

Voting Correctly during the European Parliament Elections of 2014

DO POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION AND SALIENCE AWARDED TO EU
INTEGRATION HELP VOTERS VOTE CORRECTLY?

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Abstract

How representative is the European Parliament? As the role of the European Union keeps evolving, so does the attitude of the European people toward EU integration. Integration had been steadily creeping forward up until the 1990s, symbolized by a supposed permissive consensus. In contemporary European politics, Eurosceptics are found in every ideology. Does the influx of Eurosceptic MP's in 2014 mean that the European Parliament has become more congruent? One way to study this is to study the congruence between voters and parties. This thesis does so on the topic of EU integration and approaches it from an individual voter level. What determines if a voter votes for the 'correct' party, conceptualized as the most congruent vote on the issue of EU integration? In this thesis Europeanization, EU integration, congruence, and voting correctly literature are all combined to seek an answer to the question: which variables increase congruence between voter and party during the 2014 EP elections, in the context of attitudes toward EU-integration? This novel question bridges different gaps in political science and has some surprising conclusions. It also presents many avenues for future research.

Key words: EU integration, congruence, voting correctly, political sophistication, salience,

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Introduction

The next European Parliamentary election will take place in May 2019. It will be the first EP election post-Brexit. The previous election took place in 2014 and saw an increase of Eurosceptic MEP's being elected to the parliament (BBC, 2014). This increase might be attributed to of the Eurozone crisis that wreaked havoc between the 2009 and 2014 EP elections (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016b). Considering that the EU population has always been more critical of EU integration than the parties in the parliament (Mattila & Raunio, 2006), it might seem that the European Parliament has become more representative due to the influx of Eurosceptic MP's (Von Ondarza, 2016). However, this observation cannot be based solely on the outcome of the vote. This outcome can only be interpreted this way if all voters voted for the party closest to their own attitude toward the EU. In other words, the congruence between voter and party determines to what extent the conclusion can be made that the European Parliament has become more representative. If the ideological distance between the EU population and the European Parliament decreases, the EU becomes more representative. Representation, and thus congruence, are key indicators for determining the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament.

Moreover, information about congruence is vital information, as it tells researchers, opinion makers, and politicians what people do at the voting booth. Do they vote for the party that is most alike their own ideological positions? Do they vote strategically? Much research has been done on explaining voting behavior during EP elections, ranging from explaining why people vote Eurosceptic or why they support EU-integration: Hobolt, Spoon & Tilly, 2009; Hobolt & De Vries, 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2011, Treib 2014 and why some vote for right Eurosceptic parties and others for left Eurosceptic parties (Van Elsas, Hakhverdian, Van der Brug, 2016). However, a strand of literature that is lacking, especially on the issue of EU-integration, is how representative voters and party are of each other, how congruent they are. The research that does exist on this topic has shown that the people are far more skeptical of the EU than the parties that compete in EP elections (Mattila & Raunio, 2006 & 2012). Existing congruence literature focuses mostly on the left-right economic scale while simultaneously taking a party-perspective. (Belchior, 2013; Golder & Stramski, 2010). A party perspective implies that congruence is approached from a party standpoint. It asks how representative parties are compared to their voters. However, congruence works both ways. Congruence can also be addressed in the opposite direction: the individual perspective. Rather than asking whether parties

are representative of voters, this approach asks whether voters are representative of parties. In other words, and assuming that voters want to vote for a party that best represents their ideas and interests: the individual approach asks whether voters vote for the most representative party.

One way of conceptualizing the most representative, most congruent party, is to call that party the “correct” party (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997). Whether a party is “correct” depends on what the researcher is interested in. In most cases a comparison is made between the positions of the voter and the party, the party that is closest to the position of that voter is the “correct” party for that particular voter. This “voting correctly” approach is not new and there exists abundant literature on it. However, like the literature on congruence, voting correctly literature focuses mainly on the economic left-right scale (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997; Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk, 2008; Lau et al, 2014). Moreover, voting correctly literature also tends to focus on domestic elections whereas EP elections are obviously not domestic and are moreover often seen as second-order elections (Nielsen & Franklin, 2016). Voters regard them as less important than primary, domestic elections and, therefore, they often have low voter turnout and suffer from other issues. Other examples of second-order elections include municipal election and other lower government elections.

Therefore, in order to fill all these scientific lacunas, the research question of this thesis is: which variables increase congruence between voter and party during the 2014 EP elections, in the context of attitudes toward EU-integration? As a correct vote can be conceptualized as the most congruent vote, this thesis also researches correct voting. This question is very relevant, in both societal and scientific ways. It is relevant for society as it may provide insight as to why the EP is so unrepresentative of the people. Aside from the scientific lacunas, discussed above, this thesis also is somewhat novel in its usage of different databases for calculating congruence, an approach that is not free from disadvantages. The individual approach to congruence is also novel, as is the focus on attitudes toward EU integration.

Voting correctly literature started out as a quest to find out to what extent democracy is feasible, considering that individual voters can never be fully informed. A healthy democracy is dependent on a well-informed public and the voting correctly literature wants to see to what extent the public is informed enough. How does this work for transnational elections like the EP elections? This thesis hopes to contribute to the gap by showing how political sophistication and salience awarded to the EU integration issue effect voting correctly. Moreover, this thesis

contributes to congruence research on the EU-integration issue by using Euromanifesto data instead of voter perceptions to calculate congruence.

I expect that especially the salience that voters attribute to the EU, and how sophisticated they are politically, effects voting correctly and congruence. Moreover, due to the often “extreme” nature of Eurosceptic parties (extreme because these parties often are situated at the ends of the left-right spectrum (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2002)) I also expect that the effect of salience on congruence is mediated by how extreme or niche a party is. The effect of salience on congruence is expected to be stronger for more extreme parties. This is shown by Giger & Lefkofridi (2014), who show that salience has a stronger effect on congruence for niche parties, especially on core issues.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Frame Work

Literature Review

The research question posed above crosses multiple fields within political science. The main topics touch on EU integration research, congruence research and voting correctly research. However, within these main themes, there are several other subfields that need to be discussed in order to fully understand the question and thus, to conjure a fitting theoretical framework. Therefore, the literature review consists of three main research fields but also consists of some of the smaller fields that make said research fields: EU integration research is split up into a general part, different typologies for support and opposition, second-order election research, EU issue voting, and explaining voting behavior. The second-order election literature is important because this research will use data from the European Election Survey and thus evaluate congruence during the 2014 EP elections. European Parliament elections are seen as second-order election by some (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Nielsen, Franklin 2016), while the EU issue voting approach claims that EP election are increasingly about European affairs (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016). Both sides will be discussed. The second part of the literature review is on congruence research and first introduces the concept through Golder & Stramski (2010), whose ideas are then applied to empirical studies on congruence to see how the different methods work. Because this thesis focuses specifically on the congruence between individual voters and the parties they voted for, this part ends with a discussion of voting correctly literature. This discussion serves to provide insight in what micro variables affect congruence. The third and last part of the framework consists of a review of the existing literature on congruence between voter-party combinations on the issue of EU integration during the EP elections. The congruence literature helps to understand what previous research on voter-party congruence on the EU-integration issue did, and subsequently criticize it. Thus, this discussion is also introductory to the theoretical framework that will be used in this research, as this framework builds upon the criticisms presented in the discussion. Because the data used in this thesis deals with the European Parliament election of 2014, studies that use the same database, used in this thesis, will be highlighted as well. Due to the subject, it makes sense to start with the literature on EU integration research.

1. EU integration research

Research on EU integration has been done from various perspectives, all with their distinct research interests. A public administration perspective can involve researching the different

approaches member-states take in to EU integration. Do they lead or are they reluctant to implement EU policies? (Börzel, 2012). What explains the implementation deficit of EU policies that many member-states have (Mastenbroek, 2005)? These questions deal with the “policy” part of the EU. Other research focuses on the politics of the EU, meaning how European Elections work, what drives parties and citizens, or whether the EU-integration ‘cleavage’ has replaced the other cleavages (Marks & Wilson (2000)). Most importantly for this thesis: much research has been done on why people vote the way they vote during European elections (Hobolt, Spoon & Tilly, 2009; Hobolt & De Vries, 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2011, Treib 2014)) Research on voting behavior often uses the post-election surveys. This research includes researching which variables explain voting Eurosceptic or voting in favor of the EU.

As it seems to be the case with many research fields, EU integration literature became more populated as the EU itself became increasingly contested. The attitude of the European people toward EU integration was generally seen as an attitude of “permissive consensus” until 1991 (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Political leaders more or less assumed that citizens agreed with furthering EU integration. The EU had not yet been politicized and was not yet a mobilizing force, the way it is now. The polity was not yet contested (Mair, 2007). However, in 1991 the Maastricht Treaty provided drastic changes to the relation between member-states and the Union, which resulted in a changing role of the citizenry. The EU became increasingly politicalized; its polity, policies, and politics were increasingly criticized. De Vries and Van Kersbergen (2007) show that support for the EU dropped by 16.5% from 1991 to 2003. The EU was (and might very well still be) a polity in which there was no contestation, and thus no real politics (Schmidt, 2006). Unable to contest the policies of the EU, the EU itself became contested. This is what Hooghe and Marks call the ‘constraining dissensus’: political leaders can no longer ignore citizens’ attitudes to the EU but also; citizens can no longer ignore the EU.

The increasing politicization of the EU presented new questions for political scientists. What explains the support of, or opposition to, EU integration? From a party perspective the question arose whether the EU integration issue would replace existing cleavages. Would it thaw the frozen cleavage structure (which were argued to be frozen by Lipset & Rokkan, 1967)? Marks & Wilson (2000) argue that party responses to EU integration show that this new cleavage has assimilated into the party structure, meaning that over the period of 1984-96, party responses to EU integration could be predicted (to some extent) by which party family the party belonged to.

However, during this period Euroscepticism was not yet developed as it is now. Research, which will be discussed later, shows that party attitudes toward EU integration can still be predicted based on where they are positioned in the political spectrum. According to the horseshoe model (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2002), center parties support EU integration. The more removed from the center a party is, the more opposed to integration they are.

Combined with the concepts of the permissive consensus and constraining dissensus, it seems clear that parties have always been more pro-integrationist than the people are. This is supported by the argument that after the 2014 EP elections, a quarter of the seats were distributed to Eurosceptic parties (Von Ondarza, 2016) whereas according to the Eurobarometer 83.46% of European citizens tend not to trust the European Union. There seems to be a discrepancy between the number of Eurosceptics in the parliament and in Europe. Moreover, according to research by Matilla & Raunio (2006 & 2012), the parties elected to the European Parliament in 2004 and 2009 were more pro-integration than were the voters. An argument against the claim that the EP is not representative, is that while most established parties might not be Eurosceptic they definitely have softened their optimism about EU integration in response to the growing Euroscepticism within the population. Spoon & Williams (2017) show that when the public becomes more Eurosceptic and a party is divided on the topic, the party also becomes more Eurosceptic.

Because it was clear the EU would have, and had already had, far-reaching implications, Euroscepticism in the population grew quickly (De Vries & Van Kersbergen, 2007). The peak seemed to be during the mid-2000s, during which people directly rejected an EU constitution via referendums in the Netherlands and France. Political scientists responded accordingly with research on explaining voting behavior. Before delving into this literature, there are research fields that need to be discussed before discussing explaining voting behavior. Namely, typologies of support and opposition and second-order elections in the EU. These are important in that they directly impact voting behavior and thus help explain that behavior. Second-order elections are also important as European Parliament elections are generally seen as second-order elections. Because the EU issue voting literature argues that EP elections are about European affairs, this literature will also be discussed. The conclusion is that the nature of the elections does not influence the comparability of the results, and that the two perspectives can coexist.

