Identity categorization in the EU PEACE Programme

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14-8-2017

The spatial differentiation of the identity categorization approach of the EU PEACE Programme in Northern Ireland and the border region.

Master thesis Human Geography - School of Management 14-08-2017

Specialization *Europe: Borders, Identity & Governance*

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Acknowledgements

This thesis is the final product for my master in Human Geography, in which I followed the specialization Europe: Borders, Identity & Governance. Good things need their time, therefore it is finished a bit later than originally planned. Nevertheless, I hope you enjoy reading it. Many thanks go out to the participants of this research. Also, I would like to thank my supervisor, Olivier Kramsch for the right amount of support throughout the process and being there when I needed his help. Furthermore, I am deeply grateful for the people in the Good Relations Unit of the Belfast City Council, who allowed me to do my research with them. They were very kind and welcoming to me and made sure they involved me in their work in the Good Relations Unit. In particular I would like to thank Isaac May, my supervisor during the internship, for always being interested in helping me with my research, which he did excellently. Lastly, I'd like to thank my family and friends for their support throughout this process.

Please enjoy reading the thesis, thanks!

Summary

After more than two decades of active EU involvement in the Northern Irish peace process through the EU PEACE Programme, its effectiveness is being questioned. Although the relations between the conflicting identity groups are better and there is more intergroup contact, the two identity groups are still strongly apparent. This means that the division that forms the basis of the conflict is still an important aspect of the Northern Irish society. Whenever an issue comes up that accentuates the differences between both identity groups, there is a possible risk for the peace process.

In order to adequately look into this problem, the PEACE Programme must be assessed by using a perspective that emphasizes on identity which offers comprehensive insights into the rationale that underlies the PEACE Programme. Since the population of Northern Ireland is segregated along community lines, it is important to look into the spatial differentiation of the relation between identity and the PEACE Programme. According to the theory, there is a difference between the border area and the centre of Northern Ireland in terms of cultural, political and economic exchange with other areas. Therefore, the main research question is: *"What is the difference between the PEACE Programme's approach to identity in the centre of Northern Ireland and in the border region?*". By answering this question it becomes clear which approach towards identity the EU PEACE Programme takes and whether there is a difference between the centre and the border area of Northern Ireland.

The PEACE Programme has been decomposed into three levels, the lower, the intermediate and the higher level of governance. Interviews with important actors in each of these levels provide insights into which approach is being taken towards identity. The lower level represents the spatial differentiation, as PEACE projects in Belfast, the centre of Northern Ireland, and Derry/Londonderry, the border area of Northern Ireland, have been examined. These interviews provide a comprehensive image of the several aspects that are part of the main research question.

After comprehensively analyzing the interviews, there wasn't a strong indication that there is spatial differentiation in the approach to identity in the PEACE Programme. This is possibly due to having defined Belfast as the centre of Northern Ireland. The cultural connections of the nationalist communities are strongly tied to Ireland, which might be the reason that there doesn't seem to be spatial differentiation. However, the interviews do give indications that there is a difference between the different levels of governance in the PEACE Programme. The higher levels seem to focus more on dual recategorization with a stable and peaceful society as the superordinate factor that binds the two traditional identity groups. The focus is therefore still on the traditional CNR- and PUL-communities. The intermediate and the lower level of governance are indicating more towards decategorization and thus emphasize on the individual identity. This illustrates a discrepancy between the EU's notion of identity in Northern Ireland and the situation in the field. In turn this can have implications for the effectiveness of the PEACE Programme.

List of abbreviations

SEUPB	Special European Union Programmes Body
EU	European Union
UK	United Kingdom
RoI	Republic of Ireland
NIE	Northern Ireland Executive
BCC	Belfast City Council
CI	Cooperation Ireland
CRC	Community Relations Council
GDT	Gasyard Development Trust

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Chapter - 1 - Introduction

This thesis elaborates on the approach that the PEACE Programme of the European Union has towards identity. It focuses on the different ways identity can be transformed in a post-conflict situation at the hand of the terms decategorization and recategorization. Peacebuilding initiatives often have a certain approach towards identity, such as for instance the concept of the 'Rainbow-nation' of South Africa, which is a clear example of recategorization. The PEACE Programme doesn't seem to have a clear formulation on what its approach is towards identity in Northern Ireland. Therefore this research tries to clarify what the approach of the EU PEACE Programme is, at the hand of interviews with involved parties on all levels of the programme. Furthermore, the research looks for spatial differentiation between the Irish/Northern Irish border area and the more central Belfast area, because there is a difference expected between both of these geographic spaces.

1.1 Research Questions

The guideline in this research is a main research question. This question derives from one of the issues that is apparent in the PEACE Programme, and actually also in the Northern Irish peacebuilding process in general. The issue is that the EU peacebuilding intervention in Northern Irelandis supported by the government of Northern Ireland. This government is based on the communities that were the main identity groups in the conflict. So the PEACE Programme needs to be in line with the approach to peacebuilding that this government has. A common issue with these types of interventions is that they perpetuate the conflict, instead of actually solve it. Good relations between these communities can be established through the peacebuilding interventions, but these relations are prone to change. This could mean that it will be a seeming peace, instead of a positive peace, which should be the goal of peacebuilding interventions. The literature has provided a framework that can address this issue and make the effects of the PEACE Programme more clear. Additionally, it is important to explore whether there is a difference between the 'center' and the border area. Due to the high permeability of the Irish-Northern Irish border, there is an expected difference between the border area and the more central Belfast area. Cultural and political exchange in the border area is expected to influence the effect of the PEACE Programme in this area. Therefore, a different type of categorization might prove to be apparent in this area. As a result of these issues, the main research question of this research is;

“What is the difference between the PEACE Programme’s approach to identity in the centre of Northern Ireland and in the border region?”

To support this question, four sub-questions have been created that form the basis of the analytical part of the research. These are;

1. *"What is the Northern Irish conflict?"*
2. *"What is identity in Northern Ireland?"*
3. *"What is the PEACE Programme?"*
4. *"What form of categorization is used in the PEACE Programme and its projects?"*

The first question tries to form part of the context. By understanding the conflict and the possible causes, one can understand what needs to be overcome by the peacebuilding intervention. The second question then gives an overview on the different perceptions of identity that are apparent in the Northern Irish society, at the hand of influential surveys that are composed by local universities and the peace monitoring report. This should give an extensive and contemporary overview of which direction the sense of identity is going in Northern Ireland. The third sub-question elaborates on the PEACE Programme. The insights that this chapter gives on the structure of the programme, the goal of the programme and the important stakeholders that influence the programme, will help to understand the rationale of the PEACE Programme. Understanding the rationale means it will be easier to assess which form of categorization is apparent in the programme. The last question is aimed at providing an assessment of the interviewed projects. They are assessed by looking for signs of decategorization and recategorization, ultimately trying to figure out towards which approach they are leaning to. The combined answers of all these questions culminate in the conclusion. The conclusion provides insights into the spatial differentiation of categorization approaches in the PEACE Programme, looking for differences between Derry/Londonderry and Belfast and differences between the different organizational levels of the PEACE Programme.

1.2 Scientific Relevance

Although the European Commission does do evaluations on the Peace Programme, Buchanan (2008) states that it has not often been the subject of academic research outside of the influence of the European Union. Furthermore, the evaluations that have been done, predominantly focus on the effects of the programme and the goal of the programme, which is to improve cohesion between the dichotomous communities. This research will directly contribute to the evaluations of the PEACE programme by using a more theoretically based approach. Rather than just observing the effects, the research frames this into a theory that helps to define the direction that the peacebuilding intervention is going. By taking a different theoretical framework, the PEACE Programme can be examined in a deeper manner than the comparatively 'shallow' evaluations. As one of the interviewees argues, the government tends to focus on delivering, rather than on development (see Appendix 3, page 22). Due to this, it doesn't have a clear direction defined towards which it is heading. The nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland is very closely tied into the concept of identity, which makes it useful to also examine the PEACE Programme from this perspective. After all, its focus on grassroots level projects means that the initiative predominantly lies with the local people who are generally part of either of the conflicting identity groups. If there is a discrepancy between the lower level, local approach and the higher level approach, this could reduce the efficiency of the programme. This was also signaled during the research by several people who wondered whether it was still useful to accept foreign funding. In line with criticism on power-sharing governments, they wondered whether the dichotomous situation wasn't being maintained or even strengthened by empowering the dichotomous communities and corresponding political parties that are at the basis of the conflict.

Research on the influence of identity on policymaking is sparse, especially on policies that focus on the grassroots level such as the PEACE Programme. Combined with the precarious situation, regarding the strongly divided identities in Northern-Ireland, it is a very interesting subject and it can contribute to various fields of research that haven't been thoroughly explored yet. Furthermore, the intention of the programme to improve cross-border relationships also adds to the literature that is concerned with border policies, as it will give insights into policies with a bottom-up approach and cross-border situations in former conflict areas. The latter manner in which this research will add to the existing scientific literature is in the field of superordinate identities and personal identities. Rather than focusing on both existent dichotomous identities that have dominated the conflict, this research also focuses on a Northern-Irish identity and personal identities. This is unlike most evaluative sources that generally seem to be more focused on the dichotomous communities in Northern Ireland. So, this research aims to have an open look into the matter of identity, in order to

adequately define the effect the PEACE Programme has, in terms of identity categorization. It is important to define this effect, because this has all kinds of implications for future peacebuilding intervention methods. After all, as one of the interviewees states, peacebuilding in Northern Ireland is experimental (see Appendix 3, page 21). In order for the experiment to work, one needs to know what has been done by the PEACE Programme and in what way this has affected the peacebuilding process as a whole.

1.3 Societal Relevance

There is a certain relevance of this study to societal issues in a number of ways. Firstly, similar to the scientific relevance, it can add to the existing research that has been done in terms of identity and peacebuilding interventions. The increased knowledge on the mechanisms that underlie identity and recategorization and decategorization that is gained in this research, can help improve peace and stability in post-conflict societies that are strongly segregated. Since identity has become an important factor in contemporary conflicts, the need to research peacebuilding interventions for this type of conflict has increased.

Secondly, peacebuilding in Northern Ireland is similar to community work that is done in other countries. Due to its quite extreme situation in terms of division, Northern Ireland is an interesting place to study this, because it can give an indication of what can happen when division in society is increasing and what kind of problems that can create in the future. An increasing amount of countries are experiencing division in their society, which makes interventions that build connections between the divided groups more important. As some of the interviews in this research have pointed out, there will always be a certain necessity of some form of peacebuilding in society, as long as there are different groups in it. Therefore, this research can also be seen as an addition to the current knowledge on integration and segregation. This could for example be helpful for European societies that are dealing with the influx of refugees. Or for the USA that is increasingly divided along the political dichotomy.

Lastly, the importance of this research has increased due to Brexit. The UK leaving the EU has all kinds of implications for Northern Ireland and this research hopes to add to the considerations that are being made in terms of the possible continuation of the PEACE Project. By approaching the PEACE Project from a social perspective, the research might prove to be useful in the considerations.

Chapter - 2 - Theoretical Framework

As previously stated, this research focuses on the approach of the PEACE Programme towards identity and tries to find out whether there is spatial differentiation within that approach. In order to create a comprehensive image of this approach, several key-components need to be thoroughly examined. To properly explain what the theoretical background is of the research, an increased understanding of the current debates around identity and peacebuilding is needed. Identity is a key-concept because it is one of the main subjects of the relationship that this research tries to study. The first part of this chapter deals with identity and its most important characteristics. Peacebuilding is the other main concept within this relationship, since the EU PEACE Programme effectively is a peacebuilding programme of the European Union in Northern Ireland. The second part of this chapter therefore deals with peacebuilding in general, and in conflicts of identity in particular.

2.1 Identity

Identity is a concept that is perceived as a driver to why certain social, political, economic structures are occurring in the form that they do. By describing the relationship between these structures and identity, insights into why certain issues arise should be gained. In general terms, identity is the collective of identifications of a certain person or object. It's a particularly broad and ungraspable concept. It is broad in the sense that its definition, manifestation and understanding can be strongly variable. This is largely depending on the context in which it is used, but also on the views of what the user of the concept of identity perceives to be true. Due to this broadness in the definition of identity, certain conceptual issues can arise such as that identity can be used by the same person, but have different meanings in different times, making identity multi-interpretable. It's ungraspable in the sense that identity is, at least partially, based on perceptions and social constructs. For this research it is therefore paramount to be as clear as possible as to what the understanding of identity means in this research. If this is understood, it will make it easier to follow the reasoning that is presented further into this research.

2.1.1 Fluidness of identity

The fundamental contentiousness in the concept of identity is in the essence of identity. Leve (2011)observes that the Buddhist monks in Nepal are rejecting identity as an important factor in all

kinds of structures that influence day-to-day lives. They view identity, or *'one's self*', as a result of ongoing physical and mental sensations and events. Therefore, 'the person' itself is subject to these flows, which makes identity meaningless. Although this is an interesting view, the scientific perception on identity is rather different and it is generally understood that identity is a very important factor in all kinds of actions that are taken on a daily basis. Its connection to social action and social life is considered to be the strongest. Identity theories, especially group identity theories, therefore fit well under social theories. Being a social theory, identity theory shares the same fundamental paradigm. This is the paradigm that describes the relation between agency and structures (Sewell, 1992). Consequently, some argue that human action derives from acting according to the characteristics that belong to the identity they have. Others might argue that identity derives from human action itself. In other words, does a person act lazy because he is a lazy person, or is that person lazybecause he acts lazy?In practice the outcome is the same, namely that the person acts lazy. Therefore, the distinction between the two might seem trivial, but the implications of this are not. If the former was true, the implication is that a lazy person can never act the opposite, and thus it is static. The latter implies that a person acts by other motivations than identity and that those actions create an identity, which makes identity a fluid concept. The first examplealso describes an absolute relation, because identity defines what a person does. The other exampledescribes a relation in which identity doesn't influence human action. In the first case identity carries weight and meaning to everything humans do, making it an ontological concept. In the second case identity is a more descriptive term of what persons are, according to what they do, making it a holistic concept. In between both of these views, there are hybrid theories that describe the relation between human action and identity as being more interdependent of each other. In modern identity theories it is generally accepted that evidence has shown that identity is formed by a relation between the social structures and agency of its actors, viewing identity as a fluid concept.

Another notion that needs to be examined when dealing with identity is that it doesn't always carry the same importance. It can differ per person, but also per situation. This is called the *'salience of identity'*. For instance, two people with a Dutch background can live in the USA. One of them tries to hold on to this background as part of his identity, while the other identifies more with the USA as part of his identity. The salience, or the importance, of the Dutch background as a part of their identity is different to both of them. The first person might want to keep talking Dutch when he is at home, whilst the other insists on talking English at all time, because that is part of his new identity. To the last person, the Dutch language as a part of the Dutch identity has made place for his new identity as an American, who generally talk (American) English. The salience of the Dutch language as a part of his identity has changed for him when he moved to the USA and was replaced by the English

language, which became a larger and more important part of his identity for him. It is debatable where this salience comes from, similarly to the social theory paradigm of structures and agency. Some argue that the salience is constructed under the social structures that are dominant in a social setting, while others argue that it is a conscious choice by the person that arranges the order of salience of its identifications (Brenner, Serpe, & Stryker, 2014; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999).

The third note is that identity is relative to other identities. Individuals tend to assess the characteristics they identify with on the basis of other identifications. . For instance, in constructivism identity is viewed upon as being solely defined by its environment (Zehfuss, 2001, p. 318). It is created, transformed and sustained by interaction with other identities. For example, John isn't as lazy as Jack, so John considers himself to be active. However, Jesse comes in and is much more active than John. So now John regards himself and is regarded by Jack and Jesse as lazy, just like Jack. This simplification illustrates something that, in reality, is a complex process and subject to many internal and external forces. Besides that, it is also the basis of identity conflict, because when John loses his affiliation with the active trait that he might have really liked about himself, it could cause him to drop into a crisis of identity. Again, this is explained in a very simple way, but its essence, namely that there is an important shift in what identity means to someone, tends to cause stress, uncertainty and conflict for that person. In principal, this is the same mechanism that underlies conflicts of identity on a different scale (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010).

2.1.2 Personal and Social Identity

The last, and perhaps most important distinction that needs to be made for this research, is the difference between an individual identity and a group identity. In psychology and sociology this is often referred to as, respectively, personal identity and social identity. According to Tausch, Schmid and Hewstone (2010, p. 75), personal identity is mainly focused on individual strengths and capacities and personal uniqueness. Social identity, on the other hand, emphasizes on group characteristics and attributes these to the individual members of the group. Social identity should be regarded as, like personal identity, fluid and dynamic. The characteristics that are attributed to a certain social group can change overtime, as well as the meaning of these characteristics. For example, during the pillarization of the Netherlands, the Catholic religion was a strong denominator for social identity in the Southern part of the country, dividing the nation along the lines of the Catholic or protestant faith. When the pillarization subsided, the importance of this characteristic as part of social identity was also reduced and the Catholic pillar largely fell apart (Hellemans, 1988, p.

