

Teaching towards peace

*The role of education-based civil society programmes
on peacebuilding processes in Cyprus*



Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

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Preface

Before you lies my master's thesis "Teaching towards peace", the final work for my studies of Human Geography. To get a better view of the Cyprus situation, I did a three-months internship at the Home for Cooperation in Nicosia. During this time, I got new insights which influenced my ideas so much that I decided to change the focus of my research. It was very interesting to live in the divided capital and experience how it is to have to show your passport when you want to travel within the same country. Furthermore, the abandoned Buffer Zone was in my backyard and there was a military basis in my street, which confronted me with the conflict on a daily basis. The contrast between the enthusiasm of promoters and participants of peacebuilding activities and the realisation what a small part of society this really is, was sometimes difficult to deal with. Moving in the bubble of peacebuilding you don't get the feeling that the misconceptions, stereotypes and distrust towards each other are still so present for many people. This resulted in confused feelings all the time. The following quote perfectly summarises the confusion I had while interviewing and writing my thesis.

"There are people who genuinely want for something to happen and there are people who genuinely don't want something to happen and then there is the majority of the people that just don't think about it anymore."

(Panos Panayiotopoulos, 2018)

Panos Panayiotopoulos describes the different feelings boiling in society, but what confused me so much was the complete apathy of a large part of society. As explained in other interviews, the majority of society doesn't think about it anymore, doesn't talk about it anymore, while deep down they do want a solution. The discrepancy between the wish for a change but not acting upon it at all, in combination with a diminishing hope for a solution within civil society while still actively striving for it on a daily basis, was interesting to see and experience. Maybe the most affecting quote is from 81 years old Mrs. Atikol, who fled from the south to the north and clings to the idea that one day there will be a united Cyprus again:

"Deep in my heart I still have the feeling that we start living with Greek Cypriots again. And I still have hope that one day I wake up and we are living with Greek Cypriots again."

(Mrs. Atikol, 2018)

I would like to thank everyone who made it possible for me to write this thesis. First of all, I'd like to thank Bert Bomert for his advice throughout the whole process. Secondly, I want to thank the Home for Cooperation team – Marina Neophytou, Lefki Lambrou, Hayriye Rüzgar and Marilena Spyrou – who made my internship unforgettable and who were always there to give me more insights in the Cyprus dispute, peacebuilding and feelings in the Cypriot society. Furthermore, I'd like to thank my fellow interns and roommates for the great time, fun and chats about the Cyprus situation, the divide, peacebuilding education and future of the country. Many thanks go to family Boral who made it possible for me to get to the right locations for my interviews in the north and of course also to my friends and family who all came to visit me in Nicosia and with whom I had great and hot adventures and who supported me all this time and motivated me every time I got stuck. At last, a special thanks to my mum who read all my work.

Summary

The division of Cyprus has lasted for 45 years now and peace negotiations have been on hold since July 2017. The last solution plan, the Annan Plan, was rejected and the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is the longest-running UN peace mission. This gives the feeling of a frozen conflict with a lack of peace negotiations, or at least negotiations that are stuck. However, on the ground there are people trying to make a change which recently resulted in the opening of a new checkpoint; only the ninth checkpoint in total. There is a growing worldwide (academic) interest in civil society and the local in peacebuilding missions and although the civil society movement recently made the opening up of a checkpoint possible, civil society in Cyprus is still struggling to attract more people and increase its reach and impact. Civil society is supposed to be able to transform conflict by building trust, transparency and openness between the communities; this is genuinely needed to get the conflict out of its impasse. However, civil society in Cyprus is getting recognition from international players only, while the national government is neglecting and sometimes even contradicting civil society's programmes and goals. Peacebuilding initiatives and reconciliation in Cyprus don't come from above, but have to work their way up in a bottom-up approach. As a result, the formal educational system – which is strictly regulated by the government – is still very nationalistic. The daily injection of misconceptions about the 'other' on both sides of the island obstruct civil society's impact and encourage the current division and fear for each other. However, there are also educational programmes organised by civil society. Some of these programmes are linked to an actual (history) class, while others are working in the non-formal field. In this research, the ideas of civil society and peacebuilding education are combined and linked to the theory of intergenerational closure. Intergenerational closure in education-based programmes should help to increase social cohesion by providing benefits for the older and younger participants. These include, amongst others, the development of new relationships, more positive perceptions of other generations, cooperation between different community groups, and diminished stereotypes about each other.

For the future of Cyprus, it is important to overcome the impasse. Therefore, the societal relevance lies in finding a way to get more Cypriots actively involved in civil society and by doing so slowly come to a culture of peace. The goal of this explorative research is to get insight in the role of education-based peacebuilding programmes originating from civil society and the extent to which the implementation of different generations can accomplish a bigger societal support for the peace process. This leads to the research question: *"In which ways can the implementation of intergenerational closure in education-based civil society peacebuilding programmes in Cyprus help to make a societal change towards a culture of peace?"*

This research question is especially interesting because of the implementation of intergenerational closure, a topic that has hardly been investigated in conflict-affected areas. Attributing to that, Cyprus is not only facing a division between the two communities, but also within each community. Theory outlines that intergenerational closure can increase social cohesion. This is currently missing in Cyprus society. The presence of contradictions between and within communities give interesting possibilities for the expected outcomes of intergenerational closure.

To research how intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programmes in Cyprus (could) work out, qualitative data was collected. In-depth insights in the current situation, peacebuilding initiatives and intergenerational closure were gained by conducting interviews with 15 peacebuilders. To get a complete view, the interviews are spread across four categories: young Greek Cypriots (18-34 years old), old Greek Cypriots (60+), young Turkish Cypriots (18-34 years old) and old

Turkish Cypriots (60+). These data are combined with statistical research from the Centre of Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) which resulted in the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index. The Index is designed to measure peace in societies around the world, based on two main components of peace; reconciliation and social cohesion. This resulted in some concluding remarks that show that intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programmes have a positive impact on a change towards a culture of peace. The research showed that interaction between groups that normally won't meet, although tough to establish, helps in reducing misconceptions about each other. These interactions are first of all hard to establish because Cypriots in general aren't active citizens, secondly, because there is still a lot of fear for the 'other' and thirdly, because civil society initiatives are struggling to get enough funding to expand their activities. The lack of funding restricts them geographically, as a result of which most education-based programmes are only available in and close to Nicosia. The lack of funding is mostly due to a lack of national political recognition; this, in combination with the nationalistic formal educational systems, makes the need for intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programmes even more important. The programmes won't be able to expand as much as needed when they remain dependent on the international funds they already receive. Civil society has the feeling that there will come a time where the UNFICYP will be terminated and international players will lose their interest in Cyprus. However, the lack of funding and the concern of losing international support one day as well, doesn't hold civil society back from innovating. It made an important change with diversifying its activities from traditional activities like readings and discussions towards activities based on people's interests. These include education-based programmes in the field of arts, sports, literature, and so on. As a result, the barrier to participate is lowered and a diverse public – in age as well as origin – is coming to the programmes. Although it is still a small part of society that is participating, there is a growing awareness of the opportunities of crossing and peacebuilding events. Initiators see a breakdown of misconceptions and stereotypes amongst their participants and a growing understanding of each other and more friendships across the divide. However, the progress that is being made is (too) slow and without a rapid expansion of the activities apathy towards the Cyprus problem and possible solution might prevail.

This research argues that intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programmes can have a positive impact on a societal change towards a culture of peace in Cyprus, because every meeting and interaction with the 'other' will help to (slowly) break down stereotypes and misconceptions in people's minds, although current political and media conditions aren't positive for the development of civil society. Because this research is very context-specific, it is hard to make broader statements on the theory. In this case, it should be realised that 15 interviews were conducted, which as such does not create a high validity for the research, though because of the specification in certain categories, an interesting research has been done. For further research it would be interesting to investigate ideas about intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programmes amongst people who are not or not that much involved in civil society already. This could provide interesting insights in how to get more people involved in peacebuilding initiatives and how the initiatives are experienced by society. Another perspective could be to investigate the motives of young Greek and Turkish Cypriots to study abroad and not come back or come back but without working on reconciliation. This is a growing phenomenon and the younger generation is, after all, the future of the country.

Table of Contents

Preface	V
Summary	VI
Table of Contents	VIII
List of Figures and Tables	X
List of Abbreviations	XI
1. Introduction	1
1.1 Relevance	2
1.2 Research question	3
2. Background	5
2.1 (Ancient) history of Cyprus.....	5
2.2 The Cyprus problem	6
2.2.1 The Cyprus Dispute.....	6
2.2.2 The Greek Coup, invasion and division	6
2.3 EU Accession period	8
2.3.1 The Annan Plan.....	8
2.3.2 Referenda	9
3. Theoretical framework	10
3.1 Peacebuilding	10
3.2 Civil Society.....	12
3.2.1 Civil society: a definition.....	12
3.2.2 The Local Turn	15
3.2.3 Civil society initiatives in Cyprus.....	17
3.3 Intergenerational closure	20
3.3.1 Intergenerational Closure: a definition	20
3.3.2 Motivations, benefits and risks of intergenerational closure	22
3.4 Peacebuilding education	23
3.4.1 Peacebuilding education: a definition.....	23
3.4.2 (Re)constructing narratives	25
4. Methodology	26
4.1 Research method	26
4.2 Validity and reliability	26
4.3 Operationalisation.....	27
4.3.1 Research Group	27

4.3.2 Interviews	28
4.4 Analysis	29
4.5 Sub-questions	29
5. Results – Peacebuilding Education in Cyprus	31
5.1 Current peacebuilding initiatives	31
5.1.1 Peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus	31
5.1.2 Needs of peacebuilding initiatives	35
5.1.3 The manifestation of current civil society peacebuilding initiatives	37
5.2 Educational programmes and the peace process	37
5.2.1 Formal educational system	37
5.2.2 Non-formal education-based programmes	39
5.2.3 Needs of educational programmes	41
5.2.4 The role of education-based programmes of civil society actors in the peace process	45
5.3 Current generations	45
5.3.1 Active generations	45
5.3.2 Active generations in education-based programmes	48
5.4 Differences between generations and communities	48
5.4.1 Observed differences between generations and communities	48
5.4.2 Explanation of the observed differences between generations and communities	49
5.4.3 Create a more inclusive peace process	53
5.4.4 Differences, the explanation and the peace process	54
5.5 Intergenerational closure in educational programmes and increase societal support for the peace process	55
5.5.1 Possibilities of mixing generations and their roles in educational programmes	55
5.5.2 Increase in societal support for the peace process	58
5.5.3 Intergenerational closure, educational programmes and an increase in societal support for the peace process	59
6. Conclusion	60
6.1 Discussion	63
References	65
Appendix 1 – List of respondents	71
Appendix 2 – Topic List	72
Appendix 3 – Code Tree	75

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure 1.1	Map of ethnic demography on Cyprus	p. 7
Figure 3.2.3.1	Extent to which the voice of citizens is heard by the leaders in the negotiations process	p. 17
Figure 3.2.3.2	Opinion on whether citizens should be consulted about major policy decisions	p. 17

Tables

Table 4.3.1.1	Categories different research unites	p. 28
Table 5.3.1.1	SCORE Index per category; engagement, openness, trust, coherence	p. 46
Table 5.4.1.1	SCORE Index per category; negative, positive, trust	p. 49
Table 5.4.2.1	Causes per group for lack of feeling trust towards the each other	p. 52

List of Abbreviations

CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EOKA	Nationalist Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
H4C	Home for Cooperation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
SCORE	Social Cohesion and Reconciliation
SeeD	Centre of Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organisation
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1. Introduction

Cyprus is a complex country, a conflict zone in the Mediterranean, characterized by an eventful past. The island is still strictly divided, although some progress has been made, for instance an opening of the so-called Green Line in Nicosia in 2003 (Innes, 2017; Demetriou et al., 2011, p. 29) and the recent opening of two new checkpoints, only the eighth and ninth checkpoint along the 180 km long Buffer Zone (CyprusMail, 2018; Keep Talking Greece, 2018). However, the opening of the checkpoints is received differently. For most people it is a step towards peace and reconciliation, while others see it as politically unacceptable and for some others it brings back painful memories of losses as a consequence of the Cyprus dispute (CyprusMail, 2018). Although it is nowadays easier to cross the intrastate border, almost all Cypriot children grow up without ever meeting the 'other'. They have been taught from a very early age on that the 'other' is the enemy whom one should fear and abhor (Yakinthou, 2009, p. 2), resulting in an institutionalised fear for the 'other'. The older generation, on the other hand, did grow up with people from the other community as their neighbours.

The impasse of hardly crossing and not meeting people from the other community is also reflected in the peace process. The political leaders aren't moving and the negotiations aren't getting any closer to a solution. In February 2019, the leaders of the two communities met for the first time since July 2017. It was an informal meeting about confidence-building measures, already agreed upon in 2015 but never implemented (Psyllides, 2019). They finally agreed to meet, but whether this is the start of new peace negotiations remains unclear.

In response to the ongoing political impasse there is a growing bottom-up movement in civil society challenging the status quo and institutionalised fear. An example of this growing movement is the NGO Home for Cooperation (H4C) and its stated goal: "The Home for Cooperation is the embodiment of intercommunal cooperation, contributing to the collective efforts of civil society in their engagement with peacebuilding and intercultural dialogue. Using its sources it encourages people to cooperate with each other beyond constraints and dividing lines. The Home for Cooperation essentially aims to act as a bridge-builder between separated communities, memories and visions." (Home for Cooperation, 2015). Engaging students in an open, inclusive dialogue about conflict-related issues can help them in developing skills and values for democratic civic engagement (Parker, 2016, p. 3).

The local actor is getting more attention in peacebuilding missions. To come to a more sustainable peace, it is important to not only acknowledge local players, but also to establish partnerships between national and local governments, the international community, and other key stakeholders. Civil society, encouraged by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), is trying to build these relationships (Connolly & Considine, 2018). Therefore, civil society adapted its programmes from seminars to a broader range of activities, including education, sports and music events. A ground-breaking programme, is the bi-communal school teaching programme on history, where learning about a shared history and meeting the 'other' are the main goals. Programmes like these are dependent on the political elites to officially recognise the programme and therefore hard to implement. Crossing community borders and meeting is still the exception rather than the rule, so educational programmes from civil society focus on this phenomenon. Is this the way to bring the two communities closer together?

1.1 Relevance

Although there is a growing worldwide interest in local and civil society initiatives in peacebuilding missions, civil society still faces many challenges. The need for innovative and long-term funding is the biggest challenge experienced by civil society worldwide. Another challenge comes from politics; political violence and government obstacles (Connolly & Considine, 2018). Just like other civil society movements, civil society in Cyprus is also facing these obstacles.

Civil society programmes that have been initiated in Cyprus have shown that perceptions towards the 'other' can change. Nevertheless, there are still very few people in Cyprus who believe civil society can bring the reunification of the island any closer (Demetriou et al., 2011, pp. 34-35). Despite successful civil society projects, there is still a perception, strengthened by media and politicians, that an actual change and a step forward can only be reached by political negotiations. Societal projects are thus considered to be inferior or even useless, which of course undermines the credibility of the civil society programmes. Another disadvantage experienced, in particular concerning civil society projects funded by international actors, is that projects designed to create mutual understanding between Turkish and Greek Cypriots often fail in reaching a wider audience. This could partly be traced back to the challenge of funding. Without more funding, it is hard to establish a larger geographical spread of the activities. Another form of civil society action are the less organised programmes, however. These seem to be more successful in making a real change on the ground (Demetriou et al., 2011, pp. 36-40).

Furthermore, the so-called Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index – a tool designed to measure peace in societies around the world, examining reconciliation and social cohesion (ScoreForPeace, 2018) – shows that there is a discrepancy between the young and old generations within the communities as well as between the two main communities. This brings up the idea that not just the two communities are losing each other, but also that the different generations within a community are drifting apart as well. To come to more societal support for the peace process, intergenerational closure could be an important factor. Intergenerational programmes (can) not only increase personal development; it might also contribute to the functioning of the community as a whole and increase cooperation, interaction and the exchange of skills, knowledge, and experience (Elli & Granville, 1999; MacCullum et al., 2010; Meshel & McGlynn, 2004). Little research has been done in the field of intergenerational closure, however, especially in conflict-affected areas. Until now intergenerational research mostly focused on particular schools and neighbourhoods, not on a society divided as a result of violent conflict. Intergenerational closure could be the key in education-based peacebuilding programmes in Cyprus, to bring society closer together and get rid of the status quo in the peace process. It is therefore interesting and relevant to supplement the quantitative research of the SCORE index with a qualitative research concerning the opinions of different generations.

In the Greek Cypriot as well as the Turkish Cypriot society a dominant nationalist rhetoric is present, which limits the options for peace negotiations and the creation of a strong civil society. On the other hand, in both communities a growing wish to unlock the conflict and build a peaceful and reunited future is visible. A 2015 poll (Jarraud et al., 2013) shows that 80% of Greek Cypriots and 78% of Turkish Cypriots are of the opinion that civil society organisations should act as representatives of the wider public and play a more meaningful role in the peace process. There is obviously a mandate for a civil society-based peace movement, but only if that movement turns out to be inclusive and owned by the citizens rather than by a small elite: 'peacebuilding also requires the involvement of more people, especially hard-to-reach people.' (Jarraud et al., 2013).

The SCORE index shows some interesting, as well as worrying results. Not only the generations within one community are diametrically opposed, the same age groups from the two main communities are diametrically opposed as well. To get the peace process out of its impasse, it is important to bridge gaps within society. The SCORE Index determined this difference between generations and communities. This research delves into the underlying causes of these differences and explains them. Intergenerational closure also contributes to the creation of meaningful encounters – encounters that have the capacity to challenge and transform individual values and attitudes (Gawlewicz, 2015). The generational mix of these encounters can help in bringing society as a whole closer together. Therefore, the integration of different generations in peacebuilding education can result in more meaningful encounters and may have the ability to increase societal support for the peace process and empower Cypriots to become active citizens.

1.2 Research question

Civil society is becoming a more important player in peacebuilding initiatives. Since the peace negotiations in Cyprus are stuck, new solutions have to be investigated. There is ongoing hate and fear towards the ‘other’ and generations within the communities are growing apart. Therefore, this research focuses on education-based peacebuilding programmes by civil society in Cyprus. Society’s mindset has to change to escape from the current status quo. The goal is to analyse the role of education-based peacebuilding programmes originating from civil society and the extent to which the implementation of different generations can accomplish a bigger societal support for the peace process. Therefore, the main research question is:

In which ways can the implementation of intergenerational closure in education-based civil society peacebuilding programmes in Cyprus help to make a societal change towards a culture of peace?

In order to be able to answer this main question, insights in the current situation of civil society peacebuilding and civil society peacebuilding education are needed to be able to find out if educational initiatives are useful to break through the impasse. Furthermore, the views and involvement of different generations need to be investigated to see if bringing them together can help the societal change towards a culture of peace. This results in the following sub-questions:

1. How does current civil society peacebuilding manifest itself in Cyprus?
2. What role do education-based programmes of civil society actors play in the peacebuilding process in Cyprus?
3. Which generations are currently involved in education-based peacebuilding programmes of civil society actors?
4. Is there a difference between the various generations in Cyprus and in which ways can their inclusion in education-based peacebuilding programmes help to facilitate a more inclusive peace process?
5. How to explain the differences between the generations and communities?
6. What role can generational mixed education-based peacebuilding programmes of civil society actors play in creating more societal support for the peace process?

The sub-questions give an overall view of the civil society peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and therefore insights in the research question. The questions help to outline the current development rate of civil society education-based peacebuilding programmes and the involvement of different generations. To formulate an answer to the various sub-questions, and by doing so answering the main research question, the research has the following structure: first, the background chapter will give an insight in the development of the Cyprus problem, up to the current status quo. After that, a theoretical overview is given of notions of peacebuilding, civil society initiatives, intergenerational closure and peacebuilding education; as seen from a positive as well as a critical perspective. Chapter 4 on methodology explains the qualitative methods used in this research and outlines how the data are analysed. Next, the results are outlined, discussed and analysed, built upon the sub-questions. The thesis ends with concluding remarks, the answer to the research question and a discussion on the research itself.

2. Background

2.1 (Ancient) history of Cyprus

Cyprus is strategically located in the Mediterranean: 64 km south of Turkey and about 960 km southeast of the Greek mainland and is known for its long history of conquerors (Morag, 2004). The island is inhabited since 1400 BC and has had many foreign rulers, like the East Roman Empire, or the Lusignan (1192-1489) and Venetian (1489-1570) rulers (Dietzel, 2014, p. 87; Dodd, 2010, p. 1). After the latter, new rulers arrived: the Ottomans, during a reign that lasted from 1571 to 1878 (Dietzel, 2014, p. 81). The Ottomans established their hold by colonizing the island, resulting in an influx of Turks to the island and the emergence of a new demographic balance. The confiscatory and discriminatory colonial policies stimulated Greek nationalism (Dodd, 2010, p. 1; Lindley, 2007). Another result of the Ottoman rule was that the Greek Cypriots turned to their Church as a symbol of continuity and security. Their Church did profit from the new rulers, since they had more freedom than under previous rulers, even administrative independence. This made it possible for the Church to acquire wealth and eventually own as much as 30 percent of the arable land on the island (Dietzel, 2014, p. 90; Dodd, 2010, p. 2; Lindley, 2007). There were positive effects of the Ottoman rule. Turkish peasants were allowed to resettle on the lands of dispossessed Venetians, resulting in mixed villages. Turkish and Greek Cypriot peasants lived together in the same villages, intermarriage was not uncommon and they spoke the same language. The peasants felt they had much more in common with their peasant counterparts than with the elite of their own national group. The Greek Cypriots living in the towns were way more nationalistic, however (Morag, 2004). By 1640 Cyprus had a total population of around 120,000-140,000, about a quarter of them being of Turkish descent (Dodd, 2010, p. 1), and very few separation or visible tensions.

Almost 200 years later, in 1821, the successful Greek War of Independence – also known as the Greek Revolution against the Ottoman Empire – stimulated the Greek Cypriot call for *enosis*; *enosis* being the Greek Cypriot wish for unification of Cyprus with the Greek ‘motherland’ (Dodd, 2010, p. 4; Hadjipavlou, 2007). In 1878 the British took over the administration of Cyprus and the feeling amongst Greek Cypriots was that the British would allow them to realise their ambition to rule the island and deliver it to Greece.

After the British took over the administration of the island, the division started to emerge with a growing number of separated villages. Intermarriage and mixed villages became less common (Dodd, 2010, p. 2; Lindley, 2007; Morag, 2004). British law even encouraged the separation of the two ethnic groups, since it allowed the various groups to have their own separate schools; this resulted in different systems with different narratives about the past (Kaufmann, 2007). Turkish Cypriots encouraged their students to see themselves as an extension of Turkey, while Greek Cypriots did the same, but then obviously concerning Greece (Lindley, 2007). The foundations for intercommunal conflict were laid: the emergence of different and completely incompatible views concerning the future of Cyprus – *enosis* versus *taksim*, the wish for partition of Cyprus in a Turkish and Greek part – and the merging of church, schools and politics in divisive and nationalistic ways (Lindley, 2007).

In the mid-1950s, tensions because of the wish for *enosis* peaked for the first time; encouraged by the Greek nationalists from EOKA, the Nationalist Organisation of Cypriot Fighters, who had a permit for a campaign of violence from their leader (Dodd, 2010, p. 20; Sertoglu, 2003). In response to EOKA, the Turkish Cypriots established their own militia, TMT (the Turkish Resistance Organisation). The tension was encouraged by the “divide and rule” principle of the British, who used the Cypriot police

force, a majority of which were Turkish Cypriots, to suppress Greek nationalists (Morag, 2004; Sertoglu, 2003).

On 16 August 1960, Cyprus proclaimed its independence, becoming the 'Republic of Cyprus' and its status was guaranteed by Turkey, Greece, and Britain, but neither community felt cause for celebration. Meanwhile the Guarantor Powers – Britain, Greece and Turkey – were negotiating about a new Constitution for Cyprus. This Constitution, also known as the Zürich-London agreements, felt as a defeat for the Greek Cypriots. The Constitution contained specific ratios (70:30 and 60:40) to balance the institutional influence of both ethnic groups. For Greek Cypriots this felt as a loss, because they made up over 80 percent of the population. The lack of a common Cypriot identity and the ideas of a separate Greek versus Turkish identity resulted in a growing mutual distrust. Therefore, both communities continued arming themselves and their villages in anticipation of future communal strife (Morag, 2004; Sertoglu, 2003).

2.2 The Cyprus problem

2.2.1 The Cyprus Dispute

The power-balance in the current Constitution stimulates tension between both communities (Morag, 2004). The tensions were encouraged by thirteen proposed constitutional changes by then-President Makarios in 1963 that would have reduced, or even totally eliminated, the Turkish Cypriot veto powers and quotas (Dodd, 2010, p. 48; Dorn, 2014; Morag, 2004). In December 1963, violence erupted (Dodd, 2010, pp. 50-51; Ker-Lindsay, 2006). This violent period eventually resulted in the "*Enclave Period*" (1963-1974), in which the island was *de facto* partitioned into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot areas. This more radical and visible division of the two national groups resulted in a further deterioration of relations between the two national communities (Morag, 2004).

Meanwhile, a Greek Cypriot organization designed a plan, the so-called Akritas Plan. The Plan's goal, outlined by Makarios, was to put the Turkish Cypriots offside, making them a minority within Cyprus. The tension escalated so quickly that on 27 December 1963 the British military intervened, resulting in a military guarded, permanent cease-fire line, the Green Line (Dodd, 2010, pp. 52-53; Morag, 2004; Sertoglu, 2003). In January 1964, the Guarantor Powers agreed on a United Nations (UN) peace mission. On 4 March 1964, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) mission started (Ker-Lindsay, 2006). UNFICYP, present on the island until this day, is by far the longest-running UN peacekeeping force mission.

2.2.2 The Greek Coup, invasion and division

Relative stability could be restored and in May 1974 UNFICYP was able to substantially reduce its size from 6,400 to 2,300 (Dorn, 2014). On July 15, 1974, however, a Greek coup against ruling President Makarios was staged by extremist Greek Cypriot nationalists from EOKA.

In response to the coup, Turkey invaded Cyprus on July 20, 1974 and seized a small part of the island (Kaufmann, 2007; Ker-Lindsay, 2006). Turkey increased its hold on Cyprus and by mid-August it already controlled 37% of the territory. The invasion and occupation led to enormous refugee flows; around 150,000-200,000 Greek Cypriots and 65,000 Turkish Cypriots fled in opposite directions (Lindley, 2007; Morag, 2004; Sertoglu, 2003). The result was that the Greek Cypriot south and Turkish Cypriot north ended up being almost completely homogeneous entities (see Figure 1.1). In between both parts a small demilitarized zone (DMZ), better known as the 'Green Line' or Buffer Zone, was created, guarded by a permanent UN peacekeeping force (Demetriou, Christou & Mavris, 2011, p. 25;

Kaufmann, 2008; Lindley, 2007). In February 1975, Rauf Denktaş, a Turkish Cypriot politician, proclaimed the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' (TRNC) – by now Turkish Cypriots had an independent state of their own, although only recognised by Turkey (Morag, 2004).




Figure 1.1: Ethnic demography of Cyprus (Source: originally Meleagrou and Yesilada 1993:56; U.S. Library of Congress 2006, Cyprus as cited by Lindley, 2007).

2.3 EU Accession period

On July 3, 1990, the Greek Cypriot Administration applied for full membership of Cyprus to the European Union. The application was for membership of the (Greek) southern part as well as the (Turkish) northern part of the island – in contradiction with the current situation, because officially the Greek Cypriot Administration doesn't have control of the north of the island. However, an application on behalf of just the Republic of Cyprus was seen as accepting the de facto division of the country (Sertoglu, 2003). In 1997, the UN tried once more to start negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but all hope for an agreement was gone after the announcement by the European Union that it would go ahead with accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus (Dodd, 2010, p. 196). Although leading EU members had stated before that Cyprus couldn't become an EU member as long as it was divided, the first accession negotiations started in March 1998 (Dodd, 2010, p. 199; Sertoglu, 2003).

In December 1999 the UN proposed a new series of talks. The TRNC was against this proposal, because it first wanted to be recognised to have political equality. After five rounds no solution was reached and in November 2001 Denktaş invited Clerides (President of the Republic of Cyprus) for personal face-to-face talks without UN involvement (Dodd, 2010, pp. 202-212; Dodd, 2005). The TRNC was still trying to come to a solution before the Republic of Cyprus would become an EU member, expected to take place in 2003. But again, the negotiations didn't bring a solution.

On 11 November 2002, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan published his plan for a federal system in which veto rights for each community were very much reduced. In 2003, during the Copenhagen European Council, the EU had to decide on which states would become new members. Greece announced it would veto any Eastern enlargement if Cyprus didn't become a member. So, it was clear Cyprus would gain its European membership (Christophorou, 2005; Dodd, 2010, pp. 220-223).

2.3.1 *The Annan Plan*

On 26 February 2003, the so-called Annan Plan III was presented. Previous plans had tried to modify the 1960 Constitution, but Annan III was different. Annan III was based on EU membership and made co-operation and consensus key-points by reducing the possibilities of veto powers for all parties involved. The advantage of a European solution was that much legislation would be made in Brussels instead of Cyprus, which could reduce areas of friction. Furthermore, the Annan Plan was based on a constituent state for each community within a federal state (Christophorou, 2005; Dodd, 2010, p. 225). The federal state was composed of two elected legislatures and seats were equally divided amongst both communities. The federal state would be responsible for the EU, but the constituent states could still represent their own interests in Brussels under certain circumstances. A topic of concern – which is a concern until today – is the issue of residence and property ownership. Because of the refugee flows from 1963-1964 and 1974 there is a lot of abandoned property on each side, still belonging to Greek or Turkish Cypriots who fled to the other side of the island. During negotiations, mutual distrust between the two communities remained. Turkish Cypriots feared the idea that Greek Cypriots would overpower them when they can settle wherever they want and Greek Cypriots were afraid that the Turkish Constituent State would try to become autonomous. The EU and UN on the other hand tried to come to a solution to create a stable country in the Near East, all for their own international political interests. While President Denktaş remained sceptical towards the Annan Plan, people in the TRNC were demonstrating, urging him to sign the Annan Plan or to resign. In March 2003, leaders of both sides and the then-UN Secretary-General met in The Hague. The expectation was that they would

agree to the Annan Plan, but the leaders weren't willing to compromise and rejected the plan. And so it came to be that on 16 April 2003 Cyprus became a member of the European Union without a solution for the Cyprus problem. There was still time, because the official European membership started 1 May 2004 (Dodd, 2010, pp. 223-236; Ker-Lindsay, 2006).

After signing the EU Agreement, the TRNC made a breath-taking announcement on 21 April 2003: it would allow freedom of movement across the divide and checkpoints were opened. Both sides were eager to visit their (former) properties and people who visited the other side were surprised that the propaganda about the 'other' wasn't the reality they saw when crossing. On 30 April the Greek Cypriot government offered the Turkish Cypriots the possibility of getting identity cards and passports from the Republic of Cyprus – which was seen as a great advantage since the Republic of Cyprus was now a member of the EU – and Turkish Cypriots got access to the (better) healthcare in the south (Dodd, 2010, pp. 236-237).

2.3.2 Referenda

On 24 April 2004, both communities voted about a revised Agreement, Annan Plan V. With a high participation rate (89%), the result was that 65% of the Turkish Cypriots approved the Plan whilst 76% of the Greek Cypriots rejected it (Christophorou, 2005; Dodd, 2010, p. 253; Ker-Lindsay, 2006). The Turkish Cypriot press was quite positive about the Agreement and stimulated people to support the Plan. Even though the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş wasn't in favour of the Plan from the beginning, a pro-Annan Plan movement in the north explained the pros and cons of the Annan Plan and called people to vote for the Annan Plan. The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Papadopoulos, and the media in the south solidly opposed the Plan and never tried to convince Greek Cypriots to support the Plan. Other political parties rejected the plan as well and an image was created that the Annan Plan was based on non-existent good will of Turkey and that there would be a better and more hopeful solution as a member of the European Union. Only the Democratic Rally, the party of former President Clerides, supported the Annan Plan and stated that a rejection would mean the start of a permanent division of the island. Characteristic for the campaigns in north and south was that the political leaders weren't able to convince all their supporters to follow their position in the debate (Christophorou, 2005; Dodd, 2010, pp. 252-253; Dodd, 2005; Ker-Lindsay, 2006). The rejection of the Annan Plan left Cyprus in a complex situation, without a solution. Negotiations are on and off, but a solution is far away, as illustrated by the recent absence of negotiations since July 2017.

3. Theoretical framework

This chapter examines the most important theoretical aspects and notions for this research. Section 1 addresses existing theories about peacebuilding. The second section theoretically embeds civil society, while Section 3 explains the term intergenerational closure. Section 4 explains peacebuilding education and links the previous three sections to it.

3.1 Peacebuilding

The notion of peacebuilding gained importance after the Cold War; until then the UN focus had been on peacekeeping, being the deployment of lightly armed military forces to monitor a cease-fire or patrol neutral buffer zones between former combatants (Paris, 2014, p. 13). This measure is only taken after a conflict has become violent and protracted. Until now, peacekeeping hasn't established an environment of long-term sustainable peace, which means that peacekeeping didn't create space for conflict resolution; it sometimes even worsened the situation (Fetherston, 2000). Therefore, in 1992, then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali formulated a new policy on peace operations. Post-conflict peacebuilding was defined as "to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in the aftermath of civil strife" (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Schellhaas & Seegers, 2009; Paris, 2014, p. 18; Vogel, 2016). This definition fits the description of peacebuilding when it was first introduced in 1975: "structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur." (originally Galtung, 1975, as cited by International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 2007). By improving relationships between the parties and securing their interests in socio-political mechanisms, a relapse into conflict could be avoided (Handelman, 2017; Schellhaas & Seegers, 2009).

Until recently, peacekeeping wasn't a highly theorised topic, but mostly illuminated by militaries and diplomats involved in the field of peacekeeping operations. With an increase in (case) research in this field, there is also an increase in theories. An important notion is the difference between negative peace and positive peace; negative peace refers to a situation "that is 'not war', but where structural violence exists", while positive peace is a situation "where human beings are not impeded from fully developing and living out their life-span – a situation sometimes referred to as peace with justice" (Fetherston, 2000, p. 202). This distinction is an important development in the field of peacebuilding, since only positive peace leaves space for a critical, problematical form of theory and practice of conflict resolution.

Apart from the distinction between negative and positive peace, Galtung also introduced the idea of structural violence. The different terms used in conflict studies – peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – are all slightly different. In regard to dealing with structural violence there is an important difference between peace-making and peacekeeping on the one hand, and peacebuilding on the other hand. According to Galtung, peacebuilding is the only approach that is dealing with the structural causes of violence (Fetherston, 2000). The idea that peacebuilding pays attention to the structural causes of violence corresponds with John Burton's idea about prevention and resolution. He defines prevention as "the means of deducing from an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of conflict, including its human dimensions, not merely the conditions that create an environment of conflict, and the structural changes required to remove it, but more importantly, the promotion of conditions that create cooperative relationships" (Burton, as cited by Fetherston, 2000, p. 203). Burton

claims there has to be interaction between prevention and resolution. Resolution transforms the relationships in a particular case, by which it could pave the way for the application of prevention measures to those particular situations (Fetherston, 2000).

These definitions and approaches assume an overarching bigger concept that could be applied anywhere. John Paul Lederach was one of the first to develop an integrated model for peacebuilding incorporating grassroots as an important player in peacebuilding and included the idea of a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding (Fetherston, 2000). This is an interesting aspect for this research, because it focusses on the role of civil society initiatives and therefore attributes an important role to the grassroots level as well.

In recent years, liberal peacebuilding missions have become the dominant approach to peace. This vision of peace promotes democracy, human rights, free markets and the rule of law as the solution for war-torn countries (Van Leeuwen, Verkoren & Boedeltje, 2012). Recently, this concept of peacebuilding is facing a growing amount of criticism. During the 1990s, peacebuilding operations – that were seen as liberal peacebuilding – made a slip in areas like Angola, Nicaragua and Bosnia. Despite the fact that most countries that hosted operations in the 1990s didn't face a return to large-scale conflict, there was a growing number of questions about the sustainability and results of the missions – also acknowledged by defenders of liberal peace. Critiques on liberal peace dealt with too much brevity and superficiality, but there were also people who stated that peacebuilding missions were too “imperialistic”, neglecting the importance of local ownership of the direction and activities in the mission's programme (Chandler, 2010; Van Leeuwen, Verkoren & Boedeltje, 2012; Paris, 2010). Most often the top-down implementation of these peacebuilding missions is being criticised, not necessarily the ideas on which liberal peacebuilding is based, although for instance the focus on the national level and the lack of attention to identity – key points of liberal peacebuilding initiatives – clash with the reality in post-conflict areas (Van Leeuwen, Verkoren & Boedeltje, 2012).

Despite the increased doubts about liberal peacebuilding, there is a lack of alternative visions. Duffield, for example, explains emancipatory peacebuilding as “one that enhances the solidarity of the governed” (Duffield, as cited by Paris, 2010, p. 356) and Pugh sees this as “participation of local actors and more pro-poor engagement with local populations” (Pugh, as cited by Paris, 2010, p. 356), but a more specific elaboration of this concept is not given, which makes it difficult to evaluate these approaches in more detail (Paris, 2010). Furthermore, it is important to realise the pitfalls of liberal peace and that the alternative idea shouldn't fall into the same traps. The most important trap is the idea that one set of arrangements could be implemented to all (conflict) societies around the world and it is up to “us”, the “West”, to compile this package of arrangements. In addition to that, it is a difficult challenge that with the alternative you have to break the dominant liberal discourse and create an alternative narrative (Van Leeuwen, Verkoren & Boedeltje, 2012).

Nowadays, most scholars consider peacebuilding to be an umbrella-like term, including notions like resolution, management, mitigation, prevention, or transformation of conflict (Schirch, 2008). This results in a situation where each and every term might indicate different possibilities. For instance, conflict resolution suggests that it is possible to end a conflict in a neat and smooth way, but in reality this is virtually impossible. The term of conflict prevention implies that one can proactively build peace to prevent violent conflict, but Conflict Studies show that conflict is normal and offers opportunities for change. This implies one should prevent violence, not conflict.

The above shows the importance of choosing, or at least substantiating, the right term when talking, writing or researching peacebuilding. Another element of the “multiplicity of peacebuilding” is

given by the fact that it has been and is defined and used in many different ways. The notion of peacebuilding is used for particularly focussing on the post-conflict time span, but also on all conflict stages; a narrow focus on specific kinds of activities is possible, but also a wider focus on a broader range of activities like peacekeeping and education; there can be a focus on high level national and international interventions, or rather a focus on all levels, including the local/communal level. A distinction can also be made related to the kind of violence that has to be prevented and/or ended, be it political, structural or social (Schirch, 2008).

Given the wide variety and multiple options in defining peacebuilding, some scholars have decided to use a rather narrow definition of peacebuilding. For instance, Barma (2017, p. 13) differentiates in level, with a definition focussing on interventions by the international community in transforming a post-conflict country, with a specific focus on the UN and other “high level actors”.

Nowadays, broader definitions are common. For instance, Schirch (2008) defines peacebuilding as: “peacebuilding seeks to prevent, reduce, transform, and help people recover from violence in all forms, even structural violence that has not yet led to massive civil unrest. At the same time it empowers people to foster relationships that sustain people and their environment.”

This research focusses on the role of educational programmes of civil society in the peacebuilding process and by doing so, tries to avoid some of the traps of (liberal) peacebuilding. Because of this point of view, the broader definition of the term peacebuilding, as cited by Schirch (2008), is used. This leaves the opportunity to include a broader range of activities and developments of educational peacebuilding projects.

3.2 Civil Society

3.2.1 Civil society: a definition

Civil society is a concept with many definitions. Lately, civil society is getting more attention in policy making and scientific research, but there is still no common agreed-upon definition. Paffenholz (2010, pp. 8-9) uses a broad definition, by stating that civil society is “an arena of voluntary, uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. Civil society is a sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state, political, private, and economic spheres, keeping in mind that in practice the boundaries between these sectors are often complex and blurred. It consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organizations – competing with each other and oriented to specific interests – that are not purely driven by private or economic interests, are autonomously organized, and interact in the public sphere. Thus, civil society is independent from the state and the political sphere, but it is oriented towards and interacts closely with them”.

According to Marchetti & Tocci (2009, p. 206), civil society “encompasses a wide variety of actors, ranging from local to international, independent and quasi-governmental players. Conflict tends to shape the identity and actions of Civil Society Organizations (CSO).” The libertarian Cato Institute defines civil society as “fundamentally reducing the role of politics in society by expanding free markets and individual liberty.” The Advocacy Institute, one of Cato’s alter egos, calls civil society “a society that protects those who organize to challenge power”. Meanwhile, back in academia, civil society has become the “chicken soup of the social sciences” – “the new analytic key that will unlock the mysteries of the social order” and “our last best hope” while the UN and the World Bank see it as one of the keys to “good governance” and poverty-reducing growth (Edwards, 2014, pp. 15-16).

Barnes (2009, p. 133) defines civil society as something that “takes form through various types of association that give expression and direction to the social, political, spiritual and cultural needs of members. By reflecting diverse interests and values, they enable the articulation, mobilisation and pursuit of the aspirations of the constituent elements of a society. Their combined effect can be key to beginning to transform deeply entrenched conflict systems”. Also, John Paul Lederach, one of the first researching civil society, mentions the network basis and political independence of civil society when he defines it as a “web of human relationships made up of individual people, their networks, organisations, and institutions and much of it is considered to be autonomous from the state” (Lederach, as cited by Kim, 2017, p. 517).

Paffenholz (2010) and Barnes (2009) show the importance of a combined effect of civil society on the one hand, and state and politics on the other. No conflict is the same and every conflict has its complexities, therefore it is important for civil society, as well as politics, to realise that they need each other to establish a sustainable solution. A view that is getting more recognition in (international) peace operations. Peacebuilding can only be sustainable when it is working on the horizontal and vertical axis, so all levels are affected and coordinated with each other (Kim, 2017).

All these definitions show the broad range of definitions of civil society. Organisations like the UN and the World Bank focus on the political side of civil society and how this can help civil society to bring a country further (on a political level). Others highlight the different status of civil society compared to politics, as well as the voluntary base. Academics state that previous research shows that top-down didn’t work out in a way people expected it to do and therefore they see civil society and its initiatives as “our last best hope” to make a change. This research uses the ideas of Paffenholz (2010), “an arena of voluntary uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. A sphere of voluntary action, distinct from the state” and Marchetti & Tocci (2009, p. 206), “a wide variety of actors, ranging from local to international, independent and quasi-governmental players” and the Advocacy Institute “a society that protects those who organize to challenge power”. Barnes (2009, p. 133) mentions that “their combined effect can be key to beginning to transform deeply entrenched conflict systems” which is an important statement for this research, because it focusses on the positive influence civil society can have in creating a feeling of reconciliation and a culture of peace. These definitions use the elements of civil society that can be used to analyse education-based peacebuilding programmes by civil society in Cyprus, namely voluntary based, not political, a variety of actors, challenging power and transforming deeply entrenched conflict.

This research focusses on peace-oriented civil society. According to Vogel (2016, p. 475), peace-oriented civil society describes the type of civil society that “attempts to support an inclusive settlement of a conflict”. When speaking about civil society in this research, peace-oriented civil society is meant, because it investigates the influence of education-based peacebuilding programmes by civil society on the peace process in Cyprus. This is important to mention, because civil society can be seen as an important player in mobilising people in different ways. This means mobilising civil society in peacebuilding so as to create a culture of peace, but also the mobilisation of people in inflaming a conflict.

The above-mentioned range of definitions of civil society makes it look like civil society is, nowadays, a thoroughly analysed and researched topic, but it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that the role of civil society gained serious attention in peacekeeping operations (Vogel, 2016). It was Lederach who, in the 1990s, recognised the importance of including locals (and civil society) in peacebuilding projects. According to Lederach, a sustainable long-term peace was only possible when meeting the local people

and their wishes. The international community must recognise locals and see them as resources in creating peace, instead of passive recipients in peacebuilding. After all, local understandings of peace are crucial in building “peace from below” in a sustainable way. Yet, even peacebuilding that focusses on peace from below is never detached from top-down approaches. Civil society initiatives are still used by (international) donors to implement their agenda. (Peace) promoters have to change their way of thinking and see that it is about understanding people’s perceptions of peace instead of implementing a universal notion of liberal peace. So, in this sense, peacebuilding from below – and thus civil society initiatives – is not only about elites and civil society, but goes beyond these institutions and focusses on the diversity of individuals and communities. This creates a working environment with cross-fertilization between civil society and existing structures (Fetherston, 2000; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Marchetti & Tocci, 2009).

In peacebuilding initiatives there is only recently attention for the local, while the idea of continuous interaction between state and civil society already goes back to Montesquieu. His philosophy stresses a balance between central authority and societal networks. His idea is that the central authority has to be continuously controlled by, on the one hand the rule of law, and on the other hand the countervailing power of independent networks like civil society (organisations). These organisations operate inside and outside the political structure and challenge the ideas of the established order to bring about reconciliation and a culture of peace (Paffenholz, 2010). This idea has gained growing confidence during the last decade. More policy makers and researchers recognise the importance of civil society in the process leading up to a sustainable peace. Their participation could be crucial in influencing and challenging the political system and come to reconciliation and a culture of peace (Belloni, 2001).

National structures and governments are not the only factors influencing civil society. Civil society movements are also influenced by the nature and role of the international community. There is a global trend in which (local) governments play an increasingly smaller role, which results in privatisation of world politics. The spaces that are created as a consequence of privatization are filled up by booming civil society organisations with growing local and transnational networks. The privatisation and therefore growth of civil society is positive, but there is also another side to the matter. International organisations can also negatively influence civil society developments. By supporting civil society, they try to create a network through which they can still implement their own agenda in the peace process. This could weaken civil society, because it focusses on the needs of the international objectives instead of the local needs (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009; Vogel, 2016).

The interaction between civil society and existing structures is, for example, visible when looking at the supporters of civil society. Peace-oriented civil society actors are often supported and/or protected by international actors and/or the political elite in the concerned area. If this wasn’t the case, civil society actors would be in danger of not finding a space to develop their ideas and implement them in society (Vogel, 2016). It’s a combination of the two approaches – trying to change attitudes, behaviours and patterns through civil society organisations or through governmental/ intergovernmental intervening – that can establish a societal change. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) shouldn’t believe they are solely the key to change, but that an interaction of the two makes change possible (Barnes, 2009).

3.2.2 *The Local Turn*

The term “local turn” goes without saying: the local context, local agency and dealing with local partners is becoming more important in today’s peacebuilding initiatives (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). Mac Ginty & Richmond (2013, p. 769) see the local turn as the recognition “of the diffuseness of power and its circulation, of the importance of culture, of the unintended consequence of external blueprints, and of rights and needs in everyday contexts. It is a recognition that peace building, state building and development should support their subjects rather than define them.” Encouraged by recent failures of peacebuilding, the local turn gained more awareness and support (Chandler, 2010; Van Leeuwen, Verkoren & Boedeltje, 2012).

There have been two local turns in peacebuilding. The first one took place during the 1990s. People thought after the Cold War there would be less, or even no armed conflict at all, but the decade brought a new challenge of intrastate violence instead of interstate violence. Failures of peacebuilding interventions in amongst others Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia showed that the toolbox of interveners, like the UN, wasn’t rightly equipped for intrastate violence. This had to change. The local turn was strengthened and there was more attention for an active civil society. The first local turn in peacebuilding emphasised the necessity of empowering local people as the key designers of peacebuilding instead of externally driven and imposed peace interventions. Peace from below was seen as the solution to come to a sustainable long-term peace (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015).

It sounds as a positive development to include locals in the peace process, because in the end they are the ones that need to make the solution work. The inclusion of civil society in the process could be the right step to make peace more sustainable in the long-term, but instead of integrating civil society initiatives in peacebuilding, the international community started to use civil society to integrate their liberal agenda in the conflict areas. The intentions were good, but the focus was still on liberal values like promoting democratisation, marketisation and human rights. The criteria to get funding and support are so narrow that this is used as a way to implement the (Western) intervener’s agenda and by that keep control over the development of those countries. The only “improvement” was that it was now seen as a participatory approach of implementing these values, but societal and human consequences were still ignored, so the top-down Western intervention was still there, although the local turn challenges existing and assumed universal relations. This means that the Western world is no longer automatically the top of hierarchy when the local turn is applied (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Lidén, Mikhelidze, Stavrevska, & Vogel, 2016; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Paffenholz, 2015).

This interpretation of the local turn is based on the theory of Lederach and focusses on the sub-national governmental level. This level was seen as an intermediary between the state and citizens that could influence both levels and through which interveners tried to implement concepts such as local governance, local capacity and local ownership. Conflict prevention through dialogue became an important pillar. Implementing this strategy, the intervener had to guard that the sub-national level wouldn’t be hijacked by the elite as well (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). Hayman at Peace Direct emphasises that “local capacity must be regarded as a central element of any strategy for managing conflict and that what is needed is a new orthodoxy that places local capacity (far beyond the government) at the centre, gives it a leadership role, and respects its expertise and commitment” (Hayman, as cited by Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015, p. 830). According to critics of the implementation of the local turn, this full recognition for the local isn’t there yet. Instead, the focus on local governance,

local capacity and local ownership still represents liberal values. The local is constantly negotiating between local and non-local (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013).

Caused by criticism about the first local turn, and state building failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, another trend in the local turn in peacebuilding operations came to the fore. This turn started as a critical reaction to further development of the international peace- and state building project and dissociated itself from liberal peacebuilding by focussing on emancipatory approaches. It sees the local in peacebuilding as a means of emancipation expressed through the emphasis on voices from below. The locals know the real causes of conflict, so this approach takes the local understanding of peace as their starting point. An important base of the emancipatory approach is that the entire local community must be included in the peace negotiations, so also local minorities play a role in the peace process. Local inclusion and participation remain crucial factors after the peace process, since they have to sustain peace. The importance of cross-fertilisation of the local and national is still important in this approach. Local and national concerns have to be adjusted to one another to come to a sustainable long-term peace and have to interact with each other continuously (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015).

Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) give five reasons for the growth of and raised awareness for the local in peacebuilding. The most important reason is that local actors have gradually become more assertive. Working both within and against the liberal peace framework, these actors have found a louder and more targeted voice. Main motives for this development are the failure of top-down peace and development projects (in major cities) and the absence of local identities and/or standards in these projects. To have their voices heard, these local actors realised that it was necessary to become activists and bring the local to the capital rather than wait for the metropolitan elites to approach them.

Besides the assertiveness of local actors, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) list the following other reasons for the increasing importance of the local in peacebuilding. First, liberal peace goes hand-in-hand with resistance. Second, power in peace making moves circularly instead of unidirectional and top-down. Third, by seeing inequality as a causal factor for local and regional conflicts, it could help in resolving these conflicts. Fourth and last, more senior positions in international organisations have been filled by people and practitioners from the global South.

The main critique on, especially, the second local turn in peacebuilding is the fact that it is hampered by a binary and essentialist understanding of the local and the international, which are presented as the only relevant locations of power or resistance. Another major problem is the over-emphasis on Western international actors. International intervention is only viewed from a Western view. Other, non-Western actors, are in a blind spot and don't get any attention while their interventions are often more oppressing to the local than the (current) Western interventions. Another problem is that international donors support local NGOs, even when those NGOs try to implement liberal projects. The projects of these NGOs, and local actors in general, aren't criticised in the way international projects are. The local is romanticised while it is just as divided as the international (Paffenholz, 2015).

3.2.3 Civil society initiatives in Cyprus

Until now, negotiations in Cyprus have been between (political) elites of both communities. There is a growing critique that civil society wasn't consulted. Aligned with the academic change of a growing awareness for local initiatives, there is a growing civil society movement in Cyprus, but the peace process remains elitist. The participatory and emancipatory approaches are still untried. So far, the elitist negotiations didn't work and encouraged by international developments civil society is roaring itself (Jarraud, Louise, & Filippou, 2013).




Figure 3.2.3.1: Extent to Which the Voice of Citizens Is Heard by the Leaders in the Negotiation Process (Source: UNDP 2012 – Jarraud, Louise, & Filippou, 2013).




Figure 3.2.3.2: Opinion on Whether Citizens Should be Consulted about Major Policy Decisions (Source: UNDP 2012 – Jarraud, Louise, & Filippou, 2013).

The above figures (3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.2) show the feelings amongst Cypriots. In both communities, people have the feeling that they aren't heard by their politicians, despite the fact that they want to be consulted in the peace process (Jarraud et al., 2013; ScoreForPeace, 2018). How did the civil society movement develop in Cyprus and what has been its influence?

As a consequence of the division of the island, civil society was weakly developed until the 1990s. Interaction between the communities was difficult, so civil society had to develop itself separately on both sides of the divide without creating bi-communal structures. The presence of the Buffer Zone made it almost impossible to physically meet each other, so it was not until the 1990s that some activists started to find ways to meet people from the other side. But having a real impact was difficult, partly because of the restrictions to meet (Jarraud et al., 2013).

The Fullbright Commission bi-communal workshop in the Buffer Zone in 1994 made civil society activists realise that they could organise themselves and have a real impact on the peace process. This insight resulted in an increase in face-to-face contact across the divide and a huge increase in bi-communal activities in the Buffer Zone. Unfortunately, the donor and political environment stayed behind in this development, especially when in 1997 the Turkish Cypriot authorities banned all peacebuilding activities. In this relatively short period between 1994-1997, civil society was able to have an impact on community level, but impact on the formal peace process was nil (Jarraud et al., 2013).

In light of the EU accession negotiations (see Chapter 2), the political climate changed which should have generated opportunities for civil society. However, bi-communal civil society developed itself on a grassroots level in safe areas like infrastructure programmes instead of peacebuilding initiatives and reconciliation. Even the biggest civil society peacebuilding initiative, the Bi-Communal Development Programme (BDP) implemented by the UN, UNDP and USAID, didn't focus on bi-communal peacebuilding activities. BDP had remarkable results, however. By September 2003 70% of BDP projects had succeeded in achieving some form of face-to-face contact between people from both communities (Jarraud et al., 2013). Face-to-face, meaningful, encounters are an important part to come to reconciliation (Hadjipavlou, 2017, p. 206).

In the year 2003, some new opportunities for civil society were revealed. First, Cyprus signed the Treaty of Accession and would soon become an EU-member. As a consequence, it was expected that – especially the Turkish Cypriots – would do anything to come to a solution before the EU accession was final (more details in Chapter 2). Second, the Turkish Cypriot authorities opened the first five crossing points in the Buffer Zone. The last opportunity was the Annan Plan referendum, planned for 2004. The prospect of a solution paved the way for civil society to broadly implement reconciliation and peacebuilding projects all over the island (Jarraud et al., 2013). The opening of the crossing points meant a new sort of interaction. People were able to visit the houses where they used to live, meet the 'other', they could humanise the dehumanised enemy again and new friendships and relations arose (Hadjipavlou, 2017, pp. 206-208); eagerly used by the Turkish Cypriots to mobilise a broadly supported civil society peace movement. However, the Greek Cypriot civil society movement never fully supported the Annan Plan, which created obstacles for the peace promoters and in the end a rejection of the Annan Plan from the majority of Greek Cypriots. The result of the referendum painfully uncovered three gaps within society. First, it uncovered a gap between the negotiating elite and civil society. Second, it uncovered a gap between civil society supporters and the rest of society that didn't fully trust or believe civil society and their promises. Thirdly, it uncovered a gap between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot society (Jarraud et al., 2013).

The lack of impact of civil society until the Annan Plan referendum could mostly be blamed on failures in two important areas. First, they weren't able to create a vision of a united Cyprus that was supported and owned by the public. Second, they weren't able to maximise the opportunities to challenge the political elites and expand the space for peace making (Jarraud et al., 2013). This failure could be blamed on failing to achieve bonding; they weren't able to improve community activity. Other causes are a lack of promoting engagement between the communities (bridging) and failing to improve connections with those parties that have influence and the right resources (linking) (Gillepsie, Georgiou, & Insay, 2013).

After the Annan Plan failure, civil society movements started to choose activities with which they wanted to develop society and influence the peace process. There were organisations focussing on creating a legal environment for civil society, building organisational capacity, and challenging the elitist negotiation format. A big problem remained, however; civil society had to gain more legitimacy. Especially Greek Cypriot civil society was facing a lack of legitimacy. Meanwhile, organisations like UNDP, USAID and the EU gave funding to new civil society strengthening and peacebuilding initiatives (Jarraud, et al., 2013).

Civil society already made a long journey to come to this point and there is still progress being made, but it hasn't yet reached the point that it has public participation in the peace process and civil society organisations are still facing numerous barriers to do their job across the divide. There are no formal registration possibilities for bi-communal networks, financial transactions on the Turkish side of the island are complex, transport to meetings is cumbersome, and there are psychological and historical issues that each individual has to overcome. On top of that, civil society in both communities is still partly attached to the authorities (Jarraud et al., 2013).

Currently, international funding is still coming, but civil society realises this won't stay forever and that funding can be diminished or even stop at all. The EU already chose to make a distinction between which civil society organisations (CSO) they support and which they don't. It chose to solely support CSOs that organise peace-oriented projects. This also nicely illustrates how Western powers still try to determine the development agenda of conflict-affected areas. CSOs will follow the agenda of (Western) donors, because of an overall shortage of funding (Lidén et al., 2016). A way to face the problem of funding is by joining forces.

Difficulties with funding are not the only challenge. The problem of a lack of legitimacy – from the leadership and the Cypriot public – stayed and even increased after 2011. Therefore, civil society still has to come up with a strategy to convince more Cypriots that they themselves can have an impact on the situation. Civil society organisations are not connecting to the feelings of the majority of both communities. Participation is dropping and it is hard for organisations to attract a wider and new audience for their activities. So, just like the formal peace process, civil society is missing the representation and participation of the wider society (Gillespie et al., 2013; Jarraud et al., 2013; Lidén et al., 2016; Vogel, 2016). An important reason for this is the lack of bilingualism in Cyprus. The communities don't speak each other's language anymore and therefore most of the time events are held in English. As a consequence, people that don't speak English, especially the older generations, are excluded from bi-communal events (Gillepsie et al., 2013; Jarraud et al., 2013). Contrary to a diminishing participation, is a growing civil support for civil society initiatives to create reconciliation and a culture of peace, reaching towards support from at least half the population of both communities (Jarraud et al., 2013; ScoreForPeace, 2018).

Despite the lack of legitimacy and difficulties with reaching a wider audience, civil society is facing some more challenges. First of all, civil society is facing internal problems regarding funding.

Civil society has to diversify the sources of funding to create a sustainable basis, especially funding from the private sector is scarce. Another important internal problem is the lack of evaluation of projects and procedures which result in a loss of valuable learning from previous projects. The lack of legitimacy is linked to a lack of trust. There is still a lot of distrust towards the other community and within each community, revived by the rejected Annan Plan and maintained by formal, informal and non-formal education. Civil society has to find a way to communicate more effectively and directly with the wider public, which could be done by working more with the media. Media isn't covering bi-communal events, therefore civil society has to invest in better relationships with journalists from the national media. A first step to create at least some coverage is the establishment of an Independent Media Centre in the Buffer Zone (Gillespie et al., 2013; Hadjipavlou, 2017, pp. 206-215; ScoreForPeace, 2018).

By working on the above-mentioned fields, civil society can help to come to an environment in which it is normal to recognise and legitimise the other narrative. There has to come a situation in which people start to understand each other's suffering instead of only mentioning one's own victimhood. There has to be a common story, because currently each side tells its version of history. Only by starting to recognise the other's narrative, an opening for more trust, dialogue and peacebuilding will emerge. By doing so, they can start to create a shared and inclusive narrative (Hadjipavlou, 2017, pp. 210-211).

3.3 Intergenerational closure

In this paragraph the concept 'intergenerational closure' is explained. Until now, there has been relatively little research into this subject, especially in conflict-affected areas. This section links the concept of intergenerational closure to peacebuilding and education to see if this could provide a new dimension to the peace process on Cyprus.

3.3.1 Intergenerational Closure: a definition

Coleman (1988) was the first to define social capital. This term is used as an umbrella-like concept under which intergenerational closure is positioned. According to Coleman (1988, p. 98), social capital is "defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different ones, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspects of social structure and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether personal or corporate actors – within the structure". Robert Putnam (1995, as cited by Salmi & Kivivuori, 2006, p. 124) puts more focus on the functional aspects and defines social capital as "features of social organizations, such as networks, standards and trust, that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit".

In this research social capital is implemented on a micro-level, namely individual people. Social capital is about the (changes in) relations among persons and how they act upon it. It can only be developed through relationships. This could be seen as personal development within a network of relations with other people. Other people and actors are the resources one can use to achieve one's interest. This is different from human capital, which focusses on the acquired knowledge of individuals. The focus on relations among persons makes the term social capital suitable for appliance to intergenerational closure – a term that focusses on the relation between parents and children, children and children, and parents and parents. This results in a closed social network in which everyone is in contact.

Trustworthiness of the social environment is an important element of social capital. This aspect defines the importance of relationships, the social ties between individuals. Another aspect of social

capital is the actual extent to which obligations are held, such as trust, standards, and information (Coleman, 1988; Salmi & Kivivuori, 2006; Valasik & Barton, 2018). Interaction based on these principles results in the exchange of advice, goods, etc. and therefore increases the level of social capital. In time, this mutual exchange can help to increase social support to build on (Cleveland & Crosnoe, 2004; Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 1999).

The Oxford Dictionary phrases intergenerational as “relating to, involving, or affecting several generations”. Elaborating on this definition, intergenerational closure means there is not only a relation between parent and child and between children in a particular social setting, but the relationships are closed because there is also a direct relation between the parents of different children (Cleveland & Crosnoe, 2004; Coleman, 1988; Valasik & Barton, 2018). For this research the definition of Sampson et al. (1999) is used for intergenerational closure. This broadens intergenerational closure from parents and children to social networks between all local adults and children in the community. Relations between adults and children within an entire community are investigated, which includes amongst others teachers, religious leaders and agents. It is important to realise that adults and children are influencing the abilities of intergenerational closure. Especially in regard to friendships that are being made during adolescence, the youths themselves are of great influence on intergenerational closure (Cleveland & Crosnoe, 2004). The use of this definition makes it possible to apply intergenerational closure on educational peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus, because these activities are not necessarily for parent and child, but for the entire community.

During time the concept of social capital has been interpreted in different ways and sometimes drifted away from the original meaning. Researchers investigating social capital start to focus on an individual level of social networks, they use indicators as single parenthood and number of family moves to define the density of social capital for example. However, social capital and intergenerational closure are embedded in the structures of social organisations, not in individuals. This means that social capital is linked to the local community and not to the individual families. “Closure” is the fact that the individual is being linked to the family and the family is linked to the larger community. Another aspect that shouldn’t be forgotten is the two outcomes of social capital, namely social capital used to create an open and inclusive environment or used to hold on to conservative, closed or discriminative values (Cleveland & Crosnoe, 2004; Salmi & Kivivuori, 2006; Sampson et al., 1999).

As a result of intergenerational closure effective sanctions can be implemented and (social) standards are transferred between adults and children. Furthermore, intergenerational closure influences the social capital of trustworthiness of social structures which can increase obligations and expectations towards and from each other. Extensive social networks create a larger feeling of togetherness, which makes it easier to come to collective standards and to address each other when you’re not following group norms. After all, an open structure cannot implement collective sanctions to ensure trustworthiness. This makes intergenerational closure not only a personal investment, but maybe even more an investment in the public good. Unfortunately, establishing intergenerational closure is not very often at the top of the priority list because of the bigger public investment than personal investment (Cleveland & Crosnoe, 2004; Coleman, 1988; Valasik & Barton, 2018).

Communities, neighbourhoods and families are becoming increasingly segregated regarding age. Young people get together in school and adults work with age-related colleagues. If the concept intergenerational closure is implemented on the ground, programmes occur that try to reduce the physical and social barriers between different age groups that emerge because of a change in societal structures. These programmes work on the intergenerational relations within families and within the

community as a whole. Lack of interaction and engagement between young and old is sometimes seen as problematic. At that point, intergenerational programmes can be launched to increase personal development and/or the functioning of the community as a whole. Interaction between young and old can increase cooperation, interaction and the exchange of skills, knowledge, and experience. Its goal is to encourage interpersonal connections (Elli & Granvill, 1999; MacCullum et al., 2010; Meshel & McGlynn, 2004). Intergenerational programmes cover activities such as storytelling, arts, music, and letter writing (Meshel & McGlynn, 2004) and their aim is to seek “opportunities for both old and young to develop intergenerational co-operation in mutually supportive relationships” (Elli & Granville, 1999, p. 183).

3.3.2 Motivations, benefits and risks of intergenerational closure

It turns out that intergenerational programmes provide benefits for older and younger people. These include development of new relationships, new social networks, more positive perceptions of other generations, learning new skills and knowledge, validation of the knowledge and contribution of older adults, and confidence in young people. For the community as a whole, intergenerational programmes provide benefits like closer ties, cooperation between different community groups, diminished stereotypes about each other, and traditional cultural practices being revitalized. Social cohesion and therefore social capital of a community can be increased which results in a more stable environment (Elli & Granville, 1999; MacCullum et al., 2010).

MacCullum et al. (2010, p. 121) use a definition for intergenerational programmes that can be beneficial for Cyprus as well, namely intergenerational programmes involve “active engagement and participation of multiple generations in activities requiring mutual exchange in a range of formal and informal spaces”. This resonates with the idea to implement the intergenerational aspect in education-based peacebuilding programmes from civil society in Cyprus, because those programmes look for active engagement from multiple generations and mutual exchange in formal and informal settings. They should help to bring the communities and age-groups closer together, with the main goal that they will also get closer together in the peace process.

The study from MacCullum et al. (2010) analysed several intergenerational programmes in Australia. It reveals that the programmes enable different age groups to spend time together, which results in a breakdown of barriers and a better understanding of each other. On a personal level the programmes make participants healthier, more resilient and more motivated. Intergenerational closure is a multifaced concept with benefits for a broad range of participants, especially in regard to building relationships and networks. What clearly came out of the Australian case studies was the new and positive relationships between people who would otherwise not be in contact with each other. These relationships exceed age. Intergenerational programmes not only help to create a better social network within the community, but there are also positive results regarding individual relations between diverse people across the community.

Another study from Meshel & McGlynn (2004) investigated intergenerational programmes and their impact in the United States. Their results also show that the attitude of both age groups towards each other were (slightly) improved after participating in the programme. For the older generation it even meant an increase in life satisfaction. However, for some people negative stereotypes towards the older generation increased after the programme. This shows the importance of finding the right strategy for your programme and evaluation of the process and outcomes. Moreover, several studies mention a lack of research into intergenerational programmes and their outcomes which makes it even harder to weigh outcomes of particular analyses because of the small amount of reference material,

especially when searching for studies with comparable methodology and conceptual framework (Elli & Granvill, 1999; MacCullum et al., 2010; Meshel & McGlynn, 2004).

Kessler & Straudinger (2007) found some interesting points to realise when researching and implementing intergenerational programmes. Motivation for the old generation to participate in the programmes comes from the feeling of generativity. An important trigger is the idea that they can pass on life experience to the young generation. For adolescents on the other hand, identity formation forms an important intrinsic motivation to participate. Elli & Granvill (1999) also mention the mentoring role for the older generation. They can share their experience, pass on their love of learning, and meanwhile develop relationships with the youth. This relationship can help youths to develop more positive attitudes towards a certain topic and gives them a better understanding of older people and the positive side of and approach to ageing.

When you take these motivations into account looking at the Cyprus situation, intergenerational programmes could be tricky. The SCORE Index shows that there is a large discrepancy between generations within a community and between the communities. Especially in regard to the conflict context and feelings towards the other community and the peace process, the motivation of both age groups could be problematic in reaching the goal of a more inclusive peace process and reconciliation. The pedantic motivation and attitude of the older generation could be counterproductive on the Turkish Cypriot side, because the SCORE Index shows that the older Turkish Cypriots are more conservative towards the other community and the peace process. When the adolescents are susceptible to the ideas of the older generation, this could mean that the entire Turkish Cypriot population is becoming more conservative due to intergenerational interaction. For the Greek Cypriot community, the older generation is more positive about the other community and peace process than the young Greek Cypriot generation. In this case, susceptibility of the younger generation could thus mean a more progressive community due to intergenerational interaction. On the other hand, implementation of intergenerational programmes in Cyprus doesn't have to be tricky. When you mix all age groups and both communities, an interesting dynamic of views arises, which could cause societal movement (ScoreForPeace, 2018).

It must be noted that the (beneficial) social and economic outcomes of intergenerational programmes are little. Solid proof is missing, partly because beneficial outcomes are difficult to measure and there is still little research in this area. There is evidence that individual resilience and various forms of social capital can increase because of intergenerational programmes, but still concepts like an increase in social capital and a decrease in social exclusion are hard to proof (MacCullum et al., 2010).

3.4 Peacebuilding education

This section focusses on peacebuilding education. The concept is defined, and the role of narratives in peacebuilding education and how narratives can be (re)constructed is discussed.

3.4.1 Peacebuilding education: a definition

A distinction is made between peace education and peacebuilding education. Peacebuilding education should be seen as an in-depth version of peace education (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, p. 23).

Peace education refers to “the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level” (Fountain, 1999, p. 1). It includes facts and

figures related to militarised violence, but often stays at an abstract, theoretical level (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, p. 27).

Salomon (2002, p. 9) defines peace education as “an attempt to change individuals’ perception of the ‘other’s’ collective narrative, as seen from the latter’s point of view, and consequently about one’s own social self, as well as come to practically relate less hatefully and more trustingly towards that collective ‘other’”.

Fountain (1999) emphasizes the different perspective of UNICEF in regard to peace education because UNICEF sees peace education as a process to change behavioural attitudes. It promotes “the development of values as the basis for behavioural change, and views behaviour as an indicator of an individual’s or group’s values” (Fountain, 1999, pp. 4-5). When peace education focusses on the values of the entire community, the effectiveness of the educational programme increases.

The above perspectives are all different definitions of peace education, but, as stated before, there is another form of peace education, namely peacebuilding education, the in-depth version of peace education.

Peacebuilding education – like peacebuilding itself – would be “a bottom-up rather than top-down process driven by war-torn communities themselves, founded on their experiences and capacities. It would be firmly rooted in immediate realities, not in abstract ideas or theories. It would be applied, immediate, and relevant, which means that it cannot be restricted to the classroom” (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, p. 23). Peacebuilding education creates an environment in which students articulate, accommodate and accept differences between the groups and within their own group. Furthermore, it includes the teaching of “conflict management techniques and critical reading skills and the cultivation of the values of cultural tolerance and non-violence” (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, p. 27). The main purpose of peacebuilding education is to accept differences between and within groups, and to promote understanding, respect, and tolerance (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, pp. 23-31; Salomon, 2002; Seitz, 2004, p. 10).

This research focusses on peace(building) education in Cyprus. The term peacebuilding education is being used, instead of peace education, because it covers the bottom-up approach by communities themselves. Since this research examines educational projects started by civil society, this definition fits best. Furthermore, the role of the educational programmes examined in this research are education-based. This means that it is not necessarily about an educational project, but education in a broader sense. This includes activities like sports, music and arts. This creates an education-based programme that is not necessarily about the Cyprus problem, but education about a certain topic and interaction with the ‘other’ is an accomplishing educational factor of the activity. That’s why, from now on, the term peacebuilding education will be used.

Salomon (2002) divides peacebuilding education into three categories, namely peacebuilding education in regions of intractable conflicts, peacebuilding education in regions of inter-ethnic tension, and peacebuilding education in regions of experienced tranquillity. Cyprus can be classified as peacebuilding education in a region of intractable conflict. These regions are characterised by an ongoing violent conflict and narratives that describe a clear distinction between “us” (the good) and “them” (the bad). In these cases, education attempts to change mind-sets that pertain to the collective other, including the other’s narrative and one’s own group responsibility for the other’s suffering. Peacebuilding programmes in these areas focus on conflict resolution, multiculturalism, cross-cultural training and the cultivation of a generally peaceful outlook. Major obstacles for these programmes are

collectively held animosities, shared painful memories, and common, national or ethnic views of the self and of the 'other'. Accumulating difficulties for peacebuilding education programmes in areas of intractable violence are that the conflict is between collectives, not individuals, the conflict is deeply rooted in collective narratives, and there are deep inequalities. Therefore, peacebuilding educational programmes are slowly changing the collective's narrative to come to a culture of peace (Salomon, 2002; Seitz, 2004, p. 18).

3.4.2 (Re)constructing narratives

Conflict provides opportunities and constraints for formal education and peacebuilding education. During and after conflict, education could become more segregated, but the interruption also provides opportunities to challenge ideas and narratives. During conflict and in the period after conflict, education can be used as a tool to shape ideas and behaviour. Governments that want to proclaim their regime use education and the composition of the curriculum to propagate their ideas. The curriculum is influencing children's views mostly by the language that is being used, the fictive idea of cultural homogeneity, and perceptions of bias and/or exclusion. Therefore, important pillars of peacebuilding education are the demilitarisation of the mind, offering alternative narratives, altering the social rules of interaction between the identity groups, de-legitimisation of the use of violence as a means of addressing problems, and challenging taken-for-granted understandings and facts. The last one is an important one, because you can't establish a change if you don't challenge the taken-for-granted understandings. Implementing these pillars can help to remember the conflict and casualties in a different way. Both sides recognise each other's narrative and critically look at their own group's actions and cruelties. By doing that they can reconstruct a new narrative and remember the conflict in a new way which creates empathy and trust towards each other. Empathy is only possible when people know and understand the other's narrative, because this enables them to humanise the 'other' again which could be the beginning of a community living in a culture of peace (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, pp. 23-31; Salomon, 2002; Seitz, 2004, p. 10; Smith, 2005; The World Bank, 2005, pp. 9-10).

4. Methodology

This chapter addresses the execution of the research. The qualitative research method is debated and justified. Furthermore, the operationalisation, justification of decisions and the analysis that are used are explained.

4.1 Research method

This research focusses on the Cyprus dispute, particularly the role of the inclusion of different generations in education-based peacebuilding programmes by civil society and how this may increase societal support for the peace process. To answer the central research question and various sub-questions, mainly qualitative research methods will be used, in particular (expert) interviews (Boeije et al., 2009, p. 246). To get a complete view of the specific situation in Cyprus, in-depth interviews, built up in a semi-structured way, are conducted (see Section 4.3.2 for further explanation). These interviews provide a deeper layer of the context of the current situation of education-based peacebuilding programmes in Cyprus. In combination with the relevant publications explored in the theoretical framework, the researcher verifies the value of the reported research (Boeije et al., 2009; Roose & Meuleman, 2014).

4.2 Validity and reliability

The objectivity of a research is based upon the reliability and validity of the research. Reliability is “the extent to which a measurement procedure yields the same answer however and whenever it is carried out”, reliability is “the degree to which the finding is independent of accidental circumstances of the research”, and validity is “the extent to which it gives the correct answer” and “the degree to which the finding is interpreted in a correct way” (Kirk & Miller, 1986). Where these elements of a research are obvious and clear to account for in quantitative research, the reliability of qualitative methods is always an issue, because interviews can never be conducted in the same way. Nevertheless, there are a couple of methods to increase the reliability of the research.

The first way to increase the reliability is by the accountability of the used method. The accountability makes it possible to check the research and the role of the researcher. The choices made must be justified in the methodological accountability and be described explicitly (Boeije et al., 2009, p. 278; Kirk & Miller, 1986). In addition, there is *theoretical sampling*. The participants are deliberately selected, because they do have specific knowledge of the subject and research. They also have a specific view and angle on the research topic, as a result of which the participant is seen as an addition to the research. It's possible to delve deeply into the research question due to the large knowledge of the participants. A deeper layer in the interview increases the validity of the research (Baarda et al., 2013, p. 244). These additions to the research make it possible to assess the results and determine the reliability (Boeije et al., 2009, pp. 276-278). To further increase the reliability of the research, several quotes from the interviews are included. To show the internal validity and reliability of the research, this chapter describes and accounts for which methods are being used in the research, how the research units are selected and an operationalisation of the sub-questions is included (Bryman, 2008).

There is also attention for the external validity of the research. The external validity outlines to what extent the results can be generalised. The fact that the participants highlight examples and situations that actually happened and were discussed in the process, increases the validity of the research. A

note in the margin must be placed that qualitative research, researches (relatively) few research units. Depending on the number of participants, it could be said that the results are just an indication of the reality or that they can be used to generalise. To make the results as representative as possible, there will be a spread of the participants over all relevant fields (Boeije et al., 2009, pp. 275-278). For this research it means a spread over the four different age- and community groups as described in Section 4.3.1 (Research Group).

Although for this research fifteen interviews were held, the outcomes must be seen as a highly specified and unique research about a particular piece of the Cyprus dispute in general. The results, therefore, must be seen as a very specific result for this small part of the Cyprus dispute, for this time period, in a specific age group, on a particular topic (peacebuilding education). Therefore, the results can obviously not be generalised for the entire country and all peacebuilding initiatives.

4.3 Operationalisation

4.3.1 Research Group

The focus of this thesis is on four categories in the peace process, civil society peacebuilding initiatives and education-based peacebuilding programmes. The four categories are based on the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index. This tool is designed to measure peace in societies around the world. To achieve this ambitious goal, SCORE examines two main dimensions of peace – reconciliation and social cohesion – and the intricate relation between them. In addition to measuring these values, SCORE also looks at culturally-specific components of peace that vary across different contexts and help to complete and enrich the analysis. The SCORE Index uses a score that indicates the level of a particular issue on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 and 10 represent polar opposites in relation to the indicator. This means that if the score is 0, the phenomenon the indicator is measuring is not observed at all, and if the score is 10, the phenomenon is prevalent and strong (ScoreForPeace, 2018).

The SCORE Index used three age categories in the research (18-34, 35-59, 60+). This research only focusses on the youngest and oldest age category of the SCORE index. Because this research uses a qualitative in-depth analysis, it wasn't possible to include all age groups from the SCORE index. The reason for the selection and analysis of the oldest and youngest generation is because the SCORE Index showed the most interesting and composing results for these four categories (young and old, for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots). The focus on these two generations has more advantages. The young generation is the future of the country. These are the people that need to continue the peace process and build a future in a culture of peace. Therefore, it is useful for Cyprus and the future of peacebuilding programmes to see, understand and explain their point of view. The old generation on the other hand has consciously experienced the Cyprus dispute. They still have vivid memories and have first-hand stories about fleeing and forced movements. These stories can have added value to the education-based peacebuilding programmes, especially because of the differences between the two main communities in Cyprus as observed in the SCORE Index.

The striking differences found by the SCORE Index show contradictions between and within the two communities. The Index shows that young Greek Cypriots (especially women) are sceptical about the peace process, while old Greek Cypriots mostly support the peace process, reconciliation and reunification. Turkish Cypriots have the exact opposite opinion compared to their corresponding age group in the south. This means that most young Turkish Cypriots support the peace process and reunification, while the old Turkish Cypriots are sceptical. Table 4.3.1.1 below shows the four categories from which the research units are selected. Another remark must be made. Just like the

SCORE Index, this research focusses on the contradictions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Although Cyprus is experiencing a growth in ethnic diversity, the core of mistrust and the Cyprus dispute is between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. To keep the research delineated, the other categories – like for example the Armenian community – are excluded from the research.

Greek Cypriot <i>18-34 years old</i>	Turkish Cypriot <i>18-34 years old</i>
Turkish Cypriot <i>Older than 60</i>	Greek Cypriot <i>Older than 60</i>

Table 4.3.1.1: Categories different research units. (Source: own data).

This research investigates the differences between the determined categories and tries to explain where these differences come from.

4.3.2 Interviews

The interviews were held in a semi-structured way. Based on the theoretical framework, prior to the interviews a topic list was made. The topic list was prepared to have an overall consistency between the various interviews, but keeping the opportunity to ask several follow-up questions if necessary. The topic list provided the possibility to think about the order of the questions, the way they are asked and the possible answers in advance (Boeije et al., 2009). The question order was not static, keeping the possibility to anticipate on the given answers during the interview. This created the possibility to respond to the answers of the participants, leading to questions that were closely linked to the specific knowledge of each participant and find as much information as possible (Baarda et al., 2013). The topic list can be found in Appendix 2 and is based on the sub-questions.

To find enough respondents for all four categories, the selection procedure started with purposive sampling to find the gatekeeper of a category. The gatekeeper was one of the people I already met during my internship on Cyprus between April-June 2018. From there onwards snowball sampling was used and people were found through using the gatekeeper's network. Home for Cooperation has a large network of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who are actively involved in civil society in Cyprus and some of them specifically in education-based peacebuilding programmes. To use their network as a starting point also has its restrictions. The respondents could be biased about the subject, because they are already active in civil society which could result in a more positive attitude towards education-based peacebuilding programmes than average in society. On the other hand, an advantage of this group of respondents is that they know which developments take place in civil society peacebuilding, because they organise bi-communal activities or often take part in it. This makes them more or less 'experts' on the topic and increases the overall validity of the research.

In the end fifteen interviews were conducted with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, actively involved in civil society peacebuilding initiatives. The interviews are evenly distributed over the four categories of this research. In the end four old Greek Cypriots, three young Greek Cypriots, four old Turkish Cypriots, and four young Turkish Cypriots were interviewed (see Appendix 1); among them academics working on the Cyprus issue, people working in the UN Buffer Zone, programmers of several NGOs and people working in a non-peacebuilding organisation but who are consciously trading and working together with people from both sides. All the interviews have been transcribed and are available at request.

4.4 Analysis

The interviews have been transcribed and uploaded in Nvivo. Nvivo 12 is a computer software programme which helps to systematically categorise and analyse the gathered qualitative data. Based on the sub-questions, literature research and the interviews an analysis plan was made to systematically analyse the qualitative data from the interviews. To be able to identify themes, patterns and variations between the data, interviews have to be systematically reviewed (Emerson et al., 1995). This is done by the coding process which helps to evaluate and organise all data and to discover the meanings behind it (Cope & Kurtz, 2016). The analysis started with open coding – “unrestricted coding of the data” (Strauss, 1987) – of the transcripts, resulting in *descriptive* codes. During the process the first remarkable themes were found and highlighted. This resulted in some overarching patterns and themes that fitted the theories from the theoretical framework and sub-questions. Guided by the theories, the sub-questions and the overarching themes during the open coding process, more specified, *analytical*, codes were formulated. These codes are developed in relation to reflection on the descriptive codes. The actual analysis resulted in specified codes and answers to specific categories, developments and observations in education-based peacebuilding programmes originating from civil society in Cyprus (Cope & Kurtz, 2016). The code tree in which this resulted is shown in Appendix 3.

After coding, the interviews and SCORE Index are used to answer all six sub-questions. The answers are supported by numbers from the Index and citations from the interviews. The actual numbers and quotes strengthen the analysis and improve the reliability of the research. In the end, this provides an overview of how the interviewees see the role of peacebuilding education in Cyprus. It is an analysis of their own experiences and shows how the implementation of intergenerational closure in peacebuilding education can help the peace process in Cyprus, which is currently in an impasse. This results in an overview of the ideas of the interviewees on the possibilities, concerns and solutions for the (nearby) future of Cyprus supplemented with the SCORE Index. The exhibited views and SCORE Index numbers are interpreted on their deeper meaning and origin to formulate an answer to the research question.

4.5 Sub-questions

To be able to answer the research question, each sub-question needs to be answered first. The method that has been used to answer each sub-question is described below.

1. *How does current civil society peacebuilding manifest itself in Cyprus?*
2. *What role do education-based programmes of civil society actors play in the peacebuilding process in Cyprus?*

These questions are answered by an analysis of the interviews conducted during the research. To increase the reliability and validity of the data, quotes from the interviews are used. This gives an insight in the different implementations of peacebuilding in Cyprus and, for sub-question two, provides an outline of the formal and non-formal educational system and what role they play in the peace process.

3. *Which generations are currently involved in education-based peacebuilding programmes of civil society actors?*

This question is answered with the help of several indicators from the SCORE Index. These data are supplemented with the interviews.

4. *Is there a difference between the various generations in Cyprus and in which ways can their inclusion in education-based peacebuilding programmes help to facilitate a more inclusive peace process?*

This question is a combination of the SCORE Index evaluation and the interview research. The SCORE Index showed some differences between the communities and generations. Based on the literature, intergenerational closure provides advantages for society. The differences in the SCORE Index, the advantages of intergenerational closure and the interviews are compared with each other.

5. *How to explain the differences between the generations and communities?*

This question is answered with the help of the interviews with people from all categories. The SCORE Index showed that there are differences within and between the communities in regard to the 'other', the peace process and the role civil society can play. The quantitative method of SCORE didn't provide an explanation of those differences. The interviewees were asked where the differences between and within the two communities are from.

6. *What role can generational mixed education-based peacebuilding programmes of civil society actors play in creating more societal support for the peace process?*

This question is answered with the help of the previous two sub-questions and the interview results. Again, the SCORE Index showed that there was support for a more inclusive peace process. On the other hand, participation in civil society and therefore the possibility to influence the peace process, is low. This sub-question investigates, with the help of the SCORE Index and the interviews, whether a generational mix in education-based programmes provides society with new social networks which might increase the societal support for the peace process.

5. Results – Peacebuilding Education in Cyprus

In this chapter the results from the qualitative research are outlined per sub-question. The first section investigates current peacebuilding initiatives. After that the focus is on education-based programmes by civil society. The third section takes a look at the generations that are involved in peacebuilding education, while the fourth one investigates the differences between the various generations. The chapter concludes with the investigation of the inclusion of different generations in peacebuilding education.

5.1 Current peacebuilding initiatives

This section shows the results of current peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus. First the current peacebuilding activities are outlined, followed by what current peacebuilding activities in Cyprus need to take civil society initiatives to a next level, and ends with a brief answer to the first sub-question.

5.1.1 Peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus

Current peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus are at a low level. *“People are doing as much as they can with the resources they have”, “the lower possible” and “I’m not that optimistic. We should have extended to the whole public”* (Natalie Hami, 2018; Lefki Lambrou, 2018; Mr. Birinci, 2018, respectively) are just some expressions of the interviewees about the current status of civil society. The interviews show two main causes for this low development rate of peacebuilding initiatives. The first one is the low development rate of civil society in Cyprus in general. One of the interviewees expresses it like this:

“Civil society in Cyprus seems like it’s still in its very early stages and it doesn’t seem to have reached the point that it has reached in other countries. To be actually as useful or as powerful as it is in other countries; in the sense that you’re pushing where it needs to be pushed and you’re facilitating and promoting where it needs to be promoted as well.” (Natalie Hami, 2018)

“It’s a shame that we weren’t at this level 15 years ago. When the checkpoints opened there should have been more of a reconciliatory atmosphere. Now they say, yes, the checkpoints have opened, but there isn’t the level of cooperation or meetings between both communities of all ages that you would expect there to be. It feels like we’re scrambling around now to make up for things that we weren’t doing right from the beginning.” (Natalie Hami, 2018)

There is a link between a low development rate of civil society (and the associated active citizenship) and a lack of national political support. Peacebuilding initiatives, always started by NGOs in civil society and not governmentally organised or supported, do get international support from organisations like UNFICYP, the European Union, foreign embassies located in Cyprus and the USA, but national recognition lags behind. This lack of political support, and therefore a lack of funding from the national government, strongly influences the size and scope of civil society and peacebuilding initiatives, which is the second cause of the low development rate.

In addition to these two main causes of a low development rate of peacebuilding initiatives, there are more obstacles. All interviewees remark that there is a recycling of attendees of peacebuilding initiatives and that it is hard to reach out to new and bigger audiences. The recycling of attendees is influenced by a couple of things. First of all, most peacebuilding initiatives are taking place in and close to Nicosia, the divided capital of Cyprus. Because of its geographical location and the availability of the H4C – a community centre and café that organises all kinds of peacebuilding activities – it is argumentative that the peacebuilding initiatives start from here. But to create a bigger audience and get support from people all over the island, it is necessary that the activities expand towards other places in Cyprus as well. Almost all interviewees say they want to expand their activities, or peacebuilding activities in general, over the island, but they also note that they don't have enough financial resources to do so. This is the second cause influencing the recycling of attendees and low development rate of peacebuilding initiatives. It would be easier for civil society to expand its activities when it receives more funding. Increase in funding should mainly consist of national recognition and funding. The international donors do support the peacebuilding sector, so a profit can be achieved in establishing national funding as well. To cover all costs, NGOs do need more financial support before they are able to expand around the island in a sustainable way. These extra funds give them the opportunity to travel to cities and villages further away from the Green Line, places that aren't facing the divide on a daily basis. This will enable them to spread their message of peacebuilding and make people aware of the idea of peacebuilding.

The low development rate of civil society, a lack of funding and a lack of geographical spread leads to the recycling of attendees and therefore creates the feeling of a bubble. People who are actively involved and working on these initiatives get the feeling that they reach out to a nice audience, but when they zoom out they realise that spreading the message and creating a stronger movement is actually pretty hard. Feray Yalçuk, barista at the Home Café in the Buffer Zone, says:

“Unfortunately, I think it’s a bubble. We are living in a bubble in the Buffer Zone right now, but we are not reaching many people. Our customers and the people coming here are foreigners, mainly, and the peacebuilding volunteers. We should reach more people.” (2018)

The idea of a bubble is confirmed by Mr. Karafokas. He went to the multicultural English School, is actively promoting (bi-communal and multicultural) field hockey in Cyprus and in his job he works with Turkish Cypriots as well as Greek Cypriots. He is not directly linked to an NGO, but he does support crossing, interacting and peacebuilding initiatives. He is not as deeply involved as some other interviewees and therefore gives a great example of the bubble that is being experienced and created. When it comes to peacebuilding initiatives, he *“doesn’t see anything happening”*. Of course, there is H4C and there are some seminars and activities, but when you're not that much involved in peacebuilding, have a circle of friends with a lower participation in peacebuilding initiatives and you're not actively searching for the initiatives, it is hard to get in contact with and be aware of the different peacebuilding initiatives.

People working on the initiatives are almost always Cypriots active on a voluntary basis supplemented with international students and interns. For some of the initiators, peacebuilding became their life work, although it is sometimes hard to see any progress. As a result of this slow progress, even the fanatic peacebuilders are losing their hopes for a solution any day soon, which creates a widespread now-or-never feeling. People have the feeling that *“we are running at a very crucial time now in our country”* (Mr. Psaltis, 2018), *“we are running out of time”* (Anonymous, 2018)

and some people even state *“we are out of the deadline. We missed the deadline”* (Lefki Lambrou, 2018) and *“time has run out. It already has run out”* (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018). Most interviewees say they are experiencing a feeling where hope is at its lowest level possible. They want to move, they want a change, they want to make civil society grow, but there are little results and they can’t find the key to stop this development.

The tough job of reaching out to more people is not only influenced by politicians and their opinions, but the media is an important player in shaping national perceptions as well. This dynamic uncovers the vicious cycle of the feeling of hope. The media is mostly covering what politicians want and are interested in. This means that as long as politicians are negotiating, the media is covering peacebuilding activities and there is a national discourse about the situation, but when the negotiations are on hold the media coverage, and therefore the public interest, decreases rapidly.

“When the talks are going on there is hope, there is more mobilisation of people in groups and civil society and so on. And, when like now, there is a lot of frustration and hopelessness. So civil society also is very frustrated about this.” (Mrs. Hadjipavlou, 2018)

This rapid decrease of hope is currently taking place. Political leaders haven’t been talking with each other since July 2017 and as a result public and media interest are nil. At the end of February 2019 informal talks took place between the two leaders, to finally implement a confidence-building measure that they agreed upon in 2015, but whether or not it will result in new peace negotiations is not clear yet (Psyllides, 2019). As long as there is no continuous political and media recognition for the work that is done by NGOs working on peacebuilding initiatives, it is very hard to create a sustainable way to grow and to increase the general knowledge about and attendance of peacebuilding initiatives. The lack of funding and recognition makes it even more difficult to grow and leaves initiatives purely to personally dedicated people.

“They [organisers of peacebuilding initiatives] are committed to do this, they believe in it but are not producing tangible results and enough pressure on the leadership to change.” (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018)

“With us trying to survive, it’s very hard to expand.” (Lefki Lambrou, 2018)

But of course, not all developments – or the lack of developments – in civil society are caused from the outside. There is also some criticism from inside civil society. According to Mr. Psaltis (2018), civil society is indeed doing a great job, but it also missed some opportunities. Civil society didn’t manage to put forces together to create a bigger movement and organisation. Everyone is doing fantastic work in their own area, but they are working within their own small groups. This results in a scattered landscape of peacebuilding initiatives, with a lack of money and operating in their own circle of already active citizens. To make the movement grow and to make civil society in general grow, they need to combine their powers and reach outside their circle. Mrs. Tugberk (2018) is noticing the same development: *“They are all kind of not organised and scattered here and there and everyone is doing the same under the same umbrella aim”*. When Mr. Birinci is asked about this, he underlines that civil society in general is missing a clear direction, but when it comes to collaboration and creating a bigger movement he acknowledges the difficulties:

“Seemingly there was this widespread unite Cyprus movement in 2003. With the loss of the Annan Plan it faded away. It was such a large movement and just died out. I don’t understand. When we have small group initiatives, they complain that they are too small to achieve something, but then they become bigger and they can’t achieve the same thing as well. I don’t know, but there must be an explanation.” (Mr. Birinci, 2018)

A young Turkish Cypriot, who wants to stay anonymous, also acknowledges that society must be more active and creative in finding a way to cooperate and grow, because at the moment there is not much collaboration between the two communities going on. Lefki Lambrou is also mentioning that Cyprus society is in need of more cooperation. This shouldn’t just be a collaboration between civil society in both communities, but should cover all sectors and levels – ministries, municipalities, schools, religious institutions, civil society, and so on. They should join forces and work under the same strategy with everyone’s input.

“This process had to start from the governments, with the civil society together. Not from the civil society without any support from the government.” (Lefki Lambrou, 2018)

Aware of the need to grow, to spread geographically and start a widespread collaboration, the interviewees also place a side note of how hard it is to establish a bigger and more widespread involvement in society. Cypriots in general aren’t active citizens. They make their personal decisions on daily life, but they have the feeling that bigger decisions are out of their reach and that they cannot influence them. They aren’t aware of the fact that society can have an influence and what role they can play in this. *“It is in our culture not to fight for our rights. Other people decide for us”* (Lefki Lambrou, 2018). So, the growth of peacebuilding initiatives and civil society is also dependent on current civil society being able to exhibit their individual potential.

“Cypriots are not actively involved, I think from both communities. They prefer not to be seen, they are expressing themselves at home and among their friends, but you will not expect them to go to a demonstration for even better reasons.” (Mr. Christofides, 2018)

“One thing is the fact that people aren’t very ..., people aren’t active citizens, generally. For me it is kind of rooted in that. Once people become active citizens or even understand the meaning of what it means to be an active citizen. It means that you’re more willing to devote time to other things which are volunteer-based.” (Natalie Hami, 2018)

The lack of political support is crucial in another aspect of the Cypriot society and the low development rate of peacebuilding initiatives. Cypriots still look up to their political leaders and copy their beliefs and behaviour. So, when politicians start promoting crossing, interacting and getting to know the ‘other’, the public will follow. But at this moment politicians are voicing the complete opposite message and discourage crossing; something they have been doing since the opening of the checkpoints in 2003.

“If the leaders make a public declaration saying that it is something positive to meet people or to talk to people, host people from the other community, it would make a difference. Or if they would introduce some schemes or plans to create opportunities for the groups of people to meet, that would create an impact.” (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018)

Establish a growth in civil society without verbal and financial political and media support is very hard. The message told by civil society and peacebuilding initiatives is being torn down by almost all messages spread in the media and at a political level. As long as media is covering what the government wants and politicians keep discouraging interaction, the establishment of the awareness of a culture of peace will be very hard. Slowly even the most fanatic peacebuilders will start to lose their belief and hope will be gone in a couple of years.

5.1.2 Needs of peacebuilding initiatives

The above section shows the complicated situation in which peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus have to unfold. One could say that the development of this sector is part of a vicious circle. To have a bigger impact, civil society needs to grow. To establish this growth, it needs political recognition that results in more funding and more media coverage. The increase in funding and attention can help to establish a bigger geographical spread of the activities, which in turn results in a bigger impact. And so the circle starts again. This shows how dependent civil society is on the political (and media) will to move into the direction of a culture of peace. On the other hand, one could argue that when civil society manages to grow bigger without the national political stimulant, it could create such an impact that politics and media are forced to move with the feelings that are rising within society. This idea gives civil society the strength to keep on fighting for its beliefs. To establish this, there are some other actions that civil society could take, has to take and is already taking.

Peacebuilding initiatives should move away from traditional peacebuilding approaches. Steps in this direction have already been taken. Theoretical discussions are translated into practical events. Seminars and readings transform into activities that are appealing to a larger audience. This creates a situation in which attendance is based on personal interest and commitment, instead of theoretical knowledge about what peacebuilding is and therefore lowers the barrier to participate. This could also be the key for civil society to reach out to a bigger audience without an increase in funding, because you're directly speaking to people's interests. Attendance is purely based on your enthusiasm.

“People feel to move away from traditional peacebuilding initiatives and to have seminars and talking becomes in actual events sports, astronomy, arts, more and more grassroots initiatives in which locals use their skills and touch and knowledge to do events that are open to everybody. If anyone is interested, it's much more encouraging to come along than a formal discussion about peacebuilding.” (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

“I think by incentivising sports organisations to take more Turkish Cypriots. When you have people interacting with each other, especially in team combination, I say about sports but think of it in every single aspect, music or even like small social group stuff. Getting them, integrating them.” (Panos Panayiotopoulos, 2018)

“Sports, I think, is the best thing.” (Mr. Karafokas, 2018)

An additional advantage of the new and innovative peacebuilding initiatives is that they create the opportunity of organically growing new and bi-communal connections in society. By organising festivals, sports tournaments, exhibitions, etc., you attract people who are interested in a certain topic. Your aim is to bring people with the same interests together and as an additional value people from both communities start to interact. Your event isn't necessarily labelled as peacebuilding, but the result is – with every interaction and crossing, even without meaningful encounters with the 'other', *"there must be some small barrier within your brain that's being broken down"* (Natalie Hami, 2018). When the most important aim of the event isn't the promotion of peacebuilding, the organisation will also be able to attract people who are more hesitant about peacebuilding initiatives, crossing, interacting and the 'other'.

Another hidden goal of this way of organising peacebuilding initiatives is that it might help to raise awareness in society. Participation in these events can, unknowingly, break down existing stereotypes and misconceptions that people have about each other. Ultimately, this could even be a way to break through the mainstream ignorance and apathy that is visible in both communities. Panos Panayiotopoulos and Natalie Hami explicitly mention *"complete apathy"* and *"general apathy"* in the south. The following quotes show how deeply rooted this ignorance and apathy in both communities is.

"There are people who genuinely want for something to happen and there are people who genuinely don't want something to happen and then there is the majority of the people that just don't think about it anymore. Whatever happens, happens. Because it doesn't really affect me and they have been telling us the same for decades now. What's the point of it all? That's how I feel the situation is now." (Panos Panayiotopoulos, 2018)

"They don't see the reason why they should discuss and debate." (Mr. Birinci, 2018)

"Some people are really not wanting to act. There is a constant ...; you can feel it from some people, they are very ready to point the finger, but when you give them the opportunity, take this in your own hands, run with it, there is this still holding back. This is something that is very ...; I mean, I feel it is almost a cultural thing. People get very comfortable in certain circumstances and environments."
(Natalie Hami, 2018)

"They burry their head in the sand. They don't want to hear. Or you just live in complete blind ignorance. Ignorance is bless, they say. A lot of people do. They don't even want to contemplate."
(Natalie Christopher, 2018)

A solution for this or a way to break this cycle of ignorance isn't given. People really don't know how they can reach out to a wider audience, with the resources they currently have. Only Natalie Christopher says, *"I think once it starts becoming more mainstream, hearing about these projects on TV, on the radio, people are talking about them in their everyday life, then people are more likely to take part in them"*. But to make it more mainstream, politics and at least the media should be willing to support and cover these initiatives. The first step to make this coverage happen is unknown. The answer most often heard is, *"I don't know. I wish I knew, but I really don't know how to activate them."*

5.1.3 The manifestation of current civil society peacebuilding initiatives

Probably the best summary to sub-question 1 is: civil society is doing as much as it can, but without actually becoming visible in (a larger part of) society. Important reasons for this are the low development rate of civil society and active citizenship in general and the lack of national political support. These are the two main barriers that obstruct the larger impact of peacebuilding initiatives. Especially the lack of national political support creates a vicious circle for developments in Cyprus' society. Without national political recognition, there is almost no media coverage of the initiatives and there is no funding coming in. This results in a low level of (financial) resources for civil society and the inability to spread across the island. Civil society stays too small to get recognition from the government and the circle starts again.

It is therefore admirable that NGOs keep on fighting for their belief in a culture of peace. Civil society tries to increase its audience by changing the concept of (some) peacebuilding initiatives. Instead of seminars and talks, the focus is now on 'real' activities with respect to a specific interest like sports or arts. The aim is to lower the barrier to participate, because people can join any event which is in their field of interest. This enables civil society to attract new people in the area of Nicosia to come and join the activities, but still leaves the problem of geographical isolation of the activities. To establish a sustainable geographical spread of its activities, civil society needs funding. Mrs. Tugberk articulates it nicely: *"We need local representation in the communities. There should be insiders. We haven't been able to build that local communities to deal with the daily problems, talk to people and change their mindset."* Another way to increase the impact is by joining forces within civil society. When current separated initiatives are combined, there is an opportunity to reach out to a new audience and create a bigger movement.

5.2 Educational programmes and the peace process

This section takes a look at the different education-based programmes that are active in Cyprus. The first part describes the formal educational system in Cyprus and its influence. The second part describes the non-formal education-based programmes that run in Cyprus. After that the needs for formal and non-formal educational programmes are outlined. The final section answers the second sub-question.

5.2.1 Formal educational system

The focus in this research is on peacebuilding education started by civil society. However, one can't take a look at non-formal education without getting in on formal education. The fact that all interviewees referred to the role of the formal educational system on people's mind-set and the peace process, made it even more interesting to highlight this sector of the educational system.

The Constitution of 1960 laid the foundation for the deep societal division that can be felt nowadays. According to this constitution the northern and southern parts of the island could integrate their own educational system. The result is an educational system in the North that is completely focussed on Turkey. This means that even the books, etc. are coming from Turkey, with a Turkish point of view on history and geography. The southern part of the island created an educational system, exclusively focussed on Greece and their materials are coming from Greece. This creates the paradoxical situation in which one island teaches two different histories of the same island. The point of view is never Cypriot, but Greek or Turkish. The result is a system with very nationalistic (history) teaching on both sides. It is interesting to realise that the respondents call the focus of the history teaching on both sides nationalistic, while the nationalistic viewpoint that is being taught is Greek and

Turkish nationalistic, not a Cypriot nationalistic view. This is probably related to Mr. Christofides' remark for the southern part of the island that generations are raised and educated with the idea that they are Greek; and only Cypriot in the second place.

"The big limitation and very wrong article in the 1960 Constitution was that education was only separated and defined in ethnic terms. So Turkish Cypriots were connected with the Turkish education system and Greek Cypriots with the Greek education system." (Mrs. Hadjipavlou, 2018)

Because of this ethnic division and dependence on Greece and Turkey, the nationalistic view of these two countries is very present in the current educational system, especially in history teaching. All interviewees refer to these nationalistic views and show their amazement of this way of teaching youth the history of their country. The influence from both mainland Greece and Turkey in shaping children's mind-sets is nicely illustrated by the next two quotes:

"The books are coming from Turkey and it says 'our rivers are', but those rivers do not exist in Cyprus and still kids learn 'our rivers'. They ask where these rivers are, but we don't have rivers running in Cyprus. This kind of wrong attitudes and everything ... right from scratch it needs to be changed." (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018)

"The books have pictures of the occupied areas within it, with a caption below it saying 'don't forget/I won't forget'. I just thought that this was the message that was being perpetuated constantly, and all that we knew was that in 1974 there was an invasion and that was it. And that was what I heard from home as well." (Panos Panayiotopoulos, 2018)

Mr. Psaltis also refers to the nationalistic point of view in current (history) teaching. History is told from a Greek perspective. The nationalistic viewpoint is strengthened by 'blank space pages'. The history books make no reference to what Greek Cypriots have done to the Turkish Cypriots (and vice versa). There has been a lot of conflict in the past, but the explanation of this is always suppressed and Greek Cypriots are always presenting themselves as the victims of the Turks and Turkish Cypriots. A result of this educational system is that the youth on the Greek Cypriot side of the island are given a one-dimensional view of what happened in Cyprus' history. Children at the school-going-age are flexible in their conceptions and it is easy to shape their minds. As part of this educational system, it is very hard to stay non-judgemental about Turkish Cypriots and Turks and what they have done in history. This while the crimes of Greek Cypriots aren't mentioned at all.

"Bombarding young children with all of this negative imagery and slogans ... the ones that come away from school and are actually objective in their understanding of the situation is a miracle to me that those people exist." (Natalie Hami, 2018)

The Turkish Cypriot educational system is doing the same thing, but in the opposite direction. They communicate Cyprus' history from a Turkish point of view and make the Greek and Greek Cypriots look bad. A common story and the fact that both sides committed crimes has been forgotten in both educational systems. For example, Feray Yalçuk says: *"they were trying to teach us that Greek Cypriots are like monsters, they will kill us."* This creates a situation in which some NGOs try to make a change with peacebuilding activities, educational programmes, etcetera, but where the formal educational

system is pushing progressive people and ideas backwards. At this point it is very hard to change people's perceptions, because the narrative that is being taught and the general atmosphere is Greek or Turkish nationalistic. The interviewees mention that the predominant ambience, on both sides of the island, is strengthening this nationalistic direction. Instead of coming to a culture of peace, the atmosphere is going in the opposite direction.

A positive comment should be made in regard to the teachers' union in the northern part of the island. This union is quite progressive and is pushing for a change; a change that can bring for example a shared history book, the same educational methods on both sides and an overarching Cypriot narrative. However, it is hard to have a real impact because the government is holding it back and the teachers' union in the south is much more conservative.

5.2.2 Non-formal education-based programmes

Education-based peacebuilding programmes are, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1, still not at the level they should be at. The education-based programmes organised by civil society, just like other peacebuilding projects, have to develop without financial and policy-based support from the national government which makes it hard for them to enlarge their impact. The previous section shows the long way education-based programmes have to go. The projects organised by NGOs and supported and propagated by some dedicated teachers are not enough to make an actual change yet. Children are confronted with coloured stories about the Cyprus conflict day after day and they can barely get in touch with the shared history of the conflict. This makes it hard for the NGO projects to have a real influence, because after a one-day project children will return to their schoolbooks, back to a nationalistic story. But, despite the different interests of formal and non-formal education, there are more aspects influencing the reach of education-based peacebuilding programmes.

"All this work that we do, peacebuilding projects, it's so hard for us to have an impact when children go to school and they are still told everyday just negative things about the other side. It's really sad. Education plays a huge role." (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

The problem of isolation of projects – not being able to enlarge their impact – is mentioned by many of the interviewees. There are some educational programmes focussing on the shared history, interaction with the 'other' and highlighting similarities instead of differences, but all of these projects are isolated, local projects, mostly concentrated in and around Nicosia. There is no overarching power, for instance the Ministry of Education, that publicly and financially supports these projects. Both governments hold on to a Greek nationalistic and a Turkish nationalistic story, respectively, and in the mean time they have the media in their pocket. Media, in both parts of the island, promotes the vision of the ruling politicians. Right now, this vision is nationalistic, not supporting the peace process and hostile against the other side. The fact that media is so strongly adjusted to the ideas of the government, makes it very hard for civil society to promote its activities on a larger, national platform. The interviewees mention that activities that deviate from the government's view are underrepresented in the media.

"It's not priority and it's the line of the government. They [the media] follow the line of the government. The government does not support, because it's not in the negotiations period, then media is not following peacebuilding." (Lefki Lambrou, 2018)

“Another area is the media. We have the same problem with media. Most of the media are conservative and nationalistic.” (Mr. Psaltis, 2018)

“Some media channels, newspapers are covering these things, but it is not enough for now.” (Feray Yalçuk, 2018)

“How do you want more media to cover this? Free media. I mean it is kind of free, but they are either left or right. I think there must be independent media companies.” (Okan Bullici, 2018)

As long as the media is not covering peacebuilding initiatives and these initiatives don't become mainstream topics in the daily lives of more and more people, it is very hard to establish a breakthrough in the peace process. The fact that media is not completely independent and focusses on the government's direction makes it difficult for peacebuilding initiatives to get on a bigger stage, although media is the perfect platform that could trigger the questioning of (general) views and opinions in, for example, societal and political debates. The educational role of media is not just the covering of peacebuilding education and civil society initiatives, media has to take initiative as well. Currently, there aren't any programmes that discuss the bi-communality of Cyprus. Mr. Psaltis mentions that there used to be a bi-communal programme on television, but it got moved from primetime to the middle of the night and because of a subsequent lack of spectators it was taken off the air completely. Television should position itself as a platform that makes bi-communality visible, instead of neglecting interaction.

Mrs. Hadjipavlou (2018) mentions that education and media could prepare society for a solution. They could create programmes that promote a culture of peace and connection with the other. Instead of recycling victimhood, suffering and demonization of the other, Cyprus needs programmes that recognise the benefits of meeting the other, what you learn about yourself and what you learn through the other. This is the playing field with much potential for education as well as the educational role of media.

“I think once it starts becoming more mainstream, hearing about these projects on tv, on the radio, people are talking about them in their everyday life, then people are more likely to take part in them.” (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

The fact that the large media institutions don't propagate the message of a culture of peace, would be less devastating when more parts of the island got in contact with the ideas of peacebuilding education and activities. The interviewees mention that to make a bigger change and activate a bigger part of civil society, there has to be a larger geographical spread of activities. People living in Nicosia are faced with the division on a daily basis, but when you're living in cities like Paphos, Limassol, Kyrenia or the small villages surrounding them, you're living in rather peaceful surroundings, without being faced with the division and the other community on a daily basis. Living in an environment like that makes the urge for a solution invisible. Unfortunately, the lack of (financial) support of the government makes it very hard to establish this geographical spread because the NGOs don't have enough resources to penetrate into the other villages in a sustainable way. This resonates with the difficulties described above: (formal) education, media, funding and geographical spread are all influenced by the political will to recognise, invest and transform.

In the search for peace and enlarging the impact of activities, civil society is moving away from the traditional peacebuilding projects and changes its spectrum from talking groups and plenary sessions to actual (physical) activities, like education-based programmes. The central goal is that by doing things together because you're both interested in a certain topic, you meet, interact, get to know and understand people from all backgrounds and ages. You come together because of your interests and not because of the will to tell your side of history. The (informal) interaction makes the unknown known. Peacebuilding education on the basis of interests, shows that educational programmes can be defined in a different and broader way than offering a different historical narrative.

It's easy to make a parallel with formal education and focus on school projects about a shared history of both sides of the island when you design an educational programme, but without political support and the ongoing presence of coloured history in school classes it is very difficult to make a change with just these educational projects. Therefore, the spectrum of educational programmes is broadened. A non-formal educational programme is not necessarily a history class, a project that focusses on the parallels between experiences of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but arts, sports, films and literature could be part of non-formal education-based peacebuilding programmes as well. The educational part lies in meeting the other, talking to each other without first defining who is Turkish Cypriot and who is Greek Cypriot. You start a conversation based on a common interest. Along the way you might find out that one of you is Turkish Cypriot and the other is Greek Cypriot, but your intrinsic motivation comes from a different cause, for example arts. You don't want to tell about the impact of the Cyprus problem on your personal life, but want to interact with people that are interested in the same hobbies as you are. As a result of this interaction you find out that people from the other side aren't monsters, as you have been told in school, media and maybe family, but that you do and can have the same hobbies and want the same things in life. An additional advantage is that a programme like this might attract new people, different people than the common peacebuilders that attend plenary sessions and discussions. You lower the barrier to attend the activity, because your attention is fully based on your own interest and enthusiasm, whereas a plenary session might sound as if you need to have more background about the historical facts to be a useful addition to the programme. The growing pallet of activities is a positive development for civil society and can help to spread the message of peacebuilding even when funding lags behind.

5.2.3 Needs of educational programmes

The interviews and above section show how much civil society and its activities are bound to formal education and politics' direction. Formal and non-formal education are entwined and opposite in shaping children's views. What becomes clear is that the formal educational system has to change as well. Otherwise the impact of the non-formal educational programmes can never be big enough to make a change. However, it is a tough job to establish a change in the formal educational system. Political willingness is needed to achieve this. Unfortunately, in the current political environment it is almost wishful thinking to believe that there will be politicians that stand up for a change. The interviewees mention that especially on the Greek Cypriot side of Cyprus, politicians are cherishing the status quo and are acting very conservative. The result is that there is still a nationalistic rhetoric in schools and that there haven't been any peace talks since July 2017. This environment is not conducive for the impact of education-based peacebuilding programmes.

A way to change the formal education and bring it closer to the peacebuilding education initiatives, is the inclusion of a peacebuilding education course in all educational levels; especially in

the Cyprus situation where education very often becomes a tool in reproducing the conflict and playing a lot on the past instead of being a tool for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Children are being shaped in the conflict. But for a plan like this, political willingness is needed, because the curriculum has to change. This has to be approved of by the Ministry of Education.

Another idea comes from Mrs. Hadjipavlou who talks about a programme that shows the advantages of a personal solution as well as for the country. This programme could be part of an educational project as well as a television documentary and should be available on the largest geographical scale possible. Facing people with the consequences of the status quo, and the personal advantages of a solution can help in diminishing misconceptions about the other and create a bigger and more active support for the peace process.

The current international support for peacebuilding initiatives offers opportunities as well as difficulties. NGOs don't have big financial resources and are dependent on international funding, but as some of the interviewees mention, this provokes different reactions from society. Besides the people who do and don't support the peace initiatives, there are also people who don't want Cyprus to be influenced by other countries again. This makes them hesitant about or openly opposed to initiatives that are labelled by foreign embassies or the UN. The result is a difficult scope where NGOs working on the establishment of a culture of peace are constantly balancing between financial support, recognition and societal emotions. This challenge is part of the previously mentioned vicious circle: for a larger geographical spread, they need more (national) funding, they will only get this national support when they get national political recognition, the recognition makes more funding available and more funding results in the resources to increase the geographical spread and impact of peacebuilding education. So, one could say, what is mostly needed is national political recognition for peacebuilding education and activities.

"I feel we're doing what we can and as members of the general public we are doing what we can, but ultimately this is out of our control." (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

"As soon as you brand it as an external embassy or UN, it automatically gets branded as peace initiative and people get like why are the outsiders telling us what to do. But then we don't get support from Cyprus, so then we wouldn't be reliable to do anything. So, you're stuck in that cycle. So, people say we do need external forces to push us, because only Cyprus there would be no money, we weren't able to do anything." (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

Another need and challenge for Cypriot society is the need to meet and interact between the communities to reduce misconceptions and stereotypes about each other. They should come to a society where meeting someone from the other community is the standard, not the exclusion. Knowledge about the 'other' will reduce the fear for each other and contribute in reshaping the current narratives. Mr. Karafokas put it as follows: *"People have to realise that more things unite people than keep them apart."* Peacebuilding education should see itself as the perfect stage to bring together all kind of people to reduce misconceptions about each other. During this process they should focus on a programme that is literally labelled as peacebuilding education and tells a different history than is being told in schools, but even more important is embracing the similarities and differences between the communities. This programme can also look to the future and highlight the opportunities and advantages of a one-state solution. A look into the future, showing consequences of the status quo

and possible solutions is missing in the current debate.

An important part of getting people to meet and interact is actively supporting people to cross to the other side. This can help to increase the amount of interactions. Many people decided to cross right after the opening of the checkpoints, but nowadays the number of crossings is diminishing and the majority still has never crossed the checkpoints. As long as you don't cross and see the other side of the island, your images are based on stories from family, teachers, media and misconceptions that have been projected on you. From the opening of the checkpoints, the government is discouraging crossing and interaction which makes it hard for peacebuilding education and activities to convince people to come and meet people, because of the institutionalised fear for the 'other'. Mrs. Tugberk explains her worries about the current situation, when asked how peacebuilding education and activities can be extended. Without a geographical spread of their ideas, and thus without more funding, it will be very hard to combat the institutionalised fear. The following quotes give an impression of the institutionalised fear and its consequences. Just like funding, the support to interact needs one important factor: political recognition and support.

"If you don't meet and establish dialogue, how can you trust? And how can you help people overcome their fears? This political fear being injected in the society on a daily basis is not good, the seeds are there. There is fear all the time." (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018)

"We were hosting a group of students at the H4C and I was giving them a talk. I asked them if you have ever crossed the checkpoints to see the other half of their country. One of the kids said, I've never been there and I don't think I'm going to be there. I said why? Can you give me a reason? And she said, it is too Turkish. How do you know if you haven't been there? This idea, the idea that it had become too Turkish, fear of the Turkish army, don't go there because something will happen is constantly there. Although there haven't been almost no incidents for the Greek Cypriots coming to the North. Almost no, but still this fear." (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018)

The difference in willingness of both sides of the island – politically and socially – is nicely illustrated by the different responses to the question if they have friends and family who, until now, have never crossed the checkpoints. All Greek Cypriot interviewees mention that they still have (many) friends and family who never crossed the checkpoints. Sometimes even the closest relations haven't crossed, like their wife, children or parents. Some of them try to convince their close relatives, but they will never push them to cross. It is interesting to see that people still feel close friendships with people who are fundamentally different regarding the Cyprus problem and current situation. It seems hard to keep a close relation with people who don't (want to) believe in peacebuilding when peacebuilding education, peacebuilding activities and interactions are part of your work and life (goals). For them, on the other hand, it sounded like a natural thing. They mention that they try to convince them, but if they don't want to cross it is their choice and they respect and can understand it. This shows how complicated it is to change a society's mind-set when it is even difficult to get your own close relatives to cross.

"I just don't tell my family when it comes to crossing the divide. Cause I feel that their opinion is very outdated and that whatever I am going to say they are not going to be changed." (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

“Whoever doesn’t want to cross, he cannot cross. I mean it’s each persons’ perspective. I try, through my personal relations and experiences, to convince people to travel with me when they cross for the first time. But I don’t argue with people that don’t want to cross and I don’t try to push them to cross if they don’t want.” (Lefki Lambrou, 2018)

“I can understand them. I didn’t want to go to the other side as well. It is their prerogative. I’m definitely not going to pressure them into doing that.” (Panos Panayiotopoulos, 2018)

For Turkish Cypriots there was a different result. Only one of them mentions that she has friends and family that never crossed the checkpoints. All the others say all their friends and family have crossed. It is not clear why there is this difference, but a possible explanation is the different societal emotions about crossing. All interviewees mention that the Greek Cypriot government, education and teachers’ union are much more conservative than their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. The Turkish Cypriot teachers’ union is supporting interaction and is progressive and the Turkish Cypriot government wants to restart negotiations, while the Greek Cypriot government is blocking this.

This difference is even more interesting when realising that 9 out of 15 interviewees are refugees. Four Greek Cypriots interviewees have their roots in the northern part of the island. On the other hand, five Turkish Cypriots originally come from the southern part of the island. The feeling of displacement, losing your house and family grounds and the wish to go back to that place are therefore visible in both communities, but still there is a longing for showing your own victimhood over and over again.

At the end of the day all interviewees have one important message: education is the key towards change. All levels and sectors of education are important and media must be seen as an educational institution as well. The interviewees gave me a feeling of despair, but combine this with militancy. For some of the interviewees, peacebuilding education and activities are their life’s work, others have recently started attending activities every now and then, but they all share one hope: a one-state solution by creating a culture of peace. The fact that all levels of education are so dependent on the political will, strengthens the feeling of despair, but they also manage to keep working for their beliefs in a culture of peace, even though many of them mention that they are losing hope for a solution. Until now, they managed to hold on to the belief that if they establish a political or educational change any time soon, there will be a brighter future for the country ahead. Right now the question is how long they can hold on to this belief, while they are continuously met by a wall of political unwillingness.

“Education people get in school is really important. You can’t solve this problem with just crossing and do shopping on the other side without knowing what happened in the past. So most important is the education they get in the school.” (Mrs. Atikol, 2018)

“Education, education, education. It’s all education. When I say education I mean formal, non-formal and informal. All these play a very, very crucial role.” (Mr. Psaltis, 2018)

An important side note is placed by Mrs. Hadjipavlou and Mr. Psaltis. They definitely see an important role for education in transforming the conflict system into a culture of peace and hope, but only *“if it is used in the right way”*. Education can play a very important role when used properly. Principles like social inclusion, human rights for everybody, gender equality and reconciliation have to be spread.

Furthermore, education has to contribute to issues about the new image for the island. Dependent on the way in which education is used and integrated, it can be nationalistic, racist and so on, but it can also be used positively, in a multicultural, connecting and transforming way. Cyprus needs to find this spirit in education. A spirit that is currently only visible in peacebuilding education.

5.2.4 The role of education-based programmes of civil society actors in the peace process

The education-based programmes of civil society actors play a minor role in the current situation. It's hard for the programmes to have a direct impact on the peacebuilding process. Furthermore, peacebuilding education is a relatively new phenomenon in Cyprus and therefore there aren't any grown-ups that have had an actual peacebuilding education programme during their school period.

Peacebuilding education programmes aim for the long term. Society's mind-set is slowly changing from a culture of war towards a culture of peace. As long as Cyprus isn't dealing with an inclusive peace process, this is the way to go for civil society. When a growing group openly supports peacebuilding initiatives, politicians will notice this and get the feeling they should give it a place in the peace process. But given the existing different narratives on both sides and without political recognition, it is very hard for peacebuilding education to have a bigger impact on society's mind-set.

Peacebuilding education programmes are a very minor detail in a huge picture as long as formal education and the political atmosphere don't change. It could be argued that peacebuilding education is at a crossing point. If it does get the support of politics, it might have an impact and the status quo can be challenged – but when there is no political support, it might result in an even further diminishing of civil society and an unchangeable status quo.

5.3 Current generations

The SCORE Index showed there is a difference between the generations, as well as a difference within the communities regarding the 'other' and the peace process. This section gives an impression of trends observed in society by the SCORE Index, complemented with experiences of the interviewees.

5.3.1 Active generations

This chapter uses the SCORE Index results to examine differences between the communities in Cyprus. As explained in Section 4.3.1 the SCORE Index is designed to measure peace in societies around the world by examining two main components of peace, namely reconciliation and social cohesion. In the Cyprus case, SCORE was developed through the joint efforts of the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) and UNDP-ACT with USAID funding. SeeD is a non-profit, research driven international think tank that works with international development organisations, governments and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based strategies for social cohesion and sustaining peace. SCORE is an adaptable tool that is well-suited for multi-ethnic building societies that have experienced conflict and are now facing simultaneous peacebuilding and state challenges. Besides in Cyprus, SCORE is, amongst others, implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Nepal (ScoreForPeace, 2018).

In the current debate about the Cyprus problem and status quo, the focus is often on the differences between the two communities. Imaging in politics, media and society and as a result opposing Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but the SCORE Index shows that there is another problem: opposing generations within both communities. It seems like this distinction is not part of the current debate, although it might give starting points to overcome the current impasse in the peace process. The younger and older generations of each community are opposed to each other. As a result,

a Greek Cypriot generation and a Turkish Cypriot generation might even be closer to each other than the various generations within a community. This gives an extra dimension to the current status quo and what it means for societal support for the peace process. The figures of the SCORE Index and the interviews give an overview of experienced feelings and what this means for the involvement in civil society.

	Greek Cypriots			Turkish Cypriots		
	<i>Average</i>	<i>18-34 years</i>	<i>60+ years</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>18-34 years</i>	<i>60+ years</i>
Civic engagement	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.7	2.3	0.9
Openness to dialogue	5.1	5.1	5.3	4.7	5.2	3.9
Trust towards the other community	3	2.8	3.7	2.7	3.6	1
Community coherence	4.1	4.2	4	5.6	5.8	4.7

Table 5.3.1.1: SCORE Index per category; engagement, openness, trust, coherence. (Source: ScoreForPeace, 2018).

As shown in Table 5.3.1.1, both communities have an astonishing low average (GC 2.1 and TC 1.6) with respect to civic engagement, indicating it is almost non-existent in both communities. The same picture emerges from the interviews. Only a very small group of Cypriots is taking part in peacebuilding initiatives. The rest of society isn't active or doesn't know how and where they can be active: *"Cypriots are not actively involved, I think from both communities"* (Mr. Christofides, 2018). Young Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots do have the same level of civic engagement (GC 2.2 / TC 2.3) while the old Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have an even lower civic engagement. Especially the older Turkish Cypriots do have a very low rate of civic engagement (0.9), where the older Greek Cypriots are slightly more engaged (1.9). The interviewees also bring up the problem of an overall low civic engagement, regardless of the subject. As the previous sections (5.1 and 5.2) clarified, Cypriots don't really know how to be an active citizen, which results in this very low engagement rate.

Another interesting indicator is the 'openness to dialogue' of both communities. Compared to the civic engagement, the average 'openness to dialogue' is going in a more reconciliatory direction, but it's still far off from a 10 on the SCORE Index scale. The average of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is not very divergent (GC 5.1 / TC 4.7), but the discrepancy within the Turkish Cypriot community is remarkably bigger. Young Turkish Cypriots do have a score of 5.2 when it comes to openness to dialogue, while the older Turkish Cypriots only reach a score of 3.9. This means that not even half of the older Turkish Cypriots is open to dialogue, while a small majority of the young Turkish Cypriots is. In the Greek Cypriot community the scores are more or less equal for all age groups, with a slightly small majority in both age groups open to dialogue.

To weigh the value of the scores of 'civic engagement' and 'openness to dialogue' better, they are compared with the indicator 'trust towards the other community', shown in Table 5.3.1.1. Both communities have an incredibly low average regarding 'trust towards the other community', namely 3 for Greek Cypriots and 2.7 for Turkish Cypriots. The trust indicator clearly demonstrates the scars the Cyprus problem and current status quo have left on Cyprus' society. This indicator also uncovers the differences within the communities. The young and old generation within each community are diametrically opposed to each other. Young Greek Cypriots clearly have less trust towards the other

community than their older fellow Greek Cypriots – 2.8 compared to 3.7 – and also than the young Turkish Cypriots – 2.8 compared to 3.6. This indicator clarifies that old Greek Cypriots and young Turkish Cypriots do have the most trust towards the other community, even though their scores are still very low. The trust towards the other community among the old Turkish Cypriots is shockingly low. They only reach a score of 1. The older Turkish Cypriot generation still has deeply rooted feelings of distrust towards the Greek Cypriot community. This SCORE indicator shows that within each community there is a discrepancy between the young and old generation. When it comes to trust towards the other community, the old generation matches with the trust of the young generation from the other side and vice versa. This low score on ‘trust towards the other community’ can also help to understand the low civic engagement that has been described earlier. The difference in feelings of trust is further explained in Section 5.4.

The community coherence indicator shows pretty much the same as the openness to dialogue and therefore doesn’t completely match the exposed feelings of trust towards the other community (see Table 5.3.1.1). The Greek Cypriot community has scores that are close to each other (young GC 4.2 / old GC 4), while the Turkish Cypriot community has a larger spread of the scores (young TC 5.8 / old TC 4.7). It is interesting to see that the respondents of the SCORE Index do have some sort of feeling of community coherence, while the views within each community towards the other community differ. The difference regarding community coherence within the Turkish Cypriot community is partly resonating in the interviews. Most of the interviewees mention that the young Turkish Cypriots want to move on. They struggled a lot because they grew up in a not-recognised country, not being part of the European Union, while they saw their peers on the Greek Cypriot side enjoy all the advantages of the EU. The older Turkish Cypriots on the other hand are not always ready to move on. They are afraid that the struggles from the 1960s – as described in Chapter 2 – could start again. Section 5.4 will take a closer look at the explanation of the feelings experienced by the different communities and age groups.

The above shows that there are still many feelings boiling in both communities that keep society as a whole from moving towards reconciliation. The interviews show a complementary image regarding the SCORE indicators. There are contradictions between and within the communities, but the most important indicator and often-heard problem is the overall low civic engagement in both communities, partly explained by the very low level of trust towards the other community. Participation in civil society education and activities is so low that it is very hard to create a bigger impact as civil society. Mrs. Tugberk (2018) states: *“First we have to build trust between groups of people. That they will not take it as a threat to their personal security to mingle with the others from the other community.”* With a growing trust within and between the communities, civic engagement can start to grow and the participation in peacebuilding education and activities can increase.

Despite the fact that the interviewees would love to see a higher level of participation in civil society education and activities, they are quite content with the generational spread in attendees of activities. As mentioned by the interviewees and observed when I was in Cyprus, the traditional peacebuilding initiatives (seminars and discussions) reach out to the older generation, but also attract students. The more recent peacebuilding initiatives do reach a diverse public. The education-specific projects reach out to an even younger audience than taken into consideration in this research, namely school children that participate in the projects, and the other (educational) activities get attendance from all age groups. Mr. Christofides (2018) highlights the attendance of the younger generation: *“I*

tell you that I am very happy that I see young people from both communities in joined events. It means something.” There is a low, but diverse attendance of peacebuilding education and activities.

5.3.2 Active generations in education-based programmes

Only a very small part of society is actively involved in civil society and therefore in peacebuilding initiatives. A good development is that the initiatives are reaching out to people from different ages and that the interviewees observe a small increase in young people that are interested in peacebuilding. It's interesting to combine the civic engagement with other SCORE Index indicators, because corresponding indicators could give the idea of more civic engagement than the number itself; numbers that could help civil society to come to a strategy to increase their impact.

The next section (5.4) investigates the observed patterns. Where is the discrepancy between the communities coming from? And where does the difference within the communities originate from? The next chapter will explain the observed patterns, feelings and attitudes. The fact that the feelings experienced by the young and old generations within a community don't always resonate with each other, makes it interesting to discover the role intergenerational closure could play in bringing the generations closer together.

5.4 Differences between generations and communities

This section explains the observed differences between and within the communities and generations. The first part gives an overview of the most outstanding and interesting differences. The second part investigates the reasons behind these differences and gives an explanation. After that, the search for a way to come to a more inclusive peace process is described and the opportunities for intergenerational closure in reaching an inclusive peace process are addressed. The last part briefly answers sub-questions 4 and 5.

5.4.1 Observed differences between generations and communities

A recurring problem in this research – according to the impact of civil society initiatives in the peace process in Cyprus – is the overall low level of participation in civil society. Another SCORE Index indicator giving insight in the differences between the communities and age groups is the one about the 'negative stereotypes towards the other community'. The average negative stereotypes towards the other community are more or less equal for both communities (GC 5.5 and TC 5.7). Although the differences are small, a trend is visible with regard to the views of the different age groups. Young Greek Cypriots have a score of 5.6 which is slightly higher than the Greek Cypriot average and the old Greek Cypriots (5.4), as shown in Table 5.4.1.1. This indicator confirms a trend observed in the SCORE Index, namely that young Greek Cypriots have more negative feelings towards the 'other'. For the Turkish Cypriots it is the other way around, so young Turkish Cypriots are more positive about the 'other'. For most indicators, young Turkish Cypriots are even the most optimistic.

The positive feelings towards the other community are again shockingly low with a Greek Cypriot average of 4.6 and a Turkish Cypriot average of just 3.3 (see Table 5.4.1.1). Again, old Turkish Cypriots are very negative with a score of only 2.6 regarding their positive feelings towards the Greek Cypriot community. The young Turkish Cypriots are far above the Turkish Cypriot average and reach a score of 4.1. The old Greek Cypriots are, according to the previously detected trend, more positive than the young Greek Cypriots (5/4.4).

	Greek Cypriots			Turkish Cypriots		
	<i>Average</i>	<i>18-34 years</i>	<i>60+ years</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>18-34 years</i>	<i>60+ years</i>
Negative stereotypes	5.5	5.6	5.4	5.7	5.1	6.9
Positive feelings	4.6	4.4	5	3.3	4.1	2.6
Trust towards the other community	3	2.8	3.7	2.7	3.6	1.0

Table 5.4.1.1: SCORE Index per category; negative, positive, trust (Source: ScoreForPeace, 2018).

All these negative feelings and observed trends can be traced back to the very low level of ‘trust towards the other community’. The fact that the level of trust in both communities is so low, can help in understanding the other low scores described earlier (see Table 5.3.1.1 and Table 5.4.1.1). Why would you have civic engagement with people you don’t trust? How can your negative stereotypes about the ‘other’ diminish when you don’t trust each other? How could your positive feelings towards the ‘other’ grow as long as you don’t trust them? This brings us to a key element for educational programmes: establish a culture of mutual trust.

Despite all these negative trends, there is an indicator that could help to encourage civil society in its work, namely the ‘openness to dialogue’. In both communities around half of the population is open to a dialogue with the ‘other’ (see Table 5.3.1.1). This number is higher than expected when keeping in mind the previously described indicators and scores. This could strengthen civil society in continuing to make its programmes, because apparently there is some will in society to come together. Civil society has to find a way to reach out to the people that are willing but hesitant.

5.4.2 Explanation of the observed differences between generations and communities

After observing the trends and talking to the interviewees, it became clear that almost all indicators expressing negative feelings towards each other can be traced back to a lack of mutual trust. Without trust in each other it is hard to feel comfortable enough to attend activities that have a bi-communal audience and preach reconciliation. The interviews gave a nice perspective on the ‘why’ of feelings of the different age groups. This paragraph is built up around the four different categories of respondents of this research.

The negative feelings uncovered by the SCORE Index are especially high amongst the old Turkish Cypriots. They still have very negative feelings and distrust towards the Greek Cypriot community. This feeling can be traced back to historical events that happened to them previous to and during the Cyprus problem. As described in Chapter 2, the Cyprus problem is not only shaped by the events in 1974, but there were incidents previously as well. From 1963 onwards, Turkish Cypriots were placed in enclaves and lost a lot of their freedoms. So, statements, mostly from Greek Cypriots, about the two communities living in harmony until 1974 are not the reality for all Turkish Cypriots.

“They [Greek Cypriots] always say we lived together very nicely, but for the old people from the Turkish side it’s not the same because they feel exactly the opposite. That they were oppressed. That’s why they don’t want to come back to their homes.” (Mr. Psaltis, 2018)

“Because of 1963, the Turkish Cypriots have this fear of these things happening again, because lots of things happened in 1963. I lived then and I know. You couldn’t move anywhere. They could just, when you were travelling from one place to another you could have been dismissed, they were taking you and that’s it. They would take you and nobody knows where you are.” (Mr. Tunali, 2018)

Another important fear that is rooted in the older generation Turkish Cypriots is about the properties they are currently living in. After the 1974 invasion and separation, both sides had to deal with a lot of refugees. In the south the government chose to build new properties for the refugees. New houses and flats were built to shelter all Greek Cypriot refugees coming from the northern part of the island. The leaders on the northern side of the island decided to apply a different approach to shelter all Turkish Cypriot refugees that fled the southern part of the island. Most refugees were placed in the houses that were previously inhabited by the Greek Cypriot owners. This situation is still present in the north, meaning there are Turkish Cypriots living in houses that are, officially, Greek Cypriot properties until today. Their fear is that once there is a solution, Greek Cypriots want (and get) their properties back, which turns the Turkish Cypriots into refugees again. The chance of losing all their properties again and having to flee once more makes many older Turkish Cypriots hesitant in respect to a solution, even though they know they aren’t profiting from the current situation either.

This fear of losing their current properties is not unfounded. Older Greek Cypriots do mention that they want to go back to their villages and properties. The older Greek Cypriots hold on to an image of living peacefully together with the two communities. This image is not completely shared by the Turkish Cypriots. Basically, one could say that Greek Cypriots with properties in the north can only gain from a solution, because they can stay in the houses they currently have and claim their lands in the north. This position makes it much easier for the older Greek Cypriots to at least proclaim they are in favour of a solution, even without actively acting towards this belief. They didn’t have to live in enclaves from 1963 onwards, so they have experienced less fear than their Turkish Cypriot peers and the prospects after a solution aren’t bad either. There is a reasonable chance that they can double their properties by claiming the old ones back. This prospect increases the more positive attitude of the older Greek Cypriots towards a solution and the ‘other’.

“Especially for the Greek Cypriots they are more pro-solution, because they can claim their land back and property. Because at the end of the day it is all about property and money.” (Lefki Lambrou, 2018)

“For the Greek Cypriot side, the older generation, most people they say want a solution they want to go back to their homes. They definitely were part of the invasion, they lived during the invasion. That’s what they mean, if they want a solution they just want to go back to their homes.” (Panos Panayiotopoulos, 2018)

“This is because Greek Cypriots have always been beautifying the past in terms of living together with Turkish Cypriots, but the relationship between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the past wasn’t equality. It was one of master and servant. That’s why Greek Cypriots are feeling that things were ok in the past and hence they are willing and wish to go back. Turkish Cypriots won’t say that, because they were oppressed in so many ways, so they wouldn’t like to go back.” (Mr. Psaltis, 2018)

The young Greek Cypriots are the most negative, according to many SCORE indicators. This is mainly attributed to two causes. The first one is the educational system in the south. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, both sides, and especially the Greek Cypriot side, have a very nationalistic educational system. Teachers and school books are still very conservative and as a result kids are still injected with negative stereotypes about the other side on a daily basis. Stories that Turkish Cypriots are monsters trying to kill them and the presence of a dangerous ruling Turkish army are the rule rather than the exception. It is difficult to become a non-biased person with reconciliatory feelings towards the Turkish Cypriots when this is what they teach you.

“I think in the Greek Cypriot community younger generations’ reaction is because of the educational system. The national narratives are so strong and inject so much hatred and so much chauvinism in their textbooks and attitudes of the teachers that it would be impossible for the young people to think the opposite.” (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018)

The second cause has more to do with the current situation of the country. Young Greek Cypriots were born after the Cyprus dispute of 1974, so they didn’t vividly live the conflict. They grew up with stories about the Cyprus dispute, but the conflict doesn’t affect their daily life in any noticeable way. As inhabitants of the southern part, they are citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, member of the EU. They were born in a safe home, raised in a safe neighbourhood, have a good job and stability. Why would you want to change any of that? They have a good life with many opportunities, so they just keep on living their life. If this means they are living their life in ignorance about the Cyprus problem, so be it.

“The Greek Cypriot youth lives in a recognised country, member of the EU, they have many opportunities, they are better well off, they travel. So, there is some comfort here. They are not worried so much as the Turkish Cypriots about their future.” (Mrs. Hadjipavlou, 2018)

“A part of them does want something to happen, but is not acting and inside of that, the biggest majority is like ‘mehh, I don’t care’. Then there is the category ‘let’s do something’ and the other one is like ‘kill all Turks’. And the moderate people are ok, but that’s a minority. At least for the Greek Cypriots.” (Panos Panayiotopoulos, 2018)

The young Turkish Cypriots on the other hand are the most positive in many of the SCORE Index indicators. They have the lowest score of negative stereotypes and a high level of trust compared to the other three respondent groups. This could partly be attributed to the progressive attitude of many Turkish Cypriot teachers. Even though the curriculum still has a Turkish nationalistic focus, the teachers’ union tries to implement the curriculum in a more progressive way than is being done in the south. The second reason is maybe even more important than the educational system. Just like their Greek Cypriot peers, their current life situation is the most important motive to actively support a solution. Where the Greek Cypriot youth grew up in a recognised state, member of the EU and in a safe environment, the Turkish Cypriot youngsters didn’t have these securities. They grew up in a not-recognised state, all their traffic (money, products) has to go through Turkey, they use the strongly devalued Turkish lira and they are being oppressed by the Turkish army. The young Greek Cypriot generation has the feeling they are living a pretty good life and can only lose some of this lifestyle in case of a solution; the young Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, have the feeling they have a lot to gain from a solution. The fact that Turkish Cypriots can have an ID from the Republic of Cyprus

nowadays is for them just a first step towards a new life as part of a recognised state without military oppression.

“The younger generation is under the influence of the more progressive educational approaches and also the teachers are very progressive, more progressive compared to the teachers in the south. So, we are not allowed to inject any enmity, there are some that do that. But still, generally the younger generation is more open to the world and has a more modern way of thinking and they are not under the influence of the stories that are being told.” (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018)

“I think nowadays it’s very difficult, I have Turkish Cypriot friends, it’s difficult. You study abroad, come back and people are really struggling to find work. They are, this happens on both sides, but more in the north. They come back, skilled, educated and the opportunities are very little. I think they do feel that if there was a solution it would benefit them. Probably more than the south.” (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

The table below (5.4.2.1) gives an overview of the feelings of the different respondent groups. Those feelings are encouraged by a lack of trust towards each other. Without an educational change it is hard to establish more trust within the younger generations and without an honest recognition for the past within the older generation it is hard to increase their mutual trust. Every group has its own perspective of the past, present and future. However, they do share something in their feelings and views. They are all pretty selfish in their attitude towards a possible solution and how this might work. Their point of view towards a solution is based on their life and the narrative that is most beneficial for them.

<u>Greek Cypriots 60+</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Want to return to their houses - Hold on to the image of living happily together 	<u>Greek Cypriots 18-34</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nationalistic educational system - Are in a comfortable situation; what is there to gain from a solution?
<u>Turkish Cypriots 60+</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fear of reliving the past (1963) - Fear of being oppressed again - Afraid to lose their houses again 	<u>Turkish Cypriots 18-34</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More progressive education - Living in a not-recognised country - Want to have the same opportunities as Greek Cypriot youth

Table 5.4.2.1: Causes per group for lack of feeling of trust towards each other (Source: own data collection).

This brings us back to the beginning: there needs to be trust. Or, as Mrs. Turgberk states it:

“There should be trust. For example, if a Turkish Cypriot is communicating with the people of their age they shouldn’t be feeling threatened because they are going to lose their property because they live in the Greek Cypriot property. And the fear of the Greek Cypriot community is a Turkish arm. They shouldn’t feel threatened by the Turkish army. Which is known to be brutal, or at least perceived to be brutal, there is this fear. We should eliminate all these fears first.”

Despite all these feelings of mistrust and negative stereotypes, there is also reason to be optimistic. There are still people from all age groups active in civil society. People who try to establish a culture of peace, day in and day out. Even though this is only a small part of the total population, they already achieve a lot. The SCORE Index gives the feeling that there is some latitude for civil society, because even though civic engagement and trust are low, other indicators do show that there is willingness to move a little bit more towards (meeting) each other.

5.4.3 Create a more inclusive peace process

Despite the other indicators and the stories as told in the interviews, the numbers of 'support for a more inclusive peace process' can give civil society the right stimulus to continue its work. Both communities are on the same level with an average of 6.3 (GC) and 6.2 (TC). These numbers are very positive, compared to the previously discussed indicators. This shows there's hope that when civil society is able to trigger the right emotions, more mutual trust could grow, as well as stronger civic engagement and a more inclusive peace process.

The indicator 'support for a more inclusive peace process' is an interesting one, because it is in contradiction with indicators discussed earlier. Despite the negative stereotypes and a very low civic engagement, there is apparently a part in society that is willing to be more engaged in the peace process. Civil society should make use of this to make people aware that they actually can have an influence once they become active citizens. The will for a more inclusive peace process is in line with a worldwide trend: the local is becoming more important in peace processes. One aspect that subscribes this trend is the 'Tomorrow's Peacebuilders Award', awarded by Peace Direct since 2003. "They offer international recognition for grassroots peace activists in conflict-affected countries worldwide. Tomorrow's Peacebuilders are inspiring individuals working together to build a better tomorrow in some of the world's most fragile areas." (Peace Direct, 2018). H4C also applied for this award, but unfortunately didn't win.

There is a growing interest in local and civil society initiatives, but civil society in Cyprus is still facing some challenges. As mentioned in the previous sections, civil society wants to spread geographically so its initiatives are all over the island, but has to deal with a lack of financial resources as well as a lack of political support. This is holding back civil society to attain its goals and have a bigger impact. A research from the International Peace Institute (IPI) and Peace Direct (PD) shows that worldwide, local peacebuilders face the same problems. They mention three main challenges: the need for innovative and long-term funding, inclusive and locally-driven partnerships, and operational and policy coherence – focusing on enhancing what works. Thirty-two percent of respondents mentions a lack of funding as the biggest challenge to sustaining peace, followed by political or physical violence and threat to security, government and structural obstacles, and religious intolerance (Connolly & Considine, 2018). This shows that civil society in Cyprus is not the only movement that is facing funding and political support challenges on their way to a culture of peace. Funding and politics worldwide influence the possibilities of civil society movements and their abilities to increase their impact.

Not only institutions like the International Peace Institute and Peace Direct detect the importance of local peacebuilders in attaining sustainable peace, the UN is also acknowledging the need for a more inclusive peace process and more attention for local peacebuilders. Rather than imposing peacebuilding plans and actions, the main focus should be on supporting national ownership, particularly through strengthening the capacities of national and local actors for more inclusive engagement in the development of plans and activities.

To come to an even more sustainable peace, it is important to not only acknowledge local players, but there also need to be partnerships between national and local governments, the international community, and other key stakeholders. These developments can be paralleled to Cyprus. The increased awareness of the UN for inclusive and people-centred approaches could be seen as a positive development, since its mission in Cyprus is the longest running UN peace mission. Despite a lack of funding, a lack of political support and a very low civic engagement, there are very nice local initiatives which are supported by the UN, for example activities by Home for Cooperation, a bi-communal educational programme and an astronomy camp. Even though the UN supports these local initiatives, the lack of standard funding and a tremendous lack of national political support leave Cyprus with a peace process that is only being played on a political level. Because of that, civil society gets a feeling that it is almost impossible to influence the peace process. Lefki Lambrou expresses it like this: *"We are tiny to those who are involved in the political game. Turkey, Britain, USA, Russia."* Previous negotiations and proposals like the rejected Annan Plan didn't work, so it is time for the national politicians and involved international actors to acknowledge that the peace process needs a next step.

All previous sections more or less display the same trend: an important link to come to an increased level of mutual trust in politics. The UN is acknowledging more and more local initiatives and tries to gain trust from Cyprus society. Recognition from the UN is not enough, however. At this moment both national governments are the key towards change. They keep on distributing a message of fear and mistrust, through media as well as the educational system. Politicians should become aware of the huge impact of the national government on what is being told in media and education, and what influence their words have on emotions, perceptions and attitudes in society. The impact of their words is maybe even bigger because of the earlier mentioned high level of adoration and respect that Cypriots still have for their political leaders. The interviewees mention that Cyprus is waiting for a politician that is brave enough to not only protect his/her political position, but really stands for a solution for Cyprus. Despite the fact that there is still a high level of adoration for their political leaders, the interviewees are more sceptical about politics. *"You don't see people progress from because of what they are, but you see people progress from who they know. That's bad, very bad"* (Mr. Karafokas, 2018); *"I have reservations for their internal politics. And they have ..., they need to secure their place as a political person, not to secure the future of the country"* (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018); *"This lack of vision that the leaders could see that this [crossing and opening checkpoints] is a dynamic that could help us in the peace process"* (Mrs. Hadjipavlou, 2018). The interviewees see a key position for politicians to act as role models to encourage interaction instead of discouraging all interaction. A more positive attitude from politicians could be the right trigger civil society needs to get more people involved. Until then, civil society should carefully trigger the early willingness of people to have a dialogue and more inclusive peace process. This could be done by the previously mentioned education of interests instead of educating history and the conflict. This creates a setting in which the dialogue begins naturally and on an equal footing, instead of a forced setting where people try to convince the 'other' with their story and experience.

5.4.4 Differences, the explanation and the peace process

The differences between the generations and communities (sub-question 5) can be best explained by taking a closer look at the story of each group. They use their own feelings and experiences to project this on the possibilities and willingness for a solution. There are three important pillars that give

direction to these sentiments. First of all, the past, especially the *Enclave Period* from 1963-1974. Turkish Cypriots remember this time as a period in which they lost their freedoms. They weren't able to freely move around the island, if they did people could just disappear like Mr. Tunalı's quote in Section 5.4.2 illustrates. This period traumatised the (old) Turkish Cypriot community, while Greek Cypriots refer to a nicely shared past and living together happily. The other important pillars are the educational system and the current situation of both sides of the island. People in the south enjoy living in a safe state, that is recognised by and even part of the European Union, while the Turkish Cypriots in the north live in a not-recognised state and are being oppressed by the Turkish army. Old Turkish Cypriots have a fear of the past, of being oppressed again while the young Turkish Cypriots see a brighter future in a solution. Just like the young Turkish Cypriots, the old Greek Cypriots see a brighter future with a solution because there is a lot to gain for them. The young Greek Cypriots are worried about that shared future and enjoy their current safe country too much to actively care about the peace process.

A more inclusive peace process could be beneficial for all Cypriots to come to a more broadly supported way to a culture of peace (sub-question 4). The SCORE Index shows that there is a need for a more inclusive peace process and the UN is supporting this on a lower level by financing civil society initiatives. The education-based programmes could be a first step towards a more inclusive peace process, if they were to focus on interests instead of history/conflict teaching. This creates a natural setting for meetings and helps to slowly break down some barriers. Furthermore, interests like sports, arts and theatre aren't age-related, which creates a climate in which both communities as well as the different age groups could come closer. In the end, this could help to facilitate a more inclusive peace process, because the relations within each community, as well as between both communities grow stronger and are based on mutual trust. To reach this point, it is up to politicians to follow the worldwide trend of the inclusion of local peacebuilders in the peace process. Political recognition for interaction and civil society can diminish the confusion whether interaction is right or wrong and can help to fasten the process of reconciliation. Mr. Karafokas (2018) summarises it in a nice way:

"The only thing I can say is that people have to realise that more things unite people than keep them apart."

5.5 Intergenerational closure in educational programmes and increase societal support for the peace process

This section addresses the role different generations can play in educational programmes. The second part tries to track down if mixing can help to increase the societal support for the peace process. Then the needs to achieve this increase in societal support are outlined. The last part formulates an answer to sub-question 6.

5.5.1 Possibilities of mixing generations and their roles in educational programmes

Until now, the research showed that the interviewees do believe in the huge role education plays in shaping children's mind-set. *"It comes from education, definitely"* (Anonymous, 2018); *"Education, education, education, it is all education"* (Mr. Psaltis, 2018); *"Education could play a huge role in creating this [Cypriot] identity"* (Mrs. Tugberk, 2018); *"Most important is the education they get in the school"* (Mrs. Atikol, 2018). However, it is important to take into account what goals education pursues. As long as education strives for a positive and multicultural spirit, it can greatly contribute to the development of young people (Mr. Psaltis, 2018; Mrs. Hadjipavlou, 2018). This positive and

multicultural spirit could be encouraged by the inclusion of different generations in education, especially now we observed a discrepancy between the different generations. The interviewees do like the idea of not only mixing the communities, but also mixing different age groups. Natalie Christopher (2018), for example, mentions that *"the connection is kind of lost between the different generations"*. This is in line with the earlier described differences between the young and old generations in each community. Although the idea of mixing different generations in an educational programme is appreciated, there are also mixed feelings about it. Recreating the connection between the generations is good, but also seen as difficult, especially when you try to implement intergenerational closure in formal education. The first challenge you're facing in formal education is politics. An educational change always has to pass through the Ministry before it can be implemented and without an official recognition schools won't add a programme to their curriculum. The conservative attitude of politicians impedes the idea of implementing this intergenerational mix in formal education. Despite these challenges, the interviewees agree on the fact that integrating this interaction in schools would be a great addition.

"What I do know, is that we try to do things in the official way and get permission of the ministers of education on both sides. When you go to a school the first thing they ask is if you have this license from the ministries of education. Before this we were ignored on both sides." (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

"I think that is, is or would be, an amazing thing. It means that you're educating children from a young age that this person is no longer the enemy, and was not the enemy actually. And you're doing the reverse of what each community, more specifically for me the Greek Cypriot community, has been doing for decades." (Natalie Hami, 2018)

There are some projects that try to tell a different history or invite guest speakers who lived during the conflict. These talks are taking place from elementary school up to university, but most of them are more or less on a voluntary basis. A guest lecture like this depends on the enthusiasm of the teacher who is willing to establish a combined reading from a Turkish and Greek Cypriot and wants to add extra classes to the mandatory curriculum. These events are mostly implemented in a lecturer setting, but when you want to achieve intergenerational closure you have to take this lecture to a next level by implementing them as an equal discussion with different age groups. This brings us to the second challenge for intergenerational mixing in education. Panos Panayiotopoulos (2018) mentions that, due to seniority, the older generation tends to know more. He explains that it is hard to create a setting in which you put people from different generations as well as different opinions together, because some people of the older generation won't accept conflict and reconciliatory related opinions from the younger generation. Mr. Christofides on the other hand can imagine there are young people who prefer to have projects with their own age group instead of the older ones. This generates difficulties coming from both generations to mix with each other.

"Imagine putting people in a room and talk about stuff they lived and telling them: no, this kid never did anything to harm you, so he should be right. In theory it would be great, but in practice I don't know how this will work. And if you choose people open and willing to listen, then those are already the people who formed an opinion to bridge the gap." (Panos Panayiotopoulos, 2018)

"I guess that's the same with me, I just don't tell my family when it comes to crossing the divide. Cause I feel that their opinion is very outdated and that whatever I am going to say, they are not going to be changed. So rather than arguing with them, I just don't tell them." (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

"It will help. It depends from the people involved in each programme. Some young people might not like to be with other people. Or some would like expertise, to share their experience." (Mr. Christofides, 2018)

Besides the dependency on volunteers and enthusiastic teachers, actual crossing with school classes also creates a challenge with parents. Not all parents are progressive and there might be those that don't like the idea of their child crossing to the other side. If you make crossing and interaction part of the official curriculum, you get into problems with children whose parents don't allow them to cross. According to Panos Panayiotopoulos (2018), if you want to do something like this at all, you should start with something less radical and for instance visit the Buffer Zone, a place where you don't have to show your passport. That idea is currently part of an educational programme started by civil society, but because of the nationalistic education encouraged by the government this project is still a sensitive topic in the educational system.

A way to bypass the obstacles of politics and parents, is by seeing a particular activity or meeting itself as the educational programme. This means that the educational programme is not necessarily a programme about the conflict, but the programmes are based on interests. In this way, events like arts, sports, literature, etc. can be used as an educational programme. The promotion of the programme is about the particular interest and not necessarily focussing on bi-communality and peacebuilding. This lowers the barrier to participate and could help in reaching out to a wider audience.

"If you want to do peacebuilding activities that involve different generations, you have to step away from that and do something fresh. You'd have to find a topic that could interest all ages, which is quite difficult I guess." (Natalie Christopher, 2018)

H4C is one of civil society's organisations that is actively based on this principle. Besides the 'traditional' education programmes and readings, it organises language classes, music classes, a children's choir, the Buffer Fringe Performing Arts Festival, music nights, etc. Lefki Lambrou, director of the H4C, tells that H4C is working according to the so-called contact theory, based on arts. This results in more casual meetings, based on shared interests, instead of discussing the Cyprus problem again and again.

"I think bringing people together under the right conditions, it's easier to interact. And by interacting it's easier to change minds. And because we're fed up of discussing the same things all the time whose fault it is, bringing people through their common interests it's much easier to interact. They come together without discussing who you are and where you are from. It is about what you like, which concert did you go [to]. I've seen this, they recommend music to each other. And we've seen people changing and building new relationships and friendships through these programmes. Especially for the youth." (Lefki Lambrou, 2018)

Seeing projects, programmes and events as education-based programmes, creates a good setting for intergenerational closure as well. A Performing Arts Festival, concert or sports event isn't an age-related activity, but interest-based. Using this in the promotion could result in interaction between young and old, as well as between the different communities.

5.5.2 Increase in societal support for the peace process

Meeting the 'other' is one of the most important things to better inform people about each other. As long as school, media and politics are spreading a message of fear and mistrust towards each other, it is hard to become a non-biased person and support a culture of peace and reconciliation. Mrs. Hadjipavlou (2018) describes it like, *"we've got to find ways to deal with the past in their historicity and find a way to deal with the pain of each other. It's a human feeling, it's a human condition, everybody on this island suffered in different ways."* Meeting the 'other' based on a shared interest instead of meeting in a context where your pain is central again could help to create this mutual understanding.

"My ideas changed my family's ideas a lot. I am working at H4C since February and my family is very ... - they used to not come to H4C. After I started to work, they started to visit the home, speak to people, speak to my friends." (Okan Bullici, 2018)

The above quote shows the multiplier effect of just one of the family members participating in peacebuilding initiatives. The lower barrier of having an event based on interests instead of the Cyprus problem and peacebuilding, can also help to increase the level of participants, which might result in a multiplier effect in social circles. People that might be hesitant to talk to someone from the other community could be stimulated to establish a first meeting with the 'other' just because you have the same interest in arts, sports, etc. This is what it is all about according to the peacebuilders: meet the 'other' to experience how they are and notice the differences and commonalities between the two of you. Every meeting with someone from the other community can help in breaking down just one small part of the stereotype you have in your mind. Meeting more and more people from the other side takes away the dehumanisation of the 'other' you experienced until then and makes the 'other' human again.

When activities based on interests manage to increase their audience, the civil movement towards a culture of peace increases. An increase in the number of people attending bi-communal activities, even though that is not the main goal of the activity, could, in the end, result in more societal support for the peace process, because these people start to interact with people from the other side and build friendships across the divide. To maintain these friendships and be able to move freely around the entire island with your friends, people have to support the peace process. This can start to grow organically when more people interact and have friendships across the divide. Nevertheless, this organic growth takes time.

"Only way is education I think, but it will take some generations. I'm sorry to say that, but we need a few more generations to change that. To get things done actually. Now I don't know, but we should start teaching." (Anonymous, 2018)

An important remark is made by Mrs. Hadjipavlou, Mr. Psaltis, Mrs. Tugberk and Natalie Hami about civil society's structure. In the current political climate, it is hard to get recognition from both governments, therefore civil society needs to invest in themselves to grow. Mrs. Hadjipavlou, Mr. Psaltis, Mrs. Tugberk and Natalie Hami all mention the fact that civil society itself is still scattered. There are many nice NGOs and projects, but they are all doing more or less the same. Because of this pallet of organisations, they all reach only a small audience and operate in their own circle. There is no time for civil society to wait until national governmental recognition is achieved. So, as long as there is no national support, civil society needs to increase its impact in another way. By working together and joining forces, for instance. If they combine forces they can combine and use each other's audiences, which generates bigger events which could make a bigger impression on politicians and funds.

"Other than some of the projects that are taking place here [H4C], that are connecting to this [intergenerational events] and isolated projects here and there, I don't see it as something that the Ministry of Education would ever put forward." (Natalie Hami, 2018)

While combining forces, they should keep on fighting for national funding and political recognition. Only this can give them the huge impulse they currently need.

5.5.3 Intergenerational closure, educational programmes and an increase in societal support for the peace process

To get as many people involved as possible in intergenerational closure – and generate the biggest reach in general – educational programmes shouldn't be seen as literally educational programmes, but as a way of meeting and interacting with different communities and generations; this being the educational part of the programme. The programmes can be based on people's interests and thus it lowers the barrier to participate.

What role generational mixed educational programmes really can have in increasing societal support for the peace process (sub-question 6), is hard to answer in a concrete way. Formal education plays an important role to change society's mind-set into a culture of peace, but to gain enough political support to spread this message in formal education is tough. Furthermore, the inclusion of different generations in a formal educational programme is hard, because of the compulsory curriculum. However, if meeting and interacting are seen as educational, there are quite some possibilities for civil society to increase societal support for the peace process. The programmes and events based on people's interests can result in a larger audience than specific peacebuilding activities. A larger audience with new people will lead to more interaction between the different communities as well as the different generations. Every meeting will help to slowly deconstruct the negative stereotypes about the 'other' and can help to create a new image of the 'other'. When civil society focusses on these activities, spreading across the island, there is a big opportunity for civil society to increase societal support for the peace process.

6. Conclusion

This research tried to get a better insight in the role of education-based peacebuilding programmes originating from civil society and the extent to which their implementation among different generations can lead to a bigger societal support for the peace process. This final, concluding chapter combines the results with the theory and looks for connections between the results, guided by each sub-question.

1. How does current civil society peacebuilding manifest itself in Cyprus?

The theoretical chapter addressed the broader goal of peacebuilding where it seeks to prevent and transform violence and tries to empower people to foster relationships that sustain people and their environment. Furthermore, the civil society approach is meant to prevent some of the flaws of liberal peacebuilding, especially the top-down approach. Currently, civil society peacebuilding is present in Cyprus, although still at a low level. An important reason for this is the low development rate of civil society in Cyprus in general. Cypriots are good in expressing themselves when they are with friends, but when it comes to joining civil society and its initiatives, they are a lot more reserved. Another important reason for the low development rate of civil society initiatives is the lack of national political recognition and a lack of funding. This leaves the few civil society initiatives that are present in Cyprus with only a limited budget to organise, promote, and expand their activities. Nevertheless, there is a peace-oriented civil society that attempts to support an inclusive settlement and tries to come to an inclusive peace process. Until now, the peace process in Cyprus has been between the politicians and elites in the country, neglecting the voice of the people who are already actively supporting the peace process. In line with the growing academic awareness for local initiatives, there has been a growing civil society movement over the last twenty years in Cyprus, accelerated by the opening of the checkpoints in 2003. But until now, civil society hasn't managed to really become involved in the peace negotiations. One can say that civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus is still in its infancy, partly due to the two reasons mentioned above, but also because of civil society itself. Civil society organisations and therefore the initiatives they organise, are still very scattered. There are many smaller organisations, all more or less organising the same events. Because of this scattered landscape they are all recruiting from the same pool and therefore recycling the attendees and struggling with attracting new people. A positive move within civil society is to change its activities from traditional peacebuilding events like readings and discussions, to more practical events based on interests like sports and art, so as to lower the barrier for people to attend an event. In sum, civil society peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus are growing in numbers, but do need some more time, money and recognition, especially from national politics, to grow bigger and have a wider impact.

2. What role do education-based programmes of civil society actors play in the peacebuilding process in Cyprus?

Education-based programmes of civil society actors in Cyprus and their impact are influenced by various factors. The first one is the formal educational system in the north and south of Cyprus. Due to the 1960 Constitution there is a deeply-rooted division on the island, stimulated and maintained by the formal educational system, with a strict division between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot side. The result is ongoing nationalistic education encouraging a Greek or Turkish identity instead of a Cypriot identity. As a result, many stereotypes and misconceptions about each other remain.

Education-based peacebuilding programmes are, just like all peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus, not at the level they could be. Some education-based programmes focus on history classes. Their goal is to teach children from both sides of the island the same history class and therefore tell a story about a shared history. An important part of this programme is meeting a class from the other side as well. On the other hand, as mentioned above, there are non-formal education-based programmes that not necessarily focus on (history) classes, but rather on programmes based on interests like arts, sports and festivals. An additional advantage of these programmes is that they are perfectly suited for intergenerational closure, because arts, sports, etc. aren't age-related. Their impact on the peace process, however, is limited. Just like peacebuilding in Cyprus in general, the education-based programmes have to deal with a lack of political recognition and a peace process that is only between the elites of both sides. The will to come to a closure is not on everyone's agenda. There haven't been any negotiations at all since July 2017. The lack of recognition results, again, in a shortage of financial resources to make the activities and their impact grow.

3. Which generations are currently involved in education-based peacebuilding programmes of civil society actors?

People from all ages are taking part in education-based peacebuilding programmes of civil society. This covers a wide range from children in elementary school up to the 60+ people and pensioners. It is a hopeful sign that after generations growing up without ever meeting someone from the other side, an increasing number of children is growing up with crossing, interacting and bi-communal education-based peacebuilding programmes and thus with meeting people from the other side and building friendships across the divide. However, progress should be made by reaching out to more people. There is a spread along generations among the attendees, but the participants in these programmes are still a minority of society.

4. Is there a difference between the various generations in Cyprus and in which ways can their inclusion in education-based peacebuilding programmes help to facilitate a more inclusive peace process?

5. How to explain the differences between the generations?

There is a difference between the generations within each community and between the two communities. The different groups each have their own point of view, based on their personal situations. These situations are distinctive of each generation and are often driven by fear. For two generations this means a fear for the future in case of a solution: the old Turkish Cypriots have a fear of reliving the past and being oppressed again, the young Greek Cypriots have a fear of losing their current standard of living. This makes these two groups more hesitant towards a solution. The young Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, fear the current oppression of the Turkish army and bad economic situation of the TRNC, so they are more positive towards interaction and a solution. The old Greek Cypriots are the only group that is not necessarily driven by fear. They feel they can only gain from a solution. They neglect the fact that Turkish Cypriots have been oppressed and want to reclaim their lands, which will probably be possible in case of a solution. Altogether, this makes them more willing to come to a solution, or at least say they are positive towards a solution. Contradicting the low participation rate of all generations in education-based peacebuilding programmes, and in civil society in general, Cypriots are positive of a more inclusive peace process. The education-based peacebuilding programmes could be a first step to make Cypriots more conscious of their own influence and the

impact they can have, as well as a first step in diminishing stereotypes and misconceptions about each other.

6. What role can generational mixed education-based peacebuilding programmes of civil society actors play in creating more societal support for the peace process?

Intergenerational closure in education-based peacebuilding programmes could be a good way to increase societal support for the peace process. As shown in the literature chapter, peacebuilding education's main purpose is to accept differences between and within groups and to promote understanding and respect. Intergenerational programmes result in a breakdown of barriers and a better understanding of each other. Therefore, an intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programme, in combination with the observed differences in societal support within each age group, could result in more understanding within and between the communities and could increase societal support for the peace process. Due to the (informal) meetings in the peacebuilding programmes, people start to interact with different generations and communities which can help in bringing about a better understanding of each other, bringing different age groups and both communities closer together again and, in the end, might result in a more active civil society and more societal support for the peace process and a solution.

Altogether, in which ways can the implementation of intergenerational closure in education-based civil society peacebuilding programmes in Cyprus help to make a societal change towards a culture of peace?

Intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programmes can play an important role in making a societal change towards a culture of peace. People recognise that the connection between and within the communities is kind of lost. Especially Greek Cypriots mention that many people hardly ever cross and both communities mention that friendships across the divide are still an exception. These feelings are encouraged by the coloured formal education, politics and media who are injecting misconceptions about the 'other' on a daily basis. However, there are positive developments. A majority of both communities wants a more inclusive peace process; a feeling civil society should try to trigger, because a more inclusive peace process needs more active citizens, something Cypriots currently aren't. Civil society can show that participation in their events is a small first step towards a more inclusive peace process and more recognition.

Intergenerational closure of the programmes can further help civil society to bring people closer together. An event based on interests with a diverse mix of ages lowers the barrier to participate, because one doesn't have to discuss the Cyprus dispute again, but can start a conversation based on a shared interest. The change from civil society towards activities based on interests is the perfect move to attract more and new people to bi-communal events. This can be further implemented by not necessarily emphasizing the bi-communal aspect of the event, but by highlighting the interest itself, for example an arts exhibition or sports activity that, 'by accident', is bi-communal, in the Buffer Zone or on the other side of the island.

Initiatives based on the principles of education, interests and intergenerational closure do take place, albeit on a small scale. To grow and have a bigger impact there are some more needs, however. The two main needs are more funding and national political recognition. Wider national political recognition will result in more funding which is needed to expand the activities outside Nicosia. A bigger geographical spread of the education-based peacebuilding programmes enables people living

in cities further away from the Buffer Zone to get in contact with the principles of peacebuilding and bi-communality. This is necessary to make a bigger societal move towards a culture of peace.

Until more national political recognition and media coverage is realised, civil society should continue to organise intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programmes to (slowly) spread the message of peacebuilding, bi-communality, understanding of each other and a culture of peace. The path taken from a diversification of the activities can help to slowly bring more people to the events and the fact that the first generation growing up with the possibilities of crossing and interacting grows older, gives new opportunities for the spread of a culture of peace. Meeting and interacting across the divide and across generations can slowly become the standard instead of the exception. Unknown means unloved. So, the only chance of reaching a culture of peace is by slowly spreading this message across the island and enabling more people to get in contact with these ideas since mainstream media is not covering it. The intergenerational programmes simultaneously cover the gap within each community and can help in beginning to understand, accept and respect each other's differences and communalities. The impact of these programmes will take time, but getting more and more people to make the first move of interaction across the divide is the only way through which they will realise they have more in common than what divides them – resulting in societal change towards a culture of peace. However, apathy regarding the Cyprus problem and a possible solution lies in wait. Hopefully resources will be found swiftly and politics will understand the need to speed up the whole process.

6.1 Discussion

This research and the concluding remarks focus on the peacebuilding situation in Cyprus. Looking at the broader theory that is used in this research, intergenerational closure could result in a closer community, and looking at it from a wider perspective, even a closer society. This research suggests that intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programmes do create a closer society. Specifically, the research shows that civil society initiatives focus, in a growing amount, on interaction between different groups in society, based on shared interests instead of the Cyprus dispute. Attendees of the events do confirm that the first interactions are confusing, because they realise the images that have been injected in their brains for so many years are not the reality. Furthermore, the programmes do indeed result in friendships across the divide. This confirms the idea that intergenerational education-based peacebuilding programmes do help in learning about each other and diminish misconceptions. However, this research is a specific qualitative research which makes it hard to make broader statements on the theory, because it depends on the context and there is almost no research into the role of intergenerational closure in conflict-affected areas. In this case, it should first of all be understood that the education-based programmes are not specific lesson modules about a shared history and overlapping history class. The education-based peacebuilding programmes are based on interests, whereas the educational part is in the interest itself – for example arts or sports – and in interaction with people you wouldn't interact with otherwise.

Secondly, it should be considered that the respondents are already active in civil society, peacebuilding initiatives and supporting the peace process towards a one-state solution, which creates a biased group. In the interviews they agree on the positive role education-based peacebuilding programmes can play, but programmes like these are, to a high degree, part of their work. For further research it would be interesting to investigate the role education-based peacebuilding programmes play in the eyes of people less actively involved in peacebuilding programmes. This gives a better insight in the impact of the programmes, because they might feel different about the focus and

outcomes of bi-communal events. Further research could for instance include people who never participated, who only participated once or a couple of times, or people who were hesitant at first but nowadays are participating more. These are interesting categories to include when civil society wants to improve its programmes and the outcomes of the programmes.

Thirdly, the context of this research is important to realise. Politics on both sides of the island are nationalistic, although to a lesser extent in the north. Furthermore, Cypriots see their politicians as role models. Since there haven't been any peace negotiations since July 2017, media coverage and public interest in the peace process, a solution and the consequences of the current situation as well as the consequences of a possible solution are rapidly diminishing. This means that even the peacebuilding spirit among civil society initiators decreases. However, the widespread adoration of political leaders in the country can therefore help to change society's view all of a sudden. When peace negotiations will start again and possible solutions come to the table, the peace process will re-live in media and society which might arguably result in a change in civil society, the attendance of peacebuilding events and the societal support towards a culture of peace.

Finally, the impact of the researcher should be taken into account as well. To minimize this impact and stay as objective as possible, the perceptions of the respondents were first outlined and interpreted in a later stage. Nevertheless, the background of the researcher might have impacted the research. Being an outsider of the conflict could be seen as both positive and negative. The positive side is that the researcher could be seen as someone with an objective view towards the conflict and its corresponding parties. However, it could also be seen as negative because it might have created some sort of trust and understanding barrier while conducting the interviews.

Something that was mentioned by several interviewees was the migration of the younger generation on both sides of the island. Many young Greek and Turkish Cypriots study abroad. While being there, they meet and interact and find each other because they are both Cypriot. This helps in diminishing stereotypes and misconceptions about each other, but after their study time these interactions fade away. Greek Cypriots return to the Republic of Cyprus to find a job and return to their safe bubble, picking up their old (separated) life. Turkish Cypriots return to the TRNC. However, because of the bad economic state of the TRNC many young Turkish Cypriots don't want to return at all and look for a job abroad. In the meantime, the oppression from Turkey in the TRNC is continuing and an important part of this is the migration of mainland Turks to the north. Turkish Cypriots aren't very religious, while the mainland Turks are. As a result, Turkish Cypriots slowly start to become a minority in their own country, with already 50% of them living in the United Kingdom. This is worrisome for the future of Cyprus and the belief in a successful one-state solution, because the mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots don't share a history and culture at all. With Turkish Cypriots moving abroad and the influx of mainland Turks the discrepancy between the north and the south deepens even more. In regard to the Cyprus dispute and a possible solution, this is a worrisome development. Society is rapidly changing, both sides drifting apart. This societal change enhances the need for intergenerational and cross-community understanding. For the future of Cyprus, further research on this demographic and societal change is needed – for a better understanding of the current in- and outflows and the consequences for Cypriot society.

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Appendix 1 – *List of respondents*

Category 1: old Greek Cypriots (60+)

- A. Christos Christophides
- B. Iacovos Psaltis
- C. Maria Hadjipavlou
- D. Petros Karafokas

Category 2: young Greek Cypriots (18-34 years)

- E. Lefki Lambrou
- F. Natalie Christopher
- G. Panos Panayiotopoulos

Category 3: old Turkish Cypriots (60+)

- H. Alev Tugberk
- I. Levent Birinci
- J. Müsserref Atikol
- K. Ertuğrul Tunalı

Category 4: young Turkish Cypriots (18-34 years)

- L. Feray Yalçuk
- M. Natalie Hami
- N. Okan Bullici
- O. Anonymous

Appendix 2 – Topic List

Cyprus dispute

- Older generation:
 - o How would you describe the Cyprus dispute during its peak?
 - o How did the Cyprus problem change your personal life?
 - o In what way have your feelings about the Cyprus dispute or the other community changed over time?
- Younger generation:
 - o How visible is the Cyprus problem for you?
 - o How did the Cyprus problem change your family's life?
 - o In what way have your feelings about the Cyprus problem changed over time?
 - o What did your family tell you about the Cyprus problem?
 - o What did they teach you about the conflict in school?
- How would you describe the current situation of the Cyprus dispute?

Crossing the border

- How often do you cross the border/checkpoints?
 - o How was it when you crossed the border for the first time?
 - o Did you grow up with the idea that crossing the border is normal?
 - Yes → Why did your parents teach you that crossing the border is normal and necessary? How did this influence your friendships within your community?
 - No → why did you start crossing the border?
- Do you have friends/family that never crossed the border?
 - o In what way does this influence your friendship?
- Do you think that crossing the border more often from a young age onwards can help to improve mutual understanding of TC and GC?
- To what extent do you think crossing the border to the Buffer Zone in the context of a peacebuilding education programme can shape a safe environment in which children are more open to experience and learn from each other?
- How often do people have *meaningful encounters* when they cross the border?
- What is the added value of crossing the border (according to you)?

Peacebuilding

- What do you know about peacebuilding projects in Cyprus?
 - o In what way does the attitude of your friends and family towards the other community and peacebuilding activities influence your choice to participate in peacebuilding activities?
- What do you know about peacebuilding education in Cyprus?
 - o Did you/your children/anyone you know participate in any peacebuilding education programmes?
- What are, according to you, reasons not to implement different generations in peacebuilding education?
 - o What are the benefits of including different generations in peacebuilding education programmes?
- Do you miss the fact that there wasn't a peacebuilding education programme when you were young?

- Do you miss the fact that your school didn't participate in a peacebuilding education programme?
- Do you believe that peacebuilding education can bring reunification of the island closer?
- In what way has your view about the 'other' changed since you participate in peacebuilding activities?

Strength of identification with Turkish or Greek roots

- Do you identify yourself as a Turk, Greek or Cypriot and why?
- Is there a Cypriot identity? What is the Cypriot identity?
- What role can education play in reunification of the island?

Civic engagement = the societal change

- On the one hand GC and TC say they want a more inclusive peace process, on the other hand the civic engagement is very low. To what extent is there enough public support to actually create a more inclusive peace process and increase the civic engagement?
- What does the GC/TC community need to increase the level of civic engagement?
- In what way is the inclusion of different generations in peacebuilding education programmes a step towards larger civic engagement?

Forgiveness

- The level of forgiveness is lower for the younger generation. Why do you think this is?
- Could you describe your feelings of forgiveness?
- In what way can peacebuilding education contribute to feelings of forgiveness?

Openness to dialogue

- In what way can the inclusion of different generations in peacebuilding education programmes contribute to create an environment that could spread the idea and willingness of dialogue?

Pessimism regarding the peace process / negative stereotypes towards other community

- How would you declare the difference between the level of pessimism and presence of negative stereotypes between young GC and TC people?
- How would you declare the difference between the generations within a community?
- To what extent can the inclusion of different age groups in peace education contribute to diminish (or even take away) stereotypes and negative feelings about the other community?
- What hope do you have for the future of Cyprus?

Trust towards the other community

- Can you imagine living in a mixed neighbourhood (again)?

Social distance from the other community

- To what extent can mixed peace education contribute to diminish the social distance between and within the communities?

Intergenerational closure

- The older generation has a significant other opinion about TC/GC (the other community) than the younger generation within a community. How useful do you think it is to facilitate encounters between different generations of a community?

- In what way do you think intergenerational closure in peacebuilding education programmes can help to diminish prejudices and miscommunication between generations and between both communities?
- In what way can intergenerational closure in peacebuilding education programmes help to enlarge the overall societal support for the peace process?

According to you, what is needed to reunify the island?

Do you believe that education is the key towards re-unification of the island?

Appendix 3 – Code Tree

