Do political parties determine their own destiny?

Fuzzy set QCA to the influence of internal party processes in the policy change of political parties

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Abstract

Why do political parties change their policies? Traditionally this is explained by way of external forces such as public opinion and the interaction with other parties. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that internal party processes may have an independent influence on how parties change their policies. This thesis aims to analyze whether political parties have an independent influence on policy change and if so how this takes place. This is analyzed through a fuzzy set QCA of six Dutch political parties in the period between 2002 and 2010. The main findings of this thesis are that internal party processes are a necessary and sometimes sufficient explanation of policy change. These findings challenge dominant approaches, such as the paradigmatic spatial theory. It seems that intra-party processes have more influence on the process of policy change, while external factors such as the public opinion have a larger influence on the direction of the change. An important enabling factor in policy change turns out to be the stability of the party. A stable party is one in which leadership has not changed in the last election and in which leadership and party are unified. An unstable party is the opposite. In six of the ten cases, the stability of a party determines whether the party will change. These conclusions suggest that future research should systematically focus on internal party processes, in order to more fully understand why and when political parties change their policies.

KEY WORDS: political parties, policy change, spatial theory, leadership, Dutch politics, QCA.

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Acknowledgement

1. Introduction

Recently, my Uncle Bert asked me about the subject of my thesis. I told him I was investigating why political parties change their policies. What motivates politicians? What determines the behavior of political parties? And how does policy come to be? My uncle Bert nodded, thought for a moment, and then said, looking as wise as he could: "well son, I think that isn't such a hard question. From how I see it, politics is only about one thing: power. The only thing those politicians care about is getting as much votes as possible. Politics is their job and they want to keep it. If they have to change their policies to get more votes, they'll do it. No doubt about that. You may find me cynical, but I think I'm just being realistic." I could not entirely agree with him. But he is not stupid, my uncle Bert, and certainly not the only one with such a view on politics. Everyone knows an Uncle Bert, as a neighbor, someone you meet in a bar or on a birthday party.

The question is of course, is it true? Or, to which extent is it true? Are political parties just self-concerned vote-seekers, slaves of public opinion, or is their policy dependent upon other matters? And are they only concerned with getting elected, or do they want to get elected to realize an ideal? These are highly relevant questions: as Schattschneider put is, "modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties" (1942: 1). A political party can be defined "as an organization that pursues the goal of placing its avowed representatives in political office (Harmel & Janda 1994: 272). Political parties are the intermediary between state and civil society and the recruiters of future politicians (Foley 1996: 6; Dalton & Wattenberg 2000: 5). It is their job to listen to problems in society, represent voters in parliament and implement policy when in government. They are important in setting the political agenda and thus help to shape the future of a country. So the answer to the question as to how parties determine their political agenda and by extension, why they change it, has far-reaching consequences. It influences the way we think about politics, the way our interests are represented, the quality of democracy as a political system and in effect, our own future.

Theories

So what does political science say about why political parties change their policies? The paradigmatic theory in explaining policy change is Downs' spatial theory (1957: 34). It states that parties are primarily concerned with obtaining votes and in doing this they adjust their policy positions to those of voters and other parties. In this respect, policy is a means to an end. There are two main problems with this explanation of policy change. First, it explains all party behavior as the result of external forces, such as voters and other parties. In this system's approach, the party has no own role to play (Panebianco 1988: 242). Several authors argue that the party does have a role to play. Harmel and

Janda state that policy change can both be caused by external and internal stimuli. They argue that a party will change as the result of external forces, when the dominant coalition of the party perceives these events as conflicting with the goals of a party (Harmel & Janda 1994: 259). Furthermore, they state that a party can also change because of a change in leadership. Budge, Ezrow and McDonald make a similar argument: they explain policy change as the result of the factional distribution of power within the party (2010: 792). A second problem with the spatial theory is the basic assumption that parties are only interested in votes and that ideology is just a way of getting these votes. Several authors argue that parties do not only seek votes, but are also interested in obtaining office or in implementing their policies (Strom 1990: 572). Budge et al state that "parties are nothing if not ideological, policy-pursuing entities" (2010: 804). In their view, vote-seeking is a secondary corrective mechanism.

Main question

Given the substantial problems in the existing theories about policy change, this investigation cannot give the final answer to the question why parties change their policies. I will therefore focus on the first problem: the role of the party in policy change. Can policy change solely be explained by systematic factors such as public opinion or the position of other parties within the party system, or does the party itself influence its destiny? If we look to the literature on political science we have no clear answers. In fact things become even more puzzling given that key and influential theories in the field give contradictory answers. I choose to focus on the role of the party, because there are clear hypotheses about the possible influence of the party. The model of policy-seeking motives in party behavior is less developed (Strom 1990: 568). Furthermore, as policy-motivations cannot be deduced from a systematic approach, the role of the party first has to be established before policy-seeking can be seriously investigated.

Research design

This thesis will focus on the issue of broad policy change; in other words, I am less concerned with the small changes that often happen over small issues, but investigate only those changes which influence the course of the party. In addition, the focus is on *why* parties change their policies and not on *how* they change them. Why refers to the process of change; what is necessary before a party will decide on policy change. How refers to the direction of the change and is about what will be the new position of the party. It is this last terrain in which the spatial theory excels. However, the question is whether it performs just as well in explaining the process of the policy change.

Five possible explanations of policy change are selected from the literature. The first two focus on system factors. The first hypothesis is that a party will change when the public opinion clearly shifts away from the party (Adams et al 2004: 589). The second is the expectation that parties will change their policies when it appears that the positions of competitors are more likely to gain support (Adams & Somer-Topcu 2009: 825). The following three assume that the party plays a role in policy change. The first is that policy change in political parties requires a change of leadership (Harmel & Janda 1994: 259). The second is that a party can only decide on broad policy change, when the party is unified, implying the absence of strong factions (Budge, Ezrow & McDonald 2010: 792). The third and last hypothesis states that a party will only decide on policy change, when it experiences an external shock i.e. an environmental event with negative implications for the party's goal (Harmel & Janda 1994: 259).

Method

Party policy change has been investigated both through qualitative and quantitative approaches. This thesis uses Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as primary analytic technique. This set-theoretic method combines characteristics of both qualitative and quantitative research and allows for multiple conjunctural causation, which is the idea that different causal paths can lead to the same outcome (Rihoux & Ragin 2009: 8). The field of party policy change is highly complex, as there are a lot of different theories, based on different methods of analysis, about different types of parties and different types of change. Because of this complexity, it is likely that different causal conditions, individually or combined, might be sufficient or necessary for policy change. These considerations make QCA ideally suited for this study.

Six Dutch parties in the period between 2002 and 2010 have been chosen for investigation. These are CDA, PvdA, VVD, D66, GroenLinks and SP. For reasons of case homogeneity, only comparable parties from one party system are used. The Dutch system is chosen, because it exhibits a high volatility heightening the competitiveness of the party system (Mair 2008: 235). In such systems parties have a stronger urge to pursue vote-seeking tactics, providing a most-likely and crucial case for spatial theories of party policy change (Strom 1990: 588; Gerring 2007: 115). If it can't make it here, it can't make it anywhere (Levy 2002: 144).

Both qualitative and quantitative data is employed. Interviews were performed with members of the relevant parties and these are combined with secondary literature on the parties. In addition, party manifestos and information from databases with focus on party policy-positions were used as well.

Structure

This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the most important theories of party policy change. The methods used in this thesis are presented in chapter 3. It gives an operationalization of the used variables, the fsQCA method used for analysis and also the case selection. The fourth chapter presents the initial results; these are analyzed using QCA in the fifth chapter. Chapter 6 provides the interpretation of the results, stating which paths leading to policy change or policy stability have been found and what implications this has for the theories under scrutiny. Finally, the conclusion of the research is given in chapter 7.

2. Theoretical section

2.1 Introduction

The study of why political parties change their policy has been analyzed through two different approaches, or schools of thought. The first approach is *spatial* modeling and assumes that parties are unitary actors that adjust their policies to those of voters and other parties. The other school of thought is the *internal* approach, which assumes that internal party dynamics steer the course of a party. The first is the dominant tradition. In recent years however, problems in the spatial theory and new insight in the nature of internal party dynamics have moved the focus of the research. This process is elaborated below.

The theory most closely associated with the spatial tradition is the spatial theory of Downs (1957). It assumes parties are unitary and vote-seeking in nature, which implies they adjust their policy positions to those of voters and other parties. The most recent version of the spatial theory holds that political parties change their policy in response to policy moves of parties that are ideologically familiar and in response to a public opinion that is shifting away from the party (Adams 2004, 2009). A problem with this theory is that although one would expect parties to converge, given that most voters are located near the middle of the ideological spectrum, parties remain remarkably stable. Furthermore, the spatial model gives no independent role to internal party politics, although a lot of recent research suggests the importance of the party. Budge et al try to fix these problems in their *integrated dynamics theory*, which states that factional change within parties drives party policy change (2010). What's striking about this theory is that although it positions itself in the spatial tradition and it uses the same formal approach and data as the spatial theory, it drops some of the core assumptions of the spatial theory, as it considers internal party dynamics the key to party policy change. This carves out a solid spot for *internal* variables in the research field. However, the way in which Budge et al operationalize internal party dynamics is weak. A more qualitative explanation of the way in which internal party dynamics influences party policy change is given in the *integrated theory* by Harmel and Janda (1994). According to their theory, party policy change can both be caused by external and internal stimuli. Both can independently account for change, but the magnitude of change will be bigger if the two are combined. Their contribution is valuable because they offer a more refined account of the influence of internal dynamics on party policy change.

The analysis above shows how problems in the spatial theory drive scientists to look at internal explanations for party policy change. This chapter describes the theories involved in these developments and the questions and problems that drive them. Based on this analysis, I select five explanations of policy change for further investigation.

2.2 Policy change

The dependent variable (or in QCA terminology the outcome) is policy change. It follows that a clear understanding of this concept is essential. This is not an easy task given that it is a broad term. This thesis is concerned with the question why political parties engage in broad policy change. The next section will show that this is a rather restricted conceptualization and will go on to argue that this narrow focus is a virtue in light of the fragmented state of the research and the level of abstractness of the concept of policy change.

Conceptualization

Change, according to Aristotle, consists of three components (Aquinas 2007: 3). First, there is something new, which he labels *form*. It follows that there is also a part that ceases to be: the *privation*. Meanwhile, something stays the same: this is the *matter.* For example, the *matter* of the *form* house can be red bricks. The subject of our change is policy, which, according to the Cambridge Dictionary refers to "a set of ideas or a plan of what to do in particular situations that has been agreed officially by a group of people, a business organization, a government, or a political party". In the case of a political party, policy serves as an umbrella term to capture all the positions parties take on separate issues. So, the policy positions of political parties are the matter of our change, while party policy is the form it takes.

In this research, a *political party* is defined as "an organization that pursues the goal of placing its avowed representatives in political office, which it does by running candidates for offices in competitive elections" (Harmel & Janda 1994: 272). This contestable definition is chosen for its relative flexibility. Many authors would claim that it is not enough to just say parties seek political office. According to them, office is just a means to a certain goal, like controlling the government or promoting certain policies. However, since the literature cannot decide which goal it is parties pursue and since the theories discussed in this thesis also disagree on the subject, it seems wise to refrain from further specification of the concept. There are several sorts of *party change*. A political party can decide to change its strategies, its organization or its policies. (Mair, Müller & Plasser 2004: 12). Many of the theories under scrutiny explain several of these party changes, but the topic of this research is only the party's policy change.

This change can be broad or small. Small policy change is defined here as a change in one or a few issue positions. Would one express the change on a left/right scale of the social/economic dimension, one would hardly notice the change. The change that is the subject of this research is *broad policy change*; not only on a few issue positions, but on a broad spectrum of issues.

Finally, in answering the question of broad policy change, researchers have sought to ascertain two *aspects of policy change*. First, there is the occurrence of the change. Does it happen, or not? Second, there is the question what the new position of the party will be. What direction will the change take and with what magnitude. Since the main question of this thesis is *why* parties change their policies, I will focus only on the first aspect of policy change. Figure 2.1 presents an overview of this conceptualization.[1]

Figure 2.1: Conceptualization policy change

Conceptualizing policy change: a narrow approach

This section presents a narrow conceptualization of policy change and shows that the field of party policy change comprises more than the question of why parties decide on broad policy change. Given the complicated and abstract nature of the research field, this focus is an advantage. In this regard, Hancké states that "arguments have to be formulated in such a way and at an appropriate level of abstraction where they can be proven wrong" (2009: 20). He further states that one ought to "concentrate on the search for causal mechanisms rather than of deep trends". Policy change is, as the previous section has shown, a broad concept comprising a lot of variation. It follows that, unless policy change is formulated and operationalized at a specific level and its causal mechanisms are made explicit, it will be hard to formulate testable hypotheses which are both falsifiable and of added value to our knowledge of political reality. These epistemological considerations justify the narrow focus taken by this investigation.

2.3 The spatial theory of party policy change

The dominant theory of party policy change is the spatial theory (Adams et al 2004: 590; Budge et al 2010: 782). This theory was first formulated by Anthony Downs in 1957 as 'the economic theory of democracy'. It assumes political parties to be vote-maximizing units whose primary goal is to obtain political office. In order to maximize their support, they adjust their policies with those of voters and those of their competitors. The strength of the theory lies in its simplicity and explanatory power. Although some of Downs' original hypotheses have proven inaccurate, the core assumptions of the theory survived and have generated new hypotheses. The most recent version of the spatial theory

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[1] Since it follows from the question 'why policy change' that this thesis is about the occurrence of policy change, I will not use the term 'occurrence' again.

holds that political parties react to competitor parties that are ideologically familiar and to voters if their opinion is shifting away from the party's policy position (Adams et al 2004, 2009).

Assumptions and hypotheses

At the core of the spatial theory lie *assumptions* about parties, party orientations, voters, spatial modeling and the Nash-equilibrium. First, political parties are defined as "teams of individuals seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in an election" (Downs 1957: 34). They act rationally and are considered unitary, which leaves no role for internal politics. Second, parties are oriented at vote-maximizing.

"Since none of the appurtenances of office can be obtained without being elected, the main goal of every party is the winning of elections. Thus all its actions are aimed at maximizing votes, and it treats policies merely as means toward this end" (Ibid: 35).

In this view, ideology is a way of reducing uncertainty for voters and is designed to attract as many social groups as possible without being contradictory (Ibid: 113). Third, voters act rationally and vote for the party which best approximates their own policy views. Their preferences are seen as both "clearly perceived and exogenous to the political process itself" (Iversen 1994: 157). Fourth, the policy positions of both parties and voters are given and can be displayed on a left/right scale. Finally, in line with Nash-equilibrium, parties always search for equilibrium, the optimal policy position based on voters and the strategies of the other parties.

Based on the assumptions of the research program and criticized hypotheses by Downs, Adams et al formulate the following two *hypotheses* on party behavior. The first concerns the influence of public opinion, the second party interaction.

Hypothesis 1: A political party will decide on policy change, if public opinion is shifting away from the party's policy positions. (Adams et al 2004: 589)

Hypothesis 2: A political party will decide on policy change, if other parties belonging to the same ideological family change their policies. (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009: 825)

Conceptual model:	Public opinion shifting away	→	Party policy change
	Changing policy of family member parties	→	

Analysis

From its first formulation by Downs in 1957, the spatial theory has often been critiqued and adapted. The version of the spatial theory used in this thesis is based on research of Adams et al. The forthcoming section describes and analyzes the transition from Downs to Adams. Afterwards, attention will be focused on the non-convergence problem and the unitary actor assumption.

Downs' original hypotheses are more general than the ones of Adams et al described above. He states that political parties will always align their policies to those of the public opinion and also, that parties not only look to ideological family members for guidance, but to all parties. An analysis of contributions based on these hypotheses offers a two-sided image. Supporting evidence is offered by authors as Adams & Somer-Topcu (2009: 678, 825) and Ezrow (2005: 881). However, especially the public opinion variable has received a lot of critique. Empirical examination shows political parties to only sometimes adjust their policies to voter preferences. Confronted with this anomaly, Adams et al tested both Downs' original proposition and the new hypothesis that parties only react to a converse public opinion and found evidence for the latter (2004: 590). A noteworthy addition by Iversen is the operationalization of public opinion as only those voters that consider themselves supporters of the party (Iversen 1994: 184). Downs' second statement, that parties react to other parties' strategies, has received more support. Parties indeed seem to adjust their policies to other parties, and even more so if this party is a member of the same ideological family (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009: 825).

The *strength* of the spatial theory is demonstrated by its paradigmatic status in the field explaining policy change. One of its key features is its simplicity. Clear assumptions are made about voter- and party-preferences. Like the broader rational choice approach in which it can be situated, it delivers testable hypotheses with a limited scope (Levi 1997: 20). It is not only very specific, but also broadly applicable. In recent years, research to the spatial theory has been spurred by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens 2012). This project contains information on left/right scores of political parties' election programs of more than fifty countries going back to 1945, and thus provides good data to test the theory.

An important problem to the spatial theory is the *non-convergence problem*. Given the hypothesis that political parties adjust their policies to voters and the fact that most voters are situated near the middle of the political spectrum, one would expect parties to converge. However, reality shows political parties to be remarkably stable (Budge et al 2010: 783). Several spatial modelers have tried to fix this problem, but none of them has found a convincing answer.

Another difficulty in the spatial theory is the *unitary actor* assumption. This notion is central to the spatial theory, for it excludes the possibility that parties can change by other factors than those in their environment (Müller 1997: 294). It implies that party processes are an immediate, not an ultimate source of change (Katz and Mair 1994: 18). Although quite popular, the *environmental* view is contested. Authors like Albinsson (1986: 191), Panebianco (1988: 242) and Deschouwer (1992: 17) have demonstrated the necessary and sometimes sufficient role played by internal party processes in party change. A theory on party policy change should therefore explain the influence of internal party processes. This makes the unitary actor assumption of the spatial theory problematic.

2.4 The integrated dynamics theory

To fix the anomaly of the non-convergence problem, Budge, Ezrow and McDonald al present the *integrated dynamics theory* (2010). It states that party policy is determined by rivaling factions with their own take on party ideology. Change will only occur if one faction is substantially stronger than the rest. Budge et al thus incorporate the internal side of the party into the explanation of party policy change.

Assumptions and hypotheses

Budge et al make the following *assumptions* about party policy-making (2010: 792). First, ideology is seen as the primary party orientation. Vote-seeking is only relevant "as a subsidiary element in the internal ideological struggle" (Ibid: 804). The second assumption is factionalism. "Parties are divided into factions distinguished by their attempts to impose their own version of the common ideology on the party" (Ibid: 792). Generally, one faction is in control of the party. Third, change of the dominant factions is determined by the costs of control and election results. The costs of control work to diminish support for the dominant faction, while positive election results can heighten it. Finally, the "magnitude of policy change is proportional to the relative strength of the factions at the time of change" (Ibid: 792).

Based on these assumptions, Budge et al formulate *hypotheses* about the occurrence of change and the new position. The 'magnitude of change' assumption is particularly relevant to this investigation, since it predicts what is necessary for broad policy change to occur. This is the reason why the hypothesis below uses the term 'can only'. It is a necessary variable, not a sufficient one.

Hypothesis 3: A political party can only decide on policy change, if the faction leading the party has a dominant position.

Conceptual model: Faction dominance   →   Policy change

Analysis

Budge et al make some rather *innovative* assumptions. Although using the same data and approach as spatial modelers, they formulate assumptions which diametrically oppose the spatial theory. Instead of relying on systematic explanations as the public opinion or party interaction, they state that parties determine their own destiny and that it is factional change within the party that determines its course. Another important change compared to the spatial theory is the incorporation of policy-seeking as the primary motivation for change.

However, it is not clear to which extent the causal conclusions are warranted. This is a problem of *internal validity*. The investigation provides no test of the magnitude of change-thesis and only indirect evidence for the influence of ideology and factionalism. The authors hypothesize that ideology is steered by factional struggle. However, the test measures ideology as a function of election results. It is assumed that factions steer ideology and change between elections, but this is not proven. This operationalization is problematic, because it leaves room for systematic error. It does not exclude the potential influence of voter-preferences, which severely hampers the significance of the test. It follows that not all causal conclusions made by Budge et al are warranted, since much of the evidence is indirect.

To *conclude*, Budge et al make a significant contribution to the study of party policy change. They introduce into the spatially inspired research field the notion of internal dynamics. This is an important move beyond previous theories. However, the manner in which it is operationalized is rather weak. Just as the spatial theory, the integrated dynamics theory is a highly abstract model of party policy change. A more qualitative approach is needed to determine how factionalism steers the policy change of political parties.

2.5 The integrated theory of party goals and party change

Harmel and Janda offer a more refined account of the way in which internal and external stimuli influence party policy change (1994). Their theory focuses on two variables. First, change can happen when a party experiences an *external shock*, which is an environmental change that affects the party's primary party goal. Second, policy change can also be stimulated by *internal change,* which refers to a change in the leadership of the dominant coalition. Both variables can independently account for change, but the magnitude of change will be bigger if the two are combined.

Assumptions and hypotheses

Harmel and Janda make the following *assumptions* about the nature of party change and party goals. First, change is imposed by the *dominant coalition* of a party (Ibid: 274). Following Panebianco, this entity is defined as

"those (…) organizational actors who control the most vital zones of uncertainty. The control of these resources makes the dominant coalition the principal distribution center of organizational incentives within the party" (1988: 38).

Dominance of a coalition is a function of the conformation within a party. Second, the dominant coalition will only decide on change for reasons of internal power or advancement of the party's primary goal (Harmel and Janda 1994: 278). Third, parties pursue multiple goals, but only one is primary. The concept of party goals is defined as modes of party behavior. There are four of these: vote-seeking, policy-seeking, office-seeking and maximization of party democracy. Finally, the performance of a party is measured by the primary party goal.

Based on these assumptions, Harmel and Janda predict *two path to change*. This change not only pertains to policy change, but also to change in party organization or strategy. The authors argue that a combination of the two proposed variables creates the broad change this thesis searches for.

Hypothesis 4: A party can decide on policy change, when it undergoes a change of leadership.

Hypothesis 5: A party can decide on policy change, when an environmental change affects the primary party goal.

Conceptual model:

Environmental change	→	Party goal	→	
				Policy change
New leadership	→	Internal change	→	
New dominant coalition	→			

Analysis

The integrated theory on party goals and party change unites a lot of the work done by other authors and is highly *innovative*. First, Harmel and Janda explain party policy change as the result of both internal and external processes and thus can accommodate both the systematic explanations of the spatial theory and the internal explanations of the theory of Budge et al. Second, they introduce the concept of the dominant coalition as the party's primary decision maker. According to Harmel and

Janda, it is the dominant coalition that determines whether external events influence the course of a party and whether a party is either policy- or vote-seeking. This means that this coalition functions both as an independent and an intervening variable.

The *impact* of the theory has remained small. Even the theory of Budge et al (2010), that so much resembles the theory of Harmel and Janda that even the name sounds familiar, does not even once refer to the latter's theory. The question is, whether this has to do with the quality of Harmel and Janda's theory or with the paradigmatic differences with the spatial theories. There is substantial evidence that supports the theory (Harmel et al (1995: 18), Dunan (2006: 69) and Bille (1997: 379)). This is an indication that the quality of the theory is good and that the problem mainly lies in paradigmatic differences.

To *conclude*, Harmel and Janda make an important contribution to the study of party policy change. They introduce the concepts of the dominant coalition and party goal and use them to explain both external and internal causes for party policy change. The theory has not made a big impact on the debate yet, which is notable considering the advances the theory offers compared to other theories.

2.6 Discussion

Until now, attention has been focused at the way in which the theories relate to the internal side of party policy change. Other relevant problems, like the abstractness of the spatial and the integrated dynamics theory, the use they make of the left/right dimension, and the use of party goals in the theory of Harmel and Janda, have so far been ignored. As these issues influence the quality of the explanation and the way in which policy change is measured, they will be discussed below.

First, both the spatial and the integrated dynamics theory model party policy change on a single *dimension*. They measure policy solely on the economic scale. There is growing evidence that this distinction is not the only dimension in politics. Inglehart for example posits that the process of postmaterialism, in which ameliorated living conditions give rise to new priorities, has created an entirely new dimension (2008: 145, 1997: 265). Benoit and Laver go even further when they state that the dimensionality of the policy space differs per country and is often made up of two or even three dimensions (2006: 115). Assuming that policy is indeed multidimensional, this puts into doubt the evidence for the spatial and integrated dynamics theory. Furthermore, the decision rules in a multidimensional policy space differ from those in a unidimensional one. It follows that theories designed for a unidimensional policy space need to be adapted before they can be used to explain party policy change in a multidimensional policy space.

Second, the level of *abstractness* of both the spatial and integrated dynamics theory creates a problem of falsifiability. The spatial theory assumes parties are vote-seeking, which leads parties to adjust their policy to those of voters and other parties. The integrated dynamics theory assumes that factionalism is the driving force behind party policy change. Both mechanisms are highly abstract, which makes them hard to test. If a theory cannot be falsified, how does one determine whether it is true? "Irrefutability of a theory is not a virtue, but a vice". (Popper 1989: 36). Not only does the level of abstractness hamper the falsifiability and thus the reliability of the theories, it also poses problems for its *significance*. This is because both theories postulate with high precision how policy change takes place, but lack in explaining the change. According to Whewell, *"the decisive distinction between science and art is that while the former investigates the why, the latter only seeks to determine the how"* (1858: 129). A theory that foregoes the why is of less significance in answering the question why political parties change their policy.

Finally, the theories discussed differ in their use of party goals. Traditionally, it is assumed that political parties are vote-seeking in nature. This is the contention of the spatial theory. Other motives for party behavior like policy- or office-seeking have often been ignored. This makes the move of Budge et al, to state that parties are primarily policy-seeking, very notable. As before, Harmel and Janda provide a third way by stating parties are not only policy- or vote-seeking, but can be both, depending on the dominant coalition. On the one hand, this is highly innovative and significant, however, on the other hand, this also presents a challenge, as it makes the theory complicated to operationalize. Previous authors have only used the concept of party goals on a theoretical level. In this regard, it is problematic that Harmel and Janda offer an operationalization of party goals that is rather weak. They only briefly state how to analyze the preferred goal of a party, which is central in predicting the party's behavior. Furthermore, they state that each party has a primary goal and that it will only change when it experiences problems in attaining this primary goal. This seems not plausible, as Strom states that parties have multiple goals (1990: 572). To conclude, the use of party goals in explaining party behavior seems promising, but further investigation is necessary.

2.7 Hypotheses

Following the discussion of the theories presented in this chapter, five hypotheses are formulated.

1. Public opinion. A political party will decide on policy change, if public opinion is shifting away from the party's position.

2. Party interaction. A political party will decide on policy change, if other parties belonging to the same ideological family change their policies.

3. Unified leadership. A political party can only decide on policy change, if the dominant faction leading the party has a dominant position.

4. Leadership change. A political party can decide on policy change, when it undergoes a change of leadership.

5. External shock. A political party will decide on policy change, when an environmental event affects its party goal.

Based on the individual theories, the following hypotheses are formulated on the interaction of the conditions. Following the spatial theory, there is no role for the party in policy change. This implies that the theory is falsified when evidence is found for influence of internal party dynamics. The following hypotheses follow from this standpoint.

-   Public opinion and party interaction are each sufficient for policy change.
-   Either the presence of public opinion or party interaction is necessary for policy change.
-   The party has no role in policy change.

From the theory of Harmel and Janda, it follows that a party can change based on both a leadership change and an external shock. However, this shocked is more relevant, when they are combined. The theory also states that a combination of external and internal factors is the best recipe for broad change.

-   External shock and leadership change combined are sufficient for policy change.
-   Either public opinion and party interaction, combined with either unified leadership or leadership change, are sufficient for policy change.

To *conclude*, this chapter has selected five possible answers on the question why political parties change their policies. The next chapter will discuss the methods by which the quality of these answers will be investigated.

3. Methods and operationalizations

3.1 The problem

The central problem discussed in this thesis is political parties and policy change; the specific focus of the thesis is on the role of the party in broad policy change by political parties. A discussion of the theoretical debate delivered five abstract concepts which can explain policy change. The goal of this section is to translate these abstract concepts into concrete measures and indicators and select cases for investigation.

3.2 Method

Arguments for using fsQCA

In this thesis I have chosen to use fsQCA to test the hypotheses regarding political parties and policy change. There are several arguments for this choice. First, the amount of theories explaining policy change, and the complex nature of the matter, suggest a complex causal explanation. Furthermore, the theories need not exclude each other, as several theoretical paths might lead to policy change. Perhaps, the spatial theory can explain policy change in one set of parties, whereas the integrated theory can in another set. The QCA's focus on multiple conjunctural causation makes it ideally suited for this purpose. Second, this investigation uses a high number of variables compared with the number of cases. "In such cases, regression analysis is not an appropriate data analysis technique because the small number of observations would render the results insufficiently reliable (Davidsson & Emmenegger 2013: 349). Third, fsQCA in chosen over csQCA, because it allows for more variation, giving more reliable results.

fsQCA

Qualitative Comparative Analysis is a small-n, set-theoretic method using Boolean algebra; it combines characteristics from both qualitative and quantitative methods. It was developed by Ragin (1987) and focuses on explicit connections between what are referred to as 'conditions'. An important advantage of this method compared to regression is its use of qualitative states to pinpoint varying degrees of set-memberships (Rihoux & Ragin 2009: 90).

Key points in QCA are set-membership, calibration, causality and the set relation. First, *set-membership* is the basis of QCA. A set is a collection of objects to which a case can relate. QCA uses both crisp and fuzzy sets. In crisp set QCA, a case can be either fully in or fully out of a set (Ibid: 91).

Fuzzy set QCA was developed later to overcome some of the limits of crisp sets. It thus offers more refinement by allowing partial membership. In this way, a case can be "neither fully in nor fully out" of a set. For example, a set of cases might be political parties with broad policy change. Party A is a full member of this set when it decides on broad change and not a member (full non-membership) when it does not change. In QCA, the set that is explained is called the *outcome*, the factors that explain this phenomenon are known as *conditions*. Set-membership scores are assigned for both outcome and conditions. QCA uses Boolean algebra to represent full set-membership with the [1] value, full non-membership with the [0] value and scores in between with values between [0] and [1] (Ibid: 34).

Second, set-membership scores correspond with qualitative states that are measured through *calibration*. In the process of calibration, theoretical and substantive knowledge is used to connect facts with qualitative states. Suppose the qualitative state I am interested in is broad policy change and suppose I have index –scores on this change. And suppose Party A and B have change scores of respectively 1,2 and 1.6. These numbers could mean anything. However, when based on empirical and theoretical knowledge full-membership is set at 1,3 and full non-membership at 0,9, the numbers (party change scores) are connected to the qualitative state and become meaningful. This is calibration. The criteria for full membership, full non-membership and maximum ambiguity are called *qualitative anchors.*

Third, an important characteristic of QCA is its focus on *multiple conjunctural causality*, which is a conception of causality according to which an outcome can be caused by several combinations of conditions (Ibid: 8). For example, outcome O can be caused by both the combinations AB and CD. In this example, conditions A and B taken independently are neither sufficient nor necessary for outcome O, but together, they are sufficient. They are not necessary, because O can also be caused by combination CD. In another example, both combinations CA and BA cause outcome O. Here, A is a necessary condition, because it figures in each instance of the outcome, but not sufficient in itself because B or C needs to be present as well. Or to put in the terms of this investigation: if one assumes that O stands for policy change, A for an external shock, B for a negative public opinion and C for party interaction, than it follows that it is necessary for a party to experience an external shock before it can change its policy. However, this shock will only happen when either a negative public opinion or an interaction with other parties happens as well.

Fourth, QCA determines whether a condition is necessary or sufficient based on the *set relation* (Ibid: 99). Necessity is indicated by a superset-relation, meaning that the outcome-set is contained within a causal set. Sufficiency is indicated by a subset-relation, which is just the other way around. This

sounds more complicated than it is. A subset-relation is the situation when a party has a membership of 0,8 in outcome O and a membership of 0,6 in condition C, the superset-relation is the reverse.

Doing fsQCA

How does one do fsQCA? First, all conditions are analyzed for necessity, using the formula below.

$$Consistency\ (O_i \leq C_i) = \sum(min(C_i, O_i))/\sum(O_i)$$

O indicates the outcome, while C indicates a condition. Necessity is indicated by a high consistency. This formula calculates the consistency of O_i as a subset of C_i (Ibid: 110). Consistency is high when all or nearly all values on C_i are higher than O_i. Following Schneider and Wagemann, consistency scores above 0,90 are considered necessary (2009: 406). When a condition turns out to be necessary, it is dropped from further analysis.

Second, conditions are analyzed for sufficiency. This is done in seven steps. (Rihoux & Ragin 2009: 99-111). The first step is negation. Each membership-value can be reversed. A score of 0.8 on POLICY CHANGE is equal to 0.2 on NO POLICY CHANGE. Negation is indicated with the [~]symbol. Second, a list of all possible causal combinations is made, using the positive and negated scores. Third, a truth table is constructed, using only those causal combinations with higher than 0.5 membership scores. The next step is the assessment of the subset relation, which is done by calculating the consistency of C_i as a subset of O_i. Scores above 0,8 indicate membership on the outcome condition.

$$Consistency\ (C_i \leq O_i) = \sum(min(C_i, O_i))/\sum(C_i)$$

The next step is the resolving of contradictory configurations. When there is no clear cut-off in consistency scores, or when cases represented by combinations that score less than 0,8 have a positive outcome, a configuration is considered contradictory. Before further analysis, this needs to be fixed, often by adapting the way conditions are operationalized. This process of dialogue between cases and theory is characterizing for QCA. Finally, the resulting configurations are simplified using logical remainders, to get more parsimonious results. This process above is performed for both positive and negative outcomes.

3.3 Case selection

"Social scientists interested in testing theories that make general claims (…) must seek to limit the uniqueness and specificity of the empirical world; it is necessary to place limits on detail and diversity" (Ragin 2005: 219).

Casing is a process in which empirical and theoretical knowledge is used to place such limits (Ibid: 224). Using this process, this section will list the steps taken from the largest relevant universe of observations to the cases selected for this investigation. Or to be more concrete, the steps taken from the category 'political parties in general', to the selection of six Dutch parties in the period 2002-2010. First, the selection of the party system is explained, then the period of investigation is defended and finally, the selection of parties is described.

The following section explains the criteria leading to the selection of the Dutch *party system*. The focus of this research is at policy change of political parties. It follows that political parties are the general category of investigation. Second, because the theories used in this investigation are formulated for political parties active in democratic countries, parties in non-democratic countries are excluded. Next, to provide a good test for the spatial theory, only political parties in heavily competitive party systems are selected. The paradigmatic spatial theory has a special focus on vote-seeking party strategies. Strom points out that parties in competitive systems have a greater urge to pursue vote-seeking tactics (1990: 588). Therefore, the remaining set of cases should act as a reverse 'Sinatra Inference' for the spatial theory: if it can't make it here, it can't make it anywhere (Levy 2002: 144). In this way, it could be a most-likely and crucial case as described by Gerring (2007: 115). Fourth, to maximize the unit homogeneity, which is an important condition for meaningful generalization, parties from one party system are used. The selection of the Dutch party system meets all the previous criteria. Research has shown it to be one of the most volatile European party systems (Mair 2008: 235). This implies that parties are less sure of their voters and have to work harder to get them. This leads to a higher competitiveness.

Having explained the party system chosen for this investigation, the next two casings make clear which *period* is chosen to investigate policy change. Based on empirical grounds, political parties are analyzed at the time of the elections for the national parliament. Because the goal of each political party is to be elected in parliament, elections form meaningful benchmarks on which to analyze the change of party policy. Second, only cases from the period between 2002 and 2010 are selected. The recent decade witnessed an increase in the number of datasets on parties – and more importantly on their spatial mobility, data which is necessary to evaluate policy change, public opinion and party interaction. The most recent Dutch elections have taken place in 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010 and 2012. It

is assumed that policy change needs a substantial period of time to take place, so the early elections of 2003 and 2012 are left out. Therefore, change is analyzed between the elections of 2002 and 2006, and between the elections of 2006 and 2010.

The previous section has restricted the largest universe of cases to Dutch political parties in the period 2002-2010. From this selection, six parties are chosen. First, all new parties are excluded from analysis for theoretical reasons. A constant assumption behind all hypotheses involved is that organizations are conservative in nature and resistant to change (Harmel and Janda 1994: 264). It seems safe to assume that new organizations are not as crystallized yet and therefore exhibit different behavior on policy change. A balance of power has yet to be found. To assure maximum case homogeneity, these cases are left out. Table 3.1 shows which of the Dutch political parties active in Dutch parliament between 2002 and 2010 are left out. Doubts can be raised about CU, which is not really a new party, as it is a merger of two existing party organizations. However, because unit homogeneity is highly important in an investigation of political parties, which often display a lot of diversity, and because enough cases remain in the Dutch party system, I decide to not take any risks and thus not investigate CU. Second, the SGP is left out, because it has not played a relevant role in the Dutch party system in the period of investigation. Sartori formulates two rules

6. Political parties 2006-2010	7. No new parties	8. Relevance
CDA	X	X
PvdA	X	X
VVD	X	X
D66	X	X
GL	X	X
SP	X	X
SGP	X	-
LPF	-	-
CU	-	-
PVV	-	-
PvdD	-	-

Table 3.1: Casing 6-8 Dutch political parties

for assessing the relevance of political parties. The first is whether a party has coalition potential over time, the second is whether a party has blackmail potential, meaning the extent to which it can affect the tactics of party competition or the direction of competition (Sartori 1976: 320). The SGP has never scored higher than two seats in this period. It was not a likely coalition candidate and was not able to manipulate other parties' strategies, at least, in this period.

With the SGP left out, a definitive case selection can be made. The 12 cases measured in this research are the CDA, PVDA, VVD, D66, GroenLinks (GL) and SP in the periods between 2002 and 2006, and 2006 and 2010. This order is randomly chosen and will be used in the rest of this research.

3. Methods and operationalizations

3.4 Operationalization and measurement

In this section I discuss the operationalization and measurement of the outcome and the conditions. It addresses the translation from abstract hypothesis to concrete measurement, explaining what is measured, which techniques are used and how the data is obtained. Qualitative states for fsQCA-analysis are described, but not explicitly given. QCA is an interactive technique and since each qualitative anchor chosen for qualitative states is likely to be changed during the operation, and the exact calibration of the anchors in part depends on the data that is found, I decide to discuss these together with the results.

3.4.1. Outcome: Policy Change

The focus of the thesis is on broad policy change. Party policy is analyzed by measuring policy change between elections on the economic, ethical and European dimension. The data used in this analysis is derived from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey-dataset.

Concept

For a nominal definition of policy change, see 2.2. of the theoretical section. Policy is described as "a set of ideas or a plan of what to do in particular situations that has been agreed officially by a group of people, a business organization, a government, or a political party". Public policy includes a great variety of decisions and actions, such as taxes, environment, immigration, deregulation, the EU and social liberalism (Benoit and Laver 2006: 115). These are dimensions of policy and differ per country and time period. It follows that there is no general dimension on which political parties can be analyzed. As an indicator of the dimensionality of the Dutch party space in the period between 2002 and 2010, an investigation of the dimensional structures of policy spaces by Benoit and Laver is used. Based on a factor analysis of expert survey-data on ten relevant dimensions, they conclude that there are three factors (or underlying dimensions) in the Dutch policy space: economic left-right, EU and Social liberalism (Ibid). Economic policy is defined as the trade-off between lower taxed and higher public spending (Ibid: 85). The EU dimension indicates whether a party is in favor of or against EU integration. Social liberalism addresses issues such as euthanasia, gay rights and abortion. To conclude, policy is operationalized as the party position on the economic, ethical and EU dimension; Benoit and Laver demonstrate that all relevant variation is explained by these three dimensions.

Operationalization

Policy is measured using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Chapel Hill measures the policy positions of political parties from 24 European democracies, by asking country-experts to grade each party's policy positions on a scale from 0 to 10 (Bakker et al 2012: 2). Chapel Hill measures each of the three dimensions used in this investigation. The translation of these dimensions to the Chapel Hill questions is given in table 3.2.

Dimension Benoit/Laver	Chapel Hill question	Low	Middle	High
Economic	Econlr	1 = extreme left	5 = Neutral	10 = extreme right
Social liberalism	GALTAN	1 = extreme left	5 = Neutral	10 = extreme right
EU	EU_pos	1 = strongly opposed	4 = Neutral	7 = strongly in favor

Table 3.2: Translation dimensions to Chapel Hill questions

Policy change is measured as the difference between election t(0) and t(-1). The following operations are performed, using SPSS and Microsoft Excel. First, EU_pos is recoded in order to obtain comparable scores. This is done with help of SPSS, using the following formula:

EU_new = (EU_pos/7)*10

Second, data from the elections of 2002, 2006 and 2010 is selected (Bakker et al 2010, Hooghe et al 2010: 684). The 2002-data is depicted per expert, so averages are taken from all the expert scores per party-dimension. The 2006 and 2010-data are already given as average-scores. Third, policy change per dimension is calculated. This is done by subtracting the dimensional scores of a party in t(-1) from the dimensional scores of a party in t(0).

Dimensional change $Pa_i Ye_i = Di_i Pa_i t(0) – Di_i Pa_i t(-1)$

In this formula, Pa_i stands for a party in a given period Y_i. Di_i indicates one of three dimensions measured. Fourth, the resulting scores are made positive. Negativity or positivity of scores is an indicator of the direction of change, which is of no interest to this research. The focus is on the magnitude of change.

Positive dimensional change score = |x|

Broad policy change means big change on multiple dimensions. The goal is to measure policy change in a broad sense and by measuring both change in itself and change on multiple dimensions; 'broad change' is measured more accurately. Therefore, dimensions are first analyzed for magnitude of change separately and afterwards added to take into account the dimensionality of policy positions. Qualitative states are used at both levels. First, qualitative states are set for each dimension. A low qualitative anchor is chosen to filter out the 'noise of time'; the 'standard' change that always

happens. This must be very low and indicates full non-membership. A high qualitative anchor has to be at such a level, that only some outliers are higher. The variation above this point is not relevant for analysis. The point of maximum ambiguity is located near the median of scores. As broad change can be understood as broader than average change, such a qualitative anchor will demarcate the point between average change and above-average change. Secondly, a qualitative state is used to interpret the total change of a party. It is assumed that broad change on two dimensions counts as full membership of the set 'broad change'. Therefore, the dimension scores of each party are added and divided by two. Using this procedure, a maximum of 1,5 can be attained. It follows that a score of 1 is enough for full membership. It also follows that a party with full change on one dimension will always attain full membership of the set policy change, as a full change score on one dimension makes for a set-membership score of 0,5. As there is always some change on other dimensions, this will tip the score to full membership.

Critique

There are several arguments that can be formulated against the approach defended above. First, most spatial analysis is performed using only one dimension, the general left/right-dimension. It could be argued that the use of more dimensions leads to complicated or unreliable analyses. However, the contrary is true. The use of only one dimension, which often mimics the economic dimension, ignores empirical variation. As proven by Benoit and Laver, policy simply cannot be measured on one dimension only (Benoit and Laver 2006: 115). This can be substantiated by a sneak peek into the evidence. In the period between 2002 and 2006, the general left/right-rating of the CDA changed from 6,13 to 6,09, a negligible change. However, on EU and ethical policies, it changed more than 0,6 points, which would give CDA2006 a set membership-score of 0,5. The example shows that the left/right ignores much of the variation that is captured by an approach with three dimensions. Therefore, this approach is more valid, as it provides a better capture of reality. Second, some argue that culture is a more important dimension than EU, certainly in the period since 2002 (Pellikaan, van der Meer & De Lange 2003: 1). There are two reasons why this argument is not pursued. First, the factor analysis provided by Benoit and Laver demonstrates that positions on the cultural dimensions load high on the economic left-right factor. Therefore, the inclusion of the economic dimension in this research already captures the cultural dimension. There is a practical argument as well. Chapel Hill measures the cultural dimension only from 2006 onwards, so there is no data from 2002. A third problem with the operationalization may be that it ignores the elections of 2003. There is no Chapel Hill-data available for this election, but CMP-data shows that some parties experienced change in the period between 2002 and 2003, and afterwards between 2003 and

2006 (Volkens 2012). However, the general opinion is that parties did not change their policies much between 2002 and 2003 (Pellikaan, Van der Meer & De Lange 2003: 40). For this reason, the exclusion of 2003 as a case should not pose problems.

3.4.2. C1: Public Opinion

To measure the extent to which the public opinion is shifting away from party policies, the policy positions of the party and its supporters are measured and compared. A party is expected to change at t(0), when the difference in positions between party and public has increased between elections t(-2) and t(-1).

Operationalization

A political party will only change its policies, when public opinion is clearly shifting away from its policies. Public opinion stands for the average opinion of voters that consider themselves supporters (Iversen 1994: 184). Shifting away implies an increased difference between the position of the party and the position of the public. In operationalizing this hypothesis, the central issue is to find a medium on which to compare the opinions of voters and parties. The measurement of policy used with the outcome cannot be used, since voters do not have an opinion on a concept like social liberalism. Policy has to be operationalized on topics that are meaningful for voters, already investigated for voters and measurable for parties. Therefore, a different operationalization is chosen. This is a pragmatic choice which is steered by the available data.