49). Plausibly, members of the Catholic group have become members of other social groups that either value Catholicism differently or as part of the personal identity. The individuals that have been part of, in this case, the Catholic pillar, have categorized themselves into different groups that represent a different social identity. The process of *'self-categorization'* is widely covered in the literature and forms an important basis for the theory in this research. Self-categorization is described by Ashforth and Mael (1989) as the tendency of people to classify themselves into various social categories, such as gender, age, race and religious affiliation. Consequently, the person identifies with the traits that belong to this group, creating an in-group with members that share these characteristics that are perceived to belong to the group. Consequently, since identity characteristics are relative, an out-group is created for members that don't share these typical characteristics. The composition of characteristics of the group is referred to as the prototype of a group (Hogg M. A., 2000, p. 339). The prototype dictates how group members should identify with certain characteristics and who does and doesn't belong to that particular group. Prototypicality of members manifests itself in gradations, in which there is a difference between strongly prototypical members in the center, and less prototypical members on the edges of the group (Hogg M. , 2016, p. 28). According to Hogg (2000), the motivation behind self-categorization is uncertainty of oneself. Uncertainty reduces the predictability of social life and consequently decreases the productivity and efficiency of action. Individuals strive to reduce the feeling of uncertainty as much as possible. Hogg argues that individuals are drawn to group identity because when they adopt the prototype of a group, they know that the characteristics of these groups are approved by its members. This reduces the feeling of uncertainty. In general, highly uncertain individuals tend to categorize themselves in groups that have strong boundaries and structures and a similar fate. These groups are referred to as '*highly entitative'* groups. Also, individuals that are becoming increasingly uncertain about their identity, can increase the entitativity of the groups they have already categorized themselves in, in order to (re)gain self-esteem.

Perceived 'warmth' and 'competence' of groups further influences how personal uncertainty is reduced by social identities. Generally, a society is built up of several social identity groups, sometimes overlapping and sometimes not. The society itself is based on certain ideologies and dominant social structures that define the arrangement of these social identities. According to Fiske, Cuddy and Glick (2006), this is arranged according to gradations of warmth and gradations of competence. In this sense, warmth is meant as the perceived closeness of a prototypical member of the sub-category to the prototypical member of the main identity category in that society. In other words how 'likeable' the prototype is. Friendliness and generosity are, for example, warm characteristics of social identities. Competence is more based on respect between prototypical

members of the sub-group and the main identity group. Respectable characteristics are, for example, intelligence, skill and creativity. The consequences for how each group is perceived can be quite extensive. To use the example of Fiske et al., of how the society of the USA supposedly arranges its identity groups, the homeless in the USA are considered to be very low in warmth as well as competence. This resonates through to the societal stance and possibly the official approaches towards this group of people, limiting their possibilities of climbing out of their homeless situation, with all kinds of implications for that group when considering their socio-economical position in the general US-society.

2.1.3 Social Categorization

The main identity theory that this research will be based on is the Social Identity Theory or SIT, which at first, had been described by Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 2010). They argue it has derived from Sherif's Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RCT) that states that group conflict is based on a discrepancy of resources (e.g. economic, cultural and political power) between identity groups. When this discrepancy is more severe, so will the conflict over these resources be. Tajfel and Turner distinguished two main problems with this theory. The first being the fact that it doesn't explain why individuals move between groups, which in the theory is known as social movement. RCT adopts a rather static view of membership of identity groups, while this proves to be highly mobilein practice. The second critical note concerns the discrepancy of available resources as the only mechanism of identity conflict. Even when the meaning of resources is used in a wider sense, including political power and other more intangible forms of resources, there still is identity tension in societies that do not have an unequal balance of resources for the concerning identity groups. These are the reasons that Tajfel and Turner developed the Social Identity Theory. Social mobility is an important aspect of SIT, because it describes the ability of individuals to self-categorize into other groups or identity categories, effectively moving between them. Assuming that a society is flexible and permeable, social mobility is generally quite high. When a society lacks flexibility and permeability, individuals are less able to invest in self-categorizing into other identity categories. The caste system in India is an obvious and extreme example of this, because people are born into a certain class and can't categorize into a different class. Societies like this are typically very divisive along certain lines, such as class, ethnicity and economic position.Contacts between people tend to happen on identity group basis, rather than on personal basis, because individuals are drawn to the center of their identity group when interacting with individuals from a different identity group.In these societies social change comes into play, which is the alteration of the structures that are present in a society. These structures form the basis of the static and stratified society and social change is necessary to break

these strict social categorizations. So, Tajfel and Turner distinguish the so-called 'beliefsystems' of 'social mobility' and 'social change' as the two extremes of a continuum in which individual and intergroup contact takes place. Social mobility is the extreme for individual contact and social change is the extreme situation for intergroup contact.

Contact between individuals serves to cross or break the boundaries of social groups. The notion of boundariesis described by Lamont & Molnár (2002, p. 168) as a demarcation for social actors to indicate a space in which they can perform social action. This can either be a symbolic boundary, which is created in the minds of individuals or a group, or an social boundary, which is the visible and objectified differentiation between groups. The policy of Apartheid, for example, is based on a symbolic boundary, but it translates into physical divisions between the races in South Africa, which is a social boundary. Symbolic boundaries are constructed by stereotypes and sustained by bias towards the 'other'. Bias in relations between two groups is widely recognized in the literature to be the main driver of identity conflicts (Tausch, Schmid, & Hewstone, 2010, p. 77). When groups are strongly biased towards each other, the boundaries of the groups are strongest, creating a strongly defined in-group, and thus a strongly defined out-group (Hogg M. , 2016). When taking Identity-uncertainty Theory in mind, these groups would be considered as highly entitative groups and therefore automatically be more attractive for persons that are highly uncertain. Bias works two ways, as a positive bias towards the in-group and a negative bias towards the out-group (Cunningham, 2006, p. 535). According to Cunningham (2006), intergroup bias comes from the need for self-categorization, as described by SIT. After all, if self-esteem needs to be increased, individuals categorize themselves in groups that are perceived to have positive traits. This positive in-group is relative to other groups, the out-groups. In order to make the in-group seem more positive and thus create more self-esteem for its members, the out-group can be made to seem more negative. It is this mechanism, explained in a simplified way, that causes intergroup bias and the strong boundaries between the in- and out-group. Intergroup contact is used as a mean to decrease the cognitive processes that create these boundaries between people and thus the highly entitative groups (Gavriel & Cairns, 2011).This is assumed to help overcome the symbolic boundaries, and to some extent also the social boundaries, reducing the divisiveness in society and consequently the possibility of an eruption of conflict.

2.1.4 Spatial identity

The last not that needs to be made for this research, is that identity is crucial in creating sociopolitical spaces in regions and nations. These spaces are constituted of territories that are defined by its

borders. According to van Houtum (2010, p. 959), borders insinuate that what lies within the bordered territory, is in some way different than what lies outside of the border. This is part of a process called *'bordering'*. In the case of identity, an individual, or a group of individuals, claim territory and cultural attributes to belong to their specific identity, quite similar to categorization in SIT. Defining what is included, automatically means that what is excluded is also defined. This process is called *'othering'*, which implies a division between the included and excluded, or the 'us' and 'them'. This is very similar to the creation of the in-group and out-group in SIT.

In geographical context, these processes of bordering and othering are strengthened by the creation of narratives and imaginative geographies. Societies create these spaces to create a socio-cultural space that is used as a basis to perform their perception of themselves and create certainty of their own identity (Hogg M. A., 2000; Brewer M. B., 1991; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). In turn these spaces are used to legitimize political action by for nations or regions, creating a national socio-cultural space, in which a national identity can manifest itself. Furthermore, national identity tends to create a certain 'common-sense' for individuals (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 149). This is a sense that is part of the upbringing and defines what is normal and what is not in the light of this upbringing. This makes it difficult to understand individuals with a different or conflictive common-sense. For example, in South-Africa both the whites and the black lay claim on the farmlands. This causes tensions between both communities, because they tend to use different versions of history, thus their common-sense, in order to claim it.

A national identity can be roughly divided in two dimensions (Ha & Jang, 2015). These dimensions are ethnic, which consists of fixed cultural markers and ancestry, and civil, which consists of an imagined kinship through accepting the same political institutions. In accordance with Hogg and Brewer, the ethnic dimension of the identity of individuals makes them search for a commonality with other individuals with a similar ethnic dimension, in order to enable themselves to freely perform their perception of themselves. They establish, transform and maintain the civic dimension of their national identity in order to legitimize the performing of the perception of themselves. Brubaker (1992, p. 16) reasons that identity is therefore the leading force in the creation and implementation of policy, because the interests of a nation are decided by the population that is trying to perform their perception of themselves. However, as van der Zwet (2015, p. 63) argues, this binary approach of national identity lacks a certain refinement, because it states that the ethnic dimension is fixed and the civic dimension is fluid. This would mean that cultural aspects such as religion and language are not changeable, which is not true. Therefore, van der Zwet develops a four dimension model that consists of an ethnic, cultural territorial and civic dimension, which brings more nuance to the operationalization of identity. Van der Zwet defines these dimensions as either inclusive or exclusive

to individuals that are perceived as different. If the excluded individuals are enabled to conform to the features that belong to these dimensions, it is an inclusive dimension. Van der Zwet acknowledges that this can be problematic, because enabling becomes more subjective when regulation is based on culture and history. However, all four dimensions in this approach become fluid, instead of fixed, which creates a more comprehensible basis to look for markers of identity.

According to Anderson, O'Dowd and Wilson (2002, p. 7), it is typically the border place where identities become the most apparent, because the systems of identity come into contact here with other systems of identity. States create borders to defend the democracy of the nation state that is defined by these borders (Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999). They can make a strong demarcation of what features of the state belong to a certain territory and what do not. Furthermore, state borders tend to keep cross-border networks of flows away from the centre, causing the centre to mainly come into contact with the other side of the border through more national flows. However, in the border regions, cross-border networks are more local and tend to cause a stronger exchange of flows of political, economic and cultural origin, such as identity, between both of the sides of the border (Prokkola, Zimmerbauer, & Jakola, 2015, p. 106). Due to the difference between cross-border networks in the centre and the borderlands, the influence of identity on policy-making and implementation could therefore also be different in these places. Cross-border networks, such as identity, can manifest themselves in different ways that are distinguished by Anderson and O'Dowd (1999, p. 596) as political, economic and cultural flows. Generally, the population that has more in common with the society on the other side of the border will draw more heavily on cross-border networks of flows.

2.2 Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is the third important concept that is being examined in this research. Although this research focuses on Northern Ireland, a general overview of peacebuilding, more specifically peacebuilding in identity conflicts, should be given. The specification to conflicts of identity is much needed for the Northern Irish case, which will be further explained in the next chapter. For now, it is enough to know that although there might be different perceptions on the Northern Irish conflict, identity remains a major aspect in all of them. Therefore this section will elaborate on the different approaches to peacebuilding in a post-identity conflict setting and briefly examine the pros and cons of certain approaches.

2.2.1 Phases of Conflict

According to Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011), conflicts are, inaclassical sense, an expression of a clash between different interests, values and beliefs. These clashes tend to occur when (societal) movements are going against the interests, values and beliefs of the established structures. What is important to note is that at least one party in the conflict has the perception that there is something to gain from the other party. If the involved parties of a conflict stop thinking there is anything to gain from a conflict, they will most likely end it.

Figure 1 (retrieved from US Online Training on OSCE)

A conflict takes place in a certain period of time and the different phases of a conflict can be depicted as a parabola (figure 1).

The parabola shows five stages of conflict. According to this diagram, the ideal situation is durable peace. This is the situation in which there is no tension between several parties. If tension between groups rises due to particular circumstances, stable peace is reached. In this phase there is certain manageable tension between the parties, which requires routine diplomacy in order to move back to durable peace. If this fails or if tension rises even further, unstable peace will be the next phase of the conflict. In this phase preventive diplomacy is required in order to make sure that the crisis phase won't be reached. However, when this phase is reached, diplomacy is very hard and requires a delicate approach in order to revert back to the unstable peace situation. A failure of crisis diplomacy results in a war, according to the model. War is the highest stage of the conflict and is the violent outcome of all the tension that has been apparent between multiple groups. This is the phase that generally causes the most loss of life and in which most of the atrocities are committed. The diagram of the phases of conflict shows a parabola. This means that every stage can revert back to the more peaceful phase by using diplomacy. If war is reached however, different measures are needed. This is mainly due to the high loss of life and the atrocities of war that have been committed. Trust between the groups has reached a low-point and needs to be re-established in order to prevent a re-escalation of violence. To de-escalate a war situation and make it a crisis situation again, peace enforcement is needed. Unstable peace is then reached by doing peace keeping. In the unstable peace situation, as well as in the stable peace situation, peacebuilding starts. For this research, the peacebuilding phase is the most important phase, because the European programme that is being examined should be regarded as a peacebuilding measure. Peacebuilding is generally understood as the combination of actions that are trying to create a basis for peace by focusing on structural issues and on the relationships between conflicting parties (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, p. 25). When peacebuilding has succeeded, the ideal situation of durable peace is reached again. This depiction of conflict situations is not by definition equal to how conflicts take place in reality. Especially since after the cold-war, when the common type of armed conflicts changed from interstate to intrastate wars, which will be further discussed in this chapter (Rothstein, 1999, p. 2). However, this parabola of the stages of a conflict provides a good theoretical understanding of the stages of conflict and the general forms of measures that are being taken to de-escalate and transform the conflict to a more stable situation. This helps to clearly explain the topic of this research.

2.2.2 Peacebuilding

The UN states that its peacebuilding efforts are "aimed at assisting countries emerging from conflict, reducing the risk of relapsing into conflict and at laying the foundation for sustainable peace

development" (UN, 2017). This is in line with literature that revolves around peacebuilding. For instance, Gawerc (2006) argues that peacebuilding is the totality of intervention measures that are taken on different levels of society and government to achieve a comprehensive and total peace situation. The necessary distinction she makes is between negative and positive peace, in which the former is merely a cessation of direct violence and the latter also includes the cessation of structural and cultural violence. This distinction is based on the distinction of types of violence that Galtung (1969) has made, predominantly between personal and structural violence. After all, in the distinction made by Gawerc, a peaceful situation is a situation with an absence of violence. Galtung describes violence by using a rather broad definition of it. He argues that if physical or psychological injury could have been avoided, it becomes a matter of violence. This broad understanding of violence helps to gain a broad insight in how an effective peace can be reached. However, one can also argue that this definition is too broad and that a peaceful situation can never be reached when it is being regarded on a basis that is this broad. It is therefore important to understand that the perpetrators of violence and the intentions of their violent acts decide whether one can speak of a conflict situation. Furthermore, a conflict needs to be acknowledged by the involved parties, otherwise it isn't considered to be a conflict.

Peacebuilding efforts are made by all kinds of institutions, international as well as national and even local institutions can have special policies regarding peacebuilding. In general, the contemporary literature on peacebuilding agrees that peacebuilding is an integrated approach towards building a durable, peaceful situation by taking peacebuilding action in almost all aspects of society (Gawerc, 2006; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011).In the modern approaches to peacebuilding, the emphasis is being placed on the nature of conflicts, that supposedly has changed after the Cold War. Traditionally, conflict studies focused on conflicts that manifested themselves as open wars between two states. These were rather simple wars as opposed to the wars that are currently prevailing in the world. Especially, in the post-Cold War period intrastate conflicts became more apparent than the interstate conflicts that had prevailed beforehand. Intrastate wars are generally more asymmetrical, which means that the balance of power is strongly skewed in favor of one of the involved parties. Also, these types of war tend to involve multiple parties and fractured parties that are not always easy to define. This differs from traditional conflicts, because they were mostly between states or decently organized movements and the state. Also, in these 'new wars', as described by Kaldor (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2), the interference of global actors is more common. This causes an overlap of domestic and global interests, which makes the conflict more complicate and therefore it is harder to come to a resolution. Comprehensive peacebuilding in should therefore be seen in the light of these new wars, because they require more comprehensive methods than interstate wars. A prime

example of a ‘new war’ is the Syrian Civil War. This conflict started out as a war between the government and opposing resistance parties. The war soon became an international issue due to several issues, in which a lot of important international actors had something to gain and to defend. Islamic State, the US, European countries, Russia, Turkey and the Kurds are parties that joined in, what already was, a difficult powder keg. The addition of all these new factions has caused an increase of interests, making it harder to reach a peace agreement that could lay the basis for peacebuilding and a durable peace.

