the Dublin III Regulation (Regulation No. 604/2013) (European Parliament, 2013; Wikström, 2014). Nevertheless, the rationale behind Dublin III Regulation still nowadays remains rather vague, anachronistic and definitely failing, since this version has also been founded upon the same principle as the first two forms of Dublin System. That is, the principle that the first Member State where an asylum application has been lodged and fingerprints have been stored, is responsible for the individual’s overall asylum claim (European Parliament, 2013; Grant & Domokos, 2011; Mitchel, 2017). Overall, the Dublin system is based on the presumption that Member States should be considered as “safe countries” for asylum seekers. This is why transfers from one Member State to another are considered not to violate the principle of *non-refoulement*. Unfortunately, the European Convention on Human Rights of 1953, in brief ECHR (i.e. the International Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms), the cornerstone of the EU values, is vandalized by the EU inasmuch as by its Member States, which mistreat migrants and provide them with the worst living conditions (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017; Mitchel, 2017; Moreno-Lax, 2012).

So, what is the principal reason behind the Dublin failure? Apparently, the lack of solidarity from the EU part towards its most refugee crisis-affected Member States, that is Greece and Italy, could be interpreted at the macropolitical spectrum as tangible proof towards the scenario of a solidarity crisis on the foundations of the EU per se (Bueno Lacy & Van Houtum, 2015; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2009). The EU Directives regarding its Dublin, “paper border” have fertilized the grounds for nationalist discourses and extremist, exclusionary political strategies from various EU Member States (e.g. the fence building at the national

scale), and ironically the aforementioned States have excluded not only the unwanted asylum seekers, but also the fellow, crisis-inflicted Member states of Italy and Greece (Alencar & Deuze, 2017; Kale et al., 2018; Merler, 2016; Trauner, 2016; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020).

All in all, in times of a refugee crisis as the current where persecuted migrant populations massively reach the EU external borders and seek asylum, how effective would be the management (at the national context) of a disproportionate accumulation of incoming populations in just the national territory of one member State, which would happen to experience at the same period a financial crisis, too? Would it be reasonable and morally acceptable to finance a country like this, in order to exclusively deal itself with the situation (as the *non-refoulement* principle commands)? Could this happen even though the country fails to provide the aforementioned populations with decent living conditions, humane treatment and thus violates fundamental human rights? The Greek case indeed confirms this unfortunate scenario.

### 3.2. The EU-Turkey Agreement

Another noteworthy milestone was the meeting of the EU heads of States or Governments with Turkey (European Council, 2015c). EU and Turkey activated, on 29<sup>th</sup> of November 2015, a Joint Action Plan/Agreement, where they released a joint statement of nine action points, due to the escalating situation in Syria and the surprising number of eighty-eight thousand people illegally attempting to arrive in Greece from Turkey, since the beginning of 2015. The Joint Action Plan (commonly referred to as the EU-Turkey Deal), aimed to efficiently reduce smuggling and “irregular” migration from Turkey to the EU, providing in total six billion euros to Turkey, in order to improve the living conditions and the overall accommodation and Turkish hospitality of the Syrian refugees in the country (European Commission, 2016c; European Council, 2016a). Additionally, the Plan was targeting to discourage the migrants’ movements towards the borders of another country and also it was aiming at a more coordinated, bilateral police cooperation and information exchange, between the countries en route. Moreover, the Plan foresaw (and Turkey also agreed) that the third-country nationals/“irregular” migrants, namely those not in need of international protection, who reached EU via Turkey, would be returned to Turkey as of 20<sup>th</sup> March 2016 (European Commission, 2016b; Kale et al., 2018). In return for the EU financial aid, Turkey agreed, starting from June 2016, to take back those migrants who are not in need of international protection, and came to the EU through Turkish territory. However, if the aim was to “stem the flow”, this was a deeply inadequate approach, as the number of people (who were not in need of international protection) streaming into the EU was quite low. Therefore, this approach seemed quite narrow-minded, since the number of “irregular” asylum seekers in the EU is quite low. This fact lessened Plan’s effectiveness and thus reinforces the argument that the Deal plays a significant role on the explanation of the final, unfortunate outcome of the asylum seeking populations accumulation and entrapment within the EU (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020; Verhofstadt, 2015). To add, the Joint Action Plan was not an international agreement. Thus, it had neither binding nor obligatory nature for any of the counterparties and the inconsistency of its implementation could only have political consequences (Arribas, 2016; Haferlach & Kurban, 2017).

With regard to Turkey, the country’s Prime Minister at that point, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s introduced a new “enterprising and humanitarian Foreign Policy”, originating from

global outreach aspirations, in order to transform Turkey into a global geopolitical player (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). In this way, the government presented itself as a global protector of Muslim communities, with the head of state President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the “Ensar”, that is the historical protector of the migrants and refugees. Under this pretext, it was implied that it was Turkey’s religious and historical responsibility to provide the Syrian (at the first place) refugees with national protection (Kale et al., 2018). This approach was connected with the existent “humanitarian Foreign Policy”, along with the “open door Policy” to individuals of Syrian descent. No matter how ideal and humanitarian the Turkish approach might have initially seemed, it was reshaped into a much more different strategy. Particularly, since 2015, when the numbers of Syrian reached high levels, the preexisting “temporary accommodation centres” which used to accommodate Syrians of “temporary accommodation status”, were gradually transformed into a long-term political commitment for the government. Due to the belligerent condition between Syria and Turkey, the latter’s government adopted a stricter position both in its border crossing Policy and the management of the Syrian refugees on the inside (Hathaway & Foster, 2014; Kale et al., 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). But things were not just as simple, since that was the critical moment, where Turkey began the systematic mistreatment of those in need of its protection.

Taking into consideration Turkish strategic approaches, one could address the EU-Turkey Deal and the function of *non-refoulement* principle as key elements, in order to decipher the current situation at the EU south-Eastern, external Greek-Turkish border. With regard to the obscurantist irony of such an applicability, *non-refoulement* principle shall be investigated along with the treatment of Turkey as a first country of asylum or a safe third country (according to the Asylum Procedures’ Directive). Goodwin-Gill defined *non-refoulement* as “the obligation on states not to send individuals to territories in which they may be persecuted, or in which they are at risk of torture or other serious harm” (Arribas, 2016). The question in this case is whether or not Turkey could be considered as a safe country for the refugees. By “serious harm” one could imply that there would be torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of the refugees. This case is applicable for Turkey, as high levels of theft and sexual violence had been reported in various Turkish refugee camps and also persecution of religious minorities like various Kurdish community members (Arribas, 2016; Haferlach & Kurban, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2016). Therefore, the conditions in these camps were rather ominous and by returning refugees to Turkey, Greece would be violating the *non-refoulement* principle along with various articles of the ECHR, since it was not clear, whether the destination country fulfilled the guarantees against inhuman or degrading treatment towards the refugees. Under the light of the aforementioned statements, Turkey could neither be considered as a safe third country, nor as a country of asylum (Amnesty International, 2016; Arribas, 2016; Haferlach & Kurban, 2017; Verhofstadt, 2015). So, what lies beyond the EU-Turkey Agreement and how could the EU’s external border management be explained?

Since the lack of provisions in the Turkish juridical system, in order to guarantee the safeguard of the Syrian refugees and a growing number of reports on the violation of the Asylum Law in Turkey, there is a legal void which could be interpreted in terms of a humanitarian crisis. Even though the EU leaders were aware of the repressive and despotic political regime of Turkey which manifests itself in various ways, such as in the case of the Kurdish population deadly persecutions, they still disregarded the

despicable violations of the populations' fundamental human rights. Even worse, they sealed this humanitarian failure with the EU-Turkey Deal and at that exact moment the EU violated at its core the *non-refoulement* principle of Dublin (Arribas, 2016; Haferlach & Kurban, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2016).

In an attempt to expand its external "iron border" and make it even more powerful, the EU is currently following a new-colonial rational of "hiring" the autocratic regime of the neighboring Turkey. Turkey in this way upgraded into a pillar of the EU border management, in order to militarize the "other side" of the border. It only took a financial aid package of six billion euros and visa-free access in the EU for the Turkish citizens (via a visa liberalization roadmap) for the ultimate treason of Democracy, the *non-refoulement* principle and the violation of fundamental ECHR articles regarding freedom and indisputable human rights (Amnesty International, 2016; Arribas, 2016; Haferlach & Kurban, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Nestoras, 2015; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020; Verhofstadt, 2015).

Thus, the EU-Turkey Deal consists a current, twofold failure: On one hand, not only the EU radicalizes and securitizes in military terms its external B/Ordering regime on the inside, but it also cultivates and further propagates an even more radical ethno-exclusionary, xenophobic and populist discourse to its Member States, under the pretext of safeguarding the EU identity, values, its Democracy, its Member States, its citizens and an overall fabricated supranational utopia. On the other hand, EU infringes its founding principles, by financing a despotic geopolitical neighbor to militarize even more the "iron border" from the outside and by passively legitimizing and allowing the smuggling industry to combine its powers with the undemocratic and repressive Turkish regime towards inhuman, criminal actions (Dourakis, 2013; Triandafyllidou, 2014b; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). And thus, the short-term political goals of the EU-Turkey Deal could be nowadays evaluated as failing (Amnesty International, 2016). All in all, what really constitutes the EU "iron border" failure, is the journey from Turkey to Greece and the EU: The desperate trust of the persecuted people to the smuggling representatives with both the blessings of EU and Turkey. From the EU perspective, because the extreme militarization of its external, maritime and land Schengen border with Turkey makes it impossible for them to reach EU and seek international protection, a fact that leads them to seek illegal means and embark into life-risking situations. In this way the EU legitimizes this "deep, smuggling intra-state". From the Turkey perspective, as it constitutes a rather unstable and inappropriate political environment to host migrants, due to its systematic mistreatment of non-Turkish minorities, like Kurds, who preexisted the Arab uprising-related persecuted individuals in need of international protection.

So far, Turkey follows the same vicious strategy of political games, by exploiting like chess pawns the returned undocumented migrants from Greece, as stipulated by the EU-Turkey Deal, in order to satisfy its geopolitical aspirations. Consciously aware of the thriving smuggling and trafficking industries right around the border corner, the Turkish government recently initiated a process of fake news' diffusion: the fabrication that the EU had opened the Greek-Turkish land border in the northeastern Evros region (and the village of Kastanies). In this way, Turkey led thousands of undocumented migrants in the border area, where they had a face to face encounter, from a certain distance, with the performers of the border: The hard core Greek Army, armed for war, something not applicable in this idiosyncratic situation (Kantouris & Becatoros, 2020; Keep Talking Greece, 2020; Stevis-Gridneff, 2020b). And thus, I argue that Turkey has inaugurated the year 2020, by achieving "a big something" with

this tactic: It has just simulated a “populations entrapment-scenario” literally in the doorstep of the Greek-Turkish border to put pressure on the EU, in exchange for the latter’s support of Turkey’s military operations in Syria (Damon & Baykara, 2020; Psaropoulos, 2020; SKAI, 2020). Quite a menace, one could argue, given the fact that EU (par extension Greece) had now to deal with entrapped populations both on the inside and the outside of its north-Eastern border.

### 3.3. The EU Hotspot Approach

Since 1999, the EU has been working on a common legislative framework and Policy towards a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), in order to become an area of protection, when it comes to people escaping life-threatening situations (e.g. climate disasters, political/religious persecution, violent conflicts, etc.) and seeking for asylum and international protection (European Commission, 2018, 2020a). The refugee crisis outbreak in 2015 led to various fortifications of the preexisting system, in order to adapt smoothly to the new conditions. Towards this wind of change, on May 4<sup>th</sup> 2016, the European Commission proposed a reformation package for the sustainability and improvement of the CEAS policies: a) the reinforcement of the Eurodac fingerprint database, b) the reformation of the Dublin System, regarding the asylum application procedures and c) the forging of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) into a “full-fledged” EU Agency (European Commission, 2016d). A second package of regulations was proposed on July 13<sup>th</sup> 2016, which focused on the improvement of the reception conditions and the protection of the human rights of the newcomers (European Commission, 2016a). Since the 29<sup>th</sup> of June 2017, when the European Parliament and the presidency reached consensus via referendum for the reformation of CEAS, the negotiations initiated (between the Council and the Parliament) towards the amelioration of the rules surrounding the asylum seekers/applicants’ living conditions (on July 19<sup>th</sup> 2017) (European Council, 2017b, 2017a). Moreover, the Council stated that another circle of negotiations would initiate, in order to establish an EU resettlement/relocation framework for those seeking international protection under the auspices of the E.U (on November 15<sup>th</sup> 2017) (European Council, 2017c). But this is only half of the story.

The situation had already deteriorated since the 12<sup>th</sup> February 2016, when the Council of Europe recommended to address “serious deficiencies identified during an evaluation of Greece’s application of the Schengen acquis in the area of external border management”. The Council proposed remedial actions from the Greek part, in order to improve the abovementioned deficiencies (European Council, 2016b). Nevertheless, the Greek way of handling the situation, did not constitute the only external border management failure, at the national scale.

At that point, one could question the European solidarity and burden-sharing among the Member States, since the first reception countries (i.e. Italy and Greece) were already characterized as cases *in extremis*, due to the devastating state of their national finances (Dourakis, 2013; Kotios, Pavlidis, & Galanos, 2011; Trauner, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2014b; Tsianos et al., 2009; Visvizi, 2016). The inadequate and inappropriate management provided by the southern management/external border control led to the deficient implementation of the asylum policies by the aforementioned entry point countries. This was the result of their struggle to deal simultaneously with the consequences the economic and financial crisis and the consequences of the refugee crisis since 2015, a fact that rendered them the “southern problem” of the EU CEAS implementation. To decompress the deteriorating situation,



EU proposed a relocation scheme for 160,000 migrants from Italy and Greece and a Hotspot Approach was adopted, in order to strengthen the implementation of the Dublin Regulation (Calamur, 2015; European Commission, 2020b; Mentzelopoulou & Luyten, 2018; Nestoras, 2015; Trauner, 2016).

That was it: The Hotspot Approach signaled the final countdown for the EU external border regime and its Asylum System. This approach sealed once and for all the refugee-protection crisis with the regime's absolute failure. Particularly, the so-called Hotspot Approach was developed by the European Commission as a part of immediate, integrated action, in order to support the external border Member States (i.e. Greece and Italy), in their attempt to tackle the unruly movement of "irregular" migrants and refugees entering the EU, as indicated by the European Agenda on Migration, on May 2015 (European Commission, 2015, 2020b). In fact, the Approach could be addressed as the Commission's attempt to Europeanize its external borders and border control with a simultaneous institutionalization of mobility. Along with the relocation mechanism/scheme, the Hotspot Approach could be considered as another and even more effective Dublin Regulation and both could be seen as parts of the EU institutionalization and integration process. In a sense, hotspots constitute "liminal spaces of institutionalizing mobility through and beyond the islands of the Eastern Aegean" (Papoutsi et al., 2019).

With the Hotspot Approach came the EU operational support mechanisms (which were analyzed in [Chapter 2.3](#)), namely the registration, identification, fingerprint and debriefing operations regarding the asylum seekers and also the return operations. And this is the crossroads, where the EU external B/Ordering mechanisms take their physical, operational form: EASO, Frontex, Europol and Eurojust function and execute their roles on the ground, assisting the Member States, which face disproportionate migratory pressures at their external borders. In particular, the people applying for asylum are channeled into an asylum procedure in which the EASO support teams process the applications the sooner possible. In the case of "irregular" migrants return, Frontex coordinates the overall process. Moreover, the first reception Member States are supported by Europol and Eurojust, regarding the investigations aiming the dismantling of the trafficking and smuggling phenomena (European Commission, 2015, 2020b; Nestoras, 2015).

In essence, a hotspot is the post-border. A Humanity's prison. The quintessence of the asylum seeking population doom and imprisonment in perpetuity. And the epitome of the EU Postcolonial Governmentality, as a spatial contract and management approach between Brussels (the metropolis) and its Member States (Papoutsi et al., 2019). Its protagonists are the "*sans-papiers*", the people without work permit documents or identifications, who are considered illegal and are positioned inside overcrowded, city-isolated fenced areas, the "border camps", their "state of exemption" where they internalize mechanisms and operations and become their own "Frontex guard" (Agamben, 1998, 2005; Foucault, 2010; Lemke, 2001; Papoutsi et al., 2019; Tsianos et al., 2009; Van Houtum, 2010c, 2016; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020, 2013). And thus, we live in a world that the authorities and the incoming "subjects" acquire a new, conditional relationship, forged upon a "supra-national citizenship prototype", taking place inside the hotspots, which finally become "captivity devices" (Papoutsi et al., 2019).

What really happens inside the camp-walls dehumanizes and excludes these people through the no-places, while the long-duration procedures which defines their destiny,



finally leads a vast number of the adults detainees, inasmuch as children into severe mental health problems, among others severe depression issues, along with suicidal and self-harming behavior (McColl, McKenzie, & Bhui, 2008; MSF, 2018b; Silverman, 2018; Tondo, 2018). I cannot help but wonder, what the reverend and social activist Henry Ward Beecher once said: “Children are the hands by which we take hold of heaven” (Ward Beecher, 2020). Well, I would answer “say that to Aylan Kurdi” (Kingsley, 2016). In a contemporary, secular world we so vividly brag about, how well have we managed to dichotomize children into angels and demons based on their origin and/or religious beliefs?

Moving towards the current situation, based on the increasing polarization in EU decision-making processes regarding the refugee crisis and the escalation of the deteriorating living conditions provided by the south European arrival countries (i.e. by Greece and Italy), the Council started negotiations with the Parliament (on November 29<sup>th</sup> 2017), regarding the improvement of the reception conditions by the hosting countries (European Council, 2017f). The European Council along with the EU leaders agreed (on 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> December 2017) upon the reinforcement of the EU Migration Policy, by reforming CEAS along with the Dublin System, by June 2018 (European Council, 2017d, 2017e). So far, on June 20<sup>th</sup> 2019, the EU leaders discussed the implementation of Migration Policy in the context of a new strategic agenda for 2019-2024 (European Council, 2019a). Regarding the Agenda’s context on Migration management, it was clearly stated that

"We will continue and deepen our cooperation with countries of origin and transit to fight illegal migration and human trafficking and to ensure effective returns. Concerning the internal dimension, we need agreement on an effective migration and asylum policy. A consensus needs to be found on the Dublin Regulation to reform it based on a balance of responsibility and solidarity, taking into account the persons disembarked following Search and Rescue operations." (European Council, 2019a)

There is a tantalizing feeling of pure uncertainty and a wandering vanity, originating from the future agenda excerpt: a) There is no consensus among the EU Member States, b) the Dublin Regulation necessitates revisions every now and then, c) the Hotspot approach consists the “Achilles heel” for the EU external border regime, d) the cooperation between the EU institutions and the first reception countries is yet rather challenging and e) there is not yet, six years after the breakout of the refugee crisis “repercussions” in 2015, an altogether, effective Migration and Asylum Policy among the EU Member States.

All the aforementioned constitute the pieces, which compose the overall failure of the EU border regime and its Asylum System. In a way, they allow EU to maintain its inability to “comprehend” and radically change its fundamental, defective crisis-management elements that inevitably perpetuate the failing regime’s worst consequence, that of the asylum seeking populations’ indefinite imprisonment inside the EU borders. It seems like the EU is more focused on securing and controlling its external borders beyond rationale, rather than building on a sustainable strategy to successfully target the most defective components of its external border regime. In other words, Europe provides a hyper-mobility for the insiders, while it immobilizes the outsiders, the “exceptions”, the “others”. Even worse, it seems more likely that the EU has fabricated itself and currently preserves the aforementioned unavoidable environment and conditions for the asylum seekers at any cost and by any means, at its south-Eastern external border “experiment”: Greece. What is the “fate” of the

Member State which, more than any other, is currently confronting with the repercussions of the failing EU external border regime and its refugee-protection crisis?

## 4. The EU external border regime failure: The Greek case

This Chapter elaborates on the unfolding of the refugee crisis management in the Greek context, following a causal reasoning: The Greek state management of the refugee population is forged in image and likeness of the EU border regime and constitutes an EU microcosmos. The idiosyncratic nature of the Greek case lies in the fact that the country consists the exact geopolitical space, where the EU external border regime is manifested. Even worse, the implementation of the Hotspot Approach in the Greek islands, such as the notorious Moria camp of Lesbos, consists the quintessence of the external EU border management failure. A failure which results rather successfully in the no-escape phenomenon of the asylum seeking populations, both in the EU and the Greek context. Towards the thorough understanding of the Greek case and thus the explanation of the whys and whereabouts regarding the crisis management unfolding in Greece and its aforementioned unfortunate consequences, I interweave the theoretical framing of the threefold border mechanism with the Greek case, in order to test its applicability and thus the compatibility between the EU and the national implementation (and interpretation) of the EU external border management.

In more detail, [Chapter 4.1](#) introduces the Greek case, as a country with apparent genealogy in population mobility from antiquity until nowadays. Specifically, [Chapter 4.2](#) investigates the theoretical framings regarding the EU external border management, which is analyzed on the basis of the three phases of the “Greek crisis”, namely its financial, refugee and humanitarian, in order to completely unravel the Greek case. It is of the utmost importance that the Greek case should be investigated in these three phases, in order to a) understand in retrospect the country’s situation, up until the outbreak of the refugee crisis (1<sup>st</sup> phase: financial crisis), b) observe the country’s refugee crisis management (2<sup>nd</sup> phase: refugee crisis) and finally c) explain the current situation (3<sup>rd</sup> phase: humanitarian crisis). In detail, the Greek Asylum System and border management is researched under the prism of the manifestations of the three-layered EU border. The Greek case analysis is following the theory unfolding in the second Chapter and thus the EU external border regime failure is investigated in Greece, based on the three-layer B/Ordering regime, namely the “paper border” ([Chapter 4.2.1](#)), the “iron border” ([Chapter 4.2.2](#)) and the “border camp” ([Chapter 4.2.3](#)). In particular, I attempt to shed light on the manifestations of this three-fold EU mechanism on the Greek management of the incoming migratory and refugee flows, in order to finally decipher the reasons, the factors and the overall decision making that led to the current, “humanitarian crisis”-phase of the refugee-protection crisis in Greece.

### 4.1. The Greek genealogy: From population mobility to population entrapment

Throughout history, one could effortlessly distinguish from a noteworthy plethora, the primeval attribute of human “greediness”. In his first book of “Politics” Aristotle elaborated, among various others, on the nature of the aforementioned covetousness as the enemy of happiness (Simpson, 2000). In particular, this persistence to maximalistic aesthetics of living and all the more so of ruling over populations could possibly be referred to as “colonizing”. However, there is no joy ever, for those colonized.

While diving into the ancient Greek historiography, I encountered multifarious narrations of Herodotus regarding the founding of ancient cities. The best-known example of the early Greek colonizing movement was that of the city of Cyrene in 631 B.C., in Libya (Graham, 1971). The transition from antiquity to the modern era disproved the prestigious expectations of the ancient Greek maritime expeditions: The geographical space of Greece had progressively been transformed, in the Long Durée, into a “land of refuge”. In other words, it became a historically invested laboratory of mobilized and mobilizing populations, migrants and refugees, as it has been characterized from many as the “crossroad of the two continents and the five seas” (Mylonas, 2013).

To move into the contemporary situation, population mobility, relocation and integration consist regular policies throughout history of the Greek state. Their objective has always been to reassure a peaceful contiguity with its neighboring nation-states. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 constitutes a milestone regarding population exchanges, which entrained the compulsory dislocation of 2 million people (approximately 1,5 million orthodox Greeks from Anatolia and 500.000 Muslim citizens of Greece). The relocation found the majority of these populations *de jure* without the citizenship of the country they left behind. Therefore, they unwittingly became refugees (Hellenic Resources Network, 2016). Thus, one could claim that Greece revives a contemporary version of Lausanne: It has a refugee “record” throughout the antiquity up until a hundred years ago and finally nowadays. However, what really differentiates now and then is the fact that the population mobility and relocation have moved into the global scheme of politics. Once it was a matter of affairs, a Treaty between the two countries, namely Greece and Turkey. Nowadays these procedures undergo the EU filtering and consist a “product” of negotiations, a “bone of contention”, in order to highlight each side’s responsibilities on the basis of the EU external border *Démarches*.

The current refugee crisis has not left Greece intact. The country is for the EU asylum seekers the first stop of a long trajectory from the Middle East to Europe (Triandafyllidou, 2007, 2014a). Inevitably, the EU external border management has become an everyday topic in the political agenda of the Greek governments, since the escalation of the crisis in 2015, when the country was officially transformed into quicksand for those seeking asylum into Europe (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2019, 2020; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; Visvizi, 2016). Even worse, Greece constitutes the geopolitical space of the overall EU external border management failure, manifested through its Hotspot Approach, which led to a current, grave humanitarian crisis. And so, I wonder, how does the Greek case explain the present situation?

#### 4.2. The Crisis threefold: Financial, Refugee, Humanitarian

The *Great Recession* started at Wall Street in mid-2007 (first phase of the global economic crisis) and escalated through the collapse of Lehman brothers in 2008, a fact that led to an *Economic crisis* which was about to go in the grand scale. Finally, this crisis contaminated Europe, where it transformed into the third phase of *Fiscal crisis/deficit*. In order to save their financial sector from the financial markets’ demolition, some EU Member States were forced to increase public spending, a fact that led to the increasing of public debts. To support the governments, bankers initiated rescue plans to save the “state failures”. In mid-2010 the global crisis entered its fourth and last phase, that of *Currency War*. The states had to restore their

employment with domestic macroeconomic strategies and policies and to achieve trade surpluses via exports (Dourakis, 2013).

Many scholars argued that Greece, along with the rest peripheral Eurozone countries, created the crisis, with its profligacy and extravagant spending. However, the country entered the global economic crisis in its third (*Fiscal crisis*) phase in the end of 2009, while it was being formulated in the EU. At that time, Greece was already carrying a severe public debt for the last two decades prior to the crisis (Dourakis, 2013). In fact, in 2001 it had accessed the E.M.U. (i.e. Economic and Monetary Union) totally unprepared and with debts since 1982. Due to its adverse economic situation, the country required special treatment. The large amounts of capital inflows from the core EU countries did not make things better for Greece: The country needed active macroeconomic management, in order to deal with the crisis and by no means austerity measures, monetary tightening and a strong Euro. Greek economy was already uncompetitive, with its exports more expensive on the outside, a fact that among others led to decrease its real domestic income and a disproportional increase of the prices in its interior and excessive public debt levels, in general (Dourakis, 2013; Kotios et al., 2011; Triandafyllidou, 2014a).

The Greek governments at that time were also to be blamed for their ineffective and inadequate exercise of the national economic policy, since they misimplemented the vast majority of the adjustment policies, proposed by the E.M.U. (Kotios et al., 2011). The need for measures towards the consolidation of economy led the country to its integration in a ternary mechanism of financial support, namely Trojka, comprised by the EU, I.M.F. (i.e. International Monetary Fund) and E.C.B. (i.e. European Central Bank). In May 2010 a Memorandum was signed between the ternary mechanism and Greece, in order to cover the borrowing needs of the country (Pelekanou, 2017; The Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, 2011; Triandafyllidou, 2014b). What followed was a back-breaking raise of taxation and salary reductions, bill reformations, two more Memoranda, an Omnibus bill and finally led to the political system's crisis, the citizens' protests and strikes against the austerity measures (most renowned the Greek Indignant movement, in Greek the movement "Aganaktismenoi") and the unprecedented levels of unemployment (McKee, Karanikolos, Belcher, & Stuckler, 2012; Theodossopoulos, 2013, 2016). One could claim that the EU treated its Member State as a country in need of Europeanisation, since the EU "ring of friends" (the EU Neighborhood Policy), indicated at [Chapter 2.2](#), was founded on the financial boost of its neighboring countries (Hooper & Kramersch, 2007; Kramersch, 2006; Radaelli, 2003; Triandafyllidou, 2014a). Indeed, Greece received many financial assistance packages since 2010, such as the short-term debt measures from E.S.M. (i.e. European Stability Mechanism), and the medium-term debt relief measures from E.F.S.F. (i.e. European Financial Stability Facility), along with loans from I.M.F. and core EU Member States (European Stability Mechanism, 2020a). On August 20th, 2018 the country successfully finalized its three-year E.S.M. programme. Currently there is an ongoing process of modernization of the economy and regaining of the investors trust: The Greek financial crisis is typically over (European Stability Mechanism, 2020b).

While in the epicenter of the Greek financial crisis in 2015, another crisis emerged in the EU scheme (Tondo, 2019; Triandafyllidou, 2014a): The so-called refugee crisis. Since the Arab uprisings and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, an increasing number of Middle Eastern populations sook refuge and international protection at the EU (Silverman, 2018; Tondo, 2019; Triandafyllidou, 2014b; Walters,

2017). Along with the persecuted/ “legal” asylum seekers, “illegal” migrants from the wider Middle Eastern area also attempted to cross the EU external southern land and maritime borders of Greece (Triandafyllidou, 2014b; Tsianos et al., 2009; Visvizi, 2016). What followed was a European tendency for strict external Border Policy, along with the embracement of extremist nationalist discourses and Migration Policy management from various Member States (Alencar & Deuze, 2017; Refugee Council, 2016; Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017, 2020; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). Many of them built fences, such as that of the Hungarian-Serbian border, as a way to resist “hospitality measures” towards the incoming regular or “irregular” populations. Ironically enough, the formerly “weakest wheel” of the EU integration processes was to assume the overall responsibility and deal exclusively with the accumulating incoming populations’ management (FitzGerald, 2019; Kale et al., 2018; Stepnitz, 2019; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). With the EU financing, but with neither its assistance nor its Member States’ in practical terms whatsoever, Greece consisted the exclusive laboratory of the EU external border management and mechanisms. In the words of Daniel Trilling, “the crisis is not only the movement of refugees, but the border systems designed to keep them out – and it is still happening” (Trilling, 2018). At this point, a paradoxical relationship began to take shape, between the Greek Asylum System and the EU external border regime.

What followed could be parallelized with the ancient Greek mythology around the Underworld, the kingdom of the god Hades: It was considered that when a living soul was found on the threshold between the world of the living and that of the afterlife, they had to undergo a process of descent called “katabasis” (in ancient Greek κατάβασις). That is, a trip from the country’s interior down to a coast line that would finally lead to the gates of the Underworld. There were six major rivers that connected the two worlds, namely Styx, Acheron, Oceanus, Lethe, Cocytus and Phlegethon. To cross them, those in the threshold of life and death had to bribe Charon (the ferryman of Hades at the rivers of Styx and Acheron), in order to give them the desirable lift to the world of the dead. So, due to superstition and deeply religious consciousness, the family of the dead always placed a coin, mostly known as “Charon’s obol”, in the mouth of the corps before burial. The dead, unburied corpses and those unable to pay the necessary fee to the ferryman, were cursed to wander at the river’s shores for one century, while those buried with a coin put in their mouth would be able to transcend smoothly into their eternal residence. There were said to be quite a few gate-keepers and Law implementors, regulating the trajectory of the souls transcending from the one world towards the other, amongst which was the notorious Lernaean Hydra, the many-head serpentine beast that Hercules defeated on his second (out of the twelve) Labour (Dowden & Livingstone, 2011; Evelyn-White, Hesíodo, & Homero, 1914; Hard, 2019; Mitchell et al., 2019; “Theogony,” 2019; West, 1988).

This retrospection seems rather familiar, since nowadays there is a continuous struggle from the Greek part to implement (rather unsuccessfully so far, one could argue) the EU Migration Policy and particularly its external border management: The hotspots located on the five Aegean islands of Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Kos and Leros were gradually metamorphosed into the five heads of Lernaean Hydra, that is the gate-keeping borderlands and implementors of the EU Migration Policy Agendas and external border management (Dowden & Livingstone, 2011; Van Houtum, 2010c). While in Greek Mythology Underworld was connected with six rivers, in contemporary Greece there is only the Aegean Sea, proven to be a massive graveyard

for asylum seeking populations following the Arab uprisings of 2014. In the unlikely event that the people who attempt to cross the Aegean from Turkey manage to make it through the islands' hotspots, they find themselves trapped in the living hell of detention camps, the current versions of the Underworld (IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, 2020; Tondo, 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2007). The smuggling and trafficking networks could be seen as a contemporary Charon with an extra agony and peril. At least Charon would safely transfer those willing to bribe him at the desirable gate of the Underworld. Impressively, the Greek Mythology of Antiquity is indeed repeating itself nowadays and so, my mind is gradually being resuscitated into the current situation: Since all those divine heroes of the past, like Hercules, Odysseus, Aeneas, Orpheus, Psyche, Pirithous and Theseus are not "around" anymore, who is going to save the current sufferers from their inescapable epidemic disease, rapidly spreading via the Greek Purgatory-hotspots? And since there is still no answer to this question, how did we come to the outcome of the failing EU external border management, namely the asylum seeking populations' entrapment phenomenon, unraveling in Greece? How could the Greek case be explained, in the context of the EU external border regime and be related to its mechanisms and manifestations?

#### 4.2.1. Paper Border-ing Greece: The genealogy of a failing Asylum System

Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, Greece was struggling to be in line with the EU external border management and specifically with the Common European Asylum Policy (CEAS). This sub-chapter investigates the Greek Asylum Policy foundations and its gradual transformations into its current form, by the consecutive Greek governments and the EU Directives on Asylum. To begin with, in which ways has the "paper border", the bureaucratic regime of Dublin been manifested in the Greek case and how does its manifestation explain the refugee populations' entrapment in Greece?

Dating back to 2005, the country was attempting to gradually transform into an EU "micropolis", a national implementor of the EU border regime. On October 4<sup>th</sup>, 2009, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (in brief PA.SO.K.) prevailed at early parliamentary elections and made some interesting steps towards the shaping of the national Asylum System in image and likeness of the EU Directives. The 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2010 consisted a milestone towards a period of Asylum reforms, since the Presidential Decree 114/2010 was issued, in order to address the problematic, superannuated Asylum System and its numerous deficiencies (Hellenic Government, 2010). In particular, the Decree established a set of rules and "guidelines", regarding the first reception of "irregular" migrants, while it set the foundation for the distinction between asylum seekers and "irregular" migrants, the procedures concerning the asylum applications and finally for the waiting period until a decision is reached for an application. Last but not least, the Asylum committees were detached from the authority of the Greek police for the first time, since 2008 (Triandafyllidou, 2014a). The Presidential Decree brought Greece in line with the EU Directives regarding the Migration Policy domains of Reception and Return, specifically the Council Legislative Directive 2005/85/EC (December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2005), on "Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status" (Council of the European Union, 2005). At that moment the foundations for a more functioning and efficient Greek Asylum Service were



considered settled, while important national laws on Migration management and integration were established (Triandafyllidou, 2014a).

The combination of national and EU Asylum management did not bring fruitful results. The living conditions of the borderland centres of the pending asylum seekers were continuously degrading, a fact that led the European Commission to issue a “formal notice” (on October 29<sup>th</sup>, 2009), an “additional formal notice” (on June 24<sup>th</sup>, 2010) and finally a “second additional formal notice” (on September 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2015) regarding the alleged deficiencies of the overall Greek Asylum System. These actions applied to the EU Policy monitoring of the Migration and Home Affairs Law and oriented particularly towards the area of Asylum, which could subsequently be characterized as the “Achilles heel” of the national implementation of the EU refugee crisis management. In the above mentioned case, the Commission’s Infringement was entitled “violation du Droit Europeenne en matière d’Asile et des droits fondamentaux des migrants en Grèce”, that is “violation of the European Law, concerning the Asylum and the fundamental rights of the migrants in Greece” (European Commission at work, 2020). In the meantime, the Greek implementation inability regarding the EU Asylum Policy escalated through various national violations, the most noteworthy of which was that of the Dublin II Regulation’s Directives, regarding the case of the Afghan asylum seeker who entered the EU through Greece and ended up in Belgium (described in detail in [Chapter 3.1](#)). This case “ignited” the European Commission’s Infringement Proceedings with Greece and Belgium, accordingly. Specifically, the two Member States were brought in front of the ECtHR with the accusation of violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and of the *non-refoulement* principle. The verdict for Greece was the lack of legal guarantee for detailed examinations of the asylum applications and the inhuman detention centres’ conditions, a fact that did come with the equivalent financial sanctions for both the Member States involved (European Database of Asylum Law, 2011; Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2011).

Towards a desperate need for developments and in order to “save the day”, the PA.SO.K. government submitted before the Council a National Action Plan on Migration and Asylum, as the foundation of the following reforms. Particularly, the Law 3907/2011 (for “the establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception Service, based on the adaption of the Greek Legislation, in parallel with the EU Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals”), was approved by the Greek Parliament, on January 26<sup>th</sup>, 2011 (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2008; Triandafyllidou, 2014b). This Law introduced a) the Asylum Service, b) the Appeals Committee and c) the First Reception Service. The first two mechanisms would be impartial and autonomous, while the last would be responsible for the new arrivals’ management, with one of its main tasks to gather an initial on the spot “respondent team” in its maritime and land border areas. Moreover, the aforementioned Law initiated the implementation of two forms of new permits for asylum seekers and “irregular” migrants. That is a new type of permit (for exceptional cases for those living in Greece for twelve years or more) and a “formal toleration status” (for people already having been issued a return decision, but it is not possible to return to their country of origin) (Hellenic Government, 2011). Regarding the First Reception Service, its first Center was constructed in the south-Eastern borderland, near Evros river, in March 2013. The function of these centres included the reception of the “irregular” migrants and addressing of the asylum seekers to the equivalent

regional asylum offices, housed within the local reception centres. The regional Asylum Units and par extension their officers were responsible for the reception and processing of the applications, the conduct of interviews and the decision making procedure, within the duration of one month (Triandafyllidou, 2014a).

Once again the interweaving of national-EU policies failed to provide answers to the functional deficiencies of the amalgam of the EU- Greek “paper border”. Surprisingly enough, by the summer of 2013 the Greek Asylum Service had already gathered the gigantic amount of 45,000 unprocessed applications (Triandafyllidou, 2014b). To add, Greece increased its negatively nuanced popularity in the domain of the application processing, due to the fact that it failed to provide effective protection to those seeking for asylum, at the country’s Eastern, maritime border. Of course, there is a handful of deficiencies and “mistakes” to explain the so far failing, Greek asylum management/“paper border” failure: a) the appropriate service, in order to apply for asylum was inaccessible, b) the fact that there was no possibility for further information provision at the border areas after the applications’ filling, c) the asylum interviews were very “poor”, d) the decision making focused principally on the criterion of the country of origin (visa owners or not) and last but not least e) the overall procedures and processes were misconducted by the police officers, totally lacking an asylum-related training.

Fully complying with the Dublin System’s criteria, step by step both the Greek government and the EU Directives laid the foundation for an impermeable bureaucratic fortress, that of the CEAS: The procedures for an asylum application gradually became too complicated, the Greek asylum management authorities had an insufficient asylum training and unprofessional stance towards their responsibilities, the information system of the incoming populations at the Greek border areas was deficient and most importantly, to be granted asylum the seeker had to belong in a “white-list” country, (Merler, 2016; Radaelli, 2003; Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). So far, Greece indeed consisted a loyal implementor of the EU asylum and border management. What was actually happening was that on one hand, EU forged an Asylum System and passed its Directives and Laws incontestably on the Greek governments. On the other hand, the Greek governments systematically misapplied the EU Directives and Laws, creating a vicious circle of border management ineffectiveness. Therefore, in a joint attempt to ameliorate the Asylum System and institutionalize it further, both the EU and national Greek sides managed to create functional deficiencies which weakened the overall EU external border management, right in the wrong place and the wrong time: The refugee crisis “outbreak” towards the EU external borders.

That was the critical moment, when the party of the Coalition of the Radical Left, in brief SY.RIZ.A, took over for the first time in the Greek political history. The newly elected government seemed to deviate from the previous governments’ Migration Policy rationale, especially after the deadly incidents of 2015 in the Aegean waters. Additionally, the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras openly supported that no migrant is “illegal” and judged the EU stance towards the unfolding of the Arab uprisings since 2011, by stating that the evolving crisis was “a result of neo-colonial, neo-liberal and capitalist globalization”, which led to a deprivation of survival means for the “victims of war”. One could claim that this was a left-wing, universalist populist expression to win the impressions, since the terms “irregular” or “illegal” were replaced by that of “victim”, a persecuted individual, literally dying for hope. The refugee crisis gave indeed a first-class opportunity to SY.RIZ.A., in order to express radical, communist

and socialist opinions. The truth though, regarding both the stances of the EU and the Greek government, was always to be found in the middle (Nestoras, 2015; Tzallas, 2019). As an EU Member State, the government gradually complied with the EU Directives.

The government introduced some key institutional changes, in order to formulate its Asylum management, based on an open Border Policy. Specifically, it established the Ministry of Immigration Policy (on November 4<sup>th</sup> 2016), by the third article of the Presidential Decree 123/2016, in order to deal more systematically with the incoming populations (Hellenic Government, 2016b). Additionally, a new Law (Law No. 4375) was founded (on April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2016), which guaranteed free legal assistance (provided by the UNHCR), to applicants for international protection whose application was still pending at the appeal stage. Reception centres were also obliged to ensure that third-country nationals and stateless persons were adequately informed regarding their rights and obligations and that they would have access to legal advisory guidance and communicate with active, civil society groups on the migration domain (European Commission, 2016b; Hellenic Government, 2016a). In particular, with regard to the Asylum System at the Greek external borders, the Greek government followed a management strategy, aligned with the EU. In particular, the Greek Asylum Service was in close cooperation with EASO. Common tools and practices were adopted, regarding third country nationals or stateless persons arriving in large numbers and applying for international protection at the external EU border. Some of those are the followings: a) the joint production and use of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) at the borders of the Aegean islands, b) the joint guidance regarding the applicants' interviews (such as the Country of origin Information, in brief COI, on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq), c) the registration and other procedure-related documents of those seeking international protection to be conducted by the Greek Hellenic Police and the Armed Forces, d) the interviews with the applicants to be conducted by the staff of the EASO and the decisions on applications to be issued one day after the interview (European Commission, 2016b; Hellenic Government, 2016a).

Thus, the EU external "paper border" was further forged upon the Dublin regime and its inhumane/visa exclusionary criteria, based on which the aforementioned organized, joint cooperation between EU and national Greek authorities and mechanisms took place. However, these cooperative actions not only did not ameliorate, but further radicalized and perpetuated the already failing external border management of the Greek borderlands, by making the accessibility in the EU even more complicated, rutty and "illegal": Many individuals who turn in desperate need to the EU for international protection, are shamefully denied this fundamental plea on the pretext of the visa and other necessary identification documents' absence (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Grant & Domokos, 2011; Mbembe, 2003; Murray, 2006, 2008; Trilling, 2018; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). But the EU and the consecutive Greek governments of PA.SO.K. and SY.RIZ.A. refused to realize even at such a critical moment, that strengthening the EU "paper border" and over-institutionalizing the procedures regarding the accessibility of the Mediterranean and specifically the yeasty Greek border islands, do not discourage people who have already fled persecution, death and have been fighting for their survival to risk "a bit more". This conscious neglect from all the involving political parts towards the people behind the numbers, renders them accomplices to the smuggling and trafficking industries to which the seekers pay considerable amounts of money, put inestimable hopes and take untold risk, in order to reach the EU and find refuge. Thus,

to become a “legal” asylum seeker and be integrated into the CEAS, one had to make use of irregular means and dangerous routes at the first place. At this point, both the EU and the Greek state indisputably became supporters and implementors of the Mediterranean *Necropolitics* (Mbembe, 2003; Murray, 2006, 2008; Tondo, 2019; Trilling, 2018; Tsianos et al., 2009; Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020, 2013, 2019).

So far, the aforementioned relationship and transpositioning of the EU Directives to Greece, along with the Directives’ interweaving with the Greek, political initiatives in the context of the Common European Asylum System management resemble what Radaelli defined as Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003). Particularly, he interpreted this term as a combination of “processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies” (Radaelli, 2003). Indeed, Greece constructed its Asylum Policy with regard to the EU institutions by following the lead of the EU external border management and by implementing the EU border regime at its border island areas. These areas were institutionalized, on the basis of the EU fabricated identity and values, along with its supremacy over the “inferior” incoming populations, the non-EU, “black-listed” natives, the non-visa holders, who seek asylum in the enlightened western, Christian Europe at its Schengen borders. To take a step further, the interconnection between Greece and the EU could be conceived as a “carrot and stick” tactic, in order for the Member State to successfully pass the Europeanization test of its Asylum System (Balibar, 2009; Baun, 1995; Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Kramsch, 2006, 2007; Mignolo, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2019; Rumford, 2009; Triandafyllidou, 2014a, 2014b). In a sense, Greece could be seen as an EU exclave (Papoutsi et al., 2019).

That was a critical moment for Greece, since the goal was to successfully respond to the EU pressure and Directives in order to ameliorate its public finance, its economic performance and to fit in the overall EU economic construction. Moreover, the country had to simultaneously comply with the EU Migration Policy paradigm, rules, procedures and “ways of doing” and to finally share mutual beliefs and norms. Greece at that state of the two-fold crisis (financial and refugee), was struggling to adjust to and follow its metropolis’s refugee crisis management. However, “following” the metropolis is one thing, but the “follower’s success” in the national context of policy implementation, is a different and still important other (Triandafyllidou, 2014a).

The disproportionate number of international protection applications in Italy and Greece, led to the EU Emergency Relocation Scheme. This provisional measure was part of the EU Emergency Response System and was adopted by the European Council, in order to temporarily distribute individuals in clear need of international support from the two countries to other Member States and thus create a “balance of effort” regarding the reception of asylum seekers in a generalized atmosphere of solidarity among the Member States (European Commission, 2020c; Merler, 2016; Trauner, 2016). However, this scheme did not procure Greece with a relieving solution, since the distribution of the refugees inside Europe regarded only those who qualified as seeking international protection. The third-country nationals or the stateless individuals, the “*sans-papiers*”, were not eligible for relocation, and thus stayed in the first reception Member States (i.e. Italy and Greece), as indicated by the Dublin Regulation. The two countries were still left to deal with their failing

application systems' management on their own. The EU solidarity scheme that led to the distribution of responsibility regarding the Common European Asylum System among the Member States, resulted in the rise of illiberal Euroscepticism, political controversy, ardent opposition to the scheme and in various cases nationalist extremities, like the emergency national measures of border controls and border fence building as an inevitable measure for the relocation of the refugee populations. The justification behind these reactions was the fact that the Greek government was considered to have disregarded its obligations as a Schengen Member State and Dublin System and thus the relocation program was "Greece's fault". Since Greece was also the door to the Balkan route which led to Western and Northern Europe through North Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria, the "fence building trend" among various Member States was considered an action of securitization and not of an extreme, far-right turn (Kale et al., 2018; Merler, 2016; Trauner, 2016; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017, 2020; Vasilopoulou, 2009). Even worse, EU officials issued a warning of suspension from the Schengen zone, in case SY.RIZ.A would not be able to finally overhaul its strategy towards a better Asylum Policy and respect Dublin System (Nestoras, 2015; Trauner, 2016).

Indeed, SY.RIZ.A government's Open Border Policy failed to yield the right results and the indignation of the voters concerning the migration affairs inflicted irredeemably the party in the imminent elections (Nestoras, 2015; Tzallas, 2019). On July 8<sup>th</sup>, 2019 the center-right, liberal conservative party New Democracy (N.D.) came into power and a new perspective was set into the national border management and par consequence the Greek Asylum System's functions. From a moral case regarding the "victims" of war and persecutions, the former Open Border Policy was gradually transforming into a case regarding the "illicit immigrants". Of course, the Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis from the beginning of his term attempted to distance himself from some far-right rhetorics from within the N.D. Ministers and Members of the Parliament (M.P.), in order to present a rather moderate and reformative political attitude and not be characterized as an adherent of right political extremities (Tzallas, 2019; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2009). Prime minister even announced that it is imperative that the refugee children should attend Greek school and thus be integrated into the national education system and those excelling should carry the Greek flag at the National Independence days' parade (Σταυρόπουλος, 2019). A rather right-wing populist statement, one could argue.

Regarding the migration and refugee affairs, the government announced that it will speed up the asylum procedures, establish more effective border controls, initiate processes to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants and "put an end to the system in which doctors supposedly diagnose all arrivals with post-traumatic stress so that all are given asylum" (The National Herald Staff, 2019; Tzallas, 2019). Specifically, the Prime Minister presented four axes of governmental policy, regarding the management of the "migration and refugee problem": a) Better safeguard of the borders, b) stricter, rightful and quicker asylum and resettlement system, c) relief of the overcrowded islands with better management, diffusion and integration of the immigrational load to the Greek mainland and last but not least d) internationalization of the migration and refugee affairs (ToVima Team, 2019c; Σταυρόπουλος, 2019). In essence, the government admitted that the situation had reached its limits, since the islands welcomed five hundred refugees and migrants on a daily basis, a fact that hampers significantly the reception conditions and highlighted that the priority for the European Commission should be to build a common Asylum

Policy, which will replace the failing Dublin System (ToVima Team, 2019c). The government basically made a plea to the EU institutions, in order to work in solidarity and “share the burden” of the migration and refugee affairs via a substantial Policy, which will provide precious support to the Member States at the EU external borders (Σταυρόπουλος, 2019).

The situation worsened when, on November 31<sup>st</sup> 2019, the government presented in the Greek parliament a 237-page Bill, regarding the Asylum, entitled “International Protection and other Provisions”(iefimerida, 2019b; H. Smith, 2019). The Bill’s aim was the acceleration of the procedures, in order for the refugees to be integrated more smoothly into the Greek society and for the returns of migrants whose asylum applications had failed to be expedited. Specifically, the goal was to toughen up and accelerate the overall processing of the asylum application, in order for the asylum requests to be handled within sixty days, since the Greek Asylum Service was facing so far, an accumulation of 68,000 asylum requests, a fact that decelerated the asylum procedures and applications’ assessment which consequently caused a five to six-year waiting for the applicants. Among others, the new law would establish stricter profile criteria for the asylum applicants, since asylum seekers of Syrian descent consisted only 20% of the total incoming population and not 75% (a percentage recorded during the 2015 outbreak) (ToVima Team, 2019a). The imminent Bill quickly escalated into a “bone of contention” between the government and a handful of human rights groups, aid organizations and opposition parties, which severely criticized N.D. for violation fundamental human rights, by restricting access to safeguards for those seeking asylum. Prime Minister’s speech just before the new Law’s voting further intensified the radicalization of the government’s asylum strategy, by which he declared the following:

“enough is enough, enough with those people who know that they are not entitled to asylum and yet they attempt to cross into and stay in our country.” (H. Smith, 2019)

The Bill could be perceived as a political exploitation on the combusive situation; an extreme right, populist move of differentiation from the former left-wing government of SY.RIZ.A., which “caused anarchy with its Open Border policy” (iefimerida, 2019b; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2009). Besides, for the government the situation consists more a migratory flows’ mobilization crisis, rather than a refugee-protection crisis (Kale et al., 2018; ToVima Team, 2019a, 2019c).

All in all, there was not an effective enough political intention to ameliorate the crumbling, overburdened Greek Asylum System (Triandafyllidou, 2014b, 2014a; Tsianos et al., 2009). The unraveling genealogy of the national border management regarding the Asylum proves that not only the consecutive Greek governments of PA.SO.K., SY.RIZ.A. and the current N.D. followed the EU external border regime’s “paper border” (the epitome of the EU Postcolonial Governmentalité) with Dublin Regulation, but also each one of them added an extra national nuance of failing bureaucratic procedures, towards a much stricter B/Ordering of the country as an EU periphery. However, since there is not yet a common Asylum Policy, the defective results of both the dysfunctional implementation of the EU Directives by Greece and also the Greek governments’ initiatives are rather disappointing, due to the Member State’s insufficient state institutions/mechanisms, along with the governments’ incapacity to make use of the EU recourses on their disposal (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017; ToVima Team, 2019b; Tzallas, 2019). Ironically enough, the very N.D. government which opposed to the Dublin System at the dawn of its term, was the



same that four months later promoted its own, radicalized version of Dublin, well adapted into the Greek Asylum System's reality. Of course, this development could not flourish, without the metropolis's blessings. Just recently (on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2020), EASO signed an Agreement with the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, the Action Plan 2020, which entailed the followings: a) the establishment of an EASO office in Athens, b) the increase of its operational actions, c) an investment boost of 36 million euros (30% increased) and d) the reduplication of the Greek employees to a total of 1.000. With the aforementioned moves, the action of EASO in Greece is considered to support actively the Greek Asylum Service, in order to achieve a more effective implementation of the overall Asylum procedure and to assist the Reception Authorities in their work. Moreover, the technical groups of the Organization will support the Asylum Service, the Department of the National Dublin Unit, the Reception and Identification Service and the Appeals Authority (efsyn, 2020). To paraphrase Jacobs's onion model regarding electoral reforms, the Action Plan 2020 between EASO (EU context) and the Ministry of Migration and Asylum (national Greek context), could be approached as an attempt to create an onion model, in order to forge the Greek Asylum Service, in image and likeness of Dublin's démarche (Jacobs, 2011). Thus, the question remains: Is the EU (par extension the consecutive aforementioned Greek governments of PA.SO.K., SY.RIZ.A and N.D.) external border management reviving the Dublin regime by all means and under any circumstances? Or is it Dublin regime per se that readapts in the current adverse situation unfolding in the EU South, or both?

The Dublin Regulation came into force in 1997 and gradually and steadily evolved into a key tool, powerful bureaucratic mechanism that made EU external border regime totally bulletproof: A regime of tough border controls, which deported/returned the refugees attempting to reach and settle in the central and Northern Member States back to the first reception, Southern border countries (i.e. Italy and Greece), with the minimum available level of welfare provision, creating in this way a human trap of eternal waiting. It could be enlightening to dive into what refugees themselves consider about Dublin. The following excerpt, regarding asylum seekers in Italy, speaks for itself:

“This guy here is 12 years old. The government are deaf, they can't hear people. I want to ask other European countries: where is the help?” [...] He points at another friend, caught in the classic Dublin trap: "What can he do? He is 18, his family are in Sweden – but his fingerprint is in Italy.”(Grant & Domokos, 2011)

This was and still is Dublin. And these are the people whose entire life is defined by and depends on it. If only anyone could be a better evaluator of this regime. Their verdict? An absolute humanitarian failure, forged in image and likeness of the EU itself, copy-pasted in the southern peripheries, Italy and Greece. What does Greece do? It modifies Dublin and adjust it to the circumstances. Besides, how much worse could it be?

#### 4.2.2. Radicalizing the external EU-Greek border: The EU-Turkey Deal hazard

The situation was getting worse and worse and one of the reasons behind this deterioration was the EU-Turkey Deal. In combination with the Dublin regime, both these manifestations of the EU external border management constituted a “pain point” for Greece. Let alone the interconnection between the *non-refoulement* principle with Turkey's responsibilities, defined by the Joint Action Plan with the EU. In essence,

the EU-Turkey Statement regarded the cooperation between the EU and thus Greece and its non-EU neighbor Turkey and provided the legal framework for the forceful resettlement of migrants from Greece to Turkey, with a simultaneous reinforcement of bilateral police cooperation between the two countries (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). In this way the EU would expand and fortify even more its external Greek border on the outside of its authority, by transferring to Turkey (with the appropriate compensation), the militarization responsibility of the border's "other side". Thus, Greece was found on the threshold of the EU attempt to transform its external border in both its EU and non-EU sides into an "impermeable and deadly fortress", in other words into an "iron border".

The geopolitical position of Greece connected the country, more than any other Member State, with the EU external border radicalization. In fact, the country's significant role concerning the implementation of the EU border management led to its investment with extra layers and mechanisms of coherent cooperation with the EU mechanisms, in order to successfully manage the incoming populations' flows much earlier than the Arab uprising of 2015 and the imminent refugee crisis repercussions for the EU. Among others, the aforementioned SIS, Eurodac, Eurosur and Frontex were all put into force in the Greek case, while there were some others, that had been activated specifically either for Greece (i.e. the RABIT mechanism) or by Greece (i.e. the Operation "Shield"). Regarding the latter, since 2012, in response to the EU pressure along with the continuous arrivals of "irregular" migrants, Greece tightened its border control further, through Operation "Shield" (in Greek "Aspida"). This involved the transfer of approximately two thousand (1.800) border guards to the north-Eastern, border region of Evros. The Operation included the building of a border fence at the exact main entry point, spreading across roughly thirteen (12.5) kilometers. Moreover, passport controls were intensified, while the harbors of the south-Western Greek city of Patra and the north-Western city Igoumenitsa, which constituted main exit points to Italy, were technologically overhauled (Athens-Macedonian News Agency, 2013). In this way, Greece underwent various upgrades, that not only tightened its border, the EU external border, with Turkey, but rather its geographical range was gradually transforming the country into a nationwide, "impermeable fortress".

Regarding the RABIT mechanism, it was initially activated by Greece in October 2010 and its operation at the Greek-Turkish land border in the Evros region lasted from November 2010 until March 2011. Since then, Frontex became its successor and initiated the Joint Operation Poseidon. The Joint Operation Poseidon with both Sea and Land branches (conceived on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2011), was the first out of many operations to come and by far the largest one in the maritime border of the Greek islands with Turkey and the Greek-Turkish land border. Poseidon's goal was to support Greece with border surveillance, with its identification, registration, debriefing and screening capacities regarding the incoming migrants, and to provide the country with coast guard functions (search and rescue) and thus "save lives" at sea. In order to perform the "iron border" and cover the aforementioned purposes, Frontex at that time supported Greece with six hundred guest officers who surveilled the border, supported the identification and registration processes of the incoming populations, along with the screening and debriefing procedures. The ultimate goal was for the EU to transform Poseidon into a multi-purpose Operation. Towards this, it also targeted cross-border crime (i.e. smuggling of illegal substances, weapons, detection of forged documents) and specifically in the Greek case, the blooming

smuggling and trafficking industries that promised a danger-free transportation to the EU borders (FRONTEX, 2011, 2020).

Since the record number of migrants reaching the Greek islands of Aegean during the Arab uprisings in 2015, Greece requested for the second time the deployment of RABIT. On December 10<sup>th</sup>, 2015 this request was approved by the Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri and the Teams were deployed to the borderland between Greece and Turkey. In the words of Leggeri, “launching RABIT means upscaling Operation Poseidon Sea”. The objective for both Joint operation Poseidon and RABIT was to increase the border surveillance and border checks at the specific areas on which they focused. Specifically, the number of both sea and land patrols were increased, along with the number of incoming people identified and registered in the Greek islands. Moreover, the RABIT deployment increased even more the number of officers and technical equipment (i.e. boats, patrol cars, etc.) on the Aegean islands. Additionally, it focused anew on security checks, which would be conducted by expert officers, who would consult national and supranational/European databases and would work along with debriefing, screening and fingerprinting experts. Frontex assisted RABIT’s work, by deploying sixteen vessels and two hundred and sixty officers assisting in the new arrivals’ registration, along with extra border surveillance officers and debriefing and document experts. An interesting fact is that unlike participation in regular Frontex operations, it was obligatory for the Member States to provide both equipment and officers for RABIT (FRONTEX, 2015).

Surprisingly enough, the radicalization of the Greek side of the EU external border with Turkey began many years before the refugee crisis outbreak and the EU-Turkey Deal. The aforementioned Operation “Shield”, along with the “Joint Operation Poseidon” and the “RABIT”, consisted some of the key mechanisms of the EU external border regime’s manifestations in Greece. With their sophisticated technological equipment, surveillance systems, well organized land and maritime patrols, intensified passport controls and the overall expertise behind them, they brought with them a new bio-political era to border militarization, performed right in the Greek-Turkish maritime (i.e. Aegean islands) and land (i.e. north-Eastern territory of Evros, the village of Kastanies) borders (Lemke, 2001; Minca & Rijke, 2017; Smart & Smart, 2012; Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2019). Therefore, the aforementioned operations became the pylons, upon which the EU “iron border” was well founded, institutionalized and performed (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). But the question at this point remains: How does the shielding and fortification of Greece, which have manifested themselves through the bio-technological military operations including high intelligence, explain the current refugee populations’ entrapment in Greece, Europe’s southern external border?

Any correct answer could have never been given from the media discourses and press representations. However, who would be more appropriate to express every theatrical move and every performance set so close to the Greek side of the EU-Turkey border? Besides, the very reason behind this militarized exaggeration was exactly a demonstration of the EU power of authority, a geopolitical strategy originating from its Neocolonial Governmentality, in order to give a strong message to its Member States. The message was clear: We, the Europeans will not accept inside “our” borders the barbarians, who are demonic and whom the ultimate purpose is to invade the EU and destroy “our” supreme, European (fabricated) identity, culture and ultimately “our Democracy” (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Böröcz et al., 2001; Hooper & Kramsch, 2007; Loomba, 2007; Mignolo, 2012; Rumford, 2009; Van

Houtum, 2012; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Indeed, not only has the EU created the mechanisms to tightly Border and Order/institutionalize its peripheral/external border Member States. It also created a third mechanism, in order to patronize and reinforce the former two (Bordering and Ordering) and guarantee the overall success of the EU external border regime: Othering. Every kind of ethno-exclusionary and xenophobic discourse became gradually the international medias' favourite topic (Lykou & Mitsikopoulou, 2017; Trilling, 2018, 2019; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). No wonder why nowadays media and press are considered to be the Fourth Estate. In this way, EU had, willingly or not, a precious ally in its refugee-protection crisis.

The image of the dead body of Alan (mostly known as Aylan) Kurdi, a three-year old Kurdish toddler, who was casted up to the Mediterranean shores of Bodrum in Turkey, was shared over twenty million times on the social media (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017). This was the critical event, which unveiled in the most brutal way the misfortunes and dangers of illegal migration and raised public awareness to the western world. At that critical moment, the EU could be characterized by the following features: a) an increasingly militarized border at its geographical edges to preserve the EU ideals, b) an asylum seekers' internal movement regulation (i.e. the *non-refoulement* principle), which forced them to remain in the first Member State through which they entered the EU (i.e. Italy and Greece), c) desperate people fleeing their dangerous countries forced to trust their lives in smugglers' hands in order to reach the EU/Greek-Turkish border, while at the same time the EU prioritized impermeable borders, in exchange for dignified reception conditions at the Greek-Turkish land and sea borders and d) the cultivation of extremely xenophobic discourses and fence-building of various Member States, in fear of undocumented migrants' invasion into their national territory via the Balkan route (Kale et al., 2018; Trilling, 2019).

In order to deal with the culminating number of undocumented migrants in Greece and its overburdened Asylum System, EU acted not out of solidarity, but upon a neocolonialist aspiration to expand its border control to Turkey. This fact led to fierce critique from various humanitarian support groups and non-governmental organizations for two reasons: firstly, by expanding its "iron border", EU upgraded Turkey into an external border management partner, which would further militarize the other side of the EU/Greek-Turkey land and sea borders. EU legitimized a partnership with an autocratic, regime, whose values were totally opposite to the EU Democratic values and fundamental principles on human rights. But it did not stop there: EU financed Turkey with six billion euros and agreed upon a visa liberalization roadmap for Turkish citizens travelling to the EU. Secondly, EU was turning a blind eye on the thriving smuggling and trafficking deadly networks, which promised the asylum seekers a safe passage from Turkey to Greece (Amnesty International, 2016; Arribas, 2016; Haferlach & Kurban, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Nestoras, 2015; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020; Verhofstadt, 2015). In this way the very reasons upon which the EU-Turkey Deal was founded (i.e. the combat against Smuggling/trafficking industries in the Mediterranean, a safe third-country/Turkey, where a number of undocumented migrants would find safe asylum and thus the Greek crumbling Asylum System would be decompressed and the blockage by Turkey of further mobilization of the "irregular" migrants towards the borders of the EU countries) have nowadays been consistently violated.

Currently, the situation at the Greek-Turkish land border has gone off the rails. The news that Turkey opened its Northern borders with the EU in the end of February 2020, succeeded the death of thirty-three Turkish soldiers in the Syrian province of Idlib. Due to the fact that the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces are strongly reinforced by Iran and Russia and the outcome of the Turkish-Syrian conflict is still rather uncertain since they have gained territory over the Turkish forces, around one million people have been displaced from Idlib towards the Turkish border. The Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared his preoccupations of a humanitarian crisis turn in Turkey's Southern border, while he announced that Turkey is already beyond capacity, regarding the three million six hundred thousand refugees' accommodation, who by the way are reported to live in despicable conditions around the Turkish-Syrian border. In this way the Turkish President used the argument of an unmanageable refugee population number as leverage and the Syrian refugees were treated as political pawns, in order to put pressure in the EU to support its military operations in Syria (Damon & Baykara, 2020; Psaropoulos, 2020; SKAI, 2020). Moreover, the Turkish President accused the EU leaders of failing to keep their promise to assist Turkey with its heavy load of the Syrian refugees, many of whom were marching towards the external EU/Greek border (Kantouris & Becatoros, 2020; Keep Talking Greece, 2020). Along with the Syrians, the United Nations estimated that about fifteen thousand people from various countries, among them families with children, were heading towards the Turkish, Northern land border with Greece (Stevis-Gridneff, 2020a). Thus, Turkey created a rather explainable "populations entrapment-scenario", literally in front of the external EU/Greek border. But how has the rest of the EU-Turkey Deal members (i.e. the EU, the Greek government and the local population of both the Evros border and the Aegean islands) reacted upon its violation in radical means by Turkey?

During a parliamentary meeting last Autumn, the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis had an acute debate with the leader of the European Realistic Disobedience Front (in brief MeRA25), Yanis Varoufakis, regarding the refugee issue and its management. During this debate Mitsotakis made clear that the government did not support fence-building, but rule setting, since Greece already has land and sea borders and that the government's intention is to provide shelter under the hospitable Greek "roof" to those who really need it (ToVima Team, 2019a). Four months after this declaration, things have changed dramatically. Since Erdoğan had already referred to border opening before he actually meant it, the Greek government had declared that the whole situation regarding the refugee management since its beginning did not constitute a Greek-Turkish problem, but it was something that influenced the whole EU. For this reason, Prime Minister made a plea for the EU support and a common Policy between the Greek authorities and the European Commission, in order to create a solid Common European Asylum System (Damon & Baykara, 2020; ToVima Team, 2019c, 2019b, 2019a, 2019d, 2020b, 2020a; Σταυρόπουλος, 2019). Moreover, during a speech at the United Nations General Assembly, the Prime minister highlighted that the Member States which consist entry points for the refugee flows, such as Greece, should not carry on their own the heavy burden of the migration pressure. Besides, he added that

"Greece cannot carry all by itself the burden of the massive movements of people fleeing the wars and repression or they just seek a better future. [...] These people do not have Greece as their final destination. They come to Europe via our external borders, which happen to be the Greek borders. The misfortune of these

people cannot be transformed into a weapon put under the service of political goals by anyone and anywhere .” (ToVima Team, 2019d)

Following the Turkish border opening event, on February 28<sup>th</sup>, Mitsotakis declared on CNN that the EU-Turkey Agreement was “dead” and that EU would not be blackmailed. Specifically, he highlighted that Greece neither ignited the refugee crisis nor encouraged the illegal trespassing happening at the Evros border and that Turkey mistreated “these people” like political prawns. Additionally, he emphasized the fact that the Turkish government supported actively the massive arrival of undocumented migrants at the border, even by providing them the transportation means and tools to make holes in the border fence. He also referred to the fact that the incoming populations were not of Syrian descent and thus they did not come from Idlib, but they have already lived in Turkey for a considerable amount of time and speak fluently the Turkish language. The aforementioned argument justified completely, in the eyes of the Greek government, the fact that “Greece has the right to protect its borders and that is what it does”. It protects its border from illegal traversals (ToVima Team, 2020b). Additionally, the Prime Minister in one of those days’ statements, referred to the fact that

“Turkey, instead of curbing migrant and refugee smuggling networks, has become a smuggler itself.” (Stavis-Gridneff, 2020a)

This statement indeed depicted correctly the Turkish government’s strategy. On the beginning of March 2020, Mitsotakis welcomed at the Alexandroupouli airport in Evros region, the leaders of the EU, where he expressed Greece’s solidarity aspirations for the EU support (ToVima Team, 2020a). The European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed the positive EU vibes, by expressing the fact that

“this border is not only a Greek border; it is also a European border... I thank Greece for being our European *aspida* in these times”, which was translated as “shield”. (Rankin, 2020).

Additionally, she announced seven hundred million euros of EU funds for Greece, of which three hundred fifty million euros for immediate use in order to upgrade the infrastructure in Evros border. Additionally, the President announced that Frontex was working on “a rapid border intervention” squad, which would include “one offshore vessel, six coastal patrol boats, two helicopters, one aircraft, three thermal-vision vehicles, as well as one hundred border guards to reinforce five hundred and thirty Greek officers at land and sea borders” (Rankin, 2020). During 2009-2018, when Greece experienced the repercussions of the global financial crisis, the EU partners presented their financial assistance packages as “generous deals”, in order to support the country cope with the adverse economic conditions. Nowadays one could argue that this repetitive pattern is another sign of the EU paternalism and symbolic domination and thus its Postcolonial Governmentality’s aspirations. Both the generous financing of Turkey, in the context of the EU-Turkey Deal and that of Greece after the opening of the northern Turkish border could be considered to prove this case. In the words of Nietzsche, “if a little charity is not forgotten, it turns into a gnawing worm”(Foucault, 1977; Pippin, 2012; Theodossopoulos, 2016).

Of course, the Greek government also took immediate measures nationwide, both at the maritime and land borders with Turkey. Even though the land border of Evros is quite strong, expanding over one hundred and sixty kilometers and consisting of natural frontiers, like the Evros river and its marshy delta, it was reinforced with extra



patrols and thermic cameras. Regarding the maritime borders, they are also of a considerable length. They cover a quite long part of the Aegean and its various islands and they are patrolled by approximately forty Greek coastal patrol vessels, with the support of Frontex. At the moment, Greece is in the process of building nineteen more vessels, while it has also made a plea to the EU for more assistance (Psaropoulos, 2020).

The violation of the EU-Turkey Deal with the Turkish border opening event inaugurated a new “entrapment era” for asylum seekers in between the external EU borders with Turkey. By consciously fabricating and executing its logic, Turkey finally achieved to cause chaos at the other side of the border. Greek army and police forces, are performing the borders in an idiosyncratic way: Since there is no *casus belli*, their authority is rather symbolic, that is they are the gate-keepers of the EU-Greek border and their appearance in full armor incarnates the severity of the EU Law and the impermeability of the EU fortress. The tensions are exploding with police trying to keep in a distance the arriving refugees, by firing tear gas and with some of the refugees throwing stones and flaming wood pieces as a form of protest, in return (Psaropoulos, 2020). The stance of the local borderlanders does not remind at all their behavior towards the refugees back in 2015. Back then, the citizens of the island of Lesbos were even nominated for a Nobel Peace prize. However, five years later they have been possessed by an extremist xenophobic and ethno/religious-exclusionary “spirit” and declare that they want their lives back, because they “cannot take it anymore”. This suffocation feeling is manifested via roadblocks to stop the migrants walk through the villages or, in some cases of locals/ farmers mobilized by far-right extremists, via tractors’ lineups. Even worse, they declare their will to “fight and protect the country” from reception centers’ residents (Stavis-Gridneff, 2020b).

In times and cases of extraordinary events with humanitarian impact like the aforementioned, I seek my own refuge in paintings, literature, writing and poems, where there is only the pure truth of oneself, where the Freudian subconscious reveals itself without serving any Idealtypus of social, religious, political or other rules of any kind (Freud, 1961, 2018). In his poetic anthology “Long-lasting reality show” (2009), the contemporary Greek poet Ntinos Siotis included the below-mentioned poem (translated from Greek), entitled “Refugees”:

“Many of those who stopped  
did not know where the road would take them,  
some were searching for the port,  
some others were asking for the station,  
one of them with his head bowed was winding his watch  
stopped for days,  
besides, why did he care about the time?  
It was morning, the sun was rising  
And everything smelled another hopeless day.” (Σιώτης, 2020)

The poet revealed his pure version of truth, regarding what being a refugee really is and how it feels to be in the frontline as pawn, serving political theatrics and games. Indeed, this poem could ideally be composed by the EU and consequently orchestrated by the EU-Turkey Deal, an external border reinforcement mechanism which leads to the contemporary EU-Greek cacophonous anthem. Still, the question remains: Could things go even worse, regarding the migrant populations’ entrapment in Greece?

#### 4.2.3. Hotspot Approach-ing “Catch-22”: The Greek experiment

How can a refugee crisis be transformed into a humanitarian one? A possible answer could be through the EU Hotspot Approach. The aforementioned EU-Turkey Bilateral Readmission Agreement focused primordially on the return of “irregular” migrants and refugees to Turkey. However, the overburdened Greek Asylum System per se could not sufficiently assess the overwhelming amount of asylum claims, a fact that led to changes in the legal framework surrounding the application processes. Presented initially in the European Agenda on Migration (on May 2015) as the key response to the refugee crisis, the EU Hotspot Approach led to the creation of hotspots, which would be complimentary to CEAS and would function as primary reception centres at the EU external borders. When the numbers of incoming populations increased and while the refugee crisis was escalating towards its current form, they were transformed into emergency relocation mechanisms (Kourachanis, 2018). In this way, the “hotspot experiment” made its maiden appearance in Greece. In other words, the EU Hotspot Approach consisted the most critical and defining step towards the entrapment of the refugee and migrant populations within the EU external Greek border.

Intrinsically tied to the EU-Turkey Deal, the hotspots located in the south-Eastern Aegean islands of Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Leros and Kos constituted the dominant mechanisms of control and management of the migratory flows (Kourachanis, 2018). In this way, from reception centres they were gradually being transformed into sites of detention to facilitate the fast-track border assessment procedures (Dimitriadi, 2017; Kale et al., 2018). For this, the Greek Asylum System worked in two different ways, since the asylum processes in the islands were significantly differentiated from those in the mainland: A combination of a) infrastructural and technical deficiencies and b) management and monitoring inadequacies from the part of the Greek state, deteriorated the situation within the hotspots, which finally reached its current deficiency pick (Kourachanis, 2018; Papoutsis et al., 2019). So, how did we get here and how does the EU Hotspot Approach implementation in the Aegean islands explain the incoming populations’ entrapment inside Greece?

Detention constitutes a highly debated issue in Greece, which dates before the official implementation of the EU Hotspot Approach in the country. On February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2014, the Greek Legal Council presented the Advisory Opinion 44/2014, which legalized detention of “irregular” migrants from the Greek authorities beyond eighteen months (the maximum permissible time under the Greek Legislation) and prolonged their detention indefinitely. This would supposedly force the undocumented newcomers to return to their countries of origin. The Council insisted that this measure would prevent “a rapid increase in the number of “irregular” migrants in the country and its undesirable consequences in public order and safety” (Triandafyllidou, 2014b). Additionally, the measure foresaw a dignified living inside the detention centres for the “vulnerable”, still though “irregular” migrants. Nevertheless, history ceremoniously disproved “dignified living”, which was after a little while replaced by “inhumane conditions” or “living hell”, as many human rights advocates and camp detainees usually refer to (Silverman, 2018; Tondo, 2018).

This situation escalated in June 2015, with the record number of approximately one million people reaching Greece (and nearly four thousand dying on the way) and detonated with the drowned toddler Aylan Kurdi in the Turkish shore of Bodrum, at the Mediterranean (Kingsley, 2016; Merler, 2016). This was the critical moment that

woke the world to the refugee crisis and its transformation into a humanitarian crisis in the EU external Greek border. What followed was the arrival of an unprecedented number of international volunteers in Greece, while United Nations Agency declared an emergency within the EU. The EU deployed for the first time its own, distinguishably expensive humanitarian response unit inside the European border which, according to several aid experts, has been the most expensive humanitarian response in history (Den Hertog, 2016; Howden & Fotiadis, 2017). Moreover, EASO deployed staff and services on the abovementioned islands, in order to speed up the examination procedures of the asylum requests. The interception practices at the maritime and land borders included disembarkation, first aid and health checks, transfer to police stations for identity check for the “sans-papiers” and finally detention in perpetuity. Separate security responsibilities were distributed to the maintenance of the security at the hotspots which lied upon the Greek Army principally, along with the police and the “riot police”, Frontex and Europol (Neocleous & Kastrinou, 2016).

Since the Autumn of 2015 the situation worsened. During SY.RIZ.A. governance, Greece had been transformed into a “refugee corridor” and the vast majority of the new arrivals spent less than a week before being transferred to the northern Greek border camps (such as Idomeni, Lagkadas, Nea Kavala, Vrasna, etc.) and accommodation facilities (such as former seaside hotels and luxurious ski resorts in the Northern Greece, in remoted areas of villages, towns and cities in the mainland (such as Kilikis, Grevena, Serres, Thessaloniki, etc.), in order to continue their trajectory through the Western Balkan route (BBC, 2019; Dimitriadi, 2017; Howden & Fotiadis, 2017). On March 2016, under the threat of severe penalties, EU gave a three-month deadline to the Greek government, to establish efficient reception and identification centres (Neocleous & Kastrinou, 2016; Papoutsi et al., 2019). In order to deal with the situation, the Greek parliament made amendments to the Asylum Law: According to the Law 4375/2016 (Article 26), a General Secretariat of Reception was created, which contained the Reception and Identification Service (R.I.S.), in order to effectively execute the reception and identification processes of the arriving populations. R.I.S. was consisted of the Central Service and the Regional Reception and Identification Services, that is the Reception and Identification Mobile Units, the Reception and Identification Centres (R.I.C.), the Open Temporary Reception Structures and the Open Temporary Accommodation Structures (based on Article 8, Law 4375/2016) (Kourachanis, 2018). In more detail, the General Secretariat of Reception would be responsible for operating, supervising and establishing the following structures: the R.I.C. which would perform the procedures of recording, data verification and identification, the Reception and Identification Mobile Units with the respective responsibilities, the Open Accommodation Structures for asylum seekers and finally the pre-departure accommodation structures for those under the deportation process. Moreover, the Central Service would plan, inspect and monitor the Regional Services’ actions and would ensure the necessary obligations for the exercise of their responsibilities, in collaboration with the rest services. The Structures’ goal was to create and maintain a short-term and mid-term residence framework, which would also provide the followings: information of the residents about their rights and responsibilities in the host country, housing and nutrition, psychological support, facilitation of their access to health services, basic hygiene products, clothing, Greek language seminars and access to training skills via development programs (Article 110 of the Law 4172/2013) (Kourachanis, 2018). The

five south-Eastern Aegean islands of Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Kos and Leros would be the focusing point of the before-mentioned Structures.

However, this management and monitoring plan was far from the hotspots' reality. The hotspots' establishment happened under immense pressure, a fact that initially led to many bureaucratic deficiencies. The main problem was that multiple, heterogeneous actors were involved, each of them assuming different responsibilities, which consequently created coordination challenges, concerning the abovementioned activities and services provided (Cabot, 2013; Kourachanis, 2018; Rozakou, 2017). Specifically, the effective coordination and management of the hotspots was undermined by the fragmented public policy-making and its non-systematic execution, since there was a non-coherent strategy from the Greek state regarding the reception and identification services. Other than the State, since the UNHCR declared an emergency situation in Greece, the UNHCR office workforce expanded rapidly, with the international employees earning three times more than the locals. Even among locals and internationals the relationships were quite complicated, with the former feeling underappreciated and "treated like secretaries" by the newcoming staff. Also, with the EU as the organization's biggest funder globally, the UNHCR advocates of human rights found themselves in a difficult position, since critical voices against the EU and subsequently Greek Asylum Policy could potentially meet with political and/or financial consequences (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017). To add in this multi-factor management failure, the involvement of various N.G.Os made the situation even worse: On one hand, domestic and international organizations arrived in Greece, which had made significant contributions worldwide, regarding humanitarian issues and crisis management. On the other hand, there had been various cases of organizations interested in benefiting from the European institutions financial support, without any clear interest in providing essential assistance (Cabot, 2013; Kourachanis, 2018; Rozakou, 2017).

A serious bureaucratic and public management inadequacy could be traced in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms of the expenditure provided by the EU funds (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017; Nielsen, 2019). The absence of any kind of evaluation led to an unprecedented degradation of the quality of the services provided to the hotspots' residents and even to corruption in various cases, since the conditions at the hotspots were continuously deteriorating and falling into misery, even after the reception of the EU two billion euro financial aid package. After a while it was difficult to detect "where did the money go" (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017; Kourachanis, 2018; Nielsen, 2019).

The most important public administration and bureaucracy-related issue was that of the severe delays in the examination of the asylum applications. Along with the EU-Turkey Agreement and the institutionalization framework regarding the reception and identification procedures, introduced by the SY.RIZ.A. government, the director of the Asylum Service issued the Decision 10464/31.5.2016, which prohibited the asylum seekers from moving to the mainland from the islands (Kourachanis, 2018). This was a critical decision, which led to the overcrowding of the hotspots' populations into numbers that exceeded by far the capacity of the border camps. Even worse, due to the delays in the full registration of the asylum seekers, the process of pre-registration was adopted, which had as a result further, up to ten months, delays. These extremely complicated bureaucratic and administrative procedures left many seekers in a perpetual waiting procedure, in order to be fully registered and for their claims to be thoroughly investigated (Kourachanis, 2018). Nevertheless, this limbo

and the overall management and monitoring inadequacies were not the only problems for the hotspots' residents. Even worse, it expanded to towards the technical and infrastructural elements of the hotspot facilities.

Due to the long-waiting periods, the overcrowding of the people far beyond the hotspots' capacities, which led to disproportionate analogies of people living in few square metre residences had as a result the inappropriate and hygienically inadequate housing conditions (BBC, 2019; Grün & Antypas, 2018). In Lesvos for example, Moria camp was designed with a capacity of approximately three thousand people and nowadays hosts more than thirteen thousand people in total humanitarian misery and disgrace (Tzallas, 2019). To target this quantitative deficiency the Greek state, in collaboration with civil society and international organizations initiated the operation of improvised camp installations, close to the first reception services. The problematic living conditions of the people, however, did not ameliorate, since there was not an organized provision, in case of adverse weather conditions, in order to provide access to health and food services, but mainly inappropriate accommodation solutions like tents (Kourachanis, 2018; Nielsen, 2019).

Another problem was that there was a combination of poor construction and inadequate maintenance of the infrastructures, which also led to inadequate hygiene, housing conditions and energy deficiencies, such as low temperatures inside the containers during the winter and high during the summer season (Kourachanis, 2018; H. Smith, 2017; Κροκιδάς, 2020). Along with the aforementioned issues came the poor health conditions and health services, and the lack of specialized social care structures, which led to health risks for the lives of the hotspot residents (tvxs, 2020). As an Asylum Service Officer on one of the hotspot islands highlighted,

“Hygiene conditions are not met. There is a sewage leak under the containers that is a source of infection. We try to work and are stepping in dirty water. There is rubbish everywhere, due to the lack of cleaning staff. There are no cleaning products. Every day we need bleach, etc. Not all needs are always covered. There is a Hepatitis A outbreak. When they don't have shampoo, it is expected that people will be dirty.” (Kourachanis, 2018)

Regarding the absence of specialized social care structures, they should be considered essential, since a large amount of people residing in the hotspot areas came from war areas and conflict situations and many of them were facing significant levels of, post-traumatic stress disorders and severe psychological problems, which necessitated special treatment from trained medical staff. Additionally, there were also people with mental illnesses, communicable diseases and disability problems, who lived inside tiny containers, packed in the same few square metres with many other people. Since there are not special quarantine areas for those suffering, all psychiatric, general health, delinquent, victimized emergency cases were brought together inside the same container, a fact that constituted a major problem for the well-being of the hotspot communities (Kourachanis, 2018; Κροκιδάς, 2020). The living conditions get even worse for the packed, perpetually waiting souls of the Aegean hotspot islands inside the hotspot installation. The most notorious example is that of the Moria camp in Lesvos, where despicable inhumanity and atrocities against the asylum seekers take place. The camp is considered as a contemporary Alcatraz, a prison island from which people cannot escape (Nutting, 2019). This situation continues until nowadays, with the already traumatized, stressed and anxious victims of violence and war being far more traumatized, sexually, emotionally and psychologically abused within Moria (Humanity United, 2020). Many of the residents, in fear of their lives, resort, since the

beginning of the camp's operation, to self-harm, in order to escape the poor living conditions of Moria (Dickson & Da Silva, 2017). In the words of Jalila, an asylum seeker from Kabul,

“Yesterday we arrived here and they gave me a coat and a blanket. They didn't give me any shelter and all night I slept on the ground. I tell them I don't have anybody to support me, I'm on my own. The charity who [met] me say there is no solution.” (Humanity United, 2020)

Additionally, when Ali, an asylum seeker from Idlib who lives in Moria in the last four months with his family, was asked about the place, he stated that

“Life in Moria is impossible—believe me—most of us here have changed psychologically. Some people have lost their minds.” (Humanity United, 2020)

According to an IRC (namely the International rescue Committee) report, only in 2018

“up to 60% of asylum seekers attending the mental health centre in Moria this year said they had contemplated suicide, and almost 30% had tried to take their own lives.” (MSF, 2018b)

Surprisingly, among the self-harm incidents and the suicide attempts there are also children and teenagers, who suffered of intense, ongoing panic attacks, suicidal ideations and suicide attempts (MSF, 2018c).

Moria has turn itself into a battlefield of chaotic, regular clashes riots and assaults, where adults and most importantly the vulnerable groups of women and children fight on a daily basis for survival from conflicts among various ethnic groups' over simple things like a meal from gang rapes (especially of women and children and unaccompanied minors, with the latter to have reached six thousand five hundred in 2019) at the camp's toilets and many other violent situations evolving daily inside the camp's fences (Fallon, 2020; Kitsantonis, 2019; Tondo, 2018; Wood, 2020). What is the most shocking, is the fact that people fleeing conflicting and war environments intent to reach the EU to find refuge, dignity and peace and instead they face a second wave of violence in an unmanageable perpetual state of insecurity, danger and dehumanization that deteriorates even further their already traumatized mental health (MSF, 2018a). And this is not just the epitome of the EU Hotspot Approach failure that led to this horrible merciless, even treacherous entrapment phenomenon. Even worse, it is the utmost failure of Humanity. Martin Luther King Jr. once said that “freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed” (Wisdom Quotes, 2020). But the Moria residents after all are stripped from their dignity and hope for a better life and imprisoned indefinitely inside a fenced cage, resembling a living hell. Do they even have the right to visualize the freedom that might never come?

Greece is rather familiar with the phenomenon of (political) imprisonment and “camp life”, embodied deep in the collective consciousness and memory of various ideological and political movements. In retrospect, the contemporary Greek history provides us with a handful of examples. In 1929, the liberal government of Eleftherios Venizelos passed the Law 4229/24, which consisted the legislative framework for many others to come, concerning political prosecution (Kitromilides, 2011b). The Law targeted those whose purpose was “the implementation of ideas whose manifest purpose is the overthrow of the established social order by violent means or the detachment of part from the whole of the country”. More recently, on August 1936, General Ioannis Metaxas proclaimed his dictatorship, with basic principles the anti-



parliamentarism and anti-communism. Based on these principles, he replaced the Law of 1929 by the far stricter Law of 1938, which introduced three new measures. Firstly, the declaration of repentance, that is a written statement from the prisoners, in which they denounced Communism (as “anti-National system of beliefs”), in order to be released. Secondly, anyone interested in becoming a public servant had to submit a certificate (the so-called “loyalty certificate”) from the Under-secretary of Public Security, regarding their “social convictions” (Close, 1986; Kallis, 2010; Voglis, 2002). Last but not least, “concentration camps” (in Greek *stratopeda sygkentroseos*) were officially established for the first time for political prisoners, who were mainly occupied endlessly with excruciating manual labour. And this was only the beginning.

Getting closer to the current hotspot reality in Greece, I argue that there is one last stop that defined profoundly the genealogy of imprisonment in Greece and sealed it once and for all with the Greek twofold of political ideology. Once it was Nationalism versus Communism, nowadays it still remains firm in the same analogy, defined by different terms, like Right versus Left. One could even claim, that the two sides of the coin consist one of the most vivid ethno-cultural attributes of the modern Greek individual. From the “National Schism”, in other words “The Great Division” of the Venizelian times, at the beginning of the twentieth century and the following manichaean dichotomy between Nationalism and Communism during the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1941, what indelibly determined treachery and imprisonment was the Civil War (1946-1949) (Aharony, 2010; Arendt, 2009; Coufoudakis, 2018; Hatzis, 2017; Kallis, 2010; Kitromilides, 2011a; Milton, 1997; M. L. Smith, 2011; Δεμερτζής, 2015; Καλύβας, 2015; Μαρκέτος, 1998). During that time, about fifty thousand people were put in prisons and camps and banished to isolation at numerous Aegean islands (Van Steen, 2005). In August 1950 official documents revealed that there were 18.816 political prisoners, 3.406 exiles and 4.641 soldiers and officers detained in the notorious Makronisos island, which from then on became a symbol of oppression due to the historical events that took place (Voglis, 2002).

During that time, Makronisos camps were sites of de-humanization, torture, solitary confinement, propaganda, hard labour, wretched living conditions and killings. Makronisos almost became a “phenomenon” providing spectacle, regarding the shaping of symbolic violence (process of Ordering) it projected to the Communists. It could be considered as a heterotopia, a reality within reality, a cursed “imagined community” of the political anti-Nationalist minority, a fenced cage (process of Bordering) for the contagious ideology of the “Others” (process of othering) (Anderson, 1983; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Foucault, 1984, 2009; Green, 2012; Van Houtum, 2012, 2016; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002; Van Steen, 2005). Of course, the Makronisos “mechanism” could not be absent from the post-war and post-authoritarian world. Right after the Civil War, it was not supposed to imprison or execute people, on the basis of their political convictions. In this way, they were executed as common criminals and the definition of the status of political prisoner remained obscure, since the Greek government never officially recognized the existence of political prisoners, but only of the criminal ones (Panourgíá, 2009; Voglis, 2002). In essence, the ideology of Communism, which aimed at a better world for everyone, was being executed along with its supporters, as the shadow of a crime. The end for the Makronisos “mechanism” came with the fall of the Military Junta (1967-1974). Nowadays, there is no such thing like exile for the Greeks, since Makronisos is a grey zone of the Greek history intact by its people, a no-man’s land which never before existed. An island of shame and a forgotten symbol of oppression

(Agamben, 2005; Boedeltje, Van Houtum, & Kramsch, 2007; Foucault, 2004, 2009; Van Houtum, 2010b).

Profoundly engraved in the Greek narrative, Makronisos reminds me of Moria. Political imprisonment back then was the prevailing form of political exclusion of the divergent ideologies and political beliefs from the authoritarian norms and regimes. In Moria there is more of a humanitarian démarche. But this is just the cover. Behind it, refugees and migrants remain the unwanted, a cumulative problem unfolding in the external European border of Greece. In the past, Communism was the enemy of the established authoritarian European regimes, while currently this enemy is the “inferior races” intending to enter the EU territory, aiming at the distortion of our fabricated, collective European identity. Just like Makronisos concentration camps, the Moria of Lesbos became a contemporary no-man’s land, a living hell for its residents and the focal point for international human rights organizations and groups, a symbol of humanity’s failure. In this way, I argue that Moria and Makronisos are both prison camps, designed to exceptionalize, de-humanize and literally bury alive the “Others” (Agamben, 1998, 1999, 2005; Foucault, 2007, 2010; Heller-Roazen, 1998; Papoutsi et al., 2019; Tsianos et al., 2009): Back then, the political prisoners and exiles of the Civil War era could be considered as the most emblematic subjects of the twentieth century, the heroes who turned the way of thinking into a way of living at any cost. Still, they embodied the different, the non-compatible solution to the Greek political status quo and thus they suffered as enemies of the State (Voglis, 2002; Δεμερτζής, 2015; Καλύβας, 2015). Nowadays, the pawns on the political strategies and games between the EU and Turkey, the “foreigners”, the “evil” Islamists and the “inferior”, “barbarian” Middle-Eastern populations that do not belong in the “civilized”, the “enlightened” West. Basically, there is the fear that the asylum seekers will “contaminate” Europe, which comes from the fact that people are afraid of what they cannot understand (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008; Hooper & Kramsch, 2007; Kramsch, 2006; Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Even with different protagonists, less than fifty years later the history repeats itself and the Aegean islands once more consist places of terror, the contemporary concentration camps under the Directives of the EU Hotspot Approach. Since the prisons of the past and the present belong to their prisoners after all, the similarity between the witnesses of the asylum seekers of Moria and the artistic expression of the political prisoners’ diaries during the Civil War era, is breathtaking. “Diaries of Exile” is a sequence of three poetic journals Yannis Ritsos composed between late 1948 and mid-1950s, during his imprisonment at two detention camps, in the islands of Lemnos and Makronisos. The uniqueness of his work comes from his artistic skills, namely the combination of diaristic and poetic elements, along with his impeccable, realism of memories (Ulin, 2013). The (translated from Greek) excerpt speaks for itself:

“October 27<sup>th</sup>, 1948

Here the thorns are many-  
chestnut-brown , yellow thorns,  
throughout the whole day and throughout sleep.

When the nights transfix the wire netting  
they leave rag shreds from their skirt.

The words that we once found nice  
they lost their colour like the old man’s waistcoat in the chest

like a sunset wiped off on the windowpanes.

The people are walking with their hands inside the pockets  
or sometime gesture as if they repel a fly  
which lingers on the same place again and again  
on the rims of the empty glass or deeper  
on an undefined spot and persistent  
as their denial to acknowledge it.” (Πίτσος, 1948)

Other than the date, the almost identical description of the life inside the camp confuses the reader. Unfortunately, the real-life experiences emerging from the poem significantly differ from the Greek state’s decision-making and the management of the contemporary humanitarian crisis. Seen from its political dimension, for Dimitris Christopoulos (head of the International Federation of Human Rights), the strategy of the former SY.RIZ.A. government, who gave the baptism of fire to the EU Hotspot Approach and everything that followed, was twofold: a) The Greek government used the “mess” and the humanitarian failure of the Aegean hotspots in order to defer potential mass returns of asylum seekers who reached other countries of the EU via Greece as an entrance Member State (according to Dublin Regulation). b) The abovementioned administrative and bureaucratic chaos could deter those willing to reach the EU and seek refuge in its external, maritime Greek border (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017; Kitsantonis, 2019).

When the liberal-conservative New Democracy superseded the Coalition of the Radical Left (SY.RIZ.A.) during the July 8<sup>th</sup> 2019 elections, their different approaches on the Migration Policy and strategic planning were apparent, as these were derived from their ideological divergence. Principally through the management of the refugee crisis and specifically their stance on the implementation of the EU Hotspot Approach. From an open Border Policy, the current government has presented itself via a more moderate and reformative agenda which focuses on correcting the former government’s mistakes (Tzallas, 2019). Among the Prime Minister’s primary priorities are the followings: Initially, government would aim to speed up the asylum procedures, with more strict legislative measures on border controls with the Frontex support. Additionally, the Prime Minister declared the reinforcement of the maritime police forces (by eight thousand border guards) on the Greek maritime borders and at the land border with Turkey (four hundred border guards) to tighten inspections, with simultaneously hiring five hundred employees at the asylum services (iefimerida, 2019a, 2019b; Tzallas, 2019).

Emphasis was also given on the definition of clearer criteria regarding the distinction between the migrant and the refugee and the termination of false diagnoses of the vast majority of the incoming asylum claimants with post-traumatic stress, to be granted asylum (Tzallas, 2019). The Prime Minister declared “safe” countries by Joint Ministerial Decision, namely twelve countries that from then on were considered safe to return rejected asylum seekers. These are Ghana, Senegal, Togo, Gambia, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Albania, Georgia, Ukraine, India and Armenia. According to Article 87 of the most recent Law on Asylum in 2019, a country is considered safe, if the examination of the asylum claim of the seeker indicates that they have not cited “serious reasons why the country is not a safe country of origin for the applicant” (Wood, 2020). The newly established Asylum Bill (entitled “International Protection and other Provisions”) is deemed to reinforce fast-track asylum application procedures in shorter processing times and to limit new arrivals, increase deportations

of failed asylum seekers and establish the aforementioned closed holding centres (iefimerida, 2019b).

Regarding the hotly debated issue of the islands, which carry the burden of the refugee crisis, the Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defense (in brief KYSEA) announced the establishment of closed pre-departure centres, due to the increasing migratory flows from Turkey. The ultimate goal is to transfer twenty thousand people in already existing and also newly established safe mainland Structures, in order for the north-Eastern Aegean islands (and mainly Moria in Lesbos and Vathi in Samos) to be decongested of their overcrowded hotspots (iefimerida, 2019a; Kitsantonis, 2019; ToVima Team, 2019a). Specifically, the aim is to ease the pressure on the islands with overcrowded camps, in order to increase control over the camps and to improve the living conditions of the migrants. In this way there will be determined who should be returned to their countries of origin and who should be sent into the mainland. For this, the plan is to replace the three big camps on Lesbos, Samos and Chios with smaller and more restricted ones and to refurbish the Leros and Kos camps, respectively. This decision did not have the consensus of the local communities of Lesbos and Chios, since there was not clear whether the already existing camps would function along with the newly established, smaller, pre-departure Structures. This fact led to violent riots and violent incidents among locals and the police Units for the Reinstatement of Order. Due to these incidents, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet held a meeting with the deputy Regional Governors of Lesbos, Samos and Chios, in order to discuss the legislative initiatives of the Ministry of Migration and Asylum (iefimerida, 2020). The government's ultimate goal was the internationalization of the issue, since the main objective was the return of ten thousand people back to Turkey within 2020 (iefimerida, 2019b; Kitsantonis, 2019).

The specific political decisions regarding public administration/bureaucratic and infrastructural/technical inadequacies are essential, in order to explain a) how the situation got out of hand and b) how different Greek governments attempted (rather unsuccessfully, indeed) to target it. From now on, history will evaluate the abovementioned governmental measures regarding the hotspot experiment in the Greek case. Unfortunately, the situation is continuously being derailed. So here we are, still experiencing an ongoing humanitarian tragedy since 2015, which penetrates Greek governments' hotspot management implementation. Even worse, the decision-making behind the management of the migratory and refugee flows cultivated the perfect conditions, which led to the current Hotspot Approach pernicious failure and therefore to its worst consequence: The unavoidable imprisonment of the asylum seekers in the Aegean hotspots.

In his homonymous novel, Joseph Heller referred to the notion "Catch-22", which consisted a paradoxical, inescapable situation, a dilemma whose dipole is consisted by two non-preferable options for the individual involved (J. Heller, 1955). In essence, the individual is rather weak when experiencing a "Catch-22", because by default they have to conform with established sets of rules and regulations, feeling simultaneously trapped by contradictory rules. A typical example could be that of "bureaucracy". No matter how meaningless it sometimes seems, it comprises of sets of unavoidable procedures and paperwork even for a lawful citizen to follow. With regard to the refugee crisis experience in the EU, a vast amount of incoming populations entered (legally and/or illegally) Greece and Italy and until nowadays are still entrapped mainly inside these two Member States, the EU external southern borders, with no way out (Merler, 2016; Trilling, 2018; Tsianos et al., 2009; Visvizi,

2016). The asylum seeking populations' indefinite accumulation and entrapment in dead-end geographical spaces, highlighted throughout the thesis, could thus be overall summarized by the term "Catch-22": the most unfortunate outcome of the failing EU external three-fold border regime (Calamur, 2015; FitzGerald, 2019; Stepnitz, 2019).

All in all, what really needs a second read is the oppression, the violence and torture of those who dared to seek a better life in Europe. The postcolonial, metropolitan Europe that betrayed them, because of their religious "inferiority", their "barbarian" origin, "lower-ranked" culture and overall civilization. Because Europe reacted as an "impermeable fortress", only accessible to "privileged European races" (Böröcz et al., 2001; Hooper & Kramersch, 2007; Kramersch, 2006, 2007; Loomba, 2007; Mignolo, 2012; Radaelli, 2003; Rumford, 2009; Said, 1995; Trilling, 2018; Van Houtum, 2010c, 2010a; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2013, 2020; Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). What kind of humanity could be addressed, when the non-Europeans are not equal human beings? In the words of FitzGerald "the Mediterranean continues to be cemetery without graves" and the EU continues to unleash a "harsh migration regime" (FitzGerald, 2019; Solomos, 2019). So far, "status confirmed" (Tondo, 2019; Wood, 2020).

## 5. Discussion and Conclusions

### 5.1. Discussion

This thesis objective was to shed light on the refugee-crisis management both at the EU and the Greek context, along with the significance of the EU external border regime for the unfolding of the crisis in the Greek case. Towards this direction, the [introductory Chapter](#) posed two research questions, regarding the EU and the national/Greek part, respectively: How did the EU external border regime result in a failing refugee-crisis management (EU context)? What mistakes did Greek governments do, that turned the EU refugee crisis into a humanitarian one (Greek context)?

In order to answer the aforementioned questions, I considered most appropriate to deploy a hybrid conceptual framework, with the interweaving of Postcolonial Governmentality with the B/Ordering and Othering processes (Van Houtum, 2010b, 2010a, 2012; Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009; Van Houtum & Bueno-Lacy, 2017; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2013; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002). Each of these two theoretical approaches, separately, procures the research of the EU external border regime during the refugee crisis with insightful results. Regarding the B/Ordering and Othering processes, I built my ideological argumentation upon the fundamental procedures of territorial demarcation (Bordering process), legitimization/justification/institutionalization of the border (Ordering process) and the cultivation of a collective consciousness that excludes/discriminates (even demonizes) those who do not share it (Othering process). This framework consists by itself the cornerstone towards the deciphering of the Greek part of the refugee crisis story. Since the external, south-Eastern EU-Greek border has been demarcated long before the crisis outbreak, its institutionalization during the crisis regarded the creation of a bureaucratic regime that served as a check point that granted permission only to those coming from a “white-list” country. The asylum seeking populations from the “black-list” countries were/are openly unwelcome and have to go through a time-consuming and back-breaking process, during which they are further criminalized/discriminated and treated poorly and in terrible living conditions by the local islands’ reception centres. The Othering processes consist the cornerstone, upon which I attempted to investigate the EU external border securitization/militarization towards the incoming, asylum seeking populations and the Greek state securitization that was expressed by a Foucauldian panopticon or/and an Agambenean biopolitical “state of exemption” and thus by the building of border facilities highly resembling the Nazi period’s concentration camps in the Eastern Aegean islands of Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Leros and Kos.

With regard to the Postcolonial Governmentality, it is academically advocated that the European colonialism has nowadays an afterlife, which is expressed via the EU transboundary power, diffused from the central EU powerful institutions to its peripheral Member States (Hooper & Kramsch, 2007; Kinnvall, 2016; Kramsch, 2006, 2007). In this way, the geopolitical EU borders have been transformed into postcolonial boundaries and the EU colonial past has been evolved into a postcolonial present. What is this theory’s connection to the refugee crisis and the EU external border regime and par extension the Greek state’s management at the national context? Since the refugee crisis outbreak and the incoming population mobility, there are certain EU Directives that originate from the centre of the EU metropolis and are implemented by its Member States and in this case the peripheral Greek Member



State. Thus, the crisis management at the national context and the Greek Asylum System is in line with the EU decision-making processes and the EU external border regime. The theoretical lenses of Postcolonial Governmentality address a more genealogical investigation, in Foucauldian terms, a fact that I considered very innovative and promising for the purposes of this thesis, in order to shed light on the power relations between the EU and Greece and the Greek genealogy before and during the crisis unfolding in the country. These results indicate how connected is the periphery to the metropolis apropos of the EU Migration Policy and the Greek Asylum System and what amount and part of responsibility do they share, regarding the refugee crisis management in the Greek case.

While either one of the two aforementioned theoretical frameworks could be deployed, in order to target the research problem and the thesis objective, I considered that their interweaving could provide an alternative and even more insightful conceptual amalgam. The theoretical lenses of B/Ordering and Othering processes, along with those of Postcolonial Governmentalité connected with a golden ratio, that is the threefold EU border mechanism, a theoretical notion comprised of the “paper border”, the “iron border” and the “border camp” (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Each one of the mechanism’s layers were investigated through the prism of three pylons, which manifest the EU external border management: The Dublin System, the EU-Turkey Deal and the EU Hotspot Approach. The goal was to interweave the “paper border” with the Dublin System, the “iron border” with the EU-Turkey Deal and the “border camp” with the EU Hotspot Approach, in order to target their exact deficiencies, and highlight that these mechanisms render the EU external border management a failing one. On the national/Greek context, this framework also argues that Greece constitutes a microcosmos of the EU external border regime, but at the same time the Greek governments take further initiatives, which render Greece an idiosyncratic case.

To the best of my knowledge, this hybrid framework has not been deployed elsewhere in the literature so far, at least with regard to the research of the refugee crisis unfolding in the EU and par consequence in Greece and its transformation into an unforeseen humanitarian tragedy in the Aegean islands. Thus, I argue that it is quite promising for future research, since it brought tangible results that indeed promoted the understanding and further explanation of the reasons behind the crisis management deficiencies from both the EU and the Greek state.

Specifically, with regard to the Dublin System, the “paper border” failure evolved around the *non-refoulement* principle. Essentially, the principle is obliging the Member States, where the “irregular” migrants have registered their fingerprints, to take complete responsibility of them, while no other Member State or the EU as a supranational institution involves in the incoming migratory flows. For this reason, the *non-refoulement* principle became the Dublin System’s impediment, with the overcrowding of the incoming asylum seekers accumulated exclusively in Italy and Greece (i.e. the EU external borders). This lack of proper management from the EU part created the first irreversible flaw in the overall EU external border regime (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). This thesis extends this argument in the Greek case. In Greece, the consecutive governments of PA.SO.K., SY.RIZ.A. and the current New Democracy attempted to follow the direction of the EU and comply with the Dublin Regulation. This has proven to be quite challenging, since the initiatives of the aforementioned governmental parties deteriorated the situation even further. In brief, the overall procedures and processes focus on the criterion of the country of origin for

the newcomers. Along with the fact that Greece is the only responsible Member State for the incoming populations' management, according to the *non-refoulement* principle, this situation led to the inevitable accumulation of an enormous number of asylum seekers exclusively in Greece, a fact that could be expressed by the notion "Catch-22". Thus, the implementation of Dublin consists the foundation for the asylum seeking populations' "Catch-22" in Greece.

The EU "iron border" failure is manifested through the EU-Turkey Agreement. This Agreement was primarily made, in order to stem the undocumented migratory flows from Turkey, combat the thriving smuggling and trafficking industries and create an environment of police cooperation and information exchange between EU and Turkey. However, the benefits of this Deal are far from encouraging. While with the Dublin System EU managed to project its neocolonial B/Ordering strategy of extremely securitizing its internal borders bureaucratically, with the EU-Turkey Agreement, EU took its Postcolonial Governmentality a step further: Turkey became the EU "refugee crisis management partner". In other words, EU supported the militarization of the outside of its external borders by Turkey. Even worse, it financed and thus legitimized an autocratic regime, the continuation of the smuggling and trafficking industries and thus it violated the fundamental human rights and the democratic values, upon which it was founded. This fact also cultivated the ground for the Othering processes to take place via exclusionary and extremely racist discourses from various EU Member States towards the incoming populations (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). This failing partnership with Turkey not only led people die in front of the borders, but also during their long way until they reach it. With regard to the Greek case, this thesis argues that Turkey, based on the EU sympathy proven through the Deal, fabricated a pre-"Catch-22" unavoidable situation, by opening its Northern land border with Greece and falsely propagating the message to the asylum seeking populations that they could cross the border and enter Greece. In this way, the people were trapped literally in the threshold, on the border line, something like the Cypriot green line, a no-place between the Greek and Turkish territories.

The "border camp" was investigated through the EU Hotspot Approach. It works like an everlasting contemporary quarantine, a prison for the "*sans-papiers*", condemned to life-lasting sentences, the quintessence of a "Catch-22". It consists the ultimate exclusionary method, that creates the dichotomy of "us" versus "them" and demonizes the latter, since "it is all their fault" and "they should not have come to harm us". This Approach consists the epitome of the EU external border management failure (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). This work investigates the "Greek experiment", where the hotspots' creation detonated the existing refugee crisis and transformed it into a humanitarian one. Moria is considered the most representative example of this transition: Bureaucratic and public administration inadequacies are connected with the "poor" construction, maintenance and specialized (for those suffering of various health and mental illnesses) infrastructural/technical deficiencies. Since Greece has a long "imprisonment genealogy", I argue that the contemporary hotspots of the Aegean islands resemble the prison islands in the Aegean, which served as concentration camps for the communist, political prisoners during and long after the end of the Greek Civil War. In this way, Moria is a modern version of Makronisos, the notorious prison island during the dark times of the Greek political history. They are both places of exception and misery for the enemies, political and/or ethno-religious, alike.

## 5.2. Proposed future work

The aforementioned findings pave the way for further research, regarding both the EU and the Greek context, but at the same time they put considerable pressure for urgent solutions. In essence, the thesis pinpoints the vulnerable elements of the threefold EU border mechanism, applied in Dublin System, EU-Turkey Deal and Hotspot Approach.

Regarding Dublin Regulation, it constitutes a powerful pylon of the EU Postcolonial Governmentality. In order to address the expanding, supranational EU sovereignty over its Member States, it would be interesting to investigate the potential repeal of the *non-refoulement* principle and its results for the Member States with different characteristics (i.e. economic, political, sociological, etc.). In this way, researchers (i.e. Political Scientists, Human Geographers, International Relations' experts, Policy Makers, Political Statistics researchers, etc.) could give their multilayered and multilateral perspectives, regarding alternative models of equal distribution (of the incoming, asylum seeking populations) among the Member States of the Northern, Central and Southern parts of the EU. A possible outcome would be the fact that Member States with more firm economies could respond in a more effective way, regarding the incoming populations' management, than others which cope with financial problems and present high rates of unemployment. The following hypothesis "the better the economic conditions of a country, the better the chances of the asylum seeking populations' overall integration into the European communities" could be validated in interdisciplinary (political, economic, sociological, geographical, etc.) research.

The findings of the research regarding the EU-Turkey Agreement unveiled Turkey's vicious political-pressure attempt on the EU, at its Northern land border with Greece, which led to the overcrowding of asylum seeking populations in between the border. This is a currently unfolding situation and consists a challenge for the EU policy making and overall refugee crisis management. Since the extreme radicalization and militarization of the external EU border regime did consist one of the major reasons behind the "Catch-22" in Greece, it should be investigated in parallel with the current pre-"Catch-22", fabricated by Turkey. Along with this relationship, Human Geography, Geo-Strategic studies, International Relations, Border studies, Political Sociology, Political Science and various other domains could research and further focus on the strategic planning, specific tactics and political moves from Turkey, in order to decipher a) how Turkey currently perceives the Agreement, b) what are the reasons and the purposes of its current tactics and political games, c) how is EU handling this relationship with Turkey, d) how are the geopolitical dynamics between EU (and separately its Member States) and Turkey going to evolve in the near future and e) at what extent will this political power correlations affect the ongoing refugee and humanitarian crises.

The thesis has also based a lot of its argumentation on the Greek case, on genealogical analysis of historical facts and events: Regarding the Dublin Regulation and its implementation on the Greek case, the political decisions for the refugee crisis management were researched via three consecutive governments. Each of them built on the EU Directives and took further steps at the national level, which determined and defined step by step the situation we cope in Greece nowadays. Another part of the thesis, where this analytical style was deployed, was the EU Hotspot Approach implementation in Greece. There, the intrinsic resemblance between two notorious

concentration camps, Moria and Makronisos, was analyzed through the narrative of imprisonment, throughout the Greek political history from the nineteenth century until nowadays. The political prisoners behind the bars of the prison islands of the Civil War era were transformed into the contemporary ethnic and religious ones. This parallelism could inspire Political Historians, Political Psychologists, Human Geographers, Political Philosophers and/or many other scientists to propose innovative combinations of the past, along with the present reality (e.g. connect the architecture, planning, geography of the modern penal facilities between the past traumas of humanity, for example the Nazi period, and the atrocities of contemporary authoritarian regimes). In particular, the investigation of the regimes of Syria, North Korea, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia and more, or better of “democratic” regimes around the world, such as those of the U.S.A., Russia, France, etc.) could shed light on the past and consist a valuable lesson for the future. Besides, what a more alarming event than the realization that war-period tactics, tortures and imprisonments are repeated under contemporary pretext in the same geographies?

Still, the practical question remains: What needs to be done urgently, in order to successfully deal with the pending humanitarian crisis and the perilous lives of the asylum seeking populations, accumulated and indefinitely trapped in the Aegean hotspots? Which should be the most proper policy recommendation to address the all the more failing EU external border regime and its subsequent refugee-protection crisis? In other words, is there a way out?

Considering the complexity of the EU institutions and mechanisms, it seems like no definite solutions could be given, regarding the perilous smuggling and trafficking businesses thriving upon the fear of persecuted people in the near future. Since the EU-Turkey Agreement neither decreased the power of the aforementioned businesses, nor Turkey remained totally loyal to the Agreement’s term to stem a part of the asylum seekers’ flows, EU should decide whether or not to “trust” Turkey, anymore. This decision could possibly require some immediate actions from the EU part: redefine the terms of the Agreement, demand stricter implementation of the revised terms and impose sanctions on Turkey for potential violations on the Deal. With regard to the Dublin System, since the *non-refoulement* principle is deeply “rooted” within the EU logics and power manifestations, its replacement by a moderate system or regulation would probably still draw upon the principle’s properties, whilst a scenario of its definite banishment would be much too radical and perilous for the EU entity per se. It seems like the coveted “express” solution has been “here” all along: Solidarity. And since the failing EU Hotspot Approach manifested in the Aegean hotspots has finally transformed the accommodation centres of the Greek islands into contemporary concentration camps and the situation has derailed completely into a severe humanitarian crisis (as this thesis has argued upon and investigated thoroughly), the “urgent solidarity” could still be applicable in this case, too. Partially, the humanitarian catastrophe at the Aegean is due to the *non-refoulement* principle, which dictated that Greece (along with Italy) had to carry the “burden” of the asylum seeking flows reaching the EU borders, unaccompanied. It was the *non-refoulement* principle that did not allow the EU and the rest Member States to support Greece in this difficult task, even though the country has been financially struggling for years and was still, during the refugee crisis outbreak, on the brink of bankruptcy. Again, the problem has been the lack of solidarity (Maldini & Takahashi, 2017; Scipioni, 2018; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). With the *non-refoulement* principle still in service, solidarity and support from the EU and its Member States could yet

ameliorate the situation in the Aegean islands' border camps. And since the Hotspot Approach experiment has been proven to be rather unsuccessful, it could be entirely dismissed. An immediate, alternative plan could be that of an innovative scheme of relocation from Greece to the rest of the EU Member States which could serve, in order for Greece to manage better the incoming populations, for the installations to transform from overcrowded prisons, into decent and appropriate structures of accommodation and for the incoming populations to integrate peacefully and harmonically within the EU. In other words, Member States could act in solidarity towards each other. As the English proverb dictates, "where there is a will, there is a way". Therefore, which is the "way"?

What is urgently required to boost the EU Member States' solidarity, along with the EU Migration and Asylum System is a responsible, sustainable and legitimate Border Policy, consisted of three key elements: normalization, legalization and equalization (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). The way of normalization promotes the cooperation of the Member States, in order to prevent discrimination/criminalization against the undocumented migrants or any kind of phobic behavior. However unsubstantiated, threatening descriptions, ethno-exclusionary/xenophobic metaphors and criminalizing cartographic and other media-related imaginaries that serve extreme right parties' discourses have managed over the years to create a false image of the incoming populations, dehumanize them and establish the perception that "they" are inferior than "us" (Van Houtum, 2010a; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017, 2020). Mainly, they are depicted as engaged in military and illegal activities, enemy armies, invasions and always as rivals of the state and the country. Nevertheless, the aforementioned tactics are far from the reality, since the refugees hosted in the EU represent less than one per cent of the total refugee population, globally (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). In order to deal with these perceptions and prevent their further normalization, phobic media representations, extreme right policies and anti-migrant discourses of the equivalent political parties that attempt to politicize migration to their end, should neither stay unchallenged nor tolerated (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020).

Greece consists a case in point. Since the local communities of the Eastern Aegean islands have been "exposed" to the refugee crisis and the incoming asylum seeking populations, various researches have indicated that this mere stage of approach has been rather sufficient to trigger the natives' support for the extreme-right party Golden Dawn (hard core of anti-austerity, anti-Europe and mainly anti-immigration discourse). This situation assured an impressive electoral support to the party in both the electoral rounds of January 2015 (six point three percent of the parliamentary votes) and September 2015 (seven per cent of the parliamentary votes) (Dinas, Matakos, Xefteris, & Hangartner, 2019; Sekeris & Vasilakis, 2016). The extensive, large-scale media coverage from the media probably contributed further to the forging of the party during the on-going refugee crisis and to the electorate's polarization (Melki & Pickering, 2014). However, since 2019 the popularity of the party gradually started to decline due to various scandals on illicit behaviors such as money laundering and extremely violent behaviors of the principal party members that were also covered in detail and were ferociously criticized and denounced by the media. In this way, the public opinion de-normalized the political entity of the extreme-right Golden Dawn. Finally, the aforementioned incidents ruptured the popularity of the party, which did not reach the required percentage (i.e. three percent of the total of the parliamentary votes) on the parliamentary elections of July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2019 (Παπαϊωάννου,

2019; Χασαπόπουλος, 2019). The Golden Dawn example consists the proof that solidarity among the EU Member States preconditions the solidarity inside the contemporary societies per se and that the *Volonté Générale*, in the words of Rousseau, can make the difference and normally demolish ethno-exclusionary and xenophobic discourses and practices from modern societies.

With regard to the way of legalization, more safe and legal channels should be created for the migrants, in order to reach the EU (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). The asylum seeking populations are widely criminalized in countries like Greece, where there are scarce resources such as access to the job market, housing or education (Sekeris & Vasilakis, 2016). Due to the -still- adverse economic situation of the country, conflicting situations are thriving in the Aegean island, along with the mainland (such as in Athens, Thessaloniki, etc.), where the native communities co-exist with the incoming refugee/migrant populations, since there is a deep-rooted fear that the “foreigners” will “still our jobs”/“live in better houses”/“share common education with local children”. Nevertheless, migrant populations and specifically the economic migrants consist an economic partner of the EU and its Member States, since they are ambitious and motivated to migrate from their country of origin, in search of a better future and more attractive incentives. In this way, the circularity of migration is promoted, along with the individuals’ well-being, the financial support of their countries of origin is achieved via the remittances that they send back to support their families and the EU economy is also supported. In the cases of weaker economically Member States, such as Greece, the integration of migrant populations in the job market and in general in the society would probably promote a surprising boost for the rebound of the state economy. Thus, the legalization of the incoming migratory flows either by creating legal paths to reach the EU from its Greek borderlands or/and by legalizing the people per se (grant them citizenship, social security rights, etc.) could consist an active step, in order to eliminate the trafficking and smuggling networks that thrive illegally and at the same time could promote and reflect the EU moral values regarding the fundamental human rights (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020).

Last but not least, equalization could be also an effective way for the EU to follow (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). Specifically, it regards an equal distribution of the asylum seeking populations across the EU and among its neighboring regions, on the basis of mutual responsibility and resettlement, in order to terminate the EU Hotspot Approach and its refugee camps diffused on the south-Eastern EU borderlands, the Aegean islands. Equalization could consist the foundation towards the elimination of the bureaucratic regime at the EU external borders, in order for the global population mobility to be facilitated further, for the wealthy and the not wealthy enough to have equal opportunities for a better life (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). This path could make an immense impact, not only for the Greek islands’ populations’ well-being and co-existence (at the local context), for the national Asylum System’s effectiveness (at the national context) and for the improvement of the EU refugee crisis management and the smoother operation of the external border regime (at the EU context). By restoring its overall Border Policy, EU will render itself a paradigm for its Member States and will be established as the most fervent advocate internationally, for the fundamental human rights of those in need of international protection.

### 5.3.Final remarks

This thesis concludes that the EU external border regime not only failed to manage the so-called refugee crisis. Even worse, the EU created and currently maintains the aforementioned fabricated crisis within its borders, a fact that results in the entrapment situation of the asylum seeking populations exclusively within its external Greek border. As a microcosmos of the EU management on the situation, Greece implemented the EU Directives, which it further enriched with nationwide Migration Policy that transformed the refugee crisis into a humanitarian one. While the specific deficiencies of the EU and par extension the Greek management that led to the explanation of the reasons behind the incoming populations' "Catch-22" phenomenon are outlined in this thesis, we are currently at the eye of the storm.

Regardless the ominous future of this situation, this final epilogue is destined to be an optimistic one, since optimism consists a deeply embodied feature in the Greek society. And what a better way to draw a close, than highlight and honor in this way, one last time, the omnipotent art of Committed Art of Poetry (l' Art Engagé or die Engagierte Kunst), which constituted quite a source of knowledge and supplementary argumentation throughout this work. Odysseas Elytis was a Greek poet, awarded in 1979 with the Nobel Prize in Literature. It was him that praised the Greek tradition and identity in difficult circumstances for the nation, since through his poetry he brought brightness and optimism for better days. His book "The sovereign sun" (1971), included the poem "A beautiful and strange homeland", where "the Sun" recites the followings:

"I've never seen a homeland more strange and beautiful  
than this one that fell to my lot

Throws a line to catch fish-catches birds instead  
sets up a boat on land-a garden in the waters  
weeps, kisses the ground-emigrates  
becomes a pauper-gets brave

Tries for a stone-gives it up  
tries to carve it-works miracles  
goes into a boat-reaches the oceans  
looks for revolutions-wants tyrants

I've never seen a homeland more strange and beautiful  
than this one that fell to my lot."  
(Elytis & Bogue, 1995; Hamill, 1995; Tsirmpas, 2016)

Quite dense, quite ironic. Quite now and then. This manichaeian logic of the "paradise" and the "living hell", the promised and accursed land at the same time reminds me of my asylum seeking friends, from the Open Structure Temporary Refugee Accommodation installations in my hometown, Serres: One of them finally preferred Serres over Sinjar in Northern Iraq to raise his children. Another wished he could return to his homeland and continue his life in longed-for peace. Interesting how a man's wish is another man's curse. Reality is like a coin: There is always the "Other" side.



## 6. References

- Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life*. Stanford University Press.
- Agamben, G. (1999). The witness and the archive. In *Remnants of Auschwitz*.
- Agamben, G. (2005). The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government. *State of Exception*.
- Agnew, J. (1998). *Geopolitics: Re-visioning world politics*. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001: Routledge.
- Aharony, M. (2010). Hannah Arendt and the idea of total domination. *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/dcq023>
- Alencar, A., & Deuze, M. (2017). News for assimilation or integration? Examining the functions of news in shaping acculturation experiences of immigrants in the Netherlands and Spain. *European Journal of Communication*, 32(2), 151–166. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323117689993>
- Althusser, L. (2006). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, 9(1), 86–98.
- Amnesty International. (2016). TURKEY: ILLEGAL MASS RETURNS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES EXPOSE FATAL FLAWS IN EU-TURKEY DEAL. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/04/turkey-illegal-mass-returns-of-syrian-refugees-expose-fatal-flaws-in-eu-turkey-deal/>
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Verso Books.
- Arendt, H. (2009). Social science techniques and the study of concentration camps. In *Echoes From The Holocaust: Philosophical Reflections on a Dark Time*.
- Aristotle. (2002). *Nicomachean ethics*. (C. J. Rowe, S. Broadie, & others, Eds.). Oxford University Press, USA.
- Arribas, G. F. (2016). The EU-Turkey Agreement: A Controversial Attempt at Patching up a Major Problem. *European Papers*. <https://doi.org/10.15166/2499-8249/80>
- Athens-Macedonian News Agency. (2013). Ε.Ε.: Αποτελεσματική η “Ασπίδα” στον Έβρο για τους παράνομους μετανάστες. Retrieved March 3, 2020, from <https://www.news247.gr/koinonia/e-e-apotelesmatiki-i-aspida-ston-evro-gia-toys-paranomoy-s-metanastes.6212303.html>
- Balibar, E. (2009). Europe as Borderland. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 27(2), 190–215. <https://doi.org/10.1068/d13008>
- Barthes, R. (1968). Elements of semiology.
- Baun, M. J. (1995). The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration. *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(4), 605–624. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2151886>
- BBC. (2019). Greece migrant crisis: “Horrible” camps to shut amid influx. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50486209>

- Bernard, S. (2004). Frequently Asked Questions about Plato. Retrieved from <https://www.plato-dialogues.org/faq/faq009.htm>
- Boedeltje, F., & Van Houtum, H. (2008). The abduction of Europe: A plea for less “unionism” and more Europe. *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9663.2008.00467.x>
- Boedeltje, F., Van Houtum, H., & Kramsch, O. T. (2007). “The shadows of no man’s land”: crossing the border in the divided capital of Nicosia, Cyprus. *Geographica Helvetica*, 62(1), 16–21. <https://doi.org/10.5194/gh-62-16-2007>
- Böröcz, J., Kovács, M., Mauro, S. E.-D., Sher, A., Dancsi, K., & Kabachnik, P. (2001). *Empire’s New Clothes: Unveiling EU-Enlargement*. (J. Böröcz & M. Kovács, Eds.). Central Europe Review e-books. Retrieved from <http://aei.pitt.edu/144/>
- Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Bryant, R. (2004). *Imagining the modern: The cultures of nationalism in Cyprus*. IB Tauris.
- Bueno Lacy, R., & Van Houtum, H. (2015). Lies, Damned Lies & Maps: The EU’s Cartopolitical Invention of Europe. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2015.1056727>
- Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (1991). *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality*. Chicago University Press Chicago.
- Cabot, H. (2013). The social aesthetics of eligibility: NGO aid and indeterminacy in the Greek asylum process. *American Ethnologist*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/amet.12032>
- Calamur, K. (2015). An EU Meeting on the Migrant Crisis. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from <https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/08/eu-meeting-migrant-crisis/402916/>
- Carrier, P. (2006). The Second World War in the Memory Cultures of France and Germany. *National Identities*, 8(4), 349–366. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14608940601051950>
- CAVAFY ARCHIVE. (2020). Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.onassis.org/initiatives/cavafy-archive>
- Cheah, P., Robbins, B., & others. (1998). *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and feeling beyond the nation* (Vol. 14). University of Minnesota Press.
- Clayton, G. (2011). Asylum seekers in Europe: M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece. *Human Rights Law Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngr037>
- Close, D. H. (1986). The Police in the Fourth-of-August Regime. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*.
- Coufoudakis, V. (2018). Andreas in Jail and in Exile: Junta, Resistance, Americans, Karamanlis [in Greek] (Ο Ανδρέας στη Φυλακή και την Εξορία: Χούντα, Αντίσταση, Αμερικανοί, Καραμανλής) by Stan Draenos. *Mediterranean Quarterly*. <https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-6898123>

- Council of the European Union. (2005). Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status.
- Damon, A., & Baykara, M. (2020). Greece stands firm on migrants, as Turkey opens floodgates to Europe. Retrieved March 3, 2020, from <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/01/europe/turkey-greece-migrants-open-border-intl/index.html>
- de Saussure, F. (2011). *Course in General Linguistics*. (P. Meisel & H. Saussy, Eds.). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Den Hertog, L. (2016). EU Budgetary Responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’ - Reconfiguring the funding landscape. *CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe*.
- Dickson, J., & Da Silva, C. (2017). Refugees held at Lesvos detention centre resorting to self-harm to escape ‘poor living conditions.’
- Dimitriadi, A. (2017). Governing irregular migration at the margins of Europe: The case of hotspots on the Greek islands. *Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa*. <https://doi.org/10.3240/86888>
- Dinas, E., Matakos, K., Xefteris, D., & Hangartner, D. (2019). Waking Up the Golden Dawn: Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Increase Support for Extreme-Right Parties? *Political Analysis*. <https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2018.48>
- Dourakis, G. (2013). Doomed to Failure: the European Union’s role in the Greek debt crisis. In *The Great Catalyst: European Union Project and Lessons from Greece and Turkey*.
- Dowden, K., & Livingstone, N. (2011). *A Companion to Greek Mythology*. *A Companion to Greek Mythology*. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444396942>
- efsyn. (2020). Υπεγράφη η συμφωνία κυβέρνησης και Ευρωπαϊκού Οργανισμού για το Άσυλο. Retrieved March 1, 2020, from <https://www.efsyn.gr/node/228832>
- Elytis, O., & Bogue, R. L. R. (1995). Nobel Lecture, 8 December 1979. *The Georgia Review*, 49(1), 99–104. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41401611>
- European Commission. (1990). The Dublin System. Retrieved December 28, 2019, from [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/20160406/factsheet\\_-\\_the\\_dublin\\_system\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/20160406/factsheet_-_the_dublin_system_en.pdf)
- European Commission. (2015). European Agenda on migration. Retrieved February 10, 2020, from [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication\\_on\\_the\\_european\\_agenda\\_on\\_migration\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf)
- European Commission. (2016a). Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum System: towards an efficient, fair and humane asylum policy. Retrieved January 6, 2020, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_16\\_2433](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_2433)
- European Commission. (2016b). Country Factsheet: Greece 2016. Retrieved March 4, 2020, from <https://ec.europa.eu/home->

- affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/12a\_greece\_country\_factsheet\_2016\_en.pdf
- European Commission. (2016c). MANAGING THE REFUGEE CRISIS EU-TURKEY JOINT ACTION PLAN: IMPLEMENTATION REPORT. Retrieved December 22, 2020, from [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing\\_the\\_refugee\\_crisis\\_-\\_eu-turkey\\_join\\_action\\_plan\\_implementation\\_report\\_20160210\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_-_eu-turkey_join_action_plan_implementation_report_20160210_en.pdf)
- European Commission. (2016d). Towards a sustainable and fair Common European Asylum System. Retrieved December 20, 2019, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_16\\_1620](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1620)
- European Commission. (2018). Common European Asylum System. Retrieved from [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en)
- European Commission. (2020a). Common European Asylum System. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en)
- European Commission. (2020b). Hotspot Approach. Retrieved January 10, 2020, from [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european\\_migration\\_network/glossary\\_search/hotspot-approach\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/hotspot-approach_en)
- European Commission. (2020c). Relocation. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european\\_migration\\_network/glossary\\_search/relocation\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/relocation_en)
- European Commission at work. (2020). Infringement decision 20094104. Retrieved February 10, 2020, from [https://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/infringement\\_decisions/index.cfm?lang\\_code=EN&decision\\_date\\_from=&decision\\_date\\_to=&title=&submit=Search&r\\_dossier=20094104](https://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/infringement_decisions/index.cfm?lang_code=EN&decision_date_from=&decision_date_to=&title=&submit=Search&r_dossier=20094104)
- European Council. (2015a). Council establishes EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers in the Mediterranean. Retrieved December 20, 2019, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/18/council-establishes-naval-operations-disrupt-human-smugglers-mediterranean/>
- European Council. (2015b). Justice and Home Affairs Council on migration: presidency conclusions.
- European Council. (2015c). Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey - EU-Turkey statement, 29/11/2015. Retrieved December 15, 2019, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/29/eu-turkey-meeting-statement/>
- European Council. (2015d). Migratory crisis: EU Council Presidency steps up information sharing between member states by activating IPCR. Retrieved January 7, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/30/migratory-crisis-activating-ipcr/>
- European Council. (2015e). Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 - statement. Retrieved January 4, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement/>

- European Council. (2016a). Refugee facility for Turkey: Member states agree on details of financing. Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/03/refugee-facility-for-turkey/>
- European Council. (2016b). Schengen evaluation of Greece: Council adopts recommendation to address deficiencies in external borders. Retrieved January 11, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/12/schengen-evaluation-of-greece/>
- European Council. (2016c). Securing Europe's external borders: Launch of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Retrieved January 7, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/06/launch-ebcg-agency/>
- European Council. (2017a). Common European asylum system reform: Council ready to start negotiations on qualification and protection standards. Retrieved January 10, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/19/qualification-protection-standards/>
- European Council. (2017b). EU Agency for Asylum: Presidency and European Parliament reach a broad political agreement. Retrieved January 13, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/29/eu-agency-for-asylum/>
- European Council. (2017c). EU resettlement framework: Council ready to start negotiations. Retrieved January 16, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/15/eu-resettlement-framework-council-ready-to-start-negotiations/>
- European Council. (2017d). European Council, 14-15 December 2017. Retrieved December 23, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2017/12/14-15/>
- European Council. (2017e). Leaders' Agenda: Migration: way forward on the external and internal dimension. Retrieved December 24, 2019, from [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32083/en\\_leaders-agenda-note-on-migration\\_.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32083/en_leaders-agenda-note-on-migration_.pdf)
- European Council. (2017f). Reception conditions for asylum applicants: Council agrees mandate for negotiations. Retrieved January 12, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/29/reception-conditions-for-asylum-applicants-council-agrees-mandate-for-negotiations/>
- European Council. (2019a). A new strategic agenda 2019-2024. Retrieved January 2, 2020, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/20/a-new-strategic-agenda-2019-2024/>
- European Council. (2019b). Timeline - response to migratory pressures. Retrieved December 5, 2019, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressure/history-migratory-pressure/>
- European Database of Asylum Law. (2011). ECtHR - M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece [GC], Application No. 30696/09.
- European Parliament. (2013, June). Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and

- mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the. Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604>
- European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. (2008). DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL.
- European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. (2019). Information Management. Retrieved January 5, 2020, from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1475741492010&uri=CELEX:32016R1624>
- European Stability Mechanism. (2020a). Greece emerges from crisis: Three programmes restore growth, confidence. Retrieved February 5, 2020, from <https://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/greece>
- European Stability Mechanism. (2020b). Greece successfully concludes ESM programme. Retrieved February 4, 2020, from Greece successfully concludes ESM programme
- Evelyn-White, H. G., Hesíodo, & Homero. (1914). Hesiod, the Homeric hymns, and Homerica. *The Loeb Classical Library*.
- Fallon, K. (2020). Europe's refugee crisis is getting worse—for these children.
- FitzGerald, D. S. (2019). *Refuge beyond Reach*. *Refuge beyond Reach*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190874155.001.0001>
- Foucault, M. (1975). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. Penguin Book, Ltd.
- Foucault, M. (1977). Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In D. F. Bouchard (Ed.), *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. Vintage.
- Foucault, M. (1984). Michel Foucault. Des espaces autres (1967), Hétérotopies. *Moyen Age*.
- Foucault, M. (2004). Des espaces autres. *Empan*, 54(2), 12–19. <https://doi.org/10.3917/empa.054.0012>
- Foucault, M. (2007). *Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78*. Springer.
- Foucault, M. (2008). *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978 - 1979*. *Journal of Chemical Information and Modeling*. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>
- Foucault, M. (2009). *Le corps utopique, les heterotopies*. *Le corps utopique, les hétérotopies*.
- Foucault, M. (2010). The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 [Trans. Graham Burchell]. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10286630902971637>
- Freud, S. (1961). THE EGO AND THE ID. *The American Journal of the Medical Sciences*. <https://doi.org/10.1097/00000441-196111000-00027>

- Freud, S. (2018). *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. LULU Press. Retrieved from <https://books.google.gr/books?id=PjFfDwAAQBAJ>
- FRONTEX. (2011). Update to Joint Operation Poseidon 2011. Retrieved March 29, 2020, from <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/update-to-joint-operation-poseidon-2011-jzZfWV>
- FRONTEX. (2015). Frontex accepts Greece's request for Rapid Border Intervention Teams. Retrieved March 29, 2020, from <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-accepts-greece-s-request-for-rapid-border-intervention-teams-amcPjC>
- FRONTEX. (2020). Operation Poseidon (Greece). Retrieved March 29, 2020, from <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/main-operations/operation-poseidon-greece/>
- Giddens, A. (1978). New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies. *Human Studies*, 1(3), 311–314.
- GlobalGiving. (2019). A Quote To Share Every Waking Hour Of World Refugee Day. Retrieved February 15, 2020, from <https://www.globalgiving.org/learn/listicle/12-shareable-world-refugee-day-quotes/>
- Goodreads. (2019). Most Good, Least Harm Quotes. Retrieved December 23, 2019, from <https://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/5760459-most-good-least-harm-a-simple-principle-for-a-better-world-and-meaning>
- Graham, A. J. (1971). Patterns in early Greek colonisation. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 91, 35–47.
- Grant, H., & Domokos, J. (2011). Dublin regulation leaves asylum seekers with their fingers burnt. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/07/dublin-regulation-european-asylum-seekers>
- Green, S. (2012). A sense of border. In T. M. Wilson & H. Donnan (Eds.), *A companion to border studies* (Vol. 26, pp. 573–592). John Wiley & Sons.
- Grün, G.-C., & Antypas, I. (2018). Beyond capacity, Greek island refugee camps get more packed. Retrieved March 3, 2020, from <https://www.dw.com/en/overcrowded-refugee-camps-greek-islands/a-46771466>
- Haferlach, L., & Kurban, D. (2017). Lessons Learnt from the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement in Guiding EU Migration Partnerships with Origin and Transit Countries. *Global Policy*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12432>
- Hamill, S. (1995). A Paradise of One's Own: Odysseas Elytis. *The Georgia Review*, 49(1), 105–110. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41401612>
- Hard, R. (2019). *The Routledge Handbook of Greek Mythology*. *The Routledge Handbook of Greek Mythology*. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315624136>
- Hathaway, J. C., & Foster, M. (2014). Persons not deserving protection. In *The Law of Refugee Status*. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511998300.008>
- Hatzis, A. N. (2017). Review of George Th. Mavrogordatos', 1915: Ο εθνικός διχασμός [1915: The national schism]. *Historein*. <https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.10392>



- Haukkala, H. (2008). The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60(9), 1601–1622. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130802362342>
- Hellenic Government. (2010). Presidential Decree 114/2010. Retrieved March 29, 2020, from <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-allodapoi/prosphuges-politiko-asulo/pd-114-2010.html>
- Hellenic Government. (2011). Law 3907/2011. Retrieved March 27, 2020, from <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-allodapoi/n-3907-2011.html>
- Hellenic Government. (2016a). Law 4375. Retrieved March 29, 2020, from <https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/en-law-4375-organization-operation-asylum-service-appeals-authority-reception-identification>
- Hellenic Government. (2016b). Presidential Decree 123/2016. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kubernese/proedriko-diatagma-123-2016.html>
- Hellenic Resources Network. (2016). The Treaty of Lausanne. Retrieved from <http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/>
- Heller-Roazen, D. (1998). *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford University Press.
- Heller, C., & Jones, C. (2014). Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders? *Statewatch Journal. Reflections on the State and Civil Liberties in Europe*, 23(3/4), 9–11. Retrieved from <https://www.borderline-europe.de/sites/default/files/background/statewatch-journal-vol23n34.pdf#page=9>
- Heller, J. (1955). *Catch-22: a novel*. Simon and Schuster.
- Hesiod, & West, M. L. (1999). *Theogony and Works and days: And, Works and Days*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Hooper, B., & Kramsch, O. (2007). Post-colonising Europe: The geopolitics of globalisation, empire and borders: Here and there, now and then. *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie*, 98(4), 526–534. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9663.2007.00420.x>
- Howden, D., & Fotiadis, A. (2017). Where did the money go? How Greece fumbled the refugee crisis. Retrieved February 22, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/09/how-greece-fumbled-refugee-crisis>
- Huggan, G. (1989). Decolonizing the map: post-colonialism, post-structuralism and the cartographic connection. *ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature*, 20(4).
- Human Rights Watch. (2016). EU: Don't Send Syrians Back to Turkey. Retrieved March 1, 2020, from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/20/eu-dont-send-syrians-back-turkey>
- Humanity United. (2020). “Moria is a hell”: new arrivals describe life in a Greek refugee camp. Retrieved March 12, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jan/17/moria-is-a-hell-new-arrivals-describe-life-in-a-greek-refugee-camp>

- iefimerida. (2019a). Οι αποφάσεις του ΚΥΣΕΑ για το προσφυγικό: Αλλαγές στο άσυλο, μετακίνηση προσφύγων, αύξηση ελέγχων. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.iefimerida.gr/politiki/apofaseis-kysea-prosfygiko-allages-asylo>
- iefimerida. (2019b). Σήμερα ψηφίζεται το ν/σ για το άσυλο, το απόγευμα ο Μητσοτάκης στη Βουλή -Πιο γρήγορες διαδικασίες, κατανομή προσφύγων στη χώρα. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.iefimerida.gr/politiki/simera-psifizetai-ns-asylo-grigoroteris-diasikasies>
- iefimerida. (2020). Μεταναστευτικό: Ο Μητσοτάκης συγκαλεί υπουργικό -Το απόγευμα συναντά τους δημάρχους νησιών αν. Αιγαίου. Retrieved from <https://www.iefimerida.gr/politiki/synedriazei-pempti-yπουργiko-yπο-kyriako-mitsotaki>
- IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre. (2019). Immigration and emigration statistics: Migrant deaths and disappearances. Retrieved December 20, 2019, from <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/migrant-deaths-and-disappearances>
- IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre. (2020). Over 3,770 Migrants Have Died Trying to Cross the Mediterranean to Europe in 2015. Retrieved January 2, 2020, from <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/over-3770-migrants-have-died-trying-cross-mediterranean-europe-2015>
- Jacobs, K. (2011). Patterns of Electoral Reform: The Onion Model. *6th ECPR General Conference. University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland.*
- Jensen, O. B., & Richardson, T. (2003). Being on the map: The new iconographies of power over European space. *International Planning Studies*, 8(1), 9–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563470320000059246>
- Jensen, S. (2011). Othering, identity formation and agency. *Qualitative Studies*, 2(2), 63–78. <https://doi.org/10.7146/qs.v2i2.5510>
- Kale, B., Dimitriadi, A., Sanchez-Montijano, E., & Süm, E. (2018). Asylum Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations: Between Cooperation and Conflict. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from [https://www.feuture.uni-koeln.de/sites/feuture/user\\_upload/FEUTURE\\_Online\\_Paper\\_No\\_18\\_D6.4.pdf](https://www.feuture.uni-koeln.de/sites/feuture/user_upload/FEUTURE_Online_Paper_No_18_D6.4.pdf)
- Kallis, A. (2010). Neither fascist nor authoritarian: The 4th of august regime in greece (1936-1941) and the dynamics of fascistisation in 1930s Europe. *East Central Europe*. <https://doi.org/10.1163/187633010X534504>
- Kantouris, C., & Becatoros, E. (2020). Thousands of migrants look for way around shut Greek border. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://apnews.com/95a694161bcae5253074e597ce61ad49>
- Keep Talking Greece. (2020). Tension high at Evros border as thousands try to cross into Greece (vids). Retrieved March 3, 2020, from <https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/02/29/evros-border-greece-turkey-migrants/>
- Kingsley, P. (2016). The death of Alan Kurdi: one year on, compassion towards refugees fades. Retrieved February 16, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/01/alan-kurdi-death-one-year-on-compassion-towards-refugees-fades>
- Kinnvall, C. (2016). The Postcolonial has Moved into Europe: Bordering, Security

- and Ethno-Cultural Belonging. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(1), 152–168. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12326>
- Kitromilides, P. M. (2011a). *Eleftherios Venizelos: The trials of statesmanship. Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cen052>
- Kitromilides, P. M. (2011b). Venizelos' intellectual projects and cultural interests. In *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*. <https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624782.003.0014>
- Kitsantonis, N. (2019). Greece Announces Steps to Shut Down Notorious Refugee Camps. Retrieved January 15, 2020, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/world/europe/greece-migrants-aegean-islands.html>
- Kotios, A., Pavlidis, G., & Galanos, G. (2011). Greece and the Euro: The Chronicle of an expected Collapse. *Intereconomics*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-011-0390-7>
- Kourachanis, N. (2018). Asylum Seekers, Hotspot Approach and Anti-Social Policy Responses in Greece (2015–2017). *Journal of International Migration and Integration*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0592-y>
- Kramsch, O. T. (2006). Transboundary Governmentality on Europe's Postcolonial Edge: The Cypriot Green Line. *Comparative European Politics*, 4(2), 289–307. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110080>
- Kramsch, O. T. (2007). Querying Cosmopolis at the Borders of Europe. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 39(7), 1582–1600. <https://doi.org/10.1068/a38212>
- Lemke, T. (2001). "The birth of bio-politics": Michel Foucault's lecture at the Collège de France on neo-liberal governmentality. *Economy and Society*, 30(2), 190–207. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140120042271>
- Loomba, A. (2007). *Colonialism/postcolonialism*. Routledge.
- Lykou, C., & Mitsikopoulou, B. (2017). Chapter 4. The chronicle of an ongoing crisis. <https://doi.org/10.1075/dapsac.70.04lyk>
- Maldini, P., & Takahashi, M. (2017). Refugee Crisis and the European Union: Do the Failed Migration and Asylum Policies Indicate a Political and Structural Crisis of European Integration? *Communication Management Review*. <https://doi.org/10.22522/cmr20170223>
- Mbembe, A. (2003). Necropolitics. *Public Culture*. <https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-15-1-11>
- McColl, H., McKenzie, K., & Bhui, K. (2008). Mental healthcare of asylum-seekers and refugees. *Advances in Psychiatric Treatment*, 14(6), 452–459. <https://doi.org/10.1192/apt.bp.107.005041>
- McKee, M., Karanikolos, M., Belcher, P., & Stuckler, D. (2012). Austerity: A failed experiment on the people of Europe. *Clinical Medicine, Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of London*. <https://doi.org/10.7861/clinmedicine.12-4-346>
- Melki, M., & Pickering, A. (2014). Ideological polarization and the media. *Economics Letters*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.008>

- Mentzelopoulou, M. M., & Luyten, K. (2018). Hotspots at EU external borders.
- Merler, S. (2016). EU migration crisis: facts, figures and disappointments. Retrieved December 29, 2019, from <https://www.bruegel.org/2016/02/eu-migration-crisis-facts-figures-and-disappointments/>
- Mignolo, W. D. (2012). *Local histories/global designs: Coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking*. Princeton University Press.
- Milton, S. (1997). Registering civilians and aliens in the second world war. *Jewish History*.
- Minca, C., & Rijke, A. (2017). Walls! Walls! Walls! Retrieved January 25, 2020, from <https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/walls-walls-walls>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018). TURKEY'S ENTERPRISING AND HUMANITARIAN FOREIGN POLICY. Retrieved March 3, 2020, from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>
- Mitchel, J. (2017). The Dublin Regulation and Systemic Flaws. *San Diego International Law Journal*, 18(2), 5.
- Mitchell, K., Jones, R., Fluri, J., & Van Houtum, H. (2019). 'Ceci n'est pas la migration': countering the cunning cartopolitics of the Frontex migration map. In *Handbook on Critical Geographies of Migration*. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786436030.00021>
- Moreno-Lax, V. (2012). Dismantling the Dublin system: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. *European Journal of Migration and Law*. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157181612X627652>
- MSF. (2018a). Confinement, violence and chaos: How a European refugee camp is traumatising people on Lesbos. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from <https://www.msf.org/confinement-violence-and-chaos-how-european-refugee-camp-traumatising-people-lesbos>
- MSF. (2018b). Self-harm and attempted suicides increasing for child refugees in Lesbos. Retrieved February 15, 2020, from <https://www.msf.org/child-refugees-lesbos-are-increasingly-self-harming-and-attempting-suicide>
- MSF. (2018c). Trapped in Moria. Retrieved March 20, 2020, from <https://www.msf.org/trapped-moria>
- Murray, S. J. (2006). Thanatopolitics : On the Use of Death for Mobilizing Political Life. *Polygraph*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420802024350>
- Murray, S. J. (2008). Thanatopolitics: Reading in Agamben a Rejoinder to Biopolitical Life. *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420802024350>
- Mylonas, H. (2013). *The politics of nation-building: Making co-nationals, refugees, and minorities*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nadler, S. (2006). *Spinoza's "Ethics": An Introduction*. Cambridge University Press.
- Neocleous, M., & Kastrinou, M. (2016). The EU hotspot: Police war against the migrant. *Radical Philosophy*.
- Nestoras, A. (2015). *The Gatekeeper's Gambit: SYRIZA, Left Populism and the European Migration Crisis*. Brussels.

- Nielsen, N. (2019). Misery at Greek migrant camp, despite €2bn of EU aid. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from <https://euobserver.com/migration/145757>
- Nutting, T. (2019). Headaches in Moria: a reflection on mental healthcare in the refugee camp population of Lesbos. *BJPsych International*. <https://doi.org/10.1192/bji.2019.2>
- Official Journal of the European Union. (2016). REGULATION (EU) 2016/1624 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/20. Retrieved January 2, 2020, from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1475741492010&uri=CELEX:32016R1624>
- Paasi, A. (1996). *Territories, boundaries, and consciousness: The changing geographies of the Finnish-Russian boundary* (Vol. 1). Wiley.
- Paasi, A. (2009). Bounded spaces in a ‘borderless world’: border studies, power and the anatomy of territory. *Journal of Power*, 2(2), 213–234. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17540290903064275>
- Panourgiá, N. (2009). *Dangerous citizens: The Greek Left and the terror of the state. Dangerous Citizens: The Greek Left and the Terror of the State*. <https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-1189692>
- Papoutsis, A., Painter, J., Papada, E., & Vradis, A. (2019). The EC hotspot approach in Greece: creating liminal EU territory. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1468351>
- Pelekanou, M. (2017). *The large economic crisis (2008-) in Greece: historical analysis by the media references*. University of Patras.
- Pippin, R. (2012). Nietzsche: Thus spoke zarathustra. In *Introductions to Nietzsche*. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139051736.010>
- Psaropoulos, J. (2020). Greece on the defensive as Turkey opens border to refugees. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/greece-defensive-turkey-opens-border-refugees-200229091808379.html>
- Radaelli, C. M. (2003). The Europeanization of Public Policy. In *The Politics of Europeanization*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0199252092.003.0002>
- Rankin, J. (2020). Migration: EU praises Greece as “shield” after Turkey opens border. Retrieved March 7, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/03/migration-eu-praises-greece-as-shield-after-turkey-opens-border>
- Refugee Council. (2016). Top 20 facts about refugees and asylum seekers. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from [https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/4735\\_top\\_20\\_facts\\_about\\_refugees\\_and\\_asylum\\_seekers/](https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/4735_top_20_facts_about_refugees_and_asylum_seekers/)
- Rijppma, J., & Vermeulen, M. (2015). EUROSUR: saving lives or building borders? *European Security*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2015.1028190>
- Rozakou, K. (2017). Nonrecording the “European refugee crisis” in Greece navigating through irregular bureaucracy. *Focaal*.

<https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2017.770104>

- Rumford, C. (2009). *The SAGE handbook of European studies*. Sage Publications.
- Said, E. W. (1995). *Orientalism: western conceptions of the Orient*. 1978. Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 115.
- Scipioni, M. (2018). Failing forward in EU migration policy? EU integration after the 2015 asylum and migration crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1325920>
- Sekeris, P., & Vasilakis, C. (2016). The Mediterranean Refugees Crisis and Extreme Right Parties: Evidence from Greece. *Mpra*. <https://doi.org/10.1227/01.NEU.0000349921.14519.2A>
- Silverman, S. J. (2018). The EU's Hotspot Approach: Questionable Motivations and Unreachable Goals. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3178892>
- Simpson, P. L. P. (2000). *The politics of Aristotle*. Univ of North Carolina Press.
- SKAI. (2020). Γερμανικός Τύπος: Άνοιξε η Τουρκία τα σύνορα για τους πρόσφυγες; Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.skai.gr/news/greece/germanikos-typos-anoikse-i-tourkia-ta-synora-gia-tous-prosfyges>
- Smart, A., & Smart, J. (2012). Biosecurity, Quarantine and Life across the Border. In *A Companion to Border Studies* (pp. 354–370). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118255223.ch20>
- Smith, H. (2017). “Welcome to prison”: winter hits in one of Greece’s worst refugee camps.
- Smith, H. (2019). Greece passes asylum law aimed at curbing migrant arrivals. Retrieved February 17, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/01/greece-passes-asylum-law-aimed-at-curbing-migrant-arrivals>
- Smith, M. L. (2011). Venizelos’ diplomacy, 1910-23: From Balkan alliance to Greek-Turkish settlement. In *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*. <https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624782.003.0006>
- Solomos, J. (2019). Refuge beyond reach: how rich democracies repel asylum seekers. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1668039>
- Stepnitz, A. (2019). *Refuge Beyond Reach: How Rich Countries Repel Asylum Seekers*. By David ScottFitzGerald. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. *Law & Society Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12448>
- Stavis-Gridneff, M. (2020a). Greece Suspends Asylum as Turkey Opens Gates for Migrants.
- Stavis-Gridneff, M. (2020b). Vigilantes in Greece Say “No More” to Migrants. Retrieved March 5, 2020, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/07/world/europe/greece-turkey-migrants.html>
- The Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. (2011). *The Global Ecoomic Crisis and the Case of Greece*. (Konstantina E. Botsiou Antonis Klapsis, Ed.). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18415-4\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18415-4_1)

- The National Herald Staff. (2019). Minister Says Greek Doctors Gave Diagnoses to Help Refugees, Migrants. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from <https://www.thenationalherald.com/265645/minister-says-greek-doctors-gave-diagnoses-to-help-refugees-migrants/>
- Theodossopoulos, D. (2013). Infuriated with the infuriated? blaming tactics and discontent about the Greek financial crisis. *Current Anthropology*. <https://doi.org/10.1086/669855>
- Theodossopoulos, D. (2016). Philanthropy or solidarity? Ethical dilemmas about humanitarianism in crisis-afflicted Greece. *Social Anthropology*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8676.12304>
- Theogony. (2019). In *Greek and Roman Hell*. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfxv90b.10>
- Tondo, L. (2018). “We have found hell”: trauma runs deep for children at dire Lesbos camp. Retrieved February 17, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/03/trauma-runs-deep-for-children-at-dire-lesbos-camp-moria>
- Tondo, L. (2019). Mediterranean will be “sea of blood” without rescue boats, UN warns. Retrieved February 16, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/09/mediterranean-sea-of-blood-migrant-refugee-rescue-boats-un-unhcr>
- ToVima Team. (2019a). Μητσοτάκης: Μεταναστευτικό και όχι προσφυγικό το πρόβλημα – Αυστηρός έλεγχος σε σύνορα, άσυλο, ΜΚΟ. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.tovima.gr/2019/10/04/politics/ora-tou-prothypourgou-o-mitsotakis-apanta-gia-to-prosfygiko/>
- ToVima Team. (2019b). Μητσοτάκης: Το μεταναστευτικό δεν είναι ελληνοτουρκικό πρόβλημα. Retrieved March 5, 2020, from <https://www.tovima.gr/2019/12/05/politics/mitsotakis-me-tin-eyropi-tha-antimetopisoume-to-prosfygiko/>
- ToVima Team. (2019c). Μητσοτάκης για προσφυγικό : Η Ελλάδα έφτασε στα όριά της. Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.tovima.gr/2019/11/20/politics/mitsotakis-gia-prosfygiko-i-ellada-eftase-sta-oria-tis/>
- ToVima Team. (2019d). Μητσοτάκης στον ΟΗΕ : Η Ελλάδα δεν μπορεί να αντέξει μόνη της τη μεταναστευτική πίεση.
- ToVima Team. (2020a). Μητσοτάκης: Τα σύνορα της Ελλάδας, σύνορα της ΕΕ.
- ToVima Team. (2020b). Μητσοτάκης στο CNN: Η συμφωνία ΕΕ-Τουρκίας είναι νεκρή, δεν θα εκβιαστεί η Ευρώπη.
- Towner, W. S. (2005). Clones of God: Genesis 1:26–28 and the Image of God in the Hebrew Bible. *Interpretation*, 59(4), 341–356. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002096430505900402>
- Trauner, F. (2016). Asylum policy: the EU’s ‘crises’ and the looming policy regime failure. *Journal of European Integration*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2016.1140756>
- Triandafyllidou, A. (2007). Mediterranean Migrations: Problems and Prospects for Greece and Italy in the Twenty-first Century. *Mediterranean Politics*, 12(1), 77–



84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390601136855>
- Triandafyllidou, A. (2014a). Greek Migration Policy in the 2010s: Europeanization Tensions at a Time of Crisis. *Journal of European Integration*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2013.848206>
- Triandafyllidou, A. (2014b). *Migration in Greece: Recent Developments in 2014. OECD Network of Interational Migration Experts*.
- Triantafyllidou, A., & Dimitriadi, A. (2011). The management of asylum in Europe. The reform of Dublin II and the case of Greece. *Public Law Applications*, 24(I), 22–26.
- Trilling, D. (2018). Five myths about the refugee crisis. Retrieved February 6, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/05/five-myths-about-the-refugee-crisis>
- Trilling, D. (2019). How the media contributed to the migrant crisis. Retrieved February 15, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/aug/01/media-framed-migrant-crisis-disaster-reporting>
- Tsianos, V., Hess, S., & Karakayali, S. (2009). *Transnational migration Theory and method of an ethnographic analysis of border regimes*. University of Sussex Sussex Centre for Migration Research Working Paper.
- Tsirmpas, E. (2016). A Look at Greek Poet Odysseas Elytis's Best Poems. Retrieved April 25, 2020, from <https://theculturetrip.com/europe/greece/articles/the-best-poems-by-odysseas-elytis-you-should-read/>
- tvxs. (2020). Συγκλονιστική μαρτυρία γιατρού από τη Μόρια: «Όλοι τους είναι υποσιτισμένοι με ματωμένα ούλα». Retrieved March 12, 2020, from <https://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/sygklonistiki-martyria-giatroy-apo-ti-moria-oloi-toys-einai-ypositismenoi-me-matomena-oula-oy>
- Tzallas, T. (2019). Greece is still struggling to cope with the refugee crisis – and now thousands of migrants have gone missing.
- Ulin, L. D. (2013). Yannis Ritsos and the poetry of witness. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from <https://www.latimes.com/books/la-xpm-2013-jan-02-la-et-jc-yannis-ritsos-and-the-poetry-of-witness-20130102-story.html>
- Van Houtum, H. (2010a). Human Blacklisting: The Global Apartheid of the EU's External Border Regime. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 28(6), 957–976. <https://doi.org/10.1068/d1909>
- Van Houtum, H. (2010b). The Janus-face: on the ontology of borders and b/ordering. *Simulacrum*.
- Van Houtum, H. (2010c). Waiting Before the Law: Kafka on the Border. *Social & Legal Studies*, 19(3), 285–297. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663910372180>
- Van Houtum, H. (2012). Remapping Borders. In T. M. Wilson & H. Donnan (Eds.), *A companion to border studies* (Vol. 26, p. 405). John Wiley & Sons.
- Van Houtum, H. (2016). The mask of the border. In *The Routledge Research Companion to Border Studies* (pp. 71–84). Routledge.
- Van Houtum, H., & Boedeltje, F. (2009). Europe's Shame: Death at the Borders of the EU. *Antipode*, 41(2), 226–230. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467->

- Van Houtum, H., & Bueno-Lacy, R. (2017). Frontiers. In D. Richardson, N. Castree, M. F. Goodchild, A. Kobayashi, W. Liu, & R. A. Marston (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Geography* (pp. 1–8). American Cancer Society. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118786352.wbieg0859>
- Van Houtum, H., & Bueno Lacy, R. (2013). Europe's Border Disorder. *E-International Relations*. Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/05/europes-border-disorder/>
- Van Houtum, H., & Bueno Lacy, R. (2017). Reflections: Extreme geographies the political extreme as the new normal: The cases of brexit, the French state of emergency and Dutch islamophobia. *Fennia*. <https://doi.org/10.11143/fennia.64568>
- Van Houtum, H., & Bueno Lacy, R. (2019). The migration map trap. On the invasion arrows in the cartography of migration. *Mobilities*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2019.1676031>
- Van Houtum, H., & Bueno Lacy, R. (2020). The Autoimmunity of the EU's Deadly B/ordering Regime; Overcoming its Paradoxical Paper, Iron and Camp Borders. *Geopolitics*, 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2019.1676031>
- Van Houtum, H., & Pijpers, R. (2007). The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU. *Antipode*, 39(2), 291–309. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2007.00522.x>
- Van Houtum, H., & Van Naerssen, T. (2002). Bordering, Ordering and Othering. *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie*, 93(2), 125–136. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9663.00189>
- Van Steen, G. (2005). Forgotten theater, theater of the forgotten: Classical tragedy on modern Greek prison islands. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1353/mgs.2005.0024>
- Vasilopoulou, S. (2009). Varieties of Euroscepticism: The Case of the European Extreme Right. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*.
- Verhofstadt, G. (2015). Europe bribes Turkey. Retrieved February 25, 2020, from <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-bribes-turkey/>
- Visvizi, A. (2016, September). Greece, the Greeks, and the Crisis: Reaching Beyond "That's how it Goes." Retrieved from [https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles\\_papers\\_reports/787](https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/787)
- Voglis, P. (2002). Political prisoners in the Greek Civil War, 1945-50: Greece in comparative perspective. *Journal of Contemporary History*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220094020370040201>
- Walters, W. (2002). Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the Border. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 20(5), 561–580. <https://doi.org/10.1068/d274t>
- Walters, W. (2004). Secure borders, safe haven, domopolitics. *Citizenship Studies*, 8(3), 237–260. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1362102042000256989>
- Walters, W. (2017). Live governance, borders, and the time-space of the situation:

- EUROSUR and the genealogy of bordering in Europe. *Comparative European Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-016-0083-5>
- Ward Beecher, H. (2020). Famous Quotes About Children. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from <https://www.compassion.com/poverty/famous-quotes-about-children.htm>
- West, M. L. (1988). *Hesiod: Theogony and Works and Days: Translated with an Introduction and Notes*. Oxford University Press.
- Wikström, C. (2014). The Dublin III Regulation. Retrieved February 27, 2020, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20140222012517/http://ceciliawikstrom.eu/en/politik/migration-och-asyl/dublinforordningen/>
- Wisdom Quotes. (2020). 460 humanity quotes that will inspire you to change the world. Retrieved March 20, 2020, from <https://wisdomquotes.com/humanity-quotes/>
- Wood, G. (2020). Ongoing refugee crisis in Greece set to continue in 2020. Retrieved January 25, 2020, from <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/21942/ongoing-refugee-crisis-in-greece-set-to-continue-in-2020>
- Δεμερτζής, Ν. (2015). Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος ως πολιτισμικό τραύμα. *Επιστήμη Και Κοινωνία: Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Και Ηθικής Θεωρίας*. <https://doi.org/10.12681/sas.821>
- Καλύβας, Σ. Ν. (2015). Εμφύλιος πόλεμος (1943-1949): Το τέλος των μύθων και η στροφή προς το μαζικό επίπεδο. *Επιστήμη Και Κοινωνία: Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Και Ηθικής Θεωρίας*. <https://doi.org/10.12681/sas.916>
- Κροκιδάς, Α. (2020). Καλώς ήρθατε στην κόλαση. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from <https://www.efsyn.gr/node/230565>
- Λάμπας, Ι. (1980). *Λεξικό του Αρχαίου Κόσμου. Τόμος Γ. Δομή*.
- Μαρκέτος, Σ. (1998). Δημήτρης Μιχαλόπουλος, Ο Εθνικός Διχασμός. Η άλλη διάσταση. *Μνήμων*. <https://doi.org/10.12681/mnimon.687>
- Παπαϊωάννου, Γ. (2019). Γιατί έπεσε στα μισά η Χρυσή Αυγή και γιατί είναι λίγοι εκείνοι που το αναδεικνύουν. Retrieved June 11, 2019, from <https://edromos.gr/giati-epese-sta-misa-i-chrysi-avgi/>
- Ρίτσος, Γ. (1948). Ημερολόγιο Εξορίας 1. Retrieved March 26, 2020, from [http://users.uoa.gr/~nektar/arts/tributes/giannhs\\_ritsos/hmerologio\\_e3orias.htm](http://users.uoa.gr/~nektar/arts/tributes/giannhs_ritsos/hmerologio_e3orias.htm)
- Σιώτης, Ν. (2020). Πρόσφυγες. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from <https://www.politeianet.gr/selidodeiktis/ntinos-siotis-prosfuges-873>
- Σταυρόπουλος, Λ. (2019). Μητσοτάκης : Τα προσφυγόπουλα πρέπει να πάνε σχολείο – Όσα αριστεύουν να σηκώσουν και τη σημαία. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from <https://www.tovima.gr/2019/10/04/politics/mitsotakis-ta-prosfygopoula-prepei-na-pane-sxoleio-an-einai-aristoi-mathites-na-sikosoun-kai-ti-simaia/>
- Χασαπόπουλος, Ν. (2019). Γιατί καταρρέουν οι ακροδεξιοί της Χρυσής Αυγής στο δρόμο προς τις κάλπες. Retrieved July 8, 2020, from <https://www.tanea.gr/2019/07/04/politics/antipoliteysi/giati-katarreoun-oi-akrodeksioi-tis-xrysis-aygis-sto-dromo-pros-tis-kalpes/>

## 7. List of Abbreviations

<b>CEAS</b>	Common European Asylum System
<b>COI</b>	Country of Origin Information
<b>EASO</b>	European Asylum Support Office
<b>EBCG</b>	European Border Coast Guard
<b>ECRE</b>	European Council on Refugees and Exiles
<b>ECB</b>	European Central Bank
<b>ECHR</b>	European Convention on Human Rights
<b>ECtHR</b>	European Court of Human Rights
<b>EDAL</b>	European Database of Asylum Law
<b>EEAS</b>	European External Action Service
<b>EFSF</b>	European Financial Stability Facility
<b>EMSA</b>	European Maritime Safety Agency
<b>EMU</b>	Economic and Monetary Union
<b>ESM</b>	European Stability Mechanism
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUNAVFOR Med.</b>	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
<b>EUREGIO</b>	European Region
<b>EURODAC</b>	European Dactyloscopy
<b>EUROJUST</b>	European Judicial Cooperation Unit
<b>EUROPOL</b>	European Police Cooperation Agency
<b>EUROSUR</b>	European Border Surveillance System
<b>FRONTEX</b>	Frontières Extérieures
<b>GMDAC</b>	Global Migration Data Analysis Centre
<b>IBM</b>	Integrated Border Management
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund

<b>INTERPOL</b>	International Police
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>IPCR</b>	Integrated Political Crisis Response
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>KYSEA</b>	Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defense
<b>MAT</b>	Units for the Reinstatement of Order
<b>MeRA25</b>	European Realistic Disobedience Front
<b>MP</b>	Member of the Parliament
<b>MSF</b>	Médecins Sans Frontières
<b>NCCs</b>	National Coordination Centres
<b>ND</b>	New Democracy
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>PASOK</b>	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
<b>RABIT</b>	Rapid Border Intervention Teams
<b>RIC</b>	Reception and Identification Centres
<b>RIS</b>	Reception and Identification Service
<b>SatCen</b>	Satellite Centre
<b>SIS</b>	Schengen Information System
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operating Procedures
<b>SYRIZA</b>	Coalition of the Radical Left
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>VIS</b>	Visa Information System

## 8. Acknowledgments

This thesis consists the outcome of a continuous search for self-awareness and fulfilment, a combat with inner fears, dubiety, time, (im)perfectionism, my idiosyncratic “Catch-22”. On my way to accomplish this Master’s goal, every challenge, every paper, constituted a path towards the improvement of my academic writing skills, a fact that finally helped me to define and redefine my sincere academic character and interests. Besides my personal development, in this two-year journey I met special people, colleagues and friends and this makes the journey even more precious.

Most importantly, I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Professor Dr. Henk van Houtum, whom I perceive as my mentor throughout these two years. I feel particularly lucky and grateful for his always insightful feedbacks and his continuous support.

I am also thankful to Professor Dr. Olivier Tomas Kramsch, who believed in me and provided me with invaluable support throughout my Master’s studies and to Rodrigo Bueno Lacy for being the second reader of my thesis.

Additionally, with regard to the research organization I did my internship, “Praxis Greece”, I am grateful that this N.G.O. supported my research ideas and provided me with the opportunity to become a member of a group that promotes equality and solidarity towards the refugee populations, accommodated in Greece and specifically in Serres.

I would also like to convey my most honest thankfulness to all my wonderful friends, who tolerated me innumerable times, when I could not “speak right now, because I have a deadline to catch for the x course” and who remained patiently by my side, all the way.

Moreover, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my Family, my Father Theophanes, my Mother Melina and my Brother Konstantinos, who loved and supported me ever more and by any means, unconditionally. I wish written language consisted a more precise reflector of my thoughts and feelings, so as to describe how blessed I feel being a part of this Family.

Last but not least, I would like to convey my appreciation and gratitude to my partner Argyrios, who believed in me and supported me in all those times when I had lost hope and faith, my secret second reader, a ferocious critic, an even more ardent supporter.