THE ROAD AHEAD

MILITARY MOBILITY, PESCO AND THE NETHERLANDS: A CASE STUDY ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT

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BA
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Master's thesis
Human Geography: Conflicts, Territories and Identities
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“The line between disorder and order lies in logistics.”

- Sun Tzu, general and military strategist of the Chinese Zhou Kingdom, 500BC

From: Thirty-six Stratagems of War

Preface

From an academic perspective we are often outsiders looking in, asking ourselves the questions: what have *they* done, what are *they* doing, what are *they* going to do next? When I was about to start my job at the Ministry of Defence in The Hague, in my naïve excitement, I thought (although I told myself not to be naïve and I really thought I wasn't), that I would get to see what was happening behind the curtains and that I would get to understand and see (a little bit) of the major scheme behind everything. Looking back, I can say that I got a better look behind those curtains than I would have imagined, only to realise that the life on the inside of the Ministry wasn't so much different from the world at the outside, and I frequently found me and my colleagues asking ourselves the questions: What have *we* done so far, what are *we* doing, what are *we* going to do next? With the little bit of self-knowledge that I do possess, I knew that writing this thesis was going to be a tough task for someone like me who enjoys working in a dynamic environment, thriving when I work as a member of a team. This thesis, a solo project, would never have been finished without the help of numerous people pulling me trough. There's a Dutch military saying that would translate as: 'Where others stop, we continue.' For me, having heard it over and over, it has a double meaning. Of course, it means that I'm determined to continue, even if it gets hard, but for me it also means I might need to go on a little longer than some others need, just to get to the same result. I want to apologize in advance to all non-military personnel that will read this thesis: The world of defence is riddled with abbreviations, military slang and even abbreviations within abbreviations, of which I tried to use as little as possible. Besides all the people I am forgetting to call by name, I want to thank Brigadier General (retd.) Hans Damen for offering me the chance to step aboard the final adventure of his military career and Captain (Navy) Han van Bussel for supporting and mentoring me during the entire process. I want to thank my supervisor, dr. Bert Bomert for his patience and willingness to give feedback, especially during and after the periods when it was far too quiet from my side. I want to thank all the interviewees who were so kind and willing to answer all my questions and welcomed me in places I would never have thought to enter. Special thanks go out to my brother Job and friend Thomas who provided me with feedback through the entire process. And finally, I want to thank my fiancée Nienke for her support, help and commitment to make sure I did go on when I would have wanted nothing more than to stop.

Contents

Abstract

This research focuses on the development of European defence within the European Union from a Dutch perspective. A changing world calls for a new answer to the question of European defence. A chain of events has sparked old debates regarding the role of the European Union in defence and has led to various initiatives in the field, within and beyond the EU to answer to this question.

In all these initiatives, the Netherlands has chosen to put a strong emphasis on military mobility, the issue it deems the most important when it comes to European defence development. Next to multiple efforts regarding military mobility, the Netherlands has initiated a project within PESCO, the EU platform launched in 2017. This project on military mobility is seen by the Netherlands as the answer to the most important issues as well as a best practice of what European defence for the EU should look like.

By using European integration theory and analysing the factors shaping European defence development in the case of PESCO and military mobility, we can see where this development is coming from and how the current state of affairs came to be. In doing this, we shed light on the current positions of the European Union and the Netherlands, but also look at the influence of other countries or third parties.

The myriad of states and the numerous institutions through which nations work together make analysing European developments a tough ask. However, by taking the national perspective of countries into account and by understanding the complex environment in which everybody has to operate, we have come to see that countries are able to push their short- and long-run expectations and national interests trough these motions, in the hope of sticking to their route towards the future of European defence.

List of Figures and Tables

List of abbreviations

Adm.	Admiral
AP	Action Plan
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
ChoD	Chief of Defence
Col.	Colonel
CPE	Civilian Power Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the EU)
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (of the EU)
DB	Deutsche Bahn
EC	European Commission
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDF	European Defence Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EI	European Integration
EP	European Parliament
EPRS	European Parliament Research Service
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
HCSS	Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host Nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LI	Liberal Intergovernmentalism
LNO	Liaison Officer
LoG	Letter of Government
Lt-col.	Lieutenant-colonel
MC	Military Committee
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MilRep	Military Representative
MilReq	Military Requirement
MM	Military Mobility
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MSR	Main Supply Route
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATO MC	NATO Military Committee
NF	Neofunctionalism
NIP	National Implementation Plan
NLD	The Netherlands
PESCO	Permanent and Structured Cooperation
PMR	Permanent Military Representation
POC	Point of Contact
Retd.	Retired
SN	Sending Nation
SNPOC	Single National Point of Contact
TenT	Trans-European Transport Network policy
TFL	Task Force Logistics
USA	United States of America

1. Introduction

On August 20, 2019, former Netherlands Chief of Defence, General (retired) Dick Berlijn, proposed a radical shift in defence policy. He called for the Netherlands to "come loose from the Americans" and to put more effort in giving Europe "strategic autonomy" (Brouwers, 2019). Berlijn's take on Dutch defence within the European context is a response to the changing global security situation that the Netherlands and other member states of NATO and the European Union (EU) are confronted with; a gradual shift towards more insecurity, marked by (perhaps in hindsight) shocking events that were part of – or at least a symptom of – that shift. One of those markers was the start of the Donbass war in Ukraine, with the downing of civil airliner MH17 as an all-time low. Another relevant change in the security situation is signalled by the steady rise, since 2014, of ISIS. This increased insecurity environment – outside the West, but arguably influencing it – might have sparked other major events taking place in the Western world: the election of Donald J. Trump to the presidency of the United States and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, both taking place in 2016. This was also the year NATO initiated its so-called Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltics and Poland, meant to deter potential Russian aggression. At the same time, EU High Representative Mogherini presented the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), a document sparking the debate on (further) European defence integration (European Commission, 2016).

The United States is by far the largest member state of NATO. On its own, the USA spends more than double the money on defence than all other member states of NATO combined (see Figure 1). General Berlijn rightly pointed out that the American position within NATO, perhaps because of its then-current president, has brought unfavourable changes for the other member states: "In the past the NATO Council discussed strategy and our [NATO member states'] political goals. Nowadays, the U.S. forces its NATO partners to follow them" (Brouwers, 2019).
Until recently, European defence was mostly characterized by words rather than deeds. The hard reality is that European defence spending has declined ever since the end of the Cold War. Although defence budgets across NATO have been recovering slightly for the last four years, between 2008 and 2014 EU defence capabilities decreased with over 20% (Andersson et al., 2016).



Figure 1: Defence expenditure of NATO, in billion US dollars (NATO PDD, 2019)

In hindsight, 2016 might have been the year in which the international stage was set for European defence to (re)start its development. The various developments and events taking place, in combination with the debate on the so-called '2% norm' – the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product, as set by NATO for its member states, as the minimum amount of money to be spend on the military – changed the dynamics; new triggers for change in defence policy were set.

Zooming in from this broader perspective, the Netherlands, with a military budget of less than 10 billion US dollars (Ministerie van Defensie, 2017-II), is obviously a relatively small actor, albeit involved on all fronts. Throughout the years, most recently in November 2018 (NOS, 2018), the Dutch government has always stated that it opposes any development towards one European military. At the same time, however, the government is aware that the present system needs revisions: "As far as the government is concerned, transatlantic cooperation and the European Union are unquestionably the cornerstones of Dutch foreign policy. Nevertheless, many aspects of the post-war multilateral system are in urgent need of modernisation" (Speech from the Throne, 2019). While the post-Cold War status-quo was based on the European Union focussing on civil matters and NATO serving as the most important military power within Europe, recent developments seem to indicate this situation might shift in the coming years. During the Cold War period, defence in Europe was shaped by the multilateral system with NATO as the major institution for Western Europe and the Warsaw pact for Eastern Europe. In the decades following the demise of this antithesis, a new multilateral balance for Europe has not come into existence. In a context of a change in international relations and a possible decline of NATO's importance and/or a shift in global power, defence policy in Europe is set to change. However, there is

no clear vision on defence in this post-multilateral system yet. Nevertheless, at the same time, European defence keeps developing.

During the past couple of years various groups of EU and NATO countries have initiated specific projects, often in response to a 2017 call for a so-called Military Schengen (Schultz, 2017). Against this background, the Dutch Minister of Defence, Bijleveld, has framed the Netherlands as 'The gateway to Europe' (NOS, 2018), arguing that for the Netherlands the main objective in European defence projects is the enhancement of movement of allied forces through Europe. In light of this idea of the Netherlands being a gateway, various projects have been designed to make the movement of military troops and equipment within Europe easier and faster; the notion of military mobility. This same term also refers to the Dutch-initiated project within the EU defence platform of PESCO, Permanent and Structured Cooperation. PESCO is one of the three new EU initiatives, next to the Common Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), formulated by the European Union to improve European defence.

The military mobility project, just like the other projects within this PESCO framework, have been in place for only less than three years now; in addition, new projects are initiated on a national scale, as well as within the EU and NATO. As of now, it is very hard – if possible at all – to see what the long-term results of the various projects will be and how they will interconnect. The question is why the Dutch have chosen to focus on this issue and the PESCO project in particular. What does this choice say about their position and role within European defence development? My argument is that the Dutch government's choice to 'lead the way' in military mobility and put so much effort in PESCO is a result of its short-term expectations (positive as well as negative) regarding European defence development, its preference for autonomy over capabilities, and the preference for NATO as the most important military actor within Europe. The subsequent focus on a-political issues that take place at a level of low politics – such as military mobility – is a direct result of this, leading to differentiated integration.

1.1 State of the debate

In this section an exploration of the origins and most prominent positions within the debate on European defence development is given. In order to investigate the current developments in European defence, we need to assess the academic debate on European integration and European defence. Without diving too deep into theory, the main positions in the debate will become clear. We will see that European integration and European defence have a complex relationship and that European defence is not just a sub-topic of European integration. I will position myself in the debate and explain which research questions are necessary to add to the debate. Based on this overview and the research topic, the main

research question and necessary sub-questions to answer the main question will be formulated. In addition to that, we will also discuss a set of four hypotheses.

1.1.1 Where European defence and European integration connect

In 1961, Samuel P. Huntington published 'The Common Defense', which became the basis for modern ideas on defence policy-making. Huntington describes the "Janus-like quality" of defence policy. Just like the two-faced Roman god, defence policy always faces in two directions (Huntington, 1961, p. 1). On the one the hand, defence policy (-making) is a national topic, an issue of domestic political parties and public opinion. On the other, defence policy is seen as an extension, at least partly, of foreign policy, with 'hard', kinetic force as a way to influence other states. In that sense, defence policy cuts across the usual distinction between foreign and domestic policy. All around the world, Defence ministries are strange beasts among their national counterparts. Even just the idea that defence policy would get involved in something at least just as special, European integration, is something that has sparked a sizeable debate. This is logical considering what the extent of the consequences of the defence integration or cooperation within European Union could be.

Looking at these two topics, defence policy and European integration, there is a broad debate on European integration as well as on European defence development, as a semi-connected sub-topic. There has always been a discrepancy between the size of the debate and the actual progress that has been made. Already at the start of the 'European project', right after World War 2, discussions began on whether or not Europe (in what form or shape) should unite its forces into a single military – a debate that has been going on ever since. At the same time NATO is the most important military alliance for most of the (Western) European states. After the Cold War, when the European Union in its present form came into being with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, political and military decision-makers, as well as academics have repeatedly called for some kind of unification of European military forces. This view was supported by the argument that with the disappearance of the East-West divide and the idea that liberal democratic ideology was the only remaining ideology (Fukuyama, 1992), a loosely organised grouping with decreasing capabilities would be less effective than an alliance with a united force. For that reason, individual European nations should transfer sovereignty over its forces to 'Europe' (Stocchetti, 1996). The reallocation of sovereignty to a supranational level never materialized, however; either because the anticipated need to do so was not strong enough or because of a lacking political will.

One of the basic assumptions why this materialization never took place, shared by many, is that defence policy was seen as an exceptional field where the normal theories or frameworks on integration didn't apply (Ojanen, 2006; Howorth, 2019). The fact that so many theorists and scholars thought that their

own theory didn't answer the question when it came to European defence development didn't stop them from debating the future of European defence, as we will see further on.

Areas of tension

In an effort to categorize the debates on the development of an EU foreign policy, with security and defence as two important elements, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) define the tension areas in which the debates take place.



Figure 2: Areas of tension in EU foreign policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008)

As illustrated in Figure 2, the European Union and its policy are confronted with various areas of tension when it comes to determining what kind of union the EU wants to be (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). These tensions characterize the playing field in which the debate on the future of European defence development within the EU takes place. The debate on European defence development can be structured accordingly.

1.1.2 European integration vs Atlantic solidarity

After a period of economic crisis and continued Euroscepticism, over the last decade the debate on the European Union as a military power has continued and intensified. The exact relationship between the EU and NATO remains a point of discussion; some scholars – for instance Tocci (2018), who is a scholar but was also a special advisor to High Representative Mogherini – argue that NATO will lose its importance and (therefore) the European Union has to have a stronger role in defence cooperation in the future. In addition to those that argue that the EU should compete with or replace NATO, there are also scholars that argue that defence development within the European Union will actually strengthen NATO and its member states, without major changes in the position of the European Union (Novaky, 2018). According to others, for instance Sus (2017), the Union, although making (small) steps towards becoming a strategic actor in the field of defence policy, is not (yet) touching the autonomy of its member states; military sovereignty is still at a national level. Tardy (2018) states that the European Union might be making progress in the direction of defence integration, but in the end the individual

nation states will never give up their sovereignty over their military forces, making European integration less favourable than the already existing Atlantic solidarity.

1.1.3 Civilian power vs military power

Some would argue that by initiating the EU Global Strategy and PESCO, the European Union is slowly shifting away from being just a civilian power by default, moving more in the direction of becoming a military power – or a civilian power by design: choosing to be a civilian power while capable of being a military power. The element of civilian power as a factor of influence has also been discussed by Orbie and Duchene (Orbie, 2006). According to Orbie (2006), the explanation of why the EU chose to be a civil rather than a military power can be found in the notion of Civilian Power Europe (CPE), a notion that has been dominant during most of the twentieth century. The European project has always been civilian by default instead of by design, and therefore nation states felt reluctant towards defence integration. Berger, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst even argue that Germany, which is one of the driving forces in the EU, has a culture of anti-militarism that is so strong that it will hinder any form of development on this terrain (Meyer & Strickmann, 2011).

The practical side of defence integration within the European Union has often been debated, but not much researched; for the simple reason that the EU has never been a military power, nor did it choose to become one. Ojanen (2006) argues that as early as 2006 the EU began with efforts regarding interstate defence and security integration, in particular through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), stating that the European Union might very well start competing with NATO in the field of integration of defence policies. Sus (2017), and Niemann and Brerethon (2013) argue that the EU has been making steps towards becoming a strategic military actor, obtaining strategic (read: military) actorness. However, a common assessment is that – despite all efforts – little progress has been made. Other groups of scholars have continuously argued that defence had a greater potential in Europe than just NATO, for instance Howorth (2019), Glarbo (2001) and Ojanen (2006). Arguing that security and defence have a great potential towards integration, they prefer a future for the EU as a military actor because the European Union could be an ethical alternative to NATO's hard power and focus on military operations (Dyson, 2013). Some, such as Giegerich, Howorth and Rieker argue that European defence development stems from the idea of a common strategic culture and national strategic culture as stated by Hyde-Price (2004). They argue that the idea of a common (strategic) culture will lead to further developments in defence integration. We will later revisit how this idea is also present in Ernst Haas' theory on neofunctionalism (1958).

1.1.4 Intergovernmental approach vs community approach

While there is plenty of research and debate on the future of defence within Europe, with various insights in the future of the EU and NATO, the role of individual member states and their objectives in the current developments have so far been under-investigated. The vertical tensions between nations and supranational organisations have a continuing influence on European defence development, but they are rarely debated. It's tempting to forget about the national dimension in European developments, but even while this trap has been broadly recognized, many scholars keep making this error; the European project has intergovernmental as well as federal characteristics (Checkel, 2006). Braun and Bergema, of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, HCSS (2019), also notice the lacking intergovernmental perspective in the Dutch views. In particular Braun (2018) raises serious questions related to the paradox of, on the one hand, EU's unanimous decision-making process versus, on the other, initiatives taken outside of the EU framework (like PESCO), with just small, non-inclusive groups involved in specific projects. The ambiguity of the EU, being a supranational institution with intergovernmental components, is something we need to take into consideration when doing research. It is important to formulate questions and build a theoretical framework that embrace this ambiguity. This area of tension is very much linked to European Integration theory, further elaboration of which will be given in the next chapter.

1.1.5 External objectives vs internal objectives

The final area of tension is the internal versus the external objectives. The EU, as a political actor – but also individual member states – formulates policy to achieve its objectives. Developing European defence can be driven by external objectives, such as the desire to become a global military actor of influence, or internal objectives, for instance trying to enlarge internal security by developing new policies.

By focusing on the role of a single member state, in this case the Netherlands, we might get a better insight in this debate on the objectives of the EU and its member states. We can assess its position and role and based on that analyse how its efforts and aims influence the developments and relate to the objectives. In zooming in to the level of the Netherlands and its promotion of the military mobility project, two Dutch research institutes have analysed recent developments: the Clingendeal Institute and the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). The debate on PESCO is, obviously, very recent and therefore rather limited. Nevertheless, various researchers are quite critical about the potential successes of PESCO, in particular the military mobility project (Zandee, 2018-I). As developments in the process continue, answering the 'why' question is very important. Are developments taking place because of external or internal objectives, or, in other words, do the Union and its members have clear, long-term objectives in the field of defence or is the development mainly propelled by national interests and short-term expectations?

1.2 From debate to research

The societal relevance of the changing international security climate is apparent, as will be explained in this section. Answers to the questions within this changing security environment can come in the form of innovation in military policy. The efforts of the European Union, NATO and its member states regarding military mobility are an example of this and have the potential to reinforce European and NATO's abilities to quickly and effectively deploy over the long term. Military mobility efforts could provide an answer toward the goal of better enabling defence and deterrence within Europe (Scaparrotti & Bell, 2020). The possible impact of improved military mobility against the background of a changing international security situation is what makes this topic societally relevant. The choices made by Dutch political and military actors in the military mobility project and European defence development as a whole will affect the Dutch international position. For the Netherlands, military mobility could be the vehicle shaping the image of the Netherlands as a military actor that matters, but at the same time put it on the map as the 'go-to nation' when it comes to (military) logistics, with knowhow, a-grade infrastructure and the port of Rotterdam.