2.2.3 Conflicts of identity

As opposed to interstate wars, which are often based on differences in broad ideology, identity is one of the key issues that underlies the new wars. Gawerc (2006) argues that identity conflicts are typically focused on community groups and that the issue of these types of conflict is group rights. Consequently, citizens as part of the identity group are deeply involved into the conflict. They are mobilized to stand up for their rights and to fight the ‘other’ community group on the basis of their identity. Identity is a stronger mobilizer than a simple ideology, because it appeals to every aspect of society and trickles through to daily personal lives. Often, but not always, a skewed balance of power has been historically present as well, which adds to polarization and the sense of injustice. Typically, these new wars manifest themselves in areas that have been formerly colonized. The borders of these post-colonial states often don’t align with the borders of community groups that have been historically present. They tend to cut right through the territories of communities, which is creating minority and majority community groups. In turn, this is making these states prone to issues that are concerned with the political (mis)representation of these groups. Adding to this are all kinds of strategies that were used by colonial rulers to increase their influence in the territories and still resonate through today’s issues. For instance, the fact that colonizers enabled their subjects to migrate to the colonized territories has caused severe polarization between black and white identity groups in South Africa. Another example is the Tutsi identity group, who have been favored by the Belgian colonizer and thus were enabled to occupy the more important professions, which has been one of the, if not the, cause of the Rwandan genocide. It is important to note that identity should be seen as a mobilizer, rather than as something fixed (Kane, 2001, p. 255).

Following the reasoning of the Social Identity Theory, in which individuals place themselves in identity groups that pursue the same goal of decreasing uncertainty, claims can be made by groups on the basis of their identity to decrease uncertainty. A poor identity group can for example claim that they want higher wages. This way, individuals are enabled categorize themselves with groups

that pursue the same goals as the individual. In formerly colonized states, the population of the colonial state had already been categorized by the former colonizing nation that discriminated on the basis of ethnicity, which can be seen as part of an identity. These identity groups tend to have persisted throughout time and they are often perceived as fixed identity groups. However, the fluid characteristic of identity is what makes it a useful mobilizer for activism. In South Africa for example, the black identity became an important overarching identity, in which it didn't matter whether you were Zulu, Xhosa or whatever, as long as you were oppressed by the white community group. They all had the goal to end this oppression. To draw this even further, the identity of being oppressed by the whites was used to unite coloreds, Indians and blacks for the same cause. When Apartheid was abolished, these identity groups were rearranged, and black identity lost some of its importance to tribal categorizations, further indicating the fluidity of identity and its usefulness as a mobilizer. The question arises, when identity is a mobilizer for conflict, can it also be a mobilizer for peace?

2.2.4 Zero-sum conflict

The success of a peacebuilding effort is dependent on the nature and the severity of the conflict, as well as the capacity of national and international peacebuilding institutions (Harriss, 1999). This starts with the conditions on which peace has to be built, the peace agreement. A comprehensive peace agreement, which is theoretically followed after peace enforcement has taken place, lays out the terms under which a durable peace situation can be achieved. In the classical conflict theory, conflict resolution is described as either zero-sum or nonzero-sum. This means that in the end, when the conflict is resolved, there will be a winner and a loser or only losers or only winners. In zero-sum conflict resolution, the party that has won has gained something from the losing party. In this case, the gain of the winning party is equal to the loss of the losing party. Nonzero-sum conflict resolution does not indicate a strict view of equal loss and gain. It can also be on the basis of win-win or lose-lose. There are conflicts that can be resolved by weighing the interests of the involved parties and finding out that these interests are actually not based on a clash of interests but rather on a wrong or narrow perception of what those interests exactly are. By evaluating the interests and finding a common ground a win-win situation can be achieved. However, conflicts tend to end in a lose-lose situation. Mainly due to ignorance of what it is that the other parties are fighting for, each party will go for the most profitable situation for its own (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, p. 13). According to peacebuilding studies, this ignorance and misconception of interests is something that needs to be breached in order to achieve a successful durable peace situation. Peacebuilding in the new wars is in general more difficult than in the traditional wars. This is partly due to the persistence of violence by some of the involved parties and the lack of trust between these parties that need to

work together after the conflict. The focus on identity in these types of war further adds fuel to the difficulties that peacebuilding efforts face.

2.2.5 Peacebuilding stages

Harris (1999, p. 111) distinguishes three broad and interrelated areas where peacebuilding tasks are focused on, namely social, economic and political reconstruction. Not coincidentally, these fields are very similar to the fields of border exchange, as used in theories of O'Dowd and Anderson on borders in Northern Ireland (1999). In both situations the distinction is made to help describe how a society is constructed, be it through border exchange or through peacebuilding efforts. Also, both instances describe a certain relationality between these areas. However, peacebuilding should be seen as a set of policies that directs society towards a certain situation, a durable peaceful situation, whereas border exchange according to O'Dowd and Anderson is rather fluid and doesn't have an end goal. Being a set of policies, peacebuilding is easier to operationalize and it's easier to understand the build-up of a peacebuilding process. Harris operationalizes peacebuilding into four stages (Harriss, 1999), although the first two stages might also be categorized with efforts of peacekeeping.

The first stage is focused on ending the fighting. This starts with signing the peace agreement and the involved parties will simply have to cease the fighting. The terms of the peace agreement are formed during negotiations between the most influential parties in the conflict. In these negotiations the zero-sum or nonzero-sum aspect of the conflict is dealt with. The parties will deal with each other based on the amount of power they have in the conflict, in order to gain on their interests.

During and after this stage, peacebuilding efforts aim at re-establishing civil law and basic utilities will have to be made available for the population. The most important action to take during this stage is to disarm the armed forces of the conflict. By doing this, the monopoly on violence is returned back to the state, which is believed to form one of the bases that is needed to create an effective civil law. In international peacebuilding studies, there are two interventions that are strongly favored when dealing with a post-conflict situation that is in stage two of the peacebuilding process. This is the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and the process of weapon reduction (Muggah, 2005). Weapon reduction is the most practical approach to the disarmament side of DDR. It simply requires all citizens that are subject to the (re-)installed government to hand over all arms that would otherwise help to spark an armed conflict when tensions rise again. The difference with the disarmament phase of DDR, is that DDR is mainly focused on reintegration in society of combatants that are part of the peace process. Muggah argues that this isn't comprehensive enough and that a general weapon reduction, integrated with DDR, would be more

effective. According to Theidon (2007), DDR takes place on three levels that have to be balanced between the desire for peace and the desire for justice. These levels are the combatants laying down their arms, governments that want to end conflict and the communities that are required to take in the combatants that have often violently affected them. This balancing act, as well as the integrated intervention on different levels, is quite typical to most types of peacebuilding intervention and can be seen in all stages of peacebuilding.

The third stage of peacebuilding takes place when the peacebuilding process has advanced somewhat further and moved beyond the initial two stages. This stage is particularly aimed at economic revitalization and state-building efforts. On the basis of the peace agreement that was signed in the first stage, all kinds of measures will be taken to recreate a government that is in line with the terms of the peace agreement. Depending on this agreement, elections will be held or old institutions will be reformed or reinstalled. This way the legitimacy of the new state is secured and the different people in society should feel represented by their new government. In this stage, the peacebuilding also starts with truth and reconciliation efforts to help appease the sense of justice among victims of the conflict. This is a very delicate intervention method, in the sense that the balancing act between justice and the desire for peace is quite hard in this stage. A common issue is that there is a polarization between victims and perpetrators that will put a strain on the peacebuilding efforts (Borer, 2003, p. 1091). Furthermore, in such complicated conflicts it is often hard to attribute 'guilt' and a suitable punishment to the perceived perpetrators. For instance, did the person that shot the gun commit the crime, or was he merely following orders from the upper-hand? Also, the line between terrorist and freedom-fighter can be quite thin, because in the new wars these tend to be based on perceptions and different interpretations that are based on the different identities.

Stage four is the last stage of peacebuilding and is predominantly focused on changing the underlying structures of society, which is also known as nation-building. Basically it is trying to move everybody in society in the same direction, which is towards a durable and peaceful future. In this future, the possibility of a re-escalation of violence has been decreased to a bare minimum. Nation-building is done by implementing structural changes and formalizing the 'new society' that is envisioned by the new government. Furthermore, this is typically the timeframe in which institutions are built that help to solve issues that could spark the conflict, in a non-violent way. The goal here is to create a so-called 'culture of peace', meaning that the general public is aware of the necessity of peace.

2.2.6 Right to self-determination & power-sharing/partition

If a durable peace situation is to be achieved, the root-causes of the conflict need to be addressed. When identity is an important aspect of a conflict, the differences between the involved identity groups tend to be marked and strengthened by the conflict. After all, if a group can define why they are different than the other and explain why both identities don't fit together in a state, that group gains legitimacy to more self-determination. Predominantly based on the right of self-determination of the peoples, which is a key principle in international law. The right to self-determination works on two sides. On the one hand as a defense principle to external forces that want to break state-integrity, and on the other hand as an internal mechanism that ensures equal political representation for the different peoples in the state itself (Melandri, 2015). Therefore, it is practical for the group that wants more self-determination to look for differences from other groups in the state, in order to address the perceived unequal representation in the state.

The right to self-determination leads to two general options that are suitable to satisfy the need for autonomy and equal rights. The more extreme option is secession of the so-called 'rump'-state, by creating a new state that is built along the norms and values of the identity group that is trying to improve its self-esteem. The other option is power-sharing, in which the integrity of the state remains, but the governmental system is reformed into a system that is based on the different identity groups that are in conflict. Examples can be provided from all over the world, especially of secession, the most recent example being South-Sudan. One of the most recent examples of a power-sharing government is Northern Ireland. This is not by definition a form of government that is installed through a peace agreement. In Belgium for example, the power-sharing government was installed without Flemish and Walloon people going into violent conflict with each other. Lijphart argues that it is generally more difficult in divided societies to maintain a democratic government (Lijphart, 2004). Therefore a government in such a society should focus on power-sharing, thus equal representation of community groups, and group-autonomy, which means that communities can decide on some matters for their own community. The positive side of this, is that political representation of community groups is ensured, which his supposed to secure the need for self-esteem of community groups. Consequently, this lowers the need to go into conflict with the other community and thus decreases the chance of a re-escalation of the conflict. The power-sharing model of the government makes extensive collaboration on the basis of the differences necessary, because not doing so will blockade political progress. However, opponents of the power-sharing model argue that the division in identities that have been the basis of the conflict are maintained through the system of power-sharing, because the political parties are often still organized according to that same division

2.2.7 Social Recategorization

Since peacebuilding is a dynamic concept, it is not always clear as to which approaches to peacebuilding are right or wrong for a specific conflict. At current, case-specific interventions are the norm in peacebuilding. However, in the literature efforts are being made to categorize specific interventions that have a similar approach. This also goes for peacebuilding in conflicts of identity. Traditionally, the literature that is concerned with the management of relations between (ethnic) groups is focused on two extremes (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). These are assimilation, aiming for a culturally homogeneous society, on the one hand and multiculturalism, aiming for a culturally heterogeneous society, on the other. Modern literature on peacebuilding has distinguished other approaches that lie in between these extremes. McKeown et al. (2016) have tried to distinguish several of these approaches by using the Social Identity Theory as a framework to look at several cases from all over the world. They seem to distinguish the types of peacebuilding interventions based on types of categorization. As previously discussed, identity in the Social Identity Theory manifests itself by comparison with other groups and identities, tending to focus on dissimilarities between these groups. In this view, identity is strongly relative and relational to other identity perceptions. The fluidness of identity causes individuals to constantly categorize themselves and others into groups or social categories. When taking the Uncertainty-Identity Theory in mind, which is identified as the main driver behind categorization, conflict should be seen as a consequence of the strive for increasing and/or maintaining group esteem. The out-group with lower esteem will try to gain esteem by trying to equalize with the in-group in some way. This is often perceived by the in-group as threatening and is therefore cited as the sources of conflicts of identity (Tausch, Schmid, & Hewstone, 2010, p. 78). This identity threat is operationalized by Branscombe et al. (1999, p. 36) into four general types of threat that cause intergroup tension and thus possibly conflict. The first type is the threat of being categorized against one's will. The second is when the in-group characteristics are being merged with that of the out-group, consequently decreasing the distinctiveness of the in-group from the out-group. Where, in the first type of threat, someone is being made distinctive from others against one's will, the distinctiveness threat makes people lose their distinct social identity which causes friction. Thirdly, the tendency of groups to positively evaluate their in-group identity and thereby evaluating the out-group in a negative way, causes threats to value. The meaning of a shared group value can change over time due to all kinds of circumstances. When the shared value changes from something positive into something negative, the associated group feels threatened, because it changes the meaning of their identity. Lastly, when an in-group member or a set of in-group members are feeling less accepted by the in-group, they can feel threatened in their position within

that group and thus in their identity. These types of social identity threat, related to the desire to decrease personal uncertainty, form the basis on which inter-group conflict arises. In order to decrease the uncertainty that derives from these threats, personal and group esteem should be increased or maintained. As discussed, a consequence of the increase of esteem is in-group and out-group bias. This bias reproduces a positive view of the in-group and a negative view of the out-group. This has all kinds of implications for a society and even more for a society that is consisted of a certain in-group and one or more out-groups. Intergroup bias can trickle through from a social setting into the political setting, in which political measures are being taken to decrease the out-groups position in that society, in favor of the often larger, dominant in-group. These political measures tend to create distinctiveness, therefore ultimately reducing personal uncertainty for members of the in-group, which makes a very stable in-group. Society as a whole, however, tends to become highly divisive, because the out-group is likely to feel increasingly threatened. When action can be taken to increase the position of the in-group, there must also be interventions that increase the position of the out-group to become more equal to the in-group. This is where peacebuilding in conflicts of identity comes into play. The following cases exemplify the approaches that are outlined by McKeown et al. and help to elucidate the different categorization methods that can be used by peacebuilding intervention to structure society in a less divisive way and thus create a society that is less inclined to conflict.

The South African apartheid period is an example in which one group, the (Afrikaner) whites tried to maintain their self-esteem by denying the other groups, black, colored and Indian communities the same rights and freedoms as they had (Huber, 2013). In the post-apartheid period, the different groups were being leveled to each other. The basis of the apartheid, namely skin-color, was being taken away by political leaders that tried to create an overarching, South African identity that did not have one color, but was based on the narrative of the multi-colored rainbow-nation. During the presidency of Nelson Mandela, South African diversity was extensively propagated and then especially the tolerance that they believed should accompany this diversity (Evans, 2010, p. 323). The new identity was a concept that could be adopted by all kinds of groups that lived in South Africa, who were all of different color and origin, but, nevertheless, part of the same rainbow. In peacebuilding in conflicts on identity, there is an importance in trying to balance the self-esteem of the groups that are involved in the conflict. Hogg (2010) argues that in a post-conflict situation, distinctiveness should be valued, while common group goals should be formulated in order to move forward to a durable peace situation. Valuing differences between groups of people increases self-esteem, and formulating shared goals creates an overlap of the groups, which, combined together, should be beneficial for the peace process. However, as a result of the rainbow-nation narrative, the

nation turned more inward, making the South African identity relative to other African nationalities (Klotz, 2016). Hence, with the immigration of other Africans that wanted to work in South Africa, a new form of divisiveness started to arise between 'South African' blacks and black migrant groups that were searching for employment in the same sectors as black South Africans. According to Meyer, Durrheim and Foster (2016), the divisiveness has changed from being based on racial characteristics to being based on class characteristics.

A similar, albeit more extensive, approach to peacebuilding can be seen in Rwanda, where the difference in ethnicity was the underlying motive for the Hutu and the Tutsi group to go into conflict. When the violent conflict was resolved, peacebuilding in Rwanda emphasized on the creation of a national identity and is trying to degrade the value of ethnic identities such as the Hutu and Tutsi identity. Different to the case of South Africa, in Rwanda the peacebuilding is focused on making the ethnicity-based identities meaningless, which should prevent new eruptions of violence. After all, there is no reason to fight over something that doesn't have meaning. The homogeneity of the Rwandese society was emphasized by pointing out shared Hutu and Tutsi characteristics.

In South Africa, the Rainbow Nation narrative emphasizes on the heterogeneity of South African society and made this heterogeneity a shared characteristic of South African identity. The difference between the South African and the Rwandan approach to peacebuilding illustrates the two manners of an intervention method called 'social recategorization'. This is extensively examined by Dovidio and Gaertner (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). In principal, social recategorization is the revaluation of the relation between subordinate (ordered 'below' other identities)and superordinate identities (ordered 'above' other identities). It is based on the common in-group identity model, which proposes that tension between groups should reduce when the bias between these groups is removed. In order to do this, the boundaries of the groups need to be removed and the groups need to be placed in a different category or the meaning of the category needs to change. Essentially, the notion of 'them' and 'us' needs to change into a collective 'we', creating a common identity (Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson, 2010). The 'we' category becomes more important than the divisive 'them' and 'us' categories. In the South African case, one can speak of dual recategorization, were both the subordinate (Afrikaner, Tschwana, Zulu etc.) and the superordinate identity ('South African') are valued.The Rwandan case is an example of single recategorization, which values the superordinate identity ('Rwandan') over the subordinate identities (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa), ultimately replacing the subordinate identities with the superordinate identity.

