

Yes peace, democracy please –

An analysis of the process of democratisation in Mozambique from 1994 – 2012

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Abstract

Mozambique has made a stunning revival – after a 16 year civil war the country has remained peaceful for twenty years during its phase of democratisation, in contrast to many other post-conflict democratising countries. What explains this stability? By looking at the political institutions and actors during this period, this thesis identifies three major processes explaining this stability - the dominance of Frelimo, the successful transformation of Renamo and an ongoing willingness of politicians and citizens to participate within the system. Despite these stabilising factors, there are also worrisome trends. An increasing dissatisfaction with the current political system, deteriorating democratic institutions and a decline in voter turnout show that democracy has not been firmly anchored in the country.

Keywords: Mozambique, democratisation, stability

Foreword

Although the final product is entirely my own, writing a thesis is never a solitary process. Therefore, I would like to thank some of the people who've helped along the way.

In the very first place my parents who have always provided me with the means to be able to study. Thanks to my sister for always wanting to hang out with me when I need a little distraction.

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Inhoud

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Donor darling and outlier – Mozambique's path of democratisation

Mozambique, situated on the south eastern coast of the African continent, is a country buzzing with colourful people and brightened by activity, known for its beautiful beaches. It is one of the donor darlings of the international community, being viewed as an African success story recovering from its civil war. Mozambique, however, is also the third poorest country with high levels of inequality and corruption.

On the 4th of October 1992 the Mozambican government, represented by Frelimo (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*), and its belligerent, Renamo (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*), signed *O Acordo de Paz Geral* in Rome. The signing of these accords marked the end of a civil war, which lasted for 16 years. In the accords it was agreed upon the Mozambican political system would be transformed from authoritarian one-party rule into a multi-party democracy. This process of democratisation was part of the peacebuilding process.

In 1992, the country faced grave conditions, just starting to recover from the devastating conflict. Economically, the country was drained; much of the infrastructure had been destroyed during the fights as part of the war tactics, demobilisation and reintegration of the soldiers had to begin and the country had no prior experience with democracy. "Mozambique lacked nearly all of the social, economic, and political factors usually held to be conducive to democracy and had spent virtually all of its post independence existence immersed in a brutal domestic conflict." (Manning, 2002: 63). Mozambique seemed a precarious case for successful and peaceful democratisation because of the situation in the country at the start of the process but after twenty years is still relatively stable.

The democratic peace debate

There is a rich tradition in the academic debate on the link between democracy and peace. The idea behind democratisation as a part of peacebuilding is that democracies are both internationally and internally more inclined to peace than other forms of government – known as the democratic peace theory. President Clinton declared in his 1994 State of the Union that, since democracies don't attack each other, the best way to achieve international security is to build and promote democracy (Owen, 1994). Peacebuilding missions have often taken place in this neo-liberal mind-set. The assumption is that for the practice of peacebuilding to be successful, economic and political reform is needed. Economically, this often meant privatisation and austerity policies. Politically, this meant the installation of democracy by organising elections. Peacebuilding missions, thus, are informed by the democratic peace theory; if

democracy would be implemented, peace would surely follow (Call & Cook, 2003; Ungerer, 2012).

However, empirical research showed the phase of democratisation itself is prone to conflict (Hegre et al., 2001). Given this body of research, Mozambique is an interesting case. Even though the process of democratisation so far has remained stable and peaceful, it has not led to a full-grown democracy, but neither has it collapsed back into civil war. The political system is degrading from the promising democratising system it was developing since 1992, to a formal democracy with many undemocratic features. Still, Mozambique celebrated its twenty-year period of peace in 2012 and in 2014 their fifth national and presidential elections will be held, as well as their third provincial election.

The research

Mozambique, thus, is an outlier for both the theory on the relation between peace and democracy and conflict and democratisation. This thesis will look at the question which processes have allowed for this process of democratisation to be peaceful and the political system to remain stable. This leads to the following research question: *How has the political system in Mozambique contributed to the stability during the process of democratisation from 1994 to 2012¹?*

To explain this deviating pattern the focus will be on the political system. Two specific and crucial elements of the democratic political system will be analysed, being the relationship between the government and its citizens and the viability of the party system. The relation between the government and its citizens is the basis for a democratic system. Important elements of this relation which will be researched are legitimacy, elite habituation, inclusivity and participation. The viability of the party system is a means to establish the relation between the government and its citizens. For this concept the elements of party competition, ideological placement and electoral performance will be researched. The implementation of structures and procedures is not enough, however. Political actors engage with the implementation of democratic institutions and their actions will decide whether the process will be successful or will fail (Taagepera, 1999).

A qualitative case study research is conducted using academic literature, government documents, party documents and newspapers, as well as some expert interviews. Conducting a single case analysis means not all findings will be applicable outside the case of Mozambique. Nonetheless, the lessons from the Mozambican case can guide future research on what features

¹ Note that I do not mean to suggest the process of democratisation has been successfully completed in 2012. However, as this thesis is being written in 2013, resources are only available up to 2012. The process of democratisation, nonetheless, is still on-going.

and questions to focus on when analysing the peacebuilding and democratisation process within different countries or when conducting a qualitative, large-N analysis.

This thesis aims to contribute to scientific research on democratisation processes through this case study research. The research will describe in greater detail how the process of democratisation within the peacebuilding process has taken place. The Mozambican case shows, in contradiction to the current academic knowledge, that even when the democratic institutions are not properly functioning, there can still be stability. Interestingly enough, while Mozambique is a 'success story' in its revival, it has not often been academically analysed in this light. Improved knowledge on the dynamics of democratisation as part of peacebuilding could be used to improve peacebuilding missions by a better understanding of how recurrence of conflict could be prevented. This adds to the societal relevance of this thesis - adding to knowledge on the democratisation process and its relation to peacebuilding, which can inform post-conflict policies both domestically and internationally. In addition, researching the dynamics inherent to the democratisation process in Mozambique will also provide a better understanding of the effect of Mozambican policies and actions. The long period of democratic transition - twenty years - allows for a longer research period.

So, this thesis hopes to provide insight in what features of the political system, and the actions of the political actors within that system, have contributed to the stability and peacefulness during these twenty-years of democratisation.

The outline of this thesis is as follows. The second chapter will describe the theoretical framework that informs the analysis of the Mozambican democratisation process. The theories that will be dealt with describe the relation between the likelihood of conflict and the type of government or the process of political transformation. Within this chapter the main research question will be further elaborated and the sub questions will be introduced. The third chapter will describe the methodology and the method for the research – a process tracing analysis within a critical theory perspective. This chapter will clarify some of the concepts that are used in this thesis such as 'democracy' and 'stability'. It will also deal with the operationalisation of the sub questions. Chapter four will describe the history of Mozambique, starting with the Portuguese colonisation, leading up to end of the civil war and the beginning of the peace process. In the fifth chapter the analysis of the case is presented, describing the development of the elements, distinguishing the interacting variables within the process and answering the sub research questions. The conclusion will answer the main research question, comment on the limitations of the research and provide suggestions for further research.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

Democracy's and democratisation's effect on the existence of peace or the recurrence of conflict

In the introduction it has already been stated that the theoretical relation that lies at the basis of this research is the relation between the type of government and the likelihood of conflict. A prominent theory discussing this connection is the democratic peace theory, which will be discussed first. However, research programmes went ahead and, apart from criticism on the assumption democracy causes peace, researchers have also pointed at the link between political transition, such as democratisation, and conflict, showing the phase of transition is conflict prone. Both these bodies of theory have profound effects on the actual implementation of peacebuilding.

Mozambique is an outlier, having remained peaceful without successfully completing democratisation. Therefore, after having discussed these theories, the possible stabilising factors will be discussed. The two central elements for this chapter will be the development and current status of two crucial features of democracy and democratisation – the relationship between the government and its citizens and the viability of the party system.

Democracy as the cause of peace

The relation between democracy and peace has been much researched. Despite the long tradition in the academic debate, there are still questions that remain and adverse ideas on its occurrence and explanations.

Research on this relation is founded on Kant's work *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795) in which he argues, in short, that eventually all states should be republics and if this stage is reached, these republics will agree not to fight wars, leading to global and perpetual peace. Kant's ideas stand in the tradition of the social contract thinkers, such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke, who legitimise government and its authority through a thought experiment starting with the rhetoric idea of the state of nature (Van Peperstraten, 2007). To escape the domestic state of nature, where there is a constant threat of war², people transfer their natural rights to a governing body because such a body can ensure a peaceful state by enabling cooperation through the protection of the (property) rights of its citizens.

In the republican, or democratic,³ state, citizens are on a par and decide on the state's policies. The citizens in the republican state will decide not to fight wars with other states. In

² This interpretation of the state of nature can be linked to the work of Hobbes. Locke and Rousseau, however, describe the state of nature as a peaceful and harmonious affair.

³ Kant distinguishes between the democratic and the republican state, saying they are labels that belong to different categories. Democracy is one of three types of forms of sovereignty, distinguished from aristocracy and autocracy. In a democracy all citizens together are the sovereign. The republic is a form of government, distinguished from

war the citizens carry the costs; it's their lives at stake and their business that can be ruined. Kant states that if all countries are to become republics, they will decide to agree on a constitution saying they will not fight wars, in a similar manner to how the citizens agreed to create national government (Kant, 1795).

This relation between democracy and peace has received much academic attention (Doyle, 1986; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Hegre et al., 2001). Empirical, quantitative research showed democracies have never fought a war against each other (Doyle, 1986; Owen, 1994; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995).⁴ Further quantitative and qualitative research was conducted to check this correlation and provide explanations for its occurrence – the interplay of empirical and theoretical research developed this body of literature.

As research evolved, scholars moved away from researching the correlation to trying to explain how this relation works – the underlying causal path. This research led to the insight that democracies are also internally more peaceful than states with different governmental systems (Owen, 1994).

The institutional approach, looking at the institutions and procedures for its explanation, focuses on the internal mechanisms of liberal democracy (Ray, 1993). The democratic processes of accountability ensure democracies are less likely to be involved in violent conflict, constraining the state from entering into war and lower-level conflicts (Owen, 1994; Ungerer, 2012).

The cultural approach focuses on cultural or normative aspects, emphasising the importance of norms on war within democratic society (Doyle, 1986; Owen, 1994). As democracies guarantee certain rights, their citizens most likely don't support a war which would abuse the rights of other humans.

This does not mean the relation has remained unchallenged. The most important critiques targeted the definitions of 'peace' and 'democracy' that were being used (Owen, 1994). Depending on which definition is chosen, the relationship changes – in other words, the relationship is not robust. It matters whether a minimal or a more extensive definition of democracy is chosen. This will lead to different cases being included and also changes the relation that is found. The same goes for the threshold that is used to define when something is a conflict. Apart from that, some scholars argued the correlation could be a statistical artefact as

despotism. In the republican state the power to make the laws and the power to execute the laws is separated while in a despotic system both powers are concentrated in the same organ. Our current understanding of democracy often implies a republican state.

⁴ They do fight wars with countries with different types of government (Owen, 1994).

democracies have been rare.⁵ In statistical research, when the number of cases that can be used is small, the strength of the correlation between variables can be overstated.

Democratisation as a cause for conflict

So, democracy was assumed to lead to peace, both internationally and internally. This was envisioned as a linear relationship. However, empirical research showed the relation was not linear. If the likelihood of conflict is explained using a scale from an authoritarian to a democratic political system⁶, an inverted U-shaped relation is the result (Ellingsen & Gleditsch, 1997; Hegre et al., 2001). While both an authoritarian and a democratic regime, the extremes, are highly likely to be peaceful⁷, the types of government in between are likely to be violent.

In addition, when looking at the transition from regime types and the likelihood of conflict, the early years of the transitions have shown to be conflict prone as well. "The road to democracy is complicated and can be marked by internal violence and even collapse of the state." (Hegre et al., 2001: 34). The phase of transition does take time. "[C]ountries do not become mature democracies overnight. More typically, they go through a rocky transitional period ..." (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995: 5). So, while democracy is shown to be peaceful, the transition to democracy is a conflict prone phase.

An institutionalist explanation for this instability is that internal domestic political competition and institutions are not yet fully grown and therefore are fragile for abuse. "[E]lites exploit their power in the imperfect institutions of partial democracies to create *faits accomplis*, control political agendas, and shape the content of information media in ways that promote belligerent pressure-group lobbies or upwellings of militancy in the populace as a whole." (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995: 7). When the political system is not yet successfully implemented, its outcomes are not yet predictable. This period of insecurity is especially difficult for elites who are faced with a shift in power relations and structures. As they will not want to lose their power, they will try to use the imperfect system to their advantage. This situation can lead to conflict. "The most reliable path to stable domestic peace in the long run is to democratize as much as possible." (Hegre et al., 2001: 44). In the end strong, democratic institutions have to be created for stability so a fast phase of transition would be the best option available.

⁵ For an overview of the development of the body of research, see Morgan, 1993.

⁶ The data that is being used to research this relation, is the Polity Dataset. All countries (for which data is available) are ranked on a 21-point scale where -10 corresponds with a hereditary monarchy and 10 corresponds with a consolidated democracy. The regime categories that can be composed from these scores are autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to +5) and democracies (+6 to +10). The score is composed of six indicators recording 'key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition' (Polity, 2013).

⁷ Democracies are even more peaceful than autocracies, although they are equally stable. The phase of transition towards democracy is somewhat more stable than the other way around (Hegre et al., 2001).

Knowing that Mozambique still is not a full grown democracy (in other words; is still not at the extreme of the U) after twenty years and has been in the process of democratic transition for that same period, it is remarkable that violence has not yet erupted or state collapse has not yet happened. The case of Mozambique is an outlier when looking at the theory on democratisation and conflict. The features that caused Mozambique to be the exception to the rule, are interesting for academic debate and post-conflict policies of democratisation on how the phase of democratisation could be a peaceful transition.

Implementing democracy for peace - political aspects contributing to stability

The democratic peace theory has informed peacebuilding practices, democratisation often being part of peacebuilding (Call & Cook, 2003; Ungerer, 2012). The debate on the important characteristics of democratisation as part of peacebuilding has moved beyond the focus on the institutional set up and rather focused on more specific features of the situation in which democracy was implemented and the actual working of the institutions.

Different factors have been pointed out as contributors or inhibitors to the success of democratisation, such as economic reform and horizontal and vertical inequality (Gurr, 1970; Bunce, 2000; Stewart, 2002; Besançon, 2005). Instead of looking at the institutional set up, it is important to look at the character and the proceedings of the democratic system (Taagepera, 1999; Pouligny, 2000).

There are two specific elements of the democratic structure, which will be the subject of the analysis – the viability of the party system and the relation between the government and its citizens (Pouligny, 2000)⁸. Both are core elements of the democratic system. A legitimate relation between the government and its citizens is the basis for the democratic system. The viable party system is a means to establish such a relation. Both are needed in a true democracy.

The features of the relation between government and citizens and the party system are interesting features of the Mozambican case. In any post-conflict case the relation between the government and its citizens is of specific importance. Democracy differs from other forms of government in that it places the power in the hands of its citizens; they decide what the state will do. The citizens are the actual sovereigns in a democracy.⁹ They give a mandate to the government to decide for them (in the case of a representative democracy), granting the government legitimacy (Brinkerhoff, 2005).

⁸ Pouligny distinguishes other variables as well but in order to demarcate the research as much as possible, the two most important variables have been chosen.

⁹ Mind there is no black and white difference between democracy and other forms of government, some political systems possess some democratic features but are not truly democratic, the anocracies according to the Polity data.

The party system provides a core means to establish such legitimate relationships. Elections are the mechanisms to judge the government. Through elections a legitimate government is installed and in following elections that government can be punished for bad governance (Gallagher et al., 2005). In Mozambique much aid has been given in order for Renamo to be transformed from a rebel movement into a political party and for other parties to organise (United Nations, 1995; Hanlon & Smart, 2008).

Therefore, these two core elements will be the focus of this study. These are not the only aspects that make a democracy but these interconnected aspects are of particular interest looking at peacebuilding. The two concepts will be discussed in the following sections, specifying what elements are connected to them.

It has to be noted there is a growing acknowledgement that in many new democracies there is a discrepancy between the formal or legal reality and the practical reality due to the dynamic between formal rules and their use (Bunce, 2000). At the start of the democratisation process the rules for the new political system are agreed upon. Merely agreeing upon the rules of the game still does not make the game, though. Through daily interactions with these rules, the implementation and the adaptation of these rules, a certain culture takes shape – a common manner of interaction. “[T]he definitive rules of the game are arrived at through a protracted process of repeated interaction between the major political actors, within an environment that may itself be changing” (Manning, 2002: 7). This culture can differ from the culture that is described within the formal rules or between the lines of the formal rules (Taagepera, 1999).

Therefore, it is important to look beyond the institutions and rules and also take into account daily interactions with these rules.

1 – Relation between government and its citizens

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the relation between government and its citizens is important in a democracy because the citizens are the sovereigns who give mandate to the government to rule. But how can this feature contribute to stability and peacefulness? First of all, the concept of legitimacy will be discussed, which has to be granted by citizens to the government. Secondly, the concept of inclusivity will be discussed, meaning no group is left out of the government policies. Thirdly, the concept of participation will be discussed, the willingness of citizens to be actively involved within their democratic system. These three concepts are often mentioned in academic works on this relationship. If government is legitimate, policies are inclusive and citizens are willing to participate, there is a strong and positive relation between the government and its citizens which will contribute to the democratic system.

Legitimacy

The important aspect of the relation between government and its citizens in a democratic system is that citizens provide the government with legitimacy. The authority of democratic government will only be accepted if this government is regarded as legitimate (Weber, 1972). In that case there will be compliance. Citizens have transferred their natural rights to the government, according to the contract thinkers, which in return protects its citizens and their property rights. In theory, if a democratic government is no longer accepted as legitimate, the citizens will discard of it in the following elections. Within the democratic system this can be done through voting for a different party in the next election but in cases of grave violations by the government this can also happen through protest (Gallagher et al., 2005).

During the phase of peacebuilding, this relation between government and its citizens is introduced. While during a period of conflict the government gained its 'legitimacy', or rather its authority, through the use of violence and failed to do so in parts of the country where the opposing party had control, in the phase of peacebuilding a relationship of dependence is institutionalised. In non-democratic societies, and specifically in conflict settings, the relationship between the government and its citizens is one where oppression of citizens is used as a means to ensure authority of the state. The new relationship gives citizens voice in the democratic decision-making procedures, which they do not possess in different forms of government and did not possess during the phase of conflict.

Elite habituation

In a case such as Mozambique, where there is no previous democratic culture, introducing this relationship is especially challenging. A part of the transformation of the relationship between citizens and their government from a conflict setting to a democratic setting is getting citizens to accept democracy as 'only game in town' (Manning, 2002). The rules and procedures of the democratic system have to be accepted, by its citizens and most specifically by the elites, as the only legitimate means to make decisions and to get power; known as mass and elite habituation (Bermeo, 2003; Manning, 2010). This elite habituation entails that the elites regard the system as inescapable, which, secondly, will lead to them viewing it as legitimate (Manning, 2002). It is both an attitudinal and a behavioural process. Elite acceptance contributes to stability of the system. If the elites do not accept the democratic structure, it is unlikely the system will stay in place.

Inclusivity

Inclusivity means all citizens have an equal opportunity to be heard in the process of decision-making. There are no voices, or points of view, which are excluded (Smith & Wales, 2000). There is also no group which has the monopoly of power (Stewart, 2002). An inclusive political system is more likely to be accepted as legitimate by its citizens. A highly inclusive system results in a high level of representation (Gallagher et al., 2005).

Inclusivity can be achieved through an electoral system. A system of proportional representation is mostly labelled as the most inclusive electoral system. In such a system a party only has to receive a small proportion of the votes to win a seat in parliament (ibid.).

The centralisation of power is distinguished as a feature negatively associated with inclusivity. A decentralised political system is regarded as more inclusive (Olugbade, 1992).

Participation

Inclusivity is a more passive feature of the political system that can ensure government will be accepted as legitimate. Participation is an active feature in the relation between the government and its citizens meaning the citizens are willing to be involved in the political system. Participation entails the actions that are taken by either private citizens or private or public organisations and groups with the goal of influencing government decision-making processes (Alford & Friedland, 1975; Teorell, 2006). While the goal is to influence, participation itself does not necessarily mean the action will be a powerful one. Even if there is no effect in terms of influencing policies, participation might still have occurred.

Participation has several degrees. One common form of participation, which demands minimal efforts from the citizens, is voting during elections. A more demanding type of participation is to stand for election or defend or protest a certain policy via means such as the public debate or lobbying.

The skills that citizens would have to acquire for this type of participation can be learned when they are active within civil society. Countries with a high level of participation often have a vibrant civil society (Gallagher et al., 2005).

If the relation between citizens and government is strong, this could explain the stability of the process of democratisation in Mozambique. Even if the process has not yet led to a full functioning democratic system, when this relation is in place that might explain why the semi-democracy is stable and its installation was peaceful.

II – Viability of the party system

The viability of the party system is a means to establish the legitimate relation and an important feature of the democratic system. In the process of (re)shaping the relation between government and its citizens, elections are an important mechanism. They ‘install a legitimate and democratic government’ (Pouligny, 2000: 18).

To be able to hold truly democratic, multiparty elections, a viable party system is a prerequisite. A viable party system is in place when there are multiple (two or more) political parties competing in the elections to try to gain power in order to represent the interests of (a certain group of) citizens. For this concept the focus will be on party competition and ideological placement which can strengthen the viability of the party system and the electoral performance of the parties which also has its effect on the viability.

One of the signs of the consolidation of democracy is the presence of robust political parties (Bermeo, 2003). The creation and existence of a viable party system will ensure a successful transition and strengthens the democratic procedure, ensuring stability.

Party competition

Within a democratic system, political parties play an important role. They are the link between the people and the government, between the mass and the political elites (Arian & Barnes, 1974; Stokes, 1999). Party competition ensures the representation of the population and its interests – the process of interest aggregation. Political parties also provide the opportunities for citizens to become active in the political arena. Parties are motivated by the incentive to gain as much power as possible. Using this power, which can be quantified in terms of seats won in parliament or other positions, the party can influence policies (Schumpeter, 1950; Becker, 1985; Strom, 1990). This is also known as effectiveness in the party system.

The multiparty system is often associated with a higher degree of fragmentation and therefore a higher level of instability. Although the two-party and the dominant party system are consequences of a low level of proportional representation, they are associated with stability (Taylor & Herman, 1971; Arian & Barnes, 1974). They do allow for democratic competition but at the same time ensure government stability as there is always one dominant party.

In developing countries dominant parties often played a role in the struggle for independence and the establishment of a new order (Arian & Barnes, 1974).

The opportunity to shape fledgling institutions in a favorable direction and to staff public and semipublic bureaucracies during a period of rapid expansion, the identification in the public mind with an heroic or eventful period, and a leadership cadre with an unusual wealth of experiences are

all important consequences of the party's early arrival on the scene. (Arian & Barnes, 1974: 595).

Such conditions can even lead to a dominant party system where the electoral rules do not necessarily imply this. The dominant party sets the rules for the new political order.

Apart from the dominant party system often being an effect of low proportional representation, dominant parties are often exclusive. They mobilise only a part of the citizens and can deny other groups from effective input in the political system (Arian & Barnes, 1974). Therefore, a multiparty is more democratic.

Electoral performance

Mozambique was one of many African countries to hold (their first) democratic elections in the 1990s. Most of these political systems have not led to viable party systems, as Van de Walle (2003) shows in his analysis. One of the causes is the success in these first elections as an important indicator for future success. The winning party gains access to the country's resources. It can use these resources to marginalise opposition parties and in that way consolidate its own power. The marginalisation of the opposition parties results in a non-viable party system.

Ideological variety

For a viable party system there ideally is ideological variance between the parties. African party systems often show programmatic homogeneity. Most political parties don't have distinctive party programmes and elections are often characterised by a high level of populism. The party programmes are written vaguely, allowing room for interpretation afterwards. One explanation for this could be the lack of parties based on labour or church organisations. Even though these organisations have been involved in the process of democratisation in many of the countries, they often retreated from politics (Van de Walle, 2003). A low level of programmatic heterogeneity results in a low viability of the party system. If party programmes are more or less the same, this means voters will have less possibilities to choose for a party that represents their interests.

For the analysis of the Mozambican case, the viability of the party system will be evaluated looking at the existence and development of party competition, the ideological placing of the parties and their electoral performance, starting with the first elections. If there is a high level of

party competition, there is a varied ideological placing as well as the ability for parties to challenge the party winning the first elections, Mozambique has a viable party system.

These two concepts are of a different category. The relation between the government and its citizens is a basic and overarching feature of the political system of which the viable party system is part, being a means to establish the relation.

For both concepts it has to be noted the indicators are not black and white. If some of these features are present only to a certain degree, this does not necessarily mean the relation is not established or the party system is not viable. All factors have to be taken together and the concepts have to be treated as continuous variables.

Research questions

Having found that Mozambique does not fit the general pattern of democratisation as a conflict prone process, the main research question for this thesis is:

How has the political system in Mozambique contributed to the stability during the process of democratisation from 1994 to 2012?

Having explored the concepts of democratisation and stability, the research question can be refined by posing the sub-questions for this research. In this thesis the stability will be explained looking at the relation between the government and its citizens, focusing on legitimacy, inclusivity and participation, and the viability of the party system, looking at party competition, electoral performance and the ideological placement of the parties. The sub-questions therefore are:

How has the relationship between the government and its citizens been shaped and contributed to the stability?

1a) How have the Mozambican elites acted and reacted within the process of democratisation?

1b) How has the inclusivity of the political system developed in Mozambique?

1c) How has participation of the Mozambican citizens within the political system taken place and how has participation developed?

How does the Mozambican party system contribute to a healthy democratic practice and thus the stability of the Mozambican system and the Mozambican country?

2a) How has party competition been achieved in Mozambique and how has it developed?

2b) How have parties represented themselves in terms of ideological placement?

2c) How has the electoral performance of the parties influenced the party system and has this led to ensured participation of the political parties in the electoral competition?

Conclusion

This chapter has shown Mozambique is an interesting case to research as it is an outlier for the theory on how democratisation and democracy influence the likelihood of (the recurrence of) conflict. The stability of Mozambique after its 16-year civil war, during the phase of democratisation is remarkable and interesting from a theoretical point of view.

Being two main features of the democratic system, the relation between government and citizens and the viability of the party system will be the two concepts used in the analysis of the case.

The following chapter will discuss the methodology, methods and operationalisation of the concepts discussed in this chapter to be used in the analysis.

Chapter 3: Methodology and method

How to look and what to look for

Having discussed the topic of research and the theoretical background in the previous chapters, this chapter will discuss the methodology and method to be used to conduct the research. These can be represented by metaphors. The methodological framework is like glasses – it guides what one will look at and what one will see. This, therefore, is important to be made explicit; it is not just a framework to guide the research, it also narrows the view. The methodological framework informs us on what is left out in the analysis.

The method to be used is like a hammer; it is a tool. In itself the method is not the key to the research, but it is a necessity for a successful analysis. A research method is used to gather the data, order it and analyse it. The better the tool fits the task, the better the results will be.

The operationalisation of the concepts of research equals the nails. The hammer and the nails will create the object; the analysis. The operationalisation helps us to specify what it is we can and want to look for using the chosen method.

This chapter moves from the broader framework to the specific concepts. To start with, the methodological framework will be sketched - critical theory. Second, the method to be used will be discussed - process tracing. Following from this discussion, the demarcation of the research is also described. After having discussed the methodology and the methods, the operationalisation of the concepts used is presented. Altogether, this chapter will have covered the manner of research – data gathering and analysis.

The glasses – the methodological framework

The methodological framework which lies at the basis of this research is informed by the theoretical tradition of critical theory, an approach which fits in the post-structuralist turn. In contrast to previous theoretical traditions, the post-structuralist and post-modern traditions state there is no simple explanation for events and human actions. The reality that is perceived is not objective; every observation is influenced by one's previous experiences and theoretical notions, which may be unconscious. A researcher must be aware of such assumptions she or he possesses and continue to challenge these and make them explicit (Wylie, 2006). Critical theory has come forth out of this turn in academic thinking and has its cradle in the Frankfurter School.

Two of the important concepts in the critical theory tradition are structure and agency. The relation between these has been debated and different theoretical approaches have used these concepts for explanation such as structuration theory and actor network theory (Aitken & Valentine, 2006). Anthony Giddens is one of the important authors of structuration theory.

The main idea for this approach is the influence of structure on the interactions of humans and the influence of human activity on structure. Structure is at the same time the medium for and the result of the reproduction of practices. Structure is the pattern of social interactions. For Giddens, however, structure involves more than the rules that shape social conduct. Structure also includes the resources which are needed for the exercise of power (Giddens, 1984; Cassell, 1993). The structure exists of the rules which guide our social interactions but these are not static. Rules are reproduced by action but they can also be produced by action. The rules shape actions by both enabling and constraining certain actions.

One such structure is language. Language is enabling in the sense it gives us the possibility to communicate but it is constraining at the same time as we have to abide by its structure in order to communicate. “[T]he structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems. ... *Structure thus is not to be conceptualised as a barrier to action, but as essentially involved in its production ..*” (Cassell, 1993: 122 – emphasis in the original). This is the duality of structure which creates the contextuality of social life.

Within the structure there is agency which includes the power to shape the structure. Agency means an individual is an actor who has a choice to have acted differently (Dyck & Kearns, 2006). Agency can be performed intentionally as well as unintentionally. The individual also has room to interpret the rules set by structure. Agency can maintain or transform structure.

Following from this dynamic of structure and agency is the possibility for social change, a second important aspect of critical theory. The world order is not seen as static and given – it can be changed through social action. Structure, being the product of human interactions, can be changed through the agency of people. Acknowledging this potential of social change again points at the analysis, conducted from a critical theory perspective, which has to go beyond the idea of a static world order.

Critical theory, in comparison to previous academic traditions, does not aim at theory testing. Theories are merely used as they are useful for explaining the object of research. In research, informed by the critical theory perspective, theory truly is the glasses. The critical theory researcher chooses the theoretical perspective which best suits answering the research question. This was already implemented in chapter 2 in the choice for the theories to explain the stability. Theory testing, as is important in the tradition of Karl Popper (1959; 1970), doesn’t help explaining the way the world works and is therefore less important, according to critical theory scientists. This distinction has been made by Cox (1986) who distinguishes problem-solving theory from critical theory. These types of theories have different purposes. The problem-solving theories take the world and its order as given and try to explain events that do

not comply with this order. They do not question the central agents and the structure within they act. Such theories are a-historical. As critical theory states the world order is subject to change, transformative and differing events should be analysed in the appropriate context (Cox, 1986).

Structuration theory has not been translated into guidelines for empirical research. Giddens describes his ideas as 'a sensitizing device' to inform research, not to provide 'detailed guidelines for research procedure' (Giddens, 1989: 294). The duality of structure and agency will only be used as a broader framework.

Having chosen this methodology affects the course of the research. If a more rational based methodology would be used, the research objected would be even more demarcated, focusing on a set of hypotheses. This could lead to more objective results.

Using the critical theory methodology can make the theoretical scope unclear. The subject is approached from such a broad perspective, it could be that many things are overlooked, simply getting lost within other dynamics.

The value of a critical theory perspective for this specific research lies in two of its important features. First of all, a critical theory perspective informs research to look beyond existing power structures. Power structures are the result of human agency and thus are the product of history. Critical theory questions relations of power and therefore often focuses on hegemony and dominance. Hegemony or dominance can be political, economical, cultural or ideological. Traditional theories often overlook groups which do not have a dominant position within society. This causes the traditional theories to overlook their potential to add to social change. These groups can play an important role in transformation and therefore should not be left out of the analysis.

Secondly, critical theory values the importance of context. Where non-critical theories tend to look at an explanation of a certain event in its static time and place, a critical perspective requires a historical analysis in order to explain how power structures have come into place (Postone, 2004; Cox, 1986). Critical theory involves 'a fundamentally historical approach to questions of the state, law, politics and economics' (Postone, 2004: 166). The context of the event that is explained is of importance.

The hammer – the method of analysis

The method used for this research is process tracing (Bennett & George, 1997; Gerring, 2006; Falletti, 2007; Vennesson, 2008; Collier, 2011). Process tracing is 'a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context ...' (Vennesson, 2008: 231). This is a qualitative method

which allows the close examination of a case. In the analysis every stone along the path is examined, as well as possible alternative paths (Gerring, 2006). Process tracing is a method which is valuable for the analysis of paths of causality. “The general method of process tracing is to generate and analyze data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link putative causes to observed effects.” (Bennett & George, 1997). It is often described comparing it to a line of dominoes. To explain why one stone fell, it must be proved that all other stones before it fell as well – the path leading to its fall has to be uncovered.

This method fits well with the critical theory perspective as it is itself a historical perspective, ensuring the context is taken into account. First, the method itself will be described in further detail. This paragraph will end with a small addition to the method to ensure the implementation of the critical theory perspective.

There are two important distinctive features of process tracing. The first is that for every step multiple pieces or types of evidence are used in order to verify the steps or outcomes. To investigate the different steps in the causal chain, both qualitative and quantitative types of evidence can be used. The second feature is that the causal process which is the results of the analysis is a complex chain which might include feedback loops and side tracks (Gerring, 2006).

For this research the dependent variable is the stability of the political system of Mozambique. The processes leading to this stability will be examined through the use of process tracing. The final analysis will provide a causal chain, possibly on several levels. The *basis* for the path will however be this:

$X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_3 \rightarrow X_4 \rightarrow X_5 \rightarrow Y$: the *stability of the political system in Mozambique*

Every X in the chain represents a certain action or event which contributed to the stability and the shape of the political system. For every X_x several types of data are used to defend its occurrence and its role in the chain. For process tracing it is important to start with the key steps which should be pointed out. From these key steps, the analysis of the sequence of events can be made (Collier, 2011). This sequence is more than just a historic narrative. Due to the analytical perspective used in distinguishing between the importance of steps based on the theoretical concepts, it rises above a mere account (Bennett & George, 1997).

For process tracing to produce results with high validity, two elements are of specific importance. The argument has to be clarified and precise. The order of steps has to be made explicit, including the alternative paths and intervening paths of explanation. The second important specification to be made is the researcher’s evaluation of each step’s level of certainty. It might not be possible to support every step with a sufficient amount of evidence. Such ‘gaps’

can be filled through argumentation and educated guesses but the researcher has to point out that those steps suffer from relative uncertainty (Gerring, 2006).

Process tracing can be used both for the testing of hypotheses or generating hypotheses.¹⁰ As is described in the previous section critical theory researchers do not use theories to test them. Within this thesis, through the use of process tracing, hypotheses can be generated on the stabilising factors during the phase of democratisation for the Mozambican case which may be generalised to other post-conflict democratisation cases.

Both critical theory and process tracing do not necessarily inform us on where to start; which is the first X to look at? To ensure the research will not be an infinite regression it is important to have a clear demarcation, guided by the theory to be used or the case to be investigated. For this research the case informs the starting point because the case has been leading in the formulation of the research question. As the process of democratisation is the object of investigation, the starting point will be 1994, the first democratic multi party elections.

X₁: first multiparty democratic elections in 1994 → X₂ → X₃ → X₄ → X₅ → Y: the stability of the political system in Mozambique

This does not mean events before this date will be left out of the equation entirely but the main focus will be on the events after this point.

Having described the method, one important question to answer is how the use of process tracing differs when it is informed by a critical theory perspective. It has already been mentioned process tracing supports the critical theory perspective because of its historical context. Critical theory also adds a dimension to the causal path that is analysed using the technique of process tracing – the dimension of the duality of structure and agency. In addition to specifying each step in the causal chain, the dimensions of structure and agency will also be discussed. For example, an important event within the process can be the result of a change in structure, an important exhibit of agency or the results of the limits stated by structure.

As has been stated in the introduction of this section, process tracing is well suited for the close observation of one case. Case study research is very valuable to research and describe the interconnectedness of different variables and to distinguish new, important variables. This goes beyond the sole finding of a correlation which is the result of quantitative research (Van Leeuwen, 2009).

However, case study research is often criticised. One important critique on process tracing and case study research more generally is that the results cannot be generalised. As the

¹⁰ For a full description of the different types of process tracing, see Gerring, 2006 or Bennett & George, 1997.

results are specific for the case it is difficult to draw universal conclusions from this type of research. However, if the researcher is aware of the position of its case and its relation to other cases, it is possible to draw more general conclusions than just on the case.

Another critique is the degrees of freedom problem. This refers to the small amount of cases compared to the independent variables. In statistical research the rule is that the amount of cases has to exceed the number of variables. If this is not the case, the relationship that is the result of the analysis has a low level of validity. This critique is reproached, however, stating a qualitative observation has more dimensions than a quantitative 'single observation'. For one, in process tracing the different types of evidence that are used for one step resolves this problem, producing several observations per variable. For this, however, enough evidence has to be available (Bennett, 2010).

Apart from these critiques there are also pitfalls which have to be acknowledged in order to avoid them. The first is the infinite regress problem, already briefly mentioned. A case study goes into great detail on the events in the causal chain. This puts the researcher in danger of getting lost in details, leading to an infinite regress studying the causal steps (Bennett, 2010). To avoid this pitfall, it is important the research question is strictly demarcated. As the analysis of this research involves a historic perspective, it can be hard to demarcate the research in terms of the period although the main focus will be on the post 1994 period. In addition, this research will be narrowed to the focus on political institutions and actors.

Another pitfall is confirmation bias. A researcher can be inclined to search for information that proves his or her hypotheses and disregard information that disproves the expected relation (Vennesson, 2008). For this thesis there is no clear hypothesised expected relation in order to be able to focus on the interaction of the different elements and processes. If there would be a specific hypothesis for each process, this research would only test those hypotheses. Instead the concepts are used in order to recap the important steps within the process.

The nails – operationalisation of the research concepts

This section will deal with the specification and definition of the concepts to be researched. These definitions are needed to make sure it is clear how the analysis has been conducted. The concepts which has been chosen, and the more specific elements, have to be understood as assisting or aiding the analysis. If these concepts would not be specified, the research would not be demarcated. The dynamic of these concepts and their role within the political system, not the concepts themselves, is of importance for the process tracing.

To start, the dependent variable, the stability in Mozambique, will be clarified, followed by the operationalisation of the elements connected to the concepts of the relation between the government and its citizens and the viability of the party system.

What we mean: Dependent variable

Stability (of the political system)

For this research, stability is defined as the absence and non-recurrence of conflict (Hurwitz, 1973; Goldsmith, 1987). The reason to research the Mozambican case is the fact that there was no relapse to conflict. Therefore, this is the appropriate definition to use for this analysis.

Indicators for stability defined in this manner are deaths due to violence in comparison to other peaceful countries, post-war incidents between former belligerents or incidents in the spirit of the former conflict.

The stability of the political system will be understood as the existence of a predictable political process in this research (Hurwitz, 1973). One of the indicators is the stable succession of elections. Another indicator is whether the behaviour of politicians is in support of the democratic procedures. For example, do politicians follow the rules and procedures?

What we mean: stabilising factors

Democratisation

Democratisation is the overarching variable for the two concepts which will be discussed in the following part. For this thesis democratisation is to be defined as the institutionalisation of democratic rules, procedures and institutions and the accommodation to this system by the various actors. Democratic means give the electorate a say in the decision making process. Any move towards more democracy can be understood as democratisation (Bogaards, 2010).

The relationship between the government and its citizens

For a functioning democratic system there has to be a relation of legitimacy given by citizens to their government for which the government provides certain services (Gilley, 2006). This **legitimacy** entails the belief that 'existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society' (Lipset, 1959: 86). Legitimacy for the government is provided through fair elections.

One element of the existence of such a relation and its quality is **elite habituation**. This habituation is the process during which the elites have to accept the system and work in

accordance with the system in order for the system to function (Manning, 2002). To investigate this indicator the actions of the elites, both positive and negative towards the democratic rules, will be analysed.

Another element is that of **inclusivity**, giving all groups of citizens a say in the process. The indicator for inclusivity is the representation of different groups in parliament as well as in government.

A third element is **participation**, the action of citizens trying to influence decision making or partaking in the democratic institutions. One indicator for this is electoral turnout. Within an electoral democracy this is the most basic type of participation. A second indicator is the activity of civil society. Another focus will be on the existence of a public debate and free and independent media as well as civil society organisations which expose misconduct and the electoral turnout.

Viable party system

A functioning democratic system is characterised by a viable party system. There has to be activity of different parties, **party competition**, and the existing parties have to be effective. One indicator for this is to be measured looking at the number of competing parties, their ability to win seats and the overall quality of oppositional parties.

Another element is the **ideological variety** between the parties. The indicators for this are the ideological positions of the parties. A third element is the **electoral performance** of the parties, which can be measured looking at the electoral outcomes and the conduct during campaigning and the election period.

Sources

These concepts are analysed by doing a literature study of previous academic analyses, reports from international organisations, party and government documents as well as two interviews conducted in Mozambique and interviews with European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM¹¹) employees.

Using these resources implies there will be somewhat of a western bias. This western bias can involve focusing on aspects of democracy as it has been implemented and evolved in western countries and overlooking indigenous characteristics and Mozambican features of the

¹¹ I've conducted my internship at ECDPM, a think and do tank which advises on the policies of countries in the South. Working at the Africa's change dynamics programme, the focus of my research there was on the democratisation efforts and initiatives of the African Union, providing me with a broader perspective on democratisation in African countries. The employees I've interviewed were well acquainted with the case, either having worked and lived there or having researched the case and visited the country.

system. This narrows the view on the system. Despite a two week visit to the country¹², most of the sources have been gathered in the Netherlands and are secondary sources. This also implies the dynamics which are discussed in the analysis are broad and nation-wide dynamics, possibly overlooking local and regional differences.

For the entire research it has to be remarked that, having democracy as the main focus, the research has been conducted within a certain paradigm. This paradigm is suited to answer the research question as it has been formulated but it has the consequence that possible alternative paradigms from which stability can be viewed are not used and discussed. Such different paradigms can lead to different conclusions.

Conclusion

This chapter has described the method which has been used, the underlying methodology and the concepts which will be used in the analysis. From a critical theoretical perspective, a process tracing analysis will be conducted. This will lead to a historic perspective informed by the dynamic between structure and agency. The following chapter will discuss the history of Mozambique, before presenting the analysis.

¹² During my two week visit to Mozambique I've conducted travelled from Maputo to Beira (from an area supporting Frelimo to an area in support of Renamo). I've conducted two interviews, one with a Western organisation and one with Mozambican students, who will remain unanimous.

Chapter 4: History

The road to peacebuilding and democratisation in Mozambique

This chapter will provide some background to the conflict in Mozambique and the start of the peacebuilding process. What are the historic characteristics of the country and what led to the outbreak of the conflict? Knowing this background provides more context to the period of democratisation, which is necessary for the critical theory analysis. This context shows in what circumstances democratisation is taking place. This historic account starts with the period of colonisation.

Portuguese colonisation

After having been habituated by African tribes such as the Bantu as early as the 3rd century, the Portuguese arrived in Mozambique in 1498 during an expedition of Vasco da Gama. The Portuguese moved into the mainland of Mozambique in the following centuries, establishing trading lines for natural resources but also for slave trade. The European settlers claimed many strips of land (O Governo de Moçambique, 2013). In 1932 Portugal installed direct rule. The economic growth attracted new Portuguese settlers.

This period of colonisation cost the Mozambican society heavily. The Portuguese extracted many resources from the country but left no infrastructure or institutions in place. The Portuguese were not bothered by the development of the Mozambican citizens or the country, failing to prepare Mozambicans for positions in management and government. During this period there was also no legitimate relation between the citizens and the government, meaning there was no tradition in legitimate government. The Portuguese put Mozambicans to forced labour, causing grievances feeding into the nationalist movement, created in the early 1960s (Bossema, 1995).

Struggle for independence

In 1962 exiled Mozambican activists, whom opposed Portuguese colonial rule, met in Tanzania and started the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo), choose Eduardo Mondlane as their leader. Frelimo began their violent guerrilla campaign against the Portuguese in 1964, taking control of a great part of the north (O Governo de Moçambique, 2013). In 1969, Mondlane was assassinated and succeeded by Samora Machel.

The struggle in Mozambique endured for a decade. In 1974, however, with a change of power in Portugal due to a military coup, Portugal's colonies gained autonomy. Later that year the Lusaka Accord was signed, establishing a transitional government to be led by Frelimo. The

Portuguese settlers left the country in great numbers, draining the country of its trained and educated population. During their departure the Portuguese destroyed many of the machines they left behind, leaving the country in ruins.

In 1975 Mozambique was officially declared independent. Frelimo took government and installed single-party rule. Little would they know they would still rule the country in 2013, uninterrupted since 1975. Machel became the first president of independent Mozambique. He inherited a country 'sorely depleted of the managerial and professional skills needed for its economic development' (United Nations, 1995: 9). This set-back still plagues the country and still complicates the task of political parties to find suited people for their functions.

Civil war

Just as Frelimo was supported by Mozambique's Tanzanian neighbour, the start of the civil war has to be viewed in terms of the broader power play in the southern African region. At the time of Mozambique's independence, Rhodesian forces and South African forces were engaged in a liberation strife. Both countries were ruled by white minorities. In 1976 Rhodesia carried out attacks on Mozambican ground. The Frelimo government responded with sanctions. Rhodesian officers set up Renamo (*Resistência Nacional de Moçambique*) as a reaction to these sanctions. Even though Renamo started out as a Rhodesian affair, Mozambicans were recruited to fight for them and eventually took over the lead of the group. The Rhodesian regime collapsed in 1980 but at the end of the 1970s Frelimo adopted a Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which gave South Africa a reason to support Renamo (Hanlon, 2010). The two antagonists were created but during these years tensions between them were partly fed by regional and international power plays.

Adopting the communist doctrine provided the Frelimo government with resources from the other communist countries. The communist policies, however, also aggravated parts of the Mozambican population. Certain types of farming were not recognised within Mozambique's plan economy which meant certain farming communities became more and more isolated and detached from the market. This led to economic losses and loss of government support for those farmers, mainly in the centre of Mozambique.

The communist policies also targeted traditional structures of authority which were no longer recognised but were not effectively replaced either. This deteriorated social relationships in the countryside. "[E]conomic disruption was most acutely felt in rural areas, where people were cut loose from both their economic means of survival and the authority and belief systems that had given their lives order and meaning." (Manning, 2002: 51). The communist policies were regarded as unfair. Renamo made these grievances, the absence of the freedom of religion and the lack of respect for traditional authorities, the focus of their political demands, binding the central provinces to them in which the citizens were discontent with the government and

felt alienated from them. Traditional leaders, the *regulos*, supported Renamo because of this stance (Turner et al., 1998; Manning, 2002; Barosso, 2012).

These two Frelimo policies laid the basis for the still present regional divide of electoral support in the country. The central provinces, having felt hardship because of Frelimo's policies, have never been Frelimo's support base.

Renamo controlled most of the centre of Mozambique during the civil war – the Sofala, Manica, Zambezia and Nampula provinces. They did engage in violent campaigns in the northern and, especially, the southern part where Frelimo remained in control. They succeeded in gaining control over parts of the country which became 'no go areas' for the government, destroyed infrastructure and disrupted trade and traffic. The government referred to them as *bandidos armados*, armed bandits (Manning, 2002). Most of their soldiers were forcefully recruited, for example by means of kidnapping (Minter, 1989).

The fighting was at a high point in the first half of the 1980s. Support for Renamo from the United States was rapidly increased after Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, Mozambique being one of the Cold War proxy wars (Hanlon, 2009; APRM, 2010). It was paralleled by an economic crisis (Bray, 1992). In 1986 president Machel was killed during a plane crash. Joaquim Chissano was chosen as his successor.

Catalysed by the costs of natural disasters that plague Mozambique, the devastation of war and the collapse of the Soviet countries, meaning the end of aid for the Frelimo government, the communist doctrine was renounced in 1989 (Turner et al., 1998). This opened up the opportunity to apply for loans from the IMF, of which Mozambique had become a member in 1984. It also opened the door for excluded groups, such as religious leaders, to enter the Frelimo party (Manning, 2002). At this time the funding for Renamo from South Africa was drying up as well with the South African conflict coming to its end.

In the 1990s Frelimo and Renamo were in a 'mutually hurting stalemate' (Manning, 2002: 67). Neither wanted to continue the fighting on the battlefield; neither party could achieve military victory (United Nations, 1995). Their fighters longed for home, both were facing desertion of combatants. The disappearance of their international support had crippled both groups. With peace reigning in the neighbouring countries, the momentum for peace talks occurred in Mozambique as well. In 1990 the government changed the constitution to allow a multi-party political system. This marks the beginning of talks with Renamo, which took place in Rome and were supervised by the community of Sant'Egidio (United Nations, 1995). The end of the conflict left many displaced and about one million of Mozambique's citizens killed (Manning, 2002).

This violent history has left its mark on the country but also led to the strong willingness of its citizens to remain peaceful and not to return to the devastating war.

Peacebuilding commences

The process of the peace talks was somewhat turbulent. Renamo demanded to be recognised as a political group but Frelimo kept referring to them as the *bandidos armados*. In 1992, the Peace Accords were signed in Rome by president Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhaklama. An important part of the peacebuilding initiatives was the democratisation of the political system. In addition, there was also a great focus on the demobilisation of the soldiers and rebels and the creation of a national army. The country, however, was left in devastation after years of fighting. Economically, Mozambique was in desperate need of international support.

The United Nations send a support mission to help organise the first multi-party elections. The process of democratisation had already been started by the government in compliance with the international mediators. The UN was involved in a later stadium. Their role was to observe and support the implementation of the already agreed upon peace agreement (Manning, 2008). The UN had a mandate to participate in crucial commissions instead of being restricted to observation. At that moment it was its most extensive peace-keeping operation in its history (United Nations, 1995).

Many resources from the international community have been put into the transformation of Renamo from a rebel movement into a political party. They had a hard time finding the right people, who would be both competent and loyal, to fill the positions in their new founded party and to take place in the different commissions (United Nations, 1995; Manning, 2002).

In 1994 the first elections took place and Frelimo won the most seats in parliament and Chissano, Frelimo's candidate, won the presidency (Bossema, 1995). Frelimo consolidated its dominant position from the first election on, although they were surprised by the support for Renamo. The results of the elections meant a continuation of the strife between Frelimo and Renamo, now being situated within the political arena.

Conclusion

This history has shown the difficult circumstances for Mozambique to successfully go through democratisation. The period of colonisation left the country depleted and without trained people. The following civil war even further devastated the country. During this period the antagonism between Frelimo and Renamo was created. In its history, the Mozambican citizens have not been acquainted with a responsive government.

The following chapter will discuss the development and current state of the political system, based on the elements discussed in the previous chapter and the results of the process tracing.

Chapter 5: Analysis

How the political system in Mozambique has developed and currently functions

This chapter discusses the findings on the different elements introduced in the chapter on methodology and methods - elite habituation, inclusivity, participation being connected to the relation between the government and its citizens and party competition, ideological placement and electoral performance being connected to the viability of the party system. The chapter will end with a discussion on the place of the elements within the process of democratisation and the interaction of the variables – the results of the process tracing method.

The dependent variable: stability in Mozambique

We can positively state that there is stability in Mozambique in the sense of the non-recurrence of conflict (Macamo, 2006; Groelsma et al., 2009; De Tollenaere in ECDPM, 2012). The peace accords have been respected. “O governo e a RENAMO que jamais voltou às armas.” [The government and RENAMO both never returned to arms] (Belincanta, 2013). The country has not relapsed into the old conflict so far, which is a great achievement, given the conditions amongst which peacebuilding and democratisation had to take place. “Mozambique ... resembles the legendary phoenix, a mystical bird that is born again from its own ashes.” (APRM, 2010: 1).

Another aspect of stability, as defined in chapter 3, is a predictable political process. The elections have been organised periodically and regularly (Manning, 2008; Groelsma et al., 2009). This stable sequencing allows for citizens to accommodate to the democratic procedures and ensures the basis for the institutions to function democratically.

Some incidents however have to be mentioned. After the 1999 elections, Renamo protested against the outcome of the elections, saying many voting ballots were counted as invalid in the provinces where Renamo has much support. The call for presidency was very close and, although it is unlikely, if all the ballots which weren't counted because they weren't valid would have been in favour of Renamo's candidate, Renamo would have won the presidency. The complaint that Renamo filed at the *Comissão Nacional de Eleições* (CNE) was not taken into account due to a lack of evidence and the failure to provide the necessary documents. This led to demonstrations and incidents where Renamo supporters clashed with the police in November 2000. These took place in a very short period after which tensions died down again (Manning, 2002; Hanlon, 2010).

It has been noted in research on Mozambique that this stability is remarkable (Hanlon & Smart, 2008). Especially because of the lack of procedures to enhance reconciliation in Mozambique which have been implemented in other post-conflict situations. There has been no truth commission, there was no political settlement guaranteeing all the former belligerents an

equal say in the political process and no international court was installed (Hanlon, 2010). The Mozambican citizens have shown to be willing to put their violent past behind them, without demanding looking back and investigating the period of violence (Jacobson, 1995).

Although it is important to note this violence has occurred, the scale was minor and they were an exception during the past twenty years. So far, the spirit of the peace agreement has been sustained (Mosse & Selemene, 2008; APRM, 2010). Therefore, it can be stated Mozambique has indeed been stable so far.

The stabilising factors

Democratisation has definitely taken place and is still taking place. Mozambican citizens were positive about the progress being made (Afrobarometer, 2003). However, the system has been described as ruled by 'an oligarchy within the ruling party which purchases support through patronage, much of which derives from aid' (Tony Vaux in Hanlon & Smart, 2008: 98). There is an ongoing bipolarisation and an even greater dominance by Frelimo (Turner et al., 1998). Frelimo is 'a political party, the government of the day, the state and its bureaucratic machinery, and the country's mega projects, all wrapped together' (Groelsma et al., 2009: ix). The system is one of low intensity democracy – the government keeping up the appearances of respecting human rights while the citizens have no real influence on decision-making (Harrison, 1999). The two concepts and their elements show in greater detail how this works and has developed.

I – Relation government and citizens

Legitimacy

The democratic system in Mozambique is viewed as legitimate. The political institutions are accepted by the relevant actors (BTI, 2012).

Frelimo has managed to win all elections so far, implying they are the legitimate party in Mozambique. Frelimo has gained the democratic legitimacy granted by the Mozambican citizens (APRM, 2010). Especially the huge majority of votes casted for Frelimo in the 2004 and 2009 elections show that the Mozambican citizens are willing to support the party and do not choose the alternative parties.

The reason the citizens of Mozambique view Frelimo as the legitimate ruling party is the fact that Frelimo was the party which fought for the country's independence. One of the Mozambicans said "Machel is still alive in the hearts of my parents". Every town has a statue of Machel on a central square. Voting for Frelimo is a sign of gratitude for their role during the independence struggle (Harrison, 1996; Sumich, 2008; Groelsma et al., 2009; BTI, 2012).

This legitimacy is increased by ongoing support from international donors. As Mozambique has been labelled as a success story and the country has made improvements in the socio-economic area, it has become a donor darling. International actors have not withdrawn their support, showing that Frelimo is a party which is a serious partner for them (Manning, 2002).




Figure 1.1: Percentage of votes for Frelimo in 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections. The redder the area, the higher the percentage of votes.

It is interesting that there is a strong regional divide between provinces and cities that support Frelimo or Renamo, shown in figure 1.1 and 1.2. As explained in chapter 4, the central provinces turned against Frelimo due to grievances over their authoritarian policies in the 1970s and 1980s. In these provinces the actions by Frelimo have made them forget their actions against the Portuguese colonisers. The *regulos*, who lost their traditional authority under the Frelimo policies, granted legitimacy to Renamo by their outspoken support for them.




Figure 1.2: Percentage of votes for Renamo in 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections. The greener the area, the higher the percentage of votes.

Nation-wide Frelimo receives enough support to give them a majority in parliament, giving them democratic legitimacy, but the concentration of support for Renamo in the central provinces is a shortcoming for government legitimacy in terms of representation.

Elite habituation

Because of the ongoing involvement in the electoral process by the elites, one could say elite habituation has been positively developed. The politicians, especially those of Renamo and other opposition parties, have contributed to the predictability of the system by continuously participating in these elections (Manning, 2008). They have shown to be committed to the new political process. The elites have accepted the democratic system and procedures as the only game in town, despite their tendency to sometimes circumvent the formal procedures. They have not demanded a different type of governance regime.

Aside from the formal democratic procedures, there is also a habit of negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo. They tend to resolve conflicts by elite bargaining instead of out in the open in parliament. By making political decisions based on such negotiations there is a lack of transparency in the system and Renamo shows not abiding to electoral results. "These informal interactions have consistently served to "correct" both for weaknesses (real and perceived) in the formal procedures and institutions of the political system ..." (Manning, 2002: 206). Renamo has been able to be granted this space by Frelimo because of the international actors, who appeal to the parties to cooperate. Renamo has used such negotiations to try and

gain high positions in government organs, even when the electoral outcome didn't give them the right to these positions. In the case of formal weaknesses it is important that there are mechanisms to adjust such faults. However, the danger is that this elite bargaining starts to replace democratic procedures which actually work. It has been sustained even after the first post-conflict election amongst other because of the prevailing presence of the international community (Manning, 2002).

Renamo's ambiguous behaviour towards the democratic institutions might be justified but also shows a lack of habituation. This behaviour circumvents the implemented procedures, hampering the establishment of strong institutions and process. The procedures for elite bargaining are not formally laid down in the constitution, thus citizens won't know when and how these take place and what the outcome will be.

Renamo shook up to process by announcing a boycott the day before polling began in 1994. Eventually, they did participate but an extra day of polling was organised (United Nations, 1995). Each time around the elections they threaten to boycott them, protest against the outcome or refuse to take their seats in parliament (Hanlon & Waterhouse, 1995; AIM, 2000; Manning, 2002; Nuvunga, 2005; OSIN, 2009).

Their protest against the electoral outcomes might have been legitimate as the elections have been marked by the failure of the CNE to fulfil all organisational conditions for fair and free elections, but Renamo's disruptive actions do not support the growth of a strong democracy either (Afrobarometer, 2002; Brito, 2009; APRM, 2010). With such actions, the citizens of Mozambique will not know what to expect from the democratic system as there is no tradition being build up.

The main lingering disagreement is over the electoral laws. Revisions are made before each election but each time there is no consensus and Frelimo wins the vote. One of the disagreements is on the composition of the CNE (Hanlon, 2011). Renamo wants the two parties to have an equal share in this organ while Frelimo wants a more independent organisation. Despite their disagreement over electoral law, Renamo does partake in the elections in the end (AIM, 2007).

This shows however that, despite ongoing commitment to the institutions, behaviour of the opposition is not always in support of them. So far, the political elites have remained divided.

Inclusivity

All groups are included in the political process (United Nations, 1995). Although Mozambique is a multicultural country, there is no ethnic divide which is politically salient (Turner et al., 1998; OSIN, 2009). All groups are included in representation, due to lists of electoral candidates which have to be specified per electoral constituency.

During the first elections, it was hard for small parties to win seats in parliament due to the threshold of 5%. If a party received less than 5% of the total votes, it would not get a seat in parliament. In addition to complicating the participation of smaller parties in parliament, this also meant many votes which people casted on the smaller parties were 'lost'. Those votes have not led to the participation of the party they favoured in the parliament (Turner et al., 1998; Nuvunga, 2005; OSIN, 2009; Ostheimer, 2011; Reisinger, 2009).

The 5% rule was abolished in 2006, opening up possibilities for opposition parties (Groelsma et al., 2009). The desired effect, however, didn't occur. Although MDM (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique) did manage to win seats in the 2009 election, their share in the votes was 8%, meaning they would have received seats even if the rule was still in place.

Inclusivity is limited by the regional divide. The provinces where Renamo has a strong hold have a very low representation within government. As Frelimo is only challenged very little by the other parties, there is no incentive for them to be involved with these regions themselves.

Within this regional divide there is also a strong divide between voters in rural or urban areas (Manning, 2002; OSIN, 2009; BTI, 2012). Voters in urban areas are often more informed than those in rural areas and therefore more engaged in the system. This implies the citizens in the urban areas are more represented than those in the rural areas who rarely make their voices heard and are excluded from the system because of these incapacities.

The Mozambican system is inclusive in theory. The parties do include all different groups in society in their rhetoric. The only politically salient exclusion is that of the regional divide.

Participation

The government has assured that there are many spaces for participation. There are some very positive notes on the participation of the citizens in the political process but progress is also marked by worrisome events.

First of all, the government has contributed to a positive climate for participation due to the quick pace of decentralisation (Groelsma et al., 2009). Already in 1994 the parliament decided to hold local elections (Reaud & Weimer, 2010), the first of which were held in 1998. In 2013 the fourth local elections are to be held.

Decentralisation has only been introduced in urban areas meaning only 27% of the entire population can now vote during the local elections. During the first elections there were only a few municipals for which elections were held, the other governors and mayors were appointed. In the first local election of 1998 the turnout was only 20% (Wood, 1999; Carbone, 2005; Kulipossa, 2006; Smart & Hanlon, 2008). The opposition boycotted these elections because of difficulties in the organisation (Ostheimer, 2001). Participation in local elections has not increased since then.

Decentralisation has not led to the envisioned empowerment of local initiative (Smart & Hanlon, 2008). This is partly caused by the slow devolution of powers to the local level, implying for a long time there was limited space for local initiative. Grants are often blocked at the central level, showing there is still a centrally focused direction of accountability (Groelsma et al., 2009). The lack of trained people at the local level also makes it difficult to carry out local initiatives (Hanlon, 2008).

Another positive and more widespread type of participation is involvement in the public debate. The Mozambican citizens themselves are willing to participate in the public debate. Politics are often the subject of conversation. Multipartyism has made it possible for citizens to criticise the elites and the government (Manning, 2002). This debate is strengthened and formalised by the existence of free press, including journals such as *Mediafax*, *Savana* and *@Verdade* and the national radio station *Radio Moçambique* (Wood, 1999; AMB, 2005; Hanlon, 2008; Groelsma et al., 2009; Mário et al., 2011).

The media have successfully brought cases of undemocratic situations to the attention of the public, resulting in, for example, politicians stepping down. Newspaper *Meticaís* reporting on declaration of wealth led to many members of parliament to publicise their own declarations (Harrison, 1999). Publications on *Banco Comercial de Moçambique* (BMC) exposed a great fraud scandal, eventually leading to the resignation of the BMC attorney-general (Ostheimer, 2001).

Although there have been media operating since independence, in 2005 free press was truly established with the passing of a bill on freedom of information (Freedom House, 2011).

Nonetheless, increasingly there have been incidents where journalists have had to justify actions before the juridical system (Hanlon, 2008; Groelsma et al., 2009; BTI, 2012). The assassination of journalist Carlos Cardoso in 2000, who was investigating claims of fraud at the time, was a shock for the independent media and the international organisations (Groelsma et al., 2009).

Another remark is that the papers are mainly distributed in the urban areas, are expensive for citizens to buy and are not often read. The papers with the greatest resources are state-aligned, meaning government approved messages are more likely to be spread (ibid.). The bill on freedom of information and setting up of independent papers have not changed this.

Another positive feature of participation is the growth and maturing of civil society. Groups such as LDH (*Ligade Direitos Humanos*; human rights league), OTM-CS (*Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique – Central Sindical*; Mozambican Workers Organisation) and CONSILMO (*Confederação Nacional dos Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Moçambique*; Mozambican Labour Confederation) not only do a good job; they are also creating a climate where citizens can be actively involved in discussing the government policies. LDH has exposed cases of human rights abuse by police employees (Harrison, 1999; BTI, 2012).

Mozambican citizens do indicate freedom of speech is the most important feature of democracy for them (Afrobarometer, 2002). This space has been given by the government, allowing such media to exist and civil society organisations (CSO) to evolve. This has allowed for the possibility of participation (Mário et al., 2011).

This input, however, is not used in the formulation of policies. There is an increasing number of people who are unsatisfied with Frelimo's responsiveness. They say the government does not listen to them. They do not try to use the democratic institutions because they do not believe this will bring about change. The function of the participation remains consultative (OSIN, 2009; APRM, 2010).

Another negative sign for participation is the decline in voter turnout, despite obligatory registration (Harrison, 1996; Carbone, 2005; Manning, 2008; APRM, 2010). In 1994 the turnout was 88%, dropping to 74% for the 1999 elections and 43% for the 2004 election (OSIN, 2009; Hanlon, 2010).

There are several possible explanations for this decline. It can be a sign that citizens are not satisfied with the current political system. Not voting is showing their attitude towards the ineffective institutions or the unresponsiveness of the government (AIM, 1998). It could also be a sign that voters do not oppose Frelimo or do not believe in the capacities of the opposition (Groelsma et al., 2009; Hanlon, 2010). This is also shown by the rise in the level of blank votes (Brito, 2008). However, yet another explanation could be that democracy is still young and not deeply rooted. People are possibly not involved due to a lack of information (AIM, 1998; NIMD, 2012). Many Mozambican citizens still do not know what the parliament is and does and they are unaware of who represents them in government.

There were also practical reasons contributing to the lower levels of turnout, for example polling stations which didn't open and problems with registration (Nuvunga, 2005). Voting is one of the lowest efforts of participation in the political system. If, for whatever reason, citizens are not willing to do this, it is likely they will not engage in other forms of participation.

There are some elements which have not yet been mentioned on the subject of the relation between the government and its citizens but which are important. Firstly, the fact that there is no effective reciprocal tax system in place. Many citizens in Mozambique do not pay taxes to the government (Kulipossa, 2006). In many parts of the country state presence is low. This is problematic as it distorts the democratic relationship between citizens and government as described by the social contract theorists. Paying taxes gives citizens the right to demand services in return from their government. Mozambique's current tax system does not constitute the reciprocal relation which lies at the basis of democracy, hindering the establishment of

domestic accountability. Without successful taxation, the mechanisms of accountability are not institutionalised properly (Moore, 2007).

Another distorting factor is the role of the donor countries and organisations. Mozambique is extremely dependent on international aid. More than half of their budget comes from external actors. This is problematic because the government seems to be held accountable to those donors and organisations rather than their own citizens (Manning, 2002; Hanlon & Smart, 2008). Mozambique's budget dependence implies a high level of involvement from donors who have to agree with the way the money is spent before they will give it. The focus has led to less of a focus on the rural economy, while this is an important part of Mozambique's entire economy (Hanlon, 2010). Again, the mechanisms of accountability are not successfully in place at the cost of Mozambique's own citizens.

The relation between the government and its citizens has definitely changed after the civil war. The relationship between the government and its citizens has transformed in one where citizens have a say in the political system. The democratic elections have created democratic legitimacy for the government and through free and independent press and operating CSO have encouraged Mozambican citizens to participate. However, this relation remains mostly restricted to the urban areas. Nonetheless, mechanisms of accountability aren't always present and these resources are not available to all citizens. Despite the flaws, a democratic relation has been established, which is still in need of strengthening.

II – Viability party system

Party competition

Despite a high level of involvement, party competition has not been successfully established. Looking at the number of registered parties, which now exceeds forty and was already ten during the first election, competition seems to have been established. There is a very large number of political parties which participate in the elections. In the 1994 elections ten parties were registered, rising to twenty-six for the 1999 elections (OSIN, 2009). In the 2004 elections twenty parties and coalitions ran for parliament and there were five candidates for the presidency (EU, 2004). In 2006 forty parties were registered (Mário et al., 2011). In 2009 fifty parties were registered (OSIN, 2009). However, most of the registered parties are not really effective (Nuvunga, 2005; APRM, 2010; BTI, 2012). Only four different parties have managed to win seats in the assembly (OSIN, 2009). Many of the smaller parties, the so called non-armed opposition, are highly personalised parties (EU, 2004; Nuvunga, 2005). It shows the willingness of the Mozambicans to make party competition work (Wood, 1999).

One important weakness of the current party system is the remaining polarisation of the system due to the dominance of Frelimo and Renamo and due to remaining distrust between the two parties (Afrobarometer, 2002; Brito, 2009). The differences in organisational strength between the two parties – Frelimo being institutionalised and Renamo struggling to find competent candidates and personnel – have allowed for this bipolarity where Frelimo dominates (Manning, 2002; Carbone, 2005).

Renamo has not managed to become a powerful player against Frelimo, mostly because of its weak organisation and enduring internal squabbles (Groelsma et al., 2009; Belincanta, 2013). They have not managed to present themselves as a 'credible alternative government' (Hanlon & Smart, 2008: 94). During the local elections of 2003 Renamo did win several, previous Frelimo held, municipalities, including the second largest Mozambican city, Beira. The power was passed peacefully (Kulipossa, 2006; OSIN, 2009). During the 1999 national elections they also managed to challenge Frelimo but again did not win. In the national elections of 2004 and 2009 the party lost heavily. Ever since the 1999 elections Renamo used the strategy to boycott sessions of parliament, stating the elections were fraudulent and the installed government illegitimate. People are unlikely to be interested in joining a party using such strategies, instead of trying to use its influence through parliament (Wood, 1999).

Overall, there is no level playing field for competition (Groelsma et al., 2009; APRM, 2010). While Frelimo, having access to state resources, has no financial problems, the turnout of subsidies for the other parties has often been late (Ostheimer, 2001). The separation of party and state was initiated but, after the electoral losses in the 1999 elections, Armando Guebuza, then leading Frelimo, reversed the efforts (ECDPM, 2012). This trend was continued after the 2004 elections. "There is now a closer identification between the state apparatus and the predominant party. Pressure has been increased on civil servants and figures in civil so society to join the party, and there are increasing allegations that it is easier to obtain licences, government grants, etc, if one is a member of the party." (Hanlon & Nuvunga, 2006: 2).

Ideological placement

There is a lack of different ideologies or alternative policies (Jacobson, 1995; Wood, 1999). During the civil war Frelimo had a clear ideological stand; they supported Marxist-Leninist communism. They renounced this ideology when they had to apply for international budget support and the IMF would not provide them with aid if they would remain a communist country.

They opened up their party even further for the first election, wanting to appeal to all Mozambicans. Their manifesto dealt with the subjects of peace, democracy and national unity,

human development, economic development and good governance (Nuvunga, 2005). This broader perspective, not supported by a strong ideology, weakened the party's identity.

Renamo's most important claim during the civil war was that they wanted to bring democracy. For the first elections Renamo's manifesto included the battle against neopatrimonialism, the revival of traditional structures and strengthening the national forces (Nuvunga, 2005). Frelimo, however, also tried to establish its role as bringer of independence, peace and democracy (Manning, 2002). The rhetoric of democracy does not distinguish the two parties (Wood & Haines, 1998).

Not only the two dominant parties do not distinguish themselves on an ideological basis, the smaller parties do not either (Nuvunga, 2005). The only factor which determines the differences between the support for the parties is regional division and personalities.

One of the reasons for the absence of strong ideological parties is that even the Mozambican government doesn't have much to say on their policies. A narrow space for variation is dictated by the international donors such as the IMF (Hanlon & Smart, 2008). This not only creates a difficulty for other parties to present alternative policies, it also changes the meaning of competition. "[C]ompetition becomes much more about power and patronage, and the predominant party is always at an advantage in such a contest" (Hanlon & Smart, 2008: 95). This adds to the parties operating at different levels, with Frelimo as the dominant party and other parties trying to gain support based on personalities of the leaders rather than ideological party programs.

Electoral performance

Frelimo has managed to create a position of dominance since the first elections in 1994. The first election showed the 'deep desire of the Mozambican people – and of the principal parties involved in the process – for peace' (United Nations, 1995: 67). This was shown by the high turnout and voters who split their votes between the two parties (voting for one for parliament and the other for presidency) in order to keep both parties in the democratic process (United Nations, 1995; Turner et al., 1998; Manning, 2002). The elections were stated to be free and fair by the international observers. The opposition accepted the results (Jacobson, 1995; United Nations, 1995; Harrison, 1996; Manning, 2002).

The 1999 elections were a close call (see table 1). The 2004 election however gave Frelimo a comfortable majority again (Carbone, 2005; Kulipossa, 2006). The 2009 elections gave Frelimo a landslide victory.

Year	Party							
	Frelimo		Renamo		MDM		UD	
	Pres. (%) of vote)	Parl. (Seats)	Pres. (%) of vote)	Parl. (Seats)	Pres. (%) of vote)	Parl. (Seats)	Pres. (%) of vote)	Parl. (Seats)
1994	53.3	129	33.7	112	-	-	-	9.0
1999	52.3	133	47.7	117	-	-	-	-
2004	63.7	160	31.7	90	-	-	-	-
2009	75.0	191	16.4	51	8.6	8.0	-	-

Table 1: Electoral results presidential and parliamentary election 1994 – 2009. (Manning, 2002; AED, 2012; NIMD, 2012).

Ever since the 1998 local elections there have been accusations of fraud, including complaints on ballot box-stuffing, and the electoral regulatory bodies, the CNE and STAE, are heavily criticised. In the 1999 elections many votes were not counted because they were illegible (AIM, 1998; AIM, 2005; Hanlon, 2009). According to Renamo these votes were often cast in the Nampula, Sofala and Zambezia provinces, where Renamo has its stronghold (Manning, 2001; Manning, 2002). The announcement that Renamo's complaints on the 1999 election would not be considered by the CNE was followed by riots (Manning, 2002). These remaining uncertainties have also led to a lack of trust and confidence of the parties in each other and the opposition parties in the electoral process (ibid.).

These uncertainties are so strong that Freedom House has dropped Mozambique from their list of electoral democracies after the 2009 election. During the preparations for this election the CNE prevented most opposition parties from participating because, according to them, the paperwork was not correct. International observers however mentioned it was the CNE that neglected to processes all application in time. On the election day itself election officials have hampered with the voting ballots (Brito, 2008; Manning, 2009; OSIN, 2009; BTI, 2012). Such incidents have a negative influence on the trust in the system and confidence in the electoral authorities (Carter Institute, 2005).

For this concept there are also elements which have not been specifically focused on but which are of importance. The same inhibitory factors apply as for the relation between the government and its citizens. The tax system and donor involvement hinder the mechanisms of accountability, which weakens the party system.

Another difficulty is the low access to information that citizens have and their lack of formal education, adult literacy being only 46%¹³ (Afrobarometer, 2007; BTI, 2012). Mozambican citizens themselves are unaware of the politicians who are representing them. Many citizens are so poor that they have to worry about their livelihood every day, making politics less salient, understandably.

Formal party competition has been introduced but the lack of a level playing field, the lack of policy differences due to donor presence and Frelimo's ongoing dominance have hindered the establishment of true competition and true viability.

The process

In the first part of this chapter the concepts and their elements were discussed separately. What have been the most important processes leading to stability and what is the interaction between the elements? This section will discuss the processes, as visualised in figure 1, which have led to stability.




Figure 2: Visualisation process tracing Mozambique's process of democratisation¹⁴

¹³ Compared to 61% on average for low income countries (Afrobarometer, 2007).

¹⁴ In this figure the three colours (red, dark blue and dark green) represent the three processes which will be discussed in this section. The lighter colours represent influencing variables which themselves are not of specific importance to stability. It is chronologically ordered from left (Portuguese colonisation) to the right (stability in 2013).

The section will end with a discussion of alternative paths of destabilising processes and future changes, also shown in figure 1, which might influence the current stability.

Which aspects explain Mozambique's peaceful stability?

There are three features of the current political system in Mozambique, and the development of its characteristics, which have had a positive influence on the stability in the country.

First of all, Frelimo has managed to remain the ruling party of the country. This position has been granted to them by the Mozambican people who have continued to vote for Frelimo in a majority.

By winning the 1994 elections, Frelimo stretched its dominant position into Mozambique's democratic era after their authoritarian rule following independence. People still view them as the liberators from the colonisers which gives Frelimo a strong basis with the electorate as it has been composed during the last twenty years. This has allowed them access to the resources of the state and has allowed them to set up a strong network, also reaching into the realm of businesses. It was however not just the material resources which have allowed their enduring dominance. Their majority in parliament and claim on the presidency have led to a position in which they could craft the rules which are in Frelimo's favour and weaken the opposition.

The 1999 elections had the closest outcome of the elections so far which had a dual effect. On the one hand, Frelimo had their wake up call and after the electoral outcome increased their tight grip on the state. On the other hand, Renamo lost much support due to their remaining strategy of boycotting parliament following the 1999 elections, despite their stronger position in parliament after these elections. By not participating in the democratic institutions to fight the - in their eyes illegitimate - government, they've shown to be an unreliable alternative.

These two intertwining dynamics led to Frelimo's landslide victory in 2004 and 2009 which has allowed them to create a dominant one-party state. This is not positive for the development and quality of Mozambique's democracy, but seems to have ensured a stable situation.

Secondly, Renamo has gone through a successful transformation from a rebel movement into a political party. There are two internal factors, already early on in the process of democratisation, allowing this. First, the soldiers fighting during the conflict were tired of war. During the peace talks soldiers were already deserting both armies. The momentum of a longing for peace was important for the transformation of Renamo from rebel movement into a political party to be made possible.

Secondly, the postponement of the first multiparty elections, planned for 1993 but held in 1994, also added to the successful transformation. Ex-combatants had time to build up their

lives again, meaning at the time of the elections most of them had a wife and a home. This reduced the likeliness Renamo would have the strength to fight the government again and softened their reputation as combatants.

An external factor adding to this positive dynamic is the amount of aid the international community granted Renamo to finance this shift. The huge amount of resources ensured soldiers could be demobilised and Renamo had the opportunity to establish their party.

Thus, these processes together ensured Renamo's members could transform from rebels into politicians, relieving Renamo from its military character. Despite the transformation having been successful, Renamo has not succeeded in being a reliable and strong political party for the opposition. This has allowed Frelimo to establish its dominance. The following section will explain this failure.

The third stabilising dynamic can be summarised as the ongoing willingness for democratic participation. Already during the war, Renamo's demands were focused on democracy. It would harm their credibility if they would now turn away from the democratic system. Frelimo gave in to the demands of democracy at the end of the civil war under pressure of the international community. Renamo's actions of boycotting or rejecting election results are all formulated in terms of democracy. For Renamo, therefore, participating within the democratic system, despite their undemocratic moments, is of great importance.

At the end of the civil war not just the soldiers were weary of fighting, the population of Mozambique wanted peace as well. At the beginning of the process of democratisation people were inclined to participate within the system, which added to its stability.

Since the beginning, every few years new reforms have been introduced. These moments of refreshment of the system seem to give the different actors involved a reason to remain engaged within the system. This started with decentralisation in 1998, the establishment of free press in 2005 and the increased importance of CSO in 2009. With the establishment of free and independent press, the public debate was also formalised. Mozambicans are engaged and willing to participate within the public debate. These gradual reforms have kept people to participate within the system.

Although it is certain these reforms have taken place, the attitude of politicians and citizens towards these reforms have not been researched. The certainty of this process, therefore, is not as high as with the other processes.

These dynamics together seem to have ensured that all relevant actors have been committed to the democratic system. Their ongoing involvement has also contributed to the stability of the system and of the country as a whole.

Processes which don't encourage stability

There are however also features which indicate the deterioration of the democratic system. Although Frelimo's dominance has led to stability so far, it has also had the effect of deteriorating democratic institutions and a decline in voter turnout. Frelimo also turned Mozambique into a neopatrimonial state where the party has influence far beyond the political realm. This form of corruption can lead to dissatisfaction.

As has already been stated, Frelimo's dominance has been made possible by the weak opposition. Although Renamo has gone through a transformation, they have failed to provide a true alternative. There are two main reasons for this.

First of all, Renamo has a hard time finding suitable candidates. The root for this problem can be found in the period of Portuguese colonisation. The Portuguese did not provide education for the Mozambicans and on the eve of independence they left the country, draining it from its intellectual capacities. The years following, marked by conflict, made it difficult, if not impossible, to close this educational gap. Frelimo members often received training in Tanzania for the independence war. This gave them the chance to escape this limitation.

Another inhibiting factor for a strong opposition to develop, which is also true for the many smaller parties in the system, is the enduring involvement of the international donors and organisations. This limits the possibilities for the other parties to formulate alternative policies. As the Mozambican government is so dependent on the resources from the international community, many of their (economic) policies are also dictated by external agents such as the IMF and donors such as Italy and Denmark. Therefore, the opposition has limited space to suggest different choices. Therefore, the parties do not differ from each other on ideological basis.

These dynamics have kept the opposition weak and allowed Frelimo to become dominant. A weak opposition might not lead to instability directly but the non-functioning of the democratic institutions and procedures can lead to grievances which endanger the stability of the country.

These processes have translated into declining electoral participation. This shows that there is big group within society who chose not to participate. Although not all of them have done so to show their dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole, this group might be growing. This step has a lower certainty as there has not been much research on reasons for voter absence. If citizens do not participate through voting, they are unlikely to be willing to participate in another way and they may view the government as illegitimate because it doesn't have enough electoral support.

So far, these processes have not led to dissatisfaction grave enough for the citizens of Mozambique to choose another alternative than the democratic system. However, the dynamic between the processes and indicators might change in such a way that stability is endangered.

Who's to blame?

Reading this analysis, one might say Frelimo is to blame for the country's falling reputation as a democracy. This however is too easy a conclusion. First of all, as the analysis has shown, it is the complex interaction between different processes. The organisational weaknesses of Renamo has made it possible for Frelimo to establish such a stronghold on the political institutions. Frelimo used its dominant position to shape the rules and made the elections less transparent for international observers.

Secondly, there are also more structural characteristics of Mozambique and its political system which make the process of consolidating democracy difficult. Of the two divides which are important in Mozambique, the regional and the rural/urban divide, the latter encompasses one of the difficulties. Even in the urban areas there is still quite a big group of illiterate citizens. In the rural areas this level is even higher – two-thirds of the residents there are illiterate (Harrison, 1999; Afrobarometer, 2007). For the Mozambicans living in the rural areas, often dependent on agriculture, the political institutions are often still unknown. Politics is of less importance and even if citizens are politically involved, their participation is based on a low level of information. Government isn't present in the rural areas of the country meaning the government doesn't have legitimacy in those areas and citizens might not be interested in participating.

As has already been discussed, the enduring involvement of international donors and organisations seems to suffocate the political system. It has often been noted how donors have created a situation in Mozambique where the international community is a more important constituency than the Mozambican citizens themselves. The democratic system cannot flourish until Mozambique becomes less dependent on this foreign aid and involvement.

Within the structure of a highly involved international community and citizens who lack basic skills for democratic participation, Frelimo's agency has shaped the democratic system. The presence of the international community is both enabling and inhibiting. Democracy as a structure has survived so far as well, meaning none of the parties or citizens have used their agency to change the system.

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with (the evolution of) the different elements concerning democratisation. Overall, it can be stated that although many institutions and rules are in place, they have resulted in the dominance of Frelimo within the democratic system. Frelimo remains 'the only show in town' (Hanlon, 2011).

The following part of this chapter has discussed the important processes and interactions between elements and processes which have led to stability. The following chapter will conclude this research by answering the main question and discussing the research itself.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

How Mozambique managed to remain stable but failed to install a properly functioning democracy

Spring 2013. Renamo has blocked Mozambique's main road, the EN1, where it crosses the Save river. A passenger bus trying to pass the obstruction is taken under fire, leaving three dead. At the dawn of the 2013 local elections and the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, tensions over the electoral law between Renamo and Frelimo have led to incidents of violence. It is difficult to predict whether this will be the end of it, whether the tensions will be dissolved in some manner or whether this is the prelude to a recurrence of the conflict (Santos, 2013).

As has been shown in the analysis in chapter 5, threats from Renamo to disrupt or boycott election and complaints on electoral conduct are not a first. On the contrary, they have been Renamo's main strategy. So far, they have chosen peace over war but frustration with the system has been building up. Will the system continue to develop in a stable and peaceful manner?

At the time the research question for this thesis was formulated there had been many rhetoric incidents and some troubles between the main antagonists – Frelimo and Renamo. Having come out of a war where the two parties fought each other, the two parties now continue to strife but mainly in the political arena. Up to 2012, despite setbacks and deficiencies in the workings of the political system, there was stability in the country.

Within the academic debate, democratisation is seen as a means to establish peace in a country, therefore often being part of peacebuilding missions. Mozambique also started its process of democratisation after its civil war. Despite the democratic peace theory, stating democracy is inherently more peaceful, both internally and internationally, the process of democratisation has empirically shown to be prone to conflict. Mozambique is an outlier for this theory, having remained peaceful and stable already during 20 years of post-conflict democratisation.

This thesis has analysed which factors have led to the stability during the period of 1994 – 2012, by conducting a process tracing analysis informed by the critical theory perspective. The critical theory perspective allows for a historic perspective and to look beyond the dominant power structures. The process tracing method complements this methodology as it also demands a historic perspective of the processes. By conducting a process tracing analysis in the spirit of critical theory perspective, an interplay of elements has been sketched and the stabilising factors of the democratisation process and the political system in Mozambique have been found.

The focus has been on two main features of the democratic system, of special importance in the post-conflict setting, namely the relation between government and its citizens

and the viability of the party system. For the first feature, the concepts of legitimacy, inclusivity and participation have been distinguished as indicators. For the feature of the viability of the party system, the party competition, the ideological placement and electoral performance are distinguished.

There is an interplay of three important processes, having led to the stability in Mozambique so far. First of all, Frelimo has managed to dominate the political system. From the first election on they've managed to win the elections, giving them the position to shape the rules.

Secondly, Renamo has been successfully transformed from a rebel movement into a political party. They were given enough time and resources to demobilise and turn into a political party. This made a return to conflict unlikely. Renamo would not have the strength nor would this be in line with their rhetoric commitment to peace and democracy.

Thirdly, there is an ongoing willingness both of elites and citizens to participate in the democratic system. Mozambicans were tired of war. During the process reforms have taken place every few years, strengthening the system. This seems to have ensured people remain involved.

These processes altogether have led to stability in Mozambique, defined in terms of the non recurrence of conflict. Apart from these stabilising processes, the process tracing has also identified factors which can be destabilising. Despite Frelimo's dominance having led to stability within the system, it has also led to a deterioration of the democratic institutions. This could lead to destabilising dissatisfaction. This is partly already shown by the decline in electoral turnout.

Mozambique as outlier

This research started out with presenting Mozambique as a deviant case for the democratic peace theory and the theory on the relation between democratisation and conflict. The findings of the analysis seem to imply that it are not the democratic institutions themselves which are of importance but the engagement and commitment of the citizens and elites to the system. This engagement does not mean there are no disruptive actions or that the procedures are not circumvented. It means that despite the occurrence of such behaviour, there is never the demand for an alternative type of regime. For the theories on the relation between democracy, democratisation and peace this means we might have sought the stabilising factors in the wrong place.

Mozambique however may also be a well suited case for post-conflict recovery. The country has almost no political salient cleavages, apart from the regional divide. This lack of overlapping cleavages implies the political institutions will not be overloaded. This might also explain the low demand for reconciliatory procedures. This implies that in countries with

overlapping cleavages it might be harder to keep the different groups committed to the system and its procedures.

Who knows?

There are also two current processes which have to be mentioned. First, Mozambique is one of the African lions with a stunningly growth in GDP. The discovery of gas fields in the Indian Ocean before the Mozambican coast will create much revenue. This natural resource boom will change the political game. It could create less dependence on aid and international donors which could open the space for opposition parties. However, it is unclear who will benefit from the revenues. If the poorest population doesn't see improvement in the next couple of years, they might channel their dissatisfaction towards the corrupt government.

Another feature is the changing of the guards. So far, politics was the affair of war veterans. Now, a generation is waiting to take over who have lived their lives in peace and view the government in a different manner. For them, the liberators of Frelimo have less of an important association and government is regarded as unresponsive.

These dynamics will definitely change the political way of things but it is hard to predict what this will mean for the political system and the stability of Mozambique.

Having summarised the research and having answered the main research question, the research itself can be discussed. There are three important limitations to this research. First of all, looking at the Mozambican case from a Western perspective might lead to moralising conclusions. So far, this thesis has linked democracy with stability. It can be imagined a different form of government can also lead to stability. Therefore, the focus of this research might have been too narrow.

Secondly, internal party dynamics have not been discussed. These add a dimension to the reasons for the functioning of the parties which might explain the case in more detail. Both parties also have defecting divisions within them. Frelimo tries to keep everyone in the party, making them less political. Renamo has always been led by Dhaklama and party members have left the party out of dissatisfaction with his methods. These internal dynamics would have added another level to the analysis.

Thirdly, not being in the position to do more research in the country itself meant having to rely on secondary sources more than on primary sources. This always increases the chances of narrowing the perspective. This implies it is well possible there are processes and dynamics which have not been included in this thesis but which are of importance.

Mozambique remains a case worth researching. For future research on Mozambique's political spectrum it could be interesting to look at the internal dynamics of the parties and to

focus on the leaders of the parties. As the parties are centralised and personalised, perspectives on their features and development could give important insights. It could also be interesting to investigate the regional dynamics in the country and how people in the different regions view the government. This would imply doing intensive field work in different parts of the country. A third suggestion for research is to look closer into how power is distributed within Frelimo and the businesses they are linked to. This would require a political economy analysis of the elites.

Despite its shortcomings, the thesis has added to the research on Mozambique and the research on the link between democracy and peace. Giving an overview of the Mozambican process of democratisation so far has allowed for an evaluation. Putting the factors in this historic perspective has made it possible to look at the process as a whole. This showed the importance of commitment to the system which so far has been left out in the literature on the link between democracy and between democratisation and conflict.

By having focused on political processes and actors and by conducting a case study research, more knowledge has been gained on the internal dynamics of a democratising country. The Mozambican case has shown that it is very well possible to be a semi-democracy and still be stable as long as there is commitment to the democratic system.

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