In the debate on defence within Europe, the Permanent and Structured Cooperation is a new institution and military mobility is a relatively new concept. The body of literature on these topics is still shallow, but growing through its momentum. Testing how PESCO projects fit within European integration theory and analysing the role of a single nation within these movements hasn't been done yet. Conducting such a research could help us to better understand the current developments on a national as well as an international level.

To sum up, the main topic of this research is the Dutch position in (recent) European defence development, with PESCO and military mobility as our case study. The case as such has various important dimensions, all connected to European defence development: (1) the Platform for Permanent and Structured Cooperation (PESCO); (2) the overarching, all-purpose term military mobility and its eponymous project; (3) the position of individual nations, focussing on the Netherlands. Developments in the field of EU defence take place under the umbrella of the Common Security and Defence Policy, the CSDP. In some respects, the CSDP functions as the foundation for the development of security and defence policy, similar to the national departments of defence, but on the level of the European Union. The dividing lines between security and defence are grey and even though this research focuses on defence policy, some overlap with the security domain is inevitable. However, given the size of the topic, we will not go (far) beyond the defence institutions and thus only pay limited attention to the foreign policy departments.

Based on the above, the following research question has been formulated:

How does European defence development within the European Union take shape and what impact does it have on the role and position of the Netherlands in the case of the PESCO project on military mobility?

In order to answer this central research question, various sub-questions must be answered first. In paragraph 1.1.4 we stated that the ambiguity of the EU as an intergovernmental and supranational actor is important, making it crucial to also investigate which levels of government are involved. (1) What is the historical-institutionalist background of PESCO and the military mobility project and how do these two subjects relate to each other?; (2) Which levels of government are involved in the policy processes?; (3) What are the Dutch views regarding the military mobility project within the broader context of EU defence development?; (4) In which direction is the EU defence development heading and how does this process relate to the Dutch aims?; (5) How does military mobility and in particular the PESCO project on military mobility fit within existing theories on European integration?

The purpose of this research is twofold. From an academic perspective we can add valuable insights into the national process behind European defence development and for the Dutch Ministry of Defence and European institutions it offers valuable insight in and reflection on these developments. Based on the case study on the military mobility project within PESCO and the Dutch national efforts, we are able to discern the concrete actions, results and consequences regarding the current process of defence development, at the same time placing them within the broader debate on European defence development.

The outline of this research is as follows: in Chapter 2, the main theories regarding the field of research are introduced and based on that our theoretical framework will be drawn. In Chapter 3, an overview of and elaboration upon the chosen research methods will be given. In Chapter 4 we dive into the history of the Permanent and Structured Cooperation and the project on military mobility. This will give us a broader understanding of our case in light of its historical-institutional background, recreating the timeline behind the major events. Chapter 5 consists of the analysis of the military mobility project by diving into sources in the form of interviews with subject matter experts and stakeholders, official documents and other research documents. In Chapter 6 we will revisit our hypotheses, before we move to the conclusion and discussion in Chapter 7 and 8.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Explaining and analysing European defence development

To structure and make sense of the enormous amount of information that is available to us, we need theories. Policymaking is a field of research in which public administration theory is leading, while in the research field on European Integration the main source for theories is found in the academic discipline of International Relations (IR). When we refer to the term 'policy', we mean public policy, as it is the set of public institutions that we take into consideration. Public policy can be defined as "[a]nything a government chooses to do or not to do" (Dye, as cited in Howlet, Ramesh & Perl, 2009, p. 4).

This chapter consists of two parts. First, the theoretical approaches developed to explain and analyse European integration – and European defence development in particular – are discussed. Secondly, the key concepts from these theories that will help us in the analysis of our case are addressed. Two focal points are European integration and (European) defence. We will start with the three major theories on European integration: Federalism, Neo-functionalism and Liberal-intergovernmentalism. Our focus on European defence policy brings us to a further exploration of the Social-constructivist theory.

Haas (1958) already argued that the classical thinking in terms of ideologies and party politics doesn't apply when it comes to the developing European project. The concept Haas uses to explain why the European project doesn't take place along the lines of traditional national political levels is based on the ideas of Northrop (in Haas, 1958), according to which the project will move forward regardless of the specific ideological background of each single government, as long as the overall norms and values of all member states are mutually compatible. This notion will return later on.

In the course of the history of European integration, numerous theories have been formulated regarding the process of (re)distribution of national interests to a supranational level, nowadays known as the European Union. Comprehensive overviews of dominant theories are, however, scarce (Diez, 2009). Some scholars even argue that in understanding all the developments in the field of European defence, for instance, theory seems to be of little assistance (Howorth, 2019). We need to acknowledge that "[n]o single approach can capture all the complexity of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy." (Walt, 1998, p. 30)

As said, three main theories used for explaining European integration are Federalism, Neo-functionalism (NF) and Liberal-intergovernmentalism (LI) (Wiener & Diez, 2009). These various theories, each with their strengths and weaknesses, are discussed in Sections 2.1.1-2.2.3. As a disclaimer, we have to take into consideration, however, that the field of European defence is so complex that no simple (predictive)

theory is applicable, not even the 'grand theories' on European integration; at best, we might be able to come up with probabilities (Dyson & Konstadinides, 2013). In order to address this problem, the theory of Social constructivism will be explored as a melting pot for the strengths and positive elements of the various theories.

Cooperation, integration, association, unification: European defence development

In researching military development in the context of the European Union, specific terms reappear in all sources: cooperation, integration, association and unification, often used by adding the nouns European, military and/or defence. The terms are often used to describe different views on the same development. In the context of this thesis, their (literal) definitions are as follows: cooperation can be defined as "the act of working together", integration as "the action or process of combining two or more things in an effective way", association as "the fact of being involved with or connected to someone or something" and unification as "the act or process of bringing together or combining things or people" (Cambridge dictionary). When used to describe the possible extent of impact the terms line up as unification, integration, cooperation and association. Using these terms to 'measure' the development that is taking place, would be very subjective and therefore non-academic. Giving a measurable definition is not our aim, but noting the use of words and the framing behind it is. The literal definitions are obviously less important than the way in which particular words and terms are used to frame the debate.

Therefore, this research will refer to the research subject as European defence development. European defence development is the all-purpose term to describe the efforts that are undertaken in our case on the European as well as the national level, whereas the use of the word development doesn't frame any of these efforts, such as integration and cooperation do, and allows us to make a neutral assessment.

Of the four previously named terms, only 'integration' and 'cooperation' will be used to describe and label developments. To be able to do so, the term integration needs a more in-depth definition. In this research, integration is defined as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas, 1958, p. 16).

2.1.1 Federalism

The concept of Federalism has a long history, going all the way back to the first ideas regarding nation states during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. It is closely related to the concepts of autonomy and in particular sovereignty. 'Autonomy' and 'sovereignty', although two very similar terms, are different regarding at least two issues. Autonomy means that an entity has the capacity to govern itself and/or is

actually governing itself, but it "is partial and limited, while sovereignty is whole and undivided" (Feinberg, 1983, p. 447). The other difference is that "autonomy is delegated; sovereignty is primal and underivative" (Feinberg, 1983, p. 448). When a nation declares it will not give up sovereignty, this might sound more or less the same as not willing to give up autonomy, but the notion of sovereignty bears the meaning that a state does not want to give up any authority, while the word autonomy offers way more space to manoeuvre; in other words, it is far less definitive.

When talking about Federalism in the context of European integration, we look at Europe from the perspective of the European integration project of "previously separate, autonomous, or independent territorial units to constitute a new form of union" (Burgess, 2009, p. 26). The Federalist idea of a European union is seen as a voluntary conglomerate of states and peoples with a focus on recognition, preservation and accommodation of interests, identities and cultures. This underlines that Federalism focusses on integration and forming a union (Burgess, 2009). The Federalist approach to Europe centres around cooperation, by handing over parts of the autonomy from lower levels to a federation, while at the same time sticking to specific other powers. The idea behind it is the notion that despite the differences, each member with its own characteristics can flourish because of the diverse character. Maintaining and protecting these differences is at the core of the Federalist theory. Traditionally, federations have accepted constitutions that form their cornerstones. These federations built upon their constitutions with new agreements or deals. Unions such as the EU are not bound to strict borders, neither in a physical sense nor on a political level, which means they might "evolve in both size and scope" (Burgess, 2009, p. 30).

Although the European Union doesn't have a constitution, its legitimacy is based on various treaties that combined give it a comparable character to states that have constitutions. The Federalist approach ascribes a lot of impact to national political and economic self-interest. Because of its complex character, Federalism can be seen as a process in state-building, but also as a political philosophy on its own. From a Federalist perspective, European integration refers to the convergence of states that were previously not cooperating. The Federalist interpretation of integration as "a process whereby a group of people, organized initially in two or more independent nation-states, come to constitute a political whole which can in some sense be described as a community" (Pentland, as cited in Burgess, 2009, p. 30) is too broad for this research, however, also because it does not differentiate between cooperation and integration.

Important factors in Federalism, like autonomy and sovereignty, can be used in analysing contemporary European integration regarding defence policy (Burgess, 2000, p. 30). However, Federalist theory on its own is not suitable for the operationalisation of the methods in this research.

2.1.2 Neo-functionalism

Neo-functionalist theory originates in the late 1950s. In its reasoning on the position of the nation state within the EU, this theory is located somewhere in between Federalist and Liberal-intergovernmental approaches (the latter of which we will elaborate upon in the next section). Neo-functionalism sees the European Union as a supranational institution with only limited power for nation states. Key elements of Neo-functionalism are obviously the notions of functionalism, as well as functional *spill-over*, a concept that was already adopted by Monnet before it became commonly known under that name in the academic world. In defence policy theory this concept is known as 'logrolling' (Hilsman et al., 1993). Traditionally, Neo-functionalists were of the opinion that defence as a sector is the exception to spill-over, but other approaches, for instance Social constructivism, think it could also take place in the defence sector (Ojanen, 2006). Haas uses the phrase "the expansive logic of sector integration" to describe spill-over (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 49). The idea is that integration is an ongoing and ever-widening process; after the first integrative steps have been set, the pressure on member states increases to further integrate other sectors because the various sectors are interdependent. Since sectors are interdependent, problems do emerge when (a part of) a sector is integrated at another level. The only way to counter these problems, is by further integration of other sectors or tasks, hence functionalism.

The incentive for the development of this theory was the founding of the institutional predecessors of the European Union: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Neo-functionalism is therefore directly connected to the European Union and its history.

A concept with Federalist and Neo-functionalist feathers is the idea of 'strategic actorness'. Recent developments suggest that the European Union is evolving into a strategic actor (Sus, 2017). With the growth of the Union while military capabilities are still mainly seen as being attributes of states, the label of 'strategic actorness' for this process is increasingly used (Norheim-Martinsen, 2012). If the European Union is actually gaining strategic (read: military) actorness, this illustrates a shift in the tense relationship of being either a civilian or a military power. The European Union, while falling short of statehood but being more than just a supranational institution in service of its member states, needs to develop "recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion" (Sus, 2017, p. 3). In looking for an answer to the question whether the European Union is becoming a strategic actor, Realist, Federalist and Liberal-intergovernmental theories focus too much on issues of high politics, without taking into proper account what is happening on a lower political level, in contrast to Neo-functionalism. That is a reason why we need Neo-functionalism as a part of our framework.

While scholars, in particular Haas, have argued that Neo-functionalism is merely an analytical framework, it can also be seen as a normative guide towards integration. Within Neo-functionalism,

there is debate on the end state of integration. Other, more general, critiques regarding the theory are that it is too selective and narrow in its interpretation and that there is too much confusion regarding the definition of specific key concepts, such as spill-over (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009). Another factor in the push for integration, also adopted by Monnet, is the idea of 'socialisation' of elites, an intergovernmental notion that mirrors the Liberal-intergovernmental factor referred to as the development of 'policy networks'.

In order to answer sub-questions (3) and (4) – 'What are the Dutch views regarding the military mobility project within the broader context of EU defence development? and 'In which direction is the EU defence development heading and how does this process relate to the Dutch aims? – we need a framework to analyse the positions of the various actors. As an alternative way of looking at the nations involved, and analyse their position regarding the developments, Haas proposes the concept of expectation types. According to Haas, actors can have certain expectations which determine their actions in European projects. According to Haas, a distinction has to be made between:

1. Actors with long-run positive expectations who
    - have long-range (economic) plans that can't be terminated by a decree or ruling;
2. Actors with short-run positive expectations who
    - are based on single conditions and unconnected measures,
    - don't expect far-reaching actions from supranational bodies,
    - don't focus on the element of continuity,
    - may turn into long-run expectations when successful;
3. Actors with short-run negative expectations who
    - focus on preventing specific policy,
    - work with ad-hoc coalitions in order to block legislation,
    - disintegrate after their goal has been reached,
    - can form (semi-)permanent institutions if they don't achieve their goal;
4. Actors with long-run negative expectations who
    - oppose integration at the onset of supranational activity,
    - seek national policy away from supranationalism and federalism,
    - keep opposing supranational policy even after it has been active for several years.

This model accommodates the qualification of events and opinions to define the role of the Netherlands and other states. Based on this we can see how their expectations are a factor in their actions.

2.1.3 Liberal-intergovernmentalism

Liberal-intergovernmentalism (LI) is an application of so-called rationalist institutionalism. It is a 'baseline theory', combining various other theories. The central idea of understanding the European Union through Liberal-intergovernmentalism is by looking at the Union as the result of interstate

negotiations (Risse, 2009). Its main characteristics are that it sees nation states at the main actors and 'Masters of the Treaty' in European integration and considers European institutions to be the product of bargaining processes between states. Rationalist institutionalism is the basis on which the application of Liberal-intergovernmentalism is built (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009). It emphasises the main factor in the process as governments acting upon national interests when choosing their preferred fields for integration based on the advantages they identify (Dyson & Konstadinides, 2013).

Policy Network Analysis and New Institutionalism: Analysing the case study

The European Union is the most institutionalised environment in the world. The body of literature theorizing on these institutions is referred to as New Institutionalism (Pollack, 2009). The EU movement towards new policy areas has resulted in the creation of new, diverse and anomalous policy structures (Peterson, 2009). To what extent this is the case for European defence, remains to be seen. When we look at the development of defence within Europe, the history of the armed forces of European nations suggests that any transnational convergence is unlikely. The European states have been fighting each other for centuries. While the European Coal and Steel Community, as one of the first institutions of what would become the European Union, contributed to peace on the continent, since 1945 all efforts focussing on defence integration have failed. In contrast to this history of war and failed integration efforts, shared military culture and expertise throughout Europe pointed in the other direction in terms of the potential for European defence: cooperation or integration could have significant long-term results (Cross, 2011).

We assume that the military mobility project group within the PESCO framework is a platform where policy networks develop. Policy network analysis is a theoretical model that can be used for an empirical study of military mobility, since it specifically focuses on low-political groups, for instance officials shaping policy instead of politicians (Peterson, 2009). If these networks can be identified, we might be able to analyse their influence as a factor leading up to possible integration. In particular, Rational Choice theory and Historical Institutionalism are relevant theories in this respect, because they both reject the functionalist idea behind the design of institutions – the idea that every institution has been designed and constructed in the most efficient way. The Historical Institutionalist approach tries to uncover the legacies of institutions and past decisions that influence future outcomes. Historical Institutionalist theory is related to Liberal-intergovernmentalism in the sense that both theories consider the European Union as an institutionalized environment in which the member states are the masters of the treaty (McLean & Gray, 2009). However, whereas Liberal-intergovernmentalism sees the EU member states as external institutions, Historical Institutionalism approaches the member states as embedded within the EU institutions (McLean & Gray, 2009). 'Path-dependence' and 'unintended consequences' are two key notions in this respect. Path-dependence means that "once a country or region has started down a path, the costs of reversal are very high" (Pollack, 2009, p. 127). It does not mean

that there are no choices left to make, but the choice to reverse the process is hard. Unintended consequences are the unwanted results of decisions that have been made. Path-dependency can also have unintended consequences as a result. A Historical Institutional approach to the military mobility project in PESCO is useful, because it helps in understanding how an institution can shape the outcome (Pollack, 2009).

2.2 Analysing European defence development

When it comes to analysing the development of defence in Europe, the classic European integration theories take a far less prominent place. The main reason for this is that they might explain integration, but they focus on the outcome and make fundamental claims on the way European integration will go forward (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; Dyson & Konstadinides, 2013).

Liberal-intergovernmentalism remains a dominant theory in analysing defence development that has been adopted for two reasons: (1) because European defence development has been taking place on the intergovernmental level LI focusses on, and (2) development takes place as the result of national interests. Because European defence development is also taking place at international levels, in addition to the national ones, intergovernmental approaches as such are too narrow, however. Intergovernmentalism as a theory is not sufficient to explain the emergence of supranational policy agenda-setting and implementation (Dyson & Konstadinides, 2013). Neo-functionalism is also being used in the field, but mainly as a part of institutionalist approaches. As defence on a supranational level has never taken on a federal form, Federalist theory has no prominent place (yet). All three theories are based on the assumption that European integration is a process that is likely to progress in its development. Liberal-intergovernmentalism offers some space, because stagnation of development is arguably an option. However, to get a better understanding of the case, the broad theories on European integration do not offer enough detail in their options to empirically investigate a single case. We therefore need a more post-positivist approach, an approach that the Constructivist theory offers (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013).

2.2.1 Social constructivism

While perhaps not among the ‘grand theories’ explaining European integration, Social constructivism has become increasingly popular in analysing European governance and it is frequently used in analysing European defence development (Checkel, 2006; Dyson & Konstadinides, 2013). But what is Social constructivism? Social constructivism – Constructivism in general – is based on the idea that the reality we see around us is the result of social constructions. It is within this environment of social constructions that everything and everyone yields connections which influence our actions; individuals “do not exist independently from their social environment” (Risse, 2009, p. 145). This is in contrast to

individualist and rational-choice theories. Much, although certainly not all, of the inspiration for Social constructivist readings of European integration comes from the Neo-functionalist and Liberal-intergovernmental theories (Risse, 2009).

'Differentiated integration' is a constructivist concept we are adding to our research framework. The main idea behind this concept is the notion that European defence development takes place on so many levels that "policy agenda-setting and implementation has become increasingly fragmented" (Dyson & Konstadinides, 2013, p. 119). So, even while development might lead to integration, the integration is only partial and, in many respects, very much differentiated. This process, mainly taking place in areas of low politics, will not open roads to progress towards integration in high politics (Howorth, 2019). Differentiated integration thus might be a factor that causes integration through, for instance, spill-over to take place more easily, but the more this progress is differentiated on all levels, the more likely it is that it stops in its tracks when all these low-political areas need to develop into a high-political area (Howorth, 2019).