Besides recategorization, decategorization is also an approach that can be taken to rearrange the structures of identity that are underlying the conflict. When peacebuilding is aimed at decategorization of the identity groups, individual representation becomes the most important form of identity. Members of identity groups view themselves and others as separate individuals. The idea is that, in this case, personal interaction transcends bias towards members from other groups (Gaertner, et al., 2000, p. 101). When engaged in personal contact, the valuable information of an out-group member that is important to that specific person will be engaged with, rather than the information that derives from group membership. Over time, extensive and repeated personal contact with out-group members will decrease the value of the stereotype of the entire out-group, therefore reduce bias and consequently decrease intergroup tension. However, personalized contact needs to meet some requirements in order to be successful. Among others, equal status of the groups needs to be present. They need to have the same social capacity. Furthermore, cooperative intergroup interaction is needed, as well as the government or leading authorities, who should create spaces in which this personal contact is facilitated. In a way, this personal contact should remove the entire group-group interaction and replace it with individual-individual interaction. However, Ensari and Miller (2001, p. 195), as well as Crisp and Hewstone (1999, p. 670),argue that decategorization doesn't necessarily overcome differences, but creates sub-groups within the in- and out-group that are valued more positively. This way, the in-group/out-group dichotomy can still remain and conflict is still plausible. Furthermore, following the Uncertainty-identity Theory, it is likely that when an individual is feeling increasingly uncertain about one's self, that person might revert back to self-categorization and therefore set the entire process of creating intergroup bias in going again.

In a society that is transitioning from a conflict situation to a peaceful situation, social recategorization is a rather delicate matter. Firstly, the choice between dual or single recategorization is difficult. According to Dovidio and Gaertner, single categorization is generally more effective in the long-term, but is in danger of neglecting issues that revolve around reconciliation and justice. After all, when a group is being devalued to non-existence, it isn't really clear who its members are. If that isn't clear, then who is reconciliation and justice for? When a group has been done harm during a conflict, but that group has been degraded in importance by peacebuilding action, it will become less clear for who the peacebuilding efforts are meant. This tends to create new groups of victims and perpetrators, who have directly been affected by conflict, neglecting the indirectly affected people. Dual categorization tends to be more effective in the short-term, but the equalized valuing of these identities can also become troublesome with regard to reconciliation issues, especially when the conflict has been particularly violent. Opposite to the single categorization, reconciliation will be needed for every social category and contentious issues will

cause a lot of 'old' conflicting sentiments to boil up again. After all, when all the social categories are valued the same, you cannot have the appearance of choosing sides. This is for instance a problem in South-Africa, where Afrikaner-street- and city-names are being replaced by Swahili names. It is argued that this contributes to the sense of justice for the black part of the population, because they have the feeling that they were conquered by the Afrikaner and their culture. However, these measures have a strong impact on the Afrikaner population, because they have to let go of their heritage. This is a difficult situation and merely one of the multitude of examples that can be given on this issues around reconciliation. Conflicting interests make it hard to value all social categories the same, especially when there are so many contentious issues. Another issue that is very apparent with dual categorization is that by sustaining the subordinate identities that were part of the conflict, it can be argued that the conflict is, unintentionally, sustained as well. When the division is the driver behind the conflict, making this division institutional doesn't necessarily seem to be the best idea. However, it must be noted that the idea of dual categorization is that social categories with the same value, and thus the same level of esteem, will not engage in violence anymore. Institutionalizing it creates an institutional basis for leveling the esteem. Decategorization is, similarly to single categorization, more effective in the long-term, but, as stated before, is vulnerable to loss of esteem. This causes individuals to move back to the categories of the conflict that are generally highly entitative, in order to increase self-esteem.

The decategorization effort in South Africa seems to focus on shared goals. All subcategories of identity are placed under the umbrella of the superordinate South African identity category, that has the goal of being a harmonious, heterogeneous society. The shared goal contributed to the process of creating a superordinate identity. Sherif (1958) defines these as superordinate goals, which are goals that are *'compelling and highly appealing to members of two or more groups in conflict, but which cannot be attained by the resources and the energies of the groups separately'* (Sherif, 1958, pp. 349-350). In order for the superordinate goals to have a positive effect on intergroup relations, activities that involve both groups need to be undertaken. These activities need to work towards the superordinate goal, which has a cumulative effect and decreases friction and intergroup bias overtime. Dovidio and Gaertner (2000, p. 108) argue that by installing these superordinate goals, the path is cleared for decreasing the sense of 'them' and 'us'. Recategorization and decategorization intervention efforts should be the methods that follow the cleared path. Recategorization and decategorization efforts should use superordinate goals as a mean to achieve a reduction of tension between groups. When superordinate goals are used as a mean, they see a certain pattern emerging. At first it starts with group-to-group contact, in which activities take place that work towards a superordinate goal. The importance of a common, superordinate identity is stressed upon, which

encourages recategorization. Consequently, overtime, the subordinate identity groups lose value and superordinate identity group becomes dominant. The removal of in-group and out-group friction means that person-to-person contact tends to become more apparent, facilitating decategorization.

It is noticeable that decategorization emphasizes so much on person-to-person contact. According to Ensari and Miller (2001), decategorization should be conceptually divided in differentiated decategorization and personalized decategorization. The approach of differentiated decategorization is a top-down approach, in which the authorities or other organizations are creating awareness of individual distinction among the population. Personalized decategorization, on the other hand, focuses on a personal, bottom-up approach, in which personal contact is of key-importance. The latter approach is in line with the general understanding of contemporary peacebuilding intervention methods. These tend to, as Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011, p. 21) mention, emphasize on the integration of peacebuilding on all levels with a bottom-up approach. This way, long-term relationships between the conflicting parties are strengthened at the base, which should have an effect on higher level policy-making. In modern peacebuilding intervention that is based on decategorization, one should therefore expect to find a strong presence of personalized decategorization and a smaller form of differentiated decategorization. It is likely that this also counts for decategorization efforts, when contemporary peacebuilding literature is followed. A bottom-up approach to trying to restructure the identity categories, supported by top-down awareness and institutionalization of these identity categories. However, for whatever reason, in the formerly discussed cases of South Africa and Rwanda, the recategorization efforts do seem to be very strongly focused on a top-down approach. One of the main points in personal contact is that quality goes over quantity. As Sugden (1997, p. 53) explains, it is paramount that the moments of contact between the identity groups need to improve the sense of commonality, rather than detract from it. Therefore, this should be the goal, rather than creating as many contact moments as possible. Furthermore, as previously stated, person-to-person contact needs to be accompanied by an equal status of the involved groups in order to successfully decategorize the groups. The process that aims to create an equal status of groups is generally referred to as ‘capacity-building’. The capacity of the apparent identity groups will be increased in order to make group members feel secure enough to actively participate in cross-community activities. This is not only seen in decategorization, but can also be observed in dual recategorization, in which communities are equalized under the superordinate umbrella-identity.

Chapter - 3 - The Research

3.1 Methodology

As stated, the goal of this research is to find out what the approach of the PEACE Programme in the matter of identity is. In order to adequately research this, the observances must be made on different levels of the PEACE Programme. The viewpoint must switch from the local level in Northern Ireland where it is implemented, to the higher policy-level. The primary approach to gathering data for this research is doing interviews with organizations that are part of these levels of the PEACE Programme. After decomposing the PEACE Programme and its organizational structure, three levels of the PEACE Programme can be distinguished. The higher level, the intermediate level and the lower level. The higher level is preoccupied with distributing the funds and being the medium that links the local projects with the EU policy-makers. This level is made up of the SEUPB, the managing authority of the PEACE Programme. In the third installment of the PEACE Programme, they were supported by two advisory organs, POBAL and the Community Relations Council, in the form of a consortium. All three of these organizations have been interviewed, covering the entire higher governance level of the PEACE Programme. The intermediate level is consisting of organizations that are dealing with the distribution of funds, but that also manage the individual projects. These organizations are typically local councils, but can also be larger peacebuilding organizations that operate throughout Ireland, the UK or other places in the world. For this level the Belfast City Council and Cooperation Ireland have been interviewed. The third and lowest level is the implementation level. In this level organizations are receiving funding from either the intermediate or the higher level of the PEACE Programme and are using it for their projects that contribute to the peacebuilding goal of the PEACE Programme. In this level several organizations have been interviewed. Firstly, the Fellowhsip of the Messines, that operates in Belfast and other places throughout Northern Ireland and the Republic. Furthermore, the interviews were held with two organizations that explicitly work in Belfast, Turas and the Ashton Centre, and two that explicitly work in Derry/Londonderry, the Gasyard Development Trust and the Londonderry/Derry Playhouse. This covers the spatial differentiation, because Derry is a city in the border area and Belfast is the main city that makes up the center of Northern Ireland. This way the border-centre dynamic in terms of the approach towards identity can be observed.

Due to the delicate nature of the subject ‘identity’ in Northern Ireland, the research requires an in-depth approach, rather than a broad one. The PEACE programme has the goal to ease the tensions between both communities, which is something that is sensitive to these communities that have

been the victim of these tensions. Therefore, the notion of decategorization could be seen as a threat towards the traditional identities for example. The organizations that are leading the projects will most probably not admit that they are influencing these identities. Thoughtless questioning might result in politically correct, but truthfully incorrect answers. To minimize the effect of this, careful and specific questioning probably proves to be more useful in order to gather the results that are needed for an adequate research. Also, the view on communities and the traditional division is quite strongly manifested in Northern Ireland, which might have caused the interviewees to always observe things from this viewpoint. In-depth questioning could go deeper than this community-framework and clarify the approaches that the organizations are taking. When reasoning this way, an in-depth, qualitative approach is more suitable to this research, rather than a broad, quantitative research. The lack of a large amount of possible respondents also adds to the reasons to favor an in-depth, qualitative approach. The amount of projects that have been realized with funding of the PEACE programme is not enough to conduct a substantive broad, quantitative research. In a qualitative, broad research, interviews are generally the mean to gather data. For this research a semi-structured interview would be the most suitable. This style of interviewing uses a structured list of questions as a common thread, but allows us to divert from this list and to delve deeper into the answers that are given by respondents. This makes it easier to avoid politically correct answers and expose the approach of the PEACE programme in the matter of identity.

The usage of semi-structured interviews as a mean to gather data, requires a qualitative approach to processing the gathered data. The interviews are fully transcribed and coded according to the research question and its sub-questions. Arranging the codes this way ensures that the sub-questions can be answered correctly and helps to give an elaborate answer to the main research question. The coding and structuring of the transcripts will be done with the help of the coding-software AtlasTi. This software also enables us to make network overviews of the codes, which will further enhance the comprehensibility of the answers to the sub-questions and therefore the main research question. The coding of the data will be guided by the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This method is used for qualitative research and focuses on language in particular (Fairclough, 2003, p. 2). This enables the uncovering of hidden meanings of a text, such as an interview, which is useful for bypassing the expected political correctness. The main focus of CDA is to find discourses that can help to elucidate relations of dominance, power and control between complex structures, such as the structures of identity in Northern-Ireland (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000, p. 448).

Fairclough distinguishes three dimensions of social interaction, namely social structures, social events and social practice (2003, p. 23). Social structures are a set of norms defined by a social group. The structure is abstract and defines what could be a possible outcome of social interaction, rather

than defining what the outcome is. Social events, on the other hand, are the actual outcome of social interaction within the structure. The structure has an intermediate relationship with social events, because they both define and are defined by these social structures. This intermediate relationship is constructed by social practice. Discourses are social practices, focused on language (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 6; Fairclough, 2003, p. 123). They derive from the textual or verbal statements that are made by individuals or groups of individuals that give shape to the social practice. They can be found in the social practice and therefore are framed by and reframe the social structure. In the case of this research, the identities in Northern-Ireland are the social structure. It seems as if the PEACE Programme tries to change the social events by trying to reframe the social structures, trying to create identity structures that are less based on conflict and more on cooperation and cohesion between both community groups. For this research, the social practice of the projects in the PEACE Programme are examined, in order to find out whether the discourse on identity is different in places with a different ratio of Catholic and protestant communities. The use of language in the interviews helps to elucidate the influence of identity on the projects of the PEACE programme.

The data that is gathered through executing and analyzing the interviews is complemented by academic sources, newspaper articles, surveys and census data on Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the observances that have been acquired in the field during the research also add to the data. Multiple academics have been approached during the research and a relatively large amount of meetings that dealt with peacebuilding and commemoration in Northern Ireland have been visited. The latter form of data has been written down as notes in a sketch, which also has been analyzed in Atlas.ti.

3.2 Conceptual model

Several models can be designed based on the literature. Firstly, there is the circle of self-categorization model (figure 2), that derives from combining the Social Identity Theory by Tajfel (2010), the theory of identity-uncertainty by Hogg (2000) and theories on conflicts of identity, such as by McKeown et al. (2016) and Rambotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011). As the model depicts, it is an ongoing circle of self-categorization and conflict. Self-categorization, which is done from individual uncertainty, leads to the individual placing him-/herself in a group. This tends to create a positively perceived in-group and a negatively perceived out-group. This bias towards the other leads to threats to the availability of resources, but also threats that are based on identity. When this isn't



Figure 2: The cycle of self-categorization and conflict

countered, this eventually culminates into conflict, which will lead to individual uncertainty and renew the process of self-categorization.

To add to this model, the theory of Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) has also resulted in a conceptual model that helps to elucidate on the manners that in-group and out-group bias can be overcome. This way the likelihood of a perceived threat by either of the communities is reduced and conflict is prevented. So, this essentially is a way of peacebuilding, also used by the PEACE Programme. This is the core of the research, as it tries to find out which approach the PEACE Programme is using. The model in figure # illustrates the different approaches that peacebuilding interventions have in terms of identity. The goal of the research is to find out which step the PEACE Programme is situated on in the centre and in the border area.



Figure 3: The conceptual model of recategorization and decategorization

Chapter - 4 - The Conflict in Northern Ireland

The conflict that taunted Northern Ireland in the second half of the 20th century, better known as the Troubles, has been extensively examined by scholars all over the world. Its location within the United Kingdom, Europe and the Western World, combined with the relatively long-lasting violence of the conflict made it very important and accessible to study. When one looks into the examinations of the conflict, the contentiousness in its meaning becomes apparent. To some the conflict is a struggle for civil rights in Northern Ireland, whilst to others it is part of a century-long struggle for disposal of colonial rule. A general certainty however is that the segregation of Northern Irish society into two particular groups has played a considerable part in the run-up to the Troubles, the Troubles itself and in the peace process afterwards. Therefore, in order to properly understand the Troubles, one needs to understand how the Northern Irish society and the relation between the segregated communities developed throughout the centuries. This chapter deals with the different stages that, arguably, have been part of the lead-up to the conflict and specifically pays attention to identity in these stages.

4.1 Anglo-Norman era

When discussing the history of Northern Ireland, it is very hard to overlook its relation with the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Although Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, it is the only country in the UK that is not situated on the island of Great Britain, but on the island of Ireland together with the Republic of Ireland. In the early medieval era, Anglo-Norman lords came to the island of Ireland to conquer lands and claim their authority over the island and its local, Gaelic inhabitants. The Anglo-Norman lords, officially under the name of the English king, quarrelled with Gaelic lords over land and power in Ireland. Some scholars might argue that this, what happened 800 years ago, has created the foundation of the Anglo-Irish conflict (Muldoon, 2004). Gaelic society was based on a clan system that derives from the iron-age. The Anglo-Norman society was based on the feudal system, which originates from the western-roman period. Hierarchy is one of the most important characteristics of feudalism. This hierarchy created a situation in which the English crown could increase its influence in Ireland through individual Anglo-Norman lords that conquered land from Gaelic lords for themselves and the crown at the same time. However, over the course of the following centuries, the English Crown had lost its influence over these Anglo-Norman

lords to Gaelic culture. Beyond the area of Dublin (known as 'the Pale') Gaelic influence became very strong as the Anglo-Norman lords became Gaelicized (Canny, 1973).

4.2 The Plantations

In the 16th century, the English ruler Henry VIII tried to regain the English grip on Ireland by 'planting' loyal, English and Scottish subjects in Ireland. The focus was on Anglicizing the island and trying to assimilate local Gaelic rulers into the English system. The plantation period is the most important period that explains the origin of the issues that created the division in the Northern-Irish society. By planting the English subjects on Gaelic dominated land, the Crown consolidated its power, but it also created a division that has lasted, in varying intensity, from that period in the 16th century to the present. Although the initial plantations mostly failed to significantly increase the influence of the English king in Ireland, the plantations in the North of Ireland that were ordered under king James I were more successful in achieving their goal. The North of Ireland, or Ulster as it was and is sometimes still referred to, had remained outside the control of English lords, up until king James' orders. When the main Gaelic lord in Ulster was beaten by the English and fled in an event which is known as 'the flight of the Earls'. The Gaelic Irish inhabitants of that area dispersed and English and Scottish settlers were being planted to replace them. This is where the division becomes very clear. Gaelic-speaking, Irish, Catholic people that were removed from their land to be replaced by English-speaking, British, protestant people. An important note to make here is that political motives were ruling the divisions between the groups of people during these times. The English Crown had conquered the last, large Gaelic area of influence and did not want Gaelic rebellions that would undermine their authority over the island. Physically dividing Irish from English and Scottish people made it easier to regulate and combat these rebellions. Arguments can be made that, and are often made, that this was essentially the colonization of Ireland (Canny, 1973). The characteristics of planting settlers and the views that were created around the Irish people, as being 'backwards' to the English, were quite similar to for example how the English colonized America and their views on the indigenous inhabitants. However, the close proximity of Ireland to Great Britain and the mutual cultural exchange that had existed and exists throughout the centuries is an argument against this. The Ulster plantation started the strong division between what is perceived as Catholic Irish and protestant British culture. This has persisted throughout the centuries up until the Troubles and even after. Often it is thought that this division is the primary division in the Northern Irish society and the basis of the Troubles, but this actually is one of the overlying identifications that is adding to the segregation. The basis of the Troubles should be found in the political situation at that time. Ever since the English started to consolidate their power in Ireland, the indigenous Irish have been

contesting English claims with violent uprisings and rebellions. In turn, the English had initiated the so-called penal-laws which were severely discriminating towards the Catholic Irish.

