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**Abstract**

The road to decolonisation has been difficult for many colonial regions. The two regions under investigation here, West Papua and East Timor have had an opposite experience with acts of self-determination. The UN has condoned a mock referendum in West Papua in 1969 while the UN prepared free and fair elections in East Timor in 1999. The thesis tries to understand the difference in UN behaviour with regard to the act of self-determination in West and the act of self-determination in East Timor. The thesis looks at the historical representation of the indigenous people from a postcolonial lens and the internalization of the norm of self-determination from a social constructivist lens. The results are that the people of West Papua were seen as deeply inferior to the West, resulting in a mock referendum. The norm of self-determination was also not internalized by states and the UN, which contributed to the behaviour of the UN. The norm of self-determination was also not internalized in the case of East Timor, which then cannot explain the UN’s behaviour. The people of East Timor were seen as victims of abuse, which to a certain extent can explain the UN’s genuine act of self-determination.

Keywords: *West Papua, East Timor, UN, postcolonialism, social constructivism.*

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**List of Abbreviations**

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

ETAN East Timor Alert Network

HC Deb House of Commons Debate

HL Deb House of Lords Debate

IR International Relations

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non governmental organization

MP Member of Parliament

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor

UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

UNTEA United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

UN ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council

UN GA United Nations General Assembly

US United States

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# Introduction

The time after the Second World War was characterized by the decolonization of former colonies. The United Nations played an important role in the struggle of many colonies to get out from under the yoke of the colonizer (UN, 2017a; Roberts & Kingsbury, 1993, p. 19). The UN’s behaviour has not been consistent throughout its historywith regard to the granting of the right to self-determination todependent regions. The UN behaved differently with regard to the instance of West Papua[[1]](#footnote-1) in 1969 than the instance of East Timor in 1999, while the statutory base was the same.In 1969 the Act of Free Choice was held in West Papua concerning the territorial status of West Papua to remain with Indonesia or acquire independence. The UN had the task of assisting and advising the Indonesian government in the consultation process (New York Agreement, 1962). The UN, nevertheless, condoned an act of self-determination in which most of the Papuans did not have a vote and therefore certainly not a voice. In 1999, after almost twenty-five years of occupation by Indonesia, a popular consultation was held in East Timor. The people were able to choose between special autonomy in Indonesia or independence from Indonesia (UN, 2000, p. 10). The UN was able to organize free and fair elections in which everyone could participate. This thesis tries to explain the different behaviour of the UN with respect to the acts of self-determination in West Papua and East Timor.

In 1960, the United Nations Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was adopted. The declaration stated, “all peoples have the right to self-determination” (UN, 1960). It was also stated that the UN had an important role in assisting “Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories to independence”. West Papua and East Timor were both Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories (UN, 2017b). The decolonization declaration ensured that the UN would at some time assist these territories to independence. The UN did not however assist West Papua in 1969 to carry out a real act of self-determination, while East Timor was indeed assisted by the UN in 1999 to independence. The cases of West Papua and East Timor can be compared as they share Indonesia as their oppressor, as well as the statutory basis to self-determination.

West Papua was a Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territory since the Netherlands transferred the region from the Dutch East Indies to the UN under the auspice of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in August 1962. An agreement between the Dutch and Indonesia was reached that Indonesia would assume control of West Papua in May 1963 (Lijphart, 1966, p. 21). The people in West Papua would however have the right to choose in a plebiscite before the end of 1969 whether they wanted to remain part of Indonesia or become independent (Lijphart, 1966, p. 21). The agreement of UNTEA between the Dutch and Indonesia stated that the plebiscite of 1969 was to be held “according to international practice”. The phrase was not further specified but it should have included at least a popular consultation by the people of West Papua on the right of self-determination, since this was the international practice in the case of an act of self-determination (Budiardjo & Liong, 1988, p. 24). A popular consultation was however not held, instead a consultation was held to establish a consensus among representatives of the Papuan people under pressure of the Indonesian government. A genuine attempt was not made by the UN and the Indonesian government to conduct a plebiscite in West Papua in accordance with international practice (Saltford, 2000). The UN should have held a real referendum in West Papua on the political fate of the region as the UN committed itself in the UNTEA agreement to hold a plebiscite on the fate of West Papua. The UN also committed itself to assisting the movement to independence of Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, as established in the decolonization declaration of 1960. In short, the UN had a statutory base to conduct an act of self-determination in accordance with international practice to which they have not, but should have, abided.

The conduct of the UN with respect to an act of self-determination in the case of West Papua stands in stark contrast to the act of self-determination of the people of East Timor in 1999.

East Timor began in 1975 a process of decolonization from its colonizer, Portugal. Indonesia nonetheless invaded the region in 1975 and occupied it brutally for more than twenty years (Crocombe, 2007, p.298-299).

The UN did not lawfully accept the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia, therefore East Timor remained a Trust- and Non-Self-Governing Territory with Portugal as its administrative power from 1975 onwards (UN Security Council, 1975; UN Security Council, 1999a; UN, 2017b). The foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal, under the hospice of the UN decided that a referendum, on the basis of one-man-one-vote, was to be held in the summer of 1999, to decide if the East Timorese people favoured independence or special autonomy under the rule of Indonesia (UN, 2000, p. 10). A formal UN mission was established in East Timor to organise the referendum as well as the creation of an independent Election Commission. The mission educated the population via a public information campaign. They also provided official observers for the popular consultation (UN, 2000). Therefore, the UN conducted an act of self-determination in accordance with international practice in the case of East Timor.

The differences in UN behaviour in conducting acts of self-determination in West Papua and East Timor leads to the main research question of the thesis:

*Why did the UN not undertake a ‘genuine’ act of self-determination in the case of West Papua in 1969, while they did undertook a genuine act of self-determination in the case of East Timor in 1999?*

The UN has not been a unitary actor throughout the process of self-determination in West Papua and East Timor. It is important to understand which divisions of the UN were involved in the acts of self-determination if one wants to answer the main research question. The Secretary-General had a supervising role in both cases. The Secretary-General appointed a special UN representative, Fernando Ortiz Sanz, who had to assist the Indonesians with the plebiscite in the West Papua case. Ortiz Sanz, as the UN representative, gave his final report on the plebiscite proceedings to the Secretary-General who then informed the General Assembly on the result of the act of self-determination (New York Agreement, 1962). The Secretary-General also had an important supervising role in the case of East Timor. The Secretary-General was responsible for the establishment of a UN mission in East Timor to effectuate a fair election process. The result of the popular consultation was then reported to the Security Council and the General Assembly (UN Security Council, 1999a). The discourse and process of an act of self-determination involved in both cases many different organizations inside the UN. This thesis will try to show the discourses surrounding both acts of self-determination in the various agencies.

The existing literature on West Papua has multiple focal points. The first focal point has a national approach to the case, focusing on the Dutch national level (Lijphart, 1966). The comprehensive study of Pieter Drooglever (2005) on the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia and the subsequent Act of Free Choice in West Papua has a historical perspective (Drooglever, 2005). The study can almost be seen as a fact finding mission as the independent research study was requested by the Dutch government (Rutherford, 2010). Another focal point in the literature on West Papua is the study of the developing independence movement (Kirksey & Roemajauw, 2002; Van den Broek & Szalay, 2001). The third focal point in the existing literature is research with an activist focus. This kind of literature tries to create awareness of the neglected history of the West Papuan people by showing the fraud act of self-determination (Budiardjo & Liong, 1988; Saltford, 2003). There is of course more literature on West Papua but these are the main trends in the existing literature. The overarching argument that can be derived from this is that the act of self-determination in West Papua has not been analysed by means of a theoretical IR perspective.

The existing literature on East Timor also covers multiple perspectives. Most of the existing (IR) literature on the act of self-determination in East Timor focuses on the state building and peacekeeping efforts of the UN in East Timor after the eruption of violence at the end of the popular consultation (Chopra,2000; Chopra 2002; Butler, 2011; Suhrke 2001; Chesterman, 2002). Other literature involves first hand accounts by UN observers of the referendum and its aftermath (Martin, 2001). The independence struggle of East Timor is analysed in several studies as well as the role of Australia in the history of East Timor (Hainsworth & McCloskey, 2000; Dunn, 2003; Cotton, 2004)*.* The thesis adds a new dimension to the study of West Papua and East Timor because it consistently compares the two cases for the first time. The case of East Timor has been compared to other cases such as Kosovo and Chechnya or Ireland but not to West Papua (Charney, 2001; Goodman, 1998). The comparison of the two cases in the thesis therefore covers new ground. The West Papua and East Timor case and the behaviour of the UN with regard to the acts of self-determination have not been analysed through an IR lens, which makes this a highly under researched but worthwhile endeavour.

The theoretical approaches chosen in this thesis are social constructivism and postcolonialism. The initial literature study pointed to explanations based on the a degrading representation of indigenous people. The possible validity of such an explanation could best be analysed through postcolonialism. The timespan of thirty years makes it possible to see if a change occurred in a variable over time. In this case the possible change in a variable could be a change in the internalization of the norm of self-determination which could best be analysed through social constructivism.

Social constructivism centres in this thesis on the norm life cycle and therein the internalization of the norm of self-determination by states and the UN. The advantage of social constructivism is that it can show the socialization mechanisms leading to the internalization of the norm of self-determination. Postcolonialism will focus in this thesis on discourse analysis and the historical representations of the West Papuan and East Timorese people. The advantage of postcolonialism is that it looks at the underlying representations of a people that can co-determine the decisions made by political leaders and international organizations.These aspects of social constructivism and postcolonialism are not covered in mainstream IR theories. The chosen theories can therefore shed new and important light on the political decision-making of the UN.

The methods of the thesis included discourse analysis, interviews and the method of historical representation. Discourse analysis will be used to analyse the discourses surrounding the norm of self-determination following social constructivist theory. The method of historical representation tries to analyse the way in which the West Papuan and East Timorese people have been portrayed throughou the time span set in the thesis. Two interviews will complement the methods with even more primary source material. The researcher will try as much as possible to use primary sources such as government minutes, UN agreements and despatches from embassies. Other resources will include academic books and articles as additional secondary sources.

The scientific contribution of this master thesis is twofold. Firstly the cases of West Papua and East Timor have not been comparatively analysed through an IR lens.

 Secondly, the theoretical lenses that I propose have never been used to explain either the West Papua or East Timor case, let alone both. Postcolonialism and social constructivism focus on the puzzle in different ways, thereby explaining and contributing in different ways to expanding knowledge about the UN, West Papua and East Timor.

The thesis also has a societal contribution as it shows the struggle for independence by indigenous people such as the Papuans. It also raises awareness for the on going struggle of the Papuans for a right to self-determination.

The thesis proceeds with two theory chapters on social constructivism and postcolonialism. There are two separate theory chapters because this will show that the approaches have distinctly different theoretical lenses for looking at the research question. The third chapter covers epistemology, methods and operationalization. The fourth and fifth chapter discuss the empirical analysis through a social constructivist and a postcolonial lens. The empirical analysis is divided into two chapters because they focus on different independent variables to explain the empirical puzzle. The structure of the thesis will be more easily comprehensiblewith two distinct theory and empirical chapters. The thesis ends with an overarching conclusion, a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the thesis and suggestions for further research.

#

# Chapter 1 Social Constructivism

The first theory chapter discusses social constructivism. The chapter first describes social constructivism in general and then works its way towards specific social constructivist concepts relevant for this thesis. First the ontological premises of social constructivism are described as to establish the theoretical underpinnings of social constructivism. Then the different understandings of the mutually constituted nature of agency and structure are discussed with the intention tocontextualize the literature on the norm life cycle. The different strands of social constructivism are addressed and the thesis is positioned into the social constructivist spectrum accordingly. Subsequently the concept of the logic of appropriateness is discussed. The importance of the logic of appropriateness for social constructivists cannot be stressed enough as it plays a significant part in their understanding of international institutions, their ideas on norms and norm internalization. The chapter proceeds to the with a discussion on the norm life cycle. The chapter ends with a conceptual model incorporating all the relevant social constructivist theorizations.

## 1.1 Historical Embedding

When mainstream IR theories proved ill equipped to explain the end of the Cold War, social constructivists made their entry into the IR field in the 1990s, leading to the famous “constructivist turn” (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 265). The constructivist critique on neorealism and neoliberalism focuses mostly on the rationalist assumption of these approaches. Actors behave on the basis of rational choice according to neorealism and neoliberalism (Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 16). The rationalism of neorealism makes for a certain logic of consequence in which utility is optimally maximized (Checkel, 1998, p. 327). Social constructivism instead developed a social theory of the world (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 393; Adler, 1997, p. 323; Jupille et al., 2003, p. 14). From this view of the world, it follows that behaviour, identities and interest are not formed in isolation of the social context but are defined by it (Wendt, 1992, p. 398).

### *A social theory of international relations*

A social theory of international relations means thatthe world is socially constructed, which purports that actors construct their own reality. Actors give meaning to the world around them. The behaviour of actors is defined by the social context and the different meanings that they give to actors around them (Wendt, 1992, p. 396). It is not just the behaviour of actors, but also their interest that depends on the social context (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). So the fact that social constructivism is a social theory has the important consequence that actors’ identities, interests and behaviour are seen as constituted by the social context.

## 1.2 Ontological premises

The assumptions that underpin social constructivism entail, first, that it is important to look at ideational structures and not only at material structures (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, p.266; Checkel, 1998, p. 325). This is a contrast with other approaches, such as the aforementioned neorealists and neoliberalists, who emphasize material structures. According to social constructivists the material structure will only receive meaning through the social context (Checkel, 1998, p. 326; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 266). Wendt famously explained in his constructivist book *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) that material capabilities receive meaning only when they are put in a social context. The military capabilities of France, which for instance possesses six hundred nuclear weapons, is far greater than the capabilities of a country such as North Korea, that might only possess five nuclear weapons. Still, the five nuclear weapons of North Korea would be seen by the US as a bigger threat then the six hundred nuclear weapons of ally France. The shared understanding between the US and France on the usage of nuclear weapons means that the five weapons of North Korea are more threatening, as the North Koreans have a different understanding of the usage of nuclear weapons (Wendt, 1999, p. 255). This example illustrates that material capabilities on their own have no meaning.It is, for instance, not enough to simply count the military equipment of antagonistic countries to assess whether they will go to war with one another. Instead the social context should be taken into consideration. The social context can for instance mean that the rules of engagement will be taken into consideration when considering a war. Social constructivism stresses that material structures (like nuclear weaponry) only receive meaning when they are seen in combination with a social context that stresses ideational factors such as a shared understanding of the world.

The second assumption is that norms and ideas are intersubjective and form part of a shared knowledge about social life commonly held by an aggregate of individuals (Adler, 1997, p. 327; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 392). This does not necessarily mean that individuals adopt the same collective view; the most important ideational knowledge is, however, shared by different groups of individuals (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 393). This intersubjectivity assumption leads to the third assumption, namely, that shared common knowledge is reflected by the interests and actions of people and, conversely, that interests and actions are dynamically shaped by the intersubjectively held norms and ideas (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, p.267). Constructivists hence focus on how interests and preferences, as well as the agency of actors, are shaped by common norms and knowledge structures and, conversely, how these interests, preferences and actions inform commonly held norms and ideas. This emphasis on the co-constitution of agency and structure marks a stark contrast with neorealists and neoliberals, who take interests and preferences as a given and who do not consider how the interests and identities of states come into being (Ruggie, 1998, p.863; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 267).

Social constructivist assumptions about the social world and their dynamic or co-constitutive understanding of causality hint at a different relationship of structure and agency than that presented in mainstream theories such as neorealism and neoliberalism. The latter are structural theories focusing on the international political system as a constraint on the behaviour of actors, mostly states. Agency, understood as the capacity of agents to act against prevailing social structures and thus change them, does not play a major role in these theories. Social constructivism entails an ontology according to which structure and agency is mutually constitutive (Checkel, 1998, p.326; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p 393; Adler, 1997, p. 352; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 267). A mutually constitutive process in this sense entails that structure will constitute the behaviour of agents but agents will at the same time also influence structure. Agents are influenced by their environment, as it constitutes their range of possible behaviour. Agents can, however, also change the international structure over time by, for instance, forming relationships that reconstitute identities and adopt new ideas of how anarchy in the international domain becomes manifest (Fierke, 2013, p. 191). The intersubjectivity between groups of individuals is therefore closely connected to the mutually constitutive process of structure and agency.

The mutually constitutive nature of agency and structure has been understood differently by subsequent generations of constructivist scholars. The first generation of constructivist scholars emphasized structuralism as they stressed the importance of the social context for systemic impulses. Constructivists suggested that actors cannot give meaning to concepts without the bigger social context and a shared understanding of these concepts (Widmaier & Park, 2012, p. 125). The structural idealism of the first generation meant that the structure determined the actions of agents. In this sense, the structural idealism of, for instance, Wendt was a counter theory to the structural materialism of neorealist Waltz.

The first generation social constructivists’ emphasis on structuralism meant that they had great difficulty in understanding the role of agency in effectuating change. The second generation of constructivist scholars tried to refine their understanding of intersubjective structures and intersubjective change. They stressed the importance of agency in defining intersubjectively held interests and identities (Widmaier & Park, 2012, p. 126). Most of the earlier norm literature is part of this generation as they try to understand how new norms and institutional arrangements emerge out of previous arrangements. With this focus they inevitably needed to “bring agency back into the picture” (Risse, 2002, p. 612). Critics of this second generation scholarship state that too much attention was being given to the stability of intersubjective structures and norm entrepreneurs as the (only) possibility for change.

A third generation of constructivist approaches has arguably come up in the wake of critique on the second generation. The third generation emphasizes the sentimental or psychological origins of interests and change. The third generation of constructivists is not at the heart of the present thesis. The focus will be on the second generation constructivists because the norm life cycle literature can be situated in the second generation, while keeping the critique on the research of this generation in mind.

## 1.3 Different strands of social constructivism

Many different strands of social constructivism emerged over time (Adler, 1997, p. 323; Christansen et al., 1999, p. 535). The different constructivist strands have different ways of understanding social reality. Broadly speaking there are the conventional constructivists, who argue that there is an objective social reality out there that can be captured by social sciences, and the critical constructivists who argue that there is no objective world out there and that social scientists construct the very world they attempt to study (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 535; Fierke, 2013, p. 193). The different understandings of reality of critical and conventional constructivists intersect with a different epistemology. The conventional constructivists combine an intersubjective ontology that focuses on norms and identity with a positivist epistemology. The conventional constructivists try to incorporate ideational factors into a focus on explaining on the basis of mono-causal logics, whereas critical constructivists take the intersubjective ontology of the co-constitutive relationship between agency and structure more seriously and refuse to abstract mono-causal logics. By applying a positivist epistemology consisting of mono-causal reasoning and hypothesis testing, conventional constructivists acquired some sort of middle ground position in the field of IR between rationalists and post-structuralists. Constructivists study many of the same features of international relations as rationalist theories do, while also focusing on the identities of actors and the meaning they give to actions, which they have in common with the reflectivist or post-structural approaches (Smith, 2001, p. 242). Critical constructivists argue that a social ontology and positivist epistemology are not commensurable and that the epistemology of constructivists should be based on a complete linguistic turn, which argues that language is social and cannot be seen as separated from the object (Fierke, 2013, p. 193-197).

The present thesis situates itself towards the middle of the constructivist spectrum. The fringes of the spectrum are too absolute for the purposes of the thesis. The position that I have taken therefore keeps the middle between conventional and critical constructivists. Monocausal logics are rejected but the thesis consists of hypothesis testing, therefore the thesis combines an intersubjective ontology with a positivist epistemology.

## 1.4 A logic of appropriateness

Social constructivism has a different foundation for looking at actors’ behaviour. The behaviour of actors is driven by rules of appropriateness. March and Olsen (2008) describe that “to act appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity based on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right and good” (March & Olsen, 2008, p. 690). The focus for most social constructivists in this definition is on the second part of the account. The mutual understanding of what is the true, reasonable, naturally right and good kind of behaviour is for them the essence of the logic of appropriateness. Actors behave on the basis of what they think a particular rule, role, identity or norm should entail. The logic of appropriateness has cognitive and normative components (March & Olsen, 2008, p. 689). To call one aspect of the appropriateness of rules normative, does not mean that these perceptions of appropriateness are always morally acceptable. A collective can follow a particular logic of appropriateness but still be morally wrong.

The logic of appropriateness is not just an integral part of social constructivism, it is also an important concept in this thesis as the logic of appropriateness is closely related to norms and social constructivist views on international institutions. Norms embody the rules of appropriateness. At a particular moment in time a particular norm might be dominant, which entails certain appropriate behaviour. The dominance of a particular idea of appropriateness might not be absolute, there can be multiple logics of appropriateness conflicting with each other. Over time a new logic of appropriateness can evolve when a situation changes and actors receive new experiences (March & Olsen, 2008, p. 697)

## 1.5 Social constructivism and international institutions

The logic of appropriateness as the underlying base for the study of international institutions ensures that social constructivists focus on rule-guided behaviour in this area of study (Risse, 2002, p. 597). International institutions function as a broader concept than international organizations. Although the focus of this thesis is the UN as an international organization, this cannot be seen separately from the theory’s larger understanding of international institutions. The concept of intersubjectivity, as discussed earlier, plays an important role in the study of international institutions. Social constructivism claims that intersubjectivity is the fabric holding international institutions together. Actors are in this sense deeply embedded in the social structures of international institutions. The identities or interests of actors, such as states, are not just constrained or regulated by institutions, they are also constituted by them. International institutions can define the identities and interests of a state (Risse, 2002, p. 605). In other words, international institutions “have deeper effects on core properties of agents (interests and identities)” (Jupille et al., 2003, p. 15). The constitutive power of international institutions and the underlying logic of appropriateness are the biggest difference with more rationalist theories such as neorealism or neoliberalism, which emphasizes the logic of consequences and the constraining effect of international institutions.

## 1.6 The norm life cycle

The constructivist focus on the ideational dimension of social reality has given rise to an extensive body of literature on norms (Klotz, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Tannenwald, 1999; Joachim, 2003). One of the most influential articles on the origin, emergence and influence of norms was the seminal article *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* (1998) by Finnemore and Sikkink. The article explains norm influence through the idea of the ‘norm life cycle’, a model to explain the emergence of a norm (at the international level), the norm cascading (socialization) and the internalization of a norm by states.

Finnemore & Sikkink define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). The wording “a standard of appropriate behaviour” reflects the logic of appropriateness. A norm therefore guides actors in divers situations with regard to the acceptability of certain behaviour.

### *1.6.1 Stage one of the norm life cycle*

The norm life cycle proceeds through three different stages. The first stage is the emergence of the norm through norm entrepreneurs on an organizational platform. The emergence of the norm, in the sense that a norm will be spoken of in the international domain for the first time, is not the focus of this thesis as the norm of self-determination was already one of the norms in the international ‘community’. The concept of norm entrepreneurs is however an important concept for this thesis because the content of the norm (over time) and the subsequent logic of appropriateness attached to the norm might have received other meanings through pressure of norm entrepreneurs.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 897) conceptualize norm entrepreneurs as organisations or people who construct and thereafter promote norms. Norm entrepreneurs can be individuals, NGOs or nowadays even businesses (Joachim, 2003; Deitelhoff & Wolf, 2013, p. 22).

A relatively new form of norm entrepreneurs is what Keck and Sikkink (2014) have called transnational advocacy networks. The hallmark of NGOs is their call for social action on a specific or more general topic while promoting certain values (Willetts, 2001, p. 370). These NGOs can organise themselves into networks with a transnational range. The networks advocate ideas, norms and certain behaviour in specific issue areas (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 8). Transnational advocacy networks are, for instance, very active in the field of human rights and climate change.

Transnational advocacy networks can consist of more than just a group of NGOs. Foundations, churches or intellectuals can also be a part of these advocacy networks. Mostly, however, NGO’s are the driving force behind the transnational networks, as they promote the shared values that are at the core of their organizations. The transnational advocacy networks are not just connected because of shared values but also for the benefit of formal and informal information exchanges (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 9). In the past, NGOs used to come together in order to further their cause as well, but the increase in communication technology has facilitated a rise in networks that work on an international basis.The advantage of transnational advocacy networks is that NGOs can focus all their energy on international platforms, such as the UN, by bypassing the domestic level. It is often impossible for NGOs to achieve results on the domestic level in a country with a repressive government that closes off the political and judicial arena for pressure groups. The transnational advocacy networks provide a good opportunity for NGOs to find international allies and to pressure a specific government from the outside. (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 12). Keck and Sikkink (2014) call this kind of behaviour by NGOs “the boomerang pattern of influence” (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 12). For this thesis,it is important to include the UN into the model of the boomerang pattern. A government might prohibit organizations from expressing a wish for social change. The organization can then join a transnational advocacy network on the international level to be able to pressure that specific government more forcefully. The network can then also try to persuade an intergovernmental organization like the UN to pressure the specific government to change its behaviour (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 13). The UN can in this way be seen as an additional lever to pressure governments to change.

The UN can then serve two functions in the norm life cycle. First the UN, as an international organization, can provide additional pressure on governments for norm compliance through the boomerang pattern of influence. The other role of the UN is that of the traditional organizational platform at which NGOs can table their issues. The UN provides NGOs with an excellent platform, as almost all countries in the world are included in this organization.

Norm entrepreneurs such as transnational advocacy networks have multiple mechanisms at their disposal to promote certain norms. Keck and Sikkink (2014) identify four different mechanisms: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics and accountability politics (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 16).

The first mechanism at the disposal of norm entrepreneurs is information politics. Norm entrepreneurs gain credibility by providing target actors such as governments with information otherwise not readily available to them. NGOs are equippedwith very specific information that helps them become legitimate players in the international system (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 21). The information that they spread through policy papers, bulletins and newsletters does not just consist of bare facts but also includes testimonies of people living in hardship. NGOs strategically frame the information so that it fits the cognitive frames of what they want to present to the public(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). The promoted norm needs to correspond to earlier normsin order to prevent structural disconnect in the minds of target actors and the people at large.The linkage between the new norm and earlier norms makes it more likely that the norm will appeal to the wider public.The new norm needs to fit people’s cognitive frame and their subsequent logic of appropriateness. It will be more difficult for a new norm to emerge if it does not resonate with an actor’s previous frame of what is appropriate (Risse, 2002, p. 611).

The second strategy of norm entrepreneurs is the use of symbolic politics. Norm entrepreneurs use symbolic events to raise awareness for their cause (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 22). One of these symbolic events can, for instance, be the awarding a Nobel Peace Prize to a political activist. Awarding such a prize will raise the public’s awareness of a certain issue. One specific symbolic event can have a catalyst effect and thereby create a turning point in the public’s opinion about a certain cause. Most of the time, however, a symbolic event needs to be seen as one among many occurrences that together might persuade the public opinion, and thengovernments, to change policies.

Thirdly, norm entrepreneurs such as transnational advocacy networks use leverage politics to convince governments of their point of view on a particular issue. NGOs in and off themselves are not necessarily very powerful actors; they need to persuade and pressure more powerful actors. More powerful target actors can be governments, intergovernmental organizations or transnational corporations.NGOs can use leverage to pressure these kinds of actors into changing their policies. NGOs can only use the leverage technique when they are already more or less established, the NGO needs to raise its salience in the international political arena.Information and symbolic politics are the first steps, after which an NGO can use leverage mechanisms to persuade more powerful actors to change course. Transnational advocacy networks can identify moral or material leverage. An issue will be linked to money or goods when material leverage is used. Action groups can for instance connect human rights to the trade deals of a democratic government with a human rights violating government.

Moral leverage will link a social change issue with the past behaviour of target actors. Keck & Sikkink (2014) call this tactic the “mobilization of shame” as target actors are morally ‘blackmailed’ for their behaviour with regard to the issue (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 23). NGOs will for instance connect their topic of environmental protection to the violation of international agreements on this issue by a government in the past. Not all target actors, such as governments are susceptible to this kind of moral leverage. An actor needs to find his or her reputation in the international system valuable; otherwise the moral leverage will not be effective.

The fourth and last strategy of norm entrepreneurs is accountability politics. Norm entrepreneurs try to persuade governments and other target actors to change their policies. Often, target actors only support particular norms in a rhetorical manner. NGOs try to raise the public’s awareness that this is the case, by arguing that target actors are, in fact, accountable for their practices. The discourse of target actors needs to conform to their practices. An example of accountability politics would be a situation in which a government that has publically committed itself to human rights, but violates them in practice, is put on the spot by NGOs about the discrepancy between its discourse and its practice. The hope of NGOs is that exposing this discrepancy will lead to a change in policy.

A tipping point is needed for a norm to go from the first to the second stage in the norm life cycle. The tipping point moment in the norm life cycle is the instant when the norm entrepreneurs have persuaded enough states to become norm leaders. The tipping point is important as it signals that “a critical mass of states” has been persuaded by the norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). It is difficult to say, however, when the threshold point has been reached exactly, because the number of states that need to be persuaded by the norm entrepreneurs to reach the tipping point is not the same in every instance.

The norm life cycle inherently has a sequential logic. The hypotheses deducted from this social constructivist theorization are therefore not standalone hypotheses for every stage of the norm life cycle. The deducted hypotheses at the first and last stage of the norm life cycle are cumulative in nature. This means that the stage of internalization cannot occur without first the stage of norm entrepreneurs and *a successful* socialization mechanism. The discussion of the first stage of the norm life cycle results in the first set of hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 1. The UN has not employed the right of self-determination in West Papua in 1969 because the norm entrepreneurs did not persuade the critical mass, through their pressure tactics, to employ the right of self-determination.*

*Hypothesis 2. The UN has employed the right of self-determination in East Timor in 1999 because the norm entrepreneurs persuaded the critical mass, through their pressure tactics, to employ the right of self-determination.*

### *1.6.2 The second stage of the norm life cycle*

The second stage of the norm life cycle is about the socialization of the norm with the aim of internalization of the norm. The norm starts to flow through the international system, as more and more states will accept the norm. The stage of norm cascading, as Finnemore & Sikkink understand it, is perhaps less a distinct stage, as it is a mechanism to get a norm internalized. The norm cascading stage can then be understood as a mechanism of socialization. The socialization of states into the norm becomes a means to the norm internalization by states.

 Finnemore & Sikkink do not define the concept of socialization very thoroughly. Later research, which builds on the norm life cycle notion, has put more emphasis on norm diffusion by socialization. Checkel (2005), for instance, defines socialization as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community […]” with the outcome being “compliance based on internalization of the new norm” (Checkel, 2005, p. 804). An actor, in this case a state, changes in the process of socialization from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness. In other words, a state comes to realize that following the (new) norm is more appropriate behaviour then not following the norm. The underlying theory of social action for this mechanism of socialization is a normative understanding of rationality (Börzel & Risse, 2009, p. 6). The relationship between socialization and internalization is one that can be described as a mechanism (socialization) towards an end point (internalization) (Checkel, 2005, p. 806).

Checkel (2005) then identifies two different types of socialization. The first type is a kind of thin socialization in which a state acts out the role it is supposed to play without necessarily really agreeing with the norm attributed to the role that is being played. The second type of socialization goes beyond this thin socialization and constitutes a thicker type of socialization. An actor characterized by the thicker second type of socialization will internalize the norm of the international community,as he identifies with it. The logic of appropriateness is more pronounced here as a state complies with a norm because the state subscribes to the notion that this is “the right thing to do” (Checkel, 2005, p.804). Finnemore & Sikkink do not concede that a thinner socialization process is possible. It might be quite difficult empirically to distinguish between thin and think types of socialization. The clarification of the socialization mechanisms in later research are a good addition to the norm life cycle, as the socialization stage of the norm life cycle in Finnemore & Sikkink’s article is undertheorized. This addition shows that the second stage of the norm life cycle is less of a distinct stage and more of a mechanism to go from the pressure of norm entrepreneurs to the internalization of the norm by states.

The last stage in the norm life cycle is the norm internalization. A norm can become such an established feature in the international system and in the workings of a state, that the norm will have become completely self-evident. The norm will not even consciously be thought about anymore; the norm will be taken for granted. Policy alternatives based on a different norm will not be consciously thought about in this end stage of the norm life cycle (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904).

The second part of the norm life cycle with the socialization mechanism towards internalization leads to the second set of hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 3. The UN has not employed the right of self-determination in West Papua in 1969 because the socialization of the norm of self-determination had not resulted in internalization of the norm.*

*Hypothesis 4. The UN has employed the right of self-determination in East Timor in 1999 because the socialization of the norm of self-determination had resulted in internalization of the norm.*

The discussion on the social constructivist concepts for this thesis can be summarized in the subsequent model.

Figure 1. The social constructivist model

Hypotheses 3 & 4

Hypotheses 1 & 2

# Chapter 2 Postcolonialism

The second theory chapter discusses postcolonialism. The ontological underpinnings are first described with a focus on the different disciplines that have contributed to the approach. The next discussion is about postcolonialism’s critiques on mainstream IR approaches such as the Westernalization of history, the possibility of resistance to colonial oppression and most importantly Orientalism. Orientalism is a prime example of colonial discourse analysis, which is the postcolonial focus of this thesis. The chapter therefore deals in depth with Said’s Orientalism (1978). Hereafter specific concepts are discussed that can be found in colonial discourses such as binarism, othering and race. The chapter further looks at the concepts of big names in postcolonialism that have to do with colonial discourses. The chapter namely ends with a discussion of Bhabha’s concepts of mimicry, ambivalence and hybridity and Spivak’s ideasabout the voice of the subaltern. This all culminates into a colonial discourse that portrays colonial subjects in a particular way.

## 2.1 Historical embedding

Postcolonialism as a theory and research focus emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, at a time that colonies started to decolonize (Pierce, 2009). Postcolonialism is used as an approach to study different fields and often is very eclectic (Quayson, 2000, p. 1). Different fields such as anthropology, literary studies and political science all have a different take on postcolonialism. The term postcolonialism was used in the discipline of political sciences mainly to denominate the time period after the Second World War when decolonization movements started to stir in the colonies. The term *post*colonialism would then be fitting, as the field would concern itself with the time after colonisation had ended. Postcolonialism, as a theoretical approach, however does not concede that colonialism has completely ended. Moreover, postcolonialism finds that the world of today cannot be explained without taking the legacy of colonialism and imperialism into consideration (Quayson, 2000, p. 2).

## 2.2 Ontological underpinnings

Early postcolonial writings are highly indebted to the tradition of literary criticism, which in turn is often grounded in poststructuralism. This is, for instance, the case with Said’s indebtedness to Foucault’s writings and Bhabha’s use of Freud. Postcolonialism in IR is highly influenced by the literary critic Edward Said and his book on Orientalism. The ontology of postcolonialism sways towards the reflectivist post-positivist part of the rational-reflectivity spectrum, because of the influence of Said on its theoretical approach.Postcolonialism thereby becomes a social theory with an ontology that is based on the social construction of reality. Postcolonialism tries to show the dominance of the Eurocentric structure in history and world politics. The focus of postcolonialism is therefore mostly on (colonial) structures. Nevertheless they also try to show the possibility for agency in the dominant Western structure. Agency in postcolonialism is mostly focused on the potential for resistance to unjust (neo) colonial practices and the North/South divide. Some scholars stress the importance of the interaction between the European and non-European world. The result is that a growing importance is accorded to the mutual constitution of the West and the East (Lawson, 2015, p. 592).

## 2.3 Postcolonial critiques

The most important postcolonial critiques on mainstream IR approaches are the Westernization of history, the possibility of resistance to colonial oppression, race theory and Orientalism.

Postcolonialism stands in a long tradition of thinkers who concerned themselves with resistance to imperialism and colonialism such as Césaire (1973), Fanon (1967), Gandhi (1927, 1928), Lenin (1947) and Nkrumah (1965) (Prasad, 2003, p. 7). All of these thinkers, scholars, and anti-imperialists tried to expose the faults still visible in the international order today as a product of colonial history.

### *2.3.1 Eurocentrism*

One of the most important aspects of the postcolonial critique is that the international order is fundamentally Eurocentric in its origin (Prasad, 2003, p. 7; Seth, 2013, p. 15; Biswas, 2016, p. 228). It is important for this theoretical exercise to understand how deeply rooted this Eurocentrism is, as it still shapes the way people and whole countries look at indigenous peoples. The decisions that are under investigation in this thesis are only possible, according to postcolonialism, because of a Western way of looking at the world. This particular view of the world has its roots in centuries of a Eurocentric way of writing history. The extent of the Western biases and the Western lens of actors can only be fully comprehended if one looks at the roots of Eurocentrism. Postcolonialism tries to do just that for the benefit of understanding the roots of the discourses analysed in this research.

The ‘modern state’ and the international order can only be understood if one looks at the origins of concepts such as citizenship, civil society and scientific rationality which emerged at the time of theEuropean Enlightenment of the 18th and 19th centuries (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 4). The ideas about democracy, state, and reason that were formulated in this intellectual tradition had an immense impact on the rest of the world, as Europe was the colonizer of most of the known world. The international order as it is now, has been shaped by the European ideas about statehood and the impact of colonisation (Grovogui, 2013, p. 249). Postcolonialism tries to uncover the European roots of the international system to show that far from being universal, these concepts come from a very specific part of the planet, namely Europe, and later the US. Chakrabarty (2000) and other scholars after him aim for the “provincialization of Europe”, which means that the Eurocentrism of the international order becomes less dominant, so that a space is opened up for other perspectives (Chakrabarty, 2000; Seth, 2013; Prasad, 2003; Biswas, 2016). The IR story of the birth of the sovereign nation state with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is, for instance, a very European centric way of looking at the birth of the nation, as the European nation state could only thoroughly come into existence with the colonization of areas of the world that were not themselves granted complete sovereignty (Biswas, 2016, p. 224).Sothe regions under colonial rule did not have sovereign privileges, which in effect created a strong nationhood among European countries. It is also striking that the ‘mainstream’ IR theories do not perceive that the Westphalian sovereign state came about in a mutually constitutive endeavour of the East and the West (Hobson, 2013, p.32). Postcolonialism explicitly deals with the consequences of this European centred history while most mainstream international relations approaches are not aware of or do not deal with this bias. It borders on arrogance to think that only Europe could or can ever have the only right conception of the nation state. The undue universalism of Western concepts and norms is closely related to the inattentiveness to more particular or local ideas about these concepts and norms. Postcolonialism wants to uncover non-Western discourses and tries to give voice to local histories and indigenous peoples (Grovogui, 2013, p. 248).

### *2.3.2 Resistance*

Another key concept found in the works of many postcolonial scholars is the notion of resistance (Young, 2001; Prasad, 2003). Not only is the notion of resistance to colonialism one of the most important concepts in postcolonialism, it is also important if one wants to understand the cry of indigenous people for self-determination. It is important to see where and how resistance can take place in the cycle of colonial oppression identified by postcolonialism today. Suppression is now taking place not just by the former colonizers but ironically also by the formerly colonized, as was the case with Indonesia in East Timor.Postcolonialism does not think that resistance to colonialism took place only at the end of the colonialist era, or that resistance against colonialism and its legacy is not necessary anymore in a *post*colonial international order (Prasad, 2003, p. 5).

In all postcolonial writings a form of critique of the existing order can be found, but the extent of it can differ profoundly. The postcolonial critique that is more inspired by the Marxist tradition focuses on oppression and coercive domination in the sphere of production as new forms of colonisation in conjunction with a focus on new forms of imperialism (Young, 2001, p. 11). Young (2001), for instance, intertwines the notions of postcolonialism with (neo)colonialism and imperialism.Colonialism and imperialism both are the product of domination of one people by another people.Young distinguishes between colonialism and imperialism. Imperialism for Young is based on ideological and financial components managed by a government from the centre. Colonialism on the other hand was mainly economically driven by companies or for settlement (Young, 2001, p. 40). This distinction between colonialism and imperialism does not take geopolitical factors into account. Marxist scholars writing on imperialism such as Harvey (2005) or Callinicos (2009) would argue that imperialism can only be distinguished from colonialism if intertwined economical and geopolitical factors are considered in a definition of imperialism. Postcolonialism in its historical setting comes after the first phase of colonialism and imperialism; this however does not mean that colonialism as economic domination has ended (Young, 2001, p. 44). Political and economic domination are still very much part of the international order as northern countries still dominate the southern countries, so *post*colonialism is, despite the name, situated in a period of neocolonialism.

One form of resistance to the Eurocentric international order of today that is advocated by postcolonial scholars, is ‘decolonizing the mind’, a phrase taken from the Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa Thiong’O (1986). Decolonizing the mind means that it is important to question and expose the Western origin of many (binary) concepts such as epistemology, East/West, rationality/irrationality and sovereignty (Prasad, 2003, p.7). It is now clear that the Eurocentrism inherent in colonialism, results in a status quo highly unbeneficial for many countries in the world with colonial histories.

## 2.4 Orientalism

Postcolonialism as a distinct approach is highly indebted to the linguistic scholarship of Said (1978), Bhabha (1984) and Spivak (1994), as they all, in some way or another, deal with the question of knowledge production and colonial discourses. They show the mechanism behind the Western biases in knowledge production. They state that an account of history, the production of knowledge about history, is never the full story of events. A complete account of history is not possible.History as a production of knowledge, just as theory, is always “for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128).Colonial discourse is a one-sided account of events. All three scholars point out that this one-sided knowledge production by the superior West ensures dominating power structures over the inferior East. This is one of the main points that Said makes in his seminal work *Orientalism* (1978).

Orientalism for Said has three different meanings. The first meaning is the academic field of scholarship that studies the Orient. The second meaning is a “style of thought” (Said, 1978, p. 2), which construes a blunt ontological and epistemologicaldistinction between the Orient and the Occident. The third meaning is a discourse of Orientalism that made it possible for the West to “manage and produce the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively” (Said, 1978, p. 3; Prasad, 2003, p. 10). Said recognizes that the Orient is a social construct; it is something that is not just there (Said, 1978, p. 4). It would however be too simple to state that the Orient was just an idea. The Orient, as a reality, was constructed in a certain way by discourse (Young, 2001, p. 388). Discourse of the Orient was created in the West, by the West, as a particular idea of what the Orient entails. The Orient is therefore “a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness and later Western empire” (Said, 1978, p. 203). The representation of the Orient includes many stereotypes, such as the Orient as irrational, cruel, backwards and childish (Said, 1978, p. 35-39). The dimension of inferiority can also be seen in the idea that the West knows the Orient better then they know themselves. The West, in other words, has the right kind of knowledge production, whereby the West knows better what is good for the colonised then they themselves can know (Said, 1978, p. 35). Said shows that this discourse of Eastern inferiority as a justification for domination by the West, established itself as a general doctrine, which continues to the present day.

Said draws on Foucault’s notion of discourse as ‘a discursive regime of knowledge’ to show that the knowledge about the Orient, the way in which the Orient was represented, provided Western elites and academics with a way to exert power over the East. Said also draws on Foucault’s concept of the power/knowledge nexus. Foucault has a very specific idea about the interrelatedness of power and knowledge. Gutting (2003) explains that for Foucault there is “an inextricable interrelation of knowledge (discourse) and power (non-discursive practices)” (Gutting, 2003, p. 866). Knowledge is, in this sense, always related to the politics in a society, while power allows for knowledge of the subject that one controls (Gutting, 2003, p. 867). Power for Foucault is not just negative, repressive power that prohibits things. Power is also productive (Foucault, 1977) in that it makes known to us the limitations of for instance self/other. Power produces therefore the knowledge of what a thing is and is not (Campbell, 2013, p. 234).

Said uses this Foucauldian notion in that knowledge, in this instance of the Orient, or at least the European idea of the Orient, ensured that the West was able to dominate the Orient. Said gives a nod to the duality of power in Foucault’s writing by showing the mutually constitutive process that provided the West with the justification to dominate the East while thereby constituting the East’s idea about itself (Said, 1978, p. 7). The inclusion of Foucault’s concepts of power and knowledge also meant that Said for the first time explicitly included poststructuralist notions into the study of colonialism (Quayson, 2000, p. 4). Postcolonialism looks at the dominance of European culture and the ‘Us’ against ‘the Other’ dichotomy still expressed nowadays in relation to many topical subjects. Said’s accomplishment is that he shows, in a very structured way, that the idea that the European identity is superior to other identities, is an idea cultivated by writings providing a certain inferior representation of the Other.

Said’s most well-known work has been very important in bringing different strands in postcolonialism together. His greatest achievement was to ensure that colonial oppression was not only seen in military terms but also as a discourse of oppression (Young, 2001, p. 383). Said’s *Orientalism* has become known as the prime example of colonial discourse analysis – almost as a theory of colonial discourse – although this was not the primary aim of his book. The aim of his book was to study the Orient as a discourse (Young, 2001, p. 386). Part of the legacy of Said’s paradigm-shifting book is also the notion that Orientalist discourse of the East was legitimized by academics. Academia kept reproducing a certain representation of the East, thereby enforcing Orientalism.

## 2.5 Critiques on Orientalism

A ground-breaking work such as *Orientalism* will invariably lead to critique. The most frequently voiced critique on *Orientalism* is that Said sees Orientalism as an unchanging Western discourse, neglecting the historical contexts in which it came about. Said has tried to show in his book that Orientalism is a long-running pervasive and constant Western discourse. He therefore incorporates ancient Greek and nineteenth-century writers alike in his treatise on Orientalism. His critics, however, find it highly doubtful that a Western discourse of Orientalism can be unchanged through centuries (Porter, 1994, p. 152-154; Malik, 1996, p. 228). Said, they argue, does not pay enough attention to change in history. If Said sees a constant Western discourse running through two thousand years of history then he is liable to the charge that he creates a ‘Westernization myth’ along the same lines as the Orientalism that he tries to expose. Europe becomes one unitary actor as Said fails to incorporate in his analysis the diversity and conflicts in European history (Malik, 1996, p. 229).

Another criticism of *Orientalism* is that Said’s all-encompassing discourse leaves little room for alternative voices. Porter (1994) goes so far as to say that even though Said says he is attentive to individual voices, “virtually no counter-hegemonic voices are heard (Porter, 1994, p. 153). The discourse of Orientalism is so pervasive for Said that he does not show that alternative discourses were able to appear. This is a real criticism of *Orientalism*, because his treaty about an all pervasive Orientalism would have been even stronger if he showed that there were alternative voices but that they were marginal. This research incorporates Orientalism’s critique in that it will try to show a possible alternative discourse counteracting the prevailing discourse.

## 2.6 Colonial Discourse

Said’s work on Orientalism has been at the forefront of colonial discourse as a field of study, despite some critique. Said’s use of the Foucauldian notion of power and knowledge as an inherent feature of discourse, has become the basis for a definition of colonial discourse. Colonial discourse can then be defined as “ the variety of textual forms in which the West produced and codified knowledge about non-metropolitan areas and cultures, especially those under colonial control” (Williams & Chrisman, 1994, p. 5). Colonial discourse is thus about “colonies and colonial people, about colonizing powers and the relationship between these two” (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 37).

The first important feature of colonial discourse is that it makes for binarism. Colonial discourse is all about a dichotomous binary logic. The world is split between the colonized and the colonizer. The effect of a discourse with a binary logic is an inherent hierarchy in this dichotomy. One of the categories is always dominant (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 19). The dominant category, in this case the colonizer, is comprised of all the attributes with a positive association while the inferior category of the colonized is comprised of negative attributes. The colonizer might in this way have attributes such as civilized, good and human, while the colonised will be described in colonial discourse as primitive, evil and bestial.

These binary distinctions can take many forms, such as a West-East distinction or Said’s Occident-Orient distinction. Binary categories, by definition, exclude the possibility for degrees of, for instance evilness or primitiveness. The result is a system of rigid categories without any potential for change (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 18).

The binarism often voiced in colonial discourse leads to another feature, namely the process of ‘othering’. In the process of othering the self is established in relation to the other. The relationship of self and other in the colonial context is one of the dominant self and the other as the subordinate (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 156). It is important for the construction of the self’s ego to contrast with an other who is a lesser being. Othering in this sense is used to make the self superior over the other. The West has the power of othering the other, in the context of colonial discourses. The West has the power to let their own perceived ideas about the other become *the*widely accepted standard (Tripathi, 2016, p. 10). Othering as a process can carry so far as to objectify the other. The other is not seen as a person anymore, but as less human, or an object. The concept of othering is important to keep in mind when studying colonial discourses, as it shows exclusion and a continued dominance of the West over everyone they deemed different.

## 2.7 Race

The concept of the Other, opposed to the West, had one other very important consequence, namely the creation of the concept of race (Malik, 1996, p 221). The creation of the concept of race is naturally closely associated with colonialism and imperialism. The ideas about race are focused on a divide in people on the basis of biologically unchangeable physical features, which determine the behaviour and intellect of a person (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 180). Race became a scientifically studied category and the basis of race theory. The 18th and 19th century became the heyday of scientific racism in which a hierarchical system of races was actively propagated (Loomba, 2005, p. 100).

Scientists at the time tried to objectively measure race by attaching racial characterizations to biological differences. Differences in facial angles, brain size and skull size were attributed to different races (Loomba, 2005, p. 101; Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 184). Scientists tried to prove the scientific race theory of biological differences until the beginning of the twentieth century when they finally had to concede that they could not objectively measure race. This realization, however, did not stop them from categorizing people into distinct races. The concept of race had become so internalized that a scientific justification of race was no longer deemed necessary. Race became an ideology and a social category (Malik, 1996, p. 121-122).

The categorization of human beings into races was a completely European invention (Winant, 2000, p. 172). The most problematic part of the notion race is not only the categorization of humans into races, but also the inherent hierarchy of these categorizations. The European, white race was always seen as the superior race, while the other races where seen as deeply inferior.

Europe needed an inferior other to distance itself from and create a (superior) European self (Loomba, 2005, p. 91; Young, 1995, p. 93-94). The inferiority of the colonized people on the basis of race in particular, strengthened or even justified imperialism. A racial hierarchy made it possible for European countries to justify their exploitation and domination of colonial peoples, as these inferior beings were barely seen as humans. Colonialism and race share a very unique relationship because colonialism is at the same time about debasement and idealization of colonized people. On the one hand the colonized people were seen as inferior beings, who could be justifiably dominated by the superior white race. On the other hand, racial improvements were sought after on the basis of the imperial ideology of civilization missions. (Ashcroft et al., 2007, 183). Race as a constructed concept became a very real reality of racial inequality (Loomba, 2005, p. 106). Race stayed a pervasive cultural and social category long after the biologically underpinned racist apotheosis of the Shoah. Postcolonialism however tries to deconstruct the racial underpinnings of colonialism and the present day’s prevailing racist ideas.

## 2.8 Bhabha: mimicry, ambivalence and hybridity

Homi Bhabha, (1984) as a postcolonial philosophical scholar, has contributed greatly to the vocabulary of postcolonialism by developing key concepts such as mimicry, ambivalence and hybridity.These concepts are important to understand the more fluid notion of colonial relations that Bhabha proposes. Bhabha’s work is influenced by Foucault, as is Said’s work, but he is also greatly influenced by psychoanalysis. The first concept that is important to understand in Bhabha’s work is the concept of ambivalence. Bhabha takes the concept of ambivalence from psychoanalysis were it means the space between “wanting one thing and wanting its opposite” (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 10). Bhabha puts this notion into the colonial context with the purpose of describing the complex relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. The relationship of the colonizer and the colonized is one in which the colonized is both derided and desired (Childs & Williams, 1997, p. 124). There is in colonial relationships both a pull towards and a push away from each other. The colonial subject therefore has an ambivalent relationship with the colonizer. Part of the colonial subject is complicit while another part is resistant. The colonial identity, in this sense, lies somewhere in between and is constantly in flux (Childs & Williams, 1997, p. 125; Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 10). The relationship between colonizer and colonized is not clear-cut for Bhabha. The ambivalence in this relationship can easily lead to mimicry.

Mimicry means for Bhabha “a discursive process by which the excess or slippage produced by the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same *but not quite*) does not merely “rupture” the discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a “partial” present” (Bhabha, 184, p. 127, emphasis in original). The colonized begins to look like the colonizer, but s/he will never be the same as the colonizer. The colonized is encouraged to take up behaviour, traditions, values and institutions from the colonizer but a difference will always remain between them (Childs & Williams, 1997, p. 130). The colonized becomes ‘almost the same, but not quite’ the same as the colonizer. The incomplete sameness of the colonizer can easily result in mockery, understood as ‘the excess or slippage produced by the ambivalence of mimicry’. There is then in the colonized subject a certain desire to mimic the colonizer, but this desire is turned into a parody (Huggan, 1994, p. 645). Mockery therefore makes for a more uncertain colonial dominance, as the colonizer is less in control off the behaviour of the colonized subject. Consequently for Bhabha mimicry is “at once resemblance and menace” (Bhabha, 1984, p. 127).

 The third, arguably most debated, and important concept of Bhabha is hybridity. The usual meaning of the word is the biological meaning of cross-breading between two species. Bhabha uses the concept of hybridity to show the interdependence and mutual constitutiveness of the colonizer and the colonized (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 108). The discourse of colonialism loses its dominance when the “denied knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority” (Bhabha, in Young, 1995, p. 23). In other words, the colonial discourse has become a hybrid form in which the authoritative discourse of the colonizer is intertwined with the “language of the other” (Young, 1995, p. 22). There is not one single dominant colonial voice anymore, the colonial voice is changed, with a diminishment of its authority as a result. Therefore hybridity is a process which can lead to the challenging of colonial dominance and the resistance of colonial power.

## 2.9 Spivak and the possibility of giving voice to the subaltern

The last scholar to be discussed because of her contributions to postcolonialism is Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1994). Spivak is a versatile scholar drawing on different theoretical approaches such as feminism, Marxism and psychoanalysis, while disavowing large theoretical systems and grand narratives. Her most important work centres on the position of the subaltern and the possibility of giving voice to the subaltern. The term subaltern comes from Gramsci and means “of inferior rank”. In Gramsci’s work, the term subalterns refers to the people who are oppressed by the “hegemony of the ruling class” (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 198). In the postcolonial context, the term was first used by the Subaltern Studies Group. The Subaltern Studies Group was a group of Indian historiographers that tried to study subaltern people. The Subaltern Studies Group tried to read between the lines to retrieve the voices of the people who resisted colonization (Childs & Williams, 1997, p. 161). In Spivak’s writing, the term subaltern is mostly used to describe colonial women, as they fall prey, in her view, to a ‘double colonization’. Double colonization refers to the duality of oppressive power for colonial women in both the domestic space, with the patriarchy of men, and the public space, with the patriarchy of colonial power. The result is that subaltern colonial women do not have a place in colonial history, from which they themselves can speak (Young, 1995, p. 162). Spivak questions the possibility to retrieve the voice of the subaltern in her famous essay *Can the subaltern speak?* ( Spivak, 1994)*.* Spivak contends in this essay “the subaltern cannot speak” (Spivak, 1994, p. 104). Spivak’s view that the subaltern cannot speak should not be construed as the unfeasibility of giving voice to suppressed people, but rather as the impossibility to do this outside of the dominant discourse structure (Ashcroft, 2007, p. 201). Historiographers cannot retrieve the hidden histories of subaltern people by studying colonial texts. The entire point about the inability of the subaltern to speak is that the subaltern cannot be found hidden between the lines of colonial texts. Texts by the colonizer do not speak about subaltern people. It is important says Spivak to instead point to the *silence* of colonial texts on the subaltern (Maggio, 2007, p. 421-425). The silence of history on the subaltern is, for Spivak, the ultimate reason why the subaltern cannot speak.

## 2.10 Hypothesis for postcolonialism

The chapter has dealt with different aspects of postcolonial theory. The characteristics all have to do with colonial discourses. The (Western) writers of colonial discourses portrayed their subjects in different ways. The two cases examined in this thesis are expected to have different colonial discourses and portrayals of their people. The hypotheses describe the different portrayals in colonial discourses of the West Papuans and the East Timorese.

*Hypothesis 4: The lack of a genuine act of self-determination by the UN in the case of West Papua is a result of a prevailing discourse according to which the people are portrayed as inferior and incapable of deciding on their political future.*

*Hypothesis 5: The act of self-determination by the UN in the case of East Timor, is a result of a change in the prevailing discourse according to which these people are portrayed as equals and capable of deciding on their own political future.*

# Chapter 3 Epistemology, Methods and Operationalization

## 3.1 Positivism and post-positivism

Epistemology in international relations distinguishes between positivism and post-positivism. Positivism has a different view of how knowledge comes about than post-positivism, while it also has a different understanding of reality. Positivism understands the world as one reality that can be objectively measured, researched and understood. Post-positivism sees reality as social constructed.

Positivism, in short, focuses on observations in which regularities can be discovered which can lead to generalizations and general laws. It is not possible for positivism to look at non-observable ‘realities’ as they only measure entities that are observable (Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 22). The research of positivist scholars is therefore often quantitativein nature. The aim of positivism is empirical falsification through hypothesis testing. The idea underlying objective observations, is that it is desirable and necessary to distinguish between fact and value (Fisher, 1998, p. 4).

Post-positivism emerged as a critique of the positivist idea of knowledge production. The world, according to post-positivists, is not one objective reality. The way one looks at reality is based on normative views and one’s social and historical context (Fisher, 1998, p. 6). Scientific study is, therefore, a social practice that is determined by the context one is in.

The post-positivist approaches – for there are many different approaches under this umbrella – share an interpretive philosophy of science. A method of interpretation or *verstehen* tries first of all to ‘read’ discourses to ascertain what they say about intersubjective structures. An interpretative method tries to understand the *meaning* of specific policies or actions. This results in a denouncement of the need to find “universal cause-and-effect relationships” (Lichbach, 2003, p. 88).

The general section on the difference between positivism and post-positivism is important, because it enables the categorization of the epistemologies of social constructivism and postcolonialism.

The theory versus theory design of this thesis can be seen as a positivist mold. This thesis therefore has to adhere to a positivist epistemology in that it takes theories, distils hypotheses and tests its causal mechanisms. The social ontology of social constructivism can create tension with a positivist epistemology but it is possible to test hypotheses in a positivist model. Postcolonial theory will be much more difficult to situateinto a positivist mold. The first reason for this is that postcolonialism is a normative theory while positivism aims to be value neutral. The second reason is that postcolonialism aims to offer a partial perspective, which means that it focused on situated knowledge in a historical context (Epstein, 2014, p. 295; Grovogui, 2013, p. 248). Postcolonial most certainly does not try to create generalisations, while this is the aims of positivism. Postcolonialism thus does not normally have a positivist epistemology. The result of analysingpostcolonialism in a positivist mold is that one can generate hypotheses but even in a positivist mold these should, if one honours the origin of the theory, not be taken as absolute causal chains.

## 3.2 Case design and time span

In this thesis an intensive approach is used to study a phenomenon. An intensive approach, according to Swanborn (2010), means that a researcher studies one or a small number of cases (Swanborn, 2010, p. 2). In this instance, two cases are studied in what George and Bennett (2005) would call a method of structured, focused comparison. The study of the cases is structured in that the same (theoretical) questions are asked of each case. The study is focused because there are parameters ensuring that a limited number of aspects of the case are examined. The research objective of this thesis is a disciplined configurative case study, since the aim of the study is to explain two historical cases by applying established theories (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 67-75). In principle, this can lead to the contestation of a theory, if the theory is not able to explain the case sufficiently. I would, however, not go so far as to disqualify a theory on these premises, as these are quite general theories that can, if necessary, be changed or broadened.

The cases of West Papua and East Timor are selected because they are both instances of acts of self-determination decided for by the UN. The cases can broadly be defined as most-similar different outcome cases. A pure definition of most similar different outcome cases is that the cases are “similar in all respects except the variable of interest” (Gerring, 2007, p. 131). It is not possible in most research designs to select cases that are exactly the same except for the outcome, there are almost always some other differences as well. The cases of West Papua and East Timor share certain characteristics, such as a struggle for self-determination against the same oppressor and the statutory base for an act of self-determination, but they differ in outcome; West Papua did not become independent while East Timor did become independent. The disadvantage of this case selection might be that there is a thirty-year gap between the cases. This can, however, also be seen as an advantage because it allows for the study of change, such as a change in the internalization by states of a norm or a change in historical representation.

*Timespan for social constructivism*

The chosen cases indicate that for social constructivism there are two different timespans to study. The discourse surrounding the norm of self-determination will be analysed in the case of West Papua between 1960 and 1969. It is useful to study the discourse surrounding the norm of self-determination a couple of years before the transfer to Indonesia, up to the time of the act of self-determination in 1969. The discourse surrounding the norm of self-determination will be analysed in the case of East Timor between 1990 and 1999. The reason for this is that the discourse about the independence of East Timor, and the act of self-determination required to achieve that end, was the most intense in the 1990s. The time period therefore includes the whole decade up to the act of self-determination in 1999.

*Timespan for postcolonialism*

The object of inquiry in this thesis is the historical representation of the West Papuan and the East Timorese people. The timeframe chosen to research the discourses surrounding the West Papuan people is quite wide, as this discourse analysis is historical in nature. The chosen timeframe for the West Papua case is 1930-1969. The Dutch language proficiency of the researcher is a great advantage in the case of West Papua, as it makes it possible to follow the development of the historical representation of the West Papuan people through a longer period of time, including the last decades of the Dutch colonization.

The timeframe for the East Timor case is 1975-1999. The timeframe starts in 1975, as this was the starting point of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. This comprehensive timeframe allows for a good comparison of the historical representation at the time of the occupation with the historical representation immediately leading up to the act of self-determination.

## 3.3 Methods

### 3.3.1 Discourse Analysis

The ontological and subsequent epistemological premises of social constructivism tie in well with discourse analysis as the chosen method. Discourse analysis is an interpretative method, which implies a certain underlying ontology. Discourse analysis, just as social constructivism, presumes that social reality is not just out there, but that language and discourse actively make reality.A discourse could be defined as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1). Discourse, as a means of social action, in this way, actively constructs (aspects of) the world we live in, such as identities and social relations (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 5).

In the discourse analysis traditionthese socially constructed meanings are called representations. In the practice of discourse analysis it is important to be able to distinguish between discourses, although they are always related to one another (Neumann, 2008, p. 66). It has to become clear, therefore, to which discourse a representation belongs. The boundaries of one specific discourse are not fixed but fluid, so that discourses can overlap (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 89).

To carry out a good discourse analysis one must first demarcate the texts that will be analysed. In this thesis the discourse analysis of social constructivism studies political texts such as government minutes, white papers, political speeches, UN agreements, UN resolutions, statements by NGOs and despatches from embassies. The most important of these texts are called monuments, these are the texts that refer to previous important texts and are referred to by others (Neumann, 2008, p.70).

The next step is analysing the texts. As one analyses the texts and abstracts the discourses, one should try to determine if or when discourses changed over time. In other words, the permanence or impermanence of a discourse should be noted.

The discourse analysis of this thesis specifically looks at the discourse surrounding the norm of self-determination. First of all the norm of self-determination is analysed in general to understand how the norm became established in the UN’s legal frame. Then the discourse analysis will focus specifically on the norm of self-determination in combination with West Papua and East Timor.

### 3.3.2 Historical representations

The chosen method to analyse postcolonialism is the method of historical representations. Historical representation is a special kind of discourse analysis. Historical representation examines discourses but in a sense goes a step further then discourse analysis as it shows that historical representations of peoples can create certain courses of action and prohibits others.It fits extremely well with postcolonialism as it is designed to analyse the representations of a people in a particular historical context. The method of historical representations is closely connected to Orientalism and colonial discourse analysis, because the characteristics and meanings attributed to representations create knowledge of, and power over, the subject. A particular representation, attached to the subject of inquiry, can therefore have political consequences as it delineates the possible actions.

Kevin Dunn (2003), as well as Roxanne Doty (1996), has originated this type of discourse analysis. For Dunn the term historical representations, refers to “how the object of an inquiry (X) has been represented over time and space” (Dunn, 2008, p. 79). The central aim of the method is “to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible” (Doty, 1996, p.5).

The historical representation approach tries to identify the different representations of the object of inquiry (Klotz et al, 2006, p. 376). The postcolonial empirical chapter of this thesis will focus on the various aspects of the representations of the West Papua and East Timor people. The identification of historical representations is only possible is one keeps in mind ‘who is speaking’, in other words who is constructing the representation (Dunn, 2008, p. 81. Then one can focus on the sort of language and metaphors that are being used to describe a people (Klotz et al, 2006, p. 376).

Afterwards, the contestations between the representations are analysed. There is almost always more then one historical representation, although one can be the dominant one. The strength and pervasiveness of the historical representation shows how dominant one representation can be (Klotz et al, 2006, p. 371). The divergence from general discourse analysis is the most evident in the third step of the analysis, as the researcher will try to “contextualize these representations and discourses within the larger structures of meaning of which they are a part” (Dunn, 2008, p. 90). The researcher will not only try to contextualize the historical representation, she will also try to show what course of action becomes possible following this historical representation. The postcolonial empirical chapter will analyse the extent to which the units of observation have let a certain historical representation delineate their course of action. In this thesis that course of action would be the possibility of a *serious* act of self-determination for the people of West Papua and East Timor.

### 3.3.3 Interview

The thesis also uses the method of semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are interviews that use an interview guide but allow the interviewer to ask **deeper** questions when the conversation turns to new information on the topic (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). A semi-structured interview captures a tick social context and can be seen a supplementary to the other method used in the thesis. The method of interviewing is supplementary to the other method in this thesis because the undue reliance for information on a small N is subjected to biases. For this thesis two interview are conducted, one for each case. The aim of the interview selection is to interview people who have been/are actively involved in the West Papua and East Timor case. The involvement of the interviewees in the cases ensures a great knowledge of the subject.

## 3.4 Operationalization of the social constructivist concepts

The concepts discussed in relation to social constructivism in the theory chapter will be operationalized in the following section.

### *3.4.1 Norm entrepreneurs on an organizational platform*

Finnemore and Sikkink specify norm entrepreneurs as actors who promote, call attention to and sometimes even create norms. In this thesis, norm entrepreneurs are NGOs and individuals who promote the norm of self-determination through their discourse.Norm entrepreneurs need an organizational platform upon which they can promote the norm or a change in the content of the norm. Norm entrepreneurs at the level of the UN can have access to multiple organizational platforms. An important organizational platform at the UN is the Commission on Human Rights and sub commissions thereof on topics such as arbitrary detention and torture. Another organizational platform used in this thesis is theSpecial Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The norm entrepreneurs studied in this thesis need to have access to the organizational platforms. This means that they will need to have access to the UN as a platform. The NGOs that are of importance to this thesis will be NGOs that have been granted some form of consultative status in the ECOSOC. If they have some form of consultative status at the UN, then they will, in all probability, be credible and perhaps even powerful norm entrepreneurs.

### *3.4.2 Socialization and internalization*

A norm will begin to be socialized into the international system in the second stage of the norm life cycle. The premise held by this thesis is that socialization should be seen as a mechanism towards internalization. The mechanism of socialization might be difficult to identify empirically, but internalization as the end point could be more easily discerned. The process of socialization might, however, be visible when the Keck & Sikkink (2014)mechanisms available to norm entrepreneurs can be traced.

The concept of socialization can therefore be seen when norm entrepreneurs use information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, accountability politics. Internalization of the norm implies not only compliance with the norm, but also a certain ‘taken for grantedness’. It should therefore be seen in the empirics that states not only comply with the norm but also base their justification for that compliance on the norm. Another sign of internalization would be when a state refers to their decisions arising from the norm in terms of the ‘right thing to do’.

## 3.5 Operationalization of the postcolonial concepts

### *3.5.1 Portrayals*

The method of historical representation will be operationalized through a description of a specific portrayal that I expect to find. The hypothesis on West Papua suggests an inferiority portrayal. An inferiority portrayal is visible through the use of phrases such as savages and primitive, which suggests that these people are almost inhuman and therefore inferior to (superior) Westerners. The inferiority of the people can also be seen in the notion that the people are not capable of decide on their political future. This notion can be seen through the use of phrases such as, uneducated, underdeveloped and stone-aged. The inferiority portrayal might include other notions and other phrases, as this is by no means an exhaustive list, but it does give an idea of the direction of the historical representation of the West Papuans.

The hypothesis on East Timor suggests a portrayal of the East Timorese as equals and capable of deciding on political issues. A portrayal of equals is probably more difficult to see, as equality is part of the status quo and is often not explicitly mentioned. However, a notion to see this portrayal might be the idea that they are “just like us”. Another notion might include the idea that the East Timorese people deserve something, for instance a referendum or peace, because they are equal to Westerners. The capability of the East Timorese to decide on their own fate might be visible through the way in which the referendum is organized, for instance one-man-one-vote or a UN mission to safeguard the elections.

## 3.6 Unit of observation: United Nations and countries

Certain countries, as well as the UN itself, will be researched in this thesis, alongside aforementioned other actors such as NGOs. The behaviour of the United Nations is the unit of analysis and the focus of this thesis. The United Nations is not one big monolithic institution. The United Nations consists of many organs, agencies and sub-organizations (Hurd, 2011, p. 99). Thus, the discourses in the UN can relate to, for instance, a sub commission like the commission on human rights or an internal report by the Secretary General.

The thesis examines in the empirical analysis the internalization of the norm of self-determination and the historical representation of multiple countries and the UN.

Figure 2 shows the different units of observation per empirical analysis. The countries that are analysed are consistent per case except for the Netherlands in the postcolonialism analysis. The Netherlands is not analysed separately because the historical representation of the Papuans already comes from the Dutch and Dutch sources. The Dutch were the ones with knowledge of the Papuans and therefore the ones with the power to communicate their historical representation to other countries and the UN. The US is chosen as a unit of observation because it was the leader of the ‘free’ world and the most powerful actor in the international community with regard to the UN. The UK is an important actor to choose as a unit of observation because is was the biggest colonizer in the pre-War period. The UK had many colonies, which could be expected to have an effect on the postcolonial discourse and policies regarding decolonization and the norm of self-determination. Indonesia is specifically added to the list in the case of East Timor because Indonesia was, throughout both the timespans, the colonizer of East Timor and therefore a relevant actor when looking at discourses surrounding the norm of self-determination and their historical representation of the people of East Timor.

Figure 2. Units of observation per empirical analysis.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Social constructivism countries | Postcolonialism countries |
| West Papua | Netherlands | United States |
|  | United States | United Kingdom |
|  | United Kingdom | United Nations |
|  | United Nations |  |
| East Timor | Indonesia | Indonesia |
|  | United States | United States |
|  | United Kingdom | United Kingdom |
|  | United Nations | United Nations |

## 3.7 Source material

The thesis will try to use primary sources as much as possible. Primary sources will include political texts such as government minutes, white papers, political speeches, UN agreements, UN resolutions, statements by NGO’s and despatches from embassies. Furthermore information will be gathered through the two interviews.

The historical representation approach has as an important component the use of an even bigger variety of sources and text genres to ensure “a deeper contextualization” of the discourse and the accompanying historical representation (Dunn, 2008, p. 83; Dunn, 2003, p. 16). The variety of sources includes not just political texts, such as government reports and speeches, but also literature, travel journals, newspapers and magazines. The emphasis is on a wide selection of sources to identify and understand the different discourses on the historical representation of the West Papuan and East Timorese people.

The thesis will also use secondary sources such as academic books and articles.

The advantage of primary sources is that it is ‘new’ source material that the researcher can interpret through different theoretical lenses. The disadvantage is that it is difficult and not always possible to gather primary sources because of time and money constraints. Primary sources are also not always available because states could keep information classified for a certain number of years.

The advantage of secondary sources can be that other scholars have already uncovered information in for instance a foreign archive, that would otherwise not be available to a master student. The disadvantage of secondary sources is that one must be aware of the fact that the writer has already interpreted the information in a certain way which might lead to certain theoretical biases.

# Chapter 4 Empirics analysis for social constructivism

## 4.1 Case description of West Papua

West New Guinea was part of the Dutch East Indies colony, which was established in the 1820s (Budiardjo & Liong, 1988, p. 2). The Dutch East Indies became Indonesia when it declared itself independent of the Netherlands on 17 August 1945(Lijphart, 1966, p. 11). The future of West Papua was only a minor issue until 1949. At the Round Table Conference in 1949 the matter of West Papua became a major issue between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The Netherlands wanted West Papua to remain a part of the Kingdom so that it could decide its own fate later on. Indonesia wanted West Papua to become part of their territory, as it wanted the Dutch East Indies to become independent asa whole.The outcome of the dispute was that the territory of West Papua was excluded from the transferof sovereignty charter of Indonesia. The matter of West Papua was to be resolved a year after the Republic of Indonesia came into existence (Lijphart, 1966, p. 14-15). In 1950, a conference was unsuccessfully held to resolve the dispute between the two countries. Indonesia made appeals in the General Assembley of the UN from 1954 to 1957 on the subject of West Papua (Lijphart, 1966, p. 16).

The resolutions of Indonesia never received the required two-third majority. The Netherlands began to increase their emphasis on the right of the West Papuans for self-determination. The Netherlands wished the West Papuans to employ an act of self-determination when they were ready. Until then, the Netherlands would administer the territory. Indonesia was not about to let this happen so they repeatedly threatened to invade West Papua (Lijphart, 1966, p. 19-20). In 1962, small fights in West Papua between the Dutch and Indonesia were the result. Under pressure of the US, the Netherlands relinquished their demand that Indonesia should recognize West Papua’s right of self-determination prior to an agreement (Crocombe, 2007, p. 283; Kamsteeg, 2014, p. 51). The relinquishment of this demand made it possible to sign an agreement between the two parties. The New York agreement was signed on August 15, 1962. The Agreement stipulated that the Dutch would transfer the authority of West Papua to the UNTEA. On the first of May 1963 UNTEA would transfer its authority over theterritory of West Papua to the Indonesians. Before the end of 1969, an act of self-determination was to be held in which the West Papuans would vote to stay with Indonesia or “sever their ties with Indonesia” (New York Agreement, 1962). The New York Agreement also specified that all adults, not foreign nationals, were eligible to vote in the act of self-determination “to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice” (New York Agreement, 1962). In August 1968, a UN team came to West Papua to assist in the act of self-determination slated for next year. The UN reporter, Fernando Ortiz Sanz, toured the region to ascertain the situation (Saltford, 2000, p. 73). He did not regard an act of self-determination in accordance with international practice as feasible. Ortiz-Sanz argued that the one man one vote system could be changed in favour of a mixed method system in which the urban areas vote directly while the rural areas would have a system of collective consultation (Saltford, 2000, p. 77). Indonesia did not agree with this method and decided to create special assemblies, which would decide on the basis of consensus on the fate of the territory (Saltford, 2000, p. 80). In practice, the Indonesian government had full control over the appointment of people to the special assemblies (Crocombe, 2007, p. 284). The UN only witnessed the appointment of a very small number of people who were to take part in the Act of Free Choice (Saltford, 2000, p. 85). The Act of Free Choice began on July 14, 1969, with the first consultative assembly meeting. The assembly members had been isolated from their families for weeks while some also complained of being bribed and threatened (Saltford, 2000, p. 87). Under the watchful eye of foreign ambassadors and Indonesian government officials, a consensus was reached to remain with Indonesia. Several of such meetings were held, in which the assembly members spoke in favour of incorporation with Indonesia, largely because they were bribed, coerced and afraid of reprisals if they would speak in favour of independence (Crocombe, 2007, p. 284). On August 2, 1969 the last assembly meeting was held, after which the Indonesian government proclaimed that the Papuan people had voted to remain part of Indonesia (Saltford, 2000, p. 88-89).

## 4.2 Case description of East Timor

Portugal colonized East Timor from the 16th century onwards. The end of the *Estado Novo* regime in Lisbon was also the end of the colonization by Portugal of East Timor (Budiardjo & Liong, 1984, p.3). Fretilin proclaimed independence on 28 November 1975. Fretilin had been a vocal pro-independence party underPortugal’s colonial rule. The Indonesian government invaded East Timor on 7 December 1975, because Indonesia was anxious to prevent East Timor from becoming an independent state. The UN condemned the invasion of Indonesia and never acknowledged Indonesia’s sovereignty in East Timor. Portugal was still the legal administrative power of East Timor in the eyes of the UN (UN, 1975). No states in the international system publically recognized Indonesia’s claims on East Timor. Australia was the only exception of this policy as president Hawke in 1985 publically stated that his country recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor (Cotton, 2004, p. 5). Even though Australia was the only country to officially recognize Indonesia’s sovereignty in East Timor, other countries were unofficially condoning Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor. Indonesia attacked East Timor with the tacit approval of the US, including military aid (National Security Archive, 2001). The invasion and subsequent occupation of East Timor by Indonesia was brutal. In the first 24 hours of the invasion more than 150 people, mostly civilians, were killed at random (Budiardjo & Liong, 1984, p. 129). The ensuing occupation of more than twenty years can be seen as genocide, as approximately 200.000 people died – a third of the population (BBC, 2016). Indonesia displayed brutal war techniques as they illegally detained alleged fighters, torturing and killing them in the most vicious ways possible (Kohen & Taylor, 1979; Budiardjo & Liong, 1984). Foreign journalist had up until that moment great difficulties in getting access to East Timor. It was to a certain extent possible to visit the territory, but the authorities allowed the journalists only selective access (Budiardjo & Liong, 1984, p. 124).

The international community in general remained quite placid about the human right violations in East Timor, until the Santa Cruz killings (1991), where Indonesian soldiers killed peaceful protesters before the eyes of foreign journalists (UN, 2000, p. 5; Timor Archives, 2011). The international pressure for an act of self-determination for East Timor increased throughout the 1990s (Endie van Binsbergen, personal communication, 14 March 2017).

Indonesian President Habibie announced on 27 January 1999 that the people of East Timor would be able not only to choose for autonomy within the territory of Indonesia, but also for independence from Indonesia (UN, 2000, p. 7). The opinions on this change of policy were mixed in Indonesia. Many military leaders did not agree with Habibie’s decision. Pro-integration groups in Indonesia and East Timor grew and were allowed by the dissident military leaders to violently intimidate East Timorese. The tripartite talks between Indonesia and Portugal, which were more or less ongoing since 1983,culminated in an agreement signed on 5 May 1999, in which the countries agreed to hold a referendum (UN Security Council, 1999a). The situation in East Timor was not completely secure, but the referendum was held on 8 August 1999. The turn-out was incredibly high with 98,6% of the registered people voting (UN, 2000, p. 38). The outcome of the act of self-determination was that 78,5% of the population rejected the proposed special autonomy within Indonesia while 21,5% accepted the proposed special autonomy (UN, 2000, p. 40). The outcome of the act of self-determination was clear in that East Timor would become independent.

The security situation in East Timor deteriorated very fast in the wake of the referendum. Violence erupted as pro-integration militias, backed by Indonesian armed forces, forcefully displaced hundreds of East Timorese while also threatening and killing UN personnel (UN, 2000, p. 41-43). The post-ballot violence intensified to a “humanitarian crisis of massive proportions” (UN General Assembly, 1999). The Indonesian government requested a UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor in September 1999. A multinational peacekeeping force was established to restore peace in East Timor. The transfer of authority from Indonesia to the UN was established at the end of October 1999, with the launch of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (UN General Assembly, 1999). UNTAET remained the administrative authority until East Timor became truly independent on 20 May 2002 (UN, 2002).

## 4.3 Self-determination and the birth of the United Nations

The first empirical chapter looks at the West Papua and East Timor case through a constructivist lens. The structure is roughly the same for both cases throughout the chapter. The norm of self-determination will be analysed throughout the norm life cycle. The chapter begins with the birth of the UN to show that the norm of self-determination has been a part of the UN’s (legal) frame from the beginning. The use of the term self-determination in the UN’s Charter does not however equal the internalization of the norm of self-determination. The endpoint of internalization can only be achieved through norm entrepreneurs and a successful socialization mechanism. The chapter will therefore continue with an analysis of norm entrepreneurs in the case of West Papua and the level of internalization of the norm of self-determination by the units of observation, which in this case are the Netherlands, the US, the UK and the UN.

The East Timor case follows the same structure namely an analysis of the norm entrepreneurs, their socialization mechanisms and the levels of internalization of the units of observation, in this case Indonesia, the US, the UK and the UN. Both cases end with a conclusion based on the hypotheses.

The social constructivism empirics look at West Papua between 1960-1969. It is, however, necessary for the analysis of the norm of self-determination to understand that the norm has been part of the UN’s legal frame from the beginning, so as to understand the context in which the norm of self-determination was used in the 1960s.

The United Nations was founded in 1945. On the 26th of June, the Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco (UN Charter, 1945). The normof self-determination was mentioned in this founding charter of the United Nations. The principle of self-determination can be found in Articles 1 and 55. Article 1 (2) speaks about the principle of self-determination in the context of delineating the UN’s purposes, one of which is, “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and *self-determination*of peoples” (UN Charter, 1945, emphasis added). Article 55 mentions, “the creation of stability and well being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of *self-determination* of peoples” (UN Charter, 1945, emphasis added). Both articles speak of the self-determination of peoples without specifying the term peoples. Different actors for their sole discretion could interpret the term in different ways. There are roughly three different ways to interpret the term peoples as used in Articles 1 and 55. The first interpretation is that with the term peoples, states are meant. The second interpretation is that the term refers to Non-Self-Governing Territories, such as West Papua and East Timor. The peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories might have the right to self-government. The last interpretation is that peoples refers to Trust Territories, in which case they have the right to some sort of an act of self-determination such as self-government or independence (Quance, 1998, p. 541). The question of the meaning of peoples in the Charter might be ambiguous, but the question as to who would have the right of self-determination had a slightly easier answer. The United Nations chose a territorial criterion as to who would have a right of self-determination (Pomerance, 1982, p. 18). The choice for this definition had as a result that ethnic or racial criteria were not the deciding factor in distinguishing a people.

## 4.4 Self-determination in the age of decolonization

The norm of self-determination came to the forefront again in the age of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. On December 14, 1960, The General Assembly passed Resolution 1514, better known as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN, 1960). The declaration marked a new heading in the struggle of the anti-colonial countries. The declaration can be seen as a symbol of the norm emergence of the right of self-determination. The declaration was preceded by an interesting political struggle, of importance also for the thesis.

The process of drafting this declaration reveals the different stands countries took on decolonization and the principle of self-determination, also with regard to West Papua. The Soviet Union leader Krushchev proposed at the General Assembly a UN declaration on the independence of the colonies. The proposed declaration was ambitious, as it demanded the independence of all the colonies within only a year (Luard, 1989, p. 184-185). This specific provision, as well as the rest of the proposal, was not taken seriously, especially not by the developed countries. The newly independent African and Asian countries felt very strongly about the decolonization of other colonies in the world, but they felt that the Soviet Union hijacked their cause.

As a result, the former African and Asian colonies proposed a counter decolonization declaration.The counter declaration was quite similar to the draft declaration of the Soviet Union but more elaborated (Luard, 1989, p. 185). The draft declaration obtained support of the former colonies as well as Latin American countries. The colonial powers were very cautious in their support for the draft declaration, but they knew that they were not in a position in which they could prevent the declaration from being passed. Eventually the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was passed with 89 votes to 0 with 9 abstentions (Luard, 1989, p. 186). The declaration stated in clear wording that “all peoples have the right to self-determination”. This statement was followed by the admonition that “inadequacy of political, economic and social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence” (UN, 1960). This phrase in the declaration has important consequences as it anticipates and eliminatesthe argument that peoples or colonies should not (yet) have independence because they are not politically prepared enough. Self-determination could, with this declaration in hand, be seen as the possibility for peoples to decide their own political future. The colonies and peoples that the declaration referred to were not just the trust territories that were already under the auspice of the UN. They included all dependent countries (UN, 1960). It was a bold and important feat to include both kinds of territories in the declaration. It signalled that the end of colonization was nigh. A General Assembly declaration that is passed with such an overwhelming majority carries weight, even though strictly speaking it is a recommendation instead of a legally binding resolution**.**

## 4.5 West Papua and the norm of self-determination

### *4.5.1 Norm entrepreneurs*

Social constructivism expects international norm entrepreneurs to appear to promote the legal and moral basis for the right of self-determination. The inclusion of the right of self-determination in the Charter and the decolonisation Declaration does not mean that states already internalized the right of self-determination. Norm entrepreneurs are therefore needed to socialize the norm, after which states might internalize the norm.

Most of the norm entrepreneurs promoting the right of self-determination are expected to be NGOs. Norm entrepreneurs, as the constructivist theory goes,need an organizational platform whereupon they can promote their norms and causes. The UN provided such a platform for a number of NGOs. Some NGOs were granted consultative status at the founding of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). NGOs were divided into three different categories. The highest level of consultative status was category A for NGOs who had a general interest in all the topics discussed in the ECOSOC. The lesserconsultative category was category B for NGO’s with specific competences in specific issue areas. Another possibility for consultation was a register for organizations with a very specific field of expertise that could be consulted on anon-regular base(Willetts, 1996a, p. 32). The NGO Committee is responsible for the application of NGOs to consultative status. In the first year of its establishment only four organisations were granted the category A status (Willetts, 1996a, p. 33).The number of NGOs in the international system has increased significantly since the end of World War II. In the late1950s there were approximately a thousand NGOs, while this number increased to two thousand in the 1970s and to around five thousand in the 1990s (Willetts, 1996b, p. 9). Through the decades, the number of NGOs that have been granted consultative status on some level at the UN ECOSOC are far smaller. In the 1960s, less then 150 NGOs had been given a consultative status with circa 250 NGOs on the register. The specific NGOs that had been granted some sort of status in the ECOSOC have been poorly documented. It has not been possible to establish a list of all the NGOs that were active at the ECOSOC in the 1960s. There is a list of NGOs who have a consultative status at the moment, with the year of admission in brackets but this only includes NGOs who are still active (UN ECOSOC, 2016). The list excludes NGOs that might have been on the register but have since ceased to exist. There are, however, human rights NGOs on the list that have been active since the early 1960s such as Amnesty International (UN ECOSOC, 2016). Self-determination can be seen as the ultimate human right but the human rights organizations in the 1960s did not connect the issue of self-determination with their human rights stance (Simpson, 2014, p. 253). Consequently it has not been possible to say with complete certainty that there were no NGOs concerning the right of self-determination in the 1960s. However there was no indication that there were NGOs concerned with the right to self-determination in the 1960s, especially not with regard to West Papua. The interviewee confirmed that there were, to his knowledge, no international NGOs concerned with West Papua in the 1960s (Raki Ap, personal communication, 28 March 2017). Therefore it can be stated in all probability that there were no norm entrepreneurs who promoted the norm of self-determination in the case of West Papua. The lack of norm entrepreneurs increased the chance that the norm of self-determination was not internalized by states in the case of West Papua.

### *4.5.2 Levels of internalization*

The case of West Papua will bring to light the different meanings given to self-determination. It shows the level of internalization of the norm of self-determination by specific member states and the UN itself. If a country has internalized the norm of self-determination she will find it appropriate for a people or colony to determine its own political fate, through for instance a referendum. An act of self-determination would be seen as ‘the right thing to do’ for a people.

#### 4.5.2.1 The Netherlands

The Dutch emphasized from the start of the dispute in 1949 onwards that West Papua should not become a part of Indonesia. The emphasis of the Dutch policy shifted in the 1957-1961 period to an even greater focus on self-determination for the Papuans (Lijphart, 1966, p. 19). The dispute of the Netherlands with Indonesia played out in large part in the General Assembly of the UN. Indonesia appealed multiple times to the General Assembly in the 1950s (Lijphart, 1966, p. 16). The Dutch contribution to the General Assembly discussions emphasized the right of self-determination for West Papua. The Dutch minister Luns spoke in the 1061th meeting of the General Assembly about the actions of the Netherlands “aimed at the speediest possible attainment of self-determination by the Papuan people” (UN General Assembly, 1961a). The Dutch put their argument for self-determination explicitly in the context of the Charter and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The most important of the five considerations that Luns proposed in the same assembly meeting was that “the sole purpose of the Netherlands in its policy in respect of Netherlands New Guinea is the granting of complete self-determination to the people in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations” (UN GA, 1961a).

It is difficult to assess the extent to which the Dutch government really internalized the norm of self-determination. The continuing emphasis on the right of self-determination for the people of West Papua in their argumentation suggests a certainlevel of internalization. On the other hand, there is some plausibility to the Indonesian argument that the Dutch emphasis on self-determination was only a gimmick to retain part of their colony a little longer (UN, GA, 1961b). It is however also important to mention that the Dutch did try to promote the political awareness of the Papuans and prepare them for a subsequent act of self-determination. In 1960,the Dutch government began to set up political institutions in which the Papuans could participate. The New Guinea Council was set up as an advisory council with a share in the legislative process (Lijphart, 1966, 19). The Dutch prided themselves on this endeavour to incorporate Papuans in the political process. The New Guinea Council was a relatively late, but genuine attempt of the Dutch to assist the Papuans with self-government (Raki Ap, personal communication 28 March 2017).

In sum the argument can be made that the Dutch did find the norm of self-determination important**,** but that they also used the norm somewhat strategically as an argument to preserve their control over the territory.

4.5.2.2 United StatesThe position of the United States on self-determination at the time of the West Papuan question is important since the US was the biggest power in the self-titled ‘free world’.The United States were, according to themselves, in a difficult predicament over the West Papua question. On the one hand, they tried to prevent Indonesia from entering the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, while they acknowledged, on the other hand, the need to stand by the Netherlands as a trusted and important ally in the NATO(National Security Council Report, 1959). By the end of the 1950’s the United States still tried as much as possible to remain neutral with respect to the West Papua question. The policy of neutrality had been followed because of the “seriously adverse consequences”, which would ensue if the United States supported either the Dutch or the Indonesian position (National Security Council Report, 1959). This suggests that, at the time, the principle of self-determination was not taken into account when discussing the issue of West Papua. A ‘seriously adverse consequence’, such as an Indonesian liaison with the Communist bloc, was of more weight than a genuine act of self-determination for the West Papuan people. The danger of Indonesia siding with the Soviet Union is an argument that is made throughout the discussion on the question of West Papua. The US wanted Indonesia on their side as a stable ally in South East Asia (Telegram by the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 1959).
The United States changed their neutral position towards the dispute in 1960. Indonesia wanted to inscribe the issue of West Papua onto the agenda of the General Assembly. In addition, she threatened to use force to settle the dispute. The US deemed these actions unwanted and therefore started to play a more active role in solving the dispute (Memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of State, 1960). The United States became actively involved in finding a compromise between the almost incommensurable positions of Indonesia and the Netherlands. One US option for the territory of West Papua was a Melanesian Federation in which the whole of New Guinea (Dutch and Australian territory) would be combined under a United Nations trusteeship. The territories would become autonomous when they would have “a sufficient degree of development to permit independence” (Memorandum from Secreatry of State to President Kennedy, 1961. The US acknowledged time and again that the Netherlands found it very important that self-determination was given to the inhabitants of West Papua. They themselves however found self-determination much less important.
The option that the parties ultimately agreed upon was, according to the US, a way to “temporarily bypass the self-determination issue, without, however turning the territory over directly to Indonesia” (Memorandum of the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1961).This statement shows that the US had not in the slightest internalized the norm of self-determination. The principle of self-determination was seen by the US as one of many considerations instead of the most important consideration for West Papua. The Americans did not see self-determination as a norm that needed to be upheld. The suggestion of the possibility of bypassing the self-determination issue makes this abundantly clear. The US was, therefore, prepared to give up considerations of self-determination in favor of national security and an easy solution to a testy situation.

4.5.2.3. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom made their calculations with regard to the question of West Papua in a different context then the US. The UK was still a big colonial power, plagued with the issue of self-determination for their own dominions. In the House of Lords, the House of Commons and at the level of the government the apprehension was great that Indonesia would acquire support from other newly independent countries on the issue of West Papua. The UK feared that the newly independent countries would not condemn the use of force in acquiring this particular territory (HC Deb, 20 December 1961).The government of the UK was very anxious that a solution to the problem of West Papua was found as soon as possible, while they maintained their diplomatic relations with both parties. The government had to navigate in their assessment of the situation between Indonesia as a large strategically located country and the Netherlands as a historically close neighbor with NATO ties (HC, Deb, 20 December 1961). After the New York Agreement on the issue of West Papua in 1962, questions were asked by MPs in the House of Lords on the agreed upon arrangements for the act of self-determination for the Papuan people (HL Deb, 7 May 1963a, 29 May 1963b, 16 July 1963c, 21 November 1963d). At different times, MPs asked questions about the West Papua situation, which suggests that they found it important that a legitimate act of self-determination would take place. The government responded to these questions with reassurances that a genuine act of self-determination was possible (HL Deb, 21 November 1961). The government was not prepared to press the matter any further in the UN, although this was suggested by some MPs (HL Deb 7 May, 1963a). The reluctance to press the matter in the UN suggests that the government valued other considerations more than the right of self-determination, thus not internalizing the norm.

4.5.2.4 United NationsThe UN should have played, at least theoretically an important part in the Act of Free Choice in 1969. The way in which the UN negotiated and observed the Act of Free Choice is telling for the level of internalization of the norm of self-determination. The need for an Act of Free Choice was established in the New York Agreement in 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The ambiguous position of the UN and the difficulties surrounding the Act of Free Choice stems to a certain extent from the wording of the New York Agreement. The New York Agreement was deliberately vague as to the specifics of the act of self-determination. Firstly, the New York Agreement stated that the act of self-determination was to take place in accordance with international practice, without specifying the meaning of the term ‘international practice’ (New York Agreement, 1962). Another provision that, later on, could lead to an unfree act of self-determination was the provision that the Act of Free Choice would be held “under arrangements made by Indonesia” while the UN only had the task to “advice assist and participate” (Budiardjo & Liong, 1988; New York Agreement, 1962). The UN had, in other words, just an observational task, instead of the role of organizer or supervisor.
The UN sent a representative, Fernando Ortiz Sanz, to the territory of West Papua in 1968 for a tour of the territory and to advise and witness the Act of Free Choice in 1969 (Ortiz Sanz, 1969). It becomes clear throughout the stay of Ortiz Sanz in West Papua, his subsequent report in 1969 to the Secretary General, and the behavior around the Act of Free Choice, that the UN legitimized an act of self-determination unworthy of the name, thereby showing that the UN had not internalized the norm of self-determination.Although the term ‘in accordance with international practice’ was (deliberately) vague, this initially meant for Ortiz Sanz a one man one vote system. He stated in his report in 1969 that “in my capacity as United Nations Representative I could suggest no other method for this delicate political exercise than the democratic, orthodox and universally accepted method of “one man, one vote” (Ortiz Sanz, 1969, §82). The system of one man one vote would have been, as Ortiz Sanz also stated, the universally accepted (i.e internationally accepted) practice. He proceeded this statement however with the concession that “I recognize that the geographical and human realities in the territory required the application of a realistic criterion” (Ortiz Sanz 1969, §82). He therefore proposed a mixed system in which the urban areas would have a one man one vote system while the interior areas would be conferred with through collective consultations. “A mixed system of that type would have the merit of being the best possible in the circumstances and would enable the Indonesian Government and the United Nations to state that the orthodox and perfect method of “one man, one vote” had been used in the act of free choice to the maximum extent compatible with reality” (Report of Ortiz Sanz 1969, §82). A mixed method system would not have been in accordance with the New York Agreement but it would at least have meant a form of popular consultation for part of the population. The mixed method system however did not happen. The Indonesian government rejected the mixed system and instead chose a system based on *musjawarah*, which means a system based on reaching a consensus. Eight consultative assemblies with a total of 1025 representatives would need to reach a consensus (Saltford, 2003, p. 130; Ortiz Sanz 1969, §84). The Indonesian government was, in practice, able to choose the representatives (Saltford, 2000, p. 80). The Act of Free Choice itself consisted of eight assembly meetings in which all representatives stated that they wanted to remain with Indonesia (Saltford, 2003, p.165). The representatives complained beforehand that they were bullied and threatened if they did not vote in favour of Indonesia (Crocombe, 2007, p.284). The UN should never have accepted a system of consensus as a valid method for an act of self-determination. In the words of Budiardjo and Liong, “A referendum is not meant to produce a consensus. Its purpose is to discover the relative strength of those in favour and those against a proposition” (Budiardjo & Liong, 1988, p. 24). The UN diplomats could have known beforehand that the Indonesian government was not intending to give the Papuans people a really free choice. The New York Times reported that Indonesian diplomats stated in private that the whole process is “a meaningless formality” followed by the statement that “West Irian is Indonesian and must remain Indonesian. We cannot accept any alternative” (Shabecoff, July 7 1969). The report by Ortiz Sanz leaves out certain politically delicate incidents such as demonstrations or rebellions by Papuans against the decision to remain (Saltford, 2003, p. 165). The crux of the matter, and the most damning evidence against the UN, came unwittingly from the closing remarks of Ortiz Sanz in his report, where he stated that, “certain elements of the population of West Irian held firm convictions in favour of independence. Nevertheless, the answer given by the consultative assemblies to the question put to them was a unanimous consensus in favour of remaining with Indonesia” (Ortiz Sanz 1969, §250). He also conceded that the act of self-determination was in accordance with Indonesian practice, not in accordance with international practice (Report by Ortiz Sanz, §253). An act of self-determination can of course not be a genuine consensus when a ‘unanimous’ decision is reached while also contending that there are people who have a different view. The conclusion with regard to the Act of Free Choice has to be that no honest attempt at an act of self-determination was made, and that the UN knew this but did not care enough to reject the act.

4.5.2.5 Taking noteThere were some countries in the UN General Assembly of whom one can say that they internalized the norm of self-determination. This became clear when some Francophone African countries, such as Togo and Senegal, opposed the New York Agreement, seeing the Agreement as a violation of the rights of the West Papua people to self-determination (Luard, 1989, p. 340). The same countries tried to fuel a debate in the General Assembly on the legitimacy of the act of self-determination when it had taken place. They were, however, ignored by other countries in the General Assembly; the General Assembly simply took note of the act of self-determination and moved on (Crocombe, 2007, p. 284; Luard, 1989, p. 346). These francophone countries did not have any strategic interest in West Papua. They voiced their opinion on the settlement just because they found it important that the West Papuan people would have a real chance to determine their future. Unfortunately,they were a minority.

### 4.5.3 Conclusion

The first hypothesis states: *The UN has not employed the right of self-determination in West Papua in 1969 because the norm entrepreneurs did not persuade the critical mass to employ the right of self-determination.* The hypothesis is accepted in that the norm entrepreneurs were not able to persuade a critical mass of states to employ the right of self-determination. The norm entrepreneurs were not able to do this because there were no norm entrepreneurs in the West Papua case. The third hypothesis, which also relates to West Papua states: *The UN has not employed the right of self-determination in West Papua in 1969 because the socialization of the norm of self-determination had not resulted in internalization of the norm.* The third hypothesis therefore has to be accepted because the absence of norm entrepreneurs made it impossible for the socialization mechanism to work. The states under investigation in this thesis consequently did not internalize the norm of self-determination.

## 4.7 East Timor and the norm of self-determination

### *4.7.1 Norm entrepreneurs*

The first stage of the norm life cycle discussed in the first chapter of this thesis states the importance of norm entrepreneurs for the emergence of a norm. Norm entrepreneurs such as NGOs have internalized the norm to the fullest extend as they try to convey the importance of the norm to target actors such as governments. In the case of East Timor many general and issue specific NGOs were concerned with the question of self-determination for East Timor.

Special attention is paid to NGOs and transnational advocacy networks that made a statement at the special committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in the UN in 1995. The special committee paid extensive attention to the situation in East Timor (UN GA, 1995a; UN GA, 1995b). More than a dozen NGOs made a statement in multiple meetings concerning East Timor. The petitioners included representatives of Indonesia and Portugal and wide-ranging NGOs such as Amnesty International and Pax Christi. Most of the NGOs and transnational advocacy networks at the special committee were, however, specific coalitions lobbying for East Timor and speaking up about the deteriorating situation in East Timor. These NGO’s included the East Timorese Alert Network (ETAN), Free East Timor Japan Coalition, Timorese Defense Association, Parliamentarians for East Timor, East Timor Religious Outreach and the Australian Coalition for a Free East Timor.

The committee meetings give a good overview of the most important actors in the international community with respect to East Timor, and thus the most important norm entrepreneurs. The NGO’s all identify very strongly with the norm of self-determination, as they view an act of self-determination for the people of East Timor as the only appropriate action. Most of these coalitions were established for the sole reason of campaigning for an act of self-determination in East Timor. The ETAN, for instance, proclaimed in the committee that she is “working for East Timor’s right to self-determination” (ETAN at the General Assembly, 11 July 1995a). The Timorese Defence Association stated that they “desire self-determination for East Timor until a true, just, dignified and honorable solution is reached for its people” (Timorese Defence Association at the General Assembly, 11 July 1995a). The Parliamentarians for East Timor stated, in the same vein, that their reason of being was “to have their respective countries recognize East Timor’s inherent right to self-determination” (Parliamentarians for East Timor at the General Assembly, 11 July 1995a).

It becomes clear that there were many norm entrepreneurs who fully internalized the norm of self-determination and tried to socialize the norm into the international system.

### *4.7.2 Socialization mechanisms in practice*

Keck and Sikkink (2014) showed the mechanisms that norm entrepreneurs could use to promote norms: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics and accountability politics (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 16). This paragraph pays attention to the way in which NGOs used these mechanisms to promote the norm of self-determination, with regard to the question of East Timor.

The information politics mechanism presumes a gain in credibility for NGOs when they provide accurate information to governments. Factual information is linked to testimonies of people involved in the situation. The information is spread through bulletins, voluntary email lists and reports. Amnesty International, for instance, called attention to the human rights situation in East Timor in alltheir annual reports.

Such information politics is also visible when the Secretary General annually receives written statements by NGOs such as Pax Christi, bulletins by Tapol, reports by Human Rights Watch and annual calls for attention to the East Timor situation in the UN Human Rights Commission (UN Commission on Human Rights, 1996; UN Commission on Human Rights, 1997). Pax Christi for instance calls attention in the Commission on Human Rights to the widespread torture of detainees and “a massive security crackdown […] for several months with hundreds of arrests” (Pax Christi in the UN Commission on Human Rights, 1996).Pax Christi, just like all the other NGOs, links the human rights abuse discourse to the right of self-determination for the people of East Timor. The ETAN not only provides factual information, they also try to make the discourse on East Timor personal by providing names and testimonies of people**.** They also urge the public to appeal to the Indonesian authorities in general and specific ministers and lieutenants in Indonesia to revise their policy on issues such as the release of political prisoners in East Timor (ETAN, 1993).

One important event can be seen as a prototypical example of symbolic politics.

In 1996, the Nobel Peace Prize was given to Carlos Belo and José Ramos-Horta for their “work towards a peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor” (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 1996). Carlos Belo is a Catholic priest who has been one of the most important representatives of the oppressed people of East Timor throughout the occupation by Indonesia. José Ramos-Horta is the international spokesperson for the East Timorese oppression. The Norwegian Nobel Committee linked the Peace Prize very specifically to the right to self-determination for the East Timorese people, as they stated the hope that a diplomatic solution could be found on the basis of the people’s right to self-determination (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 1996). Awarding such a prestigious international prize as the Nobel Peace Prize to these political activists raised the profile of the East Timorese cause. The granting of the Nobel Peace Prize significantly raised the international public’s awareness of the situation in East Timor.

Another mechanism that norm entrepreneurs can use to promote their norm is leverage politics. In the case of East Timor, this mechanism was undoubtedly used by NGOs to change governments’ policies with regard to East Timor. Material leverage is combined by NGOs with moral leverage to render a powerful pressure tool.

An example of leverage politics is the argument made by NGOs that the US and the UK provided Indonesia with military aid, while they always championed international human rights in public (ETAN, 1997; TAPOL, 1992a, p. 21). NGOs were able to link the discourses of the US and the UK about human rights to their own behavior as weapons suppliers to a regime that knowingly violated human rights. The UK and in particular the US, as the self-professed moral leader of the world, were vulnerable to these kinds of criticism. The US and the UK found their reputations in the international system quite important, which contributed to the successful shaming of the government.

The mechanism of accountability politics is closely related to the leverage mechanism in this case. The accountability tactic tries to show a discrepancy between the discourse of a government and their actions. NGOs such as ETAN, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch try to show the discrepancy between the right to self-determination discourse of governments and their continued refusal to grant peoples real self-determination.

### *4.7.3 Levels of internalization*

#### 4.7.3.1 Indonesia

The level of internalization of Indonesia is an interesting story as it reveals that while they themselves did not internalize the norm, they did feel the need for a veneer of legitimacy. Indonesia held their own version of an act of self-determination after the invasion of East Timor (Budiardjo & Liong, p. 96). The act of self-determination by Indonesia was a one-sided undemocratic affairbut the fact that they felt the need to carry out some form of self-determination is telling.Indonesia apparently felt the need in 1976, with the invasion of East Timor, to at least pretend to have carried out an act of self-determination in which the people of East Timor could decide their fate. The fate of the East Timorese people was already decided for them, but Indonesia apparently still felt international pressure to legitimize their invasion with an act of self-determination. This shows that Indonesia was aware that the norm of self-determination was starting to become more powerful in the international system. Indonesia repeated the line of argument in the UN that East Timor had a legitimate act of self-determination throughout its occupation of the territory. A good example of this line of argument by Indonesia can be seen in the special UN committee on the implementation of the decolonization declaration. Indonesia stated in the committee, “the people of East Timor have already exercised their right to self-determination in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions” (UN, GA, 1995b). The representative of Indonesia continued with the statement that there was no need to keep East Timor on the committee’s agenda because East Timor “ceased to be an issue of self-determination or decolonization” (UN GA, 1995b).The conclusion can be that Indonesia had quite clearly not internalized the norm of self-determination as they vehemently opposed a real act of self-determination for the people of East Timor.

#### 4.7.3.2 United States

State Department papers and memorandums about the East Timor question have not yet been declassified. The historical documents of the Foreign Relations series of the United States are not yet available. The consequence is that the position of the United States with regard to the norm of self-determination will be analysed on the basis of public documents related to the president. The American Presidency Project contains thousands of oral and written documents of the different presidents. The database includes press conferences, memorandums, executive orders and other policy statements (American Presidency Project, 2017). It is possible to create a clear picture of the discourse of the American president with regard to East Timor.

Public statements from the American president about East Timor are not made in the 1970s or the 1980s. The Bush administration in the beginning of the 1990s refers only one time to the question of human rights abuses in East Timor without mentioning self-determination. In 1992, the American presidency changes as the Democratic president Clinton comes to power. The change in office meant an increase in awareness of the East Timor case, without necessarily boosting the norm of self-determination. The American presidential discourse in the 1990s about East Timor is focused on the condemnations of Indonesian human rights abuses. The Clinton administration tries to show that the American policy towards East Timor has significantlychanged since he took over the presidency.

In a background briefing by senior administration officials in November 1994, on the eve of a visit from president Clinton to Indonesia, the administration states, for instance: “ We have […] restricted our arms sale policy so that we do not sell to Indonesia small arms or other munitions or things that could possibly be used in connection with human rights abuses. We have cosponsored, in the United Nations Human Rights Commission, for the first time, a resolution raising concerns about East Timor”(Clinton administration, November 8 1994a).

The restriction on arms sales and the cosponsoring of an East Timor resolution are mentioned frequently to show the changing policy with respect to East Timor (Clinton administration, November 8 1994; Clinton administration, November 8 1996a; Clinton administration November 20 1996b). Both of the actions are, however, in relation to human rights abuses. The US does not automatically equate the severe human rights violations with East Timor’s struggle for independence and its right to self-determination. When Clinton, for instance, is asked by a reporter at a 1994 press conference whether the people of East Timor deserve self-determination, he answers “that the people of East Timor should have more say over their own *local affairs*” (Clinton administration, November 14 1994b, emphasize added). This answer implies more of an internal self-government for the East Timorese people than a right to external self-determination. The US government at no point publically declared the need for an act of self-determination for the people of East Timor. These actions show that the norm of self-determination was not internalized in the Clinton administration to the extent that it would publically advocate for an act of self-determination for East Timor. The US continued to try to balance economic trade relations with their self-professed image as advocates of human rights. The Clinton administration’s avoidance of a public commitment to self-determination with regard to East Timor suggests that the norm of self-determination did not determine the actions of the US.

#### 4.7.3.3 United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has put trade relations before normative considerations throughout the 1990s with regard to their policy on the right of self-determination for the people of East Timor. The UK did not internalize the norm of self-determination in the 1990s. The UK was the third biggest supplier of major weapons to Indonesia between 1988-1992 (Ward, p. 74). Britain became the number one supplier of weapons to Indonesia in the 1990s (Phythian, 2000, p. 148).

The supply of military equipment by the UK to Indonesia gave a certain legitimacy to the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, thereby denying the people of East Timor the right of self-determination. After the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, questions were raised in the House of Lords with regard to the British policy on East Timor. Lords from both parties criticized the arms policy of the government and demanded an arms embargo and the suspension of economic aid (Tapol, 1992a). Some statements connected the demands to the right of self-determination of the people of East Timor, thereby showing that some MPs internalized the norm of self-determination (HL Deb, July 16 1992). The government responded with the statement that they did not find it necessarily to cut economic aid to Indonesia saying that, “its record of sound economic policy justify a continuation of aid” (HL Deb, July 16 1992). The government in other words stated that economic considerations in relation to Indonesia were of more concern than the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination. The response of the government is quite easily understood when one takes into account the fact that 98% of the export to Indonesia in 1992-1993 was arms export (Phythian, 2000, p. 160). The UK was not prepared to act unilaterally against Indonesia’s actions in East Timor as it was afraid it would hurt business interests, therefore the government referred the issue of East Timor to the UN, and to bilateral talks between Portugal and Indonesia (Phythian, 2000, p. 161). The UK accepted the assurance of the Indonesian government that the British military equipment would not be used for offensive purposes. The British government knew full well, however, that these weapons could be used to oppress the people of East Timor (Phythian, 2000, p. 163). The later part of the 1990s saw the same line of argumentation, namely, that British weapons were not used to repress the people of East Timor. The UK government indicated with this line of argumentation that they did not internalized the norm of self-determination.

#### 4.7.3.4. United Nations

The UN had, at the time of the referendum, internalized the norm of self-determination asthey ensured a genuine act of self-determination in East Timor. The view that the UN had internalized the norm of self-determination is evidenced by the way in which they organized the independence referendum in East Timor in 1999. The UN was, first of all, completely in charge of organizing the popular consultation. The 5 May Agreement entrusted the Secretary General with the organization of the popular consultation (Security Council, 1999b). The UN as head of the operation is advantageous because the UN is supposed to be less partial than countries. They also have more resources and expertise with which they can try to create a level playing field to ensure fair elections. The agreement stated, secondly, that all East Timorese of voting age, inside and outside of the territory would be allowed to vote in the referendum to reject or agree with autonomy from Indonesia. A one man one vote method ensured that all Timorese of voting age could express their opinion on the future of their country.

Another example that the UN internalized the norm of self-determination is that they insisted on sending a mission to East Timor, UNAMET, to organize the act of self-determination. UNAMET totalled almost 1000 international staff, which is in stark contrast to the sixteen staff members that the UN send to West Papua, a territory much bigger than East Timor (UN 2000, p. 12; Salford, 2000, p. 77). UNAMET was responsible for the fairness of the election, the registration, voting and information activities. The UN actively informed the people of East Timor via different channels such as radio, television and leaflets (Security Council, 1999b). The people were provided with information to make an intelligent decision. The UN also tried to achieve transparency through the accreditation of more than 2000 official, domestic and international observers (UN, 2000, p. 15).

The aim of the UN was to create a level playing field for both the pro-integration and pro-independence groups. They did not succeed, however, because of continued reports leading up to polling day of intimidation and killings of pro-independence groups (UN, 2000, p. 37; Security Council, 1999b).The absence of a level playing field can in large part be attributed to the fact that the May Agreement did not make the UN responsible for the security situation in East Timor. Indonesia was responsible for a secure environment before, during and after polling day. Not only did this mean that the Indonesian army and police had to remain neutral, it also meant that the UN would be unarmed and without a peacekeeping mission in East Timor. As a result, pro-integration militias, believed to be aligned with the Indonesian army, were able to intimidate and kill pro-independence groups. The surge in violence and the subsequent evacuation of UN personnel after the outcome of the referendum, nonetheless does not diminish the extraordinary feat of conducting a fair and accessible act of self-determination for the people of East Timor.

### 4.7.4 Conclusion

The second hypothesis, concerning East Timor stated: *The UN has employed the right of self-determination in East Timor in 1999 because the norm entrepreneurs persuaded the critical mass to employ the right of self-determination.* This hypothesis can be accepted. There were a lot of norm entrepreneurs in the case of East Timor who actively tried to persuade states to employ the right of self-determination. The fourth hypothesis stated: *The UN has employed the right of self-determination in East Timor in 1999 because the socialization of the norm of self-determination had resulted in internalization of the norm.* The many norm entrepreneurs in the case of East Timor expertly used socialization mechanisms to internalize the norm of self-determination. The case of East Timor shows, however, that the use of socialization mechanisms does not necessarily constitute the subsequent internalization of the norm. The norm was not internalized by states in the East Timor case, although the UN did internalize the norm. The discrepancy between the internalization of states and the UN cannot really be explained by the norm life cycle.

# Chapter 5 Empirics for postcolonialism

The fifth chapter analysis the historical representations of the West Papua and East Timorese people. The historical representation of the Papuans is described in a discourse of inferiority. The discourse of inferiority is divided into subparts consisting of savagery and primitiveness, animal metaphors and paternalistic development. The chapter shows the pervasiveness of the discourse of inferiority but also the existence of a marginal alternative discourse. Then chapter then proceeds with an analysis of the historical representations of the US, the UK and the UN with regard to the people of West Papua.
The historical representation of the East Timorese can be characterised as a victims discourse. The victims discourse consists of subparts covering mass killing, mass starvation and political repression. The chapter then looks at Indonesia’s alternative representation of the people of East Timor. The chapter ends with an analysis of the historical representations of the US, the UK, and the UN.

## 5.1 Historical representations of West Papuans

The territory of West Papua is one of the most inhospitable and desolate areas in the world. The Dutch were the occupants of the territory since early 19th century (Budiardjo & Liong, 1988, p. 2). They had however very limited control over the territory. The focus of the colonization efforts was not on West Papua, but on the main island of Java. A good indicator is that the inland of the island only became the subject of exploration missions at the beginning of the 20th century.

The historical representations of the Papuans and the discourses surrounding those representations in the 1930s and 1940s, can be gleaned from Dutch documents such as travel journals,newspaper articles and journal articles.The extrapolated discourses are the basis for the historical representation of the Papuans in later decades. The Dutch representation of the Papuans is important as they were the administrators of the territory, which meant that their representation of the people became public knowledge. The Netherlands controlled the knowledge of the Papuans, which gave them the power not only to control the Papuans but also the international public image of the Papuans. The power of the colonizer to control the representation of the colonized becomes clear.

### *5.1.1 Savagery and primitiveness*

The dominant historical representation of the Papuans is what I call ‘a discourse of inferiority’. The discourse of inferiority is multifaceted and consists of several parts.

The first part of the inferiority discourse is the discourse surrounding the idea of savagery and primitiveness. The travel journals on West Papua show that Papuans were not just seen as different from Westerners, but as primitive and wild. One travel journal from 1940 is called ‘op zoek naar oermenschen’ which can be translated as ‘searching for cavemen or primitive men’. The terms oermensch (primitive men) or natuurmensch (nature men or wild men) are frequently used to describe Papuans. The terms are most of the times used in a derogatory way, to degrade the Papuans as beneath civilised people. Another example of the primitiveness discourse is a section in a travel journal which describes an encounter with Papuans on the river. A group of Papuans, who are heading for the boat of an exploration mission, are described as a gang of fiercely yelling and arm waving savages (Geurtjens, 1940, p. 21). One particular trait of the ‘savages’ was their headhunting. The literal headhunting conducted by most tribes in West Papua is described as a most savage and gruesome activity. The practice of headhunting was one of the most ferocious images of the Papuans. The image left a lasting impression, as it contrasted beautifully the civilized and the savage. The Papuans were seen not just as headhunting savages but also as eaters of human flesh; they are described in a travel journal as “dangerous cannibals” (Feuilletau de Bruyn, 1940, p. 15).

The colonizing Dutch found it necessary to actively prohibit the headhunting excursions of the Papuans. The discourse shows that the Dutch felt very strongly that the raids for human skulls should be stopped, in particular because the United Kingdom had complained that the West Papuans conducted their headhunting excursions also in their territory of Papuan New Guinea, since the Papuans did not distinguish between the Dutch and the English parts of the island (Geurtjens, 1940, p. 65). The Papuans are described as having stopped their headhunting practices, but this was only partly true, as they would still go occasionally on headhunting excursions. The partial obeying of the rules was seen by the Dutch as subsequent proof that the Papuans were obstinate in their ways (Geurtjens, 1940, p. 58).The Papuans are described as undeveloped on numerous occasions. Their agriculture is for instance at “a very low stage of development” and one particular tribe is described as standing at “the lowest level of cultural development” (Feuilletau de Bruyn, 1940, p. 164 & 177).

The whole population is, in another instance, described as consisting of “largely primitive tribes, standing at the bottom of the civilization ladder (Beversluis, 1950, p. 27). The discourse of primitiveness shows the binary distinction in a colonial discourse between the colonizer and the colonized. The relationship between the colonizer and the colonized is described in the discourse as primitive vs. cultured and as undeveloped vs. developed.

### *5.1.2 Animal metaphors*

The second part of the discourse of inferiority is the use of animal metaphors to describe the appearance and the behaviour of Papuans. This part of the discourse is closely associated with the discourse of savagery. The idea behind savages is that they are more closely connected to beasts than to developed people, they are, in a sense, not fully human. Animal metaphors were thereforeseen as justified means to describe these ‘incomplete humans’. An example of the comparison of Papuans with animals is for instance in a description of their way of laughing. The Papuans’ way of laughing is described as ‘flapping comically with their legs’ otherwise described as the wagging of their tails, which is obviously a reference to dogs (Geurtjens, 1940, p. 13). An even clearer example is the comparison of Papuans with boars with whom one does not want to grub (Geurtjens, 1940, p. 42). The most typical example of an animal metaphor is a description, in one of the travel journals, of a Papuan man. The man is described as “a skimpy male with apelike long arms, a little sly face and clever monkey eyes (Feuilletau de Bruyn, 1940, p. 64).

### *5.1.3 Paternalistic development*

A third part of the discourse of inferiority is what I call paternalistic development. The Dutch, like many other colonizers thoughtthat they ought to educate and develop the people in their colonies. However, the implementation of a development scheme for Papuans started relatively late. Already in the 1930s newspapers in the Netherlands discussed the head start of the Australians in developing the Papuans at the other side of the border, in Papua New Guinea. The newspapers denounced the centralization of the governance of the Dutch East Indies while applauding the independence of the administration in Papua New Guinea (Telegraaf, 02-09-1936; De Tijd, 15-09-1936). The Dutch administrators concluded, in the next decade, that the system of colonial administration for West Papua needed to be different from the system in the rest of the Dutch East Indieas as the Papuans were ‘different’ – read ‘more primitive’ – from the rest of the colony (Ploeg, 2002, p. 83).

A discourse focused on educating the primitives, is quite paternalistic in that the Dutch felt that they knew how and in what direction the Papuans should develop. The colonizers probably meant well, but paternalism always shows the superiority of one people over another. The discourse of paternalistic development is seen for instance in the schools set up by missionaries. The schools educated the Papuans in more than just reading and writing, they were also ways to Christianize the population (Lijphart, 1966, p. 151).

The Dutch felt a strong need to expunge the ‘excesses’ in Papuan culture. One 1950 contribution to the journal *Tijdschrift Nieuw-Guinea*stated, for instance, that the Papuan culture included elements that were unacceptable in Western eyes.The unacceptable parts of their culture needed to be abolished. The mission schools would be a good place to abolish these elements and teach them Western values. All of this was, of course, in the interest of the Papuans so that they would not feel ‘lost’ when certain parts of their culture would be prohibited. New moral standards, it was argued, are needed to make civilized people out of these headhunters(Van Eechoud, 1950, p. 6). Another example of the urge of the Dutch to develop the Papuansis the scheme of co-operative communities. Community development was a trend in the 1950s which was “concerned with the economic, social, cultural and political progress of the population through the extensive and active efforts of the people themselves” (Van Dooren, 1959, p. 241). The objective of the scheme was, therefore, an increase in the prosperity of the community in a material and social sense. The focus was on people-led development instead of government-led development (Van Dooren, 1959, p. 241). The emphasis of community development is on the initiative of the community to createa need for improvement. In practice, however, the scheme was initiated in the rural areas of West Papua by the government of Netherlands New Guinea. The crops of the village people were to be produced on a mechanized farm and sold collectively (Van Dooren, 1959, p. 255). The population, “who did not understand anything of the proposals on the subject”, never took initiative for the project (Van Dooren, 1959, p. 253). The Papuans simply did not see the need for a change in their way of living, especially not a change organized by a distant government. The community development scheme is an excellent example of the representation of the Papuans as incapable of developing on their own. The government needed to make them into developed people farming in the right ‘modern’ way. The great irony of the community development scheme wasthat the scheme was developed to increase the social cohesion in a community, but it issued only in decreased cohesion, because of the disparities in income it generated.

## 5.2 An alternative discourse

The dominance of the discourse of inferiority can hardly be overstated, but with every dominant discourse there is at least one alternative discourse. In the discourses about the Papuans throughout the investigated period, there is another more positive discourse about the Papuans. The more positive discourse experienced its, still minimally contributing, heyday in the 1960s when the Dutch wanted to keep West Papua. The alternatively positive discourse can be seen earlier in for instance a travel book referring to Papuans as a “most interesting people”, “a people full of character” and characteristics such as the eagerness to learn, entrepreneurial instinct and a good sense of humour that will make it possible for Papuans to develop quickly. The author does, however, add that they have a lot to learn as they still have “a primitive culture” (Brantjes, 1950, p. 7-10). The more positive discourse cannot completely escape the paternalistic tendencies of the inferiority discourse but the tone is much more positive. An alternative discourse is also visible in the book *Papoea’s*, *mensen zoals wij* (*Papuans, people like us*) by Dr. Oosterwal in 1961, in which he aims to show that Papuans are people just like us (i.e., Westerners). Oosterwal refuses to engage with the dominant inferiority discourse, but tries to articulate a different discourse which focuses on the human kinship between the Papuans and the West. He believes that he speaks with authority as he has lived with the Papuan people for a considerable time. Now he tries to bring the world of Papuan tribes closer to the public in the West. In doing so, he endeavours to demonstrate that Papuans are not lesser humans, just because they might appear to be different (Oosterwal, 1961, p. 9).

The pervasiveness and different aspects of the inferiority discourse of the Papuans are important to keep in mind when discussing the decision making around the territorial status of West Papua. The implicit and explicit biases in the discourse of inferiority have an effect on the representation of the Papuans by internationally influential countries. The next section will analyse the discourses surrounding the Papuans with regard to the self-determination question in the United States, the United Kingdom and the UN.It becomes clear that the inferiority representation of the Papuans is the dominant discourse, which becomes manifest through the use of parts of the inferiority discourse.

## 5.3 Historical representation of the Papuans by the US, UK and the UN

### *5.3.1 United States*

The United States did not have a past as a colonial power, in contrast with the United Kingdom. The different historical trajectories made for slightly different imageries of indigenous people. The UK looked at indigenous people and their struggle for independence from a colonial lens as a possible source of trouble for the colonizing country. The US’s representation of indigenous people in general, and of the Papuans in particular, was fuelled by an almost complete ignorance of the people whenever they were of no interest to them.

The discourse surrounding the issue of West Papua from the late 1950s to the end of the 1960s is described in telegrams, dispatches and reports to and from the department of state. The picture that is painted in these dispatches is one of America looking down upon all parties involved, with mild arrogance. The US iterated at the beginning of the dispute a neutral position focused on a dispute settlement without the use of force by either party (National Security Council Report, 1959; Memorandum Prepared for Eisenhower, 1960).The US became actively involved in settling the dispute as the dispute developed. The primary focus of the US was to salvage the diplomatic relationships with both the Netherlands and Indonesia, while settling the matter in a way convenient for themselves.

The primitiveness part of the inferiority discourse is clearly visible in American documents. In different memorandums, the Papuans areconsistently calledstone-aged people, which indicates that in the American representation the Papuans lacked civilization (Memorandum prepared for Eisenhower, 1960; Memorandum of Secretary of State to president Kennedy, April 1961; Memorandum to president Kennedy, October 1961). The background information provided for president Eisenhower on West Papua describes the Papuans as “among the most primitive on the face of the earth” (Memorandum prepared for Eisenhower, September 1960).Another inferior description of the Papuans is given when the issue is explained to president Kennedy in 1961. The inhabitants of West Papua are described as “seminomadic stone-aged Papuan tribesmen, speaking a couple of hundred mutually-unintelligible languages” (Memorandum of Secretary of State to president Kennedy, April 3 1961). The Papuans were not considered civilized enough to decide on self-determination.The education of ‘the primitives’ wasexpected to take too long. The option of a UN trustee period in which the Papuans would be prepared for an act of self-determination was deemed unrealistic. The trusteeship would have to be in existence for too long as a consequence of the immaturity of the Papuans. The reasoning of the Americans that the Papuans were immature went so far that it led to wonderment how someone could even think that West Papua “could ever be viable as an independent state” (Memorandum to president Kennedy, February 1962). The representation of the Papuans by the Americans remained one of inferiority around the time of the act of self-determination. The Americans conceded that it would take a long time for the Indonesians to educate “the most primitive of the Indonesian people to an acceptable level of development” (Telegram of the Secretary of State to the Department of State, August 1969).

### *5.3.2 United Kingdom*

West Papua became a minor issue in the parliamentary debates in the UK in the 1960s. The UK had historical and cultural affiliations with the Netherlands, as they were both colonial powers. The bond with the Netherlands as a fellow colonial power was apparent, but the UK also did not want to alienate the newly established and strategically important state of Indonesia too much. The members of parliament connected the issue of West Papua to the independence struggles in their own colonies. A comparison is for instance made between the Goa question and the issue of West Papua. The difference is however that they find Goa to be intrinsically linked to India as opposed to West Papua, which should be granted independence if the former colonizer, the Netherlands, wished it (HC Deb, 20 December 1961).

At some occasions, the discourse of primitiveness comes into play when MPs speak about the West Papuan territory as being “one of the most backward in the world” (HL, 28 March 1962). In the discourse in both Houses of Parliament, the idea emerged that the Netherlands and Indonesia should both have the chance to ‘save face’ with regard to the agreement. The parliamentarians are less concerned with the fate of the Papuan people. The Papuan people are however referred to **on** multiple occasionsas “poor people” (HL Deb, 7 May 1963a). The Lords in the House of Lords repeatedly state in 1963 and the years beyond that the poor Papuan people should not simply be handed to Indonesia without any safeguards as to their well-being (HL Deb, 7 May 1963a; HL Deb, 21 November 1963d**;** HL Deb, 19 December 1967). The role of advocates for the fate of the Papuans could be seen as **an** alternative discourse. This would be misleading, however, as the ‘poor people’ discourse has more to do with the Lords’ very negative image of Indonesia than with genuine empathy forthe Papuans. At the same time that the Papuans are being portrayed as poor indigenous people, Indonesia is portrayed as a formally anti-colonial country with neo-colonial tendencies. An example of this is the classification of the Indonesian government as inefficient and corrupt (HL Deb, 7 May 1963a). An MP from the House of Commons even went as far as to say that West Papua had been handed to “a dictator” and “a new colonial master” (HC Deb, 29 May 1963; HC Deb, 26 March, 1968).

### *5.3.3 United Nations*

The historical representation by the UK and the US of the Papuan people is important, as they are major actors in the international political system. Therefore, the inferiority discourse surrounding their view of the Papuans is significant to understand decisions made by the UN. The way in which the UN handled the act of self-determination shows that they incorporated the pervasive inferiority discourse. Ortiz Sanz, the special representative of the UN to West Papua, was easily persuaded by the Indonesian government that the one man one vote method could not be applied because of “the lack of sophistication of vast segments of the population” (Saltford, 2000, p. 76). The Papuan people were, in other words, not deemed educated enough to understand an internationally agreed voting method. Ortiz Sanz thereafter suggested the mixed methods approach, which was based, in the “less advanced areas”, on intermediaries (Ortiz Sanz, 1969, p. 28). The idea of intermediaries suggests that the UN did not think the Papuans capable of voting for themselves and expressing their free choice. Ortiz Sanz also writes in his report that the “population is illiterate and little concerned with political matters” (Ortiz Sanz, 1969, p. 45). The statement that the Papuans were not concerned with political matters is very difficult to substantiate. Brian May, a foreign journalist, travelling in West Papua around the time of the Act of Free Choice stated in his book that “the desire for independence […] was shared by all” (May, 1978, p. 180). Ortiz Sanz received numerous petitions by Papuans, most of which were pro-independence and petitioned for a one-man-one vote system (Saltford, 2000, p. 81; Saltford, 2003, p. 106). The Papuans were, therefore, well aware of what was at stake, while they also understood that they only had a chance at independence if the one-man-one vote method would be used. In sum, the UN and key member states knew that the “a fair reflection of the peoples’ wishes” would lead to a separation from Indonesia (Saltford, 2003, p. 119). The UN and key member states internalized the inferiority discourse and for that reason did not care enough about the plight of the Papuan people to make a genuine effort at an act of self-determination.

## 5.4 Conclusion

The fifth hypothesis stated: *The lack of an act of self-determination by the UN in the case of West Papua is a result of a prevailing discourse according to which the people are portrayed as inferior and incapable of deciding on their political future.* The findings in this thesis support this hypothesis. It was possible to ascertain a historical representation of inferiority shaped by decades of discourse. The discourses in the US, UK and the UN thereafter also displayed the discourse of inferiority around the time of the decision making. The discourse of inferiority was deeply value laden and very persuasive, which is visible through the weakness of an alternative discourse.

##  5.5 Historical representations of the East Timorese

The method of historical representations looks at the ways a people can be represented in discourse. The inferiority representation of the Papuans is a very value laden representation. The inferiority representation actively made a value judgement about the Papuans. The historical representation of the East Timorese is slightly different as the representation that I identify, namely the victims discourse, is far less value laden and more fact oriented. The two historical representations should therefore not be put on the same conceptual level. The change from a value laden to a more fact oriented historical representation does however suggest a change in the way indigenous people are perceived.

The dominant historical representation of the East Timorese from 1975 to 1999 can be classified bestas a victim discourse. The next section looks at the different parts of which the discourse existed. Indonesia as good as closed off East Timor from the outside world after the invasion. It became increasingly difficult to travel to East Timor to gather information as the foreign press was banned from entering, except for tours staged by the Indonesian government (Kamm, 15 February 1981). The information that managed to seep through was often smuggled by travellers, refugees or journalists at high risk. The travel ban was lifted in 1989 but reinstated in the aftermath of the Santa Cruz massacre (Schwarz, 1994, p. 209 & 213).

### *5.5.1 Mass killings*

The first subpart of the victim discourse described the East Timorese as casualties of mass killings. The indiscriminate mass killing of civilians began when Indonesia invaded East Timor. The United Nations strongly rebuked Indonesia for the annexation and called on the country to withdraw its forces (UN Security Council, 1976; Associated Press, 28 February 1977). The Indonesian army was said to have killed 2000 people at random in the capital of Dili in the first days of the invasion (Budiardjo & Liong, 1984, p. 128). Many newspaper articles about East Timor in the Western press in the later half of the 1970s described mass killing by Indonesian forces in East Timor. The international press frequently covered the high death count since the invasion, estimating the number of killings up to 100.000 people (Associated Press, 28 February 1977; Lowe, 9 October 1978). The killing of East Timorese continued in the next decade, with reports stating indiscriminate killings by Indonesian troops (Kamm, 15 February 1981; Laidlaw, 30 June 1985).

### *5.5.2 Mass starvations*

The second part of the victim discourse portrays the people of East Timor as victims of starvation. In the beginning of 1977, the so-called encirclement strategy of Indonesia, which consisted of uprooting vast amounts of the population to camps, resulted in famine and mass starvation for much of the Timorese population (Schwartz, 1994, p. 205). An added factor was that people fled from their plot of land to the mountains because of the civil war. In the mountains, they faced the prospect of starvation because people could not support themselves there (The Globe and Main Canada, 30 October 1979).
One journalist who visited a village in East Timor described the people there as “Men, woman and children – all shared the look and scent of deprivation to the limits of human endurance: frail bodies clothed in rags, gaunt faces uttering mute pleas. The bloated bellies of children protruded over waists so scrawny that the smallest ones had to hold up their shorts or lose them” (Kamm, 15 February 1981). The quote is a very good example of the representation of the East Timorese as victims of mass starvation. The discourse on starvation is mentioned frequently in some newspapers, which stated, for instance, that massive help is needed “to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of starving people” (The Globe and Main Canada, 30 October 1979). The East Timorese people are described as suffering a calamity like Cambodia “less terrible only in terms of scale” (Fadyl, 8 December 1979).

The discourse representing the East Timorese as victims of mass starvation is at its height in the international press in 1979. The discourse is pervasive, however, as follow-up articles in 1981 and 1982 report that while the threat of mass starvation might be abated, the East Timorese people still suffer hunger and malnutrition(Whiting, 30 July 1982; Kamm, 15 February 1981).

### *5.5.3 Political Repression*

The last part of the victim discourse consists of the people of East Timor being the victims of political repression. The political repression of the East Timorese is composed of several parts, such as arbitrary arrests, torture and involuntary disappearances, among other things.

The Indonesian government prohibited all pro-Timor political parties after its take-over in 1975 (Budiardjo & Liong, 1984, p. 113). The only three political parties allowed, were military and pro-Indonesia parties. The repression of the people also took on more subtle forms,such as constant intimidation by threats and surveillance. People could be arbitrarily arrested and then subjected to torture because of suspected links with independence movements. The torture of prisoners included cutting them with knives, mutilating their ears and using electric shocks. The arbitrary arrests often let to imprisonment without a trial thereby transferring them to prison camps (Budiardjo & Liong, 1984, p. 131). International NGOs such as Amnesty International reported these political repressions, after which international media sometimes took up the story. This is what the New York Times did, for instance, when they reported in July 1980 about the vanishing of 20 political prisoners following Amnesty International’s questions to the Indonesian government about these political prisoners (The New York Times, 25 July 1980). The victim discourse, and in particular the political repression part has been actively deployed by the activist organization Tapol.

## 5.6 Tapol

The international press was not the only actor reporting on the people of East Timor.

Another big circulator of the victim discourse is the UK based NGO Tapol. Tapol has been established in 1973 by Carmel Burdiardjo, a political prisoner from Indonesia, and has become one of the most influential NGOs campaigning for human rights in Indonesia. The organization has campaigned for human rights in East Timor, West Papua and Indonesia as a whole, and is active to this day (Tapol, 2017a). Tapol has been very active in especially the UK in raising awareness for human rights violations in East Timor by publishing reports and providinginformation through their Tapol Bulletin (Tapol, 2017b). Tapol has published its Tapol Bulletin every two months since their establishment in 1973. The discourse in the Tapol Bulletins is a prime example of the victim discourse. The aim of the Tapol Bulletins was to raise awareness about the human rights abuses in East Timor. The Bulletin therefore rightfully portrayed the East Timorese as victims of human rights abuses and political repression, while directly or indirectly linking the abuses to the right of self-determination for the people of East Timor. The headline of the Tapol Bulletin in February 1977 was for instance “Massacres and Torture in East Timor” while a bulletin in October 1978 headlined “Starvation camps in East Timor” (Tapol, 1977; Tapol 1978). Tapol continued to raise awareness in the 1980s about topics relating to East Timor, such as stagnation or progress at the UN , the plight of political prisoners, East Timorese refugees fleeing to Portugal, and military operations in East Timor (Tapol, 1984; Tapol 1985; Tapol 1986; Tapol 1988). The informing and campaigning discourse of Tapol continued with attention given of course to the Dili massacre, in the form of a headline reading “The killing fields of East Timor”, and the worldwide condemnations afterwards (Tapol, 1991). Tapol covered a wide range of topics in the middle of the 1990s, such as European Parliament hearings on East Timor, the arms sales of developed countries to Indonesia, the escalation of human rights abuses, and updates on the UN talks between Indonesia and Portugal (Tapol 1992b; Tapol 1994; Tapol 1995).

## 5.7 The Santa Cruz killings and its aftermath

Two East Timorese were killed in a church in Dili, at the end of October 1991. The Indonesian army created a bloodbath, at their commemoration service at the Santa Cruz cemetery. Between 100 and 200 young people were killed while many others were wounded. Foreign journalists and foreign observers were present, thus witnessing and filming the shooting. The filmed segments were smuggled out of East Timor and gave rise to widespread publicity for the shooting (Walsh, 1995, p. 149; Schwarz, 1994, p. 212). The result was that East Timor became front page news (Indonesia, Feiten en Meningen, 1992, p. 11). The Santa Cruz massacre and its aftermath became a turning point in the coverage of East Timor (Endie van Binsbergen, personal communication 14 March 2017). The pressure increased on Indonesia, the industrialized countries, and the UN to deal with the issue of East Timor (Anderson, 1995, p. 146). The Santa Cruz massacre strengthened the victim discourse surrounding the East Timorese people. Now the international community could see for themselves the shocking images of the repression of the East Timorese people. The Santa Cruz massacre became a turning point in the history of the East Timor people, not just by showing the world the cruelty of the Indonesian oppression but also because governments of developed countries slowly started to adopt the victim discourse and subsequent the call for self-determination.

## 5.8 Indonesia’s alternative representation of the people of East Timor

The Indonesian alternative discourse stressed the economic development of East Timor since the Indonesian takeover. The discourse emphasised that Indonesia invested heavily in the territory with new schools and hospitals. The per capita income of the people of East Timor increased substantially in comparison with the time of the Portuguese rule. The fact that the per capita income in 1990 was still half of the Indonesian average was not mentioned (Schwarz, 1994, p. 206). Throughout its occupation of East Timor, the Indonesian government has held a different view of events in East Timor. The Indonesian explanation for the invasion in 1975 was, for instance, that the independence movement Fretelin tried to create a communist country on their eastern border (Lowe, October 9 1978). Most of the developed countries, at the height of the Cold War, went along with this reasoning while Fretelin never expressed communist intentions. The victim discourse, as expressed by the mainstream international media throughout the occupation of East Timor, was disputed by Indonesia with their version of events. The claims by NGOs of mass killing and human rights abuses were dismissed as untrue, while Indonesia claimed that “East Timor has all the rights and privileges of the other provinces” (United Press International, August 8 1985).

The mass starvation, another element of the victim discourse, was attributed to the independence movement in Indonesia’s alternative discourse. The fighting by Fretelin and other independence fighters forced the population to retreat from their farms to the mountains, causing starvation according to Indonesia (Fadyl, December 8 1979).

The Indonesian government also released their official military version of the Santa Cruz shooting. They put down the funeral procession to the Santa Cruz cemetery as a riot, while the mass prior to the procession was presented as an opportunity to hold a separatist meeting. The Indonesian version also claimed that the military only started shooting after an unexploded grenade was thrown at them and after someone in the crowd fired a weapon at the soldiers (Schwarz, 1994, p. 213; IFM, 1992, p. 12). The official version included just nineteen casualties but these claims had to be adjusted upwards as the evidence of many more casualties mounted. The Indonesian version of events was strongly disputed by credible witnesses, such as foreign journalists and a Red Cross worker, who stated that the violence was a unilateral military action.

The shooting had as a result in Indonesia that there was “unprecedented news coverage of East Timor, and the first public signs, however cautiously expressed, of disillusionment with government policy” (Anderson, 1995, p. 146). The Indonesian government, therefore, found it necessary in 1992 to start a propaganda attack on the dissident voices in the national and international community. The propaganda attack focused again on the economic gains for the people of East Timor since their incorporation in Indonesia. The involvement of Indonesia with East Timor is explained as “helping to ensure that democratically expressed will of the majority of the people not be overruled by the armed terror and unilateral imposition of a ruthless minority” (Schwarz, 1994, p. 225). Indonesia continued to share this opinion of the East Timor question till the change in policy in 1998, when autonomy and eventually independence became viable options.

Indonesia’s alternative discourse on events in East Timor was disputed by the mainstream international press and pressure groups around the globe, while some countries adopt the alternative discourse whenever it was in their interest to do so.

## 5.9 Historical representation of the East Timorese by the US, UK and the UN

### *5.9.1 United States*

A discourse on the people of East Timor in the US government did not begin before the 1990s. The president of the United States was not asked a single question by the press on the issue of East Timor in the 1970s or 1980s. The president himself also did not comment in any way on the invasion of East Timor or the subsequent human right violations. The only political document in the 1980s that contained a reference to East Timor is the Democratic Party Platform on 11 August 1980. The political situation in different parts of the world is briefly sketched. In the section on Asia a small reference is made to East Timor in the form of the commitment of the Democratic Party to offer “humanitarian aid to the people of East Timor” (Democratic Party Platform, 1980).The reference shows that the political elite in the US were aware that humanitarian assistance to the region was required but that they did not find it important enough to warrant further debate. In the 1990s, a discourse on the issue of East Timor finally developed at the time of the Clinton administration.

The president of the United States started to discuss the issue of East Timor in the 1990s. The discourse of the president of the US was in accordance with the victim discourse. The questions by the press were focused on the human rights violations committed against the people of East Timor. The people of East Timor are portrayed as victims and poor people that need to be helped as much as possible. The president emphasized the (diplomatic) pressure of his administration on the government of Indonesia with respect to the human rights abuses. Clinton emphasized, for instance, that he raised the issue of East Timor in conversations with Indonesian leaders, and that he would continue to do so (Clinton administration, 14 November 1994).

The victim discourse is closely related, at least in the eyes of the American president, with universal values that should be maintained throughout the world. In this sense, the East Timorese people deserved to be treated like other peoples, that is, without suffering human rights abuses.The fact that the US government took up the victim discourse did not mean that they endorsed an act of self-determination for the people of East Timor.

### *5.9.2 United Kingdom*

The historical representations of the people of East Timor in the United Kingdom were varied. The House of Commons and the House of Lords both talked about the East Timor question in the 1970s, when East Timor was annexed by Indonesia. The discourse focused mostly on questions to the government to pressure for implementation of UN resolutions as well as to state their policy towards East Timor more clearly (HL Deb, 19 February 1976; HC Deb, 11 May 1976).The parliamentarians also asked repeatedly about the mass murder and atrocities committed by the Indonesian army. The government responded, however, that they would “in the context of the existing friendly relationship with Indonesia, […] be in touch with them about the allegations” (HC Deb, 17 March 1977a).The government stated in the next debate with the House of Commons about East Timor that “we have been in touch with the Indonesian Government about allegations of atrocities, which they have denied” (HC Deb, 21 July 1977b). The discourse suggests that some MPs spoke of East Timor in line with the mass killing and atrocities subpart of the victim discourse. The government, however, was not at all persuaded or interested in the victim discourse, as they considered a denial by Indonesia of atrocities a satisfying answer.

A lengthy discussion in the House of Lords in 1980 showsthese two different discourses concerning East Timor really well. One discourse in the debate portrayed the people of East Timor as victims of the killing of a third of their population and deliberate starvation. The Lord also tried to show the duplicity of the government’s position, in that they spoke of self-determination for the people of East Timor but acted in accord with Indonesia with regard to weapons deals. Another MP, Baroness Vickers, formulated a contribution in line with the discourse of the government, stating that Indonesia spent more money on the development of the area than Portugal ever did. She also stated that “the unfortunate state of Timor is now very much better off”, in the hands of Indonesia (HL Deb, 4 December 1980).The Baroness received support for her statement by other MPs. The contrast between the victim discourse and the alternative pro-Indonesia discourse becomes very clear in this instance. The 1990s saw a big increase in parliamentary debates about East Timor, mainly focusing on human rights abuses in line with the victim discourse. Yet, the government stuck to Indonesia’s alternative representation, which suited them better economically.

### *5.9.3 United Nations*

The invasion of East Timor by Indonesia was met in the UN by a series of resolutions denouncing Indonesia’s occupation (Schwarz, 1995, p. 195). The UN stated, for instance, in its first resolution in 1975, that they were “gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in East Timor” while they were also “deploring the intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in East Timor” (UN Security Council, 1975).The next year, another resolution passed, stating among other things that the UN “calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without further delay all its forces from the Territory” (UN Security Council, 1976).The Security Council adopted resolutions on the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor every year until 1982 (Schwarz, 1995, p. 206).Discussions on the question of East Timor were also conducted in the Human Right Commission and the working group of, for instance, enforced or involuntary disappearances, and the working group on arbitrary detention (UN Commission on Human Rights, 1994).East Timor was on the Human Rights Commission agenda again in 1987, after a hiatus of two years, until the end of Indonesia’s occupation. The commission was obviously concerned with human rights violations, but the discourse remained rather distant and technical, without references to the people of East Timor. The workings groups evidently took up the political repression discourse because they wrote about the people of East Timor beingthe victims of arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearances. The working groups tried to determine the validity of the information handed to them by NGOs and the Indonesian government. The discourse of the East Timorese as victims can be distilled from reports of the workings groups, which are quite detailed about the arbitrary detention, disappearances and torture of people in East Timor (UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993a; UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993b; UN General Assembly, 1995c). The victim discourse is not linked in these reports to a right to self-determination but the people of East Timor are seen a equals who should have more rights and freedoms then they at that moment had.

The victim discourse had as a result that the UN found it important to conduct a fair and free act of self-determination. The people of East Timor in a way deserved a popular consultation because of their many casualties and sacrifices. The one man one vote method used in the popular consultation clearly suggests that the UN’s representation of the East Timorese was not one of inferiority. The East Timorese were instead seen as people capable of deciding on their own future. This representation is also visible in the great effort of the UN to inform the population. The UN spent a lot of time, money and energy to inform the population about the two positions in the referendum and the consequences of either position. In this way, the UN tried to ensure that people could make a good decision on their political future.

## 5.9 Conclusion

In the case of East Timor the sixth hypothesis stated:*The act of self-determination by the UN in the case of East Timor, is a result of a change in the prevailing discourse according to which these people are portrayed as equals and capable of deciding on their own political future.* The findings in the case of East Timor need to be analysed in a nuanced way. The expected historical representation was one of equality and capability. The people of East Timor were portrayed in the period under investigation in my thesis as victims. This is not so much a value judgement as well as a factual representation of the people. In that sense the representation of the people of East Timor is not on the same conceptual level as the inferiority discourse of the Papuans. The data that I have analysed nevertheless shows this representation of the Timorese. The change of a value laden representation to a more fact oriented representation does show a change in the way indigenous people are being portrayed. The fact oriented victim discourse is not as pervasive as the inferiority discourse, since the discourse is not used by states until just before seriously talks about a popular consultation started.The expected equality discourse is not necessarily found but a change to a more fact oriented representation does suggest that the Timorese *are*seen as equal, the discourse would otherwise have been more value laden and pervasive.

# Chapter 6 Conclusion

In this thesis I asked the question: *Why did the UN not undertake a ‘genuine’ act of self-determination in the case of West Papua in 1969, while they did undertook a genuine act of self-determination in the case of East Timor in 1999?*

The West Papua and East Timor case had never been comparatively analysed in IR. The commonalities of the cases warranted such a study. I chose to compare two theories that had never been used to study the behaviour of the UN with regard to these two cases. Social constructivism and postcolonialism have both provided fresh insights and different (partial) answers to the research question.

This thesis has societal relevance because it shines a light on the often hidden struggle of indigenous people for a right to self-determination. The Papuans are still struggling for the right to self-determination and I hope that this thesis can have a very small contribution in raising awareness for their cause. This thesis furthermore has societal relevance since it shows the hidden biases in our own culture and hopefully makes us pause and think about our way of writing history.

The social constructivist premise that norm entrepreneurs socialize the norm of self-determination into the international community after which the norm will become internalized can be seen as a partial explanation of the main research question. The lack of norm entrepreneurs in the case of West Papua resulted in the absence of a functioning socialization mechanism and a complete lack of internalization of the norm of self-determination by states and the UN. One can state about the case of West Papua that the norm of self-determination was not an important factor in the behaviour of the UN.

The social constructivist premise in the case of East Timor holds to a certain extent. There were many norm entrepreneurs who fully internalized the norm of self-determination and propagated that norm in the international political community. The presence of norm entrepreneurs and their use of socialization mechanisms did not, however, result in the internalization of the norm of self-determination by states. The UN showed that they internalized the norm of self-determination through their discourse and actions. The internalization of a norm should be visible when states justify their actions on the base of the norm and the idea that this is ‘the right thing to do’. This kind of justification was nevertheless not visible in the empirics, which leads me to conclude that social constructivism cannot completely explain the case of East Timor and therefore the main research question.

The postcolonial premise that the historical representation of a people directly or indirectlyaffects the policy making about those people can also partly explain the main research question. The inferiority discourse discovered in the West Papua case explains the farcical act of self-determination in West Papua. The Papuans were seen as inferior to the superior West and therefore not capable of making decision about their own future. The inferiority discourse thus had a very negative value judgement. The inferior historical representation of the Papuans can be found in the US, UK and UN, which shows that the inferiority discourse was very widespread and pervasive. The premise of postcolonialism further entailed that the historical representations of the Papuans and Timorese differed, thereby explaining the different acts of self-determination. The historical representation of the Timorese was expected to be one of equality. The empirically established historical representation of the Timorese did indeed differ from that of the Papuans. The inferiority discourse was no longer present. The historical representation of the Timorese is less distinct and less clear. The discourse on the Timorese focused on a victim discourse. The absence of an inferiority discourse and the presence of a more fact oriented victim discourse can suggest that the postcolonialism premise of an equality representation for the Timorese is true. The Timorese are thus represented as they really are instead of a postcolonial fiction.

The thesis beautifully shows the development of the norm of self-determination as it analysis the norm of self-determination through a thirty year timespan, thereby contributing to the IR literature on self-determination. The West Papua case makes clear the necessity of norm entrepreneurs for the socialization of a norm. The notion that socialization is less a distinct stage and more a mechanism for internalization can on the basis of the thesis findings be seen as a useful contribution to the norm life cycle literature. The thesis also shows that the actions of the West were shaped by the West’s ideas about the East. The finding that the West’s actions were indeed shaped by their ideas of the East could very well be the base of multiple solutions to IR puzzles, thereby underscoring the need for more postcolonial thinking in IR.

Postcolonial thinking has been very challenging to incorporate into a thesis with a theory versus theory design. The criterion of hypothesis testing is inherent to this thesis design but severely constrains postcolonialism. Postcolonialism’s epistemology is post-positive in nature so this clashed with the positivist epistemology of the thesis. This epistemology clash is a methodological weakness of the thesis that in this thesis design cannot be helped. The method of discourse analysis has been successful in analysing the discourse on self-determination for the social constructivist analysis. Other methods might have been used but the combination of discourse analysis and interviewing has in this case been enough to provide a good analysis of the norm life cycle with regard to the norm of self-determination.

There has been a methodological difficulty in operationalizing the concept of norm internalization. It has been incredibly difficult to measure and discover internalization empirically because however well crafted the proxies, one can never really look into somebody’s head. The social constructivist concept of internalization will always be inherently difficult to test empirically because unconscious thought processes are seldom consciously written down.

The method of historical representation has been an excellent method to tie the expected portrayals of postcolonialism with the actual empirical colonial discourse. The method is historical in nature and therefore very good at showing the historical context of a representation and the way in which this representation is embedded in Western thinking, thereby almost completely determining actions. The difference in conceptual levels of the pervasive inferiority discourse and the fact oriented victims discourse makes for slightly stronger results in the West Papua case then in the East Timor case.

A significant strength of the empirical analysis is that a lot of primary sources have been used. The researcher has tried to avoid cherry picking but the analysis of primary data is always somewhat subjective. The primary data on the United Kingdom has been difficult to gather, as one has to physically go to the UK to access the government’s historical archive. In addition one has to pay for the use of this archive. The UK data therefore consists of more easily accessible parliamentary minutes. It was not possible to use data from the incredibly useful Foreign Relations series of the US in the case of East Timor because this information has not been declassified yet. The possible information shortage has been leveraged by excellent information from the American Presidency Project.

The social constructivist and postcolonial analysis of the main research question can explain the West Papua case quite well but the East Timor case is more difficult to explain. The absence of internalization of the norm of self-determination suggests that further research along the lines of classical liberalization and pressure group analysis might be better at explaining the East Timor case completely. Some empirical data and the interview point to the idea that the lobbying and pressure by activist groups became so great that states had to change their stance on East Timor. They then did not change their stance on East Timor because they had internalized the norm of self-determination but because they could no longer ignore the public opinion and the pressure by activist groups. This line of reasoningcould be an alternative avenue to explore in further research.

Other countries and the UN have profoundly shaped the futures of West Papua and East Timor. The different outcomes of the acts of self-determination have ensured a completely different future for the people of West Papua and the people of East Timor. East Timor has faced many challenges as a new country, ranging from reconciliation efforts to upsurges of violence and the combatting of corruption (BBC, 2016). But in the words of the new president of Timor Leste, Francisco Guterres, “the Timorese have created a state, and then a constitution and a government, and democracy is growing from there” (Davidson, 8 June 2017). The outcome of independence at the 1999 referendum will in the end bring the country more prosperity, security and peace then the incorporation with Indonesia ever could.

The future of West Papua after their act of self-determination has not been so bright. The people have experienced human rights abuses for decades, some researchers even calling it ‘slow motion genocide’ (Wilts, 10 March 2016; Fox, 2 March 2017). The Freeport mine is looting the region’s resources. The mine is Indonesia’s biggest tax payer and therefore a huge incentive for Indonesia to keep tight control over the region (Coca, 2015). West Papua has vanished from the world stage in the last decades because it is difficult for journalists to get into the country (Pacific Media Watch, 2017). Activist organisations such as Free West Papua nevertheless believe there is reason for hope as they raise awareness for the plight of the West Papuan people. Raki Ap also said that the hope is immense because awareness, especially in the region has increased (Raki Ap, personal communication 28 March 2017). The people of West Papua still have a long way to go if they ever want a genuine act of self-determination to take place, but they have to begin somewhere and hope is the best place to start.

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# Appendix A Interview with Raki Ap

Mr. Ap is a spokesperson for the Dutch branch of the activist organization Free West Papua.

28-03-17

Q: Marit Zuijdwegt

A: Raki Ap

Q: Kun u wat over uw zelf vertellen?

A: Mijn achtergrond, ik ben een politieke vluchteling, na de moord op onze vader zijn wij gevlucht. Ik was toen nog niet geboren, toen hij werd vermoord, dat was in 1984. We zijn gevlucht naar net over de grens, Papua Nieuw Guinea, daar werd ik geboren, toen zijn we naar hier gevlucht (red. Nederland). Ik heb mijn leven hier opgebouwd en eigenlijk gaande weg toen ik volwassen werd ben ik me ook heel speelsgewijs gaan verdiepen in wat er nu gebeurd is, waarom ik in Nederland beland ben. Zo heb ik me eigenlijk gevormd tot een politieke activist, vandaag de dag. Dat is eigenlijk wie ik ben en ik heb geen titel maar ik ben wel heel gretig in het lobbyen en onderzoek doen, debat avonden en naar scholen gaan om het verhaal te vertellen. Gewoon heel simpel voor mensen want het is een heel moeilijk complex verhaal. Voor mensen die a politiek zijn, studenten die economie studeren. Politicoloog heeft er meer gevoel voor, voor dit soort verhalen. Maar als wij naar mensen toe gaan, dan moet het heel simpel en begrijpbaar zijn. Dat is dan wat ik dagelijks, wekelijks doe met onze leden van ons campagne team.

Q: In het algemeen werd er in de internationale gemeenschap op een denigrerende manier naar de Papoea’s gekeken?

A: Klopt.

Q: Maar waren er uitzonderingen? Mensen die er op een andere manier naar keken, die zich er meer voor inzetten?

A: Nee voor zover ik de stukken ken eigenlijk niet. Je had voor en tegenstanders op het moment dat de soevereiniteitsoverdracht plaats vond en dat leden van de VN mochten instemmen. Dan had je een lijst van landen die tegenstemden dat Papua onderdeel zou worden van Indonesië. Voor de rest was er helemaal niemand mee bezig. De enigen die er bij betrokken waren voor zover ik weet waren de Nederlanders, Indonesiërs zelf en de Amerikanen. Voor de rest was het zo een verstopt land dat niemand verder wist waar Nieuw Guinea lag.

Q: Waren er groepen in Nederland zelf die zich er mee bemoeiden?

A: Op het moment in de jaren 60 toen Nederland, de Nederlandse regering, voorbereidingen trof om Papoea onafhankelijk te laten worden. Daarmee ontstond in Papoea zelf een beweging. De Papoea’s wilden onafhankelijkheid, voor degenen die wisten wat er op dat moment aan de hand was, en dat waren er toen best wel veel die waren er heel erg mee bezig. Ook in eerste instantie de Nieuw Guinea Raad, de eerste regering die onder Koninklijk besluit was afgegeven. Zij werden opgericht op 5 april 1961.

Q: Tot die tijd had Nederland zich niet echt bezig gehouden met het bewustmaken van de Papoea’s?

A: Wel want eigenlijk toen Indonesië in 1949 onafhankelijk werd, toen was West Papoea nog niet echt in the picture. Nederland was er ook nog niet echt mee bezig mar wel de tien jaren na de overdracht. Het was vooral het gevoel van minister Luns, destijds minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, die kon het niet hebben dat Indonesië het laatste stukje Nederland ook nog wilde inpikken. Als je die stukken leest, dan is dat het gevoel dat bij mij opkwam.

Q: Ze (red Nederland) wilde het vooral maar niet aan Indonesia moeten geven?

A: Dat is het gevoel wat ik kreeg toen ik die stukken las. Dat is het laatste stukje Nederland in het oosten. Het is een stukje status dat Nederland denk ik wilde behouden. Dus het gaat niet zozeer om Papoea’s, dat geloof ik niet. Maar uiteindelijk pakt het voor ons heel goed uit, de band tussen de Nederlandse militairen die daar waren, andere Nederlanders en de Papoea’s. Het gedachtegoed van de regering kunnen we nooit exact weten, maar mijn gevoel is dat het puur een stukje status is in het oosten, niet zozeer een gevoel voor de Papoea’s. Het was tegen de Indonesiërs, dat was de eerste gedachte en dat ze een eigen stukje kolonie in het oosten hadden. Maar vervolgens ontstond er wel een hele mooie bijzondere band, dat ervaren we vandaag de dag nog steeds, met name met de Nieuw Guinea veteranen en de Papoea’s is die band nog steeds heel warm. Die band, dat is wat wij overal vertellen, zoals zij die toen hebben ervaren, die is er nu nog steeds met mijn generatie. Dat is het enige dat over is gebleven aan die tijd.

Q: Wat deed Nederland voor die tijd met West Papua?

A: Volgens mij waren de Nederlandse bedrijven actief, zoals Shell. Shell was al redelijk actief in Indonesia en ook in Papoea in de jaren 50. De Nederlandse bedrijven waren daar actief maar ze wisten nog niet zo goed, los van de specerijen, wat ze met de Papoea’s aan moesten totdat iemand in de regering en met name Luns vond dat dit ons stukje was, dat niet naar Indonesia moest gaan. Hierdoor hadden ze zo iets van we gaan het land opbouwen, we gaan de Papoeas begeleiden. Dus dat kwam na 1949 aardig op gang.

Q: En voor die tijd?

A: Eigenlijk is daar heel weinig over bekend. Naar mijn weten waren ze aanwezig, vooral voor specerijen, maar hoe de band toen was weet ik ook niet zo goed.

Q: Welke rol speelde de kerk? Je had namelijk allemaal zendingsgenootschappen in het gebied.

A: De kerken waren er veel aanwezig en de Papoea’s voelden zich verbonden tot het christelijk geloof tot de dag van vandaag.

Q: Hebben zij (red. De kerken) zich ingezet voor West Papua om bij Nederland te blijven?

A: Niet tot nauwelijks. Eigenlijk was het een verlengstuk van de regering. Ze mochten zich eigenlijk niet met politiek bezig houden. Hoewel er veel kerkelijke instanties waren die echt met de Papoea’s meeleefden en voor educatie zorgden, maar ze hadden geen macht. Ze konden geen echte verandering brengen voor de Papoea’s. Voor ons gevoel nu was de kerk een afleiding om het verzet tegen te houden. Je moet je vooral met geloof bezighouden, je tot Christus richten en dan zou het verzet langzamerhand afnemen. Dat is wat wij de afgelopen jaren sterk hebben waargenomen. Ze willen dat het verzet ophoudt omdat het de laatste jaren sterk is toegenomen, het is heel dynamisch. De afgelopen vijf jaar is heel bloeiend in de strijd. De hoop is immens groot omdat de bewustwording, met name in de regio is toegenomen. De bewustwording in de Pacific is iets waar wij echt hoop uit halen. Indonesië kijkt het met angst in de ogen aan. Ze zitten daar met geld te smijten om politici om te kopen, wat ze al die tijd wel is gelukt, maar nu niet. Nu zitten wij aan de winnende kant en social media zorgt ervoor dat de gewone burgers in de Pacific weten wat er gaande is en dat zorgt ervoor dat het verhaal bekender wordt en daarmee het draagvlak ontzettend toeneemt.

Q: Nederland hamerde erop dat ze de Papoea’s uiteindelijk zelfbeschikkingsrecht hadden gegeven? Denkt u dat ze dit ook echt hadden gedaan?

A: Als het aan Luns had gelegen was het gelukt. Maar er zat een hele andere macht achter hem en dat was Prins Bernhard. Prins Bernhard was onderdeel van de Bilderberg groep/ groep Rijkens. Groep Rijkens waren de CEO’s van de Nederlandse industrie en die waren heel actief in Indonesië. Zijn reis naar Kennedy toen, naar Amerika, dat is een van de keerpunten en een van de meest verbazingwekkende momenten in de Nieuw Guinea kwestie. Hij zorgde ervoor dat Nederland uit eindelijk op de knieën moest omdat Amerika, op advies van Prins Bernhard, druk heeft uitgeoefend op Nederland om Nieuw Guinea af te staan aan Indonesië. Zijn rol is in deze historisch van belang geweest. Hij was zeg maar de game changer in de Nieuw Guinea kwestie. Natuurlijk waren er meer factoren, waaronder de Koude Oorlog en Vietnam, Amerika had geen zin in een tweede Vietnam, ze zagen dat de Russen erbij betrokken waren waarbij ze hen de kaarten niet in handen wilde spelen. Het waren dus heel veel factoren maar Nederland kon dat spelletje niet winnen. Ik ben van mening dat als het aan Nederland lag, de Papoea’s onafhankelijkheid hadden gekregen. Al was het alleen maar on Soekarno niet zijn zin te geven, alleen al daarvoor hadden wij die zelfbeschikking gehad, als het aan Nederland lag, met Luns als minister van Buitenlandse Zaken was het gelukt. Zonder bemoeienis van Prins Bernhard en dreiging van de Russen was het gelukt. Ook al was Prins Bernhard er niet naar toe gegaan en Indonesië zou met de Russen Nieuw Guinea aanvallen, had Nederland verloren. Het lag echt niet aan de Nederlandse regering, echt niet, het waren de factoren daar om heen.

Q: Daar zit geen wrok naar Nederland toe?

A: Nee nee totaal niet. Tot vandaag de dag zit er geen wrok bij de Papoea’s. Wij zien ze nog steeds als onze broeders. En dit verhaal gaat komen, dat kan ik je beloven, in de komende tien jaar gaat het gebeuren, maar dit verhaal moet bij alle Nederlanders belanden. Die band die er toen was, is er nu nog steeds. We weten welke actoren dit tot stand hebben gebracht en Nederland kon dit niet winnen, ook al wilden ze dat. Dat is uiteindelijk de stand van zaken toen destijds. Ook al wilden ze het graag, het lukte niet. Indonesië was met Rusland een te grote speler. Er hadden zoveel slachtoffers geweest. Misschien is het goed geweest dat het zo is afgelopen, wij betalen daar de prijs voor als Papoea’s, het is heel vervelend maar de toekomst gaat nu bepalen wat er gaat gebeuren.

Q: De VN had daar niet een ander referendum van kunnen maken dan ze uiteindelijk hebben gedaan?

A: Als ik me de stukken goed herinneren zei de Secretaris General toentertijd: dit is een te gevoelig onderwerp, hier wil ik mijn vingers niet aan branden. Deze kwestie met mensen die het land niet zelf kunnen besturen, wat moet ik ermee. Dus die hield zich afzijdig maar liet zich vooral aansturen door de Amerikaanse ambassadeur Bunker. En Bunker liet zich op zijn beurt weer voeden door het advies van Prins Bernhard. Plan Bunker werd naar de VN gebracht, waar Nederland zich erover moest buigen samen met Indonesië. Dat plan Bunker kwam vooral tot stand door Prins Bernhard die twee keer naar hem toe is gereisd met hoe hij Nederland onder druk zou kunnen zetten en hier moet je je plan op maken.

Q: Het grote Verenigde Staten laat zich beïnvloeden door een Nederlandse prins?

A: Het was in het belang van Amerika zelf. Anders hadden ze het niet gedaan. Als ze hadden geweten dat er iets viel te winnen als ze Nederland hadden geholpen hadden ze het niet gedaan. Maar ze hadden Vietnam, ze wilden de Russen niet in de kaart spelen, Indonesië naar Rusland sturen dus het was in hun belang dat de Nieuw Guinea kwestie zo snel mogelijk doofde. En dan was door de soevereiniteitsoverdracht van Nieuw Guinea aan Indonesië. Daarmee was de zaak gedaan en bleef Indonesië neutraal, sterker nog, misschien wel aan de zijde van Amerika. En dat was voor hen van nationaal belang, in mijn beleving. Dus voor hen was het dusdanig hoe kunnen we dit tot rust brengen en zorgen dat Indonesië geen tweede Vietnam wordt. En daarom namen ze het advies van prins Bernhard ter harte. Jij bent de prins, als jij zegt dat dit gaat werken, dan gaat we het op deze manier doen. Hij stuurde dan weer vanuit mijn beleving de VN aan. De VN wist zelf niet hoe ze dit moesten oppakken en de Secretaris Generaal liet zich eigenlijk aansturen door de ambassadeur van Amerika die dan natuurlijk heel veel touwtjes in handen had bij de VN, zeker in die tijd. Nu nog steeds, maar toen zeker denk ik. Het was of de Amerikanen die de touwtjes in handen hadden, of Indonesië, en anders een tussenweg, een tussenoplossing. En de VN ging er maar gewoon in mee. Nu hebben ze eigen reglementen, eigen instructies. Dat was toentertijd helemaal niet, zeker niet in de kwestie Nieuw Guinea. Dat is eigenlijk een hele magere vorm van de VN toentertijd. Die hebben eigenlijk niks zelfstandig opgezet.

Q: Zelfs toen ze het referendum hadden gehad waren er nog wel een aantal landen in de General Assembly die het referendum niet goed vonden, maar dan heb je de meerderheid en dan is het klaar.

A: De vraag is waarom lieten ze het gebeuren zoals het ging, terwijl het tegen alle internationale verdragen in ging. Daar zijn onze juristen nu mee bezig. Wat je nu ziet op de Krim is exact hetzelfde als toentertijd. Waarom nu wel die verontwaardiging voor de Krim. Dat het in het verleden ligt, daar gaat het niet om, internationaal recht is internationaal recht. Toen heeft de VN gefaald, het is volledig fout gegaan volgens internationaal recht, maar het is wel gebeurt. Waarom ze het lieten gebeuren is voor ons allemaal een grote vraag.

Q: Dat is onder andere de vraag waar ik naar kijk.

A: Die documenten, hoe dat helemaal tot stand is gekomen, dan heb je natuurlijk een geweldig dossier.

Q: Er zijn een heleboel factoren en ik haal er daar een paar uit om te toetsen. Onder andere het idee dat de beslissingen zijn genomen met in het achterhoofd dat die mensen het zelf niet konden. Ik bedoel, ze worden ook nergens in gekend. Ze werden nergens bij de beslissingen betrokken.

A: Er werd geen enkele Papoea betrokken bij de hele kwestie. Dat is achteraf. Toen kon je zeggen, waren de Papoea’s bereid om zo een grote verantwoordelijkheid te nemen. Ik denk het niet. Er was net een Nieuw Guinea Raad op gericht, voor de Nederlanders was het goed genoeg. Het was allemaal heel fragiel. De vraag was hoe de VN hiermee om ging en of het voldoende was. Maar de druk was zo groot dat de optie gewoon niet ter sprake kwam. Dat mocht geen issue worden want dan stootte je Indonesië voor het hoofd. En daar kwam Amerika met hun eigen nationale belang en zij wilden Indonesië niet naar de richting van de Russen laten gaan.

Q: Het interessante is dat Amerika ook nog ander soortige opties heeft overwogen. Zoals een Melanesische Federatie.

A: Ook al leek dit Amerika wel een optie, dat zou Soekarno niet laten gebeuren. Die wilden perse dat stukje erbij hebben.

Q: Waarom dan toch nog een referendum?

A: Het was een eis, zeker van Luns en uiteindelijk ook van de Nederlandse regering dat er een moment kwam dat de Papoea’s zelf mochten kiezen of ze wel of niet bij Indonesië wilden horen, dat hadden ze de Papoea’s beloofd. Zo is het ook in de New York Agreement vast gelegd. Dat de Papoea’s binnen zeven jaar tijd middels een referendum zelf mochten kiezen of ze wel of niet onderdeel wilden worden van Indonesië. Je weet de uitkomst er van. Het is volledig uit de context van one man one vote getrokken. Met de uitkomst zoals we die vandaag kennen. Het is toen een hele soapserie geweest. De VN was er bij, de keek er naar en liet het allemaal gebeuren. Dat is nog het meest erge. Met de wetenschap van nu, en ook van toen, had dat nooit plaats mogen nemen. De overdracht was nooit rechtsgeldig geweest.

Q: Indonesiërs, keken en kijken zij neer op de Papuas?

A: Ja net zoals de rest van de wereld toen. Iedereen dacht dat is een primitief land, dat was het ook. Mensen waren niet zo modern als de andere landen die de macht hadden in die tijd dus die keken er op neer. Het interesseerde ze ook niet wat wij vonden. Die conclusie kun je ook wel trekken.

Q: Doet Indonesië dat nog steeds? Doen ze dat met andere bevolkingsgroepen ook?

A: Heel het archipel. Java koloniseert de rest van Indonesië zoals we het nu kennen. Als je kijk naar alle eilanden die eigenlijk onafhankelijkheid willen, dan bestaat het huidige Indonesië niet meer.

Q: Er is nu veel migratie in West Papoea, als er nu een referendum zou zijn heb je kans dat niet eens de meerderheid meer voor onafhankelijkheid zou zijn.

A: Dat zeggen heel veel mensen, dat het nu geen zin meer heeft. Maar het heeft wel zin. Het referendum was gemandateerd op de etnische bevolking van het eiland. Daar was het referendum op gebaseerd. Ook als het nu plaats vind gaat het om de etnische bevolking en niet alle migranten die er bij zijn gekomen. Het gaat om de lokale bevolking. Daar gaat het referendum over en zij zijn gerechtigd om een stem uit te brengen. Dus volgens het concept zoals het in 1969 is bepaald; de etnische bevolking exclusief migranten etc. Dat zou de eis vandaag de dag zijn. Wij hebben de overtuiging van wij het referendum dan zouden winnen.

Q: Het verbaast met een beetje dat er helemaal geen groeperingen waren die het voor hen opnamen. Er waren natuurlijk ook minder NGO’s maar dat er überhaupt niemand voor opkwam verbaast me.

A: Eigenlijk waren die er niet.

Q: Werd het nooit in verband gebracht met een gewone vorm van dekolonisatie zoals je ook zag in bijvoorbeeld kolonies van Engeland?

A: Je ziet dat Indonesië heel hard heeft gelobbyd internationaal en regionaal om te voorkomen dat West Papoea zowel bekend werd internationaal laat staan dat ze op een dekolonisatie lijst zouden komen. Dat proces is nu ook gaande. Op aandringen van Nederland stonden wij tot 1962 wel op die lijst omdat zij ons voorbereiden op onafhankelijkheid. Wij waren dus een van die landen die onafhankelijk zouden worden, totdat het een spel werd tussen Amerika en de VN. Toen verdwenen wij volledig van de wereldkaart. Tot nu. Nu wordt dat weer opgepakt met allerlei steun in de regio. Tot vandaag kun je zeggen dat er geen NGO’s echt met West Papoea bezig zijn geweest. Er was helemaal geen betrokkenheid, van geen enkele NGO.

Q: Als men kijkt naar Nederland in de jaren 50/60 dan zie je mensen die er echt wel voor zijn terwijl er weldegelijk een groep tegen was. Ik kan niet zo goed identificeren wie dat dan waren.

A: Ik weet wel dat er een hele grote groep was, ook in Nederland, voor een onafhankelijk West Papua. De media, bijvoorbeeld polygoon journaal publiceerde heel veel over Nederlands Nieuw Guinea. De tijd van voorbereiding voor onafhankelijkheid, dan heb ik het over 1959-1962, toen hadden ze een Nieuw Guinea Raad, dan ben je bereid om de overdracht plaats te laten vinden. Dus ze waren gereed. Als je dan kijkt naar de nieuwsuitzendingen tussen 1958-1962, dus de tijd dat ze nog onder Nederland vielen, toen zag je een enorme nieuws verspreiding in Nederland. Die artikelen waren allemaal ondersteunend aan de Papoea’s. De bevolking was heel welwillende ten opzichte van de Papoea’s maar het was ineens de regering die de knoop doorhakte, we gaan niks meer uitzenden over Nieuw Guinea. Het was zo een gevoelig issue geworden, dat het een bewuste keuze was om de Nederlanders niks meer mee te geven over wat er nu in Nieuw Guinea gebeurd. Dat is een kwalijke zaak met gevolgen tot de dag van vandaag, waardoor generatie genoten van ons niks of nauwelijks weten over Nieuw Guinea. Na de overdracht stopte het gelijk, niet pas na het referendum. We zijn hier verslagen, dit willen we niet aan ons volk mee geven. Het beleid van de regering was, hier mee stopt dit hoofdstuk en gaan we ook niks meer meegeven over dit stukje kolonie en dat heeft zich vertaald in de onbekendheid nu.

Q: Hartelijke bedankt voor het interview.

# Appendix B Inverview with Endie van Binsbergen

Mrs. Van Binsbergen is the chairwoman of the Dutch foundation Vrij Oost Timor.

14-03-17

Q: Marit Zuijdwegt

A: Endie van Binsbergen

Q: Waarom heeft uw organisatie zich gespecialiseerd in Oost Timor? Na een bredere organisatie te zijn die zich met Nederland en Indonesië bezighield. Oost Timor was niet van Nederland.

A: Oost Timor was wel een van de gebieden waar zeg maar de steungroepjes en het idealistische clubje mensen zich mee bezighield. Oost Timor was dat stukje Indonesië dat een kans had. Dat er eigenlijk het ergst aan toe was, en tegelijkertijd een kans had. Om een aantal redenen. Ten eerste omdat de VN de annexatie nooit erkend had. Je hebt een opening. Zo kwamen wij daar op terecht. Wij zijn een groepje geworden dat zich ging verdiepen. Wat je moet doen is eigenlijk, je moet een actie organiseren waarbij de persverklaring interessanter is dan de actie zelf. Je moet iets organiseren waardoor de pers op je afkomt, je geeft ze iets waar ze een foto van kunnen maken; je doet iets mooist of iets lolligs, iets anders, iets creatiefs. Als er maar journalisten op af komen en dan geef je de persverklaring en dan beweer je allemaal dingen in je persverklaring en dan zet je er verwijzingen bij (en dit is voor Google en internet!) en dan verwijs je naar boeken en manuscripten. Je verwijst naar dingen en dan zit er altijd wel een journalist tussen die denkt: ik ga daar eens even een achtergrond verhaal over schrijven. Dat werd onze insteek. Ik denk ook dat wij, omdat wij meer uit die kraak bewegingen kwamen, waar je dus zoveel clubjes had die allemaal met iets anders bezig waren, maar altijd bezig waren met, verzin iets nieuws en val op.

Q: Dat was Nederland. De beweging wilde dat Nederland een bepaald standpunt innam over Oost Timor en dat verwoordde op een groter platform?

A: Nederland was en is een van de grootste wapenleveranciers aan Indonesië. Indonesia is toch niet in oorlog, waar hebben ze die wapens dan voor nodig? Wij gingen er vragen over stellen. Je organiseert een actie, je zorgt dat er pers op af komt en je geeft die cijfers mee. Je stelt kritische vragen aan het parlement. Waar heeft Indonesia deze wapens voor nodig? Dan komt er iemand die zegt: weet je wat er in de Nederlandse wet staat? Nederland mag helemaal niet leveren aan landen met interne conflicten. Ja maar dit is geen intern conflict, want Timor is niet erkent door de VN als provincie van Indonesië. Daar gingen we toen mee spelen. Iets verzinnen waardoor dat opgepakt werd. De vraag is: Vindt Nederland, tegen het VN besluit in, dat Oost Timor van Indonesia is? Waarom dan? Business as usual. Heel lang is dat in Nederland ook de kreet geweest: business as usual. Als Nederland er geld aan kan verdienen houden wij onze mond dicht.

Q: En dat gebeurde ook in andere landen?

A: En dat gebeurde ook in andere landen. Daardoor kwam er ook een soort netwerk. Duitsland had een gigantisch netwerk voor Oost Timor. Veel groter dan Nederland.

Wij zochten dus een ingang en vooral nadat wij mee hadden gedaan aan die actie voor Bonke Prinsen. Het is er dus nog, mensen zijn zo makkelijk over de zeik als het over Indonesië gaat. Het is er gewoon, maar we willen het niet meer weten. Dus daar moet je in gaan peuteren, waarom willen we het niet meer weten.

Q: De combinatie van wapens en shaming was de ingang?

A: Ja. Onze handelsbanden met Indonesië, zijn zo heilig dat we, met het internationale gerechtshof in Den Haag en met ons wijzende vingertje naar de hele wereld, vooral toen nog, willen wij ondertussen niks weten over wat er met onze wapens gebeurt daar in Indonesia. Waar heeft Indonesia die wapens voor nodig? In de regio waar ze liggen hebben ze alleen maar vriendjes: Maleisië, Singapore. Australië haalt het niet in zijn hoofd om Indonesia aan te vallen.

Q: Wat was Australië positie over Oost Timor. Oost Timor ligt heel dichtbij, er kwamen vluchtelingen naar Australië voor zover dat lukte.

A: Australië heeft een beetje hetzelfde probleem als Nederland, wat Oost Timor betreft. In de Tweede Wereld oorlog was Portugees Timor een soort bufferzone, want het was nog Portugees gebied, tegen de Japanners. Dus Australië had heel veel militairen in Oost Timor neergezet. Want Japan zat natuurlijk in Indonesië, en Australië zat dus daar. Maar de Japanners kwamen ook, dus eigenlijk werd die oorlog tussen Australië en Japan een beetje uitgevochten in Oost Timor. En heel veel Australische soldaten zijn levend teruggekeerd omdat ze geholpen werden door de Timorezen. Timor had niet een behoefte aan Japan. Zij hadden een andere angst, zij waren bang voor Indonesië. Ze hebben het altijd geweten, Indonesië komt gewoon en dan zijn wij van de kaart verdwenen. Dus eieren voor hun geld. De Timorezen hielpen de Australiërs. Er zijn heel veel Australiërs verborgen geweest door Timorezen. Dus je hebt in Australië een hele grote laag, zoals je in Nederland de Nieuw Guinea veteranen hebt, die hebben allemaal nog zo een warm plekje voor Timor. Maar Australië, politiek gezien, wat hele andere plannen met Timor. Begin zeventiger jaren is er de roemruchte Timor Gap Deal gesloten, tussen Australië en Indonesië, vliegend over Oost Timor. Dat ging over, en dat verhaal is nog niet afgelopen, waar de zee grens ligt tussen Indonesië en Australië.

Q: Zij waren ook een van de enige die de annexatie hebben goedgekeurd.

A: Precies, zij hebben het inderdaad erkend, als eerste. Heel simpel: business as usual. Olie. Er zit olie in de Timor zee. De Indonesische deal met Australië ging over de grens tussen Timor, tenminste Indonesië en Australië, maar dan heb je een groot deel Oost en West Timor. Dat grenst allemaal zee matig aan Australië. De grens liep dus vrij dicht lang de Indonesische kust waarmee dat hele stuk zee van Australië werd. Alleen dat stukje grens dat dan precies langs Oost Timor liep, lag volgens Indonesië ook zo vlak bij de Timoreese kust. Maar de VN heeft dat stukje grens niet erkend, wat niet van jou is, daar kun je geen grens trekken. Daar kreeg je dus de Timor Gap. Een heel gebied, in deze gap ligt dus ergens de grens tussen Oost Timor en Australië, wordt nog steeds om gevochten. Maar precies in die gap liggen drie gigantisch grote olievelden. Australië zegt gewoon: die grens ligt daar, pompen. Timor zegt: fijn dat jullie ons geholpen hebben maar willen jullie even opzouten uit onze achtertuin.

Q: Dus er waren misschien wel mensen in Australië die een zeer positief beeld hadden van Oost Timorezen, maar de rest wilden vooral hun eigen belang?

A: Een beetje zoals in Nederland, het grootste gedeelte had gewoon geen mening. Het is zo gecompliceerd, het is zo pijnlijk, het is zo lastig.

Q: Australië heeft nooit gewild dat Oost Timor zelfbeschikkingsrecht kreeg?

A: Het interesseerde ze geen moer. Er was een Jakarta lobby in Australië met zakenbelangen. Het enige wat van belang was voor de Australische overheid was die grens en de olie. Het interesseerde ze echt geen moer. Sterker nog, toen in de jaren zeventig het gerucht ging dat Indonesië Oost Timor zou binnen vallen waren er vijf journalisten, drie Australiërs en twee Britten. Die gingen in oktober naar Oost Timor. Niet samen, het waren twee ploegen die daar bij elkaar terecht kwamen. Zij konden aantonen dat die invasie ging gebeuren. Zij zagen het gewoon gebeuren vanuit de plaats waar zij zaten, Balibo. De eerste berichten zijn nog naar buiten gekomen. Zoals Ramos Horta’s woorden; the invasion is immenent. En ze zijn vermoord, door cross fire, was de officiele versie. En daar legde Australië zich bij neer. Shirley Shackelton, die getrouwd was met een van de Britste journalisten heeft vijfendertig jaar van haar leven besteed aan de boodschap: mijn man is vermoord en mijn regering wist het. Die zaak is heel erg onder het kleed geveegd. Totdat John Pilger aan de slag ging met een publicatie. Er waren natuurlijk nog wat beelden achtergehouden die ineens toch opdoken.

Q: Rond welke tijd?

A: Jaren negentig pas. Na Santa Cruz kwam alles in beweging. Het stomme is ook, even een sprong makend, als ik dan over Santa Cruz begin dan trekken ze die bezorgde frons, terwijl ik hoe erg ook, een van die mensen was die dachten: wat zijn er nu ineens een hoop mensen die het nu ineens erg vinden. Nooit veel mee gedaan maar nu ineens wel. Wat er met mij gebeurde was: nu gaan we dus met zijn allen actie voeren voor Timor, nu heb ik een beweging, iedereen is boos. Je leert als actievoerder dat je moet leren exploiteren, net als je vijand.

Q: Die boosheid was niet alleen in Nederland?

A: Ow nee die was wereldwijd! Dat was wereldwijd veel groter dan in Nederland. Wij waren in Nederland altijd de laatsten. En ook altijd de kleinste demonstratietjes. Op een gegeven moment wilde ik ook geen demonstraties meer organiseren want dan loop je daar met zijn driehonderden. Dat is gewoon niet groot genoeg, dat doet het niet. Je moet strategisch actievoeren, je moet gekke stunts uithalen. Ik was heel erg geïnspireerd door Greenpeace ook. Je moet ergens inklimmen, en een spandoek ophalen ergens waarvan iedereen denkt, hoe ben je daar in hemelsnaam boven gekomen.

Q: Maar het (red. Na Santa Cruz) heeft nog zeven, acht jaar geduurd?

A: Ja, maar toch kwam alles in beweging na ’91. Daarvoor heeft het allemaal meer dan dertig jaar in de doofpot gezeten. De moord op de journalisten die anders wereldkundig konden maken dat de invasie eraan kwam. ’91 was een hele belangrijke kentering. Niet dat er tussen de invasie in 1975 en 1991 nooit wat gebeurde, er is heel veel gebeurd voor Timor. Portugal zetten het iedere keer weer op alle VN agenda’s, het kwam iedereen keer onder aan de agenda terecht. De eerste grote acties voor de mensen van Oost Timor, dus solidariteit met de mensen van Oost Timor, het lot van Oost Timor, waren er in ’76 al, in Nederland en Australië.

Q: Was de kentering van na Santa Cruz of na al die mensenrechtenschendingen aan het begin van de invasie en er na?

A: De kentering van Santa Cruz en het is ook een feestdag in Oost Timor. Een hele mooie feestdag. Het is de dag van de jeugd en de toekomst. Het is opgedragen aan de slachtoffers van Santa Cruz. Ik was erbij toen dat besluit werd genomen in het Congres en iedereen moest huilen. Het werd voorgesteld vanuit de studentenbeweging en het Congres nam het aan. Ik was erbij en ik dacht: dit is legendarisch, historisch, dit is zo iets moois. Een feestdag, we vieren de jeugd. Dat is ook iets met dignity, hoe herdenk je je slachtoffers, we gaan niet huilen, we gaan ze vieren. Het belang van 1991 was eigenlijk dat het niet om details ging, de wereld wist eigenlijk de details al, maar wilde het niet weten. De details waren niet praktisch.

Met name de filmbeelden van Max Staal, naar buiten gesmokkeld door onze eigen Nederlandse Saskia Kouwenberg, als die er niet geweest waren, die levensechte beelden waarop je ook nog kon zien dat de journalist zelf zich moest verbergen en met gevaar voor eigen leven is blijven filmen, die beelden hebben Oost Timor zodanig op de kaart gezet dat de regeringen niet meer konden ontkennen dat er wat aan de hand was. Het is dus echt niet zo dat 1991 in een keer de deur opende naar als die mensenrechtenschendingen want dat wist iedereen al lang. Dat wisten mensen gewoon wel. Die wapenhandel en die olie, die was gewoon belangrijker. En Indonesië te vriend houden was gewoon belangrijker.

Q: Toen werd het belangrijker of druk en ze konden er niet meer onder uit?

A: Ze konden er niet meer onder uit. Ze moesten wel. Het ging nog steeds niet over onafhankelijkheid, het ging over mensenrechtenschendingen, maar dan ben je al een heel eind.

Q: Maar wanneer ging het discours over dat ze niet meer bij Indonesië konden blijven?

A: 1998 pas. Bij de val van Soeharto. Toen had de lobby de ruimte. Wij zeiden het vanaf het begin. Dat was het eerste wat je leerde als je ging meedoen met actie voor Timor, het doel was referendum. Niet zo een referendum als in West Papua, maar een echte. Een referendum met de VN, maar Portugal moet er ook bovenop zitten en waarnemers. Wat vooral de lobby in Nederland en Australië was zich goed bewust dat het anders zo kan gaan als het referendum in West Papua. Er zit niets moois aan het gebaar van de wereld met alsjeblieft hier heb je een referendum, zo is het niet gegaan. 1991 was gewoon een kentering omdat het zodanig op de kaart stond dat de mensen eisen dat de regering een standpunt in neemt. Je moet als regering een standpunt innemen. Het was tegen wil en dank, het moest gewoon. Zo konden er niet meer onder uit.

Q: Er werd in bijvoorbeeld de UK parlement nog steeds niet echt geëist dat bijvoorbeeld wapenleveranties stopten. Het kwam niet uit de politiek. Het was echt bottom up?

A: Het was echt bottom up. Het is ook heel bijzonder dat je nu in Engeland bijvoorbeeld wel Parliamentarians voor West Papua hebt en dan zeggen de Papoea’s in Nederland en waarom de Nederlanders niet? Omdat wij fout zijn. Engeland is niet fout in Papua, dus die kunnen daar rustig actie voor voeren. Als wij toegeven dat we fout zitten, dat gaat geld kosten. Dus wij hebben geen parliamentarians for West Papua. Al zat Engeland wel fout in de cover up van de Balibo vijf. Ze wisten dat daar Engelse staatsburgers bij betrokken waren maar zij hebben dat mede gecoverd.

Q: En de positie van Portugal?

A: Portugal is gewoon een klein landje. Portugal wist ook dat de invasie zou komen, ze hebben wel herrie geschopt, maar wie is Portugal? Nederland is ook maar een klein pest landje maar vergeet niet dat wij in 1975 een ontzettend rijk land waren met de grootste haven van de hele wereld. En vergeet niet, Portugal kwam net uit een dictatuur. De hele kentering is 1974 de Anjerrevolutie. En in de roes van de revolutie en de democratisering van Portugal werd de kolonie voorbereid op onafhankelijkheid. Vergeet niet dat Portugal net uit een dictatuur kwam, zijn eigen wonden aan het likken was. Ook de behoorlijk grote linkse beweging van Portugal, die niet zo kritisch en slagvaardig waren eigenlijk. Het moest gewoon gebeuren. Portugal heeft nooit geïnvesteerd in Timor. Ik kan me voorstellen dat Timor tweehonderd jaar geleden totaal niet interessant was, maar het was wel van hun. Sandelhout was wel interessant. Portugal had dus niet zoveel geïnvesteerd, tegelijkertijd dus ook niet zoveel schande aangericht. Als je het vergelijkt met wat Nederland in Indonesië heeft aangericht, want we hebben zogenaamd zoveel gebracht naar Indonesië. Waardoor we wel Indonesische dingen hebben uitgewist. En dat vergeten mensen. Ja maar we hebben scholen opgericht, ja voor als je katholiek was. Je moest daarvoor wel je eigen geloof laten vallen en een broek aan trekken. Je moest Nederlander zijn en dan mocht je naar school. En dan was je nog geen Nederlander. Portugal kon helemaal niet investeren. Portugal was al lang niet meer een van die rijke zeevarende landen. Portugal leed al heel lang onder zijn eigen dictatuur. Portugal lag gewoon stil.

Q: Voor mij is van belang te weten of Portugal de Timorezen zag als minderwaardig of als gelijken?

A: Het was een beetje zoals Nederland om gaat met zijn Papoea’s. Of je krijgt tranen in je ogen als je denkt aan Papua omdat we het in de steek hebben gelaten, of je praat je eigen schuldgevoel weg door te zeggen, tsja stelletje inboorlingen. Het is maar wat je wilt denken. Je kan qua discourse Portugal en Timor heel erg vergelijken met Nederland en Papua. Portugal liet Timor in de steek. Portugal ging gewoon ineens. Dat heeft Nederland ook gedaan met Papoea. Met een heel belangrijk verschil, uit eigen belang of uit belang voor de mensen van Timor, Portugal bleef Timor op de agenda zetten.

Je wilt misschien even kijken in het archief nu.

Q: Hartelijke bedankt voor het interview.

1. I have chosen to use this name instead of for instance West New Guinea or Irian Jaya, because the name for this region confusingly changes multiple times in the timespan of this thesis and as this is the name chosen by the West Papuan people. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)