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Echoes of Influence

The Effect of Propaganda and Political Events on the Political Socialisation of the Iranian Diaspora in the Netherlands

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Preface

The thesis that is before you is the result of my Masters in Conflict, Power, and Politics at Radboud University. The topic of this research is the outcome of my interest in the Middle East generated during my minor in CICAM during my bachelor's in Political Socialisation and during the women's rights protests in Iran following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022.

I would like to extend my gratitude to all of the interviewees for the conversations we had and the kindness that was extended to me. In addition, I want to thank those who provided me with the connections to interview more people. All of the participants have given me insights into their experiences, ideas, and thoughts, that have inspired me. Moreover, without these stories, this thesis would not be possible.

Additionally, I want to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Sanne Weber for the help she gave during the process of writing this thesis. The feedback and meetings have encouraged me to explain myself better and inspired me to work hard. She was always ready to help with any question I had and pointing me in the right direction when I was in need of guidance.

On a personal note, I want to thank my parents for support they gave throughout the writing process and for being willing to not discuss my thesis when I needed to disconnect. In particular, I want to thank my mother for reading my thesis and giving feedback from an outsider's perspective. Furthermore, I want to thank my friends for the moral support, discussions, and many long coffee and lunch breaks during our days at the university library. Finally, I would like to thank my sister helping me brainstorm at every point during the writing of this research. In addition, I would like to thank her for proofreading my thesis one final time and helping me to dot the i's and cross the t's.

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Abstract

This research examines the effect of encountering propaganda and witnessing political events on the political (re)socialisation of people in the Iranian diaspora in the Netherlands. The tumultuous history of Iran in combination with its oppressive regime has led Iran's citizens to flee as a result of persecution or to move in search of a country with more rights and freedoms. In this new country of residence, the Iranian diaspora is forced to create a new social and political life. Propaganda and political events can have an effect on how this process of political socialisation takes place and if resocialisation is possible. In order to conduct this research, a qualitative case study is used to do a thematic analysis. The data used derives from the seven semi-structured interviews that were conducted with members of the Iranian diaspora. The analysis suggests that propaganda and political events do affect political socialisation. This manifests in the levels of political trust and political participation as well as in political opinions. Moreover, this thesis argues that resocialisation in a new political and cultural context possible. This thesis adds to the debate by creating a deeper understanding of political socialisation theories and by creating more in-depth data and analyses of the Iranian diaspora. Limitations of this research include the representativeness of the sample and researching a single case. Therefore, future research might focus on increasing the representativeness by adding more people with different backgrounds and looking to different contexts with the same framework.

Keywords: Political Socialisation, Migrant Socialisation, Propaganda, Political Events, Iranian Diaspora, Dutch Society

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1. Introduction

The Iranian diaspora has grown significantly over the past few decades. Estimates of the amount of Iranians living outside of Iran range from 1.3 to 7 million people (CGVS, 2023). Among the people who have moved abroad, one in five Iranian migrants obtains international protection. If Iranians decide to move back, this is in and of itself not reason for persecution. However, any criminal offences committed abroad can be (CGVS, 2023). Therefore, moving back or visiting Iran can be dangerous for people who are part of the Iranian diaspora. Unfortunately, this is not the only reason for the Iranian diaspora to be afraid of the Iranian government. The Iranian government uses digital intimidation tactics, monitors people's loved ones still residing in Iran, kidnaps people, and sometimes even resorts to executing them (AIVD, 2023; CGVS, 2023).

For most people, the power Iran exerts outside of its borders is unknown. However, for people in the Iranian diaspora who are politically active, receiving threatening messages on social media or having supporters of the Iranian government trying to extract personal information, is part of their daily lives. All of these methods are intended to silence politically active people in the Iranian diaspora (Malek, 2023). Moreover, these methods of surveillance and censorship are used to undermine the messages that the anti-regime activists in the Iranian diaspora try to spread (AIVD, 2023). In order to further try and curb dissent, the government uses propaganda to create uniform messaging and bans news sources that report differently (Rhodes & Chao, 2009).

The Iranian diaspora is characterized by a range of political, cultural, and social experiences, shaped both by their homeland and their host country. As a result of a revolution, war, changes in the political system, and large protests, many people have fled or been forced to flee for their safety. These people carry the tumultuous Iranian history with them, which has shaped the way they view the world.

1.1 The Iranian Political Context

From 1921 until 1941, Iran was ruled by Reza Shah Pahlavi, further referred to as Reza Shah (Saikal, 1980). Under his reign, the country underwent many reforms which had two main effects. First, these reforms allowed the country to modernise (Saikal, 1980). Second, these new laws reduced the influence of religious people (Saikal, 1980). Nevertheless, the freedoms that were granted as a result of these policies were not the only outcome of his rule. Other policies included the banning of political parties and countering free press (Avery & Afary, 2024). As a result of making trade agreements with Nazi-Germany and later allying themselves with the

allied forces, Iran's foreign politics were constrained (Saikal, 1980). This resulted in the abdication of Reza Shah.

His abdication meant that Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, further referred to as shah, took the throne. After this succession, the country had a phase of economic recovery, political parties were formed again, and press was also freer (Takeyh, 2014). At the same time, there was growing unrest in the religious elite as a result of the policies of Reza Shah (Avery & Afary, 2024). Left-wing parties sought to reduce the political power of the monarchy and nationalists wanted the country to nationalise their oil reserve (Saikal, 1980). It all conduced to a shah who did not have absolute control over the population and fled the country in 1953, leaving the more popular Mosaddegh in charge (Avery & Afary, 2024). Soon after, the shah returned with help of the CIA which invited the Wests involvement in the oil industry, increasing their power and influence in Iran (Saikal, 1980).

Starting from 1960, a new period of economic development and political and social reform began. This was called the White Revolution. To illustrate, the shah called for land redistributions, policies to combat illiteracy and increase health services, and improved the role of women in society (Axworthy, 2014). As a consequence, Islamic leaders voiced their disconcertment as the country secularised more (Avery & Afary, 2024). Furthermore, the government's plans for land redistributions failed to include necessary support, leading to high fail rates, which caused further unrest (Axworthy, 2014).

In the 1970s, the economic growth as a result of the oil industry seemed to be diminishing. In order to curb the adverse economic effects, the shah sought to diversify the economy (Saikal, 1980). Despite these attempts to help Iran's economy, the instability of Western oil consumption resulted in inflation and high product prices (Avery & Afary, 2024). Moreover, Iran was dealing with the continued decline of the agricultural sector due to the land reform during the white revolution (Saikal, 1980). At the same time, the Iranian democracy could not offer real political participation and elections were manipulated. The intellectual left as well as the religious right took to protest. The former with the goal to establish a freer country and true democracy and the latter with the goal to return to its indigenous culture (Avery & Afery, 2024). As all forms of protest were unwanted by the shah, participants were met with censorship, surveillance, and harassment by the secret police SAVAK (Axworthy, 2014).

During the large protests that started in 1978, the government used excessive force, causing casualties (Axworthy, 2014). These deaths fuelled the fire and led to more protests. The climate was ripe for change as hostilities toward the shah grew further with the increased dependence on the West, which elicited discontentment from the nationalists, and the policies

that did not do what they were supposed to (Saikal, 1980). Furthermore, the working class turned to religion at this time which opened the door for religious leaders to put forward Ayatollah Khomeini as the solution for Iran (Axworthy, 2014). When the shah fled Iran again in 1979, it created a power vacuum and the same year the ayatollah took over and created an Islamic Republic of Iran (Avery & Afary, 2024).

In the aftermath of the revolution, Khomeini excluded all left-wing, nationalist, and intellectual people from power. Under the ayatollah, the country returned to the conservative values from decades before (Axworthy, 2014). For example, women were deprived of all of the freedoms that came from the modernisation policies the shahs put in place (Avery & Afary, 2024). Khomeini also called the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into existence that eliminated all opposing political groups using excessive force (Axworthy, 2014). Any influence of the West was squashed, causing the United States to lose an ally in the middle east.

In 1980, Iraq launched an invasion in Iran effectively starting an eight-year long war (Potter & Sick, 2004). Religious leaders were often the target of Iraq and Iranian organisations backing Iraq. The Iranian government reacted to the attack on the religious elite by using the IRGC to repress and execute anyone suspected of opposing them. People were arrested with little evidence and were denied human rights (Avery & Afary, 2024). The war itself was detrimental to the Iranian population. Young boys were recruited and used as sacrifices on the front lines and many high populated centres became the targets of heavy bombings (Potter & Sick, 2004). Therefore, many people lost their loved ones. In 1987, the United States joined forces with Iraq and in the following year Iraq won back the terrain that was captured by Iran (Potter & Sick, 2004). One year later, a ceasefire, facilitated by the United Nations, was accepted (Avery & Afary, 2024).

This ceasefire meant a time of internal turmoil in which policy objectives were debated and internal problems were examined (Axworthy, 2014). Near the end of the war, Khomeini died and Khamenei became the new ayatollah, causing further internal tensions (Avery & Afary, 2024). The newly elected president Rafsanjani set out to liberalise the economy and to reconcile with the west (Avery & Afary, 2024). The new ayatollah and the parliament opposed and stifled such measures, causing infighting in the government (Avery & Afary, 2024). In turn, this led to public unrest and protests that were quelled with violence.

In 1997, after Rafsanjani's term, a member of the reformist movement, Khatami, was elected (Axworthy, 2014). Khatami was only selected to be part of the ballot to hold up the appearance of democracy. Once again Iranian citizens hoped voting for Khatami would be the key to a freer and more democratic country (Avery & Afary, 2024). While Khatami was able

to make some changes, there were limits to his power (Mehran, 2003). Khatami was able to grant more news sources the right to publish (Avery & Afary, 2024). However, after doing so, new ayatollah Khamenei found reasons to shut them down again. In 1999 more seats were up for the elections, many of which were won by the reformists again (Axworthy, 2014). The same year, and for the first time since the revolution in 1979, there was a large protest against the government and their suppression of freedom of speech (Axworthy, 2014). Even after a second term, president Khatami was not able to cause lasting reformist policies.

During the next presidential elections, the reformists were banned and conservative Ahmadinejad was elected (Avery & Afary, 2024). The combination of freedom of speech that was again reigned in and the high inflation rates increased societal discontent (Axworthy, 2014). The re-election of Ahmadinejad against societally favoured Mir Hossein Mousavi in 2009 was contested and Mousavi called his supporters to oppose (Avery & Afary, 2024). Due to the election' large turnout, there were many voters who were mobilised, causing nearly a week of demonstrations (Avery & Afary, 2024). After warnings by Khamenei to stop protesting, new demonstrations were met with a heavy hand. Demonstrators during protests in 2011 and in 2017, as a result of the economic decline, also caused the regime to use excessive force as a means to quell the uprising (Richter, 2011; Young, 2022).

In 2022, there was another uproar in Iran. Large protests broke out with women being positioned as the primary heroes (Pelham, 2024). The slogan Zan, Zendegi, Azadi – women, life, freedom – was adopted and used to rally the Iranian population. The goal was for women to have the right to choose what they wear and, on a larger scale, the emancipation of women (Avery & Afary, 2024). These protests gained traction and received worldwide coverage. Many believed this would bring about lasting change (Avery & Afary, 2024). In the end, large waves of violence, arrests and executions were used to suppress the voices of this movement (Pelham, 2024).

1.2 Research Purpose and Research Question

The main goal of this research is to shed light on the effects of encountering propaganda and experiencing large political events, like those described above, on the process of political (re)socialisation. Political socialisation refers to the process through which citizens learn, develop, and internalise a political identity (Haegel, 2020). This process is affected by the context they find themselves in (Neundorf, 2020; Mishler & Rose, 2001). For instance, growing up with a government that uses propaganda and excessive force could affect people differently than growing up with a government that invites the expression of diverging opinions and an

open and accessible legal system. Another example of such a context is experiencing large political events, both happening within the country of origin and in the new environment. Political events affect someone's individual political trust based on the opinions they hold, and can also change the way they interact with politics (Schuman & Corning, 2012).

In order to achieve the objective, the following research question was formulated: *What is the effect of encountering propaganda and witnessing political events on migrant (re)socialisation in the Iranian Diaspora?* To complete this research, a qualitative case study methodology is used and the data will be collected through semi-structured interviews. This approach allows for an in-depth analysis of personal experiences of the Iranian diaspora.

1.3 Societal Relevance

Reviewing the lasting effects of growing up under oppressive regimes can help us understand how political (re)socialisation manifests in hostile environments. If political (re)socialisation is possible in adult life, people are able to adapt their political identity. As a result, integration and assimilation is then made possible as well. Successful integration enables migrants to contribute to society, create personal economic stability, and prevents marginalisation. Furthermore, the amount of support for oppressive regimes can affect the strength of these regimes (Esen & Gumuscu, 2017). As mentioned above, Iran is known for its hard penalties for those who oppose the regime. Iran is also known for the disinformation and propaganda that go hand in hand with these penalties (Darcy, 2022). Thus, a better understanding of these processes can contribute to counteracting the adverse effects of trust in and support for Iran's oppressive government.