Within the field of Social constructivism, conventional constructivists focus mainly on the concept of 'norms and values' as factors for potential development in terms of integration (Checkel, 2006). This concept encompasses Haas' idea of mutually compatible norms (Haas, 1956), adopted from Northrop. This notion is arguably leaning on intergovernmental ideas. A process-tracing case study is a typical starting point for analysing these factors. Through process-tracing we can also analyse and assess the socialisation levels and/or policy networks in our case. Although national interests are acknowledged as an important factor by Neo-functionalists and Liberal-intergovernmentalists as Haas (1958) and Moravscik (2009), it is in particular Constructivism that does investigate and assess the presence of national interests rather than just identify it. Interpretive constructivism is popular in Europe and investigates 'discourses and framing' and how they affect changing attitudes. How does the discourse around identity affect a nation's actions?

2.3 Conclusion

In this short overview we have briefly touched upon the wealth of theories on European integration and its connection with European defence development. Hindered by the size of the academic subject of European integration and the special position of defence within European integration, no single theory offers an absolute answer. Moreover, choosing one of the major theories, be it Federalist, Liberal-intergovernmental or Neo-functionalist theory, would blindsight us when trying to unravel the theoretical foundation underlying the current developments. Thus, choosing one major theory doesn't help in answering our question.

Although a comprehensive overview as well as a comprehensive theoretical framework doesn't exist, elements from the various theories can provide enough theoretical foundation to be able to analyse the topic of European defence development. The assessment of the three major theories, Federalism, Neo-functionalism and Liberal-intergovernmentalism, complemented by Historical Institutionalist and Social-constructivist theory, have brought forward a set of factors that these theories see as crucial in their respective analyses. Focussing on these factors will help us in analysing our case and determine which factors are of importance and how they play a role. Based on that we can draw conclusions regarding which mix of theories is dominant in our case as well as building an accurate assessment of our case.

The list of relevant factors as derived from our theoretical framework is as follows:

1. *Autonomy vs sovereignty*
2. *Spill-over effects* within the defence branch of the CSDP field
3. The influence of *differentiated integration* on current and future developments
4. The *expectations* behind the national position
5. The emergence of EU *strategic (military) actorness*
6. *Socialisation/policy networks*
7. *Discourses/framing*
8. Compatibility of *norms and values*
9. The presence of *national interests*
10. *Path dependency*
11. *Unintended consequences*

In Chapter 1, we elaborated upon the areas of tension as formulated by Keukeleire and MacNaughton (2008):

1) European integration vs Atlantic solidarity,
2) civilian power vs military power,
3) an intergovernmental approach vs a community approach and
4) external objectives vs internal objectives.

In combination with the analysis regarding the factors that play a central role and the areas of tension, we can formulate several hypotheses concerning the positions of the Netherlands and the European Union within these areas. Testing these hypotheses by assessing the areas with our set of factors will help us in answering our main questions. The following hypotheses are put forward:

Hypothesis 1, based on the tension area European integration vs Atlantic solidarity:
The Netherlands pursues European defence developments that lean towards integration, without affecting Atlantic solidarity.

Hypothesis 2, based on the tension area civilian power vs military power:
The European Union is developing into the role of a strategic (military) actor, but will keep its focus on being a civilian power as long as NATO provides the military power.

Hypothesis 3, based on the tension area intergovernmental vs community approach:
The current European defence development in the case of PESCO strikes a balance between the intergovernmental bottom-up and the community-based top-down approach, which exactly coincides with the interests and expectations of the Netherlands.

Hypothesis 4, based on the tension area external objectives vs internal objectives:
European defence development within the PESCO's project on military mobility is driven by a balance of external and internal objectives.

In the next chapter we'll elaborate upon how these various theoretical considerations have been translated into methods for our analysis.

3. Research methods

Building on the theoretical framework, this chapter outlines the research design and methodology that has been used. This chapter addresses the choice of a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach, followed by an explanation for choosing a case study methodology to answer the research questions. I will also argue how the types of sources that have been chosen fit within the case study methodology. In Section 3.2, additional context of the conducted interviews is provided.

This research has been done based on a qualitative rather than a quantitative basis. Quantitative research would require a standardisation of questions and a large enough sample size to base relevant information on. Assessing sector integration is easiest done by assessing economic index figures (Haas, 1958). Such a quantitative approach doesn't fit the defence field, however, because defence spending is largely disconnected from regular market mechanisms. In order to realistically reconstruct the social reality that is the topic of research, quantitative methods would be neither feasible nor preferable, because of the shape of its landscape.

Qualitative methods offer more flexibility when it comes to structure, while still making use of quantitative methods such as data collection through, for example, in-depth interviews (Kumar, 2014). The main sources of information consist of semi-structured in-depth interviews and an analysis of literature and documents. The topics, European defence development and the military mobility project, are connected to two levels of governance and three large institutions, i.e. national and supranational, in respectively the Netherlands, the European Union and NATO. From a holistic point of view, they are in line with the aim of the research: giving a complete as possible assessment of the Dutch role in European defence development. By incorporating all these points of view, we can make a comprehensive analysis of the status of military development.

The internal validity of the research has to be ensured by a consistent use of terms and concepts, in combination with coding of the data from the interviews based on a clear and unambiguous set of codes. The external validity rests on the ability to use the results of this research for future research. This is achieved by clearly marking the boundaries and the context of the research. A proper theoretical and methodological framework ensures that information can be deducted from this research. In that respect, the origin of statements from any of the sources will be made quite clear by using direct quotes.

3.1 Case study methodology

In analysing a single case, such as the project on military mobility, the use of case study methodology is straightforward. Using a case study is an appropriate way to conduct an in-depth analysis of a particular topic. Case study methodology is also useful for conducting qualitative research. According

to Kumar (2014), a case study research design is useful to make an in-depth analysis of a phenomenon that would otherwise be too large to research. However, drawing conclusions from just a single case and projecting these on to a higher level is difficult. This makes the choice for a distinguishing case very important (Taylor, 2016, p. 584). The aim of assessing European defence development is rather broad. A case study helps us in drastically narrowing down our scope.

Taylor (2016) defines three preconditions that a case needs to fit in order to make it a distinguishing case that is suitable to use for a case study. The military mobility project within the framework of PESCO has been chosen as a distinguishing case because it fits the following criteria: (1) it is a critical case, meaning it can be used to test the theoretical framework; (2) it fits within the broader landscape of European defence development and as such can help to better understand its full context; and (3) the case is also revelatory because the PESCO military mobility project provides us with the opportunity to specifically investigate Dutch-led efforts in the field of defence development. By adding an in-depth analysis of a single case to the already existing body of literature, the theoretical basis of the broader theories can be tested and, if necessary, improved. By doing so, we might create an oversight of European defence development, its shape and impact. We can also show how our case corresponds with existing integration theories and based on this, be able to see the broader perspective. While this approach produces very detailed empirical information, it is still a theoretical approach (Diez & Wiener, 2009).

The time frame chosen for this case is the period from 2016 until present. The period prior to 2016 also provides useful sources on the broader trend of European defence development outside of our case that will be of use. In 2016 the discussions regarding renewed defence development evolved, followed by a period starting March 28, 2018, when PESCO came into existence. Although the efforts regarding the military mobility project as such did not start until 2018, the period between 2016 and 2018 is also vital because during this timeframe political processes pushed towards the start of the policy process.

Typically, a case study uses multiple sources and methods of data collection. According to Yin, there are three types of case studies: explanatory, exploratory, and descriptive. Beginning with the first and the last types, specified as being used to "describe a phenomenon within its context," we will move on to the second one to further explore the case (Yin, as cited in Taylor, 2016, p. 583).

The use of multiple methods for data collection is also referred to as triangulation and is a method in itself (Taylor, 2016). The use of multiple data collection methods addresses the main Achilles heel of using qualitative methods: the researcher's communication with the field. The method of triangulation is the same for all case study concepts, but the result is dependent on the theoretical perspective. From a positivist perspective, triangulation leads to a uniform and as accurate as possible picture of the

situation, while the more interpretive and/or constructivist perspective refers to the result of triangulation as "to give a richer understanding of an issue" (Taylor, 2016, p. 857). As Social constructivism has been adopted as an important part of the theoretical framework, the aim is to achieve the latter.

The collected data is derived from three main sources: (1) literature research serves as a basis for the research; (2) published sources in the form of policy papers and action plans from the various stakeholders provide the second source of information; while (3) interviews with individual experts complement the totality of information. These three sources provide the data to answer the research questions. While the use of academic and scholarly literature needs no further explanation, the other two sources will be explained in the following sections.

3.1.1 Document analysis

The bureaucratic institutions, the Dutch state with its various ministries, the European Union, and NATO, produce numerous documents on important topics, partly because the continuance of these institutions is anchored in the documents they produce. In an analysis of these documents, it is important to pay attention to the type of document and especially from which institutional source it derives. The information in the documents can be ordered according to three categories; the legislative, executive and judicial powers, based on the notion of separation of powers by Montesquieu (Pollack, 2009). Documents from these three groups have very different purposes. Beyond simply putting an agreed-upon text on paper, these documents have a particular power in themselves, in the sense that they give rights as well as duties to the subscribers and as such carry a sense of strength. We have to realise that each and every document is meant for a specific goal or purpose; the information contained in documents is certainly framed. In this research, various types of documents have been used. Based on Montesquieu's distinction, we could say that official documents can be divided into three categories, being:

(1) documents from the legislative branch, as well as (2) documents originating from the executive branch: council conclusions, committee prints, record of proceedings and debates, statutes, bills, laws, codes (for instance, Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), Letters of Intent (LoIs) and Action Plans (APs)), research reports, statistical publications, fact sheets, handbooks and manuals, commission papers, budgets, pamphlets (including Letters of Government (LoG), reports and other informative documents such as press digests and visualisations such as timelines, factsheets and other infographics);
(3) documents from the judicial branch: decisions, orders of the court, oral argument transcripts (WSU, 2019).

However, this divide is not very rigid in its appearance in most governmental institutions. For instance, in the European Union but also nationally the legislative and the executive power overlap and the political process is a result of the interaction of both branches (Lawaspect, 2020). The judicial power is

always very independent from the other two. Products from the third branch react to the first two from a judicial perspective. The overlap within the institutions results in some of the above-mentioned examples, also fits another category. In this research we will mostly use documents from the first and second category, as we are analysing the political and policy side of European integration and this process mainly takes place on these levels.

3.1.2 Semi-structured interviews

The third source of information are in-depth interviews with key informants. These interviews were semi-structured. In a case study, direct observations of the case are important. First-hand information about the case is important to come to a complete as possible understanding of the case in all its dimensions (Taylor, 2009). The interviews used for this research have all been conducted based on the same list of topics, as attached in Annex B. The use of semi-structured interviews gives flexibility to ask follow-up questions and offers the interviewee space to highlight those areas of interest and opinions they personally judge as important. At the same time, it also ensures that particular topics regarding the research are being discussed. To explore which people had to be included in the research, criteria are needed to select a research population that is able to answer the questions.

In order to be able to be interviewed on military mobility, specific criteria were formulated. Each individual had to:

1. be a (government) official from the EU, NATO, the Netherlands or a partner nation;
2. be involved in European defence development and/or the military mobility project; and
3. have enough oversight to be able to reflect on the Dutch perspective on European integration.

Based on these criteria, just a relatively small number of potential respondents remained. In total, seven interviews have been held, with six interviewees from the Netherlands and one from Germany. Two officials are employed by the European Union, two by the Dutch Ministry of Defence, one by the Netherlands at NATO and the EU, one by the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one by the German Ministry of Defence. An important note is that, in addition to the interviewees being subject matter experts, they are also directly involved stakeholders. In analysing the data from the interviews, we have to take into account that the interviewees will most likely argue in line with their position and frame their views accordingly. Additional information on the interviews can be found in Section 3.2.[1] References to the interviews are made according to their numbers. At the request of the interviewees, the transcripts of the interviews are not published in the appendices; they are only available to the supervisors of Radboud University.

[1] More details, as far as undisclosed, can be seen in Table 1 and in the appendices.

3.1.3 Coding

In order to create a scientifically sound analysis of the semi-structured interviews and documents, the choice has been made to analyse the transcripts of the interviews using coding. The codes that have been used to analyse the transcripts correspond with the factors as drawn from the major theories. In line with Chapter 2, these factors are:

1. *Autonomy vs sovereignty*
2. *Spill-over effects* within the defence branch of the CSDP field
3. The influence of *differentiated integration* on current and future developments
4. The *expectations* behind the national position
5. The emergence of EU *strategic (military) actorness*
6. *Socialisation/policy networks*
7. *Discourses/framing*
8. Compatibility of *norms and values*
9. The presence of *national interests*
10. *Path dependency*
11. *Unintended consequences*

Since each interviewee has a different background and work environment with its own vocabulary and jargon, these codes will help us in structuring the information. Borrowing from the most important theories, this is the most comprehensive list of factors possible. We want to see if we can identify these factors and based on that analyse how important their presence is in our case. Open coding has been used to signal any other factors that might come forward. There might be a difference in importance of the various factors; the order above is random and any judgement on the importance of a factor is part of the results. There are obviously relations between individual factors that emerged throughout the analysis, but the exact nature of these relationships is not the core of the research. Coding results is a set of useful information, but not yet results. Codes help to structure the data obtained from the sources, ensuring that all the input is processed in a solid way. For instance, clustering data on a factor or other code shows the presence of these factors. The number of times a factor has been coded, says something about the presence and importance of a factor according to a specific source. When factors are coded together with other factors, relations between factors can be traced.

3.2 Interviews in the case study

Table 1 lists the interviewees. As the background and relations to the military mobility project of each interviewee's position might need some additional explanation, a brief overview is given. Policy officials working at a political-strategic level are often willing to share information but are sometimes reluctant to share their insights in an interview because some of those insights might come across as political statements. Because this specific field has only a limited number of policy officials involved,

two of the seven interviewees were very willing to cooperate as long as they could be listed without their names.

Table 1: List of Interviewees

List of interviews[2]

Number, Date + Time	Interviewee	Role	Place	Recorded
1. 25-07-2019 10:00	Emma Brandsen	Senior policy official of the NL Ministry of Defence	Ministry of Defence, The Hague	Yes
2. 25-07-2019 13:30	Raoul Bessems	Senior policy official of the NL Ministry of Defence, chair of the PESCO military mobility project	Ministry of Defence, The Hague	Yes
3. 29-07-2019 15:00	Col. Erwin Hoogland	Senior policy official for military matters at the NL Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague	Yes
4. 01-07-2019 13:30	Lt.-Col. Marc Sleven	Official at the NL Permanent Military Representation, responsible for logistics	NATO HQ Brussels	Yes
5. 12-08-2019 10:00	Col. Marc Huiskes	EU official of the Logistic Directorate within the EU	Royal Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda	Yes
6. 01-07-2019 16:00	Anonymous	Dutch EU official; expert on military mobility		No
7. 12-08-2019 17:00	Anonymous	Senior policy official of the German Ministry of Defence, member of the PESCO military mobility project	Via phone: Nijmegen and Ministry of Defence, Berlin	Yes

3.2.1 The Netherlands' Permanent Military Representation (PMR) at NATO and the EU

Where the link between the Permanent Military Representation of the Netherlands at NATO with the European Union might not seem so obvious at first, the connection is definitely there. As we will see when we proceed, the use of Liaison Officers (LNOs) is a very common practice when it comes to the establishment of connections between states and international institutions. In a somewhat typical effort to work efficiently, the EU and NATO representative, a three-star general, and his staff, together forming

[2] Note: the order of this list is based on the order in which the interviews are used in the analysis in Chapter 5.

the Permanent Military Representation of the Netherlands, are the same for the European Union and for NATO. In the case of the Netherlands, the Ministries' member of the Permanent Military Representation who is responsible for all logistical topics officially focusses on NATO, although he is also involved in this topic within the EU context. Figure 3 shows a simplified model of the formal relationships between the Permanent Military Representation within NATO and EU in regard to PESCO. The most important and direct links for the Permanent Military Representation are to the respective Military Committees of NATO and the European Union, as well as to their policy directorates in the Netherlands. Through these channels they work on issues that come from two directions, down from the Military Committees or up through the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Because issues might be brought up at various levels, a major secondary task of the Permanent Military Representation is to communicate to and harmonize at a national as well as international levels. In July 2019, Lt-col. Sleven was interviewed for this research about European defence development and the PESCO military mobility project; the interview took place at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.



Figure 3: Relations of the Netherlands Permanent Military Representations at NATO and the EU to PESCO

3.2.2 The Netherlands Ministry of Defence Policy Directorate, Task Force Logistics and the PESCO military mobility project

Most prominent among the interviewed are arguable the two Dutch officials who actively participate in the project on military mobility and co-chair the workgroup. The fact that the people closest to this supranational project function on a national level, might in itself already say a lot. Two institutions within the ministry are involved in the military mobility project, the Policy Directorate and the Task Force Logistics. The first is a standing institution within the ministerial structure, with its own Director-

General and it reports directly to the minister. The second one, the Task Force, is a political-strategic project organisation within the Ministry of Defence, focussing on representing and establishing the logistical side of the forces at a ministerial level. The relations within the Netherlands' Ministry of Defence are pretty straightforward, as shown in Figure 4. Brandsen works directly for the Policy Directorate. Bessems is a member of the Policy Directorate, specifically working for the Task Force, reporting to the Task Force as well as to the Policy Directorate. These two individuals co-chair the workgroup. The interviews with both were conducted within the ministry building in The Hague.



Figure 4: Relations of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence to PESCO and the military mobility project

3.2.3 The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Although the role of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a part of this research, there is a logical reason to conduct an interview here. In order to harmonize efforts, but also to provide expertise on defence issues, Col. Hoogland has been actively involved in the efforts leading up to the current situation in roles at both ministries. In particular when it comes to the national process leading up to the current state of affairs, Hoogland was frequently mentioned as one of the persons with a clear perspective on the way events transpired within the Ministry of Defence, but also in the Netherlands in general.

3.2.4 The EU's related institutions, the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU Military Staff (EUMS), Logistics Directorate and the European Defence Agency (EDA)

As a framework provided by the European Union, PESCO is clearly embedded within the EU institutions. A (simplified) model of the way PESCO and the military mobility project are related to the other institutions is given in Figure 5. To understand this part of the context better, two interviews were conducted; the first one with Col. Huiskes, chief of the Resources and Support Branch within the Logistics Directorate, a sub-division of the European External Action Service. The second interview

was conducted with an official who wished to remain anonymous. An important note is that both, although having the Dutch nationality and previously having served in national roles, are not liaison officers but work for the EU.