1.1 Support & Opposition

Attitudes toward EU integration are not a binary of either support or opposition. In order to better understand attitudes toward EU integration, typologies should be used. There is a need to distinguish between the many different positions on EU integration that exist as there are many different reasons to support or oppose the EU. Few (if any) of these reasons are important to all that oppose or support EU integration. Research that explains voting for Eurosceptic parties but does not distinguish between different forms of Euroscepticism is important but also lacks a deeper understanding. It prevents research from distinguishing between parties and people that are against the EU as a polity and those who only oppose its policies. Nationalism is not the only reason to oppose further EU integration. This is also true for support: being unable to distinguish between federalists and those who only seek economic cooperation might result in a lack of significant variables. Variables that explain support for a federalization of the EU might not explain support for a further solely economic integration. Therefore, it is important to take different typologies into account while researching support and opposition.¹

One way to look at different foundations for support or opposition to the EU is to make a distinction between left-wing and right-wing support and opposition (e.g. De Vries & Edwards (2009)). This is a critically important distinction because the different ideologies that they represent, have completely different reasons to be Eurosceptic. Euroscepticism is a so-called “thin-ideology”, meaning that it needs an accompanying ideology that explains why the voter is against the EU. These ideologies are of course very different in nature and explains why there is right-wing Euroscepticism as well as left-wing Euroscepticism. As both forms of Euroscepticism come from the extremes of party systems, this idea became known as the horseshoe model or the inverted U curve (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2002). This model is the result of research that shows that the EU integration issue is structured along the conventional left/right dimension. Moreover, the ‘new politics dimension’ of GAL/TAN (Green-Alternative-Liberal and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) is an even more powerful in explaining party position. (ibid, pp. 985). The horseshoe model also explains the permissive consensus, as during the earliest stage of Europeanization, it were primarily center and center-right parties that were in

¹ See Taggart & Szczepiński, 2004; Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Conti, 2003; Raines, Goodwin and Cutts, 2017 for examples of typologies

government and pushed for greater European cooperation (Haas, 1958).

Some of the literature discussed on explaining voting behavior makes use of these typologies, whereas some still use the binary. This is most likely due to data limitations. In order to go beyond the binary, much more information is needed in order to classify parties and especially people. Especially information gained through specific questions about the EU economic policies, immigration policies, what part of the EU people do or do not support etc. The more specific information, the better the typologies can be made. This thesis does not incorporate different typologies due to data limitations. It is also more interested in explaining congruence in general rather than comparing congruence between different typologies.

1.2 Second-order elections

Europeanization research has also taken a second-order approach. This has to do with the salience that voters allot to certain elections. Election for the domestic executive branch are seen as the most important elections, hence voters award the most salience to them. Other elections, for local governments for example, are seen as less important. This is what Reif & Schmitt (1980) referred to as “second-order elections”. For most citizens, national elections are more important than EU elections. This means that parties also focus most of their resources on national elections, as it is in these elections that they can win power. The result is sub-par turnout and interest in EU-elections. An attribute of second-order elections is that in practice they tend to not be about the actual subject: they are sometimes described as “mid-term referendums on government performance” (Hobolt, Spoon & Tilley 2009, pp. 93).

Second-order elections are thus elections in which voters feel less is at stake, which is represented by a lower turnout (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). The effect of second-order elections on the number of votes for a government party is argued to be related to when these elections occur. According to Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), the popularity of a government declines after an initial post-election high until the next election cycle increases the popularity again. If an election for the European Parliament is held somewhere between those two highs, government parties are said to lose more frequently (Dinkel, 1977; Tufte, 1975). This means that the EP elections can be influenced by external factors that do not directly have to do with the elections themselves.

A seemingly logical result of the increasing Euroscepticism discussed before, would be greater mobilization and thus a higher voter turnout. However, the turnout hardly increased

between 2009 and 2014. In general, turnout has steadily decreased since 1979 (European Parliament, 2014). What did change was the number of Eurosceptic MP's: the 2014 election saw the highest number of Eurosceptic MP's being voted into the parliament. As said before, this can be explained through the context in which the elections were held: the EU was still in the midst of the Eurozone crisis. An increase in Eurosceptic European MP's might be interpreted as a signal that voters are increasingly expressing their view of the EU at the voting booths. However, as Nielsen & Franklin (2016) point out: Eurosceptic parties also made gains in national parliaments, so their European gains might reflect domestic political processes. They use the post-election surveys and argue that the 2014 elections were less second-order than previous EP elections, but were still far from being first-order elections (pp. 246). The Post-Election survey of 2014 shows that 8.5% of the cases indicated that one of the main reasons why they voted was to support the national government. 7.3% indicated that expressing disapproval of the national government was one of the main reasons to vote. Even if EP election are gradually becoming less second-order, what has remained the same is their "second-rateness". European elections are said to be second-rate due to the fact that "EP elections do not decide the policies of the EU" (Nielsen & Franklin 2016, pp. 246).

Because of this second-order and second-rateness, it might be the case that variables that are proven to influence voting decisions and congruence during first-order/first-rate domestic elections, have weaker correlations in European election. Moreover, it might also mean that voting behavior during EP election is explained primarily through the national perspective. An example is the influence of the domestic election cycle, which was briefly discussed above. Without this national perspective, it would not be possible to explain why countries that were hit the hardest by the Eurozone crisis were more likely to blame their own government rather than the EU (ibid, page. 245). Schmitt & Teperoglue (2015) reach the same conclusion: the 2014 EP elections in Southern Europe (which were heavily impacted by the Eurozone crisis) were still mostly second-order. However, their findings do indicate that the EU integration cleavage was more salient and polarizing during the 2014 election. (pp. 304). However, this might also be because the EU integration cleavage became more salient and polarizing within the respective party systems.

1.3 EU issue voting

There is also a strand of literature that disagrees with this second-order perspective. The EU issue

voting perspective argues that that European elections are increasingly about European issues and different visions for the EU. In this vision, the rise of Eurosceptic parties during the 2014 elections underline that idea. Hobolt, Spoon & Tilley (2009) show that EP elections also function as “referendum on the issue of European integration” (pp. 111). However, this referendum is about the national relation with the EU so EP elections are still second-order: domestic interests are still the primary driver (pp. 112). Another argument that is made is that the domestic politics, politics and policies of member-states have been Europeanized (see Ladrech 2010). This results in a strengthening of the executive branches (also known as presidentialization) and domestic politics becoming increasingly intertwined with European politics. As a result of this, domestic and European issues are increasingly intertwined. So, even if EP elections are increasingly about the future of the EU, they will remain second-order as the primary place to discuss the future of the EU is in the domestic political arena. Moreover, considering the EP does not actually have that much influence on integration in the first place (hence the second-rateness of the election) and that domestic governments can trigger Article 50 (the “exit” article), it makes sense for Eurosceptic voters to both focus on domestic politics and to vote from a domestic perspective. Ideological opponents of the EU might also boycott the elections as a way to prevent legitimizing the EU. In a sense, the second-rateness of these elections thus make sure they will be second-order (to some extent). It can be used to send a message to politicians, domestically and within the EP itself but the power of the latter is much smaller than the former. But this does not mean that these elections are not about the future of Europe. If voting in European elections is primarily driven by domestic issues, and the most salient domestic issue is EU integration, then voting during European elections is driven by EU integration.

Second-order elections and EU-issue voting can, to some extent, both be applicable to EP elections. A consequence of an election in which people care less about the result, is that people are freer to vote however they want. This means that they do not have to take strategy into account. An example of this could be UKIP which won 27.5% of the vote during the 2014 EP election but only 12.64% during the 2015 general elections. This suggest that second-order election give a clearer view of the opinion distribution of the population. It provides an argument as to why an election can be second-order while voters take European affairs as voting cues.

What does this mean for this thesis? For comparability’s sake, it does not. The discussion above can be held for all previous EP elections. Considering that congruence research has been

done on those elections, there is no reason why it cannot be done for the 2014 election. However, as the reason why someone voted in the 2014 election might influence voting behavior, the effect of salience on voting is something to consider.

1.4 Voting behavior

There is a lot of research on voting behavior during EP elections. Hobolt & De Vries (2016a) is a good place to start, as they summarize the literature on voting behavior in the EP. They distinguish three perspectives: a utilitarian perspective in which “citizens with higher levels of income and human capital (education and occupational skills)” (pp. 420) are more likely to support EU integration, an identity approach in which citizens who feel European (both in addition to and in place of a national identity) are more likely to support EU integration, and a cue-taking approach in which citizen support is dependent on cues from influencers in/and the media. Boomgaarden et al. (2011) show that attitudes toward the EU are multidimensional, meaning that there is no single theory that explains voting behavior. Different theories intertwine to explain voting behavior. Van Spanje & De Vreese (2011) use the framework put forward by Boomgaarden et al. (2011) to see which variables are conducive for voting for a Eurosceptic party. They find that all dimensions have an impact: evaluation of the EU’s democratic performance, negative view on what the EU contributes, negative affection toward the EU, opposition to further EU integration, and a lack of a European Identity all increase the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. This finding corroborates Boomgaarden et al.’s (2011) conclusion that these dimensions should not be looked at individually. A good explanatory approach thus incorporates variables from different perspectives. Van Spanje & De Vreese do show that opposing further integration, as well as negative view of the benefits of EU membership, are the key predictor for voting for Eurosceptic parties. They further suggest that when the EU-integration issue becomes more salient, Eurosceptic parties will profit more.

De Vries & Edwards (2009) use a cue-taking approach to explain voting behavior. Their research shows that left and right wing Eurosceptics respond to different cues. They show that left-wing Euroscepticism is mostly mobilization against the neoliberal character of the EU whereas right-wing Euroscepticism revolves around the protection of national sovereignty. A left-wing argument against the EU can be found in Scharpf (2010) who argues that EU member states cannot be a ‘social market economy’. Therefore, supporters of such an economic should be more

critical of the EU than neo-liberals. The right wing's goal of protecting national protection can be seen as a result of the nativist ideology that these parties often have (see Mudde & Kaltwasser (2012)). The distinction between a neo-liberal opposing of the EU and a national-protection Euroscepticism is corroborated by other research. For example, Van Elsas et al. (2016) find that not only do the two wings differ in their reason to be against the EU, the target of the skepticism differs as well. Left-wing Eurosceptics are more likely to be dissatisfied with the contemporary EU but also more likely to support further integration (provided that it meets their demands), whereas right-wing Eurosceptics are fundamentally against more integration. (pp. 1199). Both stances are informed by cultural attitudes, in which the former is egalitarian and the latter nationalistic. Hobolt & De Vries (2016b) research the effects of the economic crisis on the likelihood of a voter voting for Eurosceptic parties (and thus taking a utilitarian approach). They divided parties into soft or hard Euroscepticism and also use the left- right dimension. Their findings support the idea that left-wing Eurosceptic voters are driven by economic concerns: the effects of the crisis on the voting for Eurosceptic parties was greater for left-wing parties. Therefore, countries that saw the worst of the crisis have citizens who are more likely to vote for left-wing Eurosceptic party (pp. 510) (SYRIZA in Greece is an example of this).

A special look at the Brexit should also give us more information about which variables explain Euroscepticism. Hobolt (2016) shows that the following variables increased the likeliness of voting "leave": gender (male), low-skilled work, old age, and low income, of which the last two have the most effect. The opposite is also true: those with high-skilled jobs, who are younger and have high incomes are more likely to vote remain and thus support the EU. Thus, these variables represent Kriesi et al's (2008) integration/demarcation cleavage in which "losers" of globalization oppose further integration. Hobolt also finds that Brexit voters partook in issue voting: those who thought the Brexit would better Britain's economic chances voted Leave and vice versa, and those who oppose immigration also voted Leave.