However, immigration does not solely affect individuals, it affects society as a whole. Immigration itself has been a topic that brings about lively debate (Van Heerden, et al., 2014; Van Amersfoort, 2020). On the one hand, there are citizens pushing for policies that bring about more restrictions for people who aim to move to the Netherlands (Van Heerden, et al., 2014). On the other hand, there is a group of citizens that is pushing for more open borders which will result in more migration (Van Heerden, et al. 2014). The apprehension to allow people who are foreign to live healthy and fulfilling lives often stems from fear of the unknown (Alves, et al., 2024). Therefore, promoting accurate information and offering a glimpse of personal accounts could moderate these negative feelings.

At a governmental level, the Dutch government has looked at the problem of Iran's usage of propaganda and alarming interventions abroad. Since the large protests accompanying the emergence of the women's rights movement in 2022, this problem has been the topic of discussion within the Dutch government more frequently (Tweede Kamer, 2022a; Tweede

Kamer, 2023). The increase of Iran's appearance in world news has led to an increased societal importance. Consequently, more and more speculation about the experiences and the effects of Iran's displays of power on citizens has come about (Tweede Kamer, 2022b). Iran uses information operations abroad to gain knowledge about the Iranian diaspora (AIVD, 2023). This allows them to track and intimidate Dutch citizens who are part of this diaspora. This research can offer an answer to questions of what factors hamper the Iranian diaspora from experiencing the freedoms that the Netherlands offers to the fullest extent. In turn, this would lead to more appropriate and accurate responses to the problems involved with Iran's influence abroad.

1.4 Scientific Relevance

Nowadays academics largely agree that some form of adaption of opinions in adult life is possible (Lersch, 2023; Stanojevic et al., 2020; Mitchell & La Parra-Casado, 2023). However, there are little scholars working on papers that focus solely on adult socialisation of migrants. When political resocialisation is researched, the concept will often be conflated with integration which places the emphasis on the acceptance of society instead of the individual (Al Shmaly, 2022). This research will advance the existing theoretical understanding of adult political socialisation by analysing whether or not the same processes of this theory can be applied to migrants. It will also provide a new perspective on political resocialisation, namely that of individual experience. By excluding integration from this research, a focus is put on individual beliefs without examining how these fit into the society they currently live in. This allows for a better examination of their individual belief systems.

This thesis adds to the current debate not only by analysing whether or not migrant political resocialisation is possible, but also by focussing on the role of political events and propaganda as the causes of change in someone's political identity. The effect of propaganda has been studied even less than migrant resocialisation while propaganda is known for brainwashing people and causing lasting changes to people's opinions (Roberts, 2018; Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024). Moreover, using participatory propaganda – a tactic of propaganda in which the participation of audiences to enhance the message of the regime – has not been studied at all within the field of political socialisation. Analysing the effects of information operations used by oppressive regimes can give us insight into whether theories should take this phenomenon into account when doing research into different diasporas than the Iranian diaspora.

In contrast to scientific evidence about the effect of propaganda, there is information available as to how political context affect people's political socialisation processes (Neundorf, 2020; Mishler & Rose, 2001). More specifically, Schuman and Corning (2012) look at how political events affect people and their experiences of memories. However, it does not investigate how these experiences are shaped through the usage and manipulation of information and knowledge by the government.

This thesis adds to the current debate by combining perceptions of political events with propaganda to study political socialisation. This research is the first to do so. Moreover, studying political socialisation in people of the Iranian diaspora in the Netherlands has also not taken place. The single case study design allows for a deep understanding of this specific context of political socialisation that has not happened in previous research.

1.5 Thesis Structure

The thesis begins with the introduction that outlines the problem definition, research question, hypotheses, and societal and scientific relevance of the study. Following the introduction, the theoretical framework and methods will be presented. The theoretical framework will start with an overview of political socialisation and move to theories on propaganda. The methodology will contain an explanation of the case study design, the choices for data collection, ethical considerations and limitations. The theories explained in chapter 2 will form the foundation for the analysis presented in chapter 4. The last chapter contains the conclusion, which answers the research question, shows the limitations of this research, gives recommendations for future research, and explains the implications that are attached to this research.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, we will delve into existing literature and outline a theoretical framework that will serve as the foundation for the empirical analysis. First, theories of political socialisation will be discussed with a focus on two specific subfields, namely: adult political socialisation and migrant political socialisation. Subsequently, the chapter will turn to propaganda and in what way and to what end it can be used as a tactic for the control of a population both in general and in the Iranian case. Lastly, the notion of the Iranian diaspora will be addressed within the context of this research.

2.1 Political Socialisation

The field of political socialisation has undergone different stages. Therefore, there are different schools of thought. Nevertheless, the authors of these different schools do agree on the nature of political socialisation research. Political socialisation can be defined as the process through which individual citizens learn, develop, and internalise a political identity (Haegel, 2020). The concept of political participation can be used as a way to measure people's involvement with politics. In other words, political participation is a way in which political socialisation can manifest. Political participation can be defined as people's voluntary actions that are aimed at influencing policies (Uhlaner, 2001). It can be direct, by running for office or joining political organisations, or it can be indirect, by increasing political knowledge and awareness or by engaging with political discussions, activism or protests.

Furthermore, the literature emphasises that this learning process of political socialisation does not happen within a vacuum, since there are agents who influence these processes. For example, parents (Durmuşoğlu, 2023; van Ditmars & Bernardi, 2023), schools (Wiseman et al., 2011), traditional and social media (Morgan et al., 2015; Ohme & De Vreese, 2020), social contexts (Dennison & Geddes, 2019; Noordzij et al, 2019), and political events or political context (Neundorf, 2020; Mishler & Rose, 2001) can influence the political identity of a person. All of the political socialisation actors affect a person's belief system and create a context specific to that person. In turn, this personal context explains their political behaviour.

The first school of thought is functionalist political socialisation. When the theory of political socialisation was introduced, studies were mainly based on young children. The main reason for this is that the expectations were that political behaviour and political orientation developed early in life and stayed the same in adulthood (Neundorf et al., 2015). Political socialisation was heavily critiqued during its early stages due to its functionalist nature. The

assumption that children are to be made into adults who need to learn the rules of the social game to be functional citizens was implied within most of the research. This theory was critiqued by people pointing out differences in political learning among people growing up largely the same. Growing up largely the same can mean that they grew up in the same neighbourhood, with the same family and going to the same schools. However, even with people who had experienced childhood highly similarly, for instance siblings, do not always hold the same political ideas and have the same political identity. Moreover, Searing et al. (1973) describe how political ideas that children had developed changed during their adulthood. This is corroborated by Dannefer (1984) who states that adulthood is not a uniform process and instead points to the social construction and production of human development as evidence for adulthood change. Additionally, this theory does not account for large cultural changes such as shifts in public opinions affecting people's progressive ideas, for instance conceptions about racism and slavery. In later research, Kiley and Vaisey (2020) set out to explain these population-wide changes in political opinion. In the 60s and 70s, the field of political socialisation almost solely consisted of the functionalist approach. As a result of the heavy criticisms the field faced, the theory of political socialisation lost some of its importance.

As a result, the same research on political socialisation was often done under the guise of different names, e.g., social reproduction, to remain credible. The field of social reproduction centres around the question why social life does not change more often or more drastically (Guhin et al., 2021). After political socialisation lost its traction, part of the question was still answered using socialisation mechanisms, because political socialisation examines these changes in social life. However, these mechanisms were not specifically named socialisation processes. In their article, Guhin et al. (2021) show that this had some drawbacks and that it led to the erasure of power dynamics, because not all things that happen, happen due to agency. Moreover, there is a loss of history within the discipline, because other research often excluded culture and context. Lastly, transferability between research is more difficult as there is no longer any shared terminology that makes these concepts easier to understand (Guhin et al., 2021). In order to regain efficacy and efficiency within research about how political identities are formed, a post-functionalist agenda was proposed. The post-functionalist agenda aimed to bring back the term political socialisation and internalise the criticisms made before it was partly discredited. Instead of only focussing on societal influence, there was now also a focus on cognition (Lizardo & Strand, 2010; Kesebir et al., 2010), the effects of conversations (Brown & Gaskins, 2014), the effect of values and norms (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004), and on ideology (Sapiro, 2004). In addition, the post-functionalist agenda allowed research to be refocused on

the causality within political socialisation hypotheses. Moreover, it has broadened our view of what political socialisation is and what mechanisms support these theories.

Nowadays, scholars largely agree that political learning does not stop when you become an adult (Lersch, 2023; Turner-Zwinkels & Brandt, 2023; Stanojevic et al., 2020). The research has expanded and now often includes adolescents, and sometimes even adults. In line with this, the impressionable years hypothesis came about. The impressionable years are thought to be between childhood and adulthood and can start as early as fourteen and end as late as twenty-five years old. The accompanying hypothesis is that due to adolescents being malleable, yet not full adults, the greatest impact on people happens during this time, called the formative years (Biesta et al., 2009; Gordon & Taft, 2011). For instance, Neundorf (2020) discusses how living under autocratic rule during their formative years impacts their opinion on different political institutions. Their political trust varies based on whether these regimes had been inclusionary or exclusionary and whether these people were so-called winners or losers within these systems. This research shows that people do gain an understanding of their political identity in their formative years and that this has an effect on how they view the world around them.

In the past years, attention was increasingly paid to facets of this research that were previously largely overlooked. For example, power dynamics and their repercussions for different inequality dimensions, e.g., gender (Gordon & Taft, 2011), race (Mijs, 2018), or socio-economic class (Neundorf, 2020). Issues such as these have created two new directions for research. The first one places the repercussions of conflict theory in political socialisation. This type of social structuring in theory assumes that all individual people can be placed in a certain social category that opposes another. Effectively, this pits people against each other. The effect is that structural differences based on these inequality dimensions can be explained based on individual experiences. To illustrate, Mijs (2018) shows that people in the same environment can infer norms differently and as a result, these people have diverse ideas on what and unequal world is and what their place is in that world. In other words, people's experiences can be used to explain inequality differently, according to similar and opposing views. Another development within the discipline is adding facets of social constructivism by paying more attention to horizontal socialisation wherein people give meaning to the world through activating their agency. An example of this is a study by Terriques et al. (2020) that looks at the effects of grassroots organisation within the socialisation process and found that horizontal socialisation works better for activating political interest. Therefore, we can conclude that people who are active in the political arena, be that politicians or activists, are more likely to influence others to expand their political identity.

The main focus of my research will be grounded in political events and the political context in which citizens grow up and are socialised. In their article, Schuman and Corning (2012) explain how experiencing transformative events during, but also after, adolescence can add to memories that are largely shared by an entire generation. For example, these events can include large protests, revolution, violent or important changes in government structure and war. The shared memories can affect a myriad of things. For instance, it can affect how people evaluate a political system, their political behaviour and also someone's willingness to take risks later in life. Besides shorter-term effects, people can also act on the experiences of these transformative events and choose to make life-changing decisions. In the case of this research, these life-changing events would lead to the choice or need to emigrate from Iran. This is what bonds the people within the Iranian diaspora who are currently first-generation immigrants in the Netherlands.

2.1.1 Adult Political Socialisation

In political socialisation, multiple theories aim to explain how political identities are formed. As mentioned before, these theories do not all agree on when and if a person's political identity stops developing. Due to the dominance of the impressionable years theory within research, adult political socialisation has yet to be well-studied. Many research papers that do include adults, look at people starting at thirty years old because people in their twenties are more likely to change, especially when they do not have a rich political background or interest. However, where the starting line of adulthood is, is debated on.

The existing literature has resulted in three main models, namely: the settled dispositions model, the active updating model, and the life course adaption model. The first and second models were realised and compared by Kiley and Vaisey (2020). The first model, the settled dispositions model, assumes that people have a settled tendency to respond in the same manner to new situations (Kiley & Vaisey, 2020). Moreover, it emphasises that the influence of dispositions acquired early in life affects their political attitudes and beliefs the most. Furthermore, according to Lersch (2023), this model suggests that these dispositions create a baseline to which a person always reverts. This model is consistent with the aforementioned functionalist trends of political socialisation as it highlights a political identity that changes during childhood and adolescence and stops developing in adulthood.

The second model, the active updating model, stands on the other side of the spectrum. Instead of assuming that people do not change their political identity, it assumes that individuals change constantly (Lersch, 2023). Furthermore, this hypothesis states that with the introduction

of new information or new experiences, a person only thinks and acts based on that new piece of information (Kiley & Vaisey). In other words, every new piece of information and every experience is integrated into a belief system. Accordingly, people do not have predispositions which they can fall back on.

In prior research, the first model usually found more support, which led to the conclusion that lasting change is rare after the impressionable years phase (Kiley & Vaisey, 2020). These claims were made using short-running panel data. However, according to Mayer (2009), long-running data is needed to read the signal while filtering out the noise. In other words, long term effects cannot be found with this type of information. As a result, it remained unclear how this long-term data would affect political identity. Therefore, the life course adaption model was introduced to fill this gap. The model was introduced by Lersch (2023) and uses the long-term data, as well as integrates different facets of the previous model into a new one.