Although being framed as a platform by and for the member states, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Defence Agency (EDA) are actively involved; the EEAS and EDA facilitate PESCO and together form its secretariat. EDA also has the responsibility to complete the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and manage the European Defence Fund. These two projects aim to support PESCO in materializing its results, something that will be elaborated upon later.



Figure 5: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) institutions and their relations with PESCO and the military mobility project

3.2.5 The German Ministry of Defence official and member of the PESCO military mobility project

As said previously, verifying information can be done with research outside of the Dutch bubble. One form of verification are the interviews with Dutch officials who are working for the EU. Another side of the story is given by officials that work for another country. In this case a German official, employed by the German Ministry of Defence, was willing to be interviewed, albeit anonymously. Germany, arguably the most powerful national actor in the European Union, plays an important role and is an important partner for the Netherlands in numerous defence initiatives. The official in question is connected to the PESCO military mobility project, but was also interviewed regarding his views of the Dutch perspective and his own national perspective on defence development. The role of Germany in defence development was also frequently mentioned in the other interviews as well as in the literature, making it all the more important to do a confirmation interview.

4. PESCO and the project on military mobility

In order to answer the research questions: 'What is the historical-institutionalist background of PESCO and military mobility and how do these two subjects relate to each other?' and 'Which levels of government are involved in the policy process?', a closer look at the institutional environment is necessary. Supranational policy development, especially within the European Union, takes place in one of the strongest institutionalized environments in the world (Pollack, 2009). Getting a grasp of the exact structure in this institutional environment is a never-ending challenge for everyone working with or within it, let alone for outsiders that are not part of it. As we will see, PESCO as well as military mobility are two topics that have a very recent history within the European Union and a comprehensive overview of their origins, their position within the Union as well as their aims is not yet available. This section contains a brief historical institutionalist analysis of PESCO and the military mobility project to paint a clear(er) picture of the case. First, the institutional history of PESCO will be analysed, followed by the institutional position of PESCO within the EU framework.

Next, the institutional history and structure of military mobility will be discussed. Here we will start with a short overview of the history of the term 'military mobility', narrowing it down to the PESCO military mobility project and its relations to other efforts in the same field. It will reconstruct the process various European actors went through to reach the current state of affairs and helps to find out how our case fits within the European structure as well as European defence development. A complicating factor in gaining a more holistic view on the events lies in the problem that the process took place in a rather ad-hoc way. Much of the information was obtained through the interviews. Where literature and official documents help to gain oversight on the landmarks and fault lines in the process, the interviews provide a contextualization of these events.

4.1 PESCO

4.1.1 The rise of the Permanent and Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

Pre-2007

Since 1989 defence spending across Europe plummeted by more than 50%. In the struggle to keep as many military capabilities as possible despite the need to save money, pooling and sharing of capabilities seemed to be the right response to coping with further austerity measures (Valasek, 2011). The first initiatives in establishing a flexible form of cooperation in the EU defence sector came about during the early 1990s, after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. A decade later, PESCO was already brought up in the draft version of the European constitution; a document that was abandoned after a majority of the French and Dutch population voted against it in a referendum in 2005 (Novaky, 2018).

2007-2009 the Treaty of Lisbon

The idea for the PESCO platform did not die with the European Constitution, however. It was introduced once more in the Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007 and entering into effect in 2009. Initially, PESCO remained an inactive part of the treaty, that could be activated if the EU member states felt the need for it.[3] Looking at the foundation put in place for PESCO from a historical institutionalist point of view, we have to take the context of the Lisbon Treaty into account. Over the course of the last decade or so, the European defence and security landscape has changed. In 2009, Europe found itself in its second year of a financial crisis. While a financial crisis might be a reason to cut back on public spending, since the end of the Cold War, for almost twenty years, most countries had already imposed very strict austerity measures for their armed forces. PESCO was seen as a way of using cooperation as a way to minimize the effects of austerity.

Winter 2017: The activation of PESCO

PESCO remained a rather abstract concept for more than a decade, until a series of events already described in the introduction – the start of the Donbass war in Ukraine, the rise of ISIS, the election of Donald J. Trump, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, the start of the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltics and Poland, and the release of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) – contributed to a sense of urgency among EU member states, strong enough to increase defence development, including PESCO.

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was finally established in December 2017, after the Foreign Affairs Council tasked the European Commission to do so in November that year, following the release of the EU Global Strategy. The activation of PESCO is one of the more recent steps to increase cooperation on defence within the European Union (EPRS, 2019). Since then, 25 EU member states have joined and still participate in PESCO. Nowadays PESCO hosts 47 different initiatives covering topics across seven sectors: Training and Facilities, Land Formations Systems, Maritime, Air Systems, Joint Enabling, Cyber, and Space (PESCO, 2020). The United Kingdom and Denmark did not join PESCO because of the imminent Brexit and the special status of Denmark, not being a member of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The institutional position of PESCO within the EU's CSDP will be further explored in the next section.

[3] Art. 42.6, 46 and Protocol 10.

4.1.2 PESCO's institutional structure and its relations to the European Union and its member states

The institutional relations within the European Union

The CSDP provides the custodian framework for PESCO, meaning that the EU's CSDP institutions are responsible for facilitating PESCO. The uniqueness of PESCO is given by the fact that it is not a supranational institution, but rather an intergovernmental institution by and for the EU member states. Although the idea is derived from an EU treaty, PESCO should not be seen as an EU institution in a strict sense. To shine more light on this paradoxical structure, some clarification is needed. As Figure 5 in Chapter 3 has already illustrated, the European External Action Service, the EU Military Staff and the European Defence Agency are the main CSDP institutions embodying this role of facilitator (European Council, 2018; Zandee, 2018-I).

PESCO's slogan is 'Member States Driven' (PESCO, 2020), which does however not mean that PESCO has no ties with the institutions. The possible results ('products') of PESCO projects are supposed "to strengthen Europe's security and defence to contribute to the fulfilment of the Union level of ambition as derived from the EU Global Strategy" (European Council, 2018, p. 2). This means that, although the internal structure might be independent from the European Union, the surrounding structure as well as possible outcomes are firmly embedded within the Union. We will elaborate upon this in the next section.



Figure 6: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) institutions, the EEAS, EDA and EUMS, and their relations with PESCO and the military mobility project

The internal structure and aim of PESCO

The formal objective of PESCO is: "To jointly arrive at a coherent full spectrum of defence capabilities available to Member States for national and multinational (EU, NATO, UN, etc.) missions and

operations. This will enhance the EU's capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection of the EU citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending" (Foreign Affairs Council, 2017). All participating members have subscribed to a list of twenty 'binding' commitments that aim to develop and deepen defence cooperation. The essence of PESCO is that it is a platform for pragmatic, step-by-step progress in European defence (Billon-Galland & Quencez, 2017). As mentioned, the emergence of PESCO was an answer to the budget cuts that had had a great impact on the military capabilities, and it was considered to be one of the projects that could help the EU members in strengthening their defence. PESCO is also a platform for national policy advisors to work together on whatever issue their respective policy directorates see fit. PESCO literally puts nations together at the table by working with the national policy directorates, bypassing the liaison staff of countries and placing the EU staff into a supportive role. This means that, formally, the EU institutions do nothing more than facilitate PESCO. A PESCO project does only need the support of four nations to get started. Nations can join, act as observer but also abandon projects at any given time, thus lowering the threshold to get started. Nations can work in changing coalitions on various issues at the same time. It also opens up space for states to choose their own path when it comes to the implementation of plans. The aim to develop and deepen defence cooperation can be translated into the goals of developing joint capabilities, for instance in the form of the development of common weapon systems, or the alignment of rules and procedures (Tocci, 2018).

A few critical comments on PESCO are necessary. Despite the call for 'permanent' and 'structured' cooperation, little specific guidelines regarding what those words actually mean were given. And although the PESCO commitments are called 'binding', there is no way nor an institution with the power to force compliance (Billon-Galland & Quencez, 2017). Negatively interpreted, the absence of a way to successful implementation might prove to be a lock-in that will hinder development; positively interpreted, it gives member states quite some space to build their own road towards success. PESCO will only be a game changer, however, if the member states do more than just a minimalist implementation of the commitments (Novaky, 2017).

The position of the Netherlands

Traditionally, the Netherlands has always been a strong supporter of NATO as the cornerstone for European defence. However, in the offset of PESCO, the Netherlands played an unusually large role on the EU level. The EU Global Strategy was finished during the Dutch Presidency of the European Council, and in relation to the launching of PESCO it has assumed a very active role as a supporter as well as a pro-active member of the platform (Zandee, 2018-II). In the Netherlands, PESCO is seen as an instrument to strengthen *European* defence, rather than just EU defence. According to the Dutch government, in order to be successful, ideological debates should be avoided and PESCO should be seen as a means to reach concrete results improving European defence, in the process also strengthening

NATO (Zandee, 2018-II). Within this context, the Netherlands participates in 11 of the 47 PESCO projects. The two largest projects in terms of number of participants are the project on military mobility and the project on logistic hubs.

PESCO's sister institutions: European Defence Fund and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

PESCO's 'sister institutions', the European Defence Fund and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, were also created to improve defence development; they are built around PESCO (see Figure 7). The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence comprises a yearly stock-taking of defence spending of the nations, conducted by the European Defence Agency, and was established in 2019. The European Defence Agency works with a set of benchmarks: 20% collective investment, 2% investment in defence technology and research, and an increase in defence spending (EDA, 2018). Although nations are committed to fulfil these investments, the European Union does not require a specific timeline, but just asks for regular increases. Figure 7, released by EDA, illustrates that the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence plays a monitoring role, assessing the state of defence within the European Union and assisting in finding possibilities for further cooperation. The model also shows that PESCO projects can be implemented in several ways, without a rigid line of operation, not just as a PESCO project, but for instance also in a multinational setting or by the European Defence Agency.



Figure 7: EDA visualization of CARD, EDF and PESCO relations (EDA, 2018).

The European Defence Fund is the financial component put in place by the European Union to strengthen existing projects but also to foster new projects. When the European Defence Fund was proposed in June 2018, the financing of military mobility was specifically emphasized (European Commission, 2018-I).

4.2 Military mobility

Our case, military mobility, is one of the projects of PESCO. To fully understand the current position of military mobility within European defence development, we have to start with exploring the history behind the project, even the history of the entire notion as such.

4.2.1 Military logistics, Military Schengen, military mobility: a brief history

Pre-2017: Military mobility as a part of military logistics

Unravelling the origins of military mobility, we have to go back into military history, way before PESCO. In the early 19th century military logistics was defined by De Jomini as "the practical art of moving armies" (EPRS, 2019, p.1). Traditionally, the term military mobility was used to address the mobility of military units. According to McLoughlin and Robson (1990), we can make a distinction between two categories of military mobility: (1) battlefield mobility: the ability to move around on a battlefield, and (2) logistic mobility: moving military personnel and equipment to its destination. While the term has always been part of the military jargon, it was not much in use in the spheres of defence policy. In the context of contemporary European defence development, military mobility focusses on logistic mobility.

Summer 2017: The need for better military logistics in the Netherlands

Being plagued by deficiencies in the logistic mobility of the Dutch armed forces, but also of allies moving through the Netherlands, in the Summer of 2017 a policy advisor and Head of the Policy Directorate kicked off with efforts to improve military logistics in Europe (interview 1). Back then, this idea didn't have a specific name but it focussed on problems that became visible when trying to move forces trough Europe. There were major deficiencies in the system – apparent in the Netherlands in, for instance, an excessive bureaucracy around the transport of dangerous goods such as weapons or ammunition, or infrastructural problems such as recently built bridges that couldn't handle the weight of heavy military transports. These deficiencies illustrated a major change compared to the Cold War era, when the American, Canadian or British forces could move swiftly from their points of debarkation (harbours, air bases or train stations) towards the 'innerdeutsche Grenze'. When NATO expanded its membership, its territory obviously increased but mobility lagged behind. New member states never became connected to the logistical system that was in place during the Cold war (interview 3). In the Summer of 2017, then defence minister of the Netherlands, Hennis-Plasschaert, first brought up the need

for military personnel to travel through Europe freely and swiftly, in case tensions with Russia would rise on the Eastern flank. She specifically called for a "Military Schengen" (Ministerie van Defensie, 2017-I, p. 1). NATO became the starting platform, because the Atlantic alliance had experienced these problems during exercises. The alliance was not able to do much about it, however. This changed when Hennis-Plasschaert politicized the issue by stating: "It is odd that a tourist can move faster through Europe than a soldier" (interview 3).

Fall 2017: How military mobility became a focus area for the European Union

In order to increase the chances of success for improving military mobility, policy officials launched various ideas on several levels, "betting on all horses" (interview 1). As a result, different channels were used to bring the issues around military mobility under attention, creating fragmentated projects at multiple levels. In this process of trying to maximise the impact of military mobility, the Dutch minister of Defence asked the EU High Representative, the Director of the European Defence Agency, and the Secretary-General of NATO to explore the possibilities to improve the situation by taking away obstacles and simplifying procedures to increase military mobility (Ministerie van Defensie, 2017). At the same time, policy advisors argued that it was also important to start working on the national, interdepartmental side, in parallel to the international effort, realising it was more than just a matter of political arrangements (interview 3).

From 2017 onwards, the issue of logistical problems was addressed under various headings; initially as Military Schengen as coined by the Netherlands, later followed by the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Cross-Border Military Transportation of the European Defence Agency (interview 1). In November 2017, following a political debate in which the narrative of a Military Schengen didn't survive, the European Commission adopted a Joint communiqué on improving military mobility in the European Union, marking the start of the shared will to improve what now would be called military mobility (EPRS, 2019). When the EU joint communiqué was published, the possibility of civil-military complementarity – meaning the use of civil projects, for instance to improve structures in bridges that were already planned to be built for the improvement of civil infrastructure – had already been put forward (EPRS, 2019). In the meantime, the European Defence Agency working group continued its assessment of the requirements for achieving improved military mobility. In March 2018, the European Commission responded to the results of the European Defence Agency's efforts by releasing the Action Plan on military mobility, proposing "concrete operational measures regarding military requirements, transport infrastructure and regulatory and procedural issues", in order to strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy and by that European security (EPRS, 2019, p. 1).

Several issues were identified that needed addressing in order to improve military mobility:

- Military requirements - referring to those requirements infrastructure has to comply to, to be able to cope with the loads and sizes of military transport;
- Transport infrastructure - focussing on, for instance, the availability of ports, warehouses and logistical hubs;
- Dangerous goods - addressing issues to safely and easily transport dangerous goods such as weapons, ammunition and other explosives;
- Customs and Value Added Tax - taking care of the bureaucracy around the large amounts of goods that are transported within military movement;
- Cross Border Movement permission - considering the formal permission allied militaries need to be able to cross any national, or even regional border;
- Additional lines of action related to regulatory and procedural issues. (European Commission, 2018-II)

This gives a good overview of what were seen as the issues in military mobility where improvement was deemed necessary.

Spring 2018: How military mobility became a PESCO project

The connection between military mobility and PESCO was made in March 2018, when the first seventeen PESCO projects were formally accepted, military mobility being among them. Although PESCO and its military mobility project are independent from the European Commission and the Action Plan on military mobility, the project and efforts driven by the Action Plan are complementary (European Commission, 2018-II). Military Mobility at PESCO is coordinated by the Netherlands; it is the only PESCO project where every single state is either a participant or observer. For the Netherlands, the military mobility project is seen as the flagship project of the first wave of projects, fitting the Dutch criteria on what a PESCO project should bring (Zandee, 2018-II).

Spring 2018: Reinforcing international and national efforts through the Task Force Logistics

Meanwhile, in a response to the urgency for better military mobility, but also military logistics in general, the Netherlands acted on a national level. After a process of evaluating the political-strategic state of military logistics, in April 2018 the Dutch Ministry of Defence installed the Task Force Logistics, tasked to "deal with military mobility but more broadly create strategic oversight into all logistical affairs of the military within the military, the Netherlands and other ministries as well" (interview 2). The Spring of 2021 was set as the end date to complete its tasks. Due to internal and external complications, such as the COVID-19 crisis, the end date of the Task Force has been prolonged to the Spring of 2022. While the coordination of military mobility is only one of its tasks, the set deadline says a lot about the expectations within the Defence Ministry concerning its efforts on the military mobility project; an issue we will come back to later.

Meanwhile, the Task Force Logistics, jointly with the Dutch Policy Directorate, provides the coordination of the national as well as the international efforts on military mobility. In addition to chairing the military mobility project, the Task Force also supports related projects at for instance the EDA and, nationally, with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Infrastructure and Water Management.

4.2.3 What does the military mobility project do?

Although we have already used words like 'concrete results' and hinted at the importance of the strengthening of European defence, we haven't dealt with any concrete examples of what the military mobility project is involved in. We have to begin with the agreements that were made when PESCO started: all the nations that have joined PESCO have subscribed to twenty commitments. Commitment 12 is dedicated to military mobility, stating that all member states must commit themselves, both political and in practice, to contribute to improving and simplifying military movements across Europe (PESCO, 2017). The formal goal of the PESCO project on military mobility is to "guarantee the unhindered movement of military personnel and assets within the borders of the EU" (EPRS, 2019, p. 2). Now, two years on, the interpretation of commitment 12 and the aim of the project have led to the following focus points of the project:

Coordination of the national efforts on military mobility

To materialize the commitments of PESCO, member states have to come up with National Implementation Plans, NIPs (Tocci, 2018). This is also the case for the military mobility project. Every member has to come up with a national plan to improve military mobility. The PESCO project coordinates these efforts, meaning that progress is monitored, best practices are shared and efforts are synchronized (TFL, 2020). Two important elements in this national plan refer to the Main Supply Routes (MSRs) and Military Requirements (MilReqs) for infrastructure. The idea for the establishment of Main Supply Routes originates within the military mobility project. While the execution of this concept is a national responsibility and is simply too complex to execute on an international level, the project coordinates these various national efforts. How this relatively vague notion of routes for military mobility trickles down into concrete action is something that we will elaborate upon later.

Working on faster procedures for military border crossings

A (literally) border-crossing element of the project is the aim to reduce the time required to complete the formal process of foreign troops crossing national borders. While probably present in every national plan, this bureaucratic element is deemed so important that all nations agreed to shorten the time for these efforts to a maximum of five working days (TFL, 2020).

A network of national Points of Contacts (POCs)

Another concrete action that has materialized from the military mobility project is the establishment of a network of national Points of Contact for military mobility. This simply means that every nation has to have a single point of contact for all matters related to military mobility, in order to simplify the addressing of issues for Sending Nations (SNs) that visit a Host Nation (HN). Although NATO already had a comparable structure, non-NATO members did not have access to this network (interview 5). As expanding the existing NATO network was not an option, due to the lack of a unanimous decision to do so, a new network was created.

4.2.4 The connection of different efforts on military mobility

To be able to book progress on the commitment and fulfil (part of) the aims of the project, the military mobility efforts have to reach further than just PESCO. Military mobility is active on multiple levels of government as well as society. Efforts on improved military mobility serve the European Union as well as NATO and the military mobility project at PESCO has multiple parallel counterparts within the CSDP and NATO (European Commission, 2018-I; interview 1).

The topic also involves and impacts a broad range of national actors. In addition to, for instance, national Ministries of Infrastructure and Transport, the private sector with companies such as Deutsche Bahn and the port of Rotterdam are also involved in this whole-of-society project (Zandee, 2018-I). In order to create more clarity on what these connections mean in practice, we take a look at the military mobility project and its relation with several other, related efforts. As already stated, and illustrated in Figure 8, the military mobility project has formulated three concrete goals: a national plan for the improvement of military mobility, faster procedures for military border crossing, and the creation of a network of national Points of Contact. Topics such as the Main Supply Routes and Military Requirements are an important example of military mobility issues that have an impact on all of these levels.



Figure 8: The connection of different actors related to the three goals of military mobility within PESCO

The connection to civil EU projects

In the early stages of military mobility, the option to connect the efforts to other, civil EU projects has already been identified. The Trans-European Network of Transportation focusses on creating a large network of first-class infrastructure through Europe for economic purposes. As we can see in Figure 9, the TENT routes create connections with every corner of the Union and even beyond. It is logical to see the possibility to connect these planned routes, along with their planned investments, to the effort to improve military mobility. This way, there has been spill-over from the civil Trans-European Network of Transport policy, which is now connected to the Main Supply Routes and Military Requirements (interview 1). On a short term, up to €6.5 billion would become available for military mobility via the European Defence Fund, not so much to build or maintain infrastructure (the main aim of the Trans-European Network of Transport policy), but rather to upgrade these efforts to the Military Requirements. However, the changing international environment because of Covid-19 has made it uncertain or even unlikely that the proposed €6.5 billion will still be included in the EU multi-annual budget (Scaparotti & Bell, 2020).



Figure 9: The Trans-European Transport Network, TEN-T core nework corridors (European Commission, 2020).

The Dutch Ministry of Defence and the national plan

In response to the task of defining a national plan for military mobility, the Dutch ministry has formulated its goal as "the establishment of The Netherlands as a transit nation and as the gateway to Europe" (TFL, 2020, p.2). A central element in this Dutch national plan is the notion of Main Supply Routes for military transport (TFL, 2020). This topic of the Main Supply Routes is a good example of the interconnecting, whole-of-society dimension of military mobility. The Main Supply Routes are connected to the aim of PESCO to formulate national implementation plans and seek a connection with the Trans-European Network of Transport (TEN-T). It answers to the European aim to connect military mobility to TEN-T. Efforts in establishing these routes are among the first (political) results of military mobility and a meaningful example of the scope and connections of the topics within the military mobility project at PESCO.

A role for the EDA: From Main Supply Routes to Military Requirements

During the Cold War the notion of military mobility was present in the design of all major infrastructure projects. An example of this is the yellow sign, as shown in Figure 10. Military load classifications were

a common sight on all major roads that included bridges and/or tunnels. While these classifications are still displayed on modern military vehicles (see, for instance, the Boxer armoured vehicle in Figure 11), most bridges built after 1990 do not only lack the yellow sign, they were also constructed without taking any of the previous requirements into account.

Figure 10: Military load classification sign vehicle (Dreamstime, 2020).

Figure 11: Military load classification on an NLD Boxer (Defensie, 2017).

This prompted the Dutch Chief of Defence, Adm. Bauer, to argue that the Dutch infrastructure is largely incapable of dealing with military movement (Houtekamer, 2017). Defined as one of the three points of action by the European Defence Agency, it was this issue that soon led to an EU-wide set of Military Requirements for infrastructure. The European Commission and the European Defence Agency formulated the issue and the European Defence Agency was responsible for the official documents that set the Military Requirements for all infrastructural modalities across the Union.

The connection to national actors

While the agreement to establish Main Supply Routes might seem very straightforward and one-dimensional, it resulted in very concrete actions on the interdepartmental level in the Netherlands and likewise in other countries. This directly involves the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it comes to Cross Border Movement permission, resulting in an intensive process to adjust to the new agreements. At the same time, the enormous task of evaluating all (!) infrastructural modalities as a result of the commitment on Main Supply Routes and Military Requirements, landed at the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management; “You should ask the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management how they did it, but they somehow managed” (interview 3). Decisions made by the Ministry of Defence on an international level, forced the national levels of government to deliver results on hot topics on sometimes a very short notice.

4.3 Conclusion

The reconstruction of the historical-institutionalist background of PESCO and military mobility within European defence development, gives us some important information. In the processes around PESCO and military mobility, quite some defining events took place, as can be seen in Figure 12.



Figure 12: PESCO and military mobility timeline

It is clear that the concept of PESCO is a lot older than the moment it was introduced, since it was already 'invented' in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The European Union found itself in a climate where member states, third parties like NATO, and a shifting security situation called for concrete action. The EU Global Strategy was a significant institutionalist incentive that, in the run-up to the activation of PESCO, in the Netherlands sparked ideas about the need for better military mobility in Europe. PESCO was seen as a feasible platform of which the foundations already existed. While originally meant to maximize the effect of decreasing defence budgets, nowadays PESCO is considered to be a way to maximize the impact of stable or even increased budgets.

Prior to the start of PESCO, the European Commission and High Representative acknowledged the Dutch plea for military mobility by publishing the Joint Communiqué on Military Mobility. At the time of the activation of PESCO, various members quickly acknowledged the chances for military mobility as a project within the platform. Coinciding with the publication of the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility, the PESCO project on military mobility was accepted. On the Dutch national side, the founding of the Task Force Logistics shows a great level of willingness to make quick progress in this

field. On the European level, the founding of the European Defence Fund, with a special emphasis on military mobility and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence show the effort, willingness but also the ability of the European Union to exploit the existing momentum that was created among the nations.

Whereas military mobility was a rarely used term, a political process made military mobility the key concept when it comes to the efforts to improve military logistics throughout Europe. Taking the Netherlands as an example, there are numerous levels involved in military mobility. On a national side, there is a strong interdepartmental link because European defence development has a broad impact on various ministries and other governmental structures, but also on non-governmental institutions such as the Port of Rotterdam and Deutsche Bahn when it comes to the capabilities in ports and on railroads. This broad variety of actors is obviously also present in other European projects, but seems to play a rather large and influential role in European defence development around military mobility. What makes PESCO special is that it surpasses the EU institutions in communicating with international counterparts. Within the supranational environment there are still national liaison officers that play a part in European defence development, albeit outside of PESCO or in a more supporting role. Within the supranational institutions, the European Union and NATO, we also find active actors that focus on military mobility or efforts that are, in some way or form connected.

While all levels are working on separate projects, it turns out that all the efforts are closely connected and sometimes this makes it hard to see on which level specific projects are actually located. A logical source of this fragmentation can be found in the fact that the Netherlands tried to use all possible platforms to achieve quick progress, with the European Commission at the same time aiming for more long-term effects. However, the whole-of-society character of the issues that compose military mobility are the main reason for the topic being present on so many levels of government but also outside of that in society.

5. The Netherlands, a sceptic frontrunner

In this chapter, we'll continue with answering the remaining research questions by assessing the importance of the factors that were distinguished in the theoretical framework.

1. *Autonomy vs sovereignty*
2. *Spill-over effects* within the defence branch of the CSDP field
3. The influence of *differentiated integration* on current and future developments
4. The *expectations* behind the national position
5. The emergence of EU *strategic (military) actorness*
6. *Socialisation/policy networks*
7. *Discourses/framing*
8. Compatibility of *norms and values*
9. The presence of *national interests*
10. *Path dependency*
11. *Unintended consequences*

We'll continue with the questions: 'What are the Dutch views regarding the military mobility project within the broader context of EU defence development?', and 'Where are the developments regarding EU defence development in the case of military mobility heading and how does this process relate to the aims of the Netherlands?' In this section, the results of the interviews will be discussed and combined with the other sources. with a focus on the Dutch views regarding the military mobility project in relation to the current developments. The assessment of the importance of the various factors will show us the relation with European Integration theory.

5.1 Autonomy vs sovereignty

In the search for answers on what the current developments mean, *autonomy and sovereignty*, are two of terms used most often; they are used to describe the same movement or aim, but as we saw in Chapter 2, these terms, although similar, have some fundamental differences. The partial and limited character of autonomy is what makes it different from sovereignty, which is whole and undivided; whereas autonomy exists on delegated levels, sovereignty does not.

The Dutch perspective

When it comes to military mobility and the Dutch views, the opinions on autonomy and sovereignty are linked to national interests. On a national level, autonomy and sovereignty are important, albeit rather complex factors. While the Dutch defence policy is based upon NATO, the European Union and

specifically the US nuclear power, the Netherlands shies away from any concrete stance on its position on the future of European defence (AIV, 2020).

For instance: with the call for a 'military Schengen', the Netherlands, quite literally, asked member states to hand over the sovereignty over their borders towards the supranational level. This call seems a very straightforward display of the Dutch stance to abandon sovereignty over their borders. Yet, this frame wasn't meant to imply the abandoning of sovereignty, as Brandsen clarifies: "it was only a label to explain what we wanted", meaning that the threshold for military personnel to travel through Europe should be just as low as for tourists (interview 1). At the same time, it did spark a response from several nations according to which the deeper meaning behind this proposal was to take the sovereignty over borders, and as a consequence the territorial integrity of nations, to a European level. The European Union, as a result, referred to this negative frame of handing over sovereignty as "the misconception of a military Schengen" in order to keep all nations on board (EPRS, 2019, p.1). Soon after, the label military mobility was introduced to identify these efforts.

Some nations are outspoken on the sovereignty over their borders and military capabilities. While not defining a concrete stance on the future of European defence, the Netherlands is quite clear itself when it comes to plans for European sovereignty. For the Netherlands, losing sovereignty is out of the question, as illustrated by the Dutch position on the current voting system and the 'binding' commitments of PESCO. Currently, Common Security and Defence Policy matters are decided by unanimity. Initially, it was said that PESCO decisions would be 'binding', but in reality it is up to each and every nation to implement them as they see fit, since only the commitment is binding, not any specific action. Brandsen points at the Dutch fears of, hence opposition to, changing this to a qualified majority, let alone forced implementation.

Developing new capabilities in cooperation with other nations does not directly imply any loss of sovereignty regarding national military capabilities. Loss of autonomy over certain areas, such as the autonomy to set the military requirements for infrastructure, as a possible result of the development regarding military mobility, is not a political issue. Military mobility, qualified by Brandsen as "low-political", is a topic which, according to the Dutch, most likely will not break down national sovereignty. Projects like military mobility might sometimes lead to 'paper solutions', for instance the list of national points of contacts for military mobility, but might also lead to improvements in the infrastructure.

Col. Hoogland, as would be expected of a military official, echoes the national viewpoint that the Netherlands is not per se in favour of handing over autonomy. The loss of sovereignty is a bigger issue and is out of the question in the field of defence. He adds, however, that whereas it seems that the Netherlands is not likely to promote any developments that touch upon national sovereignty or shift

power from NATO towards the European Union, the impact of the Netherlands is limited. He adds that the future of the Alliance – and the road ahead for Dutch autonomy and sovereignty – is mostly out of the hands of the Dutch, because the Netherlands is one of the nations that doesn't spend its 2% of the GDP on defence nor has it a solid plan to get its future investment up to the promised level.

Lt.Col. Sleven argues that in general the Netherlands is not in favour of handing over autonomy to the European Union, although exceptions might be possible in case it leads to a direct Dutch advantage. As Sleven adds, the Netherlands is known for its willingness to look for consensus in every debate and certainly does not take an obstructionist stance, in line with the Dutch 'polder model' (interview 4).

The European perspective

The supranational view on this factor offers some slightly different insights, based on the input of Col. Huiskes and one anonymous interviewee, both working for the European Union (interview 5 and 6). Regarding the matter of *autonomy vs sovereignty,* the interviewees have a slightly different view than the national government. The Netherlands is an unexpected frontrunner when it comes to handing over empowerment, in the form of autonomy or sovereignty. With the EU moving forward on defence, the loss of autonomy on a national level entails a risk, especially when the Netherlands puts so much effort in the EU defence development.

At the same time, the European Union follows its own path. In the EU's Global Strategy (2016) the use of the terms 'autonomy' and 'sovereignty' is carefully weighed. Where this strategy says it seeks to strengthen strategic autonomy for the Union, it also states that the national sovereignty regarding defence decisions is a key element for European security. However, the statement on the importance of national sovereignty is questioned by the EUGS itself when it comes to addressing the lack of cooperation within the defence sector.

Providing more context for the EU plans, Juncker, then-president of the European Commission, was already calling for a European army and set the ambitious aim of becoming a "fully fledged defence union by 2025" (2017, p. 8). The current president of the European Commission, Von der Leyen, recently repeated this ambition to move towards a defence union, calling for an "integrated approach towards security" (2020, p. 21). In both of their addresses, implications for national autonomy nor sovereignty are mentioned, but the goal of a defence union certainly does not match the Dutch position on this.

Along with the statements made by the respective presidents of the European Commission, the view of the German interviewee also certainly does not equal the Dutch position. A very interesting difference

in the perception of the military mobility project in Germany and the European Union is the political importance of projects such as the one on military mobility. Whereas the Dutch policy advisors tend to see the project itself as low-politics or even apolitical, for the European Union and Germany the project "has big political importance" (interview 7; Billon-Galland & Quencez, 2017). The reason for this difference is that military mobility suits one of the German (and French) main priorities: deployment (Billon-Galland & Quencez, 2017), whereas the Netherlands is more focussed on providing quick transit possibilities for deploying forces.

5.2 Spill-over

In Chapter 4, we already touched upon the presence of the neo-functionalist factor of *spill-over*. Here we'll dive somewhat deeper into the presence of this concept, which is so much intertwined with European Integration theory.

The Dutch perspective

In the search for useful developments in European defence, the Netherlands has chosen to make military mobility one of its focal points. One of the answers to the question why it did so and did not focus on older, larger and more fundamental topics – such as the European battlegroup, EU military headquarters and/or the European Intervention Initiative – is the importance of spill-over. For instance, the interview with Lt.Col. Sleven highlights the importance of military mobility for the Netherlands, because its economy is largely based on logistics (the port of Rotterdam and the highway and railway network), making the *spill-over* to this military dimension of logistics a sensible route to national profits outside of defence.

Spill-over as such is an answer to why the Netherlands is so active in the current developments: not only the military profits from enhanced military mobility, so does the economy. Being the gateway to Europe would bring foreign troops and equipment to the Netherlands, using existing facilities such as the port of Rotterdam and transport networks. Furthermore, using funding from the European Defence Fund to improve infrastructure will also benefit the economy in the long term. Another important note made by Col. Hoogland is that modern-day society, especially the Dutch economy and defence sector, are so much interconnected that it is impossible to develop defence without having an economic impact (interview 3; Scaparotti & Bell, 2020).

Such potential *spill-over effects* from and to other sectors are the typical subjects in which the Netherlands is likely to invest. Investing in military mobility is, most of the time, also investing in the economy. Spill-over of developments within the European Union to NATO is therefore welcomed and

a major part of the Dutch expectations and national interests; an issue we will elaborate upon later in this section.

The European perspective

If we connect the current trend in the development of military mobility in the European Union to the presence of spill-over, a few issues become apparent. Starting with the areas that were defined by the European Defence Agency and European Commission, it is clear that the connection with other sectors was one of the starting points for the formulation of the aims. Recapitulating, the areas that the European Defence Agency and the European Commission regarded as areas of improvement are:

- Military requirements;
- Transport infrastructure;
- Dangerous goods;
- Customs and Value Added Tax;
- Cross Border Movement permission;
- Additional lines of action related to regulatory and procedural issues. (European Commission, 2018-II)

Five of these six categories are all closely connected to other sectors, whereas the sixth category is a residual one. The military requirements are, as previously mentioned, connected to the Trans-European Network of Transport policy at the EU level, and also link up to the national interdepartmental level (for instance, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management). Transport infrastructure, focusing on ports, warehousing and logistical hubs is also connected to these national elements (European Commission, 2018-II). At the same time, it is also linked to other PESCO projects, such as the project on logistical hubs (PESCO, 2020). The issue of dangerous goods – ammunition, weapons and explosives – is closely linked to national elements in the form of regulation, but also to local actors such as the municipalities and security regions. Customs and Value Added Tax is also an area which is linked to the European Union because of the common market, but obviously also to national ministries of finance. The fifth category is closely connected to the national authorities that execute the sovereignty over national borders; in case of the Netherlands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Anticipating on a possible spill-over from the military mobility project – but also other projects – by the European Union is logical, since the Union is already involved in most of the other sectors, whereas NATO is only active in the field of defence. For example, economic spill-over suits the European Union better than NATO, because the EU also has economic tools to solve problems or exploit opportunities, whereas economic consequences of, for instance, large NATO exercises are said to be “your problem” (interview 3); every nation has to sort out these consequences by itself when NATO is involved.

5.3 Differentiated integration

As we have seen so far, (inter)national cooperation in the military mobility project and its subsequent efforts have already led to results – and aim to achieve further results in the near future. But can we qualify the results of this project as integration? In this section we will see to what extent military mobility, being a low-political project with efforts on many levels, has led to fragmentation or differentiation, but not to *differentiated integration* as a result.

To see whether or not a result can actually be called integration, we have to go back to Haas' definition of integration: "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas, 1958, p. 16). Furthermore, we have to asses to what extent the efforts are fragmentated and fit Howort's (2019) concept of differentiated integration; fragmentated efforts on low-political levels lead to differentiation in levels of integration and as a consequence prohibit future integration in high-political levels.

The Dutch perspective

While differentiated integration is not a deliberate aim or factor in Dutch policy, differentiation with other EU member states is a logical result of the current efforts. Being involved in multiple, relatively small, projects with different groups of allies results in different types of progress for each group. This process of cooperation in the military mobility project can create forms of integration, but not necessarily so.

Although the Netherlands appears to be a front runner trying to achieve new things, a consequence of its actions might be that, because of this differentiation, development past a certain point will stall. Assuming that the current policy is in the realm of low-politics, the Netherlands wants to push the advantage in the short-term, but also be prepared to step on the brake in the near future and is already preparing for this possibility (AIV, 2020). The Dutch national approach, with the term pragmatic as a keyword used by policy officials, is a very functionalist and pluralist one. "Betting on all horses" and "setting the agenda towards our aims" are clear examples of a pluralist, opportunistic and functionalist approach (interview 1, interview 5). Differentiating levels of development is a common result of this approach, rather than a factor influencing the current development (Howorth, 2019). However, for the future of European defence development, differentiated integration will most likely become a more important factor when cooperation efforts deepen and lean towards integration within the European Union, which might be exactly the anticipated result of the Dutch policy.

The Dutch view on the preferable international structure also explains why military mobility with its differentiated elements suits the Netherlands. In the Dutch view on defence, NATO was, is and will still be the central alliance when it comes to European defence, although the alliance has to be revised and updated (AIV, 2020; Speech from the throne, 2019). As long as the developments on the military mobility project continue in the current differentiated way, nations such as the Netherlands can create change and implement new policy so that it also strengthens the capabilities of NATO.

In addition to strategical reasons for choosing military mobility, the Netherlands also faces some more practical issues when it comes to actively participating in projects. The Netherlands is arguably a very small actor, with an even smaller staff. As Sleven argues, there is not much time to analyse where we are going as a nation, simply because the Netherlands lacks the manpower to do so, in contrast to nations such as France and Germany (interview 4). This makes the choice for smaller projects with concrete deliverable results a logical one. Sleven also argues that the Dutch traditionally work with coalitions in order to reach majorities within NATO and the European Union, but also outside of those institutions. In the military mobility project there is no need to work with a smaller group, as all members agree to the need and have all joined. When it comes to specific measures or projects, the Netherlands picks its coalitions based on its own interests, and, according to Sleven, these coalitions change and the Dutch do not side with a set group of nations, unlike many others (interview 4). If projects with different states produce results, the result is differentiation in development. However, the current results of the military mobility project, as discussed in Chapter 4, have resulted in a reallocation of autonomy on a national level, but not to a transfer to the EU level.

Pluralist capacity building and acquisition is more fitting with the Dutch approach, focussing on cooperation rather than handing over sovereignty, according to Col. Huiskes. Connected to this lacking will to hand over sovereignty, Huiskes argues that the Netherlands will effectively merge capabilities with other countries on a binational or multinational (pluralist) scale, but outside of the EU context. Examples of this are the binational 1st German-Netherlands Corps, founded in 1995, and the recent maritime cooperation with Belgium in binationally acquisitioning of new minesweepers. This shows that the Netherlands has over the years actively emphasised differentiated integration.

Although the interviewees have hinted that the Netherlands is (purposely) differentiating when it comes to European defence development, they also emphasize the Dutch efforts to incorporate third parties such as the United Kingdom and United States, alongside NATO into their efforts in the field of military mobility. It goes to show that the Netherlands favours spill-over and maximized cooperation in its efforts, rather than differentiation.

The European perspective

The European Union takes the position that it works for its member states. These 27 member-states have obviously 27 different governments, with 27 different opinions. 21 of them are also members of NATO. One of the aims of PESCO – but also of the European Defence Fund and the Common Annual Review on Defence – is to structure and coordinate all national efforts. In 2018, when the European Union launched the European Defence Fund, one of the key figures used is that nations spend 80% of their budget for procurement on a national scale (European Commission, 2018-III). In order to persuade nations to cooperate on the EU level regarding the procurement of new and existing systems, at the same time fighting fragmentation, the European Commission has proposed to include a total of €10.5 billion for the European Defence Fund in its multi-annual financial framework for the period 2021-2027 (European Commission, 2018-III). Furthermore, the €6.5 billion earmarked for the improvement of military mobility across Europe was also added. However, more recent drafts of the financial framework show that this latter sum will most likely disappear (Brzozowski, 2020).

Yet, the intergovernmental structure doesn't give PESCO nor the European Union the means to stop fragmentation in the results of all the projects, including military mobility. Currently, PESCO is just a platform for differentiated integration and cooperation, rather than for real integration (Biscop, 2020). The binding commitments, which would most likely result in integration through the development of common capabilities, have not had this result (yet) (Biscop, 2020). The commitments were made at the start of PESCO, but there is still no way to enforce them. The only way of shared progress is through monitoring the national developments in the National Implementation Plans (European Commission, 2018-II) and focussing on what the nations do by themselves. There are numerous projects in various stages, resulting in differentiated integration (Biscop, 2020). Although the European Council as well as the European Commission would like to find ways to actually make the commitments binding, there is still no plan in place (European Council, 2018).

There are, however, some results of the military mobility project that are being achieved by all members of the project and even by third states, although the stage of completion differs from nation to nation. These efforts and results refer to the coordination of the national efforts on military mobility, the formulation of speedier procedures for military border crossings, and the setting up of a network of national Points of Contacts (POCs). Nevertheless, these elements of the military mobility project didn't lead to integration as the implementation takes place on a national scale.

5.4 Expectations

The factor referred to as *expectations* also had some extra context in the form of criteria that define them. Recapitulating, the division of actors into four categories is as follows:

1. Actors with long-run positive expectations who

    - have long-range (economic) plans that can't be terminated by a decree or ruling;
2. Actors with short-run positive expectations who
    - are based on single conditions and unconnected measures,
    - don't expect far-reaching actions from supranational bodies,
    - don't focus on the element of continuity,
    - may turn into long-run expectations when successful;
3. Actors with short-run negative expectations who
    - focus on preventing specific policy,
    - work with ad-hoc coalitions in order to block legislation,
    - disintegrate after their goal has been reached,
    - can form (semi-)permanent institutions if they don't achieve their goal;
4. Actors with long-run negative expectations who
    - oppose integration at the onset of supranational activity,
    - seek national policy away from supranationalism and federalism,

      keep opposing supranational policy even after it has been active for several years.

We will see that, when it comes to short-run expectations on integration, determining whether or not they are positive or negative isn't as straightforward as the theory initially states.

The Dutch perspective

Looking at our case, military mobility, the Netherlands must be qualified as an actor with short-run expectations. This qualification is based on the Dutch approach towards military mobility, almost going all-in on this topic within PESCO and beyond, focussing on short-term gains while staying away from a long-term vision on European defence, but the qualification is also based on the observations regarding the overall sceptic attitude of the Dutch government towards European defence and the lack of a long-term effort to influence European defence (AIV, 2020; Boon, 2020). At the same time, it is hard to qualify the Dutch expectations as either positive or negative, as they seem to flipflop depending on each individual topic and even within dimensions of each topic.

The Netherlands is willing to move forward and accept commitments that might go further than it wants, if it means it will benefit nationally; at the same time, it also communicates a very reluctant posture when it comes to European defence development in terms of integration within the European Union. Although there are EU members that want to go much further with developing European defence, military mobility is the translation of the Dutch position, aiming for a golden mean that results in much progress with only a minimal amount of actual integration, or only of the kind that is not political.

This stance can be explained when looking at the Dutch position on the future of NATO. In the Netherlands, the idea of NATO as the primary military organization for Europe is very strong and deeply

rooted (interview 1; AIV, 2020). There is, however, a threat of the European Union steering away from NATO, mainly if the larger countries, France and Germany in particular, have expectations that go in another direction (interview 2). In regards to the current development in the binding commitments of PESCO, Lt.-Col. Sleven says that if the European Union wants to enforce commitments, the Netherlands, even though it is not in favour of enforcement, is nevertheless likely to support such a move as long as there is something to gain. The Netherlands focuses on the simplification of regulations regarding military mobility and other relatively simple measures such as the creation of a network of national POCs and a standardisation of Military Requirements for infrastructure (see Chapter 4). When inconvenient legislation should come up, it's unlikely the Netherlands will implement it without pressure from above.

Looking at the Dutch expectations from the military mobility project, it was clear for the Dutch that a number of quick wins was desirable (interview 3). The will of the Netherlands to quickly solve issues like the economic consequences of large NATO operations shows that the expectations on the short term were positive. The fact that these quick wins could be achieved through the Union rather than through NATO, seems to be more practical than ideological, given the whole-of-society character of military mobility, as we have seen in the previous sections. The Netherlands needed some good examples to show that its approach to European defence development would be effective.

The European perspective

The European Union has long-term positive expectations for itself as an institution. There is a logical explanation for that: the EU plans its own future. In this case, the future is planned with vague concepts of a defence union and concrete actions in the form of platforms such as PESCO. In these long-term positive expectations, the developments the European Union envisions are (or should be) the product of the shared expectations of a majority of EU member states. To find the source of the current developments, we might look at France and Germany as the largest member states and drivers of the current developments in the EU defence field, but also at the United Kingdom leaving as well as its role in the development of the EU's expectations (Tocci, 2018).

With the UK leaving, one of the main obstacles for defence development is gone (Novaky) and it also resulted in more unity within the European Union (Tocci, 2018). Looking at France, it has an ambitious agenda for European defence, trying to become less dependent on NATO. At the same time, Germany is primarily looking for an inclusive approach with NATO and other third parties (Zandee, 2018-I). This view has become the main foundation under PESCO, being a broad platform for all sorts of projects and welcoming these third parties. There is a difference in expectations between the Netherlands and Germany, as witnessed by the way in which both nations act regarding the issue of military mobility.

The active pursuit of the national interests by the Dutch can be explained by their short-term expectations: the Netherlands is looking for improved military mobility so as to be able to host and support large exercises. Germany, on the other hand, has more long-term expectations for European defence development. Larger member states like Germany are also active but act less in the forefront and direct their focus on more topics. Germany, the largest EU member state, doesn't want to force nations in a specific direction (interview 7), making it all the more convenient to have countries like the Netherlands to act as plea bearers.

5.5 Strategic actorness

Regarding *strategic actorness*, we are looking at the European Union building its own influence regarding defence issues, a development that has become more apparent during the recent years.

The Dutch perspective

The Netherlands is not a de-facto supporter of more *strategic actorness* for the European Union. The choice for PESCO shows the pragmatic approach towards European defence development rather than a radical choice for the Union as the main military actor in Europe. At the same time, there is acknowledgement for the rise towards strategic actorness from the Netherlands. However, there is not much new about the EU's efforts to be a more credible strategic military actor. The only element that is actually new, are the material gains (funding) in the form of structural budgets provided by the European Union (interview 1), funding that is not a central part of the nationally aimed results of the Netherlands in the military mobility project. Even though some countries are in favour of acting under a European flag, the Netherlands wants to concentrate on NATO as the main executive organ when it comes to military matters. Considering European defence development within the European Union, the view is that PESCO is a suitable platform for development because the Netherlands can pick and choose "partner nations while working to improve the [Dutch] allied military capacity without directly integrating into a European army" (interview 3).

Military mobility is the project that embodies this approach to European defence and the EU role in it. The focus is on military mobility becoming successful rather than the EU's position as a strategic military actor; the expectation is, in the words of Col. Hoogland: "Whilst we will encounter a few speedbumps, we will go forward and hopefully, military mobility will be one of the best practices of this progress" (interview 3).

The European perspective

Many nations see PESCO as the instrument to reach improved capability and synergy for the European Union as well as NATO (Biscop, 2020), rather than a platform for the EU to build *strategic* (military)

actorness. At the same time, movement into the field of defence will mean at least some strengthening of EU strategic actorness. Even if the European Union were building its influence as a strategic military actor, the focus will always be on the diplomatic, development and defence side, while leaving all the core military elements to NATO (interview 4). This assessment is based on the foundation of the European Union, being a civilian power by design (Orbie, 2006). However, when the European Union develops strategic military actorness, acquiring military power could make it a civilian power by choice instead of a civilian power by design as it currently is. While some argue that the Union already is a strategic military actor (interview 5; Sus, 2017), Col. Hoogland is more sceptical: "I doubt whether the EU is [a civilian power] by choice. That would imply that the EU has a successful military apparatus […]. The success of EU training missions – with the exception of the European Naval Force [the EU anti-piracy campaign off the coast of Somalia] – has been debatable." (interview 3)

Looking at the future rather than the present, Lt.Col. Sleven notes that some institutions, for instance the European Defence Agency, are focussing on getting a permanent role in the defence field. This is shown by their pro-active approach towards platforms like PESCO, the military mobility project, but also by gaining influence over material factors (money).

The interviewees recognize that the focus of the EU in European defence has been on securing structural funding for defence and, by doing so, trying to gain strategic military actorness by using its economic power. In addition to economic actorness, the European Union can also build upon seventy years of strategic diplomatic actorness. The European Parliament Research Service even refers to the debate on European defence development as "The debate surrounding the EU as a global player" (2019, p. 1). Interviewee 6 remarks that the success of the intergovernmental approach of PESCO limits the Union in its efforts to gain more military power, as the members show there is no need for a federalist structure above PESCO in order to have European defence development. PESCO has been very efficient in putting military mobility on the political agenda of all major institutions (interview 6). An acknowledgement for a changing role for the European Union is present, but the Union will perform the task to "signal differences between nations and help to reach uniformity on the desired topics" (interview 6). This way, the European Union will gain more strategic actorness by adding military capabilities to its toolbox (interview 5), without becoming a sovereign military power as such.

Adding the perspective of the German interviewee, he states that "we [read: the EU] are definitely trying to become a strategic player but we have huge discussions" (interview 7). These discussions focus on what kind of *strategic actor* the European Union should be; one of the biggest problems the interviewee notes, is the choice between isolation or dependency on partners, such as NATO. The interviewee sees the amount of Dutch activity when it comes to military mobility and agrees it suits their *national interests* as a trading nation. However, being active in projects is not a substitute for nor an example of

building a long-term European defence strategy (Biscop, 2020). The development of strategic actorness is slow and just beginning, as interviewee 6 states: “Little steps are showing that we are thinking more strategically, but there still needs to be a more structured discussion on what we’re actually trying to get to”.

5.6 Socialisation/policy networks

The interconnected character of military mobility makes improvement mostly a matter of cooperation and coordination between the numerous stakeholders, with common policy between nations as the most important result. Autonomy in key areas of improvement is often outside the national defence ministries (Scaparotti & Bell, 2020). To be able to improve military mobility, coordination is crucial and, in this coordination, the socialisation and development of policy networks is vital. We don’t need to understand how the policy networks function, but we do need to know if and how they are present.

The Dutch perspective

What the idea of PESCO and the rise of military mobility show, is the founding of an intergovernmental forum that created large *policy networks* as a result of *socialisation* through all developments all across Europe, even outside of the European Union. PESCO provides a stage for countries for initiatives or issues they want to improve. Quick access to and contact with foreign national policy departments is crucial for the Netherlands given its aim to be a transit nation and in relation to their short-term efforts in military mobility. Its importance for the Netherlands is illustrated by the comment: “I have never seen such a strong network between a policy official here and in Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom and France. I can just call my colleagues where earlier that wasn’t the case.” (interview 1)

While the development of new policy networks or socialisation are not as present at the national interdepartmental level, military mobility forced the ministries to work together more intensively and build communication structures within their existing policy networks. For instance, the formulation of the military requirements led to intensified relations within the ministries. As Col. Hoogland states, this led to the creation of a regular interdepartmental meetings on the executive level.

The European perspective

Regarding PESCO, the European External Action Service and the European Defence Agency are the institutions that facilitate the development of *policy networks*. Furthermore, there is a lot of communication with individuals from various nations to monitor progress and perform the EU role of signalling options for future development. To give an impression of the newly created networks as a direct result of military mobility (both inside and outside of PESCO), Figure 13 offers a depiction made by a member of the policy directorate at the Dutch Ministry of Defence, showing all the networks that

emerged around the topic. There are so many connections within the scheme, that it is almost impossible to actually read it. The main conclusion we can draw from the interviews and Figure 13 is that the policy networks that emerged around military mobility are so numerous and interconnected that they are hardly containable (nor readable) within a model.

When it comes to the existing policy networks, Lt.Col. Sleven notes that the EU Military Staff is mainly seen as a by-product of the European Union that doesn't have a prominent place. This shortcoming of the structure might have had an influence on their past effectiveness and the reason for the Union to launch PESCO. When it comes to the implementation of policy, such as transport permission, contacts between countries are now established, although the structures within every country are so different that socialisation doesn't necessarily lead to new networks. Without platforms to bring these contacts together, the building of policy networks can be a win in itself.



Figure 13: Military Mobility Landscape (Huiskes, 2019).

5.7 Discourses/framing

A constant, but easily overlooked factor in every political development are the discourses and frameworks that shape the debate. That is also the case for European defence development within and beyond the European Union. How the Dutch as well as the EU's practices within PESCO and military mobility are perceived from the outside, is obviously not the same as the actual situation. In this section we look at some of the discourses and frames and how they impact the developments around PESCO and military mobility.

The Dutch perspective

As Figure 13 shows, policy networks, a form of integration, have developed. The presence of these new networks and its potential is clear to the Dutch. At the same time, however, the national *framing* of European defence development positions the Netherlands as a sceptical nation when it comes to integration efforts. Cooperation or integration is only sought as a pragmatic solution for existing problems, not touching national autonomy and sovereignty – at least, that is the discourse that has been created (AIV, 2020; interview 1; interview 2; interview 3; interview 5).



Figure 14: Europa und Niederlande (Bengen, 2016).

The discourse of the Netherlands as a conservative nation when it comes to the European Union moving forward has been around for some time. Figure 14, a 2016 German cartoon, made after the Dutch referendum on the EU's association treaty with Ukraine, shows the Dutch using an anchor in order to prevent the European Union from moving forward. Looking at defence instead of the Dutch position

towards EU development in general, the Netherlands also finds itself in an uncomfortable discourse. The Netherlands is among a group of eleven states that do not have any solid plan in place, nor in the making, to increase its defence budgets. Lt.Col. Sleven argues that the Dutch efforts regarding military mobility serve as a show of willingness to move forward and fight this discourse of the Dutch as free riders on the transatlantic defence train (interview 4). Bessems explains the lack of concrete plans to increase defence budgets as follows: "[t]here is a sense of urgency, but it is differently interpreted and reacted to by every nation. Within the Netherlands, a general feeling that keeps coming back is the opinion that we are safe within our 'nice little corner in North-West Europe'" (interview 2).

PESCO seemed to fit the frame of urgency around military mobility and was therefore a strong platform. Although the Netherlands has been framing military mobility as an urgent matter in multiple ways, concrete results on the international stage have been minimal (TFL, 2020).

The European perspective

In contrast to the European Commission's continuing *discourse* for a "fully-fledged defence union by 2025" (European Commission, 2018-II, p. 1), the practice seems quite different and the European policy level is much more nuanced. In the debate on European defence development, a negative frame that comes up every now and then is the notion of a European army. Col. Huiskes reacts to this frame with the following: "there is [also] no NATO army, so why would the EU try to create one?" (Interview 5) Juncker's fully-fledged defence union can have many forms; an EU-wide structure in the field of defence most likely won't start off with building a European army.

For now, the European Union focusses on the newly created structures to move forward. The discourse of the Union rapidly becoming a strategic military actor is not coherent with the present situation. The need for European defence within the European Union (EUGS, 2016) that was put forward at the beginning of the process created the urgency for nations to start the discussion, but is just a document as long as the member states do not completely back this discourse (Sus, 2017). In the end, any change in the structure and position of the European Union in this dossier will be a decision that has to be made by the member states themselves. Currently, the institutional innovations like PESCO might be used to frame that the EU is indeed taking big steps forward, but the lack of high policy level action proves otherwise (Sus, 2017).

5.8 Norms and values

European states, within and beyond the Union, share a common history of strategic culture rooted in the common history of the European nation states. (Hyde-Price, 2004). This common history and culture do not mean, however, that these states have completely common interests and goals. On the contrary,

views on issues like transatlantic defence differ from state to state. We can position the current common norms and values in strategical thinking as a factor within the development around PESCO and military mobility and connect them to other, more fundamental European values.

The Dutch perspective

As stated previously, the Netherlands sees military mobility as an opportune topic to achieve quick progress. The Netherlands, among other member states, suits the description of a state "that thinks pragmatically" in its ambition to improve European defence (interview 7). National interests propelled by pragmatism are more prevalent than common norms and values as a reason for the current developments and ambition levels of other nations that participate in improving military mobility. Although the compatibility of norms and values is seen by Haas (1958) as a crucial factor to make progress, it is not that visible in the current practice around PESCO and military mobility. Progress in the development of defence on an international level cannot start without a form of consensus, in other words at least some compatible norms and values. There has to be a more or less general common understanding of norms and values of the Netherlands as a plea bearer of military mobility with those of (all) other EU member states, third parties and external organisations that are involved. Compatibility of norms and values does not mean, however, that nations act in the same way. For instance, Germany is not very actively pushing for progress while it is nevertheless seen as one of the front-runners in European defence development. The Netherlands is more active in promoting cooperation and European defence development in military mobility than Germany, but this does not translate back into its national position (interview 7).

The European perspective

In the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, the foundations for PESCO were only a few among the many elements. One of the more fundamental topics in the treaty is the formulation of the common values that all EU member states have subscribed to. Art. 1a of the Treaty states that the common values for all EU member states are "human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights" (EU, 2007, p. 10). This article, revived from the European constitution, is the literal formulation of the shared values of all EU members. With the developments regarding PESCO and military mobility, the signing and communicating of a common set of principles or goals connected to these values is one of the first things that happens. International organizations like the European Union and NATO can only function based on the assumption that Haas' concept of compatibility of *norms and values* between the involved nations is present. The common European values and the 20 commitments that each PESCO member has signed are the most concrete examples of this (EU, 2007; PESCO, 2017).

Although norms and values concerning many very practical defence-related issues align, they show more difference on a meta-level. According to Col. Huiskes, all the nations want to make steps forward in defence development, but "the Netherlands is in a different part of the spectrum. The French, for instance want to take more steps than the Netherlands, motivated by external threats, but also certainly by their defence industries" (interview 5). At the same time, Lt.Col. Sleven thinks that many of the PESCO initiatives will be "dead within two years", as many of them were started but didn't manage to host meetings even within the first year, while other project groups might find out that they can't fulfil their ambitions (interview 4). Shared norms and values in themselves might create common ideas for the future, but is not a spark that lights the fire to give a new concept its momentum. In other words, the impact of this set of common norms and values is limited. We haven't seen any major changes in the European defence landscape hinting towards a strong change. In the case of PESCO and military mobility, cooperation starts from a common sense of urgency and the belief that the international norms and values are alike, but as we will see in the next section, the role of national interests is a greater factor in this than common norms and values.

5.9 National interests

The presence of national interests as a factor in the case of PESCO and military mobility has been sinking in. The relationship between the previously addressed expectation types and national interests plays an important role in this.

The Dutch perspective

If the Dutch are pro-NATO and not in favour of military power for the European Union, why do they and others with the same opinion still participate in a platform like PESCO, since it might move in the opposite direction? The answer is that military mobility serves the Dutch interest to ascertain that defence within NATO and the European Union develop in the same direction. One of the simplest, at the same time one of the most overlooked reasons is that different views and opposing models for the future of European defence development are by far not the most pressing issues. Military mobility offers the Netherlands the chance to play a role as an intermediary between the European Union and NATO and quite some progress can be made without hitting fundamental issues.

The Netherlands is seen as pragmatic nation and not as a threat to bigger players, resulting in being at the table quite often (interview 2). The Dutch have been effective in taking their place within Europe as a trading nation, which made military mobility "a sensible project for the Netherlands to be involved in and also take the lead in" (interview 7). Furthermore, the Netherlands is unable to use opportunities for its industry outside of military mobility as it lacks a real defence industry (interview 4). It is in the national interest of the Netherlands to be an influential player, able to steer the future of European

defence. The Netherlands rightfully sees improved military mobility as a way to improve the European deterrence and defence posture (Scaparotti & Bell, 2020), while having strong secondary national interests that shape its role. The Netherlands is already focussing, and will continue doing so, on NATO as the number one alliance (interview 2). Providing some – rather than all – answers to the question of what European defence should look like seems to be the main goal, without making the mistakes of the failed efforts in the past (Billon-Galland & Quencez, 2017).

As stated previously, the Netherlands has a cautious approach when it comes to the implementation of EU plans for national defence (AIV, 2020). This approach was shared with the United Kingdom (Ojanen, 2006). With the Brexit, the Netherlands has lost a very important ally in this approach; therefore, the Netherlands "will stand more and more in the wind" with its conservative position (interview 5). Being seen as the most important nation blocking paths towards an improvement and deepening of European defence within the Union, jeopardizes the prominent position of the Netherlands in other platforms like PESCO.

The European perspective

Whereas it can be in the national interest to keep development within a national context, the international setting of the PESCO platform and momentum behind it can persuade nations to shift those interests to the EU level. The fact that all PESCO members and even third states and organisations participate or observe in the military mobility project, shows that there is a very broad consensus regarding the importance of the issue. For the European Union, "[m]ilitary mobility is a subject that suits the EU because it allows [it] to play a role within the Common Security and Defence Policy in which they can be complementary to NATO" (interview 2). Military mobility stays away from major issues like the EU battlegroup or military headquarters and it is a suitable topic for the European Union to focus on the supporting element of defence (interview 2). As the European and Transatlantic security threats change, development has to focus on being more flexible rather than focussing on one type of threat. Military mobility is an answer to the problem of a growing diversity in security threats (Scaparotti & Bell, 2020).

Another perspective is the division between the civil and military dimensions of military mobility. Military transports take place via 90% civil, 10% military infrastructure (interview 6). In other words, it is clear measures taken to improve military transportation, will also have their effects on other sectors.

There is just no question whether or not nations want to improve their military mobility; the only question is how to about. The main subjects that have come forward can be divided into two categories: improving the infrastructure and creating less bureaucracy. The focus for Western Europe and the 'older' NATO members such as the Netherlands will be on reducing or removing administrative hurdles in military mobility (Scaparotti & Bell, 2020). Funds to improve infrastructure might sound very appealing,

but in day-to-day practice most of this money will go to Eastern Europe as most EU members in this corner of the continent do not have the infrastructure that is up-to-date with contemporary NATO requirements (Scaparotti & Bell, 2020).

5.10 Path dependency

In the two final sections of this chapter, we will look at the importance of the factors *path dependency* and *unintended consequences*. Based on the same theoretical background, but also in practice, these two factors are closely connected. Path dependency might – however, not necessarily – lead to unintended consequences. Path dependency is the process that takes place when the possibilities of returning to the previous status-quo have become impossible or the costs of returning to this point have become higher than following the path that has been chosen. Path dependency has been closely linked to the process of European integration, but how does it influence the field of defence in relation to PESCO and military mobility?

The Dutch perspective

Even as early as the late 1950s, when Haas published *The Uniting of Europe* (1958), he defined the Netherlands as a nation that is willing to take painful measures in order to reap the short-term profits of further co-ordination and harmonisation. More than sixty years later we can't project Haas' view of the Netherlands on the current Dutch perspective. What we can see are the possible results of going down a similar route. Choosing to join PESCO and being the front-runner in and around military mobility may result in short-term results, but can they reverse the process or is path-dependency a factor at play?

EU budgets like the European Defence Fund can create a material objective. Although the current state of the Dutch armed forces is the result of thirty years of austerity, the economic actorness of the European Union in the defence field doesn't seem to be creating a path dependency for the Dutch. While EU funding for PESCO and military mobility is an added element, it's unlikely to create a path dependency for the Dutch, as we've discussed in Section 5.2. If the Netherlands would for instance be willing to improve its infrastructure, it would most likely have to pay for it by itself – in contrast to most of the Eastern European economies (interview 3; Scaparotti & Bell, 2020). The main economic factor in addition to infrastructure that could be interesting is the defence industry, but the Netherlands does not really have a large defence manufacturing industry (interview 3).

The new structures and procedures that are facilitated by the PESCO platform or other institutions do create a kind of new path dependency. Examples of this are the network of National Points of Contacts and the creation of Main Supply Routes and National Plans and the institutionalised monitoring by the European Defence Agency and reporting to the Common Annual Review of Defence. By now, these

structures have been created and are (becoming) a part of the daily management of national defence. Reversing this process or facilitating the same new structures in other international compositions, for instance NATO or binational, would bring along significant costs and therefore creates a path dependence.

The European perspective

National defence within Europe is subject to European, but also transatlantic dependency (Howorth, 2017). We will elaborate on the area of tension between European and transatlantic defence in Chapter 6. For now, it is crucial to understand that every form of cooperation or integration, for example European defence development, is a direct product of these dependencies (Howorth, 2017). PESCO and military mobility are the result of a Dutch, but also European and transatlantic common consciousness of the dependency for European defence and its dependence on the United States. With Europe's autonomy currently hinging on the USA, which currently plays a less prominent role, the European Union acts because it has to (Howorth, 2017).

The 20 commitments on PESCO aim at defence integration, but the current result is not much more than improved cooperation (Biscop, 2020). This shows that the presence of path dependency doesn't determine the exact outcome.

Path dependency within PESCO is also connected to the economic dimensions. Although rules are imposed to make sure money is spent wisely and countries have large individual roles to play in the implementation of policy (interview 5), for some material gains in the form of money appear to be a driving force. Combined, the European institutions have over €30 billion to spend on Common Security and Defence Policy development and, as stated before, the European Union is becoming an economic actor in the defence field. The European Defence Fund is hosting a pilot of €500 million for industrial defence innovation; a serious amount of money and even though the success of this pilot has yet to be determined, it is already clear that the EU budget for European defence development will increase (interview 5). Not joining in and/or proposing projects not only means not having any control over the way money is spent, but also missing out on the chance to influence the shape and form of European defence.

What the exact European architecture in the field of defence will look like remains to be seen, but in a sense the events are shaping themselves while building on dependencies that have been around for decades. By now, the old status quo, with the United States assuming the main role in European defence – and the United Kingdom as an EU member state – has gone, making a return to this situation nearly impossible; in other words, creating a path dependency that will ask for an answer to the question of the future of European defence.

5.11 Unintended consequences

Finally, in this section we will take a look at the factor *unintended consequences* in relation to European defence development in PESCO and military mobility. In this relatively short section, we'll discuss the unintended consequences connected to the Dutch, as well as the European perspective in relation to these topics, once again emphasizing the embeddedness of the combination of European defence and military mobility trough all levels of government.

The Dutch perspective

The case of military mobility shows that the Netherlands still sees harmonisation and co-ordination as the most important targets when it comes to integration, showing that this way of working is still present in the Dutch ethos. Path dependencies combined with the Dutch aim of achieving quick wins offer a lot of space for *unintended consequences.* The momentum behind military mobility is very strong. Where harmonizing legislation and procedures was the main aim, the aims of military mobility are now already much broader when looking at improved infrastructure and the implementation of funding by the European Union.

Due to the intergovernmental approach of PESCO, implementation of the commitments regarding military mobility takes place on the national level. The results of military mobility are cross-departmental. The need to achieve quick wins results in pressure on the decision-making process, in turn having an impact on the implementation side as an unintended consequence (interview 3), as illustrated in the case of the military requirements for infrastructure in Chapter 4. If PESCO and the military mobility project have to make progress to keep its momentum, the important but hardly visible dimension of national implementation is a threat if the consequences for further initiatives keep piling up, resulting in big or difficult tasks on the national executive level. Concerning the previously discussed goals of military mobility – the national implementation plans, faster border crossing procedures and the network of Single National Points of Contact – a lot of work has already been done, but none of the goals have been fully achieved. Improved military mobility is only feasible when the measures that nations are committed to are actually in place, meaning that the national executive level should keep up the pace with the political developments.

The European perspective

The potential unintended consequences of the European Union developing military capabilities that duplicate NATO, have also been recognized, but always in light of two issues. First, the European Union doesn't have the same ambition level as NATO (interview 5). Second, the assumption is that the European union and NATO need to collaborate and make sure no duplication takes place. The first remark might be correct, but the assumption so far has only proven to be nothing more than that: an

assumption. Efforts to integrate defence within the European Union has mainly led to improved cooperation instead of integration (Biscop, 2020); concrete results of effective cooperation between the two regarding military mobility on the political-strategic level can't be recorded yet (TFL, 2020. If the European Union keeps the process of development in the defence field going, it is inevitable that duplication will take place (Howorth, 2017).

In theory, efforts to improve cooperation and integration within the European Union do not necessarily lead to integration, but, on the other hand, in day-to-day practice it rarely leads to disintegration. While progress is not a path-dependent result, the opposite is even less likely to happen. Examples of disintegration within the European Union are scarce and projects leading toward disintegration are even more scarce.

6. The areas of tension in European integration and the hypotheses

We have now discussed the historical-institutionalist background of PESCO and military mobility and the relation of the subjects, the involved levels of government, the Dutch views and aims in relation to the wider context and the direction of development of the European Union. By using the factors from our theoretical framework, we've also seen the connection of European integration theory with PESCO and military mobility. It's time to discuss the four hypotheses from Chapter 1. In the following section we'll go through all four hypotheses, based on the areas of tension of Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008), placing them in the context of our research results and drawing conclusions. Testing these hypotheses gives us more insight in order to answer our main question.

6.1 Area of tension: European integration vs Atlantic solidarity

Outside the field of defence, Atlantic solidarity is just a notion rather than a clear norm. Atlantic solidarity is expressed by issues like intergovernmental trade agreements, programs like the Erasmus scholarship programme that also (partially) include transatlantic nations like Canada and the USA (European Commission, 2018-IV), but also immaterial topics.

Within the field of defence in Europe, the unique element of this case is the institutionalised expression of Atlantic solidarity in the form of NATO. While researching European defence development within an EU project, NATO is present as the largest external factor, or third party. The fact that European defence development is taking place in a playing field with two huge supranational actors, the European Union as well as NATO, is unique. They embody the area of tension which is European integration vs Atlantic solidarity. That is why this section needs somewhat more elaboration than the other sections.

Hypothesis 1: *The Netherlands pursues European defence developments that lean towards integration, without affecting Atlantic solidarity.*

The inevitable discussion: the roles of the European Union and NATO in European defence

From a national point of view, but also looking from the point of view of the supranational institutions, the relationship of the European Union and NATO in the field of defence is a factor that impacts every step in European defence development, from integration to cooperation. In essence the integration of defence in Europe is able to co-exist with and even strengthen NATO (Navoky, 2018). NATO is based on Art. V – an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies (NATO, 2019) – whereas the European Union on the other hand works with "a coalition of the willing by choice" (interview 3), meaning that the Union is completely dependent on its member states when it comes to

the use of military power. This implies that both military systems can support each other, a scenario which is desired by interviewees (interview 2; interview 5).

It is therefore interesting that the European Union has taken on a more prominent role. Figure 15 shows the EU's future relationship with NATO as visualised by the European External Action Service. The keywords when it comes to the relationship between the European Union and NATO are compatibility and complementarity. However, the realisation of such a compatibility also means that the European Union has to take a step forward when NATO steps backward. NATO and the EU act on behalf of their member states, providing the capabilities that cannot be provided by individual nations. As the figure illustrates, the European Union wants to assume a role on the left end of the spectrum in a way in which the Union and NATO can be used to their maximum efficiency, and their tools are the best used.



Figure 15: The relative utility of the EU and NATO as visualized by the EEAS (M. Huiskes, August 19, 2019, personal communication)

In reality, it is not as simple, however, because the power of the supranational institutions depends on the member states. The latter determine the importance of the institutions based on the economic and political situation of the individual state. Furthermore, the balance as portrayed in Figure 15 does not exist yet and, as we have seen, cooperation between European Union and NATO has yet to show concrete results (TFL, 2020). While the EU institutions act with a level of autonomy in these matters,

sovereignty lies with the member states. “What we do is defined by the member states, how we do it is up to us, but what we have to do and achieve is up to the member states” (interview 5). In that sense, we can speak of a liberal-intergovernmental construction, where the institutions are shaped by and act upon what the member states ask. However, the institutions work with guidelines as broad as the Foreign Affairs Committee gives them: “coordinate with NATO as appropriate” (interview 5), which inevitably leads to autonomous interpretations and actions. Consequently, this mechanism can shift the power-balance between NATO and the EU. Autonomous action of the European Union in the field of defence can and has been a result of this. While handing over sovereignty might not be a point of discussion, the changing, or declining, role of NATO (Tocci, 2018) combined with autonomous actions of the EU could lead to a more sovereign role in the field of defence within Europe. The actual development in terms of the cooperation between NATO and the EU, in other words the results, has been limited and is faced much uncertainty and unpredictability (TFL, 2020; Howorth, 2019).

The role of the nations and military mobility

It is up to those 21 member states of the European Union that are also part of NATO to carefully navigate between the European Union, NATO and national expectations (Scaparotti & Bell, 2020). The pragmatic approach of the Dutch gives them a nuanced position when it comes to choosing the platform to start the development. Therefore, the Dutch are willing to cooperate on issues such as military mobility, because improved military mobility as a result of integration within the EU also benefits NATO (interview 3).

The launch of PESCO has provided the Dutch with a forum to cooperate and coordinate on the topics connected to military mobility and integrate the elements that they see fit. The Dutch are very aware of the spill-over effects of military mobility and with an economy relying on logistics, the Dutch see chances to enhance their logistic networks. Military mobility fits the Dutch position as a transit nation as well as their reputation of being able to achieve compromises through their ‘polder model’ (interview 4; interview 6). Military mobility improves EU and NATO cooperation (TFL, 2020) and is seen by the European Union as a “key action for EU-NATO cooperation”. as the most important way of addressing the issue (EPRS, 2019, p. 1).

Concluding, hypothesis 1 can be confirmed. The Dutch only want European integration when it complements and supports NATO. Within the changing dynamics in European defence, the European Union is becoming a more prominent actor, while the role of NATO is changing. Dutch efforts regarding military mobility are aimed to support the Dutch polder model, to navigate between the two supranational institutions as well as the national interest of being logistically important for Europe.

6.2 Area of tension: Civilian power vs military power

Historically the European Union has always been a civilian power, but it has the potential to grow into a military actor, according to Ojanen (2006), Sus (2017) and Niemann and Brerethon (2013). Although some steps have been taken by the EU, the outcomes were not very convincing; this caused by the uncertainties about the role the EU and NATO have when it comes to defence and military actorness. This relationship is defined by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) as the second area of tension. In this section, the factor strategic actorness plays the most important role.

Hypothesis 2: *The European Union is developing into the role of a strategic (military) actor, but will keep its focus on being a civilian power as long as NATO provides the military power.*

Civilian and military power and military mobility

The potential for the European Union developing into a strategic military actor lies in the fact that the Union is able to plan its own future. The EU as an actor has a positive long-term expectation regarding military integration. The most important examples of the current developments of the EU into the role of strategic military actorness, are the structural funding for defence, the various projects within or outside of PESCO that have strategic actorness for the EU as a goal, but most importantly the actions and statements of the European Commission when it comes to its vision regarding European defence development. The power on the EU side, increasing as a result of further institutionalisation of defence on this level, should not be underestimated.

With NATO's Northern hemisphere stretching over vast territories, improving military mobility, in particular within Europe, is also a key action for the Alliance (Scaparotti & Bell, 2020). While relocation of US troops to those countries that spend 2% of their GDP on defence – or even the withdrawal of troops that have been stationed in Europe for decades – might seem to point in a different direction, we have to realise that it is the United States making this decision, not NATO. In that sense, they are not a translation of NATO's current and future visions for European defence, but more so the result of American political decision-making (interview 5).

Improvement of military mobility of European states without the involvement of the European Union is simply impossible, as "several of the challenges inherent to military mobility, such as infrastructure development and legal and diplomatic procedures, are civilian controlled" (Scaparotti & Bell, 2020, p. 8). Achieving progress is so strongly dependent on cooperation and coordination in the civil as well as the military domain, that only the EU can offer the right platform to achieve this progress. At the same time, the risk of neglecting the relationship between the EU and NATO can lead to the European Union developing its own military capabilities as a result (Howorth, 2019). Member states that either have

different views on the future of European defence, such as the United States, or are firmly against EU-NATO cooperation, such as Cyprus and Turkey have a negative impact on the current developments in the field of cooperation between the EU and NATO (interview 3; interview 5). Even if NATO wants to focus on complementarity with the EU and wants to provide the hard military power within Europe, these situations are proving to be roadblocks.

What PESCO and military mobility show is that the progress on this topic can go beyond these roadblocks. Improved military mobility needs a lot of coordination but does not come to a halt if the European Union and NATO do not cooperate. Furthermore, it will not build towards structured and centralized military capabilities for the EU. The project has an apolitical character, the outcomes are not binding for member states and the developments are differentiated between the involved member states. This construction with its subsequent results shows the EU's strength as a diplomatic platform to achieve progress (interview 4) and thereby shows the strength of civil actorness of the Union (Orbie, 2006). The EU as a civilian power can benefit from the side effects of pragmatic military integration, for instance improved infrastructure and military capabilities to use in situations in the spectrum prior to a war scenario, without acting as military force (interview 5).

In summary, the hypothesis can be confirmed. The case of PESCO and military mobility shows that progress as a civilian actor in the defence field is possible for the European Union. The EU is still focussed on being a civilian actor, and tries to contribute to a stronger defence infrastructure within Europe. This is not for the sake of developing military capabilities for the EU, but rather to enhance the Union as a civilian power and contribute to security and defence within and beyond the EU. As shown in Figure 15, Section 6.1, the European Union wants to focus on the capabilities that strengthen the combination of the EU and NATO. But as shown multiple times during this research, much depends on the actual results of EU and NATO cooperation and in that respect, little has been achieved.

6.3 Area of tension: Intergovernmental vs community approach

In this section we will zoom in to the top-down community and bottom-up intergovernmental approaches within PESCO and military mobility. The European project has intergovernmental as well as federalist characteristics (Checkel, 2006) and so does PESCO; what the exact balance in this area of tension is, will be discussed in this section.

Hypothesis 3: *The current European defence development in the case of PESCO strikes a balance between the intergovernmental bottom-up and the community-based top-down approach, which exactly coincides with the interests and expectations of the Netherlands.*

A balanced approach through pragmatism

The foundation of PESCO is intergovernmental. As we have addressed in Chapter 4, PESCO and all its sub-projects including military mobility are the result of intergovernmental cooperation, although PESCO is supported by the EU's institutions. Even though the basis of development concerning PESCO is intergovernmental, the fact remains that the EU's movement into the domain of defence and foreign policy has made its governance more nation-state like (Peters, 2009). This movement, of which PESCO, but also the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the European Defence fund are examples, thus contributes to the European Union becoming a more federalist actor by extending its power to the field of defence.

As it turned out, to quote PESCO's own slogan, PESCO is even more 'Member States Driven' than one would initially think, based on the way in which other EU institutions on the executive level are structured. PESCO was initiated by the European Commission, the federalist institution as opposed to its intergovernmental counterpart, the European Council. As Haas (1958) already argued, the theoretical structure behind these institutions, meaning federalist or intergovernmental, doesn't predict the actions they take. So even though the European Commission is a federalist institution, the initiation of an intergovernmental platform, PESCO, is not strange.

As we know, military mobility is an example of one of the many projects currently within PESCO. Each project is started by a group of member states, so the foundation under each project is intergovernmental and bottom-up. At the same time, the European Union facilitates PESCO by offering the platform and the institutional infrastructure of the CSDP around it, as we have seen with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the European Defence Fund. Implementation, on the other hand, is a national matter.

PESCO was activated top-down by the European Union after the nations asked for it, bottom-up through the European Council. The result of all the projects being carried by different compositions of members inevitably causes differentiated integration across all levels, giving nations quite some space to heed the commitments. Defining the intergovernmental versus federalist balance between al the initiatives is hard and not possible within this research.

As we have seen in Chapter 4, the Dutch have invested a lot of effort in PESCO and military mobility. In Chapter 5, we have seen why the factors of expectation types and national interests were important. Military mobility suits the Dutch position on the future of European defence and provides them with their preferred way of working: an intergovernmental foundation supported by the federalist institutions of the European Union.

Concluding, while we can see that the basis for PESCO is top-down as well as bottom-up, the exact balance of approaches for PESCO as a whole cannot be confirmed. PESCO does show clear intergovernmental as well as federalist features, but the first part of the hypothesis cannot be confirmed. The second part, regarding the interests and expectations of the Netherlands in relation to these developments, can be confirmed as the Netherlands clearly favour the current way of working. The Netherlands fares well within intergovernmental settings with different coalitions and the development of small, low-political topics within PESCO. It is a pro-active member of PESCO (Zandee, 2018-II). The Netherlands gets the opportunity to lead the way on military mobility, getting quick results, with the European Union facilitating the Netherlands. At the same time, it can promote cooperation over integration and keep track of the position of NATO.

6.4 Area of tension: External vs internal objectives

As we said at the beginning of this research: each and every policy is always made with certain goals in mind. These goals can be focussed on internal objectives or external objectives, outside the scope of the European Union. In the field of defence, policy is shaped by the perception of threats emanating from the external environment and the perceived amount of (military) effort needed to respond to these threats (Huntington, 1961). How this perception translates into the external and internal objectives that are an area of tension in European integration will be discussed in the next section.

Hypothesis 4: *European defence development within the PESCO's project on military mobility is driven by a balance of external and internal objectives.*

Providing security within Europe

The main objective of each and every effort in European defence development is the same: European security. The main concretisation of the objectives in military mobility from a European perspective is best described by the following quote from the European Commission: "A better mobility of forces within and beyond the EU will enhance European security by enabling the EU Member States to act faster, in line with their defence needs and responsibilities, both in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations, as well as national and multinational activities (e.g. in the framework of NATO)." (European Commission, 2018-II, p. 2) The main argument presented is a clear combination of internal as well as external objectives for the member states. The concrete objectives that we've discussed, such as improved infrastructure and the removal of bureaucratic hurdles between European states, are examples of these internal objectives. But these objectives also must be seen in an international context, as they also support external objectives.

In the case of military mobility, objectives that are external to European defence development are all the more present because of the interdependent nature of everything connected to mobility. The main internal objective for the European Union as well as its member states is improved European security and the external objective is an enhanced ability of the nations to fulfil their roles in regard to third parties like NATO and defence issues outside the Union. The European Commission gives some concrete examples of these external objectives that are important for the individual member states: "national defence planning and commitments agreed within NATO and the UN by the Member States concerned." (European Council, 2018, p. 2)

In conclusion, while the major developments in European defence have been sparked by the external events that we have discussed in the beginning of this thesis, among others the release of the EU Global Strategy, the changing position of the United States and unrest at the borders of the European Union, the current developments concerning military mobility have been initiated with mainly internal objectives. Furthermore, the European Union, by mouth of the Commission as well as the Council, clearly identified the external objectives of military mobility for their member states and the possibility to assist NATO in achieving its objective of deterrence and defence posture in Eastern Europe. We have also clearly seen the external objectives as an important reason for the Dutch to put so much effort in the improvement of military mobility. While we might not speak of a perfect balance of internal and external objectives and therefore we cannot confirm our hypothesis, both types are clearly present, albeit that the primary objectives are internal; the external objectives are seen as quick wins that can be achieved within the same process.

7. Conclusion

It's striking to see how much has happened and still happens regarding the issue of European defence. At the star of this research, PESCO was a relatively new and hot topic. In its four years of existence, PESCO has grown into the role of a well-established practice for international cooperation. Reflecting on this research, the choice to investigate the Dutch efforts on military mobility, focussing on the PESCO project, has given a useful insight into the Dutch position and the state of European defence development.

To conclude this research, we still must answer our final question. We'll continue with the answering of our sub-questions and end with our main question: 'How does European defence development within the EU take shape and impact the Netherlands' role and position in the case of the PESCO project on military mobility?'

1. What is the historical-institutionalist background of PESCO and military mobility and how do these two subjects relate to each other? By analysing the historical-institutionalist background of PESCO and military mobility, we have seen that PESCO has roots that go back to the 1990s. Meanwhile, military mobility has its roots even further back in history. While military mobility and PESCO can be considered as one case, we have seen that the military mobility project is connected to PESCO but is much bigger than that. All the efforts on military mobility connect and overlap with efforts outside of PESCO, showing the way in which mobility interconnects with many related topics, but also showing the pluralist approach of the Dutch in order to increase the success chances for the project that includes many of their national goals for European defence.

2. Which levels of government are involved in the policy processes? In this policy process, we have seen that many levels of government are involved. On the national side, multiple ministries and the political as well as the executive levels of these ministries are somehow a stakeholder in the process. On the European level, it includes all the institutions under the CSDP that are working for PESCO and/or military mobility. On the highest levels we have seen the activity of the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament.

Since 2016, European defence development has started developing more actively than in the previous years. The fact that a lot of these developments took place at the EU level was mainly given by the demand for development from triggered by external factors and NATO's role was being affected by the changing foreign policy of the USA. The EU will go from spending no earmarked money on defence to pushing several defence issues and including defence in the coming multi-annual financial framework. This shift in behaviour will inevitably have an effect.

Although the current development takes place within or linked to the EU institutions, NATO is present as a third partner, but more importantly, the development around PESCO and military mobility is also aimed at strengthening the position of NATO by helping its member states to improve military logistics.

3. What are the Dutch views regarding the military mobility project within the broader context of EU defence development? The Netherlands has been and still is conservative when it comes to the development of strategic military actorness for the European Union, but has chosen to actively participate on all fronts of military mobility. The Netherlands has chosen to take on an active role in the development process within, but also outside the PESCO platform when it comes to improving military mobility.

4. In which direction is the EU defence development heading and how does this process relate to the Dutch aims? The current political climate within Europe but also in the transatlantic relationship makes it important for the Netherlands to show its relevance. The Netherlands, as a small player among several larger nations playing the same field, like France and Germany finds itself within the external forcefield created between the European Union and NATO. Within and outside of PESCO, the Netherlands has always assumed a pluralist, pragmatic and functionalist approach towards cooperation. This approach gives the Netherlands a chance to be a key player regarding a topic that has a lot of importance for the Dutch.

And finally, how does military mobility and in particular the PESCO project military mobility fit within existing theories on European integration? We have seen that European defence development covers multiple theories in the field of European integration and European defence; however, none of the major theories offers a comprehensive approach. By using factors from multiple theories, we have seen the presence of different theories in the practice of military mobility and PESCO.

The answer to our main question is that the developments around PESCO and military mobility have taken place in a short time, especially in light of such a major political change. The success of the notion of military mobility has led the Dutch to fulfil a role at the front of its development, within and outside of PESCO. At the same time, the Netherlands has remained a firm believer in NATO as the main military alliance and has seen military mobility as its way of showing what European defence in the context of the European Union should look like. When the goals of military mobility will be achieved, the result is improved cooperation or differentiated integration and not the EU's aimed integration of defence. But as we have seen, all the developments have led to few concrete results and the aims that have been set and the opportunities that have been identified remain mostly unachieved.

8. Discussion

Starting off, the developments around PESCO and military mobility have shown that the potential for European defence development is not limited to NATO, but can also take place within the EU, just as argued by scholars like Howorth (2019), Glarbo (2001) and Ojanen (2006). Previously, the major theories, federalism, Neo-functionalism and Liberal-intergovernmentalism even argued that defence was not a field suitable for European development.

Based on among others Haas (1958), Walt (1998) and Diez (2009) we made the assumption that one theory would not be enough to assess European integration. With the use of various elements from the most prominent theories in the form of factors, we have operationalized this research. The presence of all these factors within the case study have shown that elements from each theory apply to a certain extent, because the case presents elements that are intergovernmental as well as federalist and functionalist.

The areas of tension (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008) have proved to be applicable to structure the research and debate; however, there is a strong emphasis on the first area of tension – European integration vs Atlantic solidarity – given the presence of NATO as the institutional expression of this transatlantic relation. And although most, like Scaparotti & Bell (2020) and the European Council (2018), see cooperation with NATO as a key area, this research shows that although wished for, this isn't yet happening, like Biscop (2020) also argues.

We also haven't seen proof for the argument that the European Union needs to step up in the field of defence because of a shrinking role for NATO, as argued by Tocci (2018). What we do see is more in accordance with what Novaky (2018) and Tardy (2018) argue, namely that the European Union focusses on development which strengthens NATO. Also, Ojanen's (2006) argument that the Union would start to cooperate in an intergovernmental fusion like NATO is consistent with the set-up of PESCO with its intergovernmental foundation and federalist supporting structure.

Concerning the position of the Netherlands, the 2020 AIV report emphasizes that the Netherlands assume a very conservative view, characterized by a lack of a vision for the future when it comes to European defence development. The Netherlands has over and over again stated that it is against any form of handing over sovereignty in the field of defence to the European Union. At the same time, it has chosen to participate in every action taken in military mobility inside and outside of PESCO. Brexit leaves the Netherlands with the loss of a conservative ally, however.

While elements of PESCO, such as military mobility, might deliver results, it is unlikely to deliver the binding, but non-enforceable commitments that the member states have made "to arrive at a coherent full spectrum force package" (Foreign Affairs Council, 2017, p.1). Biscop's report (2020) also confirms the view that PESCO offers a lot of chances, but its structure makes it likely that many of these chances won't be utilized to its maximum or even get wasted.

Based on the above, recommendations for future research can be given as follows:
Recommendation 1: This research covers one case study and provides a clear picture on one big project, but further research on multiple PESCO projects or other European defence development initiatives can help broaden the knowledge on the development happening within the platform and add comparative results.
Recommendation 2: More research into the institutional relations between the European Union, NATO and other member states is needed to gain insight into current developments in European defence.
Recommendation 3: The amount influence of policy networks and socialisation is an interesting field for further research.
Recommendation 4: Whereas theory focusses on European integration as a progressive process that can either stand still or go forward, there is a lack of research on disintegrative factors in European integration theory. Disintegration within NATO and the role of the United States should be further researched but also research on disintegrative factors between the EU and NATO offers opportunities to learn from current developments.

Concluding, European defence development shouldn't be seen as a ship that has sailed, or the result of exogenous shocks. European defence development is a very complex institutionalised environment in which one simple case has numerous elements and perspectives. We should see it as a process that has developed in various directions over the last 75 years and that will continue to develop as long as the security and defence environment around Europe will keep changing.

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Figure 1: NATO Public Diplomacy Division. (2019, November). Defence Expenditure [Graph]. Retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_11/20191129_pr-2019-123-en.pdf

Figure 2: Keukeleire & MacNaughtan. (2008). Areas of tension in EU foreign policy [Graph].

Figure 3: Personal visualisation of the author. Constructed to show 'Relations of the Netherlands Permanent Military Representations at NATO and the EU to PESCO' [Graph].

Figure 4: Personal visualisation of the author. Constructed to show 'Relations of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence to PESCO and the military mobility project' [Graph].

Figure 5: Personal visualisation of the author. Constructed to show 'CSDP institutions and their relation to PESCO and the military mobility project' [Graph].

Figure 6: Personal visualisation of the author. Constructed to show 'CSDP institutions, the EEAS, EDA and EUMS, and their relations with PESCO and the military mobility project'[Graph].

10. Appendices

10.1 Annex A: Topic list used for interviews

Cooperation or integration in defence policy in the EU

Thesis

Topic list

1. Introduction and relation to Military Mobility

2. Vision of the Netherlands (ministry) – federalism vs neofunctionalism

3. The role of PESCO – federalism vs neofunctionalism
   a. The importance of individual projects
   b. The choice for Military Mobility
   c. Policy space available to manoeuvre

4. The influence of individual policy advisors

5. The EU as a strategic actor
   a. The gaining of actorness
   b. The force field between the EU, member states and NATO

6. The most likely scenario for further developments

7. Opportunities and threats for the Netherlands

10.2 Annex B: Interview transcripts

10.3 Annex C: Military mobility codebook