To summarize, the existing literature on explaining voting behavior in EP elections has made strides in explaining who votes for pro-EU parties and who votes for Eurosceptic parties. As the variables (age, gender and income) mentioned above influence voting behavior it is important to consider them when analyzing the data. However, because these variables are not linked to congruence but still influence voting, they should be considered as control variables rather than as predictor variables. The literature has also begun to make distinction between left-

wing and right-wing Euroscepticism. Beyond those typologies there has not been much research. Voting behavior and typologies are very interesting but they become even more interesting considering that other research has shown that parties are more pro-integration than voters are. Voting behavior theories have not yet taken this difference into account. A reason for this is that it is still unclear what actually determines how great the discrepancy is between voters and parties on the EU integration issue, even though there exists a large body of literature on congruence on the left-right dimension.

2. Congruence

Ideological congruence between party and voters exists when they share the same opinion on a specific subject. Congruence can be visualized as a matter of distance between two positions on a scale, and the lower the numerical distance the more congruent the two positions are. This concept is very useful in examine representativeness. Therefore, research has been done on what electoral institutions are most congruent (Golder & Stramski 2010, pp. 90), but congruence research can also be done on specific ideological issues like the left-right economic scale (Belchior, 2013) or any other issue that can be transformed into such a scale (Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014). What the two points represent can also change: they can be a single voter or an entire house of representatives for example. A key aspect of these different research topics is that the conceptualization of congruence should change accordingly. In order to better understand congruence, the next section further explains Golder & Stramski's theory (Golder & Stramski, 2010), the second section shows how congruence is conceptualized and operationalized in empirical studies.

2.1 Congruence theory

Congruence is a two-way street as it is influenced by both party and voter positions. Accordingly, Golder & Stramski (2010) argue that congruence has two dimensions: "(1) one citizen or many citizens and (2) one representative or many representatives" (pp. 91). The four different situations that this produces call for different conceptualizations and operationalizations of congruence. These situations can be found in Table 1. The table also includes the different conceptualizations of congruence that go with the different situations. For example, a situation in which congruence is calculated between a party (or representative) and all citizens (or just those who voted for the

party/representative) calls for either of the three conceptualizations of congruence that are named in that cell.

Table 1: four situations for congruence

	One Representative	Many Representatives
One Citizen	- Congruence	²
Many Citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Absolute Median Citizen Congruence - Absolute Citizen Congruence - Relative Citizen Congruence 	- Many-to-Many congruence

The one citizen-to-one representative style congruence is the easiest to understand. Golder & Stramski call this conceptualization simply “congruence”. One point is a voter and the other point is a representative. The closer the points are to each other, the more congruent they are. This kind of congruence relation is helpful when the researcher is interested in the individual-voter level because all individual variables can still be used, whereas in many-to-one relation (as will be discussed below), these variables have to be sacrificed. The downside is that a one-to-one relation is not helpful when the research looks at the relation via the representative/party perspective. Representatives and parties represent more than one individual, so they will by default be more interested in the average position of voters.

Golder & Stramski propose three different ways to conceptualize a many-to-one relation. First of all, they propose the absolute median citizen congruence measure, in which congruence is high when the absolute distance between the representative/party and the median citizen is low. The median position of citizens is calculated and then compared to the position of the party to see how congruent that party and the citizens are. Due to the use of the median citizen, variables that might explain individual differences are lost and therefore this measure is most suitable for explaining congruence from a party/representative perspective. Next is the absolute citizen congruence measure which does not take the average of the citizens’ positions, but rather the

² Calculating congruence between many representatives and one citizens is possible but not theoretically relevant or interesting as all representatives represent more than one citizen.

average of the distances between each individual citizen and the representative/party.

A problem with these conceptualizations is that they are not particularly suited for comparing cross-nationally because they do not control for wing-distance. Wing-distance is the distance between the two most extreme positions represented. This is mostly related to party positions as it is likely that voters will represent every position. Relative citizen congruence does control for wing-distance and is therefore suitable for comparing cross-nationally. If wing distance is not considered, “representatives in homogeneous constituencies ... [are] at a significant advantage in terms of their ability to produce congruence compared to representatives in more heterogeneous ones” (Golder & Stramski 2010 pp. 93). If the wing distance is 3 and a voter scores a 0 or a 10, then the highest possible distance to the most congruent party is 7. For example, if the party-system stretches from position 7 to position 10 then the most congruent party for a voter with a position of 0 is thus the party from position 7. If the wing distance is 7, then the highest possible distance to the most congruent party is 3. Thus, by taking this wing distance into account, researchers are able to compare cross-nationally³. Despite all its benefits, this conceptualization has the same problem as the previous two discussed: it aggregates individuals meaning all information on individual variables are lost.

The last option discussed by Golder & Stramski is a form of congruence that they themselves develop and test in the article: the many-to-many relationship. This type of conceptualization is most useful when discussing the representativeness of the government as a whole, with an emphasis on representatives’ positions rather than government policy outcome. Therefore, congruence is high when the preference distributions of citizens and representatives are similar. This conceptualization is not suitable for individual or party-level but is suitable for system level analysis.

As this thesis is primarily interested in using a voter perspective on congruence, the one-to-one conceptualization of congruence is the most fitting. In the case of this thesis, this relation will exist between one voter and the party they voted for.

2.2 Empirical studies

With these different conceptualizations of congruence in mind, we can look at previous research on congruence and discuss their choice of conceptualization. Belchior (2013) looks at micro,

³ For a more in-depth explanation see: Golder & Stramski 2010 pp. 93-94

meso and macro variables to explain the variance in congruence on the economic left-right scale during the 2009 European Parliament elections. They calculate congruence by comparing the average position of MP's and the average position of the voters of a party and find that electorates "tend to be at the center of the ideological spectrum" (pp. 372) but they rightfully note that what this center means is determined by national context. Thus, they use a many-to-one conceptualization of the absolute median citizen kind. This is the appropriate approach considering the goal is to compare parties. Next, three different models for explaining congruence are compared. The Downs-May Model (Downs, 1957) is a spatial theory in which a congruent vote is a vote for the party with which the distance is lowest. The variables that are used in this model are of micro-level, like the voters' political involvement and the MP's political experience. Therefore, a one-to-one relation would be the best way to operationalize congruence in this model. The second model used is the Przeworski-Sprague Model (Przeworski & Sprague 1986). This model makes a distinction between ideological parties and "catch-all" parties. Ideological parties try to actually change opinions and therefore focus on those that are not yet congruent with the ideology. Catch-all parties focus on those voters who are in close proximity of the party's position and because the center is supposed to be the most populated, catch-all parties are often centrist parties. Ideological parties can then be considered niche parties. Therefore, this model argues that centrist parties are more congruent with their voters. The third model is the Huber-Powell-Wessels in which congruence is explained through party and system characteristics. Variables in this model are thus all macro-level so either a many-to-one or even a many-to-many operationalization seems suitable here. The main argument of this model is that the more ideologically distinct the parties are, and the more proportional the system is, the higher the congruence is. Belchior finds that political sophistication is not significant⁴ in explaining congruence, proportionality is not significant, but a party's spatial position is significant. The model shows that political parties competing for the center are more congruent. (pp. 371) This is interesting because Belchior used a many-to-one conceptualization of congruence and the variables that are best suited for that approach are the variables that are significant. Political

⁴ Political sophistication is a variable that is used very heavily in the "correct voting" literature and there are studies that shows that sophistication is significant in explaining congruence. This will be discussed in the next section

sophistication is an individual variable, whereas the spatial position of a party is a meso-level variable. The use of a many-to-one conceptualization is said to be most useful for macro-level variables. It is clear that there are some discrepancies there.

Giger & Lefkofridi (2014) study salience-based congruence in order to see how the salience of issues affected congruence. Thus, they do not focus on the left-right dimension but rather on the issues that voters deem important. They research whether congruence is greater on salient issues or on non-salient issues. Due to data limitations, the scope of the research is small, as Switzerland is the only case. As the salience awarded to an issue is of key interest in this research, Giger & Lefkofridi calculate an individual citizen congruence variable as well as an absolute citizen's congruence. The former operationalization is the congruence between every individual citizen and the position of the party they voted for. This variable is thus fit for use in individual level approaches. The latter is the average party-voter distance for all the seven issues the authors look at. This variable is thus suitable for comparing congruence between parties. The authors thus use a combination of both a one-to-one relation and a many-to-one relation and accordingly change the operationalization. The research shows that individual salience levels are very important for explaining congruence for niche-parties: "niche parties outperform mainstream parties on salient issues while... mainstream parties score higher on the left-right dimension than on salient issues" (p. 299). Parties on the ends of the wing distance should thus be more congruent with their voters on issues those voters deem important.

Within an EU context, this implies that parties who represent extreme positions are more congruent with voters that award high salience to the issue of EU integration issue, then are centrist parties. However, Belchior finds that center parties are more congruent. Therefore, by including variables for salience and distance to the center, we can see how these variables influence individual congruence.

3. Voting Correctly

The individual citizen congruence conceptualization used in the Giger & Lefkofridi's research can be linked to the voting correctly literature. As Golder & Stramski (2010) already discussed, a one-to-one relation is best approached through the individual level. To further explore this individual level, the literature on voting correctly is of great use. The concept of a "correct vote" is defined by Lau & Redlawsk (1997) as follows: "We define a "correct" vote decision as one that is the same as the choice which would have been made under conditions of full information." (pp.

586). A vote is thus “correct” if the party that is chosen is the same party that the voter would have chosen if they had full information on everything important. This does not necessarily imply that this correct choice is the choice that is most congruent. Different salient levels of issues might play a role here, as well as different factors like party fragmentation. However, the way the Lau & Redlawsk predict the correct vote is by comparing the position of the respondent with the positions of those running for election. This means that the correct vote can be determined by looking at which candidate is most alike (Lau et al 2014, pp. 241). Researchers can thus use a mass survey and predict each individual voters’ “correct vote” based on distance. If this is the same party as the party that the voter voted for then this is a correct vote. If this party is also the party that is closest to the voter, then this is also the most congruent choice.

Lau & Redlawsk continue to assess to what extent they can predict the correct choice this way. They compare it to the extent citizens can make the ‘correct’ choice, even if they are not fully informed. Through an experiment in which the subjects had to vote with incomplete knowledge and subsequently vote again but this time with all information readily available, they found that citizens made the correct choice in 70% of the cases (pp. 588). Moreover, Lau & Redlawsk were able to predict correct voting choices in 66% of the cases, which is almost as accurate as voters are themselves. This also means that in 66% of the cases the correct vote is the same as the most congruent vote. They call this the normative naïve measure of voting correctly.

There are some problems with cross-national comparisons with this approach, which has to do with the wing-distance problem discussed for congruence. If all citizens in two different countries voted correctly, the difference in congruence could still be huge. Congruence is a two-way street and perfect congruence is not just a case of voters aligning themselves with parties but also vice versa. A theoretical example of how this works would be a two-party system with mandatory voting, compared to a multiparty-system with mandatory voting. In both systems all voters vote for the correct party, based on which parties is most congruent with the individuals’ position. The two-party system will most likely have a lower level of average congruence because the entire political spectrum that exists in the citizenry has to anchor to only two positions within that spectrum. The level of incongruence depends on where those parties are positioned exactly but in any case, the level of congruence in the multiparty- system will be most likely higher. So one system is more congruent even though both systems have maximized correct voting. In conclusion: voting correctly does influence congruence but becomes less influential when

comparing between party systems. A correct vote can be predicted based on congruence.