4.3 Home-rule and independence

In 1798, a protestant-led rebellion in Ireland, known as the Irish Rebellion of 1798, was cracked down by the UK government. It might seem strange that protestants were the leading force behind this rebellion, but it must be regarded in context with the spirit of that time. Predominantly influenced by the American and French revolutions, liberal protestants in Ireland sought to reform the situation and increase autonomy with the help of the Catholic population. After the UK defeated the uprising, Ireland was, for the first time, in its entirety under control of the British crown. In the following century, several incidents, such as the Great Famine and the Easter Rising, eventually led to a large-scale rebellion that forced the British government to consider independence of Ireland. After a long struggle for more autonomy that predominantly came from Catholic Irish, the so-called Home-Rule Bill was adopted. After three previously discarded Home Rule amendments in 1886, 1893 and 1914, the fourth version was approved of in 1920, albeit due to a violent independence war of the Catholic Irish. It created two separate states on the island of Ireland, the Irish Free State, which later became the Republic of Ireland (RoI), and Northern Ireland.

The creation of two separate countries on the island formed the basis of the division that is the most important one in the Troubles. The political division between groups that wanted Northern Ireland to join the RoI and groups that wanted Northern Ireland to remain in the union with the UK. The nationalists and the republicans are historically pro-unification and like to see a unified Ireland, for love of Irish culture, for the republican ideal or for both reasons. Unionists and loyalists are opposed to this view and want the union between Great Britain and (Northern) Ireland to remain. This was a division that was already apparent during the call for Home Rule, but has remained very important in Northern Ireland. This adds to the dichotomous characteristics that create the segregation in Northern Ireland. In line with this characteristic is the division between Irish and British people. This identification seems to be based on background and therefore in line with nationalism and unionism. After all, it makes sense that a British person would like to remain in Britain and an Irish person would like to join the republic of Ireland. However, in reality this is not as simple. Irish and British tends to refer more to culture and sometimes ethnicity and is therefore harder to demarcate. Also, as Brewer (2015, p. 211) points out, the connection between religion and political opinion, thus whether Northern Ireland should be independent or remain in the union, is somewhat outdated and stems from a sectarian view on society that has changed. However, these three dichotomies of

political view, cultural view and religious denomination do tend to be strong indicators for the social groups that divide Northern Ireland. The Catholic, nationalist/republican, Irish (CNR) community on the one hand and the protestant, unionist/loyalist, British (PUL) community on the other. The chance that a nationalist or republican affiliates with being Irish and Catholic is rather high, therefore excluding Protestantism, unionism and loyalism and to some extent Britishness. This obviously also works the other way around. These two dichotomous communities form the basis of the violent conflict during the Troubles.

4.4 The Troubles

As mentioned before, the Troubles can be interpreted as an outcome of the desire for equal civil rights, or as the last chapter in Ireland's struggle for independence, or perhaps a combination of both. Fact is that the Troubles were severely fuelled by the discrimination of the Catholics by the protestant-led Northern Irish government. Soon after the Fourth Home-Rule Bill was signed, the protestant population consolidated its hold on Northern Ireland. In fact, this already started before the Fourth Home Rule Bill was actually signed. The entire make-up of Northern Ireland, which constituted of six out of nine countries of the province of Ulster, was designed to keep a demographic balance that was slightly in favour of the protestant population. Incorporating the other three counties of Ulster would have meant a strong increase in the amount of Catholics in Northern Ireland. Predominantly due to the 'first past the post' system, this made it easier for the protestant unionists to grab and hold their power in the new country. However, it must be said that the majority of power over Northern Ireland lied with the UK government, rather than with the local Northern Irish government. Under the protestant rule, certain actions were taken that caused the Catholic Irish population of Northern Ireland to feel discriminated against. Gudgin (1999) names two areas in which this took place, namely in the housing sector and in employment in especially the public sector, but also in the private sector. Adding to this was the sense of discrimination in the legal system, supported by a police force that consisted predominantly of protestants/unionists. Gudgin also mentions gerrymandering as one of the discriminatory problems of Northern Ireland at the time. The careful and deliberate outlining of electoral areas secured unionist votes with a small majority of votes, due to the 'first past the post' system.

Although civil rights movements named these practices discrimination based on them being Catholic, some might argue that it was simply a historical and demographic concurrence of circumstances, fuelled by bigotry and segregation from both sides of the Northern Irish population. However, the fact of the matter still is that there was an overrepresentation of unemployed and homeless

Catholics. Also, reports of excessive police violence were not uncommon in the period before and during the Troubles, which indicates a certain discriminatory, or at least divisive, attitude towards Catholics. This probably stems from a fear that was installed among Northern Irish protestants over the centuries. A fear of Northern Ireland being ruled by Catholics and joining with the Republic. This would mean that their community would lose power to decide for themselves, which, in this dichotomous society, was something to be afraid of. As mentioned by one of the interviewees, one must keep in mind that there is a long history of fighting and distrust between English and Gaelic and protestant and Catholic identity-groups in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Supported by historic images and imaginative geographies of Catholic Irish being more backwards than the protestants created a certain basis for these discriminatory actions.

During the 1960's, civil rights movements were created all over the world, such as for instance the Black Panthers in the Unites States. In Northern Ireland, a civil rights movement started to address the unequal situation of Catholic Irish. Initially this was peaceful, but after several violent incidents from the protestant government, as well as from violent republican groups, this changed into a destructive spiral, based on revenge and retaliation. As violence between both communities increased, so did the segregation in all aspects of life. People tended to revert back to their community in order to stay safe from bombings and shootings of paramilitary organization of both sides of the conflict, most notably the UVF, the UDA and the IRA. After several decades of bombing and shooting, but not actually getting anywhere, the communities grew tired of fighting. With help, or under pressure, of the United States, the UK and the RoI, a peace agreement was signed in 1998, named the Belfast Agreement, or the Good Friday Agreement. The agreement was signed by the government of the RoI and the UK, to first and foremost, declare that the status of Northern Ireland had changed, as well as remained the same. It would remain part of the union with the UK, but if a majority of the population wishes, it could become part of the RoI, under full support of the UK. This is of major importance for the independence struggle by nationalists and republicans, but also keeps the unionists and their identity secure. The second part of the agreement mentions all kinds of new authorities that will be installed in Northern Ireland, the consociational devolved government being the most important. This new government, the Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA), is supposed to give a fairer representation of the communities that are present in Northern Ireland. It is a design that is based on cross-community rule and has all kinds of safeguards in place to ensure that this happens, such as the right to veto and the need for a weighed majority vote. Other institutions that have been formed are North-South and East-West institutions, in which the former actively works on Northern Irish-Irish relations and the latter on British-(Northern) Irish relations. In the last section of the Belfast Agreement, equality and civil rights are ensured for all people in Northern Ireland, supported by

organizations that are meant to promote and secure this. It speaks of reformations in the system of justice and the police force, obviously in order to make the position of Catholic Irish more equal to that of the protestants. After signing the Belfast Agreement, the most influential involved parties were committed to creating peace and stability, paving the way for peacebuilding interventions that could further enhance this peace, such as the EU PEACE Programme.

Chapter - 5 - Identity in Northern Ireland

In order to understand the PEACE Programme and the context in which it operates, this chapter will elucidate on identity in Northern Ireland. Firstly, it deals with the traditional division between the two largest communities in Northern Ireland. It delves deeper into the political parties that support them and the symbolism that belongs to these identity groups. The next part deals with the current status of the division between these identity groups, but also other identity groups. Lastly, the trends in terms of identification are discussed, at the hand of the influential life and times survey and the Peace Report that have been monitoring identity in Northern Ireland in the last years.

5.1 Traditional division

As discussed in chapter 1, the conflict has created a rift in the population of (Northern) Ireland. This rift is assembled of certain identity traits that are traditionally interpreted to be strongly exclusionary and dichotomous of each other. This is mainly due to the conflicts and incidents in Ireland, which tend to accentuate the differences between both communities, rather than the similarities. Although, it must be said that there also were periods in which these differences arguably didn't matter so much, such as during the Irish Rebellion of 1798. However, in just a decade after the Troubles, the division is still very much apparent in the Northern Irish society. As previously discussed, the Troubles was a time of conflict between the Catholic nationalist community and the protestant unionist community. When the Belfast Agreement was formed, it had to deal with the strong dichotomous attitude of these communities. In line with the literature on conflicts of identity, the Belfast Agreement indicated power-sharing as the solution to the conflict, in order to equalize political power of the nationalist and the unionist communities. They were to be represented by their own political parties, which can be categorized as two 'extreme' parties and two 'intermediary' parties for each community. The extremes are the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) for the unionist community and Sinn Féin (SF) for the nationalist community. Both parties tend to receive the majority of the votes within their community. They have hard-line stances on various subjects, SF is generally being regarded as leftists and progressive, while the DUP tends to be regarded as centre-right and rather conservative. SF is very strongly opinionated on the independence matter and the legitimacy of Northern Ireland as part of the UK. It refuses, for example, to acknowledge the UK government and therefore the seats of Westminster that are appointed to members of SF remain unused. The DUP, on the other hand, is also strongly opinionated on the independence matter, but

then in favour of the union of course. They tend to oppose all efforts that imply a political and cultural move of Northern Ireland towards to the RoI. This is illustrated, for instance, by their support of the Brexit. Although other reasons might have also played a role in these considerations, Northern Ireland being out of the European Union means a step away from the RoI and a step closer to the UK. The two intermediary parties would be the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SDLP) on the nationalist side and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) on the unionist side. These parties are generally more inclined towards constructive cooperation and deal-making, but seem to have a declining influence in terms of their share of votes. Then, besides these larger parties, a small, conservative unionist party called the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) has gained a seat in the current assembly. Besides these community-based parties, there are also several parties that are not based on the traditional dichotomy. The most important party is the liberal and centrist Alliance Party (AP), with a strong presence in Belfast. Other parties are the environmentalist Green Party (GP) and the socialist People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA). After the agreement, the SDLP and the UUP secured most of the votes, but over the course of time this has changed. At current, the historic 'diarchy' of SF and the DUP is back andseems to be unmatched by the other parties. However, these parties did form several governments with each other that have lasted for a considerable amount of time. In that sense, the power-sharing seems to work, if even the two extreme parties can make a government work. Although, as one of the interviewees mentions, this hasn't been without difficulties. Due to their hard-line stance on a lot of contentious issues, it is hard to divert from their point of view and work together, while also keeping their public support.

5.2 Symbolism

After the violence had started to subside, due to the Belfast Agreement and further negotiations, the conflict transformed. In a way, the conflict between identities wasn't fought with violence anymore, but with culture and symbolism. Issues such as the Orange Parades of the unionist community and the removal of the British Flag from Belfast City Hall as requested by the nationalist community, have sparked the sentiments of 'them' and 'us' and maintained the conflict. When taking Hogg's theory of identity uncertainty in mind (2000), these reaction are understandable. When the nationalists opted for the removal of the British Flag on Belfast City Hall, the unionists felt threatened in their identity. Removing the flag, an important symbol in unionist tradition, from the city hall of the capital of Northern Ireland, was an infringement on their identity. However, vice versa, the British flag on Belfast City Hall could also be called an infringement on the identity of nationalist Northern Irish people. For them the flag can be seen as a sign of centuries of oppression of their people. Understandably they don't want to see this symbol on the city hall of their capital. The

contentiousness in the meaning of these symbols is illustrative of a large amount of symbols that are used by the communities to define themselves ánd the other.

Another example is the symbolic support for Palestine from nationalists and for Israel from unionists. This derives from when the civil rights movements tried to internationalise the conflict(see Appendix 2, page 10). They tried to ally with organizations that were also fighting oppression, so they connected with Palestinian groupings. As a response, the unionists claimed symbolic support for Israel. This still is apparent in nationalist and unionist organizations and is illustrative for the contentiousness that is, in part, created around these identity groups. Some argue that the unionists might have never cared for Israel if the nationalists didn't show support for Palestine. On the other hand, some might also argue that the Palestinians were oppressed to a far greater extent than the nationalists were. This would be an unfair representation of the truth and by naming them oppressors in such a severe way, they threatened the identity of unionist protestants. In this case, identity is very clearly being constructed by adapting other situations to their own situation. The nationalists categorize themselves with Palestinians as being oppressed, indirectly saying to members of the nationalist identity group that they are somewhat similar to members of the Palestinian identity group. The unionists, as a response, categorize themselves with Israel. Their members should therefore identify in some sense with members of the Israeli identity group. They even created a narrative that supported it, in which Northern Ireland was their promised land, such as Israel is supposed to be for the Israelites. What this ultimately of course does, is widening the gap between the two main identity groups in Northern Ireland, asking, yet again, people to support either Palestine or Israel. Someone of the nationalist identity group who supported Israel would have went against the nationalist prototype. Therefore, this is strengthening the sense of identity in both identity groups, at the cost of their relation.

What these examples illustrate is that the symbolism that is used by the traditional communities in Northern Ireland, is directly related to the concept of identity. It illustrates the relativity of identity in a perfect manner. Nationalists and unionists groups seem to continually compare themselves to ‘the other’ in order to define themselves. For peacebuilding initiatives, it is therefore paramount to create a mind-set among the people that there also are commonalities. According to the interviewee of the BCC, this is done by transforming these symbolisms to being more inclusive to the other group. For instance, the unionist bonfires on the 12th of July are known for being very sectarian. The unionists place pictures of SF politicians and Irish flags on the bonfires and celebrate around it when they are lit. Some organizations, such as Belfast City Council, are trying to make the bonfires less contentious by forbidding sectarian outings on the bonfires. Furthermore, they provide alternatives that are safer and less imposing to the other communities, in an attempt to make the festivity more attractive and

inclusive for those communities (see Appendix 5, p. 37). This way, they seem to transform the symbolism of the bonfires to be less based on conflict and strife. Similar work has been done in terms of sports in Northern Ireland. During the Troubles, when the identity groups were driven further apart from each other, sporting organizations in Northern Ireland were being accused of promoting identity and therefore perpetuating the conflict (Sugden & Harvie, 1995). The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) is the umbrella-organization of all Gaelic sports in Northern Ireland, such as Gaelic football and hurling. Although the organization was neutral in the conflict, they were strongly connected to nationalist and Catholic communities and supported the Gaelic identity. Cricket, hockey and rugby associations in Northern Ireland, on the other hand, derive from the English upper-class and were therefore connected to the protestant unionist community. Obviously, through their history, they maintained and supported British identity in Northern Ireland. As the interviewee of the SEUPB points out, important work on sports has been done in PEACE I & II, trying to change the mind-set of the organizations to become more inclusive towards the other community (see Appendix 2, p. 15). In the interview with CI (see Appendix 6, p.50) and BCC (see Appendix 5, p. 43), the importance of working with sporting organizations is also stressed on. Their role, being tied into the social fabric of the communities, makes them important platforms to produce cross-community contact. The example of sports is typical to what the intention seems to be of peacebuilding interventions. They seem to want to create an open an inclusive society, in which it matters less what your community background is.

5.3 Current division

The work that is being done on creating cross-community interaction is an important step towards peacefulness. However, the current state of Northern Ireland's society is still very contentious and divisive along lines of communities. According to the Peace Monitoring Report, social housing and schooling still tend to be segregated along nationalist and unionist lines (Wilson, 2016). This is despite the fact that the Belfast Agreement contains a clause that promotes mixed-housing and integrated schooling. About seven percent of the students in Northern Ireland went to an integrated school in the 2015-2016 school year and according to the BCC (see Appendix 5, p. 38), 90 percent of social housing in Belfast is still segregated. Furthermore, the issues around symbolism are still central in terms of shared space. For instance, the flying of flags and sectarian murals as a signs of claiming certain spaces, is a problem with regard to working towards shared spaces. Furthermore, the segregation is exacerbated by the physically apparent obstacles that are designed to keep communities apart, such as the M1 highway in West-Belfast and the peacewalls in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry. When taking the theory of O'Dowd and Anderson in mind, the division between

the communities also becomes clear. The cross-border networks with the Republic of Ireland are more important to the Catholic nationalist population, while cross-border networks with the UK tend to be more important to the protestant unionist community. The proportion of Catholic nationalists is higher in the border counties than in the more central counties around Belfast. Therefore, the proportion of protestant unionists is higher in these areas, but lower in the border area. This is illustrated by map 1 that was created with data from the census of 2011 on identities in Northern Ireland.