The NKO provides data on voter's opinion on seven policy topics, they are presented in Table 3.3. To measure policy preferences with voters, NKO uses a different operationalization of policy than the one of Benoit and Laver. There are similarities though, as the category 'Income differences' is part of the economic dimension and 'Euthanasia' or 'Crime' are part of the ethical dimension. As these seven topics together form the operationalization of policy for voters, I decide to use all seven questions. More topics also ensures a more reliable test. NKO measures these topics on a scale from 1 to 7

Topic	Question	Positions
1. Euthanasia	V_37_10	Low: Forbid euthanasia
		High: Allow euthanasia
2. Income differences	V_38_10	Low: Larger differences
		High: Smaller differences
3. Crime	V_39_8	Low: The government acts too tough on crime
		High: The government should act tougher on crime
4. Nuclear power	V_40_10	Low: More nuclear power plants
		High: No nuclear power plants
5. Minorities	V_41_10	Low: Preserve cultural customs
		High: Completely adjust to Dutch culture
6. EU unification	V_42_11	Low: Unification should go further
		High: Unification has gone too far
7. Asylum seekers	V_43_10	Low: Admit more asylum seekers
		High: Send back as many asylum seekers as possible

Table 3.3: NKO questions and answers

(Aarts, Todosijevic and Van der Kaap 2010: 16). Both parties and voters are measured in the (election)years of 1998, 2002 and 2006. The voter positions are derived from the NKO-dataset, the party positions are derived from different sources. The next section will explain how the data is gathered and analyzed.

Measurement

To measure the opinion of voters, adherents of each party are analyzed for their average opinion on an issue. This is done by the following procedure. First, NKO measures whether people are adherent to a certain party (question V7_2) and which opinion's they hold on seven policy topics (Ibid: 60). Second, the mean opinion of all cases is calculated for each of the seven topics. Third, to make the public opinion comparable with the party positions, which are measured on a scale from 0 to 1. Each mean is recalculated using the following formula

New mean = (Mean-1)/6

The reason for first subtracting 1 from the mean value is because by simply dividing by seven a value can never reach absolute zero, a value which the party scores can reach.

To measure the opinion of parties, data is gathered from party manifestos, Chapel Hill, the CMP-database and research from Pellikaan et al. For reasons of reliability and time efficiency, existing databases are used when available. Because Chapel Hill uses expert surveys, this database is deemed most reliable. The Comparative Manifesto Database analyzes party manifestos to calculate a general left/right-rating. Elements of this analysis concern the same topics as measured in this analysis. Pellikaan et al (2003: 160) analyze party's positioning on minorities and asylum seekers in 2002 and 2003, so the data from their analysis is used in this research. For the questions where no existing data is available, a content analysis is performed on the party manifesto. This is a reliable indicator of the party position, since it represents the official position of the party. The sources for the assessment of party positioning are given in table 3.4.

NKO Question	1998	2002	2006
1. Euthanasia	Content Analysis	Content Analysis	-
2. Income differences	CMD	CMD	CMD
3. Crime	-	CMD	CMD
4. Nuclear power	Content Analysis	Content Analysis	Content Analysis
5. Minorities	Content Analysis	Pellikaan et al	Chapel Hill
6. EU	Chapel Hill	Chapel Hill	Chapel Hill
7. Asylum seekers	Content Analysis	Pellikaan et al	Chapel Hill

Table 3.4: Sources for assessment of party position

The party positions are measured on a three-value scale, with possible scores of 0, 0.5, and 1. Scores are given in accordance with the direction of the scores given in Table 3.3.

1. Euthanasia

Euthanasia is measured using a content analysis of the party manifestos. Euthanasia is only measured for the years 1998 and 2002, as it was a controversial item before it was introduced by the PvdA-VVD-D66 coalition in 2002 (Lucardie, Noomen en Voerman 2002: 25). Afterwards, public opinion quickly became favorable. A low score of [0] is given to parties that want to forbid euthanasia. A middle score of [0,5] is given for parties that are neutral, which includes parties that do not mention the matter in their manifesto. A high score of [1] is given to parties who want to allow euthanasia.

2. Income differences

'Income differences' is measured using a selection of the category '5: Welfare and Quality of Life' in the CMD (Volkens et al 2012). The CMD operationalizes Welfare and Quality of Life by the following seven items: 'per501 Environmental protection', 'per502 Culture', 'per 503 Social justice', 'per504 Welfare state expansion', 'per505 Welfare state limitation', 'per 506 Education expansion' and 'per 507 Education limitation'. Only the items per501 to per504 and per506 are used, as the items per505 and per 507 measure the same as per504 and per506, only reversed. The five items used are a good measure of 'Income differences', because these items are either ways of changing income differences or debates traditionally associated with the discussion of income differences. The scores of the five items are added to get a total score for Welfare and Quality of Life. The results of this process are interpreted using Chapel Hill data. Chapel Hill measures the category 'Income differences' since 2006 (Q17: REDIST Position on redistribution from the rich to the poor) (Hooghe et al 2010: 11)). Although this means it is of no use for the years 1998 and 2002, it does give a good framework of comparison to fine-tune the interpretation of the CMP-data, as both sources of data can be compared for the year 2006. As Chapel Hill gives scores between 1 and 10 and a three-value scale is used for analysis, score categories of 1-4, 4-7 and 7-10 are used.

3. Crime

'Crime' is only measured for 2002 and 2006, as the NKO did not measure this category in 1998. It is measured using the CMD-category 'per 605 Law and Order' (Volkens et al 2012: 12). Just as with 'Income differences', the CMD-data is interpreted using Chapel Hill. In 2006, Chapel Hill measured civil liberties (Q19 CIVLIB: position on civil liberties vs. law and order) (Hooghe et al 2010: 11).

4. Nuclear power

The question on 'Nuclear power' is addressed using a Content Analysis of party manifestos of 1998, 2002 and 2006. The Content Analysis aims at analyzing the position of the party on the topic Nuclear

Power and thus awards one of three scores to each party. The low score of [0] is given to parties that want more power plants. The middle score of [0,5] is given for parties that are neutral: those who do not want more or less power plants. The high score of [0,5] is given to parties that want to close the existing nuclear power plant. The other Content Analyses performed in this thesis are performed in the same way.

5. Minorities

'Minorities' is analyzed using a combination of Content Analysis, data of Pellikaan, Van der Meer and De Lange (2003: 160) and Chapel Hill. Chapel Hill measures minorities from 2006 onwards (Q:27: MULTICULT Position of integration of immigrants and asylum seekers) (Hooghe et al 2010: 12)). The data of 2002 is coming from research of Pellikaan, Van der Meer and De Lange, who measure 'minorities' by analyzing party manifesto on five items (2002: 166). The year 1998 is analyzed by Content Analysis of the party manifestos, using the same five items. These items are listed in table 3.5. Each item is awarded a +1, 0 or -1. In this way, a ten point scale ranging from -5 to +5 is formed. A low score of [0] is awarded for scores of -5/-2. A middle score of [0,5] is awarded for scores between -1 and +1. A high score of [1] is awarded for scores above +1. The rationale behind this

Item	+	-
1. Abolish grants for immigrant organizations	Pro	Contra
2. Abolish grants for education in foreign language	Pro	Contra
3. Harder standards on integration	Pro	Contra
4. Danger of Islam	Agree	Don't agree
5. Emphasis on Dutch identity	Pro	Contra

Table 3.5: Operationalization 'minorities' by Pellikaan, van der Meer & De Lange (2003: 166)

categorization, is because the score range -5/+5 contains eleven possible scores. Since eleven cannot be parted by three, a categorization with four, three and four scores seems most reasonable.

6. EU

EU is measured using the Chapel Hill database. 'Q1: EU_Pos overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration' measures the degree to which the party leadership is opposed or in favor of European integration on a 7-point scale (Hooghe et al 2010: 9; Steenbergen & Marks 2007: 5). For reasons of continuity, this 7-point scale is recalculated into a 10-point scale, so that the 1-4/4-7/7-10 distribution can be used that was also used with 'Income differences'.

7. Asylum seekers

Finally, 'Asylum seekers' is measured in the same way as 'Minorities'. Chapel Hill measures this

Item	+	-
1. Put limits on immigration	Pro	Contra
2. Put limits on family unification	Pro	Contra
3. Harder requirements on residence permits	Pro	Contra
4. Spreading of immigrants	Pro	Contra
5. Harder requirements on naturalization	Pro	Contra

Table 3.6: Operationalization 'asylum seekers' by Pellikaan, Van der Meer & De Lange (2003: 166)

variable in 2006 as 'Q25: IMMIG Position on immigrant policy' (Hooghe et al 2010: 12). Pellikaan, Van der Meer and De Lange measured this variable as well in their investigation (2003: 166). 1998 is measured in the same way, using the items depicted in table 3.6.

After all seven items have been measured, the difference between public opinion and party position is calculated using the following formula.

$$Difference = (\sum(\sqrt{((Pu_i - Pa_i)^2)}))/6$$

In this formula, the party and public score are compared per item. The differences per item are added and divided by the number of items. Since 'Crime' is measured for the cases in 2006 and 'Euthanasia' is not measured for the cases in 2010, both years are measured using six items. It could be argued that this difference in operationalization leads to unreliable results. However, if both items were excluded from comparison, there would be only five items left to compare and this could make the results unreliable as well. There are disadvantages to both alternatives. The choice is made to prefer a greater number of items, although this choice is contestable.

After the difference scores per year have been calculated, the difference of the year t(-1) is subtracted from the difference of t(-2).

$$Direction\ public\ opinion = Diff\ t(-2) - Diff\ t(-1)$$

A negative score indicates that public opinion has shifted away from the party position. Since a party is only supposed to change if public opinion is clearly shifting away from its policy position, the qualitative anchors of the QCA are placed in such a way that every negative movement is rewarded and attains membership of the subset 'public opinion is clearly shifting away', while a positive or zero result is treated as no membership.

Critique

The approach chosen is not without disadvantages. The next section lists problems of measurement, operationalization of policy and operationalization of the hypothesis. A first problem is that while public opinion is measured very precise, the party position is measured on a three-value scale. This does not only lead to a loss of variation, but also puts doubt to the comparability of the two. To begin with the first problem, the loss of variation is a result of the limited time available for this project. It would have cost a lot of extra time to perform a more nuanced measurement in a reliable way. The measurement chosen may not be very precise, but is reliable. Furthermore, this problem may not be as big as it appears. With a public opinion score of 0,7 and a party position that is about the same, a party score of 1 would lead to a difference score of 1-0,7=0,3, while a party score of 0,5 would lead

to 0,7-0,5 = 0,2. This is only a small difference. It follows that the roughness of the party score is partially offset by the nuance of the public opinion score. Second, the rough party score and the nuanced public opinion score can be compared without problems, because it's not about the difference between them, but about the direction in which this difference goes. A difference score of 0,2 or 0,3 does not mean anything in itself, it only becomes significant when compared with difference scores of other years.

An alternative way of operationalizing policy would be to use only one dimension, for example the traditional left/right scale. This scale has been used often and there is a lot of data on left/right scores of both public and parties. However, as was argued in the section concerning the outcome, the disadvantages of using only one instead of three dimensions are considerable. Policy is about more than only one dimension. A more nuanced approach is needed and even if the disadvantages of the measurement used in this thesis are bigger than the one-sided operationalization of policy as a left/right scale, the approach chosen here would still be useful, as it forms a necessary exploration of the possibilities of a more nuances operationalization of policy.

An alternative way of operationalizing the hypothesis that parties react to changes in the public opinion would be to measure what people think of topics themselves and where they think political parties stand on such issues. Although this would be a subjective measurement, it might just be what political parties are looking for when they change. After all, politics is not only about what parties really think, but also (and perhaps even more) about what people think parties think. Although this would be an interesting operationalization, it is not used here, because there is not enough data on this issue. For example, the NKO measures what people think parties think, but only of three parties. SP, D66 and GL are measured only at some elections.

To conclude, the operationalization of the public opinion hypothesis chosen is deemed the best option available. It may have its disadvantages, but these do not affect the reliability of the measurement in such a way that it is unacceptable. Furthermore, alternatives are either more unreliable or not measurable.

3.4.3. C2: Party Interaction

Political parties are supposed to react to policy moves made by other parties. The party to which political parties react is called the marker party and is dependent upon ideological and electoral considerations. This condition is measured using the same Chapel Hill data as the outcome condition Y: Policy change.

The theory of Adams and Somer-Topcu is based on a one-dimensional system with a limited number of parties (2009: 829). However, the Dutch party system is more complicated, with three relevant dimensions on which parties compete and a high number of parties. Therefore, using the same basic assumptions, some adjustments are made to operationalize Party Interaction for the Dutch party system.

Conceptualization

The assumption behind the hypothesis is that parties are vote-seeking. In a party system, each party has to concentrate on certain sections of the electorate. An equilibrium is established, in which each party is assumed to have an optimal position compared to the other parties (Situation 1 in Figure 3.1). The dotted line demarcates the different sections of the electorate. If party B decides to move left, as happens in situation 2, parties A and B compete with portions of the electorate previously owned by A. A will therefore react by also moving to the left, to expand its own electorate (Adams and Somer-Topcu: 841). This is the basic logic of party interaction, as presented by Adams and Somer-Topcu. Note that A does not react to party C. A and C do not compete with the same electorate, so are no threat to each other. The party to which A (or any other party) reacts is called the *marker party*.

Figure 3.1: Party Interaction

In the Dutch party system, three relevant dimensions exist. In a system with more parties and more dimensions, it is not as clear which party is a marker party. Parties that compete on one dimension might be the opposite on another dimension (parties A and C in situation 1). Note that party B is a competitor to A on both dimensions and party C only on one. In situation 2, party B moved rightward

Figure 3.2: Party Interaction in a multi-party, multi-dimensional system

and downward, while party C moved leftward. Both party's B and C are a competitor to A on the horizontal dimension. The question is, to which party will party A adapt? Party Interaction is primarily a vote-oriented process (Ibid). It is therefore assumed that a party will react in a way in which it can win most votes. In practice, this means that the biggest party will be the marker party. As demonstrated in situation 3, party A has gone left and thus reacted to party C. Note that A also moved downward, as the only competitor on the vertical dimension, B, also moved downward. Party C is the marker party on the horizontal dimension, while party B is the marker party on the vertical dimension. It follows that each party can have several marker parties.

Operationalization

Party Interaction is measured using the same Chapel Hill data as used with the outcome variable. First, the policy positions of each party are determined. Second, for each party on each dimension, the differences with other parties are calculated using the following formula.

$$\textit{Difference to party } X_i = \sqrt{((PosX_i - Pos\,X_i)^2)}$$

This formula calculates the difference in policy of a given Party X_i to the other parties. Based on this information, the competitors on policy can be determined. Third, based on the number of seats won in the last parliamentary elections, the biggest party is selected from the competitor parties. This is the marker party on a particular dimension. Fourth, the expected change is calculated by analyzing the change of the marker party and parting this number by two. There are two reasons for doing this. First, Adams and Somer-Topcu concluded that for each 1 policy move made by a marker party, the other party will react by moving 0,25 in the same direction (Ibid: 837). They also concluded that this number probably underestimates the real party interaction. Second, as this thesis is about broad policy change, party interaction numbers of only 0,25 or 0,35 would not have real influence on the outcome. Therefore, a number is used that can have any influence in the analysis. For this reason, 0,5 is used. When this number is incorrect, for example when it is too big, this should be indicated by inconsistent results. The condition is calibrated in the same way as the outcome Policy Change. So to conclude, party interaction is measured by first measuring what parties are competitors in terms of policy, and second, which of these parties are competitors in terms of votes. This is the marker party to which a political party will react when it changes its policies.

3.4.4. C3: Unified leadership

In theory, parties are only able to make broad policy change, if their leadership is unified (Budge 2010: 792). This hypothesis is analyzed by measuring the amount of factionalism present in the party as a whole and in the coalition leading the party.

Operationalization

Unified leadership is defined as the absence of factionalism. Factionalism is defined as "a group within a larger group, especially one with slightly different ideas" (Cambridge dictionary). Applied to the world of politics, the larger group is the political party. The assumption behind the hypothesis is that the extent, to which a party can change, is determined by the dominance of the faction leading the party. In practice, a party is not led by one faction in particular, but rather by persons belonging to several factions or tendencies (Harmel and Janda 1994: 274). Therefore, the dominant faction is translated to dominant coalition. Following Harmel and Janda, dominant coalition is defined as "those (…) organizational actors who control the most vital zones of uncertainty" (Ibid).

The dominance of the coalition is dependent on internal and external factors. Internally, strife can occur between participating factions. Externally, factionalism can be caused by factions outside the dominant coalition, but inside the party. Factionalism is operationalized using the work of Hine, who divides factionalism into three parts (1982: 36). First, the dimension of the strife, which can be policy or strategy related. Dimensions can be crosscutting or reinforcing, which heightens the degree of factionalism. Second, the organizational solidarity is analyzed. The strife can be between tendencies, issue groups or factions. Third, the coverage of factionalism determines whether it only takes place in one arena, like only in parliament, or more broadly in the party.

Measurement

Unified leadership is measured using literature and interviews with either party members who held relevant party positions, or experts. There is plenty of literature on the subject of this research, but often not very specific. Therefore, first-hand information is preferred. For the CDA, longtime Member of Parliament Cees van der Kamp is interviewed. For the VVD, former fraction officer Friso Fennema is interviewed. For the D66, former fraction employee Marcel de Ruiter is interviewed. For GroenLinks, former employee of the scientific bureau of GroenLinks Simon Otjes is interviewed. With two parties, PvdA and SP, an interview could not be arranged. Although analysis therefore cannot be based on first-hand information, it should still be reliable. This is because the literature on both parties is substantial. Furthermore, the information received from other interviews presents a clear picture of the structure of factionalism in political parties in general. This can help with analyzing the parties where no interviews could be performed.

The condition is measured on a five-value scale, on which both the party and the dominant coalition must be fully unified to be a full member of the set Unified Leadership. Party and dominant coalition can score [0] for factionalism, [0,25] for a lesser degree of

Aspects of factionalism	Light factionalism	Factionalism
Dimension	Present	Present
Organization	Tendency	Issue-group or faction
Coverage	Not broad	Several arena's

Table 3.6: Measurement of factionalism in party

factionalism and [0,5] for no factionalism. Measurement of the party is explicated in Table 3.6. Factionalism in the dominant coalition is measured as follows. A score of [0,25] is awarded when members of the dominant coalition belong to opposite tendencies. A score of [0] is awarded when members of the dominant coalition belong to opposite factions or issue-groups.

3.4.5. C4: Leadership change

A party is only supposed to change, when there has been a change of leadership. This hypothesis is measured by analyzing changes of party leader and dominant coalition between elections. The combination of the two is thought to produce the highest change. The term 'leadership' used in the hypothesis refers to two things. First, it refers to the person leading the party. Second, it relates to the dominant coalition leading the party (for a definition, see 3.4.4.).

Leadership change is measured using the same data as C3: Unified Leadership. To be a full member of the set Leadership change, a case must meet two criteria. A score of [0,5] can be received for a new leader. The other half of the score is awarded if the party has changed its dominant coalition. A score of [0,25] is received when there is some change in the composition of the dominant coalition. Full change of the dominant coalition is operationalized as the situation when nearly all of the members of the dominant coalition are gone, partial change of the dominant coalition refers to the situation when some members left, while some members stayed. Change is measured at the moment of the elections. To conclude, a five-value fuzzy set is used to measure leadership change.

3.4.6. C5: External shock

A political party will only change its policies, if it experiences a shock on its primary goal. This condition is measured in two parts. First, it is analyzed which goal is preferred by a party, second, it is analyzed whether there has been a shock on this goal.

3. Methods and operationalizations

Operationalization

An external shock is an environmental event with specific consequences for the primary goal of the party. An environmental event only turns into an external shock, when it is perceived as such by the dominant coalition. In the theory of Harmel and Janda, a political party is assumed to have multiple goals, but only one primary goal (1994: 273). They hypothesize that a party will only change its policies, when the primary goal is hit. This seems a problematic assumption, as a party can also react to blows on other goals (see 2.7). Therefore, the hypothesis is adjusted. It is assumed that a party not only has a primary goal, but also secondary goals. When these secondary goals are hit, policy change can be expected as well, though not so much as with a primary goal.

Measurement

The condition is analyzed in three steps. First, the goal orientation of the party is analyzed using the criteria given by Wolinetz (2002: 150). He measured the goal of a party by looking at party organization and elections campaigns. Second, the goals of the dominant coalition are analyzed using interviews and literature. If both are not the same, this indicates that a goal is not broad-based and thus should have less impact. Finally, it is analyzed whether the dominant coalition has experienced a shock.

The QCA qualitative states are used as follows. Full membership [1] is awarded when a party is hit by an external shock on its primary goal. Partial membership [0,5] is awarded when a party is hit by a small external shock on its primary goal, or by an external shock on a secondary goal. A score of [0,25] is awarded when a party is hit by a small external shock on a secondary goal. By measuring this hypothesis with two grades of external shock and two grades of external shock, a more nuanced analysis is possible.

4. Results

4.1 Introduction

This section will discuss the empirical results of the research and perform the fsQCA analysis used to interpret these results. The interpretation itself follows in the next chapter. First, the empirical results are discussed. Starting with the outcome-condition, each condition is discussed. Conditions three, four and five are discussed together for each party. This is because the arguments about party organization used in the period 2002 to 2006 are often comparable to the period 2006-2010.

4.2 Policy Change

Table 4.1 shows the dimensional scores per party in the years 2002, 2006 and 2010. The changes in the economical and ethical dimensions are visualized and presented in Appendix A. Table 4.2 shows the changes made between 2002 and 2006, and 2006 and 2010. It further shows the QCA-scores per dimension and the definitive QCA-score.

QCA-scores are calculated using qualitative anchors. Using these anchors, the program fsQCA can translate interval-scores into QCA-scores. This is part of the process of calibration. Three

Year	Party	EU	Eco	Ethical
2002	CDA	8,26	6,22	6,89
	PvdA	8,73	3,78	3,25
	VVD	6,34	8	5,56
	D66	9,20	5,11	1,44
	GL	7,69	1,89	1,44
	SP	4,29	0,78	3,33
2006	CDA	7,61	5,56	6,7
	PvdA	7,97	3,56	3,7
	VVD	6,43	7,89	5,1
	D66	9,29	5,22	2,5
	GL	7,79	2	2,4
	SP	2,86	1,11	5,22
2010	CDA	7,56	6,5	7,14
	PvdA	7,56	3,57	4
	VVD	5,61	8,29	4,79
	D66	9,49	5,5	1,57
	GL	8,87	3	1,93
	SP	3,47	1,5	5,21

Table 4.1: Party positions

anchors are required: a high anchor that receives the QCA-score [0,95], a medium anchor that receives QCA-score [0,5] and a low anchor that receives a QCA-score of [0,05]. For this condition, qualitative states are used at two levels. First, with dimensional scores individually, and afterwards, when these scores are added and recalculated into the definitive QCA-scores.

The following qualitative anchors are used per dimension. A low qualitative anchor is placed at [0,2]. This anchor indicates full non-membership and is used to filter out the 'standard change'. The results in table 4.2 show a first category of scores around 0,1. These scores indicate that the party hardly changed during the case period. To make sure these dimensional changes get full non-membership, the low qualitative anchors is set just above 0,1 at [0,2]. The high qualitative anchor is set at [0,8],

because this number forms a natural demarcation between scores of 0,9 and higher, and scores around 0,6 and 0,7. The anchor at [0,8] means that variation above 0,8 is irrelevant for set-membership. The medium qualitative anchor is placed in the middle of these two, at [0,5].

Year	Party	EU Change	Eco Change	Ethical Change	EU QCA	Eco QCA	Ethical QCA	Total	Total /2	QCA Score
2006	CDA	0,64	0,66	0,19	0,8	0,83	0,04	1,67	0,835	0,84
	PVDA	0,76	0,22	0,45	0,93	0,06	0,38	1,37	0,685	0,69
	VVD	0,09	0,11	0,46	0,02	0,02	0,4	0,44	0,22	0,22
	D66	0,09	0,11	1,06	0,02	0,02	1	1,04	0,52	0,52
	GL	0,1	0,11	0,96	0,02	0,02	0,99	1,03	0,515	0,52
	SP	1,43	0,33	1	1	0,15	0,99	2,14	1,07	1
2010	CDA	0,06	0,94	0,44	0,01	0,99	0,35	1,35	0,675	0,68
	PVDA	0,41	0,01	0,3	0,29	0,01	0,12	0,42	0,21	0,21
	VVD	0,81	0,4	0,31	0,96	0,27	0,13	1,36	0,68	0,68
	D66	0,2	0,28	0,93	0,05	0,1	0,99	1,14	0,57	0,57
	GL	1,09	1	0,47	1	0,99	0,43	2,42	1,21	1
	SP	0,61	0,39	0,01	0,75	0,25	0,01	1,01	0,505	0,51

Table 4.2: Party change and fsQCA-scores

The columns 'EU QCA', 'Eco QCA' and 'Ethical QCA' show the calibrated change numbers. These are added under the header 'Total' and divided by two under 'Total/2'. This constitutes a second level of qualitative states. The assumption is that a party that shows full change on two of the three dimensions obtains full membership in the condition Policy change. A party with full change on two dimensions has a 'Total' score of two. Dividing this number by two produces the full set-membership-score of [1]. For the definitive QCA-score of the set Policy change, the numbers under 'Total/2' are rounded up and the variation above 1 is ignored.

4.3 Public Opinion

A party is supposed to change its policies if public opinion is clearly shifting away from its policy positions. The voter positions and party positions are given in Appendix B7. Voter positions are derived from the Chapel Hill-database. The party positions are based on different sources and thus need some explanation.

Parties

1. Euthanasia

Euthanasia is measured using a Content Analysis presented in Appendix B2. The results of this analysis are given in table 4.3.

Party	1998	2002
CDA	0	1
PvdA	1	1
VVD	1	1
D66	1	1
GL	1	1
SP	1	1

Table 4.3: Euthanasia positions

A coding sheet of the procedure is showed in Appendix B1, which contains the coding sheets of the other issues as well.

2. Income differences

'Income differences' is measured using data from the Chapel Hill (CH) and CMD-database. The CMD scores in table 4.4 are based on a number of CMD-categories figured in Appendix B3. The data is interpreted using Chapel Hill-data. Chapel Hill works with a 1-10 scale. Dividing this range by three gives categories of 1-4, 4-7 and 7-10 (table 4.4). Based on a comparison with the CMD-data in 2006, this distribution is translated to CMD-categories. The VVD shows the highest scores in the Chapel Hill-index (8) and the lowest in the CMD-data (3,68). A middle category of cases is formed by CDA and D66, with scores of about 5 in the Chapel Hill and scores between 4 and 5 in the CMD-data. A third category of cases is formed by GL, PvdA and SP, which all score lower than four on the Chapel Hill and higher than five on the CMD. Since the Chapel Hill and CMD data correspond so well, the Chapel Hill data is used to interpret the CMD-data, according to the

Year		CMD	Chapel Hill	Coding
1998	CDA	5,40		1
	PvdA	7,29		1
	VVD	3,86		0
	D66	6,07		1
	GL	7,34		1
	SP	6,64		1
2002	CDA	4,96		0,5
	PvdA	4,80		0,5
	VVD	3,04		0
	D66	4,78		0,5
	GL	4,95		0,5
	SP	6,64		1
2006	CDA	4,19	5,29	0,5
	PvdA	5,63	3,5	1
	VVD	3,68	8	0
	D66	4,63	5,14	0,5
	GL	6,30	3,14	1
	SP	6,00	1,24	1

Table 4.4: Income differences: CMD and CH-scores + Coding

coding in Appendix B1. The only outlier is the SP, which scores comparable scores to GroenLinks in the CMD and substantially lower scores in Chapel Hill. However, since both are clearly in the [1]-category, this should not pose problems.

3. Crime

Crime is analyzed using variable 'per 605' of the CMD-database. Table 4.5 shows the CMD-scores and the coding. The coding categories are chosen in accordance with natural demarcations in the data (see Appendix B1). The following categories stand out. A group of scores lower than 4, a middle

group of scores between 4 and 6 and a group of high scores of 8 and higher. In accordance with these groupings, the coding presented in Appendix B1 is chosen.

Year	Party	CMD-scores	Coding
2002	CDA	8,56	1
	PvdA	4,1	0,5
	VVD	8,08	1
	D66	6,06	0,5
	GL	3,5	0
	SP	5,75	0,5
2006	CDA	5,66	0,5
	PvdA	7,63	1
	VVD	12,71	1
	D66	3,38	0
	GL	3,5	0
	SP	5,02	0,5

Table 4.5: Crime CMD-scores + Coding

4. Nuclear power

Nuclear power is measured using a Content Analysis presented in Appendix B4. Table 4.6 provides the results of the analysis.

Party	1998	2002	2006
CDA	0,5	0,5	0,5
PvdA	0,5	1	1
VVD	0,5	0	0
D66	1	1	0,5
GL	1	1	1
SP	1	1	1

Table 4.6: Party positions on nuclear power

5. Minorities

Table 4.7 shows the results for item 5. 'Minorities'. It is measured using different sources. For the year 2006, the Chapel Hill database is used. It uses a 10-point scale, so just as with the other items, it has been coded as 1-4 = 0, 4-7 = 0,5 and 7-10 = 1. The data for 2002 is derived from an analysis by Pellikaan, van der Meer and De Lange. As discussed in the methodical section, their 5/-5

Year	Party	Pellikaan	Chapel Hill	Coding
1998	CDA	-1		0,5
	PvdA	-2		0
	VVD	+2		1
	D66	-1		0,5
	GL	-2		0
	SP	0		0,5
2002	CDA	0		0,5
	PvdA	+1		0,5
	VVD	+3		1
	D66	-1		0,5
	GL	-2		0
	SP	-2		0
2006	CDA		7	1
	PvdA		4,5	0,5
	VVD		8,17	1
	D66		3	0,5
	GL		2,5	0
	SP		6	0,5

Table 4.7: Coding Minorities

scale is coded as -5/-2 = 0, -1/+1 = 0,5 and +2/+5 = 1. The data for 1998 has been gathered using a Content Analysis based on the operationalization of minorities used by Pellikaan et al. The Content Analysis is included in Appendix B5.

6. EU

'EU' is measured using the Chapel Hill database. The

Party	CH 1998	Coding	CH 2002	Coding	CH 2006	Coding
CDA	9,21	0	8,26	0	7,61	0
PvdA	9,36	0	8,73	0	7,97	0
VVD	7,79	0	6,34	0,5	6,43	0,5
D66	9,49	0	9,20	0	9,29	0
GL	6,36	0,5	7,69	0	7,79	0
SP	3,71	1	4,29	0,5	2,86	1

Table 4.8: EU coding

results are given in table 4.8. The same coding of the Chapel Hill-index is used as with the previous items.

7. Asylum seekers

Finally, the item 'Asylum seekers' is coded in the same way as item 5. 'Minorities'. The results of the analysis are given in table 4.9, the Content Analysis is presented in Appendix B6.

Year	Party	Pellikaan	Chapel Hill	Coding
1998	CDA	+1		0,5
	PvdA	-2		0
	VVD	+2		1
	D66	-2		0
	GL	-4		0
	SP	0		0,5
2002	CDA	+2		1
	PvdA	+1		0,5
	VVD	+3		1
	D66	0		0,5
	GL	-5		0
	SP	0		0,5
2006	CDA		6,33	0,5
	PvdA		4,17	0,5
	VVD		8	1
	D66		4	0,5
	GL		2,17	0
	SP		5,33	0,5

Table 4.9: Coding Asylum seekers

Comparison

The data on party positions and public opinion are given in Appendix B7. The differences between party and public are calculated for several elections to establish the direction of the public opinion. The difference scores per item are presented in Appendix B8. Table 4.10 shows the average differences between public opinion and party for the elections of 1998 and 2002, and 2002 and 2006. Note that Table 4.10a calculated the scores for case year 2006, whereas table 4.10b is about case year 2010.

Party	1998	2002	Difference	QCA
CDA	0,71	0,69	-0,02	0,5
PVDA	0,63	0,80	0,17	0
VVD	0,69	0,70	0,01	0
D66	0,73	0,80	0,06	0
GL	0,83	0,69	-0,13	1
SP	0,82	0,79	-0,03	0,73

Table 4.10a: Party difference scores 1998-2002

Party	1998	2002	Difference	QCA
CDA	0,74	0,73	-0,01	0,27
PVDA	0,80	0,77	-0,03	0,73
VVD	0,71	0,74	0,03	0
D66	0,80	0,69	-0,10	1
GL	0,61	0,63	0,02	0
SP	0,79	0,82	0,03	0

Table 4.10b: Party difference scores 2002-2006

The QCA-scores are calculated using qualitative anchors. As qualitative anchors are used a low qualitative anchor of [0,01], a middle anchor of [-0,02] and a high anchor of [-0,5]. In this way, all parties with negative differences scores, so with a difference between the public opinion and the party position that has gotten bigger between elections, obtain a substantial membership of the set

'Public opinion clearly shifting away'. Another reason for setting the anchor for full-membership on [0,05], is because the results show that most negative difference scores lie around -0,02 and only two outliers score substantially higher. This tells something about the distribution of difference scores. When the high qualitative anchor would be placed higher, there would be hardly any cases with full membership.

4.4 Party Interaction

A party is supposed to change its policy, if the marker party, the party who is its main competitor on a section of the electorate, also changes its policies. Several steps have been taken to measure this condition.

First, all parties in the Dutch party system in 2002 and 2006 have been analyzed on the dimensions economic, ethic and EU. Next to the six parties that are investigated, these include the LPF in 2002 and the PVV and CU in 2006. The SGP and Partij voor de Dieren have not been taken into consideration, because they are too small to be a competitor for other parties. The party positions for 2002 and 2006 are given in Appendix C1. Second, for each dimension and for each party, the gap between the dimensional scores of all other parties is calculated (Appendix C2). Third, based on these scores, it is determined which parties are competitors to which parties. As a rule of thumb, all parties that have a difference on a dimension of lower than 2 are treated as competitor. This number is chosen looking at the results. There are two main categories of difference scores: a low category with scores lower than 2, and a category of scores higher than 3. Since a party does not compete with parties with completely different positions, only those parties are selected as competitor whose difference scores do not exceed 2. Fourth, of the competitor parties, the marker party is selected. This is the largest party of the competitor parties. Largest is analyzed looking at the results of the

Year	Party	Marker EU	Marker Eco	Marker Eth	QCA EU	QCA Eco	QCA Eth	Total	QCA-score
2006	CDA	PvdA	VVD	VVD	0,22	0,18	0,25	0,65	**0,33**
	PVDA	CDA	D66	SP	0,64	0,01	0,96	1,61	**0,81**
	VVD	GL	CDA	CDA	0,88	0,61	0,01	1,5	**0,75**
	D66	PvdA	CDA	PvdA	0,22	0,61	0,04	0,87	**0,44**
	GL	CDA	PvdA	PvdA	0,64	0,21	0,04	0,89	**0,46**
	SP	LPF	GL	PvdA	0,01	0,1	0,04	0,15	**0,08**
2010	CDA	PvdA	PvdA	VVD	0,42	0,01	0,07	0,5	**0,25**
	PVDA	CDA	CDA	VVD	0,24	0,26	0,07	0,57	**0,29**
	VVD	CDA	PVV	PvdA	0,24	0,01	0,07	0,32	**0,16**
	D66	PvdA	CDA	PvdA	0,42	0,26	0,07	0,75	**0,38**
	GL	CDA	PvdA	PvdA	0,24	0,01	0,07	0,32	**0,16**
	SP	PVV	GL	VVD	0,03	0,01	0,07	0,11	**0,06**

Table 4.11: Party Interaction marker parties + QCA-scores

previous elections (Appendix C3). Note that party interaction for the case 2006 is measured by looking at the largest party in the elections of 2003. The election results of 2003 show very different results from the elections of 2002. A party that wants to change in 2004 looks to the largest party at that moment and not to the largest party in previous elections. Therefore, it seems more logical to use the results of 2003.

The results of this analysis are presented in the first columns of table 4.11. The next three columns show the QCA-scores for each dimension. The QCA-scores for each party are calculated using the same qualitative anchors as were used for the Outcome-condition. The QCA-scores on each dimension are added up under 'Total' and parted by two to get the definitive QCA-scores.

4.5 CDA

The next sections discuss per party the leadership, factions, party goals and external shock. To set the scene, attention is first focused at the context. The CDA is a Christian democratic party. Founded in 1980, the party has long played a dominant role in Dutch politics. After having spent eight years in opposition, from 1994 to 2002, the party regained its central role in Dutch politics, by winning the Dutch general elections of 2002. Party leader from 2001 onwards, Balkenende became prime minister of a cabinet that also featured the VVD and newly born LPF. The cabinet quickly resigned and after winning the elections, the CDA formed a coalition with VVD and D66. This cabinet lasted until 2006. The CDA again won the elections and formed a cabinet with PvdA and ChristenUnie: Balkenende IV. In February of 2010, this cabinet had to resign. Table 4.13 lists the mentioned events.

Date	Event
October 2001	Balkenende new party leader
May 2002	Victory at general elections (29 → 41 seats)
July 2002	CDA in cabinet with VVD and LPF (Balkenende I)
October 2002	Resignation Balkenende I
January 2003	Victory at general elections (41 → 44 seats)
May 2003	CDA in cabinet with VVD and D66 (Balkenende II)
June 2006	Resignation Balkenende II
July 2006	Rump cabinet Balkenende III
November 2006	Small loss at general elections (44 → 41 seats)
February 2007	CDA in cabinet with PvdA and ChristenUnie (Balkenende IV)
February 2010	Resignation Balkenende IV
June 2010	Loss at general elections (41 → 21 seats)

Table 4.13: CDA events in period 2001-2010

Leadership change

For each party, the leadership is discussed in the period from 2002 to 2010. In this period, the CDA was led by Jan-Peter Balkenende, who formed the dominant coalition of the party with ministers and members of parliament. Note that the dominant coalition is primarily a theoretical concept. The dominant coalition is not a fixed group of people, but rather a flexible entity with varying membership. A person does not actually 'join' the dominant coalition, it just becomes more (or less) influential. It follows that the description of the dominant coalition may not be exhaustive, as a lot of people can be influential in some way. In order to test of the hypothesis, it suffices to describe the main members of the dominant coalition.

Balkenende became the leader of the CDA in 2001. Because of a dispute between party leader De Hoop Scheffer and party chairman Marnix van Rij, both resigned, less than a year before the next elections (Lucardie, Noomen en Voerman 2002: 24). The resulting power vacuum was filled by Balkenende, Hillen, Van der Hoeven, Frissen and De Vries (Appendix D1: line 207-233) Balkenende had previously served in the scientific bureau of the party and was in parliament since 1998. Inexperienced and unknown to the public, he was surrounded by the more experienced Member of Parliament Hillen and advisor Jack de Vries. Van der Hoeven wanted to become party leader herself, she served as number two. According to Van de Camp, these were the main characters in the dominant coalition in 2002.

In the CDA, the dominant coalition is primarily formed by ministers and Members of Parliament (Ibid: line 327). It follows that the dominant coalition changed substantially after winning the elections in 2001. When Balkenende became prime minister, Maxime Verhagen replaced him as parliamentary leader. Other persons joining the dominant coalition were Klink, director of the scientific bureau and former colleague of Balkenende, and the ministers Ernst Hirsch Ballin, Piet Hein Donner and Aart de Geus. Their cooperation is described as follows:

"Balkenende, Klink, als de denkers, Verhagen als de politieke strateeg, aanjager. En Ernst als de bewaker van het geheel. En dan samen met Donner en De Geus op de achtergrond." (Ibid: line 144)[2]

The dominant coalition hardly changed after 2002. The CDA remained in office until 2010 and although some members of the dominant coalition took on different positions, as Verhagen and Klink became minister in 2006, the core of the dominant coalition remained intact.

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[2] Translation. Balkenende and Klink as the thinkers, Verhagen as the political strategist. Ernst kept the broader perspective, together with Donner and De Geus at the background.

I therefore decide to award the period 2002-2006 leadership change condition with a score of [0,25] and the period 2006-2010 with a score of [0]. Change is measured at the moments of the elections. For the first period, the leader did not change, but the dominant coalition changed somewhat, especially through the ministers that entered the dominant coalition. However, Balkenende, Hillen and Van der Hoeven remained important. Therefore, the dominant coalition did not fully change. For the second period, the dominant coalition stayed more or less the same. The party did not change either. The case is therefore awarded a [0]-score.

Unified leadership

After giving a general description of streams within the party, I discuss which concrete tensions have arisen and which degree of factionalism they correspond with. Although not without tensions, the period between 2002 and 2010 was one of relative stability. Tensions grew towards the end of the period. The CDA is a complex party, but this complexity does not in itself lead to a leadership that is not unified.

Currents

As a party of both protestants and Catholics, farmers and city dwellers, employers and employees, the CDA by nature is a complex party (Ibid: line 2). There is no primary dimension and there are no fixed faction lines. Furthermore, the party has become quite horizontal in recent years, less hierarchical. This is indicated by the following statement of Van de Camp: "Het was echt niet zo dat Balkenende zomaar los van zijn ministers alles kon besluiten. Het werd gewoon niet gepikt." (Ibid: line 182).[3] This description shows two things. First, there are always tensions within the CDA. Second, these tensions do not grow into factions. Furthermore, these tensions do not make the leadership 'not unified'. As a standard bearer of consociationalism, the CDA has always been good at managing disagreement. Van de Camp says:

"Het CDA is een beetje stalinistisch wat dat betreft, wij zijn goed in het voorbereiden van congressen. Dus partijvoorzitters hebben al gesproken met provinciale afdelingen, het partijbestuur heeft er al een paar keer over vergaderd. CDA-congressen worden niet gekenmerkt door grote, onverhoedse veranderingen." (Ibid: line 350).[4]

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[3]Translation: It was not accepted if Balkenende wanted to act on his own.
[4] Translation: In that respect, the CDA is a bit of a Stalinist party, we are good at preparing congress. This means that the party chairman has talked with the regional divisions, while the party board has also discussed everything. CDA-congresses are not known for the great changes that take place.

Although about a different matter, this gives a good indication of the way CDA handles differences. The party contains a lot of different currents, but still finds ways of effective decision making. It follows that the mentioned differences do not indicate a factionalized party.

Party factionalism

Within the party, some noteworthy tensions existed over immigration, social policy, the decision to support the war in Iraq (Appendix D1: line 66) and, later on, about the position of Balkenende and the rightwing course of the CDA. The first three matters correspond to Van de Camp's picture of tensions within the CDA. The dimension on which the discussion takes place is primarily policy. The level of organization is low. Whereas the course of the CDA on social policy was attacked by former ministers like De Vries or Boersma, the position on immigrants was attacked by former party chairman Van Rij (Hippe et al 2005: 24). Furthermore, the discussion did not spread far through the party. These tensions can be classified as tendencies at most.

Later on in the period, critique grew, especially on the position of Balkenende. Although Balkenende had never been a popular prime minister, he got good results at the elections of 2002, 2003 and 2006. This gave him a solid position within the CDA. After 2006 however, critique from within the CDA started to grow. Prominent party members as Ruud Lubbers, Willem Aantjes and Herman Wijffels openly criticized Balkenende's functioning and a pole by Maurice de Hond showed that 25% of the CDA-members wanted Balkenende gone (Elsevier 2009, Elsevier 2010, NOVA 2010). This critique can be classified as a tendency rather than a faction, as it was not really organized, but still was supported by a lot of CDA-members.

As QCA-scores, the period 2002-2006 is awarded a score of [0,5], whereas the period 2006-2010 gets a score of [0,25]. The first period is close to a score of 0,25, but as the mentioned complexity is normal for the CDA and not very organized, the classification of 'light factionalism' does not seem right. However, as critique grew in the second period and because it came from both normal and prominent party members, the CDA in the period 2006-2010 is awarded the [0,25]-score.

Factionalism dominant coalition

All the different tendencies within the CDA come together within the dominant coalition. This leads to a complex and horizontal party leadership. As a comparison of the tensions in the period 2002-2010 and the period of Lubbers, Van de Camp says:

"Ja, er is meer geknokt en ik sta er positief in. (question of the interviewer: why?) Omdat koekoek eenzaam dodelijk is, je moet ook knokken in een politieke partij. En nee, dat als meneer Lubbers kucht en dan is CDA verkouden, dat is niet mijn stijl van politiek bedrijven. Ik vind het goed dat

Balkenende en Verhagen echt grote ruzie hadden, echt grote ruzie, want ja dat hoort bij parlementaire democratie. Nu bekijk ik het even procesmatig he?" (Appendix D1: Line 412)[5]

This quote illustrates again that, although the relations within the dominant coalition were not all peaceful, this did not make the dominant coalition 'not unified'. The rationale behind the hypothesis is that a unified party has more freedom to make policy moves. The question is, whether a fight now and then indicates a lack of this freedom. Van de Camp suggests this kind of communication is actually beneficial for the decision-making process within the party. I therefore decide to award the dominant coalition of the CDA a score of [0,25] for the entire period. Clearly, it is not without tensions. However, these tensions seem to be part of a process and do not indicate factionalism.

With party and dominant coalition-scores added up, the period 2002-2006 gets a [0,75] score for unified leadership, while 2006-2010 gets a score of [0,5].

External shock

The goal of the CDA in the period 2002-2010 was to get into office. Regarding this goal, it did not suffer any shocks, as it won each election that took place. In analyzing the party goal of the CDA, first the goal of the CDA as a party is discussed. Second, the goal of the dominant coalition is analyzed, which is decisive.

Party

Wolinetz determines the party goal by analyzing the party on matters as policy debate, consistency of policy positions assumed and the role of policy in election campaigns (2002: 150). The party organization of the CDA clearly points to vote or office-seeking motives, as the extent and level of the involvement in the policy debate is confined to the leadership and debate on congress is mainly pro forma. This is indicated by Van de Camp's comment about the way the CDA prepares congresses (Ibid: line 350). He furthermore says that CDA congresses seldom show big changes.

Dominant coalition

The goal of the dominant coalition of the CDA has for the entire period been office-seeking. In 2002, Balkenende stated that he wanted to become prime minister (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004a:

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[5] Translation: There has been a lot of fighting and I like that. This is because it is not good if a party is dominated by one individual, this is not my style of politics. I therefore liked it that Balkenende and Verhagen had major disagreements, because that is a party or parliamentary democracy. I'm now looking at it from a process point of view.

44). This had not changed by the end of his reign in 2010, as he stated: "ik ga graag door als premier" (Ten Hooven 2011: 98).[6]

External shock

In the period between 2002 and 2010, the CDA did not experience an external shock. As the primary party goal was to get into office, and the CDA succeeded for the entire period, it was a rather shock-free period for the party. As QCA-scores, the party gets for both periods a [0]-score.

4.6 VVD

The VVD is a liberal party. Although never the largest (until 2010), there is no party with more years spent in government. In 2002, the VVD has just spent eight years in the purple coalition, together with PvdA and D66. At the elections in 2002, PvdA and VVD are confident that the battle for 'Het Torentje' will be fought between them[7]. This perspective changes dramatically with the rise of new rightwing leader Pim Fortuyn, whose attack on the established parties leads to great losses on the side of PvdA and VVD. Despite of these losses, the VVD gets into the new formed coalition. After the quick fall of the first cabinet Balkenende, the VVD again managed to get into a coalition, which would last until June 2006. A month before, the VVD held its first election for the party leadership. Following a fierce competition with Rita Verdonk, Mark Rutte becomes the new party leader. After the elections, in which the VVD loses seats and Verdonk attracts more voters than party leader Rutte, Verdonk again tries to become party leader. She fails, a year later she is put out of the faction. With peace restored, the VVD becomes the biggest party in the 2010 elections.

Date	Event
April 2002	Fall of Kok II (coalition of PvdA, VVD, D66)
May 2002	Big loss at general elections (38 → 24 seats)
May 2002	Zalm new party leader
July 2002	VVD in cabinet with CDA and LPF (Balkenende I)
October 2002	Resignation Balkenende I
January 2003	Growth at general elections (24 → 28 seats)
May 2003	VVD in cabinet with CDA and D66 (Balkenende II)
May 2006	Rutte new party leader through internal elections
June 2006	Resignation Balkenende II
July 2006	Rump cabinet Balkenende III
November 2006	Loss at general elections (28 → 22 seats)
September 2007	Verdonk put out of faction
June 2010	Victory at general elections (22 → 31 seats)

Table 4.14: Events VVD in period 2002-2010

[6] Translation: I want to say on as prime minister.
[7] 'Het Torentje' is the office of the Dutch prime minister.

Leadership change

Many leadership changes occurred within the dominant coalition of the VVD in this period. Also, party leadership changed twice, from Dijkstal to Zalm to Rutte.

The dominant coalition in the VVD is formed by a small group, containing the party leader, the party chairman and the number two of the fraction in parliament (Appendix D2: line 25). This group is smaller than the coalition leading the CDA or PvdA. According to Van de Camp, this is because CDA and PvdA are complex parties covering many segments of the electorate, while the VVD is more of an elitist-party covering only some segments (Appendix D1: line 164).

At the time of the elections of 2002, the small-group mentioned by Fennema consisted of party leader Hans Dijkstal, party chairman Bas Eenhoorn and 'second in command' in parliament Ancke van Blerck-Boerman (Lucardie, Noomen & Voerman 2003: 88). Furthermore, it seems VVD-ministers as Jorritsma, Zalm, Terpstra and Hermans were also important. This is because party chairman Eenhoorn mentioned these four and Dijkstal as a 'leading group' and 'dream team' (Ibid).

After the elections in 2002, the dominant coalition changes drastically. Parliamentary leader Dijkstal resigns and is succeeded by Zalm (Ibid: 171). Jorritsma, Terpstra and Hermans left national politics as well. New changes occurred when Balkenende I resigned and Zalm became vice-premier in Balkenende II. After his departure in 2003, Van Aartsen became the new parliamentary leader for the VVD (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004b: 126). In the same year, party chairman Eenhoorn was succeeded by Van Zanen (Ibid: 131). In this period, Bibi de Vries was number two in parliament (Appendix D2: line 103).

A new series of changed occurred from 2006 onwards. After big losses at local elections, Van Aartsen resigned as parliamentary leader (Lucardie et al 2008: 91). He is followed up by Mark Rutte, who defeated opponent Verdonk in internal elections (Ibid: 98). After the elections, Verdonk became the new number two in parliament. Eventuelly, she left in 2007, and was replaced by Edith Schippers (Appendix D2: line 103). Finally, in 2008, Bas Eenhoorn was replaced as party leader by Ivo Opstelten.

Based on the drastic personnel changes between 2002 and 2006, this period gets a 'Leadership change' QCA-score of [1]. Both the party leader and the entire dominant coalition changed in this period. The case 2010 gets a 'Leadership change' score of [0,5]. Mark Rutte remained the party leader, but fellow dominant coalition-members Verdonk and Van Zanen left office. Actually, this case lies in between full change and partial change of the dominant coalition. I decide it is closer to full change, as two third of the dominant coalition changed.

Unified leadership

With first Van Aartsen competing with Zalm for party leadership, and later on Rutte and Verdonk, the period 2002-2006 was tumultuous in terms of leadership. With the departure of Verdonk in 2007, things became quieter within the VVD.

General events

About the basic factional lines within the VVD, Fennema says:

"Je hebt, en dat is denk ik van alle tijden, bij de VVD twee vleugels. Je hebt law and order, met aandacht voor identiteit en integratie, de harde kant. En aan de andere kant heb je de liberale vleugel die zich meer richt op aspecten als ontplooiing van het individu, vrije keuze, meningsuiting. Die twee vinden zich meestal in het midden bij economische onderwerpen, namelijk overheidsbemoeienis, de ondernemer die zijn ding moet kunnen doen, niet te hoge belastingen." (Ibid: line 3).[8]

According to Fennema, these tensions do not result in fixed factions. In the period 2003-2007, there was a considerable debate over who should be the leader of the VVD. When Zalm became vice-premier in Balkenende II, Van Aartsen took over his function as parliamentary leader. This raised doubts about who was supposed to be party leader of the VVD. Party leader is not an official function within the VVD (Hippe et al 2005: 100). Many considered Zalm to be the party leader, but Van Aartsen was trying to take his position (Voerman and Dijk 2008: 124). This culminated in a request to the general assembly of the VVD, on the 26th of November 2004, to name him party leader (Hippe et al 2005: 100). Eventually, it was decided to name Van Aartsen 'politiek aanvoerder', 'captain', instead of leader. This reaffirmed the leadership of Zalm, but the power relations within the dominant coalition remained complicated.

New division arose in 2006, when Rutte and Verdonk competed in internal elections on the parliamentary leadership. Verdonk, who had made a name for herself as a tough Justice minister, got the support of prominent VVD-members as Bolkstein, Weisglas and Aptroot, while Rutte, who was a state secretary of Education, was supported by the head office of the VVD and members as Zalm, Hoogervorst and De Grave (Lucardie et al 2008: 96). After a tough competition, Rutte won, but only by a small margin (Ibid: 98). This did not end the struggle however. When it turned out after the following elections that Verdonk had attracted more voters than Rutte, Verdonk opted for an investigation to the meaning of this. This did not happen, but made clear that Verdonk had not given

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[8] Translation: In the VVD, there are two wings. One is about law and order, focusing on identity and integration, the hard side. On the other side, there is the liberal wing that focuses on issues as development of the individual, free choice, freedom of speech. Those two meet at economic issues such as state interference, entrepreneurial freedom, low taxes.

up her ambitions yet (Ibid: 103). Verdonk remained critical and after a number of incidents, she was set out of the faction in 2007 (Voerman and Dijk 2008: 129).

Dominant coalition

The question is, to which extent was the dominant coalition factionalized through the mentioned divisions. For the period 2002-2006, the dominant coalition was not unified. First, at the time of Zalm and Van Aartsen, it was not clear who was the leader. This implies that the dimension of the division was strategic, not policy-related. Afterwards, Rutte became the new leader, but Verdonk wanted to be leader to. About the differences between Verdonk and Rutte, Fennema says:

"Zij werden door de buitenwereld wel gezien als de representanten van verschillende vleugels, maar inhoudelijk hadden zij zelden verschil van mening. Als je kijkt naar de opvattingen van Rutte als het gaat om law en order, integratie, en dat soort zaken, verschilde dat niet van Verdonk. En ook de liberale kant, want ook Verdonk was erg liberaal als het gaat om zelfontplooiing, euthanasie, abortus, vrijheid van meningsuiting, waar Rutte natuurlijk ook heel erg voor is. Inhoudelijk was er niet zo'n verschil. Waar wel een verschil in was, dat hoef ik niet te ontkennen, is natuurlijk hun stijl, hun manier van politiek bedrijven, en natuurlijk vooral dat er een verschil ontstond over wie er nou politiek leider moest zijn." (Appendix D2: 65)[9]

Again, members of the dominant coalition were divided about who should be leader. Therefore, the dominant coalition of the VVD in the period 2002-2006 is classified as factionalized, or fully not-unified. Things changed after 2007, when Verdonk left the dominant coalition. To my knowledge, there were no relevant tensions left, so therefore, this period is classified as fully unified. The period of division from 2006 to 2007 is not counted, as the period from 2007 to 2010 provided a long enough period of unity to perform changes.

Party

For both periods, the party is classified as partially factionalized. In 2004, a poll showed that 50% of the VVD-members thought Zalm should be leader, whereas 16% opted for Van Aartsen as leader (Hippe et al 2005: 100). At the internal elections of 2006, 51% voted for Rutte, while Verdonk got 46% of the votes (Lucardie et al 2008: 98). Again, these differences were mainly strategy related. There was little organization in both camps, as both candidates were not so different on policy

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[9] Translation: By the outside, they were perceived as representatives of the different wings of the VVD, but on policy matters, they rarely disagreed. Looking at the opinion of Rutte on matters as law and order, immigration, those kind of things, this hardly differed from Verdonk's opinion. The same is true for liberal matters, such as the focus on the individual, euthanasia, abortion, freedom of speech. However, they did disagree on political style and on who was to be party leader.

matters. The division was widespread however, as party members from many levels had an opinion on the matter.

At the start of the period 2006-2010, the division seemed to aggravate. Despite of Verdonks defeat at the internal elections, she continued to show she wanted to be party leader. This heightened the tensions and forced party members to take a stand. At one point, members of a 'Verdonk groep', as Fennema mentions it, even proposed a motion of no-confidence against Rutte (Appendix B2: line 195). The use of the word 'groep' indicates a certain level of organization, which did not show earlier. However, after Verdonk left the VVD, indicants of continuing division did not show anymore. Apparently, Verdonks departure took away the sharp edges of the division. However, it seems unlikely that all division was gone. Therefore, this period is classified as partially factionalized.

With party and dominant coalition scores added up, it follows that the case 2006 receives a Unified leadership score of [0,25], whereas the case 2010 receives a score of [0,75].

External shock

The primary goal of the VVD in both periods is office-seeking. However, as a secondary goal, vote-seeking is important as well. In both periods, the VVD is classified as partial member of the set External shock ([0,5]).

Party goal

At the moment of the elections in 2002, the organization of the VVD points to an office or vote-seeking party. This follows from the statement that the VVD does not have a culture of debate (Appendix B1: line 23). Furthermore, the number of party meetings was low (Voerman and Dijk 2008: 100). This changed after the party renewal of 2003, when a system of 'one man one vote' was introduced for party assemblies. Fennema confirms this has made decision making in the VVD more democratic (Appendix B2: line 202). According to Wolinetz, it follows that the VVD has become more policy-seeking after these changes, although this does not make the party a full-blown policy-seeking party.

In all elections in the period 2002-2010, the dominant coalition of the VVD wanted to become the biggest party and get into office. The extent to which this goal was pursued differs per period. In 2002, party chairman Eenhoorn publically stated that party leader Dijkstal could become prime minister (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004a: 167). Zalm showed the same ambitions in 2003 (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004b: 123). According to Fennema, Rutte wanted to be prime minister as well (Appendix B2: line 143).

External shock

In the period 2002-2006, the VVD was hit by two external shocks. First, the party suffered a shock on the secondary goals vote-seeking [0,5] and policy-seeking [0,5]. First, the entrance of rightwing LPF posed a threat to the policy positions of the VVD. Furthermore, because of its great vote losses, the party suffered a full external shock on a secondary goal as well [0,5]. This should lead to the conclusion that the VVD is a full member of the set External shock. However, a closer look at the policy program of 2002 shows that the party made big changes to the program only months before the elections (Pellikaan, Van de Meer & De Lange 2003: 17). As a reaction to the quick growth of the rightwing LPF, the VVD changed its program to the right as well.

An external shock is about the moment the dominant coalition realizes the problems for one of its party goals. The reaction of the VVD in 2002 shows it was already aware of the shock before the elections of 2002. It follows that the shock was less hard when the elections showed the eventual results. Furthermore, the changes before the elections diminished the possibilities of changing after the elections, as the room for change was already used. Therefore, I classify the External shock in 2006 as [0,5], instead of 1.

After the elections of 2006, the VVD did not get into office. An external shock on office-seeking leads to a classification of [1], when the perspective of getting into office changes structurally. A classification of [0,5] is awarded when a party does not get into office, but retains a perspective of getting there. As there is no reason why the VVD lost its perspective on office in 2006, a score of [0,5] is awarded.

4.7 D66

D66, or 'Democraten 66', is a liberal progressive party founded in 1966, whose main goal has been the democratization of the Dutch political system. From 1994 to 2002, it formed the center of the purple coalition of PvdA, VVD and D66. After that peak, a period of decline set in. The party lost votes in the elections of 2002, 2003 and 2006 and was further plagued by confusion about the leadership

Date	Event
April 2002	Fall of Kok II (coalition of PvdA, VVD, D66)
May 2002	Big loss at general elections (14 → 7 seats)
January 2003	Small vote loss in general elections (7 → 6 seats)
January 2003	De Graaf resigns, Dittrich new party leader
May 2003	D66 in cabinet with CDA and VVD (Balkenende II)
March 2005	De Graaf resigns as minister
June 2006	Resignation Balkenende II
June 2006	Pechtold new party leader through internal elections
November 2006	Loss at general elections (6 → 3 seats)
June 2010	Gains at general elections (3 → 10 seats)

Table 4.15: Events D66 in period 2002-2010

and problems in Balkenende II. The party reached its low at the 2006 elections, when only 3 of the once 24 seats remained. After that, recovery set in under the leadership of Pechtold. At the 2010 elections, the party more than tripled its vote share and obtained 10 seats in Dutch parliament.

Leadership change

In the period between 2002 and 2006, considerable changes took place regarding the leadership of D66. While the identity of the party leader was unclear for some time, the dominant coalition changed almost completely. The period afterwards was more stable.

At the time of the 2002 elections, Thom de Graaf has been leader in parliament for D66 since 1997 and party leader since 1998. He leads the party with a dominant coalition that also includes ministers as Brinkhorst, Van Boxtel and Sorgdrager, Member of Parliament Dittrich and party chairman Schouw (Appendix D3: p.1). After the lost elections of 2002, De Graaf submitted his resignation, but this is not accepted by the fraction (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004a: 73). D66 did not return in government and the mentioned ministers did not return in national politics. In November 2002, Pechtold was chosen as new party chairman (Ibid: 79). After the party lost at the 2003 elections, De Graaf again submitted his resignation as party leader and parliamentary leader, which was accepted this time (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004b: 61). He was replaced as parliamentary leader by Boris Dittrich. However, when D66 entered a coalition with CDA and VVD, De Graaf returned to the center of the party. At that time, it was not clear who was the party leader. De Graaf had the most esteem, but Dittrich was the new parliamentary leader. What Dittrich was lacking however was legitimation, as he had never been appointed by the D66-congress (Appendix D3: p. 1). De Ruiter therefore described Dittrich as 'eerste pion' (first pawn), but not the party leader. The other D66-minister in Balkenende II was Brinkhorst.

In 2005, De Graaf quit as minister of governmental renewal, when his proposal for the direct election of mayors was rejected by the First Chamber (Hippe et al 2006: 38). He was succeeded by party chairman Pechtold, who in turn was replaced by Dales. In 2006, Dittrich resigned as parliamentary leader after a lost vote about a military operation in Afghanistan (Lucardie et al 2008: 46). In advance of the debate, he had threatened that a positive decision about Afghanistan would lead to problems in the cabinet. When it turned out that other D66-members, such as the ministers in the cabinet, did not agree with this standpoint, and when parliament voted in favor of the military operation, Dittrich admitted he had made mistakes and resigned as parliamentary leader for D66. He was succeeded by Van der Laan. Later that year, internal elections about the party leadership took place. After a fierce campaign, Pechtold beat Van der Laan with a small margin. She did not return after the elections.

In the 2006 elections, D66 lost half of its votes and obtained three seats in parliament (Ibid: 53). Next to Pechtold, D66 entered parliament with Koser Kaya and Van der Ham. These three remained in parliament until the elections of 2010. One last personnel change took place in 2006 and 2007. Party chairman Dales announced in December 2006 that he would step down. His position was temporarily taken over by former chairman Schouw, who stayed until Van Engelshoven was elected by the D66-congress in 2007 (Lucardie & Voerman 2009).

As QCA-scores for the set Leadership Change, I award the period 2002-2006 with a score of [1] and the period 2006-2010 [0,25]. In the first, the party leader changed several times. Furthermore, the dominant coalition changed almost completely. In the second period, the party leader stayed the same. The dominant coalition changed somewhat however, because some Members of Parliament did not return after the elections and because party chairman Dales resigned.

Unified leadership

One of the reasons for the success of D66 after 2006 was that there was no confusion anymore about the position of the party leader (Appendix D3: p. 2). In addition, De Ruiter points out that because of the trouble of the previous period, the few people that remained were loyal and motivated to get the party back on its feet. This indicates the precarious situation the party was in before 2006. The party was not really divided, but was not unified either. Much of this confusion has already been described in the previous section.

Dominant coalition

It follows that both the dominant coalition and the party were partially factionalized. For much of the period 2002-2006, the dominant coalition was without a clear leader. Unity of leadership does not only imply the absence of factions, but also the presence of a course, an organizing principle, something or someone setting the direction. Because of the confusion about the party leader (De Graaf or Dittrich), this organizing principle was missing. Another complicating factor in this story is Van der Laan, who had ambitions for Dittrichs job. After finishing second in internal parliamentary leader elections, she stated she would like to succeed Dittrich (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004a: 77). In 2004, she proposed a resolution in parliament that received strong criticism from prominent party members as Pechtold and Van Mierlo (Hippe et al 2005: 49). Again, this is no indicator of factionalism, but still indicates a certain lack of unity.

The unity of the dominant coalition and of the party in general was even more stretched in the internal elections for parliamentary leadership. Pechtold, Van der Laan and six other competitors fought a fierce campaign that was eventually won by Pechtold. Before that, Van der Laan had called Pechtold 'ongeloofwaardig' (Lucardie et al 2008: 49). He responded by stating Van der Laan damages

the party with comments like these. This division cannot have been good for the unity of the dominant coalition, and if it had lasted, the dominant coalition would have been classified as factionalized. However, the quarrel only lasted until the elections, after which Van der Laan left. In the period following the elections, the peace returned.

Party

The lack of unity in the dominant coalition did not lead to heavy tensions within the party. It was divided however, as the elections between Van der Laan and Pechtold showed. Whereas Pechtold received from party prominent Van Mierlo, Van der Laan was supported by Terlouw. The dimension on which this division took place was strategic in nature. It played in many arenas of the party, but was not organized.

QCA

The period 2002-2006 is awarded a QCA-score for Unified Leadership of [0,5], whereas the period afterwards gets a score of [1]. The first score is composed of [0,25] scores for both party and dominant coalition. The party was divided on the party leader, but only at the end. The dominant coalition was not really factionalized, but not unified either. The partial membership of Unified Leadership seems therefore most adequate, although this classification is not without doubt. The period 2006-2010 receives full membership of the set Unified Leadership, as De Ruiter explicitly stated that peace had returned after the 2006 elections.

External shock

In both periods, D66 suffered an external shock on its secondary party goal vote-seeking.

Party goal

In terms of party organization, D66 looks like a policy seeking party. Democracy is important to the party and this translates in an organization with much influence for party members. This is indicates by the following passage in the statutes of the party:

"De partij stelt zich als sociaal-liberale partij ten doel een politiek te bedrijven waarin zij de mens centraal stelt: vrij, betrokken, gelijkwaardig en mondig en streeft naar een democratische, duurzame

en open samenleving. (...) In het bijzonder streeft de partij naar radicale democratisering van de samenleving en het politiek bestel." (D66 2008)[10]

Next to a policy-seeking party, D66 also shows signs of a vote or office-seeking party, as it is known as a pragmatist party (Van der Land 2003: 389). Pragmatist strategies are often associated with vote or office-seeking. De Ruiter states that D66 is not a pure 'machtpartij'[11]. According to him, D66 has a focus at policy, but is also pragmatic, because one cannot implement policies without voters (Appendix D2: p.2). He concludes by saying that he cannot point out one of the three party goals for D66, as they are in balance.

I follow the conclusion of De Ruiter. Although it is possible for each party to say they pursue all three party goals, with D66, it seems like a realistic claim. This is difficult for measurement, as I measure party goals as a primary and a secondary goal. This problem also points to the restrictions attached to the use of party goals as a concept. I decide to treat each party goal as a secondary goal, so no goal can get a [1] score, but three goals can get a [0,5] score (instead of two goals).

External shock

As D66 saw its vote share halved in both the 2002 and 2006 elections, it seems the party got an external shock on its vote-seeking goal. It follows that the party gets a QCA-score of [0,5] for both periods. The party has not received a shock on its office-seeking motivation in 2006, because its not getting into office did not indicate any structural implications for its future chances on office.

4.8 GroenLinks

GroenLinks is a green party founded in 1990 by four small leftwing parties. Under the leadership of Rosenmöller (1994-2002) and Halsema (2002-2010), the party that started off as a green, socialist and opposition party grew into a green liberal/socialist party that has set its eyes on government. In

Date	Event
May 2002	Small loss at general elections (11 → 10 seats)
November 2002	Rosenmöller resigns as party leader, Halsema new leader
January 2003	Loss in general elections (10 → 8 seats)
November 2005	Publication manifest 'Vrijheid eerlijk delen'
November 2006	Small loss at general elections (8 → 7 seats)
November 2008	Publication report 'Partij van de Toekomst'
June 2010	Gains at general elections (7 → 10 seats)

Table 4.16: Events GroenLinks in period 2002-2010

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[10] Translation: Being social-liberal, the goal of the party is to focus on the individual: free, caring, equal, assertive and striving towards a society that is open, democratic and sustainable. The party in particular strives towards democratization of the political system.

[11] Translation: party that strives for power

his time as party leader, Rosenmöller was considered to be the leader of the opposition against the cabinet Kok II (Verkuil 2010: 95). Both GroenLinks and other parties considered the party to be a likely candidate for a future coalition. This changed after 2002. Fortuyn changed the rules of the game, the party system moved to the right, and GroenLinks' chances on government were diminished. Rosenmöller had fought a hard campaign against Fortuyn and was blamed for the climate that, some said, led to his assassination (Ibid: 109). At the 2002 elections, GroenLinks lost one seat. Shortly after, Rosenmöller resigned as party leader. He was succeeded by Femke Halsema. In 2005, Halsema and fellow Member of Parliament Ineke van Gent published the manifest 'Vrijheid eerlijk delen', which pleaded for a more progressive course. This implied a fundamental shift in GroenLinks policy and revealed sharp tensions within the GroenLinks ranks. The risen tensions were appeased by a commission led by Van Ojik. Peace returned in the party, and at the 2010 elections, the party gained three seats.

Leadership change

The dominant coalition in GroenLinks is primarily formed by its fraction in parliament (Appendix D4: line 175). This group changed somewhat in the period 2002-2006, but remained the same in the period afterwards.

A conversation about the future of Rosenmöller as party leader nicely illustrates the dominant coalition of 2002. On the 16th of October 2002, Rosenmöller asked fellow Members of Parliament Halsema, Vos, Vendrik and strategic advisor Van der Lee whether he should step down as party leader (Verkuil 2010: 111). Halsema was in parliament for GroenLinks since the elections of 1998 and was broadly seen as the likely successor of Rosenmöller (Ibid: 117). Vendrik was the financial expert that would later become one of Halsema's closest allies (Appendix D4: line 357). As it is this group of people with which Rosenmöller talked about such an important matter for the party, it seems logical that they are members of the 'dominant coalition'. This is in line with Otjes' statement that the dominant coalition in GroenLinks is made up of Members of Parliament (Ibid: line 175). Furthermore, Otjes also mentioned Van der Lee as an important figure in the later years (Ibid: line 30).

Although Rosenmöller initially decided to stay after the talk, he resigned one month later, after which Halsema took over.

"Femke Halsema (…) is zonder meer de belangrijkste persoon geweest, zeker ook in de ideologische debatten die er binnen GroenLinks zijn geweest. En je zou min of meer kunnen zeggen dat ze een

groep van aanverwanten, een informele organisatie van aanverwanten had binnen GroenLinks" (Ibid: 22).[12]

According to Otjes, this group consisted of individuals like Vendrik, Van der Lee, Van Gent, Van der Gaag and Snels (Ibid: line 26). Van Gent was in parliament for GroenLinks since 1998, while Snels acted as director of the scientific bureau of GroenLinks. Olaf van der Gaag was the head of communication for the party. These six persons are considered the most important members of the dominant coalition in the period 2002-2006. It can be assumed that Vos, who was in parliament for GroenLinks until 2006, also played some role. In 2008, this group was joined by Jolande Sap, who would succeed Halsema in 2010 (Ibid). One last noteworthy figure that played an important role in the period 2006-2010 is Bram van Ojik. He led the commission that was formed to appease the tensions that had risen in the discussion about the course of GroenLinks.

The case 2002-2006 gets a [0,5] membership score of the set Leadership Change, while the set 2006-2010 gets a score of [0]. Between the elections of 2002 and 2006, Halsema replaced Rosenmöller as party leader. For the rest, the dominant coalition remained pretty much intact. The same can be said for the period 2006-2010, for this reason, it is awarded a [0] membership score of the set Leadership change.

Unified leadership

"Als je GroenLinks als een piramide zou zien (…) dan zie je dat er eigenlijk een centrale scheidslijn is in mijn ogen, dat is die tussen meer oud-links en meer vrijzinnig-links. Oud-links, traditioneel-links, klassiek-links, socialistisch, (…) je kan zeggen dat in de basis van de partij, het congres, de partijraad, er een vrij grote groep is, een derde, (…) die zich daarmee identificeert, en hoe hoger je komt, hoe minder mensen er van die signatuur zijn." (Ibid: line 310).[13]

A new progressive course advocated by Halsema and her coalition from 2005 onwards spurred a series of heavy debates in GroenLinks. These debates were primarily carried out in the party, the dominant coalition was more unified.

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[12] Translation: Femke Halsema was the most important individual, in particular in the ideological debates that took place in GroenLinks. You could say she had a group of people around her that supported her policies.

[13] Translation: Treating GroenLinks as a pyramid, you can see a central dimension running between old-left and liberal-left. Old-left, traditional-left, classical-left, socialist, you can say that at the base of the party, the congress, the party board, there is a substantial group, around one third, who identifies with this view. And the higher you come, the less people are present of that signature.

Oud links vs vrijzinnig links

Underlying differences within GroenLinks surfaced with the publication of the manifest 'Vrijheid eerlijk delen'[14], by Van Gent and Halsema. Otjes notes that director of the scientific bureau of GroenLinks Bart Snels had great influence on the manifest (Ibid: line 76). Meant to spur debate and form a basis for a new party manifesto, it implied a serious change of policy (GroenLinks 2005: 3). In the manifest, the authors proposed eighteen measures to make welfare state more activating and emancipating (Verkuil 2010: 124). The manifest was supported by GroenLinks' Members of Parliament and youth organization Dwars. However, labor unions and leftwing party members were against the proposal. They saw it as a neoliberal proposal steering away from the socialist history and nature of the party (Ibid).

Tensions about the manifest rose at a congress after the elections of 2006. When prominent 'oud-links' exponent Leo Platvoet was not re-elected by the congress as candidate for the First Chamber, he started an opposition group within GroenLinks called 'Kritisch GroenLinks'[15]. Prominent party members as Van Broekhoven, De Wilt, Pitstra and Van der Lek soon joined his side (Appendix D4: line 320, Verkuil 2010: 131). Eventually, the tensions were appeased by two commissions led by Van Ojik. In a first report, 'Scoren in de linkerbovenhoek', the commission took over a lot of the point of Kritisch GroenLinks, as they stated the party lacked transparency and internal democracy (Ibid: 132). The second commission Van Ojik wrote a new 'beginselprogramma[16]', which according to Otjes, was meant as a compromise to reunite 'oud-links' and 'vrijzinnig links' (Appendix D4: line 132).

Party

GroenLinks can be considered factionalized on the matter of the progressive policy changes proposed by Halsema. The dimension, that is policy-related, does not only pertain to this discussion, but is reinforced by discussion about other matters. Otjes says the following about discussions in the party:

"En dat je daarin eigenlijk voortdurend de verhouding een derde, twee derde, een derde, twee derde, een derde, twee derde ziet, op allerlei onderwerpen. Dus zowel de verkiezing van Leo Platvoet als waar het gaat om AOW-leeftijd, WW, ontslagrecht, als waar het gaat bijvoorbeeld recenter in

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[14] Translation: fairly sharing freedom
[15] Translation: Critical GroenLinks
[16] Translation: Manifesto for principles

2011, over Kunduz, zie je eigenlijk voortdurend dezelfde twee derde, een derde verhouding." (Ibid: line 287)[17]

The question is, whether these fixed vote ratio's represent fixed alliances. Otjes cannot confirm this, but nevertheless thinks this is the case. Factionalism of a party is further measured by analyzing the level of organization and the arena's in which the discussion plays. The opposition in GroenLinks can be considered organized, as they formed a semi-permanent opposition group named Kritisch GroenLinks (Verkuil 2010: 131). Furthermore, the discussion did not play in all parts of the party, as the party representatives in the Second and First Chamber did not have problems with the progressive course.

Dominant coalition

After Platvoet, one of the main opponents of the progressive course, had not been re-elected in the First Chamber, he said:

"De aanhangers van de neoliberale agenda van Halsema hebben nu alle Eerste en Tweede Kamerzetels in handen" (Ibid).[18]

According to Otjes, he was right about this (Appendix D4: line 180). The dominant coalition of GroenLinks was mainly on the side of Halsema, although it also represented exponents of 'oud-links' as Ineke van Gent. However, on the matter of 'Vrijheid eerlijk delen', these sides were united. This is indicated by the fact that Ineke van Gent herself co-authored the manifest that stirred so much unrest under 'oud-links'. For this reason, the dominant coalition of GroenLinks is classified as unified. Factionalism is not only about the presence of factional lines, but also about the relevance of these lines in a particular matter.

QCA

The period 2002-2006 gets a membership in the set Unified leadership of [0,5]. The dominant coalition of the party was unified, but the party itself showed strong factionalism. The period 2006-2010 obtains a score of [1]. Although tensions were still heavy in the beginning of the period, rest returned quickly after the commissions Van Ojik had appeased the matter.

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[17] Translation: You find constantly the same one third/two third ratio, on all kinds of subjects. This plays in the election of Leo Platvoet, age regarding AOW, WW, employment policies, and more recently, in the decision about Kunduz.
[18] Translation: The supporters of the neo-liberal course of Halsema now control both the First and Second Chamber.

External shock

In both periods, the goal of GroenLinks was to get into office. It failed to do so in both periods, so the party is classified as partial member of the set External shock.

Party goal

'Van de straat naar de staat'[19] is the title of a book about GroenLinks by Lucardie and Voerman. It nicely indicates the change in orientations GroenLinks has gone through. With the eye fixed on government, GroenLinks has changed ideologically, strategically and organizationally (Melenhorst 2012: 91). Ideologically, the party developed a more coherent program and "tried to perform quality opposition" (Ibid). Organizationally, the party professionalized, inter alia by making the decision making-process more top-down. This is illustrated by the critique in 'Scoren in de linkerbovenhoek' that the party was becoming less transparent (GroenLinks 2007: 4). Strategically, the party developed from 'amateur' to 'professional', by presenting the party "as capable of performing important tasks and of GroenLinks as a party that needs to be taken seriously" (Melenhorst 2012: 91). The mentioned changes have taken place from the middle of the 1990's onwards.

Whereas GroenLinks used to be a policy-seeking party, according to the classification of Wolinetz, the party now more looks like a policy- or vote-seeking party (2002: 150). The same orientation is found in the dominant coalition of GroenLinks. Otjes leaves no room for doubt when he says the goal of GroenLinks in the whole period was office-seeking (Appendix D4: line 452).

External shock

With the eyes set on office, and without succeeding in this goal, the question is how great the shock was to GroenLinks. An office-seeking party is not automatically shocked when it does not reach its goal of governing. Such would only be the case if the perspective of governing was structurally damaged. In 2002, GroenLinks lost two seats and saw a rightwing coalition take office. Both are temporary, so GroenLinks did not lose sight on government structurally. It therefore gets a score of [0,5].

The same goes for the elections of 2006, although this is a complicated case. GroenLinks declined an invitation to get in office, while this was exactly what all factions in the party wanted, both 'vrijzinnig links' and the 'oud-links' (Ibid: line 555). Opinions still differ about what exactly caused this. After talks between CDA, PvdA and SP had been broken off, GroenLinks was invited to talk about a coalition (Verkuil 2010: 128). GroenLinks refused, as the party only wanted to talk about participation in government, when it was really needed. It therefore advised to first talk with the ChristenUnie, the

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[19] Dutch for 'From the street to the state'.

other small party that could give the coalition of CDA and PvdA a majority. When these three parties found each other, GroenLinks was left with nothing. Halsema blamed PvdA-leader Bos, because he wanted to be the only left party in government (Ibid: 130). Others blamed Halsema and the dominant coalition, as they had made a strategic mistake in assuming talks with ChristenUnie would fail. Whichever side is right, the question is, was this an external shock to GroenLinks. On the one hand, it can be said that GroenLinks chose to decline talks about office. This could lead to the conclusion that there is no external event that caused a shock, as it was an internal decision that led to not governing. On the other hand, Otjes says, with some bitterness, that "dit had goed kunnen gaan"[20] (Appendix D4: line 561). This was the rare chance for GroenLinks to govern and it did not happen. In this view, the perspective of GroenLinks to govern is slim in general, which makes the missing of the one chance more of a shock. As both points hold some truth, I decide to classify this case as a small shock of [0,5].

4.9 PVDA

The PvdA, short for Partij van de Arbeid, is a social-democratic party[21]. At the start of the period 2002-2010, the PvdA has just spent thirteen years in government, first in a cabinet with the CDA as the leading party, and from 1994 onwards, as the leading party in the 'purple' coalition with VVD and D66[22]. New party leader Melkert has set his sights on becoming the new prime minister and might have done so, if it were not for the entrance of rightwing politician Pim Fortuyn and his criticism of 'the ruins of eight year purple'[23]. As a result, the PvdA loses half of its seats in the 2002 elections. The party quickly recovers under the new leadership of Wouter Bos and finishes as a close second in the

Date	Event
April 2002	Fall of Kok II (coalition of PvdA, VVD, D66)
May 2002	Big loss at general elections (45 → 23 seats)
May 2002	Melkert resigns as party leader
November 2002	Bos new party leader
January 2003	Growth at general elections (23 → 42 seats)
April 2003	Talks about coalition of PvdA and CDA fail
November 2006	Loss at general elections (42 → 33 seats)
February 2007	PvdA in cabinet Balkenende IV with CDA and ChristenUnie
February 2010	Resignation Balkenende IV
April 2010	Cohen new party leader
June 2010	Small loss at general elections (33 → 30 seats)

Table 4.17: Events PvdA in period 2002-2010

[20] Translation: This could have gone right.
[21] 'Partij van de Arbeid' is Dutch for 'Labour party'
[22] Purple refers to the combination of the 'blue' VVD and the 'red' PvdA.
[23] Translation of Fortuyns book 'De puinhopen van acht jaar paars'.

elections of 2003. In 2006, the party loses some seats, but the party still manages to get into office. This lasts until February 2010, when the cabinet falls.

For both the PvdA and the SP, no interviews have been held. This implies that information on these parties is sometimes less specific. This should pose no threat to the reliability of the results, as there is alternative literature available and interviews about other parties give information about PvdA and SP too.

Leadership change

In the period 2002-2006, the PvdA underwent a great change in its leadership, as both the leader and most members of the dominant coalition changed. The following period was calmer, and only figured a small change in the dominant coalition.

General structure of dominant coalition

The structure of the dominant coalition of the PvdA is assessed with reference to the structure it has in other parties. The dominant coalition is mainly a theoretical construct and has no fixed membership. It can be analyzed on the relevant party positions in it and on the power structure. First, which party positions are present in the dominant coalition differs per party. Membership of the dominant coalition is not fixed; people just become more or less influential. This influence can be based either on a formal position or on other, informal grounds. In general, the dominant coalition is formed by a few Members of Parliament. This group is supplemented by ministers, when the party is in office. They owe their membership both to formal and informal grounds, as not all ministers or Members of Parliament are in the dominant coalition, but each dominant coalition is formed mainly of people with such functions. Furthermore, there are coalition-members whose counterparts in other parties do not play such an important role, which implies they owe their membership to a particular party structure or informal grounds such as personal merit. They might be party chairman, advisor, director of the scientific bureau, etc. Second, the form or power structure of the dominant coalition differs per party. Whereas the CDA has a broad dominant coalition with many party members who are influential (Appendix D1: line 182), VVD and especially GroenLinks have a smaller dominant coalition that is more leader centered (Appendix D4: line 173). It appears as if this latter category has more members with an 'informal' power base.

It follows that in identifying the dominant coalition in PvdA and SP, the aim should first be at analyzing the type of dominant coalition and whether the party is in government or not. This points to the relevant positions.

Dominant coalition PvdA

At the elections of 2002, the PvdA has spent thirteen years in government. This means ministers should play an influential role in the dominant coalition. Furthermore, Van de Camp states that the PvdA just as the CDA is a complex party with many currents (Appendix D1: line 21). Based on these statements, I presume the dominant coalition of the PvdA in 2002 was a broad one mainly figuring Members of Parliament and ministers.

In 2002, the PvdA was led by Ad Melkert (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004a: 130). At that time, he has just replaced Prime Minister Kok as party leader. PvdA ministers figuring in the second cabinet Kok are De Vries, Pronk, Netelenbos, Vermeend and Herfkens. The first Members of Parliament are Melkert, Belinfante, and Arib. Head of the campaign for the elections was Monasch, while Koole figured as party chairman (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004a: 135). Based on the structure of the dominant coalition within other parties, these are probably the most important names within the PvdA in 2002.

It all changed after the 2002 elections. Following the major defeat for the party, Melkert resigned as party leader. In the Second Chamber, he was replaced by Van Nieuwenhoven (Ibid). In June, she called upon the sittings Members of Parliament to consider giving up their position to make room for a new generation (Ibid: 137). Pronk, Vliegenthart, Verbeet, Herfkens and Benschop soon gave up their place in the Second Chamber. Not much later, Bos was chosen party leader and succeeded Van Nieuwenhoven as fraction leader (Ibid: 141). After the quick fall of Balkenende I, the composition of the PvdA-fraction in parliament changed again and strongly rejuvenated (Van der Zwan 2008: 281). The list was now led by Bos, Van Nieuwenhoven, Albayrak, De Vries and Bussemaker (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004a: 144).

It follows that most that were in the dominant coalition of 2002 left their position. However, it does not automatically follow that their successors are in the dominant coalition as well. The PvdA under Wouter Bos can be classified as leader centered. In both strategic and ideological respect, Bos is often said to operate on his own (Hippe et al 2005: 69). This is illustrated by the following examples. First, in the 2006 elections, Bos often met with his own campaign team of Esser, Dolstra and Van Bruggen, thereby willfully excluding the formal campaign team led by party chairman Van Hulten (Van der Zwan 2008: 313). Not much later, Bos allegedly forced Van Hulten to give up his place. Bos wanted full control and did not like any 'dwarsliggers'[24] (Ibid: 311). Van der Zwan writes:

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[24] Dutch for 'cross member'.

"De interne partijgelederen worden stevig onder de duim gehouden, aan de signalen van ontstemming van de kant van de achterban wordt voorbijgegaan. Wie de achterban in het geweer brengt om de koersbepaling van de politieke leider ter discussie te stellen wordt geïsoleerd en vervolgens opzijgezet." (Ibid: 313). [25]

From the observation that the PvdA under Bos was leader centered, it follows that the dominant coalition was probably small and not only consisting of Members of Parliament. In February 2007, Bos led the PvdA into a coalition with CDA and ChristenUnie. As ministers play a substantial role in dominant coalitions in general, it can be assumed that the dominant coalition of the PvdA changed somewhat after the start of the cabinet.

QCA

The period 2002-2006 receives full membership [1] of the set Leadership change, as both the leader and almost the entire dominant coalition changed during this period. The period 2006-2010 receives a score of [0,25]. Because of the government participation, ministers entered the dominant coalition of the PvdA. As the dominant coalition under Bos is classified as leader centered, it is not likely that the new ministers led to a full change of the dominant coalition.

Unified leadership

With the entrance of Bos and the number of seats he restored in 2003 elections, the period 2002-2006 was quite unified. However, in the course of the period, critique grew both ideologically and strategically, mainly from outside the dominant coalition. This continued through the period 2006-2010.

 "Het is de combinatie van minachting voor de interne partijdemocratie en het zich opsluiten in een kleine groep van bewonderaars en slippendragers die Bos als partijleider buiten de werkelijkheid heeft geplaatst en hem daardoor hopeloos heeft doen falen." (Van der Zwan 2008: 313)[26]

This quote, together with the one in the former section, indicates the location of the factionalism within the PvdA. The dominant coalition is not only considered unified, it is considered too unified. The opposition is located outside of the dominant coalition.

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[25] Translation: The party ranks are firmly under control, signals of discontent are not picked up. Those who try to mobilize support to change the course set by the party leader are isolated and disposed of.
[26] Translation: It is the combination of contempt for internal party democracy and the isolation from critique that put Bos outside of reality. This is the cause of his failure.

In the period 2002-2006, polls predicted a massif victory for the PvdA (Ibid: 301). This gave Bos a solid position as party leader. However, two examples illustrate that the PvdA was not unified on all matters. First, the PvdA campaigned in favor of the EU constitution at the referendum in 2005. However, a lot of party members, amongst whom were some prominent ones, openly criticized this decision (Hippe et al 2006: 65). Furthermore, in the same year, the PvdA-fraction in the First Chamber voted against the proposal to elect mayors, whereas the fraction in the Second Chamber had voted in favor of it (Ibid: 64). The division on such important matters shows the PvdA was not fully unified.

Critique also grew on the position of party leader Bos. He was criticized for his soloist performances and 'too general' statements (Hippe et al 2005: 69). Especially this critique grew after the lost elections of 2006. Bos' proposal to change the AOW was soon rebranded 'Bosbelasting' and received a lot of critique from outside and inside the party (Lucardie et al 2008: 74). The coalition agreement that was the result of negotiations with CDA and ChristenUnie was criticized as well (Van der Zwan 2008: 312). This critique continued during the course of the period in government. At one time, Bos reacted by stating that 'governing hurts' (Voerman 2008).

QCA

The period 2002-2006 gets a score of [0,75], the second period gets a score of [0,5]. In the first period, the dominant coalition seems to have been fully unified. However, as there were substantial tensions within the party, the party gets a score of 0,25. In the second period, the division in the party grew. Furthermore, the position of Bos as party leader was severely criticized. The question is how to qualify this. The dominant coalition in 2006-2010 was more factionalized than in the period before, but still not 'partially factionalized'. The party in the period 2006-2010 was more factionalized than in the period before, but still not fully factionalized. For this reason, the PvdA gets a score of [0,5]. This number is made up of a [0,375] for the dominant coalition and a [0,125] for the party in general.[27]

External shock

In both periods the PvdA's primary goal was to get into office. Vote-seeking was a secondary goal. As the party did not get into office after the elections of 2002, and because it lost a lot of votes, the party received a full external shock in the period 2002-2006. Because the party lost a lot of seats after the 2006 elections, it suffered a partial external shock in the second period.

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[27] As a five value fuzzy set is used, normally only scores of 0,25 or 0,5 are given. However, as the scores of 0,375 and 0,125 count up to 0,5, this is no problem.

The party goal

Wolinetz determines the party goal by looking at the party organization and the election campaigns (2002: 150). Looking at this second category, the PvdA under Bos looks like a vote-seeking party. Bos was in favor of professionalization of campaigning and the use of spin-doctors (Lucardie et al 2008: 74). Furthermore, the policy promoted by Bos seems to be developed to fit a strategy, another condition of Wolinetz associated with a vote-seeking party. While in opposition against the first cabinets Balkenende, Bos in many instances chose the middle ground between coalition and opposition, because he wanted to appear fit for policy (Van der Zwan 2008: 291).

However, this last statement can also be seen as pointing to an office-seeking strategy. That office was the aim of Bos also showed in the negotiations about governmental participation in 2003 and 2006. According to Van der Zwan, in both occasions, Bos was prepared to meet a lot of wishes of CDA to get into office (Ibid: 284). As the party goal is primarily determined by the dominant coalition, it follows that the primary goal of the dominant coalition under the leadership of Bos was to get into office. Following the criteria of Wolinetz, vote-seeking is treated as a secondary goal. Getting into office was the goal of Ad Melkert as well, the leader of the PvdA in the 2002 campaign (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004a: 130).

QCA

In 2002, the PvdA received shocks on both party goals. As the party did not get into office, which was the goal, the party received a partial external shock on its primary goal [0,5]. Furthermore, because the party lost half of its seats in parliament, it received a full shock on its secondary goal, which gives a [0,5] score as well. In the second period, the party again lost a lot of seats. It therefore suffered a full external shock on its secondary goal [0,5].

4.10 SP

The SP is a socialist party that is represented in parliament since 1994. Since then, the party has shown a steady growth, as it doubled its vote share at two subsequent elections and even reached 25 seats in the 2006 elections. This growth has been accompanied by a change in image. Was the party originally known as an 'extreme' Maoist party where everyone knows Marx by heart, this image gradually changed around the turn of the century to one of a trustworthy party that can make a difference. An important event in this respect was the successful campaign against the European

constitution in 2005. Since 1989, the party is led by Jan Marijnissen, who is both party leader and party chairman.

Date	Event
May 2002	Growth at general elections (5 → 9 seats)
January 2003	Break even in general elections (9 → 9 seats)
June 2005	Successful campaign against European constitution
November 2006	Growth at general elections (9 → 25 seats)
June 2010	Loss at general elections (25 → 15 seats)

Table 4.18: Events SP in period 2002-2010

Leadership change

The period 2002-2010 was a remarkably calm period in term of leadership changes, as there seem to have been no changes in the dominant coalition.

The nickname of SP leader Marijnissen is 'de grote roerganger van Oss'.[28] He owes this name to the place of his birth, the communist background of the party and to the way he leads the SP. Being both party leader and party chairman, he is according to many the dominant person in the party (Kagie 2006: 123). Based on these facts, I assume the SP is a leader centered party, which would suggest a dominant coalition that is small and fixed. Members of parliament are generally part of the dominant coalition. The first Members of Parliament Kant, Van Bommel and De Wit have been in parliament for the SP since 1998 and all stayed there until after 2010. It can therefore be assumed that they are the most important members of the dominant coalition of the SP, together with Marijnissen.

Because both the party leader and the dominant coalition did not change during the investigated period, the SP receives full non-membership of the set Leadership change in both periods.

Unified leadership

As there are no clear signs of factionalism within the SP in the given period, the party is considered fully unified in both periods.

The SP is a closed organization. Talking with GroenLinks man Simon Otjes about who I could interview for the SP, he simply stated: "they won't let you in"[29]. Furthermore, there is not a lot of literature on the party. It follows that it is hard to paint an accurate picture of the factionalism within the party.

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[28] Translation: the great helmsman of Oss.
[29] This was said while walking away after the formal interview, so I have got no transcription to refer to.

In the used literature, three signs of possible factionalism were found. First, there appears to be a division running through the party between the 'old school socialists' that perform a lot of actions and hold true to the traditional Maoist ideology and those more moderate, often new in the party and willing to appeal to a broader public (Kagie 2006: 229). Second, there are those who want more democracy in the party (Voerman 2008). The SP is a centralized party in which officials are obliged to give their salary to the party. These and other matters led to the formation of the small intraparty group 'Comité Democratisering SP'. This group had no apparent impact and got no results at congress. Third, Van Bommel, member of the dominant coalition of the party, stated in 2007 that he thought Marijnissen should not be both party leader and party chairman (Voerman 2008).

The common denominator in the mentioned events is that nothing happened as a result of them. Congress did not listen to 'Comité Democratisering SP' and Marijnissen did not give up his dual function. It follows that there is not enough evidence to identify factionalism within the SP. As a result, both the periods 2002-2006 and 2006-2010 are qualified as fully unified and obtain a QCA-score of [1].

External shock

The primary party goal of the SP is policy-seeking. The party suffered no shocks on this goal in the period 2002-2010.

Party goal

In identifying the party goal, the criteria of Wolinetz have until now played an important role. However, with the SP, they do not seem to fit. As said before, the SP is not a very democratic party and internal debate is slim. This would lead, according to Wolinetz, to the conclusion that the SP is a vote-seeking or office-seeking party. However, this does seem to concur with the empirical reality. After the 2006 elections, in which the SP gained 25 seats, the party was asked to talk about forming a coalition with CDA and PvdA. These talks happened, but did not take long. Marijnissen soon found out that the differences between the parties, in terms of policy, were too big (Lucardie et al 2008: 83). That does not sound like an office-seeking party, especially not, when the ideological neighbour social-democratic PvdA was involved in the talks as well. Whereas Wouter Bos of the PvdA was prepared to make substantial concessions to his own preferred policy to get into office, Marijnissen was not prepared to do so. If Bos' behavior is indicative of an office-seeking party, then the SP does not qualify.

The motivation Marijnissen gave for ending the talks seems more like policy-seeking. There is no clear definition of what it takes to be a policy-seeking party, but one would at least expect that such a party forgoes opportunities at votes or office in favor of policy. This concurs with the impression given in the book 'De socialisten' of the SP, in which the party is described as a calling. Only those with the right ideas qualify to be part of it (Kagie 2006: 8). The image of a policy-seeking party is also supported by the obliged cession of salary to the party. Marijnissen described this arrangements as a way to keep careerist out of the party (Voerman 2008). Certainly, one needs good reasons, like policy-seeking, to give their salary to the party.

External shock

All the mentioned events point in the direction of a policy-seeking party, which leaves office-seeking or vote-seeking as possible secondary goals. It does not really matter which of the two is more important, as the SP suffered an external shock on neither. The period 2002-2010 was a successtory for the party. The party did not lose seats at any of the elections. Nothing special happened in terms of policy either. And the party did not suffer a shock on office-seeking as well, as its chances on office grew during the period. Therefore, both the periods 2002-2006 and 2006-2010 get a QCA-score of [0].

5. Analysis

Based on the data discussed in the last chapter, an fsQCA is performed to analyze the individual or conjunctural necessity or sufficiency of conditions. Five fsQCA-analyses are performed. Because of the inconsistency of the initial results, adjustments have been made to the operationalization and instrumentation for the second to the fifth analysis. This is a normal QCA-procedure and sharpens the final conclusions.

Each analysis opens with a table containing the data. This is followed by conducting an analysis for necessary conditions. If these are found, they can be dropped from further analysis. Finally, the test for the sufficiency (subset relation) is performed.

5.1 QCA Analysis 1

Table 5.1 displays the results for the five conditions and the outcome. With regards to notification, the presence of a condition or outcome is indicated by upper-case letters (PUBLIC), while absence is indicated by lower-case letters (public).

Case	PUBLIC	PARTIES	UNITY	LEADERSHIP	SHOCK	CHANGE
CDA 2006	0,5	0,33	0,75	0,25	0	0,84
PvdA 2006	0	0,81	0,75	1	1	0,69
VVD 2006	0	0,75	0,25	1	0,5	0,22
D66 2006	0	0,44	0,5	1	0,5	0,52
GL 2006	1	0,45	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,52
SP 2006	0,73	0,08	1	0	0	1
CDA 2010	0,27	0,25	0,5	0	0	0,68
PVDA 2010	0,73	0,29	0,5	0,25	0,5	0,21
VVD 2010	0	0,16	0,75	0,5	0,5	0,68
D66 2010	1	0,38	1	0,25	0,5	0,57
GL 2010	0	0,16	1	0	0,5	1
SP 2010	0	0,06	1	0	0	0,51

Table 5.1: Summary table of all fuzzy set scores

Necessity

Table 5.2 displays the results of the analysis of necessary conditions for the outcome policy change. Conditions are considered necessary if they are above 0,9. The condition Unified Leadership has a consistency of 0,958 and can be considered a necessary condition for the outcome policy change. Appendix E1 contains a plot of the degree of membership in Policy

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
PUBLIC	0,376	0,662
PARTIES	0,461	0,825
UNITY	0,958	0,839
LEADERSHIP	0,422	0,661
SHOCK	0,487	0,804

Table 5.2: Analysis of necessary conditions for outcome POLICY CHANGE

change against the degree of membership in Unified leadership. It shows the lower-triangular distribution of cases that is typical for a superset relation. This is in line with the high coverage of 0,839.

Sufficiency

Table 5.3 displays the truth table. It contains three configurations that cover four cases, which means that eight cases did not make into the final results. This implies a big loss of data that needs to be fixed. The reason that these cases are dropped, is because only combinations with a minimal score of [0,5] make it into the final analysis. While looking at table 5.1, it shows that there are a lot of [0,5] scores. Another problem is the small variety of outcome-scores. Most of them are in the range of 0,5-0,7. A clearer picture might form when this variety is enlarged.

PUBLIC	PARTIES	LEADERSHIP	SHOCK	Number	Consistency
1	0	0	0	1	0,903
0	0	0	0	2	0,854
0	1	1	1	1	0,797

Table 5.3: Truth table for the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome POLICY CHANGE

Reconfiguration

Reconfiguration is a standard procedure in QCA. A short truth table or problems in consistency point to a yet imperfect measurement. Reconfiguration is no sign of unreliability, but a necessary step to a more perfect fit of reality.

The first problem, the [0,5] scores that do not make it into the truth table, is resolved by changing the [0,5] scores into [0,48] and [0,52] scores. This might seem random, but is defendable because fsQCA does not use interval or ordinal scores, but instead uses qualitative states. A score of [0,5] indicates maximum ambiguity, and represents the qualitative state exactly in between full membership and full non-membership. Therefore, it is reasonable to change the five-value fuzzy set into a six-value fuzzy set. As [0,5] indicates maximum ambiguity, so [0,52] indicates 'almost maximum ambiguity, but a little bit more in the set', and [0,48] indicates 'almost maximum ambiguity, but a little bit more out of the set'. The reconfiguration is further explained in Appendix E2.

The second problem, the lack of variety in outcome-scores, is remedied by a tougher measure of policy change. Instead of the initial qualitative anchors 0,8, 0,5 and 0,2, I choose to use 1,1, 0,65 and 0,2. This is done because the high qualitative anchor of 0,8 curtails the variation above this point. By using a higher qualitative anchor, more variety is incorporated into QCA set-membership. Since the

condition Party interaction is based on the measurement of Policy change, this condition is changed in the same way.

5.2 QCA Analysis 2

Appendix E3 displays the reconfigured fuzzy set scores.

Necessity

The results for the superset analysis are presented in table 5.4. UNITY, or Unified Leadership, shows the same consistency score as in the former test.

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
PUBLIC	0,376	0,662
PARTIES	0,461	0,825
UNITY	0,958	0,839
LEADERSHIP	0,422	0,661
SHOCK	0,487	0,804

Table 5.4: Analysis of necessary conditions for outcome POLICY CHANGE (2)

Sufficiency

Table 5.5 displays the truth table containing the fuzzy set analysis of the results. Because of the reconfiguration, all cases are now represented in this table. However, some new problems have occurred. The consistency scores in the truth table are supposed to demarcate the positive outcomes from the negatives. In general, cases with a positive outcome should have a consistency of above 0,8. However, as indicated by the 'outcome column', there is no pattern in consistency scores. Positive outcomes list under the lowest consistency scores and vice versa.

Best instances	PUBLIC	PARTIES	LEADER	SHOCK	Number	Consistency	Outcome
GL10	0	0	0	1	1	0,898	1
CDA06, SP06	1	0	0	0	2	0,882	0,52/1
GL06	1	0	1	1	1	0,843	0,47
PvdA06, D6606	0	0	1	1	2	0,772	0,47/0,5
VVD06	0	0	1	0	1	0,753	0,14
CDA10, VVD10, SP10	0	0	0	0	3	0,743	0,55/0,5/0,3
PvdA10, D6610	1	0	0	1	2	0,730	0,14/0,5

Table 5.5: Truth table for the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome POLICY CHANGE (2)

Reconfiguration

An important factor in the problematic consistency scores is the great amount of set membership-scores around 0,5. Especially in the set External shock and in the outcome, there are a lot of scores around this level. This skews the analysis for the following reason.

Configurations are the result of set intersection, a process in which the lowest of membership scores in a combination determines the membership score for the entire combination and in which the combination is chosen that has the highest membership. This is the configuration used in further analysis. Each set membership is measured in two ways, positively and negated. It follows that the set membership score closest to 0,5 always determines the membership score for the combination that is chosen as configuration.[30]

The consistency scores in the truth table are calculated by subtracting the total of condition scores from the minimum of condition and outcome in each case (for further explanation, see Benoit & Laver 2009: 108). However, when the condition scores are mainly determined by scores around 0,5, and when the outcome scores are mainly around 0,5 as well, the consistency score loses its function of demarcating between positive and negative outcomes.

This is what happens in the truth table in Table 5.5. Two measures are therefore taken. First, the condition External shock is dropped from further analysis, because its great amount of 0,5 membership scores skews the analysis. This is not a pragmatic step however. A condition with hardly any variation cannot explain the outcome. It is therefore irrelevant for further analysis. The second measure taken is a new operationalization of the outcome condition. The condition is formed by three dimensions: economic, ethical and EU. I decide to drop EU from further analysis. This again is a pragmatic step that can be defended on theoretical grounds. It is a pragmatic step, because the dropping of EU might bring more variation in the outcome scores. It can be defended on theoretical grounds, because EU is often not considered a relevant indicator of party policy in general, especially not for the Dutch party system in the measured period. Pellikaan, van der Meer and De Lange consider the cultural dimension of more importance than the EU dimension (2004: 163). The dimension is therefore dropped. The outcome condition now consists of only two dimensions, which are measured in the same way as before. The condition Party Interaction is changed as well. Furthermore, the same qualitative anchors are used, because these give a good distribution in outcome scores.

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[30] Example: PUBLIC has a score of 0,4 and PARTIES has a score of 0,8. Through negation and set intersection, there are four possible combinations possible: PUBLIC*PARTIES=0,4, PUBLIC*parties=0,2, public*PARTIES=0,6 and public*parties=0,2. The highest of these combinations, and the configuration used for further analysis, is the third one. Its membership score is determined by the negated PUBLIC score. This shows why scores closer to 0,5 are favored in QCA-analysis.

5.3 QCA Analysis 3

The table with the new set scores is presented in Appendix E4. Note a big change in the outcome variable, as there are now more scores towards both ends.

Necessity

Table 5.6 displays the results for the analysis of necessity. It shows that Unified Leadership is no longer a necessary condition. However, with a score of 0,815, it is still close to necessity and thus has to be treated as an important condition.

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
PUBLIC	0,470	0,821
PARTIES	0,404	0,802
UNITY	0,815	0,708
LEADERSHIP	0,384	0,600

Table 5.6: Analysis of necessary conditions for outcome POLICY CHANGE (3)

Sufficiency

Table 5.7 displays the truth table with the configurations found in the data. The results have improved substantially, as there are only two contradictory configurations left. In the first, CDA 2010 and GroenLinks have a positive outcome, yet they have a consistency score that corresponds with a negative score. The second contradiction is caused by PvdA10, which has a negative outcome, yet has a consistency indicating a positive outcome.

Best instances	PUBLIC	PARTIES	UNITY	LEADER	Number	Consistency	Outcome
GL06	1	0	1	1	1	0,882	0,92
CDA06, SP06, PvdA10, D6610	1	0	1	0	4	0,867	0,56/1/0,1/0,95
D6606	0	1	0	1	1	0,810	0,97
VVD06	0	0	0	1	1	0,779	0,25
PvdA06	0	1	1	1	1	0,778	0,26
CDA10, VVD10, GL10, SP10	0	0	1	0	4	0,697	1/0,25/1/0,16

Table 5.7: Truth table for the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome POLICY CHANGE (3)

Reconfiguration

Two measures are taken to resolve the contradictory configurations. First, the SP is dropped from further analysis. Second, Leadership Change is operationalized differently.

The SP is present in both contradictory configurations. This might be, because the party is of a different type and thus belongs to a different population of cases. The SP is a socialist party with a hierarchical party organization and a primary focus at policy. In this respect, it strongly differs from the other parties in this investigation, which are organized differently and whose main objective is getting into government. As it is this last feature that determines a party's behavior, and since policy change is primarily about party behavior, it follows that a party with a different party goal might behave differently. Its presence in the case selection could therefore diminish the unit homogeneity. It is therefore dropped from further analysis.

Leadership change has until now been measured as the difference in the dominant coalition between two election periods and has been measured at the moment of the elections. However, a leader that has been installed only months before the elections does not have the time to implement substantial policy changes. The operationalization is therefore changed. Leadership change is only measured for a certain election period, if the change has taken place long enough before the elections, so that the new leader or coalition has the time to implement changes. The four cases that have been reconfigured are described in Appendix E5. Leading question in the new operationalization is: who was responsible for the party policy at the time of the elections?

5.4 QCA Analysis 4

The results of the reconfiguration are given in Appendix E6. As there are no changes in the condition Unified Leadership of in the outcome, the data is not tested for necessity, as it is not likely that any significant changes have taken place.

Sufficiency

Table 5.8 displays the truth table containing the configurations found in the data. Because of reconfigurations, there is only one contradiction left, which is the configuration with CDA06 and PvdA10. CDA10 has a positive outcome and PvdA10 has a negative outcome.

Best instances	PUBLIC	PARTIES	UNITY	LEADER	Number	Consistency	Outcome
CDA10, GL10	0	0	1	0	2	0,936	1/1
GL06, D6610	1	0	1	1	2	0,909	0,92/0,95
D6606	0	1	0	1	1	0,810	0,97
CDA06, PvdA10	1	0	1	0	2	0,794	0,56/0,1
VVD06	0	0	0	1	1	0,779	0,25
PvdA06	0	1	1	1	1	0,778	0,26
VVD10	0	0	1	1	1	0,649	0,25

Table 5.8: Truth table for the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome POLICY CHANGE (4)

Reconfiguration

The set membership of PvdA 2010 in the set Unified Leadership is changed from [0,52] to [0,48]. Initially, I decided to award the [0,52] score, because party leader Bos was both a minister and a party leader. However, at the end of the period, Bos resigned as party leader and gave the leadership to Job Cohen. This puts the reasoning that the PvdA was more unified than factionalized in the period 2006-2010 because Bos was party leader and minister into a different perspective. Furthermore, section 4.9 shows there was a lot of critique on Bos as party leader. For these reasons, the PvdA 2010 is recoded from [0,52] to [0,48].

5.5 QCA Analysis 5

Table 5.9 displays the definitive fuzzy set scores. During the analysis, two cases and a condition have been removed and all conditions have been re-coded.

Case	PUBLIC	PARTIES	UNITY	LEADERSHIP	CHANGE
CDA 2006	0,52	0,46	0,75	0,25	0,56
PvdA 2006	0	0,53	0,75	1	0,26
VVD 2006	0	0,45	0,25	0,75	0,25
D66 2006	0	0,51	0,48	0,75	0,97
GL 2006	1	0,3	0,52	0,52	0,92
CDA 2010	0,27	0,14	0,52	0	1
PVDA 2010	0,73	0,37	0,48	0,25	0,1
VVD 2010	0	0,13	0,75	1	0,25
D66 2010	1	0,37	1	0,75	0,95
GL 2010	0	0,13	1	0	1

Table 5.9: Summary table of all fuzzy set scores (5)

Necessity

Table 5.10 displays the results for the superset analysis. None of the conditions is necessary for policy change, as none of them has a score higher than 0,9.

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
PUBLIC	0,441	0,784
PARTIES	0,423	0,781
UNITY	0,781	0,752
LEADERSHIP	0,506	0,577

Table 5.10: Analysis of necessary conditions for outcome POLICY CHANGE (5)

Sufficiency

Table 5.11 displays the final truth table. The last contradictions are gone and the consistency scores now are an accurate indicator of the outcome, as all positive outcomes have a consistency of above 0,8. The last column indicates whether a case is positive or negative.

Best instances	PUBLIC	PARTIES	UNITY	LEADER	Number	Consistency	Outcome	CHANGE
CDA10, GL10	0	0	1	0	2	0,936	1/1	1
GL06, D6610	1	0	1	1	2	0,909	0,92/0,95	1
CDA06	1	0	1	0	1	0,810	0,97	1
D6606	0	1	0	1	1	0,810	0,56	1
VVD06	0	0	0	1	1	0,779	0,25	0
PvdA06	0	1	1	1	1	0,778	0,26	0
PvdA10	1	0	0	0	1	0,724	0,1	0
VVD10	0	0	1	1	1	0,649	0,25	0

Table 5.11: Truth table for the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome POLICY CHANGE (5)

The program fsQCA gives three kinds of solutions: complex, intermediate and parsimonious. In the complex results, the analysis is done without the help of logical remainders. In the intermediate solution, logical remainders are only used in selected conditions, while the parsimonious solution uses logical remainders for all conditions. The solutions from all these procedures are given in Appendix E7. As the intermediate solution is the most nuanced, it will be discussed in more detail below.

In order to get an intermediate solution, logical remainders have been used on Unified Leadership and Leadership change. The reason it has been used on the former, is because it is possible that policy change is the result of unity in the party, while it is also possible that factionalism creates an incentive for change. The same is true for Leadership change. A new leader might decide to change the policy of the party, but it might also be possible that it is stability in leadership, so the absence of leadership change, that leads to policy change. As is it not likely that a party will change its policy, because its position is too close to the public opinion or because other parties do not change, logical remainders have not been used on the first and second condition.

Configuration	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency	Cases covered
leader*UNITY	0,545	0,206	0,857	GL10, CDA06, CDA10
UNITY*PUBLIC	0,377	0,119	0,846	D6610, CDA06, GL06
LEADER*unity*PARTIES	0,286	0,102	0,836	D6606

Table 5.12: Intermediate solution for outcome POLICY CHANGE

Table 5.12 displays the intermediate solution for the outcome Policy change. It shows three paths leading to policy change. The first is the absence of Leadership change and the presence of Unified

leadership. The second is both the presence of Unified leadership and a Public opinion that is clearly shifting away from the party position. The third is the presence of Leadership change combined with the absence of Unified Leadership and the presence of Party interaction. The consistency of all solutions is very good. The coverage is not so high, which implies that there are other factors at work in the process of policy change. Appendix E8 presents plots of the configurations. A further interpretation of these results is offered in the next chapter.

5.6 Analysis Policy stability

Whereas the previous analysis was about conditions that are conducive to the presence of policy change (POLICY CHANGE), this analysis is about conditions that attribute to the absence of policy change (policy change). The absence of POLICY CHANGE is the same as POLICY STABILITY. The analysis is conducted using the same data as the final analysis on POLICY CHANGE.

Necessity

Table 5.13 shows the superset analysis, done using the same conditions and a negated outcome. None of the conditions is necessary for POLICY STABILITY, as none is higher than 0,9. However, especially Unified Leadership and Leadership Change have scores close to that number.

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
PUBLIC	0,347	0,369
PARTIES	0,556	0,614
UNITY	0,754	0,434
LEADERSHIP	0,826	0,562

Table 5.13: Analysis of necessary conditions for outcome POLICY STABILITY

Sufficiency

Table 5.14 displays the truth table for the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome POLICY STABILITY. There is one contradiction in the results, D66 2006. This inconsistency is probably the result of the outcome of this case, which is [0,56] and thus lies close to the middle. It follows that this condition is the result of the problem fsQCA has with scores close to the middle and that is not a problem that can be remedied by recoding of conditions. For this reason, I decide to drop the case from further analysis.

Best instances	PUBLIC	PARTIES	UNITY	LEADER	Number	Consistency	Outcome	STABILITY
VVD10	0	0	1	1	1	0,816	0,25	1
VVD06	0	0	0	1	1	0,775	0,25	1
PvdA06	0	1	1	1	1	0,762	0,26	1
D6606	0	1	0	1	1	0,740	0,56	0
PvdA10	1	0	0	0	1	0,560	0,1	1
CDA06	1	0	1	0	1	0,525	0,97	0
GL06, D6610	1	0	1	1	2	0,382	0,92/0,95	0
CDA10, GL10	0	0	1	0	2	0,375	1/1	0

Table 5.14: Truth table for the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome POLICY STABILITY

The complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions are given in Appendix E9. The only logical remainders not used for the intermediate solution is Public opinion, which is set at absent, because it is not logical that a public opinion that is shifting away from the party position should lead a party to not change its policy. Table 5.12 displays the results for the outcome POLICY STABILITY. The data shows there are two paths leading to a party that does not change its policy. First, the presence of leadership change, combined with the absence of both party interaction and a public opinion that is shifting away from the party position. And second, again the presence of Leadership change, combined with the presence of Unified leadership and the absence of a public opinion that is shifting away from the party position. Both the consistency and the coverage are good in both configurations. Appendix E10 presents plots of both configurations.

Configuration	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency	Cases covered
LEADER*parties*public	0,615	0,080	0,800	VVD10, VVD06
LEADER*UNITY*public	0,607	0,072	0,832	PvdA06, VVD10

Table 5.15: Intermediate solution for outcome POLICY STABILITY

6. Interpretation

Why do political parties change their policy? Based on an fsQCA analysis using data from six Dutch parties in the period 2002-2010, there are three combinations of conditions that lead parties to change their policies. Furthermore, two paths leading to policy stability have been found. These five scenarios are presented below, using the investigated cases as an illustration. Finally, the chapter is concluded with an evaluation of the implications the results have on policy change theory. Does the party have a role in policy change? Which theories can be falsified?

6.1 Scenarios for policy change

Scenario 1: Peace and stability

The configuration with the highest consistency is the one in which a party is unified and leadership has not changed. The combination of these two conditions is sufficient for broad policy change. This is the situation in which the dominant coalition and the party itself are united. The dominant coalition does not have to make concessions to rivaling factions and is strong enough to overcome resistance (Budge, Ezrow & McDonald 2010: 293). Furthermore, the leadership of the party has been there for some time. As a result of this, the dominant coalition is probably more experienced and better able to use its support to change the course of the party. Another reason why a long sitting dominant coalition might be able to change party policy is because it has more legitimacy. In general, the legitimacy of dominant coalitions diminishes during the course of their reign (Ibid: 292). However, when the party attains good election results, this acts as a proof of competence, prolongs the life of the dominant coalition and legitimizes its later policy changes. In this way, an absence of leadership change might indicate a solid level of support for the dominant coalition in the party. To conclude, this scenario is characterized by peace and stability in the party.

This scenario is nicely illustrated by the CDA in the period 2002-2010. New leader Balkenende entered a year before the elections and by winning the CDA's first elections since 1989, he brought the party back to the center of Dutch political power. The CDA's policy course was broadly supported within the party; both dominant coalition and party were unified. Because of this broad level of support, based on the dominant coalition's policy and good election results, the CDA was able to perform substantial policy changes in the period between 2002 and 2010. The same is true for GroenLinks in the period 2006-2010. Halsema and her dominant coalition were leading the party since 2002 and after having fought tough battles in the first period about the new course of the party; their second period was characterized by peace and stability in both leadership and party. A

different mix of conditions had already enabled them to change the party policy in the first period, the peace and stability of the second period brought even broader change.

Scenario 2: Peace with outside threat

A different path to policy change is when a party is unified and confronted with a public opinion that is shifting away. Policy cannot be realized without getting votes, so when the difference in policy positions between the party and its core electorate increases, this might explain vote loss at the last elections or indicate vote loss at the next elections. As this is the only configuration in which public opinion has a role to play, it might be assumed that unified leadership is the facilitating condition enabling a dominant coalition to change, when it is confronted with an outside threat.

This is nicely indicated by the D66 in 2010. In the preceding period, the policy gap between party and core electorate grew substantially. This was a powerful incentive for the dominant coalition to change its course and it was possible to do this, because the party was unified in the period 2006-2010. The dominant coalition was strong enough to overcome resistance and take the measures necessary to bring the party's policy positions back in line with those of its core electorate. The same is true for GroenLinks in the period 2002-2006. In the period before, its policy positions had shifted away from those of its core electorate. This might have been the incentive forcing Halsema and her dominant coalition to change the party policy. It was able to do this, because it had a solid base of support in the party. Although the party was strongly divided, the dominant coalition always retained a two third majority, enabling the dominant coalition to steer a different course.

Scenario 3: Chaos

Already indicated by the label chaos, the last scenario for party change is one of internal party turmoil. Leadership has just changed, both the dominant coalition and the party are factionalized and the party's policy position is under threat from other parties changing their policies to positions suboptimal for the party already in turmoil. Such a heavy cocktail is sufficient for policy change.

This is the scenario taking place in D66 in the period 2002-2006. Party leader De Graaf resigned after the bad election results in 2003, but the party did not appoint any new party leader. This resulted in a confusing situation in which several persons claimed responsibility. Meanwhile, both the marker party on economic policy CDA and the marker party on ethical positions PvdA changed their policies in such a way that D66 was forced to react.

It is surprising that both scenario 1 and 3, which are almost the exact opposite of each other, can lead to policy change. Whereas leadership stability and unified leadership lead to policy change in the first scenario, leadership change and factionalized leadership, combined with party interaction, lead to change in the third scenario. As both conditions can have a positive and a negative effect on the stability in a party, it seems as if they are reinforcing each other when working in the same direction. No leadership change (positive effect on stability) and factionalism in the party (negative effect) or leadership change (negative) combined with unity in the party (positive) apparently do not lead to policy change. Rather, it is the conjuncture of two negatives (scenario 3) or two positives (scenario 1) that leads to policy change. One of the most fundamental assumptions in party theory is that the party organization is conservative in nature. Apparently, both a good crisis and firm control over the party are sufficient for policy change.

6.2 Scenarios for policy stability

Scenario 4: New leadership in party with ideal party position

A first configuration of conditions leading to policy stability is the conjuncture of leadership change with no party interaction and no adverse public opinion. Or to put it differently, there is no incentive to change the party position, as the public opinion is either stable or becoming more favorable and the position towards competitor parties has not changed negatively.

This is the story of the VVD in both investigated periods. The leadership of the party changed in 2002, when Zalm became party leader and changed again in 2006, when Rutte became the new leader. However, as the policy position with respect to other parties and the public was fine, there was no need to change party policy.

It is interesting that the election results of the VVD in this period were bad. As a reaction, the VVD did not change its policy, but rather decided on a drastic democratization of the party organization. It follows that a vote loss does not automatically lead to policy change, but only if the party's policy position is suboptimal. The VVD already had an optimal policy position, so reacted by changing organizationally.

Scenario 5: New leadership in unified party with positive public opinion

Another sufficient combination of conditions leading to policy stability is when the party's leadership changes, when the party in general is unified and when public opinion is positive. There is no

incentive to change the policy. Furthermore, the combination of leadership change, which is negative for the stability in the party, and unified leadership, which is positive for the stability in the party, not leading to policy change, seems to confirm the hypothesis formulated in scenario 3. Apparently, both stability and instability of a party work to change policy, but policy remains stable when stability is somewhere in between.

This scenario can be illustrated by the PvdA in the period 2002-2006. After the dramatic loss at the 2002 elections, almost the entire dominant coalition changed. The new dominant coalition assured itself of a solid base of support in the party, so the PvdA was unified. Furthermore, as Table 4.10a illustrates, public opinion rapidly became more favorable for the party. It therefore had no strong incentive to change its policies.

6.3 Cases not explained by scenarios

One case could not be explained by the scenarios, another case was excluded from further analysis because it belongs to a different population.

The PvdA in the period 2006-2010 cannot be explained by any of the configurations (no policy change). However, it looks like another confirmation of the pattern already detected in scenarios 3 and 5, as the party was neither stable nor unstable. Leadership did not change (positive for stability) during this period and the party was not unified (negative). Even the public opinion that was clearly against the party could not get the PvdA to change its policy.

The SP was dropped from QCA-analysis, as it seemed to lower the case homogeneity. The party changed considerably during the period 2002-2006 and not so much in the period after. Looking at Appendix E4, the SP results in the first period compared with the second look like a typical most similar case situation, as three of the four conditions showed exactly the same scores, but one condition and the outcome differ. Following Mill's method of similarity, this must be the determining condition (1967 [1843]: 396). In this case it would follow that the public opinion that was clearly against the SP in the first period, was the decisive factor in the policy change of the SP in 2006.

6.4 The role of individual conditions

Following the configurations that were found, the following can be said about the individual conditions and the theories from which they emanate. First, the public opinion does not appear to play a great role in policy change. Although its absence is required in both configurations leading to

policy stability, it was found in only one configuration leading to policy change. Combined with unified leadership, public opinion is a sufficient condition for policy change. The case that exhibited the most negative public opinion, PvdA 2010, did not change its policy. It follows that public opinion is certainly not a necessary or a sufficient condition for policy change, as stated by the spatial theory. Second, party interaction does not seem to play a big role in broad policy change either. The absence of party interaction is part of one configuration leading to policy stability; its presence is required in one configuration leading to policy change. It might very well play a role in smaller policy change, but it does not seem to play a role in broad policy change. A note to these conclusions is the low level of full membership scores in both public opinion and party interaction. Perhaps, a different population would have showed different results.

The most surprising result is the large role played by unified leadership in policy change. Both its presence and its absence, combined with other conditions, are sufficient for policy change. In particular, unified leadership has a strong interaction with leadership change. Policy change is especially likely when both work to stabilize or destabilize a party. The presence of unified leadership can also lead to no policy change, when combined with leadership change and a positive public opinion.

Fourth, leadership change has an important effect on party policy change, but not in the way imagined by Harmel and Janda. Whereas Harmel and Janda hypothesized that a change of leadership would lead to policy change, the results of the QCA analysis show the opposite. It is the absence of leadership change, so leadership stability, combined with unified leadership, which is the most found configuration leading to policy change. Furthermore, the presence of leadership change is found in both configurations leading to policy stability. The only configuration, in which leadership change played the role hypothesized by Harmel and Janda, is in combination with factionalized leadership and party interaction. This is labeled the chaos scenario, as all these conditions signal a crisis situation within the party. One could also state that leadership change has a lagged effect on policy change. The party policy does not change immediately after leadership change, but only after a while. However, further analysis is needed to prove such a causal relation between leadership change and policy change. Finally, no evidence was found for the influence of the external shock in policy change, as it hardly showed any variation across the measured cases.

6.5 Implications for theories of policy change

With respect to the spatial theory, clear conclusions can be derived. First, both public opinion and party interaction can play a role in policy change, but neither is necessary or sufficient, as stated by the theory. Second, the spatial theory explicitly states that the party can play no role in policy change. However, given the abundance of evidence for the influence of the party in the occurrence and the magnitude of policy change, this statement has to be rejected. The party clearly plays a role in policy change. As a counterargument, one could point at the way public opinion, party interaction and policy change have been operationalized in this research. Policy change was measured using two dimensions and as a result, public opinion and party interaction were also measured in an unordinary way. Perhaps, this has influenced the results. However, given the clearness of the results of both the party conditions and the spatial conditions, it is not likely that a different operationalization would have given substantially different results. Besides, the operationalization used in this thesis might also be better than the one normally used in the spatial theory. To conclude, the predictions of the spatial theory have not been confirmed in this thesis. Public opinion and party interaction only play a minor role and the party has considerable influence on the process of party policy change. The Dutch party system in the period 2002-2010 can be considered a most likely case for the spatial theory, as the system is highly competitive, which stimulates vote-seeking tactics. If it can't make it here, it can't make it anywhere. This gives extra weight to the conclusions and for these reasons, the spatial theory is considered falsified. Perhaps, it plays a more important role in explaining the direction of party policy change. However, the spatial theory states that it can explain all policy change, and in this, it most certainly fails.

The integrated dynamics theory by Budge, Ezrow and McDonald finds support in the results of this investigation. Their hypothesis that unified leadership determines the magnitude of change, is confirmed by the results. However, it appears that the absence of unified leadership, thus factionalized leadership, can have the same influence. Furthermore, the configurations show a positive relation between leadership stability and policy change. This is in line with Budge et al's hypothesis that a dominant coalition winning the elections enlarges its support within the party. However, it contradicts another of their statements, which is that a party can change its policy, when there is factional change. In this respect, the results are mixed.

The results for the theory of Harmel and Janda are mixed as well. The investigation confirms their view regarding the relation between internal and external causes of policy change. The configurations show that the combined effect of unified leadership and public opinion, or leadership change and party interaction. However, the conditions proposed by Harmel and Janda did not work

as expected. In most configurations, it was the absence of leadership change that spurred policy change and not the reverse. Leadership change is not directly followed by policy change, but only after a while. In this regard, one could state leadership change has a lagged effect on policy change. However, further analysis is needed before such a statement can be made. Furthermore, no support was found for the external shock hypothesis. This might have to do with the way Harmel and Janda operationalized this claim. An external shock happens when an environmental event affects the party goal of the dominant coalition. The party goal is a problematic concept (see section 2.6.4). Theoretically, it is ill-founded and practically it is hardly used. The concept is intuitively appealing, but needs a lot of work, before it can help to explain policy change. For now, this makes the theory of Harmel and Janda, and especially the external shock, inadequate in explaining why parties change their policy.

6.6 So why do parties change?

This thesis started with the question why political parties change their policies. And in particular, can policy change solely be explained by systematic factors as the public opinion or the position of other parties, or does the party have some influence as well? Looking at the process of broad policy change, this question can now be answered as follows.

External or internal?

Systematic factors as public opinion or the position of other parties appear to do have an influence on the policy change of parties. However, these factors are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the witnessed change. The analysis shows policy change cannot be explained without taking internal party processes into account. Perhaps, the system´s approach is adequate for predicting the direction of the policy change. However, if one is interested in the way policy change occurs and in the magnitude of this change, one cannot leave the party in the black box.

Party stability

An important enabling factor in policy change turns out to be the stability of the party. A stable party is one in which leadership has not changed in the last elections and in which leadership and party can be considered unified. An unstable party is the opposite. The configurations show that both the stability and the instability of a party are sufficient for policy change. A party with stability in between is less likely to change. Six of the ten cases correspond to this pattern.

Incentives for change

A question remaining is the incentive for policy change. In the first scenario ´Peace and Stability´, leadership stability and unified leadership are sufficient to explain policy change. Theoretically, this makes no sense. It seems logical to see these conditions as facilitating change, needed before an organization can change. However, it does not seem logical that a party will change its policy, because its leadership is unified. What is missing is an incentive for change. A negative public opinion or party interaction could have been such an incentive, but were not present in the cases. So which other incentives could have stimulated the change? According to the theory of Strom, parties can be vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking. Looking at the cases that conform to the configuration, CDA 2002-2010 and GroenLinks 2006-2010, it seems as if both policy-seeking and office-seeking might have been the incentives that stimulated these parties to change their policy. After the CDA won the elections in 2002, it got into office and remained there until the elections of 2010. Meanwhile, it kept changing its policies. According to Van de Camp, an important reason for this was because CDA leader Balkenende wanted to revitalize Christian Democratic ideology (Appendix D1: line 134). During the period 1994-2002, he and Klink, another important in the CDA at the time, worked together in the scientific bureau of the party on the ideology that was realized in the period 2002-2010. Based on this insight, it seems plausible that policy-seeking was at least one of the reasons why the CDA changed its policy. GroenLinks 2006-2010 seems to have changed for office-seeking reasons. As the party became focused at getting into office, it changed both organizationally and ideologically to heighten its chances on governmental participation (Melenhorst 2012: 2). These cases form strong clues that policy change is not only about vote-seeking, but also about office and policy-seeking.

The role of leadership

It follows that it is the leadership of a party that determines whether a party will change or not. Internal party dynamics are often treated as an "immediate, but not an ultimate source of change" (Katz & Mair 2004: 18). This implies that although leaders can influence the course of a party, eventually, they always follow the direction set by public and other parties. In this perspective, party leadership might only determine the moment of change. However, considering the influence of internal party dynamics on policy change, the important role played by party stability and the variety in party goals, it follows that it is the party leadership that determines whether or not the party will change. The party leadership is independent and no slave of public opinion and if it does not think it necessary to react to the public, it does not have to. In this way, internal party dynamics is an immediate, sometimes an ultimate and often the determining source of change.

7. Conclusion

This investigation started with the question why political parties change their policies. And in particular, can policy change solely be explained by systematic factors as the public opinion or the position of other parties, or does the party have some influence as well? This question has been analyzed by focusing on the process of broad policy change in six Dutch parties in the period 2002-2010. For this purpose, hypotheses from three theories have been tested using fsQCA, using data from interviews, literature and datasets.

Main findings

These are the main findings. First, the party plays an important role in policy change. The paradigmatic spatial theory posits that policy change can solely be explained by looking at systematic factors as the public opinion and the position of other parties. However, the results show that internal party processes are a necessary and sometimes even sufficient reason for a party to decide on policy change. Second, an important enabling factor in policy change turns out to be the stability of the party. A stable party is one in which leadership has not changed in the last election and in which leadership and party can be considered unified. An unstable party is the opposite. In six of the ten cases, both stability and instability of a party are sufficient for policy change. A party with stability in between is less likely to change. As organizations are conservative in nature, they primarily seem to change when there is either a crisis in the party, or when the coalition leading the party is firmly in control. Third, more specifically, three paths leading to policy change and two paths leading to policy stability were found. Next to the party stability thesis, the combination of a unified leadership and a negative public opinion also seem to be sufficient to explain policy change. Furthermore, both paths leading to policy stability involved leadership change and a positive public opinion. Fourth, the most important condition in policy change seems to be unified leadership. It is present in five of the six positive cases and therefore seems to have a big influence on the process and magnitude of party policy change. Fifth, clues were found that indicate parties do not only change their policy to gain votes, but also to pursue a policy ideal or get into office. As stated in the introduction, it was never the goal of this thesis to analyze party orientations in political parties. However, given the absence of vote-seeking stimuli to explain the change in some cases and the apparent presence of other stimuli, this thesis nevertheless finds evidence on this matter. Finally, it follows that it is the party leadership that determines whether a party will change or not. The leadership can be influenced by public opinion or other parties, but if the internal party situation is

not optimal, or if the leadership does not perceive vote-seeking as the main goal of the party, it can follow an independent course.

Implications for theory

The conclusions have the following implications for theories of party policy change. First, the spatial theory is considered falsified. Both its statements that public opinion and party interaction are sufficient for policy change and that the party is not relevant in explaining policy change have found to be incorrect. It might be a good predictor of the direction, but it certainly cannot independently explain the occurrence and magnitude of policy change. The results for the integrated theory of Harmel and Janda are mixed. On a more general level, their hypothesis that it is the combination of external and internal factors that can change a party, and also, that a party can even change its policy without external stimuli, was confirmed in this investigation. However, the two main conditions in the theory, the external shock and the leadership change, did not have the result predicted. The external shock was dropped from analysis, because it exhibited hardly any variation. Leadership change could only on one occasion be associated with policy change, but it mostly had the opposite effect. It is the absence of leadership change that stimulated policy change in three cases. Finally, the integrated dynamics theory of Budge, Ezrow and McDonald faired the best. Their untested hypothesis that the magnitude of change is influenced by the unity of the party leadership was confirmed by the results of this thesis. Furthermore, their theory could also explain why a party that does not change leadership is better able to change its policy.

A research agenda

I find the question as to why parties change their policies very fascinating. This is because it goes to the heart of democracy, the heart of politics as we know it, and also, to the heart of political science. If we as political scientists cannot answer this most basic of political questions, this topic where every uncle, child or person you meet in a bar has an opinion about, this mechanism that influences the future of a country, than what is the further relevance of the profession? How can we help people understand more of their world, and bring nuance in the bias that is so common in people's opinion about politics?

To clarify the question, I have the following recommendations for future research. First, more research needs to be done on the influence of the party in party policy change. This research should combine insights from systematic and actor focused approaches. In this regard, it would be good to

test the party stability thesis formulated in this thesis and see whether it holds in other settings. Furthermore, it might be helpful to use a (semi-)qualitative approach. Now, most theories are based on quantitative analysis and although they use different assumptions, their mechanisms are so abstract that evidence is virtually interchangeable.

Second, policy change is a multifaceted concept that needs to be clearly operationalized to derive meaningful conclusions. It can be subdivided into the occurrence of policy change, the magnitude and the direction. Based on the results of this thesis, it seems likely that intra-party processes have more influence on the occurrence of change, while external factors like the public opinion have a bigger influence on the direction of the change. However, when all these aspects are mixed up, scientific progress is slowed down. Furthermore, policy change is often operationalized based on only one dimension: the economic left/right dimension. However, a lot of research clearly suggests this one dimension does not cover other dimensions as the ethical one. It follows that a multidimensional approach renders more valid results.

Third, more research needs to focus on party orientations. The vote-seeking assumption is the most used in contemporary policy change theory, but as this research, other theories and also intuition indicate, this cannot be the whole story. "Parties are nothing if not ideological, policy-pursuing entities" (Budge et al 2010: 804). Now, most theories make a choice for either policy or vote-seeking. A more logical question is however, when do parties pursue votes and when do they pursue policy? In this regard, the approach of Harmel and Janda is very promising. The key is to take the party seriously, because policy motivations cannot be deducted from a system's approach. Furthermore, research needs a more positive approach to policy change. Now, often the quite negative question is asked: under which conditions are parties forced to change? A more positive question would be: what do parties really want? In terms of measurement, it is easier to focus at the moment of change. However, truth might be found by investigating the deeper motivations of parties and politicians.

Finally, the innovative techniques used in this thesis might serve as an example for future research. The use of QCA made it possible to describe several paths leading to policy change, and thus provides a way of uniting the different, often opposing theories on policy change. Furthermore, the underlying concept of equifinality, the notion that several paths can lead to an outcome, might also be more in line with reality than the notion underlying mainstream statistical techniques, that a given factor has the same effect on an outcome, in whichever context it is placed (Rihoux & Ragin 2009: 8).

Relevance

Let's return to the somewhat cynical (or realistic?) statement of my uncle Bert that parties are self-concerned vote-seekers that only care about getting re-elected. What implications does this thesis have for this, often heard, opinion? And what other relevance does the thesis have for reality? It must first be stated, that this investigation does not give all the answers. Science yet has a long way to travel. However, something can be said.

First, this investigation shows how the policy of parties is dependent upon internal party processes. It follows that the degree to which parties can fulfill their responsibilities in representing citizens' problems, setting the political agenda, implementing policy in office and exerting counter pressure while in opposition, is very much dependent upon the state of the party. As a factionalized party is less likely to perform policy changes and if one assumes these changes are necessary in fulfilling the responsibility given to them by the voter, than this makes internal party affairs a matter of national interest. Second, parties are not only the egoistic vote-seekers some hold them to be. Parties without vote-seeking incentives showed big changes and parties that should have changed if they were to optimize their policy position did not. Furthermore, clues were found indicating parties might have alternative goals, like striving for a policy ideal.

So as an answer to my Uncle Bert and all the other Uncle Bert's walking around in this world, it seems that politics is not only about getting at much votes as possible, at least not always and not for all political parties. That version of reality turns out to be too negative. Of course it happens, but then, receiving votes is a necessary condition before one can implement policy, so it clearly has to matter for everyone in politics. Indeed, politics is a job. However, there is more to the story. Politics seems to be about finding the right balance between a vote-seeking requirement and policy ideals. This balance differs per party, per period, per subject and per country. But it is a balance nonetheless.

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