As a congruent vote and a correct vote can be similar, they might also have similar predictors. An example of this is the variable political sophistication or political knowledge. This variable has already been discussed above, from a congruence research perspective (Belchior, 2013). Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk (2013) is an example of the variable being used in voting correctly literature. They use the normative naïve measure of voting correctly: thus the most congruent vote is the correct vote. This is applied to voting during U.S. presidential elections. They find that “three individual-level variables dominate the equation ..., the policy-distinctiveness of the two major party candidates, ..., political knowledge, and ... strength of party identification” (pp. 404). Political knowledge is both significant and positive: an increase in political knowledge increases the correctness of a vote and thus the congruence. This is contrary to what Belchior (2013) found, as that research showed that the “more politically sophisticated, involved, and best educated voters do not exhibit higher levels of congruence with the party they vote for” (pp. 367). If political sophistication does not increase congruence, it is not a stretch to assume that the same is true for political knowledge and voting correctly. One way to explain why this is not the case are the differences between the United States and Europe. Belchior argues that this contradiction is due to differences in electoral systems, as using political sophistication might only be “appropriate in the U.S. Majoritarian case, in which there is a direct linkage between MPs and voters within constituencies” (pp. 367), as opposed to European systems in which this link does not exist. The Lau, Andersen, and Redlawsk study was done on the United States and did find a significant, positive relation.

Lau et al (2014) researched voting correctly across different democracies, including the United States and European states. This research also uses the normative naïve measurement. They find that political sophistication is significant, but the effect is much smaller compared to Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk (2013). Lau et al. argue that the weakness of the political sophistication variable might be linked to the weakness of the measurement (pp. 253). This is interesting in light of Belchior’s research as they measure political sophistication with four variables, of which two are significant (whether the voter followed the news and whether they followed the campaign) and two insignificant (the voter’s political information and number of years of education). Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk (2013) captured political knowledge by using an average of over 20 questions. It is possible that their variable captured the difference in political

knowledge better than did Belchior's. What is clear is that there should be more research on the role of political sophistication on congruence and voting correctly.

Lau et al (2014) also control for strategic voting, which happens when a citizen votes for a party that they know is not the most congruent party. A strategic vote can also be seen as a correct vote and thus the authors decide to see whether institutional variables that indicate incentives for strategic voting are significant. If they are significant then the original research would have underestimated the total number of correct votes and the effect of certain institutional variables might also be underestimated. In order to test this, they see whether institutional systems with inherent incentives for strategic voting have lower numbers of votes that are correct. The conclusion is that they do not, so strategic voting does not confound the basic results (pp. 255).

Besides political sophistication, the authors also find that institutional-level variables are significant. Specifically, a higher number of parties in the party system, and a voting system that is based on individuals rather than parties, decrease the number of correct votes. Variables that increase the number of correct votes include: a party system with a clear ideological distinction between parties, a critical media culture, and clear lines of responsibility. These variables are thus important to consider when formulating hypotheses about congruence on the EU-integration issue. However, as this thesis is focused on an individual perspective such meso- and macro level variables will not be included.

Boonen, Pedersen, and Hooghe (2017) primarily look at political sophistication and its effect on voter-party congruence. They base their measurement of sophistication on the indicators of political interest, educational level, exposure to political information, and political knowledge (pp. 319). They also include party-system variables and come to the conclusions that political sophistication interacts with party identification. Voters that are sophisticated and identify with a party are more congruent than sophisticated independents. Surprisingly, they also find that "compared with weak or non-identifiers (independents), those with a strong party identification display a lower degree of left-right congruence with the party they voted for" (pp. 325).

In conclusion, the role of political sophistication is not yet completely clear and is worth to further examine. While examining the role of political sophistication on congruence it might be a good idea to take party identification into account.

4. Congruence research on EU integration

It is now time to turn attention from congruence on the left-right economic scale to congruence on the EU integration scale. The key research on congruence on the issue of EU integration are the studies by Mattila & Raunio (2006 & 2012). This research uses the post-election surveys of the 2004 and 2009 European parliament elections. In their 2006 research, Mattila & Raunio conclude that party system characteristics, in particularly the number of parties and the ideological range (wing distance), did not influence congruence. They did find that voters and parties in newer member-states were more congruent than those in older member-states. (pp. 446). Because they find that voters and parties are more congruent of the left-right dimension, they suggest that “making the EU dimension more salient in national politics” (pp. 446) will improve congruence

The conclusion of the 2012 research was that the EP had become less congruent between 2004 and 2009 (on the issue of EU integration). Analyzing the congruency of the 2014 EP elections can provide us with the answer of whether the many political events that happened between 2009 and 2014 has had an effect. One way of doing this is to duplicate Mattila & Raunio’s research but for the 2014 EP elections. Apart from that not being the most satisfactory approach from an academic perspective, the approach used by Mattila & Raunio can also be improved, especially when it comes to their conceptualization and operationalization of representativeness. They use the concept of opinion congruence on the EU integration issue between parties in the EP and their voters as a measure of representation. Even though this obviously does not encompass the entire spectrum of political issues on which the people should be represented, attitude to EU integration is a fundamental issue. Moreover, researching opinion congruence on a single issue is enough of a challenge. The improvements lie in the fact that they excluded individual-level variables that explain congruence from a citizen perspective and how they determine the two points between which congruence exists.

First of all, the authors determine congruence by comparing “voters’ own policy positions with their assessment of the positions of the party they voted for” (Mattila & Raunio, 2006 pp. 435). The position of the party is thus based on the score given by voters. The goal of this research is to find out how congruent parties in the EP and their voters are on this issue and choosing such a subjective variable as voter perception does not seem to be the wisest choice. Voter perception is possibly influenced by things like education, interest, and salience but this is

not controlled for. This is remedied (to some extent) by the fact that Mattila & Raunio do not use individual voters but rather calculate the average voter position, meaning that individual characteristics do not matter anymore. However, it also means that the individual level is excluded from the research. This is not necessary so the best way to improve this is to use a variable that is more objective, like an expert positioning of parties.

Mattila and Raunio use self-placement and perception of each individual voter and calculate the average for each dimension. Thus, congruence is calculated between two averages which means that, again following Golder & Stramski (2010), this is a many-to-one relationship of the absolute median citizen congruence kind. Even though Mattila & Raunio do not actually use one representative (but an average for the perception of all the voters), this is still a many-to-one relationship because the positions of the voters are averaged. They further explain congruence through system characteristics and individual party characteristics, but they cannot look into individual voter characteristics because of their use of aggregate measures. In order to do so, congruence should be conceptualized as a one-to-one relation. This way all the different individual level variables remain open to research.

Mattila & Raunio's research is the reason why this thesis tries to explain congruence through the individual perspective. First of all, it is one of the few research papers on congruence on the EU integration issue. Secondly, as it is done from a party perspective, there has not yet been research done which takes an individual voter perspective toward congruence on the EU integration issue. Thirdly, party-system characteristics are shown to not be significant. All of this is incorporated into this thesis.

5. Hypotheses

This thesis wishes to explore the congruence on the EU integration issue from an individual voter perspective. Therefore, and following Golder & Stramski, congruence is conceptualized as a one-to-one relation. This means that all individual variables are available for research. However, due to this one-to-one relation, the resulting research will be unable to compare levels of congruence between different countries. First of all, there is the problem of wing-distance: the distance between the two most extreme parties/voters is not the same for every country meaning that the same distance means something different in different countries. Second, there is the problem of differential item functioning: a center party in Sweden most likely does not endorse the same

policies as a center-party in Poland.

Due to the individual perspective used, this thesis can use the voting correctly literature that argues that political sophistication effects the correctness of a vote. As was discussed, a correct vote, when defined following the normative naïve approach presented in Lau (1997), is the most congruent vote possible. So political sophistication should also increase congruence between voter and party. Following the voting correctly literature (Lau, Andersen, and Redlawsk's (2013) & Lau et al (2014)), but also Boonen, Pedersen, and Hooghe (2017) and contrary to what Belchior (2013) finds, I expect that (H1): *The higher the political sophistication of a voter, the higher the congruence on the issue of EU-integration with the party they voted for during the 2014 EP elections.*

Apart from political sophistication, the other micro variable that is said to influence congruence is the salience of an issue. Following Giger & Lefkofridi (2014) and the EU issue voting (so following Hobolt et al. 2009) approach, I expect that (H2): *the more salient a voter finds the EU-integration issue, the higher the congruence with the party they voted for during the 2014 EP elections.* The more important a voter finds an issue, the more likely it is that they will cast a well-thought out vote. There are some problems with this idea. First of all, there is an obvious similarity between the effects of salience and political sophistication. For most people, the two will have a positive relation: a salient issue results in more political sophistication through the search for more information. Thus, it is important to watch out that the two variables don't confound each other. I will therefore report the Pearson Correlation between the two variables in the assumptions section. Secondly, the effect of salience might also be dependent on where the voter-party combinations are in the political spectrum. Parties that exist on the extreme ends are freer to pursue extreme or unusual policy ideas (like an EU-exit). They have less direct competition because the extremes are always sparsely populated in comparison with the center, which allows them to freely pursue issues that are not salient for other parties. Therefore, and also following Giger & Lefkofridi I expect that (H3) *the effect of the salience of EU integration on the congruence between voter & party is higher for voter/party combination at the extremes of the domestic wing distance.* The effect of salience on congruence is higher for parties & voters that are either the most pro-integration or the most against-integration within a domestic context compared to parties in the middle. This is especially the case for parties that are the only viable Eurosceptic party in the race (supposing that there are multiple pro-integration parties): every

citizen who feels strongly and negatively about the EU will vote for this party. Another situation would be when a citizen is choosing between two pro-integration parties: even if the salience level of the EU is very high, chances are that that issue will not be decisive due to the similarities between the two parties. The effect of salience on congruence will thus be lower for this citizen compared to the effect of the salience in the first situation.

Chapter 2: Data & Methods

1. Data

In order to test the hypotheses, the European Post-Election Survey of 2014 (Schmitt, Braun et al., 2016) data set will be used as well as the Euromanifesto dataset of 2014. (Schmitt, Hobolt et al., 2016). Both datasets are part of the European Parliament Election Study. The European Post-Election Survey is a survey held after European elections and includes questions about that election as well as other topics. The primary reason why this dataset is used rather than a Eurobarometer dataset like the “Europeans in 2014” (Eurobarometer 81.1) or “the future of Europe” (Eurobarometer 81.2) datasets, is that they lack information on which party the respondent voted for in the 2014 EP election. This information is essential for comparing voter and party. Whereas the other datasets mentioned do possess more information on individual level characteristics, the European Election Survey includes enough information to compute the necessary variables. The post-election surveys for previous EP elections are used by De Vries & Edwards (2009); Van Elsas et al. (2016); Clark & Rohrschneider (2009); Spoon & Williams (2017) and both studies by Matilla & Raunio. There is thus ample precedent to use the European post-elections survey of 2014. The dataset is structured hierarchically, as it consists of individual respondents within countries.

For information on the party positions, the Euromanifesto 2014 (Schmitt, Hobolt et al. 2016) dataset will be used. In this dataset, party positions are determined by analyzing manifestos that parties, participating in the EP election, put forward. The parties selected are the parties that were deemed relevant, meaning that only parties that have been in the EP for the past two periods are coded. The dataset contains parties for all EU member-states, except Croatia which subsequently is not included in model. This dataset is also hierarchical as the parties are nested in countries. As was discussed before, Matilla & Raunio 2006 & 2012 do not use this dataset but rather voters’ perception of the party they voted for. Hobolt & De Vries (2016b) and Spoon & Williams (2017) use the Chapel Hill expert survey which is another dataset that assess parties’ Euroscepticism. Both datasets have variables dealing with integration. However, the Euromanifesto dataset is preferred due to the fact that it is done in tandem with the Post-Election survey, which improves the comparability.

2. Model Specification

The data used in this thesis is nested and consists of a single time point. Therefore, the data is multilevel. This is especially the case considering that congruence is defined as an individual-level variable between a single voter and their party. If congruence is conceptualized differently, for example as the distance between the average voter and a party (which is known as a many-to-one relation) like Matilla & Raunio do (2006 & 2012), a normal regression analysis might work, as it removes individual voter variance. In this thesis, the variables of interest are micro-level variables: congruence, political sophistication, and salience. Even though the model will not include macro-level variables, it is likely that these variables still influence individual variables. This is why a model that accounts for these different variances is appropriate here. Normal regression analysis would violate the independent error assumption because individual-level errors can to some extent be predicted, by basing these prediction on the countries the individuals are in. Previously it has been discussed that the European population is less pro-integration than European parties are. It could be the case that countries that are so-called “pace-setting” (e.g. are the informal leaders of the EU) (Börzel 2012), are less congruent. In that case, the errors can be predicted based on the leadership role of the country. This violation can lead to biased coefficients, downwardly biased standard errors because of wrong z & t values and an increased probability of type 1 errors (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002).

There are three ways to deal with nested data structures that circumvent these violations. Estimating a multi-level model is one way. This method estimates a model in which both micro- and macrolevel variances are incorporated. The effects of individual variables vary across the lower level and the effects of macrolevel variables are fixed. So, the effect of political sophistication would be random but the effect of a macrolevel variable like year of accession of the nation would be fixed. The other two methods of estimating it would be to either disregard the within-variance (individual effects) or the between-variance (macrolevels effects) because without either, it becomes possible to do linear regression. The violation of the standard errors is removed when removing either the between-variance or the within-variance as the data is no longer nested: the data is no longer multilevel. As the random effects approach incorporates both variances, it has more information to work with and thus is more scientifically interesting. It also allows to explore causal heterogeneity, which is important for H3 (see Steenbergen & Jones (2002)). Causal heterogeneity is a situation in which a relation between variables is different in different groups. Boonen et al (2017) also use a multi-level model and the data used in that

research is also nested.

However, the multi-level model proved to be too difficult to get working. The intraclass correlation of 0.039 showed that 3.9% of the variance in the variable of congruence is explained by level 2. The -2log likelihood test showed that this was significant. However, performing a multi-level model in which the individual-level variables were modeled as random effects proved to be difficult. The major problem was a reoccurring “final Hessian matrix” error. This error occurs when modeling a random effect for a variable on which level-2 variance has little effect. The solution for this would be to model the individual variables as fixed-effects. But as the final Hessian matrix error did not occur for all variables, it meant that I would model some of them as random and some of them as fixed. Therefore, this thesis removes between-variance by estimating an OLS model in which dummy variables for the member-states are included. Using the dummy-variable method to control for level-2 variance proved to work much better. Moreover, by using OLS regression, I am also able to run models for each country individually and by doing so still get a sense of causal heterogeneity. This somewhat solves the biggest problem for using the dummy-variable method for nested data.

I estimate 4 models. The first two models do not include the interaction term. This variable is missing for Malta: the two parties share the same position, so the interaction term is 0 for the entire country. I could simply remove them from the model, but I want to incorporate as many member-states as possible. Model 1 consists only of the variables political sophistication and EU salience, whereas model 2 also includes the control variables. Model 3 removes Malta and thus includes the interaction term. Model 4 is the full model, in which all variables are present.

Using OLS also comes with certain assumptions that need to be met. These include multicollinearity, linearity and heteroscedasticity. The outcome of these tests will be discussed during the discussion of the regression table.

3. Operationalization's

3.1 Congruence

In order to calculate the congruence between voter and party on the issue of EU-integration, two scores need to be compared. The party score comes from the “integration” variable in the Euromanifesto dataset, in which a score of 1 means that a party is pro-EU integration and 10

means that the party is anti-EU-integration. Alternatively, the variable “pro_anti_EU” could be used, which is a calculated variable containing variables (measured on a three-point scale) that have to do with the EU in general. Because the goal of this thesis is to focus on EU-integration, only the variable ‘integration’ will be used. The voters’ score is taken from question QPP 18 in the Post-Election survey, which asks: “Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion?” This involves a 0-10 scale in which a score of 0 means “European unification has already gone too far” and a score of 10 means “European unification should be pushed further”. It is indeed problematic that these two variables do not measure the exact same thing. Being pro-integration does not necessarily imply supporting more integration, there will be people who are pro-integration but are just fine with the amount of integration that currently exists. People that are against integration will probably not be fine with how integrated the EU currently is and will thus be at the ends of both scales. These problems might be the reason why Matilla & Raunio (2006, 2012) decided to use voter’ perceptions of the party they voted for, rather than expert surveys of party positions. However, both approaches are flawed, as using self-placement might be at risk of being biased. Therefore, I continue using the Euromanifesto dataset because despite the problems with comparison between QPP18 and ‘integration’, the use of this dataset would present a new development in congruence research on EU-integration.

There is a difference in the scaling of qpp18 and ‘integration’ as the Post-Election survey has 11 different options (0-10), whereas the Euromanifesto only has 10 (1-10). The latter scale can be converted into an 11 (0-10) option scale through the following formulae: $(\text{party-position} - 1) * (10/9)$. A party coded as a 1 will then be recoded as: $(1-1) * (10/9) = 0$, resulting in a scale of 0 to 10. This also has as result that perfect congruence can only exist at the ends of the scale. For example, the voter scale has the position for 5, whereas this becomes a 4.44 for the party. However, first the Euro-manifesto should be flipped in order to align the direction of the scale: qpp18 has a 0 for anti-integration, whereas the Euromanifesto coded a 1 as pro-integration. After this is done, the ‘integration’ variable now ranges from 0-10 in which 0 is the most anti-integrationist position.

When the two scores are determined for a voter/party duo, I can then calculate the congruence. Because congruence is conceptualized in a one-to-one relationship, the two scores can simply be compared, and the difference will then represent the distance between the two.

Following Giger & Lefkofridi (2014), congruence is calculated through the following formula: $\text{Congruence} = C_i - P_{aj}$, in which C_i is the score for each individual citizen and P_{aj} is the score for the party they voted for. These calculations will result in both positive and negative numbers. The positive numbers are the result of a voter/party duo in which the voter is more pro-EU-integration than the party they voted for. A negative number represents the opposite. A score of 0 implies perfect congruence, but this means that this variable actually measures incongruence rather than congruence. Therefore, the formula is changed to: $10 - C_i - P_{aj}$. A score of 10 is now perfect congruence. In order to just look at the distance between the two, the congruence variable is calculated to only take absolute distance into account rather than relative distance. This means that if a variable increases congruence, the coefficient should be positive as it brings the congruence closer to the perfect 10.

However, before congruence can be calculated, the data on party positions should be inserted in the post-election dataset. I cannot simply copy the variable for party positions into the post-election survey. I therefore create a new variable in the post-election dataset, in which I recode the party the respondent voted for, to the numerical value of the position of that party according to the Euromanifesto dataset⁵ (I recode whilst keeping the original variable). This results in a loss of cases as not all parties in the post-election dataset are also in the Euromanifesto dataset. As a matter of fact, deleting all cases of people voting for parties that are not in the Euromanifesto dataset (also including those who did not vote), drops the number of cases from 30,064 to 11,181.

After the congruence is calculated for all voter/party duo's, the variables of political sophistication, salience, and variable representing the "extremity" of the party need to be calculated. The best way to do this is to find a way to score these variables. A good way to do this is find questions within the Post-Election survey that can be used to assess the level of political sophistication and salience. The variable concerning extremity will be computed using the EuroManifesto data.

3.2 Political sophistication

When it comes to the variable political sophistication, there is one variable that directly tests political knowledge. For question QPP 23, the respondents have to say whether the

⁵ For a more in-depth explanation of the creation of all variables, see attachment A

following statements are true or false: “Switzerland is a member of the EU”; “Each Member State elects the same number of MEPs”, “There are (150% of correct number) members in the (lower house of national parliament), and “(Name of the head of government) belongs to (name of correct party)”. A convenient way to score this is to award 1 point for every single correct answer. Respondents that score 4 points will be the most political sophisticated. Using question QPP 23 to assess political sophistication is tempting but as Lau et al (2014) showed, it seems that the strength of the sophistication measurement is important. Basing a score on just 4 questions might result in a measurement that does not capture the full effect. They showed that the effect of political sophistication in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data is much smaller compared to the effect in the American National Election Study (ANES) survey, while at the same time CSES assess political sophistication through three factual questions and the ANES survey through an average of over twenty (pp. 253). It seems like a good idea to incorporate more questions in order to assess political sophistication. QP11 asks how often the correspondent did certain things like watching a TV program about the European elections or attended a public meeting or rally about the EU elections. While attending a public meeting about the election seems like evidence of political sophistication, it is impossible to control for information absorbed at these events. Moreover, questions like this risk measuring interest or salience rather than political sophistication. These variables are already intertwined to some extent and so it is better to just stick to factual questions in order to assess political sophistication. This means that the political sophistication variable is an interval variable with a scale of 0-4.

This variable was created by recoding the 4 questions of QPP23 into dummy-variables, in which the correct answer corresponded with a 1 and all other answers (include false answers and ‘do not knows’) were coded as 0’s. These 4 recoded dummy-variable were then simply added to each other to create the variable for political sophistication.

3.3 Salience

In order to assess how salient the EU-integration issue is, the same approach is taken as with political sophistication. If a respondent answers question QP4a (What are the main reasons why you decided to vote in the recent European elections?) with one (or more) of the following items, they will have a higher salient level: you are in favor of the EU, to express disapproval of the EU, you are very interested in European affairs, the EU plays an important role in your life. Because this question can be answered with three items, choosing three of these items result in a higher

salience score than choosing just one of these. If a respondent picked three of the options mentioned above, they receive a score of three. Another question that measures saliences is QP5. QP5 asks “what are the issues which make you vote in the recent European elections? Firstly? Any Others?” in which available items include “the power and competences of the European institutions” and “the role of the EU in the international scene”. It is clear that these items indicated a salience that is not indicated by an item like “the food security”. Respondents can choose an unlimited number of issues in the second part of the question. Picking all options that correspond with salience of the EU result in 4 points. Combining QP4a and QP5 results in scale of 0-7, with 7 being the highest level of salience. Respondents that scored a 7 thus assess the EU as very important, which is shown through their voting motivations, which all have to do with EU issues.

The issues that signify EU-salience in QP4 are as follows: “to influence the choice of the president of the European Commission”, “you are in favor of the EU”, “the EU plays an important role in your everyday life”, “to express disapproval of the EU”, “you are very interested in European affairs”, and “you feel European or a citizen of the EU”. These items either express a wish to influence EU policy or signifies the salience of the EU as whole.

The issues chosen for QP5 are: “the single currency, the Euro”, “The power and competencies of the European institutions”, “European values and identity”, “the role of the EU on the international scene”. These four items all signify EU-salience because they deal directly with EU policies and or the existence of the EU. Moreover, the item of “European values and identity” is also in line with the identity approach of EU-integration research which states that those who feel more European are more likely to support EU-integration (Hobolt & De Vries (2016a).

3.4 Interaction term

Next, I create a variable for the mean position on EU integration of all parties within a country. By assessing the difference between this position and parties’ positions on integration, a variable is created that reflects how “extreme” a party is. I choose EU integration rather than the left-right scale because the most extreme pro-integration position is not that far removed from the mean position. So, the higher values of this variable are for parties opposing further integration. The created variable measures the distance to the mean party position within a country and is accordingly called “distance to mean party position”. The larger the value, the farther away a

party is from the norm. This variable is needed to test H3 and so I create an interaction variable between this “extremeness” variable and salience of the voter.

The creation of this variable once again involves inserting Euromanifesto data into the post-election dataset. This is done by recoding the variable “country” to the variable for the mean party positions. The mean party positions were calculated within the Euromanifesto dataset. After this, I create a variable for the distance between the position of the party a respondent voted for, and the mean position of all parties in that country.