Map 1: A map of sense of Britishness in each district in Northern Ireland

Although there is a considerable amount of Catholics that would identify primarily as British and there also are protestants that identify with being Irish, this map does give an adequate representation of the situation. It is in line with the theory, because there seem to be more British in the centre, or at least, away from the border. This map is more or less in line with the voting pattern of previous elections and historic mappings of religion, which indicates that it is rightful to state that there is a difference between the sense of identity in the border area and the centre.

According to the Peace Monitoring Report, the problem lies in the acceptance certain aspects of life, such as education and cultural expressions, are segregated. It seems as if the populations accepts this segregation as the way it is, probably supported by, or at least illustrated by the public support of, the hard-line parties. In terms of the common-identity and the sense of 'them' and 'us', this would mean that there is a strong sense of 'us' and that 'them' is being tolerated for the sake of peacefulness and stability. The Life & Times survey of NILT underlines this statement (Political Attitudes, 2016), as 29% and 24% of the population would still consider themselves to be either unionist or nationalist. Of that part of the population, 65% of the unionists would label themselves as fairly to very strong unionists and 56% of the nationalists would say this about themselves with regard to being nationalist. These views are mutually exclusive and essential to the conflict, therefore the percentage can be considered to be quite high. It indicates, at least in part, a strongly divided community. Especially when taking religion into account, approximately 12% of the population is fairly strong to strongly nationalist Catholic and approximately 14,5% would consider themselves

fairly strong to strongly unionist protestant. Although these numbers do not indicate anything in terms of violence or general hatred towards the 'other', the strong political opinion on these matters have proven to be fertile ground for conflict and are therefore worrisome.

Although there are strong indications that segregation still has a strong position in Northern Ireland, there are also some indications that things are heading out in the right direction. For instance, the Life & Times survey also indicates that only 4% of the population thinks that relations between the traditional communities have worsened (Community Relations, 2016). 33% and 59% of the population think that this has, respectively, stayed the same and improved. Also, there is strong support for mixed neighbourhoods and workspaces. A further indication of successful integration is the fact that there are groups in society that are moving away from the dichotomy of Catholic and protestant communities. These groups are partially formed by migrants without a historic connection to the conflict, that have arrived in greater numbers since after the Belfast Agreement. But it is also due to the increased adoption of the Northern Irish identity as a political identity. The Life & Times survey (Community Relations) indicates that a varying proportion of between 20-28% of the population has affiliated with being Northern Irish as their first identity over the years since the Belfast Agreement. This has increased academic attention, because it is argued that it can act as the common in-group identity that will connect the traditional communities and function as a superordinate identity (McKeown, Perceptions of a Superordinate Identity in Northern Ireland, 2014). Tonge and Gomez (2015) acknowledge this and see the Northern Irish identity as the counterbalance that is meant to break up the stalemate situation that was (unintentionally) created by the Belfast Agreement. According to them, the political model of 'separate, but equal' was created by the Belfast Agreement, which in itself doesn't create a good basis for community integration and might even work against it. 'Separate, but equal' is very similar to the idea that the conflict has been transformed from using violence to using cultural expression. Tonge and Gomez allude the popularity of 'Northern Irishness' to two factors. The first is the sense of security among the traditional communities. They have observed an increase of adherence to Northern Irish as an identity when identity uncertainty of the traditional communities is generally low. The second is the generational factor, as younger Catholics and protestants are more likely to identify with Northern Irish as their main identity. Not growing up in the times of violent conflict might have softened their views of the 'other'. Academics, such as McKeown (2014) and Bull (2006), add to the reasoning behind the Northern Irish identity by arguing that its meaning is not unilateral. It can mean different things to different people, because it is not vested in society in the same strength as the other identity groups are. On the one hand, this opens up the identity to all people of Northern Ireland. On the other hand, this makes it rather meaningless, compared to the highly entitative CNR and PUL

identity groups. This explains why, when uncertainty among the traditional group members increases, the support for the Northern Irish identity decreases. In line with the Social Identity Theory, uncertainty causes group members to categorize themselves into highly entitative identity groups with strong boundaries that indicate what it means to be part of that identity group. Apparently, the Northern Irish identity group is not highly entitative enough for people to join it in a convincing way. Bull reasons that for the protestant community, Northern Irish identity is stronger related to the legitimacy and the stability of Northern Ireland as a country, while the Catholic community tends to identify with the 'Irish' part of the Northern Irish identity. The identity of the PUL community has always derived from the state, since that has always been pro-union and protestant. Therefore, their identification with Northern Ireland could fill up the gap that was left when the power-sharing government was installed. For the CNR community it is logical that the Irish part appeals to them so much. The broad majority of members of this community identify with Irish, so when they identify with Northern Irish, it tends to be interpreted as the 'northern' part of the Irish identity. The ambiguity in meaning of the Northern Irish identity results in an unsteady basis for a cross-community identity group. McKeown, Bull and Tonge and Gomez all conclude their essays on Northern Irish identity by saying that there is potential for the Northern Irish identity to become that binding identity between the traditional identity groups, but that it has to become more entrenched in the Northern Irish society.

The focus of this kind of surveys, such as the Life & Times survey, predominantly lies on affiliation with certain identity groups that are related to the basis of conflict. So, the traditional identity groups, the Northern Irish identity groups and the relatively new identity groups tend to be sorted in communities. The surveys continue with asking how relations between these communities are experienced, whether they have improved or decreased etcetera. This emphasis on communities is something that is seen throughout Northern Ireland, in these evaluations, but also in policy-making and policy-implementation on all kinds of levels. However, in some years, the Life & Times survey has asked people how they would describe themselves in a very elaborate way. It added social identifications, such as husband/wife, man/woman and class. British, Irish and Northern Irish were, back then, rather low on the list. Other identifications such as woman or man, religious or non-religious and working-class are all higher on this list (Community Relations - Identity, 2001). Even when taking their second and third identification into account, these identifications only remain approximately 9% of the identifications in Northern Ireland. This can be quite important when thinking in terms of decategorization of identities, since decategorization ventures from the personal point, rather than the collective community point. The theory stresses on the importance of personal identifications and relations between people that share similar identifications, outside of the

framework of identity groups. It could, therefore, be a positive contribution to the peace process, if these identifications would become the basis of interaction with other people. For the Northern Irish peace process, this would mean that peacebuilding interventions would do well to build on these identifications and construct cross-community relationships through their identification as, for instance, man or woman, or their profession for example. Obviously, according to the decategorization method, this all should be done in a non-community framework, in order to work well.

5.4 Brexit

So although the surveys indicate that identifications are moving away from the traditional dichotomy, the Peace Monitoring report, written by Robin Wilson (2016), warns for Brexit. Arguably, the security of Northern Ireland being in the same union with Ireland has flatlined nationalist sentiments. When the UK dissolves its membership of the EU, it could be seen as a step away from Ireland and therefore nationalist sentiments might flare up again. Furthermore, the increasing influence of the diarchy could add to this, because they are also strongly opposed to each other in the matter of Brexit. Naturally, SF would like to remain as closely tied to the RoI as possible and therefore resents Brexit. The DUP, on the other hand, being a conservative party, shares the opinion of the UK conservatives and is pro-Brexit. After the elections on the 8th of June, that were called in order to increase the mandate of the sitting Conservative Party, but failed to do so, the DUP seems to be the only party that can help the conservatives to a majority in the UK parliament (Syal & Travis, 2017). This has all kinds of implications for Brexit, but especially for Northern Ireland. The Irish-Northern Irish border is one of the most pressing issues of Brexit, since a hard border over land would be costly to maintain and devastating for the local economy. Also, visiting friends and family, which are an important part of one's identity, on the other side of the border might become more complicated due to Brexit. Lastly, Northern Ireland is dependent on funding from the UK to balance its finances. Brexit could have a negative impact on UK finances, and therefore austerity might be imposed on the funding for Northern Ireland. The important role of the DUP could mean that all these negative effects of Brexit on Northern Ireland will be somewhat softened, as a so-called hard Brexit is also not in the interest of the DUP. On the other hand, when negative effects for Northern Ireland do take place, one could argue that it will be used by SF to blame the DUP for this (Robertson, 2017). The return of the diarchy does not bode well for this situation. That it has returned became even more clear during the same election on the 8th of June, in which the SDLP and UUP lost all their seats to SF and the DUP.

Chapter - 6 - The PEACE Programme

This chapter will elucidate on the EU PEACE Programme. By making clear what this programme means, a context can be drawn in which the role of identity within the PEACE Programme can be described. Firstly an explanation of the EU PEACE Programme in general will be given, pointing out who the most important actors within the PEACE Programme are and how the policy goals of the PEACE Programme are formed. Next, the chapter deals with the several installments of the PEACE Programme in chronological order. It gives an overview of PEACE I, II and III that have been installed between 1995 and 2013 and emphasizes on the changes that have been introduced into each different version of the PEACE Programme. Lastly, the problems with the PEACE Programme that are experienced by the interviewees are discussed.

6.1 PEACE Programme in general

When the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom both joined the European Union, the Northern Irish Troubles became a conflict within the borders of the EU. Therefore it was in the interest of the EU to help put an end to the violence and create stability, peace and economic prosperity. As argued in the interview with an official of the managing authority of the PEACE Programme, one of the most important reasons to create the European Union at the time was that it would increase stability and peace in the region, which had been taunted by conflict over the centuries. The fact that the EU tries to improve the stability in Northern Ireland should therefore be seen in the context of the wider EU political project, rather than merely as a side-project (Power, 2011, p. 195). This implies that when the peacebuilding project in Northern Ireland should fail, the reputation of the EU would be tarnished, because it would fail in one of its core principles in its own territory. As a result, a vast amount of money has been injected into the Northern Irish peace process during three installments of the PEACE Programme that have been implemented over the course of almost two decades. As the installments succeeded each other, the focus of the PEACE Programme shifted and the amount of money that was made available also changed.

It is important to understand the organizational structure of the EU PEACE Programme. As the name implies, the programme emanates from financial funding that is made available by the European Union. The EU provides funding on all kinds of areas that touch the economic and social wellbeing of its people, aiming on creating prosperity and stability for the member states. The programme is

jointly funded by the EU, the United Kingdom (UK) and the Republic of Ireland (RoI).Through the allegiance of the fighting communities, in the PEACE Programme, the RoI represents one side of the conflict and the UK the other. According to the interview with an official of the managing authority for the PEACE Programme, the initiative for the programme primarily comes from the governments of the RoI and the UK (see Appendix 2, p. 13). This initiative is formulated in the European Council, formed by the heads of state or government of member states, and further worked out by the European Commission. After the policy focus has been established, the PEACE Programme is managed by the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) that is located in Northern Ireland and deals with distributing the funding of the PEACE Programme as well as a version of INTERREG. The latter is an EU funded cross-border mechanism that operates in the same area as the PEACE Programme and Western-Scotland, but is more focused on economic improvement. The SEUPB decides which projects are likely to meet the goals that are set-up by the EU and therefore which projects will receive funding.

The specifics of the policy in the PEACE Programme are worked out by the European Commission, that consists of representatives of member states, each with a certain portfolio. The commission deals with policy-making, policy-implementation and proposing legislation. In terms of the PEACE Programme, policy-making is influenced by feedback from the SEUPB and the guidelines of the Northern Ireland Executive concerning peacebuilding. In turn, the SEUPB will base its feedback on the advice of several organizations that have a similar focus area as the PEACE Programme, as well as the feedback it gains from the projects 'on the ground'. In line with modern understandings of peacebuilding, the PEACE Programme is meant to function as a bottom-up type of peacebuilding intervention (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011). Therefore, the position of the SEUPB as a link between the upper, policy-making level of the EU and the lower, policy-implementation level of the individual projects is vital to the functioning of the PEACE Programme. It has to maneuver between EU regulation, as well as regulation of the Northern Ireland Executive (NIE). Especially the latter is important, because the NIE is the main authority that formulates the priorities of the general peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland.

Furthermore, it is important to note that, within the projects that are funded by the SEUPB, there is a certain hierarchy. Mainly due to the administrative task that the SEUPB requires projects to fulfill, smaller organizations tend to apply for funding with medium and large-sized organizations, such as municipalities, who in turn apply for funding by the SEUPB on behalf of them. This makes sense, because the larger organizations can carry the administrative tasks more easily. Furthermore, they can function as an axle in a network of the smaller organizations. This is pointed out in the interview with the Derry/Londonderry Playhouse Centre. According to the interviewee, there is a lack of

networking possibilities for the organizations that are doing projects under the PEACE Project, which undermines the efficiency of the programme (see Appendix 10, p. 86). It might be easier for organizations to engage in networking activities if they are part of the network that is managed by a certain larger organization such as local governments or other funding organizations.

Figure 4 is an overview of how the PEACE Programme works. It illustrates the bottom-up approach of the PEACE Programme by depicting the flow of funds, which ends at the individual projects, and the feedback that goes from these individual projects, through the SEUPB, to the policy-makers in Brussels. This over-simplified version of the organizational structure of the PEACE Programme makes the following explanation of how the PEACE Programme has evolved more clear.



Figure 4: The structure of the EU PEACE Programme

6.2 PEACE I

The first installment of the EU PEACE Programme was implemented in 1995. Notice that this is even before the Belfast Agreement was officially signed, although peace talks had already begun. So, when PEACE I was being implemented, the first phase of peacebuilding, according to Harris' overview of peacebuilding phases, hasn't been reached yet. However, as Harris also points out, these phases are not static, but rather dynamic and elements of these phases flow over into each other. The PEACE Programme shows that peacebuilding interventions can start, even before the conflict has reached the peacebuilding stage. The European Union had been involved in supporting community relations work in Northern Ireland since the end of the 1980's (Albert, 2009, p. 116). When a peace resolution became more plausible, the EU was quick to roll out the peacebuilding intervention that was called *'the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border counties of Ireland'*, which later became known as PEACE I. Arguably, the main initiative came from the European Commission, rather than the European Council. This initiative was strongly supported by important Members of European Parliament for Northern Ireland, which were Ian Paisley, John

Hume and Jim Nicholson. The SEUPB didn't have a role in PEACE I, because it wasn't even created back then. The implementation role in PEACE I was taken up by NGO's (first channel) and 'area-based' local governments (second channel).

The focus of the EU, initially, was primarily on cross-border, economic improvement. In 1995, the Maastricht Treaty had been signed three years earlier, which sought to improve European integration by increasing border-cooperation. This translated directly into the PEACE Programme, according to the interview with the SEUPB (see Appendix 2, p. 13). The policy area of PEACE I was comprised of Northern Ireland ánd the border counties in the RoI. Large amounts of money were injected into this part of the island, in order to increase its economic situation. When looking into the communication papers of the European Commission, it is noticeable that 60,8% of the money was allocated to economic regeneration in the form of so-called priorities that were aimed at stimulating employment, urban and rural regeneration, cross-border development and industrial development (1997). This is opposed to 22,8% of the money that is allocated to the priority of Social Inclusion, which is directly serving cross-community initiatives. However, the paper explicitly states that social inclusion is a very important aspect of the programme and that it is also relevant for the economic priorities. So the strategy of PEACE I seems to be focused on economic regeneration, but with a strong mention of social inclusion as a relevant aspect of the entirety of the peacebuilding programme. A final important point of notice is that PEACE I *'will concentrate principally on those areas and sections of the population most adversely affected by the violence and suffering most acute deprivation'.* When taking all this into account, the EU is doing peacebuilding intervention that shows strong similarities with phase three of Harris' overview. This phase is primarily focused on economic revitalization and state-building, in which the economic revitalization part corresponds with the strategy of PEACE I. However, the arguments made for social inclusion indicate that there also is an element of the fourth phase, which deals with reconciliation, apparent in PEACE I, and the peace agreement still had to be signed.

6.3 PEACE II

Succeeding PEACE I, PEACE II was implemented from 2000-2004. In many ways it was a direct continuation of PEACE I, because PEACE I was installed with the idea that there should be a PEACE II to follow up on the peacebuilding efforts. Many points in this installment remained more or less similar to PEACE I. One of the bigger changes, however, was the introduction of the SEUPB into the PEACE Programme, as its main managerial authority (2000, p. 11). The SEUPB was created as part of the Belfast Agreement. Being one of six north-south bodies, the SEUPB was pivotal in retaining the

cross-border element of the programme. The fact that the SEUPB was so closely connected to the Belfast Agreement and thus the peace process, but also the fact that it was working directly under the EU, should increase the efficiency of the programme overall.

With regard to the priorities of PEACE II, they remained very similar to PEACE I. The only clear change is the addition of the 'outward and forward looking region' priority, which focuses on the image of Northern Ireland. By improving the image of Northern Ireland as a progressive, stable and peaceful society, business investment and tourism should be attracted. In turn this will increase employment, economic prosperity and a more stable society (2000, p. 158). In PEACE II the allocation of funding sees a small increase, to 23,3%, in the share that is allocated directly towards the social inclusion priority. However, technical assistance is the only organizational cost, since the programme is now being directly managed by the EU through the SEUPB, and this had 9,8% of the money allocated towards it. This means that the remaining money that was spent on more economic goals, was approximately 66,9% of the funding money. This is an increase from PEACE I. However, the operational programme of PEACE II emphasizes even stronger on the relevance of social inclusion and the role it has in all priorities of the PEACE Programme. Therefore, the target-group is, as in PEACE I, specified as the most adversely affected by the conflict, adding to the importance that social inclusion has in PEACE II.

6.4 PEACE III

During PEACE I and PEACE II, it was eventually decided to move forward with the PEACE Programme and install PEACE III between 2007-2013. According to Liam O'Dowd, the necessity of EU involvement wasn't apparent anymore. The Belfast Agreement had been signed, national institutions had been formed and it was argued that Northern Ireland should fend for itself (see Appendix 1, p. 1). However, the role of the EU as an external force that promotes peace and stability was deemed to be necessary by some and therefore the PEACE Programme was able to continue. PEACE III seemed to focus primarily on social wellbeing, because it was particularly aiming for cross-community initiatives that are trying to promote contact between the communities in Northern Ireland (O'Dowd & McCall, 2008). This is in line with the notion of the SEUPB, stating that making points of contact is one of their most important tasks (see Appendix 2, p. 16). The most important change that was implemented in PEACE III was the concrete emphasis on community relations and the accompanying cross-community intervention methods. Whereas PEACE I and PEACE II also had room for purely economic project funding, PEACE III was considerably less involved with these economic goals. The amount of money that was made available was also considerably less. The involved money for PEACE

I was €667 million, for PEACE II it was €995 million, while for PEACE III only €333 million was made available. The programme seems to have been increasingly focused on social issues when implementing PEACE III. This is illustrated by the two key priorities of PEACE III that differ greatly from PEACE II. These are 'reconciling communities' and 'contributing to a shared society'. Both are directly related to social inclusion and reconciliation efforts and not so much to economic revitalization. In the operational programme a point is made that economic activities are not specifically the focus of PEACE III, but that partnerships are encouraged in order to create shared spaces and build good relations on a local level. In the interviews, it is argued that because of the smaller amount of money, a more focused approach was necessary (see Appendix 2, p. 11; see Appendix 4, p. 33). Also, around this time, Eastern European countries had joined the EU and they were more economically backwards than Northern Ireland. They would get priority in terms of economic stimulation of the EU.

6.5 Problems in the PEACE Programme

According to the interviewees, there are several problems that are apparent in the structure of the PEACE Programme. The first problem, mentioned by virtually all projects that have been interviewed for this research, is the extensive and complex bureaucracy that had to be dealt with during PEACE III. The problems in the bureaucracy were, amongst others, the need for extensive quoting, the need for thorough explanations of the spending of the funds and even the initial tendering seems to have been problematic. For this research, these kinds of problems are seemingly not too interesting. However, they do have implications for which organizations are more able to apply for funding, which might be connected to the community groups they derive from. For instance, one of the first problems in PEACE I, which was acknowledged in the interview with the SEUPB, was that the protestant community group seemed less inclined towards applying for PEACE funding. Although various reasons could allude to this, one of them was that organizations of this community did not have the administrative capacity to do so. The Catholic community had, through the lack of support from the state, more experience in doing community-work. The protestant community was, on the other hand, supported by the state and they tended to be more affluent. So, they were more able to take care of themselves. When PEACE I was implemented, it might have been easier for the existing Catholic organizations to apply for funding in doing community-work, because they were already doing that before the PEACE Programme. Although there have been interventions done that increase capacity in protestant organizations, extensive, and therefore expensive, administrative requirements might cause these organizations to avert from the PEACE Programme.

The more important problem in the PEACE Programme, with regard to this research, is the rather strong emphasis on protestant and Catholic community groups. In PEACE III, considerable efforts

have been made to increase the scope of the PEACE Programmeby adding other communities, nevertheless, it was still very much focused on the traditional dichotomy between the PUL and CNR communities. The problem, according to some, isn't that the scope is too narrow, but rather that its scope should be different. By requiring applications to work out how the projects create a more peaceful situation between the Northern Irish communities, the projects need to categorize the participants as belonging to one of these communities. Otherwise, they can't argue that their project will contribute to good relations between these communities. This problem is in line with the arguments that criticize consociationalism, the form of government of Northern Ireland. Consociationalism is meant to equalize the power of the communities in order to stop them fighting over power. However, consequently they can make claims on the basis of their community, enabling to fight over these claims. The paradox in trying to build peace between communities, but possibly perpetuating the conflict by sustaining the conflicting communities in the peacebuilding process, is at the core of this research. Similar to consociationalism, dual recategorization is often accused of preserving the dichotomous relationship that formed the basis of the conflict. Whereas single recategorization and decategorization decrease the salience of these identities and are therefore arguably stronger approaches in terms of trying to prevent a reescalation of violence.

Chapter - 7 - Categorization on the three levels of the PEACE Programme

This chapter deals with how identity is being dealt with by the PEACE Programme. In order to adequately do this, it addresses identity in three levels of the PEACE Programme in a structured manner. Firstly, it discusses the findings that have implications for all levels of the PEACE Programme. Afterwards, it deals with the role identity has in the SEUPB, the Community Relations Council (CRC) and POBAL. These represent the higher levels of the PEACE Programme, because the SEUPB is the managing authority and the CRC and POBAL were the official advising consortium for the SEUPB in PEACE III. The following that is discussed, is the medium level. In this research the medium level is consisting of the BCC and CI. They are applying for funding on behalf of projects of themselves, but also on behalf of other projects that apply through them. The lowest level, the 'grassroots' level is discussed next and is represented by organizations from Belfast and Derry/Londonderry. These are Turas, the Ashton Centre, the Fellowship of the Messines, the Londonderry/Derry Playhouse and the Gasyard Development Trust (GDT). The question here is whether these organizations tend to recategorize or decategorize identity in Northern Ireland. This is answered by using the conceptual model that is created on the basis of the theory of Dovidio and Gaertner in chapter 3.2.

7.1 General Findings

There are important notions that have arisen in the interviews, concerning categorization in the PEACE Programme. The first notion is that several interviews have indicated that the momentum for peace has stagnated. This is important, because transforming society by using categorization requires active intervention that builds on the momentum of peace. Secondly, the notion of communities seems to be strongly embedded in all interviews, which is likely because it is strongly embedded in the Northern Irish society. Community, in this context, tends to mean identity groups, based on all kinds of characteristics and seem to be rather all-encompassing. For instance, when asking about whether there is space for other identities in the PEACE Programme, the answer generally went towards minority communities, such as BMe(black and minority ethnic)-communities. This is an important notion, because this emphasis on communities is seen throughout Northern Ireland and implies several things with regard to categorization. Thirdly, the target group of the PEACE Programme is generally referred to as the most marginalized and adversely affected of the conflict. This is also stipulated by the gathered data. This group of people tends to be more visibly segregated along community lines and often are disadvantaged as a group. They tend to be working-class

communities, living close to working-class communities of the other 'community'. These areas are so-called interface areas. These groups get the majority of funding, partially because they are more clearly affected by the conflict, but also because they don't have the means to become un-segregated. For instance, a bus-ticket that could bring a person out of his/her segregated community is sometimes too expensive for members of working-class communities. So it also makes sense to fund projects that help 'poorer' people out of their community, as it is expected that more affluent people will do so themselves.

7.2 The higher level of governance

The SEUPB, as the managing authority of the PEACE Programme, would probably be one of the most important organizations for this research with regard to finding out which form of categorization is used in the PEACE Programme. The interview with the SEUPB indicates that it is leaning strongly towards dual recategorization as an approach to peacebuilding. However, there are also indications of decategorization. PEACE III tended to focus on two main aspects of peacebuilding that were stipulated several times in the interview. The first is that the PEACE Programme is focusing on establishing points of contact, in order to create meaningful relations between people of both communities. This implies two approaches, namely personalized decategorization, which essentially is meaningful contact between two individuals, and dual recategorization, because it does this from a traditional community standpoint. However, it is dual recategorization, seemingly without a superordinate identity that is created to decrease the importance of the sub-ordinate identity-groups. It takes the willingness for peace and good relations between these communities as a starting point. So in that sense, the willingness for peace and good relations could be seen as some kind of identity. Similar to South Africa perhaps, where the notion of the rainbow nation is an all-inclusive, superordinate identity. It implies the same, namely that identity groups are united in their quest for peace. However, in Northern Ireland this seems to be rather weak in comparison, because in South Africa, it seems to be more tangible and further developed through the concept of the rainbow nation.

The second point attention of PEACE III was increasing the capacity of the traditional communities, in order to engage and participate in peacebuilding projects. This also implies two approaches. Firstly, it implies dual recategorization, because it divides people into communities that apparently need more capacity. This causes a mind-set that treats identity groups as equal to each other, but sub-ordinate to the peace process. After all, they receive money to increase their capacity to participate and engage in the peace process through the PEACE Programme. Secondly, the equal basis of these

communities is one of the pillars on which meaningful intergroup contact can take place. Intergroup contact, in turn, is the basis for decategorization. So when taking the two main attention points of PEACE III into account, it seems as if there are indications for both (limited) dual recategorization and the basis for decategorization.

There are two other indicators for dual recategorization, namely the formulation of the criteria for applicants and the evaluations afterwards. In order to make sure that no-one is left out and the money is being spent well, SEUPB has transparent criteria set for its applicants. For instance, there isn't a set number of community organizations that can partake in the PEACE Programme. These criteria ensure equality and openness for the possible applicants, because there aren't any 'community' limitations on organizations to apply for funding and everybody has equal rights to join in the bid for funding. This can be seen to work in favour of recategorization, because the clear criteria can strengthen the claims that the identity group based communities can make on PEACE funding. The criteria are strongly aimed towards cross-community and intercommunity goals, which means that the projects need to describe how they plan on bringing these communities together. Simply asking for funding for individuals will not be likely to have a chance in the bid for funding, which argues against decategorization. The evaluations of the SEUPB are also very much focused on the division between communities, which indicates dual recategorization. For the SEUPB, there is a certain acknowledged difficulty in doing the evaluations, because they always seem to revert back to the goal of the PEACE Programme, which is creating good relations between communities in Northern Ireland. The difficulty is that by doing this, they frame the results of the evaluation in the dichotomous communities that were essentially at the basis of the conflict.

In the interviews with POBAL and the CRC, it becomes clear that, also in these organizations, there is a strong inclination towards dual recategorization. Over the past decades, they also seemed to focus predominantly on the (traditional) communities in their work. This is indicated by the advice they gave SEUPB, to include every community that was apparent in Northern Ireland. POBAL, as an organization that originates from the RoI, for example, had tried to increase the attention that was given to the protestant community in the border region. This could imply recategorization, because it focuses on the traditional dichotomy, but hopes to include them in a superordinate identity that has the goal of building a peaceful society. This also illustrates one of the problems with dual recategorization. Because the protestant community in the border region is quite small and dispersed, they tend to be hard to reach in terms of policy implementation. Also, one can argue that they might not want to be framed in accordance with the conflict. Due to their rather small number, they tend to be less outspoken about their religion. Framing them in the PEACE Programme as the same community as unionist protestants from Belfast for example, might be undesirable. The other

advising organization, the CRC has, probably due to its nature as a community organization, steered towards good relations between communities in its advice and therefore can also be regarded to lean towards dual recategorization. For example, the CRC worked together with local councils that are currently predominantly still based on parties that originate from the traditional division, such as the SF, DUP, SDLP and the UUP. In order to maintain their public support they are likely to remain sectarian in some way, which is defined as problematic by several of the interviewees. This implies that the work of the CRC with local councils is more likely to be framed in line with the Northern Irish communities, rather than being framed by personal identity (decategorization) or by one superordinate identity (single recategorization).

So, while most of the coding seems to indicate towards dual recategorization in the higher level of the PEACE Programme, there also are some strong indications towards decategorization. Predominantly when asking about the general view of the organization on identity, all three organizations state to have a very open view on identity. POBAL seems to go the furthest in this, because it mentions that it sees identity as a continuum, in which fluid identities take place. This implies decategorization, since that is characterized by high social mobility of individuals and thus rather fluid identities. The CRC argues that it has an open view to identity, but frames it as traditional identity groups, such as Catholic/protestant or Irish/British. So it seems to be rather open in the sense that you can be a catholic Brit, which would have been unheard of during the Troubles. But it isn't open to personal identities, therefore it indicates dual recategorization, rather than decategorization. The view of the CRC on identity seems to be quite similar to the views of the SEUPB. The interviewee of the SEUPB, however, did argue from a personal standpoint that identity is fluid and open, indicating gender fluidness as a model that perhaps could be used as a basis of cultural identity in Northern Ireland. Also, the interviewee states that PEACE IV has an increased focus on children and youth, who presumably have this more open and fluid view of identity. This could mean that PEACE IV will be paying increased attention towards the fluidness of identity and thus lean more towards decategorization as the approach for peacebuilding.

7.3 The intermediate level of governance and implementation

CI seems to be strongly leaning towards decategorization. In all the discussed projects, there are strong implications for successful decategorization. They have tiered their programmes into several sections. One of these sections is symbolic outings of peace. They try to gather support from key political figures and organize gatherings with a highly symbolic peaceful meaning. This is in line with the notion of differentiated decategorization that emphasizes on the top-down perspective of

decategorization. On the other hand, CI also does projects with implications towards dual recategorization. However, the dual recategorization is mainly focused on increasing confidence of the already existing identity-groups, similar to capacity-building that the SEUPB mentions. Also in line with the findings of the interview with the SEUPB, dual recategorization seems to be done on the basis of a shared goal which is iterated throughout the project, namely a shared, peaceful society. 'Shared' in Northern Irish policy-making generally implies shared between communities. Therefore, the interview with CI adds to the notion of a kind of shared peacefulness identity group as the superordinate identity. A further indication of dual recategorization is that CI states that it works with so-called community influencers in order to get things done. This could mean that they remain in the community oriented mind-set, because they work with them in order to adequately do their work. On the other hand, as the interviewee acknowledges, they would have to work with these influencers, otherwise they wouldn't be able to get things done due to local resistance.

In the interview with the BCC, dual recategorization comes about as the main approach that is taken in their peacebuilding efforts. Since the BCC is subject to the wishes of the aldermen that are chosen by the inhabitants of Belfast, there is a certain logic that they lean towards dual recategorization. Their focus on communities probably trickles through from the political groups that are currently seated in Belfast. Similarly to the matter of the CRC working with local councils, the Good Relations department of BCC is also subject to the political views of the current dominant political majority. These tend to be based on community background and therefore, in order to keep their public support, the political parties tend to be focused on community issues. As the interviewee states, the NIE is very much focused on the traditional divisions between faith, race and politics. There is very little room for other forms of identity, because they would be regarded as meaningless for the Good Relations department. This probably has to do with the rather high entitativity of the traditional divisions. So, for instance, BCC would allow large bonfires for the PUL community on the 12th of July, in order to celebrate the culture of their community. However, if a group of students would want to build a fire in the middle of town to celebrate that they have passed their exams, that probably won't be accepted due to fire hazard. This is an indication of dual recategorization and an indication against decategorization, because it favours the identity group above the individual identity. However, there is also an implication for decategorization and dual recategorization in the interview with BCC. The focus of BCC is, besides bringing communities together, also on creating a connection with the city. This connection could function as the highly entitative superordinate identity that is needed for dual recategorization, trying to reduce the influence of the traditional identity groups. An identity that is aligned with the city of Belfast would be a stronger superordinate identity than the common goal of peace that seems to be used by the higher level organizations. This is mainly because a Belfast

identity would have a historic precedent and because already has symbols and territory that this identity could claim. The Belfast identity could also be the connecting identification between individuals and therefore indicate decategorization. There is mention of differentiated categorization, because the BCC is actively trying to develop skills, awareness and knowledge in terms of other identities. Also, there is short mention of the creation of contact by building shared spaces. This is a basis for decategorization, but it would need to overcome issues, as addressed by the interviewee. It needs brave leadership, in order to become effective differentiated decategorization and the meaningfulness of the personalized decategorization tends to be rather ambiguous, as people move away from the shared space and go back to their own segregated community in which they live.

The difference between both organizations in terms of the approach they have towards peacebuilding is explained by their closeness towards the divided political framework. BCC is subject to the political wishes of the community-based political parties, while CI can operate more independent of them. Both interviews seem to contribute to the indications of a dual recategorization approach of the PEACE Programme, based on the superordinate 'shared' peaceful society as a goal or identity, to which the traditional and 'newcomer' communities are sub-ordinate. Albeit, the interview with BCC does this in a much stronger way than the interview with CI. So in the medium level of the PEACE Programme, there is no uniform way the approach towards identity can be identified.

7.4 The lower level of implementation

In the lower level of the PEACE Programme, the indications for the categorization approach of the PEACE Programme have resulted in a much more diverse view than in the medium and high levels. The most apparent similarity between the projects of these organizations is the emphasis on person-to-person contact, which is an for personalized decategorization. This was also core to the principles of virtually all of the interviewed organizations. The differences between these organizations are predominantly found in the quality of these person-to-person contacts and the overall approach these organizations seem to take. The Messines is the only organization that stands out in terms of its approach. This organization focuses strongly on points of contact, so thinking of personalized decategorization would be the first inclination. However, the tool they use in order to give meaning to these contacts is history. According to the interviewee, the ambiguous Northern Irish history should be discussed, in order to look for similarities with each other. This could indicate dual recategorization, because it works toward a common image of 'Northern Irish' history, which could

be part of the Northern Irish identity. This is done in a respected manner for the identity groups in Northern Ireland, creating a hierarchy of these sub-ordinate identity groups and a superordinate, common identity group, based on Northern Ireland's history. Also, in this interview, there are small, but relatively numerous indications of single recategorization. There is some mention of the notion of citizenship and nationality being discussed by the interviewee, in a somewhat appreciating manner. The interviewee seems to regard the lack of a national identity as one of the problems of Northern Ireland, which indicates towards recategorization. It can be regarded as single recategorization when speaking of citizenship. Citizenship, in the way the interviewee seems to describe it, could be able to diminish the importance of the sub-ordinate identity groups, because as a citizen of Northern Ireland with the common history, it wouldn't matter which background you have. The Gasyard Development Trust emphasized on history in its PEACE III in a similar fashion, but with communities as the starting point of their projects. The GDT ran projects that were connecting youth from the traditional communities through sessions with ex-prisoners from both sides of the conflict. Furthermore, the projects would let youth film their own community and create their own narrative around that. Furthermore, the interviewee has helped with writing a book that revolves around the history of Derry/Londonderry, looked at from both sectarian viewpoints, as part of a PEACE III project. Although the GDT has some indications for decategorization, mainly through the person-to-person contact that it facilitates in its PEACE projects. However, there is a strong emphasis on the notion of community, which indicates dual recategorization. Perhaps this is due to the origins of GDT, which lays in the CNR-community as a service provider. According to the interview, the GDT has evolved from that to a multi-facetted, cross-community service provider. Coming from this background, the GDT thought about extending their service to other communities. The two projects that facilitated contact between youth from both communities. This obviously requires the participating youth to be framed according to those communities. There seems to be a quite clear focus on the 'own' community of the GDT, which by default is a republican/nationalist working-class area called the Bogside. For cross-community work the GDT seems to focus predominantly on the relatively small PUL-community that is situated close-by, called the Fountains. The focus on these communities implies dual recategorization, aimed at opening up the views of the participating youth to be more inclusive. This could also indicate towards personalized decategorization, as an open view on identity through person-to-person contact is one of its indicators. However, this contact is still very much based on the traditional community framework, which works against decategorization being the possible approach. Also, when asked about cross-border elements of their projects, the interviewee indicated that doing cross-border work is quite the same as doing cross-community work, only in a different geography. Apparently it doesn't matter whether the projects create contact between CNR and PUL communities in Derry/Londonderry and the border area or CNR and PUL

communities that are both from Derry/Londonderry. This is a strong indication of dual recategorization, as it frames the PUL community members across the border and in Derry/Londonderry as the same identity group.

In terms of person-to-person contact, the Playhouse in Derry/Londonderry is an interesting organization. The Playhouse deals with identity in its PEACE projects by creating performances that are focused on personal stories. Through these personal stories, the visitors of the performances are encouraged to think about their own identity. Another PEACE project draws artists from other conflict areas, in order to do workshops and exhibit their works of art. Through the exhibition people should be encouraged to think differently about the conflict and peace and the workshops encourage person-to-person contact. So, in these projects there are strong indications for personalized decategorization, due to the interaction of artists with visitors of the project. They can connect through the medium of arts, making the contact meaningful. This is similar to the Ashton Centre, based in Belfast, that runs a PEACE project called the Fablab. In this shared space people from both communities are encouraged to create and invent things by using 3d-printers, laser-cutters and other machines. They are supposed to connect through the mechanics that are present in the room and their interest in machines and making things, quite similar to the art that is supposed to connect the visitors of the Playhouse. Turas also shares this characteristic of a connecting cultural feature. Turas is an Irish language centre, located in the Skainos Centre, which is a shared space funded by PEACE III. It primarily teaches Irish, but also works to promote Irish language in both traditional communities of Northern Ireland, arguing that the language is historically spoken by both community groups. So in a very similar way to arts in the Playhouse and handcraft in the Ashton Centre, the Irish language connects communities in this project. These three examples all indicate a certain level of personalized decategorization, because these points of contact that are created through these tools enable people to deal with each other outside the traditional community-framework. Turas is a peculiar one in this, because it uses a tool that is highly engrained in the conflict. The Irish language has, during the Troubles, been attributed to the Catholic community and is therefore often regarded as a nationalist/republican characteristic. Turas tried to transform the narrative of the Irish language in order to make it more inclusive for the PUL-community. This seems to be a strong indication towards decategorization, because it has transformed one of the characteristics of the conflict into something in which it doesn't matter which community background you have. This strong and meaningful person-to-person contact seems to have resulted in a situation that moves further than decategorization, as the interviewee speaks of the so-called 'Irish language speakers community'. This is in line with the theory of Dovidio and Gaertner, that argues that from a decategorized situation, new identity groups may derive. This could cause a new system of recategorization, with

sub-ordinate and superordinate identities. This means that the 'Irish language speakers community' of the interviewee would be one of the sub-ordinate identity groups in Northern Ireland. However, there isn't an indication in the interview that this is the case.

All three of the organizations that have this explicit connecting factor to bind the participants and visitors of the PEACE project also have strong indications that would imply dual recategorization. According to the interview with the Playhouse, its projects are focused on the conflict, which could indicate a focus on community. The focus on communities becomes more clear in the interview when talking about newcomers in Northern Ireland. The Playhouse is very aware of these groups and tries to work with these communities, the interviewee asserts. Also, they'd do work with one community in order to make them feel secure and safe, although this isn't the case for projects of the Playhouse in the PEACE Programme. The emphasis on communities implies that the Playhouse also leans towards dual recategorization. The same can be argued for the Ashton Centre, since they also have a particular focus on groups that could feel insecure about participating in the activities of the organization. Perhaps more importantly, the interviewee of the Ashton Centre also argues that the Ashton Centre is in principle a cross-community organizations, which according to the interviewee in Northern Ireland generally means working with the traditional communities. This indicates that the Ashton Centre itself is strongly leaning towards dual recategorization, however, its projects under PEACE still seem to lean towards decategorization. Turas has a couple of indications that signal recategorization in its work. The interviewee seems to have a view on identity that leans towards dual recategorization, as it doesn't matter to the interviewee whether someone is Irish or British, they all live on the island of Ireland. Inhabitant of the island would be the superordinate identity in this view. Meanwhile the interviewee acknowledges the importance of being able to perform the traditional cultural identities, which would be the sub-ordinate identities. In terms of the project, there is only one meaningful indication of dual recategorization, namely the signing of the ethos of Turas. The participants of Turas need to sign the cross-community ethos as part of their participation. This ethos is about respecting the Irish language as part of Irish culture, therefore categorizing it as part of the community. This could indicate a focus on the traditional communities and therefore it implies dual recategorization. However, the ethos is also about changing the narrative of the Irish language to become more inclusive towards the PUL-community. This again would indicate decategorization as it takes the individual interest for learning the Irish language as a starting point. Rather than the collective idea of learning Irish because it belongs to that particular identity group.

Conclusively, in the lower level of the PEACE Programme, there seems to be a strong emphasis on person-to-person contact and a basis for this is created in the projects. This should mean that the

lower level of the PEACE Programme is leaning towards personalized decategorization as the approach that it takes. However, this only counts for the projects that are using specific 'tools', such as arts, handcraft and language, to achieve their goals. The other projects, who have used history as a medium to create cross-community connections seem to be stronger leaning towards dual recategorization. When looking into the organizations that are running the projects in the lower level, they all also signal some indications for dual recategorization. Primarily by working with the rather strongly defined traditional communities. The conceptual model illustrates that the stage between recategorization and decategorization is indicated by a loss of salience of the identity groups. Perhaps due to the tools that the projects that are more leaning towards decategorization use, this salience of the identity groups is eroding. When everybody is busy with learning a language, making and creating or viewing arts, they are connected through this medium and that becomes a primary point of their identity.

Chapter - 8 - Conclusion

8.1 Conclusion

Having answered all the sub-questions, the conclusion of this research is made by answering the main research question. This question is; *"What is the difference between the PEACE Programme's approach to identity in the centre of Northern Ireland and in the border region?".* The PEACE Programme's approach in terms of identity has been identified on different levels in the previous chapter. Dual recategorization was mostly signalled in the higher level, with an emphasis on the sub-ordinate identities and a sort of inclusive, cross-community identity as a superordinate identity. However, the superordinate identity is considered to be rather weak in comparison with the highly entitative sub-ordinate identity groups. In the intermediate level there was a difference between both organizations. The local council was more aimed towards dual recategorization, similar to that of the high level organizations. The peacebuilding organization, on the other hand, seems to lean more explicitly towards decategorization. The lower level also seems to indicate different approaches. All projects engage with person-to-person contact, however, there is a difference in the 'tools' they use to make this meaningful. The organizations that use history also show strong signals that imply dual recategorization, on the same basis as in the high and intermediate level. The other organizations that use arts, handcraft and language seem to have a stronger approach that could be defined as decategorization. However, they also are subject to the community-framework in some sense, indicating dual recategorization.

In terms of spatial differentiation, there doesn't seem to be a significant difference between the projects in the border area and the projects in the centre area. This might be due to a variety of reasons. The most important reason is probably the strong division in Northern Ireland. This research has categorized Belfast and surrounding areas as the centre of Northern Ireland, because it is the economic and political hub of the country without strong economic local connections with Irish border areas. The connections with the UK and more international connections are stronger in this area. However, in some sense, Belfast could probably also be seen as a border area. The large proportion of CNR-community members in this area probably make it a border area in terms to identity. This explains the necessity of peacebuilding programmes in this area. Therefore, with regard to the approach of the PEACE Programme there doesn't seem to be a significant difference between the border area and the central Belfast area, which actually shouldn't be considered as a centre in a cultural sense. One of the organizations in Derry/Londonderry, the GDT, is thought to be directing more towards dual recategorization, rather than decategorization that is implied by the organizations

in Belfast. However, there is no mentioning of this being due to its situation close to the border. The advantages that were named of doing close-border work were more in terms of accessibility to possible partners of the projects. This made it easier to apply for funding with the SEUPB. With regard to identity, this advantage doesn't seem to have any influence, as creating contacts between the CNR community in Derry/Londonderry and the PUL community on the other side of the border would have the same effect as creating contacts between a CNR and PUL community that are both based in Derry/Londonderry. The emphasis on dual recategorization by this organization can probably be explained by the following two reasons. The interviewee is an important member of one of the more 'extreme' political parties in Northern Ireland, meaning that he is more likely to give importance to the identity groups, otherwise he wouldn't be a member of the political party that is predominantly aimed at securing this identity group. Furthermore, the origins of the GDT lie within one of these traditional communities, as a service provider for a nationalist community. Since this is still part of the activities of the GDT, it could explain the thinking along community lines of this organization. In Belfast, the Messines' projects are seemingly leaning towards recategorization, more than the other projects of the lower level. However, they operate throughout Northern Ireland and not specifically in the border area or in the centre. The fact that one of the organizations from Derry/Londonderry seems to lean more towards dual recategorization is more likely to be due to (a combination of) these other named circumstances than its situation at the border. Therefore, one cannot argue that there is a substantial difference between the approaches of the projects of the PEACE Programme in the Derry/Londonderry border area and in the area of Belfast.

8.2 Discussion

The methodology of this research has proven to be somewhat limited, especially in the approach towards the aspect of spatial differentiation. The literature defined the centre area and the border area as two distinct geographical units that have different characteristics. The border area should therefore be different than the central area. In terms of identity this means that identity in the border area is generally more fluid and interactive with the identities on the other side of the border, whereas identity in the centre tends to be more uniform. However, the definition of the central area in Northern Ireland was probably the difficulty in this research. As previously stated, the definition of the border area is probably distorted by the demographic make-up of Northern-Ireland. Sizeable nationalist communities in the Belfast area might move the border area to what otherwise would be known as the centre area. Perhaps if the research would have focused more on the predominantly unionist areas to the east and north of Belfast, the conclusion might have been different. These areas have been considered to examine during the course of the research, but this option was eventually not pursued do to the lack of time. Also, there were considerably less available PEACE projects in these areas. This is an interesting option for further research. By comparing predominantly unionist areas with the border area, the image of spatial differentiation in the approach of the PEACE Programme to identity might have been more diverse.

By doing this research, the importance of viewing the border landscape as fluid, in the case of identity, has been highlighted. A programme that is focused on the border region should therefore consider the border area to stretch out further than the areas that are close to the national borders. Certainly in the case of post-conflict nations, it is probably more important to widen the perspective on borders beyond the national border. For the PEACE Programme it might be important to expand the focus from areas that are experiencing division, to all of Northern Ireland and perhaps even the island of Ireland and the UK. Otherwise the programme is in danger of comforting the conflicting identity groups, rather than changing their mind-set to become more peaceful. It seems as if the PEACE Programme in its higher levels is improving intergroup relations by increasing the self-esteem of the identity groups. As a consequence, segregation remains relatively high, because people like to remain in the identity group that secures their self-esteem. This reflects onto all kinds of different important areas in the Northern Irish society, such as housing and schooling. Therefore, this doesn't only create a segregated mind-set, but also a segregated spatial environment. This reflects onto the Belfast area, which from an identity perspective can now be considered as a border area.

An interesting result of this research is that there seems to be a discrepancy between the approaches of the lower and higher levels of the PEACE Programme with regard to identity became apparent.

The differences between these levels could indicate that political involvement affects the approach that is taken in the peacebuilding intervention. Especially the differences between the two intermediate organizations indicate this. The BCC, as a local council, is subject to the wishes of the political parties that are chosen by the population, whereas CI, as a peacebuilding organization, can operate more independently, albeit in accordance with the general guidelines of the peacebuilding programme. That politics have influence on the approach of peacebuilding is confirmed by several interviewees also, which proves the validity of this statement. In the case of the PEACE Programme, the initiative lies with the RoI and Northern Ireland, on behalf of the UK. The majority of political parties in Northern Ireland rely on votes that come from the traditional communities. Increasing the entitativity of these groups is therefore in their best interests, because they can act as the safeguards of these communities. So, when the initiative of the PEACE Programme lies with these parties, the chances are that dual recategorization will be strongly emphasized on, as opposed to decategorization. It seems as if the political situation in Northern Ireland trickles through to the PEACE Programme. However, the discrepancy between this higher level and the local PEACE projects from the lower level does indicate that amongst the local population there is a certain sense of moving beyond these traditional communities, towards more individually based identities.

PEACE IV is supposed to have a more open and fluid view towards identity, which could mean that decategorization will become a more important approach of the PEACE Programme. At the moment it seems as if the high level of the PEACE Programme is somewhat limiting the lower level to take an approach of decategorization. The community-framework is projected onto these organizations by the PEACE Programme itself, by the political and social division in Northern Ireland, by the origins of the organization itself or by a combination of these factors. As one of the interviewees points out, removing from the community-framework requires brave civic leadership. As a tertiary actor and a relative outsider to the conflict, that is something that could be done by the EU. This means that the EU must engage with differentiated decategorization, emphasizing on the individual identity as the most important part of personal identity. Another option is the creation of more meaningful contacts. As pointed out, the organizations that created contact through the mediums of arts, handcraft and language seem to be more strongly leaning towards decategorization, which indicates meaningful contact. PEACE IV could extend these meaningful contacts by actively propagating that open and fluid view on identity. Also, the equal basis of self-esteem of the communities, that is needed for decategorization to work properly seems to have been created in the past PEACE instalments. The data suggests that several single-identity capacity building projects have been done and are still being done. This way, the basis for decategorization already seems to be in place. Another option for the PEACE Programme is to increase the entitativity of the superordinate identity

that is part of dual recategorization. At the moment, the EU PEACE Programme strengthens the traditional communities and does this under the name of a peaceful and stable society, as the superordinate identity or superordinate goal. However, when a delicate issue comes up that accentuates the differences between the subordinate identity groups, such as the issue of the flag on Belfast City Hall, old sentiments tend to boil up again, endangering the peace process. When the superordinate identity would be strengthened by the PEACE Programme, it might smooth the effects of these issues. People will identify stronger with the superordinate identity and will solve these issues as each other's equals, after all they are all in the same superordinate identity group.

In conclusion, the EU PEACE Programme undoubtedly has had a strong influence on the peace process in Northern Ireland, especially in the earlier stages. Due to several developments the available funds decreased over the course of the years and therefore the scope of the programme was narrowed down. This research concludes that there is a discrepancy between the approach of the higher governance level of the programme and the local level from which the projects originate. In order to increase the efficiency of the PEACE Programme, a clear course of action is needed from the EU that ensures a synchronization of the different levels of governance in the PEACE Programme. It needs to either take the reins and decide on the approach that it thinks would be best, or follow the path that has already been set out by the local projects in the PEACE Programme.

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