This model does not assume that people do not change and it does not assume that people always change. Instead, lasting changes in personal culture can happen while having a largely stable belief system. According to Lersch (2023), people have a baseline regarding their opinion of a certain belief that is influenced by the environment in which someone is socialised and through the experiences they have later in life. The author emphasises that people are not empty slates without memory. In other words, the experiences you have throughout your life form you as a person. In the context of this research, this would mean that a large political event like the Iranian Revolution of 1979 can have a lasting influence on someone's political belief system even if these events happen after people leave childhood and adolescence.

2.1.2 Migrant Political Socialisation

The last subfield of political socialisation relevant to this thesis is migrant political socialisation. Existing research on this topic aims to answer the question of how people are resocialised into new political contexts. Therefore, the agents affecting political socialisation have shifted to ones that are more relevant to migrants. For instance, there are studies about the role of state policies (Ghorashi, 2005), civic organisations (Pilati & Morales, 2016), and other migrant communities (Szulecki et al., 2021). Often in these contexts, integration is used as a synonym for political socialisation. However, this term is broader and includes the level of acceptance of the society as a whole instead of focusing on the individual political identity the migrant has adopted (Al Shmaly, 2022). This results in a distorted image of the reality of the personal

political belief systems of migrants, and more specifically the changes that took place because of it.

In a study by Krasteva and Todorov (2011), the political socialisation and behaviour of immigrants in Bulgaria are tested. They display that people show one of two strategies: either migrants show support for the Bulgarian government or they abstain from most involvement in politics. The Iranian diaspora shows the same tendencies. Some Iranian Dutch people are dedicated to representing themselves and the Iranian diaspora by going into politics and others speak out against the influence Iran exerts abroad (Groen, 2019). However, there are also people who distance themselves from their political self and use self-censorship as a way to protect themselves from the Iranian government (Bolle, 2023).

This theoretical foundation can be found in other research papers as well. To illustrate, Dollmann (2022) sets out to test the resocialisation hypothesis in combination with the persistence hypothesis. On the one hand, the resocialisation hypothesis describes a process in which people who migrate are able to change according to new conditions in the host country even if political participation was discouraged or suppressed. On the other hand, the persistence hypothesis states that immigrants that migrate from countries where political participation is not supported or has been repressed or restricted, are more likely to not become involved in political processes in the host society. In his study, he does not find clear evidence for the persistence hypothesis, but cannot say with certainty that the resocialisation hypothesis is true (Dollmann, 2022). These findings are based on a differentiated picture that suggests that the level of integration of the migrant within a society determines whether they become passive or active members of a society.

The conception of migrant political socialisation hinges on the idea that migrants experience this process in a distinct way from citizens born in the Netherlands. According to White (2023), migrants have a more gradual adoption of the new political framework than native-born citizens. Furthermore, he explains that the time of arrival for these migrants also creates a unique context in which people socialise differently (White, 2023), which alludes to the importance of political events as a critical factor with which political socialisation can be explained.

For this research, we look at these differences in socialisation for migrants and evaluate the levels of trust they have for both their host country and their home country. Political trust refers to the assessments that citizens have about the institutions of a political system (Zmerli, 2014). For example, it refers to trust in the regime and trust in the political leader (Levi & Stoker, 2000). However, political trust is affected by many aspects. To illustrate, political trust

is higher when there is little corruption (Chang & Chu, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001), when the country is responsive to political problems (Porumbescu, 2015), and when there are accountability mechanisms (Andrain & Smith, 2006). Moreover, political trust in the host country can be affected by the trust someone had in their country of origin (Voicu & Tufiş, 2015). Therefore, trust can affect the ability to participate in politics (Zhu, 2023), e.g., to vote in elections, to hold positions in office, to see your opinions reflected in government, and to hope for change in the political system or in policies. These aspects are in particular significant for people who could previously not enjoy such aspects of a democracy.

However, even these people can be critical of a government and experience lowered trust as a result of violation of their rights and freedoms. This can be expressed through political cynicism (De Vreese, 2008). The concept of cynicism has been defined in many different ways. Cappella and Jamieson (1997) define it as mistrust that stems from specific leaders, political groups, or political processes. In their definition, trust is expressed in corruption and the idea that corrupt system uses and creates more corrupt people. Other authors link political cynicism to political efficacy – citizen's trust in their ability to effect governmental change and their belief that they understand and influence politics – stating that they are opposites (Niemi et al., 1991). Depending on the research project, when defining this concept, some researchers make distinctions between political cynicism towards individual persons and institutions (Erber & Lau, 1990). Due to its broadness, in this thesis, the choice has been made to use the absence of political trust resulting in disapproval of political leaders, political parties, or the political process (Miller, 1974).

2.2 Propaganda

Another factor that can influence one's political identity is propaganda. Propaganda is largely known as a tactic of misinformation, disinformation or fake news. It is a type of communication that aims to further an agenda by influencing and persuading the audience (Smith, 2024). There are different types of propaganda. Firstly, it can be selecting certain facts while leaving out other information that might be relevant to create an informed opinion (Smith, 2024). Secondly, presenting information that is objectively not true as truth is also a form of propaganda (Smith, 2024). The third type of propaganda is using rhetoric that invokes an emotional response instead of a rational one to the presented information (Smith, 2024).

These types of propaganda can all be used by states to further their agenda. Rosenfeld and Wallace (2024) describe one of the main reasons for states producing propaganda:

> "*Any government or regime that finds itself unable to propagate messages widely risks slipping quickly into irrelevance*" (Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024, p. 15.2)

In the present, we can find evidence of propaganda in authoritarian regimes. Oftentimes, these authoritarian regimes present themselves as strong and unified and, thus, irrelevance can be dangerous to its existence. If propaganda regarding government strength is not pursued by these types of regimes, the chances of attempted coups increase (Esen and Gumuscu, 2017). In other words, propaganda often strives to make sure that the rule of the regime is accepted or at least not challenged. Another way to reinforce the regime is to conceal any evidence that shows the state partakes in state violence or to portray this type of violence in such a way that it seems like its goal is to protect the citizens from disorder (Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024).

When propaganda tactics do not use violence as a part of their messaging, this propaganda is called persuasive propaganda. Persuasive propaganda can appear in many forms and can be used for different reasons. On many occasions, regimes start with controlling the media. Over time, many scholars have shown that state-controlled media can shape political attitudes and behaviour (Stockman & Gallagher, 2011; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Little, 2017). For instance, Carter and Carter (2021) show that propaganda is able to discourage dissent, specifically on the short-term. It is important to note that propaganda can be effective, even when people are aware of the fact that the media is controlled by the government (Syunyaev, 2022). Moreover, Pan et al. (2022) show that the framing of a policy issues can shift public attitudes.

Besides this type of propaganda, dominating propaganda can also be used by states. States who use this type of propaganda use it to instil fear by spreading information about the violence they commit in order to appear stronger (Huang, 2018). In other words, governments that use dominating propaganda, do not have the goal to persuade people that the government is good, but rather have the goal to warn its citizens about the strength of the government (Huang, 2015).

Besides aiming to influence people's opinion of leadership, propaganda can be used to try to influence people's thoughts in multiple other aspects of life. One of these aspects is education. Especially when education is monitored, it has the ability to socialise them with the values of the regime. In doing so, it can increase the levels of nationalism and loyalty (Darden & Grzymala-Busse, 2006) and aid in the demonisation of a government's enemies (Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024). To be as effective as possible, states can introduce ideological coherence into the equation, as this can help the process of indoctrination (Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024). Ideological coherence refers to the consistency of beliefs and values related to an ideology

(Coveyou & Piereson, 1977). If governments use strategies of ideological coherence in messaging, the ideological beliefs can be internalised more easily (Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024).

Especially in authoritarian regimes, propaganda is often interlinked with censorship according to Rosenfeld and Wallace (2024). They explain the difference as propaganda being the altering of information while censorship describes the process of banning particular information. However, a study by Roberts (2018) classifies overloading information channels with positive news as censorship, showing that it is difficult to separate these two concepts in practice. His reasoning for doing so is that it makes it more difficult for people to access the right information. Thereby, the costs to access information are increased.

In order for governments to know where the danger to their government originates from, surveillance techniques are used. Surveillance can provide necessary data about where dissent is located and what messaging is needed to combat it (Michaelsen, 2017). Combining surveillance and propaganda can therefore be effective in minimising opposition.

The previous sections have shown what propaganda is, how it works and how it can be applied. Beyond this framework, there have been studies on the effect of predispositions on the effectiveness of propaganda tactics. Numerous studies provide evidence for the hypothesis that if citizens have predispositions that are in line with the messaging of the propaganda, the effectiveness of the messaging is higher. To illustrate, in a study by Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018), they find that messaging put forward by the Russian regime on pro-Russian parties is more effective when these people are already pro-Russian. Research in line with these findings provide the foundation for the theoretical frame that someone's predispositions are salient later in life.

2.2.1 Participatory Propaganda

Participatory propaganda is a form of propaganda that uses the participation of audiences to enhance the message of the regime (Asmolov, 2019). Due to increased connectivity, as a result of the emergence of the internet, individuals as well as states have started to look for new ways of sharing information. Furthermore, it has changed the way people interact with the information they are provided. Social media and online chatrooms, among other examples, allow people to be in contact around the globe and help spread information more quickly. The new pathways can also be abused with malicious intent and used to spread propaganda.

Participatory propaganda is an example of this. This type of propaganda aims to trigger engagement and create a connection between the creator of the content and the audience (Wanless & Berk, 2021). The participation of audiences can be triggered through content that

evokes extreme emotions (Spring et al., 2018). In turn, these extreme emotions evoke a response and these responses can be seen by other people who engage with content that elicit emotions in them which makes the cycle start again.

Participatory propaganda is often linked to echo chambers in which the same type of content is pushed and recreated (Wanless & Berk, 2021). Participatory propaganda in echo chambers works due to the frequency in which the same information is repeated. Algorithms that pick up on trends in the content you consume can also play into participatory propaganda through pushing certain content (Brady & Crockett, 2019), targeted ads (Matz et al., 2017), and through gaming of search results (Metaxas, 2009). In this way, social media amplification is used to further propagandist messaging.

Outside of echo chambers and algorithms, participatory propaganda works somewhat differently. Instead of relying on the frequency of messaging, it uses the relationships people have and corrupts one or more person(s) of that group to deliver the government's messages. The reason this works is because people are more likely to trust recommendations from their personal social circles (Wanless & Berk, 2021). Moreover, these types of messaging are less easy to filter out or ignore because it is often shared by people you trust.

In the case of Iran, they use participatory propaganda both offline and online. In online spaces, misinformation and disinformation is shared and encouraged to be reposted. Offline, members of the Iranian diaspora are sought out and sometimes threatened to agree to be a mole and report back with information (Groen, 2019). This scare tactic is also deployed as a way to exert influence over the Iranian diaspora with the goal of making sure that they remain silent on their experiences with the Iranian regime.

2.2.2 Iranian Propaganda Tactics

In addition to recruiting (former) Iranian citizens to spread propaganda, Iran also has other tactics to exert influence abroad. Iranian propaganda consists of multiple types of propaganda. While the regime influences education and information channels, it is also known to use domination that is somewhat disguised as propaganda. The goal of this tactic is to instil fear in the recipients of the news; it takes a step beyond brainwashing and makes the threats of a regime a reality (Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024). In the past, Iran has used this tactic through making it known that they are making arrests. Additionally, Iran has used these tactics to let the public know that after these arrests, people are tortured or executed, further scaring people into compliance. The women's rights protests from 2022 were followed by a wave of arrests and executions. The reasoning for these measures was not extensively communicated and due to

both uncertainty about and the heavy hand Iran used to squash these protests, the movement has resulted in little change within Iranian society.

However, this type of domination propaganda is not the only tactic employed by Iran. As mentioned above, it can prove difficult to separate censorship from propaganda. One form of censorship that the Iranian government uses which can be classified under either term, is the controlling of internet access. In addition to controlling access to the internet, Iran has the capacity to both monitor and block certain websites or block internet connections (Rhodes & Chao, 2009). In their article, Rhodes and Chao (2009) also emphasise that current technology has allowed them to create a well-running system of censorship platforms. As a result, information hardly reaches other parts of the world and communication is increasingly difficult. For instance, during the protests for women's rights in 2022, messaging emanating from Iran was sparse, exactly due to these restrictions of internet access. However, the opposite is also true: due to the censorship, information from other parts of the world is also less likely to end up with Iranian citizens.

This is evidence of the fact that propaganda and Iranian influence in general extends far beyond Iran itself. The influence Iranian propaganda has worldwide reach is also demonstrated through Iranian state-controlled media that target audiences not living in Iran. To do so, programming is made available in different languages. The content of these channels is often antidemocratic and sometimes even spread conspiracy theories.

One reason the Iranians aim to influence beyond the reaches of its borders is due to the Iranian diaspora. The Iranian diaspora is a concept with an ambiguous definition. Research regarding those who left Iran used to use words such as exile, transnational, and some that are still more commonly accepted, immigrant and immigration. The term diaspora alludes to the ongoing migration out of Iran (Elahi & Karim, 2011). Within this research, the choice has been made to refer to this group of people as the diaspora. Due to the fact that it encapsulates the ties with distance. Thus, it shows the connection to the space they grew up in. Due to its distance from the blame that comes with other words such as persecution and punishment, diaspora will be used. In this way the link with their life before is not severed and instead highlighted.

2.4 Expectations

In the previous paragraphs, the use of political socialisation within general research and within studies on migration and refugees has been explained. This research uses the post-functionalism school of thought which allows for development and expansion of the political socialisation theories. Moreover, it allows for agency, cognition, and societal influence to be included.

Additionally, theories on propaganda have been explained. Based on these theories, expectations arise about the political behaviours of the Iranian diaspora. In other words, the aim of the study is to explain to what extent the Iranian propaganda tactics influence the political resocialisation processes of the Iranian diaspora in the Netherlands as a result of Iran's intimidation techniques abroad.

The first stage of this study is to map what the personal context of growing up in Iran looked like for the Iranian diaspora. The people within the Iranian diaspora are expected to not be in support of the Iranian regime and this is what resulted in them leaving Iran behind. Most political socialisation agents are predicted to have put forth conservative norms in support for the regime.

The second stage of the research is to explain whether or not the political behaviour and belief system of people within the Iranian diaspora remain unchanged from childhood and adolescence. The expectations for this research are to find that the Iranian diaspora abides by either of the two strategies of migration, namely showing support for the Dutch government or abstaining from political involvement. As the focus of the research is people who have Dutch citizenship, these people are expected to be integrated into society. Therefore, the presumption is that the Iranian diaspora in the Netherlands had a second process of acquiring a political orientation.

Therefore, we can hypothesise that there will be discrepancies between the early-life political socialisation and the adult political socialisation. If this resocialisation perspective is proven, the expectation would be that the Iranian diaspora should be able to adapt to Dutch society and show a modification in their political belief system that differs from how it was in Iran. However, because propaganda is manipulative at its core, it is expected that some of the messaging of the Iranian government has been deeply engrained within the personal belief system of the Iranian diaspora in the Netherlands. Therefore, predispositions acquired early in life are expected to still have an impact on a person's political self.

3. Methodology

In this chapter, I will outline the methodology that this research used to answer the research question *'What is the effect of encountering propaganda and witnessing political events on migrant (re)socialisation in the Iranian Diaspora?'.* The chapter will start with an explanation of the methodological approach; it gives an overview of what a qualitative case study entails. The following section will discuss the research strategy: deductive coding. Subsequently, interviews as a process of data collection will be highlighted. The chapter will conclude with ethical considerations, and methodological reflections or limitations of this research.

3.1 Methodological Approach

The aim of this research is to find to what extent (re)socialisation takes place in people who have migrated. Moreover, it aims to provide insight into what this process looks like and how it happens. Accordingly, for this research, I have opted for a qualitative methodology. This type of methodology is equipped to deal with providing an explanation for processes that produce outcomes as opposed to solely looking at outcomes (Powner, 2015). In this case, I am researching the explanation of the effect of encountering propaganda on migrant (re)socialisation. The possible outcomes are support for the host country's political system or abstaining from participating in those politics. At the other end of the spectrum, there are quantitative approaches. These are primarily used for causal approaches that place their focus on the outcomes of the processes (Powner, 2015). Thus, this type of approach would not suit the research question or the aim of the research.

In addition to making a choice between quantitative and qualitative research approaches, there is also a choice between types of research epistemologies. In academic tradition, there are different methods of interviewing that correspond to different paradigms within research, two of them are positivism and interpretivism. On the one hand, positivism posits that knowledge is acquired through empirical observation (Lin, 2005). The aim of positivist researchers is to collect data that is observable and measurable, as well as replicable (Alharahshes & Pius, 2020). Their questions are often closed-ended, leading to data that is easier to compare and, according to them, less biased. On the other hand, interpretivism is grounded in the idea that our reality is constructed and thus relative (Lin, 2005). In other words, people's reality can only be understood by mapping their experience of said reality. Researchers who subscribe to this paradigm tend to use more open-ended questions and are less structured in the questions they ask. This corresponds to their aim to understand subjective meanings (Alharahshes & Pius,

2020). For this thesis, interpretivism will be used. This type of research epistemology is best suited to give an insight into people's life experiences and can account for the way that they interact with the world around them. As a result, their personal understanding of what it means to be a political individual and to have a political identity can be uncovered. This allows for a comparison between subjective experiences of reality instead of trying to compare objective truths. Especially because the inclusion of the concept of propaganda makes looking at objective truths difficult, interpretivism is more fit for the purpose of this research.

3.2 Research Design: Case Study

This research employs a qualitative case study design. Case studies are valuable, as they can offer new insights into existing theories (Gerring, 2004). When different researchers apply case studies to the same theory, we can eventually gain a better understanding of the specific workings of that theory. Moreover, Gerring (2007) highlights that a case study approach can further existing knowledge by giving a comprehensive overview and analysis of detailed and complex information. Additionally, a case study can be used to explore complex theory. Case studies can also be used to apply these complex theories to a real-life context. Therefore, they can provide insight into how and why certain phenomena occur.

One type of case study design is the single-case study. Single case-studies are concerned with causal mechanisms and processes (Rohlfing, 2012). In comparison, a case study design with multiple case studies tries to uncover whether or not a certain factor has a causal effect (Rohlfing, 2012). As the aim of this research project is to look at the process of political socialisation in migrants, the former is able to more clearly give insights into this phenomenon. One of the drawbacks of using case studies to test theories is that the generalisability is low. However, we can learn about the applicability of theories based on research using single case studies.

Besides the decision to use a single-case study, there is also a decision to be made between ideographic versus nomothetic case studies. Ideographic case studies aim to describe, interpret, and understand a case (Rohlfing, 2012). Therefore, this type of case study often places its focus on rare events and are emphasising the outcome of a process rather than the process itself. In contrast, nomothetic case studies are theory centred. This results in a research project that is able to contribute to the advancement of the general theory (Rohfling, 2012). In line with the explanations for the former decisions, this study uses a nomothetic case study.

For this thesis, the case of Iran and the Iranian diaspora has been selected. The theoretical foundations regarding political socialisation and propaganda, as described in chapter two, are applied to this case. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the increase in persecution of politically active citizens, many of these citizens decided to or were forced to flee. As a result, people moved all over the world to find safety; there is now a large Iranian diaspora. Many of them opted to move to European countries with democracies. Therefore, there is also a subsection of the Iranian diaspora that found their new home in the Netherlands. The move from Iran to the Netherlands means that there are two possible countries in which political socialisation processes have taken place.

Additionally, Iran's oppressive and religious regime creates a research opportunity befitting this thesis in two regards. First, the political system of Iran is structured differently than the Dutch political system. This results in a clear distinction that can be made by the people of the Iranian diaspora. Consequently, a new political system will have been discovered by them with new context which allows for a second political socialisation process. Second, the Iranian regime limits the information that enters and leaves the country. As a result, the government of Iran has used propaganda in order to make sure this is the case. For these reasons, Iran has been chosen as the case study for this research.

3.3 Data Collection: Interviews

In order to complete the analysis, two formation processes of political attitudes need to be mapped: those acquired during childhood and adolescence, and those acquired during and after arrival in the country they have emigrated to. The information about early-life political socialisation experienced in Iran helps to create a baseline from which adult life changes after migration can be indicated. Usable data should include information about the effects of propaganda and political events. As shown in chapter 2, there is little data about these effects, especially from people in the Iranian diaspora.

Due to the unavailability of data with these requirements, especially in large quantities, qualitative research methods will be used. More specifically, qualitative interviews will be conducted. Using interviews as a method will generate the needed unique primary data to later draw conclusions that will answer the main question (Legard et al., 2011). Moreover, interviews can offer more in-depth information about this topic, than readily available information could. In-depth qualitative information has the benefit of furthering contextual understanding. This contextual understanding embeds decisions and shows the justifications of choices that are

made by people of the Iranian diaspora. This will help with interpreting the meaning of the data because it creates a deeper understanding about how they make decisions.

During interviews, knowledge is created and it is negotiated (Legard et al, 2011). In doing so, feelings, motivations and meanings can be explored both explicitly in the text as well as implicitly in the subtext. Furthermore, there is the option of clarification in interviewing, leading to a higher validity and reliability of the data.

The interviews will be held with ordinary citizens. In this case, ordinary citizens refers to people who do not have expertise about the theories that are being tested. Therefore, the people will be asked about their experiences with seeking refuge and building a new political identity in a new country. People participating in these types of interviews share their experiences. In turn, these experiences can be placed within a narrative (Muylaert et al., 2014). This narrative has been created on the basis of their political identity and serves as context for their behaviour and for their answers.

To determine this narrative, a structure for the interviews has been set up. This structure can be found in appendix one and is based on the theoretical explanations and expectations as written in chapter two. The table has been broken up into themes with corresponding questions. These themes are background information, early-life political socialisation, experience of Iranian propaganda in early-life, migrant political socialisation, and experience of Iranian propaganda. The questions that have been written down are broad as to allow for diverging answers that are compatible with the lives the interviewees have lived. For example, for the theme early life political socialisation, one of the questions is: *Do you feel as though you have lived through big political changes in Iran in your childhood? If so, can you describe these political events?* A subsequent effect of making these questions broad is that it when the same answers are given by multiple people, the chances of those answers being of significance is higher.

The interviews will follow a semi-structured approach. This means that guiding questions, both open-ended and closed-ended, and certain discussion themes and topics have been prepared. Due to the semi-structured nature of the research, some questions that were asked in the interviews are not included. Based on the answers that the respondent gives, the interview questions may vary between interviewees. The disadvantage is that the type of information might differ between people (Leech, 2002b). However, the advantage is that the interview can be personalised to an individual's personal experience, and in turn, this enhances the authenticity of the collected data. The semi-structured approach aims to find a middle

ground between the two paradigms. This allows for structure as well as flexibility (Leech, 2002a).

3.3.1 Sampling Strategy

People who are part of the Iranian diaspora have chosen to move away or have been forced to. There are different explanations for the Iranian diaspora to have moved: some may have fled due to fear of persecution by the Iranian government, others may have moved because the ideology of the Iranian state did not align with their own morals, some may have gotten job opportunities abroad, and others may have had entirely other reasons for moving (Cohen & Yefet, 2021). Conversely, what the interviewees in this thesis do have in common is that they have been politically socialised in two different regimes; one during their childhood and adolescence and one during their later years.

For this research, twenty years old will be the cut-off line for moving to the Netherlands, because the main formative years of the participants will still be experienced in Iran. As a result, the participants will still experience their adult political socialisation process in the Netherlands. Moreover, all of the participants will have had rich political backgrounds, having moved as a result of persecution. Additionally, all of the interviewees are currently above the age of 30 and have lived in the Netherlands for at least five years. Five years is the minimum time spent living in the Netherlands to apply for Dutch citizenship. This parameter ensures that the people will have been able to adapt their political identity by creating their own understanding of political life in their new country of residence. Additionally, by being a Dutch citizen, they have had the opportunity to participate in Dutch society in a multitude of ways, e.g., engaging in discussions regarding Dutch politics, voting or running for office. Lastly, there were no requirements with regards to gender as there were no specific signs in the existing theories that these differences would impact the results.

The people were contacted through postings on LinkedIn, postings on other social media, and through contacting acquaintances. Due to the fact that this target group is difficult to reach, the snowball method is used. The starting point of the snowball method is the selection of the first people who will be interviewed; they are chosen based on the criteria mentioned above. These participants are then asked to propose others who fit the category. As a result, the sample size is increased.

In total, seven interviews were conducted, all lasting about one hour, ranging in age, migration age, and gender. The sample contains three women and four men and are now between the ages of 40 and 71 years old. They left Iran between 1983 and 2006, meaning that

none of the participants left the country prior to the Iranian revolution that took place in 1979. Six of the participants have left Iran with the status of political refugees and one left to study abroad and to live in a place with more freedoms and rights.

Of the seven interviews, five took place at their house, one at their workplace, and one in my own home. All of the possible participants were given the choice of location and a range in times and dates to meet them. For most of the interviews, I travelled to their work or home. This was a conscious decision which allowed them to talk about their past in a space that was safe to them. However, for one of the interviews it was impractical to do so because of time and travel restraints. Additionally, this interview took place in the weekend and as a result it was not possible to meet at a neutral place such as the university.

3.4 Research Strategy

In order to interpret the results of the interviews, deductive coding will be used. Codes are used to identify themes in the data (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Deductive coding uses existing theories to create coding schemes (Adeoye-Olatunde & Olenik, 2021). Research that uses deductive coding aims to understand to what extent the patterns within existing theory correspond with the data generated by the interviews (Adeoye-Olatunde & Olenik, 2021). In other words, this type of coding is concept-driven and is based on the themes and theories from the theoretical chapter.

The first step is to identify a set of codes based on existing literature which represent concepts or themes that you are expecting to find in the data (Adeoye-Olatunde & Olenik, 2021). In Appendix 2, you can find the full coding scheme. This scheme uses the theoretical foundations of chapter two to figure out what codes can help uncover relevant themes. The coding scheme is divided into themes: categories and indicators. The themes are split into two sections. The first section deals with the early-life political socialisation as a whole, which is then split into political opinion in early-life and the experience of propaganda in early-life. The second section deals with the adult migrant political (re)socialisation and is structured largely the same with the addition of reason for migration.

The coding scheme has been divided into themes with their own subcategories that all have certain indicators. The second step is to apply these predefined codes to the data that has been collected (Adeoye-Olatunde & Olenik, 2021). These codes are applied using Atlas.ti, a software designed for conducting qualitative analyses.

Once the data has been coded, the coded data is analysed to identify patterns, themes and relationships across all the interviews. This type of analysis is called thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is used to gather information regarding people's views, opinions, values and experiences. Therefore, it is a suitable type of analysis for this research paper. The final step is to interpret the findings to answer the main research question.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

Conducting interviews raises ethical questions regarding consent, confidentiality, and privacy. In order to ensure that all participants are aware of what will happen to their data, they have signed a document outlining their rights concerning this collected data. In addition, a second document will give an overview of the aim of this research study, what participation entails, how data is collected and handled, and it will mention how they can revoke their consent. The full documents can be found in appendix 4.

Additionally, all participants will remain anonymous to ensure their safety and allow them to be more open about their experiences without facing possible danger. The danger for these participants is that their information can be linked to them by the Iranian government. The Iranian government actively tries to minimise the amount of negative information spread about their regime. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, they use tactics to censor and intimidate political refugees abroad. In some cases, people who have spoken out against Iran have been executed, both within and outside of Iran. The transcriptions of these interviews will be nameless to protect the identity of the participants; they will be referred to as R# based on the order in which the interviews have taken place.

Besides careful handling of information, there is also the concern of reopening old emotional wounds. The reasons for fleeing boils down to fear of the Iranian government. Moreover, some of the participants have fled due to emotionally distressing experiences. Delving into this topic can remind them of these painful memories. In order to limit the chances of re-traumatisation, all people have been informed both prior and during the interview that participation is entirely voluntary and that it is possible to stop the recording or the interview at any time. If the interview would result in re-traumatisation, the participants were asked to let me know in order for me to redirect them to an organisation that was able to help, e.g., *Victim Support Netherlands.* These procedures are enforced to make sure that the procedure is ethical and the given consent is informed.

3.7 Limitations

While interviews can provide nuanced perspectives and subjective experiences, there are limitations to be addressed when using this type of methodology. This research relies on human contact. Therefore, there will be biases that cannot be avoided. One of these researcher biases stems from the fact that I am someone who was born in the Netherlands and am therefore not Iranian. As a result, I cannot relate to their lived experiences. In order to mitigate this, the questions are asked as openly as possible. It will give the participants an opportunity to interpret the questions instead of placing an interpretation in the question. Moreover, using deductive instead of inductive coding enables me to base the themes and the discussion on existing literature instead of using the interviews to find them which would lead to additional bias.

However, aiming for neutrality or complete objectivity is not the goal of this interviewing technique. This research uses the subjective experiences of people to understand their political experiences, behaviour, and personality which are inherently biased. Navigating these biases will be done by acknowledging them and minimising their impact on the results, rather than aiming to avoid them.

One of the biases that can emerge in interviewing is the social desirability bias. This entails that participants may give answers that they perceive as desirable as dictated by culture, experiences or beliefs in general (Nederhof, 1985). The adapting or filtering of responses can be minimised by framing questions neutrally and not explaining their statements back to them. Moreover, by asking them to elaborate, their feelings and thought processes become explicit, leading to different, but insightful new data.

Moreover, the snowball method resulted in the selection of mainly political refugees, skewing the sample to people who already showed to be interested in politics. However, most of the people who are part of the Iranian diaspora are political refugees as these are a group of people that are granted citizenship more easily. It has resulted in a sample from which we can guess at the differences for the different reasons, but not say them with certainty.

Due to time limitations, it was not possible to create a large pool of data. The process of interviewing combined with locating people to interview is time-consuming. Consequently, while the findings offer valuable insights into the experiences of people within the Iranian diaspora, they may not capture the experiences of those in different cultures or different countries. Therefore, the aim is not to broadly generalise the results, but rather to understand this process while reflecting on the explanations that the theory provides within the context of the Iranian diaspora.

4. Shaping Political Identity: Experiences of Propaganda and Political Events

In this chapter, the results of the analysis of the interviews will be discussed in relation to the theories described in chapter two. This analysis will be structured according to the coding scheme that can be found in appendix 3, in order to answer the research question: *'What is the effect of encountering propaganda and witnessing political events on migrant (re)socialisation in the Iranian Diaspora?'* in chapter five. The first section of this chapter will give an overview of the early-life political socialization as experienced by the participants. This is followed by a discussion of the experience of propaganda during their time in Iran. The first section will conclude with an explanation of the political opinions that the participants hold. The second section is largely structured in the same way, but it discusses these topics with regard to their time spent in the Netherlands. The chapter will conclude with a discussion on how the results relate to the expectations described in chapter 2.

4.1 Early-life Political Socialisation

4.1.1 Iranian Context

To start the analysis, we first need to understand the predispositions that political socialisation has created during the participants' childhood and adolescence. As described in the theoretical chapter, an individual's political identity is made and created by different socialisation agents. The experience of childhood and adolescence was different for all of the participants. There were people who grew up rich and there were people who had limited amount of funds. Additionally, they grew up in different parts of Iran and had different levels of education. The participants had differing levels of support from family and different support systems in the form of neighbours and peers. However, while these socialisation agents differed between people, there are common themes that have been discerned. This is due to the fact that they largely grew up in the same political and cultural context. These themes can be found along the lines of experiences with political events and political intervention.

In order to understand how people in Iran interact with politics and form their opinions, we need to take a look at this political and cultural context. The people in the sample who were politically active during the time that the shah ruled over Iran reported that their political interest and political awareness started when they encountered large differences between the way they were living their lives and what they were seeing in society. This was reported on in both directions, meaning that on the one hand people who were poor saw the inequality compared to people who were wealthy. On the other hand, people who lived wealthy lives also saw the

poignant differences when comparing their lives to people who had trouble making ends meet. For example, respondent 2 explained:

> *"What I was wearing, what I was drinking, what I was wearing, clothing, but also vacations, you could see enormous differences […]. That is how it started for me, that difference was so incredibly large between children whose parents worked at the national Iranian oil company and children whose parents did not" (Respondent 2, May 8, 2024).*

For people who did not interact with politics until the Islamic Republic of Iran was founded, this political awareness grew when they were experiencing oppression themselves, instead of seeing it in the world.

Once political interest and political awareness were sparked, the participants started growing their political knowledge, through reading, mostly illegal, books shared among people who were part of political organisations. Afterwards, they learned through reading essays, newspapers, or pamphlets.

> *"From a young age, I started reading books and I started writing […]. Of course, when you are growing up, you slowly start to have political opinions. You learn that from what you have heard, read, but also partly because of the writers who were advocates for freedom and democracy" (Respondent 4, May 15, 2024).*

Out of the seven participants, five were affiliated with left-wing and Marxist groups during the time of the shah. The other participants became politically active later in life, after the revolution and in the Netherlands. The political organisations were a place where ideas could freely be shared. Due to the risks that being part of these organisations introduces, there needed to be unwavering trust within these organisations. In order to achieve this, you needed to have acquaintances that could vouch for you and your reliability. As a result, these settings were one of the only true safe spaces within Iran to advocate for freedom, democracy, and modernisation. It was dangerous to be affiliated with these organisations, especially when all of these organisations became illegal. Becoming a part of political organisations like these is highly dependent on situational opportunity. According to the participants, if you are not in an environment where you can trust people enough to express your political views, it is less likely that you will end up with opportunities to learn more about the world outside of the misinformation put forward by the Iranian government.

> "*From the revolution onwards, because my family […] was in contact with certain organisations in Iran. […]. I wanted to do something […]. I started handing out flyers*

and going to many protests […] and after I started going to gatherings and listened" (Respondent 6, May 25, 2024).

Nonetheless, the goal of these organisations was to convince all of the Iranian population to join in their efforts to change the political and societal landscape. As stated, the poverty and distance between the poorest and the richest people of Iran led to large inequalities. The poverty in combination with the level of illiteracy, meant that the people who were politically active were mostly found in the universities and among rich people who followed values of freedom, democracy and equality. Consequently, writing and spreading books did not reach the people these organisations wanted to mobilise. As a result, the political participation turned to mean going on the streets to protest.

4.1.2 Political Events

Besides personal experiences of societal oppression and societal problems, political socialisation can also be affected by political events or the larger political culture. As explained in the theoretical chapter, these events can affect people largely the same through shared memories (Schuman and Corning, 2012). When people are socialised in the same environment during the same large events, public opinion in combination with emotion leads to people assessing these events similarly. The participants were asked what they experienced to be important political events in Iran. Almost all participants had largely the same answers, namely: the revolution, changes in government officials, and the war. According to Schuman and Corning (2012), such political events that are embedded in the larger political and cultural context, as illustrated above, can affect people's trust in political systems, political behaviour and their willingness to take risks.

The revolution had two effects on people depending on their starting point and predispositions. If the person was already actively against the government in the time of the shah, the person's trust in the government of Iran decreased and this further pushed that person into the leftist groups they were a part of. In other words, they were campaigning for a more democratic process during the time of the shah and when the revolution led to a more oppressive regime, they became more embedded in the leftist organisations. If the person supported the government when the shah was in charge, trust for the government turned into mistrust. This was the case for respondent 7 (May 27, 2024), stating that:

"We were raised with freedom and, therefore, we could not live with the new government, in the new Iran that was taken over by the Islamic regime."

There were no participants who reported that their political trust increased as a result of the revolution in Iran.

In addition to the revolution, there have been many changes in government structure, as a result of the revolution, and in government officials in the history of Iran. Nonetheless, the people that were interviewed largely pointed to the same people when denoting changes in government officials that elicited political shocks. Among these are the changes from ayatollah Khomeini to ayatollah Khamenei and the presidential election of Khatami, a political reformer. The change from Khomeini to Khamenei was largely seen as neutral as the two ayatollahs held the same values. However, the presidential election of Khatami elicited differing responses. Those participants who mentioned this change, noted that there was an increase in hope for change in society. According to them, this change should mean that people gained more freedoms, illustrated by respondent 1 stating:

> *"They said if he comes to power, a lot will change. He will give freedom to the youth and he is a political reformist, so his politics will be more moderate, and nothing will be as strict" (Respondent 1, May 1, 2024).*

Despite this initial hope for a change in the politics of Iran, this did not last. Unfortunately, people were confronted with the limitations of power that are given to the presidents in Iran. Due to the fact that the ayatollah was still the supreme religious leader, one respondent said:

> *"They are just two sides of the same coin, because in Iran, the religious leader decides everything" (Respondent 2, May 8, 2024).*

None of the participants viewed protests that took place when they were living in Iran as large political events. Instead, protests were viewed merely as a way to express discontentment. They did not view it as something that could make changes:

> *"There is no hope, but sometimes you have to show that you are dissatisfied" (Respondent 2, May 8, 2024).*

This lack of hope is a recurring theme and for some people this stems from the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq. The people of Iran did not want a war and the participants explained that it brought hopelessness, poverty, and scarcity. Furthermore, the war took many Iranian lives. Due to the fact that the Iranian government did not take accountability for these problems and did not aim to solve them, it led to a lack of hope for change. This lack of hope translated into mistrust of the government, because not ending the war was in direct conflict with what the majority of Iranian citizens wanted.

4.1.3 Religion and Political Intervention

In line with these findings, there were two themes that emerged from the interviews that had not been explicitly mentioned in the theoretical chapter. The first one is aversion to religion and the second one is political intervention. During the interviews, the answers often veered to religion, because the current government of Iran is built on religious values. Even though the country is now called the Islamic Republic of Iran, none of the participants were raised religiously.

> *"Iranians are actually not religious. Especially not us. I have never seen the inside of a mosque and neither has my father or my mother" (Respondent 7, May 27, 2024).*

While most of them were given the choice by their parents whether they wanted to pursue religion, not one of the participants wanted to follow that path. Therefore, adapting to a new Islamic society was difficult and the effect on people's lives was widespread:

> *"The Islamic tsunami had an immense impact on our lives, on our freedom, on my family, society, rights, duties, and chances of development and growth" (Respondent 7, May 27, 2024).*

Consequently, when the Islamic republic was established, these citizens were the one who became political activists. Conservative religious values from the new religious leaders were placed on society and not conforming to the new laws would lead to public shaming or arrests. Thus, the revolution meant that politics and religion were inextricably linked.

Physical political intervention is closely linked with, but separate from propaganda. Physical political intervention is aimed to scare the audience into submission by actions whereas propaganda does so by using words (Bloom & Woodcock, 2021). Intervention by the government is prevalent in dictatorial governments. For this analysis, three indicators have been selected that point to the category of intervention. These are regime intervention, regime punishment, and oppression. All of the participants have lost people they are close to as a result of intervention by the Iranian government. People have been arrested and executed due to their affiliation with leftist political organisations since the time of the shah. For some people this was a reason to keep being politically active. However, for other people this showed how dangerous the work was they were doing.

> *"Then I saw that my […] friends and acquaintances, some were just in prison, some were executed, but some were in prison. When they were back and they found me and […] I thought […] if I want to keep staying there with those connections […] that will just be more dangerous" (Respondent 5, May 21, 2024).*

Participants had been harassed at work, fired, and deemed social outcasts. For most people, leaving Iran was not the initial choice. Instead, they moved to other parts of the country to effectively go into hiding. Eventually, this was also not a viable option, and they chose to leave the country.

4.1.4 Propaganda

In the theoretical framework, different forms of propaganda are mentioned, namely: government propaganda, or traditional propaganda, and participatory propaganda. All of the participants encountered government propaganda in the media: on tv, in newspapers, and in books.

> *"On TV, of course in the news, because you always hear a coloured version of the news. You don't hear, you don't hear everything. You hear the news from their perspective. They pretend that something has happened, for example that they are destroyed or that they have many enemies that they are victims of the West" (Respondent 1, May 1, 2024).*

Participants noted that they thought propaganda on TV and in other media was easily distinguished from the truth. A majority explained that the misinformation was so blatant when comparing it to the reality they encountered daily, that they found it laughable and amusing in addition to finding the implications regrettable.

However, media is not the only place where the government used classic propaganda tactics. For instance, Respondent 1 mentioned that propaganda was very prevalent in education:

> *"I especially noticed this at school, because at school we are taught that the West is our enemy. We hear about it from an early age, from the first grade of primary school until we leave school. We have to start every morning with death to America, death to Israel. We always start […] the school day routine with standing in rows and then reading the Quran […] and everyone repeats it […] and then a speech by someone, a school principal or someone who says something about religion or the government and what we should do as young people" (Respondent 1, May 1, 2024).*

This type of indoctrination and usage of drills is explained by theory as a narrative-controlled education (Darden & Grzymala-Busse, 2006). As a result, children who are now growing up in Iran are only fed a narrative that has been edited to suit the story the regime are trying to put forward. In addition, this quote shows that they are trying to demonise their enemies with the goal to create an us and a them. This form of othering can organise people and can result in more support for the in-group and create more in-group trust.

Most people viewed the usage of propaganda negatively. However, one of the respondents who was a supporter of the shah, explained that they thought that during that time, the government did not spread enough propaganda. When asked why, they explained that they thought that all the modernisation in Iran as a result of the policies of the shah were not promoted enough. To them, it was blatantly obvious that life in Iran after the revolution was much worse than life before, that showing support for the political system before the revolution was the only sensible choice.

In line with the expectations of the theoretical chapter, there was no direct evidence that participatory propaganda was used during their time in Iran. Moreover, this did not seem to be a goal of the Iranian government. Since the revolution, the focus of the propaganda within Iran was mainly to limit the amount of outside information that was entering Iran in order to enforce support from the population.

From the data, we learn that people's early-life political socialisation was dependent on the political awareness they had. In turn, the level of awareness was largely influenced by the people they surrounded themselves with. The political participation that the respondents exhibited was largely the result of how unequal they deemed society to be. Moreover, we can conclude that the political events that people interpreted as influential, had an effect on the levels of trust they had in the government. All of these things affected their early-life political socialisation. However, according to the respondents, propaganda did not have Iran's intended effect. Instead of changing their minds, propaganda caused outrage and disbelief leading to lowered levels of trust.

4.2 Migrant Political (Re-)Socialisation

4.2.1 Dutch Context

The following section aims to explain whether or not the individual belief systems of the participants remain unchanged after moving to the Netherlands. To understand whether this is the case, we start with their initial arrival and slowly move to their current experiences with both Dutch and Iranian politics. In doing so, we learn more about whether their predispositions changed after the move to the Netherlands and, if this is the case, how this happened.

All participants, except for one, were political refugees. For them, their safety as a result of fear for persecution was the main reason for considering to seek refuge in another country. The choice for the Netherlands was mostly motivated by opportunity, based on acquaintances and family members that were already settled there. Because they often had no prior plans to

specifically choose the Netherlands, the only opinion most of the interviewees had, was that it was a country with more freedoms and rights than Iran.

> *"She contacted me to come study in the Netherlands, because the Netherlands is a better country and then I'll be free and if I go to the Netherlands, I'll know that my life will mean something" (Respondent 1, May 1, 2024).*

Adapting to a new lifestyle with different values than those that were upheld in Iran elicited two different responses from two different groups. The first response is immediate acceptance of freedom and rapid assimilation. One of the ways we can identify this when looking at the interviews is to turn to the rate at which they aimed to integrate into society. For example, some people immediately started learning the language and reading information about the Dutch political system. Respondent 4 explained their reasoning:

> *"I knew I fled and there will not be an opportunity for instance that I get to go back and that was scary, but […] I always say that I lost my first fatherland and I wanted to explore a new fatherland and my idea was: without language, you cannot find that" (Respondent 4, May 25, 2024)*

This idea stems from the expectation that there was little hope for an Iran with more freedom and more rights.

The second response is a certain level of culture shock accompanied by the hope that it will be safe to permanently move back to Iran someday. This group, consisting of 2 respondents, assimilated less quickly to the Dutch society. Moreover, these people tend to be more involved in Iranian politics and engaged with Iranian news than other people.

> *"From the beginning, I was waiting for a change in Iran, so I follow everything and, and that makes me more concerned on the one hand, but on the other hand gives me a lot of hope that there will come changes, and good changes are coming" (Respondent 3, May 8, 2024).*

After the initial move and once the respondents had housing and a social basis in the Netherlands, people from both groups started gathering political knowledge during lessons for the civic integration test in combination with either education or through political interest. Among the interviews a trend could be spotted: the value to participate in society was shared among the participants. This resulted in a high interest in both contributing to politics through voting, running for office, or becoming a civil servant.

Once they experienced the freedom to express their opinions, the political engagement and participation increased. However, there was some reluctance to participate in politics for some people. For example, some participants stated that voting would have no effect on society.

The value of voting was not learned during their childhood and adolescence in Iran. As a result of their knowledge of Iranian politics and their socialisation in Iran, they were taught the opposite; voting would not make a difference to the political situation of the country you reside in.

> *"I didn't really want to vote […] and I thought, well, there is no point and I don't have to vote, but my […] friend kind of persuaded me to vote. [They] said no, every vote counts; you really have to do it. If everyone thinks like you, then nothing is going to change […]. In the end, I did vote, but solely for [their] sake. I didn't have much confidence in it. I did not learn that voting really [..] makes a difference" (Respondent 1, May 1, 2024).*

Another example of this trend can be seen when looking at political participation through protesting and activism. At first, some of the participants were reluctant to agree to go out to protest and felt as though this would negatively impact their livelihood in the Netherlands. These perspectives show that at the beginning of the political resocialisation process, they viewed the political system in the Netherlands through the lens of the belief system created in Iran.

From a young age, many Iranian citizens learned that it was important to participate in society and help those around you. For many people, participating in a political way was not possible. However, there were other options to stay embedded in society such as helping neighbours or joining sports organisations. As a result of learning this value, many of the participants decided to become members of the equivalent of political organisations in Iran: Dutch political parties.

> *"I became a member of the Party of Labour. And, for a short period, I was also running for the municipal council. […] Where I live, it does not matter [..] what country, I have to participate in society" (Respondent 3, May 8, 2024).*

To be able to join a Dutch political party, the participants learned about the parties, but they had less background knowledge than many Dutch people. They were not in the position to simply follow their parents' choices. Instead, they researched individually to find a party that suited them. The ability to participate in politics shows that their political belief system has expanded and that the introduction of new information has influenced their consequent decisions.

As time has gone by, many of the people adopted more moderate views than they held when living in Iran. Initially, many participants felt best represented by the SP. However, there were people in the sample that explained that this party no longer represented the political

opinions they held. The reason for this is that in Iran they felt a revolution was needed in order to change the Iranian political system. Often the only option for such change was proposed by leftist or communist political organisations. Therefore, when the participants were evaluating and comparing political parties, they first aligned themselves with what they were familiar with in Iran. As trust in the Dutch political system grew, due to lived experience, they felt like the need for a revolution decreased. As a result, they started affiliating themselves with parties such as Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), GroenLinks (GL), and Partij van de Dieren (PvdD). Some participants became even more moderate and moved to parties in the middle of the spectrum such as D66. This process is still ongoing for some of the participants; respondent 6 said:

"I have now chosen a party that is in the middle and I have to say that I moved away from being truly activistic. […] You do not achieve anything with extremes, only resistance from other, normal people" (Respondent 6, May 25, 2024).

When we look at this process, we can determine that they demonstrated that a political belief system is able to change when new information and experiences are introduced.

A returning theme in the interviews is that the way that the interviewees participate in politics has changed. Around half of the sample is no longer politically active at the level they were in Iran. Most likely, this is the result of an increase in political trust in the Dutch political system and in society. Therefore, there is less of a need to advocate for their needs, wants, and wishes by going out on the street and protest to gain these rights.

When discussing Iran and Iranian politics, all of the participants mentioned that the Islamic nature of the current political system should not be the way that it is. Two of them even state that as a result of the change in government structure, there is no hope for change or modernisation of society. Respondent 2 says:

> *"Look, with the shah of Persia, political reform was possible. With the ayatollah, a religious supreme leader, you can forget it, unless a miracle happens. And I don't believe in miracles" (Respondent 2, May 8, 2024).*

While the opinions on change differ from person to person, all respondents agree that within the current system change is unlikely to happen.

However, there was also a theme of uncertainty regarding the Dutch political system. As trust in Dutch politics became the topic of conversation, it was accompanied by cynicism. A majority of the people stated that the political system in the Netherlands is not optimal either. As mentioned in chapter 2, political cynicism is the absence of trust resulting in disapproval of political leaders, political parties, or the political process (Miller, 1974). Due to their negative experiences with oppression with regards to freedom of speech and with political games, they

have a unique view of this political system. A majority of the people mention that change is needed in the system to ensure equal treatment and actual freedom for everyone as well as to create a system where poverty no longer exists. The way that this should be executed according to the participants differed from creating an entirely new political system to adopting elements of other political systems to creating more political parties.

4.2.2 Iranian Political Events

There have been little to no big changes in Iranian politics since the participants have left the country. Therefore, they point to different types of events than during their childhood and adolescence. Since living in the Netherlands, large protests are the only events that the people in the sample can agree on which can be defined as large political events. For the most part, the participants named different protests as examples. The only protests that all of the respondents named were those sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. For the first time since the Iranian revolution, these protests could be seen across the globe. As a result of the activists making use of social media, the protests were discussed by many people. In contrast, many other protests happening in Iran were not noted outside of the country (Adegbola et al., 2022). The majority of the people who were interviewed stated that they felt like this could bring about real change due to the scale of the protests.

> *"It is a true revolution born in Iran […]. A real one among the people, not in the government" (Respondent 3, May 8, 2024).*

For the first time since the revolution, the protests reached a larger audience than just Iran. Unfortunately, in the end, these protests were diffused by the Iranian government and were followed by a wave of arrests and executions. The people who had no hope that sustainable change was in the cards were not surprised while those who did were. When comparing their level of political trust in the Iranian government with regards to hope for change before and after these protests, this largely stays unchanged. From this, we can conclude that some aspects of people's belief systems stay unchanged. However, this is conditional; if the situation in Iran would have changed, it is likely that their trust would also increase. Therefore, this conclusion can only be made for the Iranian diaspora.

When asked about large changes in the Dutch environment, the participants could not name many influential events. For those who did name events, there was no pattern to be found among the interviewees. Political changes that did exert a self-reported influence include the exclusion of the SP during the formation of the government in 2006, the Dutch childcare benefits scandal, and the elections of 2023. Even though none of the participants named the

same political events, the specific events that were named all decreased the level of trust they had in the Dutch government. It is important to note that two out of these three events were mentioned were about discrimination or exclusion. Thus, the common denominator is that the participants named events that showed them that the Dutch government is not infallible and that the rights and freedoms in the Netherlands are not always as protected as they are portrayed to be. These events reminded the participants that even in democracies with promised freedoms, marginalised groups are not always safe. However, the participants did not relate these experiences to their own and placed it outside their experience.

4.2.3 Iranian Propaganda

Propaganda during the adult life in the Netherlands was also split up in the two categories: government propaganda and participatory propaganda. In all interviews, people acknowledged the influence that Iran exerted across its borders. One participant even stated that he underestimated how active Iran was abroad, even though he was already aware of the political influence that Iran had in other countries when he was still living there. According to participant 2:

> *"Iran has two goals, one is to eliminate political refugees that are still active […]. Two is to make sure that other people do not get convinced […] by people who are politically active against the Iranian government" (Participant 2, May 8, 2024)*

This is evidence of the fine line between government propaganda and participatory propaganda. Often, it is difficult to know whether the propaganda is separate from the government or attached to it. Participatory propaganda uses people who support the message of the government to further this information. However, participants noted that it is unknown whether these people who use false information or try to intimidate people who are part of the Iranian diaspora are working for the government or not. While participants said that the propaganda is not meant for them, the responses they gave, suggests that they are being reached. It points to a narrow definition of propaganda.

The political influence that Iran exerts abroad is both meant to reach governments and people who are on the neutral to positive spectrum towards Iran. However, these types of propaganda are different. In other words, the propaganda that is meant to reach other governments is based on misinformation and the propaganda that is meant to reach the Iranian diaspora is based on surveillance and censorship.

Within the interviews, people mostly spoke about being scared of the surveillance and censorship by the Iranian government when it came to displaying their stance towards the

Iranian government. Among the sample, there were respondents who were approached by people who either supported the Iranian regime or who were working for them. These people then tried to intimidate them with the goal of making sure that they stopped other people from becoming politically active. These people were effectively trying to censor them. Besides censorship, people who are part of the Iranian diaspora are often checked on and surveilled, both online and offline, by the Iranian government to make sure that they are not spreading information that is unfavourable to Iran. Respondent 7 shared her experience:

> *"I have personally been threatened, by the Iranian embassy in the Hague, but I have also met someone that still lives here [..]. She says she is here for her study [..] and her husband works at a university in Lebanon for the Iranian regime, and we found out that she is a spy as well and she came here to gather information." (Respondent 7, May 27, 2024).*

If they were not themselves intimidated in such a way, at least one acquaintance of them had experienced this. For instance, one of the respondents noted that they often join chatrooms in which people speak more freely about Iran:

> *"Luckily, Iranians are more active in Clubhouse, but again, the Iranian government has exploited this […]. I am happy that they join. That we can talk to them sometimes […]. But this is what they want, talking to people with influence, who are good, people that are trustworthy, they will discredit them when they learn about the private lives of those people" (Respondent 3, May 8, 2024).*

However, none of the participants felt as though the propaganda was supposed to be reaching them or that it was meant to convince them specifically. Moreover, they felt as though living and growing up in Iran granted them the ability to weed out the truth from the misinformation. As a result, they felt like the propaganda that they encountered, both in real life and on social media, was not meant for them. Thus, this was easily discarded.

> *"I think the propaganda does happen, it just does not reach me. I don't know, I'm just not involved in that" (Respondent 1, May 1, 2024).*

Due to a cycle of deprogramming when they were living in Iran through being active in politically leftist organisations, the lies the Iranian government puts out in the world using propaganda had already been flagged in their early-life political socialisation phase.

This is directly at odds with what they actually said. Some of the respondents did note that the Iranian government was very active on social media and other western media in general to promote their own government. However, there was a trend in respondents who said that the intimidation tactics were a reason to not be as politically active.

> *"Except for that time, in 2009, 2010, 2011, when I was very active, I received messages from a few very strange people. I blocked them, but other than that, I am not involved anymore". (Respondent 1, May 1, 2024).*

All of the data points out that participatory propaganda is a tool that the Iranian government uses, both online and offline, but due to the narrow definition they have of propaganda, these efforts are not flagged as being propagandist.

The political resocialisation they experience in the Netherlands was mainly dependent on their belief of returning to Iran, which translated to either rapid assimilation or culture shock. However, all of the participants still identify participation in society and or politics as an important value. Moreover, all of respondents still agree that the current political system in Iran does not represent Iranian citizens, showing the same levels of political trust as when they left Iran. Additionally, when looking at how they evaluate Dutch politics, their trust in the system is not infallible, but dependent on how well all facets of the government perform. For the respondents, the level of political trust in the Iranian and Dutch context were separated. Nonetheless, political events, both in the Netherlands and in Iran affected their levels of trust. In their adult life, propaganda did not affect the level of political participation in the Netherlands, but it did affect the level of engagement in activism in Iran. The data points out that surveillance, censorship, and intimidation tactics are sometimes able to deter them from participating in protests or other forms of activism.

4.3 Discussion

In the theoretical chapter, expectations were made with regards to the findings. When looking at the level of political participation as a result of political socialisation in early-life, people became politically active from a young age. Within the sample of this research, the cultural and political context can be seen as important indicators for the political identity the participants have gained during their early life. This is corroborated in articles by Dennison and Geddes (2019) and Noorzij et al. (2019). To illustrate, in a study by Terriques et al. (2020), the authors state that horizontal socialisation is effective in activating political interest. As the results show, this is the case for the Iranian diaspora in which politically active people motivate and mobilise others to join the movement.

Furthermore, the majority of the sample reported that political events have had an impact on the way they view, interact and assess politics. This is reflected in the literature with Schuman and Corning (2012) saying that transformative events can add to memories and shape

people's evaluation of politics. During their time in Iran, political trust in their home country is low for all of the participants; none of the people that were interviewed had a positive view of the current government. This was worsened by events like a revolution, war or changes in the political system.

However, there are differing levels of hope for change during adulthood. People who are now part of the Iranian diaspora in the Netherlands became politically active due to values and morality, instead of seeking representation or furthering their career. The reality of the threat of the Iranian government is too serious to not look at the effects. Therefore, the people who joined political organisations in Iran had high interest in politics and society, making them more inclined to learn about political processes.

The analysis has shown that there are discrepancies between the early-life socialisation and the adult political socialisation. This shows that people who are part of the Iranian diaspora in the Netherlands have adapted their political belief system after they gained citizenship in the Netherlands. This is in line with the life course adaption model created by Lersch (2023). In this model, people's predispositions remained salient in how people view and interact with politics, but these predispositions cannot explain all aspects of their political identity. Instead, experiences they have are able to change and have a lasting influence on someone. When applying these theories to the data we can see that the people that were the most politically active in Iran and internalised the value of political participation the most, thus were also the most active in Dutch society and Dutch politics.

To analyse how this process has affected political trust, we turn to the comparison of the resocialisation hypothesis and compare it to the persistence hypothesis as described by Dollmann (2022). All of the participants showed adaptability to new environments. Even though this change was slower for some respondents than for others, the resocialisation hypothesis holds true. In a study by Krasteva and Todorov (2011), two other strategies are discussed with regard to political trust. On the one hand, migrants can show support for the new government or they can abstain from most involvement in politics. In line with their ability to adapt, they also showed that political trust was created by participating in politics as mentioned above.

However, trust in the government of the host is shown to not be infallible. This has been demonstrated using the concept of cynicism. Miller's (1974) defined this concept as the absence of political trust resulting in the disapproval of any aspect of politics. The respondents showed that the political events, as mentioned above, created experiences that affected future assessments of politics. The interviewees named that as a result of certain

political parties or the political process itself, their trust in the government decreased. In other words, the respondents remained critical of the political system even when their trust in the Dutch government was higher than that of the Iranian government directly after their move.

Participants mostly denied that propaganda by the Iranian government had any influence on their political identity or political trust. In all cases, Iran's attempts to influence the people that were interviewed through falsehoods had no effects. This type of propaganda is called persuasive propaganda and creates ideological messaging that is meant to change people's minds (Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024). The propagandist messaging was mostly dismissed. From this, we can conclude that persuasive propaganda was not affective for this sample of politically activistic people.

However, when threats were made to individual persons, as a result of surveillance, it was sometimes a reason to stop engaging in certain circles with any discourse regarding Iran. This type of propaganda is also called dominating propaganda which uses information in such a way to instil fear (Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024). To conclude, the data points out that the propaganda did not affect people's ideological beliefs, but it did scare them into submission.

In Iran, the government propaganda is inextricably linked with participatory propaganda. Participatory propaganda is described as using the participation of audiences to enhance the message of the regime (Asmolov, 2019). The data has shown that Iran is very active in online and offline spaces. To illustrate, government censorship and surveillance is used in order to keep information leaving and entering Iran to a minimum (Michaelson, 2017; Rosenfeld & Wallace, 2024). However, these tactics are not always used to further the message of the regime, but more to stop the amount of government-critical messaging. This link between censorship, surveillance and propaganda is not always obvious to people who are subjected to it. Therefore, it is often difficult for participants to understand what is happening when they are submitted to this kind of propaganda.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter, the results will be placed in the framework, this thesis is built on, to answer the research question proposed in this paper. Furthermore, the implications for academic theories will be presented. Subsequently, I will give an overview of the limitations of this research and directions for further research. The chapter will end with the societal implications and the implications for policies of the research results.

5.1 Conclusion

In previous research, there has been little exploration of the question what political resocialisation in migrants looks like. Moreover, there is no real conclusion if this phenomenon does indeed take place. Additionally, the effect of propaganda on this process is also under researched. Therefore, the goal of this research has been to answer the following question: *What is the effect of encountering propaganda and witnessing political events on migrant (re)socialisation in the Iranian Diaspora?* This has been thematically analysed using primary data from interviews using theories from political socialisation and propaganda.

The results show that the baseline of the participants' political identity, that has been created through the process of political socialisation during their early-life, differs from their political identity in adult life. Most participants reported that they were part of leftist and communist organisations when they were still living in Iran, because these organisations offered the only way towards system change. However, after their move to the Netherlands and after obtaining Dutch citizenship, most of these people started to have moderate views and moved from parties like the SP towards GroenLinks, PvdA, PvdD or even more centre parties such as CDA or D66. This shows that resocialising in a different context can change your political identity, the political ideas you hold, and your political participation. Moreover, it shows that polarisation amplifies itself. In other words, when only extremes exist, the people who are less extremist are forced to join such movements to enact change.

Besides discussing whether or not resocialisation is possible, the findings also point to political events having an impact on this. Participants shared that large political events that took place in Iran led to an increase in mistrust of the Iranian government. Moreover, such political events taking place in the Netherlands had a similar effect. This was especially prevalent in the cases where the participants first held the Dutch government in high esteem. This shows that criticism of the government is not confined to a location and that political events continue to impact someone's political identity.

Propaganda also influenced their political identity. Participants reported being scared of their personal information being in the hands of the Iranian government and being used by them to target their loved ones who still reside in Iran. This shows that propaganda tactics like surveillance and censorship by the Iranian government are effective to some extent. However, because they are familiar with the misinformation and disinformation campaigns as a result of their childhood, they are more prone to analyse whether information they encounter in daily life is correct or not. Nonetheless, the limited understanding they have of propaganda means that the surveillance and censorship that cause anxiety are not seen as tools of propaganda, but rather as intimidation techniques.

In conclusion, this research demonstrates that people who are part of the Iranian Diaspora have the ability to adapt their belief system. Additionally, it shows that political events do have an effect on this process. When encountering propaganda, the Iranian Diaspora becomes more wary and critical of the information they encounter. Additionally, they also become more cautious in social situations with other people who are part of this diaspora. As demonstrated, propaganda affects their view on the Iranian political system and the government of Iran, but does not affect their view on the Dutch political system or their government.

5.3 Implications

These findings have implications both for academia and for policies as. This thesis added to the current academic debate by analysing whether resocialisation occurs after people migrate and if this is affected by propaganda. In previous research, these elements have not been explicitly researched together. Therefore, it gives new insight into how propaganda can affect people's political thoughts and political identity. It has also resulted in the theoretical framework being made up of theories from different disciplinaries, namely: political science, sociology, and communication studies.

In addition, this thesis has proven that the adult political socialisation does take place and that this process is not finished when people exit childhood or adolescence. The findings align with the life course adaption model as coined by Lersch (2023). This model states that while people do have baseline regarding their political opinions and beliefs, these are influenced by the environment people are socialised in and by the things they experience later in life. In showing this, the research contributes to political socialisation theories.

Moreover, this research has given a more in-depth view of the experiences of the Iranian diaspora which has two effects. On the one hand, it enriches the academic literature that exists

on the Iranian Diaspora, especially in the Netherlands. On the other hand, it has led to a better understanding of how the Iranian Diaspora is embedded into Dutch society.

Taking a better look at how the Iranian Diaspora has integrated in the Netherlands gives us the opportunity to review how migration is evaluated. Oftentimes, there is criticism that immigrants do not adapt well enough to society and do not contribute to it. When speaking with people who are part of this diaspora, it is evident that they are willing to assimilate to Dutch society. Furthermore, everyone that has been included in the sample for this research is active in society both within and outside of work hours. Fleeing a country for political reasons shows a certain finality with regards to the move to the Netherlands, which means that it is too unsafe to move back. Therefore, these people are committed to building a fulfilling life in a new country. Allowing them to obtain residence permits or Dutch citizenship, gives them the opportunity to adapt to the society they find themselves in. Thus, Dutch policy should be more open to accepting applications from migrants like these.

Additionally, the results indicate that low levels of trust caused people to be hesitant to go out and vote. Therefore, making sure that this level of trust is high not only forces the government to function as well as it can, but it also increases the efficacy. Efficacy is the belief that the government will respond to the demands of the citizens. When efficacy is high, people will be more likely to participate in elections and other facets of democracy, thereby increasing the strength of the democracy (Karp & Banducci, 2008). Thus, fostering trust and efficacy is important for democratic institutions.

Moreover, as a result of Iranian propaganda in the Netherlands, people within the Iranian Diaspora who are now Dutch citizens do not get to feel safe. Furthermore, propaganda like this can influence Dutch-born citizens that are not aware of the disinformation campaigns that Iran uses to influence the West. Not only citizens are affected by the propaganda that Iran uses. As shown in the results, Western governments are also susceptive to the disinformation that Iran spreads. Thus, this points to needing sanctions to counter or block Iranian propaganda meant for Dutch-born citizens, for people that are part of the Iranian diaspora residing in the Netherlands and propaganda meant for governments.

5.2 Limitations and Directions for Future Research

This thesis has three main limitations: complexity of propaganda effects, representativeness, and generalisability. First, the complexity of propaganda effects makes it difficult to capture whether people hold beliefs as a result of the indoctrination effect of propaganda itself or due to other reasons, such as experiences with the political system of Iran, as a result of cultural

context. Thus, this research mainly used the experiences with propaganda that the people were able to report. However, sometimes the participants had a narrow understanding of propaganda which made the evaluation and analysing of their experiences more difficult.

Second, the representativeness of the sample is not entirely representative. As a result of time limitations, there were a limited amount of participants included in this research. Moreover, because the snowball method was used, many of the people that were interviewed had some connection to each other. Gaining access to a diverse and representative sample of the Iranian diaspora proved to be challenging. The subgroup of political refugees who was against both of the regimes is the largest group. Therefore, they were overrepresented. The subgroup that moved to the Netherlands without the status of political refugee is significantly smaller, as is the subgroup of the Iranian diaspora who supported the shah and did not support the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, this research can only hint at what the differences in themes will be when including a larger amount of them into the sample. As a result, although this thesis is able to generate interesting insights, its explanatory power would increase through further research with a larger and more diverse sample.

Additionally, the parameters for selecting people for the sample should be stricter. First, the minimum age of moving to the Netherlands should be increased to twenty-five or even higher. This would align more closely with the theories on adult political socialisation and would strengthen the findings in future research. Second, the sample should be more diverse to see if the differences in backgrounds affect people differently or if it is solely their migration experience itself. In other words, future research should look more at people who do not have the status of political refugee and at people who supported the shah during and or after the time he was running the country.

Third, as explained in chapter 3, this research employs a single case study, it cannot generalise the findings to other countries. The findings are embedded in the specific cultural, social, and political context of the Iranian Diaspora's lived experience in the Netherlands and Iran. Therefore, we cannot extrapolate whether or not these findings will be reflected in other cases where people have experienced other forms of oppression, political events, and propaganda.

Further research is needed to increase the generalisability of this research. While Iran has proven to be a country from which many insights can be derived, it is important to see if these conclusions are reflected in other countries. On the one hand, it could mean looking into other similar cases to see if the same patterns of belief and identity change can be found. On the other hand, future research could also benefit from diverging cases. For example, looking

at migrants from countries that have not encountered large political events. In doing so, the patterns and themes that are identified in this thesis can be determined with more certainty.

In addition to the avenues for future research that followed from the limitations, there are also those that follow from the findings themselves. For instance, some of the respondents pointed to social media as playing a role in how propaganda has changed since they were living in Iran. Therefore, it would be interesting to look specifically at how social media influences the political socialisation processes with regard to the propaganda that can be found in these online spaces.

Furthermore, within the results it can be noted that most of the people who knew each other beforehand, had similar ideologies. Therefore, it would be interesting for future research to focus on the role that social networks play within the socialisation of the Iranian diaspora, especially due to the fact that people within this community are highly mistrusting of each other.

Despite the limitations, the findings and results of this research still contributes to field of political socialisation. They provide insights into how propaganda and political events influence the resocialisation of migrants, specifically in the Iranian diaspora in the Netherlands. The results of this research show that these factors are agents of influence in the process of political socialisation. Additionally, this research paves the way for future research to explore these tendencies in different contexts. In conclusion, this work both enriches the academic discourse on political socialisation as well as having practical implications for policy makers to make society safe and inclusive for everyone participating in it.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: Interview Guide

Theme	Questions
Background information	Can you tell me a bit about yourself: your age and where you live?
	How long did you live in Iran? What did your life look like back then?
	When did you move to the Netherlands? How was this experience for you?
Early-life political socialisation	Did you participate in politics in your early life (this can be both implicitly or explicitly)?
	Do you feel as though you have lived through big political changes in Iran in your childhood? If so, can you describe these political events?
	How do you feel they impacted your political identity?
	How did growing up in Iranian culture affect you and your political opinions?
Experience of Iranian propaganda in early-life	Do you think you have experienced propaganda from the Iranian government during your childhood and adolescence? If so, what did this look like?
	How did you realise these were propaganda tactics?
	Can you recall any specific examples or instances of propaganda that stood out to you?
	How did this affect your political identity?
Migrant political socialisation	Did you participate in politics in your adult life after moving to the Netherlands (this can be both implicitly or explicitly)?
	Do you feel as though you have lived through big political changes in Iran in your adulthood while living in the Netherlands? If so, can you describe these political events?
	How do you feel they impacted your political identity?
	How did moving to a different cultural context affect you and your political identity?

Experience of Iranian propaganda in adult life	Do you think you have experienced propaganda from the Iranian government during your adulthood? If so, what did this look like?
	How did you realise these were propaganda tactics?
	Can you recall any specific examples or instances of propaganda that stood out to you?
	How did this affect your political identity?

Appendix 2: List of Respondents

To ensure that the respondents remain anonymous, their names will be omitted from this list.

	Gender	Date	Age of Migration	Current Age	Reason for Migration
R1	Woman	01-05-2024	22 years old	40 years old	Looking for freedom and studying
R2	Man	08-05-2024	25 years old	57 years old	Political refugee
R3	Woman	08-05-2024	38 years old	70 years old	Political refugee
R4	Man	15-05-2024	38 years old	71 years old	Political refugee
R5	Man	21-05-2024	27 years old	68 years old	Political refugee
R6	Man	25-05-2024	22 years old	57 years old	Political refugee
R7	Woman	27-05-2024	20 years old	55 years old	Political refugee

Appendix 3: Coding Scheme

Theme	Category	Indicators
Early-life political socialisation	Political participation	Political knowledge/awareness, political engagement, political discussion, political organisations, activism, protests.
	Political intervention	Regime intervention, regime punishment shah, regime punishment ayatollah, oppression.
	Political events	Protests, revolution, changing government structure, war.
	Cultural context	Religion, communication, cultural values/beliefs, art, education.
	Other	Family, neighbourhoods, media, work.
Political opinion early-life	Political trust home country	Support shah, support ayatollah, trust in other government leaders, hope for change.
	Political mistrust home country	Shah criticism, ayatollah criticism, criticism political system, corruption, unresponsiveness to political problems, lack of public accountability mechanisms, no hope for change.
Experience of Iranian propaganda in early-life	Government propaganda	State-controlled media, manipulation of information, narrative-controlled education, nationalism, demonising of enemies, surveillance, censorship.
	Participatory propaganda	Social media amplification, peer recruitment/offline mobilisation, interactive propaganda tools, online mobilisation.
Adult migrant political (re)socialisation	Reason for migration	Education, political refugee.
	Political participation	Political knowledge/awareness, political engagement, political discussion, political organisations, activism, protests.
	Political events	Protests, revolution, changing government structure.
	Cultural context	Religion, culture shock, communication, cultural values/beliefs, art, education.
	Other	Family, neighbourhoods, media, work.

Political opinion adult life	Political trust home country	Support shah, support ayatollah trust in other government leaders, hope for change.
	Political mistrust home country	Shah criticism, ayatollah criticism, criticism political system, corruption, unresponsiveness to political problems, lack of public accountability mechanisms no hope for change.
	Political trust host country	Voting in elections, work in governmental position, societal participation, opinions/needs reflected in government, support political system.
	Political mistrust host country	Cynicism regarding politics, criticism political system.
Experience of Iranian propaganda in adult life	Government propaganda	Surveillance, censorship, state-controlled media, nationalism, demonising of enemies.
	Participatory propaganda	Social media amplification, peer recruitment/offline mobilisation, interactive propaganda tools, online mobilisation.

Appendix 4: Ethics documents

4.1 Consent form

Radboud Universiteit

Consent Formulier Deelnemers
voor deelname aan het masterscriptie onderzoek: Onderzoek naar Politieke Identiteit en het Effect van Propaganda.

Verklaring van de deelnemer
Zet een kruisje neer bij de onderdelen waar u mee akkoord gaat.

	Het doel van het onderzoek is uitgelegd aan mij.
	Ik heb de mogelijkheid gehad om vragen te stellen over het onderzoek.
	Ik neem vrijwillig deel aan dit onderzoek.
	Ik begrijp dat ik op elk moment mijn deelname aan het onderzoek kan stoppen als ik dat wil.
	Ik begrijp hoe de data bewaard en gebruikt zal worden voor dit onderzoek.
	Ik begrijp wie mijn data kan inzien.
	Ik begrijp dat ik het recht heb om mijn toestemming voor het gebruik van de data in te trekken zoals beschreven in het informatiedocument.
	Ik geef toestemming om deel te nemen in dit onderzoek zoals beschreven is in het informatiedocument.

Daarnaast ga ik ermee akkoord dat
Zet een kruisje neer bij de onderdelen waar u mee akkoord gaat.

	er audio-opnames gemaakt worden voor wetenschappelijke doeleinden.
	de geanonimiseerde data beschikbaar zal zijn voor 10 jaar voor evaluatie van het onderzoek.

Naam:	
E-mail:	
Handtekening:	**Datum:**

4.2 Information Document for Participants

Informatie voor Deelnemers

Wie ben ik en waarom doe ik dit onderzoek?
Ik ben Aniek Suurmond en momenteel ben ik bezig om mijn masterscriptie voor de opleiding *Political Science: Conflict, Power, and Politics* af te ronden aan de Radboud Universiteit te Nijmegen. Om het onderzoek af te kunnen ronden houd ik interviews met Iraanse Nederlanders over hun ervaring met propaganda.

Waar gaat dit onderzoek over?
Het doel van mijn onderzoek is om meer inzicht te krijgen over theorieën over politieke socialisatie in combinatie met propaganda en migratie. Het veld van politieke socialisatie probeert een uitleg te geven voor welke factoren ervoor zorgen dat iemand een politieke identiteit krijgt. Ik wil graag inzicht krijgen in de rol die verschillende types propaganda hebben in dit proces: enerzijds de propaganda die in het land van geboorte plaats vindt en anderzijds de propaganda die dat land in het buitenland uitoefent. Op deze manier hoop ik beter inzicht te verkrijgen in de korte en lange termijn effecten van propaganda op mensen die geëmigreerd zijn.

Hoe zal dit onderzoek eruit zien?
De interviews zullen ongeveer een uur duren en zullen worden opgenomen. Daarna maak ik een transcriptie van het interview waarin alles zal staan wat er besproken is. Dit document zal opgestuurd worden zodat u kan controleren of alle informatie correct is en of alle gevoelige informatie weg is gelaten.

Wat zal er gebeuren met hetgeen dat u mij verteld heeft?
Het onderzoek is niet gefinancierd of gedaan onder invloed van de overheid. De data zal uitsluitend gebuikt worden voor het schrijven van mijn masterscriptie.

Zal ik hetgeen delen wat u mij heeft verteld?
Uw gedeelde informatie is geheel vertrouwelijk. Het zal opgenomen worden om de analyse van deze data mogelijk te maken, maar dit zal alleen gedaan worden indien daar toestemming voor is gegeven. Alle informatie wordt geanonimiseerd en zal niet tot u te herleiden zijn. De informatie en het toestemmingsformulier zullen 10 jaar opgeslagen nadat het onderzoek afgerond is. Daarna zal dit zorgvuldig verwijderd worden.

Wat als u niet mee wilt doen met dit onderzoek?
Deelname is geheel vrijwillig. Als u tijdens of na het interview besluit om niet langer mee te doen, dan kunt u contact met mij opnemen. De transcriptie van de interviews zullen aan u gestuurd worden en op dat moment zal ook toestemming gevraagd worden voor het gebruik hiervan. U kunt uw deelname intrekken tot 9 juni 2024.

Met wie kan u contact opnemen als u een klacht wilt indienen?
Neem dan contact op met Dr. Sanne Weber, Radboud Universiteit. Dit is de begeleider van mijn onderzoek: sanne.weber@ru.nl

Met wie kan in contact opnemen voor vragen of om meer te weten?
Mijn contactgegevens zijn Aniek Suurmond: aniek.suurmond@ru.nl, Tel: +31 6 15545576.

Als de informatie die besproken is tijdens het interview emotioneel belastend is, laat het dan alstublieft weten. Dan kan ik u doorverwijzen naar een organisatie die in staat is om te helpen zoals Stichting Slachtofferhulp Nederland.