If the coefficient of the interaction term is significant it means that a 1-point increase in the distance between the party voted for and the mean position within a party system, results in an increase in the strength of the effect of EU salience. The more extreme a party is, the most salience affects congruence. However, it depends on the effect of EU salience what a further interpretation of this term is. If EU salience increases congruence, then a positive coefficient for the interaction term means that EU salience increases congruence even more the further a party is removed from the center, and vice versa. If EU salience decreases congruence but the interaction is positive, then it weakens the effect.

3.5 Control variables

The control variables are a mix of variables used to control for in both congruence and Europeanization research. First of all, the variables of age and gender will be used. These two variables have been shown to effect voting behavior in general, and within the context of EU-integration it has been show that the elderly and men are more likely to vote Eurosceptic (Hobolt, 2016). The age variable d11rd2 is used, which has the following categories: 16/18-24, 25 – 34, 35 – 44, 45 – 54, 55 – 64, 65+. Gender will be recoded as a dummy in which females are the reference group, so the coefficient shows how the effect for men differs from the effect for women.

Lau, Andersen, & Redlawsk (2013) and Boonen, Pedersen & Hooghe (2017) show that party identification significantly affects congruence and following them I also control for party identification. This variable is operationalized by comparing QP2 (party voted for during EP election) and QPP5 (party voted for during last parliamentary election). If this party is the same, this is coded as value of 1. If it is not the same, it is coded as a 0. Party Identification is thus a dummy variable.

Boonen, Pedersen and Hooghe also control for disproportionality, effective number of

parties, and polarization. They control for this because different electoral systems result in different party systems and the number of parties present in a party system likely effects the effect of political sophistication. Choosing between two parties is easier done than choosing between nine parties. However, this research won't control for these variables. First, these variables are macrolevel variables and this thesis is concerned with the individual level. Secondly, these variables cannot be feasibly made within this dataset. Due to the nature of the party competition and the nature of this thesis, it is impossible to control for it.

Previously in this thesis, the horseshoe model was discussed briefly. This model states that placement on the economic left-right scale determines attitude toward EU-integration, as the farther from the center voters or parties are, the more Eurosceptic they become. Because I use the distance to the mean party position on the EU integration scale rather than the left-right scale, and following Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002), I also control for left-right placement on the economic scale. QPP13 asks the respondent to position themselves on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 equals "left".

I do not explicitly control for wing-distance and year of ascension, which are said to influence congruence. Because the model incorporates country-dummies, this implicitly also control for wing-distance and year of ascension as these dummies control for all level-2 variance.

The last control variable is the variable for distance to mean party position. This variable is used in the interaction-term and thus should be controlled for.

Chapter 3: Analysis

1. Assumption tests

Before the outcomes of the model can be discussed, there are a few assumptions that need to be tested in order to secure that the outcomes are reliable. These assumptions include: multicollinearity, linearity and heteroscedasticity (statistics solutions). Multicollinearity happens when variables explain the same parts of the variance. An example of this is by having a variable for year of birth as well as a variable of age. The two are the same and will thus explain the same parts of the variance. In order to test the multicollinearity of the model, the variance inflation factor or VIF is used. Values below 10.00 are acceptable and the values of the variables used in the model range from 1.016 to 4.162⁶. Linearity means that the effects of the variables can be captured in a straight line meaning that they do not curve. If the data is normally distributed and homoscedastic, linearity is most certain. (Rachael, 2018). The P-P plot shows whether the data is normally distributed, which is the case for the dataset used in this thesis. Because the data-set used is multi-level, the scatterplot used to check for heteroscedasticity includes multiple lines but it seems that for each individual line, the variances are quite equal meaning that there is homoscedasticity. This means all assumptions are passed and the data can be trusted.

In the hypotheses section it is said that political sophistication and salience might be confounding variables. Therefore, I checked the value of the Pearson's correlation between the two variables. It came out as a 0.224, so there is a weak positive correlation between the two variables, which is as expected. It is not strong enough to be problematic.

2. Analysis

Before turning to the hypotheses, there are certain details that need to be considered. For example, due to the original scaling differences in the EuroManifesto and Post-Election survey, perfect congruence is only possible at the two most extreme positions. The database also further strengthens the idea that parties are more pro-integration than voters. The mean position for the parties is a 7.14 whereas the mean position of the voters is a 5.24, a difference of 1.9 points. The median value for parties is a 7.77 whereas the median voter had a score of 5, a difference of 2.7. The voters are also much more evenly distributed across the scale. This has the result that the mean value for congruence is 6.07, meaning that the average voter votes for a party that is almost

⁶ The output for the tests can be found in appendix F

4 points away from their own position. It also means that the most “extreme” position for those opposed to furthering EU integration is much more extreme as the most extreme supportive position. The most extreme positive position is less than 3 points away from the mean, whereas the distance between the mean position and the most extreme position is almost 7. It should be noted that because the Euromanifesto dataset only includes parties that have been represented in the EP during the last two periods (2004 and 2009), there might be some Eurosceptic parties missing. For example, Greece’s Syriza is not in the dataset.

As I cannot control for wing distance, comparing the average congruence scores does not tell us much. What can be done is comparing average party and voter positions. The average position of parties is the highest (so the most pro-integrationist) in Bulgaria and the lowest is Hungary. Interestingly, the database also shows that when it comes to voters, Great-Britain has the most pro-integrationist voters on average. The Polish voters are the most against integration. The difference between the average positions of parties and voters is smallest in Greece and largest in Sweden.

2.1 Hypothesis

Table 2 shows the result of the OLS regression. The OLS regression for each country can be found in appendix D. For clarity, the coefficients for the country dummies are not included in table 2, they can be found in appendix E. There are a couple of things that stand out immediately. The variables for salience attributed to the EU and political sophistication are both significant at $P < 0.001$, but both are also negative. This means that an increase in these variables decreases the congruence between parties and voters. This is in contradiction to both hypothesis 1 and 2, which respectively stated that:

H1: The higher the political sophistication of a voter, the higher the congruence on the issue of EU-integration with the party they voted for during the 2014 EP elections.

H2: the more salient a voter finds the EU-integration issue, the higher the congruence with the party they voted for during the 2014 EP elections.

This result might have something to do with the great disparity between the positions of the voters and the parties, especially when comparing the median values. Parties are much more pro-integration than voters, so the negative coefficients might mean that those who find the EU very important would rather vote for a moderately pro-integrationist party than the party that is closest

to them but is even more against the EU than the voter. Alternatively, this can be interpreted as that even though people are opposed to integration themselves, this is not enough of a drive to vote for a more Eurosceptic party. Besides theoretical explanations, it might also be the case that the coefficients are due to the recoded scaling of the party position, as perfect congruence is only possible at the value of 0 and 10.

There also seems to be quite some causal heterogeneity between countries individually. EU salience is only significant at $p < 0.05$ in Belgium, Denmark, France, Czech Republic, Latvia, and Slovenia. Political Sophistication is only significant at $p < 0.05$ in Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Hungary.

Table 2

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4
Salience	***-0.182 (0.021)	***-0.174 (0.021)	***0.0397 (0.029)	***-0.146 (0.032)
Political Sophistication	** -0.079 (0.028)	*-0.068 (0.029)	***-0.098 (0.028)	***-0.110 (0.027)
Interaction			***-0.170 (0.007)	-0.020 (0.012)
Gender		-0.076 (0.054)		0.009 (0.050)
Party identification		0.053 (0.059)		*-0.121 (0.054)
Age		*0.044 (0.017)		0.027 (0.016)
Left-right placement		** -0.020 (0.006)		-0.011 (0.006)
Distance to mean party position				***-0.729 (0.025)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard Errors in parentheses.

Schmitt, Braun et al. (2016), Schmitt, Hobolt et al. (2016)

Model 1 & 2 include all member states except Croatia. Model 3 and 4 exclude Croatia and Malta.

Hypothesis 3 stated: *the effect of the salience of EU integration on the congruence between voter & party is greater for voter/party combination at the extremes of the domestic wing distance.* The interaction term is not significant at $p < 0.05$ (although it is at $p < 0.1$) and

rather weak in the full model, while it is significant and quite strong when not controlling for the distance to mean party position. In this third model we also see a huge change in the coefficient for salience, which disappears when controlling for the distance to the mean party position. It seems that the effect of the interaction term can thus be explained by the distance to the main party rather than the actual interaction between the two variables. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is also disregarded. There are three countries in which the interaction is significant: Greece, Czech Republic, and Latvia.

Political sophistication changes significance quite a lot between models 1 & 2 and 3 & 4. This is not likely due to the emission of Malta, but rather because of the inclusion of the interaction term and the distance to mean position variable.

2.2 Control Variables

The variable controlling for the distance to the mean party position is the most consistently significant at $p < 0.05$ and is also negative. The farther away from the center the party is, the less congruent a vote for it is. This supports Belchior (2013) conclusion that center parties are more congruent. The variable is significant in all countries except Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia. This might be explained by the fact that these countries all have low values for wing-distance, meaning that the maximum distance to the mean position is quite low. Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Poland all have the maximum wing-distance. In all these countries the effect of this control variable is significant at $p < 0.01$ and for some countries like Poland also really strong. The interpretation for this variable is difficult, as the mean position (and thus also the distance to it) is very country dependent. It will be a combination of what the mean position is, which party got the most votes, the amount of parties in the system etc.

Party identification is significant and decreases congruence. This might be explained by the fact that parties become more supportive of the EU during their EP campaign. An example of this is the Dutch VVD who was not as supportive of the EU as the D66 during the 2017 Dutch elections, while they are members of the same transnational political alliance ALDE.

There are also some variables on country level that stand out. For example, age is both significant and positive in Italy, meaning that older people are more congruent with their parties. Gender seems to matter a lot in Austria, where males are significantly more congruent with the

parties they vote for. In Portugal, the more rightwing one considers themselves, the more congruence decreases.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

This thesis meant to answer the following research question: which variables increase congruence between voter and party during the 2014 EP elections, in the context of attitudes toward EU-integration. This question combines multiple research fields: Europeanization research, voting correctly literature, congruence literature, EU-voting behavior, political sophistication research etc. Even though these research fields are linked by their electoral nature, they are not often used together. For example, there is literature on the congruence of EU-integration attitudes but that does not take an individual level approach. Combining these fields resulted in certain problems, especially data related. In general, I found that finding the right database for such a research question is difficult. There are plenty of databases that go into great depth about attitudes toward the EU. Databases like the future of Europe (Eurobarometer 81.2) and Europeans in 2014 (Eurobarometer 81.1) provide more information about voters' opinions on EU issues but lack variables measuring voting in elections. Therefore, these databases cannot be used for research on EP elections. The Post-Election Survey used in this thesis served its purpose, but this choice also came with some problems. The database arguably had too little information to truly measure political sophistication and the questions used were also not designed to measure political sophistication. Moreover, even though the Euromanifesto dataset is made during the same project, the measurements of party and voter position were not completely the same, making any research using them weaker. I have argued that they are significantly similar to still be viable for this research, but it should come as no surprise that congruence research will benefit from databases in which the questions are the same.

When it comes to the actual research, this thesis has not made it clearer which individual variables increase congruence during the 2014 election. Even though the primary variables of interest were significant, they turned out to decrease congruence rather than increase it. The fact that distance to mean party positions was the variable with the greatest explanatory power, combined with the fact that individual countries differed wildly in the effects of the variables, leads to the conclusion that congruence is probably mostly affected by country-level variables such as wing distance and party competition. The great disparity between the mean voter position and mean party position also helps to explain incongruence.

Another conclusion that can be made is that the choice of operationalization for the measurement of congruence matters a lot. When comparing the congruence between parties and

their voters from Matilla & Raunio's (2012) research and the congruence in this thesis, it is clear that the results are too large to be only due to the events that occurred between 2009 and 2014. Matilla & Raunio report the congruence for Dutch parties in 2009 as 0.71. This means that the distance between the mean voter position and the mean voter perceptions of the parties is 0.71. In this thesis, the mean congruence between voters and parties was a 5.7 (meaning that on average, the distance between a voter and a party was 4.3). These are wildly different numbers and should thus be a warning to future congruence researchers: be sure to use the right conceptualization and operationalization of congruence. As the conceptualization are so different, it is no use to compare whether the 2014 EP is more or less congruent than the 2009 EP.

I would argue that this thesis raises more questions than it answers but as this is (hopefully) a first in many research papers on this topic this is not particularly bad. It leaves plenty of advice for future research and also plenty of issues and question to solve. As for advice, individual-perspective research on congruence could really benefit from databases that incorporate a better spread of socio-economic as well as electoral variables. Moreover, a better comparison between the measurements of the Euromanifesto and the Post-election survey is critical for research like this.

1. Future research

The format of a master thesis such as this is limiting and thus it is impossible to incorporate all things that the author wants to. For example, due to data limitations and time constraint I could not adopt an approach that is based more on typologies. The original idea for this thesis was to assess how represented the different EU-tribes (as they are described by Raines, Goodwin and Cutts (2017)) are in the Netherlands. There are studies of EU integration that go beyond the binary of pro or anti EU, but the typologies used are still often defined in theory. I think Raines, Goodwin and Cutts set an interesting precedent with their use of latent class analysis, meaning finding typologies by analyzing voters' attitudes. In this thesis I resorted to using a simple scale ranging from anti to pro EU, but this obviously does not cover the true spectrum of opinions. Research on how congruence differs between different typologies would be very interesting.

This thesis showed that while individual level variables can be significant, they are not the primary predictors of congruence. As the differences between countries were large, research on EU-integration attitudes would benefit greatly from a specialized multi-level approach. As

congruence is influenced by both party and voter positions, future research should specifically incorporate both individual, party, and country level hypothesis.

Another avenue of research that should be explored further is the role of the strength of measurement for political sophistication. The four-question approach used in this thesis can be considered a weak measurement and based on research by Lau et al. (2014), the strength of the variable seems to hinge upon the strength of the measurement. It would be interesting to see how the effect of political sophistication changes as the measurements becomes stronger. Especially because the highest score has the most cases in this database, meaning that the questions used were too easy. The role of salience is also interesting, as this thesis looked at a supposedly second-order election. Whether the effect of salience differs for first- and second-order elections is something that is not yet clear and should be researched.

The same is true for the interaction effect between extreme parties/voters and salience. This thesis showed that the two variables strengthen each other when not controlling for the distance to the mean party position, as most of the effect is captured by that variable. It can also be interesting to look at how the salience of an issue, on which a person has an extreme position, works if that person is moderate on all other issues. For example, at what point does salience become key? Another question is: when is an incorrect vote actually a correct vote? This thesis has not incorporated a control variable for strategic voting, which is something that can really influence congruence numbers. The low turnout rates at European elections is another variable that can be considered. Those with the most extreme positions on EU integration might not vote because they do not want to legitimize the polity. Yet another research topic not yet explored could be the interaction effect between political sophistication and party identification during EP elections. Boonen, Pedersen, and Hooghe (2017) did something similar but not on the EU level. There is plenty of research to be done in the future!

It is in these recommendation that the true implications and benefits of this thesis lie. I hope that the 2019 EP elections will provide a fertile ground for research into correct voting and congruence during EP elections, and other research as well. It provides a great opportunity to create databases with future research in mind. As the coming election will be the first EP election post-Brexit, the results will be interesting whatever happens, thus providing even more new avenues for research. For example, the latest Eurobarometer show that the percentage of citizens that see EU membership as a good thing is the highest it has been since the peak between the fall

of the Berlin Wall and the Maastricht Treaty (Schulmeister et al, 2018). However, 33% of the respondent will most likely not vote during the 2019 EP elections (ibid.). What will this mean for the congruence between the European people and the parliament? As research increases, hopefully the idea of the permissive consensus is firmly put to rest. For an issue that is so important, we need to understand individual motives for voting and theses like these help by taking an individual, voting correctly, perspective on congruence.

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Appendix A: Explanation of how variable were created.

Party position on EU-integration

qp2_emcs is the variable that links the party the respondent voted for with the EMCS code assigned to that party. There is a variable for the EMCS codes in the Euromanifesto database. By using Analyze → Descriptive Statistics → Crosstabs and putting party_code_emcs into the rows and ‘integration’ into the columns we get a list of all parties & EMCS codes and the number they have on 1-10 scale.

With this list we can then recode a variable in the EES dataset to match the number with the party.

transform → recode into different variables

qp2_emcs → party_voted_position

old and new values: here is change the old value (the EMCS code) into the number of the scale)

For example:

The VVD has the EMCS code of 22420, and is rated a “5” on the ‘integration’ scale.

Thus, the old value of 22420 becomes the new value of 5. I did this manually for all 200 parties.

We now have a variable for the position on ‘integration’ of the party the respondent voted for. However, the scales need to be readjusted in order to make them the same length and they also need to be reversed. Therefore, first, I recode (recode into Same Variable): 1 to 10, 2 to 9, etc. and then I rescale the party-positions to the 0-10 scale of the EES database.

Transform → compute variable

target variable: “party_positions_rescaled”

Numeric expression: $((\text{party_voted_position} - 1) * (9/10))$

We now have the variable party_positions_rescaled which is the same length as the corresponding variable of the EES database and is flipped to match the direction of the EES scale.

Congruence

Before doing the above I recoded QPP18 to QPP18_recoded so that a position of 0 corresponded with a value of 0. In the original variable QPP18, a position of 0 corresponded with a value of 1 etc. This lead to the maximum congruence distance being calculated as 11, even though the

maximum distance should be 10. Because the maximum value in the recoded variable is 10 instead of 11, this problem is solved.

In order to calculate the variable for congruence, I use analyze → compute variable
target variable = “congruence”

Numeric expressions= (ABS(QPP18_recoded – party_positions_rescaled)).

Perfect congruence is now awarded a 0 and perfect incongruence is awarded a 10, so this variable actually measures distance. By adding (10-) perfect congruence becomes a 10 and perfect incongruence becomes 0, so:

congruence = 10-(ABS(QPP18_recoded – party_positions_rescaled)).

Congruence is now a variable that consists of the absolute distance of the self-placement on the EU-integration issue and the party-positions, so it actually measures distance.

Political sophistication Variable:

qpp23_1, qpp23_2, qpp23_3, qpp23_4

For all these variables, it started out as

-9 = do not know

-8 = refusal

-7 = system missing

1 = true

2 = false

The correct answer for:

qpp23_1 = false = 2

qpp23_2 = false = 2

qpp23_3 = false = 2

qpp23_4 = true = 1

Transform → Recode into different Variable

Numerical Variable → output variable : qpp23_1 → qpp23_1_recoded

old value → new value : 2 = 1 , all other values = 0

Repeat for qpp23_2, qpp23_3 & qpp23_4.

In order to create the variable for **political sophistication**, I continue by doing the following:

transform → compute variable

target variable = Political_sophistication

political_sophistication = qpp23_1_recoded + qpp23_2_recoded + qpp23_3_recoded +
qpp23_4_recoded

EU-Salience Level

Salience is calculated through QP5 and QP4. Both these questions include items that signify EU-salience.

For qp5 there are 4 items:

- the single currency, the Euro → qp5b_5
- The power and competencies of the European institutions → qp5b_9
- European values and identity → qp5b_11
- the role of the EU on the international scene → qp5b_12

The structure of the question is that the respondent first had to pick a single item (qp5a) and subsequently could also choose an unlimited number of other items, which is coded via dummy variables (see the variables above)

For QP4, there are 6 items that signify EU-salience but the respondents could only choose 3.

These 6 items are:

- to influence the choice of the president of the European Commission → qp4a_1
- you are in favor of the EU → qp4a_3
- the EU plays an important role in your everyday live → qp4a_5
- to express disapproval of the EU → qp4a_10
- you are very interested in European affairs → qp4a_12
- you feel European or citizen of the EU → qp4a_13.

These are also coded as dummy variables.

In order to create the variable for **EU-salience** continue by doing the following:

Transform → Recode into same variable

qp5a

Old and New values:

5 to 1, 9 to 1, 11 to 1, 12 to 1, ELSE to 0 (so the salient items are now 1 and the non-salient 0)

transform → compute variable

target variable = EU_salience

$$\text{EU_salience} = \text{qp5a} + \text{qp5b_5} + \text{qp5b_9} + \text{qp5b_11} + \text{qp5b_12} + \text{qp4a_1} + \text{qp4a_3} + \text{qp4a_5} + \text{qp4a_10} + \text{qp4a_12} + \text{qp4a_13}.$$

EU_salience is now a scale from 0 – 7.

Mean_PartyPosition

The same principle applies for the mean party positions. I recode the country code to the mean position and create the variable “Mean_PartyPosition”

Distance to mean party position

transform → compute variable

target variable: “distsance_to_mean_partyposition”

numerical expression: $\text{ABS}(\text{party_positions_rescaled} - \text{mean_PartyPosition})$

Interaction Term

transform → compute variable

target variable: “interaction

numerical expression: $\text{EU_salience} \& \text{distsance_to_mean_partyposition}$

Party_identification

qpp21_ees asks “do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? If so, which party do you feel close to?”. By dividing the values for this variable with the values of the variable qp2_ees which records the party that respondents voted for during the 2014 EP elections, I create

a variable in which the value 1 correspond with a vote for the party the respondent. By recoding all others values to 0, this variable is now a dummy variable for party-identification.

Appendix B: Syntax Full model per country

USE ALL.

COMPUTE filter_\$=(b=1).

VARIABLE LABELS filter_\$ 'b = 1 (FILTER)'.
 VALUE LABELS filter_\$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'.

FORMATS filter_\$ (f1.0).

FILTER BY filter_\$.

EXECUTE.

REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT congruence

/METHOD=ENTER EU_salience political_sophistication interaction_salience_distance_to_mean_party_position
 gender_dummy_ref_female Party_identification d11r2 qpp13 distance_to_mean_party_position.

FILTER OFF.

USE ALL.

Execute.

USE ALL.

COMPUTE filter_\$=(b=2).

VARIABLE LABELS filter_\$ 'b = 1 (2FILTER)'.
 VALUE LABELS filter_\$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'.

FORMATS filter_\$ (f1.0).

FILTER BY filter_\$.

EXECUTE.

ETC.

Appendix C: Syntax Full model EU

REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT congruence

/METHOD=ENTER EU_salience political_sophistication interaction_salience_distance_to_mean_party_position
gender_dummy_ref_female Party_identification d11r2 qpp13 distance_to_mean_party_position
dummy_Belgium dummy_Denmark dummy_Greece dummy_Finland dummy_France dummy_Ireland
dummy_Italy dummy_Luxemburg dummy_Netherlands dummy_Austria dummy_Portugal
dummy_Sweden
dummy_GermanyW dummy_GermanyO dummy_UK dummy_Bulgaria dummy_Cyprus
dummy_CzechRepublic dummy_Estonia dummy_Hungary dummy_Latvia dummy_Lithuania
dummy_Poland dummy_Romania dummy_Slovakia dummy_Slovenia.

Appendix D: models per country

Belgium	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	***-0.306	***-0.298	**-.0.247
Political Sophistication	-0.122	-0.095	-0.114
Interaction			-0.067
Gender		*-0.324	*-0.318
Party identification		*0.309	0.269
Age		0.083	*0.092
Left-right placement		-0.032	-0.018
Distance to mean party position			**-.0.250

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Denmark	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	*-0.171	*-0.160	**-.0.283
Political Sophistication	-0.086	-0.036	-0.053
Interaction			0.009
Gender		*-0.468	*-0.281
Party identification		-0.082	-0.091
Age		-0.064	-0.012
Left-right placement		***0.114	***0.095
Distance to mean party position			***-1.074

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Greece	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	*-0.190	*-0.179	0.079
Political Sophistication	-0.180	-0.168	*-0.240
Interaction			-0.029
Gender		**-.0.609	**-.0.548
Party identification		-0.388	*-0.521
Age		-0.117	0.058
Left-right placement		-0.048	0.025
Distance to mean party position			***-0.788

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Spain	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	0.044	0.035	0.070
Political Sophistication	0.026	0.897	0.020
Interaction			-0.026
Gender		-0.089	-0.092
Party identification		0.148	0.149

Age		-0.147	-0.146
Left-right placement		0.027	0.026
Distance to mean party position			0.011

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Finland	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Salience	***-0.312	***-0.231	-0.198
Political Sophistication	***-0.387	** -0.299	** -0.293
Interaction			-0.008
Gender		-0.052	0.129
Party identification		*-0.420	***-0.599
Age		**0.176	**0.156
Left-right placement		***0.173	***-0.095
Distance to mean party position			***-0.661

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

France	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Salience	-0.157	-0.238	** -0.333
Political Sophistication	-0.120	-0.020	-0.021
Interaction			-0.013
Gender		** -1.087	** -0.725
Party identification		0.260	-0.507
Age		0.226	0.060
Left-right placement		-0.041	0.021
Distance to mean party position			***-0.681

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Ireland	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Salience	** -0.177	** -0.184	-0.120
Political Sophistication	-0.056	-0.082	-0.077
			-0.051
Gender		0.151	0.113
Party identification		-0.140	-0.123
Age		0.014	0.028
Left-right placement		0.009	0.014
Distance to mean party position			0.260

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Italy	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
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<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	-0.090	-0.067	2.687
Political Sophistication	-0.090	-0.051	-0.062
Interaction			-0.993
Gender		0.037	0.021
Party identification		*-0.621	*-0.644
Age		**0.164	**0.163
Left-right placement		-0.007	-0.012
Distance to mean party position			0.761

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Luxembourg	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	*-0.220	-0.209	*-0.273
Political Sophistication	0.171	0.196	0.236
Interaction			0.101
Gender		-0.079	-0.147
Party identification		0.113	0.029
Age		0.046	-0.009
Left-right placement		-0.052	-0.058
Distance to mean party position			-0.813

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Nederland	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	***-0.320	***-0.321	-0.075
Political Sophistication	-0.013	-0.056	** -0.223
Interaction			-0.042
Gender		0.010	0.132
Party identification		-0.046	-0.072
Age		*0.128	0.009
Left-right placement		***0.097	-0.037
Distance to mean party position			***-0.788

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Austria	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	0.016	-0.009	0.025
Political Sophistication	-0.168	-0.216	** -0.311
Interaction			*-0.093
Gender		0.441	***0.735
Party identification		-0.313	** -0.558
Age		0.128	0.047
Left-right placement		-0.039	-0.003

Distance to mean party position			***-0.382
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* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Portugal	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	***-0.401	** -0.345	-0.142
Political Sophistication	-0.203	-0.134	-0.144
Interaction			-0.323
Gender		-0.309	-0.608
Party identification		-0.177	0.087
Age		0.098	-0.159
Left-right placement		***-0.167	***-0.430
Distance to mean party position			-0.142

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Sweden	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	***-0.209	*-0.126	-0.223
Political Sophistication	-0.195	-0.158	-0.049
Interaction			0.051
Gender		-0.122	*-0.313
Party identification		0.016	-0.273
Age		*0.102	0.048
Left-right placement		***-0.206	***-0.134
Distance to mean party position			***-0.762

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Germany West	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	-0.119	*-0.120	-0.302
Political Sophistication	-0.034	-0.058	-0.093
Interaction			0.086
Gender		0.186	0.108
Party identification		-0.284	-0.206
Age		*0.121	0.138
Left-right placement		-0.023	-0.014
Distance to mean party position			** -0.917

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Germany East	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	***-0.343	***-0.324	-0.333
Political Sophistication	0.008	0.001	-0.130

Interaction			0.040
Gender		-0.029	0.056
Party identification		-0.370	*-0.565
Age		0.141	0.110
Left-right placement		-0.018	0.058
Distance to mean party position			***-0.831

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

UK	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Salience	0.026	0.062	-0.113
Political Sophistication	-0.116	0.005	-0.104
Interaction			0.001
Gender		-0.057	0.071
Party identification		***1.891	0.248
Age		** -0.224	-0.030
Left-right placement		-0.032	** -0.038
Distance to mean party position			***-1.152

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Bulgaria	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Salience	** -0.334	*-0.332	*-0.406
Political Sophistication	-0.286	-0.261	-0.254
Interaction			0.298
Gender		-0.281	-0.377
Party identification		-0.459	-0.448
Age		0.095	0.095
Left-right placement		-0.005	0.010
Distance to mean party position			0.212

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Cyprus	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Salience	-0.039	-0.048	-0.211
Political Sophistication	0.153	0.154	0.083
Interaction			0.161
Gender		-0.204	-0.268
Party identification		**1.177	***1.261
Age		0.017	-0.018
Left-right placement		0.009	*0.171
Distance to mean party position			1.205

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Czech Republic	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	0.053	0.014	** -1.652
Political Sophistication	-0.108	-0.070	-0.019
Interaction			**0.588
Gender		-0.213	-0.108
Party identification		*0.820	0.740
Age		-0.144	-0.200
Left-right placement		-0.007	***0.017
Distance to mean party position			***-0.998

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Estonia	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	***-0.306	*-0.200	0.009
Political Sophistication	-0.130	-0.063	-0.056
Interaction			-0.161
Gender		-0.217	-0.257
Party identification		0.027	0.071
Age		**0.266	***0.284
Left-right placement		-0.028	-0.031
Distance to mean party position			-0.172

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Hungary	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	0.130	0.109	-0.568
Political Sophistication	0.191	*0.250	**0.247
Interaction			0.201
Gender		** -0.593	-0.281
Party identification		-0.077	0.090
Age		*-0.152	***-0.281
Left-right placement		-0.005	0.004
Distance to mean party position			***-1.317

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Latvia	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	*0.462	0.417	** -2.589
Political Sophistication	0.394	*0.537	*0.480
Interaction			**1.838
Gender		0.012	0.088
Party identification		0.699	0.842
Age		0.246	**0.351

Left-right placement		-0.060	-0.069
Distance to mean party position			-0.439

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Lithuania	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Salience	-0.166	-0.152	-0.214
Political Sophistication	0.026	-0.009	0.004
Interaction			0.035
Gender		0.405	0.404
Party identification		0.221	0.172
Age		0.079	0.065
Left-right placement		0.000	-0.010
Distance to mean party position			-0.391

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Malta	MODEL1	MODEL2
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Constant	6.380	6.359
Salience	0.007	-0.013
Political Sophistication	-0.124	-0.183
Interaction		
Gender		0.259
Party identification		-0.189
Age		0.052
Left-right placement		0.016

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Ps: the two Maltese parties share the same position. Therefore the distance to the mean party position is 0, which means that there cannot be an interaction effect in Malta.

Poland	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Salience	***-0.444	** -0.443	-0.230
Political Sophistication	-0.181	-0.252	-0.144
Interaction			0.002
Gender		**0.919	**0.799
Party identification		0.123	0.036
Age		-0.121	-0.157
Left-right placement		0.015	-0.028
Distance to mean party position			***-1.737

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Romania	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>

Saliency	-0.238	-0.222	*-0.908
Political Sophistication	-0.181	-0.069	-0.060
Interaction			0.677
Gender		-0.214	-0.271
Party identification		-0.607	-0.635
Age		-0.049	-0.070
Left-right placement		0.047	*0.057
Distance to mean party position			-1.128

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Slovakia	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	0.050	0.060	-0.302
Political Sophistication	-0.031	0.009	-0.009
Interaction			0.141
Gender		-0.154	-0.067
Party identification		-0.016	-0.008
Age		-0.010	-0.040
Left-right placement		-0.057	** -0.108
Distance to mean party position			** -1.030

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Slovenia	MODEL1	MODEL2	MODEL4
<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Saliency	*-0.420	** -0.458	** -2.189
Political Sophistication	0.212	0.179	0.122
Interaction			*1.001
Gender		0.503	0.529
Party identification		0.254	0.323
Age		0.005	0.016
Left-right placement		0.012	0.008
Distance to mean party position			-0.926

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix E


	Unstandardized B	Coefficients Std. Error	Standardized coefficients Beta	T	Sig.
EU_salience	-.146	.032	-.077	-4.563	.000
political_sophistication	-.110	.027	-.043	-4.106	.000
interaction_salience_distan	-.020	.012	-.034	-1.721	.085
cetomeanposition					
gender_dummy_ref_femal e	.009	.050	.002	.177	.859
Party_identification	-.121	.054	-.022	-2.223	.026
D11 - How old are you?	.027	.016	.016	1.689	.091
QPP13 In political matters	-.011	.006	-.019	-1.928	.054
people talk of the left and the right. What is your position? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means left and '10' means right. Which number best describes your position?					
distance_to_mean_partypo sition	-.729	.025	-.449	-29.698	.000
Belgium	.481	.141	.049	3.423	.001
Denmark	1.583	.160	.140	9.906	.000
Greece	1.783	.159	.150	11.205	.000
Finland	1.482	.156	.129	9.479	.000
France	1.213	.221	.060	5.488	.000
Ireland	1.404	.157	.115	8.963	.000
Italy	1.961	.178	.134	11.019	.000
Luxembourg	.539	.195	.031	2.759	.006
Netherlands	1.513	.151	.145	10.002	.000
Austria	1.150	.161	.096	7.119	.000
Portugal	.836	.182	.055	4.586	.000
Sweden	.921	.144	.096	6.412	.000
West Germany	1.022	.156	.090	6.569	.000
East Germany	1.095	.187	.068	5.863	.000
Great Britain	.951	.169	.072	5.643	.000
Bulgary	.178	.190	.011	.936	.350
Cyprus	1.315	.239	.058	5.510	.000
Czech Republic	2.424	.214	.125	11.320	.000
Estland	.806	.184	.051	4.374	.000
Hungary	2.682	.172	.204	15.635	.000
Latvia	1.696	.311	.055	5.450	.000
Lithuania	.441	.158	.036	2.781	.005
Poland	1.387	.190	.087	7.308	.000
Romania	.414	.229	.019	1.810	.070
Slovak Republic	1.411	.206	.076	6.847	.000

Slovenia	1.303	.212	.068	6.154	.000
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Appendix F

		Coefficients ^a							
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients				Collinearity Statistics	
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF	
1	(Constant)	7.594	.118		64.585	.000			
	political_sophistication	-.060	.026	-.023	-2.280	.023	.912	1.096	
	EU_salience	-.127	.032	-.067	-3.966	.000	.327	3.063	
	interaction_salience_distance_to_mean_position	-.028	.012	-.047	-2.378	.017	.240	4.162	
	gender_dummy_ref_female	-.030	.051	-.006	-.592	.554	.970	1.031	
	Party_identification	-.018	.054	-.003	-.329	.742	.985	1.016	
	D11 - How old are you?	.026	.016	.015	1.562	.118	.983	1.017	
	QPP13 In political matters people talk of the left and the right. What is your position? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means left and '10' means right. Which number best describes your position?	-.003	.006	-.005	-.531	.595	.966	1.036	
	distance_to_mean_party_position	-.563	.022	-.347	-25.175	.000	.493	2.027	

a. Dependent Variable: congruence